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UNIVERSAL HISTORY LIBRARY |
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THE EMPIRE OF PARTHIA
I.
Condition of Western Asia in the Third Century BC—Origin
of the Parthian State.
II. Reign of Mithridates I
III
Last Struggle with Syria—Defeat and Death of Antiochus Sidetes
IV
Pressure of the Northern Nomads upon Parthia —Scythic Wars of Phraates II and Artabanus II
V
Mithridates II. and the Nomads—War with Armenia—First
Contact with Rome
VI Dark Period of Parthian History—Accession of Sanatreces—Phraates III. and Pompey
VII
Great Expedition of Crassus against Parthia, and its
Failure—Retaliatory Raid of Pacorus
VIII
Second War of Parthia with Rome—Parthian Invasion of
Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor
IX
Expedition of Mark Antony against Parthia—its
Failure—War between Parthia and Media .
X
Internal Troubles in Parthia—Her Relations with Rome
under Augustus and Tiberius
XI
Asinai and Anilai—An Episode of Parthian History
XII
End of the Reign of Artabanus III.—Gotarzes and his
Rivals
XIII Parthia in the Time of Nero—Vologases I AND CORBULO
XIV
Vologases I and Vespasian—Pacorus II and Decebalus of Dacia
XV.
Chosroes and Trajan—Trajan’s Asiatic
Conquests—Relinquishment of these Conquests by Hadrian
XVI
Vologases II and Antoninus Pius—Vologases III. and
Verus
XVII
Vologases IV and Severus
XVIII
Artabanus V. and Caracallus—The
Last War with Rome—Defeat of Macrinus .
XIX
Revolt of the Persians—Downfall of the Parthian
Empire
I.
CONDITION OF WESTERN ASIA IN THE THIRD CENTURY
B.C.—ORIGIN OF THE PARTHIAN STATE.
The grand attempt of Alexander the Great to unite the
East and West in a single universal monarchy, magnificent in conception, and
carried out in act with extraordinary energy and political wisdom, so long as
he was spared to conduct his enterprise in person, was frustrated, in the first
place, by the unfortunate circumstance of his premature decease; and, secondly,
by the want of ability among his “Successors.” Although among them there were
several who possessed considerable talent, there was no commanding personality
of force sufficient to dominate the others, and certainly none who inherited
either Alexander’s grandeur of conception or his powers of execution, or who
can be imagined as, under any circumstances, successfully accomplishing his
projects. The scheme, therefore, which the great Macedonian had conceived,
unhappily collapsed, and his effort to unite and consolidate led only to
increased division and disintegration. He left behind him at least twelve rival
claimants of his power, and it was only by partition that the immediate
breaking out of civil war among the competitors was prevented. Partition itself
did but stave off the struggle for a few years, and the wars of the “Successors,”
which followed, caused further change, and tended to split the empire into
minute fragments. After a while the various collisions produced something like
a “survival of the fittest,” and about the close of the fourth century, after
the great battle of Ipsus (BC 301), that division of the Macedonian Empire was
made into four principal parts, which thenceforward for nearly three centuries
formed the basis of the political situation in Eastern Europe and Western Asia.
Macedonia, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt became the great powers of the time,
and on the fortunes of these four powers, their policies, and lines of action,
depended the general course of affairs in the Oriental world for the next two
hundred years at any rate.
Of these four great monarchies the one with which the
interests of Parthia were almost wholly bound up was the Syrian kingdom of the Seleucidae. Originally, Seleucus received nothing but the
single satrapy of Babylonia. But his military genius and his popularity were
such, that his dominion kept continually increasing until it became an empire
worthy of comparison with those ancient Oriental monarchies, which, in remoter
times, had attracted, and almost monopolised, the
attention of mankind. As early as BC 312, he had added to his original
government of Babylonia; the important countries of Media, Susiana, and Persia.
After Ipsus he received, by the agreement then made among the “Successors,” the
districts of Cappadocia, Eastern Phrygia, Upper Syria, Mesopotamia, and the
entire valley of the Euphrates; while, about the same time, or rather earlier,
he, by his own unassisted efforts, obtained the adhesion of all the eastern
provinces of Alexander’s Empire, Armenia, Assyria, Sagartia,
Carmania, Hyrcania, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Aria, Sarangia, Arachosia, Sacastana,
Gedrosia, and probably part of India. The empire thus established extended from
the Mediterranean on the west to the Indus valley and the Bolor mountain chain
upon the east, while it stretched from the Caspian and the Jaxartes towards the
north to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean southwards. Its entire area
could not have been much less than 1,200,000 square miles. Of these some
300,000 or 400,000 may have been desert; but the remainder was generally
fertile, and comprised within its limits some of the very most productive
regions in the whole world. The Mesopotamian lowland, the Orontes valley, the tract
between the Southern Caspian and the mountains, the regions about Merv and
Balkh, were among the richest in Asia, and produced grain and fruit in
incredible abundance. The fine pastures of Media and Armenia furnished
excellent horses. Bactria gave an inexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants in
large numbers were readily procurable from India. Gold, silver, copper, iron,
lead, tin were furnished by several of the provinces, and precious stones of
various kinds abounded. Moreover, for above ten centuries, the precious metals
and the most valuable kinds of merchandise had flowed from every quarter into
the region; and though the Macedonians may have carried off, or wasted, a
considerable quantity of both, yet the accumulations of ages withstood the
strain; and the hoarded wealth, which had come down from Assyrian, Babylonian,
and Median times, was to be found in the days of Seleucus chiefly within the
limits of his empire. It might have seemed that Western Asia was about to enjoy
under the Seleucid princes as tranquil and prosperous a condition as had
prevailed throughout the region for the two centuries which had intervened
between the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus (BC 538) and its
destruction by Alexander (BC 323). But the fair prospect was soon clouded over.
The Seleucid princes, instead of devoting themselves to the consolidation of
their power, in the vast region between the Euphrates and the Indus, turned all
their attention towards the West, and frittered away in petty quarrels for
small gains with their rivals in that quarter—the Ptolemies and the princes of
Asia Minor—those energies which would have been far better employed in
arranging and organising the extensive dominions
whereof they were already masters. It was symptomatic of this leaning to the
West, that the first Seleucus, almost as soon as he found himself in quiet
possession of his vast empire, transferred the seat of government from Lower
Mesopotamia to Upper Syria, from the banks of the Tigris to those of the
Orontes. This movement had fatal consequences. Already his empire contained
within itself an element of weakness in its over-great length, which cannot be
estimated at less than two thousand miles. To counteract this disadvantage a
fairly central position for the capital was almost a necessity. The empire of
Seleucus might have been conveniently ruled from the old Median capital of
Ecbatana, or the later Persian one of Susa. Even Babylon, or Seleucia, though
further to the west, were not unsuitable sites ; and had Seleucus been content
with either of these, no blame would attach to him. But when, to keep watch
upon his rivals, he removed the seat of government five hundred miles further
westward, and placed it almost on his extreme western frontier, within a few
miles of the Mediterranean, he intensified the weakness which required to be
counteracted, and made the disruption of his empire within no great length of
time certain. The change loosened the ties which bound the empire together,
offended the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their
monarch withdraw from them into a remote corner of his dominions, and
particularly weakened the grasp of the government on those more eastern
districts which were at once furthest from the new metropolis, and least
assimilated to the Hellenic character. Among the causes which led to the
disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom, there is none which deserves so well to
be considered the main cause as this. It was calculated at once to produce the
desire to revolt, and to render the reduction of revolted provinces difficult,
if not impossible.
The evil day, however, might have been indefinitely
postponed, if not even escaped altogether, had the Seleucid princes either
established and maintained throughout their empire a vigorous and efficient administration,
or abstained from entangling themselves in wars with their neighbours upon the
West—the Ptolemies, the kings of Pergamus, and others.
But the organisation of the
Seleucid Empire was unsatisfactory. Instead of pursuing the system inaugurated
by Alexander, and seeking to weld the heterogeneous elements of which his
kingdom was composed into a homogeneous whole, instead of at once conciliating
and elevating the Asiatics by uniting them with the
Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting intermarriage and social intercourse
between the two classes of his subjects, educating the Asiatics in Greek ideas and Greek schools, opening his court to them, promoting them to
high employments, making them feel that they were as much valued and as much
cared for as the people of the conquering race, the first Seleucus, and after
him his successors, fell back upon the older, simpler, and ruder system—the
system pursued before Alexander’s time by the Persians, and before them perhaps
by the Medes—the system most congenial to human laziness and human pride—that
of governing a nation of slaves by means of a clique of victorious aliens.
Seleucus divided his empire into satrapies, seventy-two in number. He bestowed
the office of satrap on none but Macedonians and Greeks. The standing army, by
means of which he maintained his authority, was indeed composed in the main of Asiatics, disciplined after the Greek model; but it was
officered entirely by men of Greek or Macedonian parentage. Nothing was done to
keep up the selfrespect of the Asiatics,
or to soften the unpleasantness which must always attach to being governed by
foreigners. Even the superintendence over the satraps seems to have been
insufficient. According to some writers, it was a gross outrage offered by a
satrap to an Asiatic subject that stirred up the Parthians to their revolt. The
story may not be true; but the currency given to it shows of what conduct to
those under their rule the satraps of the Seleucidae were thought, by those who lived near the time, to have been capable. It may be
said that this treatment was no worse than that whereto the subject races of
Western Asia had been accustomed for many centuries under their Persian,
Median, or Assyrian masters, and this statement may be quite consonant with
truth ; but a new yoke is always more galling than an old one; in addition to
which we must take into consideration the fact, that the hopes of the Asiatics had been raised by the policy of assimilation
avowed, and to some extent introduced, by Alexander; so that they may be
excused if they felt with some bitterness the disappointment of their very
legitimate expectations, when the Seleucidae revived
the old satrapial system, unmodified, unsoftened,
with all its many abuses as pronounced and as rampant as ever.
An entire abstention on the part of the Seleucidae from quarrels with the other “Successors of
Alexander,” would perhaps scarcely have been possible. Their territory bordered
on that of the Ptolemies and the kings of Pergamus, and was liable to invasion
from either quarter. But by planting their capital on the Orontes they
aggravated the importance of the attacks which they could not prevent, and
became mixed up with Pergamenian and Egyptian, and
even Macedonian, politics far more than was necessary. Had they but made
Seleucia permanently their metropolis, and held lightly by their dominion to
the west of the Euphrates, they might certainly have avoided to a large extent
the entanglements into which they were drawn by their actual policy, and have
been free to give their main attention to the true sources of their real
strength—the central and eastern provinces. But it may be doubted whether the
idea of abstention ever presented itself to the mind of any one of the early
Seleucid princes. It was the fond dream of each of them, as of the other “Successors,”
that possibly in his person might one day be reunited the whole of the
territories which had been ruled by the Great Conqueror. Each Seleucid prince
would have felt that he sacrificed his dearest and most cherished hopes, if he
had withdrawn from the regions of the west, and shunning engagements and adventures
in that quarter, had contented himself with efforts to consolidate a great
power in the more inland and more thoroughly Asiatic portions of the empire.
The result was that, during the first half of the
third century (BC 300-250), the Seleucid princes were almost constantly engaged
in disputes and wars in Asia Minor and Syria Proper, gave their personal
superintendence to those regions, and had neither time nor attention to spare
for the affairs of the far East. So long as the satraps of these regions paid
regularly their appointed tributes, and furnished regularly the required quotas
of troops for service in the western wars, Seleucus and his successors, the
first and second Antiochi, were content. The satraps
were left to, manage the affairs of their provinces at their own discretion ;
and we cannot be surprised if the absence of a controlling hand led to various
complications and disorders.
As time went on these disorders would naturally
increase, and matters might very probably have come to a head in a few more
years through the mere negligence and apathy of those who had the direction of
the state; but a further impulse towards actual disintegration was given by the
character of the second Antiochus, which was especially weak and contemptible.
To have taken the title of “Theos”— never before assumed, so far as we know, by
any monarch—was, even by itself, a sufficient indication of presumption and
folly, and might justify us, did we know no more of him, in concluding that the
calamities of his reign were the fruit of his unfitness to direct and rule an
empire. But we have further abundant evidence of his incapacity. He was noted,
even among Asiatic sovereigns, for luxury and debauchery; he neglected all
state affairs in the pursuit of pleasure; his wives and his male favourites were allowed to rule his kingdom at their will,
and their most flagrant crimes were neither restrained nor punished. The
satraps, to whom the character and conduct of their sovereign could not but
become known, would be partly encouraged to follow the bad example set them,
partly provoked by it to shake themselves free from the rule of so hateful yet
contemptible a master.
It may be added, that already there had been examples
of successful revolts on the part of satraps in outlying provinces, which could
not but have been generally known, and which must have excited ambitious
longings on the part of persons similarly placed, from the very beginning of
the Macedonian period. Even at the time of Alexander’s great conquests, a
Persian satrap, Atropates, succeeded in converting his satrapy of Upper
Media—thenceforward called Media Atropatene—into an independent sovereignty.
Not long afterwards, Cappadocia had detached itself from the kingdom of Eumenes
(BC 326), and had established its independence under Ariarathes, who became the
founder of a dynasty. Still earlier, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus, once
Persian provinces, had revolted, and in each case the revolt had issued in the
recovery of autonomy. Thus already in Western Asia, beside the
Greco-Macedonian kingdoms which had been established by the “Successors of
Alexander,” there were existent some five or six states which had had their
origin in successful rebellions.
Such were the circumstances under which, in or about
the year BC 256, which was the sixth year of Antiochus Theus, actual
disturbances broke out in the extreme north-east of the Seleucid Empire. The
first province to raise the standard of revolt, and proclaim itself
independent, was Bactria. This district had from a remote antiquity been one
with special pretensions. The country was fertile, and much of it readily
defensible; the people were hardy and valiant; they had been generally treated
with exceptional favour by the Persian monarchs; and
they seem to have had traditions which assigned them a pre-eminence among the
Arian nations at some indefinitely distant period. “Bactria with the lofty
banner ” is celebrated in one of the most ancient portions of the Zendavesta. It remained unsubdued until the time of Cyrus.
Cyrus is said by some to have left it as an appanage to his second son, Bardes,
or Tanyoxares. Under the Persians, it had for satrap
generally, or at any rate frequently, a member of the royal family. Alexander
had conquered it with difficulty, and only by prolonged efforts. It was
therefore natural that disintegration should make its first appearance in this
quarter. The Greek satrap of the time, Diodotus, either disgusted with the
conduct of Antiochus Theus, or simply seeing in his weakness and general
unpopularity an opportunity which it would be foolish to let slip, in or about
the year BC 256, assumed the style and title of king, struck coins stamped with
his own name, and established himself without any difficulty as king over the
entire province. Theus, engaged in war with the Egyptian monarch, Ptolemy
Philadelphus, did not even make an effort to put him down, and the Bactrian
ruler, without encountering any serious opposition, passed into the ranks of
autonomous sovereigns.
The example of successful revolt thus set could not
well be barren of consequences. If one Seleucid province might throw off the
yoke of its feudal lord with absolute impunity, why might not others? There
seemed to be actually nothing to prevent them. Syria, so far as we can discern,
allowed Bactria to go its way without any effort whatever either to check the
revolt or to punish it. For eighteen years no Syrian force came near the
country. Diodotus was permitted to consolidate his kingdom and rivet his
authority on his subjects, without any interference, and the Bactrian monarchy
became thus a permanent factor in Asiatic politics for nearly two centuries.
It was about six years after the establishment of
Bactrian independence that the Parthian satrapy followed the pattern set it by
its neighbour, and detached itself from the Seleucid Empire. The circumstances,
however, under which the severance took place were very different in the two
cases. History, by no means repeated itself. In Bactria the Greek satrap took
the lead ; and the Bactrian kingdom was, at any rate at its commencement, as
thoroughly Hellenic as that of the Seleucidae. But in
Parthia Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The native Asiatics rebelled against their masters. A people of a rude
and uncivilised type, coarse and savage, but brave
and freedom-loving, rose up against the polished but comparatively effeminate
Greeks, who held them in subjection, and claimed and succeeded in establishing
their independence. The Parthian kingdom was thoroughly anti-Hellenic. It
appealed to patriotic feelings, and to the hate universally felt towards the
stranger. It set itself to undo the work of Alexander, to cast out the
Europeans, to recover for the native race the possession of its own continent.
“Asia for for the Asiatics,”
was its cry. It was naturally almost as hostile to Bactria as to Syria,
although danger from a common enemy might cause it sometimes to make a
temporary alliance with the former kingdom. It had, no doubt, the general
sympathy of the populations in the adjacent countries, and represented to them
the cause of freedom and autonomy. Arsaces effected for Parthia that which
Arminius strove to effect for Germany, and which Tell accomplished for
Switzerland, and Victor Emmanuel for Lombardy.
The circumstances of the revolt of Parthia are
variously narrated by ancient authors. According to a story reported by Strabo,
though not accepted as true by him, Arsaces was a Bactrian, who did not approve
of the proceedings of Diodotus, and, when he was successful, quitted the
newly-founded kingdom, and transferred his residence to Parthia, where he
stirred up an insurrection against the satrap, and, succeeding in the attempt,
induced the Parthians to accept him as their sovereign. But it is intrinsically
improbable that an entire foreigner would have been accepted as king under such
circumstances, and it is fatal to the narrative that every other account
contradicts the Bactrian origin of Arsaces, and makes him a Parthian, or next
door to a Parthian. Arrian states that Arsaces and his brother, Tiridates, were
Parthians, descendants of Phriapites, the son of
Arsaces; that they revolted against the satrap of Antiochus Theus, by name Pherecles, on account of a gross insult which he had
offered to one of them ; and that finally, having murdered the satrap, they
declared Parthia independent, and set up a government of their own. Strabo,
while giving currency to more than one story on the subject, lets us see that,
in his own mind, he accepts the following account: “Arsaces was a Scythian, a
chief among the Parnian Dahae, who inhabited the valley of the Ochus (Attrek?). Soon after the establishment of Bactrian
independence, he entered Parthia at the head of a body of his country-men, and
succeeded in making himself master of it.” Finally, Justin, who no doubt, here
as elsewhere, follows Trogus Pompeius, a writer of
the Augustan age, expresses himself as follows: “Arsaces, having been long
accustomed to live by robbery and rapine, attacked the Parthians with a
predatory band, killed their satrap, Andragoras, and seized the supreme
authority.” This last account seems fairly probable, and does not greatly
differ from Arrian’s. If Arsaces was a Dahan chief, accustomed to make forays
into the fertile hill country of Parthia from the Chorasmian desert, and, in one of them, fell in with the Greek satrap, defeated him, and
slew him, it would not be unlikely that the Parthians, who were of a kindred
race, might be so delighted with his prowess as to invite him to place himself
at their head. An oppressed people gladly adopts as ruler the chieftain of an
allied tribe, if he has shown skill and daring, and promises them deliverance
from their oppressors.
The date of the Parthian revolt was probably BC 250,
which was the eleventh year of Antiochus Theus. Antiochus was at that time
engaged in a serious conflict with Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt, which,
however, was brought to a close in the following year by his marriage with
Berenice, Ptolemy’s daughter. It might have been expected that, as soon as his
hands were free, he would have turned his attention towards the East, and have
made an effort, at any rate, to regain his lost territory. But Antiochus lacked
either the energy or the courage to engage in a fresh war. He was selfish and
luxurious in his habits, and seems to have preferred the delights of repose
amid the soft seductions of Antioch to the perils and hardships of a campaign
in the rough Caspian region. At any rate, he remained quietly at home, while
Arsaces consolidated his power, chastised those who for one reason or another
resisted his authority, and settled himself firmly upon the throne. His capital
appears to have been Hecatompylus, which had been
built by Alexander in the valley of the Gurghan river. According to some late authors of small account, he came to a violent
end, having been killed in battle by a spear-thrust, which penetrated his side.
It is certain that he had a short reign, since he was succeeded in BC 248 by
his brother, Tiridates, the second Parthian monarch.
Tiridates, on ascending the throne, followed a
practice not very uncommon in the East, and adopted his brother’s name as a “throne-name,”
reigning as Arsaces the Second. He is the first Parthian king of whom we
possess contemporary memorials. The coins struck by Arsaces II commence the
Parthian series, and present to us a monarch of strongly- marked features, with
a large eye, a prominent, slightly aquiline nose, a projecting chin, and an
entire absence of hair. He wears upon his head a curious cap, or helmet, with
lappets on either side that reach to the shoulders, and has around his forehead
and above his ears a coronal of pearls, apparently of a large size. On the
reverse side of his coins he exhibits the figure of a man, seated on a sort of
stool, and holding out in front of him a strung bow, with the string uppermost.
This may be either a representation of himself in his war costume, or an ideal
figure of a Parthian god, but is probably the former. Tiridates takes upon his
coins the title either of “King,” or of “Great King.” The legend which they
bear is Greek, as is that of almost all the kings his successors. The coins
follow the Seleucid model.
Tiridates was an able and active monarch. He had the
good fortune to hold the throne for a period of above thirty years, and had
thus ample space for the development of his talents, and for completing the organisation of the kingdom. Having received Parthia from
his brother in a somewhat weak and unsettled condition, he left it a united and
powerful monarchy, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in its defences, in alliance with its nearest and most formidable
neighbour, and triumphant over the great power of Syria, which had hoped to
bring it once more into subjection. He witnessed some extraordinary movements,
and conducted affairs during their progress with prudence and moderation. He
was more than once brought into imminent danger, but succeeded in effectually
protecting himself. He made a judicious use of the opportunities which the disturbed
condition of Western Asia in his time presented to him, and might well be
considered, as he was by many, a sort of second founder of the State.
It was within two years of the accession of Tiridates
to the Parthian throne that one of those vast, but transient, revolutions to
which Asia is subject, but which are rare occurrences in Europe, swept over
Western Asia. Ptolemy Euergetes, the son of Philadelphus, having succeeded to
his father’s kingdom in BC 247, made war on Syria in BC 245, to avenge the
murder of his sister Berenice, to whose death the Syrian king, Seleucus II, had
been a party. In the war which followed he at first carried everything before
him. Having taken Antioch, he crossed the Euphrates, and, in the course of a
couple of years, succeeded in effecting the conquest of Mesopotamia, Assyria,
Babylonia, Susiana, Media, and Persia, while the smaller provinces, as far as
Parthia and Bactria, submitted to him without resistance. He went in person, as
he tells us, as far as Babylon, and, regarding his power as established,
proceeded somewhat hastily to gather the fruits of victory, by compelling the
conquered countries to surrender all the most valuable works of art which were
to be found in them, and sending off the treasures to Egypt, for the adornment
of Alexandria. He also levied heavy contributions on the countries which had
submitted to him, and altogether treated them with a severity that was
impolitic. Bactria and Parthia cannot but have felt considerable alarm at his
victorious progress. Here was a young warrior who, in a single campaign, had
marched the distance of a thousand miles from the banks of the Nile to those of
the Lower Euphrates, without so much as receiving a check, and who was
threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What resistance could the little
Parthian state hope to offer to him? It must have rejoiced the heart of
Tiridates to hear that, while the conqueror was reaping the spoils of victory
in his newly-subjugated provinces, dangerous disturbances had broken out in his
own land, which had forced him to withdraw his troops suddenly (BC 243), and
evacuate the territory which he had overrun. Thus his invasion proved to be a
raid rather than a real conquest, and, instead of damaging Parthia, had rather
the effect of improving her position, and contributing to the advance of her
power. On Ptolemy’s departure, Syria recovered her sway over her lost
provinces, and again stood forward; as Parthia’s principal enemy; but she was
less formidable than she had been previously; her hold over her outlying
dominions was relaxed, her strength was crippled, her prestige lost, and her honour tarnished. Tiridates saw in her depression his own
opportunity’ and, suddenly invading Hyrcania, his near neighbour, and Syria’s
most distant dependency, succeeded in overrunning it and detaching it from the
empire of the Seleucidae.
The gauntlet was thus thrown down to the Syrian king,
and a challenge given, which he was compelled to accept, unless he was prepared
to yield unresistingly, one after another, all the fairest of his remaining
provinces. It was not likely that he would so act. Seleucus II. was no coward.
He had been engaged in wars almost continuously from his accession, and, though
more than once defeated in battle, had never shown the white feather. On
learning the loss of Hyrcania, he proceeded immediately to patch up a peace
with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, against whom he was at the time contending,
and having collected a large army, marched away to the East. He did not,
however, at once invade Parthia, but, deflecting his course to the right,
entered into negotiations with the revolted Bactrian king, Diodotus, and made
alliance with him against Tiridates. It may be supposed that he represented
Tiridates as their common foe, as much a danger to Bactria as to Syria, the
head of a movement, which was directed against Hellenism, and which aimed as
much at putting down Bactrian rule as Syrian. At any rate, he succeeded in
gaining Diodotus to his side; and the confederate monarchs, having joined their
forces, proceeded to invade the territory of the Parthian sovereign. Tiridates
did not await their onset. Regarding himself as overmatched, he quitted his
country, and fled northwards into the region between the Oxus and the Jaxartes,
where he took refuge with a Scythic tribe, called the Aspasiacae, which was powerful at this period. The Aspasiacae, probably lent him troops, for he did not remain
long in retirement; but, hearing that the first Diodotus, the ally of Seleucus,
had died, he contrived to draw over his son, Diodotus II, to his alliance, and,
in conjunction with him, gave Seleucus battle, and completely defeated his
army. Seleucus retreated hastily to Antioch, and resumed his struggle with his
brother, whom he eventually overcame; but, having learned wisdom by experience,
he made no further attempts against either the Bactrian or the Parthian power.
This victory was with reason regarded by the Parthians
as a sort of second beginning of their independence. Hitherto the kingdom had
existed precariously, and as it were by sufferance. From the day that the
revolt took place, it was certain that, some time or other, Syria would
reclaim, and make an attempt to recover, its lost territory. Until a battle had
been fought, until the new monarchy had measured its strength against that of
its former mistress, it was impossible for any one to feel secure that it would
be able to maintain its existence. The victory gained by Tiridates over
Seleucus Callinicus put an end to these doubts. It proved to the world at
large, as well as to the Parthians themselves, that they had nothing to
fear—that they were strong enough to preserve their freedom. If we consider the
enormous disproportion between the military strength and resources of the
narrow Parthian state and the vast Syrian Empire—if we remember that the one
comprised at this time about fifty thousand, and the other above a million of
square miles; that the one had inherited the wealth of ages, while the other
was probably as poor as any province in Asia; that the one possessed the
Macedonian arms, training, and tactics, while the other knew only the rude
warfare of the Steppes—the result of the struggle cannot but be regarded as
surprising. Still, it was not without precedent; and it has not been without
repetition. It adds another to the many instances, where a small but brave
people, bent on resisting foreign domination, have, when standing on their
defence in their own territory, proved more than a match for the utmost force
that a foe of overwhelming strength’ could bring against them. It reminds us of
Marathon of Bannockburn, of Morgarten. We may not sympathise wholly with the victors, for Greek civilization,
even of the type introduced by Alexander into Asia, was ill replaced by Tatar
coarseness and barbarism; but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spectacle
of a handful of gallant men determinedly resisting in the fastnesses of their
native land a host of aliens, and triumphing over their would-be oppressors.
