CRISTO RAUL.ORG

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

On the day after his return to Rome, Clement assembled the Cardinals and conservators in order to confer with them on the restoration of the city. The Pope’s first care was to provide for the most pressing necessity, the import of articles of food, of which there was the greatest scarcity. Steps were also taken to set in order the despoiled churches, and to repair the destruction wrought on buildings. The business of the Curia now resumed its regular course; persons belonging to the court tried to install themselves as best they could. Life in the city showed signs of a complete change; the luxury and frivolity of previous days had vanished, for the general poverty stamped an impress of seriousness and gloom on everything. Instead of the throng of showy equipages, religious processions made their way through the deserted streets. The unlucky inhabitants were in want not only of nourishment but of clothing; traders from Venice and other places came in numbers, but hardly anyone had money to make purchases. Strangers were especially struck by the wretched plight of most of the Cardinals. Ecclesiastical ceremonies, even those in which the Pope took a part, were shorn of their splendour owing to the lack of ornaments and vestments. Yet, notwithstanding the general misery, the Pope was glad to be back in Rome, his own See.

While in Viterbo, Clement had published the nomination of Quiñones, the General of the Franciscans, then at the Emperor’s court, to the Cardinalate. He awaited his return, with more precise information as to the Emperor’s intentions, with anxious impatience. In the meanwhile the agents of the League, led by Contarini, were active in trying to hinder the advances of the Pope to the Emperor, and a new French envoy was also busy in the same direction as Contarini. These attempts were not, at the time, altogether without hope of success, for Charles V, with icy reserve, let the Pope feel that he was dependent on his favour. The Emperor’s servants in Italy did not fail their master in keeping up this impres­sion. The return of Quinones was delayed in such a remarkable manner that the Pope was nearly worn out with impatience. Expressions made use of by Clement VII and by his advisers as well, in November and the first half of December, show how heavily the Emperor’s preponderance weighed upon him, and how gladly he would have seen a weakening of the Imperial power, whether from the side of Bavaria or from that of the Voivode of Siebenbürgen.

The Pope had begun to despair of Quiñones’ return when, on the 17th of December 1528, came the intelligence that the latter had landed at Genoa in the company of Miguel Mai. This was welcome news, for now there seemed a certainty of ascertaining the Emperor’s position. On the 30th of December Quinones reached Rome, and was immediately provided with a lodging close to the Papal apartments. The hopes that the Emperor’s attitude would now be clearly explained proved illusory, for Quinones brought with him only civil speeches; all matters of detail were to be discussed with the Viceroy of Naples.

Contarini considered this a favourable moment for expending all his gifts of eloquence on the Pope in order to persuade him to renounce his claims on Cervia and Ravenna, and to win him over to the League. He thought it necessary to show all the more energy in the matter as a report was current that the Pope had a mind to lay Venice under an interdict. On the 4th of January 1529 he entered the Papal presence; he announced that he had come not as the envoy of Venice, but as an Italian, as a private personage and as a Christian, in order to submit to his Holiness his opinion on the state of affairs. The Pope having invited him to speak freely, Contarini set forth, in impressive language, that the whole question resolved itself into one point, namely, that at that given moment the Head of the Church should not, like the rulers of secular states, pursue particular interests only, but fix his eyes on the general welfare of Christendom, and thereby divert the other princes of Europe also from their purely selfish systems of policy. Proceeding further, Contarini suggested to the Pope nothing less than the renunciation of a portion, nay, even of the entirety, of the Papal States. “Let not your Holiness suppose,” he said, “that the welfare of the Church of Christ stands or falls with these morsels of worldly dominion. Before their acquisition the Church existed, and, indeed, existed at her best. She is the common possession of all Christians; the Papal States are like any other states of an Italian prince, therefore your Holiness must set in the forefront of your responsibilities the welfare of the true Church, which consists in the peace of Christendom, and allow the interests of the temporal states to fall for a time into the background.” The Pope made answer: “I well perceive that you are speaking the truth and that I, as one faithful to his trust, ought to act as you exhort me; but then, those on the other side ought to act in like manner. Nowadays it has come to pass that the craftiest man is held to be the most capable, and wins most applause in this world; of anyone who acts otherwise, all that is said is that he is a good-natured but impracticable fellow, and, with that, they leave him to himself.” Contarini rejoined: “If your Holiness were to explore all the contents of Holy Scripture, which cannot err, you would find that nothing is prized therein more highly than truth, virtue, goodness, and a noble purpose. On many private occasions I have tested this standard and found it true. Let your Holiness take courage and go on your way with a good intention, and God, without doubt, will support you and give you glory, and you will find the right path without toil and without intrigue.”

