HISTORY OF ARIZONA AND NEW MEXICO, 1680—1888

CHAPTER XIV.

A MEXICAN TERRITORY.

1823-1845.

The ruler at Santa Fé during the Mexican republican regime of 1823-46 was known as jefe político until 1837, and later bore the title of gobernador. The list, as made up from those of Prince, Meline, Ritch, and the United States land-office reports, with slight corrections from original sources, is given in a note. As a rule, nothing is definitely known respecting the acts of these officials or the circumstances of their accession to power.

Until 1824 New Mexico was a province, one of the Provincias Internas, until, by the acta constitutiva of January 31st, it was joined to the provinces of Chihuahua and Durango, to form the Estado Interno del Norte. Durango, however, protesting against this arrangement, because the capital was fixed at Chihuahua, the two southern provinces were made states, and from July 6th New Mexico became a territory of the republic. At the same time the El Paso district was joined to Chihuahua, but no eastern or western bounds were assigned to New Mexico, it being understood that the territory extended in those directions far out beyond the settlements, and in the north to the Arkansas, the limit of Mexican possessions since 1819. Under the new constitution of December 1836 the territory became a department, and was so called to the end of Mexican rule.

Under the new forms of the republican régime there was practically no change in the government, all tranches being controlled somewhat arbitrarily by the governor. There was a kind of legislature, or executive council, of four or six members, known as the diputacion provincial, or territorial, from 1824, junta departamental from 1837, and sometimes asamblea in 1844-5; but this body is stated by Barreiro and others to have been a nullity, and very little is known of its acts. Instead of the alcaldes mayores of Spanish times, there were ayuntamientos at a few of the larger towns, with ordinary alcaldes at the smaller settlements. In 1844, by a decree of the assembly, published in a bando by the governor, the department was divided into three districts and seven partidos; and presumably prefectures were organized, since one or two prefects are incidentally named. Of New Mexican representatives in congress, I have found no record.

Down to 1839 the territory was under the military rule of a commandant, called militar, principal, or de armas, who was subordinate to the comandante general of Chihuahua. At times the civil and military commands were held by the same and at others by different men. In 1824 the presidial company at Santa Fé had 119 men, including officers, at a total cost of $35,488. A Mexican law of 1826 provided for three permanent cavalry companies of 100 rank and file, each at a cost of $87,882; and for two companies of active militia, each of 100 men. Barreiro, however, writing in 1832, states that the territory had still only its one company, urging an increase of force and a transfer of the presidio to Valverde. In 1835, on the coming of Governor Perez, who was also comandante principal, some slight effort seems to have been made to reorganize the forces, without definite results. In 1839 New Mexico was separated from Chihuahua, and made a comandancia, Governor Armijo having later the title of comandante general. From this time, also, in Mexican reports the existence of the three companies is noted, though with only seen enough for one. The truth seems to be that here, as in California during the larger part of Mexican rule, the military organization hardly existed except on paper.

Of events in their order from year to year, there are but few which require more extended notice than is given in the appended summary, or chronologic list. Troubles with the Indians were not very serious or frequent, so far as can be determined from scanty and indefinite records, the most startling occurrences in this connection resting on authority that is somewhat doubtful. The system of treaties and bribes was still in vogue, and, as a rule, the tribes found it to their interest to be nominally at peace. Still, the Navajos made trouble occasionally, and one band or another of the Apaches was generally on the war-path. There are but few items of interest or value in the record of Indian affairs for this period, though it is probable that local and personal details, if known, would furnish material for many an episode of adventure.

