CRISTO RAUL.ORG

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

CHAPTER XVIII.

Clement VII’s Efforts to protect Christendom from the Turks.

From the beginning of his pontificate, Clement VII, like his predecessors, was repeatedly occupied with the Eastern question.

Already, in his first Consistory, on the 2nd of December 1523, the Pope dealt with the dangerous position of Hungary, of which kingdom he had, when Cardinal, been the Protector. A special Commission of Cardinals was appointed to deal with the conduct of Turkish affairs and the restoration of peace. In view of the prevailing financial distress, it was exceptionally difficult to raise the sums necessary for the Turkish war. Clement VII, in extreme disquietude on account of the powerful military preparations of the enemy, did what lay in his power. When he learned that the garrison of Clissa in Dalmatia was hard pressed, he sent thither considerable help, thus rendering possible the relief of that important frontier stronghold. To the Hungarian King Louis he gave the assurance that he would continue to do all that his predecessors had done in the interests of his kingdom. The Cardinal-Legate for Germany, Campeggio, also accredited to Hungary, was commissioned to urge upon the Diet of Nuremberg the community of interests between these two countries and to work for the sanction of a liberal grant towards the expenses of the Turkish war. Clement also sent a special Nuncio to Hungary in the person of Giovanni Antonio Puglioni, Baron of Burgio, in place of Cardinal Cajetan, recalled on the 28th of January 1524. This accomplished diplomatist knew the country from former residence there, and was accurately informed on the extremely difficult circumstances of the situation.3 Clement, like previous Popes, also formed an alliance with Achmed of Egypt, one of the intestine enemies of the Turk.

Burgio was instructed to convey to the King of Hungary the subsidy, collected with difficulty by Clement, and the Papal permission to sell Church property in order to maintain the war against the infidel. In the beginning of April 1524 he reached Ofen, and was at once successful in dissuading the King from his scheme of making peace with the Turks. For his remaining task, the organization of the defensive forces of the Hungarian kingdom, circumstances could not possibly have been less favourable. The country was torn by fierce party strife, and her ruler, youthful, pleasure-seeking, and empty-headed, was the personality the least fitted to counteract the elements of disruption working in the kingdom. The saying applied by his contemporaries to the last of the Jagellons, “Woe to the country whose sovereign is a child!” was about to receive a frightful fulfilment. But among the magnates there was none who could have superseded the King. Party spirit, want of patriotism, combined with widespread corruption, held sway everywhere. On his arrival at Zengg, where Burgio first set foot in Hungarian territory, he found that of all the stores of grain sent by Adrian VI. for the provisioning of the Croatian border castles, only the scantiest portion of each had reached the place of its destination, for the Captain of Zengg and his officials had sold the greater part and spent the proceeds on themselves. In Ofen the Papal repre­sentative had no better experience; during his sojourn there of four months, he had convinced himself that neither from the King nor from the magnates at the head of the Government was the deliverance of the country to be looked for. Therefore in the beginning of July he left for Cracow in order to obtain help from Sigismund of Poland, the King’s uncle. This mission also was a complete failure, for Poland was suffering from the same conditions of internal dissolution and decay as Hungary.

In August 1524 Burgio returned to Ofen. There he found utter chaos; the nobility were in vehement opposition to the King and his associates, and were busy with the scheme of invoking, on their own authority, the intervention of a Diet. Meanwhile the danger in southern Hungary grew apace: the Turks were already besieging the fortress of Severin, the last bulwark of the kingdom on the lower Danube. Burgio did all he could to obtain relief for the besieged, but he appealed to deaf ears. The King referred him to his council; the council sent him back to the King; everywhere the most short­sighted selfishness prevailed. Burgio, during the Diet held on the Rakosfeld at Ofen, with emotion adjured the nobility to lay aside their old dissensions and come to the rescue of the kingdom in the hour of trouble. On this occasion he promised, if the Estates would do their duty, to place at once at the disposal of the kingdom the Papal subsidies deposited in the banking house of the Fuggers at Ofen. His words died away in a storm of party hatred, and thus Severin was lost, a calamity which only gave rise in Hungary to an outburst of mutual recrimination.

