In 1846 the United States began a war against Mexico for the acquisition of territory. This war and its causes are treated fully in other parts of this series devoted to the history of Mexico, of Texas, and of California. New Mexico and Arizona, except in the mere fact of being parts of the territory to be acquired, figured very slightly, if at all, in the preliminaries of the proposed conquest. There was, it is true, a claim that Texas extended south and west to the Rio Grande, by which shallow pretence the government of the northern republic managed to afford some comfort to the national conscience, on the plea that the defence of this ‘disputed’ tract by Mexico was the first act of war. It should be remarked, however, that the field of the first hostilities—of the Mexican invasion!—was not on the New Mexican frontier, but farther south-east.

War, or its ‘existence’, having been declared, an army of the west was organized at Fort Leavenworth in June. Its commander was Colonel Stephen W. Kearny, its mission the occupation of the broad territory stretching from New Mexico to California, and also if practicable cooperation with other branches of the army in operations farther south. The advance division of this force consisted of 300 regulars of the first United States dragoons under Major Edwin V. Sumner, a regiment of mounted volunteers called out by Governor Edwards of Missouri for this campaign, and commanded by Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, and five additional companies of volunteers, including one of infant, and two of light artillery, or a total of nearly 1,700 men. The second, or reserve division, comprised another regiment of Missouri volunteers under Colonel Sterling Price, a battalion of four companies under Lieutenant-colonel Willock, and the Mormon Battalion, in all about 1,800 men. The advance, or army of conquest, left Fort Leavenworth late in June; the long supply train of over 1,000 mules was soon augmented by the 400 wagons of the annual Santa Fe caravan; and all the companies, except the artillery, were encamped at the beginning of August near Bent’s Fort on the Arkansas, after a tedious but uneventful march of four companies had made an unsuccessful attempt to overtake a party of traders believed to have in their posses­sion arms and ammunition for the enemy.

From Bent’s Fort, Lieutenant Decourcy was sent with twenty men to Taos to learn the disposition of the people, rejoining the army later with some prisoners and a report that resistance might be expected at every point. Similar reports had previously been received from Major Howard and the mountaineer Fitzpatrick. From Bent’s Fort, also, Captain Cooke, with twelve picked men, was sent in advance, nominally as a kind of ambassador to treat with Governor Armijo for the peaceful submission of eastern New Mexico, but really to escort James Magoffin, the veritable ambassador, intrusted with a secret mission at Santa Fe. To send an army of 1,700 men, mainly composed of undisciplined volunteers, on a march of a thousand miles over a desert occupied by hostile savages, to conquer, by force of arms, so populous an interior province, and one so well defended, at least by nature, as New Mexico, was on its face a very hazardous enterprise. It was a radically different matter from the proposed occupation by naval forces of a coast province like California. In the annals of the latter country we have seen, however, what agencies were relied on by the government, acting through Consul Larkin as a confidential agent, to insure a bloodless victory, though the success of the plan was seriously impaired by the blundering and criminal disobedience of another and subordinate agent. These complications of the farthest west are now well known in every particular. That the policy respecting New Mexico was similar in its general features, there can be no doubt, though most details have never come to light. During the past years, the Santa Fe traders, both American and Mexican, had done much to make the condition and disposition of each people well known to the other, to convince the New Mexicans how futile must be any attempt to resist the United States, and the Americans how easy would be the occupation of Santa Fé. Doubtless, certain prominent traders had been at work virtually as secret agents of the government at Washington, which from their reports had come to believe that no serious opposition was to be expected to the change of flag. It was understood that the New Mexicans, after long years of neglect and so-called oppression, had retained but a nominal allegiance to Mexico; that many influential citizens, from motives of personal interest as traders or land-owners, desired the downfall of Mexican rule; that many others were convinced that resistance would be useless, and more than half convinced that the change would be a benefit; that prominent officials were already disposed, or might be influenced by certain appeals to their love of gain, or ambition for office, to submit without a struggle to the inevitable; that the masses might be controlled for the most part through the leaders; and that finally, any opposition based on pride, patriotism, or prejudice of race or religion, must be more than counterbalanced by lack of unity, of leaders, of arms, and other resources. Thus Kearny's army of the west was sent to occupy, not literally to conquer, New Mexico. Nevertheless, the enterprise was one attended with many risks.