In his reply the Pope kept to his former standpoint. He referred to the danger of an alliance of the Emperor with Florence, Ferrara, and Venice. “You,” he added, “would be allowed to keep all that you have got, while I, as the good-natured man, who has been robbed of all his belongings, would be left where I am without a chance of recovering one single thing.” To Contarini’s assurance that Venice would not conclude a separate treaty with Charles apart from the other members of the League, the Pope replied with the remark, “With you everything depends on a single ballot.” All further representations of the Ambassador were in vain, although his words had not been without a certain effect. “I admit,” said Clement, “that the course you recommend would be the right one; otherwise Italy falls entirely into the power of the Emperor, and you will try to get some advantage from the Turkish danger. But I tell you, we have no common ground to meet on, and the good-natured man is treated as a simpleton.”

Contarini’s advice certainly sounds like that of an idealist; but a dispassionate critic will admit that the Venetian was confusing the interests of his native city and the still unrecovered independence of Italy with the welfare of Christendom. The Medici Pope did not try to conceal that he was a practical politician to the core; if, in an age when hardly anything was respected except material power, when political considerations controlled every question, even the purely ecclesiastical, he refused to renounce his secular sovereignty, he certainly was acting intelligibly from a merely human standpoint; but higher and more Christian conceptions were demanded in one holding the office of the Vicar of Christ. The pursuit of temporal power was to a certain extent fully justified, but ought always to have been subordinated to the supreme interest, that of devotion to the supernatural claims of the Church. That Clement only too often forgot this, throws a heavy shadow over his pontificate.

In January 1529 Quiñones went to Naples in order to negotiate on the spot for the surrender of Ostia and Civita Vecchia, the liberation of the hostages, and an understanding between the Emperor and the Pope. Clement also appointed Schonberg as his colleague, and sent a token of high distinction to the Viceroy. At this time Miguel Mai arrived in Rome to represent the Emperor, “a bold, unscrupulous character, wholly devoted to his master’s interests.” Mai announced that he had full powers to give back Ostia and Civita Vecchia; the restitution would take place as soon as he had spoken with the Pope. This was impossible, for, just at this juncture, Clement was taken with a serious illness, the consequence, very probably, of the agitation and suffering of the previous year.

In spite of a cold, contracted on the Feast of the Epiphany, in the Sixtine Chapel, Clement VII had held a Consistory on the 8th of January; thereupon he fell ill; on the evening of the 9th he was in a state of high fever, and the following morning his life was despaired of. Although an improvement set in, the case seemed to give so clear a warning of his approaching end that on the night of the 10th of January the Pope summoned the Cardinals to him and with their approval bestowed the purple on Ippolito de’ Medici. Somewhat earlier the same honour had been intended for Girolamo Doria, nephew of Andrea Doria, who had promised to relieve the scarcity of food in Rome. After some hesitation, all the Cardinals assented to this nomination also. On this occasion Clement declared to the Sacred College that if God restored him to health it was his intention to journey into Spain in order to restore peace to Christendom. During the next few days the condition of the sick Pontiff continued to be very critical, and on the. evening of the 15th of January Clement was so weak that it was not believed he could live through the night.

