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THE DOORS OF WISDOM

CHAPTER VIII. Results of the Battle of Pavia. —Quarrels between the Pope and the Emperor. —Formation of a Coalition against Charles V (League of Cognac, May 22, 1526).

On the 24th of January 1525 the Imperialists broke out of Lodi; in the first days of February they appeared before the French army, still besieging the stronghold of Pavia, with the intention of forcing a battle. Peals of bells and beacon-fires from the towers of the old Lombard city welcomed the relief in this hour of need. For three weeks the hostile forces faced one another. The French camp was admirably protected by nature and art ; on the right it was covered by the Ticino, on the left by a large park surrounded by a high wall, within which lay the famous Certosa.

On the 24th of February, the Emperor’s birthday, his army, composed of Spaniards, Italians, and the dreaded German landsknechts, opened the attack. At daybreak the battle, which was to decide the “Italian imperium”, began. In a few hours the murderous fight was over; the gallant troops of Francis were laid low before the onset of the German landsknechts and Spanish veterans; the King himself was a prisoner.

The victory of Pavia made the Empire of Charles the ruling power in Europe. It is impossible to describe the impression everywhere produced by this historical catastrophe. The bloodshed and strife in which France and the houses of Spain and Hapsburg had engaged for the mastery in Europe, seemed to be brought to an end by this unexpected blow. France lay at the Emperor’s feet, while Italy, and with her the Papacy, were surrendered defenceless to his power. In Rome men were dumbfounded by the news of the great event. Clement, whose diplomatists were seeking up to the last hour for accommodations that might lead to peace, looked to Lombardy with indescribable anxiety. His position was in the highest degree precarious. The loss of the independence of Italy meant also that of the Holy See. With Milan and Naples in the Emperor’s hands, the Papacy was threatened with enclosure in a circle of iron. But Clement, in his anxiety and his statecraft, was as incapable of a great resolution, such as a Julius II would have taken, as he was of any definite action.

Persuaded by Giberti and Carpi, Clement had departed from his strict neutrality and linked his fortunes, for the worse rather than the better, with those of the French King, whose superiority at the moment had seemed to promise him a lasting triumph. But the fortune of war is fickle; what would happen if Francis were defeated? At the last moment Giberti and Clement seem to have perceived their mistake. Hence the exhortations to Francis I not to put his fortune to the proof, to refuse the wager of battle, and to have recourse to negotiations instead. As late as the 19th of February Giberti asked Aleander, the Nuncio, to represent matters in this way to the French King. He added, “As no sailor ever risks the storm of the open sea with one anchor only, so the Pope, confident though he be in the strength of Francis I, will not stake all upon the single throw of his success before Pavia”. In saying this, Giberti condemned his own policy, and a week later the news reached Rome that the cast of war had been thrown—not in favour of Francis I and his ally the Pope.

On the evening of the 26th of February Clement received, in a letter from Cardinal Salviati, the first intelligence of the Emperor’s victory. To him, as well as to all around him, the news seemed incredible; but later accounts, including one by an eyewitness, put all doubt at an end. The Pope was as one dead; his terror was increased by the reaction produced in his household by this event. All the Imperialists, the Spaniards, as well as the Colonna, gave way to the wildest rejoicing. Such a change of fortune surpassed their boldest hopes. Cardinal Pompeo Colonna held a brilliant festival in his palace throughout the city rang the echos of salvoes of congratulation, and the cries of rejoicing of “Empire, Spain, Colonna”. The Orsini, who were of the French party, had the very worst to fear their leaders were absent; they and their levies were with the Duke of Albany, who had returned from his march to Naples, to the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, and there had pitched his camp about the loth of February.

All thought of pursuing his expedition was given up, and Albany decided to return. On the 2nd of March two thousand five hundred men, consisting of Frenchmen and the Orsini, began their homeward march. Acting on a swift resolution, Colonna, supported by some of Sessa’s retainers, fell upon them suddenly at the monastery of Tre Fontane, and drove them in hasty flight within the city. Wherever the Orsini sought refuge, the Colonna were at their heels; fighting took place in the Ghetto and on Monte Giordano. The whole city was in an uproar; the streets rang with the war-cries “Orsini—Colonna”. The terrified inhabitants bolted their doors; artillery was placed to protect the Vatican, and the Swiss stood under arms all night. The terror-stricken Pope did all he could to restore quiet, and was successful in inducing Albany to disband his forces. The Italians were left behind; the foreigners, under the Duke, fell back on Civita Vecchia, and at the end of March they were conveyed in French galleys to Marseilles. In the meanwhile Schonberg, who had returned to Rome on the 5th of March, succeeded in pacifying the Colonna.