Magoffin, or Don Santiago, was an Irish Kentuckian, long in the Santa Fe trade, a man of wealth, with unlimited capacity for drinking wine and making friends, speaking the Spanish language, and on friendly terms with most of the leading: men in New Mexico and Chihuahua. At Washington he was introduced by Senator Benton to the president and secretary of war, and at the request of the three agreed to accompany the expedition, professing his ability to prevent any armed resistance on the part of Governor Armijo and his officers. Cooke’s party, without adventures requiring notice, arrived the 12th of August at Santa Fé, where he was hospitably received by Armijo, who, although he seemed to think that the approach of the army was rather sudden and rapid, concluded to send a commissioner in the person of Dr Connelly, with whom the captain set out next day on his return to meet the army. Meanwhile, according to Benton, our only authority, and as there is perhaps no reason to doubt, Magoffin easily prevailed on the governor to promise that no defence should be made at Apache Canon, a point on the approach to Santa Fe which might have been held by a small force. He had more difficulty with Archuleta, the second in command, but by appealing to his ambition, and suggesting that by a pronunciamiento he might secure for himself western New Mexico, on which Kearny had no designs, he at length overcame that officer's patriotic objections, and thus secured an open road for the army.

Unfortunately we have no definite information from New Mexican sources respecting Armijo’s preparations, real or pretended, for defence; and the fragmentary rumors that found their way into current narratives are meagre, contradictory, and of no value. The governor understood perfectly his inability to make any effective resistance; and all that he did in that direction was with a view merely to ‘save his responsibility’ as a Mexican officer, even if he did not, as is probable, definitely resolve and promise not to fight. The people were called upon, as usual in such cases, to rise and repel the invader; and a considerable force of militia was organized and joined the two or three hundred soldiers of the army. These auxili­aries were, however, but half in earnest and most inadequately armed. If any considerable portion of them or their officers ever thought seriously of fighting the Americans, their patriotic zeal rapidly disappeared as the numbers and armament of the invaders became more clearly known from returning scouts, who, in many instances, were captured and released by Kearny. With perhaps 2,000 men—though Ameri­can reports double the number—Armijo seems to have marched out to Apache Canon with the avowed intention of meeting the enemy; but on the last day, in consequence of differences of opinion between the general and his officers, the former dismissed the auxiliaries to their homes, and with his presidial troops retreated to the south by way of Galisteo, near which point he left his cannon. Armijo was blamed by the many who were hostile to the invaders and who were ashamed to see their country thus surrendered without a struggle. Doubtless the governor, had he desired it, might have waged a guerilla warfare that would have given the foe much trouble; and there is much cause to believe that his reason for not doing so was not a praiseworthy desire to prevent the useless shedding of his subjects’ blood.

Kearny’s army left Bent’s Fort on the 2d of August. The route was nearly identical with the later line of stage travel, and differed but slightly from that of the modern Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fé railroad. The march was a tedious one, there being many cases of fatal illness among the volunteers. Through some miscalculation or mismanagement of the supply trains, the men were on short rations for a larger part of the way; and it was besides a season of drought. The advance was in several divisions, by slightly different routes from day to day, in order to utilize the scanty water and grass. Fitzpatrick was the guide, Bobidoux the interpreter, while Bent commanded a company of spies. After the settlements were reached, American residents, such as Towle, Bonney, Wells, and Spry, were met, and gave information respecting the state of things at Santa Fé and Taos. Small parties of Mexican scouts were also frequently captured, or came voluntarily into camp, where they gave vague and contradictory accounts of Armijo’s preparations for defence, and whence, being set at liberty, they carried back exaggerated reports of the American force and cannon, with copies of Kearny’s proclamation. On the 14th, 15th, and 16th, respectively, the army reached Las Vegas, Tecolote, and San Miguel del Vado. At each of these places, Kearny—now brigadier-general by a commission received at Las Vegas—made a speech from a house­top, absolving the people from their allegiance to Armijo, and promising protection to the life, property, and religion of all who should peaceably submit to the new order of things; and the alcalde, and in some cases the militia officers of each town, being induced more or less willingly to take an oath of allegiance to the United States, were continued in office. A letter was received from Armijo, making known his purpose to come out to meet Kearny; but whether as friend or foe, the vague wording did not clearly indicate. Cooke and Connelly were met at Tecolote, but the message brought by the latter is not known to the chroniclers. Among the men and subordinate officers, there was an expectation of having to encounter from 2,000 to 10,000 foes in the mountain defile; but the general is said to have borne himself as coolly as if on parade, as indeed well he might, knowing how slight was the danger of a conflict. At San Miguel a Mexican officer was captured—Salazar, son of the officer with whom the Texans had to do in 1841—who reported the flight of Armijo. On the 17th the army passed the ruins of Pecos; and on the 18th, marching without the slightest opposition through the famous canon, the Americans entered Santa Fé at 6 p. m., being accorded a friendly reception by Juan B. Vigil, the acting governor. The flag of the United States was raised at sunset, and saluted with thirteen guns. General Kearny slept in the old palacio, and the army encamped on an adjoining eminence. Thus was the capital of New Mexico occupied without the shedding of blood.