The Parthians themselves were so impressed with the importance of the conflict,
that they preserved the memory of it by a solemn festival on the anniversary of
their victory, which was still celebrated in the days of the historian Trogus Pompeius.
It is possible that Seleucus would not have accepted
his defeat as final, or desisted from his attempt to reduce Parthia to
obedience, if he had felt perfectly free to continue or discontinue the
Parthian war at his pleasure. But, on his return to Antioch, he found much to
occupy him. His brother, Antiochus Hierax, was still a rebel against his
authority, and the proceedings of Attalus, King of Pergamus, were threatening.
Seleucus was engaged in contests with these two enemies from the time of his
return from Parthia (BC 237) almost to his death (BC 226). He was thus
compelled to leave Tiridates to take his own course, and either occupy himself
with fresh conquests, or devote himself to the strengthening and adorning of
Tiis existing kingdom, as he pleased. Tiridates chose 1 the latter course; and during
the remainder of his long reign, for the space of above twenty years, employed
his leisure in useful labours within the limits of
his own territories. He erected a number of strong forts, or castles, in
suitable positions, fortified the Parthian towns generally, and placed
garrisons in them, and carefully selected a site for a new city, which he
probably intended to make, and perhaps actually made, his capital. The
situation chosen was one in the mountain range known as Zapavortenon,
where a hill was found, surrounded on all sides by precipitous rocks, and
placed in the middle of a plain of extraordinary fertility. Abundant wood and
copious streams of water existed in the neighbourhood.
The soil was so rich that it scarcely required cultivation, and the woods were
so full of game as to afford endless amusement to hunters. The city itself was
called Dara, which the Greeks and Romans elongated into Dareium.
Its exact site is undiscovered; but it seems to have lain towards the east, and
was probably not very far from the now sacred city of Meshed.
We may account for the desire of Tiridates to
establish a new capital by the natural antipathy of the Parthians to the
Greeks, and the fact that Hecatompylos, which had been hitherto the seat of
government, was a thoroughly Greek town, having been built by Alexander the
Great, and peopled mainly by Grecian settlers. The Parthians disliked close contact
with Hellenic manners and Hellenic ideas. Just as, in their most palmy days,
they rejected Seleucia for their capital, and preferred to build the entirely
new town of Ctesiphon in its immediate vicinity, as the residence of the Court
and monarch, so even now, when their prosperity was but just budding, an
instinctive feeling of repulsion caused them to shrink from sharing a locality
with the Greeks, and make the experiment of having for their headquarters a
city wholly their own. The experiment did not altogether succeed. Either
Hecatompylos had natural advantages even greater than those of Dara, or, as the
growth of the Parthian power was mainly towards the west, the eastward position
of the latter was found inconvenient. After a short trial, the successors of
Tiridates ceased to reside at Dara, and Hecatompylos became once more the
Parthian capital and the seat of Parthian government.
Tiridates, having done his best, according to his lights,
for the security of Parthia from without, and for her prosperity within, died
peaceably after a reign which is reckoned at thirty-four years, and which
lasted probably from 248 to 214 BC. He left his throne to a son, named
Artabanus, who, like his father, took the “throne-name” of Arsaces, and is
known in history as Arsaces the Third.
Artabanus I, if we may judge by his coins, was not
unlike his father in appearance, having the same projecting and slightly
aquiline nose, and the same large eye; but he differed from his father in
possessing abundance of hair, and wearing a long beard. He has discarded,
moreover, the cap of Tiridates, and, instead
of it, wears his own hair, which he confines with a band (the diadem), passing
from the forehead to the occiput, there knotted, and flowing down behind. He
takes the later legend of his father——“Arsaces, the
Great King.”
It was the aim of Artabanus to pursue his father’s
aggressive policy, and further enlarge the limits of the kingdom. He was
scarcely settled upon the throne, when he declared war against Antiochus the
Great, the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, who had inherited the Syrian
crown in BC 223, and was entangled in a contest with one of the satraps of Asia
Minor, named Achaeus. Proceeding westward along the skirts of the mountains, he
made his way to Ecbatana in Media, receiving the submission of the various
countries as he went, and (nominally) adding to his dominions the entire tract
between Hyrcania and the Zagros mountain chain. From this elevated position he
threatened the low-lying countries of the Mesopotamian plain, and seemed
likely, unless opposed, in another campaign to reach the Euphrates. The
situation was most critical for Syria; and Antiochus, recognising his peril, bent all his energies to meet and overcome it. Fortunately he had
just crushed Achaeus, and was able, without greatly exposing himself to serious
loss in the West, to collect and lead a vast expedition against the East. With
an army of a hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, he set out for
Media in the spring of BC 213, recovered Ecbatana without a battle, and thence
pressed eastward after his startled enemy, who retreated as he advanced. In
vain Artabanus attempted to hinder his progress by stopping, or poisoning, the
wells along the route which he had necessarily to take; Antiochus caught the
poisoners at their work, and brushed them from his path. He then marched
rapidly against Parthia, and entering the enemy’s country, took and occupied
without a battle the chief city, Hecatompylos.
Artabanus, bent on avoiding an engagement, retreated
into Hyrcania, perhaps flattering himself that his adversary would not venture
to follow him into that rugged and almost inaccessible region. If so, however,
he soon found that he had underrated the perseverance and tenacity of the
Syrian king. Antiochus, after resting his army for a brief space at
Hecatompylos, set out in pursuit of his enemy, crossed by a difficult pass,
chiefly along the dry channel of a mountain torrent, obstructed by masses of
rock and trunks of trees, the high ridge which separated between Parthia and
Hyrcania—his advance disputed by the Parthians at every step—fought and won a
battle at the top, and thence descending into the rich Hyrcanian valley, endeavoured to take possession of “the entire country. But
Artabanus, brought to bay by his foe, defended himself with extraordinary
courage and energy. One by one the principal Hyrcanian towns were besieged and
taken, but the monarch himself was unsubdued. Carrying on a guerilla warfare,
moving from place to place, occupying one strong position after another, he
continued his resistance with such dogged firmness that at length the patience
of Antiochus was worn out, and he came to terms with his gallant adversary,
conceding to him that which was the real bone of contention, his independence.
Parthia came out of the struggle with the Great Antiochus unscathed: she did,
not even have to relinquish her conquered dependency of Hyrcania. Artabanus
moreover had the honour of being admitted into the
number of the Great King’s allies. As for Antiochus, he turned his attention to
the affairs of Bactria, and the remoter East, and having arranged them to his
satisfaction, returned by way of Arachosia,
Drangiana, and Kerman to his western possessions (BC 206).
The retirement of Antiochus, however honourable to Parthia, must have left her weakened and exhausted
by her vast and astonishing efforts. She had been taxed almost beyond her
strength, and must have needed a breathing-space to recruit and recover
herself. Artabanus wisely remained at peace during the rest of his reign; and
his son and successor, Priapatius, followed his
example. It was not till BC 181 that the fifth Arsaces, Phraates I, son of Priapatius, having mounted the throne, resumed the policy
of aggression introduced by Tiridates, and further extended the dominion of
Parthia in the region south of the Caspian. The great Antiochus was dead. His
successor, Seleucus IV (Philopator), was a weak and unenterprising prince, whom
the defeat of Magnesia had cowed, and who regarded inaction as his only
security. Aware probably of this condition of affairs, Phraates, early in his
reign, invaded the country of the Mardi, which lay in the mountain tract south
of the Caspian Sea, overran it, and added it to his territories. Successful
thus far, he proceeded to make an encroachment on Media Rhagiana,
the district between the Caspian Gates and Media Atropatene, by occupying the
tract immediately west of the Gates, and building there the important city of Charax, which he garrisoned with Mardians. This was an
advance of the Parthian Terminus towards the west by a distance of nearly two
hundred miles—an advance, not so much important in itself as in the indication
which it furnished, at once of Parthian aggressiveness and of Syrian inability
to withstand it. The conquests of Phraates added little either to the military
strength or to the resources of his kingdom, but they were prophetic of the
future. They foreshadowed that gradual waning of the Syrian and advance of the
Parthian state, which is the chief fact of West Asian history in the two
centuries immediately preceding our era, and which was to make itself
startlingly apparent within the next few years, during the reign of the sixth
Arsaces.
FIRST PERIOD OF EXTENSIVE CONQUEST—REIGN OF
MITHRIDATES I.
Mithridates the First, a brother of Phraates, was
nominated to the kingly office by his predecessor, who had shown his affection
for him during his life by assuming the title of “Philadelphus” upon his coins,
and at his death passed over in his favour the claims
of several sons. Undoubtedly, he was a born “king of men”—pointed out by nature
as fitter to rule than any other individual among his contemporaries. He had a
physiognomy which was at once intelligent, strong, and dignified. He was ambitious,
but not possessed of an ambition which was likely to o’erleap itself”—strict, but not cruel—brave, energetic, a good general, an excellent
administrator, firm ruler. Parthia, under his government, advanced by leaps and
bounds.” Receiving at his accession kingdom but of narrow dimensions, confined
apparently between the city of Charax on the one side
and the river Arius, or Heri-rud, on the other, he
transformed it, within the space of thirty-seven years—which was the time that
his reign lasted—into a great and flourishing empire. It is not too much to say
that, but for him, Parthia might have remained to the end a mere petty state on
the outskirts of the Syrian kingdom, and, instead of becoming a rival to Rome,
might have sunk after a short time into insignificance and obscurity.
To explain the circumstances under which this vast
change—this revolution in the Asiatic balance of power—became possible, it is
necessary that we should cast our eye over the general condition of Western
Asia in the early part of the second century before our era, and especially
consider the course of events in the two kingdoms between which Parthia intervened,
the Bactrian and Syrian monarchies.
The Bactrian kingdom, as originally established by Diodotus,
lay wholly to the north of the Paropamisus, in the
long and broad valley of the Oxus, from its sources in the Pamir to its
entrance on the Kharesmian Desert. The countries to
the south of the range continued to be Syrian dependencies, and were reckoned
by Seleucus Nicator as included within the limits of his dominion. But it was
not long before the empire of Alexander in these parts began to crumble and
decay. Indian princes, like Sandracottus (Chandragupta) and Sophagasenus, asserted their
rights over the Region of the Five Rivers (Punjab), and even over the greater
portion of Afghanistan. Greek dominion was swept away. At the time when Bactria,
having had its independence acknowledged by Antiochus the Great, felt itself at
liberty to embark in ambitious enterprises, as Parthia had done, the
Greco-Macedonian sway over the tracts between Parthia and the Sutlej was either
swept away altogether, or reduced to a mere shadow ; and Euthydemus, the third
Bactrian monarch, was not afraid of provoking hostilities from Syria, when,
about BC 205, he began his aggressions in this direction. Under him, and under
his son and successor, Demetrius, in the twenty years between BC 205 and BC
185, Bactrian conquest was pushed as far as the Punjab region, Cabul and Candahar
were overrun, and the southern side of the mountains occupied from the Heri-rud to the Indus. Eucratidas, who
succeeded Demetrius (about BC 180), extended his sway still further into the
Punjab region but with unfortunate results, so far as his original territories
were concerned. Neglected, and comparatively denuded of troops, these districts
began to slip from his grasp. The Scythian nomads of the Steppes saw their
opportunity, and bursting into Bactria, harried it with fire and sword, even
occupying portions, and settling themselves in the Oxus valley.
While matters were thus progressing in the East, and
the Bactrian princes, attempting enterprises beyond their strength, were
exhausting rather than! advantaging the kingdom under their sway, the Seleucid
monarchs in the West were also becoming more and more entangled in
difficulties, partly of their own creation, partly brought about by the
ambition of pretenders.' Antiochus the Great, shortly after his return from the
eastern provinces, became embroiled with the Romans (BC 196), who dealt his
power a severe blow by the defeat of Magnesia (BC 190), and further weakened it
by the support which they lent to the kings of Pergamus, which was now the
ruling state in Asia Minor. The weakness of Antiochus encouraged Armenia to
revolt, and so lost Syria another province (BC 189). Troubles began to break
out in Elymais, consequent upon the exactions of the Seleucidae (BC 187). Eleven years later (BC 176) there was a lift of the clouds, and Syria
seemed about to recover herself through the courage and energy of the fourth
Antiochus (Epiphanes); but the hopes raised by his successes in Egypt (BC
171-168) and Armenia (BC. 165) were destroyed by his unwise conduct towards the
Jews, whom his persecuting policy permanently alienated, and erected into a
hostile state upon his southern border (BC 168-160). Epiphanes. having not only
plundered and desecrated the Temple, but having set himself to eradicate
utterly the Jewish religion, and completely Hellenise the people, was met with the most determined resistance on the part of a moiety
of the nation. A patriotic party rose up under devoted leaders, who asserted,
and in the end secured, the independence of their country. Not alone during the
remaining years of Epiphanes, but for half a century after his death,
throughout seven reigns, the struggle continued; Judaea taking advantage of
every trouble and difficulty in Syria to detach herself more and more
completely from her oppressor, and being a continued thorn in her side, a
constant source of weakness, preventing more than anything else the recovery of
her power. The triumph which Epiphanes had obtained in the distant Armenia,
where he defeated and captured the king, Artaxias, was a poor set-off against
the foe which he had created for himself at his doors through his cruelty and
intolerance. Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (BC 164) improve the condition of
affairs in Syria. The throne fell to his son, Antiochus V (Eupator),
a boy of nine, according to one authority, or, according to another, of twelve
years of age. The regent, Lysias, exercised the chief power, and was soon
engaged in a war with the Jews, whom the death of the oppressor had encouraged
to fresh efforts. The authority of Lysias was further disputed by a certain
Philip, whom Epiphanes, shortly before his death, had made tutor to the young
monarch. The claim of this tutor to the regent’s office being supported by a
considerable portion of the army, a civil war arose between him and Lysias,
which raged for the greater part of two, years, terminating in the defeat and
death of Philip (BC 162). But Syrian affairs did not even then settle down into tranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid house,
Demetrius by name, the son of Seleucus IV, and consequently the first cousin of Eupator, was at this time detained in Rome as a
hostage, having been sent there during his father’s lifetime, as a security for
his fidelity. Demetrius, with some reason, regarded his claim to the Syrian
throne as better than that of his cousin, who was the son of the younger
brother; and, being in the full vigour of early
youth, he determined to assert his pretensions in Syria, and to make a bold
stroke for the crown. Having failed to obtain the Senate’s consent to his
quitting Italy, he took his departure secretly, crossed the Mediterranean in a Carthaginian
vessel, and landing in Asia, succeeded within a few months in establishing
himself as Syrian monarch.
From this review of the condition of affairs in the
Syrian and Bactrian kingdoms during the first half of the second century before
Christ, it is sufficiently apparent, that in both countries the state of things
was favourable to any aspirations which the power
that lay between them might entertain after dominion and self-aggrandisement.
The kings of the two countries indeed, at the time of the accession of
Mithridates to the Parthian throne (BC 174), were, both of them, energetic and
able princes, but the Syrian monarch was involved in difficulties at home which
required all his attention, while the Bactrian was engaged in enterprises
abroad which equally engrossed and occupied him. Mithridates might have
attacked either with a good prospect of success. Personally, he was at least
their equal, and though considerably inferior in military strength and resources,
he possessed the great advantage of having a perfectly free choice both of time
and place, could seize the most unguarded moment, and make his attack in the
quarter where he knew that he would be least expected and least likely to find
his enemy on the alert. Circumstances, of which we now cannot appreciate the
force, seem to have determined him to direct his first attack against the
territories of his eastern neighbour, the Bactrian king, Eucratidas.
These, as we have seen, were left comparatively unguarded, while their
ambitious master threw all his strength into his Indian wars, pressing through
Cabul into the Punjab region, and seeking to extend his dominion to the Sutlej
river, or even to the Ganges. Naturally, Mithridates was successful. Attacking
the Bactrian territory where it adjoined Parthia, he made himself master,
without much difficulty, of two provinces—those of Turiua and of Aspionus. Turiua recalls the great but vague name of
“Turanian,” which certainly belongs to these parts, but can scarcely be
regarded as local. Aspionus has been regarded as the
district of the Aspasiacae; but the two words do not
invite comparison. It is best to be content with saying that we cannot locate
the districts conquered, but that they should be looked for in the district of
the Tejend and Heri-rud,
between the Paropamisus and the great city of Balkh.
It does not appear that Eucratidas attempted any retaliation. Absorbed in his schemes of Indian conquest, he let
his home provinces go, and sought compensation for them only in the far East.
Mean-time Mithridates, having been successful in his Bactrian aggression, and
thus whetted his appetite for territorial gain, determined on a more important
expedition. After waiting for a few years, until Epiphanes was dead, and the
Syrian throne occupied by the boy king, Eupator,
while the two claimants of the regency, Lysias and Philip, were contending in
arms for the supreme power, he suddenly marched with a large force towards the
West, and fell upon the great province of Media Magna, which, though still
nominally a Syrian dependency, was under the rule of a king, and practically,
if not legally, independent. Media was a most extensive and powerful country.
Polybius calls it “the most powerful of all the kingdoms of Asia, whether we
consider the extent of the territory, or the number and quality of the men, or
the goodness of the horses produced there. For these animals,” he says, “are
found in it in such abundance, that almost all the rest of Asia is supplied
with them from this province. It is here, also that the Royal horses are always
fed, on account of the excellence of the pasture.” The capital of the province
was now, as in the more ancient times, Ecbatana, situated on the declivity of
Mount Orontes (Elwand), and, though fallen from its
former grandeur, yet still a place of much importance, second only in all
Western Asia to Antioch and perhaps Babylon. The invasion of Mithridates was
stoutly resisted by the Medes, and several engagements took place, in which
sometimes one and sometimes the other side had the. advantage; but eventually
the Parthians prevailed. Mithridates seized and occupied Ecbatana, which was at
the time an unwalled town, established his authority over the whole region, and
finally placed it under the government of a Parthian satrap, Bacasis, while he himself returned home, to crush a revolt
which had broken out.
The scene of the revolt was Hyrcania. The Hyrcanian
people, one markedly Arian, had probably from the time of their subjugation
chafed under the Parthian yoke, and seeing in the absence of Mithridates, with
almost the whole of his power, in Media a tempting opportunity, had resolved to
make a bold stroke for freedom before the further growth of Parthia should
render such an attempt hopeless. We are not told that they had any special
grievances; but they were brave and high-spirited they had enjoyed exceptional
privileges under the Persians; and no doubt they found the rule of a Turanian
people galling and oppressive. They may well have expected to receive support
and assistance from the other Arian nations in their neighbourhood,
as the Mardi, the Sagartians, the Arians on the Heri-rud, &c., and they may have thought that Mithridates
would be too fully occupied with his Median struggle to have leisure to direct
his arms against them. But the event showed that they had miscalculated. Media
submitted to Mithridates without any very protracted resistance; the Parthian
monarch knew the value of time, and, quitting Media, marched upon Hyrcania
without losing a moment; the others Arian tribes of the vicinity were either
apathetic or timid, and did not stir a step for their relief. The insurrection
was nipped in the bud; Hyrcania was forced to submit, and became for centuries
the obedient vassal of her powerful neighbour.
The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians into
contact with the important country of Susiana or Elymais, an ancient seat of
power, and one which had flourished much during the whole of the Persian
period, having contained within it the principal Persian capital, Susa. This
tract possessed strong attractions for a conqueror; and it appears to have been
not very long after he had succeeded in crushing the Hyrcanian revolt, that
Mithridates once more turned his arms westward, and from the advantageous
position which he held in Media, directed an attack upon the rich and flourishing
province which lay to the south. It would seem that Elymais, like Media, though
reckoned a dependency of the Seleucid Empire, had a king of its own, who was
entrusted with its government and defence, and expected to fight his own
battles. At any rate we do not hear of any aid being rendered to the Elymaeans in this war, or of Mithridates having any other
antagonist to meet in the course of it, besides “the Elymaean king.” This monarch he defeated without difficulty, and, having overrun his
country, apparently in a single campaign, added the entire territory to his
dominions.
Elymais was interposed between two regions of
first-rate importance, Babylonia and Persia. The thorough mastery of any one of
the three, commonly carried with it in ancient times dominion over the other
two. So far as can be gathered from the scanty materials which we possess for
Parthian . history at this period, the conquest of Elymais was followed almost
immediately by the submission of Babylonia and Persia to the conqueror. Media
and Elymais having been forced to submit, the great Mithridates was very
shortly acknowledged as their sovereign lord by all the countries that
intervened between the Paropamisus and the Lower
Euphrates.
Thus gloriously successful in this quarter, Mithridates,
who may fairly be considered the greatest monarch of his day, after devoting a
few years to repose, judged that the time was come for once more embarking on a
career of aggression, and seeking a similar extension of his dominions towards
the East to that which he had found it so easy to effect in the regions of the
West. The Bactrian troubles hack increased. Eucratidas,
after greatly straining the resources of Bactria in his Indian wars, had been
waylaid and murdered on his return from one of them by his son Heliocles, who chose to declare him a public enemy, drove
his chariot over his corpse, and ordered it to be left unburied. This ill
beginning inaugurated an unfortunate reign. Attacked by Scythians from the
north, by Indians and Sarangians on the east and the
south-east, Heliocles had already more on his hands
than he could conveniently manage, when Mithridates declared war against him,
and marched into his country (about BC 150). Already exhausted by his other
wars, Heliocles could bear up no longer. Mithridates
rapidly overran his dominions, and took possession of the greater part of them.
According to some he did not stop here, but pressing still further eastward
invaded India, and carried his arms over the Punjab to the banks of the
Hydaspes. But this last advance, if it ever took place, was a raid rather than
an attempt at conquest. It had no serious results. Indo-Bactrian kingdoms
continued to exist in Cabul down to about BC 80, when Hellenism in this quarter
was finally swept away by the Yue-chi and other Scythic tribes. The Parthian Empire never included any portion of the Indus region, its
furthest provinces towards the east being Bactria, Aria, Sarangia, Arachosia, and Sacastana.
The great increase of power which Mithridates had
obtained by his conquests could not be a matter of indifference to the Syrian
monarchs. But their domestic troubles—the contentions between Philip and
Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius Soter, Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas
and Demetrius II, Demetrius II and Tryphon—had so engrossed them for twenty
years (from 162 to 142 BC), that they had felt it impossible, or hopeless, to
attempt any expedition towards the East, for the protection or recovery of
their provinces. Mithridates had been allowed to pursue his career of conquest
unopposed, so far as the Syrians were concerned, and to establish his sway from
the Hindu Kush to the Euphrates, time, however, at last came when home dangers
were less absorbing, and a prospect of engaging the terrible Parthians with
success seemed to present itself. The second Demetrius had not, indeed,
altogether overcome his domestic enemy, Tryphon; but he had so far brought him
into difficulties as to believe that he might safely be left to be dealt with
by his wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains. At the same time, the condition of
affairs in the East seemed to invite his interference. Mithridates ruled his
new conquests with some strictness, probably suspecting their fidelity, and
determined that he would not by any remissness allow them to escape from his
grasp.
The native inhabitants could scarcely be much attached
to the Syro-Macedonians, who had certainly not
treated them with much tenderness; but a possession of one hundred and ninety
years’ duration confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may have
galled more than one to whose pressure they had become accustomed. Moreover,
all the provinces which the Parthians had taken from Syria contained Greek
towns, and their inhabitants might at all times be depended on to side with
their countrymen against the Asiatics. At the present
conjuncture, too, the number of the malcontents was swelled by the addition of
the recently subdued Bactrians, who hated the Parthian yoke, and longed for an
opportunity of recovering their freedom.
Thus, when Demetrius II, anxious to escape the
reproach of inertness, determined to make a great expedition upon the
formidable Parthian monarch, who ruled over all the countries between the Paropamisus and the Lower Euphrates, he found himself
welcomed as a deliverer by a considerable number of his enemy’s subjects, whom
the harshness or the novelty of the Parthian rule had offended. The malcontents
joined his standard as he advanced; and supported, as he thus was, by Persian, Elymaean, and Bactrian contingents, he engaged and defeated
the Parthians in several battles. Mithridates at last, recognising his inferiority in military strength, determined to have recourse to stratagem,
and having put Demetrius off his guard by proposals of peace, made a sudden
attack upon him, completely defeated his army, and took him prisoner. The
conquered monarch was at first treated with some harshness, being conveyed
about to the several nations which had revolted, and paraded before each in
turn, to show them how foolish they had been in lending him their aid; but when
this purpose had been answered, Mithridates showed himself magnanimous, gave
his royal captive the honours befitting his rank,
assigned him a residence in Hyrcania, and even gave him the hand of his
daughter, Rhodogune, in marriage. It was policy,
however, still more than clemency, which dictated this conduct. Mithridates
nurtured designs against the Syrian kingdom itself, and saw that it would be
for his advantage to have a Syrian prince in his camp, allied to him by
marriage, whom he could put forward as entitled to the throne, and whom, if his
enterprise succeeded, he might leave to govern Syria for him, as tributary
monarch. These far-reaching plans might perhaps have been crowned with success,
had the head which conceived them been spared to watch over and direct their
execution. But Providence decreed otherwise. Mithridates had reached an
advanced age, and, being attacked by illness soon after his capture of
Demetrius, found his strength insufficient to battle with his malady, and, to
the great grief of his subjects, succumbed to it (BC 136), after an eventful
and glorious reign of thirty-eight years.
LAST STRUGGLE WITH SYRIA—DEFEAT AND DEATH OF ANTIOCHUS
SIDETES.
The death of Mithridates, and the accession of a
comparatively unenterprising successor, Phraates II, encouraged Syria to make
one more effort to thrust the Parthians back into their native wilds, and to
recover the dominion of Western Asia. So great a position was not a thing to be
surrendered without a final, even if it were a despairing, struggle ; and in
the actual position of affairs it was quite open to question whether, on the
whole, Parthia or Syria were the stronger. The dominion of both countries was
comparatively recent; neither had any firm hold on its outlying provinces;
neither could claim to have conciliated to itself the affections of the Western Asiatics generally, or to rest its power on any other
basis than that of military force. And in military force it was uncertain which
way the balance inclined. Both countries had a nucleus of native troops, on
which absolute reliance might be placed, which was brave, faithful, stanch, and
would contend to the death for their respective sovereigns. But, beyond ’this,
both had also a fluctuating body of unwilling subjects or subject-allies,
unworthy of implicit trust, and likely to gravitate to one side or the other,
according as hope, or fancy, or the merest caprice might decide. The chances of
victory or defeat turned mainly on this fluctuating body, the instability of
which had been amply proved in the wars of the last half-century. Those wars
themselves, taken as a whole, had manifested no decided preponderance of either
people over the other; at one time Parthia, at another Syria, had been hard
pressed ; and it was natural for the leaders on either side to believe that
accidental circumstances, rather than any marked superiority of one of the two
peoples over the other, had brought about the results that had been reached.
In the last war that had been waged success had
finally rested with Parthia. An entire army had been destroyed, and the Syrian
monarch captured. Demetrius “the Conqueror,” as he called himself, was
expiating in the cold and rugged region of Hyrcania, the rashness which had led
him to deem himself a match for the craft and strategic skill of Mithridates.