All these occurrences had made the deepest impression on the Pope. The fights, especially between the Orsini and the Colonna, engaged in under his very eyes, raised his alarm to the highest pitch. While in Rome the ground was trembling under his feet, his fears for Florence were also aroused, where the ideas of Savonarola were again springing into life. Still more precarious was the Papal rule in the Romagna, where the Ghibellines were rejoicing over the victory of Pavia. The Imperialists lost no time in taking advantage of Clement’s necessity. They held the trembling Pope, who in vain urged moderation, in a vice of iron. Their troops carried fire and sword ruthlessly through the territory of Piacenza; Lannoy even uttered the threat that he would lead his soldiers on Rome. By such means Clement was forced first to pay 25,000 ducats, and then to make a treaty of alliance.

The most zealous opponent of an alliance between the Pope and the Emperor was Giberti, who, supported by Lodovico di Canossa, who was in the service of France, and by the Venetian Ambassador, was doing all he could at this time to unite the whole of Italy, under Papal leadership, in a league against the Spanish domination, and was also trying to bring England, the jealous rival of Charles V, into the combination. There were moments when the Pope, in torments of indecision, lent such a ready ear to his proposals that Giberti believed the desired end to have been reached; but at the last moment the Imperialist Schonberg upset his plans. The most immediate danger undoubtedly came from Charles V, who had it in his power to wrest Florence from the Medici. At the same time Piacenza was sending pressing appeals for help against the unbridled licence of the soldiery. Lastly, the news concerning the social revolution in Germany and the advances of the Turk was of an exceptionally disturbing kind. Clement VII saw that, cost what it might, he must come to terms with the Emperor.

On the 1st of April 1525 a treaty, defensive and offensive, was concluded between the Pope and Lannoy as Imperial Viceroy in Italy. The terms of the agreement were that both should recognize Francesco Sforza as Duke of Milan, and that the Emperor should take the States of the Church, Florence, and the house of Medici under his protection, Florence paying in return 100,000 ducats. Lannoy, moreover, undertook to withdraw his forces from the Papal States and to place no garrisons therein in future without the Pope’s permission. In the event of Charles not having ratified these conditions within four months, the 100,000 ducats were to be refunded by Lannoy. There were besides three other separate articles, to the following effect:—

1. The Pope was to hold, in the kingdom of Naples, the rights connected with benefices as settled in the Bull of investiture.

2. Milan was in the future to have the salt from the Papal salt-pits in Cervia.

3. Lannoy was to insist on the restoration of Reggio and Rubbiera to the Church by the Duke of Ferrara on this restoration being made the Pope was to pay 100,000 ducats to the Emperor and absolve the Duke from all censures.

Without waiting for the Imperial ratification, Lannoy had already, in April, published the treaty in Milan. The Pope, who on receipt of favourable letters from the Emperor’s court and from Lannoy had the best hopes of Charles’s conduct, did the same in Rome in May. He combined with this solemnity his official Possesso of the Lateran. From the Spanish Nuncio Castiglione came very reassuring accounts of the moderation of the victorious Emperor, so that on the 5th of May Clement resolved to send Cardinal Salviati to Spain as Legate in order to work for the restoration of peace, the execution of the treaty, the prosecution of the Turkish war, and the suppression of Lutheranism. Salviati at this moment was still in Parma; in order to accelerate his journey, it was determined on the 12th of June that he should proceed by sea instead of going through France, as at first intended; he was also instructed to discuss the Emperor’s coronation and the question of a council. Accordingly, the Legate left Parma on the 2nd of July and embarked at Genoa; on the 23rd of August the Pope was able to give very favourable accounts of him in Consistory. But in reality the Cardinal’s task was beyond his powers; he fell under the fascination of Charles and saw everything in the rosiest light. The official correspondence also between the Pope and Emperor was carried on in the friendliest terms for some time longer the points of controversy were slurred over as much as possible, and those of common interest emphasized.