On the day following his entry into the capital, General Kearny caused the people to be assembled in the plaza, where through an interpreter he made a speech. Then the acting governor, secretary, alcaldes, and other officials took the required oath of allegiance, Governor Vigil also delivering a brief address and reading the general’s earlier proclamation. The exercises were similar, if somewhat less hurried, to the earlier ones at Las Vegas and San Miguel. The New Mexicans as subjects of the United States from this time were assured of full protection for their lives, property, and religion, not only against American depredators, but against the Mexican nation, Governor Armijo, and their Indian foes. Three days later Kearny’s position was fully explained in the formal proclamation which is appended.

From the 9th for many days representatives of other towns, of the Indian pueblos, and in some cases of Navajo, Yuta, and even Apache bands, came to listen to the general’s explanations of United States policy, and to offer peaceful submission to his authority. Many among the ignorant populace had been led to believe that they would be robbed, outraged, or murdered by the Americanos; and many of a higher class had left the city with their families in fear of insults from a lawless soldiery; but these fears were to a considerable extent removed by the general’s words and acts, and many of the fugitives returned to their homes. A flag-staff to bear the stars and stripes was raised in the plaza. Captain Emory on the 19th selected a site for a fort, and four days later work was begun on Fort Marcy, an adobe structure commanding the city from an adjoining hill. The animals were sent to the region of Galisteo to a grazing camp guarded by a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Ruff. On the 23d and following Sundays the general and staff attended church; an express for the states was despatched on the 25th; and in the evening of the 27th Kearny gave a grand ball to officers and citizens. Minor military movements, such as the arrival of small parties that had lagged on the way and the stationing of local detachments, need not be noticed in detail. There were unfounded rumors of hostile preparations in the south, and that Colonel Ugarte was approaching with a Mexican force from Chihuahua, which caused Kearny to march down the river with nearly half his army. This tour extended to Tomé, occupied the time from the 2d to the 13th of September, and revealed no indications of hostility among the abajeños.

Back at Santa Fé, the general sent strong detachments under Major Gilpin and Lieutenant-colonel Jackson, who had succeeded Buff by election of the volunteers—to Abiquiú and Cebolleta on the Navajo frontier; and gave his attention to the organization of a civil government put in operation on the 22d of September. Then on the 25th, he set out on the inarch to California by the Gila route, with his 300 dragoons, two thirds of which number, however, were presently sent back, when Kit Carson was met with the inaccurate news that the conquest of California had already been accomplished. Orders left were to the effect that the Mormon Battalion should follow the general to California, and that Doniphan’s regi­ment, on the arrival of Price’s to take its place, should march south to join General Wool at Chihuahua. Among the volunteers of both regiments there was much sickness, caused to a considerable extent by indulgence in the various dissipations of the New Mexican metropolis. Some 300 of the Missourians are said to have been buried at Santa Fe. There was also a great scarcity of supplies, the commissary department of the army of the west being grossly mismanaged, as it appears. Provisions must be bought from fellow-citizens, not seized, as in an en­emy’s country; and even the money furnished the troops was not apparently of a kind that could be utilized, to say nothing of exorbitant prices. The men were profoundly disgusted with the country and its people, and their complaints were doubtless somewhat too highly colored. Moreover, the restraints of military life were irksome to the Missourians. They were willing to fight the Mexicans, but could not understand their obligation as soldiers to work on the fort, wear their coats under a hot sun, observe petty regulations, or obey orders against the propriety of which, as American citizens, they could present strong arguments. The popularity of the officers was therefore in inverse ratio to their knowledge and enforcement of discipline. Brawls and arrests for insubordination were of not infrequent occurrence. Yet amusements were not wanting, among which were theatrical performances by a company of military amateurs.

