CRISTO RAUL.ORG

POPE LEO X (1513-1521)

CHAPTER I.

Election and Beginning of the Pontificate of Leo X.—His Efforts to make Peace.—End of the Schism of Pisa.

CHAPTER II.

The Medici and the Policy of Leo X, 1513-1515.

CHAPTER III.

The Conquest of Milan by the French. —The Meeting between Leo X and Francis I at Bologna.

CHAPTER IV.

The War of Urbino. —Conspiracy of Cardinal Petrucci —The Great Creation of Cardinals, July 1, 1517.

CHAPTER V.

The Pope's endeavours to promote a Crusade, 1517-1518.

CHAPTER VI.

Leo X and the Imperial Succession.

CHAPTER VII

The Occasion and Causes of the Reformation in Germany. The Contest about Indulgences.

CHAPTER VIII.

Luther is summoned to Rome. His Transactions with Cardinal Cajetan and with Miltitz.  The Bull “Exsurge” and its Reception in Germany. Aleander’s Mission to the Diet of Worms, and the Imperial Edict against Luther.

CHAPTER IX

Alliance of the Pope with the Emperor Charles V

CHAPTER X.

Defeat of the French and increase of the States of the Church. Death of Leo X.

INTRODUCTION.

JULIUS II, the most powerful of the Popes of the Renaissance, had given the Holy See a firm and substantial basis by his re-establishment of the States of the Church. At the same time, by his generous patronage of art, he had given a prominence, hitherto unequalled, to the great position held by his predecessors in the field of culture. When he convened the Council of the Lateran, the patron of Bramante, Raphael, and Michael Angelo was on the verge of grappling with the greatest and most difficult task of the age—namely, the reformation of the Church—when death snatched him away.

The successor of the Rovere Pope was a member of the house of Medici, who represented, as it has been the lot of few to do, both the good and bad side of the Renaissance. True child of his people and of his age, Leo X was a rare mixture of glorious and inglorious qualities. A thorough Medici and a typical Florentine, he was a clever, not over scrupulous, and indefatigably active politician. At the same time he was an open-handed and appreciative admirer of learning, art, and music. Nevertheless he lacked the courage, greatness, and depth of his predecessor.

For over a century, a cry for the reform of both the Head and members of the Church had resounded from all parts of Europe. Some of the attempts to effect this reform were actuated by no pure motives, while others were made in an unlawful manner; but there is no doubt that many excellent men, moved by the best intentions, did concern themselves, in a lawful manner, with the reformation of abuses in ecclesiastical life and in the government of the Church; though what was accomplished remained far behind both the expectations formed and the necessities of the time. Many pious, enlightened, and wise men, religious as well as laymen, rose up in response to the call, and tried to apply a remedy to the evils of the day. Many hands were laid to the difficult task, though no decisive results were obtained; for even the best-intentioned efforts made but slight impression on the general deterioration of ecclesiastical discipline. The task was made the more difficult by the bad example of those belonging to the Roman Curia, which worked against the reformers.

With the dawn of the new century the cry for reform sounded louder and louder from both sides of the Alps, taking the shape of treatises, letters, poems, satires, and predictions, the theme of which was the corruption of the clergy, and especially the worldliness of the Roman Curia. To many the ancient Church seemed to be as rotten as the Holy Roman-Teutonic Empire; and many foretold the downfall of both these buttresses of the medieval system. The signs of the times became more and more threatening. To observant spectators it seemed as if, with the advent to power of the Medici, a heavy storm must break over the Church.

That a man who was not equal to the serious duties of his high office, who, in fact, knew scarcely anything about them, should be raised to the Chair of St. Peter at a moment so fraught with danger, was a severe trial permitted by God to overtake Christendom. With unprecedented optimism Leo X looked into the future without anxiety, and frivolously deluded himself as to the importance of the times. He never gave a thought to reform, on the grand scale which had become necessary. After the delusive results which followed the conclusion of the agreement with France, he gave himself over to a growing feeling of security in respect to the countries on the other side of the Alps

The Pope disregarded even the most serious warnings, such as those uttered by Aleander in respect to Germany in 1 516. He did not co-operate in the half-measures taken, nor in the superficial attempts made to carry out the salutary decrees of the Lateran Council. Therefore the Roman Curia, which had for a long time been held in contempt and made the object of the bitterest satires, remained as worldly as ever. While by many it was scorned for its love of money, equal condemnation fell on the unworthy, immoral conduct of the Roman courtiers, of high and low degree, which the Supreme Head of the Church was either unable or unwilling to check. Political transactions, especially those which concerned the maintenance of the States of the Church, with which the independence of the Holy See was so closely connected, absorbed Leo X more and more. Consequently, though most unnaturally, the concerns of the Church fell into the background, and were usually made subordinate to politics.

The approach of great catastrophes is usually heralded by the dark foreshadowing of future events. At that calamitous time prophetic utterances increased, and notes of solemn warning sounded from all quarters. Shortly before the close of the Lateran Council, the noble Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, in the presence of the Pope and the ecclesiastical assembly, delivered a famous oration relating to the reformation of morals in the Church. Nothing can reveal the necessity of reform in a more startling way than the wretched picture drawn so unflinchingly by this distinguished layman. We have heard a great deal about the making of laws, said he, in apology for his interference, but very little about their observance. Yet nothing could be more urgent. To prove this he described, by the aid of rhetorical antitheses, a picture, painted in the darkest colours, of the corruption which had made its way into the Church. He emphatically pointed out to the Pope that it was his strict duty to remove the crying abuses in ecclesiastical government. In conclusion, he added these words of warning: “If Leo leaves crime any longer unpunished, if he refuses to heal the wounds, it is to be feared that God Himself will no longer apply a slow remedy, but will cut off and destroy the diseased members with fire and sword”. In that very year this oracular prediction was fulfilled.

The most momentous event in modern history, the disruption of the Church in Western Christendom —anticipated and dreaded by many —took place. It was a judgment on all, but not least on the Head of the Church, who was absorbed in politics and worldly pleasures. A canon of Siena, Sigismondo Tizio, who was devoted to the Holy See, writes thus about the Pope: “Many were of opinion that it was bad for the Church that her Head should be absorbed in amusements, music, the chase, and buffoonery, instead of being occupied by the thought of the needs of his flock, and in bewailing its misfortunes. The salt of the earth has lost its savour, and nothing remains for it but to be cast out and trodden on by men”.

The danger of the anti-Papal movement which had broken out in Germany did not escape Leo X, but, absorbed as he was in politics and immersed in the excitements of a worldly life and aesthetic enjoyment, he completely lost sight of his primary duty, and was essentially the wrong man to check the storm at its beginning. He neither realized the full importance of the situation, nor did he understand the deeper causes which had led to the secession from Rome. He was incapable of comprehending that nothing short of a radical reformation in the Head and members of the Church could arrest the movement which had been in preparation for so long. Thus, at this, the most severe crisis which had met her in her fifteen hundred years of history, the right ruler was wanting to the Church. Instead of the Medici Pope, the Church needed a Gregory VII.

Leo’s successor, the noble Adrian VI, the last Pope of Teutonic race, grasped at once the one thing needful, which had been left undone by his predecessor. The pontificate of this distinguished man, though all too short, was rich in decrees for a thorough and trenchant disciplinary reform which covered nearly the whole area of ecclesiastical life. Unfortunately, however, the dry, sober-minded Dutch professor did not in the least understand the Italian temperament, so unlike his own; nor did the Italians understand him. To the end he remained a foreigner on Roman soil. While in his immediate surroundings he called forth the strongest national antipathy, his trenchant reforms raised up many enemies. His death was, therefore, hailed by the Romans as a happy event.

Though, notwithstanding his good intentions, his clear powers of perception, and honest endeavours, Adrian VI did not succeed during his eighteen months’ pontificate in remedying the evils which were the accumulation of a century and a half, still he has the merit of being the first Pope who had the courage to place his finger on the wound, and indicate what had to be done in the future.

Another Medici followed him. Seldom have high expectations been so cruelly disappointed as they were in Clement VII. In spite of his many good qualities, his temperance, his abstemiousness and piety, and his patron age of literature and art, his pontificate was one of the most disastrous known to history. The chief cause of this is to be found in the inconceivable irresolution and pusillanimity of the Pontiff, who lost courage at once, and let the helm fall from his grasp. It needed the royal spirit, the bold determination the mighty strength of a Julius II. to look consequences in the face, take the lead in Italy’s fight for freedom, and wrest the Papacy from the dominion of Spain. It was obvious therefore that a small-minded, pusillanimous calculator, such as Clement VII, must fail. “This man”, says Guicciardini, “was raised to the Papal See by a wondrous stroke of fortune. But when he reached the summit, the misfortunes which attended him greatly outweighed his good fortune. For what prosperity can be put in the balance against the ignominy of his captivity, the misery of the sack of Rome, or the evil fate of bringing about the ruin of his native city?”

The Florentine historian does not mention what was the greatest misfortune of all. While Clement VII was so unhappy in his attempts to procure the freedom of Italy and the Holy See, as to end by sealing their dependence on Spain, the defection from Rome in the north assumed terrific proportions. When Clement died, nearly one-third of Europe had broken from the time-hallowed unity of the Catholic faith, which till then, in spite of political and national disturbances, had held all Christian people together.

The religious unity of the Western Church was rent; the great, the blessed, the civilizing influence of Rome was destroyed in a considerable portion of Europe; the common defence against the archenemy of Christianity was broken, and Christian civilization was rent asunder.

Neither of the Medici Popes had fulfilled his duty as regarded the great secession from Rome; for that duty consisted above all things in the concentration of their energies on the work of ecclesiastical reform, with a total disregard for every consideration, whether worldly or national. Both these Popes were but too often unfaithful to their charge by subordinating their pastoral duty to politics, power, and love of possession. Both ignored what lay at the very root of the evil, and mistook throughout the only means to be taken for its removal.

In vain did the cry for help and salvation from ruin resound; and one after another the hopes of better things were shattered. Pain and sorrow filled the souls of the noblest, who sadly asked themselves why it was that Divine Providence permitted the Church to fall into such confusion. But together with this grief over the evilness of the times and the disorders with which a worldly spirit had saturated the Church, there was mingled an angry indignation with the chief pastors who responded so badly to their great vocation. To many it seemed as if all were already lost.

Then help came. As in the days of Gregory VII, so now again salvation came from within the Church. She might be disfigured by hideous evils; she might be oppressed and trodden under foot by her enemies; but it was now proved that the divine spark of life within her was not extinct.

Nearly the whole of the north, and a great part of central Europe, had broken the bonds of reverence and authority which had for so long united them to the Holy See, and had taken up with a new religion. But in the south there were raised up men who, imbued with the Divine Spirit, holding fast to the treasure of the ancient faith, and obedient to the lawful authority of the Church, worked with ardent zeal and untiring energy for their own sanctification as well as for a general and fundamental renewal and reformation of the life of the Church. Egidio Canisio of Viterbo, when speaking before the Lateran Council, had simply and succinctly summed up the theory of true Catholic reformation. “Men must be changed by religion”, said he, “and not religion by men.”

As in the 11th century the Cluniacs, in the 12th the Cistercians, and in the 13th the Franciscans and Dominicans had been raised up to be true reformers, and had stirred up and developed a devoted activity, so now did the noblest among men combine to work for the purification and renovation of the Church. Before the end of the pontificate of Leo X, the Oratory of Divine Love had been formed in Rome. This community grew under Clement VII, and the sack of Rome by the Imperial troops was the cause of its spread over a great part of Italy. The horrible catastrophe which overtook the capital of Christendom terminated the Renaissance. Con temporaries justly regarded it as a divine judgment, and for many it was the occasion of conversion and amendment of life. New Orders sprang into being under the two Medici Popes which corresponded to the needs of the time, and achieved most practical ends. Such were the Theatines, the Capuchins, the Clerks Regular o Somascha, the Barnabites, and, lastly, the most important instrument of all for the Catholic reformation and restoration, the Society of Jesus.

Saints, apostles and heroes sprang up, and by their mode of life introduced a new era for the regeneration of the Church, and solved the problem, already a century old, of ecclesiastical reform. Like most things that are really great, the reformation of the 16th Century grew out of small, hidden beginnings. It grew silently at the foot of the Curia, till at length it embraced those who bore the dignity of the Papacy. Having accomplished this, it made its way triumphantly in ever-widening circles, winning back a part of that which had been lost, and purifying and ennobling that which had remained faithful.

CHAPTER I.

Election and Beginning of the Pontificate of Leo X. His Efforts to make Peace. End of the Schism of Pisa.

A GREAT pontificate had come to an end. Those Cardinals who attended the Conclave as possible candidates for the Papacy, must have asked themselves whether there were any one among them who could worthily fill the place of one whose rule had been as imposing as that of Julius II. Yet the number of claimants for the supreme dignity was unusually large. Ten, or, according to other accounts, eleven or even twelve Cardinals were eager competitors for the vacancy.

At the time of the death of Julius II, the Sacred College consisted of thirty-one members in all, of whom twenty at the most were then present in Rome. Five of those absent arrived in time, so that twenty-five Cardinals took part in the Papal election. Of these, nineteen were Italians (Riario, Grimani, Soderini, Vigerio, Fieschi, Adriano Castellesi, Leonardo Grosso della Rovere,Carretto da Finale, Sisto Gara della Rovere, Ciocchi del Monte, Accolti , Achille de Grassis, Sauli, Medici, Luigi d’Aragona, Cornaro, Farnese, Gonzaga, and Petrucci). Two were Spaniards (Remolino and Serra). To these were added the Frenchman Robert Challand, the German-Swiss Schinner, the Hungarian Bakócz, and the Englishman Bainbridge. One Cardinal, Raffaello Riario, owed his elevation to Sixtus IV, and another, Giovanni de’ Medici, owed his to Innocent VIII; while of the remainder, ten had been raised to the purple by Alexander VI, and thirteen by Julius II.

Discussions as to the Papal election had begun during the lifetime of Julius II. It was the common opinion that Raffaello Riario, Bakócz, and Grimani, notable for their riches and influence, and after them Fieschi, had the best chance of attaining to the supreme dignity; but this would be the case only if such unlawful means as bribery by money or by the gift of benefices were resorted to. Fortunately, this had been put out of the question by the severe Bull which Julius II had issued on the subject. No one, writes Cardinal Sigismondo Gonzaga, dared to act contrary to this Bull. The Romans, who considered the election of Grimani or of Bakócz as a foregone conclusion, found themselves entirely mistaken. The Venetian Ambassador, who naturally was interested in the claims of his beloved fellow-countryman Grimani, declared emphatically that a simoniacal election was out of the question, and that therefore the wealthy Cardinals were not likely to attain their object. If, continues the Ambassador, an irreproachable life is to give the preference, then, after Grimani, either Medici or Carretto da Finale must be taken into account.

The election of Grimani, of which the Venetians entertained great hopes, was rendered impossible by the opposition with which his candidature was met by the Emperor Maximilian’s representative, Count Carpi, as well as the Spanish Ambassador, Hieronymus de Vich. The favourite candidate of Spain was Raffaello Riario, while Maximilian steadfastly adhered to Adriano Castellesi. But the Sacred College was not inclined to consult the wishes of either of these princes, though they were fully agreed with them on the one point, that the Cardinals deposed by Julius II should not be allowed to take part in the Conclave.

Carvajal, the leader of the schismatic Cardinals, vainly applied to Maximilian to intercede with the Sacred College for him and his companions. Every prospect of their being admitted to the Papal election vanished in the face of the military precautions taken by the Spanish Government both by sea and land. Even the attempt made by France to stir up sedition in Rome through the Orsini, and thus obstruct the election, failed.

Apart from petty disturbances, the days of the vacancy of the Holy See, usually so stormy, passed by peacefully. A newsmonger of the time writes that never in the memory of man had a like quiet prevailed during any Conclave. This was partly owing to the effects of the strong rule of Julius II, and partly to the precautions taken by the Cardinals, and the promises they had made to the Romans. Even the States of the Church remained for the most part at peace, though Giampaolo Baglioni succeeded once more in taking possession of Perugia.

The Conclave was held on the second floor of the Palace of the Vatican, made for ever famous by Raphael's frescoes. The oath was administered to the custodians in the chapel of Nicholas V, and the business of the Conclave was carried on in the Sistine Chapel. Here there were erected for all the Cardinals, even those who were absent, with the exception of course of the schismatics, thirty-one cells, so small and dark that one of the Ambassadors likened them to the cells of a prison or hospital. These rooms were apportioned by lot, with the exception of those allotted to the three sick Cardinals, Sisto Gara della Rovere, Soderini, and Medici, for whom better apartments were set aside. The cell of Soderini was near the Cantoria, while those of both the others were near the door leading into the sacristy. Sisto Gara della Rovere was so ill that he had to be carried into the Conclave; and Cardinal de' Medici, who had arrived with all haste from Florence, suffering from a fistula, had to use a sedan-chair. Each Cardinal had with him several conclavists, besides whom there were two Secretaries to the Conclave, who were admitted inside. The key of the Conclave, at which there were present seventy-five persons exclusive of the Cardinals, were kept by the two Masters of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis and Blasius de Martinellis.

The Mass of the Holy Ghost, before the opening of the Conclave, was said by Cardinal Bakócz, on the morning of the 4th of March. It could not on this occasion be celebrated at the tomb of the Princes of the Apostles, owing to the rebuilding of St. Peter's, which was in progress. It was said instead in the chapel of St. Andrew. The usual opening discourse was delivered by Bishop Petrus Flores. In stringent language this Spaniard exhorted the Conclave to elect as Pope a man who would bring peace to Italy, protect Christendom against the Turks, carry on the reform of ecclesiastical matters, and be able generally to cope with the difficulties of the situation. The speaker laid especial stress on the Bull of Julius II, which had been directed against simony, as on a sacred law. This over, the Cardinals entered into Con clave. Adriano Castellesi arrived only on the evening of that day, bringing the number of electors up to twenty-five.

The arbitrariness and powerful will of Julius II were so fresh in the memory of all the Cardinals, that their first action was to draw up an election capitulation, which was sworn to by all the Cardinals on the 9th of March. This consisted of public and secret articles. The former concerned the war against the Turks, as well as the revenues to be applied to it, more especially the exemption from taxation of the Cardinals; the reformation of the Roman Curia both in its Head and members; the immediate carrying out of the measures introduced in respect of this by Julius II, as well as regulations regarding the residence of the Curia in Rome. It was emphatically laid down in these articles that at least two-thirds of the Sacred College must be agreed as to any proceedings taken against any of its members, as to the nomination of new Cardinals, and Legates ad latere, as to the conferring of a variety of ecclesiastical offices, and finally, as to the government of the States of the Church, from which the laity were almost entirely excluded. To show the importance of the Council of the Lateran in the matter of the reformation of the Church, as well as in that of the war against the Turks, a special decree bound the future Pope to continue and close it. But it could be neither dissolved nor suspended before it had discharged these duties, without the consent of the majority of the Sacred College.

The secret articles of the capitulation related chiefly to the privileges of the Cardinals. Among other things it was laid down that any Cardinal who did not possess an income of 6000 ducats should receive a monthly allowance of 200 ducats, that no one should be appointed Legate against his will, and that all the benefices attached to St. Peter's and St. John Lateran should be conferred on Roman citizens only. Finally, the Pope elected should consent to the division among individual Cardinals of all offices, towns, castles, and jurisdiction belonging to the States of the Church.

As has been truly remarked, there is a peculiar irony in the fact that just at the time when complaints were being made against Papal absolutism, the new Head of the Church should have had his hands thus tied in the most important matters. Even the Imperial Ambassador declared that the newly elected Pontiff would be only half a Pope if he observed this capitulation, to do which, however, he added, no one could force him, seeing that he received unlimited power from God. In fact, the laying down of conditions was so overdone that they could not be carried out. As they were uncanonical, the Cardinals were bound before long to consent to their abolition.

The Bull of Julius II against simony having been read on the 10th of March, a scrutiny could be delayed no longer. It could be seen by its result that no issue had been staked, for the electors had sought to conceal their own real object for the sake of finding out that of their opponents. The Spaniard Serra, who stood in no high repute, received most (fourteen) votes; but no one thought seriously of the elevation to the Papal See of this fellow-countryman of Alexander VI. Next to Serra came Leonardo Grosso della Rovere with eight, Accolti and Bakócz each with seven, Fieschi and Finale each with six votes, while Grimani received only two, and Raffaello Riario none at all. Among those who received only one vote at this scrutiny was Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici. Yet, on the evening of the same day, his election as Pope was almost a certainty. Medici's supporters watched through the whole night to prevent a possible countermovement. Early on the nth of March the votes were taken again in due order, with the result that the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent was declared to have been elected Pope.

The event was contrary to the expectations of most of those concerned. As to the immediate circumstances, we possess the accounts of the Imperial, Venetian, and Florentine Ambassadors, as well as a letter of Cardinal Sigismondo Gonzaga, all of which agree in essentials. We can gather from these that outside influences told but little on the result of the election, which was due rather to the division of the Sacred College into the old and the young Cardinals, and the astute measures by which the latter turned the scale. With great skill the supporters of Medici had kept his candidature secret until the right moment. This explains why, in the first scrutiny, Medici received only the one vote of Cardinal Schinner. The chief objection to his elevation to the Papacy lay in his extreme youth. But here he was helped by the circumstance that even while the Conclave was sitting, he had to go through an operation for the fistula from which he was suffering. This seemed to exclude all likelihood of his reaching an advanced age.

But what commended Medici most to the electors was the brilliant name of his family, the prominent position he had held under Julius II, and the part taken by him against France, to say nothing of his personal qualities, his love of peace, his generosity, and his blameless morals. All these attracted the younger Cardinals, who trusted to his gentleness, kindness, and indulgence.

The political reasons which contributed to the election of Medici are drawn up by the historian Francesco Vettori. “It was hoped”, he writes, “that one who held sway in Florence would be powerful enough to resist both Spain and France, the two great powers which contended for supremacy in Italy, and therefore in Europe”. The cause of the outvoting of the older Cardinals was to be found chiefly in their want of unity and decision, whereas the younger (Sauli, Cornaro, Luigi d'Aragona, Petrucci, Gonzaga, Ciocchi) held firmly together. A great impression had been made on them by the reconciliation between Medici and Soderini, to which the latter had consented immediately before the opening of the Conclave. He preferred to further the promotion of the adversary of his family interests than see Raffaello Riario Pope. Schinner, who, by the desire of the Imperial Ambassador, had to work against both the Venetian and French candidates, also opposed Riario for personal reasons. Castellesi and Luigi d'Aragona also objected to Riario. Nevertheless, during the earlier days of the Conclave, Riario was a formidable rival to Medici, for some even of the younger Cardinals were inclined to favour the nephew of Sixtus IV. This aroused the jealousy of some of the older Cardinals, who now went over to the side of Medici, among them being Adriano Castellesi, who had been hitherto one of his most violent opponents. Finally, Riario gave up all hopes of his own election, and secured for his rival the votes of his own adherents

One formidable opponent to Medici alone remained—the Primate of Hungary, Bakócz, whom Julius II had summoned to Rome. The Council of Pisa, convened in the interests of France, threatened the ecclesiastical unity of the west, and it had seemed necessary to be assured of the obedience of Hungary. This rich, ambitious, and very capable Prince of the Church reckoned on the help of Venice on behalf of his own candidature, and had promised, in the event of his election, an energetic prosecution of the war against the Turks. The only important thing that told against him was that he was not an Italian. Medici’s private secretary and conclavist, the eloquent and gifted Bernardo Dovizi Bibbiena, worked for his master's election with extra ordinary skill; and at last the obstinacy of the older Cardinals, who had threatened to make a demonstration by leaving the Conclave, gave way under the stress of circumstances.

It was unanimously declared by all parties that the election of Medici had been effected without simony. All attempts of the electors to communicate with the outside world had been energetically prevented; and after certain figures had been found cut on the silver dishes, the Cardinals were given nothing but earthenware for their use.

As senior Cardinal-deacon, it was Medici’s lot to read out the voting papers. The Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, remarks that he did this modestly and calmly. He took the name of Leo, and adopted as his motto the words of the first verse of the hundred and nineteenth Psalm : “In my trouble I cried to the Lord; and He heard me”.

Cardinal Farnese announced the result of the election to the people outside, who received it with demonstrations of joy. The cry of “Palle! palle!” (the name for the balls on the arms of the Medici) resounded through the streets of the Eternal City. The Florentine merchants residing in Rome outdid each other in testifying their joy. The astonishment caused by the election of a man not yet thirty-eight years of age was so great that many would scarcely believe the result of the Conclave. If some passed an unfavourable judgment on the election on account of the youth of the Pope, if others amused themselves with making satirical allusions to his weak eyes, as a general rule the joy was unaffected, for Giovanni de' Medici was one of the most popular members of the Sacred College. “It was the best choice which could have been made”, said the Swiss Envoy, Peter Falk; “for Giovanni de' Medici inclines to peace, and is as gentle and temperate as Julius II was violent and harsh. For a century the Church has had no Pope to be compared with this one. Everyone congratulates himself on this election. Only the older Cardinals cannot conceal their disappointment at the elevation of a man so young as to seem to cut off all their hopes of ever attaining to the supreme dignity”.

Other towns, especially Siena, had greater misgivings than had Rome lest the young Pope should not be equal to his heavy burden. It was also thought that Leo X might show too much favour to his relations and fellow countrymen. Stress also was laid on his naturally complaisant and weak character. But on the other hand, it was argued that a man of his spotless reputation must prove to be a good and peace-loving Pope, whose pontificate would be useful to the Church.

All the enemies of France in Rome rejoiced at the election; though many did not trust to the firmness of Leo X. In Florence, however, the satisfaction was quite unbounded, when the news of his election reached that city only ten hours after it had taken place. No expense was begrudged to celebrate the great event; for this was the first time that a son of the city on the Arno had attained to the supreme dignity. The friends of the Medici deluded themselves with the wildest hopes, while even their enemies had to keep quiet and wait for further developments. But even in Florence there were not wanting those who feared for the liberty of their native city, while others, like true merchants, calculated the ad vantages which the event might bring to themselves.

Among the European princes no one hailed the result of the election with greater joy than Ferdinand the Catholic. Zurita reports that the King had declared that the birth of an heir, the conquest of Granada, and Medici’s elevation to the Papacy were the three happiest events in his life.

What is remarkable is that the election of Leo X was favourably received even in France. Louis XII remarked that he who had been raised to the supreme dignity was a good man, from whom therefore nothing but good was to be expected. The Emperor Maximilian’s Ambassador in Rome, Alberto Pio, Count of Carpi, reveals to us the expectations formed in diplomatic circles regarding the new Pope. After a description of the election, he writes as follows: “The Pope, so far as we are able as yet to form an opinion, will act as a gentle lamb rather than as a fierce lion, and will be a promoter of peace rather than of war. He will fulfil his duties conscientiously. Though it is true that he will not be the friend of the French, he will not be their bitter enemy, as was Julius II. Careful of his honour and good repute, he will patronize the learned, orators, poets and musicians; he will erect buildings, and will not neglect either his religious duties or his care for the States of the Church. With the exception of war against the infidels, he will not be drawn into any other, except under grave provocation, and when, as it were, forced to it. What he begins, that also will he complete; he will act circumspectly and indulgently. Truly”, adds Carpi, “the mind of man is variable”.

Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici was the second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent and Clarissa Orsini, being born on the 11th of December 1475. He was destined by his father for the ecclesiastical state at an age so early as to preclude all possibility of his free consent. Having been given the tonsure when only seven years of age, he soon, thanks to the powerful influence of his family, received the gift of many rich benefices, abbeys and dignities; and on the 9th of March 1489, was made Cardinal. Innocent VIII consented most unwillingly to the elevation to the purple of this thirteen-year-old boy, and decreed especially that for the next three years Giovanni should neither wear the outward insignia of his dignity nor have either vote or seat in the College of Cardinals. The classical education of the child-prince was undertaken by the most able humanists and learned men of the time, Angelo Poliziano and Bernardo Bibiena, as well as the holy Marsilio Ficino, who had made the hazardous attempt to combine the platonic cultus with Christianity.

From 1489 till 1491 Giovanni de' Medici studied theology and canon law with Filippo Decio and Bartolomeo Sozzini at Pisa. On the 9th of March 1492, he was invested with the insignia of the Cardinalate in the Abbey of Fiesole, and on the 25th of the same month he went to Rome, where he was received on the following day by Innocent VIII. It was not without anxiety that Lorenzo de' Medici allowed the young Cardinal-deacon of S. Maria in Domenica, who had till then led a pure and steady life, to go to the capital of the world, “the meeting-place of all vices”. This is shown by the beautiful letter, full of earnest exhortations and prudent rules of life, which he wrote at that time to his son.

The death of his father in 1492 recalled the seventeen year-old Cardinal to Florence, whence he returned to Rome in July to take part in the Conclave; after which, when, much against his wishes. Alexander VI was elected Pope, he returned once more to his native city. There he remained till the catastrophe of 1494, which compelled him to escape from Florence disguised as a Franciscan. He who had been the favourite of fortune, now came across the more serious side of life for the first time. To a time of enjoyment there now succeeded the anxieties of a fugitive life. Giovanni, like his brother Piero, did not give up all hope of his family's recovery of what it had lost, and by word and deed took part in all the efforts to restore the Medici to power. But after his hopes had been shattered three times, he travelled for some years in Germany, the Netherlands, and France.

When Giovanni returned to Italy in May, 1500, the changes in the political situation made it advisable for him to settle in Rome. There he lived in the palace of Sant' Eustachio, now the Palazzo Madama, surrounded by antiquities, statues, pictures, and a select library, and devoted himself to the literary and artistic interests which were traditional in his family.

The year 1503 brought with it both the Papal election and the sudden death of Piero de' Medici. Giovanni, who was now the head of the family, did not disguise from himself that nothing but a change in the political situation could restore to his family the dominion over Florence. As a consequence of his widespread patronage, his great generosity, and his poor knowledge of business, he often found himself in very difficult circumstances; but in spite of all his difficulties he firmly believed in his lucky star. According to him it was fortune which raised men to distinction; and with this he consoled his family. Nothing could fail them, unless they themselves gave in. As for him, however empty his coffers, he continued his generosity to learned and literary men, musicians and artists. This generosity pleased the Romans quite as much as did the gentleness and affability of the Cardinal of S. Maria in Domenica, who became one of the favourite members of the Sacred College.

The light-heartedness of Cardinal de' Medici was remarkable; and it never forsook him, even under the most painful circumstances. It is true that the son of Lorenzo led a more worldly life than did many of the older Cardinals; yet he was distinguished above all for his dignity and the decorum of his deportment.

After long, troubled years, towards the end of the pontificate of Julius II, fortune smiled once more on him who had been so sorely tried. On the 1st of October 1511, he was appointed Legate to Bologna and the Romagna. Before this, Cardinal de' Medici had afforded a proof of his trust in his lucky star; for during the severe illness of Julius II in August 1511, Giovanni was one of those who put themselves forward as candidates for the triple crown. Though the recovery of the Pope put an end to all hopes of an immediate elevation to the supreme dignity, the prospect of a restoration to power of his family dawned on Cardinal de' Medici. So long as the Florentine Republic favoured the Pisa schismatics, Julius would take part with the Medici. In fact, their fate depended on the success of the Spanish-Papal army, with which Cardinal de' Medici remained as Legate. The slowness with which he acted in that capacity did not at all come up to the expectations of the fiery della Rovere, though he justified his delays sufficiently to retain his post. Once more, however, was he to experience the fickleness of fortune. On the 11th of April 1512, the Spanish-Papal army suffered a severe defeat at Ravenna, at which Cardinal de’ Medici was taken prisoner and carried off to Milan. When he was there, Julius II sent him powers to grant absolution from ecclesiastical censures to the numerous Frenchmen who besought that grace; and ere long the captive saw himself surrounded by suppliants. When, in their turn, the French suffered a reverse, it was arranged that Cardinal de’ Medici should be taken to France. But here the proverbial good fortune of his family asserted itself, for, while crossing the Po, he succeeded in evading his captors and escaped to Bologna.

It was not hard to make Julius II understand that nothing but a change in the government of Florence could destroy the French influence in central Italy. When war was in consequence declared against Florence, Cardinal de’ Medici, in the retinue of Cardona, trod once more the soil of his native country. He was witness of the plundering of Prato, where he vainly tried to moderate the brutality of the Spaniards. After a bloodless revolution had restored the dominion of his family in Florence, the Cardinal went to live there on the 14th of September 1512. But although both he and his brother Giuliano did all they could to find favour, the city remained in a state of disturbance. A plot for the overthrow of the Medici had just been brought to light when the news of the death of Julius II called the Cardinal with all speed to Rome, to take part in the Conclave from which he came forth Pope.

At the early age of thirty-eight he had with almost un precedented celerity risen to the supreme dignity. What a fate had his been! Banished, imprisoned, liberated, at one time Lord of Florence, and now Supreme Head of the Church! What wonder that men of letters could not tire of extolling this favourite and conqueror of fortune in verse and inscription.

As Leo was only deacon, he was ordained priest on the 15th of March and consecrated Bishop on the 17th. As Holy Week was so near at hand, his coronation had to take place at once, and was fixed for Saturday the 19th, the Feast of St. Joseph, although, according to custom, the ceremony had to take place on a Sunday. In spite of the short time allowed for preparations, the function was carried out with great splendour. Cardinal Farnese placed on the head of the new Pontiff a tiara made specially for the occasion, set with rich pearls and precious stones. According to an ancient custom, the Pope was wont to confer many and generous favours, especially on the Cardinals. The demands this time were so many and exorbitant, that Leo, smiling, said to the Cardinals that they had better at once take his crown, for then, being popes, they could grant to themselves all that they wished.

On the following day, at the celebration of Palm Sunday, Leo X rejected the use of the Sedia Gestatoria, remarking that, as he was so young, he did not need any assistance of the kind. At the washing of the feet on Maundy Thurs day, the Pope really kissed the feet of the poor men. The ceremony, said he, ought to take place in reality and not only in appearance. It was the same with all the other striking solemnities of Holy Week. Leo X took part in them with great recollection, and a close observance of the ritual. The demolition of St. Peter’s, then in progress, made it impossible to celebrate the high mass on Easter Sunday in that basilica. The Sistine Chapel was therefore selected in its stead, with no detriment to the solemnity. On the contrary, as remarks the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, the Papal majesty could be displayed to better effect in the smaller space.

On the 1st of April, the Romans were made happy by the removal of the tax on wine and flour. On the 4th, the first Consistory was held, at which Paris de Grassis was made Bishop of Pesaro. At this ceremony the Pope appeared in a plain mitre without jewels. But, on the other hand, no kind of splendour was omitted in the ceremony of taking possession of the Lateran, for which great preparations were made. It was fixed for the nth of April, the Feast of St. Leo, as well as the anniversary of the capture of Leo X at Ravenna. This was done so that that unlucky day might be changed into a day of rejoicing.

The most extensive preparations for the decoration of the streets were made. All that the Rome of Raphael could produce in the way of antiquities and art was made to contribute to the glory of the Medici. The important occasion of the “Possesso”, or taking possession of the Church of the Popes, was intended to usher in not only a new era of artistic magnificence, but also that of peace. On the 10th of April, at the request of Bibbiena and of Cardinal Luigi d'Aragona, certain censures pronounced on Duke Alfonso of Ferrara by Julius II were removed in order that that prince might be able to take part in the solemnity arrayed in all his ducal splendour.

The weather smiled on the triumphal procession; and when this had been marshalled by Paris de Grassis, Master of Ceremonies, the Pope appeared. The Duke of Ferrara led his horse, and held the bridle till the fountain in the Piazza of St. Peter's was reached. There he was relieved by Francesco Maria della Rovere, Duke of Urbino, Giovan Maria da Varano, Lord of Camerino, and the Pope’s nephew, Lorenzo de' Medici.

The procession was the most magnificent spectacle which Rome had witnessed since the days of the Emperors. It was headed by two hundred mounted lancers, and the inferior members of the household of the Pope and Cardinals. The bands of musicians who attended these, wearing the Papal livery of white, red, and green, with the Medici badge on their breasts, were a brilliant sight. Then followed the standards of the twelve Papal cursori and the thirteen representatives of the Rioni, and the banner of the University, with its device of a flame coloured cherub. The great red standard of Rome, with its golden letters S.P.Q.R (Senatus Populusque Romanus) was borne by Giovan Giorgio Cesarini. With him ranked the Procurator of the Teutonic Order of Knights, carrying their white banner surmounted by a black cross; the Prior of the Knights of St. John with the banner of the Order—red silk with a white cross. The banner of the Captain-General followed, and, last of all, the Gonfaloniere of the Church.

Then came the Papal Marshal, with nine white horses and three white mules, with red trappings embroidered in gold; the Master of the Horse, clad in red, and the numerous chamberlains of honour, two of whom carried the mitre, set with pearls and precious stones, and two others the tiara, decorated with priceless gems. The brilliant group of knights, of the Roman and Florentine nobility, recalled the mediaeval history of Italy. There were the Colonna, Orsini, Savelli, Conti, Santa Croce, Gaetani, Medici, Soderini, Tornabuoni, Salviati, Pucci, Strozzi, all magnificently arrayed, and each attended by a numerous and brilliant suite. This stately procession included the diplomatic body; first the Envoys of the provinces and towns belonging to the States of the Church; then the Ambassadors from Florence, Venice, Spain, and France; and lastly, riding between Jacopo Salviati and the Senator of Rome, the representative of the Empire. At the end of the cavalcade of gentlemen who bore no arms, could be seen the Duke of Urbino, clad in mourning for the death of his uncle, Julius II, and the nephew of Leo X, Lorenzo de' Medici.

The spiritual court of the Pope presented a picture no less brilliantly coloured: first there were the >ostiarii, then the three apostolic sub-deacons, carrying a great gold cross, preceded the white palfreys, which carried on their backs the tabernacle, containing the Most Holy Sacrament, over which four Roman citizens held a canopy, surrounded by twenty-five grooms with wax torches. Immediately behind came the sacristan, with a white staff in his hand, a secretary, and a consistorial advocate. The two accompanying “sea-prefects” recalled a time long since passed.

The Papal choir followed, then the clerics of the apostolic treasury, the consistorial advocates, and the Master of the Sacred Palace. After these came two hundred and fifty abbots, bishops and archbishops, and lastly the Cardinals, according to their rank, each accompanied by eight chamberlains. Between Cardinal Gonzaga and Cardinal Petrucci could be seen Alfonso of Ferrara, clad in his ducal mantle, embroidered in gold. Then followed the Swiss Guard, magnificent men, of erect carriage, with glittering armour and picturesque uniform. These heralded the approach of the Pope.

Under a canopy, borne by Roman citizens, rode Leo X, attired with all the insignia of his Papal dignity, and his tiara, sparkling with jewels, on his head. He was mounted on the same Turkish horse which he was riding a year previously, when taken prisoner by the French at the bloody battle of Ravenna. The Holy Father was immediately followed by the Maestro di Camera and several other chamberlains, by whom gold and silver coins were thrown among the crowd. A number of pro­tonotaries followed, and, finally, the macerius with the Pope’s ombrellino. Four hundred knights wound up the procession.

An immense crowd filled all the streets of the so-called “via papale”, through which the procession had to pass on its long journey to the Lateran. Even nature seemed to share in the general joy, for it was one of those glorious days of a Roman spring, when the sun, shining out of the deep blue sky, sheds a blinding light over everything.

Near the bridge of St. Angelo there was erected a stand for the representatives of the Jewish community in Rome, in front of which the Pope stopped in order to receive, according to custom, the scroll of the law, and signify his rejection of its false interpretation. On the further end of the same bridge the first of the triumphal arches was erected, on which this inscription could be read : “To Leo the Tenth, the promoter of ecclesiastical unity and peace among Christian nations”. At the entrance to the Via Giulia there stood a second arch. Many others were erected on the way to the Lateran. Inside that basilica, reaching from the portico to the high altar, a stage was put up, about ten feet high and twenty broad, for the exclusive use of those who took part in the ceremony. After all the usual ceremonies had been performed in the Council Hall, the Chapel of St. Silvester, and the sancta sanctorum, a brilliant banquet was prepared in the Palace. Dusk set in during the return journey, and the illumination of the houses had begun.

The streets which formed the processional route were decorated with silken draperies, either worked in gold or painted, mingled with garlands of foliage and bright flowers. All the windows were full of spectators, while crowds thronged round the houses, keeping up their cry of “Leo!" or “Palle, palle!”. The lower clergy of the city, in order to pay their homage to the Supreme Head of the Church, clustered round the beautifully adorned altars which were set up at intervals along the streets. In marked contrast with these were the antique statues which had been placed in front of some of the houses. In still greater contrast were the numerous triumphal arches, which “after the manner of ancient Rome”, as says Giovio, were the chief adornment of the city on this festal occasion. On the very first of these, which had been set up by Raffaello Petrucci, Bishop of Grosseto and Castellan of St. Angelo, facing the bridge already mentioned, there could be seen Apollo and his lyre : though alongside of him was a representation of Christ delivering the keys to St. Peter. On the arch of the Florentine merchants could be seen the Baptism of Christ by St. John, while further on were SS. Peter and Paul, and SS. Cosmas and Damian, the patron saints of the Medici, with their arms and badges, mixed up with interesting allusions to ecclesiastical politics. The same sort of thing was to be seen on the arch put up by the Master of the Papal mint, Johannes Zink. Among other devices was a representation of kings paying homage to the Pope, and a session of the Lateran Council, with the inscription: “Thou wilt conclude the Council, and wilt be called the Reformer of the Church”.

The most artistic arches had been erected by the wealthy bankers. That put up by Agostino Chigi, near his house in the Via del Banco di Santo Spirito, surpassed all the others. On it was the inscription: “To Leo the Tenth, the happy restorer of peace!”. But, as befitted the worldly mind of Chigi, nearly all the figures on his arch were pagan: Apollo, Mercury, Pallas, nymphs and centaurs. Here, in golden letters, was to be read the satire, so soon to become famous, referring to the reigns of Alexander VI and Julius II, which at the same time expressed the hopes held by the humanists as regarded Leo X.

First Venus ruled ; then came the god of war;

Now, great Minerva, it is thy day that dawns.

The celebrated goldsmith, Antonio di San Marino, responded to this in a way quite in harmony with the worldliness of Rome. He placed a statue of Venus over his house with this inscription :

Mars has reigned; Pallas has followed;

 but the reign of Venus will never end.

Italian verses also could be seen under various statues. The arch put up in the Piazza di Parione by Ferdinando Ponzetti, the clerical chamberlain, was decorated with Perseus, Apollo, Moses, Mercury, and Diana, in addition to which was a representation of Cardinal de' Medici's rescue at the battle of Ravenna. No one was scandalized by this mixture of Christianity and paganism. One Bishop, after wards Cardinal Andrea della Valle, adorned his arch with nothing but antique statues : Apollo, Bacchus, Mercury, Hercules, Venus. A Roman patrician, Evangelista de' Rossi, had the largest collection of antique sculptures dis played for show at his house. Innumerable were the inscriptions which hailed Leo as the patron of learning. One floral arch at the Pellicceria bore the inscription: “Destiny has been fulfilled!”. The house of the Genoese banker, Sauli, had erected a truly artistic arch, from which a boy stepped forth and recited Latin verse. An inscription on this arch hailed the Pope as the day-star of peace.

On this great festival, celebrated in Leo’s honour, many inscriptions and emblems alluded to the love of peace of the newly-elected Pope, who would, so said those who extolled him, extend to the wider field of his high position the gentleness and moderation by which he had been so well known heretofore. The harshness and violence of Julius II. were so fresh in the memory of all men that his fortunate successor basked in the sunshine of popularity without any particular effort on his own part. The humanists, of whom the new Pope had been, even as a Cardinal, the friend and patron, proclaimed on all sides that now the iron age had given way to the golden. No doubt it was in the mind of Leo to fulfil these expectations and prove himself to be the most generous of patrons; but this was not all, for, at the beginning of his pontificate, he seemed eager to justify the good opinion held of him, on ecclesiastical and political grounds also.

As early as the 29th of March 1513, the Pope’s nephew, Giulio de' Medici, who was more versed than any, except Bibbiena, in the secrets of politics, announced to Giuliano de' Medici, the sole surviving brother of the Pope in Florence, that His Holiness’s sole care henceforward would be to give to Christendom the much-needed peace, in ecclesiastical as well as in political matters. The termination of the schism of Pisa, the prevention of fresh wars in Italy, the maintenance of the States of the Church, the union, as far as was possible, of the Christian princes for the defence of Europe against the Turks, were great under takings, the accomplishment of which demanded a well-nigh superhuman power. The future alone could decide whether the Medici Pope was the man to do it.

The first measures of Leo X tended to confirm the good opinion formed of his desire for peace, as well as of his prudence and magnanimity. The severity with which the conspiracy of the Boscoli against the Medicean rule in Florence had been suppressed, was not at all to his mind. The historians Giovio and Nerli are of opinion that the Pope would have wished to pardon the offenders, had not the Florentine government ordered their execution as soon as sentence had been passed on them. He did, however, succeed in effecting the liberation of the other prisoners. The Soderini, the implacable antagonists of the Medici, were reconciled by the Pope’s magnanimity. Pietro Soderini, who was living in exile at Ragusa, was allowed by the Pope to return to Rome, having his confiscated possessions restored to him at the same time. In order to put an end to enmity in the future, a marriage was proposed between a Medici and a Soderini. Leo, further, did his best to win over the turbulent Pompeo Colonna by holding out offers of pardon and reinstatement. There was even question of a complete reconciliation with the d'Este and Bentivogli. A commission of Cardinals was appointed to negotiate with both, and in June peace was arranged with the latter.

Leo’s attitude towards the schismatic Cardinals was one of magnanimity and forbearance. Their leaders, Carvajal and Sanseverino, were in the hands of the Florentines, and according to the Papal commands had been taken to Florence. Thither a special envoy conveyed to them re assuring messages. His Holiness, said he, would prefer mercy to justice, and would grant them pardon and restoration to their former estate if only they would make this possible to him by their submission. But, as a preliminary condition of his taking any further steps, they must consider themselves lawfully debarred from wearing the insignia of their dignity as Cardinals. The representative of France, Giovan Giordano Orsini, and Fabrizio Colonna interceded warmly for these unfortunate men; but Cardinals Schinner, Remolino, and Bainbridge, as well as the Spanish Ambassador, Hieronymus de Vich, strongly opposed their reconciliation. However, the Pope remained firm in his desire to grant absolution on the one condition of their submission and recantation. All further terms were to be settled by a commission of Cardinals; but, as the schismatics would not hear of submission, negotiations became very difficult.

But Leo met with far greater difficulties in his political efforts to make peace. In the very first days after his election, it was reported that the Supreme Head of the Church was about to send peace-envoys to the Emperor, to France, Spain, England, and Venice. It appears to be a fact that he did entertain some such project, for even before his coronation he issued Briefs, by which he sought to make peace between King Sigismund of Poland and the Grand Master, Albert of Brandenburg, alluding to the Turkish peril, which was increased by the strife of the Christians among themselves. However, as Leo was to find only too soon, the Christian princes were not inclined to give a hearing to the Pontiffs exhortations in the matter of peace.

There is no doubt that the greatest danger which threatened the peace of Europe came from the ambitious French King, Louis XII, who was determined to do everything to avenge his defeat in 1512, and regain Milan. For this end he signed at Blois, on the 23rd of March 1513, an offensive alliance with the Venetian Republic, whereby the Venetians pledged themselves to bring into the field an army of 12,000 men, while at the same time—the middle of May—the French were to invade Italy from the north. According to this agreement neither party was to lay down arms until France had once more gained possession of Lombardy, and the Venetians had reconquered all that they used to hold on the mainland before the Peace of Cambrai.

Without doubt Julius II, with his determined and stormy character, would have retaliated by severe measures for the defection of the Venetians from the Holy League and their alliance with France. Not so the peace-loving, cautious, and hesitating Leo X. However alive he might be to the evils which France had brought on his family, now that he was raised to the supreme dignity he did not wish to attach himself to any party. When the Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors, during the first days of his pontificate, made known to him the impending crisis, and urged him to declare himself openly against France, and support the League with troops and money, Leo replied that he had not been chosen to be Pope in order to make war, but rather peace; and as for money, he wished to keep the treasury of Julius II for the defence of the States of the Church, and for warfare against the Turks. In vain, in a subsequent audience, did the Spanish Ambassador remind him of the debt of gratitude he owed to his master, who had brought the Medici back to Florence. The Pope still refused the request for a contribution of 10,000 ducats.

Instead of declaring war openly against France and Venice, Leo endeavoured by friendly negotiations to restrain both powers from making war. He had already expressed his hopes of peace in a Brief drawn up by Bembo, in which he had announced his election to the Doge.

To Foscari, the Venetian Ambassador, he protested that he loved the Republic, though he warned him emphatically against anything so hazardous as an alliance with France. The Ambassador denied the existence of any such treaty. It was only when, on the 13th of April 1513, Leo turned for an explanation to his new Nuncio in Venice, Pietro Bibbiena, that the Venetian Ambassador owned for the first time to the league formed between the two States. Though he did not dare to tell the Pope the whole truth, he remarked plainly how much displeased His Holiness was by the projected seizure of Milan by the French. The Ambassador sums up his opinion of the attitude of Leo X by saying that his chief wish was to remain neutral and watch which State would be favoured by the fortune of war. In spite of the efforts of the Spanish and Imperial Ambassadors to bring him over to their side, Foscari was able to say, on the 8th of April, that the Pope still remained neutral. It was certain that he did not want to see the French in Italy.

On his side Louis made every offer which could have gained the support of Leo X. For this end he appealed to the Pope’s brother, Giuliano de' Medici, and gave him to understand how much he hoped that Leo would not oppose his proceedings against Milan. Should he do so, the King would not carry out his plans of conquest, and would even leave the conditions of peace in the hands of the Supreme Head of the Church. Giuliano, being a partisan of France, supported the request of Louis XII, but Leo X met it with much reserve. He did not, indeed, consider it advisable to oppose the King directly, but sought rather to turn him from his warlike projects by friendly representations and the promise of such future advantages as might induce him to delay his expedition. But Louis did not trust the promises of the Pope, for he could see his real object was to prevent the conquest of Milan. Even after Louis had succeeded in agreeing with Spain for a year’s truce for the purpose of arranging the Italian campaign, he remained more bent than ever on regaining his lost prestige.

Meanwhile the condition of Milan had become such, that she saw herself compelled to invite France to take possession. The weak, frivolous Duke, Maximilian Sforza, was so unequal to the situation that the chronicler Prato applied to him the words of Scripture: “Woe to thee, O land, when thy king is a child.” The Swiss as well as the Spaniards, on whom the Duke relied, had made themselves so hated in Lombardy by their extortions, that many there longed for the restoration of the French occupation. Threatened by this imminent danger, the Duke of Milan turned for help to Leo X as well as to Switzerland. In spite of the blandishments of France, that country remained true to Sforza, because they could scarcely hope to obtain the payment promised to them from any other Duke of Milan. But it was much more difficult to gain the support of the still hesitating Pope. In the hope of gaining it, the highly-gifted Girolamo Morone was sent to Rome in April. He pointed out emphatically that action—serious action—must be taken, if the many efforts made by Julius II for the liberty of Italy were not to remain fruitless, and all that he had accomplished called in question. Parma and Piacenza, as the Envoy pointed out, must inevitably fall into the hands of the French if Sforza were not supported. Cardona, the Viceroy of Naples, had taken possession of them in the name of Milan after the death of Julius II. It was not till the beginning of May 1513, that Leo X arranged for their restoration.

Morone’s representations were supported by the Emperor’s Envoys, who painted in the blackest colours the danger of the French supremacy which must necessarily follow the occupation of Lombardy. Morone declared over and over again that the Pope alone could help, for Spain was no longer to be counted on; it was in his power to open the treasury of Julius II and subsidize the Swiss, and in this way save Milan. An old enemy of France, Cardinal Schinner, who had at that time much influence with Leo X, pointed out to him the strength of the fighting population of Switzerland. But above all he urged the necessity of upholding the Papal reputation. Leo would willingly have still deferred his decision, had not a new combination among the powers put an end to all hesitation.

On the 5th of April 1513, a Holy League was formed at Mechlin between the Emperor Maximilian and the English King, Henry VIII, Leo X and Ferdinand of Spain being named as their allies. It was agreed that France should be attacked on four sides at once, and rendered incapable, by her dismemberment, of destroying the peace of Europe. But even after this powerful anti-French league had been formed, Leo maintained for some time an entirely neutral position. The more the Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors urged the ratification of the League of Mechlin, the more reluctant was he to declare himself openly as belonging to it. Nevertheless, the actual circumstances pointed un questionably to the necessity of decision on his part. The French army of invasion was already encamped at the foot of the Alps, and Leo could not long escape the danger of being isolated. But the manner in which he finally made up his mind is very characteristic of his policy.

The historian Paolo Giovio describes the hesitation of Leo at this important moment.  Although the Pope—as was inevitable with a new sovereign—had not yet developed his political programme, he had made up his mind that the course which his predecessor had taken from mature and serious conviction, was to be followed no longer. At all costs Julius would have upheld in Milan the restored Duke, Maximilian Sforza; and have considered the alliance with the brave, faithful, and victorious Swiss as a thing profitable and honourable for the Holy See. But even while Leo X recognized in himself the official prosecutor of Julius’s policy, he believed that it behoved him to maintain a certain reserve, as far as was compatible with blaming no one openly, and thus to retain the title of peacemaker, so befitting to a Pope. On one side, therefore, he tried to keep up the courage of France’s enemies; on the other, he wished to avoid the appearance of being too harsh with that country. For the power of France was great, both on account of its own strength and its alliance with Venice: and who could foretell how matters would turn out in the field of war? One circumstance, not mentioned by Giovio, but which must have had an undoubted influence in overcoming the hesitation of Leo X, was the continuance of the schism in France. Even were he compelled to follow the path adopted by his predecessor, nevertheless the restoration of ecclesiastical unity forbade him from cutting off all communication with France.

Out of such hesitation there grew the resolve to stand by the Holy League, and pay the money required for subsidizing the mercenaries in the service of Milan, by which alone that state could be saved. But how anxious the Pope was not to let himself be robbed of the prospect of an understanding with France, can be seen by the fact that the payment was to be made quite secretly. It is true that the subvention was officially denied, but the truth leaked out by reason of the clause in the agreement, which appointed that 20,000 ducats of the whole sum should be devoted to pensioning certain distinguished personages, while the balance of 22,000 was to be paid to the Swiss mercenaries.

The conduct of the Pope shows how willingly he would even then have adopted a policy of delay. But this was no longer possible. Nevertheless, though he actually adhered to the political arrangements made by his predecessor, he did not join the anti-French league openly, and most anxiously avoided anything which could exasperate either the French or the Venetians.

Knowing that everything depended on promptitude, the French had begun hostilities in May and had advanced on Asti and Alessandria with 14,000 men, while the Venetians were advancing simultaneously from the east. As the Spaniards remained inactive, Maximilian Sforza was in the greatest danger. Shut up in Novara, the Duke seemed to be lost, when a brilliant feat on the part of the Swiss changed the whole aspect of affairs. Early on the 6th of June, they, with heroic contempt of death, attacked the French army in the open plain of Novara, and defeated them so completely that those who remained fled to Turin, and thence over the Mont Cenis. The cities of Lombardy bought the favour of the Duke, while the Venetians retired eastward. At Genoa the French abandoned all hope, and the Adorni willingly gave up the city, where Ottaviano Fregoso, the friend of Leo X, was elected Doge.

When the news of the battle of Novara reached Rome on the evening of the 10th of June, all the enemies of France rejoiced. Bonfires were lighted, and the cry of “Julius II” resounded through the streets, and Cardinal Schinner had the bells of his titular church rung. But from the Pope alone nothing was heard of a celebration of the victory.

Although, however, one of Leo’s most influential advisers, Bernardo Bibbiena, now went over entirely to the side of the French, and finally did all he could to bring the Supreme Pontiff over to his views, Leo persisted in maintaining a more neutral attitude. The Imperial Ambassador demanded help for the subjugation of Venice; Henry VIII added the request that Leo X would join the Anglo-Imperial alliance and occupy the southern side of the Alps with an army; but the Pope declared that in his position as Father of Christendom he was bound to refrain from siding openly with any party. In his letters of congratulation, he exhorted the victors to observe mercy and peace, which was so essential in view of the increasing danger from the Turks. On all sides he issued Briefs advocating reconciliation; and tried to get once more into sympathy with France, whose open enemy he had never declared himself. On June the 17th the Venetian Ambassador announced that there was no fear of the Pope taking any hostile steps against Venice, as he thought a great deal more about the Turkish peril than he did about the unity of Italy, but that the downfall of the French had given him real joy. That this was the case is not to be doubted, and can easily be understood, for the humbled French King would be now constrained to seek reconciliation with Rome and abandon the cause of the schismatics. In fact, the immediate consequence of the victory of Novara was the end of the schism, the submission of the recalcitrant Cardinals, and the adherence of France to the Council of the Lateran.

When he first reopened that Council, Leo X had expressed his fixed determination to put an end to the schism, not by severity, but by the gentlest methods possible. At the sixth session of the Council, when the Procurator, Mario de Perusco, moved that the absent prelates should be cited, and proceedings against the French Pragmatic Sanction resumed, the Pope adjourned a decision out of consideration for Louis XII. Further, at the seventh session, on the 17th of June, the eighth was postponed until November, out of consideration for those among the French prelates who had adduced valid reasons for their absence. At the same time the Pope solemnly declared that he intended to send Legates to all the Christian powers, with the object of restoring peace to Europe.

On this occasion the Secretary of the Council read out a declaration, signed by themselves, in which Bernardino Carvajal and Federigo de Sanseverino —who purposely did not call themselves Cardinals— repudiated the Council of Pisa, recognised the Lateran Council, and asked for absolution. There was a long discussion before this point was conceded. The commission of Cardinals had secretly handed over the decision of the affair to the Pope, who was in favour of compromise and pardon, if the schismatics would acknowledge their guilt and beg for absolution. When, in the declaration read, they professed their readiness to do this, nearly the whole of the Sacred College decided in favour of their reconciliation.

Only the English Cardinal, Bainbridge, and the Swiss, Schinner, were in favour of withholding absolution, being supported in this by the Imperial and Spanish Ambassadors. This party, recalling the rigour of Julius II, represented that the reinstatement of the schismatics would injure the credit of the Holy See, and be a bad precedent for the future. Leo X, however, adhered to his opinion. He hoped, and rightly, to destroy schism and reconcile France by gentleness rather than by severity. In the last decisive session, Schinner threw himself at the feet of the Pope and craved permission to leave the Council hall, as he was unable to hold communion with the recreants, But the Pope and the majority of the Cardinals remained of the opinion that, saving the honour of the Holy See, the good of the Church demanded that absolution should be granted.

It was decided that the schismatic Cardinals, still deprived of their insignia, should come to Rome by night, go straight to the Vatican, and next morning, clad as simple ecclesiastics, should ask for absolution at the Consistory. According to pre-arrangement this took place on the 27th of June. The whole court, and many curious spectators, assembled to witness the unusual scene. For the proud Carvajal it was a terrible humiliation, and, as an eyewitness testifies, his whole body shook with emotion. Then the Pope, speaking earnestly, put their offence before them both.  He declared the necessity of penance, and proposed to them the following form of abjuration:—

“We, Bernardino Carvajal and Federigo Sanseverino, who have been enveloped in the cloud of schism, being now enlightened by divine grace, fully acknowledge the error of schism by which we were held fast. We desire to include in what we now say every declaration we have hitherto made, whether privately or before notaries and witnesses, as though they were expressed here verbally. After long and mature deliberation we renounce all these entirely and, in all sincerity, not from fear—for we are in a safe place and perfect liberty—being recalled by divine grace into the unity of the Apostolic See. That this conversion may not be considered hypocritical or simulated, we humbly beg Your Holiness and the Sacred College of Cardinals for absolution from our errors. And we implore Your Holiness to intercede for us before the Most High God, whose representative you are on earth. In the event of our being reinstated by your mercy in our rank and dignity of the cardinalate, we freely vow and promise, under the ban of anathema, to you, Pope Leo X, the true and undoubted Vicar of Christ, and through you to the Prince of the Apostles, Peter, that never, for whatever cause or reason, or on whatever plea or pretext, will we return to the state of schism from which we have been delivered by the grace of our Redeemer. We will always live in unity of the Holy Catholic Church and in true obedience to Your Holiness. Moreover, we undertake to live with our lords the Cardinals in peace and friendship, without seeking cause for quarrelling or giving provocation. This we say with regard to what we have already said about the past.

“We swear by the Almighty God and by the Book of the Gospels which we hold in our hands, that we will remain in the aforesaid unity of the Church, and will observe all and everything that we have promised, and this under penalty of perjury and other penalties. And having abjured the above-mentioned schism, both by what we have ourselves written, and in the document read before the holy Council of the Lateran, so do we now, in order to prove our sincerity of heart, explicitly anathematize the Council of Pisa, its convention, and all and everything promulgated by it. We acknowledge, hold, and declare every one of its transactions to be null, empty, vain, and without significance, and as the audacious actions of unauthorized persons. On the other hand we declare the holy Council of the Lateran to be the only true Council; we acknowledge that it was convened in a legitimate and just manner, and for a lawful purpose and that all and everything that it has pronounced, whether generally or individually against us, as well as all the sentences and judgments pronounced against us by Pope Julius, as also all that has been pronounced in condemnation of the Council of Pisa, has been done in a fitting, lawful, and just manner.

“This we say, this we believe, this we confess absolutely. We furthermore promise to undertake and perform joyfully and humbly any penance which His Holiness may see good to impose on us for our offences. We consider ourselves as bound by all the aforesaid penalties, and by all others pronounced by the sacred canons against schismatics: and we promise before all here present to observe all that we have undertaken. We beg the notary here present to have one or more copies made, in the full form used by the Chamber, of what we have said, and of all the occurrences regarding this document”.

Carvajal and Sanseverino having read and signed this declaration, the Pope pronounced the form of absolution. Then with due solemnity they were both received back into the Sacred College, and their offices were restored to them, so far as these had not been given to others. All the Cardinals, with the exception of Riario, who was ill, and Bainbridge and Schinner, who persisted in their resistance, were present at the ceremony.

The Christian powers were informed of the important event by dignified Briefs.

While Leo X was on the one hand receiving the schismatic Cardinals back to favour, on the other he meditated making advances to meet the wishes of Louis XII. However, about this time, his attitude towards France changed into one that was more inimical. Hitherto he had carefully avoided any open participation in the war. But suddenly a change took place which perplexed the Venetian Ambassador. The impetus to this change was given by the attitude taken by Venice. After the defeat of the French at Novara, Leo X offered his mediation for the imperilled Republic and accompanied his offer by the expression of the greatest affection. But Venice declared herself to be opposed to any negotiations which did not comprise the restoration to her of Verona and Vicenza on the part of the Emperor. This obstinacy exasperated the Pope, especially as the Venetian troops were giving themselves over to pillage in the territories of Parma and Piacenza. Moreover, the Signoria had, against all precedent, unreasonably delayed the offering of their obedientia to the Holy See, and had brought themselves to do it only when there was nothing more to be hoped for from France.

This being the case, the Pope was not inclined to show any particular consideration towards Venice, when the Emperor urgently begged for the help of a contingent of 200 men of the Papal troops to send against the Republic. This request of the Emperor came at a most unfortunate time for the Pope, in so far as it came in the way of his attempted reconciliation with France. But as to Venice, when given choice between offending the Emperor or her by such a trifle, there could be no doubt as to his decision, and he agreed to the Imperial demand, wishing to remain true to the treaty made by Julius II with Maximilian. The Venetians were alarmed by this event, which made them fear that the Pope would now pass over entirely to the side of their enemy. Leo, for his part, made use of this frame of mind to try to compel them to a reconciliation with the Emperor, and added the threat that he would make the cause of their opponents his own. To give more weight to his endeavours to secure peace, the Pope sent a Nuncio-extraordinary to Venice at the end of June, who was directed to lay great stress on the Turkish peril. The Pope explained to the Venetian Ambassador, Foscari, that he had been compelled to afford to the Emperor the trifling assistance demanded, but that though he wished to see the French driven out of Italy, his feelings towards Venice were far from hostile. On the contrary, he would do everything in his power to bring about an honourable peace between the Republic and the Empire. At the same time, he pointed out that Venice could no longer look for help from France, hard pressed as was that country at home by the fear of an invasion of the English.

