CHAPTER IX

ALLIANCE OF THE POPE WITH THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.

 

WHILE the Emperor was issuing his Edict against Luther, his political alliance with the Pope was concluded. But many changes had taken place before this was accomplished.

Leo X had been driven by sheer necessity to his final consent to the election of Charles to the Imperial throne; though, after his consent, he feared the Emperor’s ascend any more than ever. Charles and Francis were eager competitors for the favour of the Pope whose partisanship was all-important to each in the approaching struggle, which was to be fought out principally in Italy. It seemed scarcely doubtful which side Leo X would take; for, though originally his sympathies were with Spain, now the power of the Empire filled him with aversion and fear.

To the Medici Pope, like so many of his predecessors, the idea of a supremacy, such as the Hohenstaufen had ere now striven for, was like a living nightmare. The necessity for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, by which alone the independence of the Holy See and the “liberty of Italy” could be secured, drove Leo at once into the ranks of the enemies of the Hapsburg. Hence the plan of forestalling the Emperor’s journey to Rome by aggression ; hence the idea of a great anti-Imperial league with France, Venice, England, and the Swiss. England, however, showed no inclination to be drawn into any such alliance ; consequently, a smaller league between the Pope, France, and Venice was contemplated. But as the two last-named powers cautiously held back, the Pope also withdrew, having no inclination to step alone into the breach. He was, however, most eager to be on friendly terms with France, and in this wish there is no doubt that his designs on Ferrara played an obvious part. The suppression of the Duke, his insubordinate vassal, which had, ever since the time of Julius II, been an important item of the Papal policy, appeared to Leo to be more urgent than ever, because, not only at the time of the French invasion in 1515, but also during the war of Urbino, Duke Alfonso had made common cause with the enemies of the Holy See. Moreover, the subjection of Ferrara appeared to be especially desirable at this juncture, for Leo X was convinced that only by an increase of the States of the Church was an end to be put to the critical position they occupied between the two great powers of Europe. Conscious of his own weakness, no choice had been hitherto left to him except that of vacillating between these two powers, or of attaching himself to one of them, at the risk of being reduced to a state of servile dependence. After the possessions of the Church had been increased, on the death of Lorenzo, by the annexation of the Duchy of Urbino and Pesaro, the only thing wanting to enable the Holy See to defend itself from friend and foe alike was the acquisition of Ferrara.

Venice and France were the natural enemies of such a predominance of the States of the Church in Central Italy, and Alfonso knew very well that he could count on the assistance of both these powers. Nevertheless it now seemed as if France were willing to abandon so faithful and warlike an ally as Duke Alfonso. In September, 1519, a treaty, which was to be kept absolutely secret, was made between Leo and the new French Ambassador, Saint-Marceau, by which the former pledged himself to defend the interests of France with his weapons, both temporal and spiritual, and to refuse to Charles the investiture with the crown of Naples in conjunction with that of the Empire. On his side Francis I promised to defend the States of the Church with all his might against Charles, and all insubordinate vassals. This last clause obviously referred to Ferrara, and Francis hesitated for a long time before agreeing to it. However, he at last consented, and the treaty was signed on the 22nd of October.

Charles V, who knew nothing about this secret treaty, was all the time eagerly carrying on negotiations with the Pope, who understood how to keep him in hand by holding out hopes of a favourable agreement. But as soon as the co-operation of Francis had been apparently won by the treaty of October, Leo X. wished to make use of the advantages offered by the situation. Nevertheless, chiefly on account of Venice, he did not dare to take open measures against Ferrara, and therefore had recourse to subterfuges. Without at first rousing any suspicion in Alfonso’s mind, the Pope instigated a sudden attack on the Duke's capital by those whom he had banished from Ferrara. However, the watchfulness of the Marquis of Mantua frustrated the attempt.

Fortune was more propitious to the Pope in the measures taken by him against the petty tyrants of the Marches of Ancona and Umbria, who had unlawfully usurped a power exceeding that which had belonged to their predecessors. The constant complaints of the people who were oppressed by these unscrupulous and riotous despots had for some time been calling for repressive measures. In March, 1520, Leo considered that the right moment had come for these to be taken ; and ere long the tyrants of the Marches trembled before the energy which he displayed against them. Giovanni de' Medici was commissioned to combine with the Bishop of Chiusi, Niccolò Bonafede, the Governor of the Marches, to reduce to subjection the Lord of Fermo, Lodovico Uffreducci, son of the criminal Oliverotto, who had been treacherously put to death by Cesare Borgia. Lodovico defended himself like a valiant condottiere, but lost both lands and life in an engagement at Monte Giorgio. Fermo then returned to the immediate dominion of the Pope, and the surrounding places banished Uffreducci's representatives. Several of the petty tyrants of the Marches met with the same fate ; two, the Lords of Recanati and Fabriano, were put to death ; in Benevento the supremacy of Ettore Severiano was destroyed. The means used for ridding the Marches of these evil rulers must be condemned as equivocal and wholly unworthy of a Pope ; nevertheless, “the country rejoiced at the result”. Niccolò Bonafede did all he could to restore peace and order ; and the government of the Papal officials proved to be “infinitely better than that of the lawless barons”.