Colonel Price with his 2d Missouri volunteers ar­rived at Santa Fe about the 1st of October. The Mormon Battalion under Lieutenant Smith arrived in two divisions on the 9th and 12th. On account of illness about 150 of the men with most of the families were detached and sent to winter at Pueblo, in what was later Colorado, from which point they found their way the next year to Salt Lake. The rest of the battalion, 340 strong, was put under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Cooke, and started on the 19th to follow Kearny and open a wagon-road across the continent. Meeting the returning dragoons on the 23d and turning off from the Bio Grande November 13th, they found it impracticable to find a way for their wagons toward the west, and accordingly directed their course farther southward to the San Bernardino rancho on the later frontier, and thence marched by Tucson to Kearny’s route on the Gila. The adventures of the battalion from its organization pertain to the history of California rather than to that of New Mexico.

Orders came back from Kearny that Doniphan before starting for Chihuahua should undertake a campaign in the Navajo country. In September, as we have seen, Lieutenant-colonel Jackson with three companies had been sent to Cebolleta on the frontier; and from this point, apparently before Kearny’s last orders were known, Captain Reid, with thirty volunteers and a chief called Sandoval as guide, starting the 20th of October, had in twenty days made a somewhat remarkable entry far to the west and north into the heart of the Navajo country. He met the head chief Narbona, found the Indians well disposed toward the Americans, made arrangements for a treaty council at Santa Fe, and returned to Cebolleta. Major Gilpin, who had been stationed at Abiquiú in September, had made an expedition into the Yuta country, and had brought some 60 leading men of that nation to Santa Fé, where a treaty was made on October 13th. Under the new orders, Gilpin left Abiquiú on the 22d with his two companies, reinforced by 65 pueblo and Mexican allies; went up the Chama, crossed to the San Juan, descended that river, reached the Chelly canons, thence apparently turned eastward and by way of the Laguna Colorada reached a place called Ojo del Oso, or Bear Spring, on the 20th of November. Meanwhile Doniphan left Santa Fé on October 26th, but from Albuquerque sent most of his force down the river to Valverde to protect the caravan of traders and make preparations for the march to Chihuahua. With a small party he then went to Covero, whither Jackson had moved his force from Cebolleta. From this point, having received a despatch from Gilpin on the San Juan, and sent in reply orders to assemble as many Navajos as possible at Ojo del Oso, Doniphan with Jackson and 150 men started on the 15th toward the headwaters of the Puerco and thence north-westward, toiling through the deep snows and over the mountains, and joining Major Gilpin on the 21st. There were about 500 Navajos present, including the chiefs of many bands. They professed friendship and admiration for the Americans, but had much difficulty in comprehending why the new-comers should interfere with their warfare against the detested Mexicans. At last, however, after a day of speech-making, they consented to a treaty, which was formally signed on the 22d by Doniphan, Jackson, and Gilpin on the one side, and fourteen chieftains on the other. Its terms included “a firm and lasting peace” between the Navajos and Americans—the latter to include New Mexicans and Pueblos; mutual free trade, including visits for trading purposes; mutual restoration of all captives, and of all property taken since the 18th of August. Gifts were exchanged, and then the parties separated. The Americans returned by different routes, one division with the three regimental officers and a few native chieftains going by way of Zuñi, where on the 26th a treaty was concluded between the Zunis and Navajos. All were reunited at Valverde about December 12th. The treaties, like dozens of earlier ones with the same tribes, had but slight practical effect; but the journals of the different branches of this complicated campaign if extant would doubtless furnish many interesting and valuable items of geographical information.