Even Foscari had to acknowledge the good-will of the Pope; still the Venetians adhered to their hopeless demand for the restoration by the Empire of Verona and Vicenza. Foscari was in a difficult position. The Pope on his side threatened to espouse the cause of the enemies of the Republic, by making use of his weapons, both spiritual and temporal; while, on the other hand, Venice tried to raise alarm in Rome by giving it to be understood that she would, if necessary, call in the help of the Turks. But Leo X did not allow himself to be turned from his object. At the end of July he said to the Secretary of the Venetian Embassy, who was carrying on the business during the illness of Foscari, that the attitude of Venice was such as to prevent the thought of either peace or truce. Two leagues, said he, would have to be formed, one against the Turks and the other against Venice. In August Leo said to Foscari himself: “I will offer no further mediation, for I see that you expect everything from France. If she wins, she will make herself the mistress of Italy; if she loses, every State will turn against you”.

The Signoria turned a deaf ear to all Leo's exhortations.

Even the news of the invasion of France by the Swiss, and the victory which the English, led by the Emperor Maximilian, had gained over the French on the 16th August in the skirmish of Guinegate, as well as the rumoured negotiations for the formation of a league between the Pope and Spain, produced no change in the purpose of the Republic. In Rome it was asked: What will Venice do now? and the invariable answer was that she would call in the assistance of the Turks. The Pope did not take this threat seriously, and renewed his negotiations with Foscari, and in October with his successor, Lando, but with no better success than before. He acted in the same way with the Germans. The Pope tried to urge them to peace as well as the Venetians. With this object he decided to send Lorenzo Campeggio to Maximilian in Flanders on the 14th of September. The secret instructions to this Nuncio are one of the most important documents for revealing the policy of Leo X during the first years of his pontificate. The Medici Pope was inclined to conceal his intentions as much as possible in order to avoid future inquiries as to their result. Campeggio was therefore directed to keep his instructions quite secret, even so far as to have them written in cipher. These conditions enhance the value of the instructions to no ordinary degree, because few other documents could give the same insight into the objects of the Papal policy. First, the Nuncio is directed to ferret out Maximilian’s intentions as to the pending war, with the assurance that the Pope wishes to remain on good terms with him and his allies, seeing that this corresponds with the interests of the Holy See and the safety of Italy. Above all things the Envoy must represent to the Emperor how ardently the Pope desires the peace of Christendom, as befits his office as Vicar of Christ, and as corresponds with his natural disposition, and as is, finally, suitable to the needs of the European States, which ought to be at peace with each other so as to be able to offer more effectual resistance to the powerful and encroaching empire of the Ottomans. If, however, the Emperor is determined to declare war, it is necessary that he should provide for the union of the allies, and decide whether he will fight France or Venice; for to contend against two such mighty powers would be an impossibility. In the opinion of the Pope, peace with Venice is to be the most recommended, though it would be necessary for the Emperor to lay down conditions such as the Republic could not reasonably reject. But war should, in the Pope’s opinion, be undertaken solely as the means of restoring peace to Europe. Next to his care for the welfare of all Christians, these instructions reveal Leo’s zeal for the peace and independence of Italy. On this account he would wish Sforzato be upheld at Milan; and for the same reason he would stand by England and the Emperor against France. Moreover he would not refuse reconciliation to the adherents of the Council of Pisa, if the schismatics would repent and return to the Church; but the Emperor shall be instructed further on all these matters.

As early as July the Emperor had arranged for peace negotiations, though, by having recourse to arms, he wished to make the terms as favourable as possible to himself. He therefore learned with joy that the Spanish and German troops had made an attack on Venice during the last weeks of September. In thus acting the Spanish Viceroy, Cardona, had been over-precipitate, and on the 20th of October had to make a very difficult retreat. The Venetian troops followed him on foot, and on the 7th October a battle was fought not far from Vicenza, which resulted in a brilliant victory for the Imperial-Spanish army. Under the influence of their severe defeat the Venetian government decided to give to the Pope full power to make peace on the terms he wished. On this Leo at once demanded the cessation of hostilities on the part of the Viceroy. Matthaeus Lang, deeply versed in the secrets of the Imperial policy, was appointed by Maximilian as his representative at the negotiations.

While he was negotiating between the Empire and Venice, Leo was doing the same thing between England and France, urging them to make peace with one another. As he had done after the battle of Novara, so now, in his letters congratulating the King of England on his victory over the French and Scotch, he expressed the hope that the bloody struggle would now be at an end. At the same time he uttered the pious wish that the victorious arms of Henry VIII. might be turned against the Turks. It did not enter into Leo's intentions that France should be driven to extremities. Though opposed to a French occupation of Milan, the Pope wished to keep the way open for an understanding with Louis XII, as the only means of terminating the schism and restoring unity to the Church. As early as July, Leo had sent the distinguished and truly ecclesiastical Cardinal, Robert Challand, to France to prepare the way for a reconciliation.

On his side Louis XII sent the Bishop of Marseilles, Claude de Seyssel to Rome on the 24th of July. As the King had not yet repudiated the schism, his representative could not be received solemnly. He did not therefore appear in the capacity of an Envoy for the obedientia, but only as a simple agent, Seyssel turned especially to Giuliano de' Medici, who was his King’s friend. Nevertheless, he treated immediately of only ecclesiastical matters, for Louis XII had by no means given up his plans for the conquest of Italy. To hinder him in this project, the Emperor and the Kings of England and Spain had made a treaty of alliance against France, on the 17th of October 1513. It was only on learning this that Louis XII, made up his mind.

He was influenced not a little in his change of purpose by the voice of an influential body in France, who refused to recognise the lamentable anti-Papal Council, and desired a restoration of union with Rome. The influence of the Queen, who had always been opposed to the schism, weighed also in the balance. If, in spite of the King’s change of purpose, the negotiations for a reconciliation progressed but slowly, the reason was that, though the acceptance at Rome of the resolutions passed by the Council of Pisa was recognised as an impossibility, yet the express rejection of them by France would be accompanied by the gravest difficulties. Another great obstacle lay in the pride of Louis XII. He rebelled against the idea of asking, in so many words, for absolution from the ecclesiastical penalties which he had incurred. Apparently the die was finally cast by the verdict of Girolamo Aleander, the learned Rector of the University of Paris, whom the King had consulted, and who decided that the Council of Pisa was no longer defensible.

Seyssel had already formed his opinion that its repudiation was the only course possible in the interests of France. On the 6th of October, therefore, the arbitrators who had been appointed, Cardinal Sanseverino, the Protector of France, and Louis Forbin, Lord of Solier, with the Pope and four Cardinals deputed for the negotiation of this affair, drew up a solemn declaration by which Louis XII rejected the Council of Pisa and acknowledged that of the Lateran. The act was actually drawn up by Bembo.

On the 26th of October Louis XII agreed to this declaration, and appointed Seyssel and Forbin to present it at the Lateran Council. On the same day he authorized Cardinal Sanseverino, Seyssel, and Forbin to submit his dispute about Milan and Asti, as well as those with the Emperor, England, Switzerland, and Sforza, to the arbitration of the Pope. Leo on his side attested that the French King was not included in the sentence of Julius II against the Council of Pisa, Alfonso of Ferrara, and others, and, were he to receive absolution, it would be only for his greater safety. His ecclesiastical reconciliation would be ratified at the eighth session of the Lateran Council, to be held on the 19th of December.

While negotiations for peace with France were in progress, Rome witnessed another great ceremony, in the shape of the obedientia of the Emperor. The proud Matthaeus Lang had been appointed Maximilian's representative. During his visit to Rome in November, 1512, Julius II had raised this influential adviser of the Emperor to the purple. But Lang, in order to avoid all appearance of double-dealing in his mission, had refused to receive the insignia of his office. When, however, the man on whom so much depended was sent to Rome in November 1513, accompanied by a considerable suite, Leo X wished to send the Cardinal’s hat to meet him. But Lang declined this. He postponed his arrival in Rome till the Pope had returned from Civitavecchia on the 17th of November, and then entered the Eternal City without any pomp. On the 19th he had a private audience with Leo X, who received him with great consideration. During the following days Lang had several interviews with the Pope, one of which lasted for five hours. The subject of their discussion was the reconciliation of Venice with the Emperor, which was strongly urged by Leo. But Lang’s demands were so exorbitant that not only the Venetian Ambassador, but the Pope himself despaired of an accommodation. Lang also put forward the most unusual claims for himself. He lived in Rome in great state, yet he dressed as a layman, and kept his incognito so strictly that he would not go out till after dark. On one occasion this proud upstart kept the Spanish Ambassador waiting in his anteroom for such an unconscionable time, that that worthy exclaimed: “It strikes me that this man wishes to be greater than the Pope”.

An authentic account of Lang’s pretensions as regarded the Pope has been given us by the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis. The haughty Envoy demanded that as representative of the Emperor he should be met by the senators and chief magistrates of the city, when he made his public entry into Rome. In the Consistory he claimed the first place, before all the Cardinals. Lang and the Master of Ceremonies had violent altercations about this and other demands of the same nature. It was at last agreed that the Imperial Envoy should receive the red hat on the 8th of December, and that he should on the following morning be conducted by all the Cardinals from his provisional dwelling to the Consistory. Moreover, precedence over the three Cardinal-deacons made in September was conceded to him.

Lang’s procession to the Consistory on the 9th of December was exceedingly magnificent. His suite consisted of four hundred horsemen, and he was accompanied by several Ambassadors. When the Master of Ceremonies permitted himself to make a remark on the smallness of Lang’s tonsure, and on the great length of his hair, he answered with a jest.

On the 11th of December the Imperial Envoys for the obedientia, the Duke of Bari, brother of Maximilian Sforza, Alberto Pio di Carpi, Pietro Bonomo, Bishop of Trieste, and Antonio della Rovere made their entry into the Eternal City. The Pope ordered a solemn reception for them, though the French Envoy protested against the Duke of Bari acting as the representative of Milan. The ceremony took place on the 14th of December. The dis course on the obedientia was delivered by Girolamo Morone. In it he allowed himself to be carried away into charging the French King with tyranny. As was but natural, the representative of Louis XII entered a strong protest. Morone would have retorted, but was with difficulty prevented by the Master of Ceremonies. Leo X tried to put an end to the quarrel by a conciliatory speech. As usual, he spoke well and elegantly. On the 17th of December Lang dined with Leo X and had an audience with him of two hours’ duration. Afterwards the Pope received the Spanish, and after him the Venetian Ambassador. What passed between them related to peace on the part of Maximilian and Venice.

The eighth session of the Lateran Council was held solemnly on Sunday the 19th of December. Besides the Pope, who had gone to the Lateran the evening before, twenty-three Cardinals, eleven archbishops, forty-five bishops, five generals of religious orders, as well as the Emperor’s Envoy and the Ambassadors of Spain, France, Poland, Venice, Brandenburg, Montferrat, Milan, and Rhodes took part in it. In his opening discourse, the Knight of St. John, John Baptist de Gargus, urged a war against the Turks as a preliminary condition of the establishment of peace among Christian princes. After the Gospel for Sexagesima Sunday had been sung, the Envoys of Louis XII, Claude de Seyssel and Louis Forbin de Solier, presented their King’s solemn declaration that he severed himself thenceforward from all connection with the Council of Pisa, and freely and plainly acknowledged the Council of the Lateran as the only one that was legitimate. Simultaneously a fresh deputation was announced, consisting of six prelates and four doctors who had taken part in the assembly of Pisa, but who now repudiated the pseudo-Council, and asked for absolution. Finally there was handed in a request from the remainder of the absent French, for permission to defer their appearance. Without such a request nothing could be done in the matter of the Pragmatic Sanction. Even on this solemn occasion there was an exciting episode; for the representative of Maximilian Sforza protested against the French King calling himself Duke of Milan in his declaration. The Pope assured him that no trouble should arise from this. After this the Ambassadors of Brandenburg and Montferrat joined the Council.

After the promulgation of a dogmatic constitution of which mention will be made later, two important Bulls were read aloud. One related to the reformation of the Curia, and the other to the restoration of peace among the Christian princes, the formation of a Crusade, and the reconciliation of the heretical Bohemians. The Pope commanded that the Te Deum should be sung at the end of the session in thanksgiving for the adhesion that France had given to the Council, thereby restoring the unity of the Church.

Thus did the first year of Leo X close with a crowning success for his policy of peace. The schism which had broken out under Julius II was practically healed, and the abjuration of many of the Pisa schismatics was to follow ere long. This session of the Council of the Lateran was deeply interesting to the Romans; but their excitement was kept at fever heat by the series of splendid processions of Envoys sent to proffer their obedience to the Pope, which succeeded each other all through the first year of his pontificate, and half through the second. Spectacles of this kind delighted the people quite as much as did the reduction of taxes, and all the other favours bestowed upon them by Leo X. To the customary addresses of the Envoys the Pope replied with such elegance and readiness that the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, cannot refrain from repeating his expressions of admiration in his diary.

The greatest sensation of all was caused by the embassy of King Emanuel of Portugal, who had already sent gifts to the Pope with the intimation of his wondrous successes in the Indies and Africa. On receipt of this the Pope ordered ecclesiastical commemorations, and encouraged the King, in a flattering letter, to take further action against the infidel.

Leo X made extensive preparations for the reception of the Portuguese embassy, which rendered the spectacle of the 12th of March, 1514, unusually brilliant. A Bull had been published four days previously, which called on all the Portuguese to support the King in his crusade against the Moors of Africa. At the head of this embassy came Tristan d'Acunha, who was so well known for his voyages of discovery. He was accompanied by two distinguished lawyers, Diego Pacheco and Juan de Faria, and by many members of the Portuguese nobility, as well as by a number of negroes and Indians—in all seventy persons.

The brilliant and peculiar procession caused even less sensation than the rare and precious gifts presented by the Envoy to the Pope, as a living proof of the conquest of the territory of the infidels. There were Persian horses, Indian poultry, parrots, a young panther, two leopards, and a white elephant, on which the sight-loving Romans could not sufficiently feast their eyes. A richly-dressed Moor rode on the powerful beast, which carried on its back, under an ornamental canopy, a chest, surmounted by a silver fortress flanked with many towers. Inside the chest were various gifts for Leo: vestments embroidered in gold and precious stones, and chalices of purest gold, a beautiful altar-cloth, and costly books. The elephant followed its leader docilely; and when it approached the bridge of St. Angelo, above which the Pope was stationed to behold the unwonted spectacle, the beast stood still, and bent its knees three times to His Holiness. The joy of the people reached its height when the elephant sprinkled them with water which had been given to it. The animal became the talk of the town; poets sang its praises, and even the dry Master of Ceremonies set himself to describe it.

The clever beast, which performed various tricks, had for a keeper Battista Branconio, who was a friend of Raphael’s. To no less a man than the great painter of Urbino was given the commission, after the elephant’s solemn entry into Rome, to paint its portrait in a lower cupola of the Vatican. This portrait was destroyed in the course of the restorations made by Paul V. But on a door which leads from the Stanza della Signatura into the Stanza d'Eliodoro, there has been preserved a fine piece of intarsia work, which represents the elephant as it is described by the poet Baraballo. In a woodcut also we have a representation of the beast, the like of which had never been seen in Rome since the days of the Emperors.

On the 26th of March the Portuguese Envoy made his obedientia in a public Consistory. Pacheco delivered the usual discourse, which is a model of the extravagant bombast which was loved and admired at that time. Leo answered elegantly as well as exhaustively, treating of the necessity of peace among the Christian princes, and of their combination against the infidels. Next day there took place the presentation of the gifts, the value of which surpassed even the imagination of contemporary writers. The Pope now determined to send to King Emanuel the Golden Rose which he had originally intended for the Emperor.

The substantial concessions received by their Envoys were more important in the eyes of the Portuguese. Leo X at once granted to the King power of raising a tenth from the Portuguese clergy, as long as the war in Africa lasted. Moreover, by a Bull of June 7th, 1514, King Emanuel received the right of patronage over all bishoprics and benefices in his actual possessions over the sea, as well as in lands to be conquered by him in the future, and also the incorporation of these benefices in the Order of Christ. On the 3rd of November, this right of patronage in all countries conquered and to be conquered, was extended, not only to the whole Indies, but to all parts of the world as yet unknown. But even these marks of favour did not satisfy the generosity of Leo X. In the following year he sent to King Emanuel the Sword and Hat usually blessed by the Pope at Christmas. In this way did the Supreme Head of the Church proclaim before the whole world the value he set on the war which the King of Portugal alone among Christian princes had been found to carry on against the infidel, by which such brilliant prospects were opened to Christendom.

CHAPTER II.

The Medici and the Policy of Leo X, 1513-1515.

All Italians are warmly attached to their home and family. This characteristic, beautiful and noble in itself, but so harmful to many Popes, reached such proportions in Leo X that, throughout his pontificate, the history of Florence and of the Medici was closely bound up with that of Rome.

Two out of his many relatives, Giuliano, his brother, and Giulio his cousin, betook themselves to the Eternal City soon after the termination of the Conclave. The former, youngest son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, born in 1479, had always been intended for the secular state, as also was Lorenzo, the son of Leo’s eldest brother Piero. As soon as these two arrived, on the 13th of September 1513, the Roman patriciate was conferred on them with great pomp in the Capitol.

Giuliano, with his weak health, did not seem to possess the qualifications necessary for the management of Florentine affairs; therefore, Leo X decided that he should remain in Rome, with the honourable title of General of the Church. The difficult task of governing the Florentine Republic fell, by command of the Pope, to the lot of Lorenzo, who, though only twenty-one years of age, represented the elder branch of the family. He returned to Florence from Rome on the 10th of August 1513.

The form of government in that city was in essentials exactly what it had been under Lorenzo the Magnificent. Two councils legislated for everything. One consisted of seventy members, elected for life, and the other of a hundred, who were changed every six months. The council of a hundred, to which all late Gonfalonieri might belong, had the sole right of levying supplies and imposing taxes. The adherents of the Medici were in a large majority in both councils, and it was therefore unnecessary to give to Lorenzo a special position above that of the other citizens. The eyes of all were turned on the palace of the Pope’s nephew in the Via Larga, Giulio de' Medici having advised him to make friends by his courtesy and prudent hospitality. The independence of Florence was a mere form, and the house of Medici practically governed supremely. Significant of this was the fact that in September 1513, the Feast of SS. Cosmas and Damian, the patron saints of the Medici, was made into a state holiday. On the Feast of St. John, in 1514, Lorenzo celebrated with great pomp the anniversary of the return of his family to Florence, Cardinals Cibo, Este, Aragona, Cornaro, Bibbiena, and Sauli being present incognito. In May of the following year, the Pope’s nephew having been elected Captain-General of the Florentine levies, he found himself in an unusually prominent position, though the Florentine government was in all essentials dependent on Rome.

The Pope’s cousin, Giulio de' Medici, who had lived chiefly in Lombardy as an inmate of the Capuan Priory of St. John, was made Archbishop of Florence on the 9th of May 1513. Public opinion considered Giulio, who was born on the 26th of May 1478, after the murder of his father by the Pazzi, to be branded with the stain of illegitimate birth, and from this disability he had already received a dispensation. When, in the autumn, there was a question of his being made Cardinal, it was attested by witnesses that a valid marriage had taken place secretly between his father and mother, Floreta, a special deed to that effect being drawn up; and, on the 23d of September 1513, he was, at the age of thirty-five, raised to the much-coveted purple. Giulio received as his title S. Maria in Domenica, which had been that of Leo X before he was elected Pope.

In this his first creation of Cardinals, three others, closely connected with the new Pope, also received the red hat. These were Innocenzo Cibo, Lorenzo Pucci, and Bernardo Bibbiena. Innocenzo Cibo, born in 1491, was the eldest son of Franceschetto Cibo and Maddalena de' Medici, the sister of Leo X. Beyond this relationship he had no particular claims or merits. The Pope in nominating him is reported to have said, in reference to his own elevation through his grandfather: “What I received from an Innocent, that do I give now to an Innocent”. Certainly this did not justify the reception of a youth of twenty-two into the Senate of the Church. As, moreover, he made a very worldly use of his rich benefices, and gave himself over to a life of immorality, nothing but blame can be attached to his elevation to the purple.

Lorenzo Pucci, whose beautiful features are reproduced in the portrait by the master-hand of Sebastiano del Piombo (now in the Hofmuseum at Vienna), was not only a member of one of the most respected branches of the Medici family, but had given proof of his ability and skill under the pontificate of Julius II. Besides this he had been for a long-time teacher of law at Pisa, and had a profound knowledge of canon law and theology. Unfortunately, these excellent qualities were marred by the most execrable avarice, which he sought to satisfy by an unscrupulous traffic in the matter of indulgences. It must, however, be admitted that when it was a question of the promotion of art, Pucci did not spare himself. As an instance of this may be cited the fact that he had his chapel in the Trinità de' Monti painted by Perino del Vaga. He was also on terms of intimacy with Raphael, and it was through an arrangement made by him on behalf of his nephew Antonio that the picture of St. Cecilia was painted. Michael Angelo also did work for the Cardinal of the Quattro Coronati, by which name Pucci was known, after his titular church. If he could say, when speaking of that master, that he was true to him as a brother, such a relationship speaks for itself of the Cardinal's intellectual greatness.

The third to be raised to the purple was, no doubt, a very distinguished and intellectual man; but he was so worldly-minded that his elevation also must be reprehended. Bernardo Dovizi, usually known as Bibbiena from the place of his birth, a small town in the upper Casentino, had been closely connected with the Medici from his early youth. In Florence he had superintended the studies of the young Giovanni, had then become his private secretary, had accompanied him into exile, had defended his interests with Julius II, and had, finally, been invaluable to him by his services as conclavist during the business of the election. As a reward for these services he was first named chief treasurer, and soon after raised to the purple. He was not, however, fitted for such a dignity, being essentially a man of the world, who, besides being devoted to literary and artistic enjoyments, by no means despised those of a grosser description. He was much valued by Leo X on account of his faithful services, his ready pen, his warm interest in literature and art, and his invariable gaiety and overflowing spirits. As an organizer of festivities he had no equal.  In political matters he was the Pope’s principal and most influential adviser during the first years of Leo’s pontificate. At that time, out of opposition to Giuliano, he took up a line against the French; and this was probably the cause of the great fluctuations in the Papal policy.

The political influence exercised by Bibbiena was illustrated by the alterations effected by Leo in the office of the Papal secretaries. Innocent VIII, in reorganizing this department, had placed at its head a confidential secretary, called indifferently segretario domestico, secreto, or intimo, who almost filled the place of a Secretary of State. He was given an apartment in the Vatican, and had free admission to the Pope at all hours; and to him alone were his master’s secrets confided. To him were given over the reports of the Nuncios, to be answered in accordance with the verbal directions of the Pope. Naturally this extraordinary office became ere long the object of envy of the other secretaries, and led, moreover, to many abuses. In order to put an end to all complaints, Leo X appointed special secretaries for the secret Briefs.

The post of “segretario intimo” held under Leo X by Pietro Ardinghello, was considerably reduced in importance by the fact that a Cardinal intervened between him and the Pope, and that all business passed through him. At first this Cardinal was Bibbiena; later it was Giulio de' Medici. It is a mistake to say that at that time the latter was the right hand of the Pope; on the contrary, he had to resign himself for a long time to the Pope’s carrying on the most important business independently of him with Cardinal Bibbiena. The situation became more and more complicated. Bibbiena had been the confidential secretary of Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, and still retained the same post under the Pope during the first years of Leo’s pontificate; even after he had been made a Cardinal, while, by reason of the dignity of the purple, he held a position incalculably superior to that held by Ardinghello, who was more of a private secretary to Leo, for a long time—certainly till the autumn of 1515—he played a part, through his favour with the Pope, far more important than did Cardinal Giulio. Not until 1516 or 1517 did the latter rise to being the principal adviser of the Pope. Previously, Bibbiena’s position had been so confidential that state secrets were confided to him alone, to the exclusion of even Cardinal Giulio. “Bibbiena is all and everything”, declares a Venetian, immediately after the election. Even in the years 1514 and 1515 diplomatists called him the “alter ego” of the Pope.

Bibbiena was a novice in the higher matters of diplomacy, and it was often difficult for him to feel his way. His position was made still more difficult by the intrigues of the friends and adherents of the Medici. These had come in crowds to Rome, where they played an important part. In Leo’s signs of favour towards his relatives they saw only the beginning of much greater things. They entertained the most extravagant hopes, and confidently expected that both Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici would be at once made princes, and given independent territories to the north and south of the States of the Church. It seemed obvious to them that with such a change in Leo’s position the dependents of the fortunate house should receive honourable and lucrative emoluments. It is important to establish the fact that these inordinate schemes for the exaltation of the house of Medici emanated neither from Leo nor from Giuliano or Lorenzo, but from the dependents of the family. Jacopo Nardi expressly states that it was the Medicean courtiers, when discussing matters in the Orsini palace soon after Leo's election, who set abroad the rumour that Giuliano was to be made King of Naples and Lorenzo Duke of Milan. Plans of this sort might have led to the worst complications. The question was what line Leo would take about them.

Contemporaries are almost unanimous in declaring that Leo X allowed himself to be influenced by family considerations in his political actions. But since then the opposite view has been taken, and maintained with success. Probably the truth lies between the two. There is no doubt that the policy of Leo X was influenced more or less by family interests; but as far as we can form any judgment from the sources and materials that are at present at our command, private interests were not in reality so prominent in his mind as those of a higher and more general nature. Such was at one time the traditional policy of the Popes not to allow Naples and Milan to be in the power of one and the same prince. Such also was the security and increase of the States of the Church. National interests also, such as were summed up in the cry for the “freedom for Italy”, played no unimportant part in Leo's policy. Along with these there naturally ran an undercurrent of family interests. Which of these various motives was the strongest in the mind of Leo X cannot be decided with any certainty in the light of the materials which are at present available. In interpreting the secret processes of the human mind, the most extreme reserve is necessary.

As to such a policy of nepotism as was pursued by Alexander VI, the same conditions were entirely wanting in the relatives of Leo X. This applies more immediately to Giuliano, and with certain reservations to Lorenzo de' Medici. Both these princes, famous for a time, live in the memory of the world in the idealized forms which the genius of Michael Angelo has given them in the statues on the tombs of the Medici. But in reality they were not personalities of any importance. Giuliano, thirty-four years of age, was by nature kindly, gentle, and weak, somewhat melancholy and superstitious, but withal intellectual and refined. Like all the Medici, he was the friend of men of letters and artists. He was closely connected with Castiglione and Bembo. Raphael painted his portrait, and his name is connected with Fra Giocondo and Leonardo da Vinci. But Giuliano represented also the darker side of his family's characteristics, by his extravagant generosity, his boundless love of display, his desire for enjoyment, and his debauchery. Licentiousness had exhausted his feeble body, and weakened his ambition and mental activity. A man to whom the granting of frequent audiences was too great an exertion, and who desired above all things to lead a quiet, undisturbed, and pleasant life, was not fitted for high political aspirations.

The young Lorenzo was quite different. Comely in person, a bold rider, an indefatigable sportsman, a good manager, though generous withal, a skilful diplomatist, he was considered by many of his contemporaries to be possessed of all the qualities which would enable him to play a great part as the nephew of the Pope. But more were necessary to obtain a crown, and of these Lorenzo possessed but few. His ambition, as far as we can judge, was moderate; a rich wife, a small, secure, productive estate, beyond these his aspirations did not at first soar. Further desires were not natural to him, but were fostered by the constant instigation of his mother, Alfonsina Orsini. That ambitious, highly-gifted woman burned with the desire to see a shining crown on the head of her son. She conceived lofty plans; at the most, Lorenzo agreed to them unwillingly. Thus the project of gaining the principality of Piombino by supplanting the Appiani, undoubtedly emanated from Lorenzo’s mother, and not from Lorenzo himself; though the plan came to nothing through the determined resistance of Leo X.

Lorenzo returned reluctantly to Florence in August 1513. He would much rather have taken up his abode permanently in Rome, which was so brilliant and rich in enjoyments. But Leo was well acquainted with his nephew, in whom was to be seen the beginning of the decline of the Medici race. Having given the command of the Papal troops to Giuliano and that of the Florentines to Lorenzo, the Pope said to Giovanni da Poppi: “I have appointed two Captains who have next to no experience. Were some great enterprise to turn up, I know not how they would be able to carry it out!”. Both Giuliano and Lorenzo might have succumbed to the temptation of mixing themselves with the high-flown, extravagant projects of the Florentines; nevertheless, they lacked the moral and warlike qualities necessary for carrying them out. It is therefore unsafe to allege from existing sources of information that the policy of Leo X was based primarily on any such nepotistic projects. Nevertheless, the rumour that the crown of Naples was destined for Giuliano, spread further and further, till it reached the Court of Ferdinand of Spain. That King believed that the ambition of the Medici, in conjunction with France, was threatening his position in Italy.

Leo hastened to make assurances that the rumour was without any foundation. Never, he asseverated, had such a plan existed. How could he be believed capable of making enemies at one and the same time of France, the Emperor, and Spain? A kingdom could not be taken possession of by words, and was it not his sole endeavour to restore universal peace, especially in Italy? Ferdinand did not believe the assertions of the Pope; for both he and the Emperor had been filled with the deepest distrust of Leo ever since the ecclesiastical reconciliation of France. This distrust was justified so far that, from December, 1513, to July 1514, the policy of the Pope seemed to be friendly to France.

This must be looked at in connection with a change which was coming over the European situation. Louis XII, after his reconciliation with Rome, had made desperate efforts to win over Spain to his side. With this object, in December 1513, while the war was in abeyance owing to the winter season and other circumstances, he made the most enticing offers to King Ferdinand. As the price of an alliance he offered the hand of his daughter Renee to either of Ferdinand's two grandsons, with Milan and Genoa, accompanied by the renunciation of all claims to Naples, as her marriage dowry. Not one of these proposals was ever carried out. On the other hand, a year’s truce was concluded between Spain and France on the 13th of March 1514.

The news of this change in the aspect of affairs was a paralysing shock to the Pope. Every possible effort had to be made on his part to prevent either France or Spain from obtaining supremacy in Italy. By the proposed plan of marriage, the prospect of Spanish supremacy rose up before him like a nightmare. As an Italian as well as Pope, he felt himself to be most gravely menaced. As an Italian he was, like most of his fellow-countrymen, imbued with the determination that no power, whether foreign or other, should have such supremacy on the Italian peninsula as to destroy the balance of power, and injure what went by the name of the “freedom of Italy”. As Pope, Leo adhered to what had been the traditional policy of Rome, namely, the guarding of the independence, both temporal and spiritual, of the Holy See. With this in view, he directed his efforts against any step which would lead to Naples and Milan being under the same sovereign.

But that the intention of making use of the rivalry between France and Spain to his own advantage had a place in influencing Leo’s political attitude, can scarcely be disputed. Where injustice is done to the Medici Pope is in attributing everything he did to nepotism. The one predominant aim all through Leo’s ever-changing policy—his care for the independence of the Church and Holy See, and the maintenance of the so-called freedom of Italy—is apparent to all. The confidential letters which were sent to the Papal Nuncios, show that Leo's chief reason for opposing the projected Franco-Spanish marriage lay in the well-founded fear lest the power of Spain, being in possession of Naples, Milan, Genoa, and a portion of Venetian territory, should enslave the other Italian princes, the States of the Church, and even the Holy See itself.

Fully aware of this danger, Leo X overcame his natural irresolution and roused himself to take prompt and decisive measures. The Papal diplomacy was in a state of feverish activity. The most urgent messages were sent to the representatives in France and Switzerland to try to put obstacles in the way of this very dangerous marriage project. On the 4th of March a letter was sent to the Swiss Nuncio, Goro Ghersio, stating that the decision of Louis XII had reached Rome in the preceding night, to the effect that he had rather lose throne and life than renounce Milan; that this determination sprang from the marriage negotiations of France with Spain and the Emperor; that the Pope considered this projected marriage as the greatest of dangers; that as it had emanated originally from Louis’ fear of the Swiss, the Pope hoped that the latter might lay down conditions somewhat less hard, so as to make peace with France possible, which, under all circumstances, would be better than the carrying out of this family alliance, which was a menace to all Europe. The Florentine Ambassador, Roberto Acciaiuoli, was sent, so as to influence the King more directly. He was told to represent to Louis XII that the marriage project was an act of desperation which must ruin France, if not at once, at any rate later. The fear of Spanish supremacy now induced Leo to incline strongly towards France. As early as April, 1514, the Florentine Ambassador in Rome stated that the Pope, who had hitherto been unwilling even to grant an audience to the representative of Louis XII, now often transacted business with him. The same fear of Spain influenced his relations with the Swiss. Later on, the animosity of the Pope, who believed himself to have been betrayed by Ferdinand, rose to a still higher point. Obviously this reacted on his relations with Maximilian.

This was experienced by Cardinal Lang, the representative of the Emperor, who was trying to effect a reconciliation between Maximilian and Venice. The negotiations dragged on for months. The Emperor's Envoy complained bitterly of the delays and hesitation caused by the indecision of the Pope, skilfully fostered by France. Nevertheless, he was quite ready to acknowledge the good will of the Pope. At last, on the 4th of March, a compromise was arrived at, although, thanks to the obstinacy of the Venetians, it was never carried out. In other ways also, the mission of Lang was unproductive of peaceful results. The covetous and ambitious Cardinal, not content with the many emoluments which he had already secured, now imperiously demanded the important as well as lucrative post of permanent Legate in Germany. The experiences of Rome, consequent on conferring a similar dignity on the French Cardinal, d'Amboise, did not conduce to the repetition of the experiment in Germany; for such permanent Legates depended more on their temporal sovereign than on the Pope. Moreover, the considerable reduction in the revenues of the Curia which would result from such a concession had to be weighed in the balance. As the Emperor himself urged his representative’s request in a pressing letter, it seemed expedient to Leo not to refuse explicitly; and in a Consistory held on the 10th of May, he professed his willingness to grant the German legation to Lang for at any rate six months. But the Cardinals, instructed beforehand by the Pope as to the inexpediency of the concession, rejected even this com promise. Thereon Lang had one more farewell audience with Leo, in which he used “great words”. On the 11th of May he travelled in a very bad humour to Loreto, where Bibbiena and Bembo were staying at the time.

Louis XII tried to foster Leo’s favourable dispositions towards himself by assuring him that he would sacrifice life and property in defence of the Church. The Nuncio, Ludovico di Canossa. sent to France and England in May, on a mission which was at first kept strictly secret, might be sure of a very good reception. His immediate task was the reconciliation of Louis XII and Henry VIII, and thus to remove all necessity for the support of the Spanish claims by France.

The anti-Spanish feeling which was openly expressed in Rome is put before us in a very interesting report of the Venetian Envoy. According to this, Cardinal Lang tried to arrange a league between the Pope, Maximilian, and Ferdinand of Spain; but it is self-evident that Leo X would be opposed to any such plan. He trusted the fickle-minded Emperor, to whom he ascribed the intention of seizing the States of the Church, quite as little as he trusted the overbearing Aragonese. The greatest exasperation against the Spaniards was felt by the Romans, who expressed the wish to drive “those barbarians” out of Italy. It is a fact that in May and June the Pope entered into secret negotiations with Venice hostile to Spain while all the time the secret treaty with France was being carried on. Of this last only those most in the Pope’s confidence, Cardinals Medici and Bibbiena, as well as Giuliano de’ Medici, knew anything. It was the general though vain expectation that a league between Leo X, France, Venice, Florence, and Ferrara would be proclaimed on the Feast of Corpus Christi, though a report was current in the city of the lagoons that France and the Pope had come to an understanding that Giuliano de’ Medici was to receive the crown of Naples, and Louis XII that of Milan. After this the Spaniards were to be driven out of Italy by the help of the Venetians.

That Leo X contemplated something of the kind is undoubted; but he remained undecided, and carried on negotiations on every side, without making up his mind. Observant onlookers had for some time been of the opinion that he would wait to see which side was likely to get the best of it. One thing, however, is certain, and that is that Leo did everything he possibly could to bring to naught the Franco-Spanish marriage. With this object in view, Ludovico di Canossa, one of the cleverest and most gifted diplomatists of the time, worked so effectually on both Louis XII and Henry VIII that he brought about not only a reconciliation but an alliance between them. The Anglo-French treaty was to be sealed by the marriage of the King of France, a widower since the beginning of the year, and Mary, the sister of the English King. The Papal Envoy was well supported by Henry’s all-powerful minister, Wolsey, Archbishop of York, who aspired to the purple. On the 7th of August the Anglo-French alliance and the marriage contract were signed; and in October the marriage of the elderly French King with the youthful Mary Tudor took place.

Leo X was not to enjoy his diplomatic triumph for long. The danger of the Spanish supremacy had scarcely been removed when another terror, the French supremacy, arose in its place. The treaty of London contained, as Bembo remarks, a very dangerous clause which safeguarded the claims of Louis XII to Milan, Asti, and Genoa. The reports of the Florentine Ambassador in Paris are full of fears lest Louis should now set forth on his expedition to conquer Italy. Consequently, the Pope retreated further and further from his friendship with France and was inclined to form an alliance with the Emperor and Spain, while he sought to draw Venice over to his side by holding out a hope of obtaining for the Republic favourable terms of peace from Maximilian.

Guicciardini, drawing from good sources, gives us a picture of the shifting relations and secret negotiations between Leo X and France which took place in the year 1514, which shows us how much the Pope delighted in the two-faced diplomacy of the age. The well-known historian declares that Leo X was set against the conquest of Milan by Louis XII, but that, on the other hand, he thought it expedient to restrain the King by the use of diplomatic arts alone. Through Cardinal Sanseverino, the Protector of France, he made the following suggestion to King Louis:—Seeing that the exigencies of the time did not allow of an open alliance between Rome and France, it would at any rate be expedient to lay the foundations of a firm alliance in the future. A draft of this was sent to France; Louis XII accepted the offer gratefully, but hesitated before closing with it. His brief hesitation decided Leo X to listen to the proposals on the other side, and he concluded a treaty for one year with Spain and the Emperor, which mutually guaranteed the safety of their possessions. Scarcely had this arrangement been made before the answer of Louis XII. reached Rome, by which he agreed to all the Pope's proposals, with one proviso, namely, that as one of the clauses pledged him to defend Florence for Giuliano and Lorenzo, it was necessary that those two should be included in the negotiations. There upon Leo excused himself for having made his agreement with Spain and the Emperor on the plea that he had been forced to make it by Louis’s delay in answering; except for this, there was nothing to prevent him from concluding an alliance with France. Louis XII considered it advisable to accept the excuses of the Pope. On this Leo X and the French King signed a contract, with, however, the stipulation that this should not be done formally, and that the draft alone should be signed. In this way the most complete secrecy seemed to be assured.

The alliance with England was of the greatest value to Louis, as he could now undisturbedly resume his plans for the conquest of Italy. The question was whether France would at once take the initiative or postpone the undertaking till another year. The latter course seemed the more probable, as there were no visible preparations for war. This being so, the Pope, who was still in his inmost heart as averse as ever from the thought of the conquest of Milan, thought it advisable not to oppose Louis openly. Soon he even went a step further, and expressly encouraged the King to carry out his plans. There can be no doubt that Leo X did not act honourably in this. Guicciardini tries to explain his unusual conduct in the following way: — Either, he says, the Pope, being convinced that, with or without his consent, Louis XII would attack Milan, wished to secure favourable terms in the event of the success of France, or else he knew that what the Emperor and Ferdinand maintained, but what Louis denied, namely, that in the interim of the truce the King of France was bound to refrain from hostilities, was an actual fact. The Pope therefore hoped that the French King would not at once accept the challenge and attack Milan. This hope was justified by the event, for the French King did put off his project till the following year, trusting to the assistance of the Pope, whom he tried to bind to his interests by the prospect of the conquest of Naples, either for the Church or for Giuliano de' Medici.

There were many things which made Louis XII distrust the Pope. In June the Emperor had quite secretly sold to Leo X the Imperial fief of Modena, for 40,000 ducats; and in November this transaction was made known. At once Louis XII suspected a still closer alliance between the Pope and the Emperor. His suspicions increased when, in November, Leo X demanded a conclusion of peace between the Christian powers, so that they might turn their arms against the Turks. But what disconcerted the French King most was the fresh attempt of the Pope to reconcile Venice and the Emperor, thus threatening to deprive him of an important ally.

The distrust of Louis XII was well founded; for Leo X, and still more his trusted adviser Cardinal Bibbiena, were set against the conquest of Milan by the French. The most indubitable proof of this remained unknown to Louis XII, namely, a secret agreement, signed in Rome on the 21st of September, between Leo X and Ferdinand of Spain. By this treaty both parties guaranteed the security of their Italian possessions during their lifetime, and explicitly pledged themselves to make no agreement with any other State, least of all with France, relating to the reconquest of Milan, Genoa, and Asti, without the knowledge of the other.

Even if Louis XII knew nothing about this treaty, his distrust of Leo X was fully justified by the other matters mentioned above, whatever protestations the Pope might make of his good-will towards France. In order to frighten Leo, France entered into negotiations with Spain, which, however, failed in the desired effect, as was inevitable, considering the agreement already spoken of. At length the French King proffered to the Pope the formal request to give his support to the expedition against Milan, which was now decided on. The French agents laid before the Papal diplomatists the advantages—painted in the brightest colours—which the Church, the liberty of Italy, and the house of Medici would reap from a treaty between Leo X and France. The Most Christian Kings had in all ages afforded the greatest services to the Holy See, whereas the Emperor and the King of Spain had no other object in view except to reduce the whole of Italy, including the Pope himself, to a state of servitude. But these representations did not make the desired impression on Leo X. At length, driven by this increasing pressure on the part of the French, he declared that the condition of affairs had changed, that a victory for France was very doubtful, and could be bought only at the cost of much bloodshed. In face of the increasing danger from the Turks, he, as Pope, could not tolerate a war among Christian princes, and advised the King to defer his expedition. Thus was a final decision put off by Leo; although there is no doubt that, at the end of November, he was very much set against the French. But at that moment the time was approaching, which would necessitate a decision on the part of him, whose desire it was to preserve at all costs a free hand on every side.

It was with terror that the Medici Pope, like nearly all the other princes at that time, found himself “sailing to meet this crisis with two compasses”. We are assured that the Pope at that time passed many a sleepless night. In Rome the chances were being constantly weighed. Through Vettori, those associated with the Pope put questions to Machiavelli, the most acute politician of the age. It was his opinion that neutrality would be the Pope's worst policy, for it would hand him over to the will of the conqueror. As the victory of the French was almost a certainty, an alliance with Louis XII was to be recommended. It was only in the event of Venice breaking away from France that a contrary policy was pointed out by Machiavelli. But just at that time the Signoria had declared to the Papal Envoy its adhesion to France, and had tried to draw Leo into the Franco-Venetian alliance, by putting before him a plan for the conquest of Naples to be given to Giuliano.

While matters were still undecided in Rome, Louis XII died, being succeeded by Francis I, a man more gifted by nature than his predecessor. This young and ambitious prince was very much under the influence of his power loving mother, Louisa of Savoy. Even in the lifetime of the late King, Louisa’s sister, Filiberta, had been chosen as the bride of Giuliano, the Pope’s brother. It was a purely political union, for Filiberta was neither young nor beautiful. As her marriage portion Giuliano—who had been named Captain-General of the Church, on the 10th of January, 1515—was to receive Parma, Piacenza, and Reggio, as well as Modena. But both the Duke of Milan and the French King laid claim to Parma and Piacenza. The renunciation of his claim by either depended on the side taken by the Pope in the coming war; and the dilatory Pontiff was urged by both parties, by every means in their power, to come to a decision. Still more urgent was the necessity of a decision when the marriage between Giuliano and Filiberta became an accomplished fact on the 25th of June 1515. But, however warmly Giuliano, who was always the friend of France, might recommend an open alliance with Francis I, the Pope still put off a decision. Not even his intimates were in a position to guess to which party he inclined.

It was intended to form a great coalition between the Pope, the Emperor, the King of Spain, Milan, Genoa, and the Swiss, to prevent the reconquest of Milan by the French. A preliminary draft of this agreement was made out, which was to be ratified within two months, should the Swiss accept its terms. This contract, which secured to the States of the Church Parma and Piacenza as well as Modena and Reggio, with the reservation of their rights of government, was made with the ulterior object of protecting Christendom against the Turks, but, primarily, with the view of protecting Italy against France's lust of conquest. Cardinal Bibbiena, who was its author, was quite convinced that the League would prove to be a powerful check on the French King. “It will be a lesson to Francis I”, he wrote to the Spanish Nuncio on the 5th of February 1515, “and will teach him to be moderate in this as well as in all other matters”.

Meanwhile great difficulties beset this skilfully-devised diplomatic scheme. The clause about Parma and Piacenza pleased neither the Duke of Milan nor the Swiss. Further obstacles were raised by the mistrust between Milan and Genoa, which finally led to the defection to France of the latter. Nor could the terms of the League be pleasing to the Pope, seeing that the protection of Italy was to be effected by the preponderance of Spain and the Emperor. Nevertheless, it was clear to Leo X that the League might do very good service by obtaining important concessions from France. He regulated his actions by this ; he delayed the ratification of the terms, and, during the carrying on of the negotiations with Francis I, followed a waiting policy.

These negotiations were being carried on by Ludovico di Canossa, who was still in France. An order reached that astute diplomatist at the end of March, bidding him offer the alliance of Rome to Francis I, on the condition that he would waive his claim on Naples. But the French King rejected the proposal in an abrupt and offensive manner. In the Pope’s condition he read his intention to secure the crown of Naples for his brother. Later historians also have interpreted Leo’s policy at that time as actuated solely by ambition and nepotism. It is only the latest researches which have paved the way for a more just interpretation of his actions. That Leo X would have gladly seen his brother on the throne of Naples cannot be doubted. But the terms of his proposed agreement with Francis I did not proceed immediately from nepotistic considerations, being rather the result of the policy he had always followed. As the attack of the French could be no longer averted, and as there was much to be said in favour of its success, the Pope had no alternative but to do what he could to persuade France to give up her further designs on Naples, if he wished to prevent Milan and Naples being in the possession of the same power. The Pope’s old fear of a union between the north and south of Italy was the real cause of the demand which he had made through Canossa from the new ruler of France.

In spite of the rebuff received by Canossa, Leo X renewed the same offer to Francis I in June through the French Ambassador, Montmaur, though with no better result. The French King showed the same disinclination to consider the demands of the Pope relating to the independence of Genoa and the giving of Parma and Piacenza to Giuliano. Thereupon Leo X began at once to make military preparations. But the French Ambassador declared that these did not frighten him at all, for his King could produce an overpowering force. As regarded these boasts of the French, Bibbiena declared that such armies were no more difficult to raise than was the breath of rumour in respect to them.

The procuring of sufficient money for the expenses of the war presented most difficulty to the Pope. He now realized the confused state of his financial accounts. Nevertheless, he promised to contribute 60,000 ducats monthly. But further obstacles came from the want of unity and hair-splitting among those whom a common danger ought to have drawn together. The negotiations in the hands of the Swiss Nuncio, Filonardi, who was armed with full powers, prolonged themselves beyond all due bounds. It was only at the last moment that the ratification of the terms of the League, signed by the Swiss and Duke Maximilian, arrived in Rome. But Leo X even then still hesitated to give a final decision, and in spite of having armed his troops, his position remained ambiguous. Consignments of money were constantly sent from Rome for the payment of the Spanish and Swiss soldiers, and there was no doubt in the mind of anybody that the Pope was ready to do anything to prevent the invasion of the French; yet the official confirmation and publication of the League in Rome was postponed in the most unaccountable manner. At the end of July the Venetian Ambassador asked His Holiness openly whether it were true, as was said in Rome, that he had given his signature to it. “It is true”, replied Leo; “we have signed it, and Bulls and Briefs relating to our adhesion to the League are sealed. But before publishing them, we wish to await the answer of Francis I”.

This reply is highly characteristic of the Papal policy at that critical time. While the troops destined to oppose the French, who were on their way south, were paid chiefly with Roman money, the Pope up to the very last moment was contemplating a friendly arrangement with the enemy. He did not give up hope even after the French had entered Italy. It was only the first blow, ineffective though it was, dealt by the young Duke of Guise, which at last compelled the Pope to act in concert with the Emperor and the Swiss.

Giuliano de’ Medici had been entrusted with the supreme command of the Papal troops as far back as the 29th of June 1515. As, however, he fell seriously ill, Lorenzo de’ Medici, the Captain of the Florentines, had to take his place on the 8th of August. Cardinal Giulio de' Medici was appointed Legate with the Papal troops.

The Duke of Savoy, who was related to Leo X as well as to Francis I, contemplated making a compromise, as the French had already crossed his frontier. He inquired through Giuliano as to the furthest concessions which the Pope would be ready to make. Giuliano explained in a secret instruction that the price of his joining with France would be (1) the renunciation of the French claims on Parma and Piacenza; (2) the conclusion of a permanent peace between France and Spain, so that a general Christian League against the Turks might be brought about; (3) the renunciation of Naples in favour of the Holy See or of a third party agreeable to the Pope and King. Furthermore, he would agree that under no consideration the north and south of the Italian peninsula should be governed by one and the same sovereign, even were that one to be his own brother. This instruction affords a weighty proof that nepotistic designs were not what turned the balance in the position taken up by the Pope, but rather his care for the political and spiritual independence of the Holy See.

CHAPTER III.

The Conquest of Milan by the French. The Meeting between Leo X and Francis I at Bologna.

THE army which Francis I concentrated at Lyons was one of the finest which any King of France had ever led into the field. It consisted of 35,000 men, 60 cannons, and 100 culverins. The most prominent among the generals were Trivulzio, Trémouille, Robert de la Marck, the leader of the formidable Black Company, Lautrec and Bayard, nearly all of whom had had experience of the Italian theatre of war. On the 27th of June the French King had renewed the alliance made by his predecessor with Venice, and Genoa had now also joined him.

It is obvious that the allies ought to have united against this force. But the Spanish Viceroy, Cardona, was kept on the Adige by the Venetians, while the Papal troops had no thought beyond that of covering Parma and Piacenza. Leo X appealed to Francesco Maria, Duke of Urbino, to help him in the protection of those cities, but he, regardless of his fealty, favoured the French. The Swiss, whose headquarters were at Susa, had occupied the passes so effectually that Francis I. considered it impossible to force them. By the advice of Trivulzio, who knew the country well, he chose for his passage across the Alps the Col d'Argentière, leading from Embrun to the valley of the Stura, which had been hitherto considered impassable. The undertaking was one of extraordinary difficulty, for rocks had to be blasted and bridges thrown over chasms; but the warlike zeal of Francis overcame all obstacles. The surprise of the enemy was complete. Prospero Colonna was taken prisoner with his corps of Milanese cavalry on the 12th of August, at Villa Franca, on the Po, whereupon the Swiss, entirely baffled, retreated on Milan. This retreat cut off the communication between the various Swiss regiments, and destroyed the discipline of the troops. A spirit of disunion set in among the contingents from the different cantons.

The unexpected success of the French, who were ere long completely possessed of the western part of the Duchy of Milan, not only broke down the confidence of the allies, but renewed their distrust of each other. That the Papal army was only half-hearted in the part it was playing is shown by the fact that it did not cross the Po. Leo X, who, after his long hesitation, had at last joined the anti-French League, more from fear than by choice, was deeply moved by the unfortunate tidings which reached him from the theatre of war in Northern Italy. He had trusted to the military skill of Colonna as much as to the security of the watch kept by the Swiss in the Alpine passes. However much he might try to conceal his real feelings under bold words, the truth was that the destruction of his hopes made him lose courage completely, and he could see the French already occupying Rome, and spoke of flight to Gaeta or Ischia.

The position in the Vatican was all the more painful because the news from the scene of war was so scanty and unreliable. “Write, write, write!”, says Cardinal Bibbiena to Gambara in a letter of the 18th of August.  The position of Bibbiena, who was more of a humanist that a diplomatist, became more difficult each day. He found himself “as a tyro, making endless compromises between his dependence on the Medici, his care for the Church's interests, and hard political facts”. His letters afford a deep insight into the political machinery of the Curia.

On the 22nd of August the news of the loss of Alessandria reached Rome; for the Swiss had not occupied the town, although Leo X had pointed out the importance of the place. He now himself specified the measures which the Cardinal-Legate, Giulio de' Medici, was to take. The first thing to be done was to see the complete reinstatement of the Bentivogli in Bologna, so as to keep a check on the Duke of Ferrara, who was longing to possess Modena and Reggio. At all costs Cardinal Giulio must cover those cities. In vain did Bibbiena seek to remonstrate against these measures. “Write as I have commanded you”, was the answer of the Pope.

A few days later Bibbiena had to intercede with his master for no less a personage than Giulio de' Medici. Every day made it more clear that the choice of that pusillanimous, irresolute man to be Cardinal-Legate with the army, had been most unfortunate. “The Cardinal”, said Leo X, “writes about nothing but the dangers and difficulties which threaten him; as for the remedies which he holds in his hands, he does not know how to make use of them”. The defence of the absent Legate, which Bibbiena vainly attempted to make, was certainly inopportune, for it was through Cardinal Giulio's fault, as well as Lorenzo’s, that the Papal army had advanced so slowly, and had then come altogether to a standstill. The letters exchanged between those two show this only too plainly. On the 27th of August, Giulio wrote to Lorenzo from Bologna, saying that if the Swiss, in spite of the enticing offers of Francis I, persisted in carrying on the war against the French, then he could do the same thing; but should this not be the case, neither could he venture to advance, and must await the development of events. Three days later Giulio repeated: “If Cardinal Schinner insists on sending forward his light cavalry, let him do so; but it will certainly be un accompanied by the Papal colours”.

It was not extraordinary that Cardinal Giulio should act in this way, because his master, in spite of his energetic assertions, was at this time allowing negotiations to be entered on with the enemy. At length the Pope fell back into a state of indecision even greater than usual. On the 27th of August he sent word to Lorenzo de' Medici, who wished to make peace on any terms with the French, that he must not give in so soon; but in the beginning of  September, he himself, under the influence of the bad news from the Swiss camp, determined to send the faithful Cintio da Tivoli secretly to Francis I to excuse the attitude hitherto maintained by the Pope, and open negotiations with the French King. This precaution seemed to him necessary, in the not unlikely event of the fortune of war favouring the French arms still more. A few days later Leo X again yielded to renewed hopes of success and expressed his hope that Cintio would be detained by the Legate.

Thus did Leo X vacillate from one side to the other. One day he spoke with severity against France, and maintained his confidence in the valour of the Swiss, declaring that he would rather lose his mitre than Parma and Piacenza; but the next, he was inclining towards coming to an accommodation with Francis I, and even talked it over with Cardinal Sanseverino. How great were the vacillations of the Pope can be seen by the fact that on the 2nd of September 1515, he gave full powers to Duke Charles of Savoy and Ludovico di Canossa to treat with Francis I, but recalled these orders on the 13th of September.

As a matter of fact, the Papal and Florentine troops were now inactive. In order to assure himself of safety in every event, Leo X resolved to yield to the repeated requests of Henry VIII and raise Wolsey to the purple. Many objections were made by members of the Sacred College; nevertheless, the Pope proceeded with the nomination in the Consistory held on the 10th of September 1515.

Meanwhile Cintio had been intercepted by the Spaniards. This, added to other circumstances, increased the mistrust between Spain and the Papal party. To add to the unsettled state of affairs, the Swiss now wavered, and were inclined to come to an accommodation with France, a treaty of peace being in fact made between the two countries on the 8th of September. However, a large portion of the Swiss army repudiated this agreement and marched on Milan, where Cardinal Schinner was doing his utmost to stir up his fellow-countrymen to fight.

In the interval, Francis I had approached the immediate neighbourhood of the capital of Lombardy, and pitched his camp at Marignano. which he fortified with the greatest skill. His position was attacked at noon on the 13th of September by 20,000 Swiss, incited by Cardinal Schinner. A desperate fight ensued, and it was only the darkness of night which put a temporary end to the bloodshed. In spite of the numerical superiority of the French, the Swiss had succeeded in driving the enemy from the outposts and capturing some colours and ordnance; but the battle remained undecided. Both armies passed the night on the field of battle, Francis I sleeping on a gun-carriage. With the first glimpse of dawn the terrible struggle recommenced; and in spite of the heroism of the Swiss the numerical superiority of the French won the day. The scale was turned by the arrival on the scene of a troop of Venetian horse, which the Swiss took to be the vanguard of the entire army of the Republic. Thousands of dead, mostly Swiss, covered the field of battle. The veteran Trivulzio declared that all the other eighteen battles in which he had fought were mere child's play to this tremendous struggle.

On the 16th of September Leo received by a messenger despatched by Lorenzo, the joyful news that the Swiss had defeated the French. He at once sent word of this secretly to the Venetian Ambassador and to Cardinal Cornaro, forbidding them under pain of excommunication to spread the news. But when a second messenger arrived, repeating the intelligence, such precautions seemed unnecessary, and permission was given to publish the news. The French and Venetians living in Rome were half dead with alarm, whereas the Ambassadors of the Emperor and King of Spain, as well as the Swiss Guard, and, according to one source, even Cardinal Bibbiena himself, celebrated the victory by open rejoicings. Though Leo X was delighted that the French should have been defeated, he knew how to restrain himself, and the Papal court took no part in the manifestations of joy.

How prudently the Pope had acted was soon seen ; for next morning he received the news that the second day of the battle had resulted in a victory for the French—news which the enemies of France declared to be either invented or grossly exaggerated. The Venetian Ambassador received the welcome news quite early in the morning of the 6th of September, and once more breathed freely. He put on his robes of state and went at once to the Vatican. There he was informed by the private chamberlain, Serapica, that the Pope was still in bed. “His Holiness must be aroused”, said Marino Giorgi. “That cannot be”, replied Serapica. “I insist on speaking to His Holiness”, returned the Ambassador. Only then was an audience obtained with the Pope, who had not time to finish his toilet. “Holy Father”, said Giorgi ironically, “after the example of Christ, I will return you good for evil. Yesterday Your Holiness gave me bad and at the same time false news; today I bring in exchange good news which is also true : the Swiss have been defeated”. “We also have received this news”, replied Leo X; “but the defeat has been inconsiderable”. “Your Holiness can see the truth by this despatch”, was the response of the Ambassador, as he handed to the Pope his own official letter, together with that of the Venetian representative with the French King. This last letter, the writer of which was known personally to the Pope, convinced His Holiness of the real state of things. Full of alarm, he cried out: “What is to become of us? What, furthermore, will become of you?”. Marino tried to calm him by assuring him that no bad results could follow for the Holy See. He then took his leave in order to inform Cardinals Bibbiena, Grimani, and Cornaro of what had occurred. Although the Venetians refrained from any external manifestations of their joy, the Swiss Guards were so incensed that Marino Giorgi thought it wise to keep away from the Vatican for a couple of days. At his next audience with Leo X the Pope thus expressed himself: “We will throw ourselves into the arms of the Most Christian King, and beg his mercy.” The Ambassador replied: “Most Holy Father, if you do so it will be neither to your detriment nor to that of the Holy See. The King is a true son of the Church.”

The union of the Pope with the victorious French King was to be effected more quickly and completely than the Venetians cared for. It is true that for one moment Leo seemed inclined to try the fortune of war once more in conjunction with the Emperor, Spain, and the Swiss; but he very soon saw the hopelessness of any such attempt. Immediately after their defeat, the Swiss had abandoned Lombardy, leaving garrisons only in the fortresses of Milan and Cremona. It was therefore to be expected that Spain also would relinquish the struggle, and that the whole burden of hostilities would fall on the Pope. If Leo X anticipated the very worst, his was far from being an empty fear; for Francis I was making preparations to cross the Po at Pavia, and to occupy Parma and Piacenza as belonging to the Duchy of Milan. Were the Pope to resist him any further, he was prepared to seize Modena and drive the Medici out of Florence.

All idea of resistance vanished before such a danger. This was the conclusion arrived at by the immediate entourage of the Pope, especially by Alfonsina Orsini, who remembered but too well the eighteen years of exile which she owed to the obstinacy of Piero. “Bibbiena”, she wrote in a state of great excitement, “will by his doings ruin us for the second time”. Roberto Acciaiuoli, the Florentine Ambassador in Rome, and Marino Giorgi worked in the same direction, exaggerating the actual danger. The Florentines implored the Pope to come to an agreement with France before the Swiss had made peace with her, or the Spaniards had accomplished their retreat. Lorenzo was quite ready to make peace on his own account, and had told Canossa, the Nuncio at the French court, that such was the Pope’s desire.

Francis I, on his side, was equally disinclined to a war with the Pope—so much so that as early as the 18th of September he had told Lorenzo de' Medici that he had delegated an Envoy to take proposals of peace to Leo X. At one time the French had feared, and not without cause,  that a coalition between the Emperor, Henry VIII and the Swiss might wrest from him the fruits of his victory. Besides, he and all the French remembered only too well the great danger in which his predecessor had been involved by his contest with the Holy See. Therefore the Duke of Savoy, who had been entrusted by the Pope with his proposals of peace, found a favourable reception with his royal uncle. Leo X had to make up his mind to a complete change in his policy, and how difficult he found this is shown by the excited debates held in the Vatican. In smoothing the difficulties which came in the way of an arrangement, no one worked harder than Ludovico di Canossa, who came with all speed to Rome from the King's camp. Canossa, who arrived in the Eternal City on the 25th of September, brought with him fourteen articles of a treaty to be agreed to ; and in these the Venetian Ambassador saw to his dismay that the interests of his Republic were totally disregarded. By a thorough examination of all objections Canossa succeeded in overcoming the last hesitations of the Pope, who, however, would have gladly awaited the result of a Diet assembled by the Swiss at Zurich. The Envoy pointed out the danger of delay, lest Francis I, encouraged by his own generals and those of the Venetians, might be induced to take further measures, such even as an attack on Florence. He showed, moreover, that nothing was to be hoped for from the Swiss, as indeed was proved to be the case by future events. The Pope, who yielded mainly on account of the menace to the States of the Church and to his supremacy in Florence, made a stand on certain points, and insisted on certain conditions in favour of his native city. He stipulated that he should be spared a direct surrender of Parma and Piacenza; though on the other hand he was willing to recall his officials from them. Finally, the withdrawal of the Papal troops was to take place at a convenient opportunity, out of consideration for the Emperor.

On the 27th of September, Leo X sent urgent letters to the French King and his Chancellor, Du Prat, in which he reiterated his desire for peace. The decision of the Pope was awaited with feverish anxiety, especially in Florence. When the terms of the agreement between Rome and France were made known, the enemies of the French King fell into a state of great excitement. Even his allies, the Venetians, feared that their interests had not been sufficiently considered in the treaty.

But the announcement of a complete agreement was premature; for there were several important points about which an understanding could not be arrived at once, and on account of these Canossa returned to the King on the 31st of September. Francis’ demand for the renunciation of all claims on Parma and Piacenza was the severest blow to the Pope; though before long, by the purchase of Modena, that territory was once more united to the States of the Church. But the development of events in Lombardy was so entirely in favour of the French, that Leo had to resign himself to the payment of a high price. At the beginning of October Maximilian Sforza gave up all for lost, and surrendered, not only the fortresses of Milan and Cremona, but, for the sake of one year's assured tenure, renounced all further claims on the Duchy. On the 11th of October Francis I made his triumphal entry into the capital of Lombardy.

Leo X, who had left Rome on the 1st of October, 1515, and had retired to Viterbo, under the pretext of taking an autumn holiday, approved, on the 13th of the same month, of the conclusion of preliminary articles of peace. The conditions were as follows: Francis was to keep Parma and Piacenza, which were to be once more united to Milan; but on the other hand he pledged himself to pay for the salt from the salt-mines of Cervia, whereby the Apostolic Exchequer was assured of a considerable income. The French King, moreover, guaranteed the authority of Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici in Florence, and promised to make no treaty with any vassal of the Church without the knowledge of the Pope. Both contracting parties gave mutual security for their possessions. On the 14th of October the Pope entrusted the learned Giano Lascaris, a man high in the favour of the French King, with a mission to the victor of Marignano. But the deed of ratification was taken to Francis by Lorenzo de' Medici in person. He arrived in Milan on the 18th, where an honourable reception awaited him. Hence forward he placed his future hopes more than ever on the French King.

The news spread about among the members of the Curia, that Francis I intended to visit Rome, perhaps with his whole army. That at the same time his eyes would be turned towards Naples, seemed to them to be more than probable. But the fact was that Francis I was most desirous of a personal interview with the Pope. Although the Venetians warned him to be on his guard, as neither Leo nor Bibbiena would shrink from anything to gain their own ends, the King persisted in his intention; for he hoped to be able to gain further concessions by word of mouth. Moreover, by obtaining a meeting with the Supreme Head of the Church, he hoped to make an impression on the enemies who were gathering around him.