But now a new and untried monarch was upon the throne—one who was clearly
without his father’s ambition, and probably lacked his ability. Settled in his
kingdom for the space of six years, he had not only attempted nothing against
Syria, but had engaged in no military enterprise whatever. Yet the condition of
Syria had been strongest possible temptation such as to offer the to a
neighbour possessed of courage and energy. Civil war had raged, and exhausted
the resources of the country, from 146 to 137 BC, after which there had been a
protracted struggle between the Syrians and the Jews (137-133), in which the
Syrian arms had at first been worsted, but had at length asserted their
superiority. Had Phraates II, the son and successor of Mithridates, inherited a
tenth part of his father’s military spirit, he would have taken advantage of
this troubled time to carry the war into Syria Proper, and might have shaken
the Syrian throne to its base, or even wholly overturned it. In the person of
the captured Demetrius, he possessed one whom he might have set up as a
pretender with a certainty of drawing many Syrians to his side, and whom he
might, if successful, have left to rule as Vitaxa, or
subject king, the country of which he had once been actual monarch. But
Phraates had no promptitude, no enterprise. He let all the opportunities which
offered themselves escape him, content to keep watch on Demetrius—when he
escaped from confinement, to pursue and retake him—and to hold him in reserve
as a force of which he might one day make use, when it seemed to him that the
fitting time was come for it.
The result of his long procrastination was, that the
war, when renewed, was renewed from the other side. Antiochus Sidetes, who had succeeded to the Syrian throne on the
captivity of his brother, Demetrius, and had taken to wife his brother’s wife,
Cleopatra, having crushed the pretender, Tryphon, with her assistance, and then
with some difficulty enforced submission on the Jews, felt himself, in 129, at
liberty to resume the struggle with Parthia, and, having made great
preparations, set out for the East with the full intention of releasing his
brother, and recovering his lost provinces.
It is impossible to accept without considerable
reserve the accounts that have come down to us of the force which Antiochus
collected. According to Justin, it consisted of no more than eighty thousand
fighting men, to whom were attached the incredible number of three hundred
thousand camp-followers, the majority of them consisting of cooks, bakers, and
actors. As in other extreme cases the camp-followers do but equal, or a little
exceed, the number of men fit for actual service, this estimate, which makes
them nearly four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. The late
historian, Orosius, corrects the error here indicated; but his account seems to
err in rating the supernumeraries too low. According to him, the armed force
amounted to three hundred thousand, while the camp-followers, including grooms,
sutlers, courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third of the number. From
the two accounts, taken together we are perhaps entitled to conclude that the
entire host did not fall much short of four hundred thousand men. This estimate
receives a certain amount of confirmation from an independent statement made
incidentally by Diodorus, with respect to the number' on the Syrian side that
fell in the campaign, which he estimates at three hundred thousand.
The army of Phraates, according to two consentient
accounts, numbered no more than a hundred and twenty thousand. An attempt which
he made to enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries from the
regions beyond the Oxus failed, the Scyths being quite willing to lend their
aid, but arriving too late at the rendezvous to be of any use. At the same time
a defection on the part of the subject princes deprived the Parthian monarch of
contingents which usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support
of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these circumstances it is more
surprising that he was able to collect a hundred and twenty thousand men than
that he did not succeed in bringing into the field a larger number.
The Syrian troops were magnificently appointed. The
common soldiers had their military boots fastened with buckles or studs of gold;
and the culinary utensils, in which the food of the army was cooked, were in
many instances of silver. It seemed as if banqueting, rather than fighting, was
to be the order of the day. But to suppose that this was actually so. would be
to do the army of Antiochus an injustice. History, from the time of
Sardanapalus to that of the Crimean War of 1854-6, abounds with instances of
the somewhat strange combination of luxurious habits with valour of the highest kind. No charge of poltroonery can be established against the
Syrian soldiery, who, on the contrary, seem to have played their part in the
campaign with credit They were accompanied by a body of Jews under John
Hyrcanus, the son of Simon and grandson of the first Maccabee leader, who had
been forced to take up temporarily the position of a Syrian feudatory. As they
advanced through the Mesopotamian region after crossing the Euphrates, they
received continually fresh accessions of strength by the arrival of contingents
from the Parthian tributary states, which, disgusted with Parthian arrogance
and coarseness, or perhaps attracted by Syrian luxury and magnificence,
embraced the cause of the invader.
Phraates, on his part, instead of awaiting attack in
the fastnesses of Parthia or Hyrcania, advanced to meet his enemy across the
Assyrian and Babylonian plains, and, either in person or by his generals,
engaged the Syrian monarch in three pitched battles, in each of which he was
worsted. One of these was fought upon the banks of the Greater Zab or Lycus, in
Adiabene, not far from the site of Arbela, where Antiochus met and defeated the
Parthian general, Indates, and raised a trophy in honour of his victory. The exact scene of the other two
engagements is unknown to us, and in no case have we any description of the
battles, so that we have no means of judging whether it was by superiority of
force or of strategy that the Syrian monarch thus far prevailed, and obtained
almost the whole for which he was fighting. The entire province of Babylonia,
the heart of the empire, where were situated the three great cities of Babylon,
Seleucia, and Ctesiphon, fell into his hands, and a further defection of the
tributary countries from the Parthian cause took place, a defection so widespread,
that the writer who records it says, with a certain amount of rhetoric, no
doubt—“Phraates had now nothing left to him beyond the limits of the original
Parthian territory.” He maintained, however, a position somewhere in the Lower
Babylonian plain, and Still confronted Antiochus with an army, which, though
beaten, was bent on resistance.
When affairs were in this state, Phraates, recognising the peril of his position, came to the
conclusion that it was necessary to attempt, at any rate, a diversion. He had
still what seemed to him a winning card in his hand, and it was time to play
it. Demetrius, the brother of Antiochus, and de jure the king of Syria, was
still in his possession, watched and carefully guarded in the rough Hyrcanian
home, from which he had twice escaped, but only to be recaptured. He would send
Demetrius into Syria under an escort of- Parthian troops, who should conduct
him to the frontier and give him the opportunity of recovering his kingdom. It
would be strange if one, entitled to the throne by his birth, and its actual
occupant for the space of six years, could not rally to himself a party in a
country always ready to welcome pretenders, and to accept, as valid, claims
that were utterly baseless. Let troubles break out in his rear, let his rule
over Syria be threatened in Syria itself, and Antiochus would, he thought,
either hasten home, or, at the least, be greatly alarmed, have his attention
distracted from his aggressive designs, and be afraid of plunging deeper into
Asia, lest, while grasping at the shadow of power, he should lose the
substance.
Demetrius and his Parthian escort set out, but the
distance to be traversed was great, and travelling is slow in Asia. Moreover,
the winter time was approaching, and each week would increase the difficulties
of locomotion. The scheme of Phraates hung fire. No immediate effect followed
from it. Antiochus may not have received intelligence of the impending danger,
or he may have thought his wife, Cleopatra, whom he had left at Antioch,
capable of coping with it. In any case, it is certain that his movements were
in no way affected by the bolt which Phraates had launched at him. Instead of
withdrawing his troops from the occupied provinces and marching them back into
Syria, thus relinquishing all that he had gained by his successful campaign, he
resolved to maintain all the conquests that he had made, and to keep his troops
where they were, merely dividing them, on account of their numbers, among the
various cities which he had taken, and making them go into winter quarters. His
design was carried out; the army was dispersed; discipline was probably
somewhat relaxed; and the soldiery, having no military duties to perform,
amused themselves, as foreign soldiers are apt to do, by heavy requisitions,
and by cavalier treatment of the native inhabitants.
Some months of the winter passed in this way.
Gradually the discontent of the civil populations in the cities increased.
Representations were made to Phraates by secret messengers, that the yoke of
the Syrians was found to be intolerable, and that, if he would give the signal,
the cities were ripe for revolt. Much hidden negotiation must have taken place
before a complete arrangement could have been made, or a fixed plan settled on.
As in the “Saint Bartholomew,” as in the “Sicilian Vespers,” as in the great
outbreak against the Roman power in Asia Minor under Mithridates of Pontus, the
secret must have been communicated to hundreds, who, with a marvellous tenacity of purpose, kept it inviolate for weeks or months, so that not a
whisper reached the ears of the victims. Sunk in a delicious dream of the most
absolute security, careless of the feelings, and deaf to the grumblings of the
townsmen, the Syrian soldiers continued to enjoy their long and pleasant
holiday without a suspicion of the danger that was impending. Meanwhile
Phraates arranged all the details of plan, and communicated them to his
confederates. It was agreed that, on an appointed day, all the cities should
break out in revolt; the natives should take arms, rise against the soldiers
quartered upon them, and kill all, or as many as possible. Phraates promised to
be at hand with his army, to prevent the scattered garrisons from giving help
to each other. It was calculated that, in this way, the invaders might be cut
off almost to a man without the trouble of even fighting a battle.
But, before he proceeded to these terrible extremities,
the Parthian prince, touched perhaps with compassion, determined to give his
adversary a chance of escaping the fate prepared for him by timely concessions.
The winter was not over; but the snow was beginning to melt through the
increasing warmth of the sun’s rays, and the day appointed for the general
rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that no time was to be lost.
Accordingly, he sent ambassadors to Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire
on what terms it would be granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according to
Diodorus, was as follows: “If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius,
from captivity, and deliver him up without ransom, at the same time restoring
all the provinces which had been taken by Parthia from Syria, and consenting to
pay a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had; but not otherwise.” To
such terms it was, of course, impossible that any Parthian king should listen;
and the ambassadors of Phraates returned, therefore, without further parley.
Soon afterwards, the day appointed for the outbreak
arrived. Apparently, even yet no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops
were everywhere quietly enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, when,
suddenly and without any warning, they found attacked by the natives. Taken at
disadvantage, it was impossible for them to make a successful resistance; and
it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacred in their quarters.
Antiochus, and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far as we hear,
escaped into the open field, and contended for their lives in just warfare. It
had been the intention of the Syrian monarch, when he quitted his station, to
hasten to the protection of the division quartered nearest to him; but he had
no sooner commenced his march than he found himself confronted by Phraates,
who was at the head of his main army, having, no doubt, anticipated the design
of Antiochus and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious to
engage at once, as his force far outnumbered that commanded by his adversary;
but the latter might have declined the battle had he so willed, and have at any
rate greatly protracted the struggle. He had a mountain region—Mount Zagros,
probably—within a short distance of him, and might have fallen back upon it, so
placing the Parthian horse at great disadvantage; but he was still at an age
when caution is apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true
courage. Despite the advice of one of his captains, he determined to accept the
battle which the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe whom he had three
times defeated. But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by the
army which he commanded. Though Antiochus fought strenuously, he was defeated,
since his troops, were without heart and offered but a poor resistance.
Athenaeus, the general who had advised retreat, was the first to fly, and then
the whole army broke up and dispersed itself. Antiochus himself perished,
either slain by the enemy or by his own hand. His son, Seleucus, and a niece, a
daughter of his brother, Demetrius, who had accompanied him in his expdition, were captured. His troops were either cut to
pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of those slain in the battle, and
in the general massacre, was reckoned at three hundred thousand.
Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was
the last which any Seleucid monarch conducted into these countries—the final
attempt made by Syria to repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces.
Henceforth, Parthia was no further troubled by the power that had hitherto been
her most dangerous and most constant enemy, but was allowed to enjoy, without
molestation from Syria, the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in fact,
had received so deep a wound that she had from this time a difficulty in preserving
her own existence. The immediate result of the destruction of Antiochus and his
host was the revolt of Judaea, which henceforth maintained its independence
uninterruptedly to the time of the Romans. The dominions of the Seleucidae were reduced to Cilicia, and Syria Proper, or
the tract west of the Euphrates between the chain of Amanus and Palestine.
Internally, the Syrian state was agitated by constant commotions from the
claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty; externally, it was kept in
continual alarm by the Egyptians, the Romans, and the Armenians. During the
sixty years that elapsed between the return of Demetrius to his kingdom (BC
128) and the conversion of Syria into a Roman province (BC 65) she ceased
wholly to be formidable to her neighbours. Her flourishing period was gone by,
and a rapid decline set in, from which there was no recovery. It is surprising
that the Romans did not step in earlier, to terminate a rule which was but a
little removed from anarchy. Rome, however, had other work on her hands—civil
troubles, social wars, and the struggle with Mithridates; and hence the Syrian
state continued to exist till the year B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund
condition.
In Parthia itself the consequences of Syria’s defeat and collapse were less important than might have been expected. One would naturally have looked to see, as the immediate result, a fresh development of the aggressive spirit, and a burst of energy and enterprise parallel to that which had carried the arms of Mithridates I, from his Parthian fastnesses to the Hydaspes on the one hand and to the Euphrates on the other. But no such result followed. We hear indeed of Phraates intending to follow up his victory over Antiochus by a grand attack upon Syria—an attack to which, if it had taken place, she must almost certainly have succumbed—but, in point of fact, the relations between the two countries continued for many years after the Great Massacre, peaceful, if not even friendly. Phraates celebrated the obsequies off Antiochus with the pomp and ceremony befitting a powerful king, and ultimately placed his remains in a coffin of silver, and sent them into Syria, to find their last resting-place in their native country. He treated Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, who had been made prisoner in the final battle, with the highest honour, and took to wife Antiochus’s niece, who fell into his hands at the same time. The royal houses of the Seleucidae and the Arsacidae became thus doubly allied; and, all grounds for further hostilities having been removed, peace and amity were established between the former rivals. No doubt a powerful motive influencing Parthia in the adoption of this policy was that revelation of a new danger which will form the chief subject of the ensuing section.
PRESSURE OF THE NORTHERN NOMADS UPON PARTHIA —SCYTHIC
WARS OF PHRAATES II. AND ARTABANUS II.
The Turanian or Tatar races by which Central and
Northern Asia are inhabited, have at all times constituted a serious danger to
the inhabitants of the softer South. Hordes of wild barbarians wander over
those inhospitable regions, increase, multiply, exert a pressure on their
southern neighbours, and are felt as a perpetual menace. Every now and then a
crisis arrives. Population has increased beyond the means of subsistence, or a
novel ambition has seized a tribe or a powerful chief, and the barrier, which
has hitherto proved a sufficient restraint, is forced. There issues suddenly
out of the frozen bosom of the North a stream of coarse, uncouth savages—brave,
hungry, countless—who swarm into the fairer southern regions determinedly,
irresistibly; like locusts winging their flight into a green land. How such
multitudes come to be propagated in countries where life is with difficulty
sustained, we do not know; why the impulse suddenly seizes them to quit their
old haunts and move steadily in a given direction, we cannot say; but we see
that the phenomenon is one of constant recurrence, and we have thus come to
regard it as being scarcely curious or strange at all. In Asia, Cimmerians,
Scythians, Comans, Mongols, Turks; in Europe, Gauls, Goths, Huns, Avars,
Vandals, Burgundians, Lombards, Bulgarians, have successively illustrated the
law, and made us familiar with its operation. “Inroads of the northern
barbarians” has become a common-place with writers of history, and there is
scarcely any country of the South, whether in Asia or in Europe, that has not
experienced them.
Such inroads are very dreadful when they take place.
Hordes of savages, coarse and repulsive in their appearance, fierce in their
tempers, rude in their habits, not perhaps individually very brave or strong,
but powerful by their numbers, and sometimes by a new mode of warfare, which it
is found difficult to meet, pour into the seats of civilisation,
and spread havoc around. On they come (as before observed) like a flight of
locusts, countless, irresistible—finding the land before them a garden, and
leaving it behind them a howling wilderness. Neither sex nor age is spared. The
inhabitants of the open country and of the villages, if they do not make their
escape to high mountain tops or other strongholds, are ruthlessly massacred by
the invaders, or, at best, forced to become their slaves. The crops are
consumed, the flocks and herds swept off or destroyed, the villages and
homesteads burnt, the whole country made a scene of desolation. Walled towns
perhaps resist them, as they have not often patience enough for sieges; but
sometimes, with a dogged determination, they sit down before the ramparts, and
by a prolonged blockade, starve the defenders into submission. Then there
ensues an indescribable scene of havoc, rapine, and bloodshed. Ancient cities,
rich with the accumulated stores of ages, are ransacked and perhaps burnt;
priceless works of art often perish; civilisations which it has taken centuries to build up are trampled down. Few things are more
terrible than the devastation and ruin which such an inroad has often spread
over a fair and smiling kingdom, even when it has merely swept over it, like a
passing storm, and has led to no permanent occupation.
Against a danger of this kind the Parthian princes had
had, almost from the first, to guard. They were themselves of the nomadic race—Turanians, if our hypothesis concerning them be sound—and
had established their kingdom by an invasion of the type above described. But
they had immediately become settlers, inhabitants of cities; they had been
softened, to a certain extent, civilised; and now
they looked on the nomadic hordes of the North with the same dislike and
disgust with which the Persians and the Greco - Macedonians had formerly
regarded them. In the Scythians of the Trans-Oxianian tract they saw an unceasing peril, and one, moreover, which was, about the time
of Phraates, continually increasing and becoming more and more threatening.
Fully to explain the position of affairs in this
quarter, we must ask the reader to accompany us into the remoter regions of
inner Asia, where the Turanian tribes had their headquarters. There, about the
year BC 200, a Turanian people called the Yue-chi were expelled from their
territory on the west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu,
whom some identify with the Huns. “The Yue-chi separated into two bands: the
smaller descended southwards into Thibet; the larger passed westwards, and
after a hard struggle, dispossessed a people called ‘Su,’ of the plains west of
the river of Ili. The latter advanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes; and the
Yue-chi not long afterwards retreating from the U-siun,
another nomadic race, passed the Su, on the north, and occupied the tracts
between the Oxus and the Caspian. The Su , were thus in the vicinity of the
Bactrian Greeks; the Yue-chi in the neighbourhood of
the Parthians.” On the particulars of this account, which comes from the
Chinese historians, we cannot perhaps altogether depend; but there is no reason
to doubt the main fact, testified by an eyewitness, that the Yue-chi, having
migrated about the period mentioned from the interior of Asia, had established
themselves sixty years later (BC 140) in the Caspian region. Such a movement
would necessarily have thrown the entire previous population of those parts
into commotion, and would probably have precipitated them upon their neighbours.
It accounts satisfactorily for the unusual pressure of the northern hordes at
this period on the Parthians, the Bactrians, and even the Indians; and it
completely explains the crisis of Parthian history which we have now reached,
and the necessity which lay upon the nation of meeting, and if possible overcoming,
a new danger.
In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen to
which we have before alluded, and to which, in ancient times, the civilised world was always liable from an outburst of
northern barbarism. Whether the peril has altogether passed away or not, we
need not here inquire, but certainly in the old world there was always a chance
that civilisation, art, refinement, luxury, might
suddenly and almost without warning be swept away by an overwhelming influx of
savagery from the North. From the reign of Cyaxares, when the evil, so far as
we know, first showed itself, the danger was patent to all wise and far-seeing
governors both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to time guarded against
The expeditions of Cyrus against the Massagetae, of Darius Hystaspis against the European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getae, of Trajan and
Probus across the Danube, were designed to check and intimidate the northern
nations, to break their power, and diminish the likelihood of their taking the
offensive. It was now more than four centuries since in this part of Asia any
such effort had been made ; and the northern barbarians might naturally have
ceased to fear the arms and discipline of the South. Moreover, the
circumstances of the time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on continually
more and more by the newly-arrived “Su” and Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the
Trans-Oxianian regions were under the necessity of
seeking new settlements, and could only attempt to find them in the quarter
towards which they were driven by the new-comers. Strengthened probably by
daring spirits from among their conquerors themselves, they crossed the rivers
and the deserts by which they had been hitherto confined, and advancing against
the Parthians, Bactrians, and Arians, threatened to carry all before them. In
Bactria, soon after the establishment of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom, they began
to give trouble. Province after province was swallowed up by the invaders, who
occupied Sogdiana, or the tract between the Lower Jaxartes and the Lower Oxus,
and hence proceeded to make inroads into Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, or Ak-Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the
highlands between the Upper Jaxartes and Upper Oxus, were permanently occupied
by Turanian immigrants; and, if the Bactrians had not compensated themselves
for their losses by acquisitions of territory in Afghanistan and India, they
would soon have had no kingdom left. The hordes were always increasing in
strength through the influx of fresh tribes. Bactria was pressed to the
south-eastward, and precipitated upon its neighbours in that direction.
Presently, in Ariana, the hordes passed the mountains,
and proceeding southwards, occupied the tract below the great lake wherein the Helmend terminates, which took from them the name of Sacastana—“the land of the Saka or Scyths”—a name still to
be traced in the modern Seistan. Further to the east they effected a lodgment
in Cabul, and another in the southern portion of the Indus valley, which for a
time bore the name of Indo-Scythia. They even crossed the Indus, and attempted
to penetrate into the interior of Hindustan, but here they were met and
repulsed by a native monarch, about the year BC 56.
The people engaged in this great movement are called
in a general way by the classical writers Sacae or Scythae, i.e., Scyths. They consisted of a number of tribes, similar for the most
part in language, habits, and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to
the other nomadic races of Central and Northern Asia. Of these tribes the
principal were the Massagetae (“great Jits or Jats”), the former adversaries of Cyrus, who occupied the
country on both sides of the lower course of the Oxus; the Dahae, who bordered
the Caspian above Hyrcania, and extended thence to the longitude of Herat; the Tochari, who settled in the mountains between the Upper
Jaxartes and the Upper Oxus, where they gave name to the tract known as Tokharistan; the Asii or Asians,
who were closely connected with the Tochari; and the Sacarauli, who are found connected with both the Tochari and the Asians. Some of these tribes contained
within them further subdivisions, as the Dahae, who comprised the Parni or Aparni, the Pissuri, and the Xanthii; and the Massagetae, who included among them Chorasmii, Attasii, and others.
The general character of the barbarism, in which these
various races were involved, may be best learnt from the description given of
one of them, with but few differences, by Herodotus and Strabo. According to
these writers, the Massagetae were nomads who moved about in waggons or carts, like the modern Kalmucks, accompanied by
their flocks and herds, on whose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each
man had only one wife, but all the wives were held in common. They were good
riders, and excellent archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, and
used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, knives, and battle-axes. They had
little or no iron, but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their other
weapons, of bronze. They had also bronze breastplates, but otherwise the metal
with which they adorned and protected their own persons and the heads of their
horses, was gold. To a certain extent they were cannibals. It was their custom
not to let the aged among them die a natural death; but, when life seemed
approaching its term, to offer them up in sacrifice, and then boil the flesh
and feast upon it. This mode of ending life was regarded as the best and most honourable; such as died of disease were not eaten, but
buried, and their friends bewailed their misfortune. It may be added to this,
that we have sufficient reason to believe, that the Massagetai and the other nomads of these parts regarded the use of poisoned arrows in
warfare as legitimate, and employed the venom of serpents and the corrupted
blood of men, to make the wounds which they inflicted more deadly.
Thus, what was threatened by the existing position of
affairs was not merely the conquest of one race by another cognate to it, like
that of the Medes by the Persians, or of the Greeks by Rome, but the obliteration
of such art, civilisation, and refinement as Western
Asia had attained to in the course of ages by the successive efforts of
Babylonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and Greeks—the spread over some of the
fairest regions of the earth of a low type of savagery—a type which in religion
went no further than the worship of the Sun; in art knew but the easier forms
of metallurgy and the construction of carts; in manners and customs, included
cannibalism, the use of poisoned weapons, and a relation between the sexes
destructive alike of all delicacy and all family affection. The Parthians were,
no doubt, rude and coarse in their character as compared with the Persians ;
but they had been civilised to some extent by three
centuries of subjection to the Persians and the Greeks before they rose to
power; they affected Persian manners; they patronised Greek art; they had a smattering of Greek literature; they appreciated the
advantages of having in their midst a number of Grecian states. Many of their
kings called themselves upon their coins “Phil-Hellenes,” or “ lovers of the
Hellenic people.” Had the Massagetae and their kindred tribes of Sacae, Tochari, Dahae, Yue-chi, and Su, which now menaced the
Parthian power, succeeded in sweeping it away, the gradual declension of all
that is lovely or excellent in human life would have been marked. Scythicism would have overspread Western Asia. No doubt the
conquerors would have learnt something from those whom they subjected to their
yoke; but it cannot be supposed that they would have learnt much. The change
would have .been like that which passed over the Western Roman Empire, when
Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, Heruli,
depopulated its fairest provinces and laid its civilisation in the dust. The East would have been barbarised; the
gains of centuries would have been lost; the work of Cyrus, Darius, Alexander,
and other great benefactors of Asiatic humanity, would have been undone;
Western Asia would have sunk back into a condition not very much above that
from which it had been raised two thousand years previously by the primitive Chaldaeans and the Assyrians.
The first monarch to recognise the approach of the) crisis and its danger was Phraates II, the son of
Mithridates I, and the conqueror of Antiochus Sidetes.
Not that the danger presented itself to his imagination in its full magnitude;
but that he first woke up to the perception of the real position of affairs in
the East, and saw that, whereas Parthia’s most formidable enemy had hitherto
been Syria, and the Syro-Macedonian power, it had now
become Scythia and the Sacae. No sooner did the pressure of the nomads begin to
make itself felt on his northeastern frontier, than, relinquishing all ideas
of Syrian conquests, if he had really entertained them, he left the seat of
empire in Babylonia to the care of a viceroy, Hymerus,
or Evemerus, and marched in person to confront the
new peril. The Scythians, apparently, had attacked Parthia Proper from their
seats in the Oxus region. Phraates, in his haste to collect a sufficient force
against them, enlisted in his service a large body of Greeks—the remnants
mainly of the defeated army of Antiochus—and taking with him also a strong body
of Parthian troops, marched at his best speed eastward. A war followed in the
mountain region, which must have lasted for some years, but of which we have
only the most meagre account. At last there was an engagement in which the
Scythians got the advantage, and the Parthian troops began to [waver and
threaten to break, when the Greeks, who had t been from the first disaffected,
and had only waited for an occasion to mutiny, went over in a body to the
enemy, and so decided the battle. Deserted by their allies, the Parthian
soldiery were cut to pieces, and Phraates himself was among the slain. The
event proved that he had acted rashly in taking the Greeks with him, but he can
scarcely be said to have deserved much blame. It would have been surprising if
he had anticipated so strange a thing as the fraternisation of a body of luxurious and over-civilised Greeks with
the utter barbarians against whom he was contending, or had imagined that in so
remote a region, cut off from the rest of their countrymen, they would have
ventured to take a step which must have thrown them entirely on their own
resources.
We have, no information with regard to the ultimate
fate of the Greek mutineers. As for the Scythians, With that want of energy and
of a settled purpose, which characterised them, they
proceeded to plunder and ravage the portion of the Parthian territory which lay
open to them, and, when they had thus wasted their strength, returned quietly
to their homes.