Before the colonel’s return from the Navajo campaign James Magoffin with Dr Connelly and a few others ventured southward, but were arrested at El Paso and carried as prisoners to Chihuahua; the traders also started in advance of the army, by which they were overtaken on the way y and a company of volun­teers known as the Chihuahua Bangers left Santa Fé on December 1st under Captain Hudson, with the idea of opening communication with General Wool, but they also turned back to join the army before reaching El Paso. Finally Doniphan’s army of about 900 men left Valverde in three divisions on the 14th, 16th, and 19th of December. After passing the Jornada del Muerto all were reunited on the 22d at Dona Ana, including Hudson’s company and the traders. Two Mexican scouts were killed with one bullet on the 24th; and at El Bracito, some 30 miles below Doña Ana, on Christmas afternoon a force of the enemy, estimated at about 600 regulars—Vera Cruz dragoons, with cavalry and infantry from Chihuahua—and 500 El Paso militia, was encountered. These troops, commanded by an officer named Ponce de Leon, made a charge upon the Americans, but being met by a volley of rifle bullets at short range were forced to retreat, pursued for a short distance, and losing perhaps thirty men killed. No further opposition was encountered, and on December 27th, Doni­phan took possession of El Paso, the citizens having come out to meet him with a white flag, offering surrender and asking for clemency and protection. After a stay of forty-two days, and being reinforced by 117 men of the artillery battalion under Clark and Weightman from Santa Fé, the army marched on February 8, 1847, for Chihuahua, which city they occupied at the beginning of March, after a brilliant victory over four times their own number of Mexican troops at Sacramento. General Wool was not here, and after holding the town about two months to await orders and protect the traders in the sale of their goods, Doniphan marched on to Saltillo, presently returning by water via New Orleans to Missouri as the time of the volunteers had expired. The expedition of the regiment had been a remarkable one, in some respects almost without parallel, though its most brilliant features do not pertain directly to the annals of New Mexico.

General Kearny’s original instructions of June 3, 1846, from the secretary of war, included the following: “Should you conquer and take possession of New Mexico and California, or considerable places in either, you will establish temporary civil governments therein—abolishing all arbitrary restrictions that may exist, so far as it may be done with safety. In performing this duty it would be wise and prudent to continue in their employment all such of the existing officers as are known to be friendly to the United States, and will take the oath of allegiance to them. You may assure the people of these provinces that it is the wish and design of the United States to provide for them a free government with the least possible delay, similar to that which exists in our territories. They will then be called upon to exercise the rights of free men in electing their own representatives to the territorial legislature. It is foreseen that what relates to the civil government will be a difficult and unpleasant part of your duty, and much must necessarily be left to your own discretion. In your whole conduct you will act in such a manner as best to conciliate the inhabitants, and render them friendly to the United States”. Kearny’s proclamation of August 22d, more or less in accordance with these instructions, though going in certain respects far beyond their letter, has already been presented in this chapter. From the first day of occupation, Captain Waldo, of the volunteers, was set at work translating all the Spanish and Mexican laws that could be found at Santa Fé; while Colonel Doniphan, a lawyer by profession, aided by Willard P. Hall—elected to congress during this absence—busied himself with the preparation of a code of laws founded in part on Waldo’s fragmentary translations, but mainly on the laws of Missouri and Texas. Finally, on the 22d of September, the general published this code—still in force in New Mexico down to 1886—printed in English and Spanish with the old press and type found at the capital, and at the same time his appointment of governor and other officials, thus organizing the civil government deemed necessary. With the code was submitted to the government at Washington an “organic law of the territory of New Mexico”, which provided for a permanent territorial organization under the laws of the United States, naming the first Monday in August 1847 as the day for electing a delegate to congress.

It was noticeable that Kearny’s proclamations ignored the old theory that eastern New Mexico belonged to Texas. A still more notable feature was the clearly announced intention of retaining the country as a permanent possession of the United States. This was the first open avowal of the administration’s real purpose to make this a war for the acquisition of territory, and not, as had been pretended, for the protection of Texan boundaries, the avenging of past wrongs, and the obtaining of indemnity for just claims. This brought the subject before congress, which body called on the president for all the instructions that had been given respecting civil government in New Mexico and California. In the debates this subject was utilized chiefly as a basis for attacks on the administration and denunciations of the war for conquest. Nobody cared what was done at Santa Fé except as it could furnish material for arguments on one side or the other of the great and complicated national struggle for political supremacy between the north and south. Belligerent rights were, however, pretty thoroughly discussed; and it was clearly shown that a temporary civil government might be, if the people were submissive and friendly, a legitimate and proper feature of a conqueror's military rule. This whole subject and others closely connected with it have been somewhat fully presented in the History of California, and repetition is not deemed necessary here. General Kearny as a conqueror had absolute power, limited only by the requirements of humanity and justice, or international usage. He might enforce strict martial law, or protect the people’s rights and interests by civil methods, as he saw fit. He had no power to make New Mexico a territory of the United States, or the people citizens, or non-submissive enemies traitors, nor could he in a sense exact an oath of allegiance to the United States. All these matters would be settled by the final treaty closing the war. But he might perhaps promise or threaten these things, or almost any others, and he might exact from officials any oath they could be induced to take. His promises the government at Washington, if the treaty should cede the territory, would be in equity under obligation to fulfil; but it would have no right to carry out his threats.