The sudden assembling of the Cardinals at the Vatican had already thrown the Romans into dismay, and the excitement was increased by the spread of more and more alarming accounts of the Pope’s illness. Not a few believed that he was already dead; the citizens began to arm. The Cardinals met together in the Palazzo Monte for consultation, as the doctors had for the moment given Clement up. Since Ostia and Civita Vecchia were still in the Imperialists’ hands, and the unruly host under Orange was still encamped at Naples, the freedom of a Papal election seemed in serious danger. The majority of the Cardinals were therefore of opinion that the conclave ought not to be held in Rome. Even Quiñones, with his Imperialist sympathies, took this standpoint, and feared a schism, the responsibility for which would be thrown on the Emperor. Miguel Mai declared later that Wolsey had roused the anxiety of the Cardinals as to the freedom of the conclave in order to induce them to transfer it to Avignon, where this ambitious churchman considered his election would be sure.

However that may be, it is a fact that the Cardinals took into consideration the issue of a Bull in which the seat of the conclave should be assigned to Bologna, Verona, Civita Casteliana, or Avignon. Cardinals Enkevoirt and Quiñones approached Mai secretly, and told him that if the fortified places were not given up immediately there would be an uproar in Rome. Almost all the Sacred College threatened him with dismissal in the event of the Pope’s death. “The majority of the Cardinals,” Mai was forced to inform the Emperor, “are unfriendly to me on account of the ruthless havoc committed by our soldiery throughout Italy, from Piedmont to Apulia.” It was seen on the Imperialist side that something must be done to allay the excitement. Accordingly, the Cardinals kept as hostages in Naples were set free, and the order was given for the surrender of Ostia and Civita Vecchia.

In the meantime Clement had made a remarkably quick recovery from his illness, although the fever did not wholly leave him; his condition varied from day to day, but remained so far stationary that it was impossible for him to grant audiences. It was feared in the Vatican that the constantly recurring fever would at last wear out the Pope’s strength, and a commission of Cardinals was appointed to despatch the most pressing business. On the 18th of February Clement had another bad attack, and the question of the freedom of election came once more to the front. The negotiations of the Cardinals over the delivery of Ostia and Civita Vecchia proved as fruitless as ever, for, in spite of the orders from Orange, communicated by Mai, the commandants of the fortresses refused to evacuate them until their soldiers’ clamours for pay had been satisfied. “If the Pope were to die,” reported Quinones to the Emperor, “before the fortresses belonging to him are given up, a schism will be inevitable.”

By the middle of February the report gained ground that the Emperor was making serious preparations for his descent upon Italy. These tidings aroused great excitement among the diplomatists resident in Rome; the Pope was greatly alarmed, and declared himself ready to visit Spain and France in person, accompanied by six or seven of the Cardinals, on a mission of peace­making, in order to show his impartiality towards King and Emperor alike.

The Pope’s neutrality was displeasing to the representatives of the Emperor and of the League. The former saw in the Pope’s projected journey only an attempt to thwart the expedition of Charles; the latter hoped that Clement, in his alarm at the Emperor’s coming, might be drawn to their side. Thus the Pope, not yet wholly recovered from his illness, became the occasion of a sharp diplomatic struggle in which neither threats nor enticements were spared on either side.

The Emperor’s agent, Miguel Mai, had been commissioned to obtain the Pope’s consent to an offensive, or, if this was not possible, at least to a defensive alliance. The League hoped to attain its object by inviting Giberti, who had so often already won Clement over to France, to come to Rome. On the 23rd of February the Bishop of Verona arrived. He was at once able to corroborate Contarini, that Clement was now more inclined to a general peace. But, he added, two things are necessary: in the first place, no one must try to force him to change his views; and, secondly, no one must give him cause for fresh complaint. This last hint referred to Ravenna and Cervia, which the Venetians, in spite of the pressure brought to bear on them, especially by England, had no intention of giving up.