It was impossible, however, that each party should go on deceiving the other for ever. In spite of all assurances of friendship, a breach was bound to come soon, since the Pope was becoming more and more convinced that the arrogant commanders of Charles’s army had no intention of carrying out the terms of the treaty of April, and were, indeed, often acting in direct contradiction to them. Instead of the withdrawal of their troops from the Papal States, fresh occupations took place in the territory of Piacenza, whereby the country was exhausted and laid waste. Lannoy certainly made daily promises to Clement that, as soon as the 100,000 ducats were paid in full, the restoration of Reggio and Rubbiera would take place; but in secret he had already secured the possession of these places to Duke Alfonso of Ferrara. He also urgently advised the Emperor not to confirm the additional clauses of the treaty. Charles took his advice; the restoration of Reggio and Rubbiera, in which towns Clement saw the keys of Parma and Piacenza, the Papal salt monopoly in Milan, and the arrangements for Church patronage in the kingdom of Naples, were consequently discarded and remained a dead letter. Nevertheless, the Imperialists refused to repay to the Pope the sums disbursed by him for the promised surrender of the towns. The more Clement saw that this behaviour had the Emperor’s approbation, the greater became his mistrust and indignation. When the Imperial ratification of the principal treaty arrived, he declined to accept it, since it had not been executed within the stipulated four months, and proceeded to demand back the 100,000 ducats paid by Florence. This the Imperialists declined, under empty pretexts, to refund. Clement, who was suffering from gout, was fully justified in saying that he had been cheated, injured, and insulted. In addition to these grievances came Charles’s heavy claims on the church patronage of Aragon. “If the affairs of the Church are treated in this way”, said Clement to Sessa,  “it were best that I should betake myself back to Soracte”.

The rumours concerning the intentions of Charles’s advisers and of his commander-in-chief in Italy were of the kind most likely to throw the Pope into fear and despair. The proposal which came from this quarter, with a view to trampling underfoot the independence of the whole Apennine Peninsula, aimed at nothing less than the total confiscation of the Papal States. Not merely were Florence, Siena, and Lucca to come under the Emperor’s rule, but Modena also was to fall to the Duke of Ferrara, and the Bentivogli were to be re­established in Bologna. Lannoy, the soul of the anti-Papal intrigues, demanded also that Parma and Piacenza, Ravenna and Cervia, should be separated from the States of the Church; the first two were destined for the Duke of Milan, the two last for the Republic of Venice. The Pope was aware of these intrigues, but, being powerless, had to play a losing game with a cheerful countenance; for if the Emperor was able to come to terms with Francis at the expense of Italy, then Clement was lost. This eventuality seemed to be very close at hand when the captive King of France was removed to Spain (10th of June 1525).

In Rome, in Venice, indeed throughout the whole of Italy, the impression prevailed that the Emperor intended to become reconciled to his prisoner at the cost of Italian independence, and the freedom of Italy would be destroyed for ever. The decisive moment seemed to have come to run the last risk and throw off the yoke of those whom they called “barbarians.” In the sphere of literature and art the Italian of those days was unquestionably entitled to consider himself superior to the Spaniard, and indeed to all the other nations in Europe. This self-consciousness gave powerful nourishment to the revival of the national idea. “All Italy,” declared Antonio de Leyva, the loyal general of the Emperor, “is at one in combining to defend the common interests and to resist any further increase of the power of Spain. There is not a single Prince among them who thinks any longer of the favours received from Charles.”

In other respects also affairs were tending more and more to the Emperor’s disadvantage. After the defeat at Pavia, it had at first seemed as if the French kingdom must fall in pieces. But afterwards a complete change came over affairs. It was the Regent, Louisa of Savoy, the King’s mother, who held the nation together and became its leader. She soothed the disaffected among the nobles and generals, reconciled factions, organized the defences of the country, and disclosed in all directions a capacity for rule which was as determined as it was prudent. She it was, also, who succeeded in detaching Henry VIII, envious of the good fortune of Charles, from the Emperor, and in concluding at the end of August a treaty of peace and alliance between France and England.