It fared even worse with the despot of Perugia, Giampaolo Baglioni, than with Uffreducci. Leo X had vainly tried to attach him to his person ; but Giampaolo had met all his friendly advances with contempt. During the Urbino war his attitude was more than suspicious ; and during the trial of Cardinal Petrucci a letter came to light which revealed his complicity in the conspiracy. The endless brawls in the house of Baglioni gave the Pope, in March, 1520, the desired opportunity of interfering, and destroying the power of this dangerous and disloyal vassal. Giampaolo was summoned to Rome to give an account of the banishment from Perugia of his cousin Gentile and the execution of his followers. Giampaolo, who was aware of his guilt, would not obey the summons, but sent his son Malatesta to Rome instead. He charged him to find out whether any serious action were really to be feared on the part of the Pope. But so skilful was Leo in hiding his real intentions, that Giampaolo was persuaded by his friends, especially by Camillo Orsini, to go to Rome. He openly trusted to the protection of that powerful noble, who had just before married his daughter. There is no proof that the Pope gave him a safe-conduct.

On the 16th of March Giampaolo entered Rome with a magnificent retinue, including several of the Orsini. Next day he waited on the Pope, who was in the Castle of St. Angelo ; where, as soon as he entered the gate, the Castellan had him arrested. The Governor of Rome tried him, and both Cardinals Bibbiena and Armellini urged that he should suffer the extreme punishment of the law. When the news of what had occurred reached Perugia, his friends there considered him as already “more dead than alive”. In Rome his execution was generally expected ; though there were some who thought that if he renounced all claim to the government of Perugia, he might be set at liberty. However, the position of the prisoner was aggravated, and the conditions of his captivity made more severe, on account of the discovery of a plot of his to stir up a revolution in the Marches of Ancona. There upon his sons fled to the Abruzzi and thence to Venice. Horrible revelations came to light in the course of the trial, in addition to the offences already brought against him. Sources above suspicion relate that Giampaolo was found guilty of coining, murder, and bloodshed. In any case the accused deserved the punishment of death, which was carried out in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of june. Giampaolo, who consoled himself in prison by reading Ariosto’s “Orlando Furioso”, died a penitent sinner. Gentile Baglioni, who had been banished by him, received his possessions. Perugia retained only a nominal liberty, the Legate, Silvio Passerini, Cardinal of Cortona, being the actual governor.

During these events, negotiations for the forming of a triple alliance between the Pope, France, and Venice fell through because of the refusal of the Signoria to accept the clause agreed to by Francis I in October, relating to the co-operation against the Pope’s insubordinate vassals, or, in other words, against Ferrara.

It was most important that just at this crisis Charles V should have sent a new Ambassador to Rome in the person of the Castilian, Juan Manuel, who had “grown grey in diplomacy”, and proved to be as astute as he was energetic. Being provided with full instructions, far-reaching powers, and plenty of money, Juan Manuel entered Rome with great pomp on the 11th of April, 152O. The Pope received him very amicably, and Cardinal Medici invited him to dwell in his palace at the Cancelleria. Manuel presented the draft of a treaty, with the proviso that not one word of it was to be altered. But more than a year went by before any agreement was effected. In the general obscurity of the situation it cannot cause surprise that the Pope should for some time have vacillated between Charles and Francis.§ If at last he decided in favour of the Emperor, and against Francis, it was less on account of the prospect held out by an alliance with the former of an increase of the States of the Church, than because of two other momentous reasons, namely, the extreme imprudence of the French King, and the consideration of the blow given to the authority of the Pope by the Lutheran movement in Germany.

The first disturbance in the relations between Rome and France came at the beginning of 1520, in consequence of the illegal pretensions of Francis I to the guardianship of Catherine de' Medici. Cardinal Bibbiena, who had just returned from France seems to have smoothed over this misunderstanding ; but Leo X soon had fresh reasons for complaint against his confederate. While carrying on his negotiations for forming a league between Rome, France, and Venice, he learned to his bitter experience that Francis had no intention of keeping his word and renouncing his patronage of the Duke of Ferrara. Moreover, the spirit in which the French King meant to keep his solemn pledges in regard to the Turkish war, was revealed when the Pope asked his help on behalf of Rhodes, upon which the Sultan Selim was meditating an attack. Francis flatly refused all assistance.

Moreover, constant complaints came from Milan of the French encroachments on the rights of the Church. Almost as if these offences gave him the right to ask for more favours, Francis I was forever seeking for fresh concessions ; and if these were not at once granted, he used the most violent threats. In the autumn of 1520 he showed so little consideration towards the Pope that his imprudence can cause nothing but surprise. First, he demanded the prolongation by five years of the office of Legate in France for Cardinal Gouffier de Boissy. Not content with obtaining this extraordinary concession, he took the opportunity of trying to enforce the discontinuance of his protection of the rights of the Legate of Avignon. In vain did the Pope make friendly remonstrances through his Nuncios, Staffileo and Rucellai. In vain did he comply with the King's demands so far as to remove the written clause in the stipulation, and allow the word of Francis to suffice. Suggestions were bandied about on both sides from September to December without any agreement being arrived at. But even while this dispute was going on, Francis I picked another quarrel with the Holy See. He suddenly forbade the proclamation in France of the Bull of Maundy Thursday, with the command that whoever attempted to carry it out “should be drowned”. “The Pope”, wrote Cardinal Medici to the French Nuncio, “thinks it better to make no reply to this threat, lest he be carried away by anger. Therefore, should the King repeat the intimation in your presence, you must reply pleasantly that such a threat is not likely to make the Sacred College anxious to comply with other requests of his, whether it be about a Cardinal’s hat or anything else”. This last remark led to another quarrel, which burst out at the beginning of the year.