In 1837-8 New Mexico had its revolutionary movement, corresponding in many respects with Alvarado’s revolt of 1836-7 in California. It was nominally, and to a slight extent really, a rising against centralism and the new constitution of Mexico; that is, direct taxation—unknown in the territory under the jefes políticos, but introduced in the department by the governor—caused much popular discontent, affording at least a pretext for revolt. Several other motives, however, were in the aggregate more potent, though in the absence of original contemporary evidence it is not possible to ascertain their relative importance. Thus, there is said to have existed a prejudice against Governor Perez, an excellent man, because he was a stranger sent from Mexico, and not a native or old resident like most rulers of earlier years. Some of his special acts besides the imposition of taxes created discontent. Manuel Armijo, formerly governor, moved chiefly by ambition, but also by dissatisfaction at having been removed from his place as custom-house officer, is accused by Gregg and Kendall of having secretly fomented the revolt, which he hoped to control, and which by a counter-pronunciamiento he finally turned to his own advantage. Again, it was believed by the Mexicans, and not altogether without reason, as I suspect, that the revolt was ‘another Texan affair’, instigated more or less directly by the Americans, with a view of fomenting, by revolutionary troubles, the discontent already believed to be prevalent among New Mexicans.

On the 1st of August a mob released an alcalde of a northern town, who had been imprisoned on some unpopular charge, this serving as a beginning of the insurrection; and a great crowd, largely composed of pueblo Indians, soon assembled at La Cañada, where, on the 3rd, the rebel ‘plan’ was issued, the only tangible part of which was ‘not to admit the departmental plan’, and ‘not to admit any tax’, three out of five articles being devoted to platitudes on God, country, and liberty, including, as a matter of course, the resolve to ‘spill every drop of blood’ in the sacred cause. Governor Perez, with all the force he could raise, about 150 militia, including the friendly warriors of San Juan and Santo Domingo—the whereabouts of the presidial company not appearing—marched northward and met the foe at the mesa of San Ildefonso; but most of his men passed over to the rebels, and he was obliged to flee with about 25 companions, returning first to Santa Fe, but soon abandoning the capital. Within a few days, and at different points, the party breaking up for self-preservation, the governor and a dozen or more of his associates were killed, the head of Perez being carried as a trophy to the insurgent headquarters, and the bodies of Santiago Abreu and others being barbarously mutilated.

It was on August 9th or 10th that the rebels took possession of Santa Fé, where they committed no excesses beyond confiscating the property of the victims; and having elected as governor José González, a pueblo Indian of Taos, they for the most part disbanded. González summoned an assembly of alcaldes and influential citizens from the north, which body on the 27th confirmed all that had been done. Now Manuel Armijo, formerly jefe político and customs officer, either as a part of his original plot, or perhaps disappointed because Gonzalez was preferred to himself as rebel governor, or possibly moved by patriotic devotion to the legitimate government—for the exact truth eludes all search—‘pronounced’ at Tomé, the 8th of September, raised a force with the aid of Curate Madariaga, and marched to the capital to ‘suffocate the rebellion’. Gonzalez retired up the river, and Armijo had little difficulty in making himself recognized as acting governor and commandant-general. Possibly, also, he marched north and induced the rebels to submit to his authority and give up the leaders of the movement. At any rate, he reported his patriotic achievement to the Mexican government, and asked for reenforcements. These, to the number of 300 or more, of the Escuadron de Vera Cruz and presidial troops of Chihuahua, under Colonel Justiniani, arrived before the end of the year. The rebels had again assembled at or near La Cañada, and were defeated in battle on January 27, 1838. Gonzalez and several of his associates were captured and shot. Armijo, in recognition of his services, was given the rank of colonel, and confirmed for eight years in his assumed positions of governor and comandante general.

Besides the revolution of 1837, the only notable event of New Mexican history in this period, though one that in most of its phases belongs properly to the annals of another territory, was the capture of the Texan Santa Fé expedition of 1841. Hitherto there had been little or no direct intercourse between the New Mexicans and their neighbors of the adjoining but distant Texas; yet the comparative success of the eastern rebels was not unknown to the less fortunate agitators of the west Texan influences, probably not inactive in the troubles of 1837-8, had certainly been potent in fomenting later discontent. Santa Fé traders from the United States seem as a class to have feared a revolution, which might for a time imperil their commercial interests; but among them, especially those who had become residents, there was an element fully in sympathy with the filibusters. These sympathizers reported that the New Mexicans awaited only an opportunity to rise and declare their independence, and that even the authorities were not disposed to offer much resistance.