On Burgio’s invitation the Cardinal-Legate, Campeggio, left Vienna for Ofen in the beginning of December 1524. There he was received by King Louis with marks of friendship on the 18th of the same month. Both the Papal representatives worked together to induce the King and the magnates to take steps to equip the border fortresses and to raise an army; but in Paul Tomori alone, the excellent Archbishop of Kalocsa and commandant of the troops in the southern division of the kingdom, did they find a faithful and self-sacrificing ally. When the latter, in the beginning of January 1525, came in despair to Ofen, bent on his resignation, they prevented him from taking this step, and also insisted on his receiving support in money from the Government. Campeggio, at his own cost, raised three hundred foot-soldiers for the defence of Peterwardein. These Papal troops were the only force which Tomori was able to take back with him from Ofen in the beginning of February 1525 to the hard-pressed fortress. As they marched out, the populace gathered on the banks of the Danube raised their voices in praise of the Pope who had not forsaken their country in its extremity.

In the Diet also, held in May 1525, it was recognized that Clement VII and his Ambassadors were doing all they could to help the kingdom. Stephen Verboczy, the head of the national party among the nobles, praised in enthusiastic terms the services rendered to Hungary by the Holy See. But Burgio’s summons to war against the Turks, in obedience to the mandate of Clement VII., was uttered in vain. The Diet could attend to nothing but the complaints against the Palatine Stephan Bathory, the Primate Ladislaus Szalkay, the Treasurer Emmerich Szerencses, and the hated German courtiers. The removal of the latter was angrily demanded by the followers of Johann Zapolya, the richest and most powerful of all the magnates. As the King’s answer to this request was to some extent evasive, the resolution was passed that the combined nobility should meet in arms on the 24th of June at Hatvan, to the north-east of Ofen, to take counsel for the interests of the kingdom. On the 2nd of July King Louis appeared in person at this gathering; he was accompanied by Burgio, now, on the recall of Campeggio, the sole representative of the Pope. The assembly, in which Zapolya’s adherents had a majority, overthrew the whole existing government; the disloyal councillors were deposed, and Verboczy acclaimed as Palatine.[148] With regard to the most pressing need of all, the defence of the kingdom against the Turks, nothing was done then or even subsequently—only the Pope sent sums of money for the pay of the troops upon the frontier. In Hungary itself the bitterness of party strife continued.

While this political chaos, productive of the gravest crisis in the State, prevailed, the Sultan Suleiman continued his offensive preparations on the most comprehensive scale. Burgio sent reports on these to Rome, on the 18th of January 1526, while at the same time deploring the deficiencies in the Hungarian defences. Not even the garrisons of the border strongholds could be paid; the King was so poor that he even often suffered from want of food; the great as well as the lesser nobility were split into factions. Moreover, there was little prospect of assistance from the powers abroad, or of a federation of the Christian princes. “Thus,” said Burgio in conclusion, “your Holiness alone can give help; yet I know full well the hardships of the Church and that there is but little in her power to do, deserted as she is by all. My intelligence cannot fail to depress your Holiness; but it is my duty to write truthfully; willingly would I forward to you more favourable reports.”

In Rome, throughout the whole year (1525), the anxiety caused by the Sultan’s preparations was intensified by the danger to which the Italian coasts had for some time been exposed from the attacks of Turkish pirates. In November it was determined to send to Hungary fresh support in the form of liberal supplies of money, provisions, and ammunition. On receiving Burgio’s alarming reports, Clement called together the Sacred College in the beginning of February, 1526, and received on this occasion the representatives of the Christian princes. He communicated to them the reports that had reached him, and called upon them to urge their rulers to come to the aid of Hungary; as the time of year no longer permitted the despatch of troops, they might forward supplies of money for recruiting. The Pope set in this respect a good example; he addressed invitations to the Emperor, to the King of France, and to many other Christian princes to come to the assistance of Hungary. Clement VII informed King Louis of these steps taken on his behalf and exhorted him to perseverance and a vigorous resistance. When Burgio, on the 4th of March 1526, informed the Council of State, assembled round the King, of the Pope’s proceedings, many of his hearers were moved to tears; they vied with each other in expressions of gratitude and passed excellent resolutions to defend their country. But this conversion to patriotism soon proved to be only a short-lived flare of excitement; the resolutions were never more than a dead letter. Even when there was no longer any possible doubt of the imminent approach of the Turks, no decisive measures of resistance were taken. In the Council of State, which met in the afternoon, when the King had thrown off his slumbers, nothing was done save to indulge in mutual accusations. Burgio, who reports this, adds: “Here there is neither preparation for defence nor obedience; the magnates are afraid of each other, and all are against the King; some even are unwilling to take precautions against the Turk.” No wonder that the Nuncio repeatedly begged to be recalled. Of what use was he to a country that was rushing headlong to its ruin? “The spirit of faction grows more bitter every day,” reported Burgio; “the King, in spite of my remonstrances, has gone hunting as if we were living in the midst of profound peace.

