READING HALL "THIRD MILLENNIUM LIBRARY"

HISTORY OF THE POPES FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

POPE LEO X

1513-1521

BOOK ONE

THE POPE AND THE POWERS

CHAPTER I.

Election and Beginning of the Pontificate of Leo X.—His Efforts to make Peace.—End of the Schism of Pisa.

A GREAT pontificate had come to an end. Those Cardinals who attended the Conclave as possible candidates for the Papacy, must have asked themselves whether there were any one among them who could worthily fill the place of one whose rule had been as imposing as that of Julius II. Yet the number of claimants for the supreme dignity was unusually large. Ten, or, according to other accounts, eleven or even twelve Cardinals were eager competitors for the vacancy.

At the time of the death of Julius II, the Sacred College consisted of thirty-one members in all, of whom twenty at the most were then present in Rome. Five of those absent arrived in time, so that twenty-five Cardinals took part in the Papal election. Of these, nineteen were Italians (Riario, Grimani, Soderini, Vigerio, Fieschi, Adriano Castellesi, Leonardo Grosso della Rovere, Carretto da Finale, Sisto Gara della Rovere, Ciocchi del Monte, Accolti, Achille de Grassis, Sauli, Medici, Luigi d’Aragona, Cornaro, Farnese, Sigismondo Gonzaga, and Petrucci). Two were Spaniards (Remolino and Serra). To these were added the Frenchman Robert Challand, the German-Swiss Schinner, the Hungarian Bakócz, and the Englishman Bainbridge. One Cardinal, Raffaello Riario, owed his elevation to Sixtus IV, and another, Giovanni de’ Medici, owed his to Innocent VIII; while of the remainder, ten had been raised to the purple by Alexander VI, and thirteen by Julius II.

Discussions as to the Papal election had begun during the lifetime of Julius II. It was the common opinion that Raffaello Riario, Bakócz, and Grimani, notable for their riches and influence, and after them Fieschi, had the best chance of attaining to the supreme dignity; but this would be the case only if such unlawful means as bribery by money or by the gift of benefices were resorted to. Fortunately, this had been put out of the question by the severe Bull which Julius II had issued on the subject. No one, writes Cardinal Sigismondo Gonzaga, dared to act contrary to this Bull. The Romans, who considered the election of Grimani or of Bakócz as a foregone conclusion, found themselves entirely mistaken. The Venetian Ambassador, who naturally was interested in the claims of his beloved fellow-countryman Grimani, declared emphatically that a simoniacal election was out of the question, and that therefore the wealthy Cardinals were not likely to attain their object. If, continues the Ambassador, an irreproachable life is to give the preference, then, after Grimani, either Medici or Carretto da Finale must be taken into account.

The election of Grimani, of which the Venetians entertained great hopes, was rendered impossible by the opposition with which his candidature was met by the Emperor Maximilian’s representative, Count Carpi, as well as the Spanish Ambassador, Hieronymus de Vich. The favourite candidate of Spain was Raffaello Riario, while Maximilian steadfastly adhered to Adriano Castellesi. But the Sacred College was not inclined to consult the wishes of either of these princes, though they were fully agreed with them on the one point, that the Cardinals deposed by Julius II should not be allowed to take part in the Conclave.

Carvajal, the leader of the schismatic Cardinals, vainly applied to Maximilian to intercede with the Sacred College for him and his companions. Every prospect of their being admitted to the Papal election vanished in the face of the military precautions taken by the Spanish Government both by sea and land. Even the attempt made by France to stir up sedition in Rome through the Orsini, and thus obstruct the election, failed.

Apart from petty disturbances, the days of the vacancy of the Holy See, usually so stormy, passed by peacefully. A newsmonger of the time writes that never in the memory of man had a like quiet prevailed during any Conclave. This was partly owing to the effects of the strong rule of Julius II, and partly to the precautions taken by the Cardinals, and the promises they had made to the Romans. Even the States of the Church remained for the most part at peace, though Giampaolo Baglioni succeeded once more in taking possession of Perugia.

The Conclave was held on the second floor of the Palace of the Vatican, made for ever famous by Raphael's frescoes. The oath was administered to the custodians in the chapel of Nicholas V, and the business of the Conclave was carried on in the Sistine Chapel. Here there were erected for all the Cardinals, even those who were absent, with the exception of course of the schismatics, thirty-one cells, so small and dark that one of the Ambassadors likened them to the cells of a prison or hospital. These rooms were apportioned by lot, with the exception of those allotted to the three sick Cardinals, Sisto Gara della Rovere, Soderini, and Medici, for whom better apartments were set aside. The cell of Soderini was near the Cantoria, while those of both the others were near the door leading into the sacristy. Sisto Gara della Rovere was so ill that he had to be carried into the Conclave; and Cardinal de' Medici, who had arrived with all haste from Florence, suffering from a fistula, had to use a sedan-chair. Each Cardinal had with him several conclavists, besides whom there were two Secretaries to the Conclave, who were admitted inside. The key of the Conclave, at which there were present seventy-five persons exclusive of the Cardinals, were kept by the two Masters of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis and Blasius de Martinellis.

The Mass of the Holy Ghost, before the opening of the Conclave, was said by Cardinal Bakócz, on the morning of the 4th of March. It could not on this occasion be celebrated at the tomb of the Princes of the Apostles, owing to the rebuilding of St. Peter's, which was in progress. It was said instead in the chapel of St. Andrew. The usual opening discourse was delivered by Bishop Petrus Flores. In stringent language this Spaniard exhorted the Conclave to elect as Pope a man who would bring peace to Italy, protect Christendom against the Turks, carry on the reform of ecclesiastical matters, and be able generally to cope with the difficulties of the situation. The speaker laid especial stress on the Bull of Julius II, which had been directed against simony, as on a sacred law. This over, the Cardinals entered into Conclave. Adriano Castellesi arrived only on the evening of that day, bringing the number of electors up to twenty-five.

The arbitrariness and powerful will of Julius II were so fresh in the memory of all the Cardinals, that their first action was to draw up an election capitulation, which was sworn to by all the Cardinals on the 9th of March. This consisted of public and secret articles. The former concerned the war against the Turks, as well as the revenues to be applied to it, more especially the exemption from taxation of the Cardinals; the reformation of the Roman Curia both in its Head and members; the immediate carrying out of the measures introduced in respect of this by Julius II, as well as regulations regarding the residence of the Curia in Rome. It was emphatically laid down in these articles that at least two-thirds of the Sacred College must be agreed as to any proceedings taken against any of its members, as to the nomination of new Cardinals, and Legates de latere, as to the conferring of a variety of ecclesiastical offices, and finally, as to the government of the States of the Church, from which the laity were almost entirely excluded. To show the importance of the Council of the Lateran in the matter of the reformation of the Church, as well as in that of the war against the Turks, a special decree bound the future Pope to continue and close it. But it could be neither dissolved nor suspended before it had discharged these duties, without the consent of the majority of the Sacred College.

The secret articles of the capitulation related chiefly to the privileges of the Cardinals. Among other things it was laid down that any Cardinal who did not possess an income of 6000 ducats should receive a monthly allowance of 200 ducats, that no one should be appointed Legate against his will, and that all the benefices attached to St. Peter's and St. John Lateran should be conferred on Roman citizens only. Finally, the Pope elected should consent to the division among individual Cardinals of all offices, towns, castles, and jurisdiction belonging to the States of the Church.

As has been truly remarked, there is a peculiar irony in the fact that just at the time when complaints were being made against Papal absolutism, the new Head of the Church should have had his hands thus tied in the most important matters. Even the Imperial Ambassador declared that the newly-elected Pontiff would be only half a Pope if he observed this capitulation, to do which, however, he added, no one could force him, seeing that he received unlimited power from God. In fact, the laying down of conditions was so overdone that they could not be carried out. As they were uncanonical, the Cardinals were bound before long to consent to their abolition.

The Bull of Julius II against simony having been read on the 10th of March, a scrutiny could be delayed no longer. It could be seen by its result that no issue had been staked, for the electors had sought to conceal their own real object for the sake of finding out that of their opponents. The Spaniard Serra, who stood in no high repute, received most (fourteen) votes; but no one thought seriously of the elevation to the Papal See of this fellow-countryman of Alexander VI. Next to Serra came Leonardo Grosso della Rovere with eight, Accolti and Bakócz each with seven, Fieschi and Finale each with six votes, while Grimani received only two, and Raffaello Riario none at all. Among those who received only one vote at this scrutiny was Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici. Yet, on the evening of the same day, his election as Pope was almost a certainty. Medici's supporters watched through the whole night to prevent a possible counter-movement. Early on the 11th of March the votes were taken again in due order, with the result that the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent was declared to have been elected Pope.

The event was contrary to the expectations of most of those concerned. As to the immediate circumstances, we possess the accounts of the Imperial, Venetian, and Florentine Ambassadors, as well as a letter of Cardinal Sigismondo Gonzaga, all of which agree in essentials. We can gather from these that outside influences told, but little on the result of the election, which was due rather to the division of the Sacred College into the old and the young Cardinals, and the astute measures by which the latter turned the scale. With great skill the supporters of Medici had kept his candidature secret until the right moment. This explains why, in the first scrutiny, Medici received only the one vote of Cardinal Schinner. The chief objection to his elevation to the Papacy lay in his extreme youth. But here he was helped by the circumstance that even while the Conclave was sitting, he had to go through an operation for the fistula from which he was suffering. This seemed to exclude all likelihood of his reaching an advanced age.

But what commended Medici most to the electors was the brilliant name of his family, the prominent position he had held under Julius II, and the part taken by him against France, to say nothing of his personal qualities, his love of peace, his generosity, and his blameless morals. All these attracted the younger Cardinals, who trusted to his gentleness, kindness, and indulgence.

The political reasons which contributed to the election of Medici are drawn up by the historian Francesco Vettori. “It was hoped”, he writes, “that one who held sway in Florence would be powerful enough to resist both Spain and France, the two great powers which contended for supremacy in Italy, and therefore in Europe”. The cause of the outvoting of the older Cardinals was to be found chiefly in their want of unity and decision, whereas the younger (Sauli, Cornaro, Luigi d'Aragona, Petrucci, Gonzaga, Ciocchi) held firmly together. A great impression had been made on them by the reconciliation between Medici and Soderini, to which the latter had consented immediately before the opening of the Conclave. He preferred to further the promotion of the adversary of his family interests than see Raffaello Riario Pope. Schinner, who, by the desire of the Imperial Ambassador, had to work against both the Venetian and French candidates, also opposed Riario for personal reasons. Castellesi and Luigi d'Aragona also objected to Riario. Nevertheless, during the earlier days of the Conclave, Riario was a formidable rival to Medici, for some even of the younger Cardinals were inclined to favour the nephew of Sixtus IV. This aroused the jealousy of some of the older Cardinals, who now went over to the side of Medici, among them being Adriano Castellesi, who had been hitherto one of his most violent opponents. Finally, Riario gave up all hopes of his own election, and secured for his rival the votes of his own adherents

One formidable opponent to Medici alone remained—the Primate of Hungary, Bakócz, whom Julius II had summoned to Rome. The Council of Pisa, convened in the interests of France, threatened the ecclesiastical unity of the west, and it had seemed necessary to be assured of the obedience of Hungary. This rich, ambitious, and very capable Prince of the Church reckoned on the help of Venice on behalf of his own candidature, and had promised, in the event of his election, an energetic prosecution of the war against the Turks. The only important thing that told against him was that he was not an Italian. Medici's private secretary and conclavist, the eloquent and gifted Bernardo Dovizi Bibbiena, worked for his master's election with extraordinary skill; and at last the obstinacy of the older Cardinals, who had threatened to make a demonstration by leaving the Conclave, gave way under the stress of circumstances.

It was unanimously declared by all parties that the election of Medici had been effected without simony. All attempts of the electors to communicate with the outside world had been energetically prevented ; and after certain figures had been found cut on the silver dishes, the Cardinals were given nothing but earthenware for their use.

As senior Cardinal-deacon, it was Medici's lot to read out the voting papers. The Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, remarks that he did this modestly and calmly. He took the name of Leo, and adopted as his motto the words of the first verse of the hundred and nineteenth Psalm : “In my trouble I cried to the Lord; and He heard me”.

Cardinal Farnese announced the result of the election to the people outside, who received it with demonstrations of joy. The cry of “Palle! palle!” (the name for the balls on the arms of the Medici) resounded through the streets of the Eternal City. The Florentine merchants residing in Rome outdid each other in testifying their joy. The astonishment caused by the election of a man not yet thirty-eight years of age was so great that many would scarcely believe the result of the Conclave. If some passed an unfavourable judgment on the election on account of the youth of the Pope, if others amused themselves with making satirical allusions to his weak eyes, as a general rule the joy was unaffected, for Giovanni de' Medici was one of the most popular members of the Sacred College. “It was the best choice which could have been made”, said the Swiss Envoy, Peter Falk; “for Giovanni de' Medici inclines to peace, and is as gentle and temperate as Julius II was violent and harsh. For a century the Church has had no Pope to be compared with this one. Everyone congratulates himself on this election. Only the older Cardinals cannot conceal their disappointment at the elevation of a man so young as to seem to cut off all their hopes of ever attaining to the supreme dignity”.

Other towns, especially Siena, had greater misgivings than had Rome lest the young Pope should not be equal to his heavy burden. It was also thought that Leo X might show too much favour to his relations and fellow­countrymen. Stress also was laid on his naturally complaisant and weak character. But on the other hand it was argued that a man of his spotless reputation must prove to be a good and peace-loving Pope, whose pontificate would be useful to the Church.

All the enemies of France in Rome rejoiced at the election; though many did not trust to the firmness of Leo X. In Florence, however, the satisfaction was quite unbounded, when the news of his election reached that city only ten hours after it had taken place. No expense was begrudged to celebrate the great event; for this was the first time that a son of the city on the Arno had attained to the supreme dignity. The friends of the Medici deluded themselves with the wildest hopes, while even their enemies had to keep quiet and wait for further developments. But even in Florence there were not wanting those who feared for the liberty of their native city, while others, like true merchants, calculated the advantages which the event might bring to themselves.

Among the European princes no one hailed the result of the election with greater joy than Ferdinand the Catholic. Zurita reports that the King had declared that the birth of an heir, the conquest of Granada, and Medici’s elevation to the Papacy were the three happiest events in his life.

What is remarkable is that the election of Leo X was favourably received even in France. Louis XII remarked that he who had been raised to the supreme dignity was a good man, from whom therefore nothing but good was to be expected. The Emperor Maximilian’s Ambassador in Rome, Alberto Pio, Count of Carpi, reveals to us the expectations formed in diplomatic circles regarding the new Pope. After a description of the election, he writes as follows : “The Pope, so far as we are able as yet to form an opinion, will act as a gentle lamb rather than as a fierce lion, and will be a promoter of peace rather than of war. He will fulfil his duties conscientiously. Though it is true that he will not be the friend of the French, he will not be their bitter enemy, as was Julius II. Careful of his honour and good repute, he will patronize the learned, orators, poets and musicians; he will erect buildings, and will not neglect either his religious duties or his care for the States of the Church. With the exception of war against the infidels, he will not be drawn into any other, except under grave provocation, and when, as it were, forced to it. What he begins, that also will he complete; he will act circumspectly and indulgently. Truly”, adds Carpi, “the mind of man is variable”.

Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici was the second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent and Clarissa Orsini, being born on the 11th of December, 1475. He was destined by his father for the ecclesiastical state at an age so early as to preclude all possibility of his free consent. Having been given the tonsure when only seven years of age, he soon, thanks to the powerful influence of his family, received the gift of many rich benefices, abbeys and dignities; and on the 9th of March, 1489, was made Cardinal. Innocent VIII consented most unwillingly to the elevation to the purple of this thirteen-year-old boy, and decreed especially that for the next three years Giovanni should neither wear the outward insignia of his dignity nor have either vote or seat in the College of Cardinals. The classical education of the child-prince was undertaken by the most able humanists and learned men of the time, Angelo Poliziano and Bernardo Bibiena, as well as the holy Marsilio Ficino, who had made the hazardous attempt to combine the platonic cultus with Christianity.

From 1489 till 1491 Giovanni de' Medici studied theology and canon law with Filippo Decio and Bartolomeo Sozzini at Pisa. On the 9th of March, 1492, he was invested with the insignia of the Cardinalate in the Abbey of Fiesole, and on the 25th of the same month he went to Rome, where he was received on the following day by Innocent VIII. It was not without anxiety that Lorenzo de' Medici allowed the young Cardinal-deacon of S. Maria in Domnica, who had till then led a pure and steady life, to go to the capital of the world, “the meeting-place of all vices”. This is shown by the beautiful letter, full of earnest exhortations and prudent rules of life, which he wrote at that time to his son.

The death of his father in 1492 recalled the seventeen­year-old Cardinal to Florence, whence he returned to Rome in July to take part in the Conclave; after which, when, much against his wishes, Alexander VI was elected Pope, he returned once more to his native city. There he remained till the catastrophe of 1494, which compelled him to escape from Florence disguised as a Franciscan. He who had been the favourite of fortune, now came across the more serious side of life for the first time. To a time of enjoyment there now succeeded the anxieties of a fugitive life. Giovanni, like his brother Piero, did not give up all hope of his family's recovery of what it had lost, and by word and deed took part in all the efforts to restore the Medici to power. But after his hopes had been shattered three times, he travelled for some years in Germany, the Netherlands, and France.

When Giovanni returned to Italy in May, 1500, the changes in the political situation made it advisable for him to settle in Rome. There he lived in the palace of Sant' Eustachio, now the Palazzo Madama, surrounded by antiquities, statues, pictures, and a select library, and devoted himself to the literary and artistic interests which were traditional in his family.

The year 1503 brought with it both the Papal election and the sudden death of Piero de' Medici. Giovanni, who was now the head of the family, did not disguise from himself that nothing but a change in the political situation could restore to his family the dominion over Florence. As a consequence of his widespread patronage, his great generosity, and his poor knowledge of business, he often found himself in very difficult circumstances; but in spite of all his difficulties he firmly believed in his lucky star. According to him it was fortune which raised men to distinction ; and with this he consoled his family. Nothing could fail them, unless they themselves gave in. As for him, however empty his coffers, he continued his generosity to learned and literary men, musicians and artists. This generosity pleased the Romans quite as much as did the gentleness and affability of the Cardinal of S. Maria in Domenica, who became one of the favourite members of the Sacred College.

The light-heartedness of Cardinal de' Medici was remarkable; and it never forsook him, even under the most painful circumstances. It is true that the son of Lorenzo led a more worldly life than did many of the older Cardinals; yet he was distinguished above all for his dignity and the decorum of his deportment.

After long, troubled years, towards the end of the pontificate of Julius II, fortune smiled once more on him who had been so sorely tried. On the 1st of October, 1511 , he was appointed Legate to Bologna and the Romagna. Before this, Cardinal de' Medici had afforded a proof of his trust in his lucky star; for during the severe illness of Julius II in August, 1511, Giovanni was one of those who put themselves forward as candidates for the triple crown. Though the recovery of the Pope put an end to all hopes of an immediate elevation to the supreme dignity, the prospect of a restoration to power of his family dawned on Cardinal de' Medici. So long as the Florentine Republic favoured the Pisa schismatics, Julius would take part with the Medici. In fact, their fate depended on the success of the Spanish-Papal army, with which Cardinal de' Medici remained as Legate. The slowness with which he acted in that capacity did not at all come up to the expectations of the fiery della Rovere, though he justified his delays sufficiently to retain his post. Once more, however, was he to experience the fickleness of fortune. On the 11th of April, 1512, the Spanish-Papal army suffered a severe defeat at Ravenna, at which Cardinal de’ Medici was taken prisoner and carried off to Milan. When he was there, Julius II sent him powers to grant absolution from ecclesiastical censures to the numerous Frenchmen who besought that grace; and ere long the captive saw himself surrounded by suppliants. When, in their turn, the French suffered a reverse, it was arranged that Cardinal de’ Medici should be taken to France. But here the proverbial good fortune of his family asserted itself, for, while crossing the Po, he succeeded in evading his captors and escaped to Bologna.

It was not hard to make Julius II understand that nothing but a change in the government of Florence could destroy the French influence in central Italy. When war was in consequence declared against Florence, Cardinal de’ Medici, in the retinue of Cardona, trod once more the soil of his native country. He was witness of the plundering of Prato, where he vainly tried to moderate the brutality of the Spaniards. After a bloodless revolution had restored the dominion of his family in Florence, the Cardinal went to live there on the 14th of September, 1512. But although both he and his brother Giuliano did all they could to find favour, the city remained in a state of disturbance. A plot for the overthrow of the Medici had just been brought to light when the news of the death of Julius II called the Cardinal with all speed to Rome, to take part in the Conclave from which he came forth Pope.

At the early age of thirty-eight he had with almost un precedented celerity risen to the supreme dignity. What a fate had his been! Banished, imprisoned, liberated, at one time Lord of Florence, and now Supreme Head of the Church! What wonder that men of letters could not tire of extolling this favourite and conqueror of fortune in verse and inscription.

As Leo was only deacon, he was ordained priest on the 15th of March and consecrated Bishop on the 17th. As Holy Week was so near at hand, his coronation had to take place at once, and was fixed for Saturday the 19th, the Feast of St. Joseph, although, according to custom, the ceremony had to take place on a Sunday. In spite of the short time allowed for preparations, the function was carried out with great splendour. Cardinal Farnese placed on the head of the new Pontiff a tiara made specially for the occasion, set with rich pearls and precious stones. According to an ancient custom, the Pope was wont to confer many and generous favours, especially on the Cardinals. The demands this time were so many and exorbitant, that Leo, smiling, said to the Cardinals that they had better at once take his crown, for then, being popes, they could grant to themselves all that they wished.

On the following day, at the celebration of Palm Sunday, Leo X rejected the use of the Sedia Gestatoria, remarking that, as he was so young, he did not need any assistance of the kind. At the washing of the feet on Maundy Thursday, the Pope really kissed the feet of the poor men. The ceremony, said he, ought to take place in reality and not only in appearance. It was the same with all the other striking solemnities of Holy Week. Leo X took part in them with great recollection, and a close observance of the ritual. The demolition of St. Peter’s, then in progress, made it impossible to celebrate the high mass on Easter Sunday in that basilica. The Sistine Chapel was therefore selected in its stead, with no detriment to the solemnity. On the contrary, as remarks the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, the Papal majesty could be displayed to better effect in the smaller space.

On the 1st of April, the Romans were made happy by the removal of the tax on wine and flour. On the 4th, the first Consistory was held, at which Paris de Grassis was made Bishop of Pesaro. At this ceremony the Pope appeared in a plain mitre without jewels. But, on the other hand, no kind of splendour was omitted in the ceremony of taking possession of the Lateran, for which great preparations were made. It was fixed for the 11th of April, the Feast of St. Leo, as well as the anniversary of the capture of Leo X at Ravenna. This was done so that that unlucky day might be changed into a day of rejoicing.

The most extensive preparations for the decoration of the streets were made. All that the Rome of Raphael could produce in the way of antiquities and art was made to contribute to the glory of the Medici. The important occasion of the “Possesso”, or taking possession of the Church of the Popes, was intended to usher in not only a new era of artistic magnificence, but also that of peace. On the 10th of April, at the request of Bibbiena and of Cardinal Luigi d'Aragona, certain censures pronounced on Duke Alfonso of Ferrara by Julius II were removed in order that that prince might be able to take part in the solemnity arrayed in all his ducal splendour.

The weather smiled on the triumphal procession; and when this had been marshalled by Paris de Grassis, Master of Ceremonies, the Pope appeared. The Duke of Ferrara led his horse, and held the bridle till the fountain in the Piazza of St. Peter's was reached. There he was relieved by Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino, Giovan Maria da Varano, Lord of Camerino, and the Pope’s nephew, Lorenzo de' Medici.

The procession was the most magnificent spectacle which Rome had witnessed since the days of the Emperors. It was headed by two hundred mounted lancers, and the inferior members of the household of the Pope and Cardinals. The bands of musicians who attended these, wearing the Papal livery of white, red, and green, with the Medici badge on their breasts, were a brilliant sight. Then followed the standards of the twelve Papal cursori and the thirteen representatives of the Rioni, and the banner of the University, with its device of a flame­coloured cherub. The great red standard of Rome, with its golden letters S.P.Q.R (Senatus Populusque Romanus) was borne by Giovan Giorgio Cesarini. With him ranked the Procurator of the Teutonic Order of Knights, carrying their white banner surmounted by a black cross; the Prior of the Knights of St. John with the banner of the Order—red silk with a white cross. The banner of the Captain-General followed, and, last of all, the Gonfaloniere of the Church.

Then came the Papal Marshal, with nine white horses and three white mules, with red trappings embroidered in gold; the Master of the Horse, clad in red, and the numerous chamberlains of honour, two of whom carried the mitre, set with pearls and precious stones, and two others the tiara, decorated with priceless gems. The brilliant group of knights, of the Roman and Florentine nobility, recalled the mediaeval history of Italy. There were the Colonna, Orsini, Savelli, Conti, Santa Croce, Gaetani, Medici, Soderini, Tornabuoni, Salviati, Pucci, Strozzi, all magnificently arrayed, and each attended by a numerous and brilliant suite. This stately procession included the diplomatic body; first the Envoys of the provinces and towns belonging to the States of the Church; then the Ambassadors from Florence, Venice, Spain, and France; and lastly, riding between Jacopo Salviati and the Senator of Rome, the representative of the Empire. At the end of the cavalcade of gentlemen who bore no arms, could be seen the Duke of Urbino, clad in mourning for the death of his uncle, Julius II, and the nephew of Leo X, Lorenzo de' Medici.

The spiritual court of the Pope presented a picture no less brilliantly coloured : first there were the ostiarii, then the three apostolic sub-deacons, carrying a great gold cross, preceded the white palfreys, which carried on their backs the tabernacle, containing the Most Holy Sacrament, over which four Roman citizens held a canopy, surrounded by twenty-five grooms with wax torches. Immediately behind came the sacristan, with a white staff in his hand, a secretary, and a consistorial advocate. The two accompanying “sea-prefects” recalled a time long since passed.

The Papal choir followed, then the clerics of the apostolic treasury, the consistorial advocates, and the Master of the Sacred Palace. After these came two hundred and fifty abbots, bishops and archbishops, and lastly the Cardinals, according to their rank, each accompanied by eight chamberlains. Between Cardinal Gonzaga and Cardinal Petrucci could be seen Alfonso of Ferrara, clad in his ducal mantle, embroidered in gold. Then followed the Swiss Guard, magnificent men, of erect carriage, with glittering armour and picturesque uniform. These heralded the approach of the Pope.

Under a canopy, borne by Roman citizens, rode Leo X, attired with all the insignia of his Papal dignity, and his tiara, sparkling with jewels, on his head. He was mounted on the same Turkish horse which he was riding a year previously, when taken prisoner by the French at the bloody battle of Ravenna. The Holy Father was immediately followed by the Maestro di Camera and several other chamberlains, by whom gold and silver coins were thrown among the crowd. A number of protonotaries followed, and, finally, the macerius with the Pope’s ombrellino. Four hundred knights wound up the procession.

An immense crowd filled all the streets of the so-called “via papale”, through which the procession had to pass on its long journey to the Lateran. Even nature seemed to share in the general joy, for it was one of those glorious days of a Roman spring, when the sun, shining out of the deep blue sky, sheds a blinding light over everything.

Near the bridge of St. Angelo there was erected a stand for the representatives of the Jewish community in Rome, in front of which the Pope stopped in order to receive, according to custom, the scroll of the law, and signify his rejection of its false interpretation. On the further end of the same bridge the first of the triumphal arches was erected, on which this inscription could be read : “To Leo the Tenth, the promoter of ecclesiastical unity and peace among Christian nations”. At the entrance to the Via Giulia there stood a second arch. Many others were erected on the way to the Lateran. Inside that basilica, reaching from the portico to the high altar, a stage was put up, about ten feet high and twenty broad, for the exclusive use of those who took part in the ceremony. After all the usual ceremonies had been performed in the Council Hall, the Chapel of St. Silvester, and the sancta sanctorum, a brilliant banquet was prepared in the Palace. Dusk set in during the return journey, and the illumination of the houses had begun.

The streets which formed the processional route were decorated with silken draperies, either worked in gold or painted, mingled with garlands of foliage and bright flowers. All the windows were full of spectators, while crowds thronged round the houses, keeping up their cry of “Leo!" or “Palle, palle!”. The lower clergy of the city, in order to pay their homage to the Supreme Head of the Church, clustered round the beautifully adorned altars which were set up at intervals along the streets. In marked contrast with these were the antique statues which had been placed in front of some of the houses. In still greater contrast were the numerous triumphal arches, which “after the manner of ancient Rome”, as says Giovio, were the chief adornment of the city on this festal occasion. On the very first of these, which had been set up by Raffaello Petrucci, Bishop of Grosseto and Castellan of St. Angelo, facing the bridge already mentioned, there could be seen Apollo and his lyre : though alongside of him was a representation of Christ delivering the keys to St. Peter. On the arch of the Florentine merchants could be seen the Baptism of Christ by St. John, while further on were SS. Peter and Paul, and SS. Cosmas and Damian, the patron saints of the Medici, with their arms and badges, mixed up with interesting allusions to ecclesiastical politics. The same sort of thing was to be seen on the arch put up by the Master of the Papal mint, Johannes Zink. Among other devices was a representation of kings paying homage to the Pope, and a session of the Lateran Council, with the inscription : “Thou wilt conclude the Council, and wilt be called the Reformer of the Church”.

The most artistic arches had been erected by the wealthy bankers. That put up by Agostino Chigi, near his house in the Via del Banco di Santo Spirito, surpassed all the others. On it was the inscription : “To Leo the Tenth, the happy restorer of peace!”. But, as befitted the worldly mind of Chigi, nearly all the figures on his arch were pagan : Apollo, Mercury, Pallas, nymphs and centaurs. Here, in golden letters, was to be read the satire, so soon to become famous, referring to the reigns of Alexander VI and Julius II, which at the same time expressed the hopes held by the humanists as regarded Leo X.

First Venus ruled ; then came the god of war ;

Now, great Minerva, it is thy day that dawns.

The celebrated goldsmith, Antonio di San Marino, responded to this in a way quite in harmony with the worldliness of Rome. He placed a statue of Venus over his house with this inscription :

Mars has reigned ; Pallas has followed;

 but the reign of Venus will never end.

Italian verses also could be seen under various statues. The arch put up in the Piazza di Parione by Ferdinando Ponzetti, the clerical chamberlain, was decorated with Perseus, Apollo, Moses, Mercury, and Diana, in addition to which was a representation of Cardinal de' Medici's rescue at the battle of Ravenna. No one was scandalized by this mixture of Christianity and paganism. One Bishop, after wards Cardinal Andrea della Valle, adorned his arch with nothing but antique statues : Apollo, Bacchus, Mercury, Hercules, Venus. A Roman patrician, Evangelista de' Rossi, had the largest collection of antique sculptures dis played for show at his house. Innumerable were the inscriptions which hailed Leo as the patron of learning. One floral arch at the Pellicceria bore the inscription : “Destiny has been fulfilled!”. The house of the Genoese banker, Sauli, had erected a truly artistic arch, from which a boy stepped forth and recited Latin verse. An inscription on this arch hailed the Pope as the day-star of peace.

On this great festival, celebrated in Leo’s honour, many inscriptions and emblems alluded to the love of peace of the newly-elected Pope, who would, so said those who extolled him, extend to the wider field of his high position the gentleness and moderation by which he had been so well known heretofore. The harshness and violence of Julius II were so fresh in the memory of all men that his fortunate successor basked in the sunshine of popularity without any particular effort on his own part. The humanists, of whom the new Pope had been, even as a Cardinal, the friend and patron, proclaimed on all sides that now the iron age had given way to the golden. No doubt it was in the mind of Leo to fulfil these expectations and prove himself to be the most generous of patrons; but this was not all, for, at the beginning of his pontificate, he seemed eager to justify the good opinion held of him, on ecclesiastical and political grounds also.

As early as the 29th of March, 1513, the Pope’s nephew, Giulio de' Medici, who was more versed than any, except Bibbiena, in the secrets of politics, announced to Giuliano de' Medici, the sole surviving brother of the Pope in Florence, that His Holiness’s sole care henceforward would be to give to Christendom the much-needed peace, in ecclesiastical as well as in political matters. The termination of the schism of Pisa, the prevention of fresh wars in Italy, the maintenance of the States of the Church, the union, as far as was possible, of the Christian princes for the defence of Europe against the Turks, were great undertakings, the accomplishment of which demanded a well-nigh superhuman power. The future alone could decide whether the Medici Pope was the man to do it.

The first measures of Leo X tended to confirm the good opinion formed of his desire for peace, as well as of his prudence and magnanimity. The severity with which the conspiracy of the Boscoli against the Medicean rule in Florence had been suppressed, was not at all to his mind. The historians Giovio and Nerli are of opinion that the Pope would have wished to pardon the offenders, had not the Florentine government ordered their execution as soon as sentence had been passed on them. He did, however, succeed in effecting the liberation of the other prisoners. The Soderini, the implacable antagonists of the Medici, were reconciled by the Pope’s magnanimity. Pietro Soderini, who was living in exile at Ragusa, was allowed by the Pope to return to Rome, having his confiscated possessions restored to him at the same time. In order to put an end to enmity in the future, a marriage was proposed between a Medici and a Soderini. Leo, further, did his best to win over the turbulent Pompeo Colonna by holding out offers of pardon and reinstatement. There was even question of a complete reconciliation with the d'Este and Bentivogli. A commission of Cardinals was appointed to negotiate with both, and in June peace was arranged with the latter.

Leo’s attitude towards the schismatic Cardinals was one of magnanimity and forbearance. Their leaders, Carvajal and Sanseverino, were in the hands of the Florentines, and according to the Papal commands had been taken to Florence. Thither a special envoy conveyed to them re assuring messages. His Holiness, said he, would prefer mercy to justice, and would grant them pardon and restoration to their former estate if only they would make this possible to him by their submission. But, as a preliminary condition of his taking any further steps, they must consider themselves lawfully debarred from wearing the insignia of their dignity as Cardinals. The representative of France, Giovan Giordano Orsini, and Fabrizio Colonna interceded warmly for these unfortunate men; but Cardinals Schinner, Remolino, and Bainbridge, as well as the Spanish Ambassador, Hieronymus de Vich, strongly opposed their reconciliation. However, the Pope remained firm in his desire to grant absolution on the one condition of their submission and recantation. All further terms were to be settled by a commission of Cardinals ; but, as the schismatics would not hear of submission, negotiations became very difficult.