The president in his reply of December 22d, furnishing the desired information, declared that Kearny’s acts, so far as they purported to establish a permanent territorial government, and to give the inhabitants political rights as citizens, under the constitution of the United States, had not been recognized or approved; but that otherwise his acts, and the instructions on which they were based, “were but the amelioration of martial law, which modern civilization requires, and were due, as well as the security of the conquest, to the inhabitants of the conquered territory”; and moreover, “it will be apparent that if any excess of power has been exercised, the departure has been the off­spring of a patriotic desire to give to the inhabitants the privileges and immunities so cherished by the people of our own country, and which they believed cal­culated to improve their condition and promote their prosperity. Any such excess has resulted in no practical injury, but can and will be early corrected in a manner to alienate as little as possible the good feel­ings of the inhabitants of the conquered country”. As I have remarked, congress paid very little attention to the matter, except as indicating the intention of permanent occupation, which the president did not pretend to deny. Respecting the actual operations of the civil government in 1846-7, practically nothing is recorded; probably there was very little to record.

From the first there had been occasional rumors of intended revolt among the natives as well as of attack by forces from the south, but such rumors could be traced to no definite foundation, and at the time of Doniphan's departure no danger was apprehended. Price had nearly 2,000 men with whose aid to keep the province in subjection, though many of them were on the sick-list. The main force was stationed at Santa Fé, but detachments were posted at other points, including the dragoons under Captain Burgwin at Alburquerque, a company under Captain Hendley in the Mora valley, and another near Cebolleta on the Navajo frontier. Soon after Doniphan left the capital, disquieting rumors again became prevalent, and in December these became of so definite a nature that many arrests were made. The result of an investigation is affirmed to have been the disclosure of a carefully devised plot to regain posses­sion of the country by killing the Americans and all natives who had espoused their cause. The leaders were Tomás Ortiz and Diego Archuleta, who under the new regime were to be governor and comandante general respectively; several of the priests were prominent in the plot, notably padres Juan Felipe Ortiz and José Manuel Gallegos; and many leading citizens of the northern sections were involved. Meetings were held at the house of Tomás Ortiz; plans were minutely discussed and arranged; parts were assigned to the leaders, who secretly visited the different towns to incite the lower classes of Mexicans and pueblo Indians; and the 19th of December was fixed for the rising. This date was subsequently changed to Christmas night, when the town would be crowded with natives, and the Americans, by reason of the festivities, would be off their guard. Before this time, however, the plot was revealed, perhaps by the mulatto wife of one of the conspirators, and many of the alleged leaders were arrested by order of Colonel Price, though Ortiz and Archuleta escaped to the south.