On the day after the King’s departure, on the 13th of April, Tomori arrived with the alarming news that the Sultan had left Constantinople with the intention of making himself master of the capital of Hungary. The Nuncio thereupon betook himself at once to the King, and, representing to him the greatness of the danger, induced him to return to his capital. There a Council of State was at once held and Tomori, who had to defend Peterwardein, was promised ample help. The Nuncio supplied him with fifteen hundred infantry, two hundred hussars, and thirty small pieces of artillery : but his example produced little effect; the Council relapsed into their previous indolence. “If the Sultan really comes,” wrote Burgio on the 25th of April 1526, ‘'then I repeat what I have so often said before: your Holiness may look on this country as lost. Here the confusion is without bounds; every requisite for the conduct of a war is wanting; the Estates are given over to hatred and envy; and if the Sultan were to emancipate the subject classes, they would rise against the nobles in a bloodier insurrection than that of the Crusade (the Hungarian peasants’ war of 1514): but if their emancipation were to come from the King, he would then alienate from himself the nobility.”

Some still hoped that a remedy would be found in the Diet then about to assemble. Here the victory of the court party was complete; Verboczy was deposed and fined; Bathory was restored to the office of Palatine; the resolutions of Hatvan were annulled and a sort of dictatorship conferred on the King. But Louis had no means of enforcing obedience, for the authority of the Crown had fallen into desuetude, and the finances of the country were as bankrupt as its defences. How could absolute power be wielded by a king whom nobody obeyed, whose credit was gone, and who, in the presence of overwhelming danger, slept undisturbed until midday?

Neither the Diet nor the King brought deliverance. The foreign powers also, to whom the country had turned, did nothing; the Pope alone made the affairs of Hungary his own. He turned anew to the princes of Europe, gave his consent to a Crusade indulgence, sent 50,000 ducats, and permitted the taxation of ecclesi­astical benefices and the sale of a large amount of Church property. Had the King and the Estates of Hungary shown the same ready self-sacrifice and energetic action, the catastrophe then threatening might perhaps have been yet averted. Unfortunately, this was not the case; thus the doom drew nearer every day, and on the 28th of July 1526 Peterwardein fell. The garrison, half of whom were Papal troops, died like heroes. The Pope’s representative continued up to the last to do all that was possible, and raised 4000 soldiers. The forces of the King, with the reinforcements brought in at the last hour, amounted to 28,000 men. With them he moved southwards to the plain of Mohacs. Here a battle was fought on the 29th of August which decided in an hour and a half the fate of the Hungarian kingdom. Many magnates, five bishops, and the Archbishops of Gran and Kalocsa, were left lying on the field of battle. Two thousand heads were ranged as trophies of victory before the tent of the Sultan; on the following day fifteen hundred prisoners were slaughtered. King Louis was one of the few who succeeded in saving their lives by flight; but in crossing a small brook swollen by heavy rains his horse stumbled from exhaustion and buried the King in the watery morass.

On the 10th of September 1526 the Sultan made his entry into the Hungarian capital; far and wide, as far as Raab and Gran, his hordes swarmed over the unhappy kingdom, and there was already a fear lest they should attack Vienna also. But the approach of the colder season and the tidings of revolts in Asia Minor caused Suleiman to retire at the end of September, without leaving a garrison behind him in a single place.