Leo X thought it necessary to fall in with the King’s wishes; still, the one thing which he wished to avoid was a visit of Francis to Rome. He therefore proposed either Florence or Bologna as the place of meeting. As he was suffering much from his fistula, the Pope would have preferred to travel no further than Florence; but against this advantage, was to be placed the fear lest the enemies of the Medici in Florence might fraternize with the French King. Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici and Lorenzo laid such stress on this danger, that Leo X decided in favour of Bologna, this choice being pleasing to Francis for several reasons. It was in vain that objections were raised, especially by Spain, and by Cardinal Adriano Castellesi, who had the Imperial interests warmly at heart, as well as by other members of the Sacred College. But the Pope was, in fact, more prudent than his advisers. No doubt the latter attached too much importance to appearances, thinking it derogatory to the dignity of the Pope that he should go so far afield to meet the French King.

On the 3rd of October a meeting of Cardinals was called at Viterbo, where also Bonnivet arrived as Envoy from Francis I on the 2nd of November. Fourteen Cardinals arrived in obedience to the summons; and, in a Consistory held on the 5th of November, they gave their consent to the Pope’s expedition to Bologna, which was to be made via Siena and Florence. As Leo X did not wish to return to Rome till Palm Sunday in the following year, the next session of the Lateran Council was postponed till the fifteenth day after Easter. The Florentine Cardinal, Soderini, was appointed Legate in Rome. The Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, was commissioned to arrange for the suite of the Pope, in conjunction with Cardinals Accolti and Pucci; Cardinal Sanseverino was sent to the King.

At Bolsena Leo X, who had shortly before been instrumental in making peace between Perugia and Assisi gave up his first idea of travelling to Florence via Siena, because of disturbances in the last-named city. Instead of this he chose another route, which would take him to Cortona by Orvieto and Castiglione. At Cortona he remained for three days, being the guest of one of the members of his court, Giulio Passerini, and received a deputation of Florentines sent to welcome him; then, passing through Arezzo, the Pope arrived at Marignolle, the villa of Jacopo Gianfigliazzi in the neighbourhood of Florence, and there he remained from the 27th till the 30th of November.

Meanwhile great preparations were being made in Florence for the reception of the distinguished guest. The Florentines did everything in their power to prepare a pageant as imposing as had been that in the Eternal City on the occasion of the “Possesso”. The most celebrated artists of the day, Jacopo Sansovino, Antonio di Sangallo, Baccio Bandinelli, Andrea del Sarto, Pontorno, Perino del Vaga, Granacci, vied with one another in the contrivance of decorations which displayed a glorious com bination of architecture, sculpture, and painting. Twelve triumphal arches, richly ornamented with sculptures and paintings, were erected, and on these, to the admiration of all beholders, were to be seen reproductions of the most famous specimens of the architecture of ancient Rome, as well as colossal statues, while allegorical paintings and flattering inscriptions conveyed the praises of the first Florentine Pope. Jacopo Sansovino and Andrea del Sarto had erected a wooden facade to the Duomo, in close imitation of marble, covered with statues and bas-reliefs, while on the smooth surface of the facade Andrea del Sarto had painted pictures in chiaroscuro.

The Pope was greeted by music as he entered by the Roman gate, and drove through his native city, portions of the walls of which had been levelled to facilitate the decorations. He enjoyed the spectacle with the enthusiasm inherent in his race, and several times he bade the procession come to a halt that he might better examine some of the works of art. The order of the state entry, which corresponded with that of the “Possesso”, had been arranged with minute attention by Paris de Grassis. The magnificent spectacle seemed to the spectators to be like one of the triumphal processions of ancient Rome. Taking part in it were to be seen eighteen Cardinals, as well as Lorenzo de' Medici and the Florentine municipality. The procession then went to the Duomo, where Cardinal Giulio de' Medici said Mass. Leo here laid aside his heavy Papal robes and tiara, and remained in his rochet and purple cloak, such as we see him in Raphael’s portrait. In the Duomo the Pope prayed longer than usual, gave his blessing and indulgence, and then went to the cloister of Santa Maria Novella, where his predecessors, Martin V and Eugenius IV, had dwelt in former times.

On the 1st of December Leo X took counsel, first with the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, and then with the Cardinals assembled in Consistory, as to the ceremonies with which the victor of Marignano should be received.  Then there was a present for the King to be settled on. Paris de Grassis suggested a pax; but the Pope decided on a cross of pure gold, which had been the property of Cardinal Ascanio Sforza. This he took from the treasury of Julius II, who had hated the French so bitterly! Together with the precious stones with which it was set, the value of this cross amounted to 15,000 ducats. On the first Sunday in Advent (Dec. 2), Mass was said in S. Lorenzo; after which the Pope was seen in tears, kneeling before the porphyry sarcophagus in which his father’s body lay. No less moved was he when he visited his brother Giuliano, who was lying seriously ill in the family palace.

On the 3rd of December Leo X left his native city, and on the 7th he arrived before Bologna, which he entered on the following day. The reception was just the opposite of that at Florence : no decorations, no acclamations greeted the Pope, who had shown too little interest in the adherents of the Bentivogli, and too much in their enemies. Even a portion of the clergy showed animosity. In some of the streets even the cry of “Sega! Sega!” the motto of the Bentivogli, who carried a saw (sega) on their arms, was raised. Such as these did but poor service to their patrons, for after this there could be no question of a complete restoration of the Bentivogli. Not only the Master of Ceremonies, but also the Cardinals, were incensed by the hostile attitude of the Bolognese. They tried to persuade the Pope to express his displeasure; but he refused, and maintained the cheerful demeanour of a true diplomatist, who in cases such as this prudently appears to notice nothing.

The French King’s Envoys, Odet de Foix and Louis de Trémouille, arrived in Bologna at almost the same time as the Pope. Francis I, who had been received at Parma by Lorenzo de’ Medici and four prelates, and on the frontier of the States of the Church by Cardinals Medici and Fieschi, now hastened his journey, so that by the 10th of December he was only three miles from Bologna, on the bridge over the Reno. There he was met by Cardinal Sanseverino and the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, with whom all the details of the interview, as well as the state entry, were arranged. There were difficulties at this meeting which were not all due to the pedantic Master of Ceremonies, and the wit and pleasantries to which he treated the King. A difference of opinion soon showed itself, for the Pope had no intention of prolonging the visit to the extent which Francis had arranged in his own mind.

According to prearrangement, the French King arrived at Bologna on the 11th of December, amid the pealing of bells. Francis I rode a fiery steed, being accompanied by the Legates, and later by Cardinals Sanseverino and Este. Nineteen other Cardinals waited to receive him at the Porta San Felice. As senior Cardinal, Riario made a short speech in Latin, during which the others uncovered their heads. The victor of Marignano answered in French, with his head also uncovered. Neither Francis nor his suite carried arms. The bold and masterful bearing of the King, and still more his noble countenance, made the best of impressions on the susceptible Italians; but his suite and the whole procession disappointed the thousands of spectators who had thronged to see it. When the pro cession approached the Palazzo Pubblico, where Francis I was to be the guest of the Pope, Leo could not refrain from going to the window to enjoy the rare spectacle.

After the King had dined with Cardinals Bibbiena, Medici, Sauli, and Cibo, he was presented to the Pope, who awaited him in the great hall on the second floor of the Palazzo Pubblico, surrounded by the Cardinals who had been summoned to the Consistory. So many spectators had crowded into the great tapestried hall. that there was fear lest the floor might fall in. There was such a dense crowd that it was only with difficulty that the King, conducted by the Master of Ceremonies, could reach the throne of Leo X. Francis I bared his head, made the three customary genuflections, and kissed the foot and hand of the Pope, who wore a jewelled tiara, and a cloak embroidered with gold. Leo bade the King rise, and embraced him with the intimation that he might cover his head.

To a short speech in French by Francis I, Leo replied with as much courtesy as readiness. Then the Chancellor Du Prat stepped forward and made the discourse of the obediential He began by an extravagant eulogy of the wisdom, skill, and state of the family of Medici, especially of its most famous member, the Pope, to whom God had entrusted the barque of St. Peter, to steer it through the shoals into the haven of safety. The Kings of France, continued the Chancellor, had from of old surpassed all other Christian princes in their devotion to the Holy See. Treading in their footsteps, His Majesty Francis I, in spite of the disdain of advisers who were of a different mind from himself, had hastened over mountains and valleys, forests and rivers, and had run the gauntlet of the Swiss, in order to do homage to the Pope, as an eldest son to his father, and the Vicar of Christ, and lay all that he had at his feet. While these words were being said the King wanted again to uncover his head ; this, however, the Pope would not permit. Leo replied to the discourse with great skill and elegance.

There followed on this the presentation to the Pope of the principal members of the King’s suite. After this, Leo X, taking the King by the hand, led him into another room, from which he retired for a few moments to remove his heavy robes. He then returned to Francis I, whom he found standing at a window with some of the Cardinals, and spoke to him alone for two hours. The Master of Ceremonies had warned His Holiness beforehand against putting his hand to his biretta, as Alexander VI had done to Charles VIII, before the eyes of the crowd under the windows, as such a mark of respect was unbefitting the Vicar of Christ, even if paid to the highest of temporal sovereigns.

On the following day the Pope and King resumed the subject of their discussion of the previous day, but nothing is known of what transpired. First Leo X visited the King, who met him on Bramante's stairs; and in the evening there followed a longer interview between them, about which but little or nothing is known. The same process was repeated on the 13th of December.

On the morning of that day the Pope celebrated high mass with all possible pomp in San Petronio, the largest church in Bologna. The spacious building was filled to overflowing, and at last the doors had to be closed to prevent accidents. Francis I was lavish in his attentions to the Supreme Head of the Church. He even wished to carry his train; and when the Pope declined this service, the King responded that he would gladly wait on the Vicar of Christ in the smallest things. But he refused to receive Holy Communion at his Mass. Forty of his suite, however, received the Body of our Lord from the hands of the Pope. A remarkable incident occurred during the solemnity. A French nobleman cried out suddenly in his native tongue that he wished to go to confession to the Pope; but that, as this could not be done secretly, he wished to accuse himself publicly of having fought with great bitterness against Julius II, and of having disregarded the ban of excommunication. When the King heard these words, he made no hesitation in declaring himself guilty of a similar offence. Many other nobles made the same confession, and begged for absolution, which the Pope, raising his hand, at once gave. Then Francis said to Leo X : “Your Holiness must not be surprised that all these men hated Julius II, for he was our greatest enemy; in all our wars we have had no enemy so terrible as he, for Julius II was indeed a most capable general, and far better suited to be such than to be Pope”. As on this occasion, so also on others did the Catholic spirit of the French King’s suite declare itself. The Imperial Ambassador says that they kissed the Pope’s feet nearly away! The solemn obedientia of the King was at once communicated by the Pope to the mother of Francis, as well as to a number of friendly princes. On the 14th of December the outside world learned one of the results of the interview between the Pope and the King; for on that day a Consistory was held, at which Adrian Gouffier de Boissy, Bishop of Coutances, and brother of the Admiral de Bonnivet, was created Cardinal. It was rumoured that the King had vainly tried to obtain a like dignity for the brothers of the Dukes of Bourbon and Vendome. However that might be, Francis seemed very well pleased and in an amiable mood. He passed the evening with the Pope, who had invited him, with the Dukes of Bourbon and Vendome, to eat with him. The suite of the King supped at a special table with Cardinals Medici, Bibbiena, and Cibo.

The friendly intercourse between the Pope and King was sealed, on the morning of the 15th of December, by the presentation to Francis of the beautiful jewelled gold cross mentioned above. The King venerated the relic of the True Cross which it contained, and then hastened to Leo X to thank him and take leave of him. Their farewell interview lasted for half an hour. Nothing could exceed the expression of friendship on both sides. As the King left the Palace, he found some of the Cardinals in waiting to accompany him as far as the Porta San Felice, as they had done on his arrival. Many of the French suite remained behind to receive either absolution or other graces from the Pope, all of which he willingly gave. By the end of December the French King was back in Milan, and returned to France at the beginning of the new year. Duke Charles of Bourbon was left behind as his representative in the capital of Lombardy.

Leo X did not remain a single day longer than was necessary in Bologna, and on the 18th of December turned his back on the inhospitable city. On the 22nd he arrived in Florence, where his brother still lay grievously ill. Leo remained there for some time, and bestowed generous gifts on his beloved native city. At last, on the 28th of February 1516, to the great joy of the Romans and the members of the Curia, the Pope returned to his capital. Owing to its being the season of Lent, his entry was kept with ecclesiastical solemnities only. The Golden Rose, blessed on Laetare Sunday, was destined this year for the French King.

The strictest silence was observed as to the business transacted between Leo X and Francis I. Paolo Giovio, who, by the Pope’s desire, was working at his contemporary history, says, in a letter written at Bologna on the 15th of December 1515, that he could find out nothing. As time went on, the veil of secrecy was preserved all the more easily because nothing had been put on paper, and was scarcely raised at all where politics were concerned. It was Leo’s way to conceal state secrets as far as he could from even his nearest advisers; and this time it was also better for the interests of France that nothing of what had taken place should be known prematurely. But the less people knew, the more fertile was their imagination, and their surmises were of the most hazardous description. It is actually very difficult, and for the most part impossible, to be certain of what was discussed and decided upon at Bologna. What actually followed on the interview is all that can throw any light on most points.

From what we know, the victor of Marignano went to meet the Pope at Bologna, with a full consciousness of his political supremacy, and prepared to make sweeping demands. Above all, he thought to persuade Leo X to ally himself formally with France against Spain. But without directly declining this proposal, the Pope asked for time to decide on a matter of such importance, pointing out at the same time that his present alliance with Ferdinand of Spain would bind him for another sixteen months. It is, moreover, certain that the question of the necessity of a combination among the Christian princes against the Turks came up between them. Francis I made fair promises about this, in the same way that he made protestations to the Ambassadors remaining in Bologna of his desire for peace.

In view of the war against the Turks, Francis I received, for one year, permission to raise a tithe from the French clergy. The Pope also complied with the French King’s petition in favour of the enemy of Cardinal Schinner, Georg Supersaxo, who had been shut up a prisoner in the Castle of St. Angelo in the autumn of 1514, and whom the Pope now discharged from prison.

The preliminary articles of peace arranged at Viterbo on the 3rd of October between Leo X and Francis I, were confirmed at Bologna. In accordance with this confirmation, the Pope, on December the 28th, 1515, warned the Swiss not to interfere with French property, or, in other words, with Milan. Soon after this the Swiss Nuncio, Filonardi, was told to accommodate himself to France in political matters. Schinner was completely thrown over, though he does not seem to have troubled about the Pope’s warning not to work against France.

In spite of his covenant with the French King, Leo was by no means minded to throw himself into the arms of France. The mission of Egidio Canisio to the Emperor Maximilian on the 13th of December, is a proof of this; for the object of this mission was to induce Maximilian to make peace with Venice, with the asseveration on the part of Leo X that he would remain true to the old League with Germany. An unreserved agreement with France seemed an impossibility, because of the ratification by the peace of Viterbo of the secession of Parma and Piacenza. An equal sacrifice was involved in the promise to give to the Duke of Ferrara not only Reggio, but also Modena, provided the Duke would pay the purchase money of Modena and the expenses of the Holy See in regard to both towns. If Francis I thus, at any rate partially, attained his objects, on the other hand his intercession for the Duke of Urbino, who had grossly violated his oath of fealty to the Holy See, failed completely. However, the French King was quite ready to throw his friend over, all the more because the Pope just then made an unexpected concession to him in a far more important matter. In prospect of the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, which was bound, in the course of nature, to occur before long, Leo put before the French King the hope that he might be invested with the crown of Naples, on the condition that Francis would protect the Medici and refrain from interfering with the affairs of Tuscany. When, however, Ferdinand died on the 23rd of January 1516, Maximilian’s invasion of Northern Italy altered the political situation so completely that Francis I was unable to undertake at once any measures against Naples, though he by no means gave up his designs on that beautiful country.

Incomparably more important than this, and accompanied by greater and more lasting consequences, were the negotiations connected with the ecclesiastical affairs of the French kingdom. Francis I obtained at once what he had already been promised, namely, the right to levy a tax on the French clergy. In accordance with his former promise, the Pope, though with some hesitation, granted the raising of a tithe for the crusade, first in 1516, and again in 1517. Together, these levies brought in to the victor of Marignano no less a sum than 400,000 livres. What, however, meant much more was that the main lines of the famous Concordat were laid down at Bologna. This important measure has been described as due to the influence of Leo's ecclesiastical activity. With the Concordat was bound up the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, which had been contested so long and vehemently by the Holy See. Thus, though not without great sacrifices, an important victory was gained for the Church, and a dangerous political storm allayed.

CHAPTER IV.

The War of Urbino. Conspiracy of Cardinal Petrucci. The Great Creation of Cardinals, July 1, 1517.

The good terms on which Leo apparently stood with the old friend of his family, Duke Francesco Maria of Urbino, at the beginning of his pontificate, received a rude shock when Giuliano de' Medici fell ill and his young nephew Lorenzo was given supreme command of the Papal troops. The Duke of Urbino might reasonably have been affronted at being passed over; but, on the other hand, his subsequent conduct could not have failed to exasperate the Pope. Regardless of his oath of fealty, and in spite of admonitions and threats. Francesco Maria, being already in secret communication with France, delayed at the most critical moment to send the assistance he was bound to give to the Papal troops. Moreover, after the victory of Francis I, the Duke of Urbino did all in his power to stir up the French King against the Pope. When, in spite of his machinations, Leo and Francis I made friends, such fear seized the Duke that he placed his only son for safety in the fortress of San Leo, and raised a body of troops.

The fate of the Duke had been decided at Bologna. In vain did Francis I appeal for mercy on his behalf. The Pope maintained, amicably but firmly, that, Francesco Maria having forgotten his duty as feudatory, there could be no question of his pardon. Were he to be left unpunished, every petty baron in the States of the Church would do the same thing or worse. After this the King made no further attempt to save his friend. The deposition of the Duke was a foregone conclusion; and it was furthermore decided that his Duchy should be given to Lorenzo de' Medici. This last development did not emanate from the Pope, but from the ambitious Alfonsina Orsini, who was determined at any cost to see a princely crown on her son's head. Unfortunately, Leo did not this time have the strength of mind to resist the wishes of his sister-in-law, which he had shown when that ambitious woman had hoped to secure for Lorenzo the usurped principality of Piombino. The Pope now agreed to the proposal, though he did not conceal the fact that he yielded unwillingly. Once, however, he had given his consent, nothing would move him. Even the representations of his brother made no impression on him. In vain did Giuliano remind him that, in the years of their exile, the Medici had always found hospitality at the court of Urbino. Intercession was useless, and before Leo had left Florence at the end of January 1516, proceedings had been begun against the Duke of Urbino. On the 1st of March Francesco Maria was summoned to Rome, under the severest penalties if he disobeyed. If he did not put in an appearance under eighteen days, he would have to give an account of a number of grievous misdeeds. A considerable array of accusations were raised against him. These included his refusal to join Lorenzo de' Medici in his expedition against the French, although he had received the necessary pay for his troops; his understanding with the enemy; and his participation in the murder of Cardinal Alidosi, and other incidents in the pontificate of Julius II. The accusation about the murder of Alidosi was undeniably a mere pretext, because Francesco Maria had been fully acquitted of all participation in it by Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici himself. The same thing cannot, however, be said of the other counts. The refused fealty and the understanding with France were offences which called for punishment from a legal point of view. Nevertheless, the whole action of the Pope, especially when we consider the hospitality shown by the Duke of Urbino to the exiled Medici, has something repulsive about it. The impression left on the mind is that he cared less that justice should take its course, than that the Duchy should become available for his nephew.

Francesco Maria did not dream of obeying the summons to Rome, and set his hopes on mollifying the Pope through a third party. With this object he sent to Rome the noble Duchess Elisabetta Gonzaga, the widow of his predecessor. But her prayers and tears were of no avail; Leo was not to be moved, and the only point gained by her intercession was the suspension of his citation to Rome, during her absence in the Eternal City. But on the nth of March the document was printed and published. The Duke might have profited by the intercession of Giuliano de' Medici, had he not been too grievously ill to take any active measures. Therefore things took their course in Rome. The time given to the Duke for his personal vindication expired without his putting in an appearance. On the 14th of March, a Papal Bull was published which declared that Francesco Maria, on account of his repeated breaches of fealty, was deprived of all his possessions in the States of the Church.

A few days later, on the 17th of March 1516, the consumptive Giuliano de Medici breathed his last at Fiesole, at the age of thirty-seven. His widow Filiberta returned shortly after to her sister Louisa, the mother of Francis I, taking back with her her costly trousseau. Her brief marriage had been childless. Not only did the Pope grieve for Giuliano, but he was mourned sincerely throughout Florence; for, says Vettori, he was a truly good man, without strength, but with no evil in him; he was, however, too generous. In him Francesco Maria lost his most powerful intercessor, and his last hope now rested in Francis I. The Duke had every hope that the French King would at last take up his cause, for the friendship between Francis and the Pope, which had seemed to be so firmly established, now showed signs of waning. The advantages which the victor had wrung from the defenceless Leo under the cloak of great friendship, had been so great that it was impossible that the amicable footing of the contracting parties should continue for long. To the Pope the dominion of the French in Milan was in itself hateful; but the loss of Parma and Piacenza never ceased from galling him in an especial manner. Had Francis I acted as a wise statesman, he would have avoided the mortification connected with the sequestration of those cities. Leo X had, however, to put up for a while with what he could not prevent. The other arrangement, no less unpalatable to the Holy See, which related to the cession to the Duke of Ferrara of Modena and Reggio, was, however, so worded, that it was easy for an adroit diplomatist like Leo X not particular in the means he employed, to prevent its being carried out, on some pretext or other. Francis learned to his dismay how little dependence could be placed on the Pope, when, in March 1516, Maximilian crossed the Alps and declared war on the French and Venetians. In presence of this danger, the French King, relying on the Pope’s promise at Bologna, asked for the assistance of 500 men for the defence of Milan, or the alternative of payment for 3000 Swiss mercenaries. Leo, always in want of money, rejected the last alternative; but the troops which he promised instead were raised so slowly that Francis suspected a secret understanding between the Pope and the Emperor. His distrust was considerably increased by the mission to Maximilian of Cardinal Bibbiena, well known for his hatred of France, and by the liberation from prison of Marc Antonio Colonna, who, with a body of troops raised in the States of the Church, had hastened to help the Imperial party against the Venetians.

But Francis did the Pope a wrong. There is no doubt at all that the appearance south of the Alps of the Emperor with a considerable force, was an event not at all desired by Rome. The Pope knew how dangerous to the States of the Church were his far-reaching projects. What is more, he knew that not long before this, Maximilian had in no measured terms threatened Egidio Canisio, who had been appointed on an extraordinary mission to him, with a sweeping reform of the Curia. The Pope’s position as regarded the campaign of Maximilian, was the more difficult because he had to reckon with both parties, with each of whom he had made engagements. In order to keep on the safe side he tried, as he had often done before, to avoid taking any decided step until the fortune of war had declared itself for either side. It was fear, and his inveterate habit of veering from one side to the other, which governed his ambiguous course of action. He rejected all offers made to him by the enemies of France, but would not throw in his lot with Francis I; he neither dared recall Colonna nor send the desired help to the French King. When the Emperor’s expedition met with reverses, Bibbiena was directed to stay at Rubiera, on the plea of illness, to watch the development of affairs. As these turned out very favourably to the French, the Pope sent through Lorenzo one month’s payment for the Swiss mercenaries, which had been asked for some time before. Francis took the money, but, in spite of the Pope’s excuses and professions of friendship conveyed to him by Canossa, remained in the very worst of humours. Ever since May he had been in a frame of mind hostile to the Papacy, giving evidence of designs on Naples, and of intervention about the Duke of Urbino. Consequently Leo, on his side, took up a less friendly attitude towards France.

Francis was soon to feel the effect of this in a variety of ways; especially in Switzerland, where the Papal Nuncios ventured to promote the Anglo-Imperial machinations. The Pope forbade any open union with the enemies of France, yet he held out the possibility of such a measure as a threat. This was sufficient to decide Francis I to leave the Duke of Urbino to his fate.

At first Francesco Maria contemplated resistance; but as soon as he understood that Lorenzo de’ Medici was advancing on Urbino on three sides, at the head of an army of combined Papal and Florentine troops, he fled to Pesaro, and thence to Mantua, to his father-in-law, Francesco Gonzaga, to whom he had already sent his family. Urbino and Pesaro surrendered at once, and Sinigaglia offered very slight resistance. Before long the fortresses of Pesaro and Maiuolo fell also, and only the fortress of San Leo held out. In a few days nearly the whole Duchy had succumbed. Leo received the news of this on the 4th and 5th of June 1516. Even if there were not wanting those who celebrated the event in Rome with rejoicings, there were many who justly reproached the Pope for his ingratitude towards the fallen dynasty. The excuses which Leo alleged were the outrages which he had suffered at the hands of the Duke, and the justice of the punishment inflicted on him as an unfaithful vassal and a soldier who had detained troops for whom he had received pay. Above all, the Pope pleaded the impossibility of retaining in his States so unfaithful a feudatory, who was certain at the very first opportunity to have dealings with his enemies. Even Francesco Vettori, by no means a Papal partisan, is of opinion that Leo could not by any means have left the Duke's offence unpunished. But, on the other hand, the severity shown on the occasion by the Pope cannot be overlooked, for it was not in keeping with his great position of Supreme Head of the Church. To most contemporaries the conduct of Leo X seemed hard and unjust, and as though actuated solely by regard for the private interests of the house of Medici as was proved by the fact of the crown of the dispossessed prince being at once given to the nephew of the Pope.

Leo X had scarcely recovered from a serious illness, when he learned the course events had taken. On the 18th of August 1516, Lorenzo was invested with the title of Duke of Urbino, the revenues of which, including Pesaro and Sinigaglia, amounted then to only 25,000 ducats. He was at the same time declared Lord of Pesaro. All the Cardinals signed the deed of investiture except Domenico Grimani, who left Rome in a state of indignation.

The conquest of Urbino aggravated the already strained relations between Leo X and Francis I. The French King had been quite as unwilling as the Emperor to see Francesco Maria driven out of his Duchy. Francis I’s dearest wish was not only to prevent any increase of the Pope’s power, but rather to see it weakened; yet now he had to look on and see Leo putting difficulties in the way which threatened the foreign policy of France. The fact was that the Pope was trying to keep the Catholic King from forming an alliance with France, while at the same time the Papal Nuncio was seeking to prejudice Switzerland against the same country. Prospero and Muzio Colonna, as well as Girolamo Morone, from whom an attempt against Milan might be feared, considered it safer to remain on Papal territory. Francis went so far as to believe that Leo was mixed up in the negotiations which were being carried on between the Emperor, England, and Switzerland, with the object of seizing Milan. On this account he endeavoured to regain the friendship of the Medici Pope. In August he sent a force to help him against the corsairs of Tunis, who were molesting the coasts of the States of the Church, and who, at the end of April, had almost captured the Pope, while he was hunting near the mouth of the Tiber.

In other ways also the French King sought to curry favour with the Pope. But Leo detested the dominion of the French in Italy for itself, and still more bitterly resented having been compelled to give up Parma and Piacenza. No attentions on the part of Francis I could compensate for this. Thus the relations remained strained on both sides. Leo would not accede to the expressed desire of the French King for the recall of Filonardi; and the French Ambassador made no secret of his displeasure. “I know not”, said he in September, “what more the Pope will do. He controls Florence and Siena, and now he has taken possession of Urbino. He had better not think of Ferrara, for I have orders from my King to demand of him the cession to the Duke of Reggio and Modena. This is not the right moment to speak of Naples”. The Neapolitan question was just then occupying the minds of the Ambassadors both of France and Spain, who had met at Noyon, where the following agreement was come to on the 13th of August 1516. Francis I and Charles V concluded a peace in perpetuity, and a treaty for the mutual protection of their states against all comers. The French King renounced his claims on Naples in favour of his one-year-old daughter, Louise, whom Charles promised to marry as soon as she was twelve years old. Till the accomplishment of the marriage, Charles undertook the annual payment of 100,000 crowns, and after that the payment of half that sum until a child should be born of the marriage. A further stipulation which concerned the kingdom of Navarre was left so vague that it could easily be broken; Francis I wished to keep such a way open whereby to escape from the pledges he had made, for his object in signing this agreement was to prevent Charles from joining the anti-French coalition proposed by England. But neither did Charles give his definite adherence to that upon which his Dutch advisers at Noyon had agreed, when the only thing they considered was peace at any price with France. A six weeks’ limit had been allowed for the ratification, which Charles had extended by another month, so as to find time in the interim to negotiate with England. Henry VIII, who regarded the treaty of Noyon as a serious check, left no means untried to win Charles over. This he succeeded in doing, for the Noyon articles were not favourable to the King of Spain. In London, whither Cardinal Schinner went in person, a new treaty, of decidedly anti-French tendency, was prepared on the 29th of October. The contracting parties were Henry VIII and the Emperor Maximilian. The ostensible object of their alliance was the mutual protection of their states, the furtherance of universal peace, and the promotion of a general war against the Turks. They bound themselves in perpetuity to guarantee the safety of their actual and future possessions. The treaty was presented for approbation to Charles of Spain as well as to the Pope, who, through his Nuncio, had declared himself to be neutral. As regards the Pope, the deed ran thus: “Under the conviction that this treaty, being a guarantee of universal peace and the promotion of war against the Turks, must have the consent of the Holy Father, he is included in it as its head and as the participator in all its benefits, if he sanctions the articles and puts them in force by a contribution pro rata; and if, moreover, he pronounces the ban of excommunication against any aggressor, without absolution, except with the consent of all contracting parties. He must come to a decision and ratify these terms within six months”.

But this agreement, which was to be ratified within two months, remained only on paper. The Emperor Maximilian at the Brussels Convention gave his adherence to the Noyon Treaty on the 3rd of December, 1516, and promised to evacuate Verona, which he did in January of the following year. The Swiss, who had been expressly invited to accede to the London Convention, made a peace in perpetuity with France on the 29th of November 1516.

To all appearances the alliance between Francis I and the Emperor was cemented in the spring of the following year. On the 11th of March, at a conference held at Cambrai, a League was made between Maximilian and the Kings of France and Spain. In May and July not only was this treaty ratified, but some secret clauses were added, the object of which was nothing less than the division of Northern and Central Italy into kingdoms, to be made into Imperial fiefs—Venice, west of Vicenza, with Modena, Milan, Mantua, Montferrat, Piedmont, Asti, and Genoa, were to constitute the kingdom of Lombardy, and to belong to Francis I; the eastern part of Venice, with Padua, Treviso, Florence, Pisa, Leghorn, and Siena were to form the Italian kingdom, and to be given either to King Charles or his brother Ferdinand.  There is no doubt whatever that by the atrocious Treaty of Cambrai, Francis I had no object but to entrap the Emperor, and reduce Venice as well as the Pope to a state of pliancy and servitude.

Probably no one knew better than the French King how much depended on the attitude taken by the Pope. On the 17th of May, Bulls from Rome were prepared which, in accordance with the agreement of Bologna, permitted Francis I to raise a crusade-tithe in his kingdom, including Brittany. But it was only in August, after the negotiations about the Concordat were concluded, that these Bulls were issued, having been rewritten at the King’s request. Francis returned thanks to the Pope in a letter to which he added a couple of autograph lines. In this letter he announced the conclusion of the Treaty of Noyon. Leo did not allow the anxiety he felt at the alliance between the French King and the young Hapsburg to be perceived, and sent his good wishes to Francis I. Going on to remind him of the covenant between them, he professed his readiness to recall his Swiss Nuncio. On the 6th of September he thanked the King for his letter, assured him of his good wishes, and for everything else referred him to his Nuncio, Canossa.

The Nuncios in Switzerland were at the same time admonished to behave in such a way that the French King could in no way take exception. Soon after this, Francis I received a privilege in respect of Milan, in accordance with which no consistorial benefice should be conferred on anyone obnoxious to the Crown. The imminence of the Turkish peril gave Leo the opportunity, in October, of once more appealing urgently for help in that quarter. The King in return professed his zeal in the cause of a Crusade, though it must be confessed that he expressed himself in a somewhat ambiguous manner. This annoyed the Pope; all the more because Francis expressed suspicion that the Pope was not acting honestly by him. On the top of this came the pressure put on him by Francis to hand over Modena and Reggio to the Duke of Ferrara. The report that Leo wished to make Lorenzo Duke of Romagna did not facilitate an agreement. “The Pope”, declared the French Ambassador, “is making himself the master of the whole of Italy, and we shall have to go back across the mountains”. Friction was increased by the complaint raised by Francis I that Schinner had gone, by the consent of the Pope, to London to conclude the treaty of October. At the same time the French King urged the Pope, through the Nuncio, to beware of Charles and Maximilian, who, said he, wished to combine to rob the Holy See of its temporal power. This warning had the effect of making Leo X formally disavow Cardinal Schinner. On the 19th there was sent to the Swiss an exhortation to make peace, which had an influence on the ratification of the arrangement of the 24th of November. On the 25th the Papal chamberlain Latino Benassao was sent on an extraordinary mission to France, as the Pope could not agree with the representative of Francis at Rome. Gossip was rife as to the object of this mission; though it really treated of the cementing of a closer friendship with France by the marriage of Lorenzo. Although the money collected in his country for a Crusade was now, as he had long desired, at the free disposal of the King, an agreement was as far off as ever. At the end of December, Leo X complained to the Venetian Ambassador that the French King suspected him of desiring the possession of Ferrara, and that this was the reason why the agreement was delayed. The Ambassador observed on this occasion how anxious the idea of the Treaty of Cambrai made the Pope. On the top of this came disturbing news about the Turks.  Thus did the year 1516 come to a close, full of grave anxiety for the Pope; the new year brought with it the alarming tidings of a menace to the scarcely won Duchy of Urbino.

Francesco Maria had not remained inactive during his exile at Mantua, and had been turning in every direction for help. It was easy for him to gain the friendship of Federigo Gonzaga, Lord of Bozzoli, who was as jealous as he of Lorenzo de' Medici; but what was more important was that he could count on the assistance of the French viceroy of Milan, Odet de Foix, Lord of Lautrec, who hated the Pope both as an Italian and as a priest. One very favourable feature in the undertaking of Francesco Maria, was that just then a number of Spanish and German soldiers had been thrown out of employment by the peace, and were seeking everywhere for a fresh engagement. Five thousand of these now declared themselves ready to follow the discrowned Duke into his former Duchy, the inhabitants of which desired his return, being dissatisfied with the rule of Lorenzo and his exorbitant taxation. Francesco Maria left Mantua on the 16th of January with his small but enterprising army, and marched on Urbino. It was a bold venture, for he had neither money, ordnance, nor provisions of war; however, it was soon to be seen that fortune favoured him.

The news of the rising in Urbino was to Rome like a flash of lightning in a cloudless sky. At the time the Pope was deeply engaged in discussing the Turkish question with the Cardinals, and did not dream of such a thing as a menace to Urbino. All were taken completely by surprise; and the Duke was in the Romagna before it was known that he had moved. The Pope was quite unprepared for war, because, owing to his lavish generosity, added to his bad management, money, the one thing necessary, was wanting to him. The Papal officers were discontented, because they did not receive sufficient pay; they were, moreover, deeply in debt, for all men followed the Pope’s example in lavishness. Therefore the war had to be J started with borrowed money— a doubtful proceeding for any prince.

From the first the Pope had no doubt whatever that France and Venice had a hand in the Duke’s attempt. Neither of them, said he, on the 26th of January, 1517, to the Venetian Ambassador, had any reason to support Francesco Maria against him. Two days later, however, the Ambassador of the Republic was able to give him the assurance that his Government would not assist any enemy of the Pope. The French also loudly protested their innocence, but the Pope believed them so little that he had no hesitation in expressing his distrust of Francis I, even in the letters in which he begged for the help of Germany and Spain. Even in a letter to Francis himself he expressed his distrust of his intentions.

The Pope’s position was desperate, for, thanks to his habitual tactics, he was in a state of dangerous isolation. Not only Francis, but Maximilian also owed him a grudge. Still angry at what he considered the too friendly terms of Leo with France in the spring of 1516, the Emperor wrote a very bitter letter to the Pope on the 20th of February, 1517. Internal difficulties were added to those from outside. The Romagna was discontented with the bad government of the Papal representative, Florence was in a state of disturbance, and the troops were clamouring for pay. To all this was added the anxiety about the Cambrai Congress, to prevent which Nicholas von Schonberg was sent at the beginning of January. “The union of the three sovereigns”, said the Pope to the Venetian Ambassador, “portends the division of Italy, to your injury and our own”.

Lorenzo de' Medici, who left Rome on the 18th of January, was given the supreme command of the Papal troops; being inexperienced in warfare, the Pope sent with him as advisers Renzo Orsini, Giulio Vitelli, and Guido Rangoni. The Pope appealed on all sides for assistance. At Forli, Faenza, and Ravenna the troops were in want of the necessaries of life.

On the 4th of February it was stated in Rome that Francesco Maria had reoccupied Urbino. The news was premature, but on the 8th of February there was no longer room to doubt the loss of the capital of the Duchy. In spite of the Papal prohibition, Alfonso of Ferrara had given Francesco Maria a free passage through his state, which greatly incensed the Pope, who had just pronounced an interdict on the dispossessed Duke. An Ambassador to whom we owe this adds these words : “There is no money; Leo is displeased with Renzo Orsini, and Renzo with him; the Romans are rejoicing over the bad turn affairs have taken”. The whole Duchy of Urbino, with the exception of the fortress of San Leo, followed the example of the capital. Only the towns of Pesaro, Sinigaglia, Gradara, and Mondaino, which did not belong to the Duchy, remained to Lorenzo. On the 26th of March, 1517, he was wounded at the siege of Mondolfo. He left the theatre of war, and remained at a distance, even after his recovery, in spite of the express command to return sent to him by the Pope. Cardinal Bibbiena, who was sent to the army, vainly tried to reduce to order the quarrelsome mercenaries. The Pope was beside himself; he dreaded the idea of a revolution, and it seemed to him a disgrace for the Church that a “petty duke” could dare so much. His anxiety was increased by the growing danger from the Turks, as well as by the Treaty of Cambrai. He knew well that a partition of Italy was contemplated by the parties to that treaty, and that Maximilian coveted Florence. But on the top of all this there came an event which might have frightened a less timid man—namely, the discovery of a plot of Cardinal Petrucci against the Pope’s life.

Alfonso Petrucci was one of those very worldly princes of the Church, whose only desire was to accumulate riches and indulge in the enjoyment of life. He and the younger Cardinals, after they had secured the election of Leo X, put forward such exorbitant claims that the granting of them was an impossibility. Even later in his pontificate, impoverished as he was by his lavish generosity, the Pope was not in a position to satisfy the countless demands of those who had elected him Pope. Additional cause of discontent was given to these Cardinals (many of whom regarded themselves as sharers in the Papal power) by the setting aside of the election capitulation, by the severity of Leo X to Cardinal Sanseverino, and by the unfortunate war in Urbino.

Alfonso Petrucci had, moreover, a special cause of anger with the Pope. In March, 1516, his brother, Borghese Petrucci, was, with the co-operation of Leo, banished from the government of Siena, being replaced by the Castellan of St. Angelo, Raffaello Petrucci; it was in vain that at the last moment Cardinal Petrucci tried by force of arms to put a stop to this revolution, which was gravely detrimental to his interests. Henceforward, his only thought was how to take vengeance on the “ungrateful Pope”. Consumed by an insane hatred, he meditated an attack on Leo, either when he was out hunting, or at some other convenient opportunity, when he intended to murder him with his own hand. It was the difficulty and danger of such a deed, says Guicciardini, which kept him from carrying out the project, rather than the scandal which would have filled all Christendom with horror, had a Cardinal stained his hands with the Pope’s blood.

During the war of Urbino, Petrucci bethought him of another plan for the attainment of his object. He planned a conspiracy, which was to break out as soon as he had succeeded in getting rid of the Pope by means of poison. To obtain this immediate end he bribed Battista da Vercelli to help him in his crime. This man, a doctor of some renown, was to come from Florence to Rome, ostensibly to treat the Pope for fistula, and was then to take his opportunity of administering poison. The plot, however, failed; for, however highly the skill of Battista might be recommended, the Pope was unwilling to trust himself to the hands of a perfect stranger. But this check did not make Petrucci relinquish his plan, though the unexpected obstruction made the hot-headed young man neglect all caution. He wished—so he was heard to declare—to become the liberator of the despised and enslaved College of Cardinals, and to be instrumental in raising to the supreme pontificate one of the older Cardinals, who would be grateful to his electors. These rash words caused Petrucci to fall under suspicion. He therefore left Rome, where he was not safe, and retired to a place belonging to the Colonna in Latium, without first taking leave of the Pope. He conspired so openly with his brother, who was living in Naples, that the Pope thought it best to write to him with his own hand, in March, 1517, warning him against trying to stir up a revolution in Siena; otherwise his action might be construed into a conspiracy against the Pope himself. In spite of this very distinct warning, Petrucci continued his machinations, and through Lattanzio Petrucci indulged in very doubtful dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere. This added to the suspicion in which the Cardinal was held, and still more did the frequent correspondence which he carried on with his secretary and steward, Marc Antonio Nino, who had remained in Rome. In these letters the subject was revived of calling in Battista da Vercelli to attend to the Pope's open wound.

Petrucci was staying then at Genazzano, and while he was there Nino wrote to him in cipher, saying that Battista was as ready as ever to serve him, and hoped to gain access to His Holiness by means of Serapica and Giulio de' Bianchi, two of the Pope's confidential attendants. In order not to arouse suspicion, Battista did not think it wise to visit the Cardinal in person, but would as to that do exactly what Petrucci wished. This letter was intercepted, and led to the discovery of the plot.

Prompt and decisive measures were taken against the offenders. Petrucci’s confidant, Marc Antonio Nino, was torture. But nothing was made known publicly, and even the best-informed diplomatists knew nothing more than that Cardinal Petrucci was gravely implicated by Nino’s admissions. Some suspected that the offence under consideration was an attempt against Siena; while others suspected an understanding with Francesco Maria della Rovere, with whom Borghese Petrucci was staying. Battista da Vercelli’s movements in Florence were constantly watched. Cardinal Petrucci was promised the restoration of his rights in Siena, on condition that he came in person to Rome. The Cardinal hesitated to do this, though he had no suspicion that his correspondence with Nino had been discovered. All his fear was on account of his intrigues with Francesco Maria della Rovere. But so far as those intrigues were concerned, Leo gave him a free safe-conduct, assuring the Spanish Ambassador at the same time that he would keep his word. Therefore Petrucci came to Rome on the 1 8th of May. On the following day, hardly had he, in the company of his intimate friend, Cardinal Sauli, entered the Pope’s antechamber, before both of them were arrested and taken to the Castle of St. Angelo.

In a Consistory called without delay, the Pope informed the Cardinals of what had occurred, and of the introduction of proceedings against Petrucci and Sauli. It was at the same time decided that the minutes of the trial should be submitted for judgment to a special commission composed of Cardinals Remolino, Accolti and Farnese, and that the final sentence should be pronounced by the Cardinals. On the same day special Briefs were sent to the more important princes, telling them that Cardinals Petrucci and Sauli had been arrested on the charge of a secret conspiracy against the life of the Pope, and that on account of this crime a judicial process would be instituted against them.

In Rome this event, which gives us a deeper insight than can anything else into the intense corruption of the highest ecclesiastical body, caused a great sensation. The wildest rumours floated about the city, and it was said that other Cardinals had also been arrested. The excitement increased when it was seen that the Vatican was closely guarded and that troops had been brought into Rome.

Among the Ambassadors who had been informed of the proceedings, the representative of Spain openly protested against the arrest of Petrucci. He had, said he, gone surety for him, and this was the same thing as if the King had done so. But Leo X replied that even the most comprehensive safe-conduct could be no protection for one who had intended to take his sovereign’s life by poison, unless this horrible crime had been expressly mentioned. As Petrucci's safe-conduct only referred to his dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere, the Spanish Ambassador soon withdrew his protest. But even among the Cardinals there were several who were indignant with the Pope for confining Petrucci and Sauli in the lowest dungeon of St. Angelo, which went by the name of “Marocco”. Leo tried to conceal his alarm, and insisted on no one visiting the prisoners; nevertheless, at the express request of the College of Cardinals, he allowed a servant to each of them.

The management of the judicial process against the prisoners was confided to the procurator-fiscal, Mario de Perusco, a native of Rome, and auditor to the Governor of the city. In the first instance the inquiry was confined to proving whether the murder of the Pope had been actually intended. Word was sent to Florence to arrest Battista da Vercelli and bring him to Rome; other suspected persons, including a servant of Petrucci’s named Pocointesta, were also arrested. All these were put to the torture, but whether the rack was applied to the Cardinals is uncertain.

Another Consistory was called on the 29th of May. At this was made known the report of Cardinals Remolino, Accolti, and Farnese, to whom had been confided the supervision of the proceedings. The sentence of these was that the accused Cardinals should be kept under arrest as long as they were not cleared of the accusations brought against them. When the Cardinals were assembled in the Vatican, Paris de Grassis says that Leo sent for Cardinal Accolti. “He remained for over an hour in the Pope’s room”, says the Master of Ceremonies. “As we could not understand what such a long interview portended, I looked through the keyhole, and saw that there was a military guard in the Pope’s room. I suspected at once that something terrible was about to occur, but I held my tongue. As I saw Cardinals Riario and Farnese enter the Pope’s room with cheerful countenances, I concluded that he had sent for them, probably to consult with them about the nomination of new Cardinals, about which he had been speaking some days before. Hardly, however, had Cardinal Riario entered the room, than the Pope, who usually walked about between two attendants, taking slow, steady steps, hurried out of the room quite swiftly, and seemingly in a state of confusion, shutting the door behind him, so that the Cardinal was left alone with the guard. Astonished at this, and at his apparent haste, I asked the Pope what it meant, and whether he was going into the Consistory without his stole. He then asked for his stole. He was pale and very much excited, and in a harsh tone told me to dismiss the Consistory. I obeyed, but had no doubt left that Cardinal Riario had been arrested”.

The reason of Riario’s arrest soon transpired. Petrucci and Sauli had confessed that he was their fellow-conspirator. Like many others, Paris de Grassis would not believe this, and came to the conclusion that Leo was allowing himself to be influenced by feelings of personal revenge connected with the memory of the Pazzi conspiracy; but this surmise of the Master of Ceremonies, who was always prepossessed in favour of Riario, was not confirmed by after events.

On the 4th of June Riario, who till that date had been detained in honourable captivity in the Vatican, was transferred to the Castle of St. Angelo. When the un fortunate man was told that this was to be done, he became paralysed with fear, and had to be carried to his prison. As the reason for this measure, Leo X explained in Consistory that Riario would confess nothing. But in the dark dungeon of St. Angelo he soon made a full confession. Another Consistory was held on the 8th of June: and then the Pope disclosed to the agitated assembly that, by the admission of the incarcerated Cardinals, two other members of the Sacred College, present at the Consistory at that moment, were involved in the conspiracy. Bitterly did Leo complain that those from whom he could have least suspected such a thing, those into whose hands he trusted his life, could be guilty of such a crime. But however pained he might be by the ingratitude of those whom he had loaded with honours and benefactions, he declared himself willing to forgive them, after the example of Him whose place he filled on earth, provided they would confess their misdeed and ask for pardon. But as, in spite of what he said, not one came forward, the Cardinals in Consistory decided that each of them in turn should go up to the Pope and make their avowal into his private ear. When it came to the turn of Cardinal Soderini to do this, he tried to avoid the occasion of avowing his guilt. This obstinacy incensed Leo X, and he told him to his face that he was one of the two culprits. Had he confessed his guilt, the Pope went on, his words would have been those of mercy, but now justice must take its course. On hearing this, Soderini, as well as Adriano Castellesi, threw themselves at the feet of the Pope, and confessing their complicity in the plot, implored his mercy. This was at once granted. The Consistory, however, imposed a fine on each of 12,500 ducats, and commanded the culprits to keep secret what had occurred. Nevertheless, the rumour of what had taken place spread like wildfire throughout Rome, taking many a distorted form as it went about. After the long and painful Consistory, the Pope received the Ambassadors of Germany, France, England, Spain, Portugal, and Venice, and informed them that the Cardinals who had been mixed up in the affair had been, with the exception of Petrucci, Sauli and Riario, pardoned. When the English Ambassador asked him if he would not pardon all, he replied: “Those Cardinals whose guilt has since become known, we have pardoned; but against those who are now confined in the Castle, proceedings will be carried out in due accordance with the criminal law”.

On the 1 6th of June Petrucci's servant, Pocointesta, was hanged in the prison of Tordi Nona, on the charge of attempting to stir up a revolt in Siena. At first an attempt was made to keep secret the alarming discoveries that came to light in the course of the examination of the prisoners, and even the best informed of the Ambassadors could learn nothing for certain. According to a cipher report of the Ferrarese Ambassador written on the 10th of June, there was a rumour that either Farnese or Paris de Grassis was equally guilty. It was only on the 18th of June that it was learned that the later accusations were limited to Soderini and Adriano Castelles. These last were indeed allowed to remain free, but, as mentioned already, each had to pay 12,500 ducats as the price of his liberty. When, however, this fine was doubled, they feared that they would no longer be safe in Rome. In the night of the 20th of June, Soderini sought refuge with the Colonna at Palestrina, while at the same time Cardinal Adriano Castellesi, who was by nature very timid, fled disguised to Tivoli, passing thence, as was reported, to Naples.

Meanwhile the greatest anxiety was felt by their friends concerning the incarcerated Cardinals, for the trial dragged on week after week, and each day brought with it fresh surmises as to the result. True to his nature, the Pope seemed for one moment inclined to allow justice to give place to mercy. But Lorenzo de' Medici and his adherents urged that the severest punishment should be inflicted, not only on the Cardinals, but on all the other offenders. To gain this object Lorenzo arrived in Rome quite unexpectedly on the 1 8th of June. Thirteen Cardinals present at that time in the Curia were summoned to a Consistory on the 22nd of June. All those called came, with the exception of Riario’s relative, Leonardo Grosso della Rovere. In a long speech Leo X informed the Cardinals of the result of the trial held on Petrucci, Sauli, and Riario. The accusation was one of fourfold treason. First, as the Pope pointed out, was that of binding themselves by oath, as Petrucci and Sauli had done, during the lifetime of the lawful Supreme Pontiff, to make Riario Pope; to which arrangement Riario had consented. In order to remove Leo X and secure his death, Petrucci and Sauli had suborned Battista da Vercelli to poison the Pope, under the pretext of treating him for fistula. In this plot also Riario was involved. Lastly, Petrucci as well as Sauli had held treasonable communication with Francesco Maria della Rovere, and had thus incurred the penalties imposed by the last Bull issued. Then the minutes of the process instituted against the accused were read, as also were the confessions of the imprisoned Cardinals. It had now to be decided whether the charge of high-treason were proved, the penalty of such a crime being the loss of all possessions as well as sentence of death. The Cardinals proceeded to put the matter to the vote. All, with the exception of Grimani, admitted that Petrucci, Sauli, and Riario were without doubt guilty of fourfold treason; nevertheless, they begged the Pope to show mercy towards their brother Cardinals. Then the fiscal-advocate, Justino de Carosis, and after him the fiscal ­procurator, Mario de Perusco, brought forward their motion, which was read by Pietro Bembo. Their judgment was that all three of the accused should be condemned to the loss of all their benefices and possessions, then be degraded from their dignity of the cardinalate, and finally handed over to the secular arm. At the conclusion of the Consistory the Pope spoke about the flight of Adriano Castellesi, which, he said, he had known about but would not prevent.

Only such well-weighed entries, characterized by a truly diplomatic brevity and reserve, do we find in the Vice ­Chancellor’s Consistorial Acts. But from other impartial sources we learn that the Consistory was long and stormy. According to the Venetian Ambassador it lasted for ten, and, according to Paris de Grassis, thirteen hours. It was not only the reading of the minutes of the trial, filling several hundred pages, which took so much time; but there were also loud and long discussions, of such a nature that those outside could overhear the Pope disputing with the Cardinals, and they with one another. There was one especially violent encounter of words between Leo X and Cardinal Grimani.

The passing of the sentence took the Curia by surprise. To many the clause which gave the offenders over to the secular arm seemed too hard; for in this case it was equivalent to a sentence of death. Nevertheless it was, according to the laws of that time, the usual sentence passed on traitors, even when no attempt had been made by them against the life of their sovereign.

On the 25th of June all the Ambassadors then in Rome were invited to come before the Pope to hear the minutes of the trial read. “This is what we understood”, reports the Venetian Ambassador, “by the letters found on Petrucci’s secretary, the Cardinal’s schemes with Battista da Vercelli for poisoning the Pope were discovered. Petrucci himself admitted later that, in desperation at Siena being taken out of the hands of his family, he desired to take the Pope’s life and confided his plan to Cardinals Sauli and Riario”. To this the Venetian Ambassador adds: “There is no doubt as to this; yet in conducting the trial it was wrong that the accused should have been put into a position to hear the testimony of others. When this was done in the case of Riario, who would not admit the truth of any of the accusations against him, he said, on hearing the evidence of Petrucci and Sauli, that as they affirmed his connivance in the plot, this statement must be retained in the minutes. Soderini affirmed that he had promised Riario the tiara. “Unfortunately this is all that the Ambassador says about the reading of the minutes of the process, which took eight hours and a half. At the end of the conference the Pope asked for Petrucci's red biretta, which was on the table in front of him. “This”, said he, “is what he staked. He was determined to go to all lengths”.

There is no doubt that Leo X believed in the existence of a real conspiracy against his life. For some time he would not venture to leave his well-guarded palace: and when at last, contrary to all expectation, he attended Vespers in the Vatican Basilica on the vigil of SS. Peter and Paul, he was surrounded by an armed guard; and all the streets round St. Peter’s were held by troops. On the 27th of June Battista da Vercelli and Marc Antonio Nino were hanged, drawn, and quartered. In accordance with the horrible criminal custom of the day, they were both severely tortured on the way to the place of execution, which was on this occasion the Piazza in front of the bridge of St. Angelo. This barbarity was generally condemned.

The whole of Rome was waiting with anxiety to learn the sentence passed on the incarcerated Cardinals. That Petrucci’s fate was sealed was inferred by the division among others of his benefices; but there seemed to be a prospect of pardon for the other two Cardinals. As, unfortunately, the short epitome of the trial, given by the Venetian Ambassador, is all that remains to us of the acts of the process, it is difficult, and for the most part impossible, to form an estimate of the measure of guilt or of the motives of each individual. There is, however, no doubt whatever as to the existence of treasonable dealings with Francesco Maria della Rovere, or of the plot to poison Leo X.

There is no doubt that Petrucci was the most guilty of the conspirators, and indeed the head of the whole plot; for there is incontrovertible proof of his criminal machinations with Battista da Vercelli. The sentence of death pronounced against him was carried out at once, though the statements vary as to the mode of his execution, and whether he was strangled or beheaded. There is also great uncertainty whether this young man, twenty-seven years of age, who had cared for nothing but the frivolous enjoyment of life, reconciled his soul to God before he died.

As regards Sauli, Riario, Soderini, and Adriano Castellesi, there seems no doubt that they gave ear more or less to Petrucci's criminal schemes, though how far each was individually involved cannot be ascertained by the material at our disposal. The historian Paolo Giovio, who is as a rule well-informed, says as follows: “Even if those above named did not actually confide the execution of the criminal scheme to the unstable and frivolous Petrucci, there is no doubt that they incited him to it by their jests and jibes. In their inmost hearts these men were devoured by hatred and ambition, and wished that Petrucci might succeed in his project of removing the Pope, either by open violence or by subtle poison”. From other sources also it seems undeniable that at least Sauli and Riario had a more intimate knowledge of the murderous plot. Their crime, therefore, consisted in not revealing, as they were bound to do, the vengeful machinations of Petrucci, of which they were aware.

As to Adriano Castellesi, he was unlike the others, and Giovio declares that he did not wish for the Pope’s death from any feelings of hatred or ill-will, but solely because his ambition led him to wish for the tiara for himself. Ambition, as well as hatred of the Florentine who was so all-powerful in the Curia, was an essential motive with Riario. Soderini could not forget the banishment from Florence of his brother Pietro, although Leo X had at once invited him to Rome and had restored to him his possessions. Next to Petrucci, there is no doubt, from the incriminating character of the letters which were seized, that Sauli was very deeply involved. No satisfactory explanation can be given why he allowed himself to be mixed up in the treasonable intrigue. Few of the Cardinals had received so many benefits and favours from the Pope as he. The black ingratitude with which Sauli repaid his generosity pained the Pope deeply. “Even during the last three months”, said Leo to the Venetian Ambassador, “we have conferred benefices on Sauli to the value of 6000 ducats”. In court circles the opinion was held that it was these very marks of favour, and the Pope’s partiality for Sauli, which had developed in him an intolerable pride, and resentment because the Pope had given the see of Marseilles to Giulio de' Medici instead of to himself.

Urgent appeals were sent in to the Pope from many quarters on behalf of Sauli as well as of Riario. Genoa pleaded for Sauli, as also did Cardinal Cibo, and, above all, the French King. Many also interceded for Riario, among others the Venetian Ambassador. His relatives wrote in his favour even to Henry VIII of England. In his justification it was pleaded that his worst crime was keeping back the incriminating confidences of Petrucci. It is, however, undeniable that he had set his hopes on obtaining the tiara, and that his confidential relations with Francesco Maria della Rovere had led him to join the mortal enemy of the Pope.

In spite of all this, there were special reasons which induced the Pope to pardon and restore Riario. There were, however, the strictest conditions laid down for his pardon. The first of these was that he should expressly acknowledge that he had been lawfully deposed, and that he owed his restoration solely to the mercy of His Holiness. He had, moreover, to promise solemnly that he would be henceforward the true servant of the Pope; that he would refrain from all hostility towards him and his family, and have no dealings with any prince or Cardinal except about his own private concerns. As a punishment he was to pay, in three instalments, the enormous fine of 150,000 ducats. The first instalment of 50,000 ducats was to be advanced by Agostino Chigi, and the necessary security must be offered either by bankers or friendly officials of the Curia for the punctual payment at Christmas and Easter of the remaining instalments. Furthermore, caution money of 1 50,000 ducats was demanded for the observance of all matters connected with obedience and fidelity, especially that which forbade him to ever leave his appointed dwelling without the written permission of the Pope. As a further precaution, the twelve Cardinals who had taken part in Riario’s deposition, as well as Cardinal Leonardo Grosso della Rovere, were bound to pledge themselves to see that Riario kept his promises; failing which he was to be regarded as deposed in perpetuity. The same security was to be given by the Ambassadors of Germany, England, France, Spain, Portugal, and Venice. Their security was to be ratified within four months, and besides this they were to pledge themselves to make no further appeals to the Pope in favour of Riario.

On the 17th of July, in the great hall of St. Angelo, before the fiscal-procurator, Mario de Perusco, Riario promised to faithfully observe all these conditions. On the 23rd, his nearest relatives promised to pay a fine of 75,000 ducats, should Riario leave the Vatican without the express permission of the Pope. On the same day Agostino Chigi promised to pay the Pope 150,000 ducats on his behalf. On receiving this promise, the Pope decreed thus in a Consistory held on July the 24th: “Riario shall be restored to his dignities, with the exception of the title of S. Lorenzo in Damaso, and without either active or passive right of voting”.

The news of the approaching liberation of Riario, who was universally respected and beloved, spread rapidly through Rome. As the Master of Ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, made his way to St. Angelo to announce the good news to the prisoner, the streets were filled with a jubilant crowd. Riario was conducted to the Vatican by the covered way, in which he was met by Cardinal Giulio de' Medici. Having taken the oath required of him in the apartment of Cardinal Trivulzio, Paris de Grassis conducted him to the Pope, around whom all the Cardinals were assembled. Riario kissed Leo’s foot, but the latter put out his hand in a friendly manner and embraced him. Riario began to speak, but apologized for not having been able to prepare his words. Then breaking out into vehement expressions, he acknowledged his guilt, by which, he said, he deserved not only degradation but death. He praised the mercy of the Pope, which removed all fear of future punishment, and enabled him to live in peace. “I have sinned”, said he; “I have sinned far more than I admitted in my judicial confession”. “Honoured Lord”, replied the Pope, “what we have done by you is in accordance with our duty, and for the honour of the Apostolic See. We pardon you now for the sake of Christ, and restore you to your former state. Let all that has passed be forgotten between us”.

It is not difficult to understand what it was that moved Leo X to pardon and restore Riario. For many years the Cardinal had held the dignity of Camerlengo of the Roman Church and Dean of the Sacred College, a member of which he had been for forty years. His riches and generosity had made him one of the most influential personalities in Rome. Had the Pope refused pardon to such a man, he would have drawn down hatred on himself from high and low. He would have also laid himself open to the suspicion of being actuated by motives of private revenge; for Riario had been a witness of the Pazzi conspiracy, in which Leo’s father had been wounded and his uncle Giuliano killed. Though innocent, the Medici had arrested Riario, and only set him at liberty thanks to the energetic measures taken by Sixtus IV on his behalf. These measures were still so fresh in the memory of all concerned, that when Leo took proceedings against Riario for his complicity in Petrucci’s attempt, even the Pope’s adherents suspected that a desire for revenge for the old offence was at the bottom of the action taken by him. However, the joy with which his pardon was greeted by his many adherents, the friendliness of the Pope towards him then and afterwards, and even his full restoration which followed, when the right, active and passive, of voting was restored to him, could not blind him to the fact that his part in the Curia was played out. At the latter end of 1520 he asked leave to retire to Naples. This was granted. However, the bewitching beauty of his new abode could not make up to Riario for the loss of his position in the capital of the world. He who had been so full of the enjoyment of life, who had always lived in regal splendour in the most beautiful palace in Rome, fell into a state of melancholy, and died on the 7th of July 1521, at the age of sixty-one. His body was brought to Rome and laid to rest in a very simple tomb in the Church of the Santi Apostoli. He required no special monument, for his magnificent palace of the Cancelleria, which he had to leave to the Apostolic Chamber, will keep the memory of this unfortunate man alive till the most remote ages.

A few days after the restoration of Riario there followed, with unexpected rapidity, that of Sauli, who was condemned to pay a fine of 25,000 ducats. When the Pope went into Consistory on the 31st of July, he sent Paris de Grassis to fetch Sauli from the Castle of St. Angelo. As a sign that his mission was genuine, he gave the Master of Ceremonies his diamond ring to show to the gaoler. “When I received this”, says Paris de Grassis, “I was astonished, because only a few days before the Pope had told me that he meant to treat and punish Sauli as his enemy”. Sauli, however, was not allowed to appear before the Pope with his cappa, but clad as a simple priest. He also had to pledge himself to remain in the Vatican, and to confess his offence publicly in Consistory. In obedience to this command, he accused himself of conspiring with Francesco Maria della Rovere against the Pope, and of sharing in Petrucci's scheme for poisoning Leo X. He humbly prayed for pardon and absolution for this crime, and promised to be for the future the most faithful servant of His Holiness. Leo X replied shortly and irritably that he hoped that his thoughts agreed with his words, but that he feared greatly that he would fall back into his old sins. After Sauli had again prayed for mercy and had promised fidelity to the Pope, lie was reinstated in his dignity as Cardinal, though without the right, active or passive, of voting. His benefices, so far as they had not been already given away, were restored to him. The deeply humiliated Sauli enjoyed his life as little as did Riario. He lived a retired life, and died on the 29th of March in the following year. Leo had him buried with all honours in the Church of Santa Sabina.

Meanwhile Soderini, for whom Francis I had interceded, had, by the Pope’s permission, gone from Palestrina to Forli, where he possessed an estate; though he had to promise not to leave the kingdom of Naples. The Pope was quite right not to trust him, and it was not till after Leo’s death that he was able to return to Rome.