From the meagre details of testimony extant, as repeated in substance by the different writers, from the fact that no positive evidence could be found against the parties arrested, and from the confidence felt by the authorities that all danger ended with the revelation of the plot, it would appear that not very much was brought to light by the investigation, or rather that the conspiracy had not assumed any very formidable proportions. There is no reason to doubt, however, from this testimony and later developments that Ortiz and Archuleta had really plotted a rising, and had found many adherents, though nothing like a general consent of the leading men of different sections and different classes had been secured. Perhaps the only wonder under the circumstances is, that the movement was not more widespread. No blame or taint of treason could be imputed to the New Mexican people—except to individual officials who had promised allegiance—had they chosen to rise in a body against the American invaders. The temptation for such a rising was strong. The national pride of many leading citizens had been deeply wounded by Armijo’s disgraceful surrender of their country without a struggle. High officials might naturally feel that in Mexico they would be regarded as implicated in the general’s actions and regarded as traitors. The American occupation had as yet brought no benefit to the country. The natural bitterness of the lower and middle classes had been aggravated rather than appeased by recent occurrences. The situation was somewhat similar to that in southern California just before the Flores revolt. We have no positive evidence of gross outrages or oppression of the natives; indeed, in a sense, the efforts of the American authorities were constant and generally effective to protect them in their legal rights; but the volunteers were overbearing, abusive, and quarrelsome, taking no pains to conceal how much they despised all that was Mexican; and instances of indi­vidual insult and outrage were frequent. The natives were naturally revengeful, many of them vicious, ignorant, and ready to listen to the exaggerated charges and promises of the few reckless characters, who from motives of ambition or resentment were bent on stir­ring up a revolt. Moreover, the New Mexicans noted the inroads of sickness among their invaders, their difficulty in obtaining supplies, their comparatively small number, and their distance from reinforcements. Again, they probably received false news respecting Mexican successes and prospects in the south; and it is not unlikely that they heard of the Californian revolt. There was much jealousy against those natives who had been given office on the part of those who had lost their old positions; and it was asserted by Senator Benton that Archuleta’s hostility arose from the fact that the Americans had not kept their promises of leaving the western country to his control. Yet notwithstanding all this, so strong was the influ­ence of those who had directly or indirectly espoused the American cause, of those whose interest required a continuance of the new regime, and of those who realized the impossibility of a revolt that should be permanently successful, that the masses of the people looked with little favor on the movement, and it was practically abandoned, as I have no doubt, on the flight of Ortiz and Archuleta.

But the embers of revolt were left smouldering among the Indians of Taos, and they were fanned into flame by a few reckless conspirators, who trusted that once begun the revolt would become general. Governor Bent—having on January 5th issued a proclamation in which he announced the discovery of the plot, the flight of the leaders, and also the victory of Doniphan at El Bracito—believing that all danger was past, went on the 14th with Sheriff Lee and others to Taos, his home. On the 19th, the Indians came from their pueblo to demand the release of two prisoners. On this being refused, they killed the sheriff and prefect; then attacked the governor’s house, killing and scalping Bent and two others. Messengers were at once despatched in all directions to announce that the first blow had been struck, and to urge a general rising. It does not clearly appear that the Taos outbreak had been definitely planned in advance, though most writers state that such was the case, as indeed it may have been. Many Mexicans at once joined the Indians. At Arroyo Hondo, some twelve miles away, eight men were attacked on the same day at Turley’s mill and distillery, and seven of them killed after a desperate resistance of two days. Two other Americans were killed at Rio Colorado; and at Mora, eight traders who had just arrived in a wagon from Las Vegas, including L. L. Waldo, brother of Captain Waldo of the volunteers. At Las Vegas the alcalde not only fulfilled his oath of allegiance, but induced the people to remain quiet.

Through intercepted letters from the rebels, calling for aid, Colonel Price at Santa Fé heard of the revolt on the 20th. Ordering reinforcements from Alburquerque, he marched northward on the 23d with 353 men, including Angney’s infantry and a company of Santa Fé volunteers under Captain St Vrain, and four howitzers under Lieutenant Dyer. The enemy, 1,500 strong, as was estimated, and commanded by Jesus Tafoya, was encountered on the 24th near La Cañada, or Santa Cruz, and put to flight with a loss of 36 killed, including General Tafoya. Price lost two men. Four days later, at Los Luceros, reinforcements came up under Captain Burgwin; on the 29th the foe was again driven from a strong position at the pass of El Embudo, with a loss of twenty killed; and the 3d of February; after a hard march through deep snow, the army reached the pueblo of Taos, within whose ancient structures the rebels had fortified themselves. A hard day’s fighting on the 4th, marked by a continuous cannonade and several assaults, put the Americans in possession of the church and that part of the pueblo west of the stream. About 150 of the Indians are said to have been killed, including one of their leaders, Pablo Chávez; while the American loss of seven killed and 45 wounded—many of them fatally—included Captain Burgwin. Next morning the Indians sued for peace, which was granted on their giving up Tomás, one of the leading conspirators, who was soon killed in the guard­house by a private. Pablo Montoya, another leader, also fell into the hands of Price, and was hanged on the 7th, after which only one of the chief conspirators, Manuel Cortés, survived. The army returned to the capital, where, on the 13th, occurred the funeral cere­monies of Governor Bent and Captain Burgwin.