Besides crediting these exaggerated reports, the Texans had a theory, without foundation in fact or justice, that their territory extended to the Rio Grande, and that it was therefore their duty to release from tyranny all inhabitants of that territory, including, of course, the New Mexicans living east of the river. They had, moreover, a strong desire to divert through Texan channels the Santa Fé trade that had proved so lucrative to merchants of the United States. Under these circumstances, in the spring of 1841 President Lamar fitted out an expedition of about 300 men, in six companies, under the command of Hugh McLeod as brevet brigadier-general. Three commissioners were sent to establish Texan authority in the west, well provided with proclamations explaining the advantages of the proffered freedom; and a number of traders and travellers joined the expedition in quest of gain or adventure, some of them possibly not fully understanding its real purpose. It was not proposed exactly—at least, such was the explanation offered later—to undertake with 300 men the conquest of New Mexico against the will of the inhabitants; but if the people were found not favoring or ready for revolt the expedition would be content with trade, and would retire to await a more favorable opportunity. This, however, has no real bearing on the character of the party. They were simply armed invaders, who might expect to be attacked, and if defeated, to be treated by the Mexicans as rebels, or at best—since Texan belligerency and independence had been recognized by several nations—as prisoners of war. They left Austin in June, and in September, after a tedious march by the worst routes over an unknown country, they arrived ragged, worn out, and half-starved on the New Mexican frontier.

Meanwhile, the Mexican authorities had long expected an invasion from Texas, and special warnings, with promise of reenforcements, had recently been received from the national capital. While there was no lack of disaffection in certain quarters, the masses of the people were far from ready to accept the so-called freedom offered by filibusters, and the rulers still further from any intention to permit a change of government. Every possible effort, on the contrary, was made to prepare for defence, and to foment the current popular idea of the Texans as valiant but reckless desperadoes, from whom might be expected, not liberty, out pillage, murder, and outrage. All foreigners were closely watched, and several were arrested on suspicion of complicity in schemes of invasion. Satisfied that danger was near, Governor Armijo sent southward an appeal for aid, ordered a close watch of foreigners, who were forbidden to leave their places of residence, and sent Captain Dámaso Salazar to reconnoitre the eastern frontier. On September 4th Salazar sent in as captives three men, who were regarded as spies from the invading army. They were forbidden to leave the capital, but escaped a week later, and on being recaptured, were put to death. On the 15th a Mexican named Carlos and an Italian, Brignoli, who had been with the Texans in August, were found, and induced to tell what they knew or the invasion. Meanwhile, every effort had been made for effective defence; the rurales, or militia, called into service and sent to the frontier under Lieutenant-colonel Juan Andrés Archuleta; Prefect Antonio Sandoval summoned to the capital to act as governor; while Armijo set out on the 16th with the presidial troops. On the same day five men, sent on in advance of the foremost division of Texans, were captured, disarmed, and put in jail at San Miguel del Vado. Next day Colonel Cooke and Captain Sutton, with 94 Texans, surrendered to Armijo and Salazar at Anton Chico. The governor established his head­quarters at Las Vegas, distributed among the captors the property taken from the Texans, made a bonfire in the plaza of Lamar’s proclamations, sent off Cooke and his fellow-prisoners under a guard of 200 men for Mexico, and sent out explorers to find the rest of the invaders. These, under McLeod, about 200 in number, finally surrendered to Archuleta, at a place called Laguna Colorada, on the 5th of October; on the 16th Armijo was given a public and most enthusiastic reception at the capital, and next day the last of the prisoners left San Miguel on their tedious march to Mexico, where they arrived in several divisions at the beginning of 1842. A few were released in April, or earlier, at the intercession of foreign ministers, on the plea that they were not Texans, and had joined the expedition without knowing its real objects. The rest, after confinement at different Mexican prisons, some of them being compelled to work in chains on the roads, were finally released by President Santa Anna on his saint’s day, the 13th of June. The only exception was in the case of Navarro, who was at one time condemned to death, but finally escaped and returned to Texas.

There can be no doubt that Governor Armijo was fully justified in seizing the Texan invaders, disarming them, confiscating their property, and sending them to Mexico as prisoners of war. He and his officers are accused, however, of having induced their victims to surrender by false assurances of friendship and false promises of welcome as traders, the giving-up of their arms being represented as a mere formality imposed on all visitors to Santa Fé. Their arms once secured, it is said the lives of one party were saved only by the intervention and protest of Gregorio Vigil, and of another by a majority of one in a vote on the proposition to shoot them. And after their surrender, particularly on the march to El Paso, it is claimed they were starved and otherwise inhumanly maltreated, some five or six of their number, because of their illness and inability to keep up, having been deliberately shot down, and their ears cut off, to be carried to Chihuahua as proof that they had not escaped. There is, of course, nothing to be said in justification of such acts, if the charges are true. My knowledge of Armijo does not lead me to say in his defence much more than that he was certainly not so bad a man as he is represented; nor am I prepared to say that Salazar was not a brute, or that some barbarous acts may not have been committed by irresponsible and unmanageable subordinates. The Mexicans claim to have offered but life as a condition of surrender, and to have treated their captives with all the courtesy due to prisoners of war. It is well to consider the ex parte nature of the evidence against them, and the evident bias, amounting to hatred, of Kendall and other witnesses, leading to many obvious exaggerations. The Texans, if technically but soldiers of a belligerent nation, were in Mexican eyes rebel desperadoes, entering a peaceful province under false pretences, to stir up bloody strife. Let it be remembered that the capture and transportation of 300 Texan filibusters by the miserably organized soldiery of New Mexico was no slight undertaking, and small wonder if in such a struggle some of the kid-glove niceties of regular warfare were not observed; moreover, the march to Mexico was necessarily attended with much hardship and suffering, and some doubt is thrown on the charges of murder by the statement of Powhatan Ellis to Webster, that one, involving the shooting of three prisoners, was a ‘fabrication’ transferred from a northern newspaper to the columns of the Siglo Diez y Nueve. Again, if the promises alleged to have been broken were given in good faith to the Texans as peaceful traders, Armijo was fully justified in breaking them on learning, through Lewis’ treachery and Lamar’s proclamation, how he had been deceived; if, on the contrary, the Mexicans, knowing the real character of the expedition, made the promises, intending to break them, as a device to get possession of the enemy's weapons, the trick was at the least not more dishonorable than that attempted by McLeod and Cooke. The Texan adventurers were, at best, engaged in a risky invasion of an enemy’s territory; fortune was against them, and disaster resulted, for which they deserve but little sympathy. Armijo and his men, on the contrary, had the most wonderful good lack in defending their country, and merit but little of the obloquy that has been heaped upon them.

Naturally, the Texans were grievously disappointed at the utter failure of their grand filibustering expedition, and loud in their threats of vengeance for what they chose to regard as the treachery and barbarity of the New Mexicans. Active preparations began as soon as the captives of 1841 had returned. The retaliatory enterprise, as talked about in advance through the press and otherwise, had a wide scope. Not only was New Mexico to be invaded and brought under Texan sway, but probably the banner of freedom would be unfurled in Chihuahua, and all of Northern Mexico revolutionized; and at the very least, Armijo and Salazar, with the traitor Lewis, were to be taken, dead or alive. For these purposes a force of 500 or 800 men, under Colonel Jacob Snively, was to be raised, the only difficulty being to keep the number down, such was the popular enthusiasm at home and across the line in the United States. The project was made known by traders at Santa Fé—American spies, the Texans called them—and considerable alarm was felt in Mexico, especially because of the belief that the movement was to be in reality under the auspices of the northern republic. Accordingly, a large force was sent north from Chihuahua, under General José M. Monterde, to support Armijo, who, as the result proved, had little need of reenforcements.