Cardinal Adriano Castellesi found a refuge in Venice, where he arrived on the 13th of July. His flight was over­hasty, for it gave Wolsey the opportunity of ruining him. Intercession was made for him from many quarters, and probably an understanding might have been arrived at, had it not been that Wolsey was bent on obtaining possession of the unfortunate man’s benefices. For a long time Leo resisted the pressure put on him by England. Castellesi was sent for to Rome; but in spite of the safe-conduct offered, he would not go. This sealed his fate, and on the 5th of July 1518, he was deprived of his dignities, the reason assigned being his complicity in Petrucci’s plot, as also his refusal to obey the summons to Rome. The primary cause of these strong measures was the pressure from England, but they were also attributable to the Pope’s fear of an alliance between Adriano and Soderini, and ensuing intrigues. Such an idea was, however, far from Adriano’s thoughts. He lived quietly and devoted to study in the Palazzo Ca Bernardo, near the Grand Canal, belonging to his friend Giacomo da Pesaro. There he remained until the death of Leo X compelled him to go to Rome to attend the Conclave. But on his way thither the unfortunate man disappeared, leaving no trace behind him. It was supposed that he had been murdered by his servant.

After the proceedings consequent on Petrucci’s conspiracy were ended, an unusual spirit of excitement continued to prevail. It cannot be surprising that the names of other Cardinals, such for instance as Luigi d'Aragona and Cornaro, were mentioned as being connected with the plot; though, as it was proved, such a surmise was quite incorrect.

Early in May the news spread about Rome that it was Leo’s intention to create as many as twelve new Cardinals. On the 15th of June he announced this officially in Consistory. In fact the Pope contemplated a complete renewal of the Sacred College. The recent occurrences had shown the necessary consequences of the secularization of the Supreme Senate of the Church, which had been initiated by Sixtus IV. The moment had come for a radical reform of the College of Cardinals; but that Leo X did not even yet fully grasp the gravity of the situation, is shown by the manner in which he proceeded. Instead of raising quite blameless men to the purple by the process of a severe selection, he chose several for the dignity solely because they were rich, and would be able to help to defray the enormous and daily growing expenses of the Urbino war.

When the news of all the horrible things that had been occurring in Rome reached Germany, the strongest imaginable spirit of hostility sprang up. The punishment of the criminals was condemned as unjust, and the whole procedure against them construed into a scheme for making money. Nor was it only in Germany that the Pope’s conduct was censured. In Siena, Milan, Venice, and even in Rome, there were not wanting those who were severe in their judgments. The canon, Sigismondo Tizio, who was bitterly hostile to the Medici for other reasons also, wrote thus: “What is the use of canonical laws, established by holy Popes, forbidding priests to stain their hands with blood? for now Popes and Cardinals have become antichrists and tyrants”.

Regardless of all these inimical opinions, Leo X profited by the past occurrences to create a large number of Cardinals, both as a means of subjecting the Sacred College to himself, and at the same time of procuring money for the Urbino war. He forestalled the opposition of the secular powers by paying the fullest attention to their wishes. Though the College of Cardinals had been not little intimidated by all that had taken place, it was not an easy matter to obtain their consent to the nominations on the gigantic scale which was proposed. The proceeding was indeed unparalleled, and gave great umbrage to many.

On the 26th of June there was held a stormy Consistory. Those present refused to consent to the proposed nomination of twenty-seven new Cardinals, except on the condition that the names of no more than fifteen should be published at once. When, however, it came to making a selection among the candidates, there was such a difference of opinion that the settlement of the affair had to be postponed to another Consistory. But when it came to the point the Cardinals yielded to the strong will of the Pope more readily than could have been expected. On the 1st of July the great nomination took place; only, instead of twenty-seven, thirty-one Cardinals were made. The Sacred College gave its consent, not freely, but constrained by fear.

The unprecedented number of those nominated, the publication of whom followed in open Consistory on the 3rd of July made it necessary to create new titles for the Cardinals. On the 10th of July, the Pope was in a position to announce that all the older Cardinals had agreed to the abrogation of the decree of the election capitulation which limited the total number of the members of the Sacred College to twenty-four.

The new Cardinals were men of very different types, by the choice of whom Leo X wished to attain various objects. In the case of some, such as Louis de Bourbon, brother of the Constable, of the Portuguese Infant Alfonso, the Spaniard, Raymond de Vich, and the Venetian, Francesco Pisani, politics were the sole reason of their elevation. In the case of others the motive was to be found in their relationship to the house of Medici, and their readiness to advance large sums of money to the Pope. This was how it came about that men like Ponzetti, Armellini, and Passerini received the purple.

Ferdinando Ponzetti was born in Naples, though his family came from Florence. His portrait is known to students of art in the altarpiece in the Chapel of St. Brigit in S. Maria della Pace, where Baldassare Peruzzi has represented him kneeling before the Madonna. Ponzetti had made his fortune as physician to Innocent VIII, and subsequently received distinguished offices in the Curia. On the 23rd of October Leo appointed him his treasurer; and now, at the age of eighty, he was raised to the purple. Not only was Ponzetti a physician of mark, but he was also versed in classical literature, philosophy and theology, was very ready of speech, and was well known as an author. But all his good qualities were marred by the vilest avarice. He paid 30,000 ducats for his nomination.

Francesco Armellini’s reputation was even worse than his. His father was a poor merchant of Perugia, but by his own shrewdness and financial talent in discovering new sources of revenue, he made himself indispensable to the Pope; but at the same time he made himself universally hated. Silvio Passerini was not much better. This learned though self-opinionated man had been Datary since January, 1514,1 and had served the Medici with the greatest fidelity on many occasions. It was therefore easy for him to find favour with others. The list of benefices bestowed on Silvio Passerini, as is shown by the “Regest Leonis X”, is really shocking. Among all the benefice-hunters of the court of Leo X, certainly Passerini took the first place.

Their kinship to the Pope was the sole reason of the nominations of Giovanni Salviati, Niccolò Ridolfi, and Luigi de' Rossi. The young and highly-gifted musician Ercole Rangoni, Bonifacio Ferreri, and Raffaello Petrucci owed their elevation to personal considerations. The last mentioned, who had formerly held the post of Governor of Siena, led an entirely secular life. His covetousness made him hated ; but the two first named had the reputation of being excellent men.

A most rare event in the history of the Sacred College was the elevation to the purple on the same day of two members of one family. These were Scaramuccia Trivulzoo to whom the success of the Lateran Council owed so much, and his highly-gifted nephew Agostino. Still greater astonishment was caused by the nomination of seven members of prominent Roman families with no regard to party. By doing this Leo carried on the prudent policy of his predecessors, who wished to remove all party feeling from the Court. Whatever the motive, the Romans rejoiced and held high festival because of the honour paid to their fellow-citizens. But Franciotto Orsini and Pompeo Colonna were totally unfitted for their high dignity, being rather condottieri than princes of the Church. Francesco Conti also lived a thoroughly worldly life. But of the four remaining nothing but good can be said. Alessandro Cesarini was remarkable for his culture, Andrea della Valle for his great prudence, while Paolo Cesi and Domenico Jacobazzi were distinguished for their great learning.

The Roman, Domenico de Cupis, the Florentine, Niccolò Pandolfini, the Sienese, Giovanni Piccolomini, the Genoese, Giambattista Pallavicini, and Lorenzo Campeggio, who belonged to a Bolognese family, were all excellent men. Finally, there was the Dutchman, Adrian of Utrecht, who was a man of sound learning, and a model of the priestly life, who had been recommended by Charles V. With him are worthy to be ranked the Generals of the Dominicans, the Franciscan Observantines, and the hermits of St. Augustine, who received the cardinalate together on the 1st of July 1517. It is hard to say which of these religious holds the first place.

More will be said later about the learned General of the Dominicans, Thomas de Vio (Cajetan). Cristoforo Numai, a native of Forli, had taken the Franciscan habit early in life, and had then received the doctorate of theology in Paris. Only a few days before the 1st of July, the confidence of his brethren had placed him at the head of the most widespread of all religious orders. He was completely taken by surprise by his elevation to the purple. The Master of Ceremonies relates how the humble religious refused at first to believe the news of his elevation, and would not believe it until several successive messengers had been despatched to take him to the Vatican. When Numai at length appeared at the palace in his well-worn habit, his complete ignorance of courtly etiquette aroused astonishment in the ante-camera. “At last”, relates Paris de Grassis, “I conducted him to the Pope, who had already left the Consistory”. His Holiness embraced him and greeted him as Cardinal.

The General of the Augustinians, Egidio Canisio, known under the name of Egidius of Viterbo, was taken by surprise by the conferring of the dignity as completely as was Numai. If ever a man deserved the red hat it was this distinguished man, who combined a classical education and general learning with a great capacity for business and a profound piety.

Egidio Canisio's versatility and mental activity were truly astounding. Not only had he made his mark as a poet, orator, philosopher, and theologian, but also as an historian and a student of oriental languages. It is a mystery how, with all this intellectual work, he found the time to effect what he did by preaching and in reforming his Order. On the top of all these occupations there came the various and difficult diplomatic missions which were confided to him by both Julius II. and Leo X. Ever since the classical discourse at the opening of the Lateran Council, urging the reformation of the Church, his name has been famous. The calling of such a man to the Supreme Senate of the Church does great credit to Leo X; in this way he promoted the principle of true reform as well as its execution.

If we consider the nominations of the 1st of July, 1517, it must be admitted that many, if by no means all, the new Cardinals were excellent and worthy men, who deserved well of the Church, and by means of whom the Sacred College was for the first time, after long years, restored to its regenerating influence. In this respect as also in the number of nationalities represented, that creation of Cardinals showed a most decided advance on any other in many ways it was an important event. Not only was the secularization of the Sacred College to a great extent checked, but the supremacy of the Papal authority over that of the Cardinals was finally confirmed. Ever since the middle of the 14th Century, the one endeavour of the Cardinals had been to cramp and circumscribe the power of the Pope; though, in spite of all the election capitulations, the Papacy had preserved its lawfully absolute power. All attempts to fetter the Pope by the vote of the Sacred College had failed. The last great attempt made by the Cardinals to oppose him—the Council of Pisa—had had just the contrary effect to that which had been intended. The schismatic Cardinals had been compelled to repudiate the Council; and, at the eleventh session of the Lateran Council, held on the 19th of December 1516, the Bull about the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction declared that to the Pope alone belonged the right and authority to summon, prorogue, or dismiss a Council. The conspiracy of Petrucci led to a nomination of Cardinals on a scale greater than any mentioned in the annals of the Church. Ever after, the absolute supremacy of the Pope was so firmly established that the Cardinals under Leo’s next successor but one, “even in the days of the greatest misfortune, when party spirit prevailed most violently”, ventured on no opposition to it.

Meanwhile the war in Urbino was going on, and sympathy with Francesco Maria was growing in Tuscany and even in some of the States of the Church. Fear and hope alternated at the Vatican; but the various projects that were made vanished, as says an Ambassador, into smoke. There was scarcely a town in the States of the Church which did not show dangerous signs of excitement; at one time Siena, Perugia, and Citta di Castello were threatened with revolution. In June the Pope feared lest the enemy might appear before the very gates of Rome. In all haste troops were raised in the city, and the Vatican and its immediate surroundings were provided with special guards. Urgent appeals for assistance were sent out by the Pope on all sides, especially to Switzerland.

That the war, with its enormous expenses, dragged on so long, was largely due to the attitude of the great powers, to whose interest it was that the Pope should be kept in a state of embarrassment, and compelled to seek for help. After his cause was lost, Francesco Maria disclosed the true state of affairs by making it known that Francis I and Charles V had not only sympathized with him, but had even persuaded him to persevere with his undertaking. Quite in accordance with this policy were the constant offers of assistance to Leo X, which those powers vied with each other in making. But the troops promised, though always coming, never came, in spite of moving remonstrances on the part of the Pope. The leaders of the mercenary troops behaved in the same way; in order to prolong their service and extort from the Pope as much money as possible, they made it their chief duty to spare the enemy and defer a settlement.

As early as February 1517, Leo X had turned to England to obtain from Henry VIII the money for his enormous war expenses; but the English King refused to help until the Pope had joined his League. Then Leo turned to France; but Francis I demanded security for his protégé, the Duke of Ferrara, and the cession to him of Modena and Reggio. After long negotiations, the Pope acceded to this demand, but his Brief contained provisos which Francis would not accept.

Meanwhile the want of money in Rome increased to such an extent that Leo declared his readiness to join the English League; whereupon Henry VIII sent a subsidy of 50,000 ducats. The Papal plenipotentiary in London prepared a deed of alliance in the beginning of July, but Leo X, actuated by fear of France, still hesitated to take the decisive step. However, he yielded at last, and on the 11th of August he published a Brief which ratified the League between England, Spain, and the Emperor. He now received a subsidy of 100,000 ducats, to raise which he consented to the levying of a tithe on the English clergy.

Leo was told from so many quarters of the French King’s secret support of Francesco Maria, that he could no longer doubt the truth. The difference between him and Francis widened every day. Canossa, who had for many years been Nuncio at the French court, was sacrificed to the situation, for Leo X no longer trusted him, on account of the great favour in which he was held by Francis I. His successor was the Bishop of Sebenico, Giovanni Staffileo, who arrived at the French court in the middle of September 1517.

At this moment the war of Urbino came to an end after a duration of over eight months. Spain and France, the rival powers in Italy, and very jealous of each other, undertook the office of mediation and arrangement of terms. Leo X, who with good reason distrusted them both, found himself pledged to pay all arrears to the soldiers of Francesco Maria, which amounted to more than 100,000 ducats, as well as to the granting of a full amnesty. The ex-Duke, who was absolved from all the ecclesiastical penalties which hung over him, received permission to retire to Mantua, with all his artillery, as well as with the famous library collected by Federigo of Montefeltro. When he took his departure, he held out hopes to his subjects that he would come back in better days; for Francis I had promised to help him to regain his Duchy, either when there was a vacancy in the Holy See, or whenever he had come to a rupture with Leo X. It was therefore an essentially insecure crown which Lorenzo de' Medici received with the Duchy of Urbino. The only, thing gained was a suspension of arms, which would no doubt last till the Pope’s death. This much was gained, but at what a cost!

Guicciardini reckons that Leo’s war expenses up to that time had reached the appalling sum of 800,000 ducats. The statement made by Leo X to the Venetian and Swiss Ambassadors agrees with this. If, as it may be, this calculation is placed at too high a figure, there is no doubt that from that time dates the complete ruin of the Papal finances.

Not less disastrous was the war in its effect of promoting the spread of bandits in the States of the Church. But worst of all was the injury to its moral power which the Holy See had sustained, in that its occupant had again entered upon the disastrous policy of Alexander VI, in spite of the noble example set by Julius II, and regard less of the crying needs of both the Church and the world, which called for something very different from the prosecution of such a war. The struggle for the possession of the Duchy had a peculiarly injurious effect on the endeavour made by the Pope to promote a Crusade, which by reason of it came to an almost complete standstill.

CHAPTER V.

The Pope’s endeavours to promote a Crusade, 1517-1518.

Ever since his election to the Holy See, the Pope’s mind had been preoccupied by the Eastern Question, which, by the accession to power of the warlike Sultan Selim in 1512, had become very critical. In this anxiety about the encroachments of the Turks, Leo was only following the traditions of his predecessors. The historian of the Turkish Empire has no doubt that Leo X, after his accession, had the matter of a Crusade “really and seriously at heart”, and was honestly bent on making it, together with the restoration of the peace of Europe, the main object of his life. The numerous Briefs which he sent to all the Christian princes in the earlier days of his Pontificate are a proof of his intention.

Even in the earlier sessions of the Lateran Council the Turkish Question was brought up repeatedly. Words were followed by deeds, and remittances of money were sent at once to those places which were most in danger, such as Rhodes and Hungary. Besides this, numerous privileges were granted by Rome to the King of Portugal; to aid him in his fight against the infidels of Africa. The picture of the Turkish peril drawn by the Envoys of the Polish obedientia, on the 13th of June 1513, impressed Leo so painfully that he burst into tears.

On the 15th of July it was decided to send Cardinal Bakócz as Legate to Hungary, it being rumoured that he was to take with him large sums of money. Leo rejoiced when the news arrived of a victory gained over the Turks by the Hungarians, and took part personally in the thanksgiving service held at Santa Maria del Popolo. Unfortunately the departure of the Hungarian Cardinal was delayed till late in the autumn, and his attempt to preach the Crusade in his own country was an entire failure. The Hungarian peasants took up the Cross indeed, but it was not to fight against the infidel, but against their own hated magnates. A full year passed before this state of things could be set right.

In spite of all these mischances, the Pope, who at the beginning of 1515 had appealed to all Christian princes to help with the Crusade. now sent the distinguished Ban of Croatia and Bishop of Veszprim, Petrus Beriszlo, to the assistance of the hard-pressed frontier cities, taking with him not only the 20,000 ducats already promised, but large contributions of grain, war material, ordnance, gunpowder, and saltpetre. At Ancona a fleet was fitted out, for which Venice was by way of providing guns. But the Signoria, who had renewed their agreement with the Porte on the 17th of October, 1513, showed no desire to support the Pope’s proposed Crusade. They wished rather to prevent the Pope from having at heart the interests of Christendom, and preferred his devotion to personal ambition and the renown of the house of Medici. This false construction of his action was carefully disseminated by Venice, and had a very disastrous effect on the Pope’s efforts to make peace and promote a Crusade. As he learned to realize that nothing was to be hoped for from Venice, which had several times threatened to call in the help of the Turks. Leo turned his thoughts from the danger threatening from Constantinople to another quarter. He wanted to make the alliance with the chivalrous French King conducive to the protection of Christendom. From the assurances given at Bologna, both by Francis I and his chancellor, Du Prat, the Pope hoped for great things from France.

Next to Rhodes, Hungary was the place which stood in the greatest danger, and on the 17th of July Leo urged the French King most pressingly to send to Hungary at least a subsidy of money. Nothing could have been more friendly than the King’s reply, nevertheless no money was sent. King Ladislas, in whom Leo X had always taken a warm interest, died in March 1516, being succeeded by his son Louis, who was still a child. To complete the difficulties, quarrels broke out among the Hungarian magnates. The Pope’s anxiety in regard to Hungary increased, and on the 2nd of April 1516, he sent thither his relative, Roberto Latino Orsini. In urgent letters he pressed the Polish King, Sigismund, the King of Portugal, and, above all, Francis I, to go to the help of the menaced country. But even now the French King sent no money, whereas the Pope, in spite of his financial difficulties, sent to the Ban 15,000 ducats. There is no doubt that Hungary would have fallen a prey to the Turks had not the Sultan Selim, in the summer of 1516, embarked on a campaign against Syria and Egypt which engaged all his energies for two years.

The opportunity of making an attack on Constantinople during the Sultan’s absence was not made use of, for the European powers, and, unfortunately, the Pope also, were taken up for a time by their own personal interests. The project of a Crusade was made use of to cover quite other projects. This was especially the case with Francis I, who had at heart other matters, especially the conquest of Naples. Even Leo X was often turned aside from the idea of a Crusade either by the interests of the States of the Church or by those of his nephews, and especially by the war of Urbino, though it is fair to say that he never quite lost sight of it

Scarcely had Francesco Maria been overthrown before the question of the Crusade came once more to the front in Rome. In October 1516, the Pope again appealed to all Christian princes, and drew attention to the war in which the Sultan Selim was entangled in Asia and Africa. No authentic information about his movements could be obtained in the West, except by Venice, which kept its knowledge to itself. But Leo made a skilful use of whatever intelligence he had received from the East to stir up the crusading zeal of the princes. “If it be true”, was the gist of his representations to them, and especially to Francis I, “that the Sultan has overcome his ancient foes the Egyptians, it is time that we woke from sleep, lest we be put to the sword unawares. If it be not true, why should we not make use of this opportunity, so favourable to us, and given to us by God, to carry out His cause to a good end, and, uniting ourselves, attack the Turks, now hard-pressed and entangled in the Persian and Egyptian expeditions, and march against them under the unfurled standard of the Holy Cross?”

Francis I replied on the 15th of November, by an assurance of his unaltered enthusiasm for the holy cause. He urged the Pope to work for the promotion of universal peace in Europe, adding that, as soon as that had been secured, he would at once put a large army in the field and follow the Pope as his leader in the holy campaign.

But in spite of these high-sounding assurances he was not at all pleased that Leo should have thus taken the business in hand. The secret instructions given to his Ambassador, at the Congress which had met at Cambrai in the beginning of 15 17, reveal his real thoughts. In these he actually lays down, as a result of the victory of the Christian arms, a division of the Ottoman Empire between France, Germany, and Spain, no mention being made of the other powers, and least of all of the Pope. But Leo X soon learned about this project through Maximilian, and became all the more anxious to promote the universal peace of Christendom. The mission of the Dominican, Nicholas von Schonberg, was meant to serve this end.

Meanwhile very disquieting news from the East had reached Rome. There was scarcely room to doubt that both Egypt and the Holy Land had fallen victims to the Sultan’s lust of conquest. During January the equipment of a fleet and the raising of a Crusade-tax were determined on. Various plans were made, and the appointment of a special Crusade-Legate was discussed. At S. Agostino, in the presence of three Cardinals, Egidio Canisio preached an impassioned sermon about the danger with which Christendom was threatened by the Sultan, to avert which the Pope hoped for great things from the Kings of France, England, and Spain, on account of the generosity belonging to their youth.

Then the war of Urbino broke out again. The Pope, though surrounded by difficulties, did not, even at that anxious time, forget the Crusade, and carried on his negotiations with the Ambassadors and princes. In the last session of the Lateran Council he carried, in spite of the opposition of a number of bishops, the resolution that a general Crusade should be solemnly proclaimed, and that for this end a tithe should be laid on all the clergy for three years. At the same time a Bull was published which bade all princes and lords to observe a truce for five years, under the most severe spiritual penalties. Thus, by a solemn decree of the Council, the proposed Crusade became an established fact: there was no longer any question in the matter of if or how or when.

Leo X still wished to keep the conduct of the Crusade in his own hands. A congregation of experienced Cardinals was appointed to make suitable proposals both for carrying out the war and for providing the means. But, owing to the great pressure of the Urbino affair, nothing was done about it that summer. It was only when the disastrous war was at an end, and peace restored among the Christian princes, when the differences between the Emperor and Venice, and between Henry VIII and Francis I about the possession of Tournai, had been arranged. that there seemed to be once more a possibility of the Crusade being carried out. The Pope, who had been contemplating the position in the East with ever-increasing anxiety, now took up the matter with decision. The affair with Francesco Maria had scarcely been arranged before Cardinal Medici declared to the Venetian Ambassador that the moment had now come when the Turks must be attacked; that the Pope was prepared in all essentials, and that a special Nuncio would be at once sent to the Signoria to demand that the Republic should join in the war against the infidel. The Ambassador, whose government was on the very best of terms with the Porte, was so startled by this declaration that he could not make any reply to it. “While awaiting special orders from Venice”, he said, “I must confine myself to generalities”.

Leo X acted wisely in turning first of all to the great sea-power, Venice, for without the co-operation of that state a combined undertaking was not to be thought of. The task of winning the Republic over to the common cause was entrusted to Altobello Averoldo, Bishop of Pola, who was in September appointed permanent Ambassador and Legaus a latere. His distinguished qualities, added to the fact that he was a native of Brescia, seemed to fit him in an especial manner for the difficult mission. On the 29th of October Cardinal Medici wrote to Averoldo, telling him that the Turkish Question was more than ever uppermost in the mind of the Pope; that in connection with this affair a special Ambassador had lately arrived from the French court, who had made very friendly overtures ; so that even if Venice continued to hold back, the matter would at last go forward, though indeed the Pope before all things wished to ask the Signoria for advice, so valuable was their experience, as to how the undertaking had best be begun and carried out. Other Nuncios would be required who could form opinions from what was reported of the war.

On the 4th of November Leo X appointed a congregation, consisting of Cardinals Carvajal, Remolino, Fieschi, Grassis, Pucci, Medici, Farnese, and Cornaro. The Ambassadors of the European powers were admitted to its sittings, to which certain men versed in the concerns of the Ottoman Empire were also invited. The three Cardinals belonging to the Dominican, Franciscan, and Augustinian Orders, were called on to preach the Crusade.

The deliberations began on the 6th of November, under the presidency of the Pope; all the powers were represented except Portugal and Venice. The representative of King Emanuel was excused from attending on the score of illness; but why the Venetian Ambassador was absent, says the Envoy of the Duke of Ferrara, no one knows.

The conference was hurried on so effectually, that by the 12th of November a detailed memorandum was ready, which is one of the most remarkable documents relating to the history of the European movement against the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century. Six principal questions were presented: (1) Should the war be undertaken? (2) Should it be a war of offence or defence? (3) What obstacles are there in the way, and how are they to be removed? (4) Should the war be conducted by all the princes, or only by some; and if so, by whom? (5) By what means should it be carried on? (6) How should it be started?

The first question was answered by the memorandum decidedly in the affirmative. As regarded the second, an offensive war was recommended. Such a course would show more courage, and would secure the advantage of an easier discovery of the enemy’s weak point. In answer to the third question, seeing that the chief obstacle must come from discord among the princes of Christendom, the memorandum pointed out that this could be overcome only by the establishment of universal peace, or of a truce for so long as the Holy War lasted. If during that time quarrels arose, these must be settled by the Pope or Sacred College, or else their settlement must be postponed until the war was over. It might, on the other hand, be advisable to make a League of all the princes under the Pope—a kind of holy alliance—by which all would pledge themselves by oath to put down by force of arms those who broke the peace. To this League there might be given the name of the Brotherhood of the Holy Crusade (Fraternitas Sanctae Cruciatae).

As regarded the fourth question, relating to the supreme command of the undertaking, the memorandum said that though the Emperor and the King of France, as the first and most powerful of the princes of Christendom, must certainly be at the head of the combined powers, all the others would be held bound to co-operate in the Crusade according to their strength. The fifth and sixth questions, which concerned the means and manner of carrying out the war, were considered in the memorandum to be the most important. Apart from God’s help, which was to be implored without ceasing, the question resolved itself into two things, namely, money and troops.

The general war expenses were estimated at 800,000 ducats. This sum, says the optimistic memorandum, will not be very difficult to raise. In the first place, all kings and princes will contribute a goodly portion of their income, this being but just and to their own interests, seeing that it is with them that the enemy mostly concerns him elf, taking but little account of the common folk. The Turks have sworn a deadly hatred against the heads of Christendom, and want their lives. Nevertheless, we do not want to fix the amount of the portion contributed by them, for this must be left to their own prudence and generosity. Then, the clergy must be approached in like manner. All, and especially the richer monasteries and foundations should, according to the amount of their income, give a tenth, two-thirds, or even three-quarters of it for this end, limiting their private expenditure to the necessaries of life, so that they may dedicate all the remainder to the holy work, for which they are mainly responsible as the possessors of the heritage of Christ. From the nobles a tenth, and from the burghers a twentieth, of their income might be asked. Finally, the people who live by the work of their hands, artisans and labourers, should each give a suitable contribution. A third of the whole sum must be raised at once for the equipment of the army, while the remainder must be in a state of readiness, to be utilized at any moment when wanted.

The strength of the army will be about 60,000 foot soldiers, 12,000 light and 4,000 heavy cavalry. For the infantry, Swiss, German, Spaniards, and Bohemians would be preferred; for the light cavalry, Spaniards, Italians, Dalmatians, and Greeks; and for the heavy cavalry the best men would be found in France and Italy. It is evident that corresponding artillery must be provided. Ships could be supplied by Venice, Genoa, Naples, Provence, Spain, Portugal, and England. It must from the very beginning be a fixed rule that the war by sea be carried on in conjunction with that by land, “for the enemy has already a fleet of three hundred triremes”. It would be impossible to bring an equal number against them, but the Kings of France and Spain could each certainly contribute twenty of these vessels, Genoa the same number, and Venice forty. The Pope himself, with the Cardinals, would endeavour to provide ten. A considerable number of large vessels, even if not triremes, might be expected from France and England.

“It would be very advisable not to divide and split up the various contingents, but to try to mass them on one point, Constantinople being the objective of the attack. The road through Germany and Hungary, or that through Dalmatia and Illyria, might be taken; but the shortest and easiest method would be to assemble the troops at Ancona and Brindisi, and the fleet at Sicily, because from thence Greece and Egypt are quickly reached”. An alliance with the Shah Ismael would be considered, and the memorandum builds its hopes on an invasion of the border provinces by the Hungarians and Poles, while the main army is proceeding against Constantinople. The division of the conquered countries would be a delicate matter, to be treated carefully and prudently. About this the memorandum says : “Perhaps it will be advisable to appoint arbitrators at once for this object, who at the end of the war would give a portion to each country in proportion with the help it had afforded. This could be arranged either by the Pope and Cardinals, or else by plenipotentiaries appointed by the above-mentioned Holy Brotherhood, when it has been organized. To arrange a division before that which has to be divided is in our possession would be very unfitting. It would be better to regard all conquests as common property at first and make the division later”.

The memorandum, which fixed nothing, but confined itself to suggestions, was communicated by the Pope through his Nuncios to the Emperor, the Kings of France, Spain, England, Portugal, and to the Republic of Venice, with the request for their suggestions and remarks. At the same time Briefs were sent to the chief powers, pointing out the necessity of prompt action in regard to the Turkish danger. The greatest discretion as regarded the Turkish Ambassador and the actual state of affairs was recommended to the Nuncio at Venice.

“Daily,” wrote Cardinal Medici, November 17, 1517, to the Nuncio in Switzerland, Antonio Pucci, “does the matter of the Crusade become more burning. The more that is done about it the clearer does the necessity of action appear. Two things are now certain: that the Sultan has returned victorious to Constantinople, and that his forces by land and by sea are most powerful. The Pope is ready to do everything in his power, and is counting on the assistance of the warlike Swiss”.

This appeal to all Christian princes, on the eve of a new era, was the expression of the mediaeval idea of a solidarity of all Christian States against the infidel. The sending round of the above memorandum compelled the most callous powers to take up a decided position as regarded the Eastern Question. It was with the greatest impatience that the Pope awaited the answers of the various States.

Leo X had great expectations from the powerful French King, to whom, for the second time, the raising of a Crusade ­tenth had been allowed. The Pope had greater hopes of winning him over to the cause of the Crusade because he himself was on the point of complying with a project broached by Francis I as early as the autumn of 1516. This concerned a marriage between Lorenzo de’ Medici and Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne, the daughter of Jean, Comte de Boulogne, related to the royal house through her mother, Catherine de Bourbon. Ever since October 1517, negotiations about this alliance had been carried on together with those about the Crusade by Thomas de Foix, Lord of Lescun, the Bishop of St. Malo, the Papal Nuncio, Staffileo, and the Florentine Ambassador in France, Francesco Vettori. An agreement as to this matrimonial alliance was at last arrived at in consequence of which the Pope's nephew at once set out for France. Thus was this matter easily arranged: negotiations about the Turkish question presented greater difficulties.

First of all Francis I put off giving any answer at all; and at the end of 1517 the Pope was still waiting vainly for the settlement of the plan propounded in the middle of November. On the 30th of December Cardinal Medici once more impressed on the French Nuncio the fact that, in view of the increasing danger from the Turks and their undoubted menace to Italy, a prompt decision was urgently necessary. Often did the Pope himself write to Francis and the other princes, offering, in the cause of the Crusade, all that he had, and even his personal co-operation, but still no decision could be arrived at. While time was being thus wasted in writing and negotiating, the Turks were devoting their whole power to the work of arming themselves. The Pope knew that, were the enemy to choose to attack Italy or any of the Italian islands in the spring, there would be no possibility of resisting him. The Nuncios, said he, must warn, implore, and adjure the King and all persons of influence to do something. The answer of Francis, dated December 23, must have reached Rome soon after this. The objections he raised were chiefly on the subject of money. He agreed to the plan in general, but he wished to have the Crusade funds in his own hands, and also to receive the tithe levied for three years in advance. If this were granted, he said, he would go to the help of the Pope with 12,000 horse and 50,000 foot soldiers. To avoid confusion he recommended that the Emperor should proceed separately by land with the Germans, Hungarians, and Poles, and that Charles of Spain, with the Kings of England and Portugal, should remain with the fleet. The three divisions must be combined in their movements.

The proposal of the Emperor was quite different. The detailed document which he sent at the end of the year 1517, though the language is veiled, shows clearly enough Maximilian's jealousy of the share to be taken in the undertaking by the French King. Instead of one campaign, the Emperor in his fantastic way proposed a whole series of campaigns, which were to be spread over three years. The first year, the Kings of France and England were to remain in their own countries, to preserve peace in them and see to the levying of the war tax. Meanwhile Maximilian, at the head of the German and Spanish soldiers, would, in con junction with the King of Portugal, attack the Sultan's possessions in the north of Africa. This campaign would be terminated in the second year by the conquest of Alexandria and Cairo, while, at the same time, Francis I would proceed from Italy to Macedonia, and keep the coasts clear for the Crusaders on their return from Egypt. At length, in the third year, the fantastic undertaking was to be crowned by the conquest of Constantinople and European Turkey. The help of the Shah of Persia might be gained by the cession of Armenia and Karaman. The division of the booty—which reminds us of the well-known story of the skin of the bear—should be made by arbitration under the presidency of the Pope. The Emperor had peculiar ideas about how to procure the means of war. In every parish throughout Christendom, every fifty men were to supply one soldier ; to procure money besides that raised by tenths and indulgences, a tax should be levied on every hearth or family.

The most feeble of all the proposals came from the Spanish King, Charles. His idea was that the powers should at first confine themselves to the protection of the most exposed parts of Italy, such as the Marches of Ancona, Naples, and Sicily. For this object he promised the immediate service of 14,000 men.

This difference of opinion, and the jealousy on the part of the European powers which it revealed, as well as the scarcely veiled pursuit of merely personal ends, must have deeply incensed the Pope; but still more did the reserved attitude of the great sea-power of the West. In spite of the want of good-will shown from the very beginning on the part of the Venetian Ambassador and the Signoria, Leo X persisted in continuing to hope for better things, and a change of mind on the part of the Republic. He therefore showed every indulgence towards the condition of peace which existed between the Turks and the Signoria, in the hopes that at the given moment the latter would not fail to come to the assistance of Christendom.

Meanwhile, most alarming intelligence continued to arrive from the East. At the end of February a boastful and menacing letter from the Sultan was received by Leo X. The Pope’s response took the practical form of demonstrative action by renewed preparations for the Crusade.

On the 3rd of March solemn processions were organized to implore the help of God. At the same time the Pope determined to send four Cardinals to the principal countries of Europe as Legates de latere. Those appointed were among the leading and most gifted members of the Sacred College. Farnese was chosen to go to the imperial court, Egidio Canisio to Spain, Bibbiena to France, and Campeggio to England. In spite of his financial difficulties the Pope himself defrayed the expenses of these legations, whereas hitherto, in similar cases, the Nuncios had been authorized to pay their expenses by means of their lucrative faculties. Leo X made use of this difference to give a signal proof of his disinterestedness.

The questions and resolutions mentioned above, were the result of the consultations which the Pope had held with the special Congregation of Cardinals, consisting of thirteen members and the Ambassadors. As well as these resolutions, there was another idea to which expression was given in a solemn Bull. In this document, dated the 6th of March, which described very impressively the effects of the Sultan’s last victory and the growing danger from the Turks, the Pope urged a five years’ truce between all the Christian powers, to be observed under the severest penalties of the Church. Leo X made special reference to Innocent III, one of the greatest Pontiffs of the Middle Ages, in whose footsteps Leo declared his wish to tread, by making the settlement of all differences to depend on the Holy See.

While special Briefs announced all these preparations to the Christian princes, the preaching of the Crusade was begun in Rome. On the 12th of March the great intercessory processions were commenced in the Eternal City. The shops were shut, and the streets hung with drapery and tapestry, while on all sides altars were set up. On the first day the procession went from S. Agostino to S. Maria in Aracoeli. The Confraternities of Rome, including those of Germany, took part in it, clad in their picturesque and varied habits; after them came the religious orders and the secular clergy, carrying relics, and, lastly, the household of the Pope. On the second day the procession went from S. Lorenzo to S. Maria del Popolo. In it were carried the great relics which the Eternal City claims as its own : the Heads of St. Andrew and St. Matthias, the Chair of St. Peter, the Holy Lance, the Sudarium of S. Veronica, and the large fragment of the True Cross from Santa Croce in Gerusalemme.

The procession of the third day (Sunday, March 14), which went from St. Peter's to S. Maria sopra Minerva, was followed by many Ambassadors of the spiritual and temporal courts, as well as by all the Bishops and Cardinals then in Rome, and, lastly, by the Pope himself, who walked barefoot the whole way, and repeatedly showed signs of religious emotion. High Mass was celebrated in the Church of the Minerva, after which Sadolet mounted the pulpit to preach the Holy War with Ciceronian rhetoric. Mindful of the presence of the Ambassadors, the orator did not fail to eulogize the Christian princes, whose goodwill he rated much higher than it in reality existed.

“Who”, cried Sadolet, “could have the smallest doubt as to our victory when we have Maximilian as our Emperor, a general so experienced in the art of war?” In similar terms did he extol the high qualities and noble purpose of the other princes, of the Kings of France, Spain, England, Portugal, and Poland, not forgetting the two Kings, still minors, Louis of Hungary and James of Scotland, nor Christian of Denmark, about whom scarcely anything was as yet known. He was loud in the praises of the “valiant and invincible” Swiss, as well as of the Venetians and all other princes and people who had distinguished themselves in the fight against the infidel. How could the Turk have the slightest hope of success when he contemplated the union of all the powers? “Hitherto we have been blind, aye, blind, he cried in conclusion; “we have not looked back sufficiently at what has gone before. But now the night has disappeared and the darkness is dispersed. The glow of true honour shines before our eyes, and truth is made gloriously manifest!”. Before the procession left the church Cardinal Farnese read the Papal Bull relating to the five years’ truce.

Soon the Pope’s commands were sent forth into all lands, to the effect that similar intercessory processions were to be organized in every country to implore the help of God for Christendom, which was so sorely imperilled. The solemn manner in which Leo X had introduced the Crusade, and his appeal to the great Pope whose reign had marked the zenith of the power of the Holy See in the Middle Ages, show us how high his thoughts had soared. Even as in a former age the influence of the Papacy had perhaps found its most marked expression in the Crusades, so now a “general Western undertaking, with the Pope at its head”, would not only protect Europe against her worst enemy, but would bring new glory and increased influence to the Holy See.

The Pope’s efforts to promote a Crusade have found an expression in art in the fresco of the Battle of Ostia; and the memory of these efforts inspired Raphael in his last creation, the Transfiguration. Naturally, poets and writers made use of the theme of the Turkish war; hopes were raised of winning the Pope’s favour by poems and discourses on the subject. The earnestness shown by Leo in the whole matter is beyond question.  It was by the force of his will that these extraordinary efforts were made to gather the Christian princes under the one banner of the Cross, and set them in movement against the Eastern Empire. Alas! all his efforts were shattered by the self-interest of the European powers.

Leo’s most cruel disappointment came from Venice, and this in spite of his having handled the Signoria with the most delicate consideration, so as to save the Republic from the difficulties which might arise from the terms of friendship on which she was with the Sultan. He had refrained from any allusion to such terms, and had said nothing about the mission of a special Legate to Venice. Yet when Sadolet in the discourse mentioned above had allowed his zeal to carry him away so far as to allude to the great services rendered by Venice in the defence of Europe against the Turks, the Venetian Ambassador had at once remonstrated with the Vatican, and had demanded that the passage should be omitted whenever the discourse was printed.

Nothing is more significative of the pusillanimity of the merchants on the Adriatic than the way in which they shrank from their own great past. The prudent, calculating policy of Venice always had for its object the protection of her own immediate interests. The most stirring arguments beat in vain against this short-sighted egoism. When he was organizing the intercessory processions, the Pope had had the foresight to write to the Patriarch of Venice to propose that the same thing should be done in his diocese; for thus the Venetians were able to declare that the measure had not originated with them, but had been forced on them by the spiritual authority of the Pope. However, the processions could not be organized without the permission of the Venetian Government, and this permission was refused by the Signoria. The Pope accepted this rebuff without a word; though he could not long deceive himself as to the real meaning of the Signoria's repeated assurances that they were ready to join in any expedition against the Turks when the matter was really started. Nor was he ignorant that, even while making these protestations, the Signoria had secretly renewed their terms of peace with the Sultan. What he probably did not know was that Venice had shamelessly betrayed the Christian cause by keeping the deadly enemy of Western civilization informed of all the preparations which were being made for the Crusade.

The whole matter depended on what success the Cardinal-Legates would have in Spain, France, England, and Germany. Leo X wished that the Legates should start on their mission as soon as possible, and this Farnese seemed willing to do. But Bibbiena fell ill, and as combined action between the Legates was intended, a delay was caused. But on the 12th of April, Bibbiena, Campeggio, and Egidio Canisio were able to appear to­gether in Consistory, where the Pope gave them his blessing. Then, accompanied by all the members of the Sacred College, they adjourned to S. Maria del Popolo. Thence Bibbiena started for France on the 13th, Campeggio for England on the 15th, and Canisio for Spain on the i6th. Cardinal Farnese wrote that he was unable to proceed on account of illness, and recommended that the learned Cardinal Cajetan should take his place in Germany. The latter left Rome on his mission on the 5th of May 1518. Besides the Cardinal-Legates, the Dominican, Nicholas von Schonberg had been entrusted with a mission to Hungary and Poland, to bring about the co-operation of those countries in the Crusade. The first thing Schonberg had to do was to try to arrange the differences between Poland and the Teutonic Order. Later this same Envoy tried to influence the Grand Dukes of Muscovy and the Princes of Tartary. Schonberg’s task was not less difficult than that of the Cardinal-Legates, for each of the powers had its own personal object to gain in the undertaking of the Crusade.

Favourable news came, however, from Spain, where Egidio Canisio preached the Cross to vast multitudes. On the 3rd of August a letter from the King of Spain was communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory, in which he declared his readiness to agree to the five years’ truce.

The intelligence sent by Cardinal Campeggio, who had been appointed to the court of England, was, on the other hand, most unsatisfactory; for the attitude of Henry VIII about the question of the Crusade had been, to say the least of it, very peculiar from the first. He had for a long time delayed giving any answer at all, and when it was at last sent, its only object was to remove all possible doubt as to the King’s intentions. Henry VIII strongly warned the Pope to take heed that his project did not bring great danger on himself, for those on whom Leo set his hopes of peace were those who wished to draw the Pope into war. The most necessary thing of all was that he should check the King of France’s great thirst for power. As to the Crusade, England would, all in good time, combine with Spain, but she must first come to an understanding with King Charles.

It is not difficult to foresee the nature of Campeggio’s reception after such preliminaries. In this Henry VIII exceeded the worst anticipations. His minister, Cardinal Wolsey, emphatically refused either to receive the Bull relating to the truce or the Legate himself; for, said he, it was against precedent that a foreign Cardinal should exercise legatine rights in England. Campeggio could be received only on condition that all his legatine privileges were suspended, and that his authority on all matters of importance were shared with Wolsey. Consequently Campeggio, who had arrived at Boulogne at the beginning of June, had to stay there without being able to set foot in England.

These proceedings were not the only result of Wolsey's jealousy, for the latter had been made a member of the Sacred College two years before Campeggio, and, as Chancellor, he could not tolerate the presence near him of a Cardinal-Legate. The all-powerful minister of Henry VIII not only desired to be appointed Legate for life in England, but wished to wrest from the hands of the Pope the office of making peace in Europe, and thus to secure to England this glorious role. While Campeggio was detained at Boulogne and condemned to inactivity, Wolsey was carrying on negotiations with France not only about the possession of Tournai, but about the conditions of universal peace which the Pope was about to lay down.

Meanwhile Cardinal Bibbiena was in France. His task also was beset with extraordinary difficulties, especially after the question of the imperial succession arose. It was widely believed that through the marriage of Lorenzo de' Medici and Madeleine de la Tour, which had been celebrated with great pomp at Amboise on the 28th of April. Francis I had succeeded in making Leo X a willing tool of the French policy. The real fact was that, however lavishly generous Leo might be towards his nephew and his bride, he was not in the least drawn away by the marriage-contract from his own particular objects or from his policy as to the Crusade. Lorenzo, it is true, thought otherwise, for ever since his marriage he had become quite French in his sympathies, and remained for a long time with Bibbiena in France. He adopted as his own all the French demands, quite regardless of the interests of the Pope. But Leo X had no intention of giving France all she wanted, especially as Francis I paid no attention to his desire to be freed from his promise regarding the cession of Modena and Reggio. On the 28th of May he granted the request for the Cardinal's hat for John of Lorraine, but he did not so readily grant the King's further requests relating to the levying of a tenth.

Meanwhile Cardinal Wolsey was indefatigable in his efforts to make London instead of Rome the centre of the peace negotiations. Rumours were soon heard of an Anglo-French understanding, including the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of Henry's daughter Mary to the Dauphin. Nor was this alliance between the two Kings all, for a general alliance between all the powers was proposed to be concluded in London instead of in Rome. In a masterly manner Wolsey knew how to combine an Anglo-French understanding with the forming di Lorenzo de' Medici (15 18) con Maddalena de la Tour, which had been celebrated with great pomp at Amboise on the 28th of April. Francis I had succeeded in making Leo X a willing tool of the French policy. The real fact was that, however lavishly generous Leo might be towards his nephew and his bride, he was not in the least drawn away by the marriage-contract from his own particular objects or from his policy as to the Crusade. Lorenzo, it is true, thought otherwise, for ever since his marriage he had become quite French in his sympathies, and remained for long time with Bibbiena in France. He adopted as his own all the French demands, quite regardless of the interests of the Pope. But Leo X had no intention of giving France all she wanted, especially as Francis I paid no attention to his desire to be freed from his promise regarding the cession of Modena and Reggio. On the 28th of May he granted the request for the Cardinal’s hat for John of Lorraine, but he did not so readily grant the King’s further requests relating to the levying of tenth.

Meanwhile Cardinal Wolsey was indefatigable in his efforts to make London instead of Rome the centre of the peace negotiations. Rumours were soon heard of an Anglo-French understanding, including the restoration of Tournai and the marriage of Henry’s daughter Mary to the Dauphin. Nor was this alliance between the two Kings all, for general alliance between all the powers was proposed to be concluded in London instead of in Rome. In masterly manner Wolsey knew how to combine an Anglo-French understanding with the forming of a general treaty of peace, to be guaranteed by England and France. By July all parties had agreed so far that the League in its essentials could be presented to the Pope. Leo knew but too well that this League would completely destroy his plan of a five years' truce, and that therefore all his efforts to raise a Crusade were adroitly set aside. He had no doubt whatever that a general peace would put insuperable obstacles in the way of what could only be made possible by a truce. The Pope emphatically pointed out how much more likely to be observed was an agreement concluded for only a limited time, than one which professed to be a permanency.

To all the Pope’s remonstrances, the justice of which was to be proved but too soon by succeeding events, France and England turned a deaf ear. Leo yielded on the point of the Turkish war, bitterly lamenting that Wolsey’s League deprived the Holy See of the office of universal arbitrator; for, by the vagueness of its outlines, the indefinite duration of the proposed peace made any positive results of a Crusade doubtful.

Campeggio, who, after consenting to share his legatine powers with Wolsey had at last been allowed to land in England on the 29th of July, had proceeded to London and was there witness of his rival’s triumph. At the beginning of October, “on account of the danger from Turkey”, there was finally concluded an alliance between England and France.

Leo’s hope of seeing a universal league of peace guaranteed by the Holy See was destroyed, and Wolsey with his counter-project had conquered. A great blow was thus struck at the international position of the Papacy. How painful Wolsey's proceedings were to Leo X is shown by a letter from Cardinal Medici to Campeggio, written on the 6th of October 1518. With great displeasure”, he says, “has His Holiness learned that Wolsey has set aside the proposal of a five years' truce, because he does not wish to leave the final position of affairs in the hands of the Pope. No Christian— far less a Cardinal should venture to express himself in that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many honours and favours from the Holy Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the Pope have to expect from the English Chancellor”.

At last the Pope saw before him no alternative except to ratify the London agreement. This he did finally on the 31st of December, 1518, with, however, the proviso that throughout all the arrangements the liberties of the Holy See were to be respected.

At the same time that Wolsey carried off his great diplomatic victory over Leo X, news reached Rome of the closing of the German Diet, at which Cardinal Cajetan, as Papal Legate, had had to defend the arrangements as to the Crusade.

Cajetan, besides being the bearer of a courteous Brief, had with him, for the Emperor Maximilian, the Hat and Sword, consecrated martial insignia which the Supreme Pontiff was wont to send on extraordinary occasions to the most prominent princes. But Cajetan’s mission was made unpleasant by the fact that the Emperor’s ambitious adviser, Cardinal Lang, forbade him to enter the country until Leo X had issued his own appointment as co-legate, which had been agreed to on the 17th of May. Therefore, it was not until the 7th of July that he arrived at Augsburg, where he was solemnly received by the Emperor and the other princes.

When the blessed weapons were presented to him, Maximilian replied that, in spite of his age, he would, “under the protection of the helmet of the Spirit and the sword of Faith, join without fear in the expedition against the infidel”. Four days later, Cajetan, in a fluent Latin discourse, proved before the assembled States the urgent necessity of a war against the Turks, and of the proposals laid down by the Pope for this end. He pointed out emphatically that Germany was in greater danger from the enemy of Christianity than any other country. The proposal he made was that for three years the clergy should pay a tenth, and the well-to-do laity a twentieth, of their income, and that as to the remainder of the population every fifty house holders should provide one soldier for the Holy War. He gave the fullest guarantees as to the proper disposal of the money thus raised; for all in Rome knew well enough that the States of Germany were less inclined than ever before to make financial sacrifices, and were possessed by the idea that the tithes and other Crusade funds were being raised for the enrichment of the Medici. Therefore Cardinal Farnese had been instructed to observe the greatest caution in handling financial matters, and to avoid everything which could feed the suspicion that there was any other possible destination for the Crusade money than the Crusade itself. That Cajetan was instructed in a similar manner can be seen clearly by his cautious way of proceeding. He emphatically declared that it was left entirely to the Germans themselves to claim, receive, and dispose of the money in their own way. The money was to be devoted entirely to the Crusade, and if the Holy War did not take place within a given time, the money would be returned. Whatever might be said, the Pope wanted none of the money raised, and the disposal of the war funds was to remain exclusively with the German States.

The answer which the Emperor made to this shows that the ever-needy monarch was not pleased with the Pope's disclaimer of any intention of controlling the funds raised, for this cut off all possibility of retaining a portion of them for himself. Therefore Maximilian submitted the following proposal to the States:— If it seemed to them that the method of raising the money among the clergy and laity proposed by the Legate was not a wise one, he would suggest, as an alternative, that each person who went to Holy Communion during the next three years should contribute what he was able according to the dictates of his conscience.

The States eagerly adopted this proposal, and all adverse representations from the Legate, warmly supported by the Polish envoy, proved vain. The end of a lengthy conference was that on the 27th of August Cajetan's proposals were vetoed by the States. The reason they gave was the alleged grievance of the Germans against the Holy See. After a lively description of the impoverishment of Germany by war and other misfortunes, it was proclaimed that the opinion of the people of the land was universally adverse to the present mode of raising money. The common impression was that great sums of money, whether for Crusade or indulgences, would be taken out of Germany under any circumstances, whether the Turkish war was carried out or not. This conviction gave birth to great distrust. The nation was also burdened with annates, increased and extended by confirmation fees and endless other fees for succession and reserved rights. The Concordat was violated, the right of patronage encroached on, and greater and lesser benefices conferred on foreigners. All this had given rise in Germany to such distrust and indignation that any further burden seemed to be out of the question.

In these grievances we can hear the echo of the violent anti-curial feeling which had taken possession of all, not only of the younger generation of humanists, but of the whole German people. There were general complaints of the violation of the Concordat, of the amount of the annates, of the severity of the chancery laws, and of the benefice-hunting which was encouraged by the Pope. The more the people thought that they were victimized financially, so much the more acute was the antipathy to any question of raising money. In this the clergy were quite agreed with the laity. This hostile state of mind was aggravated by malicious pamphlets, the authors of which hid themselves under cover of anonymity. One of these declared openly that the real Turk lived in Italy, and that this “hound of hell” could be appeased only by streams of gold. “From his own dominions”, says this poisoned pamphlet, which is redolent of the most violent invective against Rome, “streams of wealth flow in to the Pope as to no other Christian prince; yet we have to pay for palliums, and send asses laden with gold to Rome, and exchange gold for corn, and rest content with blood-lettings—pardon me, I mean with indulgences! Woe to this monster of avarice which is never satisfied! The craftiness of the Florentine discovers a thousand devices, each one more execrable than the last. Let German freedom be mindful not to become tributary, and not to pay tenths”.

Still more violent in its expressions is a memorandum written apparently by Johann von Vlatten, and presented to the States in the name of the clergy of Liege. The impression made by it can be seen by the judgment which the deputies of the Frankfort Diet passed on it: “So much violence, deceit, and roguery—disguised though it may be in beautiful Latin—is at the present time practised in Rome by the wickedness of Popes and their familiars and courtiers, that the grievances are retailed with a gusto never before known”

In face of the anti-curial feeling thus stirred up, Cajetan’s efforts to carry out his mission could not fail to be fruitless. However little cause existed this time to doubt the disinterestedness of the Pope or his wish to have nothing to do with the money raised, the States persisted in their assertion that his only object was to receive the money into his own hands. Leo complained bitterly over the Legate’s report to this effect. He lamented the dissemination of false views as to his intentions, and of calumnies against the Holy See. He wished to refute these by his actions, so that the calumniators might see for themselves that he had no thought of appropriating the Crusade levies, but intended to leave their disposal entirely to foreign hands. Whether, under the circumstances, and considering the anti-Papal feeling of the Diet, the Pope's representative thought it expedient to pass on these complaints, is doubtful. His words would have made no impression. Even the alarming news which reached Rome at this time, that Hungary was threatened with an attack from the Turks, which Leo used as a lever when pressing his appeal for help to Maximilian, Charles, Francis, and Henry, though it caused fear, did not act as an inducement to these princes to assist Christendom at the cost of any sacrifice to themselves. When better news followed, the balance of opinion swung back, and the Turkish scare was jeered at.

On the 14th of September the States delivered to the Emperor the reply that they must confer with their subjects on the matter of any money grant for the Crusade. At the same time they requested His Majesty to treat with Cajetan about the observance of the Concordat and the matter of annates. Maximilian agreed on this point. As regarded the Turkish war-tax, the States firmly adhered to their resolution that the tenth of a florin should be paid by each person who went to Holy Communion during the next three years. But they repeated that, even as regarded this concession, they must confer with their subjects! At the same time they reiterated their complaints against the Roman See, and demanded redress. Cajetan explained that the proposed method of raising money was at once too insecure and too insignificant; but that he was unable to give his final decision before the reply of the States was put into writing. This was on the 20th of September. Thereupon both princes and States left the Diet, so that no one remained who was able to give the reply demanded by the Legate.

A special memorandum was prepared in Rome in answer to the complaints brought by the States against the Apostolic See. The introduction to this remarkable document acknowledged with astute diplomacy the readiness of the Germans to support the Crusade; though it was urged as of paramount necessity that before the assembly of the next Diet, the princes should be assured of the con sent of the States. The memorandum sought to reconcile conflicting opinions. If, it urged, it were true that Germany was enfeebled by famine and plague, these evils should not keep the people back from raising a Crusade, but should on the contrary spur them on to the enterprise, for their misfortunes were a warning to them from heaven. To the reproach that in times past the Crusade funds had been turned to other purposes, it was replied that the present Pope was not answerable for the misdeeds of his predecessors: moreover, even when he was Cardinal, he had known by personal observation that the money collected abroad for the raising of a Crusade had never reached Rome. But the plan which had been proposed this time regarding the Crusade funds gave every security against abuse. As regarded the annates, there was no ground for complaint against the Pope, for they were paid only once in the lifetime of each prelate, whereas the holders of all churches and benefices were bound to pay the decima to the Pope. As regarded the newly instituted offices, there was no ground for complaint, as by these measures no one was injured except the Pope himself, who allotted a portion of his own income to the colleges of the newly appointed officiales.

To the reproach about the expectancies and reservations, it was replied by pointing out that these had been practised from time immemorial in Rome, and that the present Pope had introduced nothing new. In the same way the complaints against the chancery laws and granting of benefices were disposed of. As regarded the derogation of lay patronage, the present Pope had acted more circumspectly than his predecessors. As to the violation of the Concordat, it must be shown wherein it had not been observed, except for just and honourable reasons and at the request of the Emperor. He would willingly do away with other “extraordinary burdens”, but he could not possibly allow the liberty of the Holy See to be prejudiced at the will of the irresponsible and easily-led multitude. In conclusion, the importance of a war against the infidel was reiterated, and the Legates were exhorted to leave nothing undone to incline the thoughts of princes and States towards undertaking a Crusade; as regarded these, they were to do their best to refute unjust accusations, and assure them that the Pope was willing to give up not only annates and all monies hitherto paid, but even his life, for the cause of Christianity.

On the 3rd of October Cardinal Cajetan was directed to leave the Imperial court only when all hopes of attaining his object had vanished. It is a matter of uncertainty whether in Rome, as in Germany, men pretended to be not altogether dissatisfied with the result of the Diet, or whether they were in the main quite satisfied. Certain hopes had, it is true, to be completely abandoned, particularly as the Emperor had at once agreed to the five years’ truce, and promised to promote the Turkish war. These concessions were connected with the Emperor’s efforts to procure for his grandson Charles V the succession to the Empire.

This important question came more and more prominently into the foreground. In order to gain the favour of the Pope in this matter, Maximilian and Charles, as well as their rival Francis I, manifested their willingness, nay, their desire, to carry on a Holy War against the infidel. But, at least on the part of Francis, these offers of assistance were not meant seriously, however emphatic his protestations that before three years had passed he would be in Constantinople or die in the attempt.

Charles's intentions seem to have been more sincere. In a submissive letter of the 20th of November, he declared his desire to devote all that he had to the great undertaking. But it was doubtful whether the young sovereign would be in a position to keep his sweeping promises. The deep-rooted opposition of the Spanish clergy to the raising of a Crusade tax, as well as the many other difficulties with which Charles was beset on all sides, might have dashed the hopes of even such optimists as Egidio Canisio. But then came the question of the election, which swallowed up Charles’s finances. Roman diplomacy also was soon so taken up by the same question, that the matter of the Crusade fell quite into the background.

CHAPTER VI.

Leo X and the Imperial Succession.

NO period of the pontificate of Leo X has been more discussed or so differently judged than his attitude regarding the important question of the succession to the Empire. It is very difficult to form a correct judgment of his policy, through all its hesitations and evasions, its deviations and changes, or to bring to light the true motives and objects which he kept so carefully hidden. This difficulty remains in spite of the documentary evidence which, if by no means complete, is sufficiently abundant to make known with tolerable clearness all that is essential to the understanding of Leo’s attitude. By a closer study of the sources of information, it is shown that the opinion held so long, that the Pope allowed himself to be guided in this matter solely by nepotism, is undoubtedly incorrect. On the contrary, what Leo X had most at heart were the temporal power and independence of the Holy See and the so-called liberty of Italy. The exaltation of his relatives, on which he was undeniably too much bent, came only in the second place. All these different objects worked simultaneously with him, and in trying to promote one he was at the same time working for the others. In individual cases it is often difficult to decide with any certainty which motive was strongest, and which was relegated to the background.

If we take a general view of the whole attitude maintained by Leo X in the years 1518 and 1519, we can see that the leading motive of his conduct in the matter of the imperial succession was the care that the temporal and moral influence of the Holy See should suffer no injury, were an already powerful prince to gain possession of the imperial crown. The crown of Charlemagne was still surrounded by a mystic halo; and if in reality it did not possess the same significance, it might offer to an ambitious prince a title—not to be underrated—to many dangerous claims. Wolsey expressed the opinion of the time when he wrote to his Ambassador in Rome that scarcely anything on earth could be compared with the imperial dignity .

Looked at from this point of view, neither of the two Kings who were the most eager candidates for the imperial dignity was pleasing to the Pope. Either Charles of Spain or Francis I would obtain a supremacy as Emperor, which might be very dangerous to the Holy See and to Italy, especially as one had already a footing in the south, and the other in the north of the peninsula. If at first the dislike of the Pope to the election of Charles was the more prominent, it is easily explained. Charles, to whom, on the 1st of April, 1517, Leo had confirmed the title of “Catholic King,” ruled not only over Aragon and Castile, but also over Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, as well as over the Burgundian-Dutch territory, in addition to countries of incalculable importance in the New World. Not only was Charles the more powerful of the two, but he held larger views about the imperial dignity; whereas the designs of the French King were not so well known to Rome. Charles, moreover, might be especially dangerous to the Holy See because, by his sovereignty over Naples, he could make a much deeper impression on Rome than could the possessor of Milan. It had been the principle of the Holy See since the time of the Hohenstaufen that the crown of Naples could never belong to the Emperor; and this now weighed heavily in the balance. “Do you know,” asked Leo one day of the Venetian Ambassador, “how many miles it is from here to the borders of the Neapolitan territory? Forty. Then Charles must never be appointed King of Rome!”. Leo had every right to appeal to the Bull of Julius II (July 3, 1510), relating to the investiture of Ferdinand the Catholic with the crown of Naples.

But, on the other hand, an increase of the power of the French King could not be desired by the Pope. Not only as sovereign of Milan, but in a variety of other ways, the ambition and spirit of enterprise of Francis I had already made things very uncomfortable for the Holy See.

After much deliberation, the idea occurred to Leo X whether the imperial crown might not be given to a third party—to some German prince—who was not already too powerful, and who had no connection with Italy. Already Rome had turned her eyes towards the “most earnest and clever” of the Electors, Frederick of Saxony, as a possible candidate for the imperial dignity. In this Leo was not influenced by any worldly or political reason, but solely by the interests of the Church. The Elector of Saxony possessed as his subject that passionate professor of Wittenberg, Martin Luther, whose new doctrines seemed so dangerous that it had been already determined in the beginning of September to procure the help of Frederick against him by the gift of the Golden Rose, which he had desired for three years. On the 7th of October, 1518, Cardinal Cajetan was commissioned to confer this mark of distinction on him, on the condition that he would agree to deliver up Luther. The same idea gave birth to the thought of holding before him the prize of the imperial crown as an inducement to take measures to suppress the Lutheran movement. This may explain the difficulties made by the Elector Frederick, which were such as to lead the Pope to make advances on the same lines to the more ecclesiastically-minded Elector, Joachim of Brandenburg.

The scheme of the Pope to promote the choice of one of the Electors for the imperial crown, can be seen more clearly during the second period of the contest for that supreme dignity, after the death of Maximilian, when, as was but natural, the struggle became more acute. From the beginning, Leo X was sincere in wishing for neither Charles nor Francis—least of all the former. There can be scarcely a doubt as to this, however skilfully he tried to conceal his real opinions, or however often he seemed to waver.

I

Maximilian’s plan to secure his grandson Charles’s succession to the Empire, by ensuring his choice at the Diet of Augsburg as King of Rome, became known at the Vatican in the middle of April 1518, or perhaps sooner, and affected the mind of the Pope most painfully. By the middle of August this election of Charles was supposed in Rome to be immediately impending, even if not already accomplished.

Leo’s attitude towards Charles at that time was fully though cautiously described in a letter from Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici to Cardinal Bibbiena, who was then in France. Two reasons, says Medici, were alleged why the Pope considered that the truth of the report should be duly weighed. First, His Holiness wondered how Maximilian could have contrived to persuade the Electors to choose a King of Rome so quickly and so easily, as hitherto such an election had not taken place before the death of the predecessor, or at any rate before his coronation as Emperor. Secondly, the Pope was astonished how Charles could have accepted the election so unreservedly, in face of the decree of Julius II, in which it was expressly laid down that the investiture to the kingdom of Naples lapsed and returned to Rome, as soon as the occupant of the Neapolitan throne was elected to be King of Rome. The Pope was convinced that when he had secured the title of King of Rome, Charles would still keep possession of the throne of Naples. He feared still more that, after the imperial election had been carried out, the confirmation of Charles as Emperor in the possession of Naples would be demanded of the Holy See, which would gain but little by the concession. In face of this condition of things, Bibbiena was instructed to obtain promptly and by any means, information as to the position of the French King, so that the Pope might act accordingly.

If Francis attached but little importance to the matter of the election, the Pope could accommodate himself to the situation, and draw the best possible advantage from it, even if this should be but slight compared with the great favour at stake. If, on the other hand, he knew for certain that the election of Charles would be displeasing to the French King, and that in the case of a refusal or delay in granting the investiture of Naples, he could rely upon France, he would act otherwise, for the greater dignity and security of the Holy See.