At this time Charles V asked for the red hat for the Bishop of Liege, Eberhard de la Mark ; while almost simultaneously Francis requested the same for his relative, Jean d'Orleans, Archbishop of Toulouse. Hearing of the petition of the Emperor, the French King declared that on no account would he consent to the elevation to the purple of the Bishop of Liege, who was his mortal enemy. Consequently, Leo X tried to persuade Charles to renounce the candidature which was so hateful to France, and accept instead the nomination of Eberhard to the Archbishopric of Valencia. As this compromise was not accepted, the Pope offered two other cardinals’ hats, but neither to this alternative would the Emperor consent. Thereupon the Pope tried to conciliate Francis by the promise of the appointment of two French Cardinals if he would give up his opposition to the elevation of Eberhard de la Mark. But this proposal was declined. Francis maintained his pretensions that the Pope must make no appointment against his wishes, even at the risk of a quarrel being caused between Charles and the Holy See. The French King carried his arrogance still further by requiring of the Pope a declaration of his intentions toward the Duke of Ferrara, and demanding the restoration of Modena and Reggio to that prince. In vain did the King's best friend, the prudent Cardinal Bibbiena, warn him against going too far; Francis remained firm in his contention that on no account should Eberhard be made a Cardinal.

In the autumn, Leo X believed that he had at last found a way of pacifying the exacting French King. A Consistory was held on the I7th of September, at which the requests for Cardinals’ hats made by the Emperor, France, and England were considered. The Pope proposed that Jean d'Orleans, Archbishop of Toulouse, should be raised to the purple ; and this was the only elevation decided on. The publication of this decision was left in the hands of His Holiness. As regarded the promotion of the Bishop of Liege, Leo X declared emphatically that he would grant it only subject to the consent of Francis I.

Charles V alone could have found cause for complaint in this last concession to France. Judge then the astonishment of the Pope when, not Charles, but Francis, made a grievance of it! The French King and his adherents in Rome believed that, owing to the revolt of the towns in Spain, the whole of the world, including the Pope, was in their hands. Acting in this spirit, Francis I declared that the fact of the Pope having spoken at all—especially in Consistory— about the elevation of the Bishop of Liege, was an attack on his own person. Leo X had remained unmoved in the face of the continuous and complete want of consideration on the part of France; but his anger was all the more violent now. Instead of gratitude for his concessions, he received nothing but the most outrageous complaints and injurious threats. Never, during his whole Pontificate, had His Holiness been so incensed, wrote Cardinal Medici to the French Nuncio, Rucellai. The Pope repudiated the idea of such servitude as forbade to him freedom of speech even with the College of Cardinals. Obviously the elevation to the purple of the Archbishop of Toulouse was now postponed. Nevertheless no formal breach with France ensued; on the contrary, it seemed to the uninitiated that, in spite of all differences, the relations between France and Leo X were closer than ever. But in his inmost heart the Pope had turned his back for good and all on Francis I.

Unmistakable facts had convinced Leo X that the French “were as unbearable as allies as they were formidable as enemies.” This bitter though dearly-bought ex­perience ripened in the Pope’s mind the resolution he had formed to regain the temporal and spiritual independence of the Holy See by driving the French out of Italy. There were many other reasons in favour of an alliance with the Emperor, the chief of which was that his help was indispen­sable against the anti-Papal Lutheran revolt in Germany. Probably the skilful and prudent Cardinal Bibbiena might have still found means to reconcile the Pope to Francis I, but at this crucial moment that most zealous champion of French interests at the Roman Court was laid low by an illness which was ere long to carry him to his grave. He died on the 9th of November, 1520.

So as to be ready for any event, the Pope decided, in October, to take into his service six thousand Swiss mercenaries. On the 2nd of that month he told the Imperial Ambassador Manuel that he had sent to his Nuncio and Raffaello de' Medici the draft of a new alliance with the Emperor. The scheme was that of an offensive alliance against France, such, indeed, as was with few alterations carried out eight months later. As a proof of his sincerity, Leo X offered that a man trusted by the German Ambassador should be hidden under a bed during the negotiations which Saint-Marceau, the new Envoy of Francis I, was to carry on with the Pope.

Saint-Marceau, who relieved the less capable Morette, arrived in Rome on the 17th of October, 1520. His proposals were startling. Francis I, they ran, wished to conquer Naples, not for himself, but for a third party. As a bait to the Pope he offered to him a portion of the kingdom of Naples and Ferrara. The negotiations, based on this, dragged on till the end of January, 1521. At last a secret agreement was made that the Pope should accept Ferrara and a strip of the Neapolitan coast extending as far as the Garigliano, while the kingdom of Naples proper should go to the second son of Francis I. In return Francis was given facilities for passing through the lines of the six thousand Swiss mercenaries, the half of whose pay he undertook to provide.

Francis I had no idea of carrying out what he thus pledged himself to do. For a long time he had been lending a willing ear to those who advised him to weaken, as far as possible, the Papal power in Italy. He did not intend that either the portion of the Neapolitan coast or the Duchy of Ferrara should fall to the Pope's share; on the contrary, the French Court planned the complete dismemberment of the States of the Church. After Leo X had helped with the conquest of Naples, the strip of sea-coast mentioned in the agreement was to be given to Venice. At the same time the Medici ascendancy in Florence was to be overthrown, and the separation of Bologna, Perugia, and the Romagna from the States of the Church effected by placing them under the rule of different small dynasties. The details of these projects were only very partially known to Leo X, but he suspected double-dealing on the part of the French King, and fought him with his own weapons.

Nearly at the same time as the Pope was carrying on these secret transactions with Saint-Marceau, he was negotiating with the Emperor's representative ; in fact a repetition was going on of the double-dealing policy of January, 1519. On the 11th of December, 1520, Leo X exchanged with Manuel a written assurance that for three months neither party had concluded any agreement contrary to the interests of the other, and that he would not do so during the next three months. This pledge was renewed sometime between the middle of March, 1521, and the end of April, notwithstanding the secret treaty between the Pope and France made in January. With the utmost skill the diplomatic Medici had once more succeeded in coming to an agreement with both rivals at once. As soon as the six thousand Swiss had arrived in the Papal States, which should be at the beginning of April, the Pope could make his irrevocable decision with more security. That this final decision was adverse to France was mostly the French King's own fault, for instead of binding the Pope to him territorially, he had in his blindness driven him into the arms of his antagonist.

The agreement with France was to be carried out only after the adhesion to it of Venice; and while this was being negotiated, the Pope became more and more doubtful whether the promise of the French King to help him to conquer Ferrara had any sincerity in it. This state of uncertainty estranged him from Francis, and drove him further towards the Emperor. Each day the necessity of the help of the latter for the suppression of the Lutheran revolt became more apparent to him.

As soon as he arrived in Rome, Manuel recognized the importance of the anti-Papal movement in Germany as a factor in the Pope’s attitude towards Charles. As early as the 12th of May, 1520, he gave his Imperial master the advice to refrain, during his visit to Germany, from any marks of favour towards a certain monk known as Brother Martin, or the Elector Frederick of Saxony. Leo had, he said, quite an extraordinary fear of Brother Martin, for he preached against the Pope, and was considered to be very learned. Manuel thought that this might be turned to account in compelling Leo to conclude a treaty ; though he was of opinion that such pressure should be applied only in the event of the Pope’s hesitating to sign or else breaking the treaty.

It is not known what Charles replied to this piece of advice. In Manuel’s reports up to the end of December there is a great deal said about a political alliance between Pope and Emperor, but no mention of the Lutheran affair ; though it is fair to say that we do not possess all the reports. It cannot therefore be said with certainty whether Manuel did use the weapon which this religious revolt afforded against the Pope. It is not at all improbable that an unprincipled politician like the German representative should, even without the explicit consent of his master, utilize, in the course of the protracted negotiations, a circumstance which proved the Pope’s absolute dependence on the assistance of the Emperor in this important matter. He would, however, have been certain to use the weapon with diplomatic prudence, employing hints, covert, though not difficult to interpret.

After the adverse judgment had fallen on Luther in June, the Pope himself could not fail to see how much depended in this affair on the attitude of the Emperor. However, although the news from Germany became more and more alarming, Leo X was such an experienced diplomatist that he carefully avoided anything which could betray his great need of help.

That at that time he desired the favour of the Emperor, is shown by his tenacity about the idea of raising the Bishop of Liege to the purple, in spite of the obstinate resistance and threats of Francis. The same spirit was shown by the granting of certain concessions demanded by Charles about Briefs which hampered the action of the Inquisition in Aragon. That Leo complied unwillingly is shown by the gradual manner of his consent. On the 12th of December, 1520, he declared his willingness to partially withdraw the Briefs in question; but only on the 16th of January, 1521, did he consent to do so entirely. On the 13th of December, 1520, Manuel was nevertheless able to send the Emperor the much-desired Brief against Antonio de Acuña, Bishop of Zamora, who was implicated in the Spanish revolt.

Meanwhile the Emperor had loyally carried out the anti-Lutheran Bull in the Netherlands. At his coronation at Aix on the 23rd of October, he swore to hold fast by the Holy Catholic Faith as delivered to the Apostles, and to show due submission and fidelity to the Pope and Holy Roman See. A few days later the Archbishop of Mainz read aloud a Papal Brief to the effect that the Pope had given to the King, as formerly to Maximilian I, the title of “Emperor-elect of the Romans”.