This grand scheme of vengeance, invasion, and revolution reduced itself in the execution to a raid for plunder on the Santa Fé caravans; for this trade, of which much more is said in this chapter, was now to a considerable extent in the hands of Mexicans. First, John McDaniel, a Texan captain, or calling himself so, enlisted in Missouri fifteen vagabonds, and with them in April 1843 attacked and plundered the caravan of José Antonio Chavez on the Little Arkansas, in United States territory. Seven of the number, with their share of the booty, at once started back for the Missouri settlements; and the other eight did likewise, after murdering Chavez for the gold about his person. This outrage was a little more than even the Texan sympathy or anti-Mexican prejudice of the south-western frontier could justify; ten of the party were captured and condemned to death or imprisonment, according as their crime was murder or simply robbery. About the same time, Colonel Warfield, with a similar party of twenty-four adventurers, attempted a raid on the little New Mexican settlement of Mora. By a surprise he killed five Mexicans of a party of hunters, and took a few horses, which he presently lost, with all his own, when the foe turned on him, and he was forced to retreat on foot. Warfield, with a few of the fugitives, succeeded in joining Snively; another party disbanded and found their way northward; while still another of five men was captured and apparently taken to Santa Fé.

Meanwhile, Colonel Snively, with his grand army of not 800 or 500, but about 180 men, reached the Arkansas late in May, to lie in wait for the traders. The caravan of the year, composed of both Mexicans and Americans, bound to Santa Fé from Independence, was approaching, escorted by two companies of United States dragoons under Captain Cook; and Governor Armijo, with 500 men or more, marched out of his capital on May 1st to meet the caravan at the Arkansas. On June 19th the Texans succeeded in cutting off an advance party of Armijo’s force, about 100 militiamen and Indians under Ventura Lobato, killing some twenty, and making prisoners of the rest, except one or two who escaped to the governor’s camp. Ten days later, as the force was deemed too small to attack Armijo, and as it was thought the caravan might have turned back through fear, about 80 of the Texans started homeward; but Captain Cook soon came up, and forced one detachment of the rest, greatly to their disgust, to give up their arms, claiming that they were on United States soil. About 50 now started for Missouri, while the remainder—part of whom, under Captain Chandler, had been absent at the disarming, and another part are said to have deceived Cook by giving up only captured Mexican weapons, concealing their own rifles—could not agree on any course of action until the caravan had crossed the river and gone on their way unmolested. Then the renowned ‘Texian Invincibles’ went home, losing some men in fights with the Indians on the way.

In July and August the Mexican minister complained to Waddy Thompson that the United States government was responsible for the so-called Texan invasion; but the reply denied such responsibility, even if there had been any invasion, which was declared doubtful. Meanwhile, General Monterde marched northward to New Mexico with some 700 men; and he and Armijo flattered themselves that they had saved their country. Good luck and a broad desert frontier had done more to defeat Texan schemes than the zeal of Mexican patriots.