With the exception of Price’s report of this campaign, there does not exist, and cannot be formed, anything like a continuous record of the insurrection, or of the subsequent annals of the year. After the defeat at Taos, it was only east of the mountains, and chiefly under the direction of Manuel Cortés, that hostilities were continued. At the first, as we have seen, Waldo and party had been killed at Mora, but Las Vegas had been kept in subjection by the efforts of the alcalde, and the presence of Captain Isaac R. Hendley with his company. He occupied Las Vegas on January 20th, concentrated his grazing guards, and on the 24th appeared with 225 men before Mora, where he attacked several hundred insurgents, killing 25 or 30 and capturing fifteen prisoners, but was himself killed with a few of his men, and the party was repulsed. A little later Captain Morin renewed the attack, and drove the inhabitants into the mountains, destroying the town and a large supply of grain. In May a grazing party and also a wagon train were attacked, one or two men killed, and a large number of horses and mules driven off. Following the marauders’ trail, Major Edmonson overtook them, 300 or 400 strong, in a deep canon of the Red River, but after a fight of several hours, in which he killed many of the Mexicans and Indians, and lost only one man, he was forced to retire. Next morning the enemy had fled. Late in June there was trouble at Las Vegas. Lieutenant Robert T. Brown and three men, pursuing horse-thieves, were killed; whereupon Edmonson made an attack, killed ten or twelve men, found indications of a new revolt, captured the town, and sent some fifty prisoners to Santa Fé, also burning a mill belonging to the alcalde, who was charged with complicity. In July a party of 31 soldiers was attacked at La Ciénega not far from Taos, Lieutenant Larkin and five others being killed. On the approach of reinforcements, however, the enemy fled. In the same month, Edmonson is said to have destroyed the town of Las Pías (?) with considerable loss to the foe, and to have marched by way of Antón Chico to La Cuesta, where were some 400 insurgents under Cortés and González. Fifty captives were taken, the rest fleeing to the mountains, and many horses were recovered. After July we have no definite record of hostilities.

Of the prisoners brought to the capital by Price, and sent in later by his officers, some fifteen or twenty, perhaps more, were tried by court-martial, sentenced to death, and executed. These included six of the murderers of Brown, who were hanged on the 3d of August. Many others are said to have been flogged and set at liberty. Others accused of complicity in the original plot were turned over to the civil authorities. In March four of these were indicted by the grand jury for treason, 25 being discharged for want of evidence, and one of the four convicted and sentenced to death. This was Antonio María Trujillo, father-in-law of Diego Archuleta, an infirm old man of high standing, in whose behalf a petition for pardon was sent to Washington by Governor Vigil and others. At the same time District Attorney Blair asked for instructions, since the accused had pleaded lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. In reply the secretary of war for the government took the ground that, while the New Mexican insurgents might properly be punished even with the death penalty for their offence against the constituted authorities, they could not be prosecuted for treason against the United States, since they were not yet citizens. For similar reasons the president declined to pardon Trujillo, but counselled mercy in his case. Apparently, he and others convicted at the May term were discharged or pardoned by Price or the governor; but not, as is stated by some Writers, by the president.

While Indians from some of the pueblos were aiding the insurgent Mexicans in their guerilla warfare against the Americans, with aid from various bands of Apaches and others, the tribes of the plains—the Comanches, Pawnees, and Arapahoes, incited and aided, as the Americans believed, by Mexicans—became troublesome from April to August on the Santa Fé trail. Hardly a party, large or small, traders or soldiers, crossed the plains without suffering from their depredations. Many were killed, and large numbers of horses, mules, and oxen were lost. Lieutenant Love, with a company of dragoons escorting government funds, had five of his men killed, and lost his animals in June. Later in the year comparative security was restored by the stationing of troops at different points; and then the Indians, in their turn, were made the objects of outrage, as when a party of Pawnees were treacherously massacred at Fort Mann. In the west and north-west the Navajos had paid no heed to their treaty with Doniphan, but continued their raids for plunder on the settlements of the Río Grande.