On the 14th of November Leo X answered the letter of Charles, written on the day of his coronation, by which he notified that event : “As there are two planets in heaven”. the Pope said, “the sun and the moon, which surpass in brilliancy all the stars, so are there two great dignitaries on earth, the Pope and the Emperor, to whom all other princes are subject and owe obedience”. The letter ended by an exhortation to Charles to remain a loyal son of the Church. There seemed no doubt that Charles would fulfil his whole duty as protector of the Church, as far as the Lutheran movement was concerned. “The Emperor”, Aleander reports from Cologne at the beginning of November, “does not let himself be led away by Hutten's anti-Roman agitation ; he stands firm on our side”. Aleander had nothing but good to report about the Catholic zeal of the Archbishops of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne. With his usual optimism, he believed that he would even be able to come round the Elector of Saxony.

This and the other news from Germany had such a soothing effect in Rome that a deceptive security prevailed. On the 3rd of December, 1520, Cardinal Medici wrote to Aleander a letter full of joyful praise, congratulating him on the activity he had shown, and thanking him, in the name of the Pope, for the welcome news he sent of the good dispositions of the Germans, and their devotion to the Holy See, as shown by their attitude towards the new Arius or Mahomet, “whom might God bring to a right mind”.

But to these glowing reports of Aleander’s there succeeded others which caused much anxiety. It was with amazement that Rome learned the proportions which the anti-Roman movement had assumed in Germany. Very great alarm was caused by the intelligence that the good intentions of the young Emperor were hampered by political considerations, and the temporizing spirit of his immediate surroundings. Consternation was caused by Aleander’s news that his efforts to obtain an imperial mandate against Lutheran books had been met by a decided refusal from the imperialists, who maintained that Luther must be heard and must be allowed to appeal to the Diet. The Pope ignored this, and at the end of December proposed to Manuel that Luther should receive a safe-conduct to Rome, where a body of men should be selected to speak and dispute with him.

Meanwhile the term set for Luther’s recantation had expired, and the Pope issued a new Bull against him on the 3rd of January, 1521. By it the excommunication threatened in June was now pronounced, because of the obstinate persistence in error of himself and his followers ; and the places in which he resided were placed under an interdict. In the middle of January there arrived news of the successful results which Aleander had obtained from the Emperor on the 29th of December. The news also came that, by burning the Bull Exsurge and the books of canon law, Luther had given the signal of war to the death. On the 18th of January, 1521, the Pope sent to the Emperor a formal and urgent request to have the Bull of excommunication against Luther published, and a general edict issued for its execution throughout Germany. Let the Emperor, so ran this Brief, the work of Sadoleto, remember the example of earlier Emperors, who always fought against heresy. Let him also remember how God had blessed him, young as he was, and had confided to him the sword of the greatest power in the world. He wore it in vain if he did not employ it against infidels and heretics. Similar letters were sent to Charles's confessor, Glapion, and several princes of the Empire. In sending these letters on the 28th of January, Cardinal Medici declared that the Pope and the Sacred College were full of praise of the holy zeal shown by the Emperor in this affair, which was so near to all their hearts alike. On the same occasion Aleander was sent a bill of exchange which was nearly as welcome to him as were the letters sent by the same messenger. In special letters to Aleander of the 1st and 6th of February, 1521, Aleander was instructed by Cardinal Medici to forcibly point out to the Emperor that the Lutheran movement was as much his affair as that of the Pope and Holy See, because the religious innovators were as much set on the overthrow of the authority of the Empire as on that of the Church. Therefore, the dearest personal interests of Charles and the princes of the Empire demanded the suppression of the new doctrines.

On the 6th of February a Consistory was held at St. Angelo, at which the Pope gave directions for dealing with two conflagrations which had broken out. The first he described as the menace to the States of the Church from plundering bands of soldiers, against whom he would, in case of necessity, employ the six thousand Swiss whose services he had hired. The other conflagration was the movement to which Luther and his followers had given rise. The Pope told the Cardinals that they would do well to draw up a memorial to send to the Emperor about this. Some of the Cardinals were of opinion that Schonberg had better deliver this document, and that when this had been done, two or three Cardinal-Legates might be sent to Germany.

On the 13th of February Leo X pointed out most forcibly to Manuel the evil consequences, not only to the Papacy, but also to the power of the Empire, if Luther’s errors were not uprooted. Afterwards the Pope proposed in Consistory the mission of several Cardinal-Legates to the Diet, though the plan was abandoned in consequence of Aleander’s representations to the contrary.

At that time the Lutheran affair occupied the mind of the Pope almost to the exclusion of anything else. The Venetian Ambassador testifies that Leo spent many hours in reading a work against Luther, probably that written by the Dominican, Ambrogio Catarino. The question of an alliance with the Emperor, which had hitherto turned chiefly on politics, now received a new importance from the point of view of what the Emperor could do against Luther and his followers. On the 25th of February Manuel wrote to tell his master how very much Leo had the Lutheran affair at heart, so that his chief object in desiring an interview with the Emperor was to concert with him as to what measures could be taken to protect the Church against the attacks of Luther. On the same day that Manuel made this report, the Pope sent to the Emperor an adulatory letter. From what he could learn from the Nuncios, he said, he could see with joy that His Majesty was rivalling Constantine, Charlemagne, and Otto in his zeal for the honour of the Church, and he praised God for thus inspiring him. In an autograph postscript, Leo X reminded the Emperor that, if necessary, he could take up sword and buckler in defence of the Church. Laudatory letters in the same strain were sent to various spiritual and secular princes of Germany ; and at the same time the two Nuncios were formally re-accredited to the German Court. When he sent these documents on the 3rd of March, Cardinal Medici repeated his injunction to Aleander to do everything to convince the Emperor that the innovators did not aim only at overthrowing the Church, but that, after the manner of the Hussites, they wished to destroy the imperial power as well. He praised Aleander’s discourse before the Diet as a brilliant and most useful performance.