We have noted the adventurous beginnings before 1822 of the trade between Santa Fé and the Missouri River. With the end of Spanish rule ceased all opposition to the traffic on the part of Mexican authorities, and a profitable market was assured for goods from the United States. The eastern rendezvous was Franklin, Missouri, down to 1831, and later Independence. From this point in May of each year set out the trains, or caravans, of pack-animals in 1823, but subsequently of wagons, drawn at first by horses and mules, but later by mules or oxen, four pairs usually to each wagon, but sometimes five or six pairs, with a load of 5,000 pounds. Cotton goods were the staple article of traffic, but there was also carried a miscellaneous assortment of dry goods and hardware. The route of over 800 miles lay in an almost direct line west-south-west to San Miguel del Vado, and thence north-west to Santa Fé; but this route, with some of the most common variations, is best shown by the map. Midway of the journey was the crossing of the Arkansas, the boundary between United States and Mexican territory; and the route corresponds nearly, in a general way, with that of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fé railroad of later times. The arrival was generally in July, and the return departure in August. The selling price of goods was on an aver­age about double the cost, and at this rate was, for a time, sufficiently low to control the market as against foreign goods imported by way of Vera Cruz or Chihuahua; and indeed, a large proportion of the Missouri goods were sent from Santa Fé to the south by the regular autumn caravans. Duties, after an ‘understanding’ with custom-house officers—for very slight attention was paid to the national arancel de derechos —were from 25 to 50 per cent of cost, and the traders’ net profit was as a rule from 20 to 40 per cent, though some cargoes were sold at a loss. The goods were paid for mainly in gold and silver coin, though a considerable quantity of furs and blankets was taken, and the wagons were sometimes partly laden with wool, there being no duty on exported products”. I make no attempt here to picture the pleasures and perils connected with this ‘commerce of the prairies’, or to present details of commercial methods, referring the reader for such matter, to the standard and often-cited work of Gregg. It should also be noted that before many years had passed Santa Fé merchants of Spanish race fitted out regular caravans and controlled a large portion of the trade.

ROUTE OF THE SANTA FE CARAVANS.

Freight was carried by pack-animals till 1824, when wagons were introduced as an experiment, and making the trip without difficulty were used exclusively after 1825. These first wagons seem to have taken the Taos route. By the success of this experiment was attracted the attention of wealthier men than any that had previously engaged in the trade; and these men lost no time in bringing the matter before the government. Memorials were sent to congress by the people and authorities of Missouri, demanding protection for the new industry, by treaties with Indian tribes, the marking-out of a road, establishing of a fort on the Arkansas, and the appointment of agents at Santa Fé and Chihuahua to prevent extortion in the collection of duties. Senator Benton took up the project with his customary zeal, and laid before the senate the statement of Augustus Storrs on the history and prospects of the prairie commerce. Finally, in January 1825, a bill was passed, authorizing the marking-out of a road, and appropriating $30,000 for this purpose and that of obtaining the Indians’ consent to the road and its unmolested use. The New Mexicans were not less eager than the Americans for the protection and development of trade; and in June 1825 Manuel Simon Escudero of Chihuahua was commissioned by Governor Vaca to visit St Louis and Washington. The same year a treaty was made with the Osages by the payment of a small sum; and the survey of the road was begun, to be completed—that is the route partially marked by a series of mounds—from Fort Osage to Taos two years later. It does not appear, however, that the traders ever made use of the road as surveyed, preferring to follow the earlier trail, with such modifications as the condition of grass and water suggested.

Meanwhile, the trade grew in proportions, and the caravans made their yearly trips without notable adventures, except that the Indians—probably not without fault on the part of the traders—became increasingly hostile, being ever on the watch for small detached parties imperfectly armed or not sufficiently vigilant. Thus a party in 1826 lost 500 horses and mules, and one of 1828 over 1,000 animals, having, besides, three men shot. This caused a renewal of demands for governmental protection; and the committee on military affairs having reported to congress in favor of a movable escort rather than a fixed garrison, Major Riley was ordered to escort the caravan of 1829 to and from the Arkansas, with four companies of the 6th infantry from Fort Leavenworth. Soon after the traders left the troops at the Arkansas, they were attacked by the Indians, losing one man; whereupon, Riley came up and guarded the caravan for a short distance into Mexican territory. The troops waited at Choteau’s island till October, and the returning caravan was escorted to this point by a Mexican force under Colonel Vizcarra. Though there was some further discussion of the mat­ter in congress, the escort was not continued.

In 1830 oxen were first used by the traders, the experiment having been successfully tried the year before by Riley’s supply train. 1831 was the year of Gregg’s first trip, and of Jedediah Smith’s death. There were also hostilities on the Canadian in 1832-3, several men being killed; but in 1834 an escort of 60 dragoons under Captain Wharton was again furnished. The revolt of 1837 did some injury to the American traders, since the property of their richest customers was confiscated; but they had no success in obtaining indemnity from Mexico. In 1837, however, the frontier custom-house of Taos was opened to foreign trade. From 1838 the Missouri traders, through their assembly, governor, chambers of commerce, and senator, made earnest efforts to secure from congress a custom­house on the Missouri River, with privilege of draw­back and debenture for foreign goods, claiming that the trade had constantly diminished since 1828, and could in no other way be restored. A bill in their favor was tabled in 1842, but in 1845 another was finally passed. In 1839 an attempt was made by Mexicans, with the aid of H. Connelly, an American merchant, to divert the course of trade from Santa Fé to Chihuahua direct. A caravan of 100 men made the trip through Texas, and returned to Chihuahua in 1840 without any serious casualty; but the attempt was not repeated. For a short time in these yean Governor Armijo tried the experiment of collecting as duties $500 on each wagon-load of goods; bat the size of the wagons that began to be used soon prompted a return to ad valorem duties.

We have seen that the Texan attempt of 1841 to wrest the Santa Fé trade from the United States was not successful; and the troubles experienced by the caravans of 1843 at the hands of Texan robbers have also been recorded. Notwithstanding these outrages, the year’s business was very large and profitable; yet President Santa Anna, by a decree of August 7, 1843, closing the frontier custom-house of Taos, put an end to the Santa Fé trade, much to the disgust of New Mexicans as well as Missourians. “Should the obnoxious decree be repealed, the trade will doubtless be prosecuted with renewed vigor and enterprise,” writes Gregg; and it was repealed almost before it had gone into effect, on March 31, 1844, so that the trade of 1844-6 was as large as ever, though selling prices, and therefore profits, had been constantly diminishing for fifteen years.

Besides the regular traders of the caravans, there were others, who resided permanently or for years in New Mexico; also many fur-trading trappers and miscellaneous adventurers, whose experiences would fill a most fascinating volume, as, indeed, in one case—that of James O. Pattie—they have done. Pattie and his father, with others whose aim was Indian trade and trapping, came to Taos and Santa Fé with a caravan of 1824, and for four years engaged in a series of the most remarkable rovings within and beyond the limits of Arizona and New Mexico. Frequent encounters with hostile Indians and bears diversify the story of long journeys and the many perils of a hunter’s life; while the claimed rescue of Jacoba, daughter of an ex-governor, from the savages, adds a slender thread of romance. Finally, in 1828, the Patties arrived in California, the elder to die, the younger to continue his exploits, as fully recorded in another work of this series. Probably in the east, as certainly in the west there is much exaggeration, not to my falsehood, in the story of personal adventure; but there is sufficient groundwork of fact to make the story valuable as well as fascinating. Benjamin D. Wilson was another of the pioneers who had a varied career as trader and trapper in Arizona, New Mexico and Sonora, before coming to settle in California.

Communication with California began in 1830, when José Antonio Vaca visited that county with a small party of his countrymen, and Ewing Young, with a company of foreign trappers, possibly including Kit Carson, made a far-hunting tour in the western valleys. In 1831-2 three trapping and trading parties made the journey under Wolskill, Jackson, and Young, the first-named opening the long-followed trail from Taos north of the Colorado River. From this time the route was travelled every year, often by parties of only a few individuals. Trade between the two territories consisted of the exchange of New Mexican blankets for Californian mules and horses; and it must be confessed that the traders soon earned a most unenviable reputation. There were many honorable exceptions; but most of the trading parties were composed of New Mexican, foreign, and Indian vagabonds, whose object was to obtain mules, without scruple as to methods, often by simple theft, and oftener by connivance with hostile Californian tribes. In 1833, especially, they caused a great excitement, and some of them, including Villapando, their leader, were arrested at Santa Fé. In 1835-7 John A. Sutter, afterward famous in California, was engaged in trade at Santa Fé; in 1841 the Workman-Rowland party brought many foreign and native New Mexicans to California; in 1842 a large trading party under Vigil included some twenty families in quest of homes, most of whom came back to settle in the San Bernardino region; and down to the end of the Mexican rule the movement of traders and emigrants continued. Among native New Mexican settlers in California were members of the Vaca, Peña, and Armijo families, while many well-known Californian pioneers had spent some years in New Mexico.

Industrially, there was for the most part no change, except a slight deterioration in some branches, from the unprosperous conditions of former years. Of home records on the subject I have found none of any value; and while Gregg and his followers, in connection with commercial annals, give excellent reviews of the country’s industries or lack of them, their remarks would apply as well to the Spanish as to the Mexican period, being confirmatory of what I have written in earlier chapters. It is possible, however, that the decadence noted, as in sheep-raising and the manufacture of blankets, was more apparent than real, being founded on an exaggerated idea of what had been accomplished in the past.

In mining, though nothing appears respecting the famous copper mine of the south-west, except the somewhat doubtful statements of the trapper Pattie, some progress was made, since placeres of gold were successfully worked in two districts some thirty miles south-west of Santa Fé. The ‘Old Placers’ were discovered in 1828, and the ‘New Placers’ in 1839. The former yielded from $60,000 to $80,000 per year in 1832-5, and later considerably less. At the latter sprang up the town of Tuerto, with 22 stores in 1845, when the yield of both districts is given as $250,000. The metal was very fine and pure, but water was scarce, the chief reliance being on the artificially melted snows of winter; apparatus was primitive, consisting of the batea, or bowl; and prejudice against foreigners prevented the introduction of improved methods. At various other points, as near Taos, Abiquiú, and Sangre de Cristo, gold was found, and mines were perhaps worked for a short time. No silver mines were worked in the Mexican period.

In educational matters a slight increase of interest is to be noted, though with very meagre results. In 1826 the diputacion territorial was about to establish some kind of a college at the capital, under the protectorship of Agustin Fernandez de San Vicente; and from 1827 to 1832 archive records show the existence of primary schools at several of the principal towns; but in 1834 there was no school at Santa Fé, and probably none elsewhere, as the diputacion announced that there were no funds, and called upon the ayuntamientos to reopen the schools, if possible, by private contributions. About 1834 a printing-press was brought to the country, and with it in 1835 Padre Martinez issued for four weeks at Taos the Crepúsculo, the only New Mexican newspaper of pre-Gringo times.

The missions continued as before, there being no formal secularization, but were missions only in name. The government still paid—or at least made appropriations for—the sínodos of from 23 to 27 Franciscan friars; but these were for the most part acting curates at the Mexican settlements, making occasional visits to the Indian pueblos under their spiritual charge. Only five of the latter had resident missionaries in 1832. The Mexican congress in 1823, and again in 1830, decreed the carrying-out of the old Spanish order for the establishing of a bishopric; but nothing was effected in this direction. Among the vicars appears in 1825-6 the name of Agustin Fernandez de San Vicente, the famous canónigo who had visited California in 1822 as the commissioner of the emperor Iturbide. In 1833 the bishop of Durango visited this distant part of his diocese, and his reception is described by Gregg and Prince as having been marked by great enthusiasm.

The population has been given as 30,000 whites and 10,000 pueblo Indians in 1822. In these 24 years I suppose that the white population was somewhat more than doubled, and that of Indians slightly diminished; or that the total in 1845-6 was not far from 80,000, though there is one official report that makes this total much larger.

CHAPTER XV.

PIMERÍA ALTA AND THE MOQUI PROVINCE.

1543-1767.