At the conclusion of this remarkable letter the writer once more emphasized the obligation of the Pope to protect his ancient and sacred rights, in the interests of the Roman See. For two hundred years it had never given the investiture of the throne of Naples without the express condition which excluded its union with the title of King of Rome. If he now departed from this rule he would be acting against the precedent given by his predecessors, and also against his own principles, besides exposing himself to great dangers. On the other hand, a refusal of investiture would provoke the anger of Maximilian and Charles; and this he could not venture to do without the help and favour of France.

This letter is very characteristic of Leo’s attitude. No one could infer from it that he would take up a decided position against Charles. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the Pope was by no means desirous of his election, or that he would willingly work against it if he could be sure beforehand of the support of France. Before he had obtained such a certainty he did not wish to cut himself off from the possibility of an arrangement with Charles, which he might turn to account to the advantage of his family. Moreover, Charles’s acceptance of the five years’ truce, and his offers to help in the Turkish war, which had been laid before the Cardinals at a Consistory held on the 23rd of August: deterred Leo from taking open measures against the Spanish King. But that the Pope should, by making a virtue of necessity, have at that time agreed to Charles's election, was not honest. He had not, however, arrived at a final decision. His natural hesitancy was increased by the extraordinary difficulty of the situation; for, as matters stood, he had to choose between breaking with the Emperor and Spain, or with France. In September the news reached Rome that Maximilian had obtained the votes of four Electors for the choice of Charles to be King of Rome; but that the Elector of Saxony was very much against any such plan, and wished the dignity to be conferred on a German. It was believed that his opposition originated in his desire to be chosen himself. This gave birth to the idea of the Saxon candidature for the imperial crown. At first Leo observed great reserve in his outward actions. When Francis I expressed a desire to take energetic measures against the election of Charles, the Pope drew his attention to the difficulties attendant on such an undertaking and the danger of kindling a great war. Leo described the project of Francis I for forming a League between the Pope, Florence, France, Switzerland, and Venice as very delightful in itself, but one which had to be treated with great prudence, lest the general peace should be disturbed. § It is clear that he hesitated to hand over his interests to the discretion of his French protector, in spite of Lorenzo’s strong advocacy of the cause of France. This explains why he kept up communications with Francis, with whom, ever since July, he had been exchanging proposals for the formation of a closer alliance. As the dispensation from the oath of fealty for Naples, which was so urgently needed for the success of the plans of Maximillian and Charles, it was Leo’s policy not to cut off- all hope of an agreement, but to bind himself to nothing.

The difference with Rome, which began in November, 1518, was very injurious to Francis’ aims. The reason of the quarrel has never been satisfactorily explained. It seems that the French King wanted to take undue advantage of his matrimonial alliance with the Pope’s family, and while he asked for much, he gave nothing. Cardinal Medici, in a letter to Bibbiena, complained bitterly of Francis’ conduct. “The Pope”, he wrote, on the nth of November, “sees that his family alliance, far from bringing him an increase of honour and renown, causes nothing but vexation and anxiety. Every day he is showing the King some fresh favour, yet he is being always pressed with some new and weighty demand. These are made just as if he had received nothing before. If his requests are not granted at once, all that has gone before counts for nothing. His encroachments on the spiritual rights of Milan by his appointment to benefices, have been carried so far as to amount to a formal contempt of Papal authority. By his indulgence and complaisance towards the French King the Pope has drawn on himself a number of vexations and disputes”. Francis I had sent a threatening letter to the Pope on this very subject of the Milanese benefices, and this letter was enclosed by Cardinal Medici to Bibbiena, that the latter might see what just cause for complaint the Pope had.

To these complaints there were added others which were retailed to Bibbiena by Cardinal Giulio in a letter of the 28th of November. These related to the salt-mines in the States of the Church, a suspicious alliance with the Duke of Ferrara, as well as various encroachments on the Papal dominions. After all these occurrences, it is not surprising, Medici goes on to say, that His Holiness should suspect Francis of a design to alienate him from the Emperor, and then, having left him stranded, hold him in his power.

These pointed complaints must have made an impression on Francis I, all the deeper because of his fear that the Pope would end by yielding to the pressure of the Emperor and Spain, and remove the obstacles which stood in the way of Charles’s election. These obstacles were twofold. First there was the existence of the oath of fealty for the throne of Naples, the terms of which for bade that crown being worn by one who held the dignity of King of Rome. There was also what had hitherto been the impossibility of an election of a King of Rome in the lifetime of another who had received the title, and who had not received the imperial crown. It was now proposed that the Pope should dispense with the clause in the oath of fealty, and that the imperial crown should be sent to Trent, where the Emperor might be crowned by either Cardinal de' Medici or the Archbishop of Mayence as representative of the Pope. Such was the request made by Charles at the end of November; but he received an evasive answer.

Soon, however, symptoms were seen of an inclination on the part of the Pope to give way in both the matters of the oath of investiture and the imperial coronation. The cause of these signs of compliance lay in the circumstance that official intelligence had just been received by the Pope that Maximilian had agreed to the five years’ truce, and held out hopes of supporting the Crusade. In the first half of November a Bull was prepared which provided for a dispensation from the obligation of renouncing Naples should Charles be elected King of Rome. But the pressure put on his uncle by Lorenzo caused the postponement of the execution of this deed. Simultaneously with the drawing up of this Bull, Leo X held out the hope to Maximilian that he would do his best to remove the second obstacle, and would perform the ceremony of the imperial coronation, either in person or by deputy, on the borders of the Tyrol and Italy.

For one moment Lorenzo thought that France’s cause was lost, and his only thought was to turn to advantage an opportunity not likely to occur more than once in a hundred years. But Leo had by no means come to his final decision. This was shown only too plainly by his attitude towards Erasmus Vitellius (Ciolek), Bishop of Plock, who was sent to Rome by Maximilian on the 7th of November, 1518, to press the matter of sending the imperial crown to Germany. He could not obtain an audience till the 26th of November. Then with skilful diplomacy he made it clear that Maximilian’s co-operation in the Turkish war depended on the request being granted.

At the same time Spain tried to win the Pope over by making generous offers for the support of the Crusade, as well as for the exaltation of the Medici. But Leo still answered evasively to the effect that, though he would gladly comply with Maximilian’s request, it must be saving his honour. “It is a question”, said he, “of our own person and our own honour”. When Erasmus, alluding to the meeting with Francis I at Bologna, pleaded that the Pope might crown Maximilian, if not at Trent, at Verona or Mantua, Leo alleged against this the opposition which the Cardinals would make to such a journey. To test the feasibility of sending the imperial crown from Rome, a Congregation of Cardinals was called on the 1st of December, the majority of whom were unfavourable to the Emperor’s proposal.

This crisis was contemporaneous with the change already mentioned which had come over the attitude of Francis. After the representations made by Bibbiena, the French King had fully acknowledged the danger which threatened his efforts should the Pope, in his displeasure with him, yield to the wishes of Charles and Maximilian. He therefore resolved to change his tone. The first symptom of this change is to be found in a report sent by Bibbiena to Cardinal de' Medici and Lorenzo on the 26th and 27th of November, which shows the change of mind on the part of the King. Francis I now declared himself ready not only to accede to Lorenzo’s wishes as to the rounding off of his territory, but also— though in this we may assume that he was not in earnest—to renounce his own candidature, and, if the Pope so wished, promote the claims of the Elector of Saxony to be King of Rome. The condition of this was that nothing should be done by Rome in favour of Maximilian and Charles.

Although the Roman Curia had adopted a more conciliatory tone towards Francis I, the latter did not feel sure that the Pope might not after all place himself on the side of his rivals. He adjured Bibbiena to prevent at all costs the sending of the imperial crown, and implored his help to prevent such a possibility as a journey of Maximilian to Rome. In a solemn audience he made the most generous offers about the Crusade, in which he said he would take part personally. He also expressed his willingness to waive all the points on which he was at variance with Rome, to promote the interests of the Medici, and conclude an alliance with the Pope.

Negotiations for an alliance with Francis I were carried on actively by Bibbiena. He was a master of Medicean diplomacy, and succeeded, without binding himself to anything, in raising deceptive hopes in the heart of the French King that the Pope would, in return for his concessions, take his part in the election. Charles was treated in exactly the same way, and he also was left with the impression that Leo would accede to his wishes; though to neither party were any pledges about the election given. When Francis demanded some guarantee, the dangers of a breach with Spain were pointed out. As regarded Charles, the Pope drew back at the most decisive moment, on the plea that such a weighty matter required the most mature deliberation.

Not only was the Bull of dispensation in respect to Naples kept back, but the other matter of sending the imperial crown was indefinitely postponed. The Congregation of Cardinals which the Pope had called to consider the question, demanded the verdict of the Master of Ceremonies, and he, on being consulted, declared that the coronation anywhere but in Rome was an impossibility. On the 15th of December there was a meeting of the Congregation, held in the presence of the Pope, which lasted six hours. On the following day Leo X informed the Bishop of Plock that he had been unable to carry the business through, as the Cardinals had brought forward, as reasons against it, both the novelty of the matter and the existence of Bulls which in times past had been issued in opposition to such a thing. He could not, he said, give the dispensation without the consent of the Sacred College. He would gladly have met the Emperor at Mantua or Verona, but was deterred by the consideration of the dangers to which such a journey might expose Maximilian.

On the 21st of December a Brief to Maximilian was prepared which informed him that his desires, conveyed through Erasmus Vitellius, concerning the Crusade indulgence in his patrimonial dominions, the protection of Croatia and Hungary, and the appointment of Cajetan as Legate in the last-mentioned country, should be granted.

But as to the matter of sending the imperia! crown from Rome, though both Pope and Cardinals had every wish to be conciliatory, the matter, being one of such importance, required further consideration.

By adjourning the decision of the main question, it was evident that Leo wished to gain time, until, in fact, he had made friends with Francis I. This event did not take place as soon as was wished in Rome. In order to win over the French King, the Pope was ready to hand over to his free disposal the second Crusade tenth. The Bull concerning this is dated the 1st of December 1518. It was, however, completed only at the end of that month, after Bibbiena, by his far-reaching assurances, had been able to arrive at an understanding with Francis I. On the 31st of December the French King pledged himself to pay back within four years 100,000 ducats of the Crusade money. At the same time Lorenzo de’ Medici received, “for services rendered,” 100,000 ducats from the King, out of the sum granted through the Pope. This was a shameful misuse of the money raised for the Holy War.

After this arrangement Francis at once, on the 20th of January, 1519, signed the treaty of alliance with Leo X. On one side the French King, and on the other the Pope and Lorenzo, as representing Florence and the family of Medici, pledged themselves to the mutual defence of their possessions, and undertook to impart to one another all state secrets. In particular, Francis promised to acknowledge the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church in Milan, to protect the States of the Church, as well as Lorenzo and the Medici generally. This last took the form of a separate treaty. On the other side, the Pope and Lorenzo pledged themselves to further the French King’s interests in every way in their power. But the question of the election was not touched on in the agreement.

It has been brought to light only by recent researches that almost at the same moment Leo X concluded an alliance of defence with the rivals of the King of France! Like Francis, the King of Spain was won over by the illusion, confirmed by no pledge but carefully fostered, that in the matter of the election the Pope would be on his side. On the 17th of January the text of this treaty, which, as was expressly stipulated, was to be kept secret, was drawn up, and signed by Charles on the 6th of February.

No more than in that with France, was there any mention of the election in the treaty with Charles. By this, both parties pledged themselves to mutual assistance and the protection of their possessions. These, on the Papal side, included not only the States of the Church, but also the possessions of Lorenzo and Florence. On the other side, the term included Charles’s possessions outside and inside Italy, with Naples. Besides all this, the Pope promised Charles, in the event of a serious war, the right to levy a tenth on the clergy of Spain.

By the light of these two treaties we can understand the policy of Leo X, and the manner in which he avoided making any actual decision in favour of either of the rivals who were competing for the imperial crown. By means of unparalleled double-dealing both parties were kept in hand, and moved, each to make a secret treaty, the object of which was the protection of the Pope and the Medici. The question of the Pope’s support at the election, which each party thought was the object of the treaty, was not even mentioned in the document. It is, however, equally true that the special advantages which both Charles and Francis had promised in regard to the States of the Church and the Medici were left quite undefined.

In excuse for Leo’s ambiguous policy it has been pointed out that “in the then condition of Italy, the smaller States could scarcely hope to save their independence except by keeping themselves skilfully in the balance between the two great powers, which threatened to crush all others”. This may have been so; nevertheless, such double-dealing on the part of a Pope must be deeply deplored.

At this moment when the question of the coronation of Maximilian was dividing the whole of Europe, and when the arming of France and Spain was regarded as the prelude of a great war, the “last of the Knights” was snatched away by death on the 12th of January, under the age of sixty. The rivalry between the houses of France and Hapsburg entered on an acute stage which set its mark on European history for centuries.

II.

The unexpected and, to many, the incredible news of the death of Maximilian, which introduced an altogether changed condition of things, reached Rome eleven days after the event. With one stroke it put an end to Leo’s indecision. The danger lest Charles, the least desired candidate, should succeed in obtaining the dignity of King of Rome, which would entitle him to the imperial crown, seemed greater than ever. With unwonted promptitude the Pope came to a decision. Not twenty-four hours after the receipt of the startling news of the Emperor’s death, instructions were sent to Cardinal Cajetan, the Legate in Germany, in which Leo took up his position in opposition to Charles quite openly and unambiguously, and proposed one of the German Electors as a candidate for the imperial crown, thus hoping to thwart the election of Francis as well as that of Charles. The Pope—so ran the instructions to Cajetan —wished, in the interests of the Apostolic See, to promote the choice of one of the Electors, either Frederick of Saxony or Joachim of Brandenburg; he cared not which, though there seemed to be more likelihood of success with the former. The King of Poland also would be pleasing as a candidate to the Holy See; but under no consideration was it to be the King of Spain. The chief reason alleged for this was that the great power already possessed by Charles would be unbearably increased by the extraordinary authority of the imperial crown. These instructions, dated the 23rd of January, were entirely the personal work of the Pope, because Cardinal Medici, on whose co-operation he usually depended in the matters connected with the election, had been called away to Florence in the night of the 22nd, by the severe illness of Lorenzo, and returned thence only on the 26th of March.

The instructions sent to Cajetan to oppose the election of Charles apply equally to those sent in regard to the French King. Though his possessions could not compare in extent with those of Charles, still, his dominions were more united v and richer in resources. There can be no doubt that the Pope did not at all desire the election of the French King ; as a proof of this, when he was passing in review the candidates to the imperial throne, he passed Francis’ name over in silence, as being out of the question. Even in the instructions to Bibbiena on the 27th of January, bidding him try to obtain the support of the French court in favour of the candidature of one of the Electors, there is no mention made of the hope that, even under certain circumstances, Francis might be chosen. But only two days later, on the afternoon of the 29th of January, Leo expressed openly to the French Ambassador his desire in favour of the election of Francis I, advising him to do everything he could to wrest the election from the Hapsburg. In the further course of conversation, he said quite candidly that Francis had better do his utmost to obtain the imperial dignity as the zenith of his ambition. Though Leo was convinced that it might be dangerous to have the imperial crown placed on the head of one already powerful, he would rather see it given to the sovereign of the obedient, religious, and judicious French than to the Catholic King.

Whence this sudden change of mind ? Erasmus Vitellius, who was still in Rome, had shown to the Pope proofs of the absolute certainty of the election of Charles to the imperial throne, by revealing to him the contents of the compact of the five Electors, formulated at Augsburg. Although the conclusion, so favourable to Charles, which had been arrived at by the Diet of Augsburg, had been long since communicated to the Pope, it does not seem that he attached sufficient importance to it, seeing that it was couched in general terms and delivered verbally. Now, for the first time, Leo understood the full significance of the matter. The only hope of checking the election of Charles lay in prompt action.

In this frame of mind, on the 29th of January, Leo made his abrupt request to Francis through his representative, to lay claim forthwith to the imperial crown and work in every way possible against the candidature of Charles. Next day the Pope, through Pietro Ardinghello, sent a very important letter to his Legate in France, in which the question of the election was treated of in the same way. This change was caused by the compact of the Electors shown to the Pope by Vitellius, which put the election before him as being as good as settled, unless it could be promptly opposed. Francis was urged to come forward as a candidate, with every promise of support from the Pope. “If anything”, the letter goes on, “having regard to the powerful position of the King, made the Electors wish for the candidature of a third party, Francis might give this nominee his active support as a means of preventing the election of the King of Spain. This step might be necessary, as Francis, by too strong an advocacy of his own cause, might play into the hands of Charles”. In the first place, the Pope wished for the election of Francis; but if that could not be carried out, then the choice of any other seemed to him to be preferable to that of Charles. The instructions sent to Bibbiena on the 5th and 12th of March are written in the same sense. The Pope, who had just received the ratification of the bond of the 20th of January, repeated the expression of his desire for the election of Francis; but at the same time, in the event of the French efforts being fruitless, he declared the necessity of trying to promote the election of a third party. In any case it must not be Charles.

From such indications it cannot be doubted that Leo warmly espoused the cause of Francis. Whether, in his inmost heart, he really desired his success, may still be considered doubtful. It is more probable that, as an immediate object, he was playing Francis against Charles, without sincerely desiring his election, or even believing in such an eventuality. Whether he became by degrees more favourable to the idea of a French Emperor cannot be said, or whether, if so, it came from a personal liking for Francis I. Probably he was influenced by the thought that nothing—not even that which might be feared most—could weigh in the balance against the increasing power of Charles. In essentials Leo went no further than this until a very short time before the actual election of Charles. Certain vacillations, entirely characteristic of the Medici Pope, must not altogether surprise us, though all through we can trace the dominant thought of Leo : Let there be no Hapsburg! It was labour lost for the Spanish Legate, Egidio Canisio, to petition the Pope on behalf of Charles,  but it is a fact that a third candidate, either the Elector of Saxony or the Elector of Brandenburg, would have been more agreeable to the Pope than either of the others. This became more evident every day. There is also, however, no doubt that the candidature of Francis, though probably taken up at first only as a means of putting aside the claims of Charles, was more desired by him as time went on, and he realized that his successful candidature was the only possible way of destroying Charles’s chances.

Besides the overwhelming extent of Charles’s power, there were many other reasons which weighed in the balance against him in the mind of the Pope: such were the tyranny which Naples might exercise over Rome; the anti-Papal feeling which had governed so many of the Roman­Teutonic emperors; their union with the Ghibelline party in the States of the Church. While Leo drew Bibbiena’s attention to these reasons against the candidature of Charles, he referred—but only in the last place, and not as to a thing of primary importance—to his family connection with France. Here then we can see a sign of the Pope’s nepotism as a factor, though by no means the chief one, in his attitude towards the rival powers. The temporal power of the Holy See, as a safeguard of its spiritual interests, was what Leo had most at heart. In the interests of this, together with those of Italian liberty, he could not tolerate that any overwhelming power should hold sway on the Italian peninsula. This object was, it is true, connected with his care for his own house, and for Florence, which was so closely united to the States of the Church; but these last were by no means the main object. In his unusually difficult position between the two great powers, the Pope tried as long as possible to veer about from one side to the other. When, however, he found himself driven by necessity to a choice between two evils, he saw in that connected with the French sovereign of Milan a lesser danger than that connected with the Spanish King of Naples.

The Pope’s preference for the French candidature was undisguisedly expressed in many ways. In the beginning of March the warm friend of France, Roberto Latino Orsini, Archbishop of Reggio, was sent, armed with Papal Briefs, to the German Electors, where, to the great satisfaction of Francis, he tried to work against Charles in every possible way. On the 12th of March the Pope authorized the French King, by a special Brief, to promise the Cardinal’s hat to the Electors of Treves and Cologne, should he be elected through their help. Two days later the Cardinal Archbishop of Mayence, Albert of Brandenburg, was, under the same conditions, promised the office of permanent Legate in Germany. The significance of this last concession is uncertain. On the 21st of March the Pope expressed himself so decidedly to the Venetian Ambassador, that the latter was quite surprised. “His Holiness”, reports Minio, “who has hitherto endeavoured to deceive both sides, has now put himself entirely on that of France, because he believes that he has more to fear from Charles than from Francis”.

If we call to our minds the character of Leo, who was ever most unwilling to take any part, who never came forward except in a case of utmost necessity, his open partisanship with Francis is most surprising. The ostensible object of driving a still more dangerous adversary out of the field is no adequate explanation of the Pope’s action in the matter of the election of Francis I; and it is only on closer observation, that we find the real reason why Leo entered the lists for the French candidate so much more openly and decidedly than at first. The reason lay in his increasing fear of being isolated. The thought that Francis and Charles might come to an understanding, pursued the prudent Medici Pope like a menacing spectre.

Therefore, on no account must France be given either pretext or opportunity of leaving the Pope to face Charles alone and unaided. Should the King of Spain be elected, the Holy See must at any rate keep a firm friend in Francis. That the rivals should come to an understanding must be prevented at all costs. Once he had com mitted himself to favouring Francis’ cause, Leo’s fear of isolation drove him further and further along the road he had taken. On the 20th of April, he emphatically refused the request of the Swiss to leave the imperial dignity unhindered to the Germans. It was by no means his intention to depreciate the rights of the German nation ; his opposition to Charles did not originate in that, but in the conviction that the Hapsburg, as occupant of the throne of Naples, had no right, by all the promises sworn to of old, to aspire to the imperial crown. It was his policy to adhere to Francis I, because from him the Holy See had no danger of that sort to fear.

Soon afterwards the Pope, on his own initiative—for Cardinal Medici had, on the 3rd of May, gone to Florence to attend Lorenzo’s death-bed—took a step by which he acted contrary to existing rules, and committed himself far more deeply than he had on the 27th of January. A Brief, dated May the 4th, empowered Cardinal Cajetan, as Legate, in case three of the Electors should be unanimous in their choice of a candidate, to declare in the name of the Pope that such an election was valid.

In spite of the zeal which he was showing for the election of Francis, Leo X still fostered his favourite plan of procuring the election of a third party, by choice the Elector of Saxony. His secret idea, that the great diplomatic struggle might be most advantageously settled in this way, was always recurring. The Roman court adopted this project with such zeal that it was even willing to temporize about the matter of Luther.

Meanwhile the Papal Envoys in Germany, having declared that, according to the constitutions of Clement IV, the King of Naples was ineligible for election to the imperial dignity, met with an angry rebuff from the ecclesiastical Electors, whose pride was severely touched. They protested against the unheard-of action on the part of the Pope in wishing to dictate to them about matters of election procedure.

In the north of Germany matters seemed to take a turn more and more favourable for Charles. A popular movement in both Upper and Lower Germany rose in favour of the “broad ways” of the Hapsburg King. The Swiss also declared that they would not suffer the imperial dignity to pass from the hands of a German into those of a foreigner, least of all into those of the French, who had thirsted so long to possess it.

This intelligence reached Rome in the second half of April.  Soon after this, there followed the death of Lorenzo de' Medici. He had been ill of the spleen ever since January. On the 13th of April a daughter—Catherine de' Medici—was born to him, whose birth cost her mother her life: on the 4th of May the father died.

The sad news affected the Pope deeply, though he accepted the blow with Christian resignation. “The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away”, said he to his confidant, Pietro Ardinghello. As a Medici the event pained him deeply, but not as Pope; for he resolved to care for nothing henceforth except the exaltation and needs of the Apostolic See. So says the Mantuan Ambassador. Another informant says that when he received the sad news Leo exclaimed : “Henceforward we belong no more to the house of Medici, but to the house of God”.

From these expressions of self-accusation, on which such different judgments have been passed, and his resolutions to renounce nepotism for evermore, it by no means follows that the Pope was conscious of having been hitherto guided solely by family interests. In them there is nothing beyond the acknowledgment that he had considered the, aggrandizement of his relatives more than was fitting. All this he now changed. Consequently, the Duchy of Urbino, with Pesaro and Sinigaglia, were united to the States of the Church; Cardinal Medici received the management of Florentine affairs as Legate of the whole of Tuscany. He remained in Florence till the autumn, when he left behind him as his representatives the Bishop of Pistoja, Goro Gheri, and Cardinal Passerini.

Lorenzo’s death certainly removed one obstacle to a change in the Pope’s policy, though it did not conduce to a reconciliation with Charles. The chief reason of the change in his policy was the conviction that came to him that Francis’ candidature was hopeless. On the 29th of May, Leo confided to the Venetian Ambassador that public opinion was so strong in Germany that the Electors could not choose the French King even if they wished it.

Nevertheless, the Pope could not reconcile himself to the thought of Charles as Emperor, and reiterated through his representative that the King of Naples could not at the same time wear the imperial crown. At the beginning of June he made a last despairing effort to avert the evil, and finish the diplomatic strife by a means as yet untried, by proposing the candidature of the Elector of Saxony. On the 7th of June an urgent message was sent to Frederick through the Papal representative and the French Ambassador, pressing him to support Francis; or, if that were impossible, to accept for himself the imperial crown. If the Elector of Saxony could add but two more votes to his own, the Pope promised to confirm his election, and support him by every means in his power.

At the time that Leo X made this proposal, the resentment of the Germans against all the friends of France had reached such a height that the lives of the latter were not safe. Through the leader of the French party, the Archbishop of Treves, the Pope learned that four of the Electors were determined on the election of Charles. On his own confession, this intelligence convinced Leo of the futility and danger of holding out any longer for Francis’ candidature. He must at last accept the inevitable. For his part Charles neglected nothing which could win Leo’s favour; while Francis, just at this juncture, committed the blunder of making a most offensive demand of the Pope. According to the report of the Ambassador of Este, on the 5th of June, a letter arrived from the French King warning the Pope against incorporating Urbino in the States of the Church, seeing that the Duchy belonged to the infant Catherine de' Medici, whom the King regarded as his own daughter. That this demand caused a revolution in the mind of the Pope is certain, for he made his final decision in the middle of June. Just then most important news came from Germany; Caracciolo reported that, though ill, he had had himself carried in a sedan-chair to the Archbishop of Mainz, to implore him, in the Pope’s name, to consider the good of the Apostolic See and promote Francis’ election. The answer of the Archbishop was to the effect that under no circumstances would he vote for the French King. At the same time Leo was told that the Elector of Saxony had written a letter, dated the 8th of June, in which “with all courtesy as to form, but incisively and plainly,” he had dismissed both Papal representatives.

These tidings caused the abrupt change in the Pope’s attitude. On the 17th of June an understanding was come to with the Spanish Ambassador, Caroz, by which Leo X agreed, for this once, to the union of the imperial crown with that of Naples, conditional on a Papal veto of the expansion of the power of Spain in Lombardy or Tuscany. On this, the Pope’s representatives in Germany were instructed to make out a new treaty embracing the new concession, and word was at once sent to the Electors that, if they wished to elect Charles, they need not be deterred by considerations about the crown of Naples. Thus, at the last moment—for the Electors were already assembled at Frankfort—Leo X gave in, in face of the probability, nay, more, the moral certainty, that the election of the Hapsburg King would take place, whether the Pope consented or not. Such a grave injury to the dignity of the Holy See must be averted at all costs! That he gave in under compulsion there can be no doubt. He himself admitted as much when he wrote to Cardinal Cajetan saying that it was useless for him to knock his head against a stone wall. Francis also saw at last the futility of any further effort to win the crown. On the 26th of June he withdrew his own candidature, and told his Envoys to work for the election of Joachim of Brandenburg. A second letter, written the same day, instructed them that, should the Archbishop of Treves be in favour of the Elector of Saxony, the latter was to be supported. On the 21st of July the Nuncio Orsini, by the Pope's directions, once more, through Karl von Miltitz, urged Frederick of Saxony either to vote for Francis, or else to stand himself for election. But Frederick positively refused either course, and declared himself in favour of Charles. On the 28th of June 1519, the grandson of Maximilian was unanimously chosen King of Rome. Although, until he was crowned by the Pope, this was the only name he was entitled to bear, he was thenceforward generally spoken of as the Emperor.

The outcome of the long diplomatic struggle was regarded with deep interest. This is borne witness to by Baldassare Castiglione, who came to Rome on the 26th of May to condole with the Pope on the death of Lorenzo de' Medici. The members of the Curia had been convinced that neither Charles nor Francis had any chance; nor were the French as certain of victory as they had been, though there were still individual Frenchmen who spoke very vauntingly. The general fear was that a grave war would ensue. The Pope alone was of a different opinion as to this, and went undisturbedly about his usual pursuits, while excitement, which expressed itself in a number of wagers, rose to fever height in the city. On the 1st of July the news that Charles had been elected spread throughout Rome; whereat the imperialists rejoiced greatly.

The definite news of Charles’s election reached Rome on the 5th of July, being celebrated by great rejoicings on the part of the Spaniards, Imperialists, and the Colonna. The cry, “The Empire and Spain!” rang through the streets of the Eternal City. Baldassare Castiglione says that “the joy of the Spaniards is as difficult to describe as the depression of the French, who go about like men dead”. The Spanish Cardinals and prelates and all those who held benefices in Naples and Spain took part in the uproarious rejoicings. On two evenings five or six hundred Spaniards, well-armed, with music and banners, paraded the streets, stopping in front of the dwellings of the Spanish prelates, where they were given wine and money. The Germans in Rome took offence at the cry of “Spain, Spain!” set up by these men, whereas they would have preferred that of “Austria!” or “Burgundy!”. Thereupon more Spaniards and their adherents mustered in Rome, as though they were the masters of the Eternal City. The consequence of all this was a very painful scene between the Pope and Caroz, the Ambassador of Charles. Leo X could not conceal the deep impression made on him by the election of the Hapsburg. “Ambassador”, said he to Minio, the representative of Venice, “had the French King acted according to our advice, a third party would have been elected. God grant that the election of Charles may conduce to the good of Christendom!”. Such an exclamation shows how set Leo had been in his secret heart on the candidature of the Elector of Saxony.

A few days later Minio found the Pope thoughtful and anxious. “What shall I do,” said he, “if the Hapsburg comes to Italy now? All Germany will back him up!”. On the 18th of July the Venetian Ambassador found him still more agitated, because, as he complained, the French were laying all the blame on him for what had happened about the election. “As you know,” said he to Minio, “I did everything that they wished, and this is the result”.

Next day the Pope communicated to the Cardinals assembled in Consistory the contents of a letter from Charles, in which, briefly and moderately, he announced his election, and professed his good-will, and submission to the Holy See. The Pope did not fail to make use of this opportunity to commend Charles for not having assumed prematurely the title of King of Rome, though powerful enough to assert his claim to it.

Only now were the customary festivities celebrated in due form. On the 16th of August a letter containing the good wishes of the Pope was sent to Charles, the fine-sounding and bombastic phrases of which could have blinded only the very ignorant to the fact that Leo anticipated with a great fear the attitude likely to be taken by the new Emperor.

CHAPTER VII

The Occasion and Causes of the Reformation in Germany. —The Contest about Indulgences.

I.

When Leo X was wise enough to withdraw his opposition to the election of Charles V, even though at the eleventh hour, he saved the dignity of the Holy See from considerable injury. When, however, he thus avoided an open conflict with the new Emperor he did not, apparently, grasp the full importance of his prudent action in respect to the far-reaching religious revolution which was then seething in Germany. From the promulgation of an indulgence, unimportant in itself, there rapidly sprang up, and spread throughout the whole Empire a storm against Rome which made the Papacy tremble to its foundations.

The man who let loose this storm was a figure of which history affords but few examples. For four centuries the picture of his character has been in varying forms before the minds of men; and at the present day there is less agreement in the opinions formed of him than at any former period. On one point, however, friend and foe may join hands, and that is as to the strong personality of Martin Luther. It is true that he alone did not bring about the revolt which was to rend the unity of the Western Church for so many centuries. Nevertheless, it is true that he contributed more than any other to the subversion of existing conditions, though, as a matter of fact, he only put the match to the inflammable heap which had been accumulating for centuries.

The death-throes of the Middle Ages show to an attentive observer not only a remarkable growth in the religious sense and life, but also in that of grave moral and religious evils. We find light and darkness mixed to an unusual extent among the people, taken as a whole. The most characteristic and glaring contrasts of the time are to be found among the clergy, both secular and religious. Alongside of the most joyous self-sacrifice and inspired love of God and man, we find tokens of unbridled self-seeking, covetousness, luxury, and immorality. To many of that time the evils seemed so great that they feared the judgments of God.

One cause of the downfall of the German Church lay in her enormous riches, the unhealthy growth of which aroused on one side the envy and hatred of the laity, and on the other had a most deleterious effect on the ministers of the Church themselves. The worst feature of all was the inducement offered by this wealth to nobles of all degrees, to use the Church as a means of providing for themselves, by turning to their own advantage ecclesiastical stipends, especially those of canonries and prebendaries. The misuse of such incomes reached back as far as the beginning of the 13th century, though it did not become universal until the beginning of the 15th century. The natural consequence of this was that an increasing number of nobles embraced the ecclesiastical state for the sole purpose of obtaining possession of some sinecure. Through these noble ecclesiastics, who often, while quite young and before binding themselves by any vows, received various benefices connected with cathedrals, a spirit of worldliness, love of pleasure, and covetousness crept into the chapters. The cases of scandal given by these young ecclesiastics by their immoral conduct were only too frequent, and the general characteristics infused into the chapters made It only too probable that they would offer but little or no resistance to the impending religious revolt, and would even welcome it, provided it did not interfere with their monetary interests.

The monopoly of the cathedral benefices by the nobility had a further effect most fateful for the German Church. The episcopal sees were as a rule held by nobles, who saw in the sacred office nothing but a source of power and wealth. The dangers always attendant on the position of Bishops as landowners were thus doubled. The danger had been increased since the middle of the 15th century by the contest between the princely families and the knighthood of the Empire, with the result that the episcopal sees were occupied in an increasing ratio by the scions of princely houses. Though there were always honourable exceptions to the prevailing decadence, still the purely secular element increased steadily among the Bishops, who devoted their large incomes to the holding of luxurious courts, and in taking part in the quarrels and feuds of their families, while they left the duties of their office to be performed by their suffragans. On the eve of the revolt from the Church, many were the complaints made by earnest and upright Catholics against the worldliness of the Episcopate. But nowhere was a stronger protest made than in the remarkable work, “Onus ecclesiae”.

“How often”, says this book, “does the choice fall on a good, virtuous, and learned Bishop, and how often on one who is inexperienced, carnal, and ignorant of spiritual things? Prelacies are for the most part obtained by evil methods and ambition, not by election or other lawful means. The Church is brought into danger by these methods of conferring spiritual offices. Where is the Bishop who at the present time preaches or troubles himself about the souls entrusted to his care? Seldom do we find a chief pastor who is content with one church, and does not hold several benefices, even trying to appropriate more than one see. Moreover, Bishops care more for the table than for the altar, and while they are ignorant about theology they love worldly knowledge. Rather are they temporal lords than servants of Christ. They adorn their bodies with gold, but bespatter their souls with dirt. They are ashamed of their spiritual ministrations, and seek their fame in worldly vanities. In defiance of ecclesiastical laws they surround themselves with immoral persons, court fools, and frivolous companions. Sometimes they have recourse to worthless theologians and artful lawyers who, being moved by covetousness, bend the law like wax whichever way suits them, and flatter them while they keep silence about the truth. As to the accursed chase to which the Bishops devote themselves in a most scandalous fashion, I say nothing. Furthermore, the Bishops are always looking out for war, they whose calling it is to promote unity and peace. I know some prelates who prefer to wear the sword and weapons of soldiers than the spiritual garb of their state. Thus it happens that the episcopal revenues are spent on this world’s possessions, sordid cares, stormy wars, and worldly dominion. They do not even exercise charity, but neglect the poor of Christ, while they fatten their dogs and other beasts, as though they would become like to them. To such as these might Christ most justly say: “I was a stranger and poor, and you did not take me in; therefore depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire”. Nearly all the Bishops are covetous, take what belongs to others, and squander the property of the Church. They devote to other purposes what they ought to use for the service of God and of the poor. They do not use the revenues of the Church for holy purposes, but spend them on their relatives, play actors, flatterers, huntsmen, bad women, and such like persons. Even the inalienable possessions of their sees are given by them unlawfully to their relatives, to whom they hire them out at a nominal interest, to the detriment of their churches, the ruin of justice, and the great oppression of the poor. Such prodigals ought to be numbered among heretics. Provincial and diocesan synods, though prescribed, are not held. Consequently many ecclesiastical matters which ought to be amended are neglected. Besides this they do not make visitations in their parishes at stated times : yet they do not forget to charge them with heavy taxes. For these reasons religion languishes in both laity and clergy, and the churches are unadorned and falling into ruin. If a visitation is made, the Bishop troubles himself rather about its temporal concerns than about those that are spiritual ; though he quite neglects to see that the funds of the parish are looked after by suitable persons”.

Even if the author of this work, led away by his zeal for reform, generalizes too much on the abuses, it is established by the testimony of other good and earnest men that in the latter days, before the great revolt from the Church, her chief pastors were in many places in a very bad moral state. The possession of most of the episcopal sees by the sons of princes and nobles, who neglected their duty, and were as a rule no better than their equals in the world, and the neglect in the chief pastoral office which this involved, had as its consequence the general moral depravity of the secular and regular clergy, as well as of the laity. Without this the sudden secession from the Church and from the faith of their fathers, of such an enormous portion of the German people, would remain inexplicable, however favourable might have been the circumstances that led to the great subversion.

Several of the Popes of the 13th century had fought against the monopoly by the princes and nobles of the benefices and sees of the Church in Germany. But, with these exceptions, the Holy See not only countenanced but even encouraged the fatal abuse. Worldliness and a confusion of ideas had assumed such proportions in the Curia that, at the dawn of the 15th century, they seemed to have lost all idea of the fatal influence which the secularization of the Episcopate must have on religion. Even one so sagacious as tineas Silvius de' Piccolomini, when defending the Roman See against the accusations brought against it by Martin Mayr, reckons it as among the merits of the Curia that it raised the sons of princes to the episcopal sees, as had happened lately at Treves and Ratisbon.

“ For”, he says, “a Bishop of princely estate is far more likely than one of lower degree to promote the interests and importance of the Church, and preserve her rights”. Looking at things from the point of view of the leading humanists, he reproaches men of lower estate for desiring to be Bishops as soon as they had acquired some learning. He laments, moreover, that the element of the lower nobility, whose noble descent it is not always so easy to prove, should have such a preponderance in the cathedral chapters, Cologne and Strasburg excepted, that these were not inclined to select the sons of princes to occupy the sees, lest they should have a Bishop whom they would have to obey. It does not seem to have occurred to the intellectual Sienese that it was not merely a high position which was required to make a good Bishop, but, primarily, the necessary moral qualities.

At the end of the second decade of the 16th century, when the revolt against the Church began, not only were a great number of archiepiscopal and episcopal sees occupied by the sons of princes, but several of these princely Bishops, such as Albert of Brandenburg, held, with the sanction of the Pope, two or more bishoprics.

In marked contrast to the higher clergy, who luxuriated in their rich revenues, the lower clergy, who had the cure of souls, had no fixed salary, and depended for subsistence on uncertain tithes and stole-fees. From poverty, though sometimes also from covetousness, they had recourse to methods of gaining money which were incompatible with their state, and could not fail to draw down on them the contempt of the people. Among those things which led to this lamentable state of things, the first to be considered is the enormous number of the lower clergy. Although the multitude of religious foundations for Masses bears striking testimony to the piety of the Middle Ages, there existed a dark side in the shape of the quantity of small benefices which were the result. These afforded their occupants neither enough to live on nor enough to employ them. The consequence was that there was a superfluity of clerics attached to the parish churches in the larger cities and smaller towns, as also to the cathedrals. It stands to reason that where the number was so excessive it was not everyone who had a vocation to the spiritual state ; nor can it be doubted that even if the vocation existed, there was nothing like enough work for all.

Parents at that time had so little conscience that they destined for the priesthood and religious life those of their children who were unfitted to make their way in the world;--and this for the sole reason of providing for them. These lamentable circumstances, combined with lack of occupation, absence of a true vocation, and want of theological training, conduced to the immorality of many of the clergy. Even when a good and worthy Bishop was found to fulfil his duty, it was difficult, if not impossible, under the circumstances, for him to maintain the necessary discipline. In the condition of the Episcopate as described above, any abuse could spread unhindered.

The complaints in the 15th century as to the immorality and concubinage of the clergy are very numerous. But we must always remember that many of the expressions used by preachers and moralists are manifestly exaggerated, and that it stands to reason that more is said about evil and depravity than about what was regular and normal. Nor must it be overlooked that there existed in the Church in Germany righteous and serious-minded Bishops, who held synods and carried on a constant warfare—and not always without results—against immorality and other scandals. There were, moreover, whole districts, such as the Rhine country, Schleswig-Holstein, and the Allgau, where, as we learn on good authority, the clergy for the most part led irreproachable lives. Still there was a superabundance of what was evil. The condition of the clergy was very bad, especially in Franconia, Westphalia, Bavaria, in the Austrian territories, especially the Tyrol, in the diocese of Constance, on the Upper Rhine, and in nearly all the large towns. There was a spiritual proletariat which extended over a large area, and formed a constant danger to the Church, being ready at any moment to attach itself to whatever movement promised to injure her.

Luxury was combined with immorality among the clergy in a higher position. “The clergy”, says a contemporary, “are to be found in inns and taverns, and at sports and theatres, more frequently than in consecrated places”. These debased tastes were rightly attributed to the abuse of the rights of patronage by both spiritual and lay per sons, who often preferred to advance bad and uneducated priests in preference to the worthy. Contemporaries mention pride and covetousness as the sins which drew down most hatred on the clergy. Even those who were in other respects better men, were a prey to covetousness. Complaints were made that even the educated clergy did not devote themselves to their sacerdotal duties, and cared only for the financial advantages of their sacred office. The love of money showed itself in all grades of the clergy by their efforts to raise as high as possible the manifold ecclesiastical taxes and revenues, in hunting for and accumulating benefices, in nepotism, and in simony. Another evil custom which was the outcome of covetousness, was that of serving benefices vicariously, by placing substitutes to serve the rich cures in which they did not care to reside in person. While they were living in affluence and frequenting the courts of princes and nobles, their office was supplied by scantily-paid vicars.

The Popes of the 15th century must incur blame by the manner in which they entrusted the offices of the Church to the unworthy and incapable, and by their facility in granting dispensations for holding a plurality of benefices, without the obligation of living on them. It is obvious how bad must have been the effect of this granting by the Popes of one preferment after another to the greedy benefice-hunters who flocked in thousands over the Alps. The hatred felt for these courtiers was general. All this contributed to fostering a widespread and deep discontent with the actual condition of ecclesiastical « affairs, the displeasure being extended to the Pope himself.

Still more injurious was the deviation from their original purpose of the old episcopal seminaries for the training of the priesthood. The universities could serve the purpose as far as the cultivation of theological knowledge was concerned, but were no adequate substitute as places of spiritual training, because they were frequented by only a small portion of the clerics. Thus, alongside of the t higher and educated clergy there existed among the lower clergy a number of ignorant and uneducated men who, as Trithemius complains, did not trouble themselves about the study of Holy Scripture, and often had not even mastered the Latin tongue. But, as in the case of other reproaches, such accusations must not be generalized on. The very activity of men like Trithemius, Wimpheling, Geiler von Kaisersberg, and others, who spoke so strongly against abuses, shows that alongside of the many bad elements in the Church of Germany there was much that was good. Even such a severe censor of the clerical offences of the time as Johannes Nider, is explicit in his warning against exaggerated generalizations; because in every condition of life the good and the bad lived alongside of one another, though more attention was invariably paid to what was bad than to what was good. In the same way that there were excellent Bishops as well as those who were unworthy, so all over Germany there were good and conscientious priests among the secular clergy and in the religious orders. This is incidentally pointed out by Wimpheling, who is often so bitter in his judgments. At the outbreak of the Reformation it was shown that, alongside the multitude of unworthy priests and monks who, from lack of theological training and discernment, and especially from moral neglect, flocked to embrace the Lutheran heresy, there always remained a number of learned priests of high moral character who stood true to the Church, at the cost of personal sacrifice and even danger.

To form any general judgment as to the condition of the religious houses in Germany at that time, is therefore peculiarly difficult, owing to the lack of individual research. The number of religious houses was enormous. Even those who are most ready to admit the value of the religious state must lament a certain superabundance of religious foundations. The circumstances were, however, very different in individual cases, and the abuses, though undoubtedly numerous, must not be generalized on. The religious orders of that time produced many upright and worthy priests, and this was all the more important, because the greatest part of the work for souls was in the hands of the mendicant friars. The monasteries, moreover, did a great deal to relieve the social needs of the people. Even if grave abuses did exist, nearly everywhere there could be seen signs of a strong reaction against the prevailing corruption. The attempts at reform in the monasteries date from the end of the great Schism of the West, and were at first accomplished under great difficulties. There were four great and successful streams of reform in the religious orders : that of the Benedictines (Bursfeld Congregation), the Canons Regular (Windesheim Congregation), and the Augustinians and Franciscan Observantines.

Stress must be laid on the fact that after Martin V, nearly all the Popes were zealous in the cause of the reform of the religious orders of Germany, both generally and in individual cases. Above all, we must remember the important work done by the Cardinal-Legate, Nicholas of Cusa, in Germany and the Netherlands, and his monastic reforms in the year 1451. Pius II also did a great deal, comparatively speaking, for the reform of the monastic houses in Germany, especially by his patronage of the Bursfeld Congregation and the reform of the Franciscan Observantines.

The results of the monastic reform varied greatly, and the sharpest contrasts could be seen in every field. The circumstances in different countries and different Orders varied very much. In Upper Germany the attempt to reform the mendicant friars met with the fiercest opposition. In Lower Germany, just at the critical time of the Lutheran revolt, the Saxon province of Luther’s own Order, the Augustinians, had so degenerated that, in 1521, it broke away as a whole, and, with the exception of a few members, followed the new religion.

As a rule it was the richest cloisters and abbeys which had fallen furthest from their original spirit, and which were most strongly opposed to any attempt at reform. Wealth had the same baneful effect on them as it had on the Episcopate and cathedral chapters. It tempted the nobles, who saw in the Church only a means of provision for their sons, and regarded religious houses as made to be appropriated for their own ends. They made it, moreover, their business to guard these emoluments from the encroachments of the burgher and peasant class, who were already excluded from the higher ecclesiastical positions. The German nobility in this way drew great odium on itself. Rich abbeys served practically as “hospitals for the nobles”, in which those were placed by preference who were unfit for the world. Even the lame and blind were placed in them without any regard for a religious vocation. Such elements introduced an entirely worldly spirit into the cloister; nor did it end there. Thus did these religious houses decline more and more from their fervour. Many of the inmates went about in the world just as they pleased, and were not even required to return. In fact, contemporaries complain that cloisters and consecrated places became mere pleasure resorts. These noble communities were the most dissolute and most opposed to ecclesiastical reform.

All this was equally the case in the houses of religious women. Many of these stood in most evil repute. It was therefore no matter for surprise that these dissolute religious passed over wholesale to the new religion, broke their vows, and threw to the winds everything which had hitherto been most sacred to them.

But if a considerable portion of the clergy and religious were disposed to embrace a doctrine such as Luther's new gospel, which so entirely suited their inclinations, the contempt and hatred of the laity for the degenerate clergy was no mean factor in the great apostasy. While the great mass of the lower orders clung for a while with fidelity to the Catholic Faith, the educated classes showed the strongest antipathy to the degenerate clergy, and from them the same spirit of opposition spread to the lower classes. More and more general became the indignation felt with those Bishops who lived like secular princes, who were better versed in the arts of war than in the duties of their sacred ministry, and who did not even reside in the dioceses the revenues of which they devoured. The scandalous manner in which many of the higher clergy paraded their wealth acted as a challenge to criticism. In the episcopal towns of the Rhine Provinces there were serious quarrels and open rupture between the burghers and the clergy, and in other places there were scandalous conflicts between the Bishops and their subjects.

The desire of acquiring wealth and property which possessed some of the religious houses, to the injury of people outside, was also very injurious to the cause of the Church. Envy drove the laity to generalize on individual cases of this kind, and detest all the clergy without distinction. Hatred and contempt were levelled against those degenerate monks who were accused of having entered the cloister merely to feast and gormandize at the expense of their poorer fellow citizens. A spirit of bitter enmity against the clergy is expressed in the various revolutionary writings of the 15th century. Of these, the “Reformation of the Emperor Sigismund” appeared at the time of the Council of Basle. Afterwards appeared “The Reformation of Frederick III”, written in the last quarter of the century; and the most radical of all in the work, lately discovered, of a revolutionary of the Upper Rhine, written in the first decade of the 16th century. In this book, which contains the darkest possible and most grossly exaggerated picture of the condition of ecclesiastical, public, and social affairs, an attempt was made to radically revolutionize all departments, and secularize all Church property.

Together with the dissatisfaction with the clergy, there grew up a deep-seated and often bitter hostility to the Pope and the Roman Curia. This spirit of opposition showed itself not only among the princes and burgher class, but was strongest of all among the clergy of both the higher and lower ranks. In this lay the greatest danger for the Papacy; “for with a discontented clergy rested the power at any moment of drawing the simple folk into apostasy”.

There were many degrees and different currents of opposition to Rome in Germany, between which a dis tinction must be drawn. The great Schism of the West, which began in 1378, not only caused much confusion by its long duration, but, as a natural consequence, gave a severe blow to Papal authority. The fact of the dual Papacy could not fail of itself to have this effect. To this must be added the great dependence of the Popes on temporal princes, caused by the Schism. In order to increase, or even keep the obedience due to them, the Popes saw themselves compelled to make important and far-reaching concessions to the temporal powers, unless they were willing to put up with arbitrary interference in the ecclesiastical domain, and submit to the extension of sovereign rights at the expense of spiritual authority.

Thus did the great Schism lastingly and fatefully prepare the way for the apostasy of the 16th century. A further consequence of this destructive confusion of the dual Papacy was the obscurity which it cast over the doctrine of the divine institution of the Primacy, and the monarchical character of the constitution of the Church.

A party sprang up in the Church which placed the authority of a General Council above that of the Pope. Even ecclesiastically-minded theologians who acted in the interests of the Church, brought forward various theories having this tendency. A sweeping system of the kind was propounded by the eminent German theologian Heinrich von Langenstein in a work written by him in 1 38 1, advocating the assembly o fa “Council of Peace”.  Another German theologian, Conrad von Gelnhausen, developed this new theory in his Einigungsbrief in 1380. In France Langenstein’s principles produced a strong effect on the celebrated John Gerson. Though with those who were sincere the movement was promoted with the honourable object of healing the Schism, the council theory took with others a form of radical opposition to the authority, of the Supreme Pontiff. Doctrines were propounded which denied the divine institution of the Papacy and the unity of the Church. A copious German literature testifies to this anti-Papal current. The best known of these books is the passionately violent Confutatio primatus Papae, by the Saxon Minorite, Matthias Doring, based on the Defensor pacis of Marsilius of Padua. After the Council of Basle, which was so fatal in its result to the holders of the Council theory, and after the Vienna Concordat of 1448 a change in many respects for the better came over the so-called conciliar movement, which was apparently relegated to the background even in Germany. But though smothered and hidden, the anti-Papal movement was by no means destroyed; though kept out of sight, it was in reality more effective even if less visible and on the surface.

During the pontificate of Callixtus III a movement in Germany, hostile to the Papacy, sprang up under the leadership of the Archbishop of Mainz, Dietrich von Erbach. The Primate of the German Church, in union with the Archbishops of Cologne and Treves, strove to promote the assembly of a great national Council, with the object of obtaining the recognition of the decrees of the Council of Basle and of procuring the redress of the so-called “grievances” of the German nation. But under their parade of reforming zeal these prelates were in reality seeking their own advantage.

The anti-Papal movement in Germany became more violent and dangerous under Pius II. To prove this it is sufficient to recall the attitude of the Archbishop of Mainz, Diether von Isenberg (a type of the secularized Episcopate), and the disorders. in the Tyrol under Duke Sigismund. The polemical writings of Gregor Heimburg in the interests of the Duke were of a violence almost unprecedented. On the other hand, Andrea Zamometic’s hazardous attempt under Sixtus IV to promote the assembling of a Council was of but slight importance. Of the same nature were the schismatic attempts of Maximilian I under Julius II, which were completely frustrated. The secularization of the Roman Curia, which reached its zenith under Alexander VI, had a bad effect on the loyalty of the Germans to Rome, and caused great dissatisfaction in those who were eyewitnesses of it. Nevertheless, any thought of a real secession from Rome found no place among the masses of the German people. In all their complaints the duty of obedience to the Pope was expressly maintained. The grievances brought against the Roman Curia, and the other causes of dissatisfaction alluded to, did not in any way touch the Faith, but were directed solely against abuses which could be remedied without severing Germany from the centre of ecclesiastical dignity. Such abuses referred to the proceedings of canon law, to the Roman practice of administration, especially in the granting of benefices, and the method of taxation through the Papal courts. In many cases the grievances were so completely justified that upright, ecclesiastically- minded men, warmly attached to the Holy See, admitted them. If the Curia was able to make so many unjustifiable encroachments in Germany, it was because it did not find itself face to face with a powerful and united government, such as it met with in England and France. The breaking up of the Empire into a number of greater and lesser territories almost invited encroachment, and “the Curia, which had so many methods at its command, always had some German princes at its back, even if others were opposed to it”.

The dissatisfaction with Rome was made more acute and virulent by the introduction of the national element, expressed by a bitter hatred of the Italians, whom the Germans charged with underrating their nation, and for caring only for what could be gained from them. This dislike was felt equally by men devoted to the Church, such as Berthold von Henneberg, Archbishop of Mayence, and wild radical spirits of the type of the revolutionary of the Upper Rhine, who to their boundless contempt united the bitterest hatred of Rome.

But in addition to an antipathy of this kind, which had no dogmatic tendency and was directed solely against the real and supposed abuses in the ecclesiastical government, heretics arose in the 15th century— largely in connection with the heresy of Hus—such as Johann von Wesel, who was called before the Inquisition at Wesel in February, 1479, and had to recant his false doctrines. The Bohemian Brethren, who denied any distinction between priests and laymen, and called the Pope Antichrist, began at that time to propagate their doctrines in Germany. Their eight different confessions of faith were printed in the German tongue in Nuremberg and Leipzig.

Ecclesiastical grievances had been much increased in Germany by political, legal, and social abuses. The study of German history shows an increase in the decay of the Empire ever since the 13th century, and as a consequence of this the sovereignty of the princes had become confirmed. The long reign of Frederick III had been especially injurious to the power of the Empire, and to its position in the eyes of Europe. The injury wrought by him was so great that later on even a distinguished ruler like Charles V could not, in spite of the gain of a few temporary results, succeed in reducing the unsettled state of things to order. From the time of Frederick III the princely houses, which had always in later times had a greater or lesser influence on the history of the German people, were firmly established at the expense of the imperial power, while only certain sovereign rights were allowed to the Emperor. The introduction of Roman law, which ever since the 13th century had been slowly supplanting the native German law, was of the greatest moment in this political development. The princes who were striving by its help to establish their power and sovereignty were its most eager promoters. Dating from the middle of the 15th century, a change, unknown before, had been introduced into the government of the territories belonging to spiritual as well as temporal princes ; and all the more important court and civil offices were held by Roman jurists, and the principles of Roman law were introduced in every branch of government. In place of the older mode of self-government belonging to the German law, bureaucracy prevailed, which interfered with and controlled everything, burdened the people to the utmost of its power, quite regardless of the violation of their ancient rights. “According to the abominable theory of Roman jurisconsults”, says Wimpheling, “the prince is everything in the country, and the people nothing. The people have to obey, pay taxes, offer their services, and, above all, obey not only the princes, but also their officials, who are beginning to assume the functions of the real lords of the country, and arrange matters so that even the princes have next to nothing to do with the government”. Taxation, above all, was promoted by the Roman jurists. The application of Roman law to this had the most injurious effects, and the result of the action of the jurists as advisers to the territorial lords, was the degradation of the peasantry, who, under the dominion of the new law, were outraged, oppressed, and ground down on every side. The effects of Roman law extended into every phase of the life of the people, bringing about the subversion of all actual conditions.

To this extension of the power of the princes—in the sense of that of the old Roman patricians—was due the fact that they aspired to dominion in the spiritual domain as well. Long before the outbreak of the Reformation, many jurists had come to the conclusion that princes might claim ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and, after the example set by the ancient Roman Emperors, “regulate even religious matters, institute and deprive Bishops, and appropriate Church property as their right, to be turned to the use of the State”. In the same way that Charles the Bold of Burgundy was instructed by his jurisconsults that he himself should be Pope in his own dominions, so the German territorial lords held the opinion that they might claim Papal rights in their own lands. To the existing desire to appropriate Church property, there was now added a desire on the part of the German princes to usurp the spiritual jurisdiction of the Bishops. Many events, especially in the second half of the 15th century, show the way in which the proprietors of land usurped jurisdiction in purely spiritual matters, and acted as if they were the lawfully constituted spiritual authorities. Sometimes the abuses which had crept into some monastery gave the desired excuse for the interference of lay authority, and monastic reformers, such as Johann Busch, called in the help of the secular arm of the nobles for the restoration of order. In individual cases, where the temporal prince in question was religiously minded, such a usurpation of spiritual rights might seem to be of small importance. But in the case of most German princes such an interference was not prompted by any desire for the purity of the Church, but was solely the assertion of the punitive office which had been claimed by them since the middle of the 15th century. German landed proprietors assumed rights in respect to the Church in an increasing ratio. Such as these were the “taxation of the Church, the limitation of her right to acquire property by loan, the exercise of the State placet, immoderate interference in the appointment of Bishops and other ecclesiastical officials, the right of visitation, and supervision of ecclesiastical matters in their own territories”.

The waning authority of the Pope and the weakening of the imperial central power by the increase of territorial influence—both a result of the great Schism—had the unhealthy effect of severing Church and State, to the injury of the former. The new State Church, as is shown by the history of the 16th century, contained the gravest dangers for the unity of the Church. In the increase of the power of the princes there lurked an easy and safe excuse for despoiling the Church, not only partially, but, in a certain sense, completely, by perfecting the revolt and seceding from Rome. Under this new development a disposition was infused into the lower and oppressed classes to join in every movement of revolt, provided only it were subversive of the authority of State and Church.

The humanism of Young Germany was the most important of the movements which threatened danger to the Church. It was totally different both in nature and effect from that of the older humanists. Whereas the latter school looked at things from the point of view of Christianity, at the service of which they placed classical antiquity as an important factor of culture, in the humanist school of Young Germany the study of antiquity was its own end, and often evinced a spirit not only indifferent, but often hostile, to Christianity. The real founder and type of the younger school was Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. A great scholar but a weak character, a man of brilliant attainments, by the many-sidedness and versatility of his active mind, Erasmus exercised by his numerous writings a prodigious influence on his time. In spite of all the services he rendered to classical study, it must be admitted that, though he never separated himself openly from the Church, Erasmus did much by his attacks, not only on degenerate scholasticism but on scholasticism itself, as well as by his venomous irony, to lessen respect for the authority of the Church and for faith itself among a large number of the highly-cultivated men of the day. Thus did he prepare the way for the impetuous and impassioned Luther.

The influence exercised by Erasmus over the younger school of humanists was portentous. While on the one hand he filled his disciples with a one-sided enthusiasm for classical antiquity, and a contempt for the ecclesiastical science of the Middle Ages (about which he knew but little), he brought discredit on the study of philosophy. He accustomed the susceptible youth of the day to despise serious, scientific, and speculative research, and regard rhetoric, witty speech and the art of style as the first requisites of education. Jakob Locher, surnamed Philomusus, well known as the translator, editor, and expounder of the ancient classics, and also as the author of textbooks of classical philosophy, was now in the field with his lawless views of life, and had taken his stand as the disciple of pure paganism purged from all Christianity. He recommended the ancient poets, even the most objectionable, as the best, nay, only means for the education of youth.

With the second decade of the 16th century complaints were entered against the abandonment and depreciation of philosophical studies, against the one-sided and exclusive study of the classics, as well as against the presumption and immorality of the younger humanists. In 15 12 Johannes Cochlaus made the following protest: “Philo sophy is set aside; some devote their lives to belles lettres; others, without fitting preparation, take up the study of law; while others again throw themselves into the study of medicine merely for the sake of gain: all this being to the injury of the student. Humanist studies, however much they may conduce to the ornamentation of learning, are injurious to those who have no solid scientific training. Hence the levity of certain persons, to whom the name of  ‘poets’ is erroneously given. Hence the buffoonery and the criminally scandalous lives of some. They are the common slaves of Bacchus and Venus; not the pious priests of Phoebus and Pallas”.

The younger humanists considered themselves qualified to look down with contempt on “the old barbarians” who busied themselves with scientific and dialectic questions; because, without any profound study of the spirit of the ancients, they had acquired a certain facility in handling their form of speech, and, by a superficial imitation, could fabricate worthless verses. Those humanist productions, which take in vain the name of the Most Holy and treat of Christian things as of a mere play of the mind, are particularly unsavoury and revolting. Of this kind were the “Christian Heroids”, in imitation of Ovid, which were published in 15 14 by Rabanus Hessus. More original, though shameless and coarse beyond words, were the ‘poets’ imitations of the old erotic poets; for in these their mode of life was in harmony with their verses. Even as in the movement of the Italian Renaissance the idea of sensual pleasure was let loose in the most unbridled manner, so was it now with many of the younger humanists such as Locher, Hermann van dem Busche, and Ulrich von Hutten. They fell into the wildest extravagances, if for no other reason than to show their superiority to the Italians.

Conrad Mutianus Rufus, by his influence over the humanists of Erfurt, of whom he was the leader, was responsible for the mixture of Christianity and paganism in the movement. This canon of Gotha, who had been in Italy a warm adherent of Neoplatonism, then rampant among the humanists, was for a time at least an opponent of positive Christianity. His definition of that religion was antagonism to the Mosaic system, and humanitarianism quite independent of revelation, while, together with his followers, he had nothing but scorn and contempt for the Church and her institutions and doctrines. Guided by such an influence, a frivolous literature sprang up in Germany, the keynote of which was enmity to the Church and the spiritual state : above all, it poured its scorn on the religious orders. It is no wonder that such doings eventually caused among many earnest men of strong ecclesiastical leanings an antipathy towards humanistic studies in general, and that the religious orders and scholastic theologians were especially zealous in their opposition to the ‘poets’, as the representatives of an unchristian learning, often exceeding all reasonable bounds in a one-sidedness which, under the circumstances, was intelligible. Mutianus was one of the most impassioned of the anti-scholastics and described the fight of the humanists against scholasticism as “a fight of light against darkness”. His one ambition was to annihilate the old school and all its institutions.

A characteristic type of the younger humanists of Germany was the gifted but morally depraved Ulrich von Hutten. Having been early imbued at Erfurt with the tenets of a completely pagan sect of humanists, he became there the champion of a proletariat of nobles, who had nothing to lose by the subversion of the existing state of things. He was possessed of an unbounded self-confidence which made him regard himself as the chosen supporter of the movement of the new era; so that everything he did or tried to do was in his eyes of history making importance. All this, combined with his ability and gift of writing, made him one of the most dangerous promoters of revolutionary ideas. Towards the Church and her doctrines and institutions, his attitude was one of unmixed scorn and repugnance. In 1513 he returned from his first sojourn in Italy the avowed enemy of the Papacy, against which he declared open war.

The dispute between Reuchlin and the theologians of Cologne, gave an impetus to the open war between the younger humanists and the representatives of the older school of learning. Johann Reuchlin, who had a natural inclination towards the Church, and was much esteemed in Germany for his personal qualities as well as for his knowledge of Greek, and still more of Hebrew, had become imbued with the doctrines of a fanatical theosophy, induced by his study of the Jewish Kabbala, and encouraged by his own propensity for mystical subtleties. He expressed his opinions in two books, Vom wundertaligen Wor and liber kabbalistische Kunst. Reuchlin was far from wishing to injure the Church by these theories; he thought rather that they would bring about a better understanding of Christianity by throwing new light upon it from the Jewish books. But in reality his views were calculated to sow confusion in the brains of the youth of Germany, and give an impetus to the inclination, already existing among them, to cast themselves adrift, at the expense of Christianity, from all dogmatic teaching. Several theologians spoke with disapprobation of Reuchlin’s writings, and Jakob Hochstraten, a Dominican of Cologne, wrote an answer in 1519.