The news that, in spite of all the Nuncios' remonstrances, Luther was to be called before the Diet, caused great excitement in Rome. The Pope laid down his exact position in the matter of the sequestration of Lutheran books, in a special instruction which he sent to the Nuncios in the second half of March. In this he took his stand on the fact that Luther, having been lawfully sentenced, could not be admitted to a public examination. Nevertheless the Emperor might lawfully grant him a private interview without witnesses, and might, if he acknowledged his errors, promise him the Pope’s pardon, or else give him a safe-conduct to Rome, or to the Spanish Inquisition. Should Luther accept none of these, there was nothing left to be done except to send him back with his safe-conduct, and then proceed with energy against him and his followers. As regarded the previous sequestration of Lutheran books, it was agreed that nothing could be done except to burn them publicly, should Luther refuse to recant. The Emperor was worthy of praise for having so far been emphatic in his protection of the Church in this affair; but he should be warned not to retreat now, in the middle of his course.

The plan of summoning Luther before the Diet pained and disturbed the Pope very much; for hitherto the young Emperor had been the only person on whom he believed himself able to rely. However, even at this juncture, Leo X did not forget the exigencies of diplomatic prudence. He allowed Manuel to perceive his fear lest the Emperor should give in too much, without betraying his need of help and the greatness of his anxiety. Cardinal Medici was more forcible and explicit in what he wrote to Aleander. The goodwill of the Emperor is not in itself enough, he wrote in a letter of the 19th of March ; his offers must also be carried out. The Pope is not quite pleased with the endless delays in carrying out the measures commanded by the Emperor himself. The zeal of His Majesty has without doubt cooled ; he who has been called to be the defender of the Church, lends his ear to her enemies. If the Emperor does not decide the matter before the conclusion of the Diet, the most vexatious consequences may be apprehended. Nevertheless God will not forsake His Church. But, the letter went on to say, Aleander must do nothing except in combination with the Nuncio Caracciolo and with Raffaello de' Medici.

Immediately afterwards, on the 20th of March, the Pope brought forward the matter in Consistory. Several Cardinals expressly complained at the Emperor’s having cited Luther to appear before the Diet, and thereby assumed a jurisdiction which belonged to the Holy See. When Leo X communicated this opinion to the Imperial Ambassador, he remarked that, in summoning Luther to appear, the Emperor had been badly advised. It was impossible that Luther should be received even in hell, and Manuel would do well to warn his Imperial master in every letter he wrote not to take the matter lightly. Under these circumstances it was doubly important that Leo X should condemn Luther in so many words as an excommunicate and heretic. This was done in the Bull In Coena Domini, issued on Maundy Thursday (March 28).

There was a difference of opinion as to whether a letter of safe-conduct couched in honourable terms should be given to Luther. Cardinal Medici blamed the Emperor severely, and when writing to Aleander at the end of March, he expressed his regret in lively language that such an imprudent and unpermissible thing as Luther's summons before the Diet should have taken place, which implied the suspension of the sentence against him and even against his books. Germany, which had always been the object of the Pope's predilection, was guilty of a shameful in gratitude, in thus acting to the detriment of the Empire. “His Holiness”, continued the Cardinal, “will nevertheless not believe that Charles is willing to depart from the paths of his most Christian and most Catholic predecessors, and show himself ungrateful to God and the Holy See. Renewed discussion of this notorious and scandalous affair would bring disgrace on His Majesty. If Charles is able to effect so little against one man who is in his power, what could the Church and Christendom expect of him in a fight against Turks and infidels?”

Aleander and Caracciolo were then urged to do all they could to influence the Emperor and his Council, as well as the Electors of Brandenburg and Mainz. But on no account were they to allow themselves to be drawn into a dispute with Luther ; for by so doing, as Aleander had already so well pointed out, they would act in a way derogatory to the dignity of the Apostolic See.