Some considerable time before this, the Regent had also entered into communications with the States of Italy. Her primary object was to win over the two most powerful—the Pope and Venice. For this purpose Louisa of Savoy employed the services of a man who, although by birth an Italian, was yet one of the most fervent adherents of her son. This was Lodovico di Canossa, Bishop of Bayeux. He was an intimate friend of Giberti, and was also held in great esteem at Venice. At the end of 1524 and in the spring of the following year he was in Rome, making himself personally active, and at that time he believed that he had already fully secured the anxious-minded Pope. At the beginning of June 1525 Canossa gave out that he had to visit his family in Verona; he really went in haste to Venice, which he reached on the 15th of June. Thither on the 23rd came the French envoy, Lorenzo Toscano, with instructions from the Regent. On the following day Canossa laid his proposals before the Signoria, but the cautious Venetians declined to give a definite answer before the Pope had declared himself. Canossa now worked with might and main, and his letters were despatched in all directions; while urging the French Government to come as quickly as possible to an understanding, he stirred up in Italy, wherever he could, the fires of national hatred against the Spaniard. But his principal object was to move the Pope, who still clung to his old policy of “I will and I won't”, to declare himself openly.

The confidant of Canossa’s plans and his best ally was Giberti, who, with Carpi’s support, and with even greater perseverance than his friend, was working against the Emperor behind Schonberg's back, in France, Switzerland, and England, and, above all, trying to induce the Pope to come over finally to the side of Francis. On the 25th of June 1525 Canossa wrote encouragingly: “All points to a swift and satisfactory conclusion”. But it was precisely at this juncture that the two friends met with the greatest difficulties. “Although the Pope”, wrote Giberti to Canossa on the 1st of July, “is a good friend to the emancipation of Italy, yet he will not fling himself headlong into an affair of such weighty responsibility, and is, in the first place, determined to await the arrival of Lorenzo Toscano”. At the same time, Giberti urged the closest secrecy with regard to all their transactions, as success would be easy if they succeeded in taking the Spaniards by surprise. In a letter addressed on the same day to the Swiss Nuncio, Ennio Filonardi, Giberti confirms his account of Clement’s indecision. In consequence of the misconduct of the Imperialists, Giberti here insists, especially with regard to their infringements of the April treaty, war might easily arise; therefore the Nuncio ought to take secret measures to have from eight to ten thousand Swiss in readiness, in case of necessity, to fight, not only in Lombardy, but also in Naples. Giberti was not less active in other ways as well. He told the Pope, in the most emphatic language, that, if he let this opportunity go by, he would bitterly repent it, and sink into a mere tool of the Emperor’s. Still Clement was not to be moved to take any open steps, and Giberti, in desperation, threatened that he would quit Rome.

Canossa did not commit himself as long as the Pope and Venice refused to declare themselves openly against Charles. On the 25th of June he explained to the Regent that both the Pope and Venice were afraid lest France, thinking exclusively of her own interests, should sacrifice Italy; even Giberti had his misgivings of France in this respect. It was certainly strange that the agents of France had never yet received full powers to conclude an alliance.

Consequently, at Rome as well as at Venice, matters were taken in hand with the greatest caution and reticence. Under cover of the closest secrecy, Giberti employed Sigismondo Sanzio, one of Carpi’s secretaries, to treat with the Regent, and Gregorio Casale to treat with Henry VIII. One object was to ascertain the truth of a report emanating from Spain, that the Emperor would probably visit Italy in person at the same time, clear information was to be procured as to the help which “poor Italy” might expect to receive. Sanzio and Casale left Rome almost simultaneously (9th and 10th of July). In spite of all precautions, Sessa was informed of these movements. But Clement VII managed, by the ambiguity of his language, entirely to deceive the Spanish diplomatist.

The shrewd Venetians proceeded with similar secrecy. They also put no trust in France. Already, on the loth of July, Canossa had described to his friend Giberti the hesitation of the Signoria, who awaited the decision of the Pope. On the 18th he was able to report that Venice was prepared to enter into a league with France on the conditions put forward by the Pope through Sigismondo Sanzio. For the present, however, this determination was to be kept absolutely secret. The conditions were: Francesco Sforza to keep Milan and marry a French Princess; the Pope to receive Naples and Sicily, and France to pay monthly 50,000 ducats and supply 6600 land forces and 10 galleys; the Italians in return to make an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, and to raise an army of 13,000 men for the liberation of the King.