The outcome of these literary publications was a long dispute about the authority of the Jewish books. Johann Pfefferkorn, a baptized Jew of Cologne, in his zeal for the conversion of his former fellow-believers, had arrived at the conclusion that the chief cause of their obstinacy would be removed if they were compelled to give up all the Talmud books in their possession. Pfefferkorn demanded this in several works, written in the years 1507-1509, and it was solely due to his efforts that an imperial mandate was issued on the 19th of August 1509, commanding the Jews to produce before him all books opposed to the Christian Faith and their own law. He obtained permission to take away such books and destroy them in any place in the presence of the parish priest and two members of the Council. In a later mandate of the 10th of November, 1509, the Emperor gave the conduct of the whole affair to Uriel, the Archbishop of Mainz, who was commissioned to obtain the opinion of the Universities of Cologne, Mainz, Erfurt, and Heidelberg, together with that of the converted Jew Victor Carben, of Reuchlin, and of the Inquisitor Jakob Hochstraten. The judgment of Reuchlin was not in agreement with the severity of the others consulted, for he considered that only the manifestly scandalous books of the Jews should be destroyed, after lawful sentence had been passed; though he opined that all the other books should be detained. However, the whole affair came to nothing, as the Emperor would come to no decision.

The question of the Jewish books gave rise to a dispute which was most important to the religious and spiritual life of the nation. Immediately, it was a purely personal quarrel between Reuchlin and Pfefferkorn, who thought he had been insulted by the other. But it went further; Pfefferkorn avenged himself by the impassioned pamphlet, the Handspiegel (1511), in which, without any ground to go on, he accused Reuchlin of having been bribed by the Jews. Reuchlin replied even more violently by his Augenspiegel, which was published during the autumn fair at Frankfort, 1511. This book caused the greatest sensation in Germany, and was sent by the chief parish priest at Frankfort, Petrus Meyer, to Hochstraten, the Inquisitor of the province of Mainze. The two theologians Arnold von Tungern and Conrad Kollin were charged by Hochstraten with the examination of the book. Reuchlin at once exerted himself to obtain a favourable verdict. The first pronouncement on either side, calmly made, seemed to justify such an expectation. But, soon after, the strife broke out afresh, and Reuchlin, in a second pamphlet published in 1512, stood by what he had said before, and attacked the Frankfort theologians. Arnold von Tungern replied in a temperate Latin book, while at the same time Pfeflerkorn attacked his adversary in his Brandspiegel. Reuchlin, embittered by the censure passed by the Emperor Maximilian on the 7th of October, 1512, on his Augenspiegel, published (1513) a Defence against the Cologne Calumniators, which is one of the most frantic libels of the age. On the 9th of July 1513 the Emperor ordered its suppression. After this the theological faculties of Louvain, Cologne, Mainz, Erfurt, and Paris pronounced the condemnation of the Augenspiegel. Hochstraten, as Inquisitor, opened the trial, and in September, 1513, called Reuchlin before his tribunal at Mainz. Reuchlin now appealed to the Pope, and by means of a flattering letter gained the advocacy of the physician of Leo X, the influential Jew, Bonet de Lattes. Leo X handed over the case to George, Bishop of Spires. This prince, only twenty-seven years of age, and little versed in such matters, passed on the decision to Canon Truchsess, a disciple of Reuchlin. Against his verdict, which exonerated the Augenspiegel and censured Hochstraten for condemning it, the Inquisitor appealed to the Pope, who this time appointed as judge Cardinal Grimani. The latter summoned both parties to Rome in June, 1514. Hochstraten was bidden to appear in person, but Reuchlin, on account of his advanced age, was allowed to send an advocate to represent him. Hochstraten had started for Rome even before the summons reached him ; but the affair dragged on year after year, for Reuchlin had many influential patrons at the Curia, and the Pope forbore from any interference.

Leo X suspected no danger, though there were not wanting those who warned him. Even as early as the 21st of April, 1514, the learned Adrian of Utrecht, afterwards Adrian VI, appealed to Cardinal Carvajal and begged him to do his best to persuade the Pope to be prompt to heal “this cankerous disease”. Shortly afterwards the Cologne theologians appealed to the same Cardinal. They, and above all the Inquisitor, had remained faithful to their duty in respect of the heretical Augenspiegel, and, being supported by the verdict of various Universities, had condemned and burnt the book. Whereupon its author obtained, by a false statement, the appointment of a new judge at Spires. He, “being more inclined to error than to Catholic truth, and being ignorant both of theology and the mysteries of faith”, was bold enough to acquit the book, “to the injury of the Catholic Church, the joy of the Jews, the detriment of the Universities and their scholars, and the grave and harmful scandal of the common folk”. Hochstraten had appealed to the Holy See, and implored Cardinal Carvajal to help him, by doing which he would be maintaining the holy faith; “for if”, said he, “the frivolity of the poets (i.e. the humanists) be not suppressed in this affair which is polluting faith, they will in the future be less diffident in attacking theological truth”.

But on both sides of the Alps rich patrons of Reuchlin's appeared, who were able to postpone a decision. Even the Emperor Maximilian interested himself on his behalf. Erasmus also spoke warmly to the Pope in favour of his friend. But, on the other hand, the Archduke Charles, afterwards the Emperor Charles V, put in a plea for Reuchlin’s adversary. With words of warning he approached the Pope in 1515. “Corruption”, said he, “will grow every day that the decision of this case is postponed. In Rome, where the trial is held, nothing is discussed except the form in which the question is put, while the substance of it is neglected. A few Cardinals are charged with the examination of the matter, whereas, on account of its importance, the affair ought to be laid before the Cardinals assembled in the Council which was then sitting in the Lateran. Would that the strife could be ended! Would that the cruel wolf could be prevented from shedding the innocent blood of the sheep, and this scandal be removed from the path of the weak!”. Francis I also had warned the Pope, and begged him to speedily make a happy decision about the matter, conforming himself in this with the judgment passed by the German schools, and “our University of Paris”. The University of Louvain, in a letter sent to the Pope, said that it looked on it as a sacred duty to care for the order and purity of the Catholic Church. In the condemnation of Reuchlin’s book, Louvain had agreed with the other faculties, especially that of Paris. “All who walked in the house of God had spoken unanimously”.

Yet no decision was given! When the Roman commission, the majority of whom favoured the Augenspiegel, declared themselves ready to express their final opinion, a Papal mandate, dated July, 1516, was issued, which deferred a decision. This did not make Hochstraten desist from his efforts. For another year he remained in Rome, and it was only in July 1517, after more than three years’ sojourn there, that he returned to Cologne without having succeeded in his object.

While Rome hesitated, affairs on the other side of the Alps had taken a menacing turn. The younger humanists, now firmly united for the first time, made use of the Reuchlin dispute in their rebellion against the authority of the Church, and especially against the doctrines of the Dominican Order, as being to them the chief re presentative of scholasticism. Under the leadership of Mutianus, who, moved merely by theological antagonism, took the side of Reuchlin against his convictions, the younger humanists gathered round the latter and stirred him up to greater fury than before against his opponents, while they poured forth scorn and satire on the theological teaching of the old school. In the years 1515-1517 the Letters, published under the title of Epistolae obscurorum virorum, appeared. The first part of them was written by Crotus Rubianus, and the second entirely by Hutten. The writers of this work did their utmost to defame their adversaries by the grossest accusations. The real motive of this shameful libel was hostility to the authority of the Church. A number of the letters in the second part are dated from Rome. It was Hutten who extended the line of attack, and made war directly against the Holy See. What the humanists did now in respect to Reuchlin, they repeated when soon afterwards they espoused the cause of Luther, whose first confederates they became.

The outbreak of the Lutheran movement and the attitude of the humanists towards Reuchlin at last caused the latter’s case to be regarded in Rome in a less favourable light; the trial terminated in a way unfavourable to him. But the Papal decision came too late ; in the long interval of hesitation, Reuchlin's name had been taken up as a war-cry by all the adversaries of the Holy See. In his final verdict, Leo X, on the 23rd of June, 1520, declared the Spires judgment to be invalid, forbade the circulation of the Augenspiegel as a book offensive, scandalous, and unlawfully favourable to the Jews. Moreover, he condemned Reuchlin to pay all costs of the trial. At the same time Hochstraten was reinstated in his offices of Prior and Inquisitor, of which he had been shortly before deprived by the Frankfort Chapter, intimidated by the threats of Sickingen.

The Reuchlin dispute, thus decided all too late by Rome, was the forerunner of a far more important contest, which was to bring about a final parting of the ways.

II.

When we look at the condition of things connected with the Church in Germany at the close of the Middle Ages, we can see that, even if by no means hopeless, it was such as to cry out urgently for reform. It is true that the Church stood firm with strong vitality; it is true that faith and piety waxed strong among the masses of the people in spite of the excesses in the lives of both secular and regular clergy. Nevertheless there existed smouldering elements, the letting loose of which was bound to lead to a catastrophe. There was an abundance of inflammable material ready laid in the field of politics and society, and above all in that of the Church, and there were only wanting the right man and the given opportunity to cause a disastrous conflagration. Both were at hand.

That the outbreak of the revolt against Rome should be connected with a financial question was by no means fortuitous; for in Germany at that time there was no subject of complaint more rampant than the constant demands for money made by the Curia, and the grave abuses connected therewith. The Papal tax-gatherers had always filled a difficult position in that country. To the nation’s innate sense of liberty there was united a general reluctance to recognize any taxes, whether legal or ecclesiastical. Ever since the development of political economy had facilitated financial dealings with Rome, the complaints against the covetousness of the Curia had become so violent as to lessen the respect felt for the Holy See. “Every person subjected to a demand for money gave vent to his displeasure, without considering that the Papacy, being a universal institution, must have the right to turn to the faithful to help it to defray its expenses”.

As a matter of fact, discontent with the Curia’s system of taxation, which was carried on by all its chief agents, was shown as early as the 13th century, and ere long passed all bounds. In the 15th century complaints were openly made by the Germans about the way in which their country was impoverished by the large sums of money which were for ever flowing into Rome. The complaints of some, as for instance Martin Mayr, were made with a vicious intention, and were meant to frighten the members of the Curia and secure a good price as hush-money. But others, upright and devout Catholic chroniclers, brought forward the same accusations§ That there was much exaggeration in them cannot be doubted; and the latest researches show the necessity of caution in accepting the current opinion. One of the most distinguished investigators pertinently declares that a closer knowledge of the Papal system of taxation will prove to be its apology; which shows how much must remain uncertain in the present state of research. But whatever may be the final verdict passed, it is certain that it was the general opinion in Germany that, in the matter of taxation, the Roman Curia put on the pressure to an unbearable degree.

The covetousness of Rome in its worst developments, connected especially with trade, money-changing, and gratuities, was the favourite theme of the most bitter satires. Again and again was the complaint made that chancery dues, annates, medii fructus, and consecration fees were unduly raised or unlawfully extended; that numerous new indulgences were published without the consent of the Bishops of the country, and tithe after tithe raised for a Crusade and diverted to another object. Even men devoted to the Church and the Holy See, such as Eck, Wimpheling, Karl von Bodmann, Archbishop Henneberg of Mayence, and Duke George of Saxony, shared in the dissatisfaction, and often declared that the German grievances raised against Rome were, from a financial point of view, for the most part only too well founded.

Added to the grievance about the tithe for the Crusade, it was a standing source of displeasure that each year the promulgation of indulgences became more and more a mere money transaction, which led to many abuses. Even under Julius II this grievance was attacked by Ulrich von Hutten.

At the court of the Medici Pope no account was taken of the deep-seated dissatisfaction caused by the Roman demands for money. With inconceivable thoughtlessness no attempt was made to leave the old beaten track. Quite regardless of the innumerable complaints which were lodged against it, the little official world lulled itself to sleep in false security. Misgivings expressed by a few individuals passed by unheeded. Nothing was allowed to disturb the prevailing satisfaction in the actual state of ecclesiastical affairs. That the Germans should inveigh against Rome was such a matter of course that no particular attention was paid to their outbursts. The chronic need of money, a consequence of disorganized finances and the Pope's boundless expenditure, led Rome to have recourse to the most perilous methods. The most reckless means of filling the always empty coffers were resorted to without misgiving. Vainly did Aleander in 1516 tell Leo X that he much feared a revolt against the Holy See, on the part of Germany, for that thousands were only awaiting their opportunity to speak out their mind most openly. But no heed was paid to the warning voice, and, in the face of the growing fermentation, the Pope committed the unpardonable error of proclaiming an indulgence for the building of the new basilica of St. Peter's, on an even more extensive scale than that proclaimed under Julius II.

According to custom, Leo X, on entering on his pontificate, had revoked all the indulgences granted by his predecessor. He made, however, one exception, and declared his intention of not revoking that which Julius II. had granted for the furtherance of the erection of the new church of St. Peter’s. As on former occasions, the Franciscan Observantines were charged by Leo X. with its promulgation in their respective provinces. No new field was opened in this proclamation, so that it applied neither to Portugal, France, Burgundy, nor to any German territory except Austria, nor to the Bohemian part of Silesia. But at the end of 1514 all this was changed. On the 29th of October, the St. Peter’s Indulgence was extended for one year to Savoy, Dauphiny, Provence, Burgundy, Lorraine, and to the town and diocese of Liege. On the 2nd of December it was further extended for two years to the ecclesiastical provinces of Cologne, Treves, Salzburg, Bremen, Besancon, and Upsala. The intermediate dioceses were exempt; the exceptions being the possessions of Albert, Archbishop of Mainz and Magdeburg, and Administrator of the diocese of Halberstadt, those of the Margrave of Brandenburg, as well as the dioceses of Cambrai, Tournai, Thérouanne, and Arras. Giovanni Angelo Arcimboldi, a member of a Milanese family and court prelate, was named commissary for indulgences in this new field. At the end of September, 1515, Arcimboldi’s powers were extended to the diocese of Meissen. At Easter, 1516, he named as his coadjutor the Dominican, Johann Tetzel. When, at the end of 15 16, Arcimboldi went north, Tetzel entered the service of the Elector of Mainz, Albert of Brandenburg, to whose dioceses of Mainz, Magdeburg, and Halberstadt an indulgence had been granted, the proclamation of which was to lead to events, the import of which was little suspected.

Albert of Brandenburg, Archbishop of Magdeburg since August 1513, and, since September of the same year, Administrator of the see of Halberstadt, was, for political reasons, elected as Archbishop of Mainzon the death of Uriel von Gemmingen on the 9th of March, 1514. But Albert was resolved to retain the other two sees as well, the result of which would be an accumulation of bishoprics such as had been hitherto unknown in Germany. There were difficulties in Rome about his confirmation in the sees, which were increased by Cardinal Lang, who had hoped to secure Magdeburg and Halberstadt for himself. Large-hearted as he was in such matters, Leo X must have hesitated to confide to the care of a prince only twenty- five years of age a field of jurisdiction so vast as to baffle the powers of a man of great experience, even were he to confine himself to the supervision of what was absolutely necessary.

But all hesitation vanished before the enticing prospect of securing the loyalty of the two powerful Brandenburg Electors by this act of condescension. After long negotiations the object of Albert’s ambition was achieved. In August 1514 he was confirmed in the archiepiscopal see of Mainz, together with that of Magdeburg and the episcopal see of Halberstadt. It is true that for his confirmation in these sees he had to pay a fee of 14,000 ducats, besides the extraordinary tax of 10,000 ducats for holding the two extra bishoprics. The whole sum was advanced by the celebrated banking house of Fugger, which reigned over international finance, under the management of the genial Jakob Fugger. To indemnify him, and above all to enable him to pay his debt to Fugger, Albert was entrusted with the proclamation of the St. Peter's Indulgence in the ecclesiastical provinces of Mainz and Magdeburg, including the diocese of Halberstadt, and throughout the territory of the house of Brandenburg. Half the proceeds were to go towards defraying the expenses of St. Peter's, and the other half to the Archbishop of Mainz. It has been held that Albert made an offer for the grant of the indulgence in his territories, and that the 10,000 ducats were a premium paid in advance by him for the favour; but later researches have disproved this. The 10,000 ducats were rather an extra fee paid by him for the right to hold the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt in addition to that of Mainz. As a matter of fact Brandenburg made no offer for the privilege of proclaiming the indulgence, the proposal coming to him from the Dataria. The Envoy of Albert was at first but little inclined to meddle with the affair, because, said he, “dissatisfaction and perhaps worse might come from it”. But at last there was nothing left to him but to consent. Probably the chief agent of this business was the future Cardinal Armellini.

Though the term of simony has been applied to this case, it is not quite borne out by facts. Still the whole thing, looked at from every point of view, was a disgraceful affair for all concerned. That it, together with other causes, led to the impending catastrophe, appears to us like a judgment from heaven. Even if the proclamation of the above-mentioned indulgence were but, so to speak, the last stone which set the avalanche in motion, it is a fact, proved by what took place, that the revolt against the Papacy proceeded from a grave abuse, patent to all beholders, connected with the obnoxious financial transactions of the Roman Curia. No doubt its demands for money affected the clergy primarily; but what weighed most with the discontent of the laity, was that the enforced payment of a certain sum of money should be added to the usual conditions for gaining an indulgence.

An indulgence is, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, as defined in the 13th century, a remission of the temporal punishment which remains due to sin, after its guilt and eternal punishment have been remitted in the sacrament of penance; which temporal punishment remains, to be suffered either here or in purgatory. Dis­pensers of indulgences are the Pope and Bishops, who draw from the inexhaustible treasury which the Church possesses in the merits of Jesus Christ, the most Blessed Virgin Mary, and the Saints (thesaurus ecclesiae). The indispensable condition for gaining any indulgence, is the state of grace given by means of contrition and confession. Besides this, good works, such as prayer, visits to churches, almsgiving, and pious offerings for holy objects and for the common welfare of the Church, are prescribed.

A distinction must be drawn between plenary indulgences, which cancel all temporal punishment due to sin, and partial indulgences, which cancel only a part of the same. Plenary indulgences, which the Pope alone, as Vicar of Christ, can grant, were granted in the second half of the XIth Century to Crusaders. A special kind of plenary indulgence is the Jubilee Indulgence, which was first granted by Boniface VIII. When such a Jubilee Indulgence was promulgated, it was done in an especially solemn manner. Confessors-extraordinary were appointed, with faculties more extensive than those exercised in the ordinary ministrations of a parish priest to his flock, and which gave them the power of absolution in reserved cases.

As regarded the application of indulgences to the dead, theologians were of divided opinion until the middle of the 15th century. Some rejected it or left the matter open, while others said it was lawful. The latter view gained general acceptance under the influence of the decisions of Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII; and by the beginning of the 1 6th century the application of indulgences to the souls in purgatory was no longer disputed by any Catholic writer. As an indulgence for the dead is fundamentally nothing else than a solemn form of prayer for the dead, according to the general opinion it could be gained even in a state of mortal sin; whereas, if anyone wished to gain an indulgence for himself, contrition and confession were necessary conditions, added to some good work prescribed, such as a visit to a church or a pious offering in money.

The Papal Bulls all put forward the doctrine of Indulgences with dogmatic accuracy; and most theologians of the declining Middle Ages, though they may differ on individual points, agree in essentials; and all unite in explaining indulgences, not as being a remission of guilt, but as a remission of temporal punishment. All equally start from the presumption that, in order to gain an indulgence, the sin must have been already forgiven through contrition and confession. In the sermons and catechetical writings of the 15th century, the doctrine of indulgences is treated clearly and theologically. The sermons preached by the celebrated Geiler von Kaisersberg in 1501 and 1502 are quite a standard explanation of Christian doctrine. The ordinary pastors of souls preached, only with varying skill, the doctrines of the Church as formulated by Popes and theologians. Sermons of the 15th century which have been preserved, prove how plainly and thoroughly this was done, and in such a way that persons of the more ignorant classes must have understood the matter.)

Such preaching of indulgences in accordance with the spirit of the Church could have only a beneficial effect, and constituted a means of extraordinary work for souls which may be compared with that of popular missions at the present day. A number of elements combined on such occasions to produce a powerful influence on the spiritual life of the people; and zealous reformers in the Church, such as Geiler von Kaisersberg, attached the utmost importance to the preaching of an indulgence. The season of grace was ushered in with special and impressive solemnities, such as processions, prayers, canticles, the erection of crosses, or pictures of the Mother of God with her Divine Son lying dead on her knee. Well-known preachers were invited from a distance to instruct the people in frequent discourses, not only about the indulgence itself, but about all the truths of faith and the duties of the Christian life, with exhortations to repentance and amendment of life.

For those thus stirred up to better things there were always at hand their own confessors, to whom to have recourse, these being, for the occasion, provided with special faculties for absolution in reserved cases and for dispensation from vows, being moreover well fitted to deal with all the ordinary cases of conscience submitted to them. Not only were the faithful exhorted to frequent the sacraments, but they were incited to prayer, almsgiving, fasting, devotion to the Saints, and all other holy practices. Whoever profited conscientiously by this time of grace granted by the Church, was sure to make progress in the spiritual life. After what had perhaps been a long life of sin, he was reconciled to his Lord and God, and enabled to set forth, full of good resolutions, to lead henceforward a good Christian life. Such a season of grace was also a powerful means of alleviating the sorrows of life. The unfortunate of every kind found strength and consolation under suffering, and returned to the difficult duties of their life comforted and reinvigorated. In this way indulgences represented a true renewal of spiritual life. Many witnesses testify that, towards the close of the Middle Ages, this end proposed was often attained.

It is true that even then complaints were made by unsuspected and credible persons of many abuses connected with indulgences. Nearly all arose from this, that the faithful, after frequenting the sacrament of penance, as the recognized condition for gaining the indulgence, found themselves called on to make an offering of money in proportion with their means. This offering for good works, which should have been only accessory, was in certain cases made into the chief condition. Thus an indulgence was lowered from its ideal purpose and degraded into a merely financial transaction. The need of money instead of the good of souls became only too often the end of the indulgence.

Like nearly all the abuses which disfigured the Church at the close of the Middle Ages, this about indulgences dates to a great extent from the Schism of the West. In order to hold his own against the French anti-popes, Boniface IX, who was not scrupulous in his methods of supplying the apostolic coffers, granted an unusual number of indulgences, with the avowed object of procuring money. This he did first by proclaiming in 1390 a Roman Jubilee over a large area, including Italy and Germany. To this in itself no exception could be taken; but the gaining of the indulgence was connected with conditions which could not fail to lead to abuses. To the ordinary conditions this was added, that whoever wished to gain a plenary indulgence must offer the same amount of money which he would have spent on a journey to Rome and in the churches there. All details were to be arranged with the collector: even should he ask but a small tribute from some, and a merely nominal offering from the very poor, still the fact remained that such bargaining between collector and pilgrim gave so marked a stamp of business to the Jubilee, that there could not fail to be unauthorized imposition on the side of the collector, and fraudulent excuses on the side of the pilgrim. Of all monies received half had to be sent to Rome. The evil consequences of all this were soon made evident. Neither religious nor secular clergy shrank from the direct sale of spiritual gifts, and gave absolution for money to those who did not even profess to have contrition. Boniface IX was told of these abuses, but instead of ordering stringent measures to be taken, he only expressed his displeasure with many of the clergy who possessed indulgence-faculties because they would render no account of the proceeds. The impression that the question of money was the chief consideration with the Roman Curia, was increased by the intelligence that the official agents of the Jubilee Indulgence in Cologne in 1394, an abbot and a banker, were living together. This was the first instance of the kind. Another custom arose of appointing sub-delegates for the proclamation of the indulgence, which no doubt weakened the sense of responsibility in the real dispensers. Much mischief was done by the expenses attendant on publishing the Bulls of indulgences. In addition to the great cost of preparing them, large fees had to be given to the officials of the Curia. There are undoubted proofs that this went on during the pontificate of Boniface IX.

Boniface’s successors went even further than he did. All the Popes of the latter days of the Middle Ages, driven by Crusade difficulties and other embarrassments, or else moved by the constant requests for assistance from clergy and laity, granted indulgences to quite an extraordinary extent, both as to number and area. Though in the wording of the Bulls, the doctrine of the Church was never departed from, and confession, contrition, and definitely prescribed good works were made the condition for gaining the indulgence, still the financial side of the matter was always apparent, and the necessity of making offerings of money was placed most scandalously in the foreground. Indulgences took more and more the form of a monetary arrangement, which led to many conflicts with the secular powers, who were always demanding a share of the proceeds. “That he who granted the grace should receive a share gave no offence, but it was the amount which was the occasion of scandal. The faithful felt themselves wronged by the Curia; and so also did the members of the latter feel themselves aggrieved by the Emperor and territorial Princes, who either forbade the proclamation of the indulgence in their lands, or else seized the profits”.

With the multiplication and extension of indulgences, and their conversion into money transactions, it was obvious, considering the covetousness of the age, that the gravest abuses should prevail at their promulgation. Painful occurrences were frequent at the collection and division of the indulgence offerings. No wonder that loud and violent complaints were heard on every side. We can understand what the abuses must have been if even a good man like Eck, who was devoted to the Holy See, could complain openly that “one indulgence drove out another!”. Eck reported that “permissory letters” were given as the actual reward of crime. Jerome Emser severely censures the guilt of “the covetous commissaries, monks, and priests, who preach the indulgence in a shameless manner, and lay more stress on money than on confession, contrition, and penance”. Murner also speaks of the abuses connected with indulgences. These, however, were by no means confined to Germany. At the Council of Trent, Cardinal Pacheco complained of the doings of the preachers who proclaimed the cruciata indulgence in Spain. The severe Cardinal Ximenes, notwithstanding his devotion to the Holy See, expressed his disapprobation of the indulgence proclaimed by Leo X for building St. Peter’s. In the Netherlands such scandal was given among the more strict Catholics by the behaviour of the indulgence comissaries, and by the frivolity with which they granted dispensations, that at Louvain open protestations were made in 1516 against the proclamation. At the Lateran Council some of the Bishops complained of the abuses attending the proclamation of the indulgence by the Minorites. A compromise was agreed to; but this effected no good, for Egidio Canisio remonstrated with Adrian VI for entrusting the indulgence to the Franciscans, which militated against the jurisdiction of the Bishops. No proofs are needed of how much the authority of the Church suffered from all this, what scandal was given, or what occasion offered to her enemies to blaspheme. Cardinal Canisio was of opinion that the facilities for absolution encouraged sinners, and were an inducement to sin.

In Italy also, voices were raised in protest against the undue multiplicity of indulgences.  Satirists like Ariosto jeered at their cheapness, while seriously-minded men like Sadolet emphatically opposed them. But Leo, always in need of money, paid no attention. He was surrounded by unscrupulous advisers, such as Cardinal Pucci, who knew how to appease his conscience by—to put it mildly—their rare gifts of casuistry. §It is therefore not surprising that the Medici Pope committed himself to the proclamation of this indulgence, which he entrusted to the new Elector, Albert of Brandenburg.

The petition of Albert of Brandenburg to be entrusted with the proclamation of the Mayence and Magdeburg Indulgence was dated the 1st of August 1514, and received the placet of the Pope on the very same day. But the proclamation itself was delayed for a short time. The Bull was not prepared until the 31st of March, 1515. By it the Archbishop of Mayence and the Franciscan Guardian of that city were nominated the indulgence commissaries in the provinces named in Albert's petition, for eight years from the publication of the Bull. The commissaries were given the right to suspend all other indulgences in their official circuit. They were also entrusted with the Motu Proprio of Leo X of the 15th of April to the Cardinal­Bishop of Ostia, as Camerlengo, and his official subordinates, which confirmed the Jubilee Indulgence applied for by Albert in his petition. The Bull passed immediately into the hands of the Emperor Maximilian, who made use of the favourable opportunity to secure some of the proceeds for himself. To enable the Emperor to reap the benefit of three out of the eight years' indulgence granted by the Pope, the Chancellor of Mainz, Johann von Dalheim, arranged to pay in each of these three years 1000 Rhenish florins into the imperial exchequer, which money was to be applied to the erection of the Church of St. James, adjoining the imperial residence at Innsbruck.

As it was not explicitly stated in the Bull that half of the proceeds were to go to the Archbishop of Mainz, the latter, to avoid future molestation, decided to delay the promulgation of the indulgence until he had received an unambiguous assurance from Rome to that effect. The arrangements connected with this caused fresh delay. As the Papal Brief, giving the assurance asked for, and sent off on the 14th of February, arrived at Mainz only a few days before the Jubilee Sunday, it was, as the provost Dietrich Zobel wrote to Albert, too late for that year. Thus it was that the preaching of the indulgence was introduced in Mainz only at the beginning of the fateful year 1517. In consequence of the confusion which ensued, it was carried on during only two years out of the eight. According to Fugger’s estimate, only lately discovered, the proceeds were distinctly less than they had been on any previous occasion.  It appears that after paying the duty to the Emperor, Albert received as his share scarcely half of the “composition”, to say nothing of the confirmation fees. “The Mayence and Magdeburg Indulgence was a bad speculation for Albert, from a purely mercantile point of view”. It is a manifest fable that Tetzel received for the Elector of Mainz in one year the sum of 100,000 golden florins.

After January 1517, Tetzel is known to us as the Archbishop of Mainz’s general subcommissary. On the 24th of January he was at Eisleben, which then be longed to the diocese of Halberstadt, throughout which, as well as the archdiocese of Magdeburg, he subsequently travelled. Early in the year he arrived at Jutterbog, whither there came many people from the neighbouring town of Wittenberg to gain the indulgence, because it was not allowed to be proclaimed in Saxony. On this occasion the professor of Wittenberg, Martin Luther, who was already secretly estranged from the Church, busied himself with the matter of the indulgence.

No doubt Tetzel was an eloquent and popular preacher, but owing to what followed his words on this occasion, his powers have been overrated by friend and foe alike. In the interests of historical truth we must no more agree with all that Tetzel said and did, than we must accept the conventional picture drawn by his adversaries. The accusations of gross immorality brought against him by contemporary opponents are mere inventions, as also is the assertion of modern writers that he preached scandalously and criminally about the Mother of God. These charges can be proved to be calumnies by Tetzel's own evidence, supported by official witnesses. The purport of Tetzel’s indulgence sermons has been distorted in the most absurd manner. The mistakes made have come chiefly from the fact that sufficient care has not been taken to keep distinct the questions of different kinds which arose. Above all, a most clear distinction must be made between indulgences for the living and those for the dead. As regards indulgences for the living, Tetzel always taught pure doctrine. The assertion that he put forward indulgences as being not only a remission of the temporal punishment of sin, but as a remission of its guilt, is as unfounded as is that other accusation against him, that he sold the forgiveness of sin for money, without even any mention of contrition and confession, or that, for payment, he absolved from sins which might be committed in the future. His teaching was, in fact, very definite, and quite in harmony with the theology of the Church, as it was then and as it is now, i.e., that indulgences “apply only to the temporal punishment due to sins which have been already repented of and confessed”.

The so-called indulgence and confession letters (confessionalia) could, it is true, be obtained for payment alone, without contrition or any other condition. The mere gaining of such a letter granted neither the forgiveness of sin nor the gaining of any indulgence. All that its possessor acquired was the right, once in his life and at the hour of death, to receive at the hands of a confessor freely chosen by himself, and after a good confession, absolution from most of the cases reserved to the Pope. A plenary indulgence was attached to this. Thus, in this case also, contrition and confession were the recognized conditions for gaining the indulgence.

The case was very different with indulgences for the dead. As regards these there is no doubt that Tetzel did, according to what he considered his authoritative instructions, proclaim as Christian doctrine that nothing but an offering of money was required to gain the indulgence for the dead, without there being any question of contrition or confession. He also taught, in accordance with the opinion then held, that an indulgence could be applied to any given soul with unfailing effect. Starting from this assumption, there is no doubt that his doctrine was virtually that of the drastic proverb: “As soon as money in the coffer rings, the soul from purgatory's fire springs”. The Papal Bull of indulgence gave no sanction whatever to this proposition. It was a vague scholastic opinion, rejected by the Sorbonne in 1482, and again in 1518, and certainly not a doctrine of the Church, which was thus improperly put forward as dogmatic truth. The first among the theologians of the Roman court, Cardinal Cajetan, was the enemy of all such extravagances, and declared emphatically that, even if theologians and preachers taught such opinions, no faith need be given them. “Preachers”, said he, “speak in the name of the Church only so long as they proclaim the doctrine of Christ and His Church; but if, for purposes of their own, they teach that about which they know nothing, and which is only their own imagination, they must not be accepted as mouthpieces of the Church. No one must be surprised if such as these fall into error”.

Unfortunately many of the preachers of the indulgence in Germany and elsewhere were not as prudent as Cardinal Cajetan. Without hesitation they proclaimed scholastic opinions as if they were defined truth, and always obtruded the question of money in a manner which did much harm. Tetzel cannot be exonerated from blame in this respect, even if he did not go as far as Arcimboldi. Tetzel was no doubt prone to exaggerations, and was wanting in modesty and simplicity. His manner was arrogant and pretentious, and he carried out the duties of his office in such a business-like way that scandals could not fail to arise. Even men who were in other respects quite on his side, complain of this. His contemporary and brother in religion, Johann Lindner, reproaches him severely for making gain his first object. “Tetzel”, he writes, “devised unheard-of means of making money. He was far too liberal in conferring offices; he put up far too many public crosses in towns and villages, which caused scandal and bred complaints among the people”. Thus spiritual treasures were carped at, on account of the abuses which accompanied them.

A professor of Wittenberg University, whose name had, hitherto, been known but to few, became the interpreter of the widespread indignation caused by the abuses connected with the proclamation of the indulgence. On the 31st of October, on the occasion of Tetzel’s preaching, Martin Luther affixed to the door of the castle church of Wittenberg ninety-five theses, challenging a dispute on the subject of indulgences. According to the academic customs of the day, there was nothing unusual in this proceeding: but a burning question was involved. Added to this was the blunt polemical style of Luther’s theses, which were full of contradictions far beyond their ostensible object. They roused great attention in every quarter. Even though Tetzel’s sermons were the occasion of Luther’s attack, it was directed less against him personally than against the whole system of indulgences. The primary object of the Wittenberg professor’s attack was the teaching body of the Church, especially the Pope and the Archbishop of Mainz, whom Luther regarded as chiefly responsible for the abuses. In his secret heart it was not the abuses of the actual system of indulgences which were at the bottom of Luther’s action. The theses of October the 31^st were nothing but the first incidental expression of his deeply--lying antagonism to the Catholic doctrine of good works. The doctrines of justification by faith alone, and the absence of free-will in man, already completely formulated in his heart, could have nothing in common with such a thing.

Luther had no intention at that time of separating himself from the Church. Neither can it be said that he took up the dispute about indulgences as a pretext to introduce his new doctrines. On the contrary, it may be assumed that he had no object beyond attacking the real and supposed abuses attached to the preaching of the indulgence. Nevertheless, the theses of the Wittenberg professor, taken as a whole, had a significance far wider than this. They could not fail to stir up the people against the authority of the Church, nor to bring indulgences into contempt, and lead the masses into error. What they put forward was a mixture of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, under which contempt and hatred of the Holy See, and much else that was reprehensible from a Catholic point of view, was scarcely concealed. The thirty-sixth thesis was directed against indulgences as interpreted by the Catholic Church, and the fifty-eighth directly denied the doctrine of the treasury of the Church.

On the same day that he had affixed them to the church, Luther sent his theses to Archbishop Albert of Brandenburg, with a letter, in which he partly summarized them, and complained of the false representations made to the people and the false promises of the preachers. In the beginning of the letter he says that he by no means wishes to accuse the preachers—whom he had not heard—of uttering such pernicious doctrine from the pulpit; but later, turning on them, he reproaches these same preachers because they, “by lying fables and empty promises, breed a false sense of security in the people”. In conclusion, he demands of the Archbishop to countermand the instructions, which were at any rate given without his knowledge or consent, and to replace them by a teaching of a better kind. He adds the threat that in case Albert should refuse, there might arise one who would write against the system, to the great injury of the Archbishop.

Albert of Brandenburg laid the case before his counsellors at Aschaffenburg and the professors of the University of Mainz. The first were unanimous in their desire that a process against Luther should be instituted. The Archbishop sent on this opinion, together with Luther's theses, to the Pope, “with the good hope”, as he wrote to his counsellors at Halle, “that His Holiness would grasp the situation so as to meet the error at once, as occasion offers and as the exigency requires, and not lay the responsibility on us”. He urged these counsellors to consider the document with due deliberation and diligence. If they were of opinion that it would be advisable to make the process more stringent, they were to intimate the same to Luther through Tetzel, in order that such poisonous error may no longer be spread among the people. But it may be safely assumed that the counsellors of Halle did not think that the legal proceedings recommended at Aschaffenburg were expedient, or that any intimation as to their increased severity was communicated to Luther through Tetzel.

The opinion of the University of Mainz, which was sent in only on the 17th of December 1517, after repeated reminders on the part of the Archbishop, touched on only one point in Luther's theses, namely, the limitation of the Pope's authority in the matter of indulgences. It censured this as being opposed to the traditional doctrine, to adhere to which “was safer and more advisable”. The Mainz professors refused to pass a formal judgment on the propositions, but rather recommended an appeal to the decision of the Pope.

By the propagation of Luther’s theses, Tetzel felt himself called on to bring his learning to bear on the adversary. He did this by a long list of theses, which he defended before the University of Frankfort on the Oder, on the 20th of January, 1518. The author of these propositions was not Tetzel himself, but the Frankfort professor, Conrad Wimpina. His anti-theses went too far on certain points, where they put forward scholastic opinions as if they were truths of faith. Generally, however, the defence gave a solid exposition of the accepted doctrine of indulgences, and proved the errors of Luther. Special stress was laid on this, that “indulgences do not remit sin, but only the temporal punishment due to it, and this only on the condition that the sin is heartily repented of and confessed; that they do not take from the merits of Christ, but place His satisfactory sufferings in the place of the satisfactory punishment”.

A travelling dealer came to Wittenberg in the middle of March with a number of copies of the Frankfort anti-theses to sell. He was at once set upon by the students who had attached themselves to Luther, and the books torn from him and burnt in the public marketplace. Later, this action was blamed by Luther himself. But shortly after as soon indeed as he had heard of the publishing of Tetzel’s theses, Luther brought out his “Sermon on Indulgences and Grace”, in which he went further than he had ever gone before. In it he severely condemns the scholastic division of penance into confession, contrition, and satisfaction, as not being founded on Scripture. At the end of the sermon he makes this declaration: “If I am called a heretic by those whose purses will suffer from my truths, I care not much for their bawling: for only those say this whose dark understanding has never known the Bible”.

In answer to this sermon, which was circulated in all parts, Tetzel published his Vorlegung, directed “against an audacious sermon containing twenty articles full of errors concerning Papal Indulgences and Graces”. In this work he went exhaustively into the doctrine of indulgences. It is to the credit of Tetzel’s acumen and theological training that he so fully grasped the scope of Luther’s new doctrine, and perceived how closely it attacked the first principles of the Christian faith and the authority of the Church. Other good Christian scholars judged Luther's doctrines far too superficially, and saw nothing in the whole dispute beyond a scholastic quarrel about non-essential points. Luther’s articles, Tetzel complained in his work, will cause “great scandal”. For by them “many will be led to despise the supremacy and authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman See. Works of sacramental satisfaction will be left undone. Preachers and teachers will no longer be believed. Each person will interpret Holy Scripture just as he pleases. Wherefore, the practice of a holy and simple Christianity by the greater number of the faithful must be endangered; for each one will learn to believe just what he chooses”.

At the conclusion of the Vorlegung, which appeared in April, Tetzel announced that he would shortly publish further points of doctrine, about which he intended to hold a disputation in the Frankfort schools. This was issued at the end of April or the beginning of May 1518, in the form of fifty theses, composed by Tetzel himself. In these he touched only incidentally on the doctrine of indulgences, having already treated it sufficiently. This time he entered more deeply into the subject of the authority of the Church, which Luther had questioned. As the professor of Wittenberg had appealed to the Bible in his attack on indulgences, Tetzel argued that there were many Catholic truths which had to be firmly believed by faithful Christians, besides those mentioned explicitly in Holy Scripture. Among these must be counted belief in the dogmatic decisions of the Pope in matters of faith, as well as that of tradition approved by the Church. He here struck the key-note of the whole dispute. Indulgences, as something incidental to the main point at issue, soon disappeared from these polemical discussions; but, on the other hand, the question of the authority of the Church always remained in the foreground.

Luther's counterattack on the Vorlegung  was in pamphlet form, and bore the title, Eyn Freyheyt des Sermons Bebstlichen Ablas und gnad belangend wider die vorlegung, so tzur schmach seyn und desselben Sermon ertichtet (Wittenberg, 1 5 18). In this work he only mentions Tetzel’s fifty theses incidentally at the end, where he dismisses them with an ironical remark. After publishing his fifty theses, Tetzel wrote no more. In consequence of Luther's attitude, it was impossible to carry on the preaching of the indulgence. He therefore returned at the end of 15 18 to the Dominican convent at Leipzig.

Meanwhile, Luther’s theses, translated into German and scattered broadcast about the country, were producing a great effect. As truth and falsehood were mixed in them to an extraordinary degree, both the friends and foes of ecclesiastical authority found something in them to suit them. As for the masses of the people, the cause of their approbation was to be found in the declaration that the support of the poor by almsgiving was more meritorious than the gaining of indulgences. But the popularity of the movement came chiefly from its onslaught on the hated requisitions for money and the general abuses connected with them. Very soon all those who were discontented with the Curia—for mercantile, political, national, and other reason —flocked after Luther, and thus he took his place at the head of a national religious revolt, which was to be carried on by him until a large portion of the German people separated themselves from the centre of the unity of the Church.

Very few foresaw this at first: on the contrary, numbers believed both then and long after that the Wittenberg professor was the champion of the reform of abuses in the Church, which had been looked for so eagerly by the faithful. Most people felt, no doubt, that Luther would carry on the desired reformation inside the Church and in obedience to her laws. They quite overlooked the fact that the sweeping away of abuses was only part of the reformer's programme. They either did not know, or would not admit, that he was already in vital antagonism to the Church by reason of the grave heretical doctrines which he held.

Among the few German theologians who from the very beginning feared great dangers for the Church from Luther’s movement, was Johann Eck, a professor of Ingoldstadt. In his rejoinders (obelisci) to Luther’s theses, at first disseminated only in manuscript form, he pointed out the kinship in many of the opinions expressed in them to the doctrines of Wyclif and Hus, which had been already condemned by the Church.

CHAPTER VIII.

Luther is summoned to Rome. His Transactions with Cardinal Cajetan and with Miltitz.  The Bull “Exsurge” and its Reception in Germany. Aleander’s Mission to the Diet of Worms, and the Imperial Edict against Luther.

I.

When, in the beginning of 1518, Leo X, through a notice sent to him by the Archbishop of Mainz became cognizant of the extent of Luther’s new doctrines, he at once took measures to check them. On the 3rd of February he directed Gabriele della Volta, Vicar-General of the Augustinians, to remonstrate with Luther, either by letter, or through learned and upright envoys, and urge him to refrain from disseminating his new doctrines. If this were done at once, said the Pope, there was hope of extinguishing a fire so lately kindled; but should there be further delay, it might be found impossible to quench the conflagration.

This attempt to check the innovator and bring him back to the Church by the discipline of his own Order, was frustrated by Luther’s determined resistance. For the purpose of justifying himself, he wrote with great care his Resolutionen von der Kraft des Ablasses, which was forwarded to Rome by his religious superior, Staupitz. But in the apparently humble letter to Leo X which accompanied it, he refused to make any retractation.

Luther had good reason to fear lest the Apostolic See might take more energetic measures against him. In order to be beforehand with Rome, he preached, in the middle of May, a sermon on the power of excommunication. In this, skilfully starting from the abuse of censures as carried on especially by subordinate ecclesiastics, and rightly condemned, he proceeded to lay down a new doctrine in startling contrast with that of the Church, namely, that the real communion of the Church was invisible, and that therefore no one could be cut off from it by excommunication, and that nothing but sin could affect it. “All men wonder”, wrote Luther to a friend, “that they have never heard of such a thing before. Meanwhile, whatever evil may befall me in the future, we may all hope that a new fire has been kindled. In this way the word of truth will become a sign of contradiction”.

One month later the canonical process against Luther was instituted in Rome. The watchful Dominicans, the faithful brethren of Tetzel, had drawn the attention of the Curia, as early as March, 1518, to the danger of Luther’s proceedings; but no measures were taken until the middle of June, or, in other words, until the reception of Luther’s letter refusing all recantation. Now for the first time the Papal fiscal-procurator, Mario di Perusco, brought a charge against the professor of Wittenberg of propagating false doctrines. Leo X entrusted the preliminary inquiry to Girolamo Ghinucci, Bishop of Ascoli, the Auditor-General of legal causes to the Apostolic Camera. The learned Master of the Sacred Palaces, Silvestro Mazzolini, better known as Prierias, from his native city, was appointed theological examiner of the case. He was a Dominican, and an ardent disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas. The anti-thomist tone of Luther’s theses stirred up within him the strongest feeling of antagonism. Immediately after they had been posted up at Wittenberg, he—as his office of Master of the Sacred Palaces constituted him supreme guardian of theological literature—had gone deeply into the subject of them. Consequently, he was able at the shortest notice to put on paper his opinion of them, which was at once printed and sent with a dedication to Leo X. The title of Dialogus, which was given to this work, written in bad Latin, is explained by its form. Luther’s theses are placed in order, and to each the answer of Prierias is subjoined. To form a right estimate of the work of Prierias, we must bear in mind what he himself says in his dedication to the Pope and in his letter to Luther, namely, that in this, his first passage of arms with the Wittenberg professor, he had no intention of refuting the theses exhaustively. So long as Luther did not too prominently obtrude his fundamenta, but contented himself with putting forward his theses without trying to prove them, Prierias was content to meet him with counter-theses, which, according to his own convictions, met the case. Should Luther, however, go back on what he had said, try to prove and add to them, then Prierias held himself ready to enter the lists with an extended scheme. In order not to fall into the fault which he blamed in his adversary, and put the theses of the latter to the test, he summed up under four principal heads his essential propositions (fundamenta). These related to the Church, the supreme spiritual authority of the Pope as her Head, the infallibility of the Church, of General Councils, and of the Pope in decisions in matters of faith and morals, as also the heretical character of rebellion against the doctrines of the Church, whether expressly defined or actually existing. The infallibility of the Church was then asserted as regarded her doctrine of indulgences in all its branches; and on this ground he condemned Luther’s attack on it. It is, however, a fact that, in spite of the excellence of most of his arguments against Luther’s assertions, his overbearing manner led him into exaggerations in his defence. It is much to be regretted that he should have allowed himself to make rude personal attacks, even if Luther’s defenders had no right to find fault with their opponent on that score. Nevertheless, to suppose that a more gentle and considerate way of meeting the attack would have had any better results than his high-handed methods, would be to misapprehend Luther's character and to ignore the breach with the Church to which he had already committed himself in his own mind.

At the beginning of July, 1518, Ghinucci and Prierias sent Luther an official summons to appear in person in Rome within sixty days, to give an account of his heretical doctrines and his contempt of the authority of the Pope. If he did not put in an appearance, he would be subjected to severe ecclesiastical penalties. This summons, together with Prierias’s pamphlet, was sent to Cardinal Cajetan at Augsburg, and were both placed in the hands of the Wittenberg professor at the beginning of August, when he set to work at once to compose a rejoinder. This reply to the “Dialogus” of Prierias, which Luther, in order to be beforehand with his adversaries, wrote in two days, was finished and printed by the end of August, and is full of expressions of contempt for his opponents, as Italians and as Thomists. What Prierias says on the question, he writes, signifies absolutely nothing to him, and he rejects the teaching of St Thomas with equal contempt. He acknowledges the canonical books of Scripture alone as infallible and maintains that both Councils and Pope are subject to error. Nevertheless he holds firmly that the Roman Church has always maintained the true faith, and that it is necessary for all Christians to be in unity of faith with her. At the same time he repudiates any authority (unless a decision of the Church or a Council intervene) which forbids him to advocate his own views about indulgences. But even while facing the possibility of such a decision, he does not speak as though he would be willing to submit his own private opinions to it; for almost in the same breath he denies the infallibility equally of Council and Pope. Evidently he expects that the Church assembled in Council would agree with him.

As soon as Luther had received his summons to appear in Rome, he wrote to his friend Spalatin, the Elector Frederick’s court chaplain, and intimated to him that it was the duty of his suzerain to defend the honour of the University of Wittenberg which was being attacked in his person, “by his murderers, with vice and cunning”. As regarded the “execrable summons through viperous and horrible instruments”, the Elector of Saxony—who was then at the Diet of Augsburg—might obtain of the Pope through the Emperor, that his affair should be tried by “an impartial commission” in Germany. In the same sense Luther wrote directly to the Emperor to have a care for the honour of his University. Maximilian, however, was not inclined to mix himself up in the matter. Under the influence of Cardinals Cajetan and Lang, and in the hopes of winning the Pope over to favour the election as King of Rome of his grandson Charles, the Emperor had written a most significant letter to Leo X from Augsburg on the 5th of August, 1518. In this he had declared that, unless Luther’s new doctrines were met seriously, the unity of the Church would be in danger, and private judgment would be set up in opposition to the revealed truths of religion. He himself was prepared to ensure that any measures the Pope saw fit to take, to put a stop to these audacious and insidious disputations, should be duly carried out throughout the Empire, for the honour of God and the salvation of souls.

This promise of the Emperor, which conveyed so much moved the Curia not to wait for the expiration of the term of sixty days set for Luther’s appearance at Rome, but to pursue a course of greater energy. This is shown by the issue of the important Brief which was sent on the 23rd of August, 1518, to the learned Dominican, Cardinal Cajetan, who had been appointed Legate to the Diet of Augsburg on behalf of the affair of a Turkish war. The news of further incriminating circumstances had reached Rome, said the Brief, and Luther had published fresh heresies. Cajetan was directed to call Luther—who had already been declared to be a heretic by Ghinucci—before him in person, “as the case was notorious and by help of the Emperor and all spiritual and temporal princes, compel him to appear. Should Luther appear voluntarily and retract his errors with signs of repentance, then he should be forgiven. But should he not appear voluntarily, but wait to be compelled, and even so did not retract, then the Cardinal must arrest him and deliver him over to Rome, there to appear before the Pope. If Luther despised the secular arm, and refused to put himself in the power of the Legate, or, in other words, made it impossible for the secular authorities to hand him over and compel him to appear before the Legate, Cajetan was, in the first place, empowered to declare him and his followers heretics by public edict, and, secondly, to demand the assistance of all spiritual and temporal princes, the Emperor alone excepted, under threat of excommunication, to seize and deliver Luther over. If any of these princes should afford him shelter or help, advise or favour him, the very ground trodden by Luther was placed under interdict These commands, especially that relating to extradition (mandata requisitionis), issued by Cajetan, were to be carried out by all authorities promptly and on the spot. To those who obeyed there was held out the prospect of a reward, to be given at the Legate’s discretion.”

The more severe course against Luther, indicated in the Brief, was based on the notoriety and aggravation of his case. Rome, with a full appreciation of the gravity of the situation, had determined to take all means within reach to meet this dangerous movement. As the support of Maximilian could be relied on, there was every hope that, if the aged Emperor survived, this object might soon be attained.

At the same time (August 23, 1518) as this Brief, the Pope wrote to the Elector of Saxony requesting him to co-operate in handing Luther over to the Legate, as he was spreading the most pernicious doctrines. The issue of this Brief led to intimate personal dealings between the Cardinal-Legate and the Elector. Frederick refused positively to deliver Luther over to Rome. He wished that the case should be tried in Germany before impartial judges. Cajetan could not agree to this; though he declared himself ready, if only Luther would appear before him at Leipzig, to treat him with paternal gentleness. The Elector regarded this conciliatory proposal as an important concession; but, as will be seen later, he put an entirely different construction on the expression “paternal gentleness” from that intended by the Cardinal.

If Cajetan did really, in the further course of the proceedings, promise to accede to the Elector's demands, and to pardon Luther without compelling him to retract, he was most certainly acting contrary to his instructions. No doubt he did provide “for the event that Luther might refuse to recant, and it might be necessary to allow him to return to Saxony, by extracting a promise from the Elector, that he would not expose himself to the censures of the Church by favouring Luther in a way forbidden in the Brief. He implored of Frederick not to disgrace the good name of his ancestors for the sake of a miserable monk. Frederick repeatedly made the promise thus asked of him, and Cajetan believed that he had thus secured the extradition of Luther”. But his calculations were at fault, for the Elector took a different view of what constituted the good name of his family from that taken by Cajetan. From the very beginning he had been determined to take active measures against Luther only in the event of his doctrines being proved false to his own satisfaction. That the Cardinal went so far to meet the “lukewarm policy” of Frederick, is most easily explained by his confidence in the theological superiority of his position, which made him hope to arrive by scientific methods at conclusions before which his adversary would be compelled to yield. A man entirely devoted to study, without much practical knowledge of the world, the Cardinal was no match for such an expert politician as the Elector of Saxony.

In consideration of the excited state of feeling in Germany, and the importance of Frederick in the matter of the election of the King of Rome, Leo X assented to the arrangements, taken as a whole, which he and Cajetan had come to, and left to his Legate to bear alone the risk of overstepping his instructions. A Brief of the 11th of September gave Cajetan the dangerous power of examining and deciding on Luther’s case at Augsburg.

Luther, encouraged by his own suzerain and provided by him with recommendations, decided to obey the summons to Augsburg, where he arrived on the 7th of October. Thrice, on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of October, he, having prudently provided himself with an imperial safe-conduct, appeared before the Cardinal-Legate, who had, in view of the coming disputations, studied the subject of them deeply.

From the first Cajetan received Luther—as is admitted by the latter in his letters— in a gentle and friendly manner, explaining that he had not summoned him to appear before him as his judge. It is true that, as the discussion went on, Cajetan could not control his indignation at Luther’s obstinacy. In the name of the Pope he demanded of the Wittenberg professor to think better of his ways and retract his errors, and to promise, furthermore, never to return to them, and refrain henceforward from meddling with doctrines which were opposed to the authority of the Roman Church. He asked him especially to retract the fifty-eighth thesis, which denied that the merits of Christ and of the Saints formed the treasury of the Church, as also that sentence in his “Resolutions” which made a salutary reception of the sacraments conditional on the faith of the recipient. Luther wished there on to enter into a lengthy and learned disputation with the Cardinal; but, in accordance with his instructions Cajetan would not be drawn into this, and broke off the first conference with a fatherly warning to Luther to renounce his errors.

At the second interview, on the following day, Luther was accompanied by Staupitz, who had in the interval arrived at Augsburg. He also brought with him a notary and several witnesses. The notary read out a declaration on behalf of Luther, that as far as he could remember he had never taught anything against Holy Scripture, the doctrines of the Church, the Papal Decretals, or sound reason. But as he was a man subject to error, he submitted himself to the decisions of the Holy Church and to all who knew better than he did. He wished to speak openly in answer to all charges and, finally, to submit to the decisions of the Universities of Basle, Freiburg, Louvain, and Paris. The Legate did not agree to the last request, by which Luther “wished to wrest the affair from the Pope’s hands, and again give it the aspect of a scholastic quarrel, thus to gain time”. However, urged by Staupitz, he ended by granting the request that Luther might hand in a written vindication. In this, which he handed in on the third day, October the 14th, Luther criticized Clement the Sixth’s Extravagant, Unigenitus, which Cajetan had proposed to him as a definition of the Catholic doctrine of the treasury of the Church. He maintained that a construction could be placed on it which would leave nothing to condemn in him. In the second place, Luther defended the doctrine of the necessity of faith for justification and for the reception of Communion. Being convinced of the infallible truth of his own opinions, he demanded that a better knowledge of Holy Scripture should be brought to bear against what he considered irrefragable arguments; and without this he refused to retract. But again Cajetan declined to allow himself to be drawn into an argument, and at parting bade him not return until he was in a better mind.

The Cardinal then tried to work on Luther through Staupitz, and induce him to yield. By the persuasion of Staupitz and Wenzel Link, Luther then wrote a letter to Cajetan on the 17th of October, in which, with an outward show of profound respect, he extolled the Cardinal’s gentleness and friendliness, and admitted that he had spoken too violently and disrespectfully against the Pope, for which he asked pardon and promised amendment. He also promised to keep silence thenceforward on the subject of indulgences, if the same were imposed on his adversaries. But he refused to comply with the primary condition, namely, that of making retractation of his errors, which, said he, his conscience forbade him to do, and against his conscience he dare not act. The authority of St. Thomas and the other scholastics, he went on to say, did not suffice for him, nor did their reasons convince him : he must be convinced by more cogent reasons than theirs. He begged Cajetan to refer the matter to the Pope, so that it might be decided by the Church, and he might know what to retract and what to adhere to. If now he retracted what was a matter of doubt, he laid himself open to the reproach of maintaining or retracting that about which he knew nothing. Obviously the Cardinal could not be satisfied with any such declaration. By accepting it he would have admitted that on all those points on which Luther had defied the authority of the Church, only those doctrines were at stake which, “not being defined by the Church, were open to reasonable discussion”.

In a later letter of the 18th of October, Luther declared that, having proved his obedience by his long and laborious journey to obey the summons to appear before the Legate, and having expressed his submission to any future judgment of the Holy See by giving up his “Resolutions”, he now considered that a longer sojourn in Augsburg was unnecessary, and burdensome both to himself and to the Carmelites with whom he was staying ; that, moreover, the Cardinal had forbidden him to reappear before him so long as he refused to recant; and on that subject he had made himself clear in his former letter. Now, therefore, he would take his departure. He went on to say that he appealed from the Legate and from the Pope, badly informed, to one who would be better informed, who would be pointed out to him by the Most High. He had, he said, no fear of censures, which he had not deserved, for by God’s grace he was in such a condition that he feared condemnation much less than he feared error and false opinions; for he knew that censure could not harm him, but would rather benefit him if he had on his side truth and a sound faith.

Two days later, in the night between the 20th and 21st of October, Luther, having been released by Staupitz from rule and obedience, fled secretly from Augsburg, and arrived in Wittenberg on the 31st. During his journey he received news of the Brief sent by the Pope to Cajetan on the 23rd of August, a copy of which Spalatin had contrived to procure secretly.

The purport of the manifesto mentioned above, the rough draft of which he had given to his notary and witnesses on the 16th of October, to be publicly affixed to the door of the Cathedral of Augsburg after his departure, and sent to the Cardinal, was as follows : There was much that was uncertain about the matter of indulgences, as well as about the manner in which they can be applied to the dead; therefore a discussion on the subject is not only permissible but praiseworthy. This he undertook to promote, moved thereto by the immoderate stir made by the preachers of indulgences, who, under pretext of carrying out their mission, carried on a scandalous and covetous trade to an un precedented extent, which brought contempt on the Roman Church, the power of the keys, and the Apostolic See. He had therefore submitted the matter under dispute not only to the judgment of the Church, but to the intelligence of those who knew and understood it better than he did. But first of all he had submitted it to his most Holy Father and Lord, the present Pope Leo X. In spite of this he had been calumniated and held up to hatred by certain children of mammon, gluttonous misers who hungered after the milk and the wool of Christ's lamb, just as if he had done any thing to bring discredit and dishonour on the Church and the power of the keys. For reasons of importance he had not obeyed the summons to appear in person in Rome, nor could he make the retractation demanded of him by the very learned and friendly Cajetan, because the points on which he was supposed to be in error had not been pointed ' out to him. As he had affirmed nothing but only discussed, as he had submitted everything to the most Holy Father, Leo X, in whose voice he recognized that of Christ, and as he had no intention of saying or believing anything except what had been proved by Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, and the canons, he appealed from this Pope, who was badly informed, and from the judges chosen by him (Prierias and Ghinucci, whom he rejected as prejudiced) to a Pope who should be better informed, and to the protection of whom he submitted himself and his actual and future followers. He reserved to himself the right to make in this present appeal, changes, additions, and improvements.

Cajetan was painfully affected by Luther’s flight, as well as by the contents of his manifesto. On the 25th of October he wrote to the Elector of Saxony and briefly told him all that had occurred, entreating him to send Luther to Rome or at least to banish him from his State. Frederick at once forwarded this letter to Luther. In his answer to Cajetan, on the 18th of December, 1518, the Elector refused the Legate’s request. He was not, he said, as yet convinced that the professor of Wittenberg had fallen into heresy. Had this been so, he would have done his duty as a Christian prince; but as it was, any action against Luther would only injure his University. Thus was Cajetan’s mission frustrated.

Luther had no doubt that his condemnation would follow ; and on the 28th of November he issued another address in which he appealed from the Pope, who was subject to error, to a future General Council.  Even before taking this step, earlier in November he had printed a report of his interviews with Cajetan ; and in this also can be seen the development and accentuation of his attitude towards the Papacy. In forwarding this document to Wenzel Link on the 11th of December, Luther says : “I send you my trifling work that you may see whether I am not right in supposing that, according to Paul, the real Antichrist holds sway over the Roman court. I think I can prove that this last is worse than any Turk”. The Sermon on Penance, belonging to about this time (November, 15 18), shows how far his protest about indulgences had carried him in the direction of his new doctrine of justification by faith alone.

On receiving the report of the transactions between Cardinal Cajetan and Luther at Augsburg, Leo sent to the Legate a constitution about the doctrine of indulgences, bearing the date of the 9th of November, 1518. So that henceforward no one should be able to excuse himself on the plea of ignorance, it was here laid down as the doctrine of the Catholic Church that, by virtue of the power of the keys, the Pope can remit both the guilt and punishment due to actual sins —the guilt by the sacrament of penance, and the temporal punishment by indulgences ; and that he can, as occasion arises, draw from the overflowing treasury of the merits of Christ and His Saints, and grant remissions to faithful Christians whether they are in this life or in purgatory, united to Christ by love. He grants (conferre) this to the living per modum absolutionis, or assigns (transferre) it to the dead per modum suffragii; therefore all who obtain these indulgences are freed from that amount of temporal punishment which is in proportion with the indulgence granted and obtained. This is what all must teach and preach under penalty of excommunication; and Bishops arc directed to make this constitution known in all places. The name of Luther was not, out of consideration, mentioned in the document, the only reference to him being at the beginning, where it is said that certain religious in Germany have by their sermons disseminated false doctrines about indulgences, which have from time immemorial been granted by the Holy See.

Cajetan received this important Bull at Linz in Austria. He published it there on the 13th of December, and at once had copies spread throughout Germany. But the results were small, for Luther’s appeal had preceded it, and had to no small degree weakened its effect. Moreover, the preaching of the Indulgence was unpopular, and nearly all through the country the people saw in it f nothing but a contrivance on the part of the covetous Curia for enriching themselves, and of the equally hated Dominicans, who were supposed to have extorted the Bull from Rome. Luther's attack on indulgences seemed to thousands to be perfectly justifiable, and he himself was regarded as the champion of necessary ecclesiastical reforms in the Church.

Connected with Cajetan's failure to amicably terminate the difference with Luther, was the mission of the Saxon nobleman and Papal private chamberlain Karl von Miltitz. The real object of the mission of this superficial, frivolous, and vain courtier, which was, throughout, quite in harmony with his consequential attitude, has been much overrated, though it was in reality quite a subordinate affair. He was the bearer of the Golden Rose which had been for so long the object of the Elector of Saxony's desire, and which he was directed to leave provisionally at Augsburg with the Legate. He was qualified for this mission by his relations with the Spanish court, and was directed to try to ascertain the Elector's intentions as regarded Luther, and procure his extradition. But throughout these transactions he was only a subordinate agent, with no right to work independently of the sanction of the Cardinal-Legate, without whose express permission he might not convey to the Elector the token of Papal favour. Still less could he “even subordinately” make an attempt “to arrange the Lutheran affair as far as possible”, or “influence Luther in a conciliatory way”, or, in a word, carry out all that he interpreted as belonging to his ostensible mission. If, notwithstanding this, Miltitz did actually enter into such negotiations with Luther as have connected him for all time with the history of the disorders of that period, he did so without authority, and entirely on his own account, under the influence of his desire for importance.

In the beginning of January, 1519, negotiations were entered into at Altenburg, in which Miltitz tried to persuade the Wittenberg professor to agree to an accommodation which must then be submitted to Rome. The result of these transactions, which is usually estimated too high, was nothing more than that Luther pledged himself to keep silence for the future on the subject of indulgences, if his adversaries would on their side do the same ; and that he agreed with Miltitz that the latter should approach the Pope with a request to entrust the settlement of the whole affair to a German Bishop. On the 10th of January, 15 19, Luther was again in Wittenberg. From Altenburg Miltitz went to Leipzig, where, in his braggart way, although without any authority, he bore himself in an arrogant and harsh way towards Tetzel, on whose behalf the Provincial of the Order, Hermann Rab, had already written to him at Altenburg on the 3rd of January, 1519. Tetzel fell ill from worry, and Luther was generous enough to console him. “Let him not trouble himself”, said he, “for it was not he who had begun the affair : but the child has quite a different father”.