In his report of the 8th of March, Aleander had mentioned a menacing utterance of the Imperial Great Chamberlain, Guillaume de Croy, Lord of Chièvres, from which he concluded that the imperialists wished to make use of the Lutheran affair to influence the Pope's political attitude. The same news came to Rome from other sources ; and it was further rumoured that, though the Emperor had required Luther to renounce his false doctrines, he had left him a free hand to say anything he liked against the Pope. However disquieting this might sound, the Pope was still careful to refrain from any ex pression which could betray his anxiety and need of assistance, and thus give to the Emperor’s representative a handle to use against him. “Thank God”, said he to Manuel on the 3rd of April, “that He has given to me at this time an Emperor who has the interests of the Church at heart”. "While he went on to beg Manuel to thank Charles for his good promises, he added the hope that the Emperor would keep them, and not allow persons who gave ear to the devil to lead him astray. But on the 8th of April Leo’s anxiety was too acute to be concealed, and Manuel sent a special courier to Worms to say that His Holiness was awaiting with the utmost impatience for news of Luther, who must, he thought, have arrived before the Diet by this time. Soon the Pope abandoned the attitude of reserve which he had hitherto observed. The immediate cause of this change was Aleander’s account of Luther’s reception, the consideration shown by the Imperialists towards Saxony, and their subsequent attitude, which showed that they “reckoned more with man than with God”. On the top of this came the tidings that Luther was to be allowed to hold a religious disputation. Leo at once sent for Manuel and told him plainly that such a dispute would, in his opinion, be a certain means of external injury to the Church. Manuel replied that he knew nothing about the alleged proposal, but that he was sure that the Emperor would see that the interests of God and of His Church were not prejudiced. “Leo X”, Manuel adds, “regards the Lutheran affair as a matter of the utmost importance, and until he is satisfied about this, nothing will be got out of him”.

The Pope must have spoken very strongly to the German Ambassador, for as lately as the 29th of March, Manuel had written to the Emperor about the possibility of bringing pressure to bear on the Pope by means of the Lutheran affair;  but he now begged him most urgently to satisfy His Holiness about this question of faith. Leo had not on his side held out any proposal of making political concessions in exchange for energetic action on the part of the Emperor against Luther.

But Charles V had no idea of turning the Lutheran affair to his own advantage politically. Just at that time he gave a clear proof of this. On the 18th of April, after Luther’s first examination, and before the final decision of the affair, he sent Raffaello de' Medici to Rome to submit to the Pope the draft of a treaty of alliance.

Medici arrived in Rome on the 30th of April. In the interval news had arrived there of Johann von der Ecken’s skilful management of the case, so that even Giberti was of opinion that there was nothing left to be done except to follow up the victory over Luther. The joy felt in the immediate entourage of the Pope was as great as had been the dissatisfaction at the turn previously taken by the affair.

Naturally the satisfaction was still greater when the Emperor made his strongly Catholic declaration on the 19th of April. In a Consistory held on the loth of May, this, with the latest reports of the Nuncios in Germany and Spain, was read. Neither Pope nor Cardinals could praise the Emperor too highly ; and the efforts of the Nuncios and all others concerned in the matter were most favourably acknowledged. The Pope’s recognition of the Catholic attitude of the Emperor, the Electors, Glapion, and other leading persons was expressed in special Briefs, coupled with the request that all these would continue in the same manner. In a Brief to Charles V, signed by the Pope himself, the latter says that the Emperor had surpassed all his expectations, and had acted as a true champion of the Church. The Imperial declaration of April the 19th was—as was most unusual—sent at once in printed form to Rome

Meanwhile eager consultations went on in Rome with Raffaello de' Medici about the political alliance which was proposed between the Pope and the Emperor against France. Unexpected difficulties occurred, for, instead of the offensive alliance desired by Leo X, the draft of the treaty brought to Rome by Raffaello de' Medici only made mention of a defensive alliance. To this the Pope would not on any account consent. Although Manuel gave in at once, and altered the draft to meet the wishes of Leo X, the Pope put off signing from day to day. The fact is that the behaviour of the Emperor, who had so repeatedly—a thousand times, said Manuel—altered the draft, made Leo think that the power of Charles V was not as great as had been represented. Still greater was the effect produced on the timid Pope by a declaration published by France that she had concluded a treaty with the Swiss. To this was added the influence of England, which advised neutrality. More than ever before did his deeply-rooted indecision prevail with Leo X.

The Pope's hesitation kindled fresh hopes among the French diplomatists in Rome, the Count of Carpi and the Lord of Gisors. Leo X fanned these hopes by a declaration which sounded most favourable to France. Knowing how bent the Pope was on the possession of Ferrara, the French held out hopes to him of its possession, as well as of the increase of the States of the Church by the strip of coast in the kingdom of Naples. All this made such an impression on Leo that, as far as we can trust Carpi's reports, he appeared to be willing to agree with the demands of French policy. On the top of this came the daily and increasing financial difficulty, which affected the Emperor as well as the Pope. When Carpi at length announced that the alliance between France and the Swiss cantons was an accomplished fact, Leo expressed himself in such terms that the French Ambassador was full of hopes.

It did not escape Manuel that fear was the chief motive which drew Leo X towards France. He therefore advised his Imperial master to try the influence of fear in another direction, by concluding a treaty with England, by alienating the Swiss from France, by entering into negotiations with France herself, and by threatening to call a General Council. Without waiting for the decision of the Emperor, Manuel wrote to the Viceroy of Naples to send a force from the Abruzzi to the borders of the States of the Church, so as to make an impression in Rome.

But, before this extreme measure was resorted to, Leo X had made up his mind in favour of the Emperor. The French had gone too far. Leo X had heard that Lautrec had said that he would leave nothing to the Pope except his ears. All the evil which the French had done to him as Cardinal and Pope now came back into his mind. The last blow was when Francis I, contrary to his many promises, tried to draw the Duke of Ferrara, together with the Swiss, into an alliance with him. On the 29th of May Manuel was able to tell the Emperor that the Pope had signed the contract and sent it to him by Raffaello de' Medici, but that it was to be kept strictly secret for the present. Girolamo Adorno and Cardinal Medici had especially helped the Imperial Ambassador in obtaining this result.