The forward advance of the Turks and the catastrophe of Mohacs caused the greatest alarm in Rome, as in the rest of Christendom. Clement VII gave expression to his grief in a Consistory held on the 19th of September, when he called on all Christian princes to recover their unity and give their aid, and declared himself ready to go to Barcelona to negotiate in person for peace. On the following day the Pope saw himself plundered in his own capital by the troops of the Emperor!

If the dissensions between the two heads of Christendom had hitherto reacted most injuriously on the project of a Crusade against the Turks, so now the danger from the latter was almost entirely forgotten amid the raging flames of the present conflict between Pope and Emperor. But in Hungary civil war was raging. The brother-in-law of Louis, Ferdinand I, and the Voivode Zapolya were rival competitors for the crown; the Sultan soon found himself the recipient of solicitations from both parties. All the enemies of the Hapsburgs, especially France and Bavaria, favoured Zapolya, who also lost no time in making strenuous efforts to gain the Pope. Clement cannot be absolved from the reproach of having been drawn for a time into transactions of doubtful import with this man; but the statement of one of his bitterest enemies, that he had given pecuniary support to the Voivode, is without confirmation; on the contrary, there exists a Papal letter, of the 30th of August 1528, in which Clement refuses a request of this kind.

The warlike condition of Italy and the contest for the throne in Hungary, whereby the spread of Protestantism in that country was promoted, encouraged the Sultan to mature his plan of striking a blow at the heart of Christian Europe. In the beginning of May 1529 “the ruler of all rulers,” as Suleiman styled himself, left Constantinople at the head of a mighty host, bent on the capture of Vienna and the subjugation of Germany. Fortunately his advance was so slow, owing to heavy rainfalls and the consequent inundations, that he did not reach Belgrade until the 17th of July.

Ferdinand I, whose forces were quite inadequate to cope with those of the Turks, looked round on every side for help. His Ambassador in Rome and that of the Emperor made the most urgent representations on the pressing danger. Clement VII therefore determined to send Vincenzo Pimpinella, Archbishop of Rossano, as permanent Legate to the court of Ferdinand. The subsidies in money, subsequently approved by the Pope and Cardinals, were perforce slender owing to the limited means at their disposal. On the other hand, it was of importance that in the Treaty of Barcelona (29th June 1529) the Pope agreed to give the Emperor, for the expenses of the Turkish war, a fourth of the incomes of the ecclesiastical benefices to the extent already conceded to him by Adrian VI. A Bull of the 27th of August 1529 gave full authority to Pimpinella to dispose, in upper Germany, of the treasures, and, in case of necessity, even of the landed property of churches and convents, in order to levy an army to meet the Turks, who, welcomed by Zapolya, had captured Ofen on the 8th of September, and before the end of the month had invested Vienna. But all their attempts to take possession of this bulwark of Christendom were frustrated by the heroic spirit of the defenders. After a final ineffectual assault on the 14th of October, the Sultan withdrew, warned by the approach of adverse seasons and the news that relief was close at hand. For the first time he saw an enterprise, on which all his resources had been brought to bear, broken by an enemy whom he had likened to “the dust.” Hungary, certainly, was still in his power, and to the Venetians, who had done him service continually as spies, Suleiman wrote on the 10th of November : “I have overcome this kingdom and bestowed its crown upon Zapolya.”

After the disasters of the year 1529, a cessation of the Turkish lust of conquest was not to be thought of; the capture of Vienna was only postponed. In the West there were no illusions on this score. During the conferences between the Pope and Emperor at Bologna, the Turkish question played an important part. Clement VII. promised, on this occasion, to pay a subsidy of 40,000 ducats, a sum which certainly could not be raised without great difficulty. Another and not less important result of the Imperial policy was the sentence of excommunication passed on Zapolya on the 21st of December 1529.