Giberti was almost all day with the Pope, who was showing marked improvement. Even though their conversation has not been reported, it is yet easy to conjecture its import. The Imperialists were fully aware of the danger threatening them. Miguel Mai wrote angrily to the Emperor that “these devils of Leaguers are besieging the Pope might and main, and spinning round him a web of lies and artifices of all sorts.” Andrea da Burgo, the representative of Ferdinand I, also saw with anxiety how the Pope, in his alarm and indecision, was being plied with every possible promise by the French and English, and encouraged in his distrust of the Emperor. Already, on the 2nd of March 1529, he reported that the French were promising Cervia and Ravenna, and anything else that the Pope wished, if he would only declare himself for the League. From his timidity, and the wholly French character of his surrounding influences, Andrea, and many others with him, inferred that Clement would certainly not make any advances towards the Emperor and Ferdinand I; they ought to be glad, thought Andrea, if he remained neutral.

In the meantime the Pope’s condition had improved so much that on the 7th of March he was able to leave his bed, and his audiences, although on a limited scale, were resumed. On the 9th of March Burgo sent a report to Ferdinand on Mai’s negotiations with the Pope and Schonberg. Clement, in his conversation with Charles’s envoy, insisted on his duty of remaining neutral, and on his poverty, which was so great that he was hardly able to afford the upkeep of his household. He refused an alliance, offensive or defensive, with the Emperor. At the same time he again went over his plan of visiting France and Spain in person, and, with this object in view, he spoke of sending Schonberg to the Emperor, and Giberti to Francis I. To Burgo the absence of Schonberg seemed dangerous, for the latter was the Emperor’s most loyal representative in Rome, and in his audiences with the Pope expressed himself in the same way.

Miguel Mai was in close communication with the Cardinals as well as with the Pope: but he found out that the former were for the most part inclined towards France. Even if Mai, occasionally, had recourse to threats,  yet his chief endeavour was, by meeting the Pope’s wishes, especially in financial matters, to induce him to renounce his neutrality and ally himself with Charles. But in all their efforts to gain the Pope, the Imperialists sought to drive home the argument that Charles could give assistance towards the restoration of the Medici as rulers of Florence. To play on Clement’s fears, the League made use of the reports, then taking definite shape, of the approaching arrival of the Emperor in Italy. He was told that in the end Charles would make himself master of the whole of the Papal States.

The excitement occasioned by these transactions and the more threatening aspect of the divorce suit of Henry VIII brought on a relapse, and Clement was unable to celebrate Mass in St. Peter’s on Easter Day. On Easter Monday 18,000 ducats were paid into the hands of the Imperial envoy, whereupon Ostia and Civita Vecchia were restored to the Pope. At the same time came the sorrowful news of Castiglione’s death; this was a heavy loss for the Pope, for none stood higher in the Emperor’s favour than this gifted diplomatist.

The repeated promises of the Imperialists to render service to the Pope both in respect of the restoration of the Medici as rulers in Florence, and of the restitution of Cervia and Ravenna, could not fail to make a deep impression on Clement. But, amid the uncertainty of affairs in Italy, nothing was less easy than a decision, and thus he continued to hesitate. The feeling that, notwithstand­ing the surrender of Ostia and Civita Vecchia, his hands were as much tied as before, weighed heavily in the balance in favour of procrastination. On the whole, shrewd diplomatist that he was, Clement did not betray this; but sometimes his emotion had the mastery of him. Thus on the 9th of April he complained to Cardinal Trivulzio, whose  sympathies were French, of the way in which the Emperor’s agents tried to hurry him into a treaty with Charles. He would gladly withstand them if he could, but his position in this matter was still just as bad as it had been during his imprisonment in St. Angelo; the only difference consisted in this, that now, at least, he had personal liberty; in the former condition of things he had no other choice left him than to fly from Rome, leaving the Papal territory to its fate, or to come to the least disadvantageous terms with those whose troops were so close at hand that they might at any hour have overwhelmed him. “What the Pope will do in the last resort, I do not know”, wrote Trivulzio ; “it is certain that he is in the greatest anxiety and perplexity, and will avoid a settlement as long as possible. When at last he does make one he will be driven to it by main force, pulled along, as it were, by the hairs of his head.”