The offensive alliance, dated the 8th of May, gives prominence to the great mediaeval idea of the combination of the two great powers, the Papal and the Imperial, set up by God above all other powers. The “two real heads of Christendom” were to unite “in purifying it from all error, in establishing universal peace, in fighting the infidel, and in introducing a better state of things throughout”.

The cause of all the present evil was France’s lust of conquest, which had led her to seize on Milan and Genoa, to threaten poor Italy and the independence of the Holy See. In order to restore order and tranquillity, this peace-destroying member must be attacked with fire and sword, and the usurpations of France in Italy must be stopped. Therefore Milan and Genoa should be invested by the Imperial and Papal troops in September, and freed from the French yoke; and the Sforza and Adorni should be set up again as vassals of the Empire. All territories belonging to the Pope should be restored to him, especially Parma and Piacenza, and also Ferrara. Moreover, the Emperor pledged himself in the fullest sense to protect the Pope against his enemies and against all who attacked the true faith and defamed the Holy See, and guaranteed the dominion of the Medici in Tuscany. On his side Leo X bound himself solemnly and in perpetuity to Charles, promising him a new investiture of the crown of Naples, and assistance in defending it, as also in enforcing his Imperial rights on Venice.

The Pope gained most by this important agreement. When the conditions relating to Italy were carried out, the Emperor would be no more powerful than he had been before; whereas the States of the Church would be so considerably increased that the independence of the Holy See, so long desired by Leo X, would probably be assured. A still greater advantage to the Holy See was the protection against all enemies of the Catholic Faith which was now solemnly promised by Charles.

Thus did the highest spiritual and secular powers unite once more for the protection of the ancient faith in the Holy Roman Empire, at the very moment when the storm against the old order of things was let loose.

The Curia was quite confident that Rome would succeed in mastering the heretical outburst, thanks to the issue of the Edict of Worms. The satisfaction felt by the Pope at the promulgation of the new Imperial law against Lutheranism was strongly expressed by Cardinal Medici in his letters to Aleander. The Nuncio was charged to convey the Pope’s warmest thanks to the Emperor and all who had contributed to the carrying out of the important measure. On the 7th of June the great news was communicated to the Cardinals in Consistory. After wards, Luther's picture and his writings were burned in the Piazza. Navona in Rome.

However well aware Cardinal Medici might be of the zeal shown by Aleander at Worms, of his fidelity to duty and his energy, he never ceased in his efforts to spur the Nuncio on to fresh measures against the heresy. It did not escape the Cardinal's shrewd observation that at times Aleander indulged in over-optimistic hopes. These were not shared in Rome, chiefly on account of the disturbing news which came from Germany through the Minorites there.

In the Netherlands Aleander’s zeal had achieved great things ; but in Saxony the new doctrines were being spread with ever-increasing rapidity under the protection of the Elector. The hopes to which Luther’s retirement to the Castle of Wartburg gave birth proved vain, and showed that Rome had not overrated the danger. On the 18th of September, 1521, Aleander was charged to make urgent representations to the Emperor about the “Saxon scandals”. If the injunctions of the Edict of Worms were disregarded now, while the ink with which it was written was scarcely dry, he was commissioned to say : What would the Elector of Saxony not dare do when Charles had departed from Germany? If matters were not taken in hand now, at the beginning of the evil, the last state of things would be worse than the first.

Had it been better known in Rome how the German people were being incited in print and from the pulpit to abolish Catholic worship and even to murder priests, the fear would have been still greater. As it was, anxiety was very acute in spite of Aleander’s more or less favourable reports. The only thing which allayed this anxiety was the fact that other countries of Christendom did not seem to have adopted Luther’s errors. In Italy, it is true, there were some who sympathized with him ; but teachers of his heresy were few and far between; and in Spain and Portugal the new doctrines had produced no effect what­ever. Even the Polish King, Sigismund, issued, on July 26th, 1521, a severe edict against the spread of Lutheran literature. It is true that the news from Denmark was disquieting; but Leo X hoped to avert the worst consequences by the exercise of great gentleness towards the King. In France, in spite of his political antagonism to the Pope, Francis I ordered that all Luther’s works should be burnt in Paris. It was of no small importance that the distinguished theological faculty of Paris, on April 15th, 1521, condemned Luther’s doctrines as emphatically as Louvain and Cologne had already done in 1519. Al­though Aleander blamed the omission of all mention of the primacy of the Pope in the condemnation by the University of Paris, he hoped that even so, the censure of a body of theologians so generally respected would not fail to have a good effect even in Germany. Great joy was caused in Rome by the action of the King of England, who attacked Luther in a book written by himself. The University of Oxford had already condemned Luther's writings. The manner in which the Pope received the book of Henry VIII. shows that he, at any rate, considered the Lutheran affair as by no means suppressed.

 

CHAPTER X.

DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AND INCREASE OF THE STATES OF THE CHURCH. — DEATH OF LEO X.