As the consultations at Bologna on the comprehensive measures of defence to be taken against the Turks had led to no final result, it was determined to pursue the matter further at Rome. This was all the more necessary as in the spring of 1530 news had arrived of increased military preparations on the part of the Turks. A congregation of six Cardinals was entrusted, in the beginning of June, with the consideration of the whole matter. On the 24th of that month the Pope assembled these six Cardinals and the Ambassadors, all of whom, including even the Venetian envoy, were present. Clement VII made an opening speech, in which he insisted upon the necessity for taking steps to meet the attack which the Sultan was making vast preparations to deliver in the coming year. To the question of the Pope, whether the Ambassadors were furnished with the requisite mandates, only the representatives of Charles V and Ferdinand I replied in the affirmative. Cardinal Gramont and the English envoys announced that they had none; the Portuguese Ambassador made excuses for his sovereign, who was actively engaged in Africa; the Milanese envoy assured Clement that it would be impossible for his master to raise any extra taxes this year. When the envoy of Ferdinand, Andrea da Burgo, observed that three things were necessary: money, money, and always money, Cardinals Farnese and del Monte agreed, with the remark that unity among the Christian powers was equally essential. It was resolved that the Pope should address himself to all the Christian princes and call upon them to support the holy war with all their might and supply their envoys with the fullest powers. Briefs to this effect were drawn up on the 27th of June. Since the answers of the princes were long in coming, Andrea da Burgo asked the Pope to make up his mind at once as to the sums to be guaranteed to Ferdinand I.

Clement VII was obliged to insist that his resources had been so drained by the war with Florence that he had no means left at his disposal. He made sanguine representations to the Ambassador as to the time when Florentine affairs would be settled; once the city had fallen, the Turkish Crusade would be taken up again with energy. By the 9th of August fresh Briefs had been despatched to the princes of Christendom; it was proposed that a monthly levy of 80.000 ducats should be paid towards the war; of this the Pope and Cardinals were to raise 10,000, the Emperor and Francis I 20,000 each, Henry VIII 10,000, the Kings of Portugal, Scotland, and Poland jointly 15,000, the Italian States 5000. All these efforts were unavailing; on the 23rd of August not one of the Ambassadors, except those of Charles and Ferdinand, had received full powers from their sovereigns. Neither the Italian powers, England or France were willing to support the Crusade; the Pope alone gave Ferdinand assistance. At a later date the Turkish war and the proceedings against the Lutherans were combined—but still no results were obtained. The Pope, da Burgo reported from Rome on the nth of December 1530, wished to raise funds for the Turkish war, but he had no means of so doing. His relations with Ferdinand I remained friendly, and it was of great value to the latter that Clement VII promoted in every way the Hapsburg candidature for the kingship of the Romans and gave his recognition ungrudgingly. In he sent the King a consecrated sword and hat1 by the hands of Albertus Pighius.

Of late the Pope had been repeatedly occupied with the affairs of the Knights of St. John. Clement VII gave them hearty support in their efforts to reinstate themselves in the possession of Rhodes; on their failure to do so he asked the Emperor to bestow Malta on the Knights as a residence. It was an excellent suggestion, for the central situation of the island made it a place of high strategical importance. Charles V was favourable to the Pope’s request; on his return journey from Bologna, on the 23rd of March 1530, at Castelfranco, he issued the document by which he bestowed on the Knights of St. John, Malta and its adjacent islands as a Sicilian fief. The Order, now known as that of the Knights of Malta or the Maltese Order, fortified the new bulwark of Christendom in accordance with all the rules of military science as then known, and defended it with the utmost valour. Through the Knights the Pope was kept closely informed of the intentions of the Turks.

In 1530 Clement VII found the Turkish difficulty even more engrossing than in the previous year. For a time this filled the foreground of affairs so completely that all other considerations, even the threatening aspects of the Lutheran movement, seemed to become of minor importance. “This is the only topic of conversation here,” wrote an envoy on the 20th of February 1531. In March all preachers within the Papal States were directed to explain to the people the dangers to which they were exposed from the Turks. The perils of the Mahommedan attack on Christendom were felt all the more keenly in middle and lower Italy, for the navigation of the Mediterranean was so insecure owing to the corsairs of Barbary that in many places, even in Rome, the difficulty of importing provisions was beginning to cause distress. As a measure of relief the Pope was planning the despatch of a fleet under the command of Andrea Doria.