Trivulzio was mistaken, for a few days after his despatch was written, the Pope made up his mind. He had been greatly influenced by a personal letter from the Emperor, dated Toledo, the 28th of February, the contents of which were communicated to Contarini by the Pope on the 12th of April. Charles first of all congratulated his Holiness on his recovery, and then announced definitely his speedy voyage to Italy; he wished to start from Toledo as early as the 8th of March, since personal negotiations with his Holiness could alone conduce to that general peace for which the initial preparations must begin in Italy, the victim of so much calamity. Therefore by the 16th of April a new Nuncio to the Imperial court with full legatine powers was appointed to succeed Castiglione; this was Girolamo da Schio, Bishop of Vaison, Master of the Papal Household. This staunchly Imperialist diplomatist, who had kept up assiduous intercourse with Miguel Mai and Andrea da Burgo, received secret instructions from the Pope.

The complete reconciliation, the alliance between Emperor and Pope, was now close at hand, and with good reason, since the members of the League seemed deliberately to be doing their best to drive Clement into their adversary’s arms. Venice and Ferrara, now as before, refused to hand back their spoils, while France kept up a lingering warfare in upper and lower Italy, encouraged the obduracy of Florence, and even gave trouble to Clement in his own territory by protecting his enemies Malatesta Baglioni and the domineering Abbot of Farfa. “The misdeeds which can be laid to the account of the Leaguers”, said Salviati,  “are such that they must force the Pope to side with the Emperor.”

In addition to these considerations, it had been known in Rome since the beginning of April that France was prepared to make, single-handed, conditions of peace with the Emperor. Even Giberti said at the time, “I am afraid that the French may make a treaty of their own with the Emperor, and then put off their allies with fair speeches.” Contarini was not willing to believe this, but it was soon made evident that Giberti had discerned aright. With a full knowledge of the state of affairs, a further sojourn in Rome seemed superfluous to this skilled politician; under the pretext of compliance with the duty of residence in his diocese, he earnestly begged for permission to return. Contarini and the Pope detained him for some time longer, but he soon gave up all hope, and on the 26th of April, regardless of the entreaties of his friend Contarini, left Rome.

Undoubtedly the Pope’s attitude towards the Emperor was greatly influenced by the hope that, through the help of Charles, Florence would once more be governed by the Medici. With what dissimulation Clement tried to disguise this anticipation is described in the reports of Contarini and other diplomatists. He tried to keep the plan a secret even from his most trusted and intimate friends, but without success, for in the beginning of March Girolamo Balbi said to Andrea da Burgo that Clement wished nothing so much as a change of government in Florence.

Just at this moment news reached Rome of a turn in Florentine affairs which Clement attributed wholly to the help of Charles.

For a long time the Pope had hoped to attain his object in Florence by peaceable means. As long as Capponi, a well-disposed and moderate man, stood at the head of affairs there, this expectation was by no means altogether visionary, especially when the timid character of the Pope, then in such sore distress, is taken into consideration. Capponi formed a scheme for freeing his native city by means of an arrangement with the Pope; with Jacopo Salviati as a go-between, he opened up secret communications with Rome; their discovery led to his fall on the 17th of April 1529. His successor was Francesco Carducci, a violent partisan, in whose circle Clement was spoken of only as the tyrant and bastard. The hatred of this democrat towards the Medici made any accommodation impossible. The fate of Florence was thus decided; everything was done there to exasperate the Pope to the utmost. The half-forgotten fact of his illegitimate birth was dragged to light; he was made the butt of scorn and ridicule in verses and pictures, and his Papal authority was often repudiated.

On the 18th of April, Clement, as feudal lord of Perugia, had forbidden all its citizens, under threat of the severest penalties, to take foreign service. Nevertheless, on the 4th of May the Florentines appointed as their captain Malatesta Baglioni; further, they paid two hundred soldiers to occupy Perugia. Clement was carried away by anger, and declared to the English envoy he would rather be the Emperor’s chaplain or equerry than allow himself to be insulted by his rebellious subjects and vassals. To Contarini he declared that the disgraceful mortifications inflicted on him by the Abbot of Farfa and Baglioni were instigated by the French and Florentines. They had compelled him to look to his private interests and no longer to maintain an indeterminate position. He did not wish to be made prisoner a second time and be carried off to Florence. To the counter-representations of Contarini the Pope replied, “What ought I, in your opinion, to do? I have taken no decided course, and thereby given satisfaction to none; rather have I exposed myself to the contempt of all.” He feared that the peace negotiations between France and the Emperor would end badly for Italy, that both one and the other would leave him in the lurch as one who could not be safely relied on. “For appearance’ sake there will be a stipulation that I am to be the protector of the peace, and with that they will rest satisfied. I tell you, Ambassador,” said Clement in conclusion, “I am forced to act as I do. What do you wish me to do? I cannot act otherwise.”

The decisive step was taken in the first days of May. On the 7th of that month the Pope sent to the Emperor an autograph letter of thanks for the restoration of the fortresses. His illness had hindered him from sending an earlier answer; he now sends to him his Master of the Household, Girolamo da Schio, Bishop of Vaison, whom his Majesty can trust as he would Clement himself, since the Nuncio knows all the secrets of his heart. Schio, who carried together with this letter the Bull of the Cruzada and other tokens of grace, had full powers to conclude a treaty with the Emperor; he left Rome on the 9th of May. Two days later, Andrea da Burgo reported to Ferdinand I. this mission of such decisive importance, and the favourable dispositions of the Pope. Miguel Mai wrote at the same time to Charles V. that the choice of a Nuncio could not have fallen on a better man than Schio, since he was a person of marked distinction, and a good Imperialist at heart.

Schio embarked on the 25th of May at Genoa for Barcelona, where Charles had been staying since the 30th of April. The Emperor ordered preparations to be made to receive the Papal Nuncio with every mark of honour. He arrived on the 30th of May; the negotiations began at once, and ran very smoothly, and on the 10th of June Charles committed to Mercurino dl Gattinara, Louis de Praet, and Nicholas Perrenot the necessary powers. By the 23rd of June a compact relating to the marriage of Alessandro de’ Medici with Margaret, the Emperor’s natural daughter, had been concluded. There was no longer any possible doubt for whom Florence was intended. On the 29th the signatures were attached to the treaty, to which the Emperor on the same day bound himself by oath before the splendid high altar of the Cathedral of Barcelona.

In view of the Turkish encroachments and the trouble arising from heresy, a defensive alliance was struck between Pope and Emperor. The Emperor promised his help towards restoring the Medicean rule in Florence and reinstating the Church in her temporal possessions, by insisting on the restitution of Ravenna and Cervia on the part of Venice, and of Modena, Reggio, and Rubbiera on the part of Alfonso of Ferrara, the rights of the Empire being left unimpaired. The Duke of Ferrara was to be declared forfeited of his duchy, a fief of the Church, and the Emperor’s support was to be given to the execution of the Papal sentence. In taking possession of the Duchy of Milan, “the fountain-head of the troubles of Italy,” Charles, in the event of Sforza being found guilty of felony, would act in conjunction with the Pope, although not bound to do so legally. All arbitrary usurpation of the patronage of the Neapolitan bishoprics on the part of the Imperial Government would cease. All amicable means of dealing with the reform in Germany having been exhausted, Charles and Ferdinand, his brother, who was included in the terms of the treaty, were to take forcible measures for the suppression of that movement. The Pope, on his side, supported these undertakings. In the renewed assumption of the Neapolitan fief he contents himself with the palfrey tax (chinea, in Spanish hacanea), hands over to the Emperor and his successors the nomination to four-and-twenty Neapolitan-bishoprics, and permits the passage of Imperialist troops through the Papal territory. Two additional articles relate to the Pope’s support of the war against the Turks. Besides the spiritual means at his disposal, Clement promises to further the work by guaranteeing to Charles and Ferdinand, for this purpose, a fourth of the ecclesiastical revenues of their countries, on the same scale as under Adrian VI, and absolves the Imperial army from all the ecclesiastical penalties incurred in consequence of the attack on Rome. Lastly, Clement increases the privileges of the recently issued Bull of the Cruzada.