In Luther'’ letter of March 3rd to Leo X, about which so much has been said, many have tried to trace the fruit of a concession extracted by Miltitz at Altenburg. In his letter to the Pope, the Wittenberg professor asseverates “that it had never been in his mind to attack the authority of the Roman Church or the Pope. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the authority of the Roman Church surpasses all other, and that nothing in heaven or on earth, save only Jesus Christ, is to be put above it”. As at that time Luther had reached that stage in his apostasy when he had declared the Pope to be Antichrist, and as shortly after the date of this letter he wrote to Spalatin saying that he had not made up his mind whether the Pope were Antichrist or only his emissary, the falseness of his submissive letter to Leo X is painfully apparent. As is shown by the latest researches the original draft which is still existing was written, not on the 3rd of March, but as early as the 5th or 6th of January, during his sojourn at Altenburg. It remained in the form of a draft, for when the letter was laid before him, Miltitz declared it to be insufficient, because, in spite of its submissive language, there was no mention in it of retractation. The document appears in a better light seen thus, as regards honesty of intention; but looked at as being of two months' earlier origin, its contradiction with his assertion in December, that he believed the Pope to be Antichrist, is most glaring. Eck’s appearance did not at first lead Luther so far, this “was only an inducement to him to express more openly the hostility to the Pope, which he had been for so long cherishing within his heart”.

The following circumstances, and especially the disputation in Leipzig in June and July, 1519, together with the correspondence connected with it, put Luther before us as moving with more and more certainty along the road which led to open apostasy from the Church. It is remarkable that during this time, in fact until the autumn, no further steps were taken in Rome about the matter, with the exception of the Pope’s Brief to Luther on the 29th of March, 1519. In this it is said that “the Pope, delighted with Luther's repentant submission, invites him graciously to set forth at once for Rome, there to make the retractation which he postponed when before the Legate”. But, meanwhile, the unreliable Miltitz was left for three parts of the year to play his own part as mediator, without any important results ensuing in the second negotiations with Luther at Liebenwerda on the 9th of October, or in those with the Elector of Treves about arranging an accommodation by arbitration.

That the endeavours of Miltitz to mediate could only injure the Catholic cause, is undoubted. The fact that this man was given a free hand, and that nevertheless nothing was done against Luther till the autumn of 1519, is most significant. It is not difficult to find an explanation. Meanwhile, the political considerations which impeded the progress of an affair so important to the Church are highly characteristic of the Medici Pope. The imperial election reduced everything else to insignificance. In face of the absorbing interest taken by Leo X in this question, the Lutheran business fell into the background as a matter of subordinate importance. It seemed, rather, advisable to let it rest for a while, for political motives demanded the greatest consideration towards the influential and highly-respected Elector of Saxony, who was for a time the Pope’s favourite candidate for the imperial throne. Thus alone can be explained the announcement, in the Brief of the 29th of March, of Luther’s supposed readiness to recant, resting on the authority of the subordinate and unreliable Miltitz, and why that envoy was allowed to pursue his own way, which bound the commissaries to nothing. Thus time was gained by the enemy, and a definite settlement avoided. Attempts were made to temporize in this all-important matter, and opportunities of an infinitude of good were missed. Meanwhile, the waves of the anti-Papal agitation rose higher and higher, yet nothing was done by Rome!

It was only when the election question had been settled that the influential Cardinal Giulio de' Medici urged that the Luther affair should be brought to a conclusion. The Cardinal had returned to Rome at the beginning of October, 1519, and it was only then that the renewal of Luther's trial was taken in hand. Eck had already reported about the Leipzig disputation, and had warned the Pope not to defer such an important matter. It had all along been his intention to go to Rome to place before the Pope the real state of affairs, in the place of Miltitz’s misleading and highly-coloured reports, when he was fore stalled by his appointment by Leo X, and he set forth on his journey on the 18th of January, 1520.

Eck had a great share in the energetic prosecution of the cause, even if his interposition had not such decisive effects as we might be led to suppose by his boastful words. Before he arrived on the scene, such prompt and strong measures had been already taken in the matter, that it seemed as if those concerned wished to make up in one moment for the delay of months. In open Consistory, by the express command of the Pope, the process against Luther was renewed on the 9th of January, 1520, the proceedings being now extended against the Elector of Saxony as his protector. An Italian member of the Curia employed all the force of his eloquence in bringing against the Elector the charges of obstinacy, cruelty, and tyranny, by which he had kindled a fire which it would be very difficult to quench. It was to be feared, he said, that the Elector, in combination with the mortal enemies of the Holy See, would seduce all Germany by his errors. The orator moved that efficacious steps should be taken against this hydra. The Pope must give full powers to the Auditor of the Camera to take all legal measures to ensure the coercion of Luther and his followers, and compel them to give an account of their religious opinions ; failing which, they should be declared to be heretics. Religion was un done, said he in conclusion, unless the evil were grasped in its beginning and the incurable wound cauterized.

Accordingly, in preparation for the final sentence, the Pope appointed a commission in the beginning of February, chiefly composed of Franciscan Observantines, under the learned Cardinals Accolti and Cajetan, who were charged permanently with the conduct of the affair. At the first sitting of the commission a summary of Luther’s false doctrines, drawn up by one of the Louvain Dominicans, was read out. This session had a very short existence, for those who composed it wished to go too fast. On the 11th of February a second commission of theologians was formed, which sat till the middle of March. It recommended the publication of a Bull against Luther’s writings, but the sparing of him in person. It made a careful distinction between the degrees of objection to be taken to the new doctrines. But this more gentle mode of procedure did not receive the consent of Leo X. As Eck had arrived in Rome in the middle of March, the assumption is justified that his influence was at work in this. A new commission, presided over by the Pope in person, then took the case in hand.

While Rome was still considering what had best be done, Luther declared most unequivocally his complete secession from the Church, about which he had in reality made up his mind long before. His position was completely changed by his alliance with the humanists, who detested the Church, and the revolutionary forces, represented by Ulrich von Hutten. The espousal of Luther’s cause by the anticatholic humanists was of the very gravest importance. These men, who had been trained in feuds and disputes, were strong in speech and with their pens, and as they had done in the case of Reuchlin, so now were they ready to do everything in their power to assist Luther. With their co-operation the difference with the Church, which had originally been theological, assumed quite a different character. At the head of these deadly enemies of the “Papists” stood Ulrich von Hutten.

Hutten, who was by nature revolutionary, had, in spite of his hostility to Rome, looked down with contempt on Luther, and in the whole affair of his difference with the Church had seen nothing but a miserable monkish squabble. His eyes were opened by the Leipzig disputation, when Luther was pressed for the first time to make a distinct declaration of his heretical views about Pope and Council. He saw the purpose to which this monk, whom he had hitherto so underrated, could be turned. Thenceforward Luther’s cause was his own. With all the passion of his undisciplined nature, he took Luther’s part, and tried to further his cause among the masses of the people. Hutten’s former hatred of Rome now assumed really fearful proportions. His dialogue, “Vadiscus, or the Roman Trinity”, contains, according to his own verdict, the strongest things that have ever been written against Rome. As a characteristic of her he drew the revolting picture of “a gigantic, blood-sucking worm”. If, said he, Germany has not the strength to free itself, then let the Turks execute judgment on Rome; for in her there stands “the great barn of the universe, into which is garnered all that has been robbed and taken from other nations. In the midst sits that insatiable corn-weevil which devours piles of fruit, sur rounded by its many fellow-gluttons, who, having first sucked our blood and then consumed our flesh, are now seeking to grind our bones and devour all that is left of us. Will not the Germans take up their arms, and make an onslaught on them with fire and sword?”

Under Hutten’s influence Luther took up national and revolutionary ideas. Instead of holding theological discussions, he now issued pamphlets and preached revolution to the people, not only in ecclesiastical but also in political matters. The whole movement assumed quite a new character. All the inflammable material which had been piling itself up for years now broke out into open flame. Cleverly chosen battle-cries, such as Fatherland! Liberty! Gospel! carried away the masses of the people.

While Hutten developed this really superhuman activity, Luther was not far behind him. The effects of his popular oratory became more and more apparent. He took Hutten as his model and often appropriated his very words. No longer can we find any trace of diffidence. When, on the 11th of June, the knight, Silvester von Schaumburg, offered to bring up a hundred nobles to protect him, he wrote to Spalatin saying: “I have cast the die; I now despise the rage of the Romans as much as I do their favour. I will not reconcile myself to them for all eternity, nor have anything to do with them. Let them condemn and burn all that belongs to me. In return, I also will do as much for them; otherwise I could not kindle the fire that is to condemn and burn, before the eyes of the world, the whole Papal system —that Lernaean hydra of heresy. Then there will be an end to this show of humility, which has proved so fruitless, about which I will no longer permit the enemy of the gospel to become puffed up. Silvester von Schaumburg and Franz von Sickingen have freed me from all human respect”. “Franz von Sickingen”, he says in a letter to a fellow- Augustinian, “promises to protect me through Hutten from all my enemies. Silvester von Schaumburg will do the same with his Franconian nobles. I have had a beautiful letter from him. Now I no longer fear, and am publishing a book in the German tongue about Christian reform, directed against the Pope, in language as violent as if I were addressing Antichrist”.

Thousands of copies of this book, which was written in the beginning of August, were spread all over Germany. It bore the title: "An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung”. In his programme of reform, the writer skilfully combines a thoroughly laudable social reform with demands relating to the Church which would upset the whole of the actual condition of ecclesiastical law. In these demands relating to the Church lie the kernel of the book, which has been described as “revolution pictured in grand style and with vigorous strokes, as though it were the normal state of things”.

“Three walls have been built round the Church”, says Luther: (1) the distinction between clergy and laity; (2) the right of the Church to interpret Scripture; (3) the right of the Pope to summon a Council. These walls, built of straw and paper, must, says he, be overthrown. All Christians are priests; all have an equal right to expound Scripture; a Council should be summoned by the temporal powers, so that Germany may be set free “from the Roman robber and from his shameful and devilish rule”. Rome sucks the Germans so dry that “it is a matter for wonder that we have still something left to eat”. “O noble princes”, he cries, “how long will you forsake your country and people to be the prey of these ravening wolves?” Instead of fighting the Turks in the East, you should rather attack “those who are at your very doors”.

Combined with this appeal for an attack to be made on “the Romanists”, Luther makes some positive and practical suggestions. The German Bishops, instead of being mere ciphers and tools of the Pope, should be free and subject only to the Archbishop of Mainz, as the Primate of Germany. The grievances should be abolished, holidays, pilgrimages, fasts, and ecclesiastical censures done away with, mendicant orders reduced, the care of the poor organized, the celibacy of the clergy abandoned. On the other hand, cathedral benefices should remain as a provision for the younger sons of the nobles. In the same way as this clause was intended to be a sop to the nobility, so was the subsequent proposal, to confiscate the States of the Church and do away with the Papal suzerainty over Naples, intended to win the favour of the Emperor.

The effect of this book, written in the vernacular and in vigorous style, was very powerful and far-reaching. The first edition of four thousand copies was exhausted in a very short time, and new impressions had to be set in hand at once to satisfy the eager demand. By his advocacy of economic changes and his severe attitude towards capitalization, luxury, and immorality, Luther won the sympathy of the multitudes for the ecclesiastical reforms recommended in this work, which were nevertheless “nothing but a flourish of trumpets directed against the actual position of the Papacy”. The hostility to Rome, which was already so widely spread over Germany, now advanced with unprecedented rapidity.

A postscript to his book, addressed to the German nobles, which completed his breach with the Church, was intended as an answer to the Epitoma responsionis of Prierias. He had this work, originally published in Perugia, reprinted with a preface and postscript as well as marginal notes. The preface and postscript contained his violent repudiation of the Papacy as such. If, says he, such doctrines as were expressed by Prierias about the authority of the Pope, were taught in Rome, then he, Luther, openly declared that Antichrist sat there in the temple of God, and that the Roman Curia was the synagogue of Satan. He extolled as blessed the Greeks, Bohemians, and all who had separated themselves from this Babylon. If the Pope and Cardinals did not restrain that mouth of Satan (i.e. Prierias), and force him to retract, he himself would renounce the Roman Church, together with the Pope and Cardinals, as the abomination of desolation seated in the holy place

In his postscript he in so many words called for a religious war and the waging of a bloody persecution against the Catholic Church. “If”, he says, “the madness of the Romanists be continued, it seems to me that the only hope of salvation left is that Emperor, kings, and princes take up arms and attack this pest of the earth, and thus bring matters to a conclusion, no longer by words but by steel... If a thief is punished by a halter, a murderer by the sword, and a heretic by fire, why should not we, with all our weapons, attack these teachers of corruption, these Popes, Cardinals, and all the rabble of the Roman Sodom, and wash our hands in their blood?”

If such writings did not decide Rome’s final verdict, they nevertheless afford sufficient proof that their author did not fall unjustly, though too late, under the ban of the Church.

So far as can be judged by the very defective accounts of the prosecution and termination of Luther’s Roman trial, the influence of the Louvain theologians must have been quite equal to that of Eck : though all through its last stage the ruling spirit was Cardinal Giulio de' Medici. In the Bull Exsurge, the draft of which was made by Accolti, forty-one of Luther’s articles were grouped by Eck with due regard to the Louvain doctors. These were condemned wholesale without sufficient regard to the distinction of their individual degree of offensiveness. The Bull was, at the end of April, given for consideration to a new commission. On the 2nd of May Eck made his report to the Pope about the final wording of this most important document. He had to seek him in the hunting lodge of Magliana, in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome. Not till then was the Bull submitted to the Sacred College. Four Consistories, held on May 21, 23, 25, and June 1, were necessary to bring the affair to a conclusion. In the second and third Consistories the only thing settled was the order of the day. The care with which the case was gone into can be seen by the unusual duration of the sittings. Some lasted six, others seven, and some even eight hours.

On the 20th of May a demand from Leo X, in menacing terms, was sent through Cardinal Riario and Valentin von Teutleben, the agent of the Elector of Saxony, and temporarily serving in that capacity to the Elector of Mainz, to request Frederick of Saxony to compel Luther to recant. This was an ultimatum which Frederick rejected finally at the end of July, almost in Luther’s own words. The Elector demanded the institution of a court of arbitration, to be held in a safe place and to be composed of men of undoubted learning, and in sufficient numbers to test the doctrines which had never yet been refuted.

On the 21st of May the draft of the Bull, together with the acts of the Leipzig disputation relating to the notoriety of Luther’s heresy, were read in Consistory. The question was then put whether, the articles of Luther being explicitly condemned, he should be once more warned to retract his errors within a given term, and in case of a refusal condemned publicly as a heretic, and at the same time his works be forbidden and committed to the flames. Then came the question, proposed by Eck, whether Luther's articles be condemned indiscriminately and without specification, or whether, according to the opinion of Cardinal Cajetan, some discrimination be made between those which could be described as simply heretical and those which were scandalous and offensive to pious ears. The Consistory decided that Cardinal Accolti, who was held in much esteem in Rome for his learning, and especially for his knowledge of law, should consult experts, and decide this fine theological distinction. After the single articles had been put to the vote, the opinion on this subject was communicated to the Cardinals at the next Consistory, at which Cajetan, in spite of his suffering health, appeared. The long duration of the Consistory shows how thorough and searching were the consultations. “It is five in the afternoon”, wrote the Este Ambassador, “and the Consistory is still sitting: Luther’s affair is under consultation”. The discussion that day was not over until six o'clock. The final resolution passed was the rejection of all Luther's articles as erroneous; while the discussion of the wording of the Bull on the subject was to be discussed at another Consistory. The protocol of the next sitting, which took place on the 25th of May, records only one resolution, namely, that Luther’s sentences be quoted verbally in the Bull. The fixing of the various degrees of censure attributable to each sentence fell through, obviously because of the delay it would have caused in terminating the process.

Prompt action was all the more necessary because it was rumoured that other princes besides the Elector of Saxony were taking Luther’s part. Cardinal Accolti, who talked over the situation with the Ambassador of the court of Este, was most anxious about these tidings. He remarked about the Archbishop of Mainz: “We thought he was one of ours; but now we know the contrary. Meanwhile, it is to be hoped that as soon as the Bull is published in Germany, most men will forsake Luther”. Cardinal del Monte also had something to say about the part taken by the German princes in favour of Luther; and he expressed a doubt whether even “the greatest of them” were to be trusted. Cardinal Scaramuccia Trivulzio spoke most pessimistically, and said that he doubted whether any good would be effected by the Bull. The Pope also was most anxious ; he believed, by what Erasmus said in a letter, that the Bishop of Liege had declared himself in favour of Luther.

It was obvious that under these circumstances it was out of the question to apportion the degree of censure to each proposition. The one thing to be done was to judge them as a whole, with a general reference to individual points. Cardinal Carvajal’s description of Luther’s appeal to a General Council as “the gravest of all his offences” was entered.

In the Consistory of the 1st of June, the Bull was read once more and its publication resolved upon. By the 15th the preparation of the document was officially completed, and the publication followed soon after. It was known as the Bull Exsurge Domine from its first words.

In the solemn prelude to the Bull, which is for the greater part made up of passages from Scripture, the protection of the Divine Founder of the Church and the Princes of the Apostles is first invoked. “Arise, O God, judge Thine own cause” (Ps. LXXIII 22). “Catch us the little foxes that destroy the vines” (Cant. II. 15). “The boar out of the wood hath laid it waste, and a singular wild beast hath devoured it” (Ps. LXXIX. 14). Even as Peter had foretold, lying teachers had risen up who had brought in sects of perdition. The whole Church was then appealed to, whose true interpretation of Scripture was set at naught by men whose minds had been blinded by the father of lies and led to falsify the Bible, in contradiction to the interpretation of the Holy Ghost, as was the way with all teachers of error.

Proceeding, the Pope complains that such doctrines should have been spread among the illustrious German nation, which he and his predecessors had always held in special affection. It was well known that among all nations the Germans had ever been most eager to oppose heresy, that they had shed their blood in the war against the Hussites, and even now, through the Universities of Cologne and Louvain, had triumphantly refuted the new errors.

After this, forty-one Lutheran errors were enumerated. These relate to free-will and original sin, to the sacraments in general, to faith, grace, sin, penance, confession, good works, purgatory, communion under both kinds, the Primacy, excommunication, the authority of General Councils, the punishment of death for heretics, and the errors of Hus.

As God had confided the chief pastoral office to the Pope, he must provide against the propagation of such errors, and cut them out like a canker. Therefore, by virtue of his supreme authority he now condemns them, partly as heretical, partly as a cause of scandal, partly as false, partly as offensive to the ears of the faithful, partly as seductive to simple souls and contrary to Catholic truth. He forbids, under the severest penalties, that they should be preached by any, whether religious or secular.

The writings which contain the above-named errors shall, immediately after the publication of the Bull, be solemnly and publicly burned in every place. In connection with this injunction Luther is expressly alluded to for the first time. Then the Bull turns to his person in the following manner:—The preceding course of events is described, and the emphatic declaration is made that the Pope has left nothing undone to recall Luther from his errors. He mentions his invitation to appear in Rome, his discussion with Cajetan, his obstinate disobedience in remaining for more than a year under censure. He is reminded of his appeal—contrary to the stringent prohibition of Pius II and Julius II—to a future Council, the authority of which he nevertheless declares to be null. From all this the Pope draws the conclusion that he could no longer proceed against Luther as against one only under suspicion in matters of faith, but must without further warning declare him to be a heretic. Nevertheless, the Pope will not pronounce sentence of excommunication at once, but, yielding to the counsel of the Cardinals, will allow justice to give way to mercy. Being mindful of the compassion of God who desireth not the death of a sinner, but that he should be converted and live, he would forget the injury done to the Holy See, and would proceed with all gentleness, in order that the prodigal son might be brought back to the bosom of the Church. Then he exhorts and adjures Luther, by the mercy of God and the Blood of Christ, no longer to disturb the peace, unity, and truth of the Church for which the Divine Redeemer Himself had so instantly prayed to the Father, and to abjure those errors which had been condemned. A limit of sixty days, after the publication of the Bull, is fixed for his recantation, which is to be made at St. Peter’s and the Cancelleria in Rome, as well as in the Cathedrals of Brandenburg, Meissen, and Merseburg. If he did not recant within this time, Luther and his followers, by the evidence of the writings which had been examined, should be cut off “like the withered vine branches which abide not in Christ” (John xv. 6), and declared notorious and obstinate heretics, and condemned to all the penalties to which canon law could condemn them.

Then the Bull returns once more to Luther’s writings and commands that all books that he has already written and might write in the future, be burned, even if they do not contain the above-mentioned errors.

After the expiration of the term of sixty days, Luther was to be avoided as a heretic by all the faithful; all spiritual and temporal authorities were bound to arrest him and deliver him up in Rome, or else banish him and his followers from their dominions. All the places in which he dwelt would be laid under an interdict while he was there and for three days after. Finally, should he not recant within the time fixed, all the clergy, secular and religious, were to declare him a heretic.

There are therefore three divisions to be noted in the Bull. In the first, Luther’s errors in faith are unconditionally condemne ; in the second, his writings are equally condemned and ordered to be burned as soon as the Bull is published. The author of these false doctrines and writings, who is the subject of the third part, is on the contrary to be allowed time for reflection, and be excommunicated only after the expiration of that time.

By the Bull Exsurge the Pope applied to Luther and his followers the “monitio evangelica” which precedes the sentence of excommunication and gives time to do penance, while at the same time it enables the judge to establish the moment of obstinacy (pertinacia) which is essential to constitute the state of heresy.

II.

Briefs of the 17th and 18th of July, 1520, entrusted the publication and execution of the Bull Exsurge to the Papal Librarian, Hieronymus Aleander, and the professor of Ingolstadt, Johann Eck, whom the Pope soon made protonotary. Both these learned men were devoted to the Holy See, and gifted with rare intelligence and energy. Nevertheless, the Italian was more of a humanist than a theologian, and before he entered the priesthood his morals had not been above reproach.

Girolamo Aleandro, or, as he is more commonly called, Aleander, was born at Motta in Friuli in 1480. Even during his studies in Venice he won for himself a name as a distinguished humanist. He also studied theology and canon law, but was more remarkable for his rhetorical gifts; His renown grew when he was called to the University of Paris, where he worked with only the intermission of half a year, from 1508 till 1513. There he was the real founder of the Greek School, and was the leading professor of Hebrew and Latin during the reign of Louis XII. His brilliant position both as professor and humanist was exchanged in 1514 for a post of confidence with the Prince ­Bishop of Liege, Eberhard de la Mark. In 1515 he became his Chancellor; in 1516 he was sent by his master on business to Rome. There the versatile and also brilliant diplomatist won the favour of the Pope and his cousin Cardinal Medici, whose service he entered as secretary in 1517. In this capacity he continued to work hard in the interests of his Prince-Bishop, who was very anxious to obtain a Cardinal’s hat. Even his appointment in July 1519, as Librarian to the Vatican made no difference in this respect. He was on very confidential terms with both the Pope and Cardinal Medici, and the esteem, in which they held him was proved by the mission fin which he was sent to the Emperor.

The other Nuncio, Johann Eck, was also highly gifted. He, like Luther, was the son of a peasant, and was unusually talented. He was absorbed in the most profound scholastic questions, as well as in mystical theology, speculative studies, and the positive science of his day. He also enthusiastically devoted to humanist studies. As a theologian he was far superior to Aleander. After he became, as it were accidentally, mixed up in the dispute with Luther, he placed all his talents and knowledge at the service of the Church. Wherever he had the chance he fought the innovator and his followers with a truly fiery zeal, though often with too great severity, for he was firmly convinced of the danger of the false doctrines. He fully deserved the honourable name of the “Catholic Achilles”, bestowed on him by Cardinal Pole. It is now admitted on all sides that he was the most efficient of all Luther’s antagonists.

The sphere of Eck’s activity was limited by Leo X to the courts of the Bishops of Brandenburg, Meissen, and Merseburg, and the other Bishops and prelates, to those of Duke Frederick of Saxony and the other Electors, of John of Saxony and the princes, barons, and towns of Upper and Lower Germany.

It made no difference to Luther personally who was commissioned to proclaim the Bull, for since 1519 he had determined to break for ever with the Pope and the Catholic Church. But it was considered by his followers most unfortunate that Eck, who had come forward as the most inveterate antagonist of the Wittenberg professor, and had drawn down on himself the hatred of the whole party, should, of all men, have been charged with the publication of the Bull. It was, however, a great misfortune for the Catholic cause, that the fact of Eck's share in drawing up the Bull Exsurge had become known in Germany. The condemnation conveyed by the Bull did not come on the Germans as a blow struck by the supreme power so much as a sword-thrust from the hand of a passionate enemy.

In August, 1520, Eck arrived with the Bull in Germany, where he found that, through the treachery of a Roman official, its contents were already known. It had in fact been printed there before it was published in Rome, and was being held up to the derision of satirists. Eck began his work in Saxony showing his intrepidity by plunging at once into the very centre of the enemy’s position. On the 21st of September he had the Bull fixed up at Meissen, on the 25th at Merseburg, and on the 29th at Brandenburg. Eck, as also Aleander, had been given the authority to mention by name some of the principal followers of Luther in his deed of publication; he therefore inserted those of Carlstadt, Johann Wildenauer (Sylvius) of Eger, Johann Dolzegk von Feldkirch, Willibald Pirkheimer, Lazarus Spengler and Bernhard Adelmann von Adelmannsfelden. In his notification of the publication of the Bull which he sent to Rome in the beginning of October, he specifies that “the parties concerned should, within the term of sixty days, either justify themselves before the Pope, or else forward to him the proof of their absolution at the hands of the special commissioners; or else, if they preferred to do so, be themselves the bearers of it, Unless this were done under sixty days, they would fall under the penalties mentioned in the Bull”.

Of the six of Luther’s followers thus singled out, Adelmann, after talking very boastfully and trying to delay the execution of the Bull, was the first to ask for absolution from Eck, which was granted to him on the 9th of November, and delivered to him in writing on the 15th. His submission was not sincere, for though he succeeded in making a good impression on Eck, he remained a secret partisan of Luther’s. The two Nurembergers, Pirkheimer and Spengler, also came to Eck with the request for absolution.

At Leipzig, where Eck arrived on the 29th of September, he had a foretaste of the difficulties which awaited him. He was personally threatened by the students from Wittenberg, and became the object of unexpected attention on the part of the University, so that the Bull was not executed until February 1521. Opposition now began in earnest. On the 7th of March 1521, Luther was able to send the pleasing news to his friend Link that the Bull had been pelted with dirt in Leipzig and torn down. The  same thing occurred at Torgau and Dobeln. At the last place the jeering inscription, “The nest is here but the birds have flown,” was added to the Bull.

From Leipzig, Eck sent the Bull on October 3rd, 1520, to the Rector of the University of Wittenberg, Peter Burkhar : but the University refused to accept it. That of Erfurt also offered resistance. There was a tumult among the students, and even the theological faculty opposed Eck: the students tore down the Bull and threw it into the Gera. Resistance was also shown by the University of Vienna, where Eck sent the Bull on the 14th of October. The motive assigned was that they could not accept the document until they knew the pleasure of the Emperor, to whom they therefore wrote on the 10th of December. Even after the submission of the theological faculty, the Rector and the other members of the University continued their resistance, and it was only by imperial command (March 1521) that the Bull was received. Even the Bishop showed great unwillingness to move. At Ingolstadt, to which University Eck sent the Bull on the 17th of October, its publication on the 29th was met with some resistance.

Many of the Bishops hung back, either from want of loyalty or from timidity. The Bishop of Meissen published the Bull in January 1521, and the Bishop of Merseburg on the 23rd of the same month. In those parts of the Electorate of Saxony where Frederick exercised spiritual jurisdiction, it was not published until April. In South Germany the Bishop of Eichstatt, Gabriel von Eyb, published the Bull through his Vicar-General ten days after he received it on October 24th, 1520. The Bishop of Augsburg, Christoph von Stadion, made greater difficulties when he received the summons in October to publish the document. His Chapter was divided into two parties, a small one which adhered to the Bishop, and a large opposition under the influence of the brothers Adelmann, who had on their side the Dean of the Chapter, Philip von Rechberg, a helpless and incapable young man. Both parties thought the moment inopportune for the publication of the Bull by the Bishop; but the Adelmann faction raised more fundamental difficulties, and did all they could to obtain a delay under the pretext that the Bishop should send for Eck to discuss the subject with him. As for the Bishop himself, he was not actuated by any consideration involving principle. “In taking up his position he was moved neither by sympathy with Luther nor by zeal for the purity of the faith. To him the Bull was simply inconvenient for external reasons only, because the possessions of the clergy, their lands and privileges, would be endangered by the seditious proclivities of the populace. The position assumed by him in his difficulty was essentially that of a political materialist”.

He therefore sent a negative reply to Eck’s summons, and consequently received a second, requesting him to proceed at once with the publication of the Bull. He perceived that further delay would have the worst consequences for himself and his see, and would be construed into dis obedience to the Pope. He therefore ordered that preparations for the publication should be made at once. The episcopal mandate of publication is dated the 8th of November; and directions for the printing of it and the Bull followed on the 12th, and were repeated on the 14th of November. He had waited to receive an answer from Eck, whom he had invited to be present at the publication of the Bull and episcopal mandate. The reply came in the form of a candid letter, written on the 10th of November, in which the Nuncio declined the invitation on the plea that the Bishop, being such a good shepherd, would not like to put forward another in his place when danger was threatened on the part of the wolves. The difficulties attending the printing of the Bull and episcopal mandate in Augsburg caused fresh delay. But on the 30th of December 1520, the Bull was proclaimed in the town of Augsburg, though not throughout the diocese until the beginning of 1521.

The Bishop of Freising, the palsgrave Philip, after much consideration and with great unwillingness, published the Bull on the 10th of January. The palsgrave John, the Administrator of Ratisbon, had the Bull read from the pulpit on the 4th of January 1521. The Bishop of Bamberg refused to publish it because it had been sent to him in an irregular way. In Passau nothing took place for some little time; the Bishop, Ernest, the younger brother of the Duke of Bavaria, was one of those unfortunate men who had entered the ecclesiastical state without a vocation, only for the sake of possessing a principality. It was reported that this prelate was too fond of dabbling in Lutheran doctrines; and it was probably on this account that Eck omitted to send the Bull to him.

Although the attitude of a man like the Bishop of Passau may not cause surprise, the same cannot be said of the supine behaviour of the Archbishop of Salzburg, Cardinal Lang. Until the beginning of March, 1521, he had made no pronouncement against Luther. He preferred to remain in a state of watchful inactivity, waiting for further developments, wishing neither to force nor hamper events by any decision. The same consideration influenced the Dukes of Bavaria, though in their case territorial jealousy played its part. On the 11th of March they sent to the Bishops of the Duchy letters of expostulation, as to the manner in which pastors of souls had acted after the publication of the Pope’s Bull of condemnation. By their own experience, they said, as well as by credible reports received, they found that the severity of these in refusing absolution to those who were possessed of Lutheran books, and would not give them up, conduced to sedition and the injury of Christian works, rather than to the salvation of souls and the production of salutary effects. The laity, they added, were opposed to this mode of procedure and were “crying out and murmuring”. As the Diet of Worms had undertaken to deal with Luther, the Bishops would do right to direct the clergy to cease their proceedings against Lutheran writings, and neither condemn nor approve, but “let the matter rest” until the result of the examination before the Diet were known. To this the Bishop of Eichstatt replied forcibly that it was not in his power to set aside the command of the Pope. Such a method of proceeding on the part of the strictly Catholic Dukes of Bavaria, shows how little the importance of the whole affair was realized.

Luther, who knew himself to be safe under the protection of his own Elector, had at first, like Erasmus, given himself the airs of not believing the Bull to be genuine. He declared that it had been made up by Eck, and as such discredited it in his book : “Eck’s New Bull and Lies”. When, however, he was no longer able to keep up a semblance of incredulity as to its genuineness, he took a line more violent than ever against the Pope. “Never, from the beginning of the world”, he wrote in November 1520, to Spalatin, “has Satan spoken so shamelessly against God as in this Bull. It is impossible for anyone who accepts it and does not contest it, to be saved”. On the 17th of November he again appealed from the Pope, “as from an unjust judge, hardened and erring, and, by all his writings, a convicted heretic and schismatic”, to a General Council. He demanded of the Emperor, the Electors, and all princes and sovereigns to join with him in opposing “the unchristian conduct and amazing enormities of the Pope”. Whoever, says he, follows the Pope, him did he, Martin Luther, hand over to the Divine tribunal. At the beginning of November he gave vent to his full fury in an intemperate, passionate pamphlet, “Against the Bull of Antichrist”, published both in Latin and German. Starting from his usual premise that his doctrine alone was the truth, he declares that the Bull, which is opposed to this truth, has for its object to compel men to deny God and worship the devil. If the Pope and his Cardinals will not change this, he declares that the Roman See is the seat of Antichrist, he condemns it and hands it over to Satan, with this its Bull and all its Decretals. “What wonder if all princes, nobles, and all the laity should set to and belabour Pope, bishops, priests, and monks, and drive them out of the country?” The Bull deserves that “all good Christians should trample it under foot, and that the Roman Antichrist and his apostle Eck should be driven away with fire and brimstone”. “As a full proof of his defiance”, he published another pamphlet in which he defended the condemned sentences, and in places emphasized them.

On the 10th of December 1520, Luther went in solemn procession, followed by the students, and burned the Papal Bull together with the books of canon law and several of his adversaries’ writings. While doing this he solemnly pronounced the words: “Because thou hast afflicted the saints of the Lord, so may everlasting fire afflict and devour thee!”. By this action he expressed, publicly and finally, his breach with the Church. Next day he spoke as follows to his disciples in the College: “This burning is only a trifle. It is necessary that the Pope and the Papal See be also burned. He who does not resist the Papacy with all his heart cannot obtain eternal salvation.” In his treatise, published under the name of “Warumb des Babsts und seiner Jüngern bücher von D. Martin Luther verbrandt sind,” he says: “From all time it has been the custom to burn impious books (Acts XIX. 19), and as Doctor in Holy Scripture he was bound to suppress bad books; if others from ignorance or human respect neglected to do this, it did not free him from responsibility. His writings had been burned at Cologne and Louvain, which, among the ignorant, had raised suspicion against him; therefore, for the establishment of truth, he had good reason to burn the books of his adversaries, being, as he hoped, prompted thereto by the Holy Ghost.”

The term of grace after the Bull had been affixed at Meissen, Merseburg, and Brandenburg expired on the 27th of November. On the 3rd of January 1521, excommunication was pronounced on Luther in the Bull Decet Romanum Pontificem. This Bull definitely excluded Luther and his followers from the communion of the Church, and at the same time all pretext for maintaining that Luther had not been unconditionally condemned by the Holy See, was removed. With this Bull the Pope sent special Briefs to Cardinal Albert of Mainz, as Inquisitor-General for the whole of Germany, as well as to the Nuncios, Caracciolo, Aleander, and Eck, giving them powers to proceed with energy against all obstinate Lutherans, even were they of electoral dignity, and to reconcile to the Church all who repented. The absolution of Luther, Hutten, Pirkheimer, and Spengler was reserved to the Pope.

The two last named, “though not without keen personal humiliation”, asked for absolution. But Hutten had not the remotest idea of doing such a thing. His rage against Rome had known no bounds ever since the Pope had, in a Brief of July 20, 1520, ordered the Archbishop of Mainz to stop his dangerous operations, and, if necessary, take severe measures against him. Hutten published a pamphlet against the Bull, full of the bitterest remarks. In the prelude he called on all Germans to take vengeance on the Pope, on account of the document by which he wished to suppress the budding truth. The conclusion was in the form of missive to Leo X, in which he said “Bounds and limitations must be set to thine audacity, and curb on such childish, wanton Bulls”.

In his pamphlets, written for the people, and therefore in German, Hutten, trusting to the protection of his powerful friend Franz von Sickingen, openly incited them to revolt.

All superstition we root out,

Return of truth we bring about ;

And if all gentle means prove vain,

We will by blood the victory gain.

In face of such an agitation, almost everything depended on the attitude taken by the young Emperor; and Aleander’s first efforts were directed towards influencing him.

III.

Aleander’s appointment, dated July 17 and 18, as Nuncio-Extraordinary and Ambassador to Charles V and the other sovereigns of Germany, was to be in conjunction with that of the ordinary Nuncio, Marino Caracciolo, already accredited to the imperial court, and entrusted with carrying out the secular policy of the Holy See, and was to be carried on contemporaneously with the mission of Eck. The instructions received by Aleander warned him to work in harmony with Eck, and provided for the event of Luther or any of his followers demanding a hearing of the Emperor. In answer to any such demand it was laid down that, Luther’s doctrine having been condemned by the Holy See, any appeal elsewhere could not be allowed. But if Luther wished to appeal to Rome, a safe-conduct would be granted, and a gracious hearing vouchsafed. The further purport of the instructions shows how little the possibility of such an event was expected. Aleander was directed to petition, first the Emperor, and after him all the princes, to arrest Luther at the expiration of the term of grace, and deliver him up to Rome to be punished, and to proceed with severity against his followers. All the Bishops were to be exhorted to proceed against them in accordance with the Bull of the Lateran Council, directed against all who printed wicked and heretical books.

The appointment of a second Nuncio in connection with the Lutheran affair shows the importance attached to it by the Pope. There was more than a remote possibility that jealousies might arise and disturb the harmonious proceedings of the two Nuncios. Indeed, there was no lack of jealousy, and the Pope had to send frequent admonitions to the Nuncios to work in harmony. As Aleander’s time was still claimed by his private business, his departure, much to the annoyance of the impatient Pope, was deferred till the 27th of July; even then he had to keep a previous engagement in France with Francis I, and it was not until the 22nd of September that he arrived at Cologne, and not until the 25th at Antwerp. To his joyful surprise the Emperor declared that he was willing to lay down his life in defence of the Church. Consistently with this declaration, he showed the greatest readiness to put the Papal Bull into execution in the Netherlands promptly and loyally. Immediately afterwards an imperial edict was issued commanding the burning of the heretical books. Aleander, looking on everything as so far settled, went on to Louvain on the 8th of October and to Liege on the 17^th. Next to the sermons which, by his instructions, he was bound to preach in all parts, Aleander considered the public burning of the heretical books as the best means of checking the propagation of false doctrine. By this means the Papal condemnation of the heresy became more surely proclaimed than was possible by the delivery of the Bull to the Bishops. Besides, the execution in this manner of the sentence pronounced by the authority of the Pope, made a deep impression on the infected laity. Finally, the Lutherans feared nothing more. At Aix, where Aleander attended Charles’s coronation, he, in company with Caracciolo, visited Cardinal Albert of Mainz, who had equally declared himself against Luther and Hutten. The Electors of Cologne and Treves showed the same readiness to obey the Pope. Aleander was very favourably impressed by the Elector Frederick of Saxony. “The Elector”, he wrote, “seems to be naturally right-minded. He is very pious, but his counsellors are nearly all as Lutheran as Luther himself. On the 4th of November Caracciolo and I visited him, and were at such great pains in arguing with him, that he appeared to be more or less convinced, and declared to us that he had not exchanged more than twenty words with Luther”. But Aleander was greatly deceived as to the real opinions of the Elector, for he was in reality wholly on the side of Luther, and tried with the utmost ingenuity to interpret the laws of the Empire in favour of his protégé. On the 31st of October he went to Cologne to remonstrate with the Emperor in person about the condemnation without appeal of the professor of Wittenberg. To this Charles replied that Luther would have the benefit of the law as occasion offered.

On the 6th of November Frederick rejected the alternatives, offered by the Papal Nuncios, of either imprisoning or delivering Luther up, and burning his writings at once, before he had been examined by learned and impartial judges and convinced of his error. If he were thus really convicted, the Elector was willing to do everything that befitted an obedient son of the Catholic Church. This scheme of submitting the case to the so-called arbitration of certain learned men was equivalent to saving Luther’s cause, and to bringing about the suspension, or rather the recall, of the Bull Exsurge. This was advocated, conjointly with the Elector of Saxony, by no less a personage than Erasmus. The project was worthy of the temporizing disposition and vague theology of the highly-gifted scholar. The deep-seated nature of the dispute made such a plan futile. Moreover, the withdrawal of the Bull would have been against the first principles of the Catholic Church; so also would a dispute about matters of faith, submitted to private arbitration, have been a defiance of ecclesiastical authority, which could alone be appealed to. What good could a court of arbitration do, which, as Luther wished, would ask the Church to break with all past traditions concerning her most vital doctrines, her sacraments and institutions? There could be no question of any such understanding or compromise; and this Erasmus’s vague theology quite ignored. He believed so fully in the realization of his idea! that he used all his influence to promote it, and tried to sweep away all that was opposed to it, making use of even the most reprehensible means, “the moral overthrow of Aleander and false representations of his methods”. While Erasmus was casting slurs on Aleander as a false Nuncio and a deceiving Jew, he threw doubts, against his better knowledge, on the validity of the Bull Exsurge. He declared that such a document was quite irreconcilable with the known gentleness of Leo's character, and must therefore have been fabricated, not even in Rome, but by the extremists of Cologne and Louvain. With the greatest success he spread his views as to its invalidity among the people, working for that end not only by private letters and conversation, but also by a craftily worded anonymous publication, and by contributions to the biting pamphlets of Hermann van dem Busche, in which Aleander was threatened with death. Every method, even the most reprehensible, seemed permissible to Erasmus, if only it would enable him to sweep from the face of the earth this Bull, which was so dangerous to his plans. Although he worked mostly in the dark, his schemes did not escape the vigilance of the Papal Nuncio. Late in the autumn he called to account the man who had tried by such underhand means to bring his mission to naught. More than once he expressed his regret to Erasmus at finding that he was the author of the widespread belief that the Bull was either a forgery or fraudulently compiled. Erasmus was compelled to accept the testimony produced by Aleander, and the Nuncio rejected all his excuses so emphatically that the versatile scholar reddened, and stammered “in mortal confusion”.

It appears that, even after the Elector of Saxony showed his hand on the 6th of November, Aleander still believed that he would be able to win him over; for at that time the Nuncio was under a fatal delusion as to the importance of the Lutheran revolt. Even when at Cologne, he said that “he had no slight hopes of victory”. He came face to face with resistance for the first time when, in spite of the strong protest of Erasmus, he ordered a general destruction of Lutheran writings at Mainz. The people protested loudly, and those charged with the burning hesitated. Aleander himself was nearly subjected to violent treatment, and it was only by threats that he carried out his purpose. Before he left the city, he gave directions to the Provincial of the German Dominicans to preach against Luther throughout his province. As the Papal mission proceeded on its way it was much harassed by Hutten’s threats. At Worms, where he arrived on the 30th of November, Aleander passed through still more bitter experiences. Here all his most sanguine hopes were so completely crushed that he fell into the opposite extreme and judged matters perhaps too despondently. “A legion of armed nobles”, he wrote from Worms in the middle of December, “under the leadership of Hutten, were thirsting for the blood of the clergy, and were only waiting their opportunity to break into revolt. The German jurists, both spiritual and secular, were declared Lutherans; still worse, the whole tribe of grammarians and poets maintained that none could have any pretensions to learning, especially in the matter of Greek, unless they renounced the teaching of the Church. He had to suffer the most bitter defamation and calumny from Luther’s followers, Reuchlin and Erasmus; there was a report going about that Hutten and his friends desired his blood; the clergy, with the exception of the parish priests, were infected by the false doctrines, and those who had received preferment from Rome were the worst of all : everywhere the people were carried away blindly by what they heard”.

Aleander placed all his hopes in the Emperor, for, as he wrote to Cardinal de' Medici, there had not been, perhaps for the last thousand years, a prince raised up with better dispositions. His horror was all the greater at learning that Charles V had yielded to the Elector of Saxony’s representations and consented to give Luther a hearing. During Aleander’s absence on the 28th of November, the Emperor had written to the Elector Frederick, telling him to bring Luther with him to the Diet of Worms, so that he might be there examined by learned and well-informed persons. Aleander at once foresaw the full consequences of this step, and did not hesitate to make energetic remonstrances, in which his theological knowledge and his acquaintance with Luther’s writings stood him in good stead. The contention of the imperial party, that a German subject could not be legally condemned without a previous hearing, was set aside by him as of no value. There could be no question, he maintained, of a sentence having been passed without a hearing, for Luther's writings spoke only too plainly for themselves; and matters of false doctrine had always been dealt with in this way. The supreme authority of the Pope overrode any other; on it, according to St. Jerome, depended the safety of the Church, which otherwise would be torn into as many shreds as there were priests. Aleander explained to the Emperor and his counsellors how, according to the most elementary ecclesiastical principles relating to the authority of the Pope, it was not practicable to give another hearing to an open heretic who had been legally condemned by the Holy See, and had refused to retract; it was therefore inadmissible to revive before the Diet, which has no special qualifications for dealing with such matters, a case on which the Pope as the true judge had already pronounced a sentence of condemnation. A further aspect of the affair was that Luther had refused to be judged by any who did not agree with him. Aleander’s arguments did not fail to produce an effect, especially on the Catholic-minded Emperor. Meanwhile the report was spread, presumably through the instrumentality of Eck, that the term of grace of sixty days fixed in the Papal Bull had expired, and that with this Luther’s excommunication had become a fact ; that the places in which he set foot had fallen under an interdict, and that any holding intercourse with him were excommunicate. Hearing this, on December 17th, Charles V revoked his invitation of the 28th of November and told the Elector that only in the event of Luther’s recantation could he be admitted to the neighbourhood of Worms.

This first success on the part of Aleander was soon followed by a second. At his request, the general Council of State determined (Dec. 29) to issue a mandate against Luther applicable to all his followers, to be extended all over the Empire, and to be obeyed under pain of imperial attainder. It was, moreover, directed that a special deputation should be sent to the Elector of Saxony, requesting him, in the name of the Emperor, to take proceedings against Luther. These instructions were drawn up by Aleander. The deputation to the Elector was, however, deferred, as that prince was already on his way to Worms, where the Diet was opened on the 27th of January, 1521. The situation was thereby changed for the worse as regarded Aleander ; for the political considerations which weighed with the States, prevailed more and more in the imperial counsels. They believed that the anti-Papal feeling, which was growing daily in Germany, could only be met slowly and prudently. The Elector Frederick knew how to take advantage of this for the benefit of his protégé. In a letter of the 8th of February, 1 521, Aleander described this change in the situation, and the difficulties which now stood in the way of carrying out the imperial edict against Luther. All Germany was in a state of religious sedition, and nine-tenths of the people were adherents of Luther, while the remainder held the Roman Court in deadly hatred. All were crying out for a General Council, which would help to remove the grievances imposed by the Curia. The most powerful princes favoured this movement; the Emperor alone was staunch to the right side. Aleander then went on to relate how Charles had torn in pieces and thrown on the ground a letter from Luther demanding to have “impartial judges”. The Emperor had taken a personal part in drawing up the imperial edict against Luther, the first draft of which was, after “unbearably fatiguing” discussion, finally agreed to in the beginning of February. This draft simply demanded the carrying out of the Pope's Bull, while Luther was refused a hearing. Aleander hoped to obtain a speedy publication of this edict by the authority of the Emperor, but the Chancellor, Gattinara, and other influential counsellors, declared that such an important question must be submitted to the States.

On the 12th of February Aleander handed to the Emperor the Bull of the 3rd of January, which declared the term fixed for Luther’s submission to have expired, and consequently pronounced excommunication on him. At the same time a Papal Brief requested the Emperor to issue an edict which would secure the execution of the Pope’s sentence. Charles V explained that it was the opinion of his Council that the States must not be ignored in a matter of such importance. But in order to incline them to accept the edict, he charged Aleander to appear at the Diet next morning and put forward the Papal demands without any reserve.

On the 13th of February, when Charles V and all the States, with the exception of the Elector of Saxony, were assembled, the Abbot of Fulda read out the message of the Pope to the Emperor, requesting him, as Protector of the Church, to put into execution, by a public edict, the sentence passed on Luther by the Holy See. Aleander then rose to confirm this request, which put into words the only possible conclusion that the Pope could have arrived at. Luther, he declared, was endeavouring, as the Bohemians had done before, to overthrow, in the name of the Gospel, both the ecclesiastical and secular governments in Germany. He had gone so far in writing as to exhort his readers to wash their hands in the blood of the clergy; the Pope and the Universities of Cologne and Louvain had condemned his errors. He showed how numerous and terrible these were by quoting several strongly-worded passages; he also proved that Luther appealed without sanction to Holy Scripture in favour of his doctrines. The Nuncio contested, on solid grounds, the opinion of those who wished Luther to have a hearing at Worms. “All-gracious Emperor”, he cried, “how can a man be heard who has openly declared that he refuses to be taught by any, not even by an angel from heaven; and that he desires nothing better than excommunication? Luther has appealed from the decision of the Apostolic See to a General Council; yet he says publicly that Hus was unjustly condemned at Constance. Therefore I ask to know by whom he can be heard and judged”.

Aleander’s speech before the Diet is a masterpiece. He spoke for several hours, quickly, fluently, with Italian vivacity, and altogether most ably, and with complete control of his subject. The impression produced by it was the more permanent because many who heard it had not been aware before how entirely Luther had given up the most fundamental doctrines of the Church. Aleander pursued his advantage with great vigour. During the lengthy and excited discussion which followed— in the course of which the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg nearly came to blows—he, zealously backed up by Caracciolo, did all he could to carry the point that Luther should be refused a hearing at Worms. His adversaries were, however, quite as zealous and active as he. “Were not the Emperor so well-disposed”, he wrote, “we must have lost the day. The Chancellor, Gattinara, considers it quite hopeless to fight the heresy without a Council. Charles’s confessor, Glapion, dreads a general conflagration; the princes are full of indecision, and the prelates full of fear. Everything is in such a state of confusion that, unless God help us, the wisdom of men will be of no avail”.

The situation was further confused by the action of the strongly Catholic Duke George of Saxony, who brought forward the question of the German grievances against the Roman government of the Church. He did this with the best intentions, thinking thus to obtain a freer hand to defend the greater interests of the Church connected with faith. The Emperor, however, dissuaded him from mixing up the Lutheran affair, which concerned faith, with grievances and abuses, for the redress of which he undertook to approach the Pope. Meanwhile, to Aleander’s great vexation, Charles’s counsellors advised him to temporize. They represented to the Emperor that, on account of the political complications with the States, the greatest possible caution was necessary in regard to this question. They convinced the Emperor that he must use consideration in the matter. With regard to the excited state of public opinion, the States, on the 19th of February, rejected the severe edict by which Luther was condemned unheard. In place of this they suggested that he should be provided with a safe-conduct and summoned to appear before the Diet. He was, it is true, to be asked whether he would retract his doctrines, as being opposed to the Holy Catholic Faith: if he consented, he was to be given a hearing and fairly met on other points, namely, the grievances connected with the abuses of the Roman Court. If, on the contrary, he refused to retract his errors, the Emperor would at once issue, throughout the Empire, an edict against him as a heretic.

Charles V consented to this proposal on the 2nd of March; at the same time, he stated in writing that he would be ready to take counsel with the States, in a friendly and gracious spirit, about the Roman grievances and abuses, and discuss the means of their redress. The draft of an edict was appended to this answer, by which Luther was required to make a retractation, and, in case of refusal, be subjected to severe measures. In the meantime, his writings were to be everywhere destroyed.

On the 6th of March the States rejected the draft of this edict, and, consequently, the Emperor, on the same day, gave a safe-conduct to Luther. “God grant”, said Aleander in a spirit of resignation, “that his coming before the Diet may bring peace to the Church”. After an attempt to put the responsibility of Luther’s summons on the Elector of Saxony’s shoulders, frustrated by Frederick’s repudiation of any such thing, the Emperor issued the citation himself. He, however, expressed his personal views in an edict issued on the 26th of March, by which the confiscation of all Lutheran writings was commanded on his own authority, without further consultation with the States.

Thereupon Ulrich von Hutten sent a threatening letter to the Emperor, containing a warning against the Romans, as well as abusive invective against all the princes of the Church who were taking part in the Diet. Still more bitter were his letters, full of slanders and threats, to the Papal Nuncios, Aleander and Caracciolo, whom he styled the most reprobate of deceivers, and the most violent of robbers. He threatened Aleander personally, and said he would do all he could to see him annihilated. The Nuncios thereupon begged for the protection of the Emperor against any attempt on their lives, which would have been a transgression of international law. But Charles himself was not surrounded by armed men. As he was still making use of Sickingen’s services, he could not call Hutten to account, but was rather inclined to purchase his silence by an income of four hundred gulden. On the 8th of April Hutten sent an apology to the Emperor, in which, nevertheless, he made a violent attack on the Nuncio. “We cannot”, wrote Aleander on the 15th of April, “make it sufficiently clear to the imperialists, in a friendly way, how shameful it is to tolerate such proceedings, and not to concede to us means of redress. They only shrug their shoulders and lament that, under present conditions, they are unable to act otherwise through lack of soldiers. In truth Sickingen is now the only sovereign in Germany ; the other princes fold their hands, the prelates tremble and let themselves be snared like rabbits, while the whole world is crying death to the priests”.

On the 1 6th of April the “arch-heretic”, as Aleander styled Luther, arrived at Worms. On the following day the first examination took place before the Emperor and the Diet. Luther admitted that he had written the books which were produced, and which Aleander had procured. To the other questions put to him by the Treves official, Johann von der Ecken, as to whether he would retract the false doctrines contained in them, he replied “in such a low voice that even those close to him could scarcely hear”, and requested more time for consideration. This was granted to him, but only until the following day. Next day he boldly defended his writings in a long speech delivered in Latin and German. In it he inveighed against the tyranny of the Pope, and called Rome the flaying-ground of Christendom. In a skilful reply the Treves official pointed out that nearly all Luther's doctrines had been already condemned by the Council of Constance. “Martin”, he cried to him, “follow the dictates of your conscience, as you are bound to do ; then will you certainly and un hesitatingly retract your errors. You will not be able to prove to me that Councils have erred in matters of faith”. But Luther positively refused to retract anything, unless he were first convinced of his error by the Holy Ghost or by plain reason, for, said he, Popes as well as Councils have often erred and have contradicted each other.

Aleander did not sit as the Pope’s representative during Luther’s examination, although he continued to work actively in the interests of the Church. He had with much skill made out the scheme of the examination, had inspired the questions to be put to Luther, and the answers to be given by the Treves official, and had checked the tendency to dispute. Before long he was to find out that his representations to the Emperor had fallen on fruitful soil. On the very next day, April 19, Charles made a declaration, written by himself and spoken in French, that he was ready to lay down his life and crown for the maintenance of the religion of his fathers, and for the extirpation of the heresy so obstinately held to by this erring monk, in opposition to the whole of Christendom; and he regretted that he had I not sooner taken measures to repress it. The safe-conduct given to Luther should be respected, nevertheless he could not be allowed to sow sedition among the people. As to what further proceedings he could take against Luther as a convicted heretic, he must wait for the States to express an opinion consistent with their duty as Christians, and in accordance with the promise made by them on the 19th of February. After this vigorous address of the Emperor’s, the sanguine Aleander believed that the victory was gained. But in the night Luther’s followers fixed up a manifesto on the door of the Council-chamber, in which they threatened to pass on the word to the seditious peasants. The Archbishop of Mainz was seized with such terror that he begged the Emperor and princes to reopen negotiations with Luther. Charles made merry over his cowardice; but the majority of the States were so intimidated that they besought the Emperor to consent to Luther’s being called before a small commission of learned men, who would inform him as to the articles in which he had erred. Charles once more yielded, in regard to the dispute going on between the supreme court and the imperial chamber. But all attempts to induce Luther to recant were of no avail. “He can be convinced neither by persuasion nor argument”, Aleander said in his report to Rome, “for he will accept no judge and rejects all Councils, considering nothing valid except the words of the Bible interpreted by himself, for he rejects all other interpretations as inadequate”.

The Nuncios once more breathed freely when, all discussions having been broken off, Charles compelled Luther to leave Worms on the 26th of April.  This state of affairs had been provided for in the declaration of the States on the 19th of February and the 20th of April. By Luther’s refusal to recant, the Emperor was set free to issue an imperial edict in defence of the Catholic Faith, on his own authority. By the desire of Charles, Aleander drew up this important deed on May the 1st. The Nuncio worked all night, and was able to submit his draft on the following morning; though it was then submitted to, and revised by, the imperial council. On the 8th of May he obtained an order through the imperial cabinet for the immediate preparation of the edict. However, when the document was brought to him for signature, Charles declared that it must be first made known to the States. Aleander and Caracciolo were at first equally alarmed by this, but they soon perceived that this precaution was solely in order not to exasperate certain princes inclined to Lutheranism, and thus avoid injury to the proposals contained in the edict.

The surmise was correct. In spite of all the pressure put on him by the Nuncios, the Emperor, from reasons of political prudence, refused to act until his demands had been passed by the Diet. Aleander meanwhile worked in every possible way, in conjunction with Caracciolo, to promote the issue of the edict by the States, in accordance with the Emperor’s repeated promises. Charles kept his word. On the 25th of May he had his edict solemnly read in the presence of a number of Electors and princes, after which Joachim of Brandenburg declared that it was accepted unanimously. The States also accepted it with equal unanimity. All ambiguity had vanished. Even though all the States were not present at the reading, the validity of the edict was not affected. The reading before the States, and still more its discussion, were unnecessary, for, in accordance with the resolution passed by the Diet on the 19th of February, the Emperor> was entitled, in the event of Luther’s refusing to recant, to issue just such an edict, assuming it to have been passed by the States.

The news that the edict had been passed by the Diet caused great joy among Luther’s enemies, and great confusion among his followers. Aleander did not close his eyes all night, partly from the effects of joyful excitement, partly from fear of counter-intrigues. He did not feel secure until the Emperor< had signed the document on the 12th of May. “Blessed be the Most Holy Trinity”, wrote the Nuncio to Rome, “on whose Feast the greatest means of overcoming the evil, which human reason can conceive, has been given to us. The converting of hearts, and setting men in the right way, belongs to God alone. He will not forsake us”. The imperial mandate, which is known to the world as the Edict of Worms condemned Luther in the severest terms, and placed him under the ban of the Empire, with the command that all his writings be destroyed. The edict declared that he disseminated evil fruits; that he violated the number, rite, and use of the sacraments; that he denied the inviolable bond of matrimony; that he uttered shameful calumnies against the Pope, despised the priesthood, and incited the laity to wash their hands in the blood of priests. He taught that man had no free-will, and encouraged a life without law, as he had proved by destroying all its hallowed safeguards and burning the books of canon law. He drew contempt on all Councils, especially that of Constance, which had, to its everlasting honour, restored peace and unity to the German nation, calling it the “synagogue of Satan”, and all those who took part, in it “antichrists and murderers”. “Like the spirit of evil in a monk’s habit”, he united in himself heresies new and old; under a semblance of preaching the faith, he tried to destroy the one true faith; and under pretence of preaching the Gospel, he destroyed all evangelical peace, love, and order.

On the 29th of May Aleander witnessed the carrying out of the imperial instructions at Worms, by the arrangements made there for burning all Luther’s writings. Two days later he and Caracciolo, in obedience to instructions received from Rome, went down the Rhine to Cologne in the Emperor’s suite.

Aleander’s activity did not cease yet, and he showed the utmost zeal in carrying out the edict throughout the Empire proper, as well as in the Netherlands, where he dwelt for the most part. It was largely owing to his discreet and indefatigable efforts that the religious innovations were almost entirely suppressed in that country. Aleander was still there when Leo X died. By this event he failed to receive the reward which he had so richly deserved by his untiring energy in the interests of the Church. He had remained unmoved at his post in a foreign land, though exposed to the most violent and venomous attacks from his former friends the humanists. He had endured hardships and physical sufferings of every sort, and at times his life had been in danger. He had, indeed, moments of despondency, especially when he did not consider himself sufficiently supported by Rome. But these were only passing phases; and on the whole he carried on his warfare against the religious innovators with wonderful endurance, ardent zeal, and great prudence and ability. Nothing could have surpassed his zeal against the heretics, which led him, highly-cultivated man as he was, to the use of very abusive language. This is much to be regretted, however great the aggravation to which he was subjected. In fact, he succumbed in this to the custom of his age quite as much as if he had succumbed to the practice of bribery.

Owing to his excitable and violent temperament, Aleander’s judgment of events was often at fault. The greatest mistake he made was that of at times attributing the strength of the Lutheran movement to base and material motives: in this he showed himself a true child of the Renaissance. Consequently he trusted too much to being able to stem the movement by marks of favour and a generous expenditure of money and was therefore untiring in his efforts to win over individuals. He cannot be reproached with the disappointment which awaited the hopes he had based on the issue of the Edict of Worms. No one could have foreseen future developments. Not only Aleander, but all other contemporaries, saw in stringent measures the only way of dealing with the very precarious state of things. Nevertheless, however much Aleander might believe in the efficacy of violent and material methods, he was too clear-sighted to ignore the importance of the use of spiritual weapons. His endeavours to make use of these are shown in a letter which he wrote to Cardinal Medici on the 5th of April, 1521. “I say openly to our poets and rhetoricians”, he says, “whose action consists in elaborating verses a month long, and in abusing each other all for the sake of some miserable word, let them be unanimous in defending our faith in their writings. They could accomplish great things by their understanding and capabilities; they could put these shriekers to silence who, with their gifts of narrative and poetry, set themselves up before the multitude as if they had quite succeeded in trampling on theology. Excommunication could make no sort of impression on them, for they only mock at it. Here is a case of driving one wedge on the top of another, and of fighting these people with their own weapons. Would that the Pope, through the intercession of Your Eminence, would, by praise and reward, encourage men of talent to make an intelligent study of Scripture, and put their pens to work, after the example of the Germans, in defence of the faith. In this work God would assist them. There is no need of great Doctor of Theology to refute these knaves for, as we have seen, they refuse to learn anything of such. I am far from meaning that the antagonists of error should be devoid of a deep knowledge of Holy Scripture; but even in so important a matter much depends on literary facility.” Here we can see how Aleander, as a true humanist, expected less from profound learning than from a skilful use of literature. It was, it is true, a gross delusion to expect lasting results in this great contest from the Roman humanists; but the principle was right that the enemy must be fought with his own weapons, and that the anticatholic literature must be met by one of the same kind, only on the side of truth. To the honour of Aleander are the unceasing warnings he addressed to the Curia to redress the abuses, which he pointed out with the greatest candour. He adjured the Pope to do away with the number of reservations and dispensations, to revoke the abrogation of the Concordat with Germany, to reform the scandals connected with the Roman Court, to put a curb on the benefice-hunters, and to restore ecclesiastical discipline. Though these warnings were but too often neglected, they make known to us the man who, as Papal Nuncio to the Emperor, served the Holy See with a fiery devotion, and was the immediate precursor of the great Catholic reformers, to whom he ultimately attached himself.

CHAPTER IX

ALLIANCE OF THE POPE WITH THE EMPEROR CHARLES V.

WHILE the Emperor was issuing his Edict against Luther, his political alliance with the Pope was concluded. But many changes had taken place before this was accomplished.

Leo X had been driven by sheer necessity to his final consent to the election of Charles to the Imperial throne; though, after his consent, he feared the Emperor’s ascend any more than ever. Charles and Francis were eager competitors for the favour of the Pope whose partisanship was all-important to each in the approaching struggle, which was to be fought out principally in Italy. It seemed scarcely doubtful which side Leo X would take; for, though originally his sympathies were with Spain, now the power of the Empire filled him with aversion and fear.