Clement was assiduous in taking counsel with the Ambassadors and Cardinals on the subject of the Crusade. The question was especially considered whether the war should be carried out on defensive or offensive lines. Francis I let it be understood that he would take part only in operations of the former class; thereupon the Genoese and others withdrew from their previous agreements concerning the support to be given to the Emperor’s forces. “The Pope alone,” wrote Andrea da Burgo, “adheres to his promise to pay 12,000 ducats per month; in this case,” he added, “I certainly cannot see how, wanting money as he does, he can give any help to your Majesty.”

In spite of the pretensions of Francis I, Clement was never weary of making plans to utilize the power of France on behalf of the common undertaking, as well as to raise the necessary sums for the protection of the Italian seaboard and the support of Charles and Ferdinand. He met with not a little opposition on the part of some of the Cardinals. When the Pope urged the necessity of raising funds in presence of the common danger, it was put forward in reply that the princes had very often expended such levies for totally different purposes, and that, on that account, no one in Italy was willing to contribute. Clement VII proposed that the sums intended for the protection of the coasts of Italy against the attacks of Mohammedan pirates should be collected and then forwarded to the spot where the most immediate succour was required. All the Cardinals were unanimous that the funds for the Crusade should not be raised by the creation of new Cardinals or the sale of Church property. It was at last agreed that there should be a tax on grain.

The enemies of the Hapsburgs pointed to the general policy of Charles V and the increase of his brother’s power by the acquisition of the Hungarian and Bohemian crowns, as standing in the way of the aggrandizement of Italy and of the Pope in particular. It was said plainly that the empire and monarchy of the Hapsburgs threatened to establish a world-power even more dangerous than that of Turkey: their agents in Italy were, it was alleged, on the one hand, always asking the Pope for money and, on the other, by their incessant demands for a Council, frustrated the very means by which money could be raised, and sowed the seeds of endless difficulties for the Holy See in Italy. In addition, there was also the Emperor’s decision in the dispute with Ferrara, which must have offended the Pope in the highest degree. Since Charles V, in spite of the counter-representations of Ferdinand I, clung obstinately to this determination, the negotiations over the subsidy against the Turks came to a standstill.

Andrea da Burgo, Ferdinand’s Ambassador, was in a difficult position. Repeatedly in the course of these negotiations he had been made to understand by the Pope that no serious arrangement could be come to in this matter unless the Emperor consented to some relaxa­tion of the too rigid conditions of the treaties of Madrid and Cambrai. In spite, however, of the imprudence of the Imperialists and the constant intrigues of the French, this indefatigable diplomatist achieved a great success in the autumn of 1531. In a Brief of the 16th of September of that year, Clement VII promised Ferdinand, in view of the menacing reports of Turkish preparations, the payment of 100,000 ducats in six months in the case of invasion, unless Italy itself were visited by a like calamity.

Contradictory as the reports often were concerning the Turkish plans, yet in the second half of December they all agreed in announcing for the coming spring a fresh attack from the Sultan, for which he was making preparations in force. On the first receipt of this information Clement showed great zeal. On the 16th of December he informed a full Consistory of Cardinals that, according to most trustworthy intelligence, a Turkish fleet of three hundred ships, with forty thousand men on board, would in the early spring set sail for Italy, while at the same time the Sultan, at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand, would advance on Hungary. On the 26th of December the Cardinals again met to deliberate on the Turkish question.

Two days later the Pope assembled the Cardinals and Ambassadors; of the latter none were absent except the Venetian envoy, whose Government was determined not to break the peace with Turkey, and the envoy of Ferrara. The Pope made a long speech, showing that a combined attack by sea and land was in preparation by the Turks for the coming spring, and urging the necessity of speedy assistance. The representatives of the Emperor and King Ferdinand gave the strongest assurances; those of Henry VIII and Francis I only proffered fair speeches, although the Pope had been urgent and even threatening in his appeal. In his closing words Clement again warned his hearers that not a moment should be lost, and declared himself ready to do his utmost.