But Leo met with far greater difficulties in his political efforts to make peace. In the very first days after his election, it was reported that the Supreme Head of the Church was about to send peace-envoys to the Emperor, to France, Spain, England, and Venice. It appears to be a fact that he did entertain some such project, for even before his coronation he issued Briefs, by which he sought to make peace between King Sigismund of Poland and the Grand Master, Albert of Brandenburg, alluding to the Turkish peril, which was increased by the strife of the Christians among themselves. However, as Leo was to find only too soon, the Christian princes were not inclined to give a hearing to the Pontiffs exhortations in the matter of peace.

There is no doubt that the greatest danger which threatened the peace of Europe came from the ambitious French King, Louis XII, who was determined to do everything to avenge his defeat in 1512, and regain Milan. For this end he signed at Blois, on the 23rd of March, 1513, an offensive alliance with the Venetian Republic, whereby the Venetians pledged themselves to bring into the field an army of 12,000 men, while at the same time—the middle of May—the French were to invade Italy from the north. According to this agreement neither party was to lay down arms until France had once more gained possession of Lombardy, and the Venetians had reconquered all that they used to hold on the mainland before the Peace of Cambrai.

Without doubt Julius II, with his determined and stormy character, would have retaliated by severe measures for the defection of the Venetians from the Holy League and their alliance with France. Not so the peace-loving, cautious, and hesitating Leo X. However alive he might be to the evils which France had brought on his family, now that he was raised to the supreme dignity he did not wish to attach himself to any party. When the Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors, during the first days of his pontificate, made known to him the impending crisis, and urged him to declare himself openly against France, and support the League with troops and money, Leo replied that he had not been chosen to be Pope in order to make war, but rather peace; and as for money, he wished to keep the treasury of Julius II for the defence of the States of the Church, and for warfare against the Turks. In vain, in a subsequent audience, did the Spanish Ambassador remind him of the debt of gratitude he owed to his master, who had brought the Medici back to Florence. The Pope still refused the request for a contribution of 10,000 ducats.

Instead of declaring war openly against France and Venice, Leo endeavoured by friendly negotiations to restrain both powers from making war. He had already expressed his hopes of peace in a Brief drawn up by Bembo, in which he had announced his election to the Doge.

To Foscari, the Venetian Ambassador, he protested that he loved the Republic, though he warned him emphatically against anything so hazardous as an alliance with France. The Ambassador denied the existence of any such treaty. It was only when, on the 13th of April, 1513, Leo turned for an explanation to his new Nuncio in Venice, Pietro Bibbiena, that the Venetian Ambassador owned for the first time to the league formed between the two States. Though he did not dare to tell the Pope the whole truth, he remarked plainly how much displeased His Holiness was by the projected seizure of Milan by the French. The Ambassador sums up his opinion of the attitude of Leo X by saying that his chief wish was to remain neutral, and watch which State would be favoured by the fortune of war. In spite of the efforts of the Spanish and Imperial Ambassadors to bring him over to their side, Foscari was able to say, on the 8th of April, that the Pope still remained neutral. It was certain that he did not want to see the French in Italy.

On his side Louis made every offer which could have gained the support of Leo X. For this end he appealed to the Pope’s brother, Giuliano de' Medici, and gave him to understand how much he hoped that Leo would not oppose his proceedings against Milan. Should he do so, the King would not carry out his plans of conquest, and would even leave the conditions of peace in the hands of the Supreme Head of the Church. Giuliano, being a partisan of France, supported the request of Louis XII, but Leo X met it with much reserve. He did not, indeed, consider it advisable to oppose the King directly, but sought rather to turn him from his warlike projects by friendly representations and the promise of such future advantages as might induce him to delay his expedition. But Louis did not trust the promises of the Pope, for he could see his real object was to prevent the conquest of Milan. Even after Louis had succeeded in agreeing with Spain for a year’s truce for the purpose of arranging the Italian campaign, he remained more bent than ever on regaining his lost prestige.

Meanwhile the condition of Milan had become such, that she saw herself compelled to invite France to take possession. The weak, frivolous Duke, Maximilian Sforza, was so unequal to the situation that the chronicler Prato applied to him the words of Scripture: “Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child.” The Swiss as well as the Spaniards, on whom the Duke relied, had made themselves so hated in Lombardy by their extortions, that many there longed for the restoration of the French occupation. Threatened by this imminent danger, the Duke of Milan turned for help to Leo X as well as to Switzerland. In spite of the blandishments of France, that country remained true to Sforza, because they could scarcely hope to obtain the payment promised to them from any other Duke of Milan. But it was much more difficult to gain the support of the still hesitating Pope. In the hope of gaining it, the highly-gifted Girolamo Morone was sent to Rome in April. He pointed out emphatically that action—serious action—must be taken, if the many efforts made by Julius II for the liberty of Italy were not to remain fruitless, and all that he had accomplished called in question. Parma and Piacenza, as the Envoy pointed out, must inevitably fall into the hands of the French if Sforza were not supported. Cardona, the Viceroy of Naples, had taken possession of them in the name of Milan after the death of Julius II. It was not till the beginning of May, 1513, that Leo X arranged for their restoration.

Morone's representations were supported by the Emperor's Envoys, who painted in the blackest colours the danger of the French supremacy which must necessarily follow the occupation of Lombardy. Morone declared over and over again that the Pope alone could help, for Spain was no longer to be counted on ; it was in his power to open the treasury of Julius II and subsidize the Swiss, and in this way save Milan. An old enemy of France, Cardinal Schinner, who had at that time much influence with Leo X, pointed out to him the strength of the fighting population of Switzerland. But above all he urged the necessity of upholding the Papal reputation. Leo would willingly have still deferred his decision, had not a new combination among the powers put an end to all hesitation.

On the 5th of April, 1513, a Holy League was formed at Mechlin between the Emperor Maximilian and the English King, Henry VIII, Leo X and Ferdinand of Spain being named as their allies. It was agreed that France should be attacked on four sides at once, and rendered incapable, by her dismemberment, of destroying the peace of Europe. But even after this powerful anti-French league had been formed, Leo maintained for some time an entirely neutral position. The more the Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors urged the ratification of the League of Mechlin, the more reluctant was he to declare himself openly as belonging to it. Nevertheless the actual circumstances pointed unquestionably to the necessity of decision on his part. The French army of invasion was already encamped at the foot of the Alps, and Leo could not long escape the danger of being isolated. But the manner in which he finally made up his mind is very characteristic of his policy.

The historian Paolo Giovio describes the hesitation of Leo at this important moment.  Although the Pope—as was inevitable with a new sovereign—had not yet developed his political programme, he had made up his mind that the course which his predecessor had taken from mature and serious conviction, was to be followed no longer. At all costs Julius would have upheld in Milan the restored Duke, Maximilian Sforza; and have considered the alliance with the brave, faithful, and victorious Swiss as a thing profitable and honourable for the Holy See. But even while Leo X recognized in himself the official prosecutor of Julius’s policy, he believed that it behoved him to maintain a certain reserve, as far as was compatible with blaming no one openly, and thus to retain the title of peacemaker, so befitting to a Pope. On one side, therefore, he tried to keep up the courage of France’s enemies; on the other, he wished to avoid the appearance of being too harsh with that country. For the power of France was great, both on account of its own strength and its alliance with Venice : and who could foretell how matters would turn out in the field of war? One circumstance, not mentioned by Giovio, but which must have had an undoubted influence in overcoming the hesitation of Leo X, was the continuance of  the schism in France. Even were he compelled to follow the path adopted by his predecessor, nevertheless the restoration of ecclesiastical unity forbade him from cutting off all communication with France.

Out of such hesitation there grew the resolve to stand by the Holy League, and pay the money required for subsidizing the mercenaries in the service of Milan, by which alone that state could be saved. But how anxious the Pope was not to let himself be robbed of the prospect of an understanding with France, can be seen by the fact that the payment was to be made quite secretly. It is true that the subvention was officially denied, but the truth leaked out by reason of the clause in the agreement, which appointed that 20,000 ducats of the whole sum should be devoted to pensioning certain distinguished personages, while the balance of 22,000 was to be paid to the Swiss mercenaries.

The conduct of the Pope shows how willingly he would even then have adopted a policy of delay. But this was no longer possible. Nevertheless, though he actually adhered to the political arrangements made by his predecessor, he did not join the anti-French league openly, and most anxiously avoided anything which could exasperate either the French or the Venetians.

Knowing that everything depended on promptitude, the French had begun hostilities in May, and had advanced on Asti and Alessandria with 14,000 men, while the Venetians were advancing simultaneously from the east. As the Spaniards remained inactive, Maximilian Sforza was in the greatest danger. Shut up in Novara, the Duke seemed to be lost, when a brilliant feat on the part of the Swiss changed the whole aspect of affairs. Early on the 6th of June, they, with heroic contempt of death, attacked the French army in the open plain of Novara, and defeated them so completely that those who remained fled to Turin, and thence over the Mont Cenis. The cities of Lombardy bought the favour of the Duke, while the Venetians retired eastward. At Genoa the French abandoned all hope, and the Adorni willingly gave up the city, where Ottaviano Fregoso, the friend of Leo X, was elected Doge.

When the news of the battle of Novara reached Rome on the evening of the 10th of June, all the enemies of France rejoiced. Bonfires were lighted, and the cry of “Julius II” resounded through the streets, and Cardinal Schinner had the bells of his titular church rung. But from the Pope alone nothing was heard of a celebration of the victory.

Although, however, one of Leo’s most influential advisers, Bernardo Bibbiena, now went over entirely to the side of the French, and finally did all he could to bring the Supreme Pontiff over to his views, Leo persisted in maintaining a more neutral attitude. The Imperial Ambassador demanded help for the subjugation of Venice; Henry VIII added the request that Leo X would join the Anglo-Imperial alliance and occupy the southern side of the Alps with an army; but the Pope declared that in his position as Father of Christendom he was bound to refrain from siding openly with any party. In his letters of congratulation, he exhorted the victors to observe mercy and peace, which was so essential in view of the increasing danger from the Turks. On all sides he issued Briefs advocating reconciliation; and tried to get once more into sympathy with France, whose open enemy he had never declared himself. On June the 17th the Venetian Ambassador announced that there was no fear of the Pope taking any hostile steps against Venice, as he thought a great deal more about the Turkish peril than he did about the unity of Italy, but that the downfall of the French had given him real joy. That this was the case is not to be doubted, and can easily be understood, for the humbled French King would be now constrained to seek reconciliation with Rome, and abandon the cause of the schismatics. In fact, the immediate consequence of the victory of Novara was the end of the schism, the submission of the recalcitrant Cardinals, and the adherence of France to the Council of the Lateran.

When he first reopened that Council, Leo X had expressed his fixed determination to put an end to the schism, not by severity, but by the gentlest methods possible. At the sixth session of the Council, when the Procurator, Mario de Perusco, moved that the absent prelates should be cited, and proceedings against the French Pragmatic Sanction resumed, the Pope adjourned a decision out of consideration for Louis XII. Further, at the seventh session, on the 17th of June, the eighth was postponed until November, out of consideration for those among the French prelates who had adduced valid reasons for their absence. At the same time the Pope solemnly declared that he intended to send Legates to all the Christian powers, with the object of restoring peace to Europe.

On this occasion the Secretary of the Council read out a declaration, signed by themselves, in which Bernardino Carvajal and Federigo de Sanseverino—who purposely did not call themselves Cardinals—repudiated the Council of Pisa, recognised the Lateran Council, and asked for absolution. There was a long discussion before this point was conceded. The commission of Cardinals had secretly handed over the decision of the affair to the Pope, who was in favour of compromise and pardon, if the schismatics would acknowledge their guilt and beg for absolution. When, in the declaration read, they professed their readiness to do this, nearly the whole of the Sacred College decided in favour of their reconciliation.

Only the English Cardinal, Bainbridge, and the Swiss, Schinner, were in favour of withholding absolution, being supported in this by the Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors. This party, recalling the rigour of Julius II, represented that the reinstatement of the schismatics would injure the credit of the Holy See, and be a bad precedent for the future. Leo X, however, adhered to his opinion. He hoped, and rightly, to destroy schism and reconcile France by gentleness rather than by severity. In the last decisive session, Schinner threw himself at the feet of the Pope and craved permission to leave the Council hall, as he was unable to hold communion with the recreants. But the Pope and the majority of the Cardinals remained of the opinion that, saving the honour of the Holy See, the good of the Church demanded that absolution should be granted.

It was decided that the schismatic Cardinals, still deprived of their insignia, should come to Rome by night, go straight to the Vatican, and next morning, clad as simple ecclesiastics, should ask for absolution at the Consistory. According to pre-arrangement this took place on the 27th of June. The whole court, and many curious spectators, assembled to witness the unusual scene. For the proud Carvajal it was a terrible humiliation, and, as an eyewitness testifies, his whole body shook with emotion. Then the Pope, speaking earnestly, put their offence before them both.  He declared the necessity of penance, and proposed to them the following form of abjuration :—

“We, Bernardino Carvajal and Federigo Sanseverino, who have been enveloped in the cloud of schism, being now enlightened by divine grace, fully acknowledge the error of schism by which we were held fast. We desire to include in what we now say every declaration we have hitherto made, whether privately or before notaries and witnesses, as though they were expressed here verbally. After long and mature deliberation we renounce all these entirely and in all sincerity, not from fear—for we are in a safe place and perfect liberty—being recalled by divine grace into the unity of the Apostolic See. That this conversion may not be considered hypocritical or simulated, we humbly beg Your Holiness and the Sacred College of Cardinals for absolution from our errors. And we implore Your Holiness to intercede for us before the Most High God, whose representative you are on earth. In the event of our being reinstated by your mercy in our rank and dignity of the cardinalate, we freely vow and promise, under the ban of anathema, to you, Pope Leo X, the true and undoubted Vicar of Christ, and through you to the Prince of the Apostles, Peter, that never, for whatever cause or reason, or on whatever plea or pretext, will we return to the state of schism from which we have been delivered by the grace of our Redeemer. We will always live in unity of the Holy Catholic Church and in true obedience to Your Holiness. Moreover we undertake to live with our lords the Cardinals in peace and friendship, without seeking cause for quarrelling or giving provocation. This we say with regard to what we have already said about the past.

“We swear by the Almighty God and by the Book of the Gospels which we hold in our hands, that we will remain in the aforesaid unity of the Church, and will observe all and everything that we have promised, and this under penalty of perjury and other penalties. And having abjured the above-mentioned schism, both by what we have ourselves written, and in the document read before the holy Council of the Lateran, so do we now, in order to prove our sincerity of heart, explicitly anathematize the Council of Pisa, its convention, and all and everything promulgated by it. We acknowledge, hold, and declare everyone of its transactions to be null, empty, vain, and without significance, and as the audacious actions of unauthorized persons. On the other hand we declare the holy Council of the Lateran to be the only true Council; we acknowledge that it was convened in a legitimate and just manner, and for a lawful purpose  and that all and everything that it has pronounced, whether generally or individually against us, as well as all the sentences and judgments pronounced against us by Pope Julius, as also all that has been pronounced in condemnation of the Council of Pisa, has been done in a fitting, lawful, and just manner.

“This we say, this we believe, this we confess absolutely. We furthermore promise to undertake and perform joyfully and humbly any penance which His Holiness may see good to impose on us for our offences. We consider ourselves as bound by all the aforesaid penalties, and by all others pronounced by the sacred canons against schismatics: and we promise before all here present to observe all that we have undertaken. We beg the notary here present to have one or more copies made, in the full form used by the Chamber, of what we have said, and of all the occurrences regarding this document”.

Carvajal and Sanseverino having read and signed this declaration, the Pope pronounced the form of absolution. Then with due solemnity they were both received back into the Sacred College, and their offices were restored to them, so far as these had not been given to others. All the Cardinals, with the exception of Riario, who was ill, and Bainbridge and Schinner, who persisted in their resistance, were present at the ceremony.

The Christian powers were informed of the important event by dignified Briefs.

While Leo X was on the one hand receiving the schismatic Cardinals back to favour, on the other he meditated making advances to meet the wishes of Louis XII. However, about this time, his attitude towards France changed into one that was more inimical. Hitherto he had carefully avoided any open participation in the war. But suddenly a change took place which perplexed the Venetian Ambassador. The impetus to this change was given by the attitude taken by Venice. After the defeat of the French at Novara, Leo X offered his mediation for the imperilled Republic, and accompanied his offer by the expression of the greatest affection. But Venice declared herself to be opposed to any negotiations which did not comprise the restoration to her of Verona and Vicenza on the part of the Emperor. This obstinacy exasperated the Pope, especially as the Venetian troops were giving themselves over to pillage in the territories of Parma and Piacenza. Moreover the Signoria had, against all precedent, unreasonably delayed the offering of their obedientia to the Holy See, and had brought themselves to do it only when there was nothing more to be hoped for from France.

This being the case, the Pope was not inclined to show any particular consideration towards Venice, when the Emperor urgently begged for the help of a contingent of 200 men of the Papal troops to send against the Republic. This request of the Emperor came at a most unfortunate time for the Pope, in so far as it came in the way of his attempted reconciliation with France. But as to Venice, when given choice between offending the Emperor or her by such a trifle, there could be no doubt as to his decision, and he agreed to the Imperial demand, wishing to remain true to the treaty made by Julius II with Maximilian. The Venetians were alarmed by this event, which made them fear that the Pope would now pass over entirely to the side of their enemy. Leo, for his part, made use of this frame of mind to try to compel them to a reconciliation with the Emperor, and added the threat that he would make the cause of their opponents his own. To give more weight to his endeavours to secure peace, the Pope sent a Nuncio-extraordinary to Venice at the end of June, who was directed to lay great stress on the Turkish peril. The Pope explained to the Venetian Ambassador, Foscari, that he had been compelled to afford to the Emperor the trifling assistance demanded, but that though he wished to see the French driven out of Italy, his feelings towards Venice were far from hostile. On the contrary, he would do everything in his power to bring about an honourable peace between the Republic and the Empire. At the same time, he pointed out that Venice could no longer look for help from France, hard pressed as was that country at home by the fear of an invasion of the English.

Even Foscari had to acknowledge the good-will of the Pope; still the Venetians adhered to their hopeless demand for the restoration by the Empire of Verona and Vicenza. Foscari was in a difficult position. The Pope on his side threatened to espouse the cause of the enemies of the Republic, by making use of his weapons, both spiritual and temporal; while, on the other hand, Venice tried to raise alarm in Rome by giving it to be understood that she would, if necessary, call in the help of the Turks. But Leo X did not allow himself to be turned from his object. At the end of July he said to the Secretary of the Venetian Embassy, who was carrying on the business during the illness of Foscari, that the attitude of Venice was such as to prevent the thought of either peace or truce. Two leagues, said he, would have to be formed, one against the Turks and the other against Venice. In August Leo said to Foscari himself: “I will offer no further mediation, for I see that you expect everything from France. If she wins, she will make herself the mistress of Italy ; if she loses, every State will turn against you”.

The Signoria turned a deaf ear to all Leo's exhortations.

Even the news of the invasion of France by the Swiss, and the victory which the English, led by the Emperor Maximilian, had gained over the French on the 16th August in the skirmish of Guinegate, as well as the rumoured negotiations for the formation of a league between the Pope and Spain, produced no change in the purpose of the Republic. In Rome it was asked: What will Venice do now ? and the invariable answer was that she would call in the assistance of the Turks. The Pope did not take this threat seriously, and renewed his negotiations with Foscari, and in October with his successor, Lando, but with no better success than before. He acted in the same way with the Germans. The Pope tried to urge them to peace as well as the Venetians. With this object he decided to send Lorenzo Campeggio to Maximilian in Flanders on the 14th of September. The secret instructions to this Nuncio are one of the most important documents for revealing the policy of Leo X during the first years of his pontificate. The Medici Pope was inclined to conceal his intentions as much as possible in order to avoid future inquiries as to their result. Campeggio was therefore directed to keep his instructions quite secret, even so far as to have them written in cipher. These conditions enhance the value of the instructions to no ordinary degree, because few other documents could give the same insight into the objects of the Papal policy. First, the Nuncio is directed to ferret out Maximilian’s intentions as to the pending war, with the assurance that the Pope wishes to remain on good terms with him and his allies, seeing that this corresponds with the interests of the Holy See and the safety of Italy. Above all things the Envoy must represent to the Emperor how ardently the Pope desires the peace of Christendom, as befits his office as Vicar of Christ, and as corresponds with his natural disposition, and as is, finally, suitable to the needs of the European States, which ought to be at peace with each other so as to be able to offer more effectual resistance to the powerful and encroaching empire of the Ottomans. If, however, the Emperor is determined to declare war, it is necessary that he should provide for the union of the allies, and decide whether he will fight France or Venice; for to contend against two such mighty powers would be an impossibility. In the opinion of the Pope, peace with Venice is to be the most recommended, though it would be necessary for the Emperor to lay down conditions such as the Republic could not reasonably reject. But war should, in the Pope’s opinion, be under taken solely as the means of restoring peace to Europe. Next to his care for the welfare of all Christians, these instructions reveal Leo’s zeal for the peace and independence of Italy. On this account he would wish Sforzato be upheld at Milan ; and for the same reason he would stand by England and the Emperor against France. Moreover he would not refuse reconciliation to the adherents of the Council of Pisa, if the schismatics would repent and return to the Church ; but the Emperor shall be instructed further on all these matters.

As early as July the Emperor had arranged for peace negotiations, though, by having recourse to arms, he wished to make the terms as favourable as possible to himself. He therefore learned with joy that the Spanish and German troops had made an attack on Venice during the last weeks of September. In thus acting the Spanish Viceroy, Cardona, had been over-precipitate, and on the 20th of October had to make a very difficult retreat. The Venetian troops followed him on foot, and on the 7th October a battle was fought not far from Vicenza, which resulted in a brilliant victory for the Imperial-Spanish army. Under the influence of their severe defeat the Venetian government decided to give to the Pope full power to make peace on the terms he wished. On this Leo at once demanded the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Viceroy. Matthaeus Lang, deeply versed in the secrets of the Imperial policy, was appointed by Maximilian as his representative at the negotiations.

While he was negotiating between the Empire and Venice, Leo was doing the same thing between England and France, urging them to make peace with one another. As he had done after the battle of Novara, so now, in his letters congratulating the King of England on his victory over the French and Scotch, he expressed the hope that the bloody struggle would now be at an end. At the same time he uttered the pious wish that the victorious arms of Henry VIII might be turned against the Turks. It did not enter into Leo's intentions that France should be driven to extremities. Though opposed to a French occupation of Milan, the Pope wished to keep the way open for an understanding with Louis XII, as the only means of terminating the schism and restoring unity to the Church. As early as July, Leo had sent the distinguished and truly ecclesiastical Cardinal, Robert Challand, to France to prepare the way for a reconciliation.

On his side Louis XII sent the Bishop of Marseilles, Claude de Seyssel to Rome on the 24th of July. As the King had not yet repudiated the schism, his representative could not be received solemnly. He did not therefore appear in the capacity of an Envoy for the obedientia, but only as a simple agent, Seyssel turned especially to Giuliano de' Medici, who was his King’s friend. Nevertheless he treated immediately of only ecclesiastical matters, for Louis XII had by no means given up his plans for the conquest of Italy. To hinder him in this project, the Emperor and the Kings of England and Spain had made a treaty of alliance against France, on the 17th of October, 1513. It was only on learning this that Louis XlI, made up his mind.

He was influenced not a little in his change of purpose by the voice of an influential body in France, who refused to recognise the lamentable anti-Papal Council, and desired a restoration of union with Rome. The influence of the Queen, who had always been opposed to the schism, weighed also in the balance. If, in spite of the King’s change of purpose, the negotiations for a reconciliation progressed but slowly, the reason was that, though the acceptance at Rome of the resolutions passed by the Council of Pisa was recognised as an impossibility, yet the express rejection of them by France would be accompanied by the gravest difficulties. Another great obstacle lay in the pride of Louis XII. He rebelled against the idea of asking, in so many words, for absolution from the ecclesiastical penalties which he had incurred. Apparently the die was finally cast by the verdict of Girolamo Aleander, the learned Rector of the University of Paris, whom the King had consulted, and who decided that the Council of Pisa was no longer defensible.

Seyssel had already formed his opinion that its repudiation was the only course possible in the interests of France. On the 6th of October, therefore, the arbitrators who had been appointed, Cardinal Sanseverino, the Protector of France, and Louis Forbin, Lord of Solier, with the Pope and four Cardinals deputed for the negotiation of this affair, drew up a solemn declaration by which Louis XII rejected the Council of Pisa and acknowledged that of the Lateran. The act was actually drawn up by Bembo.

On the 26th of October Louis XII agreed to this declaration, and appointed Seyssel and Forbin to present it at the Lateran Council. On the same day he authorized Cardinal Sanseverino, Seyssel, and Forbin to submit his dispute about Milan and Asti, as well as those with the Emperor, England, Switzerland, and Sforza, to the arbitration of the Pope. Leo on his side attested that the French King was not included in the sentence of Julius II against the Council of Pisa, Alfonso of Ferrara, and others, and, were he to receive absolution, it would be only for his greater safety. His ecclesiastical reconciliation would be ratified at the eighth session of the Lateran Council, to be held on the 19th of December.

While negotiations for peace with France were in progress, Rome witnessed another great ceremony, in the shape of the obedientia of the Emperor. The proud Matthaeus Lang had been appointed Maximilian's representative. During his visit to Rome in November, 1512, Julius II had raised this influential adviser of the Emperor to the purple. But Lang, in order to avoid all appearance of double-dealing in his mission, had refused to receive the insignia of his office. When, however, the man on whom so much depended was sent to Rome in November, 1513, accompanied by a considerable suite, Leo X wished to send the Cardinal’s hat to meet him. But Lang declined this. He postponed his arrival in Rome till the Pope had returned from Civitavecchia on the 17th of November, and then entered the Eternal City without any pomp. On the 19th he had a private audience with Leo X, who received him with great consideration. During the following days Lang had several interviews with the Pope, one of which lasted for five hours. The subject of their discussion was the reconciliation of Venice with the Emperor, which was strongly urged by Leo. But Lang’s demands were so exorbitant that not only the Venetian Ambassador, but the Pope himself despaired of an accommodation. Lang also put forward the most unusual claims for himself. He lived in Rome in great state, yet he dressed as a layman, and kept his incognito so strictly that he would not go out till after dark. On one occasion this proud upstart kept the Spanish Ambassador waiting in his ante-room for such an unconscionable time, that that worthy exclaimed: “It strikes me that this man wishes to be greater than the Pope”.

An authentic account of Lang’s pretensions as regarded the Pope has been given us by the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis. The haughty Envoy demanded that as representative of the Emperor he should be met by the senators and chief magistrates of the city, when he made his public entry into Rome. In the Consistory he claimed the first place, before all the Cardinals. Lang and the Master of Ceremonies had violent altercations about this and other demands of the same nature. It was at last agreed that the Imperial Envoy should receive the red hat on the 8th of December, and that he should on the following morning be conducted by all the Cardinals from his provisional dwelling to the Consistory. Moreover, precedence over the three Cardinal-deacons made in September was conceded to him.

Lang's procession to the Consistory on the 9th of December was exceedingly magnificent. His suite consisted of four hundred horsemen, and he was accompanied by several Ambassadors. When the Master of Ceremonies permitted himself to make a remark on the smallness of Lang's tonsure, and on the great length of his hair, he answered with a jest.

On the 11th of December the Imperial Envoys for the obedientia, the Duke of Bari, brother of Maximilian Sforza, Alberto Pio di Carpi, Pietro Bonomo, Bishop of Trieste, and Antonio della Rovere made their entry into the Eternal City. The Pope ordered a solemn reception for them, though the French Envoy protested against the Duke of Bari acting as the representative of Milan. The ceremony took place on the 14th of December. The dis course on the obedientia was delivered by Girolamo Morone. In it he allowed himself to be carried away into charging the French King with tyranny. As was but natural, the representative of Louis XII entered a strong protest. Morone would have retorted, but was with difficulty prevented by the Master of Ceremonies. Leo X tried to put an end to the quarrel by a conciliatory speech. As usual, he spoke well and elegantly. On the 17th of December Lang dined with Leo X and had an audience with him of two hours’ duration. Afterwards the Pope received the Spanish, and after him the Venetian Ambassador. What passed between them related to peace on the part of Maximilian and Venice.

The eighth session of the Lateran Council was held solemnly on Sunday the 19th of December. Besides the Pope, who had gone to the Lateran the evening before, twenty-three Cardinals, eleven archbishops, forty-five bishops, five generals of religious orders, as well as the Emperor’s Envoy and the Ambassadors of Spain, France, Poland, Venice, Brandenburg, Montferrat, Milan, and Rhodes took part in it. In his opening discourse, the Knight of St. John, John Baptist de Gargus, urged a war against the Turks as a preliminary condition of the establishment of peace among Christian princes. After the Gospel for Sexagesima Sunday had been sung, the Envoys of Louis XII, Claude de Seyssel and Louis Forbin de Solier, presented their King’s solemn declaration that he severed himself thenceforward from all connection with the Council of Pisa, and freely and plainly acknowledged the Council of the Lateran as the only one that was legitimate. Simultaneously a fresh deputation was announced, consisting of six prelates and four doctors who had taken part in the assembly of Pisa, but who now repudiated the pseudo-Council, and asked for absolution. Finally there was handed in a request from the remainder of the absent French, for permission to defer their appearance. Without such a request nothing could be done in the matter of the Pragmatic Sanction. Even on this solemn occasion there was an exciting episode; for the representative of Maximilian Sforza protested against the French King calling himself Duke of Milan in his declaration. The Pope assured him that no trouble should arise from this. After this the Ambassadors of Brandenburg and Montferrat joined the Council.

After the promulgation of a dogmatic constitution of which mention will be made later, two important Bulls were read aloud. One related to the reformation of the Curia, and the other to the restoration of peace among the Christian princes, the formation of a Crusade, and the reconciliation of the heretical Bohemians. The Pope commanded that the Te Deum should be sung at the end of the session in thanksgiving for the adhesion that France had given to the Council, thereby restoring the unity of the Church.

Thus did the first year of Leo X close with a crowning success for his policy of peace. The schism which had broken out under Julius II was practically healed, and the abjuration of many of the Pisa schismatics was to follow ere long. This session of the Council of the Lateran was deeply interesting to the Romans; but their excitement was kept at fever heat by the series of splendid processions of Envoys sent to proffer their obedience to the Pope, which succeeded each other all through the first year of his pontificate, and half through the second. Spectacles of this kind delighted the people quite as much as did the reduction of taxes, and all the other favours bestowed upon them by Leo X. To the customary addresses of the Envoys the Pope replied with such elegance and readiness that the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, cannot refrain from repeating his expressions of admiration in his diary.

The greatest sensation of all was caused by the embassy of King Emanuel of Portugal, who had already sent gifts to the Pope with the intimation of his wondrous successes in the Indies and Africa. On receipt of this the Pope ordered ecclesiastical commemorations, and encouraged the King, in a flattering letter, to take further action against the infidel.

Leo X made extensive preparations for the reception of the Portuguese embassy, which rendered the spectacle of the 12th of March, 1514, unusually brilliant. A Bull had been published four days previously, which called on all the Portuguese to support the King in his crusade against the Moors of Africa. At the head of this embassy came Tristan d'Acunha, who was so well known for his voyages of discovery. He was accompanied by two distinguished lawyers, Diego Pacheco and Juan de Faria, and by many members of the Portuguese nobility, as well as by a number of negroes and Indians—in all seventy persons.

The brilliant and peculiar procession caused even less sensation than the rare and precious gifts presented by the Envoy to the Pope, as a living proof of the conquest of the territory of the infidels. There were Persian horses, Indian poultry, parrots, a young panther, two leopards, and a white elephant, on which the sight-loving Romans could not sufficiently feast their eyes. A richly-dressed Moor rode on the powerful beast, which carried on its back, under an ornamental canopy, a chest, surmounted by a silver fortress flanked with many towers. Inside the chest were various gifts for Leo : vestments embroidered in gold and precious stones, monstrances and chalices of purest gold, a beautiful altar-cloth, and costly books. The elephant followed its leader docilely; and when it approached the bridge of St. Angelo, above which the Pope was stationed to behold the unwonted spectacle, the beast stood still, and bent its knees three times to His Holiness. The joy of the people reached its height when the elephant sprinkled them with water which had been given to it. The animal became the talk of the town; poets sang its praises, and even the dry Master of Ceremonies set himself to describe it.

The clever beast, which performed various tricks, had for a keeper Battista Branconio, who was a friend of Raphael’s. To no less a man than the great painter of Urbino was given the commission, after the elephant’s solemn entry into Rome, to paint its portrait in a lower cupola of the Vatican. This portrait was destroyed in the course of the restorations made by Paul V. But on a door which leads from the Stanza della Signatura into the Stanza d'Eliodoro, there has been preserved a fine piece of intarsia work, which represents the elephant as it is described by the poet Baraballo. In a woodcut also we have a representation of the beast, the like of which had never been seen in Rome since the days of the Emperors.

On the 26th of March the Portuguese Envoy made his obedientia in a public Consistory. Pacheco delivered the usual discourse, which is a model of the extravagant bombast which was loved and admired at that time. Leo answered elegantly as well as exhaustively, treating of the necessity of peace among the Christian princes, and of their combination against the infidels. Next day there took place the presentation of the gifts, the value of which surpassed even the imagination of contemporary writers. The Pope now determined to send to King Emanuel the Golden Rose which he had originally intended for the Emperor.

The substantial concessions received by their Envoys were more important in the eyes of the Portuguese. Leo X at once granted to the King power of raising a tenth from the Portuguese clergy, as long as the war in Africa lasted. Moreover, by a Bull of June 7th, 1514, King Emanuel received the right of patronage over all bishoprics and benefices in his actual possessions over the sea, as well as in lands to be conquered by him in the future, and also the incorporation of these benefices in the Order of Christ. On the 3rd of November, this right of patronage in all countries conquered and to be conquered, was extended, not only to the whole Indies, but to all parts of the world as yet unknown.il But even these marks of favour did not satisfy the generosity of Leo X. In the following year he sent to King Emanuel the Sword and Hat usually blessed by the Pope at Christmas. In this way did the Supreme Head of the Church proclaim before the whole world the value he set on the war which the King of Portugal alone among Christian princes had been found to carry on against the infidel, by which such brilliant prospects were opened to Christendom.

CHAPTER II.

The Medici and the Policy of Leo X., 1513-1515.

All Italians are warmly attached to their home and family. This characteristic, beautiful and noble in itself, but so harmful to many Popes, reached such proportions in Leo X that, throughout his pontificate, the history of Florence and of the Medici was closely bound up with that of Rome.

Two out of his many relatives, Giuliano, his brother, and Giulio his cousin, betook themselves to the Eternal City soon after the termination of the Conclave. The former, youngest son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, born in 1479, had always been intended for the secular state, as also was Lorenzo, the son of Leo’s eldest brother Piero. As soon as these two arrived, on the 13th of September, 1513, the Roman patriciate was conferred on them with great pomp in the Capitol.

Giuliano, with his weak health, did not seem to possess the qualifications necessary for the management of Florentine affairs; therefore Leo X decided that he should remain in Rome, with the honourable title of General of the Church. The difficult task of governing the Florentine Republic fell, by command of the Pope, to the lot of Lorenzo, who, though only twenty-one years of age, represented the elder branch of the family. He returned to Florence from Rome on the 10th of August, 1513.

The form of government in that city was in essentials exactly what it had been under Lorenzo the Magnificent. Two councils legislated for everything. One consisted of seventy members, elected for life, and the other of a hundred, who were changed every six months. The council of a hundred, to which all late Gonfalonieri might belong, had the sole right of levying supplies and imposing taxes. The adherents of the Medici were in a large majority in both councils, and it was therefore un necessary to give to Lorenzo a special position above that of the other citizens. The eyes of all were turned on the palace of the Pope's nephew in the Via Larga, Giulio de' Medici having advised him to make friends by his courtesy and prudent hospitality. The independence of Florence was a mere form, and the house of Medici practically governed supremely. Significant of this was the fact that in September, 1513, the Feast of SS. Cosmas and Damian, the patron saints of the Medici, was made into a state holiday. On the Feast of St. John, in 1514, Lorenzo celebrated with great pomp the anniversary of the return of his family to Florence, Cardinals Cibo, Este, Aragona, Cornaro, Bibbiena, and Sauli being present incognito. In May of the following year, the Pope’s nephew having been elected Captain-General of the Florentine levies, he found himself in an unusually prominent position, though the Florentine government was in all essentials dependent on Rome.

The Pope’s cousin, Giulio de' Medici, who had lived chiefly in Lombardy as an inmate of the Capuan Priory of St. John, was made Archbishop of Florence on the 9th of May, 151 3. Public opinion considered Giulio, who was born on the 26th of May, 1478, after the murder of his father by the Pazzi, to be branded with the stain of illegitimate birth, and from this disability he had already received a dispensation. When, in the autumn, there was a question of his being made Cardinal, it was attested by witnesses that a valid marriage had taken place secretly between his father and mother, Floreta, a special deed to that effect being drawn up; and, on the 23d of September, 1513, he was, at the age of thirty-five, raised to the much-coveted purple. Giulio received as his title S. Maria in Domenica, which had been that of Leo X before he was elected Pope.

In this his first creation of Cardinals, three others, closely connected with the new Pope, also received the red hat. These were Innocenzo Cibo, Lorenzo Pucci, and Bernardo Bibbiena. Innocenzo Cibo, born in 1491, was the eldest son of Franceschetto Cibo and Maddalena de' Medici, the sister of Leo X. Beyond this relationship he had no particular claims or merits. The Pope in nominating him is reported to have said, in reference to his own elevation through his grandfather: “What I received from an Innocent, that do I give now to an Innocent”. Certainly this did not justify the reception of a youth of twenty-two into the Senate of the Church. As, moreover, he made a very worldly use of his rich benefices, and gave himself over to a life of immorality, nothing but blame can be attached to his elevation to the purple.

Lorenzo Pucci, whose beautiful features are reproduced in the portrait by the master-hand of Sebastiano del Piombo (now in the Hofmuseum at Vienna), was not only a member of one of the most respected branches of the Medici family, but had given proof of his ability and skill under the pontificate of Julius II. Besides this he had been for a long time teacher of law at Pisa, and had a profound knowledge of canon law and theology. Unfortunately, these excellent qualities were marred by the most execrable avarice, which he sought to satisfy by an unscrupulous traffic in the matter of indulgences. It must, however, be admitted that when it was a question of the promotion of art, Pucci did not spare himself. As an instance of this may be cited the fact that he had his chapel in the Trinità de' Monti painted by Perino del Vaga. He was also on terms of intimacy with Raphael, and it was through an arrangement made by him on behalf of his nephew Antonio that the picture of St. Cecilia was painted. Michael Angelo also did work for the Cardinal of the Quattro Coronati, by which name Pucci was known, after his titular church. If he could say, when speaking of that master, that he was true to him as a brother, such a relationship speaks for itself of the Cardinal's intellectual greatness.

The third to be raised to the purple was, no doubt, a very distinguished and intellectual man; but he was so worldly-minded that his elevation also must be reprehended. Bernardo Dovizi, usually known as Bibbiena from the place of his birth, a small town in the upper Casentino, had been closely connected with the Medici from his early youth. In Florence he had superintended the studies of the young Giovanni, had then become his private secretary, had accompanied him into exile, had defended his interests with Julius II, and had, finally, been invaluable to him by his services as conclavist during the business of the election. As a reward for these services he was first named chief treasurer, and soon after raised to the purple. He was not, however, fitted for such a dignity, being essentially a man of the world, who, besides being devoted to literary and artistic enjoyments, by no means despised those of a grosser description. He was much valued by Leo X on account of his faithful services, his ready pen, his warm interest in literature and art, and his invariable gaiety and overflowing spirits. As an organizer of festivities he had no equal.  In political matters he was the Pope’s principal and most influential adviser during the first years of Leo’s pontificate. At that time, out of opposition to Giuliano, he took up a line against the French; and this was probably the cause of the great fluctuations in the Papal policy.

The political influence exercised by Bibbiena was illustrated by the alterations effected by Leo in the office of the Papal secretaries. Innocent VIII, in reorganizing this department, had placed at its head a confidential secretary, called indifferently segretario domestico, secreto, or intimo, who almost filled the place of a Secretary of State. He was given an apartment in the Vatican, and had free admission to the Pope at all hours; and to him alone were his master’s secrets confided. To him were given over the reports of the Nuncios, to be answered in accordance with the verbal directions of the Pope. Naturally this extraordinary office became ere long the object of envy of the other secretaries, and led, moreover, to many abuses. In order to put an end to all complaints, Leo X. appointed special secretaries for the secret Briefs.

The post of “segretario intimo” held under Leo X by Pietro Ardinghello, was considerably reduced in importance by the fact that a Cardinal intervened between him and the Pope, and that all business passed through him. At first this Cardinal was Bibbiena; later it was Giulio de' Medici. It is a mistake to say that at that time the latter was the right hand of the Pope ; on the contrary, he had to resign himself for a long time to the Pope’s carrying on the most important business independently of him with Cardinal Bibbiena. The situation became more and more complicated. Bibbiena had been the confidential secretary of Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, and still retained the same post under the Pope during the first years of Leo’s pontificate; even after he had been made a Cardinal, while, by reason of the dignity of the purple, he held a position incalculably superior to that held by Ardinghello, who was more of a private secretary to Leo, for a long time—certainly till the autumn of 1515—he played a part, through his favour with the Pope, far more important than did Cardinal Giulio. Not until 1516 or 1517 did the latter rise to being the principal adviser of the Pope. Previously, Bibbiena’s position had been so confidential that state secrets were confided to him alone, to the exclusion of even Cardinal Giulio. “Bibbiena is all and everything”, declares a Venetian, immediately after the election. Even in the years 1514 and 1515 diplomatists called him the “alter ego” of the Pope.

Bibbiena was a novice in the higher matters of diplomacy, and it was often difficult for him to feel his way. His position was made still more difficult by the intrigues of the friends and adherents of the Medici. These had come in crowds to Rome, where they played an important part. In Leo’s signs of favour towards his relatives they saw only the beginning of much greater things. They entertained the most extravagant hopes, and confidently expected that both Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici would be at once made princes, and given independent territories to the north and south of the States of the Church. It seemed obvious to them that with such a change in Leo’s position the dependents of the fortunate house should receive honourable and lucrative emoluments. It is important to establish the fact that these inordinate schemes for the exaltation of the house of Medici emanated neither from Leo nor from Giuliano or Lorenzo, but from the dependents of the family. Jacopo Nardi expressly states that it was the Medicean courtiers, when discussing matters in the Orsini palace soon after Leo's election, who set abroad the rumour that Giuliano was to be made King of Naples and Lorenzo Duke of Milan. Plans of this sort might have led to the worst complications. The question was what line Leo would take about them.

Contemporaries are almost unanimous in declaring that Leo X allowed himself to be influenced by family considerations in his political actions. But since then the opposite view has been taken, and maintained with success. Probably the truth lies between the two. There is no doubt that the policy of Leo X was influenced more or less by family interests; but as far as we can form any judgment from the sources and materials that are at present at our command, private interests were not in reality so prominent in his mind as those of a higher and more general nature. Such was at one time the traditional policy of the Popes not to allow Naples and Milan to be in the power of one and the same prince. Such also was the security and increase of the States of the Church. National interests also, such as were summed up in the cry for the “freedom for Italy”, played no unimportant part in Leo's policy. Along with these there naturally ran an undercurrent of family interests. Which of these various motives was the strongest in the mind of Leo X. cannot be decided with any certainty in the light of the materials which are at present available. In interpreting the secret processes of the human mind, the most extreme reserve is necessary.

As to such a policy of nepotism as was pursued by Alexander VI, the same conditions were entirely wanting in the relatives of Leo X. This applies more immediately to Giuliano, and with certain reservations to Lorenzo de' Medici. Both these princes, famous for a time, live in the memory of the world in the idealized forms which the genius of Michael Angelo has given them in the statues on the tombs of the Medici. But in reality they were not personalities of any importance. Giuliano, thirty-four years of age, was by nature kindly, gentle, and weak, somewhat melancholy and superstitious, but withal intellectual and refined. Like all the Medici, he was the friend of men of letters and artists. He was closely connected with Castiglione and Bembo. Raphael painted his portrait, and his name is connected with Fra Giocondo and Leonardo da Vinci. But Giuliano represented also the darker side of his family's characteristics, by his extravagant generosity, his boundless love of display, his desire for enjoyment, and his debauchery. Licentiousness had exhausted his feeble body, and weakened his ambition and mental activity. A man to whom the granting of frequent audiences was too great an exertion, and who desired above all things to lead a quiet, undisturbed, and pleasant life, was not fitted for high political aspirations.

The young Lorenzo was quite different. Comely in person, a bold rider, an indefatigable sportsman, a good manager, though generous withal, a skilful diplomatist, he was considered by many of his contemporaries to be possessed of all the qualities which would enable him to play a great part as the nephew of the Pope. But more were necessary to obtain a crown, and of these Lorenzo possessed but few. His ambition, as far as we can judge, was moderate; a rich wife, a small, secure, productive estate, beyond these his aspirations did not at first soar. Further desires were not natural to him, but were fostered by the constant instigation of his mother, Alfonsina Orsini. That ambitious, highly-gifted woman burned with the desire to see a shining crown on the head of her son. She conceived lofty plans; at the most, Lorenzo agreed to them unwillingly. Thus the project of gaining the principality of Piombino by supplanting the Appiani, undoubtedly emanated from Lorenzo's mother, and not from Lorenzo himself; though the plan came to nothing through the determined resistance of Leo X.

Lorenzo returned reluctantly to Florence in August, 1513. He would much rather have taken up his abode permanently in Rome, which was so brilliant and rich in enjoyments. But Leo was well acquainted with his nephew, in whom was to be seen the beginning of the decline of the Medici race. Having given the command of the Papal troops to Giuliano and that of the Florentines to Lorenzo, the Pope said to Giovanni da Poppi : “I have appointed two Captains who have next to no experience. Were some great enterprise to turn up, I know not how they would be able to carry it out!”. Both Giuliano and Lorenzo might have succumbed to the temptation of mixing themselves with the high-flown, extravagant projects of the Florentines; nevertheless, they lacked the moral and warlike qualities necessary for carrying them out. It is therefore unsafe to allege from existing sources of information that the policy of Leo X was based primarily on any such nepotistic projects. Nevertheless, the rumour that the crown of Naples was destined for Giuliano, spread further and further, till it reached the Court of Ferdinand of Spain. That King believed that the ambition of the Medici, in conjunction with France, was threatening his position in Italy.

Leo hastened to make assurances that the rumour was without any foundation. Never, he asseverated, had such a plan existed. How could he be believed capable of making enemies at one and the same time of France, the Emperor, and Spain? A kingdom could not be taken possession of by words, and was it not his sole endeavour to restore universal peace, especially in Italy? Ferdinand did not believe the assertions of the Pope; for both he and the Emperor had been filled with the deepest distrust of Leo ever since the ecclesiastical reconciliation of France. This distrust was justified so far that, from December, 1513, to July, 1514, the policy of the Pope seemed to be friendly to France.

This must be looked at in connection with a change which was coming over the European situation. Louis XII, after his reconciliation with Rome, had made desperate efforts to win over Spain to his side. With this object, in December, 1513, while the war was in abeyance owing to the winter season and other circumstances, he made the most enticing offers to King Ferdinand. As the price of an alliance he offered the hand of his daughter Renee to either of Ferdinand's two grandsons, with Milan and Genoa, accompanied by the renunciation of all claims to Naples, as her marriage dowry. Not one of these proposals was ever carried out. On the other hand, a year’s truce was concluded between Spain and France on the 13th of March, 1514.

The news of this change in the aspect of affairs was a paralysing shock to the Pope. Every possible effort had to be made on his part to prevent either France or Spain from obtaining supremacy in Italy. By the proposed plan of marriage the prospect of Spanish supremacy rose up before him like a nightmare. As an Italian as well as Pope, he felt himself to be most gravely menaced. As an Italian he was, like most of his fellow-countrymen, imbued with the determination that no power, whether foreign or other, should have such supremacy on the Italian peninsula as to destroy the balance of power, and injure what went by the name of the “freedom of Italy”. As Pope, Leo adhered to what had been the traditional policy of Rome, namely, the guarding of the independence, both temporal and spiritual, of the Holy See. With this in view, he directed his efforts against any step which would lead to Naples and Milan being under the same sovereign.

But that the intention of making use of the rivalry between France and Spain to his own advantage had a place in influencing Leo’s political attitude, can scarcely be disputed. Where injustice is done to the Medici Pope is in attributing everything he did to nepotism. The one predominant aim all through Leo’s ever-changing policy—his care for the independence of the Church and Holy See, and the maintenance of the so-called freedom of Italy—is apparent to all. The confidential letters which were sent to the Papal Nuncios, show that Leo's chief reason for opposing the projected Franco-Spanish marriage lay in the well-founded fear lest the power of Spain, being in possession of Naples, Milan, Genoa, and a portion of Venetian territory, should enslave the other Italian princes, the States of the Church, and even the Holy See itself.

Fully aware of this danger, Leo X overcame his natural irresolution and roused himself to take prompt and decisive measures. The Papal diplomacy was in a state of feverish activity. The most urgent messages were sent to the representatives in France and Switzerland to try to put obstacles in the way of this very dangerous marriage project. On the 4th of March a letter was sent to the Swiss Nuncio, Goro Ghersio, stating that the decision of Louis XII had reached Rome in the preceding night, to the effect that he had rather lose throne and life than renounce Milan; that this determination sprang from the marriage negotiations of France with Spain and the Emperor; that the Pope considered this projected marriage as the greatest of dangers; that as it had emanated originally from Louis’ fear of the Swiss, the Pope hoped that the latter might lay down conditions somewhat less hard, so as to make peace with France possible, which, under all circumstances, would be better than the carrying out of this family alliance, which was a menace to all Europe. The Florentine Ambassador, Roberto Acciaiuoli, was sent, so as to influence the King more directly. He was told to represent to Louis XII that the marriage project was an act of desperation which must ruin France, if not at once, at any rate later. The fear of Spanish supremacy now induced Leo to incline strongly towards France. As early as April, 1514, the Florentine Ambassador in Rome stated that the Pope, who had hitherto been unwilling even to grant an audience to the representative of Louis XII, now often transacted business with him. The same fear of Spain influenced his relations with the Swiss. Later on, the animosity of the Pope, who believed himself to have been betrayed by Ferdinand, rose to a still higher point. Obviously this reacted on his relations with Maximilian.

This was experienced by Cardinal Lang, the representative of the Emperor, who was trying to effect a reconciliation between Maximilian and Venice. The negotiations dragged on for months. The Emperor's Envoy complained bitterly of the delays and hesitation caused by the indecision of the Pope, skilfully fostered by France. Nevertheless, he was quite ready to acknowledge the good will of the Pope. At last, on the 4th of March, a compromise was arrived at, although, thanks to the obstinacy of the Venetians, it was never carried out. In other ways also, the mission of Lang was unproductive of peaceful results. The covetous and ambitious Cardinal, not content with the many emoluments which he had already secured, now imperiously demanded the important as well as lucrative post of permanent Legate in Germany. The experiences of Rome, consequent on conferring a similar dignity on the French Cardinal, d'Amboise, did not conduce to the repetition of the experiment in Germany; for such permanent Legates depended more on their temporal sovereign than on the Pope. Moreover, the considerable reduction in the revenues of the Curia which would result from such a concession had to be weighed in the balance. As the Emperor himself urged his representative’s request in a pressing letter, it seemed expedient to Leo not to refuse explicitly ; and in a Consistory held on the 10th of May, he professed his willingness to grant the German legation to Lang for at any rate six months. But the Cardinals, instructed beforehand by the Pope as to the inexpediency of the concession, rejected even this com promise. Thereon Lang had one more farewell audience with Leo, in which he used “great words”. On the 11th of May he travelled in a very bad humour to Loreto, where Bibbiena and Bembo were staying at the time.

Louis XII tried to foster Leo’s favourable dispositions towards himself by assuring him that he would sacrifice life and property in defence of the Church. The Nuncio, Ludovico di Canossa. sent to France and England in May, on a mission which was at first kept strictly secret, might be sure of a very good reception. His immediate task was the reconciliation of Louis XII and Henry VIII, and thus to remove all necessity for the support of the Spanish claims by France.

The anti-Spanish feeling which was openly expressed in Rome is put before us in a very interesting report of the Venetian Envoy. According to this, Cardinal Lang tried to arrange a league between the Pope, Maximilian, and  Ferdinand of Spain; but it is self-evident that Leo X would be opposed to any such plan. He trusted the fickle-minded Emperor, to whom he ascribed the intention of seizing the States of the Church, quite as little as he trusted the overbearing Aragonese. The greatest exasperation against the Spaniards was felt by the Romans, who expressed the wish to drive “those barbarians” out of Italy. It is a fact that in May and June the Pope entered into secret negotiations with Venice hostile to Spain while all the time the secret treaty with France was being carried on. Of this last only those most in the Pope’s confidence, Cardinals Medici and Bibbiena, as well as Giuliano de’ Medici, knew anything. It was the general though vain expectation that a league between Leo X, France, Venice, Florence, and Ferrara would be proclaimed on the Feast of Corpus Christi, though a report was current in the city of the lagoons that France and the Pope had come to an understanding that Giuliano de’ Medici was to receive the crown of Naples, and Louis XII that of Milan. After this the Spaniards were to be driven out of Italy by the help of the Venetians.

That Leo X contemplated something of the kind is undoubted; but he remained undecided, and carried on negotiations on every side, without making up his mind. Observant onlookers had for some time been of the opinion that he would wait to see which side was likely to get the best of it. One thing, however, is certain, and that is that Leo did everything he possibly could to bring to naught the Franco-Spanish marriage. With this object in view, Ludovico di Canossa, one of the cleverest and most gifted diplomatists of the time, worked so effectually on both Louis XII and Henry VIII that he brought about not only a reconciliation but an alliance between them. The Anglo-French treaty was to be sealed by the marriage of the King of France, a widower since the beginning of the year, and Mary, the sister of the English King. The Papal Envoy was well supported by Henry’s all-powerful minister, Wolsey, Archbishop of York, who aspired to the purple. On the 7th of August the Anglo-French alliance and the marriage contract were signed; and in October the marriage of the elderly French King with the youthful Mary Tudor took place.

Leo X was not to enjoy his diplomatic triumph for long. The danger of the Spanish supremacy had scarcely been removed when another terror, the French supremacy, arose in its place. The treaty of London contained, as Bembo remarks, a very dangerous clause which safeguarded the claims of Louis XII to Milan, Asti, and Genoa. The reports of the Florentine Ambassador in Paris are full of fears lest Louis should now set forth on his expedition to conquer Italy. Consequently, the Pope retreated further and further from his friendship with France, and was inclined to form an alliance with the Emperor and Spain, while he sought to draw Venice over to his side by holding out a hope of obtaining for the Republic favourable terms of peace from Maximilian.

Guicciardini, drawing from good sources, gives us a picture of the shifting relations and secret negotiations between Leo X and France which took place in the year 1514, which shows us how much the Pope delighted in the two-faced diplomacy of the age. The well-known historian declares that Leo X was set against the conquest of Milan by Louis XII, but that, on the other hand, he thought it expedient to restrain the King by the use of diplomatic arts alone. Through Cardinal Sanseverino, the Protector of France, he made the following suggestion to King Louis :—Seeing that the exigencies of the time did not allow of an open alliance between Rome and France, it would at any rate be expedient to lay the foundations of a firm alliance in the future. A draft of this was sent to France; Louis XII accepted the offer gratefully, but hesitated before closing with it. His brief hesitation decided Leo X to listen to the proposals on the other side, and he concluded a treaty for one year with Spain and the Emperor, which mutually guaranteed the safety of their possessions. Scarcely had this arrangement been made before the answer of Louis XII. reached Rome, by which he agreed to all the Pope's proposals, with one proviso, namely, that as one of the clauses pledged him to defend Florence for Giuliano and Lorenzo, it was necessary that those two should be included in the negotiations. There upon Leo excused himself for having made his agreement with Spain and the Emperor on the plea that he had been forced to make it by Louis's delay in answering ; except for this, there was nothing to prevent him from concluding an alliance with France. Louis XII considered it advisable to accept the excuses of the Pope. On this Leo X and the French King signed a contract, with, however, the stipulation that this should not be done formally, and that the draft alone should be signed. In this way the most complete secrecy seemed to be assured.

The alliance with England was of the greatest value to Louis, as he could now undisturbedly resume his plans for the conquest of Italy. The question was whether France would at once take the initiative or postpone the under taking till another year. The latter course seemed the more probable, as there were no visible preparations for war. This being so, the Pope, who was still in his inmost heart as averse as ever from the thought of the conquest of Milan, thought it advisable not to oppose Louis openly. Soon he even went a step further, and expressly encouraged the King to carry out his plans. There can be no doubt that Leo X did not act honourably in this. Guicciardini tries to explain his unusual conduct in the following way : — Either, he says, the Pope, being convinced that, with or without his consent, Louis XII would attack Milan, wished to secure favourable terms in the event of the success of France, or else he knew that what the Emperor and Ferdinand maintained, but what Louis denied, namely, that in the interim of the truce the King of France was bound to refrain from hostilities, was an actual fact. The Pope therefore hoped that the French King would not at once accept the challenge and attack Milan. This hope was justified by the event, for the French King did put off his project till the following year, trusting to the assistance of the Pope, whom he tried to bind to his interests by the prospect of the conquest of Naples, either for the Church or for Giuliano de' Medici.

There were many things which made Louis XII distrust the Pope. In June the Emperor had quite secretly sold to Leo X the Imperial fief of Modena, for 40,000 ducats; and in November this transaction was made known. At once Louis XII suspected a still closer alliance between the Pope and the Emperor. His suspicions increased when, in November, Leo X demanded a conclusion of peace between the Christian powers, so that they might turn their arms against the Turks. But what disconcerted the French King most was the fresh attempt of the Pope to reconcile Venice and the Emperor, thus threatening to deprive him of an important ally.

The distrust of Louis XII was well founded; for Leo X, and still more his trusted adviser Cardinal Bibbiena, were set against the conquest of Milan by the French. The most indubitable proof of this remained unknown to Louis XII, namely, a secret agreement, signed in Rome on the 21st of September, between Leo X and Ferdinand of Spain. By this treaty both parties guaranteed the security of their Italian possessions during their lifetime, and explicitly pledged themselves to make no agreement with any other State, least of all with France, relating to the reconquest of Milan, Genoa, and Asti, without the knowledge of the other.

Even if Louis XII knew nothing about this treaty, his distrust of Leo X was fully justified by the other matters mentioned above, whatever protestations the Pope might make of his good-will towards France. In order to frighten Leo, France entered into negotiations with Spain, which, however, failed in the desired effect, as was in evitable, considering the agreement already spoken of. At length the French King proffered to the Pope the formal request to give his support to the expedition against Milan, which was now decided on. The French agents laid before the Papal diplomatists the advantages—painted in the brightest colours—which the Church, the liberty of Italy, and the house of Medici would reap from a treaty between Leo X and France. The Most Christian Kings had in all ages afforded the greatest services to the Holy See, whereas the Emperor and the King of Spain had no other object in view except to reduce the whole of Italy, including the Pope himself, to a state of servitude. But these representations did not make the desired impression on Leo X. At length, driven by this increasing pressure on the part of the French, he declared that the condition of affairs had changed, that a victory for France was very doubtful, and could be bought only at the cost of much bloodshed. In face of the increasing danger from the Turks, he, as Pope, could not tolerate a war among Christian princes, and advised the King to defer his expedition. Thus was a final decision put off by Leo; although there is no doubt that, at the end of November, he was very much set against the French. But at that moment the time was approaching, which would necessitate a decision on the part of him, whose desire it was to preserve at all costs a free hand on every side.

It was with terror that the Medici Pope, like nearly all the other princes at that time, found himself “sailing to meet this crisis with two compasses”. We are assured that the Pope at that time passed many a sleepless night. In Rome the chances were being constantly weighed. Through Vettori, those associated with the Pope put questions to Machiavelli, the most acute politician of the age. It was his opinion that neutrality would be the Pope's worst policy, for it would hand him over to the will of the conqueror. As the victory of the French was almost a certainty, an alliance with Louis XII. was to be recommended. It was only in the event of Venice breaking away from France that a contrary policy was pointed out by Machiavelli. But just at that time the Signoria had declared to the Papal Envoy its adhesion to France, and had tried to draw Leo into the Franco-Venetian alliance, by putting before him a plan for the conquest of Naples to be given to Giuliano.

While matters were still undecided in Rome, Louis XII died, being succeeded by Francis I, a man more gifted by nature than his predecessor. This young and ambitious prince was very much under the influence of his power­loving mother, Louisa of Savoy. Even in the lifetime of the late King, Louisa’s sister, Filiberta, had been chosen as the bride of Giuliano, the Pope’s brother. It was a purely political union, for Filiberta was neither young nor beautiful. As her marriage portion Giuliano—who had been named Captain-General of the Church, on the 10th of January, 1515—was to receive Parma, Piacenza, and Reggio, as well as Modena. But both the Duke of Milan and the French King laid claim to Parma and Piacenza. The renunciation of his claim by either depended on the side taken by the Pope in the coming war; and the dilatory Pontiff was urged by both parties, by every means in their power, to come to a decision. Still more urgent was the necessity of a decision when the marriage between Giuliano and Filiberta became an accomplished fact on the 25th of June, 1515. But, however warmly Giuliano, who was always the friend of France, might recommend an open alliance with Francis I, the Pope still put off a decision. Not even his intimates were in a position to guess to which party he inclined.

It was intended to form a great coalition between the Pope, the Emperor, the King of Spain, Milan, Genoa, and the Swiss, to prevent the reconquest of Milan by the French. A preliminary draft of this agreement was made out, which was to be ratified within two months, should the Swiss accept its terms. This contract, which secured to the States of the Church Parma and Piacenza as well as Modena and Reggio, with the reservation of their rights of government, was made with the ulterior object of protecting Christendom against the Turks, but, primarily, with the view of protecting Italy against France's lust of conquest. Cardinal Bibbiena, who was its author, was quite convinced that the League would prove to be a powerful check on the French King. “It will be a lesson to Francis I”, he wrote to the Spanish Nuncio on the 5th of February 1515, “and will teach him to be moderate in this as well as in all other matters”.

Meanwhile great difficulties beset this skilfully-devised diplomatic scheme. The clause about Parma and Piacenza pleased neither the Duke of Milan nor the Swiss. Further obstacles were raised by the mistrust between Milan and Genoa, which finally led to the defection to France of the latter. Nor could the terms of the League be pleasing to the Pope, seeing that the protection of Italy was to be effected by the preponderance of Spain and the Emperor. Nevertheless, it was clear to Leo X that the League might do very good service by obtaining important concessions from France. He regulated his actions by this ; he delayed the ratification of the terms, and, during the carrying on of the negotiations with Francis I., followed a waiting policy.

These negotiations were being carried on by Ludovico di Canossa, who was still in France. An order reached that astute diplomatist at the end of March, bidding him offer the alliance of Rome to Francis I, on the condition that he would waive his claim on Naples. But the French King rejected the proposal in an abrupt and offensive manner. In the Pope’s condition he read his intention to secure the crown of Naples for his brother. Later historians also have interpreted Leo's policy at that time as actuated solely by ambition and nepotism. It is only the latest researches which have paved the way for a more just interpretation of his actions. That Leo X would have gladly seen his brother on the throne of Naples cannot be doubted. But the terms of his proposed agreement with Francis I did not proceed immediately from nepotistic considerations, being rather the result of the policy he had always followed. As the attack of the French could be no longer averted, and as there was much to be said in favour of its success, the Pope had no alternative but to do what he could to persuade France to give up her further designs on Naples, if he wished to prevent Milan and Naples being in the possession of the same power. The Pope’s old fear of a union between the north and south of Italy was the real cause of the demand which he had made through Canossa from the new ruler of France.

In spite of the rebuff received by Canossa, Leo X renewed the same offer to Francis I in June through the French Ambassador, Montmaur, though with no better result. The French King showed the same disinclination to consider the demands of the Pope relating to the independence of Genoa and the giving of Parma and Piacenza to Giuliano. Thereupon Leo X began at once to make military preparations. But the French Ambassador declared that these did not frighten him at all, for his King could produce an overpowering force. As regarded these boasts of the French, Bibbiena declared that such armies were no more difficult to raise than was the breath of rumour in respect to them.

The procuring of sufficient money for the expenses of the war presented most difficulty to the Pope. He now realized the confused state of his financial accounts. Nevertheless, he promised to contribute 60,000 ducats monthly. But further obstacles came from the want of unity and hair-splitting among those whom a common danger ought to have drawn together. The negotiations in the hands of the Swiss Nuncio, Filonardi, who was armed with full powers, prolonged themselves beyond all due bounds. It was only at the last moment that the ratification of the terms of the League, signed by the Swiss and Duke Maximilian, arrived in Rome. But Leo X even then still hesitated to give a final decision, and in spite of having armed his troops, his position remained ambiguous. Consignments of money were constantly sent from Rome for the payment of the Spanish and Swiss soldiers, and there was no doubt in the mind of anybody that the Pope was ready to do anything to prevent the invasion of the French; yet the official confirmation and publication of the League in Rome was postponed in the most unaccountable manner. At the end of July the Venetian Ambassador asked His Holiness openly whether it were true, as was said in Rome, that he had given his signature to it. “It is true”, replied Leo; “we have signed it, and Bulls and Briefs relating to our adhesion to the League are sealed. But before publishing them, we wish to await the answer of Francis I”.

This reply is highly characteristic of the Papal policy at that critical time. While the troops destined to oppose the French, who were on their way south, were paid chiefly with Roman money, the Pope up to the very last moment was contemplating a friendly arrangement with the enemy. He did not give up hope even after the French had entered Italy. It was only the first blow, ineffective though it was, dealt by the young Duke of Guise, which at last compelled the Pope to act in concert with the Emperor and the Swiss.

Giuliano de’ Medici had been entrusted with the supreme command of the Papal troops as far back as the 29th of June, 1515. As, however, he fell seriously ill, Lorenzo de’ Medici, the Captain of the Florentines, had to take his place on the 8th of August. Cardinal Giulio de' Medici was appointed Legate with the Papal troops.

The Duke of Savoy, who was related to Leo X as well as to Francis I, contemplated making a compromise, as the French had already crossed his frontier. He inquired through Giuliano as to the furthest concessions which the Pope would be ready to make. Giuliano explained in a secret instruction that the price of his joining with France would be (1) the renunciation of the French claims on Parma and Piacenza; (2) the conclusion of a permanent peace between France and Spain, so that a general Christian League against the Turks might be brought about ; (3) the renunciation of Naples in favour of the Holy See or of a third party agreeable to the Pope and King. Furthermore, he would agree that under no consideration the north and south of the Italian peninsula (il capo e la coda d'ltalia) should be governed by one and the same sovereign, even were that one to be his own brother. This instruction affords a weighty proof that nepotistic designs were not what turned the balance in the position taken up by the Pope, but rather his care for the political and spiritual independence of the Holy See.

CHAPTER III.

The Conquest of Milan by the French. —The Meeting between Leo X and Francis I at Bologna.

THE army which Francis I concentrated at Lyons was one of the finest which any King of France had ever led into the field. It consisted of 35,000 men, 60 cannons, and 100 culverins. The most prominent among the generals were Trivulzio, Trémouille, Robert de la Marck, the leader of the formidable Black Company, Lautrec and Bayard, nearly all of whom had had experience of the Italian theatre of war. On the 27th of June the French King had renewed the alliance made by his predecessor with Venice, and Genoa had now also joined him.

It is obvious that the allies ought to have united against this force. But the Spanish Viceroy, Cardona, was kept on the Adige by the Venetians, while the Papal troops had no thought beyond that of covering Parma and Piacenza. Leo X. appealed to Francesco Maria, Duke of Urbino, to help him in the protection of those cities, but he, regardless of his fealty, favoured the French. The Swiss, whose headquarters were at Susa, had occupied the passes so effectually that Francis I. considered it impossible to force them. By the advice of Trivulzio, who knew the country well, he chose for his passage across the Alps the Col d'Argentière, leading from Embrun to the valley of the Stura, which had been hitherto considered impassable. The undertaking was one of extraordinary difficulty, for rocks had to be blasted and bridges thrown over chasms ; but the warlike zeal of Francis overcame all obstacles. The surprise of the enemy was complete. Prospero Colonna was taken prisoner with his corps of Milanese cavalry on the 12th of August, at Villa Franca, on the Po, whereupon the Swiss, entirely baffled, retreated on Milan. This retreat cut off the communication between the various Swiss regiments, and destroyed the discipline of the troops. A spirit of disunion set in among the contingents from the different cantons.

The unexpected success of the French, who were ere long completely possessed of the western part of the Duchy of Milan, not only broke down the confidence of the allies, but renewed their distrust of each other. That the Papal army was only half-hearted in the part it was playing is shown by the fact that it did not cross the Po. Leo X, who, after his long hesitation, had at last joined the anti-French League, more from fear than by choice, was deeply moved by the unfortunate tidings which reached him from the theatre of war in Northern Italy. He had trusted to the military skill of Colonna as much as to the security of the watch kept by the Swiss in the Alpine passes. However much he might try to conceal his real feelings under bold words, the truth was that the destruction of his hopes made him lose courage completely, and he could see the French already occupying Rome, and spoke of flight to Gaeta or Ischia.

The position in the Vatican was all the more painful because the news from the scene of war was so scanty and unreliable. “Write, write, write!”, says Cardinal Bibbiena to Gambara in a letter of the 18th of August.  The position of Bibbiena, who was more of a humanist that a diplomatist, became more difficult each day. He found himself “as a tyro, making endless compromises between his dependence on the Medici, his care for the Church's interests, and hard political facts”. His letters afford a deep insight into the political machinery of the Curia.

On the 22nd of August the news of the loss of Alessandria reached Rome; for the Swiss had not occupied the town, although Leo X had pointed out the importance of the place. He now himself specified the measures which the Cardinal-Legate, Giulio de' Medici, was to take. The first thing to be done was to see the complete reinstatement of the Bentivogli in Bologna, so as to keep a check on the Duke of Ferrara, who was longing to possess Modena and Reggio. At all costs Cardinal Giulio must cover those cities. In vain did Bibbiena seek to remonstrate against these measures. “Write as I have commanded you”, was the answer of the Pope.

A few days later Bibbiena had to intercede with his master for no less a personage than Giulio de' Medici. Every day made it more clear that the choice of that pusillanimous, irresolute man to be Cardinal-Legate with the army, had been most unfortunate. “The Cardinal”, said Leo X, “writes about nothing but the dangers and difficulties which threaten him; as for the remedies which he holds in his hands, he does not know how to make use of them”. The defence of the absent Legate, which Bibbiena vainly attempted to make, was certainly inopportune, for it was through Cardinal Giulio's fault, as well as Lorenzo’s, that the Papal army had advanced so slowly, and had then come altogether to a standstill. The letters exchanged between those two show this only too plainly. On the 27th of August, Giulio wrote to Lorenzo from Bologna, saying that if the Swiss, in spite of the enticing offers of Francis I, persisted in carrying on the war against the French, then he could do the same thing; but should this not be the case, neither could he venture to advance, and must await the development of events. Three days later Giulio repeated: “If Cardinal Schinner insists on sending forward his light cavalry, let him do so; but it will certainly be un accompanied by the Papal colours”.

It was not extraordinary that Cardinal Giulio should act in this way, because his master, in spite of his energetic assertions, was at this time allowing negotiations to be entered on with the enemy. At length the Pope fell back into a state of indecision even greater than usual. On the 27th of August he sent word to Lorenzo de' Medici, who wished to make peace on any terms with the French, that he must not give in so soon; but in the beginning of  September, he himself, under the influence of the bad news from the Swiss camp, determined to send the faithful Cintio da Tivoli secretly to Francis I. to excuse the attitude hitherto maintained by the Pope, and open negotiations with the French King. This precaution seemed to him necessary, in the not unlikely event of the fortune of war favouring the French arms still more. A few days later Leo X. again yielded to renewed hopes of success and expressed his hope that Cintio would be detained by the Legate.

Thus did Leo X vacillate from one side to the other. One day he spoke with severity against France, and maintained his confidence in the valour of the Swiss, declaring that he would rather lose his mitre than Parma and Piacenza; but the next, he was inclining towards coming to an accommodation with Francis I, and even talked it over with Cardinal Sanseverino. How great were the vacillations of the Pope can be seen by the fact that on the 2nd of September, 1515, he gave full powers to Duke Charles of Savoy and Ludovico di Canossa to treat with Francis I, but recalled these orders on the 13th of September.

As a matter of fact, the Papal and Florentine troops were now inactive. In order to assure himself of safety in every event, Leo X resolved to yield to the repeated requests of Henry VIII and raise Wolsey to the purple. Many objections were made by members of the Sacred College; nevertheless, the Pope proceeded with the nomination in the Consistory held on the 10th of September, 1515.

Meanwhile Cintio had been intercepted by the Spaniards. This, added to other circumstances, increased the mistrust between Spain and the Papal party. To add to the unsettled state of affairs, the Swiss now wavered, and were inclined to come to an accommodation with France, a treaty of peace being in fact made between the two countries on the 8th of September. However, a large portion of the Swiss army repudiated this agreement and marched on Milan, where Cardinal Schinner was doing his utmost to stir up his fellow-countrymen to fight.

In the interval, Francis I had approached the immediate neighbourhood of the capital of Lombardy, and pitched his camp at Marignano. which he fortified with the greatest skill. His position was attacked at noon on the 13th of September by 20,000 Swiss, incited by Cardinal Schinner. A desperate fight ensued, and it was only the darkness of night which put a temporary end to the bloodshed. In spite of the numerical superiority of the French, the Swiss had succeeded in driving the enemy from the outposts and capturing some colours and ordnance; but the battle remained undecided. Both armies passed the night on the field of battle, Francis I sleeping on a gun-carriage. With the first glimpse of dawn the terrible struggle recommenced; and in spite of the heroism of the Swiss the numerical superiority of the French won the day. The scale was turned by the arrival on the scene of a troop of Venetian horse, which the Swiss took to be the vanguard of the entire army of the Republic. Thousands of dead, mostly Swiss, covered the field of battle. The veteran Trivulzio declared that all the other eighteen battles in which he had fought were mere child's play to this tremendous struggle.

On the 16th of September Leo received by a messenger despatched by Lorenzo, the joyful news that the Swiss had defeated the French. He at once sent word of this secretly to the Venetian Ambassador and to Cardinal Cornaro, forbidding them under pain of excommunication to spread the news. But when a second messenger arrived, repeating the intelligence, such precautions seemed unnecessary, and permission was given to publish the news. The French and Venetians living in Rome were half dead with alarm, whereas the Ambassadors of the Emperor and King of Spain, as well as the Swiss Guard, and, according to one source, even Cardinal Bibbiena himself, celebrated the victory by open rejoicings. Though Leo X was delighted that the French should have been defeated, he knew how to restrain himself, and the Papal court took no part in the manifestations of joy.

How prudently the Pope had acted was soon seen ; for next morning he received the news that the second day of the battle had resulted in a victory for the French—news which the enemies of France declared to be either invented or grossly exaggerated. The Venetian Ambassador received the welcome news quite early in the morning of the 6th of September, and once more breathed freely. He put on his robes of state and went at once to the Vatican. There he was informed by the private chamberlain, Serapica, that the Pope was still in bed. “His Holiness must be aroused”, said Marino Giorgi. “That cannot be”, replied Serapica. “I insist on speaking to His Holiness”, returned the Ambassador. Only then was an audience obtained with the Pope, who had not time to finish his toilet. “Holy Father”, said Giorgi ironically, “after the example of Christ, I will return you good for evil. Yesterday Your Holiness gave me bad and at the same time false news; today I bring in exchange good news which is also true : the Swiss have been defeated”. “We also have received this news”, replied Leo X; “but the defeat has been inconsiderable”. “Your Holiness can see the truth by this despatch”, was the response of the Ambassador, as he handed to the Pope his own official letter, together with that of the Venetian representative with the French King. This last letter, the writer of which was known personally to the Pope, convinced His Holiness of the real state of things. Full of alarm, he cried out: “What is to become of us? What, furthermore, will become of you?”. Marino tried to calm him by assuring him that no bad results could follow for the Holy See. He then took his leave in order to inform Cardinals Bibbiena, Grimani, and Cornaro of what had occurred. Although the Venetians refrained from any external manifestations of their joy, the Swiss Guards were so incensed that Marino Giorgi thought it wise to keep away from the Vatican for a couple of days At his next audience with Leo X. the Pope thus expressed himself: “We will throw ourselves into the arms of the Most Christian King, and beg his mercy.” The Ambassador replied : “Most Holy Father, if you do so it will be neither to your detriment nor to that of the Holy See. The King is a true son of the Church.”

The union of the Pope with the victorious French King was to be effected more quickly and completely than the Venetians cared for. It is true that for one moment Leo seemed inclined to try the fortune of war once more in conjunction with the Emperor, Spain, and the Swiss; but he very soon saw the hopelessness of any such attempt. Immediately after their defeat, the Swiss had abandoned Lombardy, leaving garrisons only in the fortresses of Milan and Cremona. It was therefore to be expected that Spain also would relinquish the struggle, and that the whole burden of hostilities would fall on the Pope. If Leo X anticipated the very worst, his was far from being an empty fear; for Francis I was making preparations to cross the Po at Pavia, and to occupy Parma and Piacenza as belonging to the Duchy of Milan. Were the Pope to resist him any further, he was prepared to seize Modena and drive the Medici out of Florence.

All idea of resistance vanished before such a danger. This was the conclusion arrived at by the immediate entourage of the Pope, especially by Alfonsina Orsini, who remembered but too well the eighteen years of exile which she owed to the obstinacy of Piero. “Bibbiena”, she wrote in a state of great excitement, “will by his doings ruin us for the second time”. Roberto Acciaiuoli, the Florentine Ambassador in Rome, and Marino Giorgi worked in the same direction, exaggerating the actual danger. The Florentines implored the Pope to come to an agreement with France before the Swiss had made peace with her, or the Spaniards had accomplished their retreat. Lorenzo was quite ready to make peace on his own account, and had told Canossa, the Nuncio at the French court, that such was the Pope’s desire.

Francis I, on his side, was equally disinclined to a war with the Pope—so much so that as early as the 18th of September he had told Lorenzo de' Medici that he had delegated an Envoy to take proposals of peace to Leo X. At one time the French had feared, and not without cause,  that a coalition between the Emperor, Henry VIII and the Swiss might wrest from him the fruits of his victory. Besides, he and all the French remembered only too well the great danger in which his predecessor had been involved by his contest with the Holy See. Therefore the Duke of Savoy, who had been entrusted by the Pope with his proposals of peace, found a favourable reception with his royal uncle. Leo X had to make up his mind to a complete change in his policy, and how difficult he found this is shown by the excited debates held in the Vatican. In smoothing the difficulties which came in the way of an arrangement, no one worked harder than Ludovico di Canossa, who came with all speed to Rome from the King's camp. Canossa, who arrived in the Eternal City on the 25th of September, brought with him fourteen articles of a treaty to be agreed to ; and in these the Venetian Ambassador saw to his dismay that the interests of his Republic were totally disregarded. By a thorough examination of all objections Canossa succeeded in overcoming the last hesitations of the Pope, who, however, would have gladly awaited the result of a Diet assembled by the Swiss at Zurich. The Envoy pointed out the danger of delay, lest Francis I., encouraged by his own generals and those of the Venetians, might be induced to take further measures, such even as an attack on Florence. He showed, moreover, that nothing was to be hoped for from the Swiss, as indeed was proved to be the case by future events. The Pope, who yielded mainly on account of the menace to the States of the Church and to his supremacy in Florence, made a stand on certain points, and insisted on certain conditions in favour of his native city. He stipulated that he should be spared a direct surrender of Parma and Piacenza ; though on the other hand he was willing to recall his officials from them. Finally, the withdrawal of the Papal troops was to take place at a convenient opportunity, out of consideration for the Emperor.

On the 27th of September, Leo X sent urgent letters to the French King and his Chancellor, Du Prat, in which he reiterated his desire for peace. The decision of the Pope was awaited with feverish anxiety, especially in Florence. When the terms of the agreement between Rome and France were made known, the enemies of the French King fell into a state of great excitement. Even his allies, the Venetians, feared that their interests had not been sufficiently considered in the treaty.

But the announcement of a complete agreement was premature; for there were several important points about which an understanding could not be arrived at at once, and on account of these Canossa returned to the King on the 31st of September. Francis’ demand for the renunciation of all claims on Parma and Piacenza was the severest blow to the Pope; though before long, by the purchase of Modena, that territory was once more united to the States of the Church. But the development of events in Lombardy was so entirely in favour of the French, that Leo had to resign himself to the payment of a high price. At the beginning of October Maximilian Sforza gave up all for lost, and surrendered, not only the fortresses of Milan and Cremona, but, for the sake of one year's assured tenure, renounced all further claims on the Duchy. On the 11th of October Francis I. made his triumphal entry into the capital of Lombardy.

Leo X, who had left Rome on the 1st of October, 1515, and had retired to Viterbo, under the pretext of taking an autumn holiday, approved, on the 13th of the same month, of the conclusion of preliminary articles of peace. The conditions were as follows : Francis was to keep Parma and Piacenza, which were to be once more united to Milan; but on the other hand he pledged himself to pay for the salt from the salt-mines of Cervia, whereby the Apostolic Exchequer was assured of a considerable income. The French King, moreover, guaranteed the authority of Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici in Florence, and promised to make no treaty with any vassal of the Church without the knowledge of the Pope. Both contracting parties gave mutual security for their possessions. On the 14th of October the Pope entrusted the learned Giano Lascaris, a man high in the favour of the French King, with a mission to the victor of Marignano. But the deed of ratification was taken to Francis by Lorenzo de' Medici in person. He arrived in Milan on the 18th, where an honourable reception awaited him. Hence forward he placed his future hopes more than ever on the French King.

The news spread about among the members of the Curia, that Francis I intended to visit Rome, perhaps with his whole army. That at the same time his eyes would be turned towards Naples, seemed to them to be more than probable. But the fact was that Francis I was most desirous of a personal interview with the Pope. Although the Venetians warned him to be on his guard, as neither Leo nor Bibbiena would shrink from anything to gain their own ends, the King persisted in his intention; for he hoped to be able to gain further concessions by word of mouth. Moreover, by obtaining a meeting with the Supreme Head of the Church, he hoped to make an impression on the enemies who were gathering around him.

Leo X thought it necessary to fall in with the King’s wishes; still, the one thing which he wished to avoid was a visit of Francis to Rome. He therefore proposed either Florence or Bologna as the place of meeting. As he was suffering much from his fistula, the Pope would have preferred to travel no further than Florence; but against this advantage, was to be placed the fear lest the enemies of the Medici in Florence might fraternize with the French King. Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici and Lorenzo laid such stress on this danger, that Leo X. decided in favour of Bologna, this choice being pleasing to Francis for several reasons. It was in vain that objections were raised, especially by Spain, and by Cardinal Adriano Castellesi, who had the Imperial interests warmly at heart, as well as by other members of the Sacred College. But the Pope was, in fact, more prudent than his advisers. No doubt the latter attached too much importance to appearances, thinking it derogatory to the dignity of the Pope that he should go so far afield to meet the French King.

On the 3rd of October a meeting of Cardinals was called at Viterbo, where also Bonnivet arrived as Envoy from Francis I on the 2nd of November. Fourteen Cardinals arrived in obedience to the summons; and, in a Consistory held on the 5th of November, they gave their consent to the Pope’s expedition to Bologna, which was to be made via Siena and Florence. As Leo X did not wish to return to Rome till Palm Sunday in the following year, the next session of the Lateran Council was postponed till the fifteenth day after Easter. The Florentine Cardinal, Soderini, was appointed Legate in Rome. The Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, was commissioned to arrange for the suite of the Pope, in conjunction with Cardinals Accolti and Pucci; Cardinal Sanseverino was sent to the King.

At Bolsena Leo X, who had shortly before been instrumental in making peace between Perugia and Assisi gave up his first idea of travelling to Florence via Siena, because of disturbances in the last-named city. Instead of this he chose another route, which would take him to Cortona by Orvieto and Castiglione. At Cortona he remained for three days, being the guest of one of the members of his court, Giulio Passerini, and received a deputation of Florentines sent to welcome him; then, passing through Arezzo, the Pope arrived at Marignolle, the villa of Jacopo Gianfigliazzi in the neighbourhood of Florence, and there he remained from the 27th till the 30th of November.

Meanwhile great preparations were being made in Florence for the reception of the distinguished guest. The Florentines did everything in their power to prepare a pageant as imposing as had been that in the Eternal City on the occasion of the "Possesso”. The most celebrated artists of the day, Jacopo Sansovino, Antonio di Sangallo, Baccio Bandinelli, Andrea del Sarto, Pontorno, Perino del Vaga, Granacci, vied with one another in the con trivance of decorations which displayed a glorious com bination of architecture, sculpture, and painting. Twelve triumphal arches, richly ornamented with sculptures and paintings, were erected, and on these, to the admiration of all beholders, were to be seen reproductions of the most famous specimens of the architecture of ancient Rome, as well as colossal statues, while allegorical paintings and flattering inscriptions conveyed the praises of the first Florentine Pope. Jacopo Sansovino and Andrea del Sarto had erected a wooden facade to the Duomo, in close imitation of marble, covered with statues and bas-reliefs, while on the smooth surface of the facade Andrea del Sarto had painted pictures in chiaroscuro.

The Pope was greeted by music as he entered by the Roman gate, and drove through his native city, portions of the walls of which had been levelled to facilitate the decorations. He enjoyed the spectacle with the enthusiasm inherent in his race, and several times he bade the procession come to a halt that he might better examine some of the works of art. The order of the state entry, which corresponded with that of the “Possesso”, had been arranged with minute attention by Paris de Grassis. The magnificent spectacle seemed to the spectators to be like one of the triumphal processions of ancient Rome. Taking part in it were to be seen eighteen Cardinals, as well as Lorenzo de' Medici and the Florentine municipality. The pro cession then went to the Duomo, where Cardinal Giulio de' Medici said Mass. Leo here laid aside his heavy Papal robes and tiara, and remained in his rochet and purple cloak, such as we see him in Raphael’s portrait. In the Duomo the Pope prayed longer than usual, gave his blessing and indulgence, and then went to the cloister of Santa Maria Novella, where his predecessors, Martin V and Eugenius IV, had dwelt in former times.

On the 1st of December Leo X took counsel, first with the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, and then with the Cardinals assembled in Consistory, as to the ceremonies with which the victor of Marignano should be received.  Then there was a present for the King to be settled on. Paris de Grassis suggested a pax; but the Pope decided on a cross of pure gold, which had been the property of Cardinal Ascanio Sforza. This he took from the treasury of Julius II, who had hated the French so bitterly! Together with the precious stones with which it was set, the value of this cross amounted to 15,000 ducats. On the first Sunday in Advent (Dec. 2), Mass was said in S. Lorenzo; after which the Pope was seen in tears, kneeling before the porphyry sarcophagus in which his father’s body lay. No less moved was he when he visited his brother Giuliano, who was lying seriously ill in the family palace.

On the 3rd of December Leo X left his native city, and on the 7th he arrived before Bologna, which he entered on the following day. The reception was just the opposite of that at Florence : no decorations, no acclamations greeted the Pope, who had shown too little interest in the adherents of the Bentivogli, and too much in their enemies. Even a portion of the clergy showed animosity. In some of the streets even the cry of “Sega! Sega!” the motto of the Bentivogli, who carried a saw (sega) on their arms, was raised. Such as these did but poor service to their patrons, for after this there could be no question of a complete restoration of the Bentivogli. Not only the Master of Ceremonies, but also the Cardinals, were incensed by the hostile attitude of the Bolognese. They tried to persuade the Pope to express his displeasure; but he refused, and maintained the cheerful demeanour of a true diplomatist, who in cases such as this prudently appears to notice nothing.

The French King's Envoys, Odet de Foix and Louis de Trémouille, arrived in Bologna at almost the same time as the Pope. Francis I, who had been received at Parma by Lorenzo de’ Medici and four prelates, and on the frontier of the States of the Church by Cardinals Medici and Fieschi, now hastened his journey, so that by the 10th of December he was only three miles from Bologna, on the bridge over the Reno. There he was met by Cardinal Sanseverino and the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, with whom all the details of the interview, as well as the state entry, were arranged. There were difficulties at this meeting which were not all due to the pedantic Master of Ceremonies, and the wit and pleasantries to which he treated the King. A difference of opinion soon showed itself, for the Pope had no intention of prolonging the visit to the extent which Francis had arranged in his own mind.

According to prearrangement, the French King arrived at Bologna on the 11th of December, amid the pealing of bells. Francis I rode a fiery steed, being accompanied by the Legates, and later by Cardinals Sanseverino and Este. Nineteen other Cardinals waited to receive him at the Porta San Felice. As senior Cardinal, Riario made a short speech in Latin, during which the others uncovered their heads. The victor of Marignano answered in French, with his head also uncovered. Neither Francis nor his suite carried arms. The bold and masterful bearing of the King, and still more his noble countenance, made the best of impressions on the susceptible Italians; but his suite and the whole procession disappointed the thousands of spectators who had thronged to see it. When the pro cession approached the Palazzo Pubblico, where Francis I was to be the guest of the Pope, Leo could not refrain from going to the window to enjoy the rare spectacle.

After the King had dined with Cardinals Bibbiena, Medici, Sauli, and Cibo, he was presented to the Pope, who awaited him in the great hall on the second floor of the Palazzo Pubblico, surrounded by the Cardinals who had been summoned to the Consistory. So many spectators had crowded into the great tapestried hall. that there was fear lest the floor might fall in. There was such a dense crowd that it was only with difficulty that the King, conducted by the Master of Ceremonies, could reach the throne of Leo X. Francis I bared his head, made the three customary genuflections, and kissed the foot and hand of the Pope, who wore a jewelled tiara, and a cloak embroidered with gold. Leo bade the King rise, and embraced him with the intimation that he might cover his head.

To a short speech in French by Francis I, Leo replied with as much courtesy as readiness. Then the Chancellor Du Prat stepped forward and made the discourse of the obediential He began by an extravagant eulogy of the wisdom, skill, and state of the family of Medici, especially of its most famous member, the Pope, to whom God had entrusted the barque of St. Peter, to steer it through the shoals into the haven of safety. The Kings of France, continued the Chancellor, had from of old surpassed all other Christian princes in their devotion to the Holy See. Treading in their footsteps, His Majesty Francis I, in spite of the disdain of advisers who were of a different mind from himself, had hastened over mountains and valleys, forests and rivers, and had run the gauntlet of the Swiss, in order to do homage to the Pope, as an eldest son to his father, and the Vicar of Christ, and lay all that he had at his feet. While these words were being said the King wanted again to uncover his head ; this, however, the Pope would not permit. Leo replied to the discourse with great skill and elegance.

There followed on this the presentation to the Pope of the principal members of the King's suite. After this, Leo X, taking the King by the hand, led him into another room, from which he retired for a few moments to remove his heavy robes. He then returned to Francis I., whom he found standing at a window with some of the Cardinals,, and spoke to him alone for two hours. The Master of Ceremonies had warned His Holiness beforehand against putting his hand to his biretta, as Alexander VI. had done to Charles VIII, before the eyes of the crowd under the windows, as such a mark of respect was unbefitting the Vicar of Christ, even if paid to the highest of temporal sovereigns.

On the following day the Pope and King resumed the subject of their discussion of the previous day, but nothing is known of what transpired. First Leo X visited the King, who met him on Bramante's stairs ; and in the evening there followed a longer interview between them, about which but little or nothing is known. The same process was repeated on the 13th of December.

On the morning of that day the Pope celebrated high mass with all possible pomp in San Petronio, the largest church in Bologna. The spacious building was filled to overflowing, and at last the doors had to be closed to prevent accidents. Francis I was lavish in his attentions to the Supreme Head of the Church. He even wished to carry his train; and when the Pope declined this service, the King responded that he would gladly wait on the Vicar of Christ in the smallest things. But he refused to receive Holy Communion at his Mass. Forty of his suite, however, received the Body of our Lord from the hands of the Pope. A remarkable incident occurred during the solemnity. A French nobleman cried out suddenly in his native tongue that he wished to go to confession to the Pope; but that, as this could not be done secretly, he wished to accuse himself publicly of having fought with great bitterness against Julius II, and of having disregarded the ban of excommunication. When the King heard these words, he made no hesitation in declaring himself guilty of a similar offence. Many other nobles made the same confession, and begged for absolution, which the Pope, raising his hand, at once gave. Then Francis said to Leo X : “Your Holiness must not be surprised that all these men hated Julius II, for he was our greatest enemy; in all our wars we have had no enemy so terrible as he, for Julius II was indeed a most capable general, and far better suited to be such than to be Pope”. As on this occasion, so also on others did the Catholic spirit of the French King’s suite declare itself. The Imperial Ambassador says that they kissed the Pope’s feet nearly away! The solemn obedientia of the King was at once communicated by the Pope to the mother of Francis, as well as to a number of friendly princes. On the 14th of December the outside world learned one of the results of the interview between the Pope and the King; for on that day a Consistory was held, at which Adrian Gouffier de Boissy, Bishop of Coutances, and brother of the Admiral de Bonnivet, was created Cardinal. It was rumoured that the King had vainly tried to obtain a like dignity for the brothers of the Dukes of Bourbon and Vendome. However that might be, Francis seemed very well pleased and in an amiable mood. He passed the evening with the Pope, who had invited him, with the Dukes of Bourbon and Vendome, to eat with him. The suite of the King supped at a special table with Cardinals Medici, Bibbiena, and Cibo.

The friendly intercourse between the Pope and King was sealed, on the morning of the 15th of December, by the presentation to Francis of the beautiful jewelled gold cross mentioned above. The King venerated the relic of the True Cross which it contained, and then hastened to Leo X to thank him and take leave of him. Their farewell interview lasted for half an hour. Nothing could exceed the expression of friendship on both sides. As the King left the Palace, he found some of the Cardinals in waiting to accompany him as far as the Porta San Felice, as they had done on his arrival. Many of the French suite remained behind to receive either absolution or other graces from the Pope, all of which he willingly gave. By the end of December the French King was back in Milan, and returned to France at the beginning of the new year. Duke Charles of Bourbon was left behind as his representative in the capital of Lombardy.

Leo X did not remain a single day longer than was necessary in Bologna, and on the 18th of December turned his back on the inhospitable city. On the 22nd he arrived in Florence, where his brother still lay grievously ill. Leo remained there for some time, and bestowed generous gifts on his beloved native city. At last, on the 28th of February, 15 16, to the great joy of the Romans and the members of the Curia, the Pope returned to his capital. Owing to its being the season of Lent, his entry was kept with ecclesiastical solemnities only. The Golden Rose, blessed on Laetare Sunday, was destined this year for the French King.

The strictest silence was observed as to the business transacted between Leo X and Francis I. Paolo Giovio, who, by the Pope’s desire, was working at his contemporary history, says, in a letter written at Bologna on the 15th of December, 1515, that he could find out nothing. As time went on, the veil of secrecy was preserved all the more easily because nothing had been put on paper, and was scarcely raised at all where politics were concerned. It was Leo’s way to conceal state secrets as far as he could from even his nearest advisers ; and this time it was also better for the interests of France that nothing of what had taken place should be known prematurely. But the less people knew, the more fertile was their imagination, and their surmises were of the most hazardous description. It is actually very difficult, and for the most part impossible, to be certain of what was discussed and decided upon at Bologna. What actually followed on the interview is all that can throw any light on most points.

From what we know, the victor of Marignano went to meet the Pope at Bologna, with a full consciousness of his political supremacy, and prepared to make sweeping demands. Above all, he thought to persuade Leo X to ally himself formally with France against Spain. But without directly declining this proposal, the Pope asked for time to decide on a matter of such importance, pointing out at the same time that his present alliance with Ferdinand of Spain would bind him for another sixteen months. It is, moreover, certain that the question of the necessity of a combination among the Christian princes against the Turks came up between them. Francis I made fair promises about this, in the same way that he made protestations to the Ambassadors remaining in Bologna of his desire for peace.

In view of the war against the Turks, Francis I received, for one year, permission to raise a tithe from the French clergy. The Pope also complied with the French King's petition in favour of the enemy of Cardinal Schinner, Georg Supersaxo, who had been shut up a prisoner in the Castle of St. Angelo in the autumn of 1514, and whom the Pope now discharged from prison.

The preliminary articles of peace arranged at Viterbo on the 3rd of October between Leo X and Francis I, were confirmed at Bologna. In accordance with this confirmation, the Pope, on December the 28th, 1515, warned the Swiss not to interfere with French property, or, in other words, with Milan. Soon after this the Swiss Nuncio, Filonardi, was told to accommodate himself to France in political matters. Schinner was completely thrown over, though he does not seem to have troubled about the Pope’s warning not to work against France.

In spite of his covenant with the French King, Leo was by no means minded to throw himself into the arms of France. The mission of Egidio Canisio to the Emperor Maximilian on the 13th of December, is a proof of this; for the object of this mission was to induce Maximilian to make peace with Venice, with the asseveration on the part of Leo X that he would remain true to the old League with Germany. An unreserved agreement with France seemed an impossibility, because of the ratification by the peace of Viterbo of the secession of Parma and Piacenza. An equal sacrifice was involved in the promise to give to the Duke of Ferrara not only Reggio, but also Modena, provided the Duke would pay the purchase money of Modena and the expenses of the Holy See in regard to both towns. If Francis I thus, at any rate partially, attained his objects, on the other hand his intercession for the Duke of Urbino, who had grossly violated his oath of fealty to the Holy See, failed completely. However, the French King was quite ready to throw his friend over, all the more because the Pope just then made an unexpected concession to him in a far more important matter. In prospect of the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, which was bound, in the course of nature, to occur before long, Leo put before the French King the hope that he might be invested with the crown of Naples, on the condition that Francis would protect the Medici and refrain from interfering with the affairs of Tuscany. When, however, Ferdinand died on the 23rd of January, 1516, Maximilian’s invasion of Northern Italy altered the political situation so completely that Francis I was unable to undertake at once any measures against Naples, though he by no means gave up his designs on that beautiful country.

Incomparably more important than this, and accompanied by greater and more lasting consequences, were the negotiations connected with the ecclesiastical affairs of the French kingdom. Francis I obtained at once what he had already been promised, namely, the right to levy a tax on the French clergy. In accordance with his former promise, the Pope, though with some hesitation, granted the raising of a tithe for the crusade, first in 1516, and again in 1517. Together, these levies brought in to the victor of Marignano no less a sum than 400,000 livres. What, however, meant much more was that the main lines of the famous Concordat were laid down at Bologna. This important measure has been described as due to the influence of Leo's ecclesiastical activity. With the Concordat was bound up the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, which had been contested so long and vehemently by the Holy See. Thus, though not without great sacrifices, an important victory was gained for the Church, and a dangerous political storm allayed.

CHAPTER IV.

The War of Urbino. —Conspiracy of Cardinal Petrucci —The Great Creation of Cardinals, July 1, 1517.

The good terms on which Leo apparently stood with the old friend of his family, Duke Francesco Maria of Urbino, at the beginning of his pontificate, received a rude shock when Giuliano de' Medici fell ill and his young nephew Lorenzo was given supreme command of the Papal troops. The Duke of Urbino might reasonably have been affronted at being passed over; but, on the other hand, his subsequent conduct could not have failed to exasperate the Pope. Regardless of his oath of fealty, and in spite of admonitions and threats. Francesco Maria, being already in secret communication with France, delayed at the most critical moment to send the assistance he was bound to give to the Papal troops. Moreover, after the victory of Francis I, the Duke of Urbino did all in his power to stir up the French King against the Pope. When, in spite of his machinations, Leo and Francis I made friends, such fear seized the Duke that he placed his only son for safety in the fortress of San Leo, and raised a body of troops.

The fate of the Duke had been decided at Bologna. In vain did Francis I appeal for mercy on his behalf. The Pope maintained, amicably but firmly, that, Francesco Maria having forgotten his duty as feudatory, there could be no question of his pardon. Were he to be left unpunished, every petty baron in the States of the Church would do the same thing or worse. After this the King made no further attempt to save his friend. The deposition of the Duke was a foregone conclusion; and it was furthermore decided that his Duchy should be given to Lorenzo de' Medici. This last development did not emanate from the Pope, but from the ambitious Alfonsina Orsini, who was determined at any cost to see a princely crown on her son's head. Unfortunately, Leo did not this time have the strength of mind to resist the wishes of his sister-in-law, which he had shown when that ambitious woman had hoped to secure for Lorenzo the usurped principality of Piombino. The Pope now agreed to the proposal, though he did not conceal the fact that he yielded unwillingly. Once, however, he had given his consent, nothing would move him. Even the representations of his brother made no impression on him. In vain did Giuliano remind him that, in the years of their exile, the Medici had always found hospitality at the court of Urbino. Intercession was useless, and before Leo had left Florence at the end of January, 15 16, proceedings had been begun against the Duke of Urbino. On the 1st of March Francesco Maria was summoned to Rome, under the severest penalties if he disobeyed. If he did not put in an appearance under eighteen days, he would have to give an account of a number of grievous misdeeds. A considerable array of accusations were raised against him. These included his refusal to join Lorenzo de' Medici in his expedition against the French, although he had received the necessary pay for his troops; his understanding with the enemy; and his participation in the murder of Cardinal Alidosi, and other incidents in the pontificate of Julius II. The accusation about the murder of Alidosi was undeniably a mere pretext, because Francesco Maria had been fully acquitted of all participation in it by Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici himself. The same thing cannot, however, be said of the other counts. The refused fealty and the understanding with France were offences which called for punishment from a legal point of view. Nevertheless, the whole action of the Pope, especially when we consider the hospitality shown by the Duke of Urbino to the exiled Medici, has something repulsive about it. The impression left on the mind is that he cared less that justice should take its course, than that the Duchy should become available for his nephew.

Francesco Maria did not dream of obeying the summons to Rome, and set his hopes on mollifying the Pope through a third party. With this object he sent to Rome the noble Duchess Elisabetta Gonzaga, the widow of his predecessor. But her prayers and tears were of no avail; Leo was not to be moved, and the only point gained by her intercession was the suspension of his citation to Rome, during her absence in the Eternal City. But on the nth of March the document was printed and published. The Duke might have profited by the intercession of Giuliano de' Medici, had he not been too grievously ill to take any active measures. Therefore things took their course in Rome. The time given to the Duke for his personal vindication expired without his putting in an appearance. On the 14th of March, a Papal Bull was published which declared that Francesco Maria, on account of his repeated breaches of fealty, was deprived of all his possessions in the States of the Church.

A few days later, on the 17th of March 1516, the consumptive Giuliano de Medici breathed his last at Fiesole, at the age of thirty-seven. His widow Filiberta returned shortly after to her sister Louisa, the mother of Francis I, taking back with her her costly trousseau. Her brief marriage had been childless. Not only did the Pope grieve for Giuliano, but he was mourned sincerely throughout Florence; for, says Vettori, he was a truly good man, without strength, but with no evil in him; he was, however, too generous. In him Francesco Maria lost his most powerful intercessor, and his last hope now rested in Francis I. The Duke had every hope that the French King would at last take up his cause, for the friendship between Francis and the Pope, which had seemed to be so firmly established, now showed signs of waning. The advantages which the victor had wrung from the defenceless Leo under the cloak of great friendship, had been so great that it was impossible that the amicable footing of the contracting parties should continue for long. To the Pope the dominion of the French in Milan was in itself hateful ; but the loss of Parma and Piacenza never ceased from galling him in an especial manner. Had Francis I acted as a wise statesman, he would have avoided the mortification connected with the sequestration of those cities. Leo X had, however, to put up for a while with what he could not prevent. The other arrangement, no less unpalatable to the Holy See, which related to the cession to the Duke of Ferrara of Modena and Reggio, was, however, so worded, that it was easy for an adroit diplomatist like Leo X not particular in the means he employed, to prevent its being carried out, on some pretext or other. Francis learned to his dismay how little dependence could be placed on the Pope, when, in March, 1516, Maximilian crossed the Alps and declared war on the French and Venetians. In presence of this danger, the French King, relying on the Pope’s promise at Bologna, asked for the assistance of 500 men for the defence of Milan, or the alternative of payment for 3000 Swiss mercenaries. Leo, always in want of money, rejected the last alternative; but the troops which he promised instead were raised so slowly that Francis suspected a secret understanding between the Pope and the Emperor. His distrust was considerably increased by the mission to Maximilian of Cardinal Bibbiena, well known for his hatred of France, and by the liberation from prison of Marc Antonio Colonna, who, with a body of troops raised in the States of the Church, had hastened to help the Imperial party against the Venetians.

But Francis did the Pope a wrong. There is no doubt at all that the appearance south of the Alps of the Emperor with a considerable force, was an event not at all desired by Rome. The Pope knew how dangerous to the States of the Church were his far-reaching projects. What is more, he knew that not long before this, Maximilian had in no measured terms threatened Egidio Canisio, who had been appointed on an extraordinary mission to him, with a sweeping reform of the Curia. The Pope’s position as regarded the campaign of Maximilian, was the more difficult because he had to reckon with both parties, with each of whom he had made engagements. In order to keep on the safe side he tried, as he had often done before, to avoid taking any decided step until the fortune of war had declared itself for either side. It was fear, and his inveterate habit of veering from one side to the other, which governed his ambiguous course of action. He rejected all offers made to him by the enemies of France, but would not throw in his lot with Francis I; he neither dared recall Colonna nor send the desired help to the French King. When the Emperor’s expedition met with reverses, Bibbiena was directed to stay at Rubiera, on the plea of illness, to watch the development of affairs. As these turned out very favourably to the French, the Pope sent through Lorenzo one month’s payment for the Swiss mercenaries, which had been asked for some time before. Francis took the money, but, in spite of the Pope’s excuses and professions of friendship conveyed to him by Canossa, remained in the very worst of humours. Ever since May he had been in a frame of mind hostile to the Papacy, giving evidence of designs on Naples, and of intervention about the Duke of Urbino. Consequently Leo, on his side, took up a less friendly attitude towards France.

Francis was soon to feel the effect of this in a variety of ways; especially in Switzerland, where the Papal Nuncios ventured to promote the Anglo-Imperial machinations. The Pope forbade any open union with the enemies of France, yet he held out the possibility of such a measure as a threat. This was sufficient to decide Francis I to leave the Duke of Urbino to his fate.

At first Francesco Maria contemplated resistance; but as soon as he understood that Lorenzo de’ Medici was advancing on Urbino on three sides, at the head of an army of combined Papal and Florentine troops, he fled to Pesaro, and thence to Mantua, to his father-in-law, Francesco Gonzaga, to whom he had already sent his family. Urbino and Pesaro surrendered at once, and Sinigaglia offered very slight resistance. Before long the fortresses of Pesaro and Maiuolo fell also, and only the fortress of San Leo held out. In a few days nearly the whole Duchy had succumbed. Leo received the news of this on the 4th and 5th of June, 1516. Even if there were not wanting those who celebrated the event in Rome with rejoicings, there were many who justly reproached the Pope for his ingratitude towards the fallen dynasty. The excuses which Leo alleged were the outrages which he had suffered at the hands of the Duke, and the justice of the punishment inflicted on him as an unfaithful vassal and a soldier who had detained troops for whom he had received pay. Above all, the Pope pleaded the impossibility of retaining in his States so unfaithful a feudatory, who was certain at the very first opportunity to have dealings with his enemies. Even Francesco Vettori, by no means a Papal partisan, is of opinion that Leo could not by any means have left the Duke's offence unpunished. But, on the other hand, the severity shown on the occasion by the Pope cannot be overlooked, for it was not in keeping with his great position of Supreme Head of the Church. To most contemporaries the conduct of Leo X seemed hard and unjust, and as though actuated solely by regard for the private interests of the house of Medici as was proved by the fact of the crown of the dispossessed prince being at once given to the nephew of the Pope.

Leo X had scarcely recovered from a serious illness, when he learned the course events had taken. On the 18th of August, 1516, Lorenzo was invested with the title of Duke of Urbino, the revenues of which, including Pesaro and Sinigaglia, amounted then to only 25,000 ducats. He was at the same time declared Lord of Pesaro. All the Cardinals signed the deed of investiture except Domenico Grimani, who left Rome in a state of indignation.

The conquest of Urbino aggravated the already strained relations between Leo X and Francis I. The French King had been quite as unwilling as the Emperor to see Francesco Maria driven out of his Duchy. Francis I’s dearest wish was not only to prevent any increase of a the Pope’s power, but rather to see it weakened; yet now he had to look on and see Leo putting difficulties in the way which threatened the foreign policy of France. The fact was that the Pope was trying to keep the Catholic King from forming an alliance with France, while at the same time the Papal Nuncio was seeking to prejudice Switzerland against the same country. Prospero and Muzio Colonna, as well as Girolamo Morone, from whom an attempt against Milan might be feared, considered it safer to remain on Papal territory. Francis went so far as to believe that Leo was mixed up in the negotiations which were being carried on between the Emperor, England, and Switzerland, with the object of seizing Milan. On this account he endeavoured to regain the friendship of the Medici Pope. In August he sent a force to help him against the corsairs of Tunis, who were molesting the coasts of the States of the Church, and who, at the end of April, had almost captured the Pope, while he was hunting near the mouth of the Tiber.

In other ways also the French King sought to curry favour with the Pope. But Leo detested the dominion of the French in Italy for itself, and still more bitterly resented having been compelled to give up Parma and Piacenza. No attentions on the part of Francis I could compensate for this. Thus the relations remained strained on both sides. Leo would not accede to the expressed desire of the French King for the recall of Filonardi; and the French Ambassador made no secret of his displeasure. “I know not”, said he in September, “what more the Pope will do. He controls Florence and Siena, and now he has taken possession of Urbino. He had better not think of Ferrara, for I have orders from my King to demand of him the cession to the Duke of Reggio and Modena. This is not the right moment to speak of Naples”. The Neapolitan question was just then occupying the minds of the Ambassadors both of France and Spain, who had met at Noyon, where the following agreement was come , to on the 13th of August, 1516. Francis I and Charles V concluded a peace in perpetuity, and a treaty for the mutual protection of their states against all comers. The French King renounced his claims on Naples in favour of his one-year-old daughter, Louise, whom Charles promised to marry as soon as she was twelve years old. Till the accomplishment of the marriage, Charles undertook the annual payment of 100,000 crowns, and after that the payment of half that sum until a child should be born of the marriage. A further stipulation which concerned the kingdom of Navarre was left so vague that it could easily be broken; Francis I wished to keep such a way open whereby to escape from the pledges he had made, for his object in signing this agreement was to prevent Charles from joining the anti-French coalition proposed by England. But neither did Charles give his definite adherence to that upon which his Dutch advisers at Noyon had agreed, when the only thing they considered was peace at any price with France. A six weeks’ limit had been allowed for the ratification, which Charles had extended by another month, so as to find time in the interim to negotiate with England. Henry VIII, who regarded the treaty of Noyon as a serious check, left no means untried to win Charles over. This he succeeded in doing, for the Noyon articles were not favourable to the King of Spain. In London, whither Cardinal Schinner went in person, a new treaty, of decidedly anti-French tendency, was prepared on the 29th of October. The contracting parties were Henry VIII and the Emperor Maximilian. The ostensible object of their alliance was the mutual protection of their states, the furtherance of universal peace, and the promotion of a general war against the Turks. They bound themselves in perpetuity to guarantee the safety of their actual and future possessions. The treaty was presented for approbation to Charles of Spain as well as to the Pope, who, through his Nuncio, had declared himself to be neutral. As regards the Pope, the deed ran thus: “Under the conviction that this treaty, being a guarantee of universal peace and the promotion of war against the Turks, must have the consent of the Holy Father, he is included in it as its head and as the participator in all its benefits, if he sanctions the articles and puts them in force by a contribution pro rata; and if, moreover, he pronounces the ban of excommunication against any aggressor, without absolution, except with the consent of all contracting parties. He must come to a decision and ratify these terms within six months”.

But this agreement, which was to be ratified within two months, remained only on paper. The Emperor Maximilian at the Brussels Convention gave his adherence to the Noyon Treaty on the 3rd of December, 1516, and promised to evacuate Verona, which he did in January of the following year. The Swiss, who had been expressly invited to accede to the London Convention, made a peace in perpetuity with France on the 29th of November, 1516.

To all appearances the alliance between Francis I and the Emperor was cemented in the spring of the following year. On the 11th of March, at a conference held at Cambrai, a League was made between Maximilian and the Kings of France and Spain. In May and July not only was this treaty ratified, but some secret clauses were added, the object of which was nothing less than the division of Northern and Central Italy into kingdoms, to be made into Imperial fiefs—Venice, west of Vicenza, with Modena, Milan, Mantua, Montferrat, Piedmont, Asti, and Genoa, were to constitute the kingdom of Lombardy, and to belong to Francis I; the eastern part of Venice, with Padua, Treviso, Florence, Pisa, Leghorn, and Siena were to form the Italian kingdom, and to be given either to King Charles or his brother Ferdinand.  There is no doubt whatever that by the atrocious Treaty of Cambrai, Francis I had no object but to entrap the Emperor, and reduce Venice as well as the Pope to a state of pliancy and servitude.

Probably no one knew better than the French King how much depended on the attitude taken by the Pope. On the 17th of May, Bulls from Rome were prepared which, in accordance with the agreement of Bologna, permitted Francis I to raise a crusade-tithe in his kingdom, including Brittany. But it was only in August, after the negotiations about the Concordat were concluded, that these Bulls were issued, having been rewritten at the King’s request. Francis returned thanks to the Pope in a letter to which he added a couple of autograph lines. In this letter he announced the conclusion of the Treaty of Noyon. Leo did not allow the anxiety he felt at the alliance between the French King and the young Hapsburg to be perceived, and sent his good wishes to Francis I. Going on to remind him of the covenant between them, he professed his readiness to recall his Swiss Nuncio. On the 6th of September he thanked the King for his letter, assured him of his good wishes, and for everything else referred him to his Nuncio, Canossa.

The Nuncios in Switzerland were at the same time admonished to behave in such a way that the French King could in no way take exception. Soon after this, Francis I received a privilege in respect of Milan, in accordance with which no consistorial benefice should be conferred on anyone obnoxious to the Crown. The imminence of the Turkish peril gave Leo the opportunity, in October, of once more appealing urgently for help in that quarter. The King in return professed his zeal in the cause of a Crusade, though it must be confessed that he expressed himself in a somewhat ambiguous manner. This annoyed the Pope; all the more because Francis expressed suspicion that the Pope was not acting honestly by him. On the top of this came the pressure put on him by Francis to hand over Modena and Reggio to the Duke of Ferrara. The report that Leo wished to make Lorenzo Duke of Romagna did not facilitate an agreement. “The Pope”, declared the French Ambassador, “is making himself the master of the whole of Italy, and we shall have to go back across the mountains”. Friction was increased by the complaint raised by Francis I that Schinner had gone, by the consent of the Pope, to London to conclude the treaty of October. At the same time the French King urged the Pope, through the Nuncio, to beware of Charles and Maximilian, who, said he, wished to combine to rob the Holy See of its temporal power. This warning had the effect of making Leo X formally disavow Cardinal Schinner. On the 19th there was sent to the Swiss an exhortation to make peace, which had an influence on the ratification of the arrangement of the 24th of November. On the 25th the Papal chamberlain Latino Benassao was sent on an extraordinary mission to France, as the Pope could not agree with the representative of Francis at Rome. Gossip was rife as to the object of this mission; though it really treated of the cementing of a closer friendship with France by the marriage of Lorenzo. Although the money collected in his country for a Crusade was now, as he had long desired, at the free disposal of the King, an agreement was as far off as ever. At the end of December, Leo X complained to the Venetian Ambassador that the French King suspected him of desiring the possession of Ferrara, and that this was the reason why the agreement was delayed. The Ambassador observed on this occasion how anxious the idea of the Treaty of Cambrai made the Pope. On the top of this came disturbing news about the Turks.  Thus did the year 1516 come to a close, full of grave anxiety for the Pope; the new year brought with it the alarming tidings of a menace to the scarcely won Duchy of Urbino.

Francesco Maria had not remained inactive during his exile at Mantua, and had been turning in every direction for help. It was easy for him to gain the friendship of Federigo Gonzaga, Lord of Bozzoli, who was as jealous as he of Lorenzo de' Medici; but what was more important was that he could count on the assistance of the French viceroy of Milan, Odet de Foix, Lord of Lautrec, who hated the Pope both as an Italian and as a priest. One very favourable feature in the undertaking of Francesco Maria, was that just then a number of Spanish and German soldiers had been thrown out of employment by the peace, and were seeking everywhere for a fresh engagement. Five thousand of these now declared themselves ready to follow the discrowned Duke into his former Duchy, the inhabitants of which desired his return, being dissatisfied with the rule of Lorenzo and his exorbitant taxation. Francesco Maria left Mantua on the 16th of January with his small but enterprising army, and marched on Urbino. It was a bold venture, for he had neither money, ordnance, nor provisions of war; however, it was soon to be seen that fortune favoured him.

The news of the rising in Urbino was to Rome like a flash of lightning in a cloudless sky. At the time the Pope was deeply engaged in discussing the Turkish question with the Cardinals, and did not dream of such a thing as a menace to Urbino. All were taken completely by surprise; and the Duke was in the Romagna before it was known that he had moved. The Pope was quite unprepared for war, because, owing to his lavish generosity, added to his bad management, money, the one thing necessary, was wanting to him. The Papal officers were discontented, because they did not receive sufficient pay; they were, moreover, deeply in debt, for all men followed the Pope’s example in lavishness. Therefore the war had to be J started with borrowed money— a doubtful proceeding for any prince.

From the first the Pope had no doubt whatever that France and Venice had a hand in the Duke’s attempt. Neither of them, said he, on the 26th of January, 1517, to the Venetian Ambassador, had any reason to support Francesco Maria against him. Two days later, however, the Ambassador of the Republic was able to give him the assurance that his Government would not assist any enemy of the Pope. The French also loudly protested their innocence, but the Pope believed them so little that he had no hesitation in expressing his distrust of Francis I, even in the letters in which he begged for the help of Germany and Spain. Even in a letter to Francis himself he expressed his distrust of his intentions.

The Pope’s position was desperate, for, thanks to his habitual tactics, he was in a state of dangerous isolation. Not only Francis, but Maximilian also owed him a grudge. Still angry at what he considered the too friendly terms of Leo with France in the spring of 1516, the Emperor wrote a very bitter letter to the Pope on the 20th of February, 1517. Internal difficulties were added to those from outside. The Romagna was discontented with the bad government of the Papal representative, Florence was in a state of disturbance, and the troops were clamouring for pay. To all this was added the anxiety about the Cambrai Congress, to prevent which Nicholas von Schonberg was sent at the beginning of January. “The union of the three sovereigns”, said the Pope to the Venetian Ambassador, “portends the division of Italy, to your injury and our own”.

Lorenzo de' Medici, who left Rome on the 18th of January, was given the supreme command of the Papal troops; being inexperienced in warfare, the Pope sent with him as advisers Renzo Orsini, Giulio Vitelli, and Guido Rangoni. The Pope appealed on all sides for assistance. At Forli, Faenza, and Ravenna the troops were in want of the necessaries of life.

On the 4th of February it was stated in Rome that Francesco Maria had reoccupied Urbino. The news was premature, but on the 8th of February there was no longer room to doubt the loss of the capital of the Duchy. In spite of the Papal prohibition, Alfonso of Ferrara had given Francesco Maria a free passage through his state, which greatly incensed the Pope, who had just pronounced an interdict on the dispossessed Duke. An Ambassador to whom we owe this adds these words : “There is no money; Leo is displeased with Renzo Orsini, and Renzo with him; the Romans are rejoicing over the bad turn affairs have taken”. The whole Duchy of Urbino, with the exception of the fortress of San Leo, followed the example of the capital. Only the towns of Pesaro, Sinigaglia, Gradara, and Mondaino, which did not belong to the Duchy, remained to Lorenzo. On the 26th of March, 1517, he was wounded at the siege of Mondolfo. He left the theatre of war, and remained at a distance, even after his recovery, in spite of the express command to return sent to him by the Pope. Cardinal Bibbiena, who was sent to the army, vainly tried to reduce to order the quarrelsome mercenaries. The Pope was beside himself; he dreaded the idea of a revolution, and it seemed to him a disgrace for the Church that a “petty duke” could dare so much. His anxiety was increased by the growing danger from the Turks, as well as by the Treaty of Cambrai. He knew well that a partition of Italy was contemplated by the parties to that treaty, and that Maximilian coveted Florence. But on the top of all this there came an event which might have frightened a less timid man—namely, the discovery of a plot of Cardinal Petrucci against the Pope’s life.

Alfonso Petrucci was one of those very worldly princes of the Church, whose only desire was to accumulate riches and indulge in the enjoyment of life. He and the younger Cardinals, after they had secured the election of Leo X, put forward such exorbitant claims that the granting of them was an impossibility. Even later in his pontificate, impoverished as he was by his lavish generosity, the Pope was not in a position to satisfy the countless demands of those who had elected him Pope. Additional cause of discontent was given to these Cardinals (many of whom regarded themselves as sharers in the Papal power) by the setting aside of the election capitulation, by the severity of Leo X to Cardinal Sanseverino, and by the unfortunate war in Urbino.

Alfonso Petrucci had, moreover, a special cause of anger with the Pope. In March, 1516, his brother, Borghese Petrucci, was, with the co-operation of Leo, banished from the government of Siena, being replaced by the Castellan of St. Angelo, Raffaello Petrucci; it was in vain that at the last moment Cardinal Petrucci tried by force of arms to put a stop to this revolution, which was gravely detrimental to his interests. Henceforward, his only thought was how to take vengeance on the “ungrateful Pope”. Consumed by an insane hatred, he meditated an attack on Leo, either when he was out hunting, or at some other convenient opportunity, when he intended to murder him with his own hand. It was the difficulty and danger of such a deed, says Guicciardini, which kept him from carrying out the project, rather than the scandal which would have filled all Christendom with horror, had a Cardinal stained his hands with the Pope’s blood.

During the war of Urbino, Petrucci bethought him of another plan for the attainment of his object. He planned a conspiracy, which was to break out as soon as he had succeeded in getting rid of the Pope by means of poison. To obtain this immediate end he bribed Battista da Vercelli to help him in his crime. This man, a doctor of some renown, was to come from Florence to Rome, ostensibly to treat the Pope for fistula, and was then to take his opportunity of administering poison. The plot, however, failed; for, however highly the skill of Battista might be recommended, the Pope was unwilling to trust himself to the hands of a perfect stranger. But this check did not make Petrucci relinquish his plan, though the unexpected obstruction made the hot-headed young man neglect all caution. He wished—so he was heard to declare—to become the liberator of the despised and enslaved College of Cardinals, and to be instrumental in raising to the supreme pontificate one of the older Cardinals, who would be grateful to his electors. These rash words caused Petrucci to fall under suspicion. He therefore left Rome, where he was not safe, and retired to a place belonging to the Colonna in Latium, without first taking leave of the Pope. He conspired so openly with his brother, who was living in Naples, that the Pope thought it best to write to him with his own hand, in March, 1517, warning him against trying to stir up a revolution in Siena; otherwise his action might be construed into a conspiracy against the Pope himself. In spite of this very distinct warning, Petrucci continued his machinations, and through Lattanzio Petrucci indulged in very doubtful dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere. This added to the suspicion in which the Cardinal was held, and still more did the frequent correspondence which he carried on with his secretary and steward, Marc Antonio Nino, who had remained in Rome. In these letters the subject was revived of calling in Battista da Vercelli to attend to the Pope's open wound.

Petrucci was staying then at Genazzano, and while he was there Nino wrote to him in cipher, saying that Battista was as ready as ever to serve him, and hoped to gain access to His Holiness by means of Serapica and Giulio de' Bianchi, two of the Pope's confidential attendants. In order not to arouse suspicion, Battista did not think it wise to visit the Cardinal in person, but would as to that do exactly what Petrucci wished. This letter was intercepted, and led to the discovery of the plot.

Prompt and decisive measures were taken against the offenders. Petrucci’s confidant, Marc Antonio Nino, was torture. But nothing was made known publicly, and even the best-informed diplomatists knew nothing more than that Cardinal Petrucci was gravely implicated by Nino’s admissions. Some suspected that the offence under consideration was an attempt against Siena; while others suspected an understanding with Francesco Maria della Rovere, with whom Borghese Petrucci was staying. Battista da Vercelli’s movements in Florence were constantly watched. Cardinal Petrucci was promised the restoration of his rights in Siena, on condition that he came in person to Rome. The Cardinal hesitated to do this, though he had no suspicion that his correspondence with Nino had been discovered. All his fear was on account of his intrigues with Francesco Maria della Rovere. But so far as those intrigues were concerned, Leo gave him a free safe-conduct, assuring the Spanish Ambassador at the same time that he would keep his word. Therefore Petrucci came to Rome on the 1 8th of May. On the following day, hardly had he, in the company of his intimate friend, Cardinal Sauli, entered the Pope’s antechamber, before both of them were arrested and taken to the Castle of St. Angelo.

In a Consistory called without delay, the Pope informed the Cardinals of what had occurred, and of the introduction of proceedings against Petrucci and Sauli. It was at the same time decided that the minutes of the trial should be submitted for judgment to a special commission composed of Cardinals Remolino, Accolti and Farnese, and that the final sentence should be pronounced by the Cardinals. On the same day special Briefs were sent to the more important princes, telling them that Cardinals Petrucci and Sauli had been arrested on the charge of a secret conspiracy against the life of the Pope, and that on account of this crime a judicial process would be instituted against them.

In Rome this event, which gives us a deeper insight than can anything else into the intense corruption of the highest ecclesiastical body, caused a great sensation. The wildest rumours floated about the city, and it was said that other Cardinals had also been arrested. The excitement increased when it was seen that the Vatican was closely guarded and that troops had been brought into Rome.

Among the Ambassadors who had been informed of the proceedings, the representative of Spain openly protested against the arrest of Petrucci. He had, said he, gone surety for him, and this was the same thing as if the King had done so. But Leo X replied that even the most comprehensive safe-conduct could be no protection for one who had intended to take his sovereign’s life by poison, unless this horrible crime had been expressly mentioned. As Petrucci's safe-conduct only referred to his dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere, the Spanish Ambassador soon withdrew his protest. But even among the Cardinals there were several who were indignant with the Pope for confining Petrucci and Sauli in the lowest dungeon of St. Angelo, which went by the name of “Marocco”. Leo tried to conceal his alarm, and insisted on no one visiting the prisoners ; nevertheless, at the express request of the College of Cardinals, he allowed a servant to each of them.

The management of the judicial process against the prisoners was confided to the procurator-fiscal, Mario de Perusco, a native of Rome, and auditor to the Governor of the city. In the first instance the inquiry was confined to proving whether the murder of the Pope had been actually intended. Word was sent to Florence to arrest Battista da Vercelli and bring him to Rome ; other suspected persons, including a servant of Petrucci’s named Pocointesta, were also arrested. All these were put to the torture, but whether the rack was applied to the Cardinals is uncertain.

Another Consistory was called on the 29th of May. At this was made known the report of Cardinals Remolino, Accolti, and Farnese, to whom had been confided the supervision of the proceedings. The sentence of these was that the accused Cardinals should be kept under arrest as long as they were not cleared of the accusations brought against them. When the Cardinals were assembled in the Vatican, Paris de Grassis says that Leo sent for Cardinal Accolti. “He remained for over an hour in the Pope’s room”, says the Master of Ceremonies. “As we could not understand what such a long interview portended, I looked through the key-hole, and saw that there was a military guard in the Pope’s room. I suspected at once that some thing terrible was about to occur, but I held my tongue. As I saw Cardinals Riario and Farnese enter the Pope’s room with cheerful countenances, I concluded that he had sent for them, probably to consult with them about the nomination of new Cardinals, about which he had been speaking some days before. Hardly, however, had Cardinal Riario entered the room, than the Pope, who usually walked about between two attendants, taking slow, steady steps, hurried out of the room quite swiftly, and seemingly in a state of confusion, shutting the door behind him, so that the Cardinal was left alone with the guard. Astonished at this, and at his apparent haste, I asked the Pope what it meant, and whether he was going into the Consistory without his stole. He then asked for his stole. He was pale and very much excited, and in a harsh tone told me to dismiss the Consistory. I obeyed, but had no doubt left that Cardinal Riario had been arrested”.

The reason of Riario’s arrest soon transpired. Petrucci and Sauli had confessed that he was their fellow-conspirator. Like many others, Paris de Grassis would not believe this, and came to the conclusion that Leo was allowing himself to be influenced by feelings of personal revenge connected with the memory of the Pazzi conspiracy; but this surmise of the Master of Ceremonies, who was always prepossessed in favour of Riario, was not confirmed by after events.

On the 4th of June Riario, who till that date had been detained in honourable captivity in the Vatican, was transferred to the Castle of St. Angelo. When the un fortunate man was told that this was to be done, he became paralysed with fear, and had to be carried to his prison. As the reason for this measure, Leo X explained in Consistory that Riario would confess nothing. But in the dark dungeon of St. Angelo he soon made a full confession. Another Consistory was held on the 8th of June: and then the Pope disclosed to the agitated assembly that, by the admission of the incarcerated Cardinals, two other members of the Sacred College, present at the Consistory at that moment, were involved in the conspiracy. Bitterly did Leo complain that those from whom he could have least suspected such a thing, those into whose hands he trusted his life, could be guilty of such a crime. But however pained he might be by the ingratitude of those whom he had loaded with honours and benefactions, he declared himself willing to forgive them, after the example of Him whose place he filled on earth, provided they would confess their misdeed and ask for pardon. But as, in spite of what he said, not one came forward, the Cardinals in Consistory decided that each of them in turn should go up to the Pope and make their avowal into his private ear. When it came to the turn of Cardinal Soderini to do this, he tried to avoid the occasion of avowing his guilt. This obstinacy incensed Leo X, and he told him to his face that he was one of the two culprits. Had he confessed his guilt, the Pope went on, his words would have been those of mercy, but now justice must take its course. On hearing this, Soderini, as well as Adriano Castellesi, threw themselves at the feet of the Pope, and confessing their complicity in the plot, implored his mercy. This was at once granted. The Consistory, however, imposed a fine on each of 12,500 ducats, and commanded the culprits to keep secret what had occurred. Nevertheless, the rumour of what had taken place spread like wildfire throughout Rome, taking many a distorted form as it went about. After the long and painful Consistory, the Pope received the Ambassadors of Germany, France, England, Spain, Portugal, and Venice, and informed them that the Cardinals who had been mixed up in the affair had been, with the exception of Petrucci, Sauli and Riario, pardoned. When the English Ambassador asked him if he would not pardon all, he replied : “Those Cardinals whose guilt has since become known, we have pardoned; but against those who are now confined in the Castle, proceedings will be carried out in due accordance with the criminal law”.

On the 1 6th of June Petrucci's servant, Pocointesta, was hanged in the prison of Tordi Nona, on the charge of attempting to stir up a revolt in Siena. At first an attempt was made to keep secret the alarming discoveries that came to light in the course of the examination of the prisoners, and even the best informed of the Ambassadors could learn nothing for certain. According to a cipher report of the Ferrarese Ambassador written on the 10th of June, there was a rumour that either Farnese or Paris de Grassis was equally guilty. It was only on the 18th of June that it was learned that the later accusations were limited to Soderini and Adriano Castelles. These last were indeed allowed to remain free, but, as mentioned already, each had to pay 12,500 ducats as the price of his liberty. When, however, this fine was doubled, they feared that they would no longer be safe in Rome. In the night of the 20th of June, Soderini sought refuge with the Colonna at Palestrina, while at the same time Cardinal Adriano Castellesi, who was by nature very timid, fled disguised to Tivoli, passing thence, as was reported, to Naples.

Meanwhile the greatest anxiety was felt by their friends concerning the incarcerated Cardinals, for the trial dragged on week after week, and each day brought with it fresh surmises as to the result. True to his nature, the Pope seemed for one moment inclined to allow justice to give place to mercy. But Lorenzo de' Medici and his adherents urged that the severest punishment should be inflicted, not only on the Cardinals, but on all the other offenders. To gain this object Lorenzo arrived in Rome quite unexpectedly on the 1 8th of June. Thirteen Cardinals present at that time in the Curia were summoned to a Consistory on the 22nd of June. All those called came, with the exception of Riario’s relative, Leonardo Grosso della Rovere. In a long speech Leo X informed the Cardinals of the result of the trial held on Petrucci, Sauli, and Riario. The accusation was one of fourfold treason. First, as the Pope pointed out, was that of binding themselves by oath, as Petrucci and Sauli had done, during the lifetime of the lawful Supreme Pontiff, to make Riario Pope; to which arrangement Riario had consented. In order to remove Leo X and secure his death, Petrucci and Sauli had suborned Battista da Vercelli to poison the Pope, under the pretext of treating him for fistula. In this plot also Riario was involved. Lastly, Petrucci as well as Sauli had held treasonable communication with Francesco Maria della Rovere, and had thus incurred the penalties imposed by the last Bull issued. Then the minutes of the process instituted against the accused were read, as also were the confessions of the imprisoned Cardinals. It had now to be decided whether the charge of high-treason were proved, the penalty of such a crime being the loss of all possessions as well as sentence of death. The Cardinals proceeded to put the matter to the vote. All, with the exception of Grimani, admitted that Petrucci, Sauli, and Riario were without doubt guilty of fourfold treason; nevertheless, they begged the Pope to show mercy towards their brother Cardinals. Then the fiscal-advocate, Justino de Carosis, and after him the fiscal­procurator, Mario de Perusco, brought forward their motion, which was read by Pietro Bembo. Their judgment was that all three of the accused should be condemned to the loss of all their benefices and possessions, then be degraded from their dignity of the cardinalate, and finally handed over to the secular arm. At the conclusion of the Consistory the Pope spoke about the flight of Adriano Castellesi, which, he said, he had known about but would not prevent.

Only such well-weighed entries, characterized by a truly diplomatic brevity and reserve, do we find in the Vice­Chancellor’s Consistorial Acts. But from other impartial sources we learn that the Consistory was long and stormy. According to the Venetian Ambassador it lasted for ten, and, according to Paris de Grassis, thirteen hours. It was not only the reading of the minutes of the trial, filling several hundred pages, which took so much time; but there were also loud and long discussions, of such a nature that those outside could overhear the Pope disputing with the Cardinals, and they with one another. There was one especially violent encounter of words between Leo X and Cardinal Grimani.

The passing of the sentence took the Curia by surprise. To many the clause which gave the offenders over to the secular arm seemed too hard; for in this case it was equivalent to a sentence of death. Nevertheless it was, according to the laws of that time, the usual sentence passed on traitors, even when no attempt had been made by them against the life of their sovereign.

On the 25th of June all the Ambassadors then in Rome were invited to come before the Pope to hear the minutes of the trial read. “This is what we understood”, reports the Venetian Ambassador, “by the letters found on Petrucci’s secretary, the Cardinal’s schemes with Battista da Vercelli for poisoning the Pope were discovered. Petrucci himself admitted later that, in desperation at Siena being taken out of the hands of his family, he desired to take the Pope’s life, and confided his plan to Cardinals Sauli and Riario”. To this the Venetian Ambassador adds: “There is no doubt as to this; yet in conducting the trial it was wrong that the accused should have been put into a position to hear the testimony of others. When this was done in the case of Riario, who would not admit the truth of any of the accusations against him, he said, on hearing the evidence of Petrucci and Sauli, that as they affirmed his connivance in the plot, this statement must be retained in the minutes. Soderini affirmed that he had promised Riario the tiara." Unfortunately this is all that the Ambassador says about the reading of the minutes of the process, which took eight hours and a half. At the end of the conference the Pope asked for Petrucci's red biretta, which was on the table in front of him. “This”, said he,  “is what he staked. He was determined to go to all lengths”.

There is no doubt that Leo X believed in the existence of a real conspiracy against his life. For some time he would not venture to leave his well-guarded palace: and when at last, contrary to all expectation, he attended Vespers in the Vatican Basilica on the vigil of SS. Peter and Paul, he was surrounded by an armed guard; and all the streets round St. Peter’s were held by troops. On the 27th of June Battista da Vercelli and Marc Antonio Nino were hanged, drawn, and quartered. In accordance with the horrible criminal custom of the day, they were both severely tortured on the way to the place of execution, which was on this occasion the Piazza in front of the bridge of St. Angelo. This barbarity was generally condemned.

The whole of Rome was waiting with anxiety to learn the sentence passed on the incarcerated Cardinals. That Petrucci’s fate was sealed was inferred by the division among others of his benefices; but there seemed to be a prospect of pardon for the other two Cardinals. As, unfortunately, the short epitome of the trial, given by the Venetian Ambassador, is all that remains to us of the acts of the process, it is difficult, and for the most part impossible, to form an estimate of the measure of guilt or of the motives of each individual. There is, however, no doubt whatever as to the existence of treasonable dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere, or of the plot to poison Leo X.

There is no doubt that Petrucci was the most guilty of the conspirators, and indeed the head of the whole plot; for there is incontrovertible proof of his criminal machinations with Battista da Vercelli. The sentence of death pronounced against him was carried out at once, though the statements vary as to the mode of his execution, and whether he was strangled or beheaded. There is also great uncertainty whether this young man, twenty-seven years of age, who had cared for nothing but the frivolous enjoyment of life, reconciled his soul to God before he died.

As regards Sauli, Riario, Soderini, and Adriano Castellesi, there seems no doubt that they gave ear more or less to Petrucci's criminal schemes, though how far each was individually involved cannot be ascertained by the material at our disposal. The historian Paolo Giovio, who is as a rule well-informed, says as follows : “Even if those above named did not actually confide the execution of the criminal scheme to the unstable and frivolous Petrucci, there is no doubt that they incited him to it by their jests and jibes. In their inmost hearts these men were devoured by hatred and ambition, and wished that Petrucci might succeed in his project of removing the Pope, either by open violence or by subtle poison”. From other sources also it seems undeniable that at least Sauli and Riario had a more intimate knowledge of the murderous plot. Their crime, therefore, consisted in not revealing, as they were bound to do, the vengeful machinations of Petrucci, of which they were aware.

As to Adriano Castellesi, he was unlike the others, and Giovio declares that he did not wish for the Pope’s death from any feelings of hatred or ill-will, but solely because his ambition led him to wish for the tiara for himself. Ambition, as well as hatred of the Florentine who was so all-powerful in the Curia, was an essential motive with Riario. Soderini could not forget the banishment from Florence of his brother Pietro, although Leo X had at once invited him to Rome and had restored to him his possessions. Next to Petrucci, there is no doubt, from the incriminating character of the letters which were seized, that Sauli was very deeply involved. No satisfactory explanation can be given why he allowed himself to be mixed up in the treasonable intrigue. Few of the Cardinals had received so many benefits and favours from the Pope as he. The black ingratitude with which Sauli repaid his generosity pained the Pope deeply. “Even during the last three months”, said Leo to the Venetian Ambassador, “we have conferred benefices on Sauli to the value of 6000 ducats”. In court circles the opinion was held that it was these very marks of favour, and the Pope’s partiality for Sauli, which had developed in him an intolerable pride, and resentment because the Pope had given the see of Marseilles to Giulio de' Medici instead of to himself.

Urgent appeals were sent in to the Pope from many quarters on behalf of Sauli as well as of Riario. Genoa pleaded for Sauli, as also did Cardinal Cibo, and, above all, the French King. Many also interceded for Riario, among others the Venetian Ambassador. His relatives wrote in his favour even to Henry VIII of England. In his justification it was pleaded that his worst crime was keeping back the incriminating confidences of Petrucci. It is, however, undeniable that he had set his hopes on obtaining the tiara, and that his confidential relations with Francesco Maria della Rovere had led him to join the mortal enemy of the Pope.

In spite of all this, there were special reasons which induced the Pope to pardon and restore Riario. There were, however, the strictest conditions laid down for his pardon. The first of these was that he should expressly acknowledge that he had been lawfully deposed, and that he owed his restoration solely to the mercy of His Holiness. He had, moreover, to promise solemnly that he would be henceforward the true servant of the Pope; that he would refrain from all hostility towards him and his family, and have no dealings with any prince or Cardinal except about his own private concerns. As a punishment he was to pay, in three instalments, the enormous fine of 150,000 ducats. The first instalment of 50,000 ducats was to be advanced by Agostino Chigi, and the necessary security must be offered either by bankers or friendly officials of the Curia for the punctual payment at Christmas and Easter of the remaining instalments. Furthermore, caution money of 1 50,000 ducats was demanded for the observance of all matters connected with obedience and fidelity, especially that which forbade him to ever leave his appointed dwelling without the written permission of the Pope. As a further precaution, the twelve Cardinals who had taken part in Riario’s deposition, as well as Cardinal Leonardo Grosso della Rovere, were bound to pledge themselves to see that Riario kept his promises; failing which he was to be regarded as deposed in perpetuity. The same security was to be given by the Ambassadors of Germany, England, France, Spain, Portugal, and Venice. Their security was to be ratified within four months, and besides this they were to pledge themselves to make no further appeals to the Pope in favour of Riario.

On the 17th of July, in the great hall of St. Angelo, before the fiscal-procurator, Mario de Perusco, Riario promised to faithfully observe all these conditions. On the 23rd, his nearest relatives promised to pay a fine of 75,000 ducats, should Riario leave the Vatican without the express permission of the Pope. On the same day Agostino Chigi promised to pay the Pope 150,000 ducats on his behalf. On receiving this promise, the Pope decreed thus in a Consistory held on July the 24th: “Riario shall be restored to his dignities, with the exception of the title of S. Lorenzo in Damaso, and without either active or passive right of voting”.

The news of the approaching liberation of Riario, who was universally respected and beloved, spread rapidly through Rome. As the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, made his way to St. Angelo to announce the good news to the prisoner, the streets were filled with a jubilant crowd. Riario was conducted to the Vatican by the covered way, in which he was met by Cardinal Giulio de' Medici. Having taken the oath required of him in the apartment of Cardinal Trivulzio, Paris de Grassis conducted him to the Pope, around whom all the Cardinals were assembled. Riario kissed Leo’s foot, but the latter put out his hand in a friendly manner and embraced him. Riario began to speak, but apologized for not having been able to prepare his words. Then breaking out into vehement expressions, he acknowledged his guilt, by which, he said, he deserved not only degradation but death. He praised the mercy of the Pope, which removed all fear of future punishment, and enabled him to live in peace. “I have sinned”, said he; “I have sinned far more than I admitted in my judicial confession”. “Honoured Lord”, replied the Pope, “what we have done by you is in accordance with our duty, and for the honour of the Apostolic See. We pardon you now for the sake of Christ, and restore you to your former state. Let all that has passed be forgotten between us”.

It is not difficult to understand what it was that moved Leo X to pardon and restore Riario. For many years the Cardinal had held the dignity of Camerlengo of the Roman Church and Dean of the Sacred College, a member of which he had been for forty years. His riches and generosity had made him one of the most influential personalities in Rome. Had the Pope refused pardon to such a man, he would have drawn down hatred on himself from high and low. He would have also laid himself open to the suspicion of being actuated by motives of private revenge; for Riario had been a witness of the Pazzi conspiracy, in which Leo’s father had been wounded and his uncle Giuliano killed. Though innocent, the Medici had arrested Riario, and only set him at liberty thanks to the energetic measures taken by Sixtus IV on his behalf. These measures were still so fresh in the memory of all concerned, that when Leo took proceedings against Riario for his complicity in Petrucci’s attempt, even the Pope’s adherents suspected that a desire for revenge for the old offence was at the bottom of the action taken by him. However, the joy with which his pardon was greeted by his many adherents, the friendliness of the Pope towards him then and afterwards, and even his full restoration which followed, when the right, active and passive, of voting was restored to him, could not blind him to the fact that his part in the Curia was played out. At the latter end of 1520 he asked leave to retire to Naples. This was granted. However, the bewitching beauty of his new abode could not make up to Riario for the loss of his position in the capital of the world. He who had been so full of the enjoyment of life, who had always lived in regal splendour in the most beautiful palace in Rome, fell into a state of melancholy, and died on the 7th of July, 1521, at the age of sixty-one. His body was brought to Rome and laid to rest in a very simple tomb in the Church of the Santi Apostoli. He required no special monument, for his magnificent palace of the Cancelleria, which he had to leave to the Apostolic Chamber, will keep the memory of this unfortunate man alive till the most remote ages.

A few days after the restoration of Riario there followed, with unexpected rapidity, that of Sauli, who was condemned to pay a fine of 25,000 ducats. When the Pope went into Consistory on the 31st of July, he sent Paris de Grassis to fetch Sauli from the Castle of St. Angelo. As a sign that his mission was genuine, he gave the Master of Ceremonies his diamond ring to show to the gaoler. “When I received this”, says Paris de Grassis, “I was astonished, because only a few days before the Pope had told me that he meant to treat and punish Sauli as his enemy”. Sauli, however, was not allowed to appear before the Pope with his cappa, but clad as a simple priest. He also had to pledge himself to remain in the Vatican, and to confess his offence publicly in Consistory. In obedience to this command, he accused himself of conspiring with Francesco Maria della Rovere against the Pope, and of sharing in Petrucci's scheme for poisoning Leo X. He humbly prayed for pardon and absolution for this crime, and promised to be for the future the most faithful servant of His Holiness. Leo X replied shortly and irritably that he hoped that his thoughts agreed with his words, but that he feared greatly that he would fall back into his old sins. After Sauli had again prayed for mercy and had promised fidelity to the Pope, lie was reinstated in his dignity as Cardinal, though without the right, active or passive, of voting. His benefices, so far as they had not been already given away, were restored to him. The deeply humiliated Sauli enjoyed his life as little as did Riario. He lived a retired life, and died on the 29th of March in the following year. Leo had him buried with all honours in the Church of Santa Sabina.

Meanwhile Soderini, for whom Francis I had interceded, had, by the Pope’s permission, gone from Palestrina to Forli, where he possessed an estate; though he had to promise not to leave the kingdom of Naples. The Pope was quite right not to trust him, and it was not till after Leo’s death that he was able to return to Rome.

Cardinal Adriano Castellesi found a refuge in Venice, where he arrived on the 13th of July. His flight was over­hasty, for it gave Wolsey the opportunity of ruining him. Intercession was made for him from many quarters, and probably an understanding might have been arrived at, had it not been that Wolsey was bent on obtaining possession of the unfortunate man’s benefices. For a long time Leo resisted the pressure put on him by England. Castellesi was sent for to Rome; but in spite of the safe-conduct offered, he would not go. This sealed his fate, and on the 5th of July, 1518, he was deprived of his dignities, the reason assigned being his complicity in Petrucci’s plot, as also his refusal to obey the summons to Rome. The primary cause of these strong measures was the pressure from England, but they were also attributable to the Pope’s fear of an alliance between Adriano and Soderini, and ensuing intrigues. Such an idea was, however, far from Adriano’s thoughts. He lived quietly and devoted to study in the Palazzo Ca Bernardo, near the Grand Canal, belonging to his friend Giacomo da Pesaro. There he remained until the death of Leo X compelled him to go to Rome to attend the Conclave. But on his way thither the unfortunate man disappeared, leaving no trace behind him. It was supposed that he had been murdered by his servant.

After the proceedings consequent on Petrucci’s conspiracy were ended, an unusual spirit of excitement continued to prevail. It cannot be surprising that the names of other Cardinals, such for instance as Luigi d'Aragona and Cornaro, were mentioned as being connected with the plot; though, as it was proved, such a surmise was quite incorrect.

Early in May the news spread about Rome that it was Leo’s intention to create as many as twelve new Cardinals. On the 15th of June he announced this officially in Consistory. In fact the Pope contemplated a complete renewal of the Sacred College. The recent occurrences had shown the necessary consequences of the secularization of the Supreme Senate of the Church, which had been initiated by Sixtus IV. The moment had come for a radical reform of the College of Cardinals; but that Leo X did not even yet fully grasp the gravity of the situation, is shown by the manner in which he proceeded. Instead of raising quite blameless men to the purple by the process of a severe selection, he chose several for the dignity solely because they were rich, and would be able to help to defray the enormous and daily growing expenses of the Urbino war.

When the news of all the horrible things that had been occurring in Rome reached Germany, the strongest imaginable spirit of hostility sprang up. The punishment of the criminals was condemned as unjust, and the whole procedure against them construed into a scheme for making money. Nor was it only in Germany that the Pope’s conduct was censured. In Siena, Milan, Venice, and even in Rome, there were not wanting those who were severe in their judgments. The canon, Sigismondo Tizio, who was bitterly hostile to the Medici for other reasons also, wrote thus : “What is the use of canonical laws, established by holy Popes, forbidding priests to stain their hands with blood? for now Popes and Cardinals have become antichrists and tyrants”.

Regardless of all these inimical opinions, Leo X profited by the past occurrences to create a large number of Cardinals, both as a means of subjecting the Sacred College to himself, and at the same time of procuring money for the Urbino war. He forestalled the opposition of the secular powers by paying the fullest attention to their wishes. Though the College of Cardinals had been not little intimidated by all that had taken place, it was not an easy matter to obtain their consent to the nominations on the gigantic scale which was proposed. The proceeding was indeed unparalleled, and gave great umbrage to many.

On the 26th of June there was held a stormy Consistory. Those present refused to consent to the proposed nomination of twenty-seven new Cardinals, except on the condition that the names of no more than fifteen should be published at once. When, however, it came to making a selection among the candidates, there was such a difference of opinion that the settlement of the affair had to be postponed to another Consistory. But when it came to the point the Cardinals yielded to the strong will of the Pope more readily than could have been expected. On the 1st of July the great nomination took place; only, instead of twenty-seven, thirty-one Cardinals were made. The Sacred College gave its consent, not freely, but constrained by fear.

The unprecedented number of those nominated, the publication of whom followed in open Consistory on the 3rd of July made it necessary to create new titles for the Cardinals. On the 10th of July, the Pope was in a position to announce that all the older Cardinals had agreed to the abrogation of the decree of the election capitulation which limited the total number of the members of the Sacred College to twenty-four.

The new Cardinals were men of very different types, by the choice of whom Leo X wished to attain various objects. In the case of some, such as Louis de Bourbon, brother of the Constable, of the Portuguese Infant Alfonso, the Spaniard, Raymond de Vich, and the Venetian, Francesco Pisani, politics were the sole reason of their elevation. In the case of others the motive was to be found in their relationship to the house of Medici, and their readiness to advance large sums of money to the Pope. This was how it came about that men like Ponzetti, Armellini, and Passerini received the purple.

Ferdinando Ponzetti was born in Naples, though his family came from Florence. His portrait is known to students of art in the altar-piece in the Chapel of St. Brigit in S. Maria della Pace, where Baldassare Peruzzi has represented him kneeling before the Madonna. Ponzetti had made his fortune as physician to Innocent VIII, and subsequently received distinguished offices in the Curia. On the 23rd of October Leo appointed him his treasurer; and now, at the age of eighty, he was raised to the purple. Not only was Ponzetti a physician of mark, but he was also versed in classical literature, philosophy and theology, was very ready of speech, and was well known as an author. But all his good qualities were marred by the vilest avarice. He paid 30,000 ducats for his nomination.

Francesco Armellini's reputation was even worse than his. His father was a poor merchant of Perugia, but by his own shrewdness and financial talent in discovering new sources of revenue, he made himself indispensable to the Pope; but at the same time he made himself universally hated. Silvio Passerini was not much better. This learned though self-opinionated man had been Datary since January, 1514,1 and had served the Medici with the greatest fidelity on many occasions. It was therefore easy for him to find favour with others. The list of benefices bestowed on Silvio Passerini, as is shown by the “Regest Leonis X”, is really shocking. Among all the benefice-hunters of the court of Leo X, certainly Passerini took the first place.

Their kinship to the Pope was the sole reason of the nominations of Giovanni Salviati, Niccolò Ridolfi, and Luigi de' Rossi. The young and highly-gifted musician Ercole Rangoni, Bonifacio Ferreri, and Raffaello Petrucci owed their elevation to personal considerations. The last mentioned, who had formerly held the post of Governor of Siena, led an entirely secular life. His covetousness made him hated ; but the two first named had the reputation of being excellent men.

A most rare event in the history of the Sacred College was the elevation to the purple on the same day of two members of one family. These were Scaramuccia Trivulzoo to whom the success of the Lateran Council owed so much, and his highly-gifted nephew Agostino. Still greater astonishment was caused by the nomination of seven members of prominent Roman families with no regard to party. By doing this Leo carried on the prudent policy of his predecessors, who wished to remove all party feeling from the Court. Whatever the motive, the Romans rejoiced and held high festival because of the honour paid to their fellow-citizens. But Franciotto Orsini and Pompeo Colonna were totally unfitted for their high dignity, being rather condottieri than princes of the Church. Francesco Conti also lived a thoroughly worldly life. But of the four remaining nothing but good can be said. Alessandro Cesarini was remarkable for his culture, Andrea della Valle for his great prudence, while Paolo Cesi and Domenico Jacobazzi were distinguished for their great learning.

The Roman, Domenico de Cupis, the Florentine, Niccolò Pandolfini, the Sienese, Giovanni Piccolomini, the Genoese, Giambattista Pallavicini, and Lorenzo Campeggio, who belonged to a Bolognese family, were all excellent men. Finally, there was the Dutchman, Adrian of Utrecht, who was a man of sound learning, and a model of the priestly life, who had been recommended by Charles V. With him are worthy to be ranked the Generals of the Dominicans, the Franciscan Observantines, and the hermits of St. Augustine, who received the cardinalate together on the 1st of July, 1517. It is hard to say which of these religious holds the first place.

More will be said later about the learned General of the Dominicans, Thomas de Vio (Cajetan). Cristoforo Numai, a native of Forli, had taken the Franciscan habit early in life, and had then received the doctorate of theology in Paris. Only a few days before the 1st of July, the confidence of his brethren had placed him at the head of the most widespread of all religious orders. He was completely taken by surprise by his elevation to the purple. The Master of Ceremonies relates how the humble religious refused at first to believe the news of his elevation, and would not believe it until several successive messengers had been despatched to take him to the Vatican. When Numai at length appeared at the palace in his well-worn habit, his complete ignorance of courtly etiquette aroused astonishment in the ante-camera. “At last”, relates Paris de Grassis, “I conducted him to the Pope, who had already left the Consistory”. His Holiness embraced him and greeted him as Cardinal.

The General of the Augustinians, Egidio Canisio, known under the name of Egidius of Viterbo, was taken by surprise by the conferring of the dignity as completely as was Numai. If ever a man deserved the red hat it was this distinguished man, who combined a classical education and general learning with a great capacity for business and a profound piety.

Egidio Canisio's versatility and mental activity were truly astounding. Not only had he made his mark as a poet, orator, philosopher, and theologian, but also as an historian and a student of oriental languages. It is a mystery how, with all this intellectual work, he found the time to effect what he did by preaching and in reforming his Order. On the top of all these occupations there came the various and difficult diplomatic missions which were confided to him by both Julius II. and Leo X. Ever since the classical discourse at the opening of the Lateran Council, urging the reformation of the Church, his name has been famous. The calling of such a man to the Supreme Senate of the Church does great credit to Leo X; in this way he promoted the principle of true reform as well as its execution.

If we consider the nominations of the 1st of July, 1517, it must be admitted that many, if by no means all, the new Cardinals were excellent and worthy men, who deserved well of the Church, and by means of whom the Sacred College was for the first time, after long years, restored to its regenerating influence. In this respect as also in the number of nationalities represented, that creation of Cardinals showed a most decided advance on any other  in many ways it was an important event. Not only was the secularization of the Sacred College to a great extent checked, but the supremacy of the Papal authority over that of the Cardinals was finally confirmed. Ever since the middle of the 14th Century, the one endeavour of the Cardinals had been to cramp and circumscribe the power of the Pope; though, in spite of all the election capitulations, the Papacy had preserved its lawfully absolute power. All attempts to fetter the Pope by the vote of the Sacred College had failed. The last great attempt made by the Cardinals to oppose him—the Council of Pisa—had had just the contrary effect to that which had been intended. The schismatic Cardinals had been compelled to repudiate the Council; and, at the eleventh session of the Lateran Council, held on the 19th of December, 1516, the Bull about the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction declared that to the Pope alone belonged the right and authority to summon, prorogue, or dismiss a Council. The conspiracy of Petrucci led to a nomination of Cardinals on a scale greater than any mentioned in the annals of the Church. Ever after, the absolute supremacy of the Pope was so firmly established that the Cardinals under Leo’s next successor but one, “even in the days of the greatest misfortune, when party spirit prevailed most violently”, ventured on no opposition to it.

Meanwhile the war in Urbino was going on, and sympathy with Francesco Maria was growing in Tuscany and even in some of the States of the Church. Fear and hope alternated at the Vatican; but the various projects that were made vanished, as says an Ambassador, into smoke. There was scarcely a town in the States of the Church which did not show dangerous signs of excitement; at one time Siena, Perugia, and Citta di Castello were threatened with revolution. In June the Pope feared lest the enemy might appear before the very gates of Rome. In all haste troops were raised in the city, and the Vatican and its immediate surroundings were provided with special guards. Urgent appeals for assistance were sent out by the Pope on all sides, especially to Switzerland.

That the war, with its enormous expenses, dragged on so long, was largely due to the attitude of the great powers, to whose interest it was that the Pope should be kept in a state of embarrassment, and compelled to seek for help. After his cause was lost, Francesco Maria disclosed the true state of affairs by making it known that Francis I and Charles V had not only sympathized with him, but had even persuaded him to persevere with his undertaking. Quite in accordance with this policy were the constant offers of assistance to Leo X, which those powers vied with each other in making. But the troops promised, though always coming, never came, in spite of moving remonstrances on the part of the Pope. The leaders of the mercenary troops behaved in the same way ; in order to prolong their service and extort from the Pope as much money as possible, they made it their chief duty to spare the enemy and defer a settlement.

As early as February, 1517, Leo X had turned to England to obtain from Henry VIII the money for his enormous war expenses; but the English King refused to help until the Pope had joined his League. Then Leo turned to France; but Francis I demanded security for his protégé, the Duke of Ferrara, and the cession to him of Modena and Reggio. After long negotiations, the Pope acceded to this demand, but his Brief contained provisos which Francis would not accept.

Meanwhile the want of money in Rome increased to such an extent that Leo declared his readiness to join the English League; whereupon Henry VIII sent a subsidy of 50,000 ducats. The Papal plenipotentiary in London prepared a deed of alliance in the beginning of July, but Leo X, actuated by fear of France, still hesitated to take the decisive step. However, he yielded at last, and on the 11th of August he published a Brief which ratified the League between England, Spain, and the Emperor. He now received a subsidy of 100,000 ducats, to raise which he consented to the levying of a tithe on the English clergy.

Leo was told from so many quarters of the French King’s secret support of Francesco Maria, that he could no longer doubt the truth. The difference between him and Francis widened every day. Canossa, who had for many years been Nuncio at the French court, was sacrificed to the situation, for Leo X no longer trusted him, on account of the great favour in which he was held by Francis I. His successor was the Bishop of Sebenico, Giovanni Staffileo, who arrived at the French court in the middle of September, 1517.

At this moment the war of Urbino came to an end after a duration of over eight months. Spain and France, the rival powers in Italy, and very jealous of each other, undertook the office of mediation and arrangement of terms. Leo X, who with good reason distrusted them both, found himself pledged to pay all arrears to the soldiers of Francesco Maria, which amounted to more than 100,000 ducats, as well as to the granting of a full amnesty. The ex-Duke, who was absolved from all the ecclesiastical penalties which hung over him, received permission to retire to Mantua, with all his artillery, as well as with the famous library collected by Federigo of Montefeltro. When he took his departure, he held out hopes to his subjects that he would come back in better days; for Francis I had promised to help him to regain his Duchy, either when there was a vacancy in the Holy See, or whenever he had come to a rupture with Leo X. It was therefore an essentially insecure crown which Lorenzo de' Medici received with the Duchy of Urbino. The only, thing gained was a suspension of arms, which would no doubt last till the Pope’s death. This much was gained, but at what a cost!

Guicciardini reckons that Leo’s war expenses up to that time had reached the appalling sum of 800,000 ducats. The statement made by Leo X to the Venetian and Swiss Ambassadors agrees with this. If, as it may be, this calculation is placed at too high a figure, there is no doubt that from that time dates the complete ruin of the Papal finances.

Not less disastrous was the war in its effect of promoting the spread of bandits in the States of the Church. But worst of all was the injury to its moral power which the Holy See had sustained, in that its occupant had again entered upon the disastrous policy of Alexander VI, in spite of the noble example set by Julius II, and regard less of the crying needs of both the Church and the world, which called for something very different from the prosecution of such a war. The struggle for the possession of the Duchy had a peculiarly injurious effect on the endeavour made by the Pope to promote a Crusade, which by reason of it came to an almost complete standstill.

CHAPTER V.

The Pope's endeavours to promote a Crusade, 1517-1518.

Ever since his election to the Holy See, the Pope’s mind had been preoccupied by the Eastern Question, which, by the accession to power of the warlike Sultan Selim in 1512, had become very critical. In this anxiety about the encroachments of the Turks, Leo was only following the traditions of his predecessors. The historian of the Turkish Empire has no doubt that Leo X, after his accession, had the matter of a Crusade “really and seriously at heart”, and was honestly bent on making it, together with the restoration of the peace of Europe, the main object of his life. The numerous Briefs which he sent to all the Christian princes in the earlier days of his Pontificate are a proof of his intention.

Even in the earlier sessions of the Lateran Council the Turkish Question was brought up repeatedly. Words were followed by deeds, and remittances of money were sent at once to those places which were most in danger, such as Rhodes and Hungary. Besides this, numerous privileges were granted by Rome to the King of Portugal; to aid him in his fight against the infidels of Africa. The picture of the Turkish peril drawn by the Envoys of the Polish obedientia, on the 13th of June, 1513, impressed Leo so painfully that he burst into tears.

On the 15th of July it was decided to send Cardinal Bakócz as Legate to Hungary, it being rumoured that he was to take with him large sums of money. Leo rejoiced when the news arrived of a victory gained over the Turks by the Hungarians, and took part personally in the thanksgiving service held at Santa Maria del Popolo. Unfortunately the departure of the Hungarian Cardinal was delayed till late in the autumn, and his attempt to preach the Crusade in his own country was an entire failure. The Hungarian peasants took up the Cross indeed, but it was not to fight against the infidel, but against their own hated magnates. A full year passed before this state of things could be set right.

In spite of all these mischances, the Pope, who at the beginning of 1515 had appealed to all Christian princes to help with the Crusade. now sent the distinguished Ban of Croatia and Bishop of Veszprim, Petrus Beriszlo, to the assistance of the hard-pressed frontier cities, taking with him not only the 20,000 ducats already promised, but large contributions of grain, war material, ordnance, gunpowder, and saltpetre. At Ancona a fleet was fitted out, for which Venice was by way of providing guns. But the Signoria, who had renewed their agreement with the Porte on the 17th of October, 1513, showed no desire to support the Pope’s proposed Crusade. They wished rather to prevent the Pope from having at heart the interests of Christendom, and preferred his devotion to personal ambition and the renown of the house of Medici. lf This false construction of his action was carefully disseminated by Venice, and had a very disastrous effect on the Pope's efforts to make peace and promote a Crusade. As he learned to realize that nothing was to be hoped for from Venice, which had several times threatened to call in the help of the Turks. Leo turned his thoughts from the danger threatening from Constantinople to another quarter. He wanted to make the alliance with the chivalrous French King conducive to the protection of Christendom. From the assurances given at Bologna, both by Francis I and his chancellor, Du Prat, the Pope hoped for great things from France.

Next to Rhodes, Hungary was the place which stood in the greatest danger, and on the 17th of July Leo urged the French King most pressingly to send to Hungary at least a subsidy of money. Nothing could have been more friendly than the King’s reply, nevertheless no money was sent. King Ladislas, in whom Leo X had always taken a warm interest, died in March, 1516, being succeeded by his son Louis, who was still a child. To complete the difficulties, quarrels broke out among the Hungarian magnates. The Pope’s anxiety in regard to Hungary increased, and on the 2nd of April, 1516, he sent thither his relative, Roberto Latino Orsini. lf In urgent letters he pressed the Polish King, Sigismund, the King of Portugal, and, above all, Francis I, to go to the help of the menaced country. But even now the French King sent no money, whereas the Pope, in spite of his financial difficulties, sent to the Ban 15,000 ducats. There is no doubt that Hungary would have fallen a prey to the Turks had not the Sultan Selim, in the summer of 1516, embarked on a campaign against Syria and Egypt which engaged all his energies for two years.

The opportunity of making an attack on Constantinople during the Sultan's absence was not made use of, for the European powers, and, unfortunately, the Pope also, were taken up for a time by their own personal interests. The project of a Crusade was made use of to cover quite other projects. This was especially the case with Francis I, who had at heart other matters, especially the conquest of Naples. Even Leo X was often turned aside from the idea of a Crusade either by the interests of the States of the Church or by those of his nephews, and especially by the war of Urbino, though it is fair to say that he never quite lost sight of it

Scarcely had Francesco Maria been overthrown before the question of the Crusade came once more to the front in Rome. In October, 1516, the Pope again appealed to all Christian princes, and drew attention to the war in which the Sultan Selim was entangled in Asia and Africa. No authentic information about his movements could be obtained in the West, except by Venice, which kept its knowledge to itself. But Leo made a skilful use of whatever intelligence he had received from the East to stir up the crusading zeal of the princes. “If it be true”, was the gist of his representations to them, and especially to Francis I, “that the Sultan has overcome his ancient foes the Egyptians, it is time that we woke from sleep, lest we be put to the sword unawares. If it be not true, why should we not make use of this opportunity, so favourable to us, and given to us by God, to carry out His cause to a good end, and, uniting ourselves, attack the Turks, now hard-pressed and entangled in the Persian and Egyptian expeditions, and march against them under the unfurled standard of the Holy Cross?”

Francis I. replied on the 15th of November, by an assurance of his unaltered enthusiasm for the holy cause. He urged the Pope to work for the promotion of universal peace in Europe, adding that, as soon as that had been secured, he would at once put a large army in the field and follow the Pope as his leader in the holy campaign.

But in spite of these high-sounding assurances he was not at all pleased that Leo should have thus taken the business in hand. The secret instructions given to his Ambassador, at the Congress which had met at Cambrai in the beginning of 15 17, reveal his real thoughts. In these he actually lays down, as a result of the victory of the Christian arms, a division of the Ottoman Empire between France, Germany, and Spain, no mention being made of the other powers, and least of all of the Pope. But Leo X. soon learned about this project through Maximilian, and became all the more anxious to promote the universal peace of Christendom. The mission of the Dominican, Nicholas von Schonberg, was meant to serve this end.

Meanwhile very disquieting news from the East had reached Rome. There was scarcely room to doubt that both Egypt and the Holy Land had fallen victims to the Sultan's lust of conquest. During January the equipment of a fleet and the raising of a Crusade-tax were determined on. Various plans were made, and the appointment of a special Crusade-Legate was discussed. At S. Agostino, in the presence of three Cardinals, Egidio Canisio preached an impassioned sermon about the danger with which Christendom was threatened by the Sultan, to avert which the Pope hoped for great things from the Kings of France, England, and Spain, on account of the generosity belonging to their youth.

Then the war of Urbino broke out again. The Pope, though surrounded by difficulties, did not, even at that anxious time, forget the Crusade, and carried on his negotiations with the Ambassadors and princes. In the last session of the Lateran Council he carried, in spite of the opposition of a number of bishops, the resolution that a general Crusade should be solemnly proclaimed, and that for this end a tithe should be laid on all the clergy for three years. At the same time a Bull was published which bade all princes and lords to observe a truce for five years, under the most severe spiritual penalties. Thus, by a solemn decree of the Council, the proposed Crusade became an established fact : there was no longer any question in the matter of if or how or when.

Leo X still wished to keep the conduct of the Crusade in his own hands. A congregation of experienced Cardinals was appointed to make suitable proposals both for carrying out the war and for providing the means. But, owing to the great pressure of the Urbino affair, nothing was done about it that summer. It was only when the disastrous war was at an end, and peace restored among the Christian princes, when the differences between the Emperor and Venice, and between Henry VIII and Francis I about the possession of Tournai, had been arranged. that there seemed to be once more a possibility of the Crusade being carried out. The Pope, who had been contemplating the position in the East with ever-increasing anxiety, now took up the matter with decision. The affair with Francesco Maria had scarcely been arranged before Cardinal Medici declared to the Venetian Ambassador that the moment had now come when the Turks must be attacked; that the Pope was prepared in all essentials, and that a special Nuncio would be at once sent to the Signoria to demand that the Republic should join in the war against the infidel. The Ambassador, whose government was on the very best of terms with the Porte, was so startled by this declaration that he could not make any reply to it. “While awaiting special orders from Venice”, he said, “I must confine myself to generalities”.

Leo X acted wisely in turning first of all to the great sea-power, Venice, for without the co-operation of that state a combined undertaking was not to be thought of. The task of winning the Republic over to the common cause was entrusted to Altobello Averoldo, Bishop of Pola, who was in September appointed permanent Ambassador and Legate de latere. His distinguished qualities, added to the fact that he was a native of Brescia, seemed to fit him in an especial manner for the difficult mission. On the 29th of October Cardinal Medici wrote to Averoldo, telling him that the Turkish Question was more than ever uppermost in the mind of the Pope; that in connection with this affair a special Ambassador had lately arrived from the French court, who had made very friendly overtures ; so that even if Venice continued to hold back, the matter would at last go forward, though indeed the Pope before all things wished to ask the Signoria for advice, so valuable was their experience, as to how the undertaking had best be begun and carried out. Other Nuncios would be required who could form opinions from what was reported of the war.

On the 4th of November Leo X appointed a congregation, consisting of Cardinals Carvajal, Remolino, Fieschi, Grassis, Pucci, Medici, Farnese, and Cornaro. The Ambassadors of the European powers were admitted to its sittings, to which certain men versed in the concerns of the Ottoman Empire were also invited. The three Cardinals belonging to the Dominican, Franciscan, and Augustinian Orders, were called on to preach the Crusade.

The deliberations began on the 6th of November, under the presidency of the Pope ; all the powers were represented except Portugal and Venice. The representative of King Emanuel was excused from attending on the score of illness; but why the Venetian Ambassador was absent, says the Envoy of the Duke of Ferrara, no one knows.

The conference was hurried on so effectually, that by the 12th of November a detailed memorandum was ready, which is one of the most remarkable documents relating to the history of the European movement against the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century. Six principal questions were presented: (1) Should the war be undertaken? (2) Should it be a war of offence or defence? (3) What obstacles are there in the way, and how are they to be removed? (4) Should the war be conducted by all the princes, or only by some; and if so, by whom? (5) By what means should it be carried on? (6) How should it be started ?

The first question was answered by the memorandum decidedly in the affirmative. As regarded the second, an offensive war was recommended. Such a course would show more courage, and would secure the advantage of an easier discovery of the enemy’s weak point. In answer to the third question, seeing that the chief obstacle must come from discord among the princes of Christendom, the memorandum pointed out that this could be overcome only by the establishment of universal peace, or of a truce for so long as the Holy War lasted. If during that time quarrels arose, these must be settled by the Pope or Sacred College, or else their settlement must be postponed until the war was over. It might, on the other hand, be advisable to make a League of all the princes under the Pope—a kind of holy alliance—by which all would pledge themselves by oath to put down by force of arms those who broke the peace. To this League there might be given the name of the Brotherhood of the Holy Crusade (Fraternitas Sanctae Cruciatae).

As regarded the fourth question, relating to the supreme command of the undertaking, the memorandum said that though the Emperor and the King of France, as the first and most powerful of the princes of Christendom, must certainly be at the head of the combined powers, all the others would be held bound to co-operate in the Crusade according to their strength. The fifth and sixth questions, which concerned the means and manner of carrying out the war, were considered in the memorandum to be the most important. Apart from God’s help, which was to be implored without ceasing, the question resolved itself into two things, namely, money and troops.

The general war expenses were estimated at 800,000 ducats. This sum, says the optimistic memorandum, will not be very difficult to raise. In the first place, all kings and princes will contribute a goodly portion of their income, this being but just and to their own interests, seeing that it is with them that the enemy mostly concerns him elf, taking but little account of the common folk. The Turks have sworn a deadly hatred against the heads of Christendom, and want their lives. Nevertheless, we do not want to fix the amount of the portion contributed by them, for this must be left to their own prudence and generosity. Then, the clergy must be approached in like manner. All, and especially the richer monasteries and foundations should, according to the amount of their income, give a tenth, two-thirds, or even three-quarters of it for this end, limiting their private expenditure to the necessaries of life, so that they may dedicate all the remainder to the holy work, for which they are mainly responsible as the possessors of the heritage of Christ. From the nobles a tenth, and from the burghers a twentieth, of their income might be asked. Finally, the people who live by the work of their hands, artisans and labourers, should each give a suitable contribution. A third of the whole sum must be raised at once for the equipment of the army, while the remainder must be in a state of readiness, to be utilized at any moment when wanted.

The strength of the army will be about 60,000 foot soldiers, 12,000 light and 4,000 heavy cavalry. For the infantry, Swiss, German, Spaniards, and Bohemians would be preferred ; for the light cavalry, Spaniards, Italians, Dalmatians, and Greeks ; and for the heavy cavalry the best men would be found in France and Italy. It is evident that corresponding artillery must be provided. Ships could be supplied by Venice, Genoa, Naples, Provence, Spain, Portugal, and England. It must from the very beginning be a fixed rule that the war by sea be carried on in conjunction with that by land, “for the enemy has already a fleet of three hundred triremes”. It would be impossible to bring an equal number against them, but the Kings of France and Spain could each certainly contribute twenty of these vessels, Genoa the same number, and Venice forty. The Pope himself, with the Cardinals, would endeavour to provide ten. A considerable number of large vessels, even if not triremes, might be expected from France and England.

“It would be very advisable not to divide and split up the various contingents, but to try to mass them on one point, Constantinople being the objective of the attack. The road through Germany and Hungary, or that through Dalmatia and Illyria, might be taken ; but the shortest and easiest method would be to assemble the troops at Ancona and Brindisi, and the fleet at Sicily, because from thence Greece and Egypt are quickly reached”. An alliance with the Shah Ismael would be considered, and the memorandum builds its hopes on an invasion of the border provinces by the Hungarians and Poles, while the main army is proceeding against Constantinople. The division of the conquered countries would be a delicate matter, to be treated carefully and prudently. About this the memorandum says : “Perhaps it will be advisable to appoint arbitrators at once for this object, who at the end of the war would give a portion to each country in proportion with the help it had afforded. This could be arranged either by the Pope and Cardinals, or else by plenipotentiaries appointed by the above-mentioned Holy Brotherhood, when it has been organized. To arrange a division before that which has to be divided is in our possession would be very unfitting. It would be better to regard all conquests as common property at first and make the division later”.

The memorandum, which fixed nothing, but confined itself to suggestions, was communicated by the Pope through his Nuncios to the Emperor, the Kings of France, Spain, England, Portugal, and to the Republic of Venice, with the request for their suggestions and remarks. At the same time Briefs were sent to the chief powers, pointing out the necessity of prompt action in regard to the Turkish danger. The greatest discretion as regarded the Turkish Ambassador and the actual state of affairs was recommended to the Nuncio at Venice.

“Daily,” wrote Cardinal Medici, November 17, 1517, to the Nuncio in Switzerland, Antonio Pucci, “does the matter of the Crusade become more burning. The more that is done about it the clearer does the necessity of action appear. Two things are now certain: that the Sultan has returned victorious to Constantinople, and that his forces by land and by sea are most powerful. The Pope is ready to do everything in his power, and is counting on the assistance of the warlike Swiss”.

This appeal to all Christian princes, on the eve of a new era, was the expression of the mediaeval idea of a solidarity of all Christian States against the infidel. The sending round of the above memorandum compelled the most callous powers to take up a decided position as regarded the Eastern Question. It was with the greatest impatience that the Pope awaited the answers of the various States.

Leo X had great expectations from the powerful French King, to whom, for the second time, the raising of a Crusade­tenth had been allowed. The Pope had greater hopes of winning him over to the cause of the Crusade because he himself was on the point of complying with a project broached by Francis I as early as the autumn of 1516. This concerned a marriage between Lorenzo de’ Medici and Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne, the daughter of Jean, Comte de Boulogne, related to the royal house through her mother, Catherine de Bourbon. Ever since October, 1517, negotiations about this alliance had been carried on together with those about the Crusade by Thomas de Foix, Lord of Lescun, the Bishop of St. Malo, the Papal Nuncio, Staffileo, and the Florentine Ambassador in France, Francesco Vettori. An agreement as to this matrimonial alliance was at last arrived at in consequence of which the Pope's nephew at once set out for France. Thus was this matter easily arranged: negotiations about the Turkish question presented greater difficulties.

First of all Francis I put off giving any answer at all ; and at the end of 1517 the Pope was still waiting vainly for the settlement of the plan propounded in the middle of November. On the 30th of December Cardinal Medici once more impressed on the French Nuncio the fact that, in view of the increasing danger from the Turks and their undoubted menace to Italy, a prompt decision was urgently necessary. Often did the Pope himself write to Francis and the other princes, offering, in the cause of the Crusade, all that he had, and even his personal co-operation, but still no decision could be arrived at. While time was being thus wasted in writing and negotiating, the Turks were devoting their whole power to the work of arming themselves. The Pope knew that, were the enemy to choose to attack Italy or any of the Italian islands in the spring, there would be no possibility of resisting him. The Nuncios, said he, must warn, implore, and adjure the King and all persons of influence to do something. The answer of Francis, dated December 23, must have reached Rome soon after this. The objections he raised were chiefly on the subject of money. He agreed to the plan in general, but he wished to have the Crusade funds in his own hands, and also to receive the tithe levied for three years in advance. If this were granted, he said, he would go to the help of the Pope with 12,000 horse and 50,000 foot soldiers. To avoid confusion he recommended that the Emperor should proceed separately by land with the Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, and that Charles of Spain, with the Kings of England and Portugal, should remain with the fleet. The three divisions must be combined in their movements.

The proposal of the Emperor was quite different. The detailed document which he sent at the end of the year 1517, though the language is veiled, shows clearly enough Maximilian's jealousy of the share to be taken in the under taking by the French King. Instead of one campaign, the Emperor in his fantastic way proposed a whole series of campaigns, which were to be spread over three years. The first year, the Kings of France and England were to remain in their own countries, to preserve peace in them and see to the levying of the war tax. Meanwhile Maximilian, at the head of the German and Spanish soldiers, would, in con junction with the King of Portugal, attack the Sultan's possessions in the north of Africa. This campaign would be terminated in the second year by the conquest of Alexandria and Cairo, while, at the same time, Francis I would proceed from Italy to Macedonia, and keep the coasts clear for the Crusaders on their return from Egypt. At length, in the third year, the fantastic undertaking was to be crowned by the conquest of Constantinople and European Turkey. The help of the Shah of Persia might be gained by the cession of Armenia and Karaman. The division of the booty—which reminds us of the well-known story of the skin of the bear—should be made by arbitration under the presidency of the Pope. The Emperor had peculiar ideas about how to procure the means of war. In every parish throughout Christendom, every fifty men were to supply one soldier ; to procure money besides that raised by tenths and indulgences, a tax should be levied on every hearth or family.

The most feeble of all the proposals came from the Spanish King, Charles. His idea was that the powers should at first confine themselves to the protection of the most exposed parts of Italy, such as the Marches of Ancona, Naples, and Sicily. For this object he promised the immediate service of 14,000 men.

This difference of opinion, and the jealousy on the part of the European powers which it revealed, as well as the scarcely veiled pursuit of merely personal ends, must have deeply incensed the Pope; but still more did the reserved attitude of the great sea-power of the West. In spite of the want of good-will shown from the very beginning on the part of the Venetian Ambassador and the Signoria, Leo X persisted in continuing to hope for better things, and a change of mind on the part of the Republic. He therefore showed every indulgence towards the condition of peace which existed between the Turks and the Signoria, in the hopes that at the given moment the latter would not fail to come to the assistance of Christendom.

Meanwhile, most alarming intelligence continued to arrive from the East. At the end of February a boastful and menacing letter from the Sultan was received by Leo X. The Pope's response took the practical form of demonstrative action by renewed preparations for the Crusade.

On the 3rd of March solemn processions were organized to implore the help of God. At the same time the Pope determined to send four Cardinals to the principal countries of Europe as Legates de latere. Those appointed were among the leading and most gifted members of the Sacred College. Farnese was chosen to go to the imperial court, Egidio Canisio to Spain, Bibbiena to France, and Campeggio to England. In spite of his financial difficulties the Pope himself defrayed the expenses of these legations, whereas hitherto, in similar cases, the Nuncios had been authorized to pay their expenses by means of their lucrative faculties. Leo X made use of this difference to give a signal proof of his disinterestedness.

The questions and resolutions mentioned above, were the result of the consultations which the Pope had held with the special Congregation of Cardinals, consisting of thirteen members and the Ambassadors. As well as these resolutions, there was another idea to which expression was given in a solemn Bull. In this document, dated the 6th of March, which described very impressively the effects of the Sultan’s last victory and the growing danger from the Turks, the Pope urged a five years’ truce between all the Christian powers, to be observed under the severest penalties of the Church. Leo X made special reference to Innocent III, one of the greatest Pontiffs of the Middle Ages, in whose footsteps Leo declared his wish to tread, by making the settlement of all differences to depend on the Holy See.

While special Briefs announced all these preparations to the Christian princes, the preaching of the Crusade was begun in Rome. On the 12th of March the great intercessory processions were commenced in the Eternal City. The shops were shut, and the streets hung with drapery and tapestry, while on all sides altars were set up. On the first day the procession went from S. Agostino to S. Maria in Aracoeli. The Confraternities of Rome, including those of Germany, took part in it, clad in their picturesque and varied habits; after them came the religious orders and the secular clergy, carrying relics, and, lastly, the household of the Pope. On the second day the procession went from S. Lorenzo to S. Maria del Popolo. In it were carried the great relics which the Eternal City claims as its own : the Heads of St. Andrew and St. Matthias, the Chair of St. Peter, the Holy Lance, the Sudarium of S. Veronica, and the large fragment of the True Cross from Santa Croce in Gerusalemme.

The procession of the third day (Sunday, March 14), which went from St. Peter's to S. Maria sopra Minerva, was followed by many Ambassadors of the spiritual and temporal courts, as well as by all the Bishops and Cardinals then in Rome, and, lastly, by the Pope himself, who walked barefoot the whole way, and repeatedly showed signs of religious emotion. High Mass was celebrated in the Church of the Minerva, after which Sadolet mounted the pulpit to preach the Holy War with Ciceronian rhetoric. Mindful of the presence of the Ambassadors, the orator did not fail to eulogize the Christian princes, whose goodwill he rated much higher than it in reality existed.

“Who”, cried Sadolet, “could have the smallest doubt as to our victory when we have Maximilian as our Emperor, a general so experienced in the art of war?” In similar terms did he extol the high qualities and noble purpose of the other princes, of the Kings of France, Spain, England, Portugal, and Poland, not forgetting the two Kings, still minors, Louis of Hungary and James of Scotland, nor Christian of Denmark, about whom scarcely anything was as yet known. He was loud in the praises of the “valiant and invincible” Swiss, as well as of the Venetians and all other princes and people who had distinguished themselves in the fight against the infidel. How could the Turk have the slightest hope of success when he contemplated the union of all the powers? “Hitherto we have been blind, aye, blind, he cried in conclusion ; “we have not looked back sufficiently at what has gone before. But now the night has disappeared and the darkness is dispersed. The glow of true honour shines before our eyes, and truth is made gloriously manifest!”. Before the procession left the church Cardinal Farnese read the Papal Bull relating to the five years’ truce.

Soon the Pope’s commands were sent forth into all lands, to the effect that similar intercessory processions were to be organized in every country to implore the help of God for Christendom, which was so sorely imperilled. The solemn manner in which Leo X had introduced the Crusade, and his appeal to the great Pope whose reign had marked the zenith of the power of the Holy See in the Middle Ages, show us how high his thoughts had soared. Even as in a former age the influence of the Papacy had perhaps found its most marked expression in the Crusades, so now a “general Western undertaking, with the Pope at its head”, would not only protect Europe against her worst enemy, but would bring new glory and increased influence to the Holy See.

The Pope’s efforts to promote a Crusade have found an expression in art in the fresco of the Battle of Ostia; and the memory of these efforts inspired Raphael in his last creation, the Transfiguration. Naturally, poets and writers made use of the theme of the Turkish war; hopes were raised of winning the Pope’s favour by poems and discourses on the subject. The earnestness shown by Leo in the whole matter is beyond question.  It was by the force of his will that these extraordinary efforts were made to gather the Christian princes under the one banner of the Cross, and set them in movement against the Eastern Empire. Alas! all his efforts were shattered by the self-interest of the European powers.

Leo’s most cruel disappointment came from Venice, and this in spite of his having handled the Signoria with the most delicate consideration, so as to save the Republic from the difficulties which might arise from the terms of friendship on which she was with the Sultan. He had refrained from any allusion to such terms, and had said nothing about the mission of a special Legate to Venice. Yet when Sadolet in the discourse mentioned above had allowed his zeal to carry him away so far as to allude to the great services rendered by Venice in the defence of Europe against the Turks, the Venetian Ambassador had at once remonstrated with the Vatican, and had demanded that the passage should be omitted whenever the discourse was printed.

Nothing is more significative of the pusillanimity of the merchants on the Adriatic than the way in which they shrank from their own great past. The prudent, calculating policy of Venice always had for its object the protection of her own immediate interests. The most stirring arguments beat in vain against this short-sighted egoism. When he was organizing the intercessory processions, the Pope had had the foresight to write to the Patriarch of Venice to propose that the same thing should be done in his diocese ; for thus the Venetians were able to declare that the measure had not originated with them, but had been forced on them by the spiritual authority of the Pope. However, the processions could not be organized without the permission of the Venetian Government, and this permission was refused by the Signoria. The Pope accepted this rebuff without a word; though he could not long deceive himself as to the real meaning of the Signoria's repeated assurances that they were ready to join in any expedition against the Turks when the matter was really started. Nor was he ignorant that, even while making these protestations, the Signoria had secretly renewed their terms of peace with the Sultan. What he probably did not know was that Venice had shamelessly betrayed the Christian cause by keeping the deadly enemy of Western civilization informed of all the preparations which were being made for the Crusade.

The whole matter depended on what success the Cardinal-Legates would have in Spain, France, England, and Germany. Leo X wished that the Legates should start on their mission as soon as possible, and this Farnese seemed willing to do. But Bibbiena fell ill, and as combined action between the Legates was intended, a delay was caused. But on the 12th of April, Bibbiena, Campeggio, and Egidio Canisio were able to appear to­gether in Consistory, where the Pope gave them his blessing. Then, accompanied by all the members of the Sacred College, they adjourned to S. Maria del Popolo. Thence Bibbiena started for France on the 13th, Campeggio for England on the 15th, and Canisio for Spain on the i6th. Cardinal Farnese wrote that he was unable to proceed on account of illness, and recommended that the learned Cardinal Cajetan should take his place in Germany. The latter left Rome on his mission on the 5th of May, 1518. Besides the Cardinal-Legates, the Dominican, Nicholas von Schonberg had been entrusted with a mission to Hungary and Poland, to bring about the co-operation of those countries in the Crusade. The first thing Schonberg had to do was to try to arrange the differences between Poland and the Teutonic Order. Later this same Envoy tried to influence the Grand Dukes of Muscovy and the Princes of Tartary. Schonberg's task was not less difficult than that of the Cardinal-Legates, for each of the powers had its own personal object to gain in the undertaking of the Crusade.

Favourable news came, however, from Spain, where Egidio Canisio preached the Cross to vast multitudes. On the 3rd of August a letter from the King of Spain was communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory, in which he declared his readiness to agree to the five years' truce.

The intelligence sent by Cardinal Campeggio, who had been appointed to the court of England, was, on the other hand, most unsatisfactory; for the attitude of Henry VIII about the question of the Crusade had been, to say the least of it, very peculiar from the first. He had for a long time delayed giving any answer at all, and when it was at last sent, its only object was to remove all possible doubt as to the King’s intentions. Henry VIII strongly warned the Pope to take heed that his project did not bring great danger on himself, for those on whom Leo set his hopes of peace were those who wished to draw the Pope into war. The most necessary thing of all was that he should check the King of France’s great thirst for power. As to the Crusade, England would, all in good time, combine with Spain, but she must first come to an understanding with King Charles.

It is not difficult to foresee the nature of Campeggio’s reception after such preliminaries. In this Henry VIII exceeded the worst anticipations. His minister, Cardinal Wolsey, emphatically refused either to receive the Bull relating to the truce or the Legate himself; for, said he, it was against precedent that a foreign Cardinal should exercise legatine rights in England. Campeggio could be received only on condition that all his legatine privileges were suspended, and that his authority on all matters of importance were shared with Wolsey. Consequently Campeggio, who had arrived at Boulogne at the beginning of June, had to stay there without being able to set foot in England.

These proceedings were not the only result of Wolsey's jealousy, for the latter had been made a member of the Sacred College two years before Campeggio, and, as Chancellor, he could not tolerate the presence near him of a Cardinal-Legate. The all-powerful minister of Henry VIII not only desired to be appointed Legate for life in England, but wished to wrest from the hands of the Pope the office of making peace in Europe, and thus to secure to England this glorious role. While Campeggio was detained at Boulogne and condemned to inactivity, Wolsey was carrying on negotiations with France not only about the possession of Tournai, but about the conditions of universal peace which the Pope was about to lay down.

Meanwhile Cardinal Bibbiena was in France. His task also was beset with extraordinary difficulties, especially after the question of the imperial succession arose. It was widely believed that through the marriage of Lorenzo de' Medici and Madeleine de la Tour, which had been celebrated with great pomp at Amboise on the 28th of April. Francis I had succeeded in making Leo X a willing tool of the French policy. The real fact was that, however lavishly generous Leo might be towards his nephew and his bride, he was not in the least drawn away by the marriage-contract from his own particular objects or from his policy as to the Crusade. Lorenzo, it is true, thought otherwise, for ever since his marriage he had become quite French in his sympathies, and remained for a long time with Bibbiena in France. He adopted as his own all the French demands, quite regardless of the interests of the Pope. But Leo X had no intention of giving France all she wanted, especially as Francis I paid no attention to his desire to be freed from his promise regarding the cession of Modena and Reggio. On the 28th of May he granted the request for the Cardinal's hat for John of Lorraine, but he did not so readily grant the King's further requests relating to the levying of a tenth.

Meanwhile Cardinal Wolsey was indefatigable in his efforts to make London instead of Rome the centre of the peace negotiations. Rumours were soon heard of an Anglo-French understanding, including the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of Henry's daughter Mary to the Dauphin. Nor was this alliance between the two Kings all, for a general alliance between all the powers was proposed to be concluded in London instead of in Rome. In a masterly manner Wolsey knew how to combine an Anglo-French understanding with the forming di Lorenzo de' Medici (15 18) con Maddalena de la Tour, which had been celebrated with great pomp at Amboise on the 28th of April. Francis I had succeeded in making Leo X a willing tool of the French policy. The real fact was that, however lavishly generous Leo might be towards his nephew and his bride, he was not in the least drawn away by the marriage-contract from his own particular objects or from his policy as to the Crusade. Lorenzo, it is true, thought otherwise, for ever since his marriage he had become quite French in his sympathies, and remained for long time with Bibbiena in France. He adopted as his own all the French demands, quite regardless of the interests of the Pope. But Leo X had no intention of giving France all she wanted, especially as Francis I paid no attention to his desire to be freed from his promise regarding the cession of Modena and Reggio. On the 28th of May he granted the request for the Cardinal's hat for John of Lorraine, but he did not so readily grant the King's further requests relating to the levying of tenth.

Meanwhile Cardinal Wolsey was indefatigable in his efforts to make London instead of Rome the centre of the peace negotiations. Rumours were soon heard of an Anglo-French understanding, including the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of Henry’s daughter Mary to the Dauphin. Nor was this alliance between the two Kings all, for general alliance between all the powers was proposed to be concluded in London instead of in Rome. In masterly manner Wolsey knew how to combine an Anglo-French understanding with the forming of a general treaty of peace, to be guaranteed by England and France. By July all parties had agreed so far that the League in its essentials could be presented to the Pope. Leo knew but too well that this League would completely destroy his plan of a five years' truce, and that therefore all his efforts to raise a Crusade were adroitly set aside. He had no doubt whatever that a general peace would put insuperable obstacles in the way of what could only be made possible by a truce. The Pope emphatically pointed out how much more likely to be observed was an agreement concluded for only a limited time, than one which professed to be a permanency.

To all the Pope's remonstrances, the justice of which was to be proved but too soon by succeeding events, France and England turned a deaf ear. Leo yielded on the point of the Turkish war, bitterly lamenting that Wolsey’s League deprived the Holy See of the office of universal arbitrator; for, by the vagueness of its outlines, the indefinite duration of the proposed peace made any positive results of a Crusade doubtful.

Campeggio, who, after consenting to share his legatine powers with Wolsey had at last been allowed to land in England on the 29th of July, had proceeded to London and was there witness of his rival’s triumph. At the beginning of October, “on account of the danger from Turkey”, there was finally concluded an alliance between England and France.

Leo’s hope of seeing a universal league of peace guaranteed by the Holy See was destroyed, and Wolsey with his counter-project had conquered. A great blow was thus struck at the international position of the Papacy. How painful Wolsey's proceedings were to Leo X is shown by a letter from Cardinal Medici to Campeggio, written on the 6th of October, 1518. With great displeasure”, he says, “has His Holiness learned that Wolsey has set aside the proposal of a five years' truce, because he does not wish to leave the final position of affairs in the hands of the Pope. No Christian— far less a Cardinal should venture to express himself in that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many honours and favours from the Holy Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the Pope have to expect from the English Chancellor”.

At last the Pope saw before him no alternative except to ratify the London agreement. This he did finally on the 31st of December, 1518, with, however, the proviso that throughout all the arrangements the liberties of the Holy See were to be respected.

At the same time that Wolsey carried off his great diplomatic victory over Leo X, news reached Rome of the closing of the German Diet, at which Cardinal Cajetan, as Papal Legate, had had to defend the arrangements as to the Crusade.

Cajetan, besides being the bearer of a courteous Brief, had with him, for the Emperor Maximilian, the Hat and Sword, consecrated martial insignia which the Supreme Pontiff was wont to send on extraordinary occasions to the most prominent princes. But Cajetan's mission was made unpleasant by the fact that the Emperor’s ambitious adviser, Cardinal Lang, forbade him to enter the country until Leo X had issued his own appointment as co-legate, which had been agreed to on the 17th of May. Therefore, it was not until the 7th of July that he arrived at Augsburg, where he was solemnly received by the Emperor and the other princes.

When the blessed weapons were presented to him, Maximilian replied that, in spite of his age, he would, “under the protection of the helmet of the Spirit and the sword of Faith, join without fear in the expedition against the infidel”. Four days later, Cajetan, in a fluent Latin discourse, proved before the assembled States the urgent necessity of a war against the Turks, and of the proposals laid down by the Pope for this end. He pointed out emphatically that Germany was in greater danger from the enemy of Christianity than any other country. The proposal he made was that for three years the clergy should pay a tenth, and the well-to-do laity a twentieth, of their income, and that as to the remainder of the population every fifty house holders should provide one soldier for the Holy War. He gave the fullest guarantees as to the proper disposal of the money thus raised ; for all in Rome knew well enough that the States of Germany were less inclined than ever before to make financial sacrifices, and were possessed by the idea that the tithes and other Crusade funds were being raised for the enrichment of the Medici. Therefore Cardinal Farnese had been instructed to observe the greatest caution in handling financial matters, and to avoid everything which could feed the suspicion that there was any other possible destination for the Crusade money than the Crusade itself. That Cajetan was instructed in a similar manner can be seen clearly by his cautious way of proceeding. He emphatically declared that it was left entirely to the Germans themselves to claim, receive, and dispose of the money in their own way. The money was to be devoted entirely to the Crusade, and if the Holy War did not take place within a given time, the money would be returned. Whatever might be said, the Pope wanted none of the money raised, and the disposal of the war funds was to remain exclusively with the German States.

The answer which the Emperor made to this shows that the ever-needy monarch was not pleased with the Pope's disclaimer of any intention of controlling the funds raised, for this cut off all possibility of retaining a portion of them for himself. Therefore Maximilian submitted the following proposal to the States:— If it seemed to them that the method of raising the money among the clergy and laity proposed by the Legate was not a wise one, he would suggest, as an alternative, that each person who went to Holy Communion during the next three years should contribute what he was able according to the dictates of his conscience.

The States eagerly adopted this proposal, and all adverse representations from the Legate, warmly supported by the Polish envoy, proved vain. The end of a lengthy conference was that on the 27th of August Cajetan's proposals were vetoed by the States. The reason they gave was the alleged grievance of the Germans against the Holy See. After a lively description of the impoverishment of Germany by war and other misfortunes, it was proclaimed that the opinion of the people of the land was universally adverse to the present mode of raising money. The common impression was that great sums of money, whether for Crusade or indulgences, would be taken out of Germany under any circumstances, whether the Turkish war was carried out or not. This conviction gave birth to great distrust. The nation was also burdened with annates, increased and extended by confirmation fees and endless other fees for succession and reserved rights. The Concordat was violated, the right of patronage encroached on, and greater and lesser benefices conferred on foreigners. All this had given rise in Germany to such distrust and indignation that any further burden seemed to be out of the question.

In these grievances we can hear the echo of the violent anti-curial feeling which had taken possession of all, not only of the younger generation of humanists, but of the whole German people. There were general complaints of the violation of the Concordat, of the amount of the annates, of the severity of the chancery laws, and of the benefice-hunting which was encouraged by the Pope. The more the people thought that they were victimized financially, so much the more acute was the antipathy to any question of raising money. In this the clergy were quite agreed with the laity. This hostile state of mind was aggravated by malicious pamphlets, the authors of which hid themselves under cover of anonymity. One of these declared openly that the real Turk lived in Italy, and that this “hound of hell” could be appeased only by streams of gold. “From his own dominions”, says this poisoned pamphlet, which is redolent of the most violent invective against Rome, “streams of wealth flow in to the Pope as to no other Christian prince; yet we have to pay for palliums, and send asses laden with gold to Rome, and exchange gold for corn, and rest content with blood-lettings—pardon me, I mean with indulgences! Woe to this monster of avarice which is never satisfied! The craftiness of the Florentine discovers a thousand devices, each one more execrable than the last. Let German freedom be mindful not to become tributary, and not to pay tenths”.

Still more violent in its expressions is a memorandum written apparently by Johann von Vlatten, and presented to the States in the name of the clergy of Liege. The impression made by it can be seen by the judgment which the deputies of the Frankfort Diet passed on it: “So much violence, deceit, and roguery—disguised though it may be in beautiful Latin—is at the present time practised in Rome by the wickedness of Popes and their familiars and courtiers, that the grievances are retailed with a gusto never before known”

In face of the anti-curial feeling thus stirred up, Cajetan’s efforts to carry out his mission could not fail to be fruitless. However little cause existed this time to doubt the disinterestedness of the Pope or his wish to have nothing to do with the money raised, the States persisted in their assertion that his only object was to receive the money into his own hands. Leo complained bitterly over the Legate’s report to this effect. He lamented the dissemination of false views as to his intentions, and of calumnies against the Holy See. He wished to refute these by his actions, so that the calumniators might see for themselves that he had no thought of appropriating the Crusade levies, but intended to leave their disposal entirely to foreign hands. Whether, under the circumstances, and considering the anti-Papal feeling of the Diet, the Pope's representative thought it expedient to pass on these complaints, is doubtful. His words would have made no impression. Even the alarming news which reached Rome at this time, that Hungary was threatened with an attack from the Turks, which Leo used as a lever when pressing his appeal for help to Maximilian, Charles, Francis, and Henry, though it caused fear, did not act as an inducement to these princes to assist Christendom at the cost of any sacrifice to themselves. When better news followed, the balance of opinion swung back, and the Turkish scare was jeered at.

On the 14th of September the States delivered to the Emperor the reply that they must confer with their subjects on the matter of any money grant for the Crusade. At the same time they requested His Majesty to treat with Cajetan about the observance of the Concordat and the matter of annates. Maximilian agreed on this point. As regarded the Turkish war-tax, the States firmly adhered to their resolution that the tenth of a florin should be paid by each person who went to Holy Communion during the next three years. But they repeated that, even as regarded this concession, they must confer with their subjects! At the same time they reiterated their complaints against the Roman See, and demanded redress. Cajetan explained that the proposed method of raising money was at once too insecure and too insignificant; but that he was unable to give his final decision before the reply of the States was put into writing. This was on the 20th of September. Thereupon both princes and States left the Diet, so that no one remained who was able to give the reply demanded by the Legate.

A special memorandum was prepared in Rome in answer to the complaints brought by the States against the Apostolic See. The introduction to this remarkable document acknowledged with astute diplomacy the readiness of the Germans to support the Crusade; though it was urged as of paramount necessity that before the assembly of the next Diet, the princes should be assured of the con sent of the States. The memorandum sought to reconcile conflicting opinions. If, it urged, it were true that Germany was enfeebled by famine and plague, these evils should not keep the people back from raising a Crusade, but should on the contrary spur them on to the enterprise, for their mis fortunes were a warning to them from heaven. To the reproach that in times past the Crusade funds had been turned to other purposes, it was replied that the present Pope was not answerable for the misdeeds of his predecessors: moreover, even when he was Cardinal, he had known by personal observation that the money collected abroad for the raising of a Crusade had never reached Rome. But the plan which had been proposed this time regarding the Crusade funds gave every security against abuse. As regarded the annates, there was no ground for complaint against the Pope, for they were paid only once in the lifetime of each prelate, whereas the holders of all churches and benefices were bound to pay the decima to the Pope. As regarded the newly instituted offices, there was no ground for complaint, as by these measures no one was injured except the Pope himself, who allotted a portion of his own income to the colleges of the newly appointed officiales.

To the reproach about the expectancies and reservations, it was replied by pointing out that these had been practised from time immemorial in Rome, and that the present Pope had introduced nothing new. In the same way the complaints against the chancery laws and granting of benefices were disposed of. As regarded the derogation of lay patronage, the present Pope had acted more circumspectly than his predecessors. As to the violation of the Concordat, it must be shown wherein it had not been observed, except for just and honourable reasons and at the request of the Emperor. He would willingly do away with other “extraordinary burdens”, but he could not possibly allow the liberty of the Holy See to be prejudiced at the will of the irresponsible and easily-led multitude. In conclusion, the importance of a war against the infidel was reiterated, and the Legates were exhorted to leave nothing undone to incline the thoughts of princes and States towards undertaking a Crusade ; as regarded these, they were to do their best to refute unjust accusations, and assure them that the Pope was willing to give up not only annates and all monies hitherto paid, but even his life, for the cause of Christianity.

On the 3rd of October Cardinal Cajetan was directed to leave the Imperial court only when all hopes of attaining his object had vanished. It is a matter of uncertainty whether in Rome, as in Germany, men pretended to be not altogether dissatisfied with the result of the Diet, or whether they were in the main quite satisfied. Certain hopes had, it is true, to be completely abandoned, particularly as the Emperor had at once agreed to the five years’ truce, and promised to promote the Turkish war. These concessions were connected with the Emperor’s efforts to procure for his grandson Charles V the succession to the Empire.

This important question came more and more prominently into the foreground. In order to gain the favour of the Pope in this matter, Maximilian and Charles, as well as their rival Francis I, manifested their willingness, nay, their desire, to carry on a Holy War against the infidel. But, at least on the part of Francis, these offers of assistance were not meant seriously, however emphatic his protestations that before three years had passed he would be in Constantinople or die in the attempt.

Charles's intentions seem to have been more sincere. In a submissive letter of the 20th of November, he declared his desire to devote all that he had to the great undertaking. But it was doubtful whether the young sovereign would be in a position to keep his sweeping promises. The deep-rooted opposition of the Spanish clergy to the raising of a Crusade tax, as well as the many other difficulties with which Charles was beset on all sides, might have dashed the hopes of even such optimists as Egidio Canisio. But then came the question of the election, which swallowed up Charles’s finances. Roman diplomacy also was soon so taken up by the same question, that the matter of the Crusade fell quite into the background.

CHAPTER VI.

Leo X and the Imperial Succession.

NO period of the pontificate of Leo X has been more discussed or so differently judged than his attitude regarding the important question of the succession to the Empire. It is very difficult to form a correct judgment of his policy, through all its hesitations and evasions, its deviations and changes, or to bring to light the true motives and objects which he kept so carefully hidden. This difficulty remains in spite of the documentary evidence which, if by no means complete, is sufficiently abundant to make known with tolerable clearness all that is essential to the understanding of Leo's attitude. By a closer study of the sources of information, it is shown that the opinion held so long, that the Pope allowed himself to be guided in this matter solely by nepotism, is undoubtedly incorrect. On the contrary, what Leo X had most at heart were the temporal power and independence of the Holy See and the so-called liberty of Italy. The exaltation of his relatives, on which he was undeniably too much bent, came only in the second place. All these different objects worked simultaneously with him, and in trying to promote one he was at the same time working for the others. In individual cases it is often difficult to decide with any certainty which motive was strongest, and which was relegated to the background.

If we take a general view of the whole attitude maintained by Leo X in the years 1518 and 1519, we can see that the leading motive of his conduct in the matter of the imperial succession was the care that the temporal and moral influence of the Holy See should suffer no injury, were an already powerful prince to gain possession of the imperial crown. The crown of Charlemagne was still surrounded by a mystic halo ; and if in reality it did not possess the same significance, it might offer to an ambitious prince a title—not to be underrated—to many dangerous claims. Wolsey expressed the opinion of the time when he wrote to his Ambassador in Rome that scarcely anything on earth could be compared with the imperial dignity .

Looked at from this point of view, neither of the two Kings who were the most eager candidates for the imperial dignity was pleasing to the Pope. Either Charles of Spain or Francis I would obtain a supremacy as Emperor, which might be very dangerous to the Holy See and to Italy, especially as one had already a footing in the south, and the other in the north of the peninsula. If at first the dislike of the Pope to the election of Charles was the more prominent, it is easily explained. Charles, to whom, on the 1st of April, 1517, Leo had confirmed the title of “Catholic King,” ruled not only over Aragon and Castile, but also over Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, as well as over the Burgundian-Dutch territory, in addition to countries of incalculable importance in the New World. Not only was Charles the more powerful of the two, but he held larger views about the imperial dignity; whereas the designs of the French King were not so well known to Rome. Charles, moreover, might be especially dangerous to the Holy See because, by his sovereignty over Naples, he could make a much deeper impression on Rome than could the possessor of Milan. It had been the principle of the Holy See since the time of the Hohenstaufen that the crown of Naples could never belong to the Emperor; and this now weighed heavily in the balance. “Do you know,” asked Leo one day of the Venetian Ambassador, “how many miles it is from here to the borders of the Neapolitan territory? Forty. Then Charles must never be appointed King of Rome!”. Leo had every right to appeal to the Bull of Julius II (July 3, 1510), relating to the investiture of Ferdinand the Catholic with the crown of Naples.

But, on the other hand, an increase of the power of the French King could not be desired by the Pope. Not only as sovereign of Milan, but in a variety of other ways, the ambition and spirit of enterprise of Francis I had already made things very uncomfortable for the Holy See.

After much deliberation, the idea occurred to Leo X whether the imperial crown might not be given to a third party—to some German prince— who was not already too powerful, and who had no connection with Italy. Already Rome had turned her eyes towards the “most earnest and clever” of the Electors, Frederick of Saxony, as a possible candidate for the imperial dignity. In this Leo was not influenced by any worldly or political reason, but solely by the interests of the Church. The Elector of Saxony possessed as his subject that passionate professor of Wittenberg, Martin Luther, whose new doctrines seemed so dangerous that it had been already determined in the beginning of September to procure the help of Frederick against him by the gift of the Golden Rose, which he had desired for three years. On the 7th of October, 1518, Cardinal Cajetan was commissioned to confer this mark of distinction on him, on the condition that he would agree to deliver up Luther. The same idea gave birth to the thought of holding before him the prize of the imperial crown as an inducement to take measures to suppress the Lutheran movement. This may explain the difficulties made by the Elector Frederick, which were such as to lead the Pope to make advances on the same lines to the more ecclesiastically-minded Elector, Joachim of Brandenburg.

The scheme of the Pope to promote the choice of one of the Electors for the imperial crown, can be seen more clearly during the second period of the contest for that supreme dignity, after the death of Maximilian, when, as was but natural, the struggle became more acute. From the beginning, Leo X was sincere in wishing for neither Charles nor Francis—least of all the former. There can be scarcely a doubt as to this, however skilfully he tried to conceal his real opinions, or however often he seemed to waver.

I

Maximilians plan to secure his grandson Charles’s succession to the Empire, by ensuring his choice at the Diet of Augsburg as King of Rome, became known at the Vatican in the middle of April 1518, or perhaps sooner, and affected the mind of the Pope most painfully. By the middle of August this election of Charles was supposed in Rome to be immediately impending, even if not already accomplished.

Leo’s attitude towards Charles at that time was fully though cautiously described in a letter from Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici to Cardinal Bibbiena, who was then in France. Two reasons, says Medici, were alleged why the Pope considered that the truth of the report should be duly weighed. First, His Holiness wondered how Maximilian could have contrived to persuade the Electors to choose a King of Rome so quickly and so easily, as hitherto such an election had not taken place before the death of the predecessor, or at any rate before his coronation as Emperor. Secondly, the Pope was astonished how Charles could have accepted the election so unreservedly, in face of the decree of Julius II, in which it was expressly laid down that the investiture to the kingdom of Naples lapsed and returned to Rome, as soon as the occupant of the Neapolitan throne was elected to be King of Rome. The Pope was convinced that when he had secured the title of King of Rome, Charles would still keep possession of the throne of Naples. He feared still more that, after the imperial election had been carried out, the confirmation of Charles as Emperor in the possession of Naples would be demanded of the Holy See, which would gain but little by the concession. In face of this condition of things, Bibbiena was instructed to obtain promptly and by any means, information as to the position of the French King, so that the Pope might act accordingly.

If Francis attached but little importance to the matter of the election, the Pope could accommodate himself to the situation, and draw the best possible advantage from it, even if this should be but slight compared with the great favour at stake. If, on the other hand, he knew for certain that the election of Charles would be displeasing to the French King, and that in the case of a refusal or delay in granting the investiture of Naples, he could rely upon France, he would act otherwise, for the greater dignity and security of the Holy See.

At the conclusion of this remarkable letter the writer once more emphasized the obligation of the Pope to protect his ancient and sacred rights, in the interests of the Roman See. For two hundred years it had never given the investiture of the throne of Naples without the express condition which excluded its union with the title of King of Rome. If he now departed from this rule he would be acting against the precedent given by his predecessors, and also against his own principles, besides exposing himself to great dangers. On the other hand, a refusal of investiture would provoke the anger of Maximilian and Charles; and this he could not venture to do without the help and favour of France.

This letter is very characteristic of Leo’s attitude. No one could infer from it that he would take up a decided position against Charles. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the Pope was by no means desirous of his election, or that he would willingly work against it if he could be sure beforehand of the support of France. Before he had obtained such a certainty he did not wish to cut himself off from the possibility of an arrangement with Charles, which he might turn to account to the advantage of his family. Moreover, Charles's acceptance of the five years' truce, and his offers to help in the Turkish war, which had been laid before the Cardinals at a Consistory held on the 23rd of August: deterred Leo from taking open measures against the Spanish King. But that the Pope should, by making a virtue of necessity, have at that time agreed to Charles's election, was not honest. He had not, however, arrived at a final decision. His natural hesitancy was increased by the extraordinary difficulty of the situation; for, as matters stood, he had to choose between breaking with the Emperor and Spain, or with France. In September the news reached Rome that Maximilian had obtained the votes of four Electors for the choice of Charles to be King of Rome; but that the Elector of Saxony was very much against any such plan, and wished the dignity to be conferred on a German. It was believed that his opposition originated in his desire to be chosen himself. This gave birth to the idea of the Saxon candidature for the imperial crown. At first Leo observed great reserve in his outward actions. When Francis I expressed a desire to take energetic measures against the election of Charles, the Pope drew his attention to the difficulties attendant on such an undertaking and the danger of kindling a great war. Leo described the project of Francis I for forming a League between the Pope, Florence, France, Switzerland, and Venice as very delightful in itself, but one which had to be treated with great prudence, lest the general peace should be disturbed. § It is clear that he hesitated to hand over his interests to the discretion of his French protector, in spite of Lorenzo's strong advocacy of the cause of France. This explains why he kept up communications with Francis, with whom, ever since July, he had been exchanging proposals for the formation of a closer alliance. As the dispensation from the oath of fealty for Naples, which was so urgently needed for the success of the plans of Maximillian and Charles, it was Leo's policy not to cut off- all hope of an agreement, but to bind himself to nothing.

The difference with Rome, which began in November, 1518, was very injurious to Francis’ aims. The reason of the quarrel has never been satisfactorily explained. It seems that the French King wanted to take undue advantage of his matrimonial alliance with the Pope’s family, and while he asked for much, he gave nothing. Cardinal Medici, in a letter to Bibbiena, complained bitterly of Francis’ conduct. “The Pope”, he wrote, on the nth of November, “sees that his family alliance, far from bringing him an increase of honour and renown, causes nothing but vexation and anxiety. Every day he is showing the King some fresh favour, yet he is being always pressed with some new and weighty demand. These are made just as if he had received nothing before. If his requests are not granted at once, all that has gone before counts for nothing. His encroachments on the spiritual rights of Milan by his appointment to benefices, have been carried so far as to amount to a formal contempt of Papal authority. By his indulgence and complaisance towards the French King the Pope has drawn on himself a number of vexations and disputes”. Francis I had sent a threatening letter to the Pope on this very subject of the Milanese benefices, and this letter was enclosed by Cardinal Medici to Bibbiena, that the latter might see what just cause for complaint the Pope had.

To these complaints there were added others which were retailed to Bibbiena by Cardinal Giulio in a letter of the 28th of November. These related to the salt-mines in the States of the Church, a suspicious alliance with the Duke of Ferrara, as well as various encroachments on the Papal dominions. After all these occurrences, it is not surprising, Medici goes on to say, that His Holiness should suspect Francis of a design to alienate him from the Emperor, and then, having left him stranded, hold him in his power.

These pointed complaints must have made an impression on Francis I, all the deeper because of his fear that the Pope would end by yielding to the pressure of the Emperor and Spain, and remove the obstacles which stood in the way of Charles’s election. These obstacles were twofold. First there was the existence of the oath of fealty for the throne of Naples, the terms of which for bade that crown being worn by one who held the dignity of King of Rome. There was also what had hitherto been the impossibility of an election of a King of Rome in the lifetime of another who had received the title, and who had not received the imperial crown. It was now proposed that the Pope should dispense with the clause in the oath of fealty, and that the imperial crown should be sent to Trent, where the Emperor might be crowned by either Cardinal de' Medici or the Archbishop of Mayence as representative of the Pope. Such was the request made by Charles at the end of November ; but he received an evasive answer.

Soon, however, symptoms were seen of an inclination on the part of the Pope to give way in both the matters of the oath of investiture and the imperial coronation. The cause of these signs of compliance lay in the circumstance that official intelligence had just been received by the Pope that Maximilian had agreed to the five years’ truce, and held out hopes of supporting the Crusade. In the first half of November a Bull was prepared which provided for a dispensation from the obligation of renouncing Naples should Charles be elected King of Rome. But the pressure put on his uncle by Lorenzo caused the postponement of the execution of this deed. Simultaneously with the drawing up of this Bull, Leo X held out the hope to Maximilian that he would do his best to remove the second obstacle, and would perform the ceremony of the imperial coronation, either in person or by deputy, on the borders of the Tyrol and Italy.

For one moment Lorenzo thought that France’s cause was lost, and his only thought was to turn to advantage an opportunity not likely to occur more than once in a hundred years. But Leo had by no means come to his final decision. This was shown only too plainly by his attitude towards Erasmus Vitellius (Ciolek), Bishop of Plock, who was sent to Rome by Maximilian on the 7th of November, 1518, to press the matter of sending the imperial crown to Germany. He could not obtain an audience till the 26th of November. Then with skilful diplomacy he made it clear that Maximilian’s co-operation in the Turkish war depended on the request being granted.

At the same time Spain tried to win the Pope over by making generous offers for the support of the Crusade, as well as for the exaltation of the Medici. But Leo still answered evasively to the effect that, though he would gladly comply with Maximilian’s request, it must be saving his honour. “It is a question”, said he, “of our own person and our own honour”. When Erasmus, alluding to the meeting with Francis I at Bologna, pleaded that the Pope might crown Maximilian, if not at Trent, at Verona or Mantua, Leo alleged against this the opposition which the Cardinals would make to such a journey. To test the feasibility of sending the imperial crown from Rome, a Congregation of Cardinals was called on the 1st of December, the majority of whom were unfavourable to the Emperor’s proposal.

This crisis was contemporaneous with the change already mentioned which had come over the attitude of Francis. After the representations made by Bibbiena, the French King had fully acknowledged the danger which threatened his efforts should the Pope, in his displeasure with him, yield to the wishes of Charles and Maximilian. He therefore resolved to change his tone. The first symptom of this change is to be found in a report sent by Bibbiena to Cardinal de' Medici and Lorenzo on the 26th and 27th of November, which shows the change of mind on the part of the King. Francis I now declared himself ready not only to accede to Lorenzo’s wishes as to the rounding off of his territory, but also— though in this we may assume that he was not in earnest—to renounce his own candidature, and, if the Pope so wished, promote the claims of the Elector of Saxony to be King of Rome. The condition of this was that nothing should be done by Rome in favour of Maximilian and Charles.

Although the Roman Curia had adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Francis I, the latter did not feel sure that the Pope might not after all place himself on the side of his rivals. He adjured Bibbiena to prevent at all costs the sending of the imperial crown, and implored his help to prevent such a possibility as a journey of Maximilian to Rome. In a solemn audience he made the most generous offers about the Crusade, in which he said he would take part personally. He also expressed his willingness to waive all the points on which he was at variance with Rome, to promote the interests of the Medici, and conclude an alliance with the Pope.

Negotiations for an alliance with Francis I were carried on actively by Bibbiena. He was a master of Medicean diplomacy, and succeeded, without binding himself to anything, in raising deceptive hopes in the heart of the French King that the Pope would, in return for his concessions, take his part in the election. Charles was treated in exactly the same way, and he also was left with the impression that Leo would accede to his wishes; though to neither party were any pledges about the election given. When Francis demanded some guarantee, the dangers of a breach with Spain were pointed out. As regarded Charles, the Pope drew back at the most decisive moment, on the plea that such a weighty matter required the most mature deliberation.

Not only was the Bull of dispensation in respect to Naples kept back, but the other matter of sending the imperial crown was indefinitely postponed. The Congregation of Cardinals which the Pope had called to consider the question, demanded the verdict of the Master of Ceremonies, and he, on being consulted, declared that the coronation anywhere but in Rome was an impossibility. On the 15th of December there was a meeting of the Congregation, held in the presence of the Pope, which lasted six hours. On the following day Leo X informed the Bishop of Plock that he had been unable to carry the business through, as the Cardinals had brought forward, as reasons against it, both the novelty of the matter and the existence of Bulls which in times past had been issued in opposition to such a thing. He could not, he said, give the dispensation without the consent of the Sacred College. He would gladly have met the Emperor at Mantua or Verona, but was deterred by the consideration of the dangers to which such a journey might expose Maximilian.

On the 21st of December a Brief to Maximilian was prepared which informed him that his desires, conveyed through Erasmus Vitellius, concerning the Crusade indulgence in his patrimonial dominions, the protection of Croatia and Hungary, and the appointment of Cajetan as Legate in the last-mentioned country, should be granted.

But as to the matter of sending the imperia! crown from Rome, though both Pope and Cardinals had every wish to be conciliatory, the matter, being one of such importance, required further consideration.

By adjourning the decision of the main question, it was evident that Leo wished to gain time, until, in fact, he had made friends with Francis I. This event did not take place as soon as was wished in Rome. In order to win over the French King, the Pope was ready to hand over to his free disposal the second Crusade tenth. The Bull concerning this is dated the 1st of December 1518. It was, however, completed only at the end of that month, after Bibbiena, by his far-reaching assurances, had been able to arrive at an understanding with Francis I. On the 31st of December the French King pledged himself to pay back within four years 100,000 ducats of the Crusade money. At the same time Lorenzo de’ Medici received, “for services rendered,” 100,000 ducats from the King, out of the sum granted through the Pope. This was a shameful misuse of the money raised for the Holy War.

After this arrangement Francis at once, on the 20th of January, 1519, signed the treaty of alliance with Leo X. On one side the French King, and on the other the Pope and Lorenzo, as representing Florence and the family of Medici, pledged themselves to the mutual defence of their possessions, and undertook to impart to one another all state secrets. In particular, Francis promised to acknowledge the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church in Milan, to protect the States of the Church, as well as Lorenzo and the Medici generally. This last took the form of a separate treaty. On the other side, the Pope and Lorenzo pledged themselves to further the French King’s interests in every way in their power. But the question of the election was not touched on in the agreement.

It has been brought to light only by recent researches that almost at the same moment Leo X concluded an alliance of defence with the rivals of the King of France! Like Francis, the King of Spain was won over by the illusion, confirmed by no pledge but carefully fostered, that in the matter of the election the Pope would be on his side. On the 17th of January the text of this treaty, which, as was expressly stipulated, was to be kept secret, was drawn up, and signed by Charles on the 6th of February.

No more than in that with France, was there any mention of the election in the treaty with Charles. By this, both parties pledged themselves to mutual assistance and the protection of their possessions. These, on the Papal side, included not only the States of the Church, but also the possessions of Lorenzo and Florence. On the other side, the term included Charles’s possessions outside and inside Italy, with Naples. Besides all this, the Pope promised Charles, in the event of a serious war, the right to levy a tenth on the clergy of Spain.

By the light of these two treaties we can understand the policy of Leo X, and the manner in which he avoided making any actual decision in favour of either of the rivals who were competing for the imperial crown. By means of unparalleled double-dealing both parties were kept in hand, and moved, each to make a secret treaty, the object of which was the protection of the Pope and the Medici. The question of the Pope’s support at the election, which each party thought was the object of the treaty, was not even mentioned in the document. It is, however, equally true that the special advantages which both Charles and Francis had promised in regard to the States of the Church and the Medici were left quite undefined.

In excuse for Leo’s ambiguous policy it has been pointed out that “in the then condition of Italy, the smaller States could scarcely hope to save their independence except by keeping themselves skilfully in the balance between the two great powers, which threatened to crush all others”. This may have been so; nevertheless, such double-dealing on the part of a Pope must be deeply deplored.

At this moment when the question of the coronation of Maximilian was dividing the whole of Europe, and when the arming of France and Spain was regarded as the prelude of a great war, the “last of the Knights” was snatched away by death on the 12th of January, under the age of sixty. The rivalry between the houses of France and Hapsburg entered on an acute stage which set its mark on European history for centuries.

II.

The unexpected and, to many, the incredible news of the death of Maximilian, which introduced an altogether changed condition of things, reached Rome eleven days after the event. With one stroke it put an end to Leo’s indecision. The danger lest Charles, the least desired candidate, should succeed in obtaining the dignity of King of Rome, which would entitle him to the imperial crown, seemed greater than ever. With unwonted promptitude the Pope came to a decision. Not twenty-four hours after the receipt of the startling news of the Emperor’s death, instructions were sent to Cardinal Cajetan, the Legate in Germany, in which Leo took up his position in opposition to Charles quite openly and unambiguously, and proposed one of the German Electors as a candidate for the imperial crown, thus hoping to thwart the election of Francis as well as that of Charles. The Pope—so ran the instructions to Cajetan —wished, in the interests of the Apostolic See, to promote the choice of one of the Electors, either Frederick of Saxony or Joachim of Brandenburg; he cared not which, though there seemed to be more likelihood of success with the former. The King of Poland also would be pleasing as a candidate to the Holy See; but under no consideration was it to be the King of Spain. The chief reason alleged for this was that the great power already possessed by Charles would be unbearably increased by the extraordinary authority of the imperial crown. These instructions, dated the 23rd of January, were entirely the personal work of the Pope, because Cardinal Medici, on whose co-operation he usually depended in the matters connected with the election, had been called away to Florence in the night of the 22nd, by the severe illness of Lorenzo, and returned thence only on the 26th of March.

The instructions sent to Cajetan to oppose the election of Charles apply equally to those sent in regard to the French King. Though his possessions could not compare in extent with those of Charles, still, his dominions were more united v and richer in resources. There can be no doubt that the Pope did not at all desire the election of the French King ; as a proof of this, when he was passing in review the candidates to the imperial throne, he passed Francis’ name over in silence, as being out of the question. Even in the instructions to Bibbiena on the 27th of January, bidding him try to obtain the support of the French court in favour of the candidature of one of the Electors, there is no mention made of the hope that, even under certain circumstances, Francis might be chosen. But only two days later, on the afternoon of the 29th of January, Leo expressed openly to the French Ambassador his desire in favour of the election of Francis I, advising him to do everything he could to wrest the election from the Hapsburg. In the further course of conversation, he said quite candidly that Francis had better do his utmost to obtain the imperial dignity as the zenith of his ambition. Though Leo was convinced that it might be dangerous to have the imperial crown placed on the head of one already powerful, he would rather see it given to the sovereign of the obedient, religious, and judicious French than to the Catholic King.

Whence this sudden change of mind ? Erasmus Vitellius, who was still in Rome, had shown to the Pope proofs of the absolute certainty of the election of Charles to the imperial throne, by revealing to him the contents of the compact of the five Electors, formulated at Augsburg. Although the conclusion, so favourable to Charles, which had been arrived at by the Diet of Augsburg, had been long since communicated to the Pope, it does not seem that he attached sufficient importance to it, seeing that it was couched in general terms and delivered verbally. Now, for the first time, Leo understood the full significance of the matter. The only hope of checking the election of Charles lay in prompt action.

In this frame of mind, on the 29th of January, Leo made his abrupt request to Francis through his representative, to lay claim forthwith to the imperial crown and work in every way possible against the candidature of Charles. Next day the Pope, through Pietro Ardinghello, sent a very important letter to his Legate in France, in which the question of the election was treated of in the same way. This change was caused by the compact of the Electors shown to the Pope by Vitellius, which put the election before him as being as good as settled, unless it could be promptly opposed. Francis was urged to come forward as a candidate, with every promise of support from the Pope. “If anything”, the letter goes on, “having regard to the powerful position of the King, made the Electors wish for the candidature of a third party, Francis might give this nominee his active support as a means of preventing the election of the King of Spain. This step might be necessary, as Francis, by too strong an advocacy of his own cause, might play into the hands of Charles”. In the first place, the Pope wished for the election of Francis; but if that could not be carried out, then the choice of any other seemed to him to be preferable to that of Charles. The instructions sent to Bibbiena on the 5th and 12th of March are written in the same sense. The Pope, who had just received the ratification of the bond of the 20th of January, repeated the expression of his desire for the election of Francis; but at the same time, in the event of the French efforts being fruitless, he declared the necessity of trying to promote the election of a third party. In any case it must not be Charles.

From such indications it cannot be doubted that Leo warmly espoused the cause of Francis. Whether, in his inmost heart, he really desired his success, may still be considered doubtful. It is more probable that, as an immediate object, he was playing Francis against Charles, without sincerely desiring his election, or even believing in such an eventuality. Whether he became by degrees more favourable to the idea of a French Emperor cannot be said, or whether, if so, it came from a personal liking for Francis I. Probably he was influenced by the thought that nothing—not even that which might be feared most—could weigh in the balance against the increasing power of Charles. In essentials Leo went no further than this until a very short time before the actual election of Charles. Certain vacillations, entirely characteristic of the Medici Pope, must not altogether surprise us, though all through we can trace the dominant thought of Leo : Let there be no Hapsburg! It was labour lost for the Spanish Legate, Egidio Canisio, to petition the Pope on behalf of Charles,  but it is a fact that a third candidate, either the Elector of Saxony or the Elector of Brandenburg, would have been more agreeable to the Pope than either of the others. This became more evident every day. There is also, however, no doubt that the candidature of Francis, though probably taken up at first only as a means of putting aside the claims of Charles, was more desired by him as time went on, and he realized that his successful candidature was the only possible way of destroying Charles’s chances.

Besides the overwhelming extent of Charles’s power, there were many other reasons which weighed in the balance against him in the mind of the Pope : such were the tyranny which Naples might exercise over Rome ; the anti-Papal feeling which had governed so many of the Roman­Teutonic emperors ; their union with the Ghibelline party in the States of the Church. While Leo drew Bibbiena’s attention to these reasons against the candidature of Charles, he referred—but only in the last place, and not as to a thing of primary importance—to his family connection with France. Here then we can see a sign of the Pope’s nepotism as a factor, though by no means the chief one, in his attitude towards the rival powers. The temporal power of the Holy See, as a safeguard of its spiritual interests, was what Leo had most at heart. In the interests of this, together with those of Italian liberty, he could not tolerate that any overwhelming power should hold sway on the Italian peninsula. This object was, it is true, connected with his care for his own house, and for Florence, which was so closely united to the States of the Church ; but these last were by no means the main object. In his unusually difficult position between the two great powers, the Pope tried as long as possible to veer about from one side to the other. When, however, he found himself driven by necessity to a choice between two evils, he saw in that connected with the French sovereign of Milan a lesser danger than that connected with the Spanish King of Naples.

The Pope’s preference for the French candidature was undisguisedly expressed in many ways. In the beginning of March the warm friend of France, Roberto Latino Orsini, Archbishop of Reggio, was sent, armed with Papal Briefs, to the German Electors, where, to the great satisfaction of Francis, he tried to work against Charles in every possible way. On the 12th of March the Pope authorized the French King, by a special Brief, to promise the Cardinal’s hat to the Electors of Treves and Cologne, should he be elected through their help. Two days later the Cardinal Archbishop of Mayence, Albert of Brandenburg, was, under the same conditions, promised the office of permanent Legate in Germany. The significance of this last concession is uncertain. On the 21st of March the Pope expressed himself so decidedly to the Venetian Ambassador, that the latter was quite surprised. “His Holiness”, reports Minio, “who has hitherto endeavoured to deceive both sides, has now put himself entirely on that of France, because he believes that he has more to fear from Charles than from Francis”.

If we call to our minds the character of Leo, who was ever most unwilling to take any part, who never came forward except in a case of utmost necessity, his open partisanship with Francis is most surprising. The ostensible object of driving a still more dangerous adversary out of the field is no adequate explanation of the Pope’s action in the matter of the election of Francis I; and it is only on closer observation, that we find the real reason why Leo entered the lists for the French candidate so much more openly and decidedly than at first. The reason lay in his increasing fear of being isolated. The thought that Francis and Charles might come to an understanding, pursued the prudent Medici Pope like a menacing spectre.

Therefore, on no account must France be given either pretext or opportunity of leaving the Pope to face Charles alone and unaided. Should the King of Spain be elected, the Holy See must at any rate keep a firm friend in Francis. That the rivals should come to an understanding must be prevented at all costs. Once he had com mitted himself to favouring Francis' cause, Leo’s fear of isolation drove him further and further along the road he had taken. On the 20th of April, he emphatically refused the request of the Swiss to leave the imperial dignity unhindered to the Germans. It was by no means his intention to depreciate the rights of the German nation ; his opposition to Charles did not originate in that, but in the conviction that the Hapsburg, as occupant of the throne of Naples, had no right, by all the promises sworn to of old, to aspire to the imperial crown. It was his policy to adhere to Francis I, because from him the Holy See had no danger of that sort to fear.

Soon afterwards the Pope, on his own initiative—for Cardinal Medici had, on the 3rd of May, gone to Florence to attend Lorenzo’s death-bed—took a step by which he acted contrary to existing rules, and committed himself far more deeply than he had on the 27th of January. A Brief, dated May the 4th, empowered Cardinal Cajetan, as Legate, in case three of the Electors should be unanimous in their choice of a candidate, to declare in the name of the Pope that such an election was valid.

In spite of the zeal which he was showing for the election of Francis, Leo X still fostered his favourite plan of procuring the election of a third party, by choice the Elector of Saxony. His secret idea, that the great diplomatic struggle might be most advantageously settled in this way, was always recurring. The Roman court adopted this project with such zeal that it was even willing to temporize about the matter of Luther.

Meanwhile the Papal Envoys in Germany, having declared that, according to the constitutions of Clement IV, the King of Naples was ineligible for election to the imperial dignity, met with an angry rebuff from the ecclesiastical Electors, whose pride was severely touched. They protested against the unheard-of action on the part of the Pope in wishing to dictate to them about matters of election procedure.

In the north of Germany matters seemed to take a turn more and more favourable for Charles. A popular movement in both Upper and Lower Germany rose in favour of the “broad ways” of the Hapsburg King. The Swiss also declared that they would not suffer the imperial dignity to pass from the hands of a German into those of a foreigner, least of all into those of the French, who had thirsted so long to possess it.

This intelligence reached Rome in the second half of April.  Soon after this, there followed the death of Lorenzo de' Medici. He had been ill of the spleen ever since January. On the 13th of April a daughter—Catherine de' Medici—was born to him, whose birth cost her mother her life: on the 4th of May the father died.

The sad news affected the Pope deeply, though he accepted the blow with Christian resignation. “The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away”, said he to his confidant, Pietro Ardinghello. As a Medici the event pained him deeply, but not as Pope; for he resolved to care for nothing henceforth except the exaltation and needs of the Apostolic See. So says the Mantuan Ambassador. Another informant says that when he received the sad news Leo exclaimed : “Henceforward we belong no more to the house of Medici, but to the house of God”.

From these expressions of self-accusation, on which such different judgments have been passed, and his resolutions to renounce nepotism for evermore, it by no means follows that the Pope was conscious of having been hitherto guided solely by family interests. In them there is nothing beyond the acknowledgment that he had considered the, aggrandizement of his relatives more than was fitting. All this he now changed. Consequently, the Duchy of Urbino, with Pesaro and Sinigaglia, were united to the States of the Church; Cardinal Medici received the management of Florentine affairs as Legate of the whole of Tuscany. He remained in Florence till the autumn, when he left behind him as his representatives the Bishop of Pistoja, Goro Gheri, and Cardinal Passerini.

Lorenzo’s death certainly removed one obstacle to a change in the Pope’s policy, though it did not conduce to a reconciliation with Charles. The chief reason of the change in his policy was the conviction that came to him that Francis’ candidature was hopeless. On the 29th of May, Leo confided to the Venetian Ambassador that public opinion was so strong in Germany that the Electors could not choose the French King even if they wished it.

Nevertheless the Pope could not reconcile himself to the thought of Charles as Emperor, and reiterated through his representative that the King of Naples could not at the same time wear the imperial crown. At the beginning of June he made a last despairing effort to avert the evil, and finish the diplomatic strife by a means as yet untried, by proposing the candidature of the Elector of Saxony. On the 7th of June an urgent message was sent to Frederick through the Papal representative and the French Ambassador, pressing him to support Francis; or, if that were impossible, to accept for himself the imperial crown. If the Elector of Saxony could add but two more votes to his own, the Pope promised to confirm his election, and support him by every means in his power.

At the time that Leo X made this proposal, the resentment of the Germans against all the friends of France had reached such a height that the lives of the latter were not safe. Through the leader of the French party, the Archbishop of Treves, the Pope learned that four of the Electors were determined on the election of Charles. On his own confession, this intelligence convinced Leo of the futility and danger of holding out any longer for Francis’ candidature. He must at last accept the inevitable. For his part Charles neglected nothing which could win Leo’s favour; while Francis, just at this juncture, committed the blunder of making a most offensive demand of the Pope. According to the report of the Ambassador of Este, on the 5th of June, a letter arrived from the French King warning the Pope against incorporating Urbino in the States of the Church, seeing that the Duchy belonged to the infant Catherine de' Medici, whom the King regarded as his own daughter.§ That this demand caused a revolution in the mind of the Pope is certain, for he made his final decision in the middle of June. Just then most important news came from Germany; Caracciolo reported that, though ill, he had had himself carried in a sedan-chair to the Archbishop of Mainz, to implore him, in the Pope’s name, to consider the good of the Apostolic See and promote Francis’ election. The answer of the Archbishop was to the effect that under no circumstances would he vote for the French King. At the same time Leo was told that the Elector of Saxony had written a letter, dated the 8th of June, in which “with all courtesy as to form, but incisively and plainly,” he had dismissed both Papal representatives.

These tidings caused the abrupt change in the Pope’s attitude. On the 17th of June an understanding was come to with the Spanish Ambassador, Caroz, by which Leo X agreed, for this once, to the union of the imperial crown with that of Naples, conditional on a Papal veto of the expansion of the power of Spain in Lombardy or Tuscany. On this, the Pope’s representatives in Germany were instructed to make out a new treaty embracing the new concession, and word was at once sent to the Electors that, if they wished to elect Charles, they need not be deterred by considerations about the crown of Naples. Thus, at the last moment—for the Electors were already assembled at Frankfort—Leo X gave in, in face of the probability, nay, more, the moral certainty, that the election of the Hapsburg King would take place, whether the Pope consented or not. Such a grave injury to the dignity of the Holy See must be averted at all costs! That he gave in under compulsion there can be no doubt. He himself admitted as much when he wrote to Cardinal Cajetan saying that it was useless for him to knock his head against a stone wall. Francis also saw at last the futility of any further effort to win the crown. On the 26th of June he withdrew his own candidature, and told his Envoys to work for the election of Joachim of Brandenburg. A second letter, written the same day, instructed them that, should the Archbishop of Treves be in favour of the Elector of Saxony, the latter was to be supported. On the 21st of July the Nuncio Orsini, by the Pope's directions, once more, through Karl von Miltitz, urged Frederick of Saxony either to vote for Francis, or else to stand himself for election. But Frederick positively refused either course, and declared himself in favour of Charles. On the 28th of June, 1519, the grandson of Maximilian was unanimously chosen King of Rome. Although, until he was crowned by the Pope, this was the only name he was entitled to bear, he was thenceforward generally spoken of as the Emperor.

The outcome of the long diplomatic struggle was regarded with deep interest. This is borne witness to by Baldassare Castiglione, who came to Rome on the 26th of May to condole with the Pope on the death of Lorenzo de' Medici. The members of the Curia had been convinced that neither Charles nor Francis had any chance; nor were the French as certain of victory as they had been, though there were still individual Frenchmen who spoke very vauntingly. The general fear was that a grave war would ensue. The Pope alone was of a different opinion as to this, and went undisturbedly about his usual pursuits, while excitement, which expressed itself in a number of wagers, rose to fever height in the city. On the 1st of July the news that Charles had been elected spread throughout Rome; whereat the imperialists rejoiced greatly.

The definite news of Charles’s election reached Rome on the 5th of July, being celebrated by great rejoicings on the part of the Spaniards, Imperialists, and the Colonna. The cry, “The Empire and Spain!” rang through the streets of the Eternal City. Baldassare Castiglione says that “the joy of the Spaniards is as difficult to describe as the depression of the French, who go about like men dead”. The Spanish Cardinals and prelates and all those who held benefices in Naples and Spain took part in the uproarious rejoicings. On two evenings five or six hundred Spaniards, well armed, with music and banners, paraded the streets, stopping in front of the dwellings of the Spanish prelates, where they were given wine and money. The Germans in Rome took offence at the cry of “Spain  Spain!” set up by these men, whereas they would have preferred that of “Austria !” or “Burgundy!”. Thereupon more Spaniards and their adherents mustered in Rome, as though they were the masters of the Eternal City. The consequence of all this was a very painful scene between the Pope and Caroz, the Ambassador of Charles. Leo X could not conceal the deep impression made on him by the election of the Hapsburg. “Ambassador”, said he to Minio, the representative of Venice, “had the French King acted according to our advice, a third party would have been elected. God grant that the election of Charles may conduce to the good of Christendom!”. Such an exclamation shows how set Leo had been in his secret heart on the candidature of the Elector of Saxony.

A few days later Minio found the Pope thoughtful and anxious. “What shall I do,” said he, “if the Hapsburg comes to Italy now? All Germany will back him up!”. On the 18th of July the Venetian Ambassador found him still more agitated, because, as he complained, the French were laying all the blame on him for what had happened about the election. “As you know,” said he to Minio, “I did everything that they wished, and this is the result”.

Next day the Pope communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory the contents of a letter from Charles, in which, briefly and moderately, he announced his election, and professed his good-will, and submission to the Holy See. The Pope did not fail to make use of this opportunity to commend Charles for not having assumed prematurely the title of King of Rome, though powerful enough to assert his claim to it.

Only now  were the customary festivities celebrated in due form. On the 16th of August a letter containing the good wishes of the Pope was sent to Charles, the fine-sounding and bombastic phrases of which could have blinded only the very ignorant to the fact that Leo anticipated with a great fear the attitude likely to be taken by the new Emperor.