At the first glance it seems astonishing that Charles should have conceded such favourable terms to the despoiled and vanquished Pope. But on closer inspection the leniency of the Emperor admits of an easy explanation. In spite of all humiliation, the status of the Papacy in human society was still one of high importance. The friendship of Clement was an imperative necessity to Charles, unless his interests in England, in Scandinavia, in Switzerland, in Hungary, and Germany were to suffer the most grievous injury. Moreover, the exhaustion of the Imperial finances and the doubtful outlook of the continuation of the campaign in Italy came into consideration. Lastly, Charles hoped that his alliance with the Pope would deal a mortal blow to the League; and even if his concessions to Clement were considerable, his own interests in Italy were not nullified by the treaty.

The treaty of Barcelona accelerated the peace negotiations between Francis and Charles.

The contradictory reports from Lombardy had caused the French king to fluctuate between one policy and another. Sometimes he unfolded before the Italian envoys far-reaching plans of campaign, and spoke of attacking the Emperor in Spain or of leading in person a great army into Italy. But these were passing paroxysms of war­like ardour. One look at his kingdom would have told Francis that the burdens of war were no longer endurable. Then there was the dissatisfaction of the French Government with their English allies, who were liberal of critiism but not of money. The scheme for entering on peace negotiations grew in popularity at the French court. In November 1528 there were thoughts of appealing to the Pope’s mediation, but the notion was soon given up. There was a greater leaning towards the Regent of the Netherlands, the Archduchess Margaret, and the Queen Mother, Louisa of Savoy, entered into direct communication with the Archduchess in order to bring about a peace. Cardinal Salviati, in May 1529, was still disinclined to believe in the seriousness of these negotiations. Nevertheless, these two women, distinguished alike for intellectual qualities and political experience, succeeded in their difficult task.

The French Government showed consummate skill in concealing their transactions from the other members of the League. On the 23rd of June 1529 Francis declared to their envoys that he would sacrifice his own life and that of his son to save the allied Leaguers; the Queen and the Admiral, Anne de Montmorency, spoke in the same sense. On the 10th of July the latter made the most solemn disclaimer of the report that France intended to desert Venice. Twelve days later the King, with equal solemnity, swore that Florence would be included in the treaty of peace, and on the 3rd of August Francis still affirmed that nothing would be concluded without the consent of his allies. On the 5th the treaty was signed at Cambrai in which he completely threw them over. Up to the last there were still great difficulties to be overcome, but matters were brought quickly to a conclusion by the news that de Leyva’s victory over St. Pol at Landriano (21st of June) had made Charles master of Lombardy and at one with the Pope.

The treaty concluded by Francis was highly disadvantageous; he saved nothing except the integrity of his own country. He had to promise that thenceforward he would abstain from all interference in Italian and German affairs; within six weeks all his troops were to be withdrawn from Italy; he was to compel Venice and Ferrara to surrender the stolen cities; in case of necessity to expel with arms the Venetians from Apulia; he was to pay Charles for the expenses of his coronation journey 200,000 thalers and furnish him with twenty galleys, and his son was to be set free at a ransom of two million crowns.

In Rome the result of the negotiations at Barcelona and Cambrai had been watched with anxious attention, above all by Contarini, who, with the tenacity of a born diplomatist, had up to the last moment urged the cause of the League, but without the least success, on the Pope, who was still unwell. On the 17th of June Andrea da Burgo could report that Salviati, by order of the Pope, had told him that the latter rejected all the offers of the League. Two days earlier Schonberg had left Rome in order to take part in the negotiations at Cambrai. On the Feast of SS. Peter and Paul the Pope, in presence of all the Cardinals, received the “Chinea” from Miguel Mai; on the same day came the news of the overthrow of the French at Landriano. The reports then current as to the Emperor’s frame of mind justified Clement in having the best hopes. On the 15th of July the conclusion of the treaty with the Emperor was made known for certain in Rome through the Abbate de’ Negri. On the following day came the decision on the divorce suit of Henry VIII, which the Pope cited before the court of the Rota in Rome.

The treaty of Barcelona was conveyed to Italy by the Emperor’s special messenger, Louis de Praet, who arrived in Rome on the 22nd of July, where he was visited at once, by command of the Pope, by Salviati, Sanga, Alessandro de’ Medici, and Cardinal Ippolito. Nor was the remainder of the Sacred College, the majority of whom now showed Imperialist leanings, wanting in marks of attention. In the afternoon of the 24th of July, Praet, together with Mai and Burgo, had an audience of the Pope, whom they saw in bed, bearing evident traces of his long illness. Clement read the Emperor’s letter, brought to him by Praet, and expressed his delight at the peace, and his hope that Charles, on his arrival in Italy, would be a protection to the Holy See. For Florentine affairs he referred the Imperial envoys to Cardinal Pucci. After a conversation with this Prince of the Church, whose devotion to the Emperor and the Medici was entire, they had a second audience, on the 25th of July, in which the Pope, still forced to keep his bed, swore fidelity to the Treaty of Barcelona Salvos of musketry from the Vatican, St. Angelo, and the palaces of the Imperialists announced the great event to Rome. Clement’s condition having much improved by the end of July, the envoys were able to discuss with him personally the Florentine enterprise which Praet had warmly advocated with the Emperor. On Sunday, the 1st of August, the Pope participated in person at the thanksgiving service in St. Peter’s on the occasion of the conclusion of peace.

Some days before, Philibert, Prince of Orange, had made his entry with a body of fifteen hundred foot. The negotiations concerning the submission of Florence, with which those relating to Perugia were combined, now reached a definite stage. Since the Treaty of Barcelona contained no terms relating to the cost of the war with Florence, serious difficulties were not wanting. It was said that the ambitious Orange demanded for himself nothing less than the hand of Catherine de’ Medici, the Pope’s niece—a marriage which would have made him master of Florence. In Clement’s immediate circle it was pointed out to him that he would be exposing his native city to great peril if he turned against her an army composed of such different nationalities. Among those who opposed the Florentine expedition, Jacopo Salviati, Roberto Pucci, and Sanga were named—those, in fact, who were in the Pope’s confidence.

No wonder that Clement fell back on his usual vacillation. If there were difficulties in coming to an understanding, the blame lay to a great extent with the Florentines, who kept up their methods of provocation towards the Pope. They were not only in the closest alliance with Malatesta Baglioni, but also with that Abbot of Farfa who had already caused Clement so much trouble.

To this turbulent leader of faction they sent 3000 ducats towards the recruiting of troops; this sum, however, was intercepted by the Papal party, whereupon the Abbot determined on revenge. In the beginning of August Clement had sent Cardinals Farnese. Medici, and Quinones to greet the Emperor on his arrival at Genoa. Quinones was set upon in the hill forest of Viterbo and kept prisoner until the 3000 ducats were repaid. How  bitterly the Pope must have resented this unprecedented occurrence1 can easily be understood. An agreement on the question of the subjection of Florence and Perugia was arrived at by the special interposition of Cardinal Pucci, who from his private resources advanced such a considerable sum that Clement was able to dispose of 36,600 scudi. But with this he could only at first clear off a small instalment of his obligations, for, on the 17th of August, Clement had to concede the demands of Orange: 80,000 scudi to be paid down, 50,000 to be added after the capture of Florence, and a final 150000 to be raised by taxation on the city. The Pope, besides, was to support Orange with artillery and recruits, and once more Rome and the Papal territory became the scene of active military movements. The Pope’s thoughts henceforward were absorbed in this unhappy enterprise against his native city. On the 13th of August Mercurino da Gattinara received from Clement, now fully restored to health, the long-coveted rank of Cardinal, as a reward for his services in bringing the Treaty of Barcelona to a conclusion.