To the Medici Pope, like so many of his predecessors, the idea of a supremacy, such as the Hohenstaufen had ere now striven for, was like a living nightmare. The necessity for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, by which alone the independence of the Holy See and the “liberty of Italy” could be secured, drove Leo at once into the ranks of the enemies of the Hapsburg. Hence the plan of forestalling the Emperor’s journey to Rome by aggression; hence the idea of a great anti-Imperial league with France, Venice, England, and the Swiss. England, however, showed no inclination to be drawn into any such alliance ; consequently, a smaller league between the Pope, France, and Venice was contemplated. But as the two last-named powers cautiously held back, the Pope also withdrew, having no inclination to step alone into the breach. He was, however, most eager to be on friendly terms with France, and in this wish there is no doubt that his designs on Ferrara played an obvious part. The suppression of the Duke, his insubordinate vassal, which had, ever since the time of Julius II, been an important item of the Papal policy, appeared to Leo to be more urgent than ever, because, not only at the time of the French invasion in 1515, but also during the war of Urbino, Duke Alfonso had made common cause with the enemies of the Holy See. Moreover, the subjection of Ferrara appeared to be especially desirable at this juncture, for Leo X was convinced that only by an increase of the States of the Church was an end to be put to the critical position they occupied between the two great powers of Europe. Conscious of his own weakness, no choice had been hitherto left to him except that of vacillating between these two powers, or of attaching himself to one of them, at the risk of being reduced to a state of servile dependence. After the possessions of the Church had been increased, on the death of Lorenzo, by the annexation of the Duchy of Urbino and Pesaro, the only thing wanting to enable the Holy See to defend itself from friend and foe alike was the acquisition of Ferrara.

Venice and France were the natural enemies of such a predominance of the States of the Church in Central Italy, and Alfonso knew very well that he could count on the assistance of both these powers. Nevertheless it now seemed as if France were willing to abandon so faithful and warlike an ally as Duke Alfonso. In September, 1519, a treaty, which was to be kept absolutely secret, was made between Leo and the new French Ambassador, Saint-Marceau, by which the former pledged himself to defend the interests of France with his weapons, both temporal and spiritual, and to refuse to Charles the investiture with the crown of Naples in conjunction with that of the Empire. On his side Francis I promised to defend the States of the Church with all his might against Charles, and all insubordinate vassals. This last clause obviously referred to Ferrara, and Francis hesitated for a long time before agreeing to it. However, he at last consented, and the treaty was signed on the 22nd of October.

Charles V, who knew nothing about this secret treaty, was all the time eagerly carrying on negotiations with the Pope, who understood how to keep him in hand by holding out hopes of a favourable agreement. But as soon as the co-operation of Francis had been apparently won by the treaty of October, Leo X. wished to make use of the advantages offered by the situation. Nevertheless, chiefly on account of Venice, he did not dare to take open measures against Ferrara, and therefore had recourse to subterfuges. Without at first rousing any suspicion in Alfonso’s mind, the Pope instigated a sudden attack on the Duke's capital by those whom he had banished from Ferrara. However, the watchfulness of the Marquis of Mantua frustrated the attempt. Fortune was more propitious to the Pope in the measures taken by him against the petty tyrants of the Marches of Ancona and Umbria, who had unlawfully usurped a power exceeding that which had belonged to their predecessors. The constant complaints of the people who were oppressed by these unscrupulous and riotous despots had for some time been calling for repressive measures. In March, 1520, Leo considered that the right moment had come for these to be taken ; and ere long the tyrants of the Marches trembled before the energy which he displayed against them. Giovanni de' Medici was commissioned to combine with the Bishop of Chiusi, Niccolò Bonafede, the Governor of the Marches, to reduce to subjection the Lord of Fermo, Lodovico Uffreducci, son of the criminal Oliverotto, who had been treacherously put to death by Cesare Borgia. Lodovico defended himself like a valiant condottiere, but lost both lands and life in an engagement at Monte Giorgio. Fermo then returned to the immediate dominion of the Pope, and the surrounding places banished Uffreducci’s representatives. Several of the petty tyrants of the Marches met with the same fate ; two, the Lords of Recanati and Fabriano, were put to death; in Benevento the supremacy of Ettore Severiano was destroyed. The means used for ridding the Marches of these evil rulers must be condemned as equivocal and wholly unworthy of a Pope ; nevertheless, “the country rejoiced at the result”. Niccolò Bonafede did all he could to restore peace and order; and the government of the Papal officials proved to be “infinitely better than that of the lawless barons”.

It fared even worse with the despot of Perugia, Giampaolo Baglioni, than with Uffreducci. Leo X had vainly tried to attach him to his person; but Giampaolo had met all his friendly advances with contempt. During the Urbino war his attitude was more than suspicious; and during the trial of Cardinal Petrucci a letter came to light which revealed his complicity in the conspiracy. The endless brawls in the house of Baglioni gave the Pope, in March, 1520, the desired opportunity of interfering, and destroying the power of this dangerous and disloyal vassal. Giampaolo was summoned to Rome to give an account of the banishment from Perugia of his cousin Gentile and the execution of his followers. Giampaolo, who was aware of his guilt, would not obey the summons, but sent his son Malatesta to Rome instead. He charged him to find out whether any serious action were really to be feared on the part of the Pope. But so skilful was Leo in hiding his real intentions, that Giampaolo was persuaded by his friends, especially by Camillo Orsini, to go to Rome. He openly trusted to the protection of that powerful noble, who had just before married his daughter. There is no proof that the Pope gave him a safe-conduct.

On the 16th of March Giampaolo entered Rome with a magnificent retinue, including several of the Orsini. Next day he waited on the Pope, who was in the Castle of St. Angelo ; where, as soon as he entered the gate, the Castellan had him arrested. The Governor of Rome tried him, and both Cardinals Bibbiena and Armellini urged that he should suffer the extreme punishment of the law. When the news of what had occurred reached Perugia, his friends there considered him as already “more dead than alive”. In Rome his execution was generally expected; though there were some who thought that if he renounced all claim to the government of Perugia, he might be set at liberty. However, the position of the prisoner was aggravated, and the conditions of his captivity made more severe, on account of the discovery of a plot of his to stir up a revolution in the Marches of Ancona. There upon his sons fled to the Abruzzi and thence to Venice. Horrible revelations came to light in the course of the trial, in addition to the offences already brought against him. Sources above suspicion relate that Giampaolo was found guilty of coining, murder, and bloodshed. In any case the accused deserved the punishment of death, which was carried out in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of June. Giampaolo, who consoled himself in prison by reading Ariosto’s “Orlando Furioso”, died a penitent sinner. Gentile Baglioni, who had been banished by him, received his possessions. Perugia retained only a nominal liberty, the Legate, Silvio Passerini, Cardinal of Cortona, being the actual governor.

During these events, negotiations for the forming of a triple alliance between the Pope, France, and Venice fell through because of the refusal of the Signoria to accept the clause agreed to by Francis I in October, relating to the co-operation against the Pope’s insubordinate vassals, or, in other words, against Ferrara.

It was most important that just at this crisis Charles V should have sent a new Ambassador to Rome in the person of the Castilian, Juan Manuel, who had “grown grey in diplomacy”, and proved to be as astute as he was energetic. Being provided with full instructions, far-reaching powers, and plenty of money, Juan Manuel entered Rome with great pomp on the 11th of April, 152O. The Pope received him very amicably, and Cardinal Medici invited him to dwell in his palace at the Cancelleria. Manuel presented the draft of a treaty, with the proviso that not one word of it was to be altered. But more than a year went by before any agreement was effected. In the general obscurity of the situation it cannot cause surprise that the Pope should for some time have vacillated between Charles and Francis. If at last he decided in favour of the Emperor, and against Francis, it was less on account of the prospect held out by an alliance with the former of an increase of the States of the Church, than because of two other momentous reasons, namely, the extreme imprudence of the French King, and the consideration of the blow given to the authority of the Pope by the Lutheran movement in Germany.

The first disturbance in the relations between Rome and France came at the beginning of 1520, in consequence of the illegal pretensions of Francis I to the guardianship of Catherine de' Medici. Cardinal Bibbiena, who had just returned from France seems to have smoothed over this misunderstanding ; but Leo X soon had fresh reasons for complaint against his confederate. While carrying on his negotiations for forming a league between Rome, France, and Venice, he learned to his bitter experience that Francis had no intention of keeping his word and renouncing his patronage of the Duke of Ferrara. Moreover, the spirit in which the French King meant to keep his solemn pledges in regard to the Turkish war, was revealed when the Pope asked his help on behalf of Rhodes, upon which the Sultan Selim was meditating an attack. Francis flatly refused all assistance.

Moreover, constant complaints came from Milan of the French encroachments on the rights of the Church. Almost as if these offences gave him the right to ask for more favours, Francis I was forever seeking for fresh concessions ; and if these were not at once granted, he used the most violent threats. In the autumn of 1520 he showed so little consideration towards the Pope that his imprudence can cause nothing but surprise. First, he demanded the prolongation by five years of the office of Legate in France for Cardinal Gouffier de Boissy. Not content with obtaining this extraordinary concession, he took the opportunity of trying to enforce the discontinuance of his protection of the rights of the Legate of Avignon. In vain did the Pope make friendly remonstrances through his Nuncios, Staffileo and Rucellai. In vain did he comply with the King's demands so far as to remove the written clause in the stipulation, and allow the word of Francis to suffice. Suggestions were bandied about on both sides from September to December without any agreement being arrived at. But even while this dispute was going on, Francis I picked another quarrel with the Holy See. He suddenly forbade the proclamation in France of the Bull of Maundy Thursday, with the command that whoever attempted to carry it out “should be drowned”. “The Pope”, wrote Cardinal Medici to the French Nuncio, “thinks it better to make no reply to this threat, lest he be carried away by anger. Therefore, should the King repeat the intimation in your presence, you must reply pleasantly that such a threat is not likely to make the Sacred College anxious to comply with other requests of his, whether it be about a Cardinal’s hat or anything else”. This last remark led to another quarrel, which burst out at the beginning of the year.

At this time Charles V asked for the red hat for the Bishop of Liege, Eberhard de la Mark ; while almost simultaneously Francis requested the same for his relative, Jean d'Orleans, Archbishop of Toulouse. Hearing of the petition of the Emperor, the French King declared that on no account would he consent to the elevation to the purple of the Bishop of Liege, who was his mortal enemy. Consequently, Leo X tried to persuade Charles to renounce the candidature which was so hateful to France, and accept instead the nomination of Eberhard to the Archbishopric of Valencia. As this compromise was not accepted, the Pope offered two other cardinals’ hats, but neither to this alternative would the Emperor consent. Thereupon the Pope tried to conciliate Francis by the promise of the appointment of two French Cardinals if he would give up his opposition to the elevation of Eberhard de la Mark. But this proposal was declined. Francis maintained his pretensions that the Pope must make no appointment against his wishes, even at the risk of a quarrel being caused between Charles and the Holy See. The French King carried his arrogance still further by requiring of the Pope a declaration of his intentions toward the Duke of Ferrara, and demanding the restoration of Modena and Reggio to that prince. In vain did the King's best friend, the prudent Cardinal Bibbiena, warn him against going too far; Francis remained firm in his contention that on no account should Eberhard be made a Cardinal.

In the autumn, Leo X believed that he had at last found a way of pacifying the exacting French King. A Consistory was held on the I7th of September, at which the requests for Cardinals’ hats made by the Emperor, France, and England were considered. The Pope proposed that Jean d'Orleans, Archbishop of Toulouse, should be raised to the purple ; and this was the only elevation decided on. The publication of this decision was left in the hands of His Holiness. As regarded the promotion of the Bishop of Liege, Leo X declared emphatically that he would grant it only subject to the consent of Francis I.

Charles V alone could have found cause for complaint in this last concession to France. Judge then the astonishment of the Pope when, not Charles, but Francis, made a grievance of it! The French King and his adherents in Rome believed that, owing to the revolt of the towns in Spain, the whole of the world, including the Pope, was in their hands. Acting in this spirit, Francis I declared that the fact of the Pope having spoken at all—especially in Consistory— about the elevation of the Bishop of Liege, was an attack on his own person. Leo X had remained unmoved in the face of the continuous and complete want of consideration on the part of France; but his anger was all the more violent now. Instead of gratitude for his concessions, he received nothing but the most outrageous complaints and injurious threats. Never, during his whole Pontificate, had His Holiness been so incensed, wrote Cardinal Medici to the French Nuncio, Rucellai. The Pope repudiated the idea of such servitude as forbade to him freedom of speech even with the College of Cardinals. Obviously the elevation to the purple of the Archbishop of Toulouse was now postponed. Nevertheless no formal breach with France ensued; on the contrary, it seemed to the uninitiated that, in spite of all differences, the relations between France and Leo X were closer than ever. But in his inmost heart the Pope had turned his back for good and all on Francis I.

Unmistakable facts had convinced Leo X that the French “were as unbearable as allies as they were formidable as enemies.” This bitter though dearly-bought experience ripened in the Pope’s mind the resolution he had formed to regain the temporal and spiritual independence of the Holy See by driving the French out of Italy. There were many other reasons in favour of an alliance with the Emperor, the chief of which was that his help was indispen­sable against the anti-Papal Lutheran revolt in Germany. Probably the skilful and prudent Cardinal Bibbiena might have still found means to reconcile the Pope to Francis I, but at this crucial moment that most zealous champion of French interests at the Roman Court was laid low by an illness which was ere long to carry him to his grave. He died on the 9th of November, 1520.

So as to be ready for any event, the Pope decided, in October, to take into his service six thousand Swiss mercenaries. On the 2nd of that month he told the Imperial Ambassador Manuel that he had sent to his Nuncio and Raffaello de' Medici the draft of a new alliance with the Emperor. The scheme was that of an offensive alliance against France, such, indeed, as was with few alterations carried out eight months later. As a proof of his sincerity, Leo X offered that a man trusted by the German Ambassador should be hidden under a bed during the negotiations which Saint-Marceau, the new Envoy of Francis I, was to carry on with the Pope.

Saint-Marceau, who relieved the less capable Morette, arrived in Rome on the 17th of October, 1520. His proposals were startling. Francis I, they ran, wished to conquer Naples, not for himself, but for a third party. As a bait to the Pope he offered to him a portion of the kingdom of Naples and Ferrara. The negotiations, based on this, dragged on till the end of January, 1521. At last a secret agreement was made that the Pope should accept Ferrara and a strip of the Neapolitan coast extending as far as the Garigliano, while the kingdom of Naples proper should go to the second son of Francis I. In return Francis was given facilities for passing through the lines of the six thousand Swiss mercenaries, the half of whose pay he undertook to provide.

Francis I had no idea of carrying out what he thus pledged himself to do. For a long time he had been lending a willing ear to those who advised him to weaken, as far as possible, the Papal power in Italy. He did not intend that either the portion of the Neapolitan coast or the Duchy of Ferrara should fall to the Pope's share; on the contrary, the French Court planned the complete dismemberment of the States of the Church. After Leo X had helped with the conquest of Naples, the strip of sea-coast mentioned in the agreement was to be given to Venice. At the same time the Medici ascendancy in Florence was to be overthrown, and the separation of Bologna, Perugia, and the Romagna from the States of the Church effected by placing them under the rule of different small dynasties. The details of these projects were only very partially known to Leo X, but he suspected double-dealing on the part of the French King, and fought him with his own weapons.

Nearly at the same time as the Pope was carrying on these secret transactions with Saint-Marceau, he was negotiating with the Emperor's representative ; in fact a repetition was going on of the double-dealing policy of January, 1519. On the 11th of December, 1520, Leo X exchanged with Manuel a written assurance that for three months neither party had concluded any agreement contrary to the interests of the other, and that he would not do so during the next three months. This pledge was renewed sometime between the middle of March, 1521, and the end of April, notwithstanding the secret treaty between the Pope and France made in January. With the utmost skill the diplomatic Medici had once more succeeded in coming to an agreement with both rivals at once. As soon as the six thousand Swiss had arrived in the Papal States, which should be at the beginning of April, the Pope could make his irrevocable decision with more security. That this final decision was adverse to France was mostly the French King’s own fault, for instead of binding the Pope to him territorially, he had in his blindness driven him into the arms of his antagonist.

The agreement with France was to be carried out only after the adhesion to it of Venice; and while this was being negotiated, the Pope became more and more doubtful whether the promise of the French King to help him to conquer Ferrara had any sincerity in it. This state of uncertainty estranged him from Francis, and drove him further towards the Emperor. Each day the necessity of the help of the latter for the suppression of the Lutheran revolt became more apparent to him.

As soon as he arrived in Rome, Manuel recognized the importance of the anti-Papal movement in Germany as a factor in the Pope’s attitude towards Charles. As early as the 12th of May, 1520, he gave his Imperial master the advice to refrain, during his visit to Germany, from any marks of favour towards a certain monk known as Brother Martin, or the Elector Frederick of Saxony. Leo had, he said, quite an extraordinary fear of Brother Martin, for he preached against the Pope, and was considered to be very learned. Manuel thought that this might be turned to account in compelling Leo to conclude a treaty ; though he was of opinion that such pressure should be applied only in the event of the Pope’s hesitating to sign or else breaking the treaty. It is not known what Charles replied to this piece of advice. In Manuel’s reports up to the end of December there is a great deal said about a political alliance between Pope and Emperor, but no mention of the Lutheran affair ; though it is fair to say that we do not possess all the reports. It cannot therefore be said with certainty whether Manuel did use the weapon which this religious revolt afforded against the Pope. It is not at all improbable that an unprincipled politician like the German representative should, even without the explicit consent of his master, utilize, in the course of the protracted negotiations, a circumstance which proved the Pope’s absolute dependence on the assistance of the Emperor in this important matter. He would, however, have been certain to use the weapon with diplomatic prudence, employing hints, covert, though not difficult to interpret. After the adverse judgment had fallen on Luther in June, the Pope himself could not fail to see how much depended in this affair on the attitude of the Emperor. However, although the news from Germany became more and more alarming, Leo X was such an experienced diplomatist that he carefully avoided anything which could betray his great need of help.

That at that time he desired the favour of the Emperor, is shown by his tenacity about the idea of raising the Bishop of Liege to the purple, in spite of the obstinate resistance and threats of Francis. The same spirit was shown by the granting of certain concessions demanded by Charles about Briefs which hampered the action of the Inquisition in Aragon. That Leo complied unwillingly is shown by the gradual manner of his consent. On the 12th of December, 1520, he declared his willingness to partially withdraw the Briefs in question; but only on the 16th of January, 1521, did he consent to do so entirely. On the 13th of December, 1520, Manuel was nevertheless able to send the Emperor the much-desired Brief against Antonio de Acuña, Bishop of Zamora, who was implicated in the Spanish revolt.

Meanwhile the Emperor had loyally carried out the anti-Lutheran Bull in the Netherlands. At his coronation at Aix on the 23rd of October, he swore to hold fast by the Holy Catholic Faith as delivered to the Apostles, and to show due submission and fidelity to the Pope and Holy Roman See. A few days later the Archbishop of Mainz read aloud a Papal Brief to the effect that the Pope had given to the King, as formerly to Maximilian I, the title of “Emperor-elect of the Romans”.

On the 14th of November Leo X answered the letter of Charles, written on the day of his coronation, by which he notified that event : “As there are two planets in heaven”. the Pope said, “the sun and the moon, which surpass in brilliancy all the stars, so are there two great dignitaries on earth, the Pope and the Emperor, to whom all other princes are subject and owe obedience”. The letter ended by an exhortation to Charles to remain a loyal son of the Church. There seemed no doubt that Charles would fulfil his whole duty as protector of the Church, as far as the Lutheran movement was concerned. “The Emperor”, Aleander reports from Cologne at the beginning of November, “does not let himself be led away by Hutten's anti-Roman agitation ; he stands firm on our side”. Aleander had nothing but good to report about the Catholic zeal of the Archbishops of Mainz, Treves, and Cologne. With his usual optimism, he believed that he would even be able to come round the Elector of Saxony.

This and the other news from Germany had such a soothing effect in Rome that a deceptive security prevailed. On the 3rd of December, 1520, Cardinal Medici wrote to Aleander a letter full of joyful praise, congratulating him on the activity he had shown, and thanking him, in the name of the Pope, for the welcome news he sent of the good dispositions of the Germans, and their devotion to the Holy See, as shown by their attitude towards the new Arius or Mahomet, “whom might God bring to a right mind”. But to these glowing reports of Aleander’s there succeeded others which caused much anxiety. It was with amazement that Rome learned the proportions which the anti-Roman movement had assumed in Germany. Very great alarm was caused by the intelligence that the good intentions of the young Emperor were hampered by political considerations, and the temporizing spirit of his immediate surroundings. Consternation was caused by Aleander’s news that his efforts to obtain an imperial mandate against Lutheran books had been met by a decided refusal from the imperialists, who maintained that Luther must be heard and must be allowed to appeal to the Diet. The Pope ignored this, and at the end of December proposed to Manuel that Luther should receive a safe-conduct to Rome, where a body of men should be selected to speak and dispute with him.

Meanwhile the term set for Luther’s recantation had expired, and the Pope issued a new Bull against him on the 3rd of January, 1521. By it the excommunication threatened in June was now pronounced, because of the obstinate persistence in error of himself and his followers; and the places in which he resided were placed under an interdict. In the middle of January there arrived news of the successful results which Aleander had obtained from the Emperor on the 29th of December. The news also came that, by burning the Bull Exsurge and the books of canon law, Luther had given the signal of war to the death. On the 18th of January 1521, the Pope sent to the Emperor a formal and urgent request to have the Bull of excommunication against Luther published, and a general edict issued for its execution throughout Germany. Let the Emperor, so ran this Brief, the work of Sadoleto, remember the example of earlier Emperors, who always fought against heresy. Let him also remember how God had blessed him, young as he was, and had confided to him the sword of the greatest power in the world. He wore it in vain if he did not employ it against infidels and heretics. Similar letters were sent to Charles's confessor, Glapion, and several princes of the Empire. In sending these letters on the 28th of January, Cardinal Medici declared that the Pope and the Sacred College were full of praise of the holy zeal shown by the Emperor in this affair, which was so near to all their hearts alike. On the same occasion Aleander was sent a bill of exchange which was nearly as welcome to him as were the letters sent by the same messenger. In special letters to Aleander of the 1st and 6th of February 1521, Aleander was instructed by Cardinal Medici to forcibly point out to the Emperor that the Lutheran movement was as much his affair as that of the Pope and Holy See, because the religious innovators were as much set on the overthrow of the authority of the Empire as on that of the Church. Therefore, the dearest personal interests of Charles and the princes of the Empire demanded the suppression of the new doctrines.

On the 6th of February a Consistory was held at St. Angelo, at which the Pope gave directions for dealing with two conflagrations which had broken out. The first he described as the menace to the States of the Church from plundering bands of soldiers, against whom he would, in case of necessity, employ the six thousand Swiss whose services he had hired. The other conflagration was the movement to which Luther and his followers had given rise. The Pope told the Cardinals that they would do well to draw up a memorial to send to the Emperor about this. Some of the Cardinals were of opinion that Schonberg had better deliver this document, and that when this had been done, two or three Cardinal-Legates might be sent to Germany.

On the 13th of February Leo X pointed out most forcibly to Manuel the evil consequences, not only to the Papacy, but also to the power of the Empire, if Luther’s errors were not uprooted. Afterwards the Pope proposed in Consistory the mission of several Cardinal-Legates to the Diet, though the plan was abandoned in consequence of Aleander’s representations to the contrary. At that time the Lutheran affair occupied the mind of the Pope almost to the exclusion of anything else. The Venetian Ambassador testifies that Leo spent many hours in reading a work against Luther, probably that written by the Dominican, Ambrogio Catarino. The question of an alliance with the Emperor, which had hitherto turned chiefly on politics, now received a new importance from the point of view of what the Emperor could do against Luther and his followers. On the 25th of February Manuel wrote to tell his master how very much Leo had the Lutheran affair at heart, so that his chief object in desiring an interview with the Emperor was to concert with him as to what measures could be taken to protect the Church against the attacks of Luther. On the same day that Manuel made this report, the Pope sent to the Emperor an adulatory letter. From what he could learn from the Nuncios, he said, he could see with joy that His Majesty was rivalling Constantine, Charlemagne, and Otto in his zeal for the honour of the Church, and he praised God for thus inspiring him. In an autograph postscript, Leo X reminded the Emperor that, if necessary, he could take up sword and buckler in defence of the Church. Laudatory letters in the same strain were sent to various spiritual and secular princes of Germany; and at the same time the two Nuncios were formally re-accredited to the German Court. When he sent these documents on the 3rd of March, Cardinal Medici repeated his injunction to Aleander to do everything to convince the Emperor that the innovators did not aim only at overthrowing the Church, but that, after the manner of the Hussites, they wished to destroy the imperial power as well. He praised Aleander’s discourse before the Diet as a brilliant and most useful performance.

The news that, in spite of all the Nuncios’ remonstrances, Luther was to be called before the Diet, caused great excitement in Rome. The Pope laid down his exact position in the matter of the sequestration of Lutheran books, in a special instruction which he sent to the Nuncios in the second half of March. In this he took his stand on the fact that Luther, having been lawfully sentenced, could not be admitted to a public examination. Nevertheless the Emperor might lawfully grant him a private interview without witnesses, and might, if he acknowledged his errors, promise him the Pope’s pardon, or else give him a safe-conduct to Rome, or to the Spanish Inquisition. Should Luther accept none of these, there was nothing left to be done except to send him back with his safe-conduct, and then proceed with energy against him and his followers. As regarded the previous sequestration of Lutheran books, it was agreed that nothing could be done except to burn them publicly, should Luther refuse to recant. The Emperor was worthy of praise for having so far been emphatic in his protection of the Church in this affair; but he should be warned not to retreat now, in the middle of his course.

The plan of summoning Luther before the Diet pained and disturbed the Pope very much; for hitherto the young Emperor had been the only person on whom he believed himself able to rely. However, even at this juncture, Leo X did not forget the exigencies of diplomatic prudence. He allowed Manuel to perceive his fear lest the Emperor should give in too much, without betraying his need of help and the greatness of his anxiety. Cardinal Medici was more forcible and explicit in what he wrote to Aleander. The goodwill of the Emperor is not in itself enough, he wrote in a letter of the 19th of March; his offers must also be carried out. The Pope is not quite pleased with the endless delays in carrying out the measures commanded by the Emperor himself. The zeal of His Majesty has without doubt cooled; he who has been called to be the defender of the Church, lends his ear to her enemies. If the Emperor does not decide the matter before the conclusion of the Diet, the most vexatious consequences may be apprehended. Nevertheless God will not forsake His Church. But, the letter went on to say, Aleander must do nothing except in combination with the Nuncio Caracciolo and with Raffaello de' Medici.

Immediately afterwards, on the 20th of March, the Pope brought forward the matter in Consistory. Several Cardinals expressly complained at the Emperor’s having cited Luther to appear before the Diet, and thereby assumed a jurisdiction which belonged to the Holy See. When Leo X communicated this opinion to the Imperial Ambassador, he remarked that, in summoning Luther to appear, the Emperor had been badly advised. It was impossible that Luther should be received even in hell, and Manuel would do well to warn his Imperial master in every letter he wrote not to take the matter lightly. Under these circumstances it was doubly important that Leo X should condemn Luther in so many words as an excommunicate and heretic. This was done in the Bull In Coena Domini, issued on Maundy Thursday (March 28).

There was a difference of opinion as to whether a letter of safe-conduct couched in honourable terms should be given to Luther. Cardinal Medici blamed the Emperor severely, and when writing to Aleander at the end of March, he expressed his regret in lively language that such an imprudent and unpermissible thing as Luther's summons before the Diet should have taken place, which implied the suspension of the sentence against him and even against his books. Germany, which had always been the object of the Pope's predilection, was guilty of a shameful in gratitude, in thus acting to the detriment of the Empire. “His Holiness”, continued the Cardinal, “will nevertheless not believe that Charles is willing to depart from the paths of his most Christian and most Catholic predecessors, and show himself ungrateful to God and the Holy See. Renewed discussion of this notorious and scandalous affair would bring disgrace on His Majesty. If Charles is able to effect so little against one man who is in his power, what could the Church and Christendom expect of him in a fight against Turks and infidels?”

Aleander and Caracciolo were then urged to do all they could to influence the Emperor and his Council, as well as the Electors of Brandenburg and Mainz. But on no account were they to allow themselves to be drawn into a dispute with Luther ; for by so doing, as Aleander had already so well pointed out, they would act in a way derogatory to the dignity of the Apostolic See.

In his report of the 8th of March, Aleander had mentioned a menacing utterance of the Imperial Great Chamberlain, Guillaume de Croy, Lord of Chièvres, from which he concluded that the imperialists wished to make use of the Lutheran affair to influence the Pope's political attitude. The same news came to Rome from other sources; and it was further rumoured that, though the Emperor had required Luther to renounce his false doctrines, he had left him a free hand to say anything he liked against the Pope. However disquieting this might sound, the Pope was still careful to refrain from any ex pression which could betray his anxiety and need of assistance, and thus give to the Emperor’s representative a handle to use against him. “Thank God”, said he to Manuel on the 3rd of April, “that He has given to me at this time an Emperor who has the interests of the Church at heart”. “While he went on to beg Manuel to thank Charles for his good promises, he added the hope that the Emperor would keep them, and not allow persons who gave ear to the devil to lead him astray. But on the 8th of April Leo’s anxiety was too acute to be concealed, and Manuel sent a special courier to Worms to say that His Holiness was awaiting with the utmost impatience for news of Luther, who must, he thought, have arrived before the Diet by this time. Soon the Pope abandoned the attitude of reserve which he had hitherto observed. The immediate cause of this change was Aleander’s account of Luther’s reception, the consideration shown by the Imperialists towards Saxony, and their subsequent attitude, which showed that they “reckoned more with man than with God”. On the top of this came the tidings that Luther was to be allowed to hold a religious disputation. Leo at once sent for Manuel and told him plainly that such a dispute would, in his opinion, be a certain means of external injury to the Church. Manuel replied that he knew nothing about the alleged proposal, but that he was sure that the Emperor would see that the interests of God and of His Church were not prejudiced. “Leo X”, Manuel adds, “regards the Lutheran affair as a matter of the utmost importance, and until he is satisfied about this, nothing will be got out of him”.

The Pope must have spoken very strongly to the German Ambassador, for as lately as the 29th of March, Manuel had written to the Emperor about the possibility of bringing pressure to bear on the Pope by means of the Lutheran affair;  but he now begged him most urgently to satisfy His Holiness about this question of faith. Leo had not on his side held out any proposal of making political concessions in exchange for energetic action on the part of the Emperor against Luther. But Charles V had no idea of turning the Lutheran affair to his own advantage politically. Just at that time he gave a clear proof of this. On the 18th of April, after Luther’s first examination, and before the final decision of the affair, he sent Raffaello de' Medici to Rome to submit to the Pope the draft of a treaty of alliance. Medici arrived in Rome on the 30th of April. In the interval news had arrived there of Johann von der Ecken’s skilful management of the case, so that even Giberti was of opinion that there was nothing left to be done except to follow up the victory over Luther. The joy felt in the immediate entourage of the Pope was as great as had been the dissatisfaction at the turn previously taken by the affair. Naturally the satisfaction was still greater when the Emperor made his strongly Catholic declaration on the 19th of April. In a Consistory held on the loth of May, this, with the latest reports of the Nuncios in Germany and Spain, was read. Neither Pope nor Cardinals could praise the Emperor too highly; and the efforts of the Nuncios and all others concerned in the matter were most favourably acknowledged. The Pope’s recognition of the Catholic attitude of the Emperor, the Electors, Glapion, and other leading persons was expressed in special Briefs, coupled with the request that all these would continue in the same manner. In a Brief to Charles V, signed by the Pope himself, the latter says that the Emperor had surpassed all his expectations, and had acted as a true champion of the Church. The Imperial declaration of April the 19th was—as was most unusual—sent at once in printed form to Rome

Meanwhile eager consultations went on in Rome with Raffaello de' Medici about the political alliance which was proposed between the Pope and the Emperor against France. Unexpected difficulties occurred, for, instead of the offensive alliance desired by Leo X, the draft of the treaty brought to Rome by Raffaello de' Medici only made mention of a defensive alliance. To this the Pope would not on any account consent. Although Manuel gave in at once, and altered the draft to meet the wishes of Leo X, the Pope put off signing from day to day. The fact is that the behaviour of the Emperor, who had so repeatedly—a thousand times, said Manuel—altered the draft, made Leo think that the power of Charles V was not as great as had been represented. Still greater was the effect produced on the timid Pope by a declaration published by France that she had concluded a treaty with the Swiss. To this was added the influence of England, which advised neutrality. More than ever before did his deeply-rooted indecision prevail with Leo X.

The Pope’s hesitation kindled fresh hopes among the French diplomatists in Rome, the Count of Carpi and the Lord of Gisors. Leo X fanned these hopes by a declaration which sounded most favourable to France. Knowing how bent the Pope was on the possession of Ferrara, the French held out hopes to him of its possession, as well as of the increase of the States of the Church by the strip of coast in the kingdom of Naples. All this made such an impression on Leo that, as far as we can trust Carpi's reports, he appeared to be willing to agree with the demands of French policy. On the top of this came the daily and increasing financial difficulty, which affected the Emperor as well as the Pope. When Carpi at length announced that the alliance between France and the Swiss cantons was an accomplished fact, Leo expressed himself in such terms that the French Ambassador was full of hopes.

It did not escape Manuel that fear was the chief motive which drew Leo X towards France. He therefore advised his Imperial master to try the influence of fear in another direction, by concluding a treaty with England, by alienating the Swiss from France, by entering into negotiations with France herself, and by threatening to call a General Council. Without waiting for the decision of the Emperor, Manuel wrote to the Viceroy of Naples to send a force from the Abruzzi to the borders of the States of the Church, so as to make an impression in Rome. But, before this extreme measure was resorted to, Leo X had made up his mind in favour of the Emperor. The French had gone too far. Leo X had heard that Lautrec had said that he would leave nothing to the Pope except his ears. All the evil which the French had done to him as Cardinal and Pope now came back into his mind. The last blow was when Francis I, contrary to his many promises, tried to draw the Duke of Ferrara, together with the Swiss, into an alliance with him. On the 29th of May Manuel was able to tell the Emperor that the Pope had signed the contract and sent it to him by Raffaello de' Medici, but that it was to be kept strictly secret for the present. Girolamo Adorno and Cardinal Medici had especially helped the Imperial Ambassador in obtaining this result.

The offensive alliance, dated the 8th of May, gives prominence to the great mediaeval idea of the combination of the two great powers, the Papal and the Imperial, set up by God above all other powers. The “two real heads of Christendom” were to unite “in purifying it from all error, in establishing universal peace, in fighting the infidel, and in introducing a better state of things throughout”. The cause of all the present evil was France’s lust of conquest, which had led her to seize on Milan and Genoa, to threaten poor Italy and the independence of the Holy See. In order to restore order and tranquillity, this peace-destroying member must be attacked with fire and sword, and the usurpations of France in Italy must be stopped. Therefore Milan and Genoa should be invested by the Imperial and Papal troops in September, and freed from the French yoke; and the Sforza and Adorni should be set up again as vassals of the Empire. All territories belonging to the Pope should be restored to him, especially Parma and Piacenza, and also Ferrara. Moreover, the Emperor pledged himself in the fullest sense to protect the Pope against his enemies and against all who attacked the true faith and defamed the Holy See, and guaranteed the dominion of the Medici in Tuscany. On his side Leo X bound himself solemnly and in perpetuity to Charles, promising him a new investiture of the crown of Naples, and assistance in defending it, as also in enforcing his Imperial rights on Venice.

The Pope gained most by this important agreement. When the conditions relating to Italy were carried out, the Emperor would be no more powerful than he had been before; whereas the States of the Church would be so considerably increased that the independence of the Holy See, so long desired by Leo X, would probably be assured. A still greater advantage to the Holy See was the protection against all enemies of the Catholic Faith which was now solemnly promised by Charles. Thus did the highest spiritual and secular powers unite once more for the protection of the ancient faith in the Holy Roman Empire, at the very moment when the storm against the old order of things was let loose.

The Curia was quite confident that Rome would succeed in mastering the heretical outburst, thanks to the issue of the Edict of Worms. The satisfaction felt by the Pope at the promulgation of the new Imperial law against Lutheranism was strongly expressed by Cardinal Medici in his letters to Aleander. The Nuncio was charged to convey the Pope’s warmest thanks to the Emperor and all who had contributed to the carrying out of the important measure. On the 7th of June the great news was communicated to the Cardinals in Consistory. After wards, Luther's picture and his writings were burned in the Piazza Navona in Rome. However well aware Cardinal Medici might be of the zeal shown by Aleander at Worms, of his fidelity to duty and his energy, he never ceased in his efforts to spur the Nuncio on to fresh measures against the heresy. It did not escape the Cardinal's shrewd observation that at times Aleander indulged in over-optimistic hopes. These were not shared in Rome, chiefly on account of the disturbing news which came from Germany through the Minorites there.

In the Netherlands Aleander’s zeal had achieved great things; but in Saxony the new doctrines were being spread with ever-increasing rapidity under the protection of the Elector. The hopes to which Luther’s retirement to the Castle of Wartburg gave birth proved vain, and showed that Rome had not overrated the danger. On the 18th of September, 1521, Aleander was charged to make urgent representations to the Emperor about the “Saxon scandals”. If the injunctions of the Edict of Worms were disregarded now, while the ink with which it was written was scarcely dry, he was commissioned to say : What would the Elector of Saxony not dare do when Charles had departed from Germany? If matters were not taken in hand now, at the beginning of the evil, the last state of things would be worse than the first.

Had it been better known in Rome how the German people were being incited in print and from the pulpit to abolish Catholic worship and even to murder priests, the fear would have been still greater. As it was, anxiety was very acute in spite of Aleander’s more or less favourable reports. The only thing which allayed this anxiety was the fact that other countries of Christendom did not seem to have adopted Luther’s errors. In Italy, it is true, there were some who sympathized with him; but teachers of his heresy were few and far between; and in Spain and Portugal the new doctrines had produced no effect whatever. Even the Polish King, Sigismund, issued, on July 26th, 1521, a severe edict against the spread of Lutheran literature. It is true that the news from Denmark was disquieting; but Leo X hoped to avert the worst consequences by the exercise of great gentleness towards the King. In France, in spite of his political antagonism to the Pope, Francis I ordered that all Luther’s works should be burnt in Paris. It was of no small importance that the distinguished theological faculty of Paris, on April 15th, 1521, condemned Luther’s doctrines as emphatically as Louvain and Cologne had already done in 1519. Although Aleander blamed the omission of all mention of the primacy of the Pope in the condemnation by the University of Paris, he hoped that even so, the censure of a body of theologians so generally respected would not fail to have a good effect even in Germany. Great joy was caused in Rome by the action of the King of England, who attacked Luther in a book written by himself. The University of Oxford had already condemned Luther's writings. The manner in which the Pope received the book of Henry VIII. shows that he, at any rate, considered the Lutheran affair as by no means suppressed.

CHAPTER X.

DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AND INCREASE OF THE STATES OF THE CHURCH. DEATH OF LEO X.

WHILE the alliance between the Pope and the Emperor was being carefully kept secret, hostilities had already begun. Francis I did not hesitate to profit by the difficulties in which Charles V was placed by the insurrection of the Spanish towns on the one side, and by the Lutheran movement on the other, and seized the opportunity to wrest Navarre from him. At the same time he favoured the attempt made in the Netherlands by Robert de la Marck. While fighting was going on in the Pyrenees and Luxemburg, the war began in Italy, and at first with unfavourable results for the Pope and Emperor. Leo’s former anger with Alfonso of Ferrara broke out afresh when he defied the spiritual authority of the Holy See by favouring a monk named Andrea da Ferrara, who was suspected of disseminating Lutheran doctrines. However, the first attempts of the Papal force against Ferrara failed. So also did an attack made on Genoa by the Imperial and Papal ships in combination with the Adorni party. No better success attended the attempt of those who had been banished from Milan to stir up an insurrection in Lombardy, where the people were possessed of a wild hatred of the harsh government of the French. Venice betrayed the danger which was threatening France, and measures were taken to frustrate the plot. But the French soon learned that the versatile and intriguing Vice-Chancellor of Maximilian Sforza, Girolamo Morone, had left Trent for Reggio, richly provided with money, and had gathered round him a large number of Milanese who had unjustly been driven out of Milan by the French. Thomas de Lescun, brother of the Governor Lautrec, tried to put a check on Morone’s far-reaching plans by a bold invasion of the territories of the Holy See. In the night between the 23rd and 24th of June, Lescun appeared before Reggio with an armed force, and demanded the delivery to him of the Milanese exiles. His intention, though its success was very doubtful, was to take possession of the town. However, the watchfulness of the Governor of Reggio, the historian Francesco Guicciardini, saved this important place. This attack on Papal territory by the French gave Leo X the desired opportunity of declaring himself openly against France. The few diplomatists in whom the Pope confided, became aware, on the 22nd of June, that he was waiting for only one thing before he declared war. In a postscript to his report of the 25th of June, Castiglione was able to tell his master of the decision which had been till then so carefully kept secret; but it was not until the 27th that he was able to speak of the influence which the attack on Reggio had had on the Pope's decision.

In a Consistory held on the 27th of June, the Pope complained of the violation of the borders of the States of the Church, and declared to the Cardinals that for the sake of self-protection he wished to ally himself with the Emperor, who had recently stood up at the Diet of Worms as the defender of the Church. The treaty of May, which had been so successfully kept secret, was now to all appearances concluded for the first time, and communicated to England and Switzerland. “The Pope has dropped his mask and allied himself to Charles V”, wrote the disconcerted Venetian Ambassador, Gradenigo, on the 29th of June. On the same day, without any concealment, Leo accepted the white palfrey from the Emperor’s representative, in token of the investiture of Charles V with the crown of Naples. In the presence of all the Ambassadors, Leo X complained of the behaviour of Francis I, who had kept no agreement, and had supported the Dukes of Ferrara and Urbino against him. He now openly declared himself the enemy of the French.

With feverish haste, and in spite of the warnings of Rucellai, who was still in France, Rome made preparations for the accomplishment of her great object, the expulsion of the French from Italy. The Pope hoped to effect this before long. To raise money he pledged his silver plate, and spoke of obtaining funds later by a great nomination of Cardinals. The opposition of many members of the Sacred College to the Imperial and anti-French policy was not heeded by Leo: Cardinal Medici was the only one with whom he took counsel.

The plan of war was discussed with the German Ambassador. Prospero Colonna was sent for to Rome and given the supreme command of the allied forces. The Marquis Federigo Gonzaga had been named Captain-General of the Church in April. This appointment had been kept secret, and was made known only at the beginning of July. Francesco Guicciardini was confirmed as Commissary-General of the army, and was appointed to accompany the Marquis, armed with extensive powers ; Ferrante d'Avalos, Marquis of Pescara, the husband of Vittoria Colonna, so famed as a poetess, received the command of the Imperial infantry ; while Giovanni de' Medici, who later made for himself a formidable name as leader of the Black Companies, was to command the Papal cavalry. The whole force of the allies was put at six hundred Papal and Florentine heavy cavalry and as many Imperialists, together with six thousand Spanish, six thousand Italian, and six thousand Swiss infantry.

As soon as he learned about the alliance between the Pope and the Emperor, Francis made several attempts to win back the former, and thus allay the tempest which threatened him; when he failed he foamed with rage. On the 13th of July he published a manifesto to his subjects in Italy in which he complained of the ingratitude of Leo, for whom he had done so much. He expressed his confidence that the Pope would reap neither honour nor benefit from his alliance with the Catholic King : it was thus that he styled Charles, for he would not give the title of Emperor to his rival. Soon after, he issued a man date forbidding, under severe penalties, the transfer to Rome of the incomes of any French bishopric or abbey. At the beginning of August he declared in his boastful way that “he would ere long enter Rome and impose laws on the Pope”. His army was by no means equal in strength to that of his opponents, but he trusted to the assistance of the Venetians as well as to that of the warlike Duke of Ferrara. He also counted on the co-operation of the Swiss.

Meanwhile Leo X had been overjoyed by the news of the repulse of the attack of the French on Navarre. By a Bull of the 27th of July, he threatened Thomas de Lescun and his fellow-culprits with excommunication and interdict, if they did not within twelve days make satisfaction for the attack on Reggio, their encroachment on matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and their violation of the agreement about the purchase of salt.  Charles did not think that the Pope went far enough in this, and, through his Ambassador, urged Leo to pronounce excommunication on the person of the French King. But the Pope would not proceed to such severe measures. In fact, among the many anxieties which at that time gave him sleepless nights, was the dread of being left in the lurch by the Emperor and given over to the vengeance of France. Charles heard that this was the case, and sent an autograph letter to the Pope in which he promised expressly to come to no understanding with France without a previous agreement with Leo. Baldassare Castiglione saw this important letter on the 2nd of August, 15214 In return for this the Pope published without further delay the nomination as Cardinal of Eberhard de la Mark, this having been resolved on in a Consistory held on the 9th of August. As to how the consent of Leo was gained, is shown by a report sent by Clerk to Wolsey. In consequence of the tidings that the Turks were maltreating the Hungarians, the Pope was very much depressed; though he did not allow this to affect his anti-French policy. Indeed he did not shrink from saying that he would not undertake anything against the Turks until he had reduced France to such a condition that she was not able to move. The Pope said that he would pledge his tiara rather than not drive the French out of Italy. The Emperor encouraged Leo in this frame of mind by the assurance that he was determined to exercise his whole strength against France. In a second autograph letter the Emperor informed Leo of the first move he had made against France, and of his determination to carry on the war with all his might.

Leo X, who had asked the assistance of the King of Portugal and his fleet, indulged in hopes which were increased by the likelihood, as he thought, of England’s turning against France. He treated the boasting of the latter with contempt, and by calculating the strength of both sides, he believed that he might count on swift and certain victory.

There were, however, moments when Leo did not feel sure of the Emperor. The mediation of England and the suggestions of France both shook his confidence. In consequence of this mistrust—which was quite unfounded —he hesitated to pronounce excommunication on Francis I. But at last, on the 4th of September, he made up his mind, and threatened the French King and his generals with greater excommunication and interdict if they did not, within fifteen days, lay down their arms and deliver over Parma and Piacenza to the Holy See. The reasons alleged by the Pope were that Francis had carried on war with Charles by use of the money granted to him by the tithe for the Crusade, that he had violated the Concordat and ecclesiastical liberty, attacked Reggio, seized the revenues of the Church, arrested Florentine merchants in Lyons, and, finally, kept unjust possession of Parma and Piacenza.

Meanwhile the news which came from the theatre of war in Northern Italy was far from reassuring. At the end of August the Pope daily expected tidings of the taking of Parma: instead, there came, on the 10th of September, the intelligence that the siege of the city had been raised. The Curia had taken matters so lightly, that Castiglione wrote on the 4th of September that he had every day to argue with those who did not understand in the slightest degree what war was, and who thought that soldiers could fly. All the greater and more painful was the disillusionment. The cause of the check was the conduct of the Swiss, on whom till now Leo had set all his hopes, as well as the want of agreement among the generals of the allied force.

The Nuncio, Pucci, who had been sent to Switzerland as Legatus a latere in July, 1521, together with Filonardi and Cardinal Schinner, were employed by the Emperor for the raising of troops in the cantons. They met with great difficulties, because all the cantons, with the exception of Zurich, had formed a treaty with France at the beginning of May, 1521, one of the clauses of which was directed against this very recruiting by a foreign power. In spite of all Filonardi’s representations, the twelve cantons remained obstinate in their refusal to send troops to the Pope. Zurich granted two thousand men, but only on condition that they were to be employed solely in the defence of Papal territory.

Under these circumstances the allies did not feel themselves strong enough to take Parma, although they had been joined by about six thousand German landsknechte. But they were insufficiently prepared, and there was want of unity in the army ; and when, added to this, they learned that the Duke of Ferrara was advancing against them, the leaders of the allied troops considered it prudent to abandon the siege. They fell back, about three thousand strong, on San Lazzaro, in the direction of Reggio. The mercenaries murmured loudly from discontent with their pay, and it was feared that they might go over to the French. Had the enemy taken the offensive at that moment, no doubt they would have come off victorious.

The position of the allies was all the more critical because of the mutual distrust which hampered their actions. The Papal generals inclined to the view that the Imperialists had abandoned the siege of Parma at the approach of an inferior force, solely because they did not wish to take the town for the Pope. On the other hand, Prospero Colonna suspected that Leo X would withdraw from the war as soon as Parma and Piacenza had been regained. When the news arrived that the French had been joined by more Swiss troops at Cremona, the allies retreated on Reggio. They would, no doubt, have retreated further, had not the agents of the Pope and Emperor combined to hinder them.

Meanwhile, a change had taken place in Switzerland which was to be of the utmost importance. Filonardi, and still more the impetuous Schinner, succeeded at last in getting together a considerable body of Swiss mercenaries. In order to effect a junction with these, Prospero Colonna crossed the Po at Casalmaggiore, on the 1st of October. Here he was joined by Cardinal Medici, who, at the end of September, had been appointed Legate to the army, to arrange the differences between Colonna and Pescara. He took large sums of money with him. The allies now advanced to the Oglio, and it seemed as if the fortune of war was going to turn in their favour. It was of the greatest advantage to them that, just at that juncture, Lautrec lost a good opportunity of combining with the Venetians and attacking the enemy at Robecco. Instead of doing this he retired to a fortified position behind the Adda. Nearly at the same time the Duke of Ferrara suffered a severe defeat at Modena, which compelled him to fall back on his capital. A manifesto which he sent to the Emperor was full of the most violent accusations against the Pope, and did not improve his position.

The Swiss, recruited by Schinner, had meanwhile advanced from Chiavenna into the territory of Bergamo, although they had not yet decided whether they would act directly against the French. In spite of all the arguments of Cardinals Schinner and Schonberg, the men of Zurich were resolute in maintaining that they had been engaged solely for the protection of the States of the Church. On this understanding they consented to march on Reggio, with the ulterior object of reconquering Parma and Piacenza for the Pope. For a long time the remaining six thousand Swiss refused to come to any decision ; but at last, at the end of October, Schinner persuaded them to join Gambara with the Papal-Spanish force. He hoped that from this they would go on with him and make a descent on Milan; in this was he not mistaken. Cardinals Medici and Schinner were with this force, to what was, according to Guicciardini, the abuse of religion; for there were the Cardinals, with their legatine crosses, mixed up with the whole crew of plundering, blaspheming murderers. The union of the Papal and Spanish troops with the Swiss, which Lautrec and his Venetian allies had been unable to prevent, had given the allies an undoubted superiority.

Soon fortune turned her back on the French. The Swiss serving in their army, who had for some time been affronted by Lautrec’s insolence and attitude of suspicion, now clamoured for their pay. As, in spite of all promises, and as a result of bad organization, this grievance was not satisfied, the mercenaries deserted in numbers. The discontent of the Swiss was, moreover, fomented by agents from their own cantons, who urged them on no account to fight against their fellow-countrymen. Lautrec was so weakened by these defections that he could not prevent the enemy from crossing the Adda, and soon found himself compelled to retire on Milan with his discontented and discouraged army. In the capital itself everything was against the French, and late in the afternoon of the 19th of November, in the midst of pouring rain, the allied force appeared before the walls. The German landsknechte formed the vanguard, then followed the bulk of the Papal and Spanish troops, and last came the Swiss.

An immediate attack was resolved on, as news came from the city that the population was ready to rise against the French, and that the defences were inadequate. Cardinals Medici and Schinner, with Pescara and the Marquis of Mantua, pointed out certain suburbs as a good object for attack. Pescara, with Spanish marksmen, attacked the Porta Romana; Prospero Colonna, with Spaniards and German mercenaries, attacked the Porta Ticinese. Contrary to all expectation, the suburbs were speedily occupied, and soon after the gates were forced. Lautrec had thought such a rapid approach of the enemy an impossibility, as the roads had, he considered, been made impassable by the rain. He was completely taken by surprise, and, without any serious attempt at resistance, retreated from Milan by the gate leading to Como; while the populace, to cries such as: Empire! Duke! Church! Palle! rose as one man and welcomed the enemy. In the night Maximilian Sforza was proclaimed Duke of Milan. Both victors and vanquished were equally surprised by the quick and easy conquest of the capital of Lombardy.

The fate of Milan decided that of the whole of Lombardy. Piacenza, Pavia, Novara, Tortona, Alessandria, Asti, Cremona, and Lodi willingly threw open their gates to the allies. The French, it is true, succeeded in retaking Cremona, but had at the same time to evacuate Parma, and they also lost Como. Altogether the star of France seemed to be on the wane. On the 24th of November the English Chancellor concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with the Pope and Emperor against Francis I. The prudent Venetians meditated a breach of their alliance with France, on the plea that quite unexpected events had completely altered the situation.

For three months Leo X had watched the progress of the war in Northern Italy with indescribable excitement. The pause when the war had scarcely begun, then the raising of the siege of Parma, had put him into despair. We can learn from the famous letters of Baldassare Castiglione how anxiously the Pope awaited news of the progress of the war, and how he despaired one day and hoped the next. His Holiness, Castiglione reports on the 15th of October 1521, is filled with great anxiety; were it possible, he would like to know every hour how things are going in Lombardy. When better news arrived on the 17th of October, Leo, with arms upraised, prayed to God that it might be true. His joy was all the greater because this was the first time that Cardinal Medici had sent favourable tidings. “The state of expectancy which reigns here has reached its highest point”, wrote Castiglione; “never before have such various rumours floated about Rome”. But all the time Leo was tormented by the fear that Francesco Maria della Rovere would try to regain possession of Urbino.

To the Pope the position was all the more critical because he had to bear nearly all the expense of the war ; for Charles was heavily burdened by the expense incident on the insurrection of the Spanish towns, and the maintenance of his army in the Netherlands, and was able to send money to Italy only at uncertain intervals. But it was not only his financial difficulties which exercised the Pope. The vacillations of the Swiss, on whom the final settlement of the war seemed to depend, caused him acute anxiety. There were times when Leo, though quite in the secret of his heart, began to give ear to the suggestions of the French. But these were only passing fits of weakness such as cannot cause surprise in one of his timid nature. When he faced the actual state of affairs he knew very well that he must stand firm. In order to cut from under his feet the possibility of any change of purpose, and to remove from the Imperialists all excuse for doubting his steadfastness, he sent Cardinal Medici as Legate to the army in the last week of September. Medici was very unwilling to leave Rome, and hesitated for some time to obey, though the Pope wrote to him with his own hand commanding him to undertake the work. The appointment of this man, who, although he often resided in Florence, was nevertheless called into consultation on all important occasions, meant as much as if the Pope himself had been present with the army.

Leo X, who had been seriously ill in the last week of August, but had now recovered as quickly, was again taken ill in the night between the 25th and 26th of October. This time it was not owing to a chill or to his old fistula trouble, but to his chronic state of excitement. However, by the 5th of November he was again convalescent; and on the 15th he held a Consistory. At this, for a consideration of 10,000 ducats, he gave the Duke Giovanni Maria da Varano of Camerino the title of Admiral of the Papal fleet. Next day, contrary to precedent, the Pope was present at the obsequies of a Cardinal; he wished to prove that he had quite recovered his health. After this he went to his hunting villa at Magliana. Ambassadors who had any news to communicate, visited him there in numbers, and were received without ceremony. On the 23rd of November Castiglione, the Ambassador of the Marquis of Mantua, had a long conversation with him at Magliana, about the events of the war and the chances of taking Milan.

On the afternoon of the 24th of November, the secretary of Cardinal Medici arrived in Rome with the intelligence that the capital of Lombardy had been taken. He at once went on to Magliana, accompanied by Giberti. They found the Pope saying Lauds, having just reached the passage in the Benedictus: “that being delivered from the hand of our enemies, we may serve him without fear” (Luke 1. 74). Leo’s joy at the news was intense, although he realized that the war was as yet only half over. He had all the details related to him, and put many questions as to the condition of the army, the position of the French, Cardinal Medici's state of health, and the dispositions of the Milanese. Messenger after messenger was despatched to Rome with orders to celebrate the event in a fitting manner. Cannon from St. Angelo proclaimed the victory to the inhabitants of the Eternal City; the joy caused by the news was altogether in describable.

At Magliana those in the immediate entourage of the Pope were intoxicated with joy, especially the Swiss, who looked on the capture of Milan as an avenging of Marignano. Fireworks were sent off throughout the night, to the accompaniment of music and volleys of guns. This commotion, added to his excitement, kept the Pope awake all night. It was reported that he passed it sitting at the open window, sunk in thought, and watching the doings of the Swiss, till he became so chilled that he had to return to the stove to warm. By this imprudence he caught a severe chill, and symptoms of fever soon set in. In the afternoon of the 25th of November, the Pope returned to Rome. It was one of those glorious winter days such as are perhaps known only in Rome, with the sun shining with almost too much warmth; in spite of this the Pope shivered and walked part of the distance on foot ; this did not improve matters, for, owing to his corpulence, he broke into a profuse perspiration. However, he paid scarcely any attention to this, so occupied was he by the thought of the great reception which was awaiting him in Rome, which was to remind him of the ovation at the beginning of his Pontificate, when he took possession of the Lateran. The crowds greeted him with joy, and the Cardinals received him with reverence. Everywhere the air echoed with joyous cries and salvos of cannon. He beamed with joy, and said to the Imperial Ambassador that he rejoiced more over the conquest of Milan than he had rejoiced at his election to the Papal chair. These words show with a terrible clearness how far the secularization of the supreme dignity of the Church had advanced since it was commenced by Sixtus IV.

Leo X talked with his Master of Ceremonies about the arrangements for a solemn service of thanksgiving for the victory. Paris de Grassis remarked in his dry way that public thanksgivings should not be offered up for a victory gained over a Christian power, unless there had been at stake some special advantage for the Church. Full of glee, the Pope replied, smiling, that the greatest advantage for the Church was at stake, and that on Wednesday he would make all arrangements in a Consistory. Rome held high festival till late into the night. As was their way, the Romans indulged in the wildest of surmises, and many believed, without a shadow of proof, that the Duchy of Milan was destined for Cardinal Medici.

In the evening the Pope dined in the best of spirits, and that night slept well. But next morning (November 26), while he was giving audience to Cardinal Trivulzio and  one of his relatives, he was taken with a shivering fit and had to break off the interview and return to bed. Though restless in the night, he felt fairly well on Wednesday the 27th, though rather weak, so that the Consistory was postponed. The physicians declared that his ailment was a case of simple intermittent fever, the consequence of the chill he had caught in the night at Magliana. Towards evening and during the following days they gave the usual remedies for cold and intermittent fever and had no doubt that the Pope would be quite well in a few days. But in the evening of the 29th of November, he had such a severe fainting fit that the doctors became alarmed. Already arrangements were being made in several quarters for the possibility of a vacancy in the Holy See. Nor did the Pope conceal from himself the gravity of his state, and made a general confession with great devotion. However, on Saturday he again felt so well that he sent off some Briefs and enjoyed some music. He went so far as to declare that in eight days, on the Feast of St. Ambrose, he wished to visit the church of that saint, and also S. Maria del Popolo. But in the evening violent fever suddenly returned and he lost consciousness for a time; those about him were much alarmed, and three messengers were sent to Cardinal Medici.

In the night he was very ill, and in the morning of the 1st of December he complained of great interior heat, and it was with difficulty that he allowed himself to be persuaded to take some nourishment. Then once again he was better and the fever left him. He was in great spirits and talked a great deal, and the doctors again entertained hopes of a speedy recovery. He had already heard of the conquest of Piacenza, and now on this day he learned that Parma had been taken. To win back these two cities had been his chief motive for beginning the war; and he had declared at the time to Cardinal Medici that he would gladly purchase their recovery with his life. It seemed now that his hope of securing the independence of the Holy See, by an increase of the States of the Church, was about to be realized.

The improvement in the Pope's condition continued all day. Feeling quite easy about him, the few persons who had been admitted to the sick-room went away. These were the doctor, Cardinal Pucci, Bishop Ponzetti, the Pope’s two nephews Salviati and Ridolfi, and his sister Lucrezia, wife of Jacopo Salviati. However, at eleven o'clock a more violent shivering fit than any before seized on him. Leo X knew that his hour had come, and at once asked for Extreme Unction. Viaticum was deferred, presumably because of his extreme weakness. He repeatedly kissed the crucifix and called on the name of Jesus: it was his last word. When Cardinal Pucci, who had been summoned in haste, entered the room, he found the Pope unconscious. He died at midnight.

Early in the morning of the 2nd of December the totally unexpected news of the death of the Supreme Pontiff was spread throughout the city, where all the shops were shut. The consternation of the friends and adherents of the Medici Pope was very great. Their glory had departed: and even in the night they carried off from the Vatican everything that they could lay hands on. In the morning the Cardinals could be seen hurrying to the Vatican for a preliminary consultation. The Palace was closed, and the Swiss mounted fifty pieces of ordnance on it, while everywhere men armed themselves. Everything, however, remained quiet, so good were the precautionary measures taken by the Sacred College.

The sudden death of this Pope, at the early age of forty-six, at the very moment when messenger after messenger was arriving with news of fresh victories, has something tragic about it. “Just eight days ago”, wrote Castiglione of the 2nd of December, “His Holiness returned from Magliana in triumphal procession, such as had not been seen since the first days of his Pontificate. This evening there will take place a very different kind of solemnity, his interment in St. Peter’s. Thus changeable is human fortune! The Lord God overthrows our plans as He pleases.”

It may be said that the proverbial good fortune of Leo X accompanied him to his death; for had he lived, he would have had to carry on the war with an exhausted ex­chequer and under the greatest difficulties. He knew only of the triumph of his arms, what was to follow was hidden from him.

As in all cases of sudden death, there was much talk of poison connected with that of Leo X. The discoloration and swelling of the body after death were taken by many as a sure sign that his decease was the result of a crime. But the physician Severino, who had been present at the post-mortem examination, declared that there was no question of any such thing, though he admitted that he could not persuade his colleagues of it. Suspicion fell at once on the Pope’s cup-bearer, Bernabo Malaspina, who belonged to the French party; his behaviour excited suspicion, and he was arrested. However, his examination brought nothing to light on which his accusers could lay hands; Cardinal Medici had him set at liberty, presumably so as not to make an irreconcilable enemy of Francis I, should he be found to be mixed up in the case. Both Francesco Maria della Rovere and the Duke of Ferrara were mentioned as instigators of the crime. The latter gave an excuse for this suspicion by the scandalous signs of joy in which he indulged when he heard of his enemy’s decease. He rewarded with generosity those who brought the news, and vilified the memory of the dead Pontiff in every possible way.

Francesco Vettori, the great friend of the Medici, has declared himself, in his History of Italy, adverse to the idea of poison. In a letter to the Englishman, Clerk, he attributes the Pope’s death entirely to the chill he caught in the night at Magliana; and says that anyone who knew Leo’s constitution, his corpulency, his bloated countenance, and almost chronic catarrh, as well as his manner of living, with frequent fasts and heavy meals, would be surprised that he had lived so long.

Two of the most celebrated contemporary historians, Guicciardini and Giovio, are firmly convinced that he was poisoned, as is also Baldassare Castiglione. Nevertheless, the result of the post-mortem, as far as it is known, as well as the form taken by the Pope's illness of intermittent fever with intervals of complete convalescence, offered no sanction for the idea of death by violence. Everything points rather to the idea that Leo X, like Alexander VI, was the victim of a virulent attack of malaria.

The number of enemies possessed by Leo was revealed by the extravagant attacks which were showered on his memory after his death. Verses of bitterest scorn and senseless rage poured in. The favourites of the Medici, whose hopes were now destroyed, were ridiculed by satirical pictures and medals with biting inscriptions. Every manner of accusation was levelled against the late Pope. This immoderate abuse was only equalled by the immoderate flattery which had been showered on him when newly elected. In other ways, his end was also in striking contrast with the brilliant beginning of his Pontificate. In consequence of the financial need his funeral obsequies, though not as mean as had been some, were by no means brilliant. His funeral oration, delivered by Antonio da Spello, was very short. There could have been nothing noteworthy in it, or it would not have passed without mention. The Pope of the Renaissance, so devoted to magnificence, was buried very poorly; a simple tomb in St. Peter's covered his mortal remains. It was only in the Pontificate of Paul III that a great tomb in white marble was erected for him in the choir behind the high altar at S. Maria sopra Minerva. Its execution was given to the Florentine, Baccio Bandinelli, and the work of designing it entrusted to Antonio di Sangallo. Four Corinthian columns support an arch surmounted by the Medici arms and subjects in relief; that in the middle depicts the meeting of Leo X with Francis I at Bologna; in the principal niche sits the Medici Pope, holding the keys in his left hand, while he raises the right in blessing. The figures of the Princes of the Apostles, by Baccio Bandinelli, the needy rival of Michael Angelo, which stand in the two side niches, are quite as commonplace as the central figure of the Pope executed by Raffaello da Montelupo. The whole thing is a cold and insipid piece of work, unworthy of the patron of Raphael. As is most unusual, there is no inscription on the tomb. Yet never was there a Pope who was the subject of more inscriptions in his lifetime than Leo X.

THE

HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION