HISTORY OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO, 1680—1888

CHAPTER XVIII.

MILITARY RULE IN NEW MEXICO.

1847-1850.

 

At Santa Fé and in the settlements generally for six months after the revolt, the state of affairs was far from satisfactory, worse in every respect than before. For a time, indeed, a greater degree of vigilance and discipline was observed; but the former, with its accompaniments of severe punishments, habitual distrust, and oppressive regulations, rapidly destroyed the confidence and friendliness before shown by large portions of the native population; while the latter soon became relaxed, and the soldiers more turbulent and unmanageable than ever. The New Mexicans were regarded as at heart deadly foes, and were treated accordingly. Sickness continued its ravages; supplies were still obtained with difficulty; the Indians constantly attacked the caravans on the plains; Navajo raids on the settlements never ceased, there being some reason to believe that they were not discouraged by the Americans so long as directed against the natives; and the situation was still further complicated by disagreements between military and. civil authorities, and by serious dissensions among military officers, there being much dissatisfaction with Colonel Price’s management.

The volunteers’ terms of enlistment expired at different dates from June to August, causing fears that the country would be left without sufficient protection against a new revolt. At the same time, however, a new volunteer force was organized in Missouri for this service. On the 6th of August a company of the 1st Dragoons, Lieutenant Love, reached Santa Fé with $350,000 of government funds. On the 17th Colonel Price, leaving besides the three dragoon companies a battalion of reenlisted volunteers under Lieutenant-colonel Willock, started with his men for the states, meeting on the way various bodies of the new troops. These included two regiments of volunteers, one of infantry under colonels Newby and Boyakin, the other of cavalry under Balls and Jones; also an infantry battalion under Lieutenant-colonel Easton; and later another battalion of cavalry and artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Gilpin, known as the Indian Battalion, and at first stationed on the plains to keep hostile tribes in order. There is nothing of importance recorded respecting military affairs at Santa Fé after August; but in December Price came back as a brigadier-general to resume the command. The force was now nearly 3,000 men, with a part of which the general marched south, and in March 1848 fought the last battle of the war at Santa Cruz de Rosales near Chihuahua. On their return north and the announcement of peace, the volunteers, except two companies, went home to the states, starting in August or September. At the same time the force of regulars was slightly increased by reinforcements from Chihuahua. In 1849 the force was still further increased till it numbered 885 men, including a garrison at El Paso. Four companies of volunteers were also called into service in March 1849; and a company of Mexicans and pueblo Indians served in a Navajo campaign. During Price’s absence the military command had been held by Colonel E. W. B. Newby in 1847, and by Major Benjamin L. Beall in 1848. Major John M. Washington assumed the command in September of that year, and in October 1849 was succeeded by Lieutenant-colonel John Monroe.

We have seen that the government at Washington, while not ostensibly recognizing General Kearny’s acts so far as they made New Mexico a territory—and its people citizens—of the United States, did recognize his right to establish a temporary civil government for the management of territorial affairs. Charles Bent as governor, and other officials as already named, were appointed in September 1846, the native prefects, alcaldes, and other local authorities being for the most part continued in office on taking the oath of allegiance. During the last months of 1846 very little for good or bad was done by the new civil authorities; and after the revolt their powers were still further subordinated to those of the military, a state of things causing many complaints on the part of the people. On the death of Governor Bent in January 1847, Secretary Vigil became acting governor. He desired the appointment of a successor, recommending Ceran St Vrain, but the authorities at Washington disclaimed all powers in the matter, and in December Vigil himself was appointed governor by General Price. In the same month a legislative assembly met at Santa Fe, accomplishing and attempting nothing of importance, so far as can be known. Vigil’s rule seems to have continued nominally until October 11, 1848. A newspaper, the Santa Fé Republican, was published from the 4th of September.

By the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, finally ratified on May 30, 1848, and proclaimed at Santa Fé in August, New Mexico became part of United States territory, the boundary on the south being the Río Grande, the Upper Gila, and a line:—of which more will be said later—uniting these rivers just above the latitude of El Paso. The people were given a choice of citizenship between the two republics, and pending a decision were assured of full protection for their persons, property, and religious faith. News of the treaty produced practically no immediate changes in the territory, except the departure of the volunteer troops. In the matter of civil government, the new status of the country involved some perplexing questions, which seem, however, not to have greatly troubled the New Mexican mind at first. The military regime was properly at an end, and the civil government organized as a temporary phase of the military occupation, strictly speaking, ended with it; but the position assumed by the administration at Washington, and carried out by the military commanders, was that the termination of the war left an existing government, a government de facto, in full operation; and this will continue, with the presumed consent of the people, until congress shall provide for them a territorial government. Accordingly, Governor Vigil ruled for a few months, and after him the commandants Washington and Monroe, there being no attempt to appoint a purely civil successor to Vigil. The state of things was like that in California, in the history of which country the reader will find some additional matter on the general subject. This solution of the difficulty was, perhaps, as satisfactory as any that could have been devised; and the New Mexicans did well in following the advice of the president “to live peaceably and quietly under the existing government” for a “few months”, until congress should attend to their civil needs. Senator Benton, however, took it upon himself to give contrary advice. Declaring all that had been done by the military authorities to be null and void, he counselled the people “to meet in convention—provide for a cheap and simple government—and take care of yourselves until congress can provide for you”. And they did hold a convention at the call of Governor Vigil on October 10th; which body, however, contented itself with sending a memorial, or petition, to congress, asking for the “speedy organization by law of a territorial civil government” and at the same time protesting against dismemberment in favor of Texas, and against the introduction of slavery.

The expenses of the civil government were partly paid during the military regime by the duties on imports; and after February 1848, General Price ordered a duty of six per cent to be still collected on imports from the United States. The citizens and traders held meetings in August to protest against such illegal exaction on goods introduced from one part of the United States to another. Price declined to modify the order, which he regarded as a measure of absolute necessity, the only source of revenue; but the government at Washington sustained the people, and in October ordered the refunding of all duties collected since the 30th of May. Consequently, salaries and other expenses went for the most part unpaid, and in 1851, when the old regime came to an end, there was a debt of $31,562.

In September 1849 another convention assembled at Santa Fé, consisting of nineteen delegates elected by the people under a proclamation issued by Lieutenant-colonel Beall, acting as governor in Major Washington’s absence. This body proceeded to elect Hugh N. Smith as a delegate to congress, to adopt a plan, or basis, for the territorial government, the establishment of which he was to urge at Washington, and to prepare a series of instructions for his guidance. A notable feature of these documents, as distinguished from the petition of 1848, was the absence of protests against slavery and Texan encroachments. The territory was simply to be bounded on the east by Texas. Governor Washington, it appears, declined to recognize officially the acts of this convention; but Smith soon started for Washington, where, in July 1850, the house, by a vote of 92 to 86, after a long discussion, refused to admit him as a delegate. But even before Delegate Smith’s failure to secure recognition for New Mexico as a territory, yet another experiment had been tried in the form of an attempted organization as a state, this being in accordance with advice from Washington. By proclamation of Governor Monroe, issued in April 1850, a convention assembled at Santa Fé the 15th of May, under the presidency of James H. Quinn, and after sessions of ten days framed a constitution for the state of New Mexico. This document prohibited slavery, and fixed as the eastern and western boundaries the 100th and 111th meridians respectively.

It was submitted to the people by the military governor’s order of May 28th, requiring an election to be held on the 20th of June, at which the electors were to vote “on a separate ballot for governor, lieutenant-governor, representatives to congress, and for senators and representatives to a state legislature to convene at the capital on Monday, the 1st day of July next. It being provided and understood that the election of all officers can only be valid by the adoption of the constitution by the people, and otherwise null and void; and that all action of the governor, lieutenant-governor, and of the legislature shall remain inoperative until New Mexico be admitted as a state under said constitution, except such acts as may be necessary for the primary steps of organization and the presentation of said constitution properly before the congress of the United States. The present government shall remain in full force until, by the action of congress, another shall be substituted”. At the election of June 20th, the constitution was adopted by a vote of 8,371 to 39; while Henry Connelly and Manuel Alvárez were elected governor and lieutenant-governor by a large majority over the opposing candidates, Vaca and St Vrain. William S. Messervy was chosen as representative to congress.

The newly elected legislature assembled at Santa Fé at the beginning of July, Alvarez acting as governor in the absence of Connelly. Francis A. Cunningham and Richard H. Weightman were elected United States senators; appointments were made; and elections for local officials were ordered for August. The intention at once became apparent to put the state government into immediate and full operation, without waiting for approval from Washington; to put an end to the existing régime, without regard to the conditions clearly expressed in Monroe’s proclamation. This led to a controversy, into the developments and merits of which it is not necessary for us to enter minutely. The military governor declared the election proclamation, and any others emanating from the new authorities, to be null and void, instructing prefects that “the state government of New Mexico has no legal existence, until New Mexico shall be admitted into the union as a state by the congress of the United States; and that, until otherwise determined by competent authority, the present government continues and will be sustained”. And this position he successfully maintained to the end, notwithstanding the protests and arguments of his adversaries, who rather forcibly cited as a precedent for Monroe the submission of Riley in California under similar circumstances.

Respecting the civil status of the newly acquired territories after the treaty and before congressional action, there were substantially three theories, in some phases tolerably distinct, in others perplexingly interlaced. First, that the treaty put an end to the Mexican system and to the temporary system of the military regime, leaving no government at all, but a right on the part of congress to impose a government, and on the part of the people, pending congressional action, to organize one for themselves. This was the settlers’ theory. Second, that the laws of New Mexico, that is, the Mexican laws, not inconsistent with the constitution and treaties of the United States, were still in force, and must still continue in force till changed by competent authority; that is, by that of congress; meanwhile the military commandant was civil governor. This was the position assumed for a time by Governor Riley of California. Third, that the temporary system of the military interregnum, virtually the Mexican law as modified by necessity, remained in force as a de facto government with the consent of the people, a consent presumed as an alternative of a state of anarchy, and could be changed only by congress. This theory, in a practical sense not differing much from the second, was that held by the administration at Washington, and inculcated in various instructions to officers in New Mexico and California, and it was virtually the one maintained to the end in the former territory. Respecting the merits of these conflicting theories no final decision was ever rendered by competent authority. In a practical sense, most differences were slight. No one seems ever to have seriously questioned the right of the people to organize a government and submit it to congress for approval. The administration at first simply advised them to submit to the de facto government resting on their presumed consent, but a later administration favored the withdrawal of that consent and the application for admission as states. In both sections of the new territory this was done. As to the real status of the new governments as organized before approval or disapproval by congress, the only important practical question at issue, there was no decision. Riley in California, under instructions from Washington, though expressing grave doubts on the legality of this course, surrendered his civil authority, and permitted the new government to go at once into operation, as indeed he had promised to do in his order for the election; this being in a sense approved by the admission of California as a state. Monroe in New Mexico, more consistently but also under instructions, inserted in his election order a condition which was subsequently enforced. The people as represented by Alvarez made out a very plausible case, but the Washington plans must not be disturbed, and any change from a state government in full operation to a territorial system might have been awkward. For it must be understood that the whole matter was manipulated by a few men at Santa Fé. In California, the gold-seeking new-comers included a multitude of politicians, with a right smart sprinkling of men who believed themselves statesman, so that there was a strong public sentiment on various matters; but in New Mexico the masses took little or no interest in theories as to civil government. They had a degree of prejudice against the existing military rule, and partially realized the desirability of a permanent civil system; but the various conventions and petitions and plans in no sense emanated from the New Mexicans, being the work of a few Americans who acted for their own personal interest or that of their party or section in the states, and aroused popular enthusiasm only slightly by false appeals to native fears—notably that of Texan encroachment. A few of those politicians thought they saw an opportunity to serve themselves by interfering with the plan and putting the state government into immediate operation, as had been done in California; but their attempt was not successful.

Turning from Santa Fé to Washington, I find it by no means necessary to follow congressional debates, or even to chronicle the many successive measures proposed for the government of the new territories. Even a brief resume would extend far beyond the space at my disposal here, and the subject does not properly belong to New Mexican history at all. Somewhat more attention is given to it in other volumes of this series on California; but the whole matter belongs to the great national controversy; and nothing that was done or left undone in New Mexico, nothing in the needs or wishes of the people, had any real weight in congress. The territory belonged to the United States, and the necessity, or at least propriety, of providing for it a regular system of government was obvious to all. Neither was the task in itself a difficult or complicated one. The south proposed simply to extend national laws over the new territories by the organization of territorial governments. This was on its face a natural and proper course, and under ordinary circumstances all details might have been readily arranged. But a controlling element in the north refused to admit the territories under any system, except with conditions prohibiting slavery. The south had made the war expressly to gain new southern territory, and consequent extension of southern power in the national councils. The north had opposed the war mainly because of the geographic position of the territory to be acquired. This opposition had failed, as had the attempt to make the acqui­sition of territory conditional on the Wilmot proviso prohibiting slavery; but now the north was stronger and more fully aroused, and was resolved to take a firm stand against the extension of the peculiar institution. Southerners maintained their right under the constitution of holding slaves in the territories, though many doubted that any considerable portion of the country in question would naturally become in the end slave territory; they held, moreover, that if there was any doubt respecting their position, or respecting particular points—such as the effect of old Mexican laws abolishing slavery—the question should be decided by the courts; they favored compromise founded on mutual concessions, such as the admission of free and slave states in equal numbers, or a geographic line like that of the Missouri compromise; and they protested against an aggressive and offensive policy on the part of the northerners, who would listen to no compromise, and would give southern institutions no standing whatever in the newly acquired domain. And indeed, the northern position was radically aggressive; but if on the face of the matter and on the points immediately at issue there was a degree of unfairness, it was believed to be justified by the political trickery on the other side that had led to the present complication, by the irrepressible nature of the great sectional conflict that had begun, and especially by the great moral question at issue between slavery and freedom. The fight in congress was a long and bitter one, most ably fought on both sides; but, as I have said, the record of its details and the discussion of its merits do not belong in this work.