By the month of August the negotiations were at a stand­still. Giberti’s and the Pope’s distrust of France had revived with increased strength. The attitude of the Regent was, in fact, so suspicious that the fear that she might treacherously surrender Italy to the Emperor was forced on men’s minds. She prolonged the negotiations in such a way that it became more and more clear that she was only making use of Italy in order to obtain the release of Francis on more favourable terms. Not merely in Rome but also in Venice, where Canossa was long kept waiting without any tidings from France being received, the worst suspicions were aroused. Moreover, there came the news that Sigismondo Sanzio had been murdered in the neighbourhood of Brescia, and all his correspondence stolen. Among the papers of this Ambassador were some highly compromising documents relating to a plot to deprive the Emperor of his ablest general.

The iron hand of the haughty Spaniard lay with all its might on young Francesco Sforza. The Duchy of Milan had been reconquered in his name, but he now saw himself given over to the arbitrary rule of the Imperial governor and treated with the most offensive insolence by the very men to whom, in their extreme danger, he had been a firm support. Milan was under greater oppression than had ever been known under French domination. The complete subjection of Sforza and the incorporation of the Duchy into the Spanish Monarchy seemed now only a question of time. To free his native land from the foreigner, the Duke’s Chancellor, Girolamo Morone, devised a plan as clever as it was daring. Pescara, the Emperor’s ablest general, felt himself ill-used and pushed into the background by his master. Morone thus hoped to secure him. In deep secrecy, after the most cautious overtures, he disclosed to Pescara his plan for delivering Italy from the Imperial sway, and, in the event of success, promised him nothing less than the kingdom of Naples, which the Pope would confer upon him. Although Pescara did not commit himself to any definite assent, Morone was under the impression that the Emperor’s general would yield to these brilliant promises. The impetuous Italian believed that the game was in his hands, and put himself into communication with Venice, Rome, and France. Soon all who were initiated into the adventure were filled with the most overweening hopes. “I see the world transformed”, wrote Giberti, “and Italy arising from the depths of misery to the summit of prosperity.” Clement VII, who, at this time, saw everything through the eyes of his present adviser, was of the same mind. But Pescara was at heart a thorough Spaniard; he despised the Italians, and only wished to become privy to their plots and to delay the crisis of the conspiracy. In secret he betrayed all to the Emperor and promised to send him money and troops so as to enable him with all possible speed to make peace with France. For never had the danger been greater. Not only the Pope, Venice, and Milan, but also Genoa and Ferrara were united in one common hatred of the Spaniard and fear of the Imperial supremacy.

Pescara, being in possession of conclusive evidence, threw off the mask. On the 14th of October 1525 Morone, who had been lulled into security, was suddenly seized, and all important places in the Duchy put under military occupation. Against Francesco Sforza, who had taken refuge in the citadel of Milan, a charge of felony was laid; the Milanese authorities were bidden henceforward to execute their functions in the Emperor’s name.

The news of these proceedings reached Rome on the 18th of October. They caused as much perplexity, terror, and despondency as the victory of Pavia had done, especially among those who were implicated in the intrigues. The Spaniards and their partisans at once took up an aggressive attitude. To Cardinal Colonna, who had left Rome a few days earlier, the remark was attributed that “with 100,000 ducats he would pledge himself to drive the Pope from his capital.” By the 20th of October Mendoza had come upon the scene commissioned by Pescara to explain the reasons for Morone’s arrest and the necessity, arising therefrom, of occupying the Duchy. Clement was unable, at first, to conceal his embarrassment; but afterwards he controlled himself, and tried to justify his recent conduct: the restitution of Reggio and Rubbiera had not taken place, but had been indefinitely deferred; in like manner the article concerning the salt monopoly had not been complied with; further, the Imperial forces continued to occupy the Papal States, to the ruin of the population. To crown all came the removal of the French King into Spain and the suspicious visit of the Duke of Ferrara to the Emperor. In view of the generally received opinion that Charles intended to come to terms with his prisoner to the detriment of the Papacy and of the whole of Italy, Clement had been filled with the greatest distrust, and had taken a share in the movements against the Emperor, so as not to be left in total isolation. Since the occupation of Milan by the Emperor’s troops he was fully under the impression that Charles was aiming at the complete conquest and subjugation of Italy. Mendoza and Sessa laboured in vain, during the following days, to convince the Pope that such apprehensions were groundless. Clement was emphatic in declaring that everything hung on the possession of Milan, and that he should never reconcile himself to Lombardy being ruled by Charles or Ferdinand. This possession of Milan clashed with the conditions of the investiture of the kingdom of Naples it gave the Emperor unlimited power in Italy, and rather than yield on this point, he would prefer to share the downfall of all the princes of Italy. The Pope made no concealment of his determination to act on the defensive with Venice, France, and England.

The extent of Clement’s alarm at this moment is shown from the fact that he at once gave orders to provide Parma and Piacenza with troops, and that he saw to the fortification of Rome and to the enlistment of additional troops.

There were real grounds for the fears of Clement and the Italians. “The only remedy”, wrote Mendoza to Charles on the 5th of November, “lies in this : to make peace with France, to take possession of Milan, and —to wrest both Parma and Piacenza from our Holy Mother the Church”. Thus wrote the man who had just been imparting to the Pope the most pacifying assurances. Can Clement and the other Italian powers be blamed if they sought to make their own position secure? “Intrigues are more rife than ever”, Caracciolo reported to the Emperor on the 10th of November from Venice. “All depends on separating Venice and the Pope : it would be a very easy thing to win the latter”. Charles V seems also to have taken this view hence the distinguished reception given, at the beginning of October, to Cardinal Salviati at Toledo. The Emperor spoke so convincingly of his peaceful intentions, of his plans against Turks and heretics, of his filial reverence for the Holy Father, that not the least doubt of his sincerity occurred to Salviati. The Emperor also gave tranquillizing assurances with respect to Milan, Reggio, and Rubbiera in reality he meant very differently. But for the moment his one object was, while keeping his hold on Clement and winning him over by fair words and promises, to crush the dangerous movement towards freedom in Italy. For this purpose he sent a special envoy to Rome in the person of Miguel de Herrera.

In the meantime the opposite party pressed their suit on Clement not less zealously. The Spanish envoys saw with special anxiety the strenuous efforts of the Venetians to bring the Pope to a final decision. Their fears increased as the couriers came and went incessantly between Rome and Venice. Clement was as far as ever from any fixed determination. The alarm caused by the arrest of Morone influenced him powerfully. This procrastination caused dissatisfaction not only to the anti-Imperialists but to the Roman public, who attributed all their misfortunes to the Pope’s indecision and stinginess. Just at this time a powerful impulse was given to the hopes and spirits of the Italians; Pescara, the special object of their hatred and the Emperor’s ablest general, was removed by death in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of December, while France had made fresh promises. Incessant pressure was now put on the Pope to give his adhesion to the League for good and all.

The position in the meantime was such that armed intervention in support of Italy by France and England could not be expected with any certainty. To strike single­handed would have been foolhardiness. Under such circumstances even a man of strong determination would have hesitated; much more Clement VII, whose leading characteristics were timidity and indecision. No one has described his strange character so strikingly as Guicciardini. Always slow in forming his plans as well as in their execution, Clement was easily frightened by the smallest difficulty. Hardly had he come, by good luck, to a decision, than the reasons which had led him fell entirely into the background, and it seemed to him that he had not sufficiently weighed those on the other side. He often gave way to the representations of his advisers without being thoroughly-convinced by them. If only his ministers had been at least of one mind! But Giberti had always been a strong adherent of France, and Schonberg an equally strong Imperialist; this made the confusion complete. The Pope’s attitude depended on which of these two alternating counsellors was in the ascendant.

Giberti’s influence was now once more to be thwarted. If we may believe Guicciardini, the day for the conclusion of the League against Charles V had been already fixed when the news was brought that Herrera had landed at Genoa. This was enough to reopen the whole question from the beginning. The Pope announced that he must first hear the proposals which Herrera was bringing from the Emperor.

Herrera reached Rome at last on the 6th of December, bringing with him very friendly letters from Charles and drafts of a treaty which had been discussed with Salviati. Schonberg was now at once in the ascendant. Giberti, who, on the 5th, still had strong hopes of securing the Pope’s adhesion on the following day, was now in such despair that he threatened to leave Rome. Perhaps, as the opponents of Charles feared, an alliance between the Pope and Emperor might then have been made, if Herrera’s offers had been satisfactory. This, however, was not the case, and the negotiations took shape with difficulty. The Pope was determined that with respect to Reggio and Rubbiera something more concrete and tangible than mere promises should be forthcoming. Over the Milanese question, the turning-point of all, agreement was impossible. Matters having reached this point, Sessa and Herrera proposed that the negotiations should be suspended for two months, with the secret intention of gaining time in which to make fresh preparations for war and arouse suspicion among Clement’s previous friends. Schonberg and Salviati managed to raise Clement’s distrust of the French and other anti-Imperialists to such a pitch that he accepted the Spanish proposal. The Pope, however, expressly declared at the time that if the Emperor did not surrender Milan within the appointed term of adjournment he would enter the League with France and Venice.

The opponents of Charles in Rome, Giberti, Carpi, and Foscari, as well as the ministers of the Queen Regent, were highly exasperated by this decision ; not less so Guicciardini and Canossa. In this respect their complaints of the Pope were hardly justified. The time gained by the adjournment was certainly of advantage to the Emperor, but also to the Pope. Clement might well hope that in two months’ time the state of things, especially the attitude of France and England, would have become so much clearer that he might more easily make the decision charged with such weighty issues.

Before the two months were out, on the 14th of January 1526, the Peace of Madrid was settled between Charles and Francis. By this agreement the captive King of France consented to almost all the demands of the victor. He surrendered the Duchy of Burgundy, the countship of Charolais, and the suzerainty over Flanders and Artois Bourbon and the other rebels were amnestied; all claims to Naples, Milan, Genoa, and Asti were renounced; and lastly, he promised to supply forces on land and sea to accompany Charles on his expedition to Rome, or in warfare against the Turk. After inexplicable delays the Emperor ratified the treaty at last on the 11th of February. On the 17th of March Francis was exchanged for his two sons, who were to remain with Charles as hostages. With the cry : “Now I am once again a King!”—he set foot on French soil.

The Treaty of Madrid was perhaps the gravest political mistake which Charles V had made. Not without reason did his Chancellor Gattinara refuse to declare his agreement with demands which he knew to be excessive and impracticable. The treaty in fact laid upon the vanquished obligations of such vast extent that their fulfilment from a man like Francis I could never be expected. Still less was it to be supposed that such a nation as France would degrade itself to become a power of the second rank and own vassalage to the Emperor. Public opinion on the whole, so far as such a thing could then be spoken of, was now steadily inclining towards Francis. In view of the almost brutal way in which Charles was seizing the spoils of victory, hardly anyone believed that the King would observe the peace. In Italy especially this opinion had wide acceptance.

Although no one had any inkling of the secret protest made by Francis before the conclusion of the treaty, he was counselled on all sides to break the oath he had just sworn. Even Clement VII, the practical politician, was in this instance no exception; he considered that treaty and oath, if extorted, were not binding. The Pope wished in the first place to obtain clear information of the intentions of Francis. He therefore sent, as Venice had done, an embassy to the King, ostensibly to congratulate him on his release from captivity, but really to discover his true intention and, in the event of his not keeping the treaty with Charles, to form an alliance with him. On the 22nd of February 1526 Paolo Vettori was entrusted on the part of the Pope with this mission. Vettori having fallen ill on the journey, Capino da Capo, who was in the confidence of Francis, was ordered to go to France on the 1st of March 1526. Yet a further appointment was made on the 20^th of April, when the Florentine Roberto Acciaiuoli was nominated Nuncio-in-ordinary at the French court.

Capino could hardly travel quick enough to please the Pope; for safety his letters were addressed to a merchant in Rome. By the end of March he arrived at the French court, where at the same time Andrea Rosso, the representative of Venice, made his appearance. The King received Capino most graciously, and assured him that he would willingly do all in his power to prevent Charles from putting his yoke on Italy; he would give a full and definite answer as soon as the solemnities of Easter were over. On Easter Monday, the 2nd of April, the formal negotiations began. By the 8th Capino was able to announce that France was won for the League; Venice and the Pope had only now to send the full powers to conclude the alliance. The news that Francis was prepared to support the work of “the liberation of Italy” and to come to the help of Francesco Sforza, still beleaguered by the Spaniards in the citadel of Milan, caused the greatest excitement in all who were privy to the scheme.

The great coalition against the Emperor was now only a question of time. I fit did not become an accomplished fact until the 22nd of May, this was on account of the gravity of the transaction and the mutual distrust of the contracting parties. However great was the desire of all the Emperor’s enemies that he should be vanquished, no one wished to take the first and principal part in his overthrow. The Italians were still, not without reason, filled with jealousy of France; they wished, therefore, that England should enter the League in order to secure them from any defection on the part of Francis I. Henry VIII, however, wished the League to be ratified in England, a proceeding which would have meant the loss of much precious time. But bold action was called for under any circumstances, for just at that particular moment the Emperor’s forces were in a critical state owing to the want of money and provisions. Since Henry held firm to his demand, the accession of England to the League had to be renounced.

In Venice decisive measures were pushed on. At a very early date movements of troops began, the object of which admitted of no doubt. Even the Pope now stood firm, although his Spanish Nuncio, Castiglione, repeatedly besought him in eloquent language to withdraw from an undertaking certain to bring ruin in its train. “These clever persons”, wrote Canossa on the 19th of February to Giberti from Venice, “who would persuade his Holiness that the league with France involves his own ruin and that of Italy, and that no one is bound to sacrifice himself in order to give freedom to others, ought simply to tell us what ruin can ensue greater than that which we have to fear at this present time”. The direct sovereignty of the Emperor over Milan, in the opinion of a Sienese diplomatist, meant for the Pope and Venice the total loss of independence.

Thus Castiglione's warnings were unheeded. However favourably he and Salviati might represent the Emperor’s intentions, facts in Italy told another story. The whole country cried out for deliverance from the galling yoke of the Spaniards, whose soldiery were driving the people of Lombardy to despair. “Hunt down these wild beasts who have only the faces and voices of men”, exclaimed Macchiavelli. “Alas! poor Italy”, sighed a poet, “whither hast thou fallen? Thy glory, thy fame, thy strength have perished”. Guicciardini expressed the opinion of all patriotic men when he spoke of the war of deliverance as a holy and necessary national event. Clement concurred all the more willingly in the general voice since, duped by the Imperialists, he saw the most important stipulations of the April treaty still left unfulfilled. Parma and Piacenza were still overrun by the troops of Charles and their inhabitants subjected to the heaviest exactions. If this was a cause of resentment to the Pope, not less so were the Emperor’s encroachments, not only in Naples but also in Spain, on the Papal prerogatives regarding presentation to ecclesiastical posts. What turned the scale, however, was Charles’s unmistakable endeavour to secure for himself the sovereignty of Milan and, with it, of all Italy. The idea of European dominion was more and more inseparably bound up with the possession of this noble land. “Let the Emperor,” said a Roman diplomatist, “rule Italy, and he will rule the world”.

Thus on the 22nd of May 1526 was brought about between Clement VII, Francis I, Venice and Sforza, the so-called Holy League of Cognac. By this compact, which was for the greater part the work of Giberti, it was settled that the Duchy of Milan belonged to Francesco Sforza, who, thenceforward, was to pay 50,000 ducats yearly to France; all Italian states were to receive back the possessions which they held before the war; Asti and the suzerainty of Genoa were to fall to France; Venice and the Pope were to decide on the number of the retinue of the Emperor on his journey to Rome for the coronation, and the sons of Francis I were to be ransomed for a reasonable sum. If these terms were refused by the Emperor, the members of the League were to declare war against him and also wrest from him the kingdom of Naples, to be bestowed by the Pope on an Italian prince, who should then pay to the King of France a yearly tribute of 75,000 ducats. In the event of the hoped-for inclusion of England taking place, further special stipulations were agreed upon. Two secret clauses were added by which Florence was also to enjoy the protection of the League, and Clement, in the event of the Emperor complying and retaining the Neapolitan kingdom, was to receive from the revenues of that crown a yearly tribute of 40,000 ducats. “We have succeeded,” Capino reported on the 24th of May to Umberto da Gambara; “the treaty was concluded the day before yesterday; for God’s sake keep all as secret as possible.”