In the beginning of January 1532 the Pope’s calls for help addressed in the preceding August to the Christian princes were emphatically renewed. At the same time it was resolved to fortify the Papal sea-ports, especially Ancona, the most exposed to danger, and to support with ample supplies of money the two Hapsburg brothers, whose extremity was the greatest. A commission of twelve Cardinals was appointed with full powers to deal with the whole Turkish question. The coming invasion of the Turks seemed all the more perilous as there were three opposing parties at strife in Hungary; Ferdinand and his adherents, Zapolya, and a party of independence led by Peter Perenyi. The friends of Francis I in Rome, including many of the Cardinals, had been trying for a long time to obtain from Clement the repeal of Zapolya’s excommunication. In spite of all the pressure brought to bear on him by the French party, Clement refused to give way, but, on the other hand, he told several Cardinals that Ferdinand, who was not in a position to subjugate Hungary, might hand over that kingdom to the Voivode, as the latter, once in tranquil possession of the country, would willingly break with the Turk and ally himself with the Christians. But the Pope took no decided step in favour of Zapolya. His intervention in the troubles of Hungary was confined to the despatch of a letter on the 17th of February 1532 exhorting all the inhabitants of the country to unite in their own defence against the infidels; their danger had reached the present pitch, he said expressly, owing to some among themselves having courted the favour of the Turks ; but they must not allow themselves to be deceived, only dishonourable subjection awaited them if they did not at once put aside their delusions.

It would have been of exceptional importance if Venice had taken a part in the Turkish war. In January 1532 Clement had already instructed Giberti to make represen­tations in this sense to the Signoria. The answer given to the Papal agent cut off all hope; Venice had no intention of interrupting the peace with the Turks. The tension between Venice and Rome on the question of the bishoprics was thus strained much further, and the Signoria went the length of imposing war taxes on the clergy without asking for the approval of the Pope. Clement felt himself deeply aggrieved by such conduct; he issued a Brief threatening excommunication to all rulers who demanded taxes of the clergy on their own sole authority. Attempts were made in vain on the part of the Republic to move Clement; he often said that the Republic had never shown respect to the Apostolic See. Once before, on an earlier occasion, he had remarked that the God of Venice was their own aggrandizement, they always tried to fish in troubled waters. How steady he was in his enmity to the over­weening policy of Venice is shown by the fantastic schemes propounded by him in May 1532 to Andrea da Burgo, concerning the reconstruction of political conditions in Hungary and Italy.

The intentions of the infidels continued to be the subject of the most varying reports in Rome during the spring of 1532. The Imperialists declared that all the rumours of Turkish invasion were inventions of the Venetians and French in their own interests. They gave this as their opinion until a letter arrived from the Emperor which left no further doubt as to the gravity of the situation.[203] A Turkish fleet of two hundred vessels was bound for Sicily and Apulia and a large army was to attack Hungary. The result of this news was a regular panic in Rome. The Pope declared on the 13th of March that he intended to levy taxes at the rate of 80,000 ducats a month for three months; it was matter of daily consultation how this sum was to be raised. Although at the Pope’s command processions passed through the streets offering up prayers of intercession, the fickle-minded Romans very soon recovered their tranquillity.

In the beginning of April Clement received letters from Constantinople dated the 18th of February; according to these an attack on Hungary was certainly impending; from the fleet, further reports declared, there was nothing to fear, as the ships would only make a demonstration. In May these reports were confirmed; nevertheless, Clement declared that all the measures of defence must be taken; he wished nothing to be omitted. He was active in three directions. In the first place, he pushed on the equipment of a fleet at Genoa under the command of Doria to ensure the safety of the Mediterranean. At the same time he was anxious for the protection of the coasts of Italy; Ancona in particular was to be strongly fortified. Lastly, the Emperor and his brother were to receive 40,000 ducats monthly as a subsidy. All this demanded an immense outlay of money, and innumer­able difficulties arose in obtaining it.

The situation was still further complicated by the bad behaviour of King Francis, whose intentions with regard to Italy scarcely admitted of doubt. He had demanded from the Pope, under a threat of apostasy, the grant of a double tithe on the Church revenues in consideration of the danger from the Turks. Clement gave his consent, but added the condition that ten French galleys should join the Imperial fleet under the command of Doria. The French King replied that this would be inconsistent with his honour. He had likewise, on first hearing of the Pope’s naval undertaking, launched out against Clement in very violent terms, in the presence of the Nuncio; he, the Pope, allowed himself to be plundered by the Emperor, who, under the cloak of the Turkish war, concealed designs against France; when the proper time came he, Francis, would come down on Italy with such a power that he would be able to drive thence Pope and Emperor. Let Clement look to it lest his protection of Genoa did not one day cost him the loss of Florence. All the Pope’s attempts to make Francis give way were unavailing. Urged and harassed by the Imperialists, distrusting the French, Clement at last had no other course open to him than to withdraw his consent, already given, to the appropriation by France of the ecclesiastical tithes.

The Pope addressed himself with all his energy to the fortification of Ancona, Ascoli, and Fano. Antonio da Sangallo was appointed master of the works; his plans for the fortification of Ancona are still to be seen in the Uffizi; a huge citadel arose manned in September by Papal troops. To the extreme dissatisfaction of Venice, the independence of Ancona was thus brought to an end, and the direct Papal authority established. This proceed­ing was uncommonly characteristic of the Pope; not less so was the sale of the legatine government of the marches of Ancona to Cardinal Benedetto Accolti for the sum of 19,000 ducats.

All manner of proposals were made to raise money for the Turkish war, but no one showed any readiness to make sacrifices for the cause, and the Cardinals refused to hear of a reduction of their incomes. But Clement on this point stood firm, and in a Consistory held on the 21st of June 1532, carried a resolution that the Cardinals should be included in the Bull imposing on the whole body of the Italian clergy the payment of half their yearly incomes. Later on a hearth-tax of one ducat was levied throughout the Papal States.

In the same Consistory of the 21st of June the despatch of Cardinal Ippolito de’ Medici to the Emperor and Ferdinand I was agreed to; the latter received 50,000 ducats for the pay of troops. The preparations for his journey were hurried on as quickly as possible. The Cardinal, who had always lived in the most secular manner, now assumed the Hungarian dress ; he has thus been painted in a masterpiece of Titian’s, now one of the ornaments of the Pitti Gallery. A robust figure clad in a reddish-brown garment with gold buttons; on the head a red biretta with peacocks’ feathers; the left hand grasps a scimitar, with the right he rests a Hungarian mace upon his knee. Ippolito de’ Medici, whose mission gave rise to various conjectures, left Rome on the 8th of July, and travelled by rapid stages to Regensburg, which he reached on the 12th of August.

A few days before, the Sultan with the bulk of his army had arrived before Guns, a few miles distant from the Austrian frontier. He at once opened the siege, but met with a very stout resistance. Nicholas Jurischitsch defended the small town with heroic determination and held out against the enemy until the 30th of August. The Sultan, who had set forth in true oriental pomp, reckoned on an easy victory on account of the divisions in Germany. On closer consideration he did not deem it advisable to risk a decisive battle at so advanced a season of the year and at such a distance from home; the accounts he had received of the strength of the Imperial army did not justify him in expecting a swift and certain triumph. Therefore the Turkish forces, after having made a rush forward as far as Oedenburg, fell back through Styria on Slavonia and Belgrade, suffering terrible losses on their way. In the Wienerwalde the army corps commanded by Kasimbeg was almost annihilated.

Misfortune also overtook the Turks by sea; for Andrea Doria was successful in sweeping the Ottoman fleet from the Ionian waters as well as in capturing Koron and Patras. To both these successes the Pope had materially contributed by his aid. Unfortunately, the hopes thus raised came to nothing; Doria did not think his forces sufficient for further enterprises, and returned to Genoa after plundering the territory of Corinth. Charles V also, notwithstanding the exhortations of Clement and Loaysa to follow up the advantages of the fortunate opening of the campaign, remained inactive. The accounts that reached him of the unruly and undisciplined spirit of his army, composed as it was of the most incongruous elements, made it appear to him inadvisable to persevere in the war except under the most urgent necessity. Not merely the Italian soldiers but many troops of the Empire refused to go into Hungary; the Protestants took up the cry that the aid supplied by the Empire was intended exclusively for the defence of Germany; they objected to strengthen the Catholic Ferdinand. Above all there was the danger threatening the Emperor from France and England, as well as the unfavourable condition of Italian affairs. The latter as well as the question of the Council seemed to call imperatively for a personal discussion with the Pope. Therefore Charles made up his mind that on his journey to Spain he would take Italy on his way.