There was, however, one phase of this controversy that did directly affect New Mexico, and in which her people took a real interest, though their wishes, had very little weight in congress; and this was the question of eastern boundary. As we have seen, Texas had claimed since 1836 the Río Grande from its mouth to its source as her western bound, relying, so far as it was deemed necessary to rely on anything but repeated asseverations, on the treaty signed by Santa Anna as a prisoner—a treaty never confirmed but always repudiated by Mexico, and never entitled to the slightest consideration from any point of view. For two centuries and a half New Mexico had been ruled continuously as a Spanish and Mexican province, and Texas had never for a day exercised any sort of jurisdiction over any portion of the province, but had, on the contrary, been disastrously defeated in her only attempted invasion. As I have before stated or implied, the claim of Texas as against Mexico or New Mexico never had any real foundation in fact or justice. But against the United States after the treaty of 1848, the claim assumed in some respects a different aspect. In annexing Texas the United States had in a sense taken her side in the boundary dispute against Mexico; and they had still more definitely assumed that ground by regarding the crossing of the Río Grande by the Mexicans as an invasion and declaration of war. Again during the military occupation, while from motives of policy the Texan claim was virtually ignored by Kearny and his successors, yet in reply to the complaints, or inquiries, of Texas, the president explained that the civil government organized as a temporary expedient at Santa Fé was by no means to be considered as interfering with the ultimate rights of Texas; and the military governor was a little later instructed definitely not to interfere with the exercise of Texan authority east of the Río Grande. Thus while the administration gradually assumed the ground that there was a question to be settled by congress and the state, yet in an important sense the national government was committed to the justice of the Texan claim. Meanwhile the Texans at home and at Washington constantly asserted their claim with an earnestness that almost leads the reader to think they really believed it a just one; and the state had also contracted a debt, based on the ‘full extent’ of its domain, so that the interests and rights of ‘innocent third parties’ became involved. To dismember New Mexico would be an outrage; still, something was due to Texas.

I find no very definite record of what occurred in this connection at Santa Fé; but it appears that the Texan legislature went so far as to organize a county government for New Mexico, to give that county a right to one representative, to pass acts regulating the militia, to establish a judicial circuit, and to appoint a judge to hold court in the Rio Grande valley. Says Davis: “Early in the spring of 1850 Texas sent a commissioner, Robert S. Neighbors, into New Mexico, with instructions to divide the country east of the Rio del Norte into several counties of that state, and to hold elections in them for county officers. Upon the mission of Neighbors being known, it was loudly denounced in public meetings throughout the territory, and a very strong opposition was raised against him and the objects he had in view. He issued a proclamation fixing time and places for an election, but nobody went to the polls, and the matter fell to the ground. In congress, while Texan representatives never lost an opportunity of declaiming on the unquestionable validity of their claim, there was much difference of opinion, even among southern members, on its original merits; but in this, as in every phase of the whole matter, all was merged in the slavery issue. Texas was a slave state, and eastern New Mexico, if decided to be a part of Texas, would be an immense territory gained at once for the south, whatever might be the final result farther west. This was the only real strength of the Texan claim in congress beyond the zealous efforts of the Texans themselves, among whom, however, as we shall see, a new motive soon became potent in the matter. This phase of the slavery question also caused northern members to favor a territorial government in New Mexico, as a choice of evils, even if slavery could not be prohibited.

Early in 1850 the great battle in congress reached its height, and so hot and bitter had the struggle become that conservative leaders on both sides were seriously alarmed at the possibility of a sectional conflict, which might disrupt the union. Therefore the idea of compromise gradually gained ground, even among northern members. A new and wonderful industrial development and growth of population, resulting from the discovery of gold, had not only fitted California for immediate statehood, but had made it apparent that slavery could never exist in the north, though the south still made a struggle for a possible slave state of the future in southern California. In Texas, the idea of relinquishing the claim to New Mexico for a money consideration from the United States rapidly grew in favor, being powerfully supported at Washington by a lobby representing the state creditors. In January Mr Clay introduced in the senate a series of compromise resolutions, the contents of which, in variously modified forms, afforded matter for a complicated and exciting debate of six months. These resolutions were not adopted, and various compromise bills, embodying provisions of a somewhat similar nature, were, as a whole, defeated; but nevertheless the ideas involved became firmly rooted, and enough conservative votes on each side were gained to adopt separately the compromise meas­ures, which became laws in September.

By this action the south gained a more satisfactory fugitive slave law than had before existed; while the north secured the prohibition of slave trade in the District of Columbia. California was admitted as a free state. New Mexico and Utah, embracing all the rest of the newly acquired domain, were admitted as territories, without conditions prohibiting slavery. And finally, Texas was paid $10,000,000, about half of which amount may be regarded as having gone to pay for her New Mexican claim. Thus each portion of the region wrested from Mexico got the government best suited to its condition, and so far as local interests, rights, and needs were concerned, the solution was eminently a satisfactory one. It was hardly less so as a temporary compromise of the great sectional struggle. The south won the main point at issue by defeating all measures designed to prohibit slavery in the territories, but lost a possible chance of making southern California a slave state; while the north, though forced to recede from its original uncompromising position, gained a free state, and made no permanent concession to slavery, since the great question of the right to hold slaves in the territories was left open—to be fought out, to the ultimate triumph of freedom, in the greatest war of modern times.

The senate passed the Texas boundary bill on the 7th, and the bill providing a territorial government for New Mexico on the 15th of August; the two bills were joined by the house, came back to the senate on September 9th, and were signed by the president on the same day. The act was not, however, to go into effect until the general assembly of Texas should have formally accepted the boundary, which was done on the 25th of November. The territory, as thus organized in 1850, included substantially the New Mexico and Arizona of later years, with a small part of Colorado. Congress reserved the right to divide the territory, or to attach any portion of it to any other territory or state. When admitted as a state, New Mexico was to be received with or without slavery as her constitution might prescribe. The new government did not go into actual operation at Santa Fé until March 1851; and it may be noted here that a memorial of the legislature, received in congress after the passage of the territorial bill, excited some fears, real or pretended, of an attempt on the part of the north to admit the state after all; also that Senator-elect Weightman made his appearance, and vainly tried to collect his mileage of $2,000 on the plea, supported by several in the senate, that his position, so far as mileage was concerned, was identical with that of the senators from California.

The treaty brought within the limits of the United States about 120,000 Indians as was estimated at the time, over one fourth of which number were in New Mexico, or a still greater proportion if all on the frontiers were included. The government had assumed the obligation of protecting the province from the incursions of hostile tribes, an obligation it could by no means fulfil, especially in the first years. The military force was altogether inadequate, the local authorities had little skill or experience, and the failure of the Americans was even more complete than that of the Mexicans in earlier times. Never had the condition of the province in this respect been worse than in 1848-50. Doubtless this unfortunate state of things was due largely to unavoidable results of the late war, to the presence and acts of the Missouri volunteers in 1846-7, to delays in substituting a proper force of regulars in 1848-9, and especially to bitterness, dissensions, and lack of confidence between the Americans and Mexicans growing out of the revolt of 1847. The Navajos and Apaches were as always the country’s chief terror, and their raids for murder and plunder were unceasing. The Navajos, who were rich and prosperous at home as well as valiant warriors, made the stealing of live-stock a regular business by which to increase their wealth, openly declaring that they would long ago have exterminated the Mexicans had it not been deemed more profitable to use them as shepherds. The Apaches came to regard their raids as a legitimate occupation, their only means of gaining a livelihood; and they were generally on friendly terms with a disreputable gang of Mexican and American traders, through whom they carried on a profitable trade in stolen articles, including women and children captured in the Sonora towns, they being sometimes at peace with Chihuahua, and drawing regular supplies at Janos. The pueblo Indians were peaceable and well disposed toward the Americans, but their status involved many perplexing problems to be solved under conditions that were far from favorable.

James S. Calhoun arrived at Santa Fé in July 1849, with a commission as Indian agent for the territory. He seems to have been a zealous and intelligent official, who, while he could do little toward putting an end to the depredations of savages, performed well his duty of reporting to the government the exact state of affairs, and the measures and means required for the country’s protection. His correspondence of 1849-51 contains a large amount of valuable information respecting the numbers and disposition of the different tribes, advice as to the appointment of subagents and stationing of garrisons, earnest appeals on the most urgent necessity of immediately increasing the military force, and a mention of many events of Indian warfare. Besides Calhoun’s correspondence the records on this subject, if far from complete, are somewhat voluminous, and not without interest; but it is almost impossible to make any adequate use of them here, since I have no space for a chronologic catalogue of depredations and resulting campaigns. Indeed, the history of Indian warfare in these countries for centuries is made up of items, for all of which one record might almost suffice if blanks were left to be filled in with dates, names, and localities. Watching for an opportunity, the savages attack some rancho or settlement, kill few or many of the inhabitants, according to the resistance offered, and run off as many stolen animals as possible. The alarm is given at the nearest post, and a party of regulars, generally reinforced by volunteers, sets out in pursuit. Often the savages cannot be overtaken before the horses of the pursuers are worn out or their supplies exhausted. If overtaken, they lose part or all of their plunder, and generally a few lives; but they also kill a few soldiers, and charge the difference to profit and loss, hoping for better luck next time. Occasionally, by a combined movement of troops, or a rapid succession of movements in some particular direction, a tribe is forced to make a treaty, which is observed as long as the interest of the Indians seems to require it. It must be added that outrage and bad faith were by no means confined to the Indians; but were frequent on both sides, so far as individuals and small parties were concerned, neither side having to go far back for plausible pretexts. The Americans had better arms than the Mexicans of earlier times, and there was less red tape in the fitting-out of their expeditions; but for some years they had less experience in this kind of warfare, their movements were slower and more in accordance with military rules, they did not know the country so well, and their general success, as compared with that of their predecessors, was not remarkable.

Colonel Doniphan’s treaty with the Navajos in 1846, a treaty which had no effect whatever, has been noted in the preceding chapter. Colonel Newby made a similar expedition and treaty in 1848. In 1849 Major Washington repeated the operation, starting from Jemes on August 22d with 350 men, and being accompanied by Indian-agent Calhoun. On the 30th at Tunicha several hundred Navajos were met who professed a willingness to submit to the United States, attributing recent depredations to bad and uncontrollable men of their tribe. They gave up some animals and began the negotiation of a treaty; but there was a dispute about a horse, and when Washington ordered its seizure the Indians ran away and were fired at, losing several men, including their great chief Narbona. On the 6th of September the army reached the Chelly Canyon, where on the 9th a treaty of ‘lasting peace’ was signed. The Indians gave up three captives and some property, agreeing to surrender the rest at Jemes a month later. The return march was by way of Zuñi, Laguna, and Alburquerque. The Navajos, it is needless to add, did not appear at Jemes as agreed, but they had a good excuse, having been informed, as they said, by Mexican traders—after they had collected the plunder and set out for the rendezvous—that the Americans were coming to attack them. Among the most notable of Indian outrages was the killing of White and party of seven or eight at Point of Rocks on the way from the states to Santa Fé, in October 1849. Mrs White and daughter of ten years were at first spared by the Apaches, but the former was soon killed. Calhoun made every possible effort, and congress voted $1,500, to effect the girls rescue, but without success.

The annals of New Mexico in the early years of American occupation would not be complete without mention of the geographical and other scientific information about the country acquired and published at this period—or rather of the various explorations by which this information was gained and of the books where it may be found, for obviously my space will permit nothing more. A. Wislizenus left Independence in May 1846, with Speyer’s trading caravan, and from Santa Fé went to El Paso and Chihuahua, finally joining Doniphan’s army as physician. His tour was mainly scientific in its purposes, and the resulting memoir contains a considerable amount of original and valuable data on New Mexico as well as the regions farther south. In all the narratives that have been cited on the conquest and following events, there is more or less matter of a descriptive nature, but particularly in Emory’s diary of the march from Fort Leavenworth by Bent’s Fort to Santa Fé and thence down the Río Grande and to California by the Gila. Captain Abraham P. Johnston’s printed journal also covered the march from Santa Fé to the California frontier. Philip St George Cooke described the march to Santa Fé and the later one to California, in which, with the Mormon Battalion, he opened a wagon-road by a route farther south than Kearny’s. His writings, however, contain somewhat less of scientific description, if more of philosophy, than those of the other officers. Lieutenant J. W. Albert, of the topographical engineers, was left ill at Bent’s Fort by Kearny end Emory at the end of July, 1846. The first part of his report includes the results of his observations at the fort, on the journey to New Mexico, and in the vicinity of Santa Fé, where he arrived on the 27th of September. Kearny had left instructions for a survey of the country to be made by Albert and Peck, which was made between October 8th and the 23d of December, with results constituting the second part of the report. The route was south-westward to the junction of the Jemes and Río Grande, San Felipe, Santo Domingo, and Santa Ana being visited; thence down the main river past Alburquerque, and westward to the Puerco and to Cebolleta. After exploring the Laguna group of pueblos, including Acoma, they returned to the Río Grande and went down to the Isleta region, and eastward to Chilili and Tajique, thence southward to Quarra and Abó, and back to the river, down which they went to Valverde and returned to Santa Fé. The third part of the report is the diary of the return from New Mexico to Fort Leavenworth, December 28th to March 1st. The author added to his text valuable engravings of towns, ruins, landscapes, and native types; and he also gave attention to the fauna and flora of the country, and to native vocabularies and traditions with other ethnographic matter, producing on the whole a most excellent report.

The campaign of Doniphan and the others against the Navajos, though involving the first American exploration of a broad region, has left in print but little of geographic or descriptive value; and the same may be said of the campaigns resulting from the insurrection of 1847. In this connection may be mentioned a report of Thomas Fitzpatrick, describing a trip from Fort Leavenworth to Santa Fé in the summer of 1847, though it is mainly devoted to Indian affairs. For 1848 we find very little of recorded exploration, but may note the narrative of an overland trip with Kit Carson from Los Angeles to Taos and Santa Fé, the author being perhaps Lieutenant Brewerton of Stephenson’s regiment, and the story of slight value. It was also in the winter of 1848-9 that Captain Fremont, in his fourth exploration, attempting to cross the mountains at the head of the Río Grande, in what is now Colorado, met his great disaster, attributed by him to the incompetence of his guide, the famous Bill Williams, losing eleven of his men by cold and starvation. With the rest he succeeded in reaching Taos, where the company was broken up, and himself proceeded early in 1849 to California by a southern over­land route. In 1849-50 the reports of Calhoun, the Indian agent, as already cited, contained a limited amount of general information not pertaining directly to the author’s special subject; and the same may be said of the correspondence of governors Washington and Monroe, and of other officials in the same years. In April 1849, Lieutenant James H. Simpson made an exploring tour from Fort Smith, Arkansas, westward to Santa Fé; and later in the year Captain Marcy, coming from Fort Smith by the same route, went down the river to Doña Ana, and thence crossed an unexplored country eastward to Preston, Texas. Put by far the most notable and valuable of the exploration records to be mentioned in this connection is that of Lieutenant Simpson’s tour to the Navajo country and Chelly Canyon, returning by way of Zuñi. The author accompanied Governor Washington’s ex­pedition of 1849, and his journal is filled with the most interesting and valuable descriptions of physical features of the country, towns, natives, and relics of antiquity, being illustrated with excellent drawings, which are especially important as showing the wonderful ruins of the Chaco and Chelly and the records at Inscription Rock. It should be added that in 1849-50 the California immigrants crossed New Mexico in considerable numbers, both by the old Santa Fé trail and by the new southern routes.

 

THE BOUNDARY QUESTION.

 

 

The survey of a boundary line between the United States and Mexico under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo is properly noticed here, so far as it affects New Mexico, though it extends chronologically beyond the limits of the chapter. In the west, from the Pacific to the Colorado the line was surveyed before February 1.850. In November of the same year the new commissioner, John Russell Bartlett, arrived with his party at El Paso, having crossed Texas from the coast; General Pedro García Conde, the Mexican commissioner, soon made his appearance; and before the end of the year several meetings were held at which the initial point and other preliminaries were decided. Active operations in the field began early in 1851; the American party had its headquarters for several months at the Santa Rita copper mines, Colonel Craig commanding an escort of 85 men; and though there were some vexatious delays and controversies, resulting in part from the tardy arrival of Gray and Graham, by September the region from El Paso to the San Pedro had been explored and the boundary line partly surveyed—to its full extent, indeed, by the Mexicans. Then Bartlett went to Sonora and California, returning east to publish his narrative in 1854. Lieutenant Whipple went down the Gila; García Conde died in Sonora; and the survey was suspended for a time, to be resumed and completed, on the Río Grande at least, in 1852-3 by Robert H. Campbell as commissioner and W. H. Emory as astronomer and surveyor. Particulars, whether of exploration or adventure, can of course find no place here. Still less is it possible or necessary to chronicle the complicated series of quarrels between Bartlett, McClellan, Graham, Gray, and others, which seriously retarded practical operations, and the record of which fills the larger part of two volumes published by the government. There was, however, one question respecting the boundary itself that merits further notice. By the terms of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, the line was to follow the Rio Grande up “to the point where it strikes the southern boundary of New Mexico; thence westward along the whole southern boundary of New Mexico (which runs north of the town called Paso) to its western termination; thence northward along the western line of New Mexico until it intersects the first branch of the river Gila (or if it should not intersect any branch of that river, then to the point on the said line nearest to such branch, and thence in a direct line to the same; thence down the middle of said branch and said river until it empties into the Rio Colorado”. The southern boundary of New Mexico had indeed been somewhat definitely fixed at one point as just above El Paso, leaving that town in Chihuahua; but I have found no evidence that any western boundary had ever been fixed at all, or even thought of. There may have been, however, a kind of tacit agreement, as on a matter of no practical importance, that the line between Chihuahua and Sonora, that is, a line between Janos and Fronteras in about longitude 108° 30', extended northward indefinitely. In no other sense had New Mexico a western boundary; and in equity, had the treaty gone no further, this should have been the line adopted. But the treaty contained an additional provision that “the southern and western limits of New Mexico, mentioned in this article, are those laid down in” Disturnell’s map of Mexico, edition of New York, 1847. This map shows an irregular dotted line extending westward from the river just above El Paso about 180 miles, and thence northward. To locate this line was therefore the only duty of the boundary commission; but in locating it, should its latitude and longitude be considered, or its distance north of El Paso and west of the Rio Grande? This was the question, and an important one, for on the treaty map the town was some 30 minutes too far north and the river some two degrees and a half too far west. The complication will be more clearly understood from the appended map. García Conde of course claimed the determination by parallels as most favorable to his nation, while Bartlett for like reasons favored the other basis of settlement. I think there can be no doubt that the latter was technically in the right; but he yielded one point by consenting to fix the initial monument in latitude 32° 22' on the river; while the Mexican commissioner yielded the other by consenting to the extension of the line 180 miles westward from the river. Bartlett’s concession was severely criticised; but if his solution of the difficulty is regarded as a compromise it was a wise one, since the territory gained would have been more valuable than that lost. But Bartlett’s line is said to have been rejected by his government and a new line adopted on latitude 31° 54' 40" from the Río Grande west to longitude 109° 37', and on that meridian north to the Santo Domingo River, though I have not been able to find the record of such an agreement or survey.

Under the treaty, citizens of New Mexico might leave the territory or remain either as citizens of the United States or of Mexico, but such as should not within one year make known their choice were to become citizens of the United States. Although I find no very definite records on the subject, it appears that many declared their intention of retaining their Mexican nationality, some of these departing and others formally withdrawing the declaration, while of those who departed some came back. It was estimated that in 1848-9 the territory thus lost only about 1,200, though in 1850 a considerable number of wealthy hacendados withdrew with their peones and possessions to Chihuahua. The Mexican government made an appropriation to aid its migrating citizens, and in 1849 Padre Ramón Ortiz and Manuel Armendariz were sent as commissioners to promote the movement. Ortiz claimed that in the first county visited, that of San Miguel del Vado, 900 out of 1,000 families eagerly agreed to go, and that the whole number of emigrants was likely to reach 80,000; but that the territorial authorities, frightened at the prospect, threw obstacles in the way. For this reason, or because of financial difficulties, or because the people became on reflection less desirous of quitting the land of their birth—to say nothing of the possibility that the honest presbítero greatly exaggerated the original enthusiasm—very little was actually accomplished.

 

CHAPTER XIX.

ANNALS OF ARIZONA

1846-1854.