The Parthian nobles appointed as monarch, in place of
the late king, an uncle of his, named Artabanus, who is known in history as “Artabanus
the Second.” He was probably advanced in years, and might perhaps have been
excused, had he folded his arms, awaited the attack of his foes, and stood
wholly on the defensive. But he was brave and energetic; and, what was still
more important, he appears to have appreciated the perils of the position. He
was not content, when the particular body of barbarians, which had defeated and
slain his predecessor, having ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to sit
still and wait till he was attacked in his turn. According to the brief but
emphatic words of Justin, he assumed the aggressive, and invaded the country of
the Tochari, one of the most powerful of the Scythian
tribes, which was now settled in a portion of the region that had, till lately,
belonged to the Bactrian kingdom. Artabanus evidently felt that what was needed
was, not simply to withstand, but to roll back the flood of invasion, which had
advanced so near to the sacred home of his nation; that the barbarians required
to be taught a lesson; that they must at least be made to understand that
Parthia was to be respected ; if this could not be done, then the fate of the
empire was sealed. He therefore, with a gallantry and boldness that we cannot
sufficiently admire—a boldness that seemed like rashness, but was in reality
prudence—without calculating too closely the immediate chances of battle, led
his troops against one of the most forward of the advancing tribes. But’
fortune, unhappily, was adverse. How the battle was progressing we are not told;
but it appears that, in the thick of an engagement, Artabanus, who was leading
his men, received a wound in the forearm, from the effect of which he died
almost immediately. The death of the leader on either side decides in the East,
almost to a certainty, the issue of a conflict. We cannot doubt that the
Parthians, having lost their monarch, were repulsed; that the expedition failed
; and that the situation of affairs became once more at least as threatening as
it had been before Artabanus made his attempt. Two Parthian monarchs had now
fallen, within the space of a few years, in combat with the aggressive
Scyths—two Parthian armies had suffered defeat. Was this to be always so? If it
was, then Parthia had only to make up her mind to fall, and, like the great
Roman, to let it be her care that she should fall grandly and with dignity.
MITHRIDATES II AND THE NOMADS—WAR WITH ARMENIA—FIRST
CONTACT WITH ROME.
Artabanus II was succeeded on the throne by his son,
Mithridates II, about the year BC 124. His military achievements were
considerable, and procured him the epithet of “the Great,’’ though that title
was perhaps better deserved by Mithridates the First, his uncle. However, the
reign of the second Mithridates was undoubtedly a distinguished one, and it is
most unfortunate that the accounts of it, which have come down to us, are so
meagre and unsatisfactory. We can but trace the history of Parthia during his
time in its general outline, with very scanty details, and those not always
altogether trustworthy.
There seems, however, to be no doubt, that his
earliest efforts after mounting the throne were directed to the quarter where
the great danger pressed—the danger which had proved fatal to his two immediate
predecessors, his cousin and his uncle. Probably, in thus determining, he
scarcely exercised any choice. The Scyths, after their double victory, would
naturally take an attitude so menacing that unless immediately met and checked,
all hope would have had to be given up—absolute ruin would have had to be met
and faced—Parthia would have been overrun, and the empire established by the
first Mithridates would have been extinguished, within twenty or thirty years
of its first appearance, under the second. The young king, perceiving his
peril, bent every effort to meet and repel it. He employed the whole force of
the State upon his north-eastern frontier, and, in a series of engagements, so
effectually checked the advance of the Scyths, that from his time the danger
which had been impending wholly passed away. The nomads gave up the hope of
making any serious impression on the Arsacid kingdom, and, turning their
restless energies in another direction, found a vent for their superabundant
population in the far East, in Afghanistan and India, where they settled
themselves, and set up permanent governments. Parthia was so completely
relieved from their attacks, that she was able once more to take the aggressive
in this region, and to extend her sway at the expense of the nation before
which she had so lately trembled. The acquisition of parts of Bactria from the
Scyths, which is attested by Strabo, belongs, in all probability, to this reign;
and it is even possible that the extension of Parthian dominion over Sacastane, or Seistan, dates from the same period. We are
assured that the second Mithridates “added many nations to the Parthian
Empire.” As these were decidedly not on the western side of the empire, where
Mithridates did not even succeed in conquering Armenia, it would seem that they
must have lain towards the East, in which case it would be almost certain that
they must have been outlying tribes of the recent Scythic immigration.
The successes of Mithridates in this quarter left him
at liberty, after a time, to turn his attention towards the west, where, though
Syria was no longer formidable, troubles of various kinds had broken out, which
could no longer be safely neglected. Hymerus, or Euemerus, the viceroy appointed to direct the affairs of
the west from Babylon by Phraates II when he marched eastward against the
Scyths, had greatly misconducted himself in his government, and almost shaken
himself free from the Parthian yoke. He had treated the inhabitants of Babylon
with extreme cruelty, condemning many of them to slavery, and sending them into
Media, besides burning the marketplace, several temples, and other buildings
of that great city. He had greatly encouraged luxury and extravagance, had
offended many by his exactions, and affected the state, if he did not actually
claim the title, of an independent monarch. Mithridates, on reaching the West,
crushed the nascent rebellion of Hymerus, and having
thus recovered dominion over those regions, proceeded to engage in war with a
new enemy.
Armenia, the new enemy, was a territory of very
considerable importance, and was henceforth so mixed up with Parthia in her
various wars and negotiations, that some account of the country, and people,
and of the previous history of the people seems to be necessary.
According to Justin, Armenia was a tract eleven
hundred miles long by seven hundred broad; but this is an extravagant estimate.
If we extend Armenia from the Caspian to the range of Taurus, we cannot make
its length much more than seven hundred miles; and if we even allow it to have
reached from the Caucasus to Mount Masius and the lake of Urumiyeh, we cannot
make its width more than four hundred miles. But, practically, its limits were
almost always much narrower. Iberia and Albania were ordinarily independent
countries, occupying the modern Georgia, and intervening between Armenia and
the Caucasus; the Euphrates was the natural boundary of Armenia on the west;
and Niphates, rather than Mons. Masius, shut it in
upon the south. Its normal dimensions have been already estimated in this
volume at six hundred miles in length by a little more than two hundred in
breadth, and its area at about sixty or seventy thousand square miles. There is
no reason to believe that, during the Parthian period, it ever much exceeded
these dimensions, except it were during the fourteen years (83 to 69 BC) when,
under Tigranes I, it held possession of the dwindled kingdom of the Seleucidae.
Armenia was a country of lofty ridges, deep and narrow
valleys, numerous and copious streams, and occasional broad plains—a country of
rich pasture grounds, productive orchards, and abundant harvests. It occupied
the loftiest position in Western Asia, and contained the sources of all the
great rivers of these parts—the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Halys, the Araxes,
and the Cyrus—which, rising within a space of two hundred and fifty miles long
by a hundred wide, flow down in four directions to three different seas.
It was thus to this part of Asia what Switzerland is
to Western Europe, an elevated fastness region containing within it the highest
mountains, and yielding the waters which fertilise the subjacent regions. It contained also two large lakes, each occupying its
own basin, and having no connection with any sea—those of Van and Urumiyeh—salt
lakes of a very peculiar character. The mountain tracts yielded supplies of
gold, silver, copper, lead, and other metals, beside emery and antimony. The
soil in the valleys was fertile and bore several kinds of grain ; the flanks of
the hills grew vines; and the pastures produced horses and mules of good
quality.
The Armenians of Parthian times were probably
identical with the race, which, still under the same name, occupies the greater
portion of the old country, and holds an important position among the inhabitants
of Western Asia. They are a pale race, with a somewhat sallow complexion,
marked features, and dark eyebrows and hair. By their language, which can be
traced back to the fourth century of our era, it appears that they are an Arian
people, but with a certain amount of Turanian admixture. Their relations are
closer with the Persians than probably with any other race, but still they
possess many notable points of difference. They are of a weaker physique than
the Persians, slighter in their frames, less muscular and robust. They are
subtle, wily, with a great talent for commerce, but wanting in strength,
stamina, and endurance. In the earlier times they were strongly attached to
their own independence, and, though seldom able to maintain it for long, were
continually reasserting it whenever an opportunity seemed to offer. But they
have now for many centuries been absolutely quiescent, and are patient under
the harsh’ rule of the three races which hold them in subjection —the Russians,
the Persians, and the Turks.
Historically, the Armenians of today cannot be traced
further back than about the sixth century BC, when they appear to have
immigrated into the territory that they have from that time occupied. Previously
their land was possessed by three powerful and warlike races, who are thought
to have been Turanians, and who from the tenth to the
seventh century BC were continually at war with the great Assyrian Empire.
These were the Nairi, the Urarda, and the Mannai, or
Minni—names which constantly recur in the cuneiform inscriptions. The Nairi were
spread from the mountains west of lake Van, along both sides of the Tigris, to
Bir on the Euphrates, and even further; the Urarda,
or people of Ararat, probably the Alarodii of
Herodotus, dwelt north and east of the Nafri, on the
Upper Euphrates, about the lake of Van, and probably on the Araxes; while the
Minni, or Mannai, whose country lay southeast of the Urarda,
held the Urumiyeh basin, and the adjoining parts of Zagros. Of these three
races, the Urarda were the most powerful, and it was
with them that the Assyrians waged their most bloody wars. The capital city of
the Urarda was Van, on the eastern shores of the
lake, and here it was that the kings set up the most remarkable of their
inscriptions. The language of these inscriptions is of a Turanian type, and,
though it may have furnished the non-Arian element in the modern Armenian,
cannot have been its real main progenitor. An immigration must have occurred
between the end of the Assyrian and the early part of the Persian period, which
changed the population of the mountain region, submerging the original
occupants in a far larger number of Arian in-comers.
The first distinct knowledge that we obtain of this
new people is from the inscriptions of Darius Hystaspis.
Darius, after mentioning Armenia (Armina) among the twenty-three provinces into
which his empire was divided, informs us that, in the second year of his reign
(BC 520), while he was at Babylon, a great revolt broke out, in which Armenia
participated, together with eight other districts. It was not till his third
year that the revolt was put down, the Armenians, as well as the other
confederates, making a most vigorous resistance. The names of the persons and
of the places mentioned in this campaign seem to be Arian, as are the other
Armenian names generally. On the suppression of the revolt, and the full
establishment of the power of Darius, Armenia, together with some adjacent
regions, became a satrapy of the Persian Empire—the thirteenth, according to
Herodotus—and was rated in the Royal Books as bound to furnish a revenue of
four hundred talents—about £96,000— annually. From this time its fidelity to
the Persian monarchs was remarkable. Not only was the money tribute paid
regularly, but a contribution of twenty thousand young colts was made each year
to the Royal Stud, so far as appears, without any murmuring. Contingents of
troops were also readily furnished whenever required by the Great Monarch; and,
through the whole Achaemenian period, after the reign of Darius, Armenia
remained perfectly tranquil, and never caused the Persians the slightest alarm
or anxiety.
After Arbela (BC 331) the Armenians submitted to
Alexander without a struggle, or an attempt at regaining independence, and,
when in the division of his dominions which followed upon the battle of Ipsus (BC
301), they were assigned to Seleucus, they acquiesced in the arrangement. It
was not until Antiochus the Great suffered his great defeat at the hands of the
Romans (BC 190), and all Western Asia was thrown into a ferment, that the Arian
Armenians, after, at least, four centuries of subjection, raised their thoughts
to independence, and succeeded in establishing an autonomous monarchy. Even
then the movement seems to have originated rather in the ambition of a chief
than in any ardent desire for liberty upon the part of the people. Artaxias had
been governor of the Greater Armenia in the earlier portion of the reign of
Antiochus, and seized the opportunity afforded by the defeat of Magnesia to
change his title of satrap into that of sovereign. Antiochus was too much
occupied at home to resist him; and he was allowed at his leisure to establish
his power, to build a new capital at Artaxata near
the Araxes, and to reign in peace for a space of about twenty-five years. Then,
however, he was attacked by Antiochus Epiphanes. This prince (about BC 165)
resolved on an attempt at re-establishing the power of Syria over Armenia, and
invading the country with a large army, forced Artaxias to an engagement, in
which he defeated him and took him prisoner. Armenia, for the time, submitted;
but it was not long before fresh troubles broke out. When Mithridates I.
overran the eastern provinces of Syria (about BC 150), and made himself master
in succession of Media, Babylonia, and Elymais, Armenia was once more thrown
into a state of excitement, and, partly by her own efforts, partly, it would
seem, by Parthian assistance, threw off for a second time the Syrian yoke, and
became again independent, this time under an Arsacid prince, named Wagharshag or Valarsaces, a
member of the Parthian royal family. A reign of twenty-two years is assigned to
this monarch, whose kingdom is declared to have extended from the Caucasus to
Nisibis, and from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. He was succeeded by a son
named Arshag or Arsaces, who carried on wars with the neighbouring state of Pontus, and had a reign of thirteen years, probably from about 128 to 115
BC. Ardashes—the Ortoadistus of Justin—then became
king, and was firmly seated on the Armenian throne, when Mithridates II, nephew
of Mithridates I, having brought the Scythic war to a
successful termination, determined (about BC 100) to make an attempt to add
Armenia to his dominions.
No account has come down to us of the war between Ortoadistus and the invaders. The relative power of the two
states was, however, such as to make it almost certain that in a collision
between the two Parthia would have the advantage; and a casual allusion in
Strabo appears to indicate pretty clearly, that in point of fact, the advantage
gained was not inconsiderable. Strabo says that Tigranes, the eldest son of Ortoadistus, was a hostage in the hands of the Parthians
for some time before his accession to the throne—a statement from which it may
be confidently inferred, that Ortoadistus, having
been worsted in battle by Mithridates, concluded with him an ignominious peace,
and as security for the performance of its terms gave hostages to the Parthian
monarch, his own son being among the number. Still, it is also clear, from the
fact recorded, that Armenia, if worsted, was far from being subjugated—she
ended the war by a treaty of peace—she maintained her own monarch upon the
throne—she was not even seriously reduced in strength, since within the space
of the next twenty years she attained to the height of her power, absorbing the
Syrian state, and really ruling for a time from the Gulf of Issus to the shores
of the Caspian.
It cannot have been more than a few years after the
termination of the Armenian war, which must have fallen about the close of the
second, or the beginning of the first century before our era, that the Parthian
state, while still under the rule of Mithridates II, was for the first time
brought into contact with Rome.
Rome appears as a permanent factor in the politics of
the East somewhat later than might have been expected. When, towards the close
of the second century BC, the ambition of the Great Antiochus dragged her
unwillingly into Asiatic quarrels, she disembarrassed herself, as speedily as
she could, of all ties binding her to Asia, and made what was almost a formal
retreat to her own continent, and renunciation of the heritage of another,
which fortune pressed upon her. For more than half a century the policy of
abstention was pursued. The various states of Western Asia were left to follow
their own scheme of self-aggrandisement, and fight
out their own quarrels without Roman interference. But, in course of time, the
reasons for the policy of abstention disappeared. Macedonia and Greece having
been conquered and absorbed, and Carthage destroyed (BC 148-146), the
conditions of the political problem seemed to be so far changed as to render a
further advance towards the East a safe measure; and accordingly, when it was
perceived that the line of the kings of Pergamus was coming to an end, the
Senate set on foot intrigues which had for their object the devolution upon
Rome of the sovereignty belonging to those monarchs. By dexterous management
the third Attalus was induced, in repayment of his father’s obligations to the
Romans, to take the extraordinary and wholly unprecedented step of bequeathing
by will his entire dominions as a legacy to the Republic. In vain did his
illegitimate half-brother, Aristonicus, dispute the validity of so strange a
testament; the Romans, aided by Mithridates IV, then monarch of Pontus, easily
triumphed over such resistance as this unfortunate prince could offer, and,
having ceded to their ally the portion of Phrygia which had belonged to the
Pergamene kingdom, entered on the possession of the remainder. Having thus
become an Asiatic power, the Great Republic was of necessity mixed up
henceforth with the various movements and struggles which agitated Western
Asia, and was naturally led to strengthen its position among the Asiatic
kingdoms by such alliances as seemed at each conjuncture to be best suited to
its interests.
Hitherto no occasion had arisen for any direct
dealings between Rome and Parthia. Their respective territories were still
separated by considerable tracts, which were in the occupation of the Syrians,
the Cappadocians, and the Armenians. Their interests had neither clashed, nor
as yet sufficiently united them to give rise to any diplomatic intercourse. But
the progress of the two empires in opposite directions was, slowly but surely,
bringing them nearer to each other; and events had now reached a point at which
the empires began to have—or to seem to have—such a community of interests as
led naturally to an exchange of communications. A new power had been recently
developed in these parts. In the rapid way Iso common in the East, Mithridates
V of Pontus, the son and successor of Rome’s ally, had, between BC 112 and BC
93, built up an empire of vast extent, large' population, and almost
inexhaustible resources. He had established his authority over Armenia Minor,
Colchis, the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, the Chersonesus Taurica, or
kingdom of the Bosporus, and even over the whole tract lying west of the Chersonese
as far as the mouth of the Tyras, or Dniestr. Nor had
these gains contented him. He had obtained half of Paphlagonia by an iniquitous
compact with Nicomedes, King of Bithynia ; he had occupied Galatia; and he was
engaged in attempts to bring Cappadocia under his influence. In this last-mentioned
project he was assisted by the Armenians, with whose king, Tigranes, the son of Ortoadistus, he had (about BC 96) formed a close
alliance, at the same time giving him his daughter, Cleopatra, in marriage.
Rome, though she had not yet determined on war with Mithridates, was bent on
thwarting his Cappadocian projects, and in BC 92 sent Sulla into Asia, with
orders to put down the puppet king whom Mithridates V. and Tigranes were
establishing, and to replace upon the Cappadocian throne a certain
Ariobarzanes, whom they had driven from his kingdom. In the execution of this
commission, Sulla was brought into hostile collision with the Armenians, whom
he defeated with great slaughter, and drove from Cappadocia, together with
their puppet king. Thus, not only did the growing power of Mithridate of
Pontus, by inspiring Rome and Parthia with a common fear, tend to draw them
together, but the course of events had actually given them a common enemy in
Tigranes of Armenia, who was equally obnoxious to both of them.
For Tigranes, who, during the time that he was a
hostage in Parthia, had contracted engagements towards the Parthian monarch,
which involved a cession of territory, and who, on the faith of his pledges,
had been aided by the Parthians in seating himself on his father’s throne,
though he made the cession required of him in the first instance, had soon
afterwards repented of his honesty, had gone to war with his benefactors,
recovered the ceded territory, and laid waste a considerable tract of country
lying within the admitted limits of the Parthian kingdom. These proceedings
had, of course, alienated Mithridates II; and we may with much probability
ascribe to them the step, which he now took, of sending an ambassador to Sulla. Orobazus, the individual selected, was charged with
the duty of proposing an alliance offensive and defensive between the two
countries. The Roman general received the overture favourably,
but probably considered that it transcended his powers to conclude a treaty;
and thus no further result was secured by the embassy than the establishment,
at their first contact, of a friendly understanding between the two states.
Soon after this, Tigranes appears to have renewed his
attacks upon Parthia, which in the interval between 92 and 83 BC he greatly
humbled, depriving it of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, at this time called Gordyene, or the country of the Kurds, and under the rule
of one of the Parthian tributary kings. Rome was too deeply engaged in the
first Mithridatic war to lend Parthia any aid, even if she had been so
disposed, and Parthia herself seems to have been suffering from domestic
troubles, a time of confusion and disturbance having followed on the death of
Mithridates II about BC 89.
Mithridates the Second is commonly regarded as the
most distinguished of all the Parthian monarchs after his uncle, Mithridates
the First. He has a fine head upon his coins, with a large eye, and a prominent
Roman nose. He takes the epithets of “Theopator” and
“Nicator.” The obverse of his coins is commonly adorned with the sitting
Parthian figure with an outstretched bow ; but sometimes exhibits, instead of
this, a Pegasus or winged horse. The military exploits of the prince were
undoubtedly remarkable, and it is unfortunate for him that the record of them
is so scanty. It is certain that he made a deep impression upon the Scythian
hordes, and thus averted from his country a great danger. It is probable that
he considerably enlarged the limits of his empire on the side of Bactria and
India. But, on the whole, perhaps his permanent fame will rest mainly upon the
two facts, that he was the first to initiate those Armenian wars which occupied
so large a portion of the later Parthian history, and that he was also the
first to bring Parthia into contact with the most formidable of all her
external enemies, Rome, and thus—though with far different intent—to pave the
way for those many bloody struggles with the Great Imperial Power, which for
nearly three centuries —from the time of Crassus to that of Caracallus—
riveted the attention of mankind upon the East.
DARK PERIOD OF PARTHIAN HISTORY—ACCESSION OF
SANATRCECES—PHRAATES III. AND POMPEY.
The death of Mithridates II introduced into Parthian
history, as has been already observed, a period of confusion and disturbance.
Civil wars, according to one authority, raged during this period; according to
another, there was a rapid succession of monarchs. It would seem that the
ancient race of the Arsacidae had pretty nearly died
out; and, as the superstition still prevailed, that fatal consequences would
follow, if any one in whose veins the old blood did not run were allowed to
ascend the throne, very aged scions of the royal house had to be sought out,
and the royal authority committed to hands that were quite unfitted for it One
king who has been thought to belong to the period is said to have died at the
age of ninety-six; another was eighty at his accession. Under these
circumstances it may well have been that younger rivals sprang up, whether of
the royal, or of some fresher and lustier stocks, who disputed the crown with
the decrepit monarchs preferred to the position by the Megistanes,
and threw the whole country into confusion. These quarrels fell out at an
unfortunate conjuncture. Rome had at last been forced into a contest with
Mithridates of Pontus, and this pre-occupation of the two great powers had for
the moment given Armenia a free hand. Armenia, under Tigranes, one of the most
ambitious princes that ever lived, took immediate advantage of the occasion,
and, while the Mithridatic war was impending, and also during the eleven years
that it lasted (BC 85-74), employed herself in building up a powerful and
extensive empire. Not content with recovering from Parthia the portion of
territory which he had begun by ceding to her, Tigranes had, quite early in his
reign, carried his aggressions much further, had made himself master of two
most important Parthian provinces, Gordyene or
Northern Mesopotamia, and Adiabene or the tract about the Zab rivers, including
Assyria Proper and Arbelitis, had conquered Sophene, or the lesser Armenia, which was independent under
a king named Artanes, and had also brought under
subjection the extensive and valuable country of Media Atropatene, which had
maintained its independence since the time of Alexander. Nor had these
successes contented him. Invited into Syria, about BC 83, by the wretched
inhabitants, who were driven to desperation by the never-ceasing civil wars
between rival princes of the house of the Seleucidae,
he had found no difficulty in absorbing the last remnant of the Syro-Macedonian Empire, and establishing himself as king
over Cilicia, Syria, and most of Phoenicia. About BC 80 he had determined on
building himself a new capital in the recently-acquired province of Gordyene—a capital of a vast size, provided with all the
luxuries required by an Oriental Court, and fortified with walls such as should
recall the glories of the ancient cities of the Assyrians. Twelve Greek cities
were depopulated to furnish Tigranocerta—so the new capital was called—with a
sufficiency of Hellenic inhabitants; three hundred thousand Cappadocians were
at the same time transported thither; and the population was further swelled by
contingents from Cilicia, Gordyene, Adiabene, and
Assyria Proper. A royal palace on a large scale was constructed in the
immediate vicinity, together with extensive parks or “paradises,” marshes well
stocked with wild-fowl, and well-appointed hunting establishments. The walls of
the city are declared to have been seventy-five feet in height; and the
intention evidently was to constitute it a standing menace to Seleucia,
Ctesiphon, Babylon, or whatever might be made the Parthian western capital. The
supersession of Parthia by Armenia was clearly aimed at; and it was only a
slight step in advance when finally Tigranes placed upon his coins the ancient
title of the Great Sovereigns of Asia—recently claimed only by the Arsacid
monarchs—the title of King of kings.
The emergence of Armenia into the position of a Great
Power would, under any circumstances, have tended to throw Parthia into the
shade; and now, occurring as it did when she was already under a cloud, rent
with civil dissensions, and guided by the uncertain hands of aged and feeble
monarchs, it produced her almost entire disappearance. For twenty years—from 89
to 69—amid the rapid movements that occupy the field of Oriental history, we
scarcely obtain a glimpse of Parthia, which is jostled out of sight by the
stronger and burlier forms that fill the space, and force themselves on our
attention.
It is with difficulty that, by dint of careful search,
we at length discover, or fancy we discover, among the fierce struggles of the
times two shadowy forms of Parthian kings to place in this interval as links
connecting the earlier with the later history. The first of these is a certain
Mnasciras, of whom Lucian appears to speak, as a Parthian prince who reached the
great age of ninety-six years, and whom it is impossible to insert at any other
point. The other is a somewhat better defined personage—a certain Sanatroeces, called also Sinatroces and Sintricus— who has left his name upon some of his
coins, and is mentioned by several authors. This last-named monarch appears to
have reigned from 76 to 69 BC, and thus to have been contemporary with Tigranes
of Armenia, Mithridates of Pontus, and the Roman general, Lucullus. He was
seventy-nine years old at his accession, and is said to have been indebted for
his crown to aid lent him in the civil struggles, wherein he was engaged with
rivals, by the Scythic tribe of the Sacauracae. During his short reign it was his special endeavour to hold himself aloof from the quarrels of his
neighbours, and thus escape the fate of the earthen pot when brought into
collision with iron ones. He entirely declined the overtures of Mithridates for
an alliance, which were made to him in BC 72; and when, in BC 69, the war had
approached his own frontier, and, the most earnest appeals for assistance
reaching him from both parties, he found it impossible to maintain the line of
pure abstention, he had recourse to the expedient of amusing both sides with
promises, while he lent no real aid to either. Plutarch tells us that this
course of action so offended and enraged Lucullus, that at one time it almost
induced him to defer to a more convenient season his quarrel with Mithridates
and his ally, Tigranes, and direct the whole force at his command against
Parthia. But the prolonged resistance of Nisibis, and the success of
Mithridates in Pontus (BC 67) averted the danger, and, the war rolling
northwards, Parthia was not yet driven to take a side, but found herself able
to maintain her neutral position for a few years longer.
The turning point of the Mithridatic War was the
recall of Lucullus (BC 66), and his replacement by one of the greatest Roman
generals of the time, Cneius Pompeius. Pompey’s
generalship showed him at once that, so long as Rome was obliged to contend
single-handed with two such powerful enemies as Mithridates and Tigranes,
success could not be reasonably expected. The Pontine and Armenian kings played
into each other’s hands, and between them possessed such advantages in local
position, in men, and in resources, that the war might go on indefinitely
without any clear and decisive issue, unless its conditions could be changed.
He looked about therefore to see whether a new factor could not be called in, and
a change in the balance of force be thereby brought about. Might not Parthia,
which had rejected the cheap blandishments of Lucullus and despised his coarse
threats, be won Over by somewhat more dexterous management, and more refined
diplomacy? A Parthian monarch was now seated upon the throne who was untried,
to whom overtures had not yet been made, who at any rate had not committed
himself to the policy of abstention. Might he not be prevailed upon? Might not
Phraates the Third, the son of Sanatroeces, who had
just succeeded his father upon the Parthian throne, be induced by a
sufficiently tempting promise, to join his forces with those of Rome in the
war, and so place the preponderance of military strength on the Roman side. The
main question was, what would be a sufficiently tempting offer? Pompey thought
it enough to pledge himself, that, if Parthia embraced his cause and gave him
the assistance which he required, Armenia should at the end of the war be
compelled to make restitution to her of her lost provinces—she should be once
more put in possession of Gordyene, and Adiabene. The
bait took—Phraates came into the terms proposed—and Parthia for the first and
last time became a Roman ally.
The general terms of the agreement made between the
high contracting parties seem to have been, that, while Rome pressed the war
against the Pontine monarch incessantly and without relaxing in her efforts,
Phraates should enter Armenia, and find occupation for Tigranes in his own
country. As Parthia and Armenia were conterminous along an extended line of
frontier, Phraates could make his assault where he pleased, and how he pleased.
It happened that he had at his Court an Armenian refugee of the highest consequence—no
less a person than the Crown Prince of Armenia, or eldest living son of
Tigranes, who, having quarrelled with his father, had
raised a rebellion, and being defeated had been forced to fly, and seek a
refuge in Parthia. Phraates determined to take advantage of this circumstance.
Having completed his arrangements with Pompey, he, in the year BC 65, placed
himself at the head of his troops, and, in conjunction with the Armenian
prince, invaded the territory of Tigranes. The prince had a party in the
country which desired to see a youthful monarch upon the throne, and was soon
joined by a considerable body of supporters. The invading army penetrated deep
into Armenia, advancing upon the capital, Artaxata,
whither Tigranes had retreated. The Armenian monarch made, however, no stand,
even at his metropolis; but, when his foes still pressed forward, quitted the
city, and fled to the neighbouring mountains. Artaxata was invested; but, as the siege promised to be
long, Phraates became tired of sitting before the place, and persuaded himself
that he had done enough to satisfy Pompey, and might safely leave the young
prince, with a contingent of Parthian troops and his own adherents, to carry on
the war against his father. Accordingly, he retired, and the young prince
remained in sole command. The result followed which might have been anticipated.
Scarcely was Phraates withdrawn, when the old king, descending suddenly from
his fastnesses, fell upon his son’s army at unawares, defeated it, and drove it
out of the country. He thus recovered full possession of Armenia, and was once
more in a position to render help to Mithridates against Pompey; but the time
for giving effectual help was gone by. Pompey had made such good use of the
interval during which the hands of Tigranes were fully employed, that in a
single campaign he had broken the power of Mithridates, driven him in headlong
flight from place to place, and finally forced him to seek a. refuge beyond the
Phasis, at Dioscurias, in the modern Mingrelia.
Deprived of his ally, Tigranes was too weak to make further head against Rome,
and his complete submission, in the autumn of BC 66, left Pompey at liberty to
settle the affairs of the East at his pleasure.
The settlement made was not very greatly to the liking
of the Parthian king. His old adversary, the elder Tigranes, who had
propitiated Pompey by the gift of six thousand silver talents—nearly a million
and a half of our money—though deprived of Syria, which was made into an actual
Roman province, was left in full possession of his ancestral kingdom of
Armenia, and not even mulcted of the valuable province of Gordyene,
which he had seized in the time of the acute Parthian distress. His friend and
protégé the younger Tigranes, was first offered the petty principality of Sophene, and when he refused it and remonstrated, was
arrested, put in confinement, and reserved by Pompey for his triumph. He
himself gained nothing by the Roman alliance but the recovery of Adiabene, of
which he no doubt took possession before invading Armenia in BC 66. When he attempted,
without Pompey’s permission, to repeat in Gordyene the process which had proved successful on the other side of the Tigris, Pompey
did not scruple to resist him in open warfare—and this notwithstanding that the
province had been actually promised to him as the price of his alliance.
Phraates learnt what Roman promises were worth, when, on seeking to repossess
himself of Gordyene, he was met by Pompey’s legate,
Afranius, who, at the head of an armed force, drove his troops from the
country, and proceeded to deliver it into the hands of the Armenians. Policy
might, conceivably, have been pleaded for this measure, which would tend to
weaken Parthia, Rome’s most formidable rival in the East, and strengthen
Armenia, Rome’s most convenient ally, against her; but no plea of policy could
excuse the useless insult offered to the Parthian monarch, when Pompey in his
written communications refused him his generally recognised title of “King of Kings.”
There can be little doubt, but that, at this time, Pompey
was balancing in his mind, with an inclination to the affirmative side, the
question whether he should, or should not, declare the Parthian prince, a Roman
enemy, and direct the full force of the Republic against him. There was much to
attract him to the formation of such a decision. His military career had been
hitherto without a reverse. He had great confidence in his good fortune. If not
as ambitious as his rival, Julius, he was at any rate thoroughly desirous of
posing in the eyes of his countrymen as unmistakably the foremost man of his day.
To engage a new enemy, and that enemy the recognised successor of Assyria and Persia in the inheritance of the Asian continent, to
tread in the steps of Alexander, and carry the arms of the West to the shores
of the ocean which shut in the world upon the East, would give him a prestige
which would elevate him far above all rivals, and satisfy all the dreams that
he had ever entertained of distinction and glory. But, on the other hand,
prudence counselled abstention from a risky enterprise. As the war had not been
formally committed to him, his enemies at Rome would make his having entered
upon it a ground of accusation. He had seen, moreover, with his own eyes, that
the Parthians were an enemy far from despicable, and his knowledge of
campaigning told him that success against them was by no means certain. He
feared to risk the loss of all the glory which he had hitherto gained by grasping
greedily at more, and deemed it wiser to enjoy the fruits of the good luck
which had hitherto attended him than to tempt fortune on a new field.
He therefore, after hesitating for a while, determined
finally on a pacific course. He would not allow himself to be provoked into
hostilities by the reproaches, the dictatorial words, or even the daring acts
of the Parthian king. When Phraates demanded his lost provinces, he replied,
that the question of borders was one which lay, not between Parthia and Rome,
but between Parthia and Armenia. When he laid it down that the Euphrates
properly and of right bounded the Roman territory, and charged Pompey not to
cross it, the latter said he would keep to the just bounds, whatever they were.
When Tigranes on his part complained, that, after having been received into the
Roman alliance, he was still attacked by the Parthian armies, the reply of
Pompey was, that he was quite willing to appoint arbitrators who should decide
all the disputes between the two nations. The moderation and caution of these
answers proved contagious. On hearing them, the monarchs addressed resolved to
compose their differences, or at any rate to defer the settlement of them to a
more convenient time, when Rome should have withdrawn from the neighbourhood. They accepted Pompey’s proposal of an
arbitration; and in a short time an arrangement was effected by which relations
of amity were re-established between the two countries.
With the retirement of Pompey from Asia in the year BC
62, the East settled down into a state of comparative tranquillity.
There was a general feeling that time was necessary to recruit the strength
exhausted in the fierce and sanguinary wars of the last thirty years, and a
general impression that further contention would only advantage the common
enemy—Rome. Rome had now to be looked upon as a permanent neighbour, securely
lodged in Cilicia, Syria, and Cappadocia, biding her time, and at any moment
ready to take advantage of any false step which might be made by any of the
Asiatic kingdoms. Parthia, as having the most to lose, had the most to fear;
but Armenia was still more exposed to attack, and might expect to be assailed
first. The other minor powers could only hope to escape destruction by
remaining quiet, and offering no provocation to the stronger states in their
vicinity.
But external tranquillity in
Parthia was only too apt to be the precursor of domestic disturbance. Within
two years of Pompey’s departure from Asia, a conspiracy was formed against the
life of Phraates, which resulted in his assassination. His two sons,
Mithridates and Orodes, plotted and effected his destruction, for what reason,
or on what pretext, we know not. Phraates had held the throne during a time of
difficulty, and had ruled, if not with signal success, yet on the whole with
prudence and vigour. He had shown himself an active
commander, a fair strategist, a successful negotiator. He was apparently in the
full possession of all his powers and faculties when he was struck down. It
seems as if the motive of the parricide must have been mere personal ambition,
that unnatural longing to thrust a parent from his rightful place which has too
often produced such tragedies, more especially in the East.
Mithridates, the elder son, obtained the throne, but
scarcely succeeded in establishing himself firmly upon it. Very early in his
reign he became jealous of his brother and fellow-conspirator, Orodes, and
drove him into banishment; while at the same time he treated a large number of
the Parthian nobles with cruelty. The Megistanes consequently deposed him, and the hereditary commander-in-chief brought back
Orodes from exile, and set him up as king in his brother’s room. As some
compensation for the loss of his independent sovereignty, Mithridates was given
the government of the important province of Media Magna; and, had he been
content to remain in this subordinate position he might probably have lived out
the full term of his natural life in peace and quietness. But there are
temperaments which nothing but actual kingship will content, after they have
once had a taste of it, and the temperament of Mithridates would appear to have
been of this order. He was raising an army with a view to the recovery of his
lost throne, when Orodes, having become aware of his intention, marched against
him, and crushed his nascent rebellion. Mithridates had to cross the frontier,
and place himself under the protection of the nearest Roman proconsul, who
happened to be Gabinius, governor of Syria, who had obtained his post through
the influence of Pompey. Gabinius, a man of moderate abilities, but of vast
ambition, readily received the fugitive, and for a time contemplated an
immediate invasion of the Parthian territory, and an attempt to force back
Mithridates upon his unwilling subjects. The expedition would probably have
taken place, had it not happened that, just at the time, the Syrian proconsul
received another invitation from another quarter, which, on the whole, was
more tempting. Ptolemy Auletes (“the Fluter”),
expelled from Egypt by his exasperated subjects, having obtained the
countenance and patronage of Pompey, presented himself before Gabinius in the
spring of BC 55, and besought his powerful assistance in recovering his lost
kingdom. The price which he was ready to pay for the boon named was a sum
nearly equal to two and a half millions of our money (twelve and a half
millions of dollars). This offer dazzled Gabinius, and almost persuaded him;
but the opposition made by his officers was such as might perhaps have induced
him to decline it, had not the influence of the young Mark Antony, who was in
his camp, been exerted in favour of Auletes, and his
representations turned the scale in favour of the
Egyptian venture. Mithridates, whose hopes had been raised to the highest
pitch, was thus left to bear as he might his cruel disappointment. It is
surprising that he did not altogether succumb. But it would seem that he still
fancied he saw a possible chance of success. The wild Arab tribes recently
settled by Tigranes in Mesopotamia were willing to espouse his cause, and the
great cities of Seleucia and Babylon appear to have also declared in his favour. Under these circumstances he threw himself into
Babylon, and there endured a long siege at the hands of his brother. It was not
until food failed the garrison that a surrender was determined on. Then at last
Mithridates, trusting that the ties of blood would be taken into consideration
by his adversary, and would cause him to be spared the usual penalty of
rebellion, allowed himself to fall alive into Orodes’ hands. But fraternal
affection was not strongly developed among the Parthians. Orodes, having
declared that he placed the claims of country above those of kindred, caused
the traitor who had sought aid from Rome to be instantly executed in his
presence. Such was the end of the third Mithridates, a weak and selfish prince,
with whom it is impossible to feel any sympathy.
GREAT EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST PARTHIA, AND ITS
FAILURE — RETALIATORY RAID OF PACORUS.
CRASSUS—or, to give him his full name, Marcus Licinius
Crassus—though one of the foremost Romans of his day, was neither a great man,
nor a great commander. Sprung from a noble stock, and the son of a respectable
father, he first became noted for his skill and success in money-getting, an
employment to which for many years he devoted all his energies, and which he
pursued with an ardour and perseverance that made
success certain. The times were favourable for the
quick accumulation of a fortune by commercial methods. The civil struggles,
through which Rome was passing, were accompanied by a continual succession of
forfeitures, confiscations, and forced sales, which gave an opportunity, even
for moderate capitalists, within a comparatively short space, by judicious
investments, to become men of large wealth. Crassus allowed no considerations
of compassion, or friendship, or delicacy to hamper him in his bargains; and
the result was that in course of time he came to be the legal owner of the
greater portion of the soil on which Rome was built His other possessions were
in proportion. He had mines which were rich and productive, fertile and
well-cultivated estates, and, above all, an enormous number of valuable slaves.
His own estimate of the worth of his property, shortly before he started on his
expedition, rated it at above seven thousand talents.
In Rome—or at any rate in the Rome of this time
—wealth led, almost of necessity, to political distinction. An enormous
expenditure was needed in order to obtain the highest offices of the state, and
these offices became naturally the objects of contention among the most opulent
men. The wealth of Crassus thrust him into a prominent position, and the position
gradually awoke in him those ambitious longings which do not seem to have
troubled him during his youth. After a time he began to court popularity, and
to endeavour .to outshine the other political favourites of the hour. He came forward as a pleader in the
courts, undertook causes which others declined, and showed himself especially
zealous and painstaking. He threw his house open to all, lent money freely to
his friends without requiring interest, and exercised a wide, if not a lavish,
hospitality. In this way he crept on into office, and by degrees worked his way
up to the highest grades. There, the talents that he displayed, without being
brilliant, were respectable. He came to be reckoned shrewd and safe. At last,
he was put on a par with the highest candidates for political power, and,
though really quite undeserving of the position, was “bracketed” with Caesar
and Pompey in the so-called “First Triumvirate.” The consulship followed (BC
55) as a matter of course, and when, on the lots being cast, Syria came out as
his “province,” Crassus found himself exalted to what was, practically, the
first position in the state.
There is reason to believe that, for many long years,
the ambition of Crassus, and his jealousy of the other chief political leaders,
especially of Pompey and Caesar, had been growing and expanding. It was
particularly in military renown that their reputation excelled his; and it was
consequently in this respect that he was most anxious to place himself on their
level, if not even, as he hoped, to excel and outdo them. In the position now
assigned him he thought he saw his opportunity. The project of Gabinius had got
wind, and it had flashed upon the imagination of Crassus how grand a thing it
would be to reduce under the dominion of Rome a wholly new country, and that
country the seat of ancient empires, and the scene of the highest triumphs of
Alexander. Like many another man of dull and plodding temper, Crassus no sooner
allowed the desire of glory to get a hold on him, than his unstable mind was
carried all lengths, and indulged in flights of the most wild and irrational
character. Instead of waiting till he had reached his province, and examined
into the position of affairs, before deciding how he would act, or what
enterprise he would undertake, Crassus immediately began to boast among his
friends of his designs and intentions. He spoke of the wars which Lucullus had
waged against Tigranes and Pompey against Mithridates of Pontus as mere child’s
play, and declared that he was not going to content himself with such paltry
conquests as had satisfied them; Syria did not bound his horizon, no, nor
Parthia either; it was his intention to carry the Roman arms to Bactria, India,
and the Eastern Ocean. The more prudent among the statesmen of the Republic
remonstrated, but in vain. His friends and flatterers applauded and encouraged
him. Even Caesar, nothing loth to help towards the downfall of a reputation,
wrote to him from Gaul to fan the flame of his ambition and stimulate his
hopes. Crassus hurried on his preparations, and, though the tribune Ateius endeavoured to deter him
by a solemn curse, and even, had the other tribunes permitted, would have
arrested his steps at the city gates, left Rome some weeks before his
consulship had expired, and, despising alike warnings and omens, set sail with
a large fleet from Brundisium.
The journey of Crassus from Brundisium to the
Euphrates was prosperous on the whole and uneventful. He lost a certain number
of his transports in crossing the Adriatic, which, as it was already midNovember, was not surprising. Landing at Dyrrhachium,
he passed through Macedonia and Thrace to the Hellespont, and thence through
Asia Minor into Syria where he established himself at Antioch. On his way he
fell in with an old Roman ally, Deiotarus, King of Galatia, who happened to be
building a new city on his line of route. As Deiotarus was far advanced in
years, Crassus, forgetting his own age, indulged in a joke at his expense: “You
begin to build, Prince,” he said, “rather late in the day”;— whereto the other
replied with the retort: “And you, too, Commander, are not beginning very early
in the morning to attack the Parthians.”
During the time that Crassus was making his
preparations at Rome, and the further time that he spent upon his march,
Orodes, the Parthian monarch, had an ample space for forming his general plan
of campaign at his leisure, and making ready to receive his enemy. Not only was
he able to collect his native troops from all parts of the empire, and to arm,
train, and exercise them, but he had an opportunity of gaining over certain
chiefs upon his borders, who had hitherto held a semi-independent position, and
might have been expected to welcome the Romans. The most important of these was
Abgarus, prince of Osrhoene, or the tract lying east
of the Euphrates about the city of Edessa, who had been received into the Roman
alliance by Pompey, and was thought by the Romans generally to be well disposed
to their cause. Orodes, however, persuaded him, while still remaining
professedly a Roman ally, to give in secret his best services to the Parthian
side. Another chief, Alchandonius, an Arab sheikh of
these parts, who had made his submission to Rome even earlier, becoming
convinced that Parthia was the stronger power of the two, was at the same time
gained over. Orodes held himself on the defensive, covering the important
cities of Seleucia and Babylon with his troops, and waiting to see in what way
Crassus would develop his attack, and by what route he would advance into the
interior.
The proconsul was at first in no hurry. His old lust
of gain came upon him, and after contenting himself with a mere reconnaissance
in Mesopotamia, where he defeated a Parthian satrap at Ichnae on the Belik, and received the voluntary submission of a number of small Greek
towns, which he garrisoned, he retraced his steps ere the year was half out,
and gave himself up to a series of discreditable but “very lucrative”
transactions. At Hierapolis, or Bambyce, where was a
famous temple of the Syrian goddess, Atergatis or Derketo, he entered the shrine, carefully weighed all the
offerings in the precious metals, and then ruthlessly carried them off. Having
tidings of the treasures still remaining in the Sanctuary of Jehovah at
Jerusalem, notwithstanding Pompey’s sacrilege, he paid the city a visit for the
mere purpose of plunder, rifled the sacred treasury, carried off the golden
ornaments, and possessed himself by a perjury of a beam of solid gold of 750
pounds weight. In the other cities and states he professed to make requisitions
of men and supplies, but let it be understood that in all cases he was willing
to accept, instead, a composition in money. One Greek town in Mesopotamia,
which resisted his arms, he took by storm and sacked, afterwards selling all
the inhabitants, who survived the sack, as slaves.
Thus passed the autumn and winter of BC 54. The spring
of BC 53 arrived, and the avaricious proconsul began to see that he must
absolutely do something to justify his high boasts. Caesar had sent him from
Gaul his eldest son, a gallant youth and good officer, who was burning to
distinguish himself; and his quaestor, C. Cassius Longinus, was also a captain
of repute, who would have been ashamed to return to Rome without having fleshed
his sword upon some worthier enemy than a handful of miserable Greek colonists.
Artavasdes too, the Armenian king, the son of the younger Tigranes, was anxious
that so large a Roman army as had been collected, should not quit the neighbourhood without striking Parthia a blow that might
seriously weaken, if not even permanently cripple her. With the first
appearance of spring he came into the camp of Crassus, and made him the offer
of all the resources of his country. He promised the assistance of sixteen
thousand cavalry, of whom ten thousand should be equipped in complete armour, and of thirty thousand infantry, at the same time
strongly urging Crassus to direct his march through his own friendly
territories, well supplied with water and provisions, and abounding with hills
and streams, suited to baffle the manoeuvres of the terrible Parthian horsemen.
A march through Southern Armenia would conduct to the head streams of the
Tigris, whence there was an easy route through a fertile and practicable
country down the course of the river to Seleucia- Ctesiphon, the double
Parthian capital. Seleucia might be expected to welcome the Romans as liberators;
and there were other Grecian cities upon the route that might lend important
aid. The Armenian proposals had much that was tempting about them, and there
were not wanting some, among the more sober of the proconsul’s advisers, to
recommend their acceptance; but he himself felt hampered by the situation into
which he had brought himself by his movements of the preceding year, which had
led to his placing garrisons in the various cities of Osrhoene,
whom he could not now leave to the tender mercies of the enemy. He therefore
felt compelled to decline the offers of Artavasdes; and it was probably with
some feeling of offence that that prince quitted his camp and returned hastily
to his own country.
On the part of Orodes no important movement was made
during the winter season except his despatch of an
embassy to the proconsul, which seems to have been intended rather to
exasperate him than to induce him to forego his attack. The Parthian monarch,
it may be suspected, had begun to despise his enemy. He would naturally compare
him with Lucullus and Pompey, and when the whole of the first year passed by
without anything more important being undertaken then a raid into an outlying
province and the occupation of few insignificant and disaffected towns, he
would begin to understand that a Roman army, like any other, was formidable or
the reverse, according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He would know that
Crassus was a sexagenarian, and may have heard that he had never yet shown
himself a captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubted whether the
proconsul had any real intention of pressing the contest to a decision, and
might not rather be expected, when he had enriched himself and his troops with
Mesopotamian plunder, to withdraw his garrisons across the Euphrates. Under
these circumstances, Orodes, in the early spring, sent an embassy to the Roman
camp, with a message which was well calculated to stir to action the most
sluggish and poor- spirited of commanders. “If the war,” said his envoys, “was
really waged by Rome, it must be fought out to the bitter end. But if, as they
had good reason to believe, Crassus, against the wish of his country, had
attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his own private gain, Arsaces
would be moderate. He would have pity on the advanced years of the proconsul,
and would give the Romans back those men of theirs, who were not so much
keeping watch in Mesopotamia as having watch kept on them.” Crassus, stung with
the taunt, made the answer so significant of the pride that goes before a
fall—“He would give the ambassadors his response in their capital.” Wagises, the chief envoy, prepared for some such exhibition
of feeling, and glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the palm of one
hand with the fingers of the other: “Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before you
see Seleucia.”
Soon after this, before the winter could well be said
to be over, the offensive was taken against the Roman garrisons and adherents
in Mesopotamia. The towns occupied were attacked by the Parthians in force, and
though it does not seem that any of them were recovered, yet all of them were
menaced, and all suffered considerably. The more timid of the defenders made
their escape from some of them and brought to the Roman camp an exaggerated
account of the difficulties of Parthian warfare. “The enemy,” they said, “were
so rapid in their movements that it was impossible either to overtake them when
they fled or to escape them when they pursued; their arrows sped faster than
sight could follow, and penetrated every kind of defence, while their mail-clad
horsemen had weapons that would pierce through any armour,
and armour that defied the thrust of every weapon.”
Considerable alarm was excited by these rumours, an
alarm which was reflected in the reports of unfavourable omens issuing from the augural staff; but the proconsul had by this time made
up his mind that something must be risked, and that he could not face the storm
of ridicule that would meet him at Rome, if he did not fight at least one great
battle.
A second campaign was therefore resolved upon; but it
still remained to determine the line of march. Armenia had been already
rejected, partly as too circuitous and involving an unnecessary waste of time,
but mainly as implying the desertion, and so the sacrifice, of the troops which
to the number of eight thousand had been left in Mesopotamia the year before.
Crassus felt bound to support his garrisons, and so to make Mesopotamia, and
not Armenia, the basis of his operations. But there were several lines of route
through Mesopotamia. In the first place, there was the line best known to the
Greeks, and through them best known to the Romans—that of the Euphrates— which
had been pursued by Cyrus the Younger in the expedition against his brother,
whereon he had been accompanied by the Ten Thousand. Along this line water would
be plentiful; forage and other supplies might be counted on to a certain
extent; and the advancing army, resting its right upon the river, could not be
surrounded. Another was that which Alexander had taken against Darius Codomannus—the line along the foot of the Mons. Masius
(Karajah Dagh), by Edessa and Nisibis to Nineveh. Here, too, water and supplies
would have been readily procurable, and by clinging to the skirts of the hills
the Roman infantry would have been able to set the Parthian cavalry at
defiance. Between these two extreme courses to the right and to the left, were
numerous slightly divergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, all of them
shorter than either of the two abovementioned routes, and none offering any
great advantage over the remainder.
The original inclination of Crassus seems to have been
to follow in the track of the Ten Thousand. He crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma
(Bir or Birehjik), in about latitude 370, at the head
of seven legions, four thousand cavalry, and an equal number of slingers and
archers, and at first began his march along the river bank. No enemy appeared
in sight; and his scouts brought him word that there was none to be seen for a
long distance in front; the only traces that appeared were numerous tracks of
horses in rapid retreat before his advancing squadrons. The news was considered
to be good, and the soldiers marched forward cheerfully. The same direction was
maintained; but presently, Abgarus, the Osrhoenian sheikh, made his appearance, and had a conference with the proconsul, wherein
he professed the most friendly feelings, and strongly recommended an entire
change of tactics. “The Parthians,” he said, “did not intend to make a stand;
they might do so later, when the king had collected all his forces; but at
present they were demoralised, and were thinking only
of quitting Mesopotamia, and flying with their treasures to the remote regions
of Hyrcania and Scythia. The king was already far away; the main host was in
full retreat; only a rearguard under a couple of generals, Surenas and Sillaces, still lingered in Mesopotamia, and might be
within striking distance. Crassus should give up his cautious proceedings, and
hurry on at his best speed; he would then probably succeed in overtaking and
cutting to pieces the rearguard of the great army, a flying multitude
encumbered with baggage, which would furnish a rich spoil to the victors.” The
crafty Osrhoenian was believed ; and, though Cassius
with some other officers is said to have still counselled a more cautious
advance, the proconsul resolved on giving himself up to the guidance of “the
Bedouin,” and altering the direction of the march in accordance with his
recommendations. Accordingly, he turned off from the Euphrates, and proceeded
eastward over the swelling hills and dry gravelly plains of Upper Mesopotamia.
Here we shall leave him for the present, while we
consider the real disposition of his forces which the Parthian monarch had made
to meet the impending attack. He had, as already stated, come to terms with his
outlying vassals, the prince of Osrhoene and the
sheikh of the Scenite Arabs, and had engaged
especially the services of the former against his assailant. He had further, on
considering the various possibilities of the campaign, come to the conclusion
that it would be best to divide his forces, and while himself attacking
Artavasdes in the mountain fastnesses of his own country, to commit the task of
meeting and coping with the Romans to a general of approved talents. It was of
the greatest possible importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a
junction with the Romans, and strengthening them in that arm in which they were
especially deficient, the cavalry. Probably nothing short of an invasion of his
kingdom by the Parthian monarch in person would have prevented Artavasdes from
detaching a portion of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And no doubt it is
also true that Orodes had great confidence in his general, whom he may even
have felt to be a better commander than himself. Surenas, as we must call him,
since his personal appellation has not come down to us, was in all respects a
person of the highest consideration. He was the second man in the kingdom for
birth, wealth, and reputation. In courage and ability he excelled all his
countrymen; and he had the physical advantages of commanding height, and great
personal beauty. When he went to battle, he was accompanied by a train of a
thousand camels, which carried his baggage; and the concubines in attendance on
him required for their conveyance as many as two hundred chariots. A thousand mailclad horsemen, and a still larger number of lightarmed, formed his body-guard. At the coronation of a
Parthian monarch, it was his hereditary right to place the diadem on the brow
of the new sovereign. When Orodes was driven into banishment, it was he who had
brought him back to Parthia in triumph. When Seleucia revolted, it was he who
at the assault had first mounted the breach, and striking terror into the
defenders, had taken the city. Though less than thirty years of age when he was
appointed commander, he was believed to possess, besides these various
qualifications, consummate prudence and sagacity.
The force which Orodes committed to his brave and skilful lieutenant consisted entirely of horse. This was
not the ordinary character of a Parthian army, which often comprised four or
five times as many cavalry as infantry. Whether it was to any extent the result
of his own selection and military insight, is uncertain. Perhaps fortunate
accident rather than profound calculation brought about the sole employment
against the Romans of the cavalry arm. Horse would be wholly useless in the
rugged and mountainous Armenia, while they would act with effect in the
comparatively open and level Mesopotamian region. Footmen, on the other hand,
were essential for the Armenian war, and perhaps the king thought that he
needed as many as he could collect. In this case he would naturally take with
him the whole of the infantry, and leave his general the troops which were not
required for his own operations. It certainly does not appear, that Surenas was
allowed any choice in the matter.
The Parthian horse, like the Persian, was of two
kinds, standing in strong contrast the one to the other. The bulk of their
cavalry was of the lightest and most agile description. Fleet and active
coursers, with scarcely any caparison but a headstall and a single rein, were
mounted by riders clad only in a tunic and trousers, and armed with nothing but
a strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in early boyhood and
continued through youth made the rider almost one with his steed; and he could
use his weapons with equal ease and effect whether his horse was stationary or
at full gallop, or whether he was advancing towards or hurriedly retreating
from his enemy. His supply of missiles was practically inexhaustible, since
when he found his quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance and
replenish his stock from magazines, borne on the backs of camels, in the rear.
It was his ordinary plan to keep constantly in motion when in the presence of
an enemy, to gallop backwards and forwards, or round and round his square or
column, never charging it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen
and barbed shafts ; which were driven by a practised hand from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of this light cavalry enveloped the
advancing or retreating foe, and inflicted grievous damage, without, for the
most part, suffering anything in return.
But this was not the whole, nor the worst. In addition
to these light troops, a Parthian army contained always a body of heavy
cavalry, armed on an entirely different system. The strong chargers selected
for this service were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, neck, chest, even
their sides and flanks, were protected , by scale-armour of bronze or iron, sewn probably upon leather. Their riders had cuirasses and
cuisses of the same materials, and helmets of burnished iron. For an offensive
weapon they carried a long and strong spear or pike. They formed a serried line
in battle, bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom they attacked, and
standing firm as an iron wall against the charges that were made upon them. A
cavalry, answering to this in some respects, had been employed by the later
Persian monarchs, and was in use also among the Armenians at this period ; but
the Parthian pike appears to have been considerably more formidable than the
corresponding weapon borne by either of these nations.
As compared with these troops, the ^Romans, as Mommsen
observes, were thoroughly inferior both in respect of number and of excellence.
Their infantry of the line, excellent as they were in close combat, whether at
a short distance with the heavy javelin, or in hand-to-hand combat with the
sword, could not compel an army consisting wholly of cavalry to come to an
engagement with them; and they found, even when they did come to a hand-to-hand
conflict, an equal or superior adversary in the iron-clad hosts of lancers. As
compared with a force like that of Surenas, the Roman army was at a
disadvantage strategically, because the cavalry commanded the communications;
and at a disadvantage tactically, because every weapon of close combat must
succumb to that which is wielded from a distance, unless the struggle becomes
an individual one man against man. The concentrated position, on which the
whole Roman method of war was based, increased the danger in the presence of
such an attack, since the closer the ranks of the Roman column, the less could
the missiles fail to hit their mark. Under ordinary circumstances, where towns
have to be defended, and difficulties of the ground have to be considered, such
a system of operating with mere cavalry against infantry could never be
completely carried out; but in the Mesopotamian plain region, where an army was
almost like a ship on the high seas, neither encountering an obstacle, nor
meeting with a basis for strategic dispositions during many days’ march, this
mode of warfare was irresistible for the very reason that circumstances allowed
it to be developed there in all its purity and therefore in all its power.
There everything combined to put the foreign infantry at a disadvantage against
the native cavalry. Where the heavily-laden Roman foot soldier dragged himself
toilsomely over the steppe, and perished from hunger, or still more from
thirst, on a route marked only by water-springs that were far apart and
difficult to find, the Parthian horseman, accustomed from childhood to sit on
his fleet steed or camel, nay, almost to spend his life in the saddle, easily
traversed the desert, whose hardships he had long learned how to lighten, and
in case of need to bear. There no rain fell to mitigate the intolerable heat,
and to slacken the bowstrings and leathern thongs of the enemy’s archers and
slingers; there in the light soil of some places ordinary ditches and ramparts
could hardly be formed for the camp. Imagination can hardly conceive a
situation in which all the military advantages were more on the one side, and
all the disadvantages more thoroughly on the other.
The force entrusted by Orodes to Surenas comprised
cavalry of both the kinds above described. No estimate is given us of their
number; but, as they are called “ a vast multitude,” and “ an immense body,” we
may assume that it was considerable. At any rate it was sufficient to induce
him to make a movement in advance—to cross the Sinjar range and the river Khabour, and take up his position in the country between
that stream and the Belik—instead of merely seeking to cover the capital. The
presence of the traitor, Abgarus, in the camp of Crassus, became now of the
utmost importance to the Parthian commander. Abgarus, fully trusted by the
Romans, and at the head of a body of light horse, admirably adapted for
outpost service, was allowed, upon his own request, to scour the country in
front of the advancing legions, and had thus the means of communicating freely
with the Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the movements and
intentions of Crassus, while at the same time he suggested to Crassus such a
line of route as suited the views and designs of his adversary. Our chief
authority for the details of the expedition, Plutarch, tells us, that he led
the Roman troops through an arid and trackless desert, across plains without
tree, or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed of a light shifting
sand, which the wind raised into a succession of hillocks that resembled the
waves of an interminable sea. The soldiers, he says, fainted with the heat and
with the drought, while the audacious Osrhoenian scoffed at their complaints and reproaches, asking them whether they expected
to find the bordertract between Arabia and Assyria a
country of cool streams and shady groves, of baths and hostelries, like their
own delicious Campania. But our knowledge of the real geographical character of
the region through which the march lay makes it impossible for us to accept
this account as true. The country between the Euphrates and the Belik is one of
alternate hill and plain, neither destitute of trees, nor very ill-provided
with water. The march through it can have presented no very great difficulties.
All that Abgarus could do to serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce
Crassus to trust himself to the open country instead of clinging either to a
river or to the mountains; and, secondly, to bring him, after a hasty march,
and in the full heat of the day, into the presence of the enemy. Both these
things he contrived to effect; and Surenas was, no doubt, so far beholden to
him. But the notion that he enticed the Roman army into a trackless desert, and
gave it over, when it was perishing with weariness, hunger, and thirst, into
the hands of its enraged enemy, being in contradiction with the topographical
facts, must be regarded as a fiction of Roman apologists, and is one not even
consistently maintained by all the classical writers.
It was probably on the third or fourth day after he
had quitted the Euphrates that Crassus found himself approaching his enemy.
After a hasty and hot march he had approached the banks of the Belik, when his
scouts brought him word that they had fallen in with the Parthian army, which
was advancing in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarus had recently
quitted him on the pretence of doing him some
undefined service, but in reality to range himself on the side of his true
friends, the Parthians. His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon the
river, and defer an engagement till the morrow, but he had no fears ; his son,
Publius, a gallant officer formed in the school of Julius Caesar, was anxious
for the fray; and accordingly the Roman commander gave the order to his troops
to take some refreshment as they stood, and then to push forward rapidly.
Surenas, on his side, had taken up a position on wooded and hilly ground, which
concealed his numbers, and had even, we are told, made his troops cover their
arms with cloths and skins, that the glitter might not betray them. But, as the
Romans drew near, all concealment was cast aside ; the signal for battle was
given; the clang of the kettledrums sounded on every side; the squadrons came
forward in their brilliant array; and it seemed at first as if the heavy
cavalry was about to charge the Roman host, which was formed in a hollow
square, with the lightarmed in the middle, and with
supports of horse along the whole line, as well as upon the flanks. But, if
this intention was ever entertained, it was altered almost as soon as formed,
and the better plan was adopted of halting at a convenient distance, and
assailing the legionaries with flight after flight of arrows, delivered without
pause, and with extraordinary force. The Roman endeavoured to meet this attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers, but they were
quite unable to cope with the numbers and superior weapons of the enemy, who
forced them almost immediately to retreat, and take shelter behind the line of
the legionaries. These were once more exposed to the deadly missiles, which
pierced alike through shield and breastplate and greaves, and inflicted the
most fearful wounds. More than once the legionaries dashed forward and sought
to close with their assailants, but in vain. The Parthian squadrons retired as
the Roman infantry advanced, maintaining the distance which they thought best
between themselves and their foe, whom they plied with their shafts as
incessantly while they fell back as when they rode forward. For a while the
Romans maintained the hope that the missiles would at last be all spent, but
when they found that each archer constantly obtained a fresh supply of arrows
from the rear, this expectation deserted them. It became evident to Crassus
under these circumstances that some new movement must be attempted, and, as a
last resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom the Parthians were
threatening to outflank, to take such troops as he thought proper and charge.
The brave youth was only too glad to receive the order. Selecting the Celtic
cavalry which Caesar had sent with him from Gaul, who numbered a thousand, and
adding to them three hundred other horsemen, five hundred archers, and about
four thousand legionaries, he advanced at speed against the nearest squadrons
of the enemy. The Parthians pretended to be afraid, and beat a hasty retreat.
Publius followed with all the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out Of sight
of his friends, pressing the flying foe, whom he believed to be panic-stricken.
But when they had drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a stand,
brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, and completely enveloped him
and his detachment with their light-armed. Publius made a desperate resistance.
His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with their hands, and dragged the
encumbered horsemen to the ground; or, dismounting, slipped beneath the horses
of their opponents, and stabbing them in the belly brought steed and rider down
upon themselves. His legionaries occupied a slight hillock, and endeavoured to make a wall of their shields, but the Parthian
archers closed around them, and slew them almost to a man. Of the whole
detachment, nearly six thousand strong, no more than five hundred were taken
prisoners, and scarcely a man escaped. The young Crassus might possibly, had he
chosen to make the attempt, have forced his way through the enemy to Iehnae, a Greek town not far distant, but he preferred to
share the fate of his men. Rather than fall alive into the hands of the enemy,
he caused his shield-bearer to despatch him; and his
example was followed by his principal officers. The victors struck off his
head, and, elevating it on a pike, returned to resume their attack on the main
body of the Roman army.
The main army, much relieved by the diminution of the
pressure upon them, had waited patiently for Publius to return in triumph,
regarding the battle as well-nigh over, and success as certain. After a time
the prolonged absence of the young captain aroused suspicions, which grew into
alarm when messengers arrived telling of his extreme danger. Crassus, almost
beside himself with anxiety, had given the word to advance, and the army had
moved forward a short distance when the shouts of the returning enemy were
heard, and the head of the unfortunate Publius was seen displayed aloft, while
the Parthian squadrons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on their
remaining foes with increased vigour. The mailed
horsemen approached close to the legionaries and thrust at them with their long
pikes, which sometimes transfixed two men at once; while the light-armed,
galloping across the Roman front, discharged their unerring arrows over the
heads of their own men. The Romans could neither successfully defend themselves
nor effectively retaliate; they could neither break the ranks of the lancers,
nor reach the archers. Still time brought some relief. Bowstrings broke, spears
were blunted or splintered, arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax; and when night closed in both parties were almost equally
glad of the cessation of arms which the darkness rendered compulsory.
It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the
Persians, to bivouac at a considerable distance from an enemy for fear of a
night surprise. Accordingly, as evening closed in, they drew off, having first
shouted jeeringly to the Romans that they would grant the general one night in
which to bewail his son; on the morrow they would return and take him prisoner,
unless he should prefer the better course of surrendering himself to the mercy
of Arsaces. A short breathing-space was thus allowed the Romans, who took
advantage of it to retire towards Carrhae, leaving behind them the greater part
of their wounded, to the number of four thousand. A small body of horse under
the command of Egnatius reached Carrhae about midnight, and gave the commandant
such information as led him to put his men under arms and issue forth to the succour of the proconsul. The Parthians, though the cries
of the forsaken wounded made them well aware of the Roman retreat, adhered to
their system of avoiding night combats, and attempted no pursuit till daybreak.
Even then they allowed themselves to be delayed by comparatively trivial
matters—the capture of the Roman camp, the massacre of the wounded, and the
slaughter of the numerous stragglers scattered along the line of march—and made
no haste to overtake the retreating army. The bulk of the troops were thus
enabled to effect their retreat in safety to Carrhae, where, having the
protection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time, secure.
It might have been expected that the Romans would here
have made a stand. The siege of a fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if
we understand by siege anything more than a very incomplete blockade. And the
Parthians were notoriously inefficient against walls. There was a chance, moreover,
that Artavasdes might have been more successful than his ally, and, having
repulsed the Parthian monarch, might be on his way to bring relief to the
Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughly dispirited, and would not listen to
these suggestions. Provisions, no doubt, ran short, since; as there had been no
expectation of a disaster, no preparations had been made for standing a siege.
The Greek inhabitants of the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to
a falling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near, and the Parthian system of
abstaining from action during the night seemed to render escape tolerably easy.
It was resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to the protection of the walls,
to issue forth once more, and to endeavour by a rapid
night march to reach the Armenian hills. The various officers seem to have been
allowed to arrange matters each for himself. Cassius took his way towards the
Euphrates, and succeeded in escaping with five hundred horse. Octavius, with a
division which is estimated at five thousand men, reached the outskirts of the
hills at a place called Sinnaca, and found himself in
comparative security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made but poor progress
during the night; he had, however, arrived within little more than a mile of
Octavius before the enemy, who would not stir till daybreak, overtook him.
Pressed upon by their advancing squadrons, he, with his small band of two
thousand legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied a low hillock connected by a
ridge of rising ground with the position of Sinnaca.
Here the Parthian host beset him, and he would infallibly have been slain or
captured at once had not Octavius, deserting his place of safety, descended to
the aid of his commander. The united seven thousand held their own against the
enemy, having the advantage of the ground, and having, perhaps, by the
experience of some days, learnt the weak points of Parthian warfare.
Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure the
person of the Roman commander. In the East an excessive importance is attached
to this proof of success; and there were reasons which made Crassus
particularly obnoxious to his antagonists. He was believed to have originated,
and not merely conducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of gold. He
had refused with the utmost haughtiness all discussion of terms, and had
insulted the majesty of the Parthians by the declaration that he would treat
with them nowhere but at their capital. If he escaped, he would be bound at
some future time to repeat his attempt; if he were made a prisoner his fate
would be a terrible warning to others. But now, as evening approached, it
seemed to the Parthian that the prize which he so much desired was about to
elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia would be gained by the fugitives
during the night, and further pursuit of them would be futile. It remained that
he should effect by craft what he could no longer hope to obtain by the
employment of force; and to this point all his efforts were henceforth
directed. He drew off his troops and left the Romans without further
molestation. He allowed some of his prisoners to escape and rejoin, their
friends, having first contrived that they should overhear a conversation among
his men, of which the theme was the Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes
to come to terms with the Romans. He then, having allowed time for the report
of his pacific intentions to spread, rode with a few chiefs towards the Roman
camp, carrying his bow unstrung, and his right hand stretched out, in token of-
amity. “Let the Roman general,” he said, “come forward with an equal number of
attendants, and confer with me in the open space between the armies on terms of
peace.” The aged proconsul was disinclined to trust these overtures, but the
Roman soldiery, demoralised as it was, clamoured and threatened; upon which Crassus yielded, and
went down into the plain, accompanied by Octavius and a few others. Surenas
received the proconsul and his staff with apparent honour,
and terms were arranged; only, with just bitterness, the Parthian chief
required that they should be at once reduced to writing, “since,” he said, with
pointed allusion to the bad faith of Pompey, “you Romans are not very apt to
remember your engagements.” A movement being requisite for the purpose of
drawing up the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers were induced to
mount upon horses furnished by the Parthians, who had no sooner seated the proconsul
on his steed than they proceeded to hurry him forward, with the evident
intention of carrying him off to their camp. The Roman officers took the alarm
and resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian, and killed one of the
grooms who were hurrying Crassus away. A blow from behind stretched him on the
ground lifeless. A general melee followed, and in the confusion Crassus was
killed, whether by one of his own side and with his own consent, or by the hand
of a Parthian, is uncertain. The army, learning the fate of their commander,
with but few exceptions, surrendered. Such as sought to escape under cover of
the approaching night were hunted down by the Bedouins, who served under the
Parthian standard, and killed almost to a man. Of the entire force which had
crossed the Euphrates, consisting of above forty thousand men, not more than a
fourth returned. One half of the whole number perished. Nearly ten thousand
prisoners were settled by the victors near the extreme east of their empire in
the fertile oasis of Margiana (Merv) as bondsmen,
compelled after the Parthian fashion to render military service. Here they
intermarried with native wives, and became submissive Parthian subjects.
Such was the result of this great expedition, the
first attempt of the grasping and ambitious Romans, not so much to conquer
Parthia, as to strike terror into the heart of her people, and to degrade them
to the condition of obsequious dependants on the will
and pleasure of the “world’s lords.” The expedition failed so utterly, not from
any want of bravery on the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from any
absolute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman tactics, but partly from
the incompetence of the commander, partly from the inexperience of the Romans
up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian warfare, and from their
consequent ignorance of the best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose
main arm is the cavalry with a body of foot soldiers, supported by an insignificant
number of horse, must be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct such an
attack on the more open part of the country, where cavalry could operate
freely, was wantonly to aggravate the peril. After the first disaster, to quit the
protection of walls, when it had once been obtained, was a piece of reckless
folly. Had Crassus taken care to get the support of some of the desert tribes,
if Armenia could not or would not help him, and had he then advanced, either by
the way of the Mons. Masius and the Tigris, or along the line of the Euphrates,
the issue of his attack might have been different. He might have fought his way
to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Septimius Severus, and might have taken and plundered those
cities. He would, no doubt, have experienced difficulties in his retreat; but
he might have come off no worse than Trajan, whose Parthian expedition has been
generally regarded as rather a feather in his cap, and as augmenting rather
than detracting from his reputation. But an ignorant and inexperienced
commander, venturing on a trial of arms with an enemy of whom he knew little or
nothing, in their own country, without supports or allies, and then neglecting
every precaution suggested by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by
a pretended friend, and marching straight into a net prepared for him,
naturally suffered defeat. The credit of the Roman arms does not greatly suffer
by the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly enhanced. The latter
showed, as they had shown in their wars against the Syro-Macedonians,
that their somewhat loose and irregular army was capable of acting with effect
against the solid masses and well-ordered movements of the best disciplined
troops. They acquired by their use of the bow a fame like that which the
English bowmen obtained at Crecy and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans
to respect them, and to allow that there was at least one nation in the world
which could meet them on equal terms and not be worsted in the encounter. They
henceforth obtained recognition from the Greco-Roman writers—albeit a grudging
and covert recognition—as the Second Power in the world, the admitted rival of
Rome, the only real counterpoise upon the earth to the mighty empire which
ruled from the banks of the Euphrates to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean.
While the general of King Orodes was thus completely
successful against the Romans in Mesopotamia, the king himself had in Armenia
obtained advantages of almost equal importance, though of a different kind.
Instead of waging an internecine war with Artavasdes, he had come to terms with
him, and, having concluded a close alliance, had set himself to confirm and
cement it by uniting his son, Pacorus, in marriage with the sister of the royal
Armenian. A series of festivities was in course of being held, to celebrate the
auspicious event, when news arrived of the triumph of Surenas and the fate of
Crassus. According to the barbarous customs at all times prevalent in the East,
the head and hand of the slain proconsul accompanied the intelligence. We are
told that, at the moment of the messengers’ arrival the two sovereigns, with
their attendants, were being amused by a dramatic entertainment. Strolling
companies of Greek players were at this time frequent in the East, where they
were sure of patronage in the many Greek cities, and might sometimes find an
appreciative audience among the natives. Artavasdes, as the master of the
revels, had engaged such a company, since both he and Orodes had a good
knowledge of the Greek literature and language, in which he had himself
composed both historical works and tragedies. The performance had begun, and it
happened, that, when the messengers arrived, the actors were engaged in the
representation of the famous scene in the “Bacchae” of Euripides, where Agave
and the Bacchanals come upon the stage with the mutilated remains of the
murdered Pentheus. The head of Crassus was thrown to them; and instantly the
player who personated Agave seized the bloody trophy, and placing it on his
thyrsus in lieu of the one that he was carrying, paraded it before the
delighted spectators, while he chanted the well- known lines—
“ From the mountain to the hall
New-cut tendril, see, we bring —
Blessed prey! ”
The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please
an Eastern audience; loud and prolonged plaudits, we may be sure, rang out; and
the entire assemblage felt a keen satisfaction in the performance. It was
followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity, and still more thoroughly
Oriental. The Parthians, in derision of the motive which was supposed to have
led Crassus to make his attack, had a quantity of gold melted and poured it
into his mouth.
Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious troops,
and seeking to annoy the disaffected Seleucians by
the exhibition of a farcical ceremony. He spread the report that Crassus was
not killed but captured; and selecting from among the prisoners the Roman most
like him in appearance, he dressed the man in woman’s clothes, mounted him upon
a horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of “Crassus” and “Imperator,”
conducted him in triumph to the Grecian city. Before him went, mounted on
camels, a band arrayed as trumpeters and lictors, the lictors’ rods having
purses suspended to them, and the axes in their midst being crowned with the
bleeding heads of Romans. In the rear followed a train of Seleucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of the effeminacy and cowardice of the
proconsul. After this pretended parade of his prisoner through the streets of
the town, Surenas called a meeting of the Seleucian senate, and indignantly denounced to them the indecency of the literature which
he had found in the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true; but the Seleucians were not greatly impressed by the moral lesson
read to them, when they remarked the train of concubines that had accompanied
Surenas himself to the field, and thought further of the loose crowd of
dancers, singers, and prostitutes, that was commonly to be seen in the rear of
a Parthian army.
It might have been expected that the terrible disaster
which had befallen the Roman arms, and the vast triumph which the Parthians had
achieved for themselves, would have had extraordinary and far- reaching
consequences. No one could have been surprised if the result had been to shake
the very foundations of the Roman power in the East, or even to restore to Asia
that aggressive attitude towards the rest of the world, which she had held four
hundred and fifty years earlier. But the commotion and change produced was far
less than might have been anticipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered by
the Parthians to its extremest limit, the Euphrates;
and Armenia was lost to the Roman alliance, and thrown for the time into
complete dependence upon Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited;
and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently aggrieved by the
unprovoked spoliation of their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms. But no general
movement of the Oriental races took place. It might have been supposed that the
Syrians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic
peoples whose proclivities were altogether Oriental, would have seized the
opportunity of rising against their Western lords and driving the Romans ’ back
upon Europe. It might have been thought that Parthia at least would have
immediately assumed the offensive in force, and have made a determined effort
to rid herself of neighbours who had proved so troublesome. But though the
conjuncture of circumstances was most favourable—though
not only was Rome paralysed in the East, but was also
on the point of civil war in the West—yet the man was wanting. Had Mithridates
of Pontus or Tigranes of Armenia been living, or had Surenas been king of
Parthia instead of a mere general, advantage would probably have been taken of
the occasion, and Rome might have suffered seriously. But Orodes seems to have
been neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful as a
commander; he lacked at any rate the keen and all-embracing glance which could
sweep the political horizon, and, comprehending the exact character of the
situation, see at the same time how to make the most of it. He allowed the
opportunity to slip by without hastening to put forth his full strength, or
indeed making any considerable effort; and the occasion once lost was sure
never to return.
If there was a man living at the time who might
possibly have taken full advantage of the situation, and forced Rome to pay the
deserved penalty of her rashness and aggressiveness, it was Surenas. But that
chief had lost the favour of his sovereign. There are
services which, in the East, it is not safe for a subject to render to the head
of the state, and Surenas had exceeded the proper measure. The jealousy of
Orodes was aroused by the success and reputation of his general; and it was not
long before he found an excuse for handing him over to the executioner. Parthia
was thus left without any commander of approved merit, for Sillaces,
the second in command during the war with Crassus, had in no way distinguished
himself in the course of it. This condition of things may account for the
feebleness of the efforts made, in the years B.C. 53 and 52, to retaliate on
the Romans the damage done by their invasion. A few weak flying bands only
crossed the Euphrates, and began the work of plunder and ravage, in which they
were speedily disturbed by Cassius, who easily drove them back across the
river. Rome should have taken advantage of the interval to strengthen her
forces in these parts, and secure the inviolability of her frontier; but those
who were at the head of the Roman State, knowing civil war to be imminent,
declined to detach troops from their own party standards for the advantage of
the national cause.
Hence, when, in BC 51, Orodes had made up his mind to
attempt a blow, and a great Parthian army under the young prince, Pacorus, and
an officer of ripe age and experience, by name Osaces,
appeared on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, there were no means of resisting
them. Cassius had done his best to unite and reorganise the broken remnants of the army of Crassus, which he had formed into two weak legions;
but no reinforcements had reached him, and he did not feel justified in taking
the open field with his small force, much less in giving battle to the enemy.
The Parthians therefore crossed the Euphrates unopposed, and swarmed into the
rich Syrian territory. The walled towns shut their gates, and maintained
themselves; but the open country was everywhere overrun: and a thrill of
mingled alarm and excitement passed through all the Roman provinces in Asia.
These provinces were at the time most inadequately supplied with Roman troops,
owing to the impending civil war in Italy. The natives were for the most part
disaffected, and inclined to hail the Parthians as brethren and deliverers.
Excepting Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, Rome had, as
Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) plaintively declared, not a friend on the
Asiatic continent. And Cappadocia was miserably weak, and open to attack on the
side of Armenia. Had Orodes and Artavasdes acted in concert, and had the
latter, while Orodes sent his armies into Syria, poured the Armenian forces
into Cappadocia and then into Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do),
there would have been the greatest danger to the Roman possessions. As it was,
the excitement in Asia Minor was extreme. Cicero marched into Cappadocia with
the bulk of his Roman troops, and summoned to his aid Deiotarus with his
Galatians, at the same time writing to the Roman Senate to implore
reinforcements. Cassius shut himself up in Antioch, and allowed the Parthian
cavalry to pass him by, and even to proceed beyond the bounds of Syria into
Cilicia. But the Parthians seem scarcely to have understood the straits of
their adversaries or to have been aware of their own advantages. Probably their
“information department” was ill organised. Instead
of spreading themselves wide, raising the natives, and leaving them to blockade
the towns, while with their as yet unconquered squadrons they defied the enemy
in the open country, we find them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities,
for which they were totally unfit, and confining themselves almost entirely to
the narrow valley of the Orontes. Under these circumstances we are not
surprised to learn that Cassius, having first beaten them back from Antioch,
contrived to lead them into an ambush on the banks of the river, and severely
handled their troops, even killing the general, Osaces.
The Parthians withdrew from the neighbourhood of the
Syrian capital after this defeat, which must have taken place about the end of
September, and soon after went into winter quarters in Cyrrhestica,
or the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. Here they remained quietly
during the winter months under Prince Pacorus, and it was expected that the war
would break out again with fresh fury in the spring; but Bibulus, the new
proconsul of Syria— “as wretched a general as he was an incapable statesman”—conscious
of his military deficiencies, contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians
themselves and to turn the thoughts of Pacorus in another direction. He
suggested to Ornodapantes, a Parthian noble, with
whom he had managed to open a correspondence, that Paqorus would be a more worthy occupant of the throne of the Arsacidae than his father, and that he would consult well for his own interests, if he
were to proclaim the young prince as king, and lead the army of Syria against
Orodes. Pacorus had already been associated in the government by his father,
and his name appears on some of his father’s later coins; but this, while
stimulating, did not satisfy his ambition. He appears to have lent a ready ear
to the whispers of Ornodapantes, and to have been on
the verge, if he did not even overstep the verge, of rebellion. There are
Parthian coins bearing the head of a beardless youth, and the exact set of
titles that had become fashionable under Orodes, which are with ample reason
assigned to this prince, and which must have been struck to be put in
circulation when his revolt was declared. But the plot was nipped in the bud.
Orodes, learning the designs cherished by Pacorus, summoned him to his Court;
and, the plans laid down not being yet ripe for execution, he felt that there
was no other course open to him but to obey. The Parthian squadrons seem to
have recrossed the Euphrates, in July, BC 50. The danger to Rome was past; but
the stain was not wiped out from the shield of Roman honour,
nor was the reputation of Rome restored in the East. The “First Roman War ”
ended, after a period of a little more than four years, with the advantage
wholly on the side of Parthia, both in respect of glory and of material gain.
The laurels lost by Rome at Carrhae had never been recovered, and the
acquisition of Armenia by Parthia was a substantial increase of strength.
SECOND WAR OF PARTHIA WITH ROME—PARTHIAN INVASION OF
SYRIA, PALESTINE, AND ASIA MINOR.
The end of the first war of Parthia with Rome synchronised nearly with the breaking out of the civil
contest between Caesar and Pompey. In this struggle the sympathies of Parthia
were on the Pompeian side. Though Pompey had certainly not given the Parthians
much reason for regarding him with favour, since he
had openly and flagrantly broken the terms of his treaty of alliance with them,
yet on the whole they seem certainly to have preferred his cause to that of his
great adversary. Perhaps they viewed Caesar as more bound in honour than Pompey to seek revenge for the death of
Crassus, since he had sent a favourite officer, with
a contingent of troops, to his aid, or possibly they may simply have felt more
fear of his military. capacity. Communications certainly took place between
Orodes and Pompey in the course of the year BC 49 or 48, and the terms of an
alliance were discussed between them. Pompey, who was not very scrupulous, or
really patriotic, made the overtures, and desired to know on what terms the
Parthian monarch would lend him effective aid in the war which was on the point
of breaking out. The reply of Orodes was to the following effect: “If the Roman
leader would deliver into his hands the province of Syria, and make it wholly
over to the Parthians, Orodes was willing to conclude an alliance with him and
send him help; but not otherwise.” It is to the credit of Pompey that he
rejected these terms, and, while not above contemplating a foreign alliance
against a domestic foe, was unwilling to purchase the assistance to himself at
a cost that would have inflicted a serious injury on his country. The rupture
of the negotiations produced an estrangement between the negotiators, and
Orodes went so far as to throw Hirrus, the envoy of
Pompey, into prison, as a means of giving vent to his disappointment. Still,
however, Pompey looked upon Orodes as a friend; and when, a few months later,
he had fought his great fight, and suffered his great defeat, at Pharsalus
(August 9, BC 48), his thoughts reverted to the powerful Parthian king, and he
entertained for some time the idea of taking refuge at the Court of Ctesiphon.
It is even said that he only relinquished the design, and made his disastrous
choice of Egypt as a refuge, when, on the receipt of intelligence that Antioch
had declared for his rival, he understood that the route to the Parthian
capital was no longer open to him. Otherwise, notwithstanding the persuasions
of his friends, who thought the risk too great, both for himself and his wife,
Cornelia, to be run with prudence, the world might have seen the spectacle of a
second Coriolanus, thundering at the gates of Rome and demanding recall and
reinstatement, at the head of legions recruited in a foreign land and furnished
by a foreign enemy. As it was, Roman history was spared this scandal; and at
the same time Orodes was spared the awkwardness and difficulty of having to
elect between repulsing a suppliant, and provoking the hostility of the most
powerful chieftain and the greatest general of the age.
The year BC 47 saw Caesar in Syria and Asia Minor,
whither he was drawn by the necessity of crushing the mad schemes of Pharnaces,
son of Mithridates of Pontus, who thought he saw in the internal quarrels of
the Romans an opportunity of re-establishing his father’s empire. After the
facile victory of Zela, the Great Roman can scarcely have avoided debating with
himself the question, whether he should at once turn his arms against his only
other Asiatic enemy, and by a movement as rapid as that which had crushed Pharnaces,
strike a blow against Orodes, and so avenge the defeat of Carrhae. But, if the
idea crossed his mind, he dismissed it. The time was not suitable. Too much
remained to be done in Africa, in Spain, and at home, for so large a matter as
a Parthian War to be, for the moment, taken in hand. Caesar resolutely averted
his gaze from the far East, and deferring the “revenge” to a comparatively
remote date, kept whatever projects he may have entertained on the subject to
himself, and was careful, while he remained in Asia, to avoid provoking or
exasperating by threats or hostile movements, the Power on which the peace of
the East principally depended. It was not until he had brought the African and
Spanish wars to an end that he allowed his intention of leading an expedition
against Parthia to be openly talked about. In BC 44, four years after
Pharsalus, having put down all his domestic enemies, and arranged matters, as
he thought, satisfactorily at Rome, he let a decree be passed, formally
assigning to him the Parthian War, and sent the legions across the Adriatic on
their way to Asia. What plan of campaign he may have contemplated is uncertain.
One writer represents him as intending to enter Parthia by way of the Lesser
Armenia, and to proceed cautiously to try the strength of the Parthians before
engaging them in a battle. Another credits him with a plan for rapidly
overrunning Parthia, and then proceeding by the way of the Caspian into
Scythia, from Scythia invading Germany, and after conquering Germany returning
into Italy by the way of Gaul! But neither author is likely to have had any
trustworthy authority for his statement. The Great Dictator would not be likely
to have formed any definite scheme ; he would have felt the need of being
guided by circumstances. Still, there can be no doubt that an expedition under
his auspices would have constituted a most serious danger to Parthia, and might
have terminated in her subjection to Rome. The military talents of Julius were
of the most splendid description; his powers of organisation and consolidation enormous; his prudence and caution equal to his ambition and
courage. Once launched on a career of conquest in the East, it is impossible to
say whither he might not have carried the Roman eagles, or what countries he
might not have added to the empire. But Parthia was saved from the imminent
peril without any effort of her own. The daggers of the “Liberators” struck
down on the 15th of March, BC 44, the only man whom she had seriously to fear;
and with the removal of Julius passed away even from Roman thought for many a
year the design which he had entertained, and which he alone could have
accomplished.
In the civil war which followed on the murder of
Julius, the Parthians appear to have actually taken a part. The East fell into
confusion on the withdrawal of Julius after Zela, and in the course of the
troubles a Parthian contingent was sent to the aid of a certain Caecilius
Bassus, a Pompeian adherent, who was seeking to obtain for himself something
like an independent principality in Syria. The soldiers of Bassus, after a
while (BC 43), went over in a body to Cassius, who was in the East collecting
troops for his great struggle with Antony and Octavian; and thus a handful of
Parthians came into the power of the second among the “Liberators.” Of this
accidental circumstance he determined to take advantage, in order to obtain, if
possible, a considerable body of troops from Orodes. He therefore presented
each of the Parthian soldiers with a sum of money for their immediate wants, and
dismissed them graciously to their homes, at the same time seizing the
opportunity to send some of his own officers as ambassadors to Orodes, with a
request for substantial aid. On receiving this application, the Parthian
monarch seems to have come to the conclusion that it would be a wise policy to
comply with it. It was for the interest of Parthia that the Roman arms, instead
of being directed to Asiatic conquests, should be engaged for as long a time as
possible in intestine strife; and Orodes might well conceive that he was
promoting his own advantage by fomenting and encouraging the quarrels which, at
any rate for the time, secured his own empire from attack. He may have hoped
also to obtain some equivalent in territory from the gratitude of Cassius at
some future period, since Cassius was at the time Proconsul of Syria, and, if
successful against Octavian and Antony, might be expected to choose the East
for his province and to make a fresh arrangement of it. At any rate, he complied
with Cassius’s request, and sent him a body of Parthian horse, which were among
the troops engaged at Philippi.
The crushing defeat suffered by the “Liberators”
(November, BC 42) was an immediate disappointment to Orodes, but, as instead of
producing a pacification of the Roman world, it only intensified the strife and
general confusion, it cannot be said to have worked disadvantageously for his
interests. He himself, at any rate, judged otherwise. The Roman world seemed to
him more divided against itself than ever; and the “self-wrought ruin,” which
Horace prophesied, seemed absolutely impending. Three rivals held divided sway
in the corrupted State, each of them jealous of the other two, and anxious for
his own aggrandisement. The two chief pretenders to
the first place were bitterly hostile; and while the one was detained in Italy
by insurrection against his authority, the other was plunged in luxury and dissipation,
enjoying the first transports of a lawless passion, at the Egyptian capital.
The nations of the East were, moreover, alienated by the exactions of the
profligate Triumvir, who, to reward his parasites and favourites,
had laid upon them a burden that it was scarcely possible for them to bear. The
condition of things generally seemed to invite a foreign power to step in,
and, taking the opportunity offered by Rome’s weakness, seriously to cripple
her power.
Parthia enjoyed also at the time the rare good fortune
of having at her disposal the services of a Roman general. Quintus Labienus,
the son of Titus, Caesar’s legate in Gaul, who had gone over to the Pompeians,
having been sent as envoy to Orodes by Brutus and Cassius a little before
Philippi, had, on learning the severities of the Triumvirs, elected to make
Parthia his home, and had taken service under the Parthian banner. Though not
an officer of much distinction among his countrymen, he had the advantage of
knowing the weak points of their military system ; and it might well seem to
Orodes, that the occasion which thus offered itself ought to be utilised.
Under these circumstances, the Parthian monarch, who
had never accepted the failure of Pacorus in BC 52-50 as final, made
preparations during the winter of 41-40, for a fresh attack upon the Roman
territory. Having collected an imposing force from all parts of his dominions,
he placed it under the joint command of his son, Pacorus, and the Roman
refugee, Q. Labienus, and sent it across the Euphrates with the first blush of
spring, while Antony was still occupied with his Egyptian dalliance, and
Octavius, having at last captured Perusia, was
applying himself to the pacification of Italy. Antony might perhaps have
exchanged the soft delights of Cleopatra’s Court for the perils of a Parthian
campaign, since when roused to action by what seemed to him a sufficient
motive, he had all the instincts of a soldier; but it happened that, just at
the time, messengers reached him from his brother Lucius, imploring him to
hasten to the West, and arrest before it was too late the victorious progress
of Octavius. With one regretful glance in the direction of Syria, the
self-seeking Triumvir sailed away from Alexandria to Italy, leaving the care of
Roman interests in the East to the incompetent hands of his lieutenant, Decidius Saxa, who had already alienated the affections of
the provincials by his exactions, and was about to lose their respect by his
incapacity. The Parthian hordes, thus weakly opposed, burst into Syria with
irresistible force, rapidly overran the open country between the Euphrates and
Antioch, and entering the rich valley of the Orontes, threatened the great
seats of Hellenic civilisation in these parts,
Antioch, Apameia, and Epiphaneia.
From Apameia, situated (like Durham) on a rocky
peninsula almost surrounded by the river, they were at first repulsed; but,
having shortly afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa and
his legions in the open fields, they received the submission of Apameia and Antioch, which latter city Saxa abandoned at
their approach, flying precipitately into Cilicia.
Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and Pacorus
agreed to divide their troops, and to engage simultaneously in two great
expeditions. Pacorus undertook to carry the Parthian standard throughout the
entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine, while Labienus took upon
himself to invade Asia Minor, and see if he could not wrest some of its more
fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditions were crowned with
extraordinary success. Pacorus reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia, except the
single city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want of a naval force.
He then advanced into Palestine, which he found in its normal condition of
intestine commotion. Hyrcanus and Antigonus, two princes of the Asmonaean house, uncle and nephew, were rivals for the
Jewish crown; and the latter, whom Hyrcanus had driven into exile, was content
to make common cause with the invader, and to be indebted to a rude foreigner
for the possession of the kingdom whereto he aspired. He offered Pacorus a
thousand talents—nearly a quarter of a million of our money—and five hundred
Jewish women, if he would espouse his cause, and seat him upon his uncle’s
throne. The offer was readily embraced, and by the irresistible help of the
Parthians a revolution was effected at Jerusalem. Hyrcanus was deposed and
mutilated. A new priest-king was set up in the person of Antigonus, the last Asmonaean prince, who reigned at Jerusalem for three years—40-37—as
a Parthian satrap or vitaxa, the creature and dependant of the great monarchy on the further side of the
Euphrates.
Meanwhile, in Asia Minor, Labienus carried all before
him. Decidius Saxa, having once more (in Cicilia)
ventured upon a battle, was not only defeated, but slain. Pamphylia, Lycia, and
Caria—the whole south coast—were overrun. Stratonicea was besieged; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken.
According to some writers, the Parthians even pillaged Lydia and Ionia, and
were in possession of Asia Minor to the shores of the Hellespont. It may be
said that for a full year Western Asia changed masters: the rule and authority
of Rome disappeared; and the Parthians were recognised as the dominant power. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising
that Labienus lost his head ; that he affected the style and title of “Imperator;”
struck coins, and placed his own head and name on them, and even added the
ridiculous title “Parthicus” which to a Roman ear
meant “Conqueror of the Parthians”—a title of honour whereto he had no possible claim.
But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the
autumn of BC 39, Antony, having patched up his quarrel with Octavius and set
out from Italy to resume his command in the East, sent his lieutenant, Publius
Ventidius, into Asia, with orders to act against Labienus, and the triumphant
Parthians. Ventidius landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia Minor, and so
alarmed Labienus, who happened to have no Parthian troops with him, that the
latter fell back hurriedly towards Cilicia, evacuating all the more western
provinces, and at the same time sending urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succour. Pacorus despatched a
strong body of cavalry to his aid; but these troops, instead of putting
themselves under his command, had the folly to act independently, and the
result was, that, in a rash attempt to surprise the Roman camp, they were
defeated by Ventidius, whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, leaving
Labienus to his fate. The self-styled “Imperator,” upon this, deserted his men
and sought safety in flight; but his retreat was soon discovered; and he was
pursued, captured, and put to death.
Meanwhile, the Parthians under Pacorus, alarmed at the
turn which affairs had taken in Asia Minor, left Antigonus, the Asmonaean prince, to manage their interests in Palestine,
and concentrated themselves in Northern Syria and Commagene, where they awaited
the approach of the Romans. A strong detachment, under a general named Pharnapates, was appointed to guard the “Syrian Gates,” a
narrow pass over Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria. Here Ventidius
gained another victory. He had sent forward an officer called Pompaedius Silo with some cavalry to endeavour to seize this post, and Pompaedius had found himself
compelled to an engagement with Pharnapates, in which
he was on the point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, who had
probably feared for his subordinate’s safety, appeared on the scene, and turned
the scale in favour of the Romans. The detachment
under Pharnapates was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was among the slain. When news of this
defeat reached Pacorus, he thought it prudent to retreat, and accordingly
withdrew his troops across the Euphrates. This movement he appears to have
executed without being molested by Ventidius. who thus recovered Syria to the
Romans towards the close of BC 39, or early in BC 38.
But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish the
contest He had made himself popular among the Syrians by his mild and just
administration, and knew that they preferred his government to that of the
Romans. He had many allies among the petty princes and dynasts, who occupied a
semi-independent position on the borders of the Parthian and Roman empires, as,
for example, Antiochus, King of Commagene; Lysanias, tetrarch of Ituraea;
Malchus, sheikh of the Nabataean Arabs, and others. Moreover, Antigonus, whom
he had established as king of the Jews, still maintained himself in Judaea
against the efforts of Herod, to whom Octavius and Antony had assigned the
throne. Pacorus therefore arranged during the remainder of the winter for a
fresh invasion of Syria in the spring, and, taking the field earlier than his
adversary expected, made ready to recross the Euphrates. We are told that, if
he had crossed at the usual point, he would have come upon the Romans quite
unprepared, the legions being still in their winter quarters, some of them
north and some south of the great mountain range of Taurus. Ventidius, however,
contrived by a stratagem to induce him to effect his passage at a different
point, considerably lower down the stream, and in this way to waste some
valuable time, which he himself employed in collecting his scattered forces.
Thus, when the Parthians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, the
Roman general was prepared to engage them, and was not even loth to decide the
fate of the war by a single battle. He had taken care to provide himself with a
strong force of slingers, and had entrenched himself in a position on high
ground at some distance from the river. The Parthians, finding their passage of
the Euphrates unopposed, and, when they fell in with the enemy, seeing him
entrenched, as though resolved to act only on the defensive, became over bold;
they thought the force opposed to them must distrust its own strength, or its
own fighting capacity, and would be likely to yield its position without a
blow, if suddenly and vigorously attacked. Accordingly, as on a former
occasion, they charged up the hill on which the Roman camp was placed, hoping,
like the Boers at Majuba, to take it by mere audacity. But the troops in the
camp were held ready, and at the proper moment issued forth; the assailants
found themselves in their turn assailed, and, fighting at a disadvantage on the
slope, were soon driven down the declivity. The battle was continued in the
plain below, where the mail-clad horse of the Asiatics made a brave and prolonged resistance; but the slingers galled them severely,
and in the midst of the struggle it happened by ill fortune that Pacorus was
slain. The result followed which is almost invariable in the case of an
Oriental army; having lost their leader, the soldiers almost everywhere gave
way; flight became universal, and the Romans gained a complete victory. The
Parthian army fled in two directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by
which it had crossed the Euphrates, but was intercepted by the enemy and
destroyed. Part turned northwards into Commagene, and there took refuge with
the king, Antiochus, who refused to surrender them to the demand of Ventidius,
and no doubt allowed them to return to their own country. It was said that this
final encounter took place on the anniversary of the great disaster of Carrhae,
and Rome flattered herself that she had at last retrieved that disgrace, having
compensated for the loss of her own legions by the destruction of a Royal
Parthian army, and having by the death of the associated monarch, Pacorus, more
than avenged the slaughter of Crassus.
Thus terminated, the great Parthian invasion of Syria
under Labienus and Pacorus; and with it terminated the prospect of any further
spread of the Arsacid dominion towards the West. When the two great
world-powers, Rome and Parthia, first came into collision, when the hard blow
struck by the latter in the annihilation of the army of Crassus was followed up
by the advance of their clouds of horse into Syria, Palestine, and Asia
Minor—when Apameia, Antioch, and Jerusalem fell into
their hands, when Decidius Saxa was defeated and
slain—Cilicia, Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria occupied, Lydia and Ionia ravaged—it
seemed as if Rome had met, not so much an equal, as a superior; it looked as if
the power hitherto predominant would be compelled to draw back and retreat,
while the new power, Parthia, would make a long step in advance, and push her
frontier to the Aegean and the Mediterranean. The history of the contest
between the East and West, between Asia and Europe, is a history of reactions.
At one time one of the two continents, at another time the other, is in the
ascendant The time appeared to have come when the Asiatics were once more to recover their own, and to beat back the European aggressor to
his proper shores and islands. The triumphs achieved by the Seljukian Turks
between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries would in that case have been
anticipated by above a thousand years through the efforts of a kindred and not
dissimilar people. But it turned out that the effort now made was premature.
While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted for the national defence on
the broad plains of inner Asia, it was ill suited for conquest, and,
comparatively speaking, ineffective in more contracted and difficult regions.
The Parthian military system had not the elasticity of the Roman—it did not in
the same way adapt itself to circumstances, or admit of the addition of new
arms, or the indefinite expansion of an old one. However loose and seemingly
flexible, it was rigid in its uniformity; it never altered; it remained under
the thirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under the first, improved in details
perhaps, but essentially the same system. The Romans, on the contrary, were
always modifying and improving their system, always learning new combinations,
or new manoeuvres, or new modes of warfare, from their enemies. They met the
Parthian tactics of loose array, continuous distant missiles, and almost
exclusive employment of cavalry, with an increase in the number of their own
horse, a larger employment of auxiliary irregulars, and a greater use of the
sling. At the same time they learnt to take full advantage of the Parthian
inefficiency against walls, and to practise against them
the arts of pretended retreat and ambush. The result was that Parthia found she
could make no serious impression upon the dominions of Rome, and having become
persuaded of this by the experience of a decade of years, thenceforth laid
aside for ever the dream of Western conquest. She took up, in fact, from this
time a new attitude. Hitherto she had been consistently aggressive. She had laboured constantly to extend herself at the expense of the
Bactrians, the Scythians, the Syro-Macedonians, and
the Armenians. She had proceeded, like Rome, from one aggression to another,
leaving only short intervals between her wars, and had always been looking out
for some fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, comparatively speaking, pacific.
She was content, for the most part, to maintain her limits. She sought no new
foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated, in the main, into a struggle for
influence over the border kingdom of Armenia; and her hopes were limited to the
reduction of that kingdom to a subject position.
The grief of Orodes at the death of Pacorus was
something extreme and abnormal, even in the emotional East. For many days he
would neither eat, nor speak, nor sleep; then his sorrow took another turn. He
imagined that his son had returned; he thought continually that he heard or saw
him; he could do nothing but repeat his name. Every now and then, however, he
awoke to a sense of the actual fact, and mourned the death of his favourite with tears. After a while this excessive grief
wore itself out; and the aged king began to direct his attention once more to
public affairs, and to concern himself about the succession. Of the thirty sons
who still remained to him there was not one who had made himself a name, or was
in any way distinguished above the remainder. In the absence, therefore, of any
personal ground of preference, Orodes—who seems to have regarded himself as
possessing a right to nominate the son who should succeed him—thought that the
claims of primogeniture were entitled to be considered, and selected as his
successor, Phraates, the eldest of the thirty. Not content, however, with
nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether the nomination would be accepted by
the Megistanes, he proceeded further to abdicate in
his favour, whereupon Phraates became actual king.
The transaction proved a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of his
brothers, who were the sons of a princess married to Orodes, whereas his own
mother was only a concubine, removed them by assassination, and when the
ex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the act, added the crime of
parricide to that of fratricide by putting to death his aged father. Thus
perished Orodes, son of Phraates, the thirteenth Arsacid, after a reign of
eighteen or twenty years—the most memorable in the Parthian annals. Though
scarcely a great king, he carried Parthia to the highest pitch of her glory,
less however by his own personal merits, than by his judicious selection of
able officers for the command of his armies. Exceedingly ambitious, he allowed
.no scruples to interfere with his personal aggrandisement,
but, having waded to power through the blood of a father and a brother,
maintained himself in power by the sacrifice of his foremost subject.
His affection for his son Pacorus is the most amiable
trait in his character, and redeems it from the charge, to which it would
otherwise be liable, of a complete defect of humanity. Even here, however, he
showed a want of balance and moderation; and, by allowing his mind to become
unhinged, brought disaster on himself, and on those dearest to him. It may have
been a just Nemesis, that he should die at the hands of one of his sons, but it
seems hard that affection for one son should have put him altogether in the
power of another.
EXPEDITION OF MARK ANTONY AGAINST PARTHIA —ITS
FAILURE—WAR BETWEEN PARTHIA AND MEDIA.
Phraates, the son of Orodes, who is generally known as
Phraates the Fourth, ascended the Parthian throne in the year BC 37. The Roman
world was still in the throes of revolution. A mock peace had indeed been
patched up between the irreconcilable rivals, Octavian and Antony, in the year
BC 40, by the sacrifice of “the fair, the modest, and the discreet Octavia”—“that
marvel of a woman,” as Plutarch calls her—to the short-lived passion of the
coarse Triumvir; but dissension had quickly broken out—the bride and bridegroom
had quarrelled—and, before the year BC 37 was over,
had parted, never to come together again. Antony and Octavian were once more
acknowledged enemies, and felt it necessary to place half the world between
them in order that they might not at once come to blows. Antony betook himself
to the eastern portion of the Roman Empire, and renewed his dalliance with his
Egyptian mistress. Octavian remained in Italy, launching recriminations against
his rival, and preparing for the deadly struggle which, he well knew, impended.
Phraates probably thought himself safe from attack under the circumstances, and
felt himself free to indulge his natural temperament, which was cruel, jealous,
and bloodthirsty. Not content with having brushed from his path the brothers
whose title to the throne was better than his, he proceeded to make a clean
sweep, and killed the remainder of the thirty. Nor was this all. From the
massacre of his own relations, he passed to executions of Parthian nobles who
had provoked his jealousy, and at last created such a panic among them, that
numbers of them fled the country, and taking refuge in the territory west of
the Euphrates, filled the camps and cities of the Roman provinces. Among these
fugitives was a certain Monaeses, a nobleman of high
distinction, who appears to have gained more than one military success in the
Syrian war of Pacorus. This officer represented to Antony that Phraates had by
his tyrannical and sanguinary conduct made himself detested by his subjects,
and that a revolt on the part of large numbers could easily be effected. “If
the Romans would support him,” he said, “he was quite willing to
invade Parthia, and he made no doubt of wresting the
greater portion of it from the hands of the tyrant, and of being himself
accepted as king. In that case, he would consent to hold his crown of the
Romans, as their dependant and feudatory; and they
might count on his fidelity and gratitude.” Antony received Monaeses with ostentatious generosity, and, affecting the munifi- ence of an Artaxerxes towards a Themistocles, made
him a present of three cities of Asia, Larissa, Arethusa, and Bambyce, or Hierapolis. The Parthian monarch, alarmed at
the prospect, sought to withdraw his traitorous subject from the enemy’s
blandishments by the offer of pardon and renewed favour;
and Monaeses, after duly balancing the proposals made
to him one against the other, came to the conclusion that his home prospects
were the more promising. He therefore represented to Antony that he might
probably do him better service as a friend at the Court of Phraates than as a
pretender to his crown, and asked permission to accept the overtures which he
had received, and to return to his native country. It is probable that the
Triumvir was clever enough to see through his motives, and to understand that
no dependence was to be placed on his protestations ; but it fitted in with his
own interests to amuse Phraates for a short time longer with pacific
professions, and he saw in the request of Monaeses an opportunity for throwing dust in the eyes of a not very keen-sighted
barbarian. Monaeses thus obtained permission to
rejoin his sovereign, and was instructed to assure him that the Roman commander
desired nothing so much as peace, and asked only that the standards captured by
the Parthians in the war with Crassus and Ventidius, and such of the prisoners
taken as still survived, should be handed over to the Romans.
But while thus playing with his adversary, and deluding
him with fond expectations, the Triumvir had fully made up his own mind to
plunge into war, and was leaving no stone unturned to perfect his preparations.
It is very unlikely that it had required the overtures of a Monaeses to put a Parthian expedition into his thoughts. The successes of his own
lieutenants must have been stimulants of far greater efficacy. C. Sosius, as
governor of Syria, had performed several martial exploits on the frontiers of
that province. Canidius Crassus had defeated the
Armenians, with their Albanian and Iberian allies, and had once more planted
the Roman standards at the foot of the Caucasus. Above all, the great glory of
Ventidius, who had been allowed the much-coveted honour of a “triumph” at Rome on account of his defeats of the Parthians in Cilicia
and Syria, must have rankled in his mind, and have moved him to emulation, and
caused him to cast about for some means of outshining his lieutenants and
exalting his own military reputation above that of his subordinates. Nothing,
he well knew, could be so effectual for this purpose as a successful Parthian
expedition—the infliction upon this hated foe of an unmistakable humiliation,
and the dictating to them of terms of peace on their own soil after some great
and decisive victory. Nor did this now appear so very difficult. After the
successes of Ventidius and Canidius Crassus the
prestige of the Parthian name was gone number. The legionaries could be trusted
to meet them without any undue alarm, and to contend with them in the usual
Roman fashion, without excitement or flurry. Time had shown the weakness, as
well as the strength, of the Parthian military system, and the Roman tacticians
had succeeded in devising expedients by which its strong points might be met
and triumphed over. With the forces at his command Antony might well expect to
attack Parthia successfully, and not merely to avoid the fate of Crassus, but
to obtain important advantages.
At the same time he had his eyes open to all the
possibilities of the military situation, and was making his preparations with
the greatest prudence and secrecy. He collected Roman troops from every
available quarter, and gradually raised his legions to the number of sixteen,
or (according to some) of eighteen. These he disposed in the different cities
of Asia, and did not begin to mass them until he had no further need for
concealment. He had brought with him from Europe Gallic and Iberian horse to
the number of ten thousand; his Roman infantry is reckoned at sixty thousand;
and the cavalry and infantry of the Asiatic allies amounted to thirty thousand.
The Armenian monarch, Artavasdes, was secretly won over in the course of the
winter, and promised a contingent of seven thousand foot and six thousand
horse. Thus the entire number of all arms on which he could count to begin the
campaign was 113,000.
Antony was in no hurry to begin. More lover than
soldier, he was glad to defer the hour for parting with the siren by whose
charms he was fascinated, and exchanging the delights of voluptuous dalliance
for the hardships of life in the field. Thus it was not until the midsummer of
BC 36 had arrived that he could bring himself to dismiss his mistress to her
Egyptian home, and place himself at the head of his legions. It was his
original intention to cross the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and to advance
against Parthia by the direct route, as Crassus had done; but, on reaching the
banks of the Euphrates, possibly at Zeugma, he found the attitude of defence
assumed by the enemy on his own frontier so imposing, that he abandoned his
first design, and, turning northwards, entered Armenia, resolved to attack
Parthia, in conjunction with his Armenian ally, from that quarter. Artavasdes
gladly welcomed him, and recommended that he should begin the war, not by
invading Parthia itself but by an attack on the dominions of a Parthian
feudatory, the King of Media Atropatene, whose territories adjoined Armenia on
the south-east. The king, he said, was absent, having been summoned to join his
suzerain on the banks of the Euphrates, and having marched away with his best
troops to the rendezvous. His territory, therefore, would be ill-defended, and
open to ravage; it was even possible that Praaspa,
his capital, might be an easy prey. The prospect excited Antony, and he put
himself at the disposition of Artavasdes. Dividing his army into two portions,
and ordering Oppius Statianus, one of his best
officers, to follow him leisurely with the more unwieldly portion of the
troops, the siege-batteries, and the baggage-train, he himself proceeded by
forced marches to Praaspa, under the guidance of
Artavasdes, accompanied by all the cavalry and infantry of the better sort.
This town was situated at the distance of nearly three hundred miles from the
Armenian frontier; but the way to it lay through well-cultivated plains, where
food and water were abundant. Antony accomplished the march without any
difficulty, and sat himself down before the place. But the want of his siegeengines and battering-train caused him to make little
impression; and he was compelled to have recourse to the long and tedious
process of raising up a mound against the walls. For some time he cherished the
hope that Statianus would arrive to his relief; but
this illusion was ere long dispelled. News arrived that the Parthian monarch,
having been made acquainted with his plans and proceedings, had followed on the
footsteps of his army, had come up with Statianus,
and made a successful onslaught on his detachment. Ten thousand Romans were
killed in the engagement; many prisoners were taken; all the baggage-waggons and engines of war fell into the enemy’s hands; and Statianus himself was among the slain. A further and
still worse result followed. The Armenian monarch was so disheartened by the
defeat, that, regarding the Roman cause as desperate, he retired from the
contest, drew off his troops, and left Antony to his own resources.
The situation became now one of great difficulty.
Autumn was approaching; supplies were falling short; the siege works which
Antony had attempted made no progress; and it was impossible to construct a
fresh battering-train to replace that which had been taken. If Antony could
only capture the town before the winter set in, he would feel himself in
safety, and, having a breathing-space during which he might repair his losses,
would be able to recruit himself for another campaign. He therefore made
desperate efforts to overcome the resistance offered by the besieged, and to
obtain possession of the city. But all was in vain. The walls were too strong
and too high. His mound was never brought to a level with their summit. From
time to time the defenders made sallies, drove off his workmen, and inflicted
serious damage on his construction. The Parthian monarch, hovering about in the neighbourhood, looked with scorn on his unavailing endeavours, and contented himself with hindering his
supplies and interfering with his foraging parties. Efforts made by Antony to
bring on a general engagement by means of a foraging expedition on a large
scale failed, the Parthians retreating as soon as attacked, and exhibiting
their marvellous power of getting out of an enemy’s
reach almost without suffering any losses. The Roman commander, as the equinox
drew near, came to the conclusion that he must withdraw from the siege and
retire into Armenia, but before making this confession of failure, as a last
resource, he sought to persuade his adversary to terms of accommodation. He
would at once relinquish the siege, and recross the frontier, he said, if
Phraates would only yield up to him the Crassian captives and standards. The demand was preposterous, and the Parthians simply
laughed at it, feeling that it was for Antony rather to purchase an unmolested
retreat, than for themselves to pay him for retiring. Each day that he lingered
placed him in a worse position, and made it more certain that he could not
escape serious disaster.
At last the equinox arrived, and retreat became
imperative. There were two roads by which it would be possible to reach the
Araxes at the usual point of passage. One lay to the left, through a plain and
open country, probably along the course of the Jaghetu and the eastern shores of Lake Urumiyeh, which is the route that an army would
ordinarily take; the other, which was shorter but more difficult, lay to the
right, leading across a mountain tract, but one fairly supplied with water, and
in which there were a number of inhabited villages. The Triumvir was informed
by his- scouts that the Parthians had occupied the easier route in the
expectation that he would select it, and were hopeful of overwhelming his
entire force with their cavalry in the plains. He therefore took the road to
the right, through a rugged and inclement country—probably that between Takht-i-Sulefman and Tabriz—and, guided
by a Mardian who was well acquainted with the district, set out to make his way
back to the Araxes. His decision took the Parthians by surprise, and for two
whole days he was unmolested. By the third day, however, they had thrown
themselves across his path. Antony, expecting no interference, was pursuing his
march in a somewhat disorderly manner, when the Mardian guide, perceiving signs
of recent injury to the route, gave him warning that the enemy could not be far
off, and the Roman general had just time to make his troops form in battle
array, and bring his light armed and slingers to the front, when the Parthian
horsemen made their appearance on all sides, and began a fierce assault But the
Roman light troops, especially those armed with slings and darts, made a
vigorous resistance, the leaden missiles of the slingers being found
particularly effective; and, after a short combat, the Parthians, following
their usual tactics, drew off, only, however, to return again and again, until
at last Antony’s Gallic cavalry found an opportunity of charging them, when
they broke and fled hastily, having received a serious check, from which they
did not recover during the remainder of the day.
However, on the day following, they reappeared; and
thenceforth for nineteen consecutive days they disputed with Antony every inch
of his road, and inflicted on him the most grievous losses. “The sufferings of
the Roman army during this time,” says a modern historian of Rome, “ were
unparalleled in their military annals. The intense cold, the blinding snow and
driving sleet, the want sometimes of provisions, sometimes of water, the use of
poisonous herbs, and the harassing attacks of the enemy’s cavalry and bowmen,
which could only be repelled by maintaining the dense array of the phalanx or
the tortoise, reduced the retreating army by one-third of its numbers.” Much
gallantry was shown, especially by some of the officers, as Flavius Gallus; and
Antony himself displayed all the finest qualities of a commander, except
judgment; but every effort was in vain: as the Roman army dwindled in numbers,
that of the Parthians increased; as the strength of the individual soldiers
failed through scantiness or unwholesomeness of food, the courage and audacity
of their adversaries were augmented ; the Roman losses grew greater from day to
day, and at last culminated in one occasion of extreme disaster, when eight
thousand men were placed hors de combat, three thousand of them, including
Gallus, being slain. At length, after a march of 300 Roman, or 277 British,
miles, the survivors reached the river Araxes, probably at the Julfa ferry, and, crossing it, found themselves in Armenia.
But the calamities of the return were not yet ended. Although it had been
arranged with Artavasdes that the bulk of the Roman army should winter in
Armenia, yet, before the various detachments could reach the quarters assigned
them in different parts of the country, eight thousand more had perished,
through the effect of past privations or the severity of the Armenian winter.
Altogether, out of the hundred thousand men whom Antony had taken with him into
Media Atropatene in the midsummer of BC 36, less than seventy thousand
remained to commence the campaign of the ensuing year. Well may the
unfortunate commander have exclaimed during the later portion of his march, as
he compared his own heavy losses with the light ones suffered by Xenophon and
his Greeks in these same regions : “Oh, those Ten Thousand! those Ten Thousand!”
On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia, a quarrel
broke out between Phraates and his Median vassal. The latter complained that he
was wronged in the division made of the Roman spoils, and expressed himself
with so much freedom as seriously to offend his suzerain. Perceiving this, he
became alarmed lest Phraates should punish his boldness by deposing him from
his office and setting up another vitaxa in
his place. He thought it necessary therefore to look out for some powerful
support, and on carefully considering the political situation, came to the
conclusion that his best hope lay in making a friend of his late foe Antony,
and placing himself under Roman protection. Antony was known to have been
deeply offended by the conduct of his Armenian ally in the late campaign, and
to be desirous of taking vengeance on him. He had already made an attempt to
get possession of his person, which had failed through the suspiciousness and
caution of the wily Oriental. Hostilities between Armenia and Rome were
evidently impending, and might break out at any moment. It would be clearly for
Antony’s interest, when war broke out, to have a friend on the Armenian frontier,
and especially one who was strong in cavalry and bowmen. The Median monarch
therefore sent an ambassador of rank to Alexandria, where Antony was passing
the winter, and boldly proposed an alliance. Antony readily accepted the offer.
He was intensely angered by the conduct of his late confederate, and resolved
on punishing his disaffection and desertion; he viewed the Median alliance as
of the utmost importance, not only as against Armenia, but still more in
connection with the design, which he still entertained, of invading Parthia
itself; and he saw in the Atropatenian ruler a prince
whom it would be well worth his while to bind to his cause indissolubly. He
therefore embraced the overtures made to him with joy, and even rewarded the
messenger who had brought them with a principality. After sundry efforts to
entice Artavasdes into his power, which occupied him during the greater part of
BC 35, but which were unsuccessful, in the spring of BC 34 he suddenly made his
appearance in Armenia. His army, which had remained there from the previous
campaign, held all the most important positions, and, as he professed the most
friendly feelings towards Artavasdes, even proposing an alliance between their
families, that prince, after some hesitation, at length ventured into his
presence. He was immediately seized and put in chains. Armenia was rapidly
overrun. Artaxias, the eldest son of Artavasdes, whom the Armenians made king
in the room of his father, was defeated, and forced to take refuge with the
Parthians. Antony then arranged a marriage between a daughter of the Median
monarch and his own son by Cleopatra, Alexander; and leaving garrisons in
Armenia to hold it as a conquered province, carried off Artavasdes, together
with a rich booty, into Egypt.
Phraates, during these transactions, had remained
wholly upon the defensive. He was not a man of much enterprise, and probably
thought that a waiting policy was, under the circumstances, the best one. It
cannot have been displeasing to him to see Artavasdes punished; and doubtless
he must have been gratified to observe how Antony was injuring his own cause by
exasperating the Armenians, and teaching them to detest Rome even more than
they detested Parthia. But while the Roman troops held possession both of Syria
and of Armenia, and the alliance between Rome and Media Atropatene continued,
he could not venture to take any aggressive step, or think of doing more than
protecting his own frontier. Almost any other Roman commander than Antony
would, after crushing Armenia, have at once carried the war, in conjunction
with his Median ally, into Parthia, and have endeavoured to strike a blow that might avenge the defeat of Carrhae. Phraates naturally
expected an invasion of his territories both in BC 34, after Antony’s
occupation of Armenia, and in the following year, when he again appeared in
these parts, and advanced to the Araxes. But Antony’s attention was so much
engrossed by the proceedings of his rival, Octavian, in the West, and it was so
clear to him that the great contest for the mastership of the Roman world could
not be delayed much longer, that Eastern affairs had almost ceased to interest
him, and his chief desire was to be quit of them. The object of his advance to
the Araxes in BC 33 was to place things in such a position that his presence
might be no longer necessary. It seemed to him that the interests of Rome would
be sufficiently safeguarded, if the Median alliance were assured, and he
therefore sought an interview with the Atropatenian king, and concluded a treaty with him. The terms were very favourable to the Median. He received a body of Roman heavy infantry in exchange for a
detachment of his own light horsemen; his dominions were considerably enlarged
on the side of Armenia; and the marriage previously arranged between his
daughter, Jotapa, and Antony’s son, Alexander, was accomplished. Antony then
marched away to meet his Roman rival, flattering himself that he had secured,
at any rate for some years, the tranquillity of the
Asiatic continent.
But Phraates now saw his opportunity. In conjunction
with Artaxias, he attacked the Median king, and, though at first repulsed by
the valour of the Roman troops in the Median service,
succeeded, after Antony had required them to rejoin his standard, in inflicting
on him a severe defeat, and even making him a prisoner. This success led to
another. Artaxias, having now only the Roman garrisons to contend with,
re-entered and recovered Armenia. The Roman garrisons were put to the sword.
Armenia became once more wholly independent of Rome; and it is probable that
Media Atropatene returned to the Parthian allegiance.
The result of the, expedition of Antony was thus
rather to elevate Parthia than to depress her. Antony, notwithstanding his
undoubted courage, let it be clearly seen that he shrank from a direct
encounter with the full force of the Parthian kingdom. Hence his avoidance of
any invasion of actual Parthian territory, and the limitation of his efforts to
the injuring of his enemy by striking at her through her dependencies, Media
and Armenia. Nor was the timidity thus exhibited compensated for by success in
the comparatively small enterprises to which he confined himself. The
expedition against Media Atropatene was a complete failure, and resulted in the
loss of thirty thousand men. The Armenian campaign succeeded at the time, but
it alienated a nation which it was of the utmost importance to conciliate, and
it was followed almost immediately by a revolt in which Rome suffered fresh
disasters, and which drew Armenia closer to Parthia than she had ever been
drawn previously. On the retirement of Antony from the East, Parthia occupied
as grand a position as had ever before been hers, excepting during the brief
space of her successes under Pacorus and Labienus.
INTERNAL TROUBLES IN PARTHIA—HER RELATIONS WITH ROME
UNDER AUGUSTUS AND TIBERIUS.
Phraates, justly proud of his successes against
Antony, and of the re-establishment of his authority over Media Atropatene,
regarding, moreover, his position in Parthia as thereby absolutely secured, proceeded
to indulge the natural cruelty of his disposition, and resumed the harsh and
tyrannical treatment of his subjects, by which he had made himself odious in
the early years of his reign. So far did he push his oppression, that ere long
the patience of the people gave way, and an insurrection broke out against his
authority, which compelled him to fly the country (BC 33). The revolt was
headed by a certain Tiridates, a Parthian noble, who, upon its success, was
made king by the insurgents. Phraates fled into Scythia, and appealed to the
nomads to embrace his cause. Ever ready for war and plunder, the hordes were
nothing loth; and, crossing the frontier in force, they succeeded without much
difficulty in restoring the exiled monarch to the throne from which his
subjects had deposed him. Tiridates fled at their approach, and, having
contrived to carry off in his flight the youngest son of Phraates, presented
himself before Octavian, who was in Syria at the time (BC 30) on his return
from Egypt, surrendered the young prince into his hands, and requested his aid
against the tyrant. Octavian accepted the valuable hostage, but, with his usual
caution, declined to pledge himself to furnish any help to the pretender; he
might remain, he said, in Syria, if he so wished, and while he continued under
Roman protection a suitable provision should be made for his support, but he
must not expect to be replaced upon the Parthian throne by the Roman arms. Some
years later (BC 23), Phraates in his turn made application to the Imperator for
the surrender of the person of Tiridates and the restoration of his kidnapped
son; but the application was only partially successful. Octavian said he
willingly restored to him his son, and would not even ask a ransom; but the
surrender of a fugitive was a different matter, and one that he could not
possibly consent to. Where would be the honour of
Rome, if such a thing were done? Phraates would, no doubt, feel that some
return was due on account of his son. An acceptable return would be the
delivery to the Romans of the standards and captives taken from Crassus and
Antony. The Parthian monarch made no direct reply to this suggestion. He gladly
received his son, but ignored the rest of the message. It was not until three
years later, when Octavian (now become Augustus) visited the East, and war
seemed the probable alternative if he continued obdurate, that the Parthian
monarch brought himself to relinquish the trophies, which were as much prized
by the victors as by the vanquished. The act was one so unpatriotic as to be
scarcely pardonable; but we must remember that Phraates held his crown by a
very insecure tenure—he was extremely unpopular with his subjects, and
Augustus had it in his power at any moment to produce a pretender, who had once
occupied, and with Roman help might easily have ascended for a second time, the
throne of the Arsacids.
The remaining years of Phraates—and he reigned for
nearly twenty years after restoring the standards —were almost unbroken by any
event of importance. The result of the twenty years’ struggle between Rome and
Parthia had been to impress either nation with a wholesome fear of the other.
Both had triumphed on their own ground; both had failed when they ventured on
sending expeditions into their enemy’s territory. Each now stood on its guard,
watching the movements of its adversary across the Euphrates. Both had become
pacific. It is a well- known fact that Augustus left it as a principle of
policy to his successors that the Roman territory had reached its proper
limits, and could not with any advantage be extended further. This principle,
followed with the utmost strictness by Tiberius, was accepted as a rule by all
the earlier Caesars, and only regarded by them as admitting of rare and slight
exceptions. Trajan was the first who, a hundred and thirty years after the
accession of Augustus, made light of it, and set it at defiance. With him
re-awoke the spirit of conquest, the aspiration after universal dominion. But
in the meantime there was. peace—peace not indeed absolutely unbroken, for border
wars occurred, and Rome was sometimes tempted to interfere by arms in the
internal quarrels of her neighbour; but a general state of peace and amity
prevailed; neither state made any grand attack on the other’s dominions; no
change occurred in the frontier; no great battle tested the relative strength
of the two peoples. Such rivalry as still continued was exhibited less in arms
than in diplomacy, and showed itself mainly in endeavours on either side to obtain a predominant influence in Armenia. There alone during
the century and a half that intervened between Antony and Trajan did the
interests of Rome and Parthia come into collision, and in connection with this
kingdom alone was there during these years any struggle between the two
empires.
After Phraates had yielded to Augustus in the important
matter of the standards and the prisoners, he appears for many years to have
studiously cultivated his good graces. In the interval between BC 11 and BC 7,
having reason to distrust the intentions of his subjects towards him, and to
suspect that they might not improbably depose him and place one of his sons
upon the Parthian throne, he resolved to send these possible rivals out of the
country; and on this occasion he paid Augustus the compliment of selecting Rome
for his children’s residence. The youths were four in number—Vonones, who was
the eldest, Seraspadanes, Rhodaspes,
and Phraates; two of them were married and had children. They resided at Rome
during the remainder of their father’s lifetime, and were treated as became
their rank, being supported at the public charge, and in a magnificent manner.
The Roman writers speak of them as “hostages” given by Phraates to the Roman Emperor
; but this was certainly not the intention of the Parthian monarch, and it was
scarcely possible that the idea could be entertained by the Romans at the time
of their residence.
The friendly relations thus established between
Phraates and Augustus would probably have continued undisturbed until the death
of the one or the other had not a revolution broken out in Armenia, which
tempted the Parthian king beyond his powers of resistance. On the death of
Artaxias, in the year BC 20, Augustus, who was then in the East, had sent
Tiberius into Armenia, to arrange the affairs of the nation; and Tiberius had
thought it best to place upon the throne a brother of Artaxias, named Tigranes.
Parthia had made no objection to this arrangement, but had tacitly admitted the
Roman suzerainty over the Armenian nation. Fourteen years afterwards, in BC 6,
Tigranes died; and the Armenians, without waiting to know the pleasure of the
Roman Emperor, conferred the sovereignty on his three sons, whom their father
had previously designated for the royal office by associating them with him in
the government. But this was a liberty which Augustus could not possibly
allow. He therefore, in BC 5, sent an expedition into Armenia, deposed the
three sons of Tigranes, and established in the kingdom a certain Artavasdes,
whose birth, rank, and claims to the royal position are unknown. But the
Armenians were dissatisfied and recalcitrant. After enduring the rule of
Rome’s nominee for the short space of three years, they rose in revolt against
him, defeated the Romans who endeavoured to support
his authority, and drove him out of the kingdom. Another Tigranes was placed
upon the throne; and, at the same time, Parthia was called in to give the
Armenians their protection, in case Rome should again interfere with the choice
of the nation. Phraates could not bring himself to reject the Armenian
overtures. Ever since the time of the second Mithridates, it had been a settled
principle of Parthia’s policy that Armenia should be dependent on herself; and,
even at the cost of a rupture with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he must respond
to the appeal made to him. The rupture might not come. Augustus was now
advanced in years, and might submit to the indignity offered him without
resenting it. He had lately lost the services of his best general—his stepson,
Tiberius—who, in consequence of the slights put upon him, had gone into
retirement at Rhodes. He had no one that he could entrust with an army but his
grandsons, youths who had not yet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates
probably hoped that, under such circumstances, Augustus would draw back before
the terrors of a Parthian war, and would allow without remonstrance—or, at any
rate, without resistance—the passing of Armenia into the position of a Parthian
subject ally.
But, if such were his expectations, he had greatly
miscalculated. Augustus had as keen a sense of what the honour of Rome required now that he was an old man of sixty as when he was a youth of
twenty. From the time that he first heard of the Armenian outbreak, and of the
support lent it by Parthia, he appears never to have wavered in his
determination to re-assert the Roman claim to a preponderating influence over
Armenia, but only to have hesitated for a time as to the individual whose
services it would be best to employ in the business. Tiberius naturally
presented himself to his mind as by far the fittest person for such a work—a
work in which diplomatic and military ability might be, both of them, almost
equally required ; but Tiberius had recently taken offence at certain slights
which he supposed himself to have received, and had withdrawn from the public
service and from official life altogether. In default of his brave and astute
stepson, Augustus could only fall back upon his grandsons; but the eldest of
these, Caius, was now, in the year BC 2, no more than eighteen years of age,
and the policy of employing so young a man in so difficult and important a
business could not but appear to him extremely questionable. Augustus therefore
hesitated, and it was not until late in the year BC 1 that he despatched Caius to the East, with authority to settle the
Parthian and Armenian troubles as it should seem best to him.
Meanwhile, however, a change had occurred in Parthia.
Phraates, when somewhat advanced in life, had married an Italian slave-girl,
called Musa, who had been sent to him as a present by Augustus, and had had a
son born to him from this marriage, who, as he grew up, came to hold an
important position in the Parthian state. It was perhaps through the influence
of this youth’s mother, Musa, that Phraates was induced to send his four elder
boys to Rome, there to receive their education. At any rate, their absence left
an opening for her son, Phraataces, of which she took
care that he should have the full advantage; and the youth, becoming his
father’s sole support in his declining years, came to look upon himself, and to
be looked upon by others, as his natural successor. Conscious, however, of the
weakness of his claim to the throne, and doubtful of his father’s intentions
with regard to him, if he allowed events to take their natural course, the
ambitious youth resolved to become the shaper of his own future, and, in
conjunction with his mother, administered poison to the aged monarch, from the
effects of which he died. Phraataces then seized the
throne, and reigned as joint sovereign with his mother, to whom he allowed the
titles of “Queen and Goddess,” and whose image he placed upon the reverse of
most of his coins.
Among the first acts of Phraataces as king was the sending of an embassy to Augustus, whom he professed to regard
as still friendly to Parthia, though he must have known that the Parthian
attitude towards Armenia had alienated him. He informed Augustus of his
accession to the throne of the Arsacidae, apologised for the circumstances under which it had taken
place, and proposed a renewal of the treaty of peace which had subsisted
between Augustus and his father, adding a request that the Roman Emperor would,
in consideration of the peace, kindly surrender to him his four brothers, whose
proper place of residence was not Rome, but Parthia. With respect to Armenia he
observed a discreet silence, leaving it to Augustus to initiate negotiations on
the subject or to accept the status quo. Augustus replied to this message in
terms of extreme severity. Addressing Phraataces by
his bare name, without adding the title of king, he required him to lay aside
the royal appellation, which he had so arrogantly and unwarrantably assumed,
and at the same time to evacuate all the portions of Armenia which his troops
wrongfully occupied. With respect to the surrender of the Parthian princes, the
brothers of Phraataces, and their families, he said
nothing. Nor did he respond to the appeal concerning the formal renewal of a
treaty of peace. He left Phraataces to infer that his
brothers would be retained at Rome, as pretenders to the throne of Parthia,
whom it might be convenient at some future time to bring forward; and he not
obscurely intimated that no treaty of peace would be concluded until the
Parthian troops were withdrawn across the Armenian frontier. Phraataces, however, was not to be cowed by mere words. He
repaid Augustus in his own coin, sending him a contemptuous message, in which,
while assuming to himself the high-sounding Oriental designation of “King of
Kings,” he curtly addressed the Roman Emperor as “Caesar.”
It is probable that this attitude of defiance would
have been maintained, and that the Parthian troops would have continued to
garrison Armenia, had Augustus refrained from active measures, and been content
with menaces. But when, in BC 1, the Emperor proceeded from words to acts, and despatched his grandson, Caius, to the East at the head of
a large force, with orders to re-establish the Roman influence in Armenia, even
at the cost of a Parthian war, and when Caius showed himself in Syria with all
the magnificent surroundings of the Imperial dignity, Phraataces became alarmed. It was arranged during the winter that an interview should be
held between the two princes in the spring of AD 1, on an island in the
Euphrates, where the terms of an arrangement between the two empires should be
discussed and settled. For the first and almost the last time a Parthian
monarch and a scion of the Roman Imperial House met amicably for the purpose of
negotiation, and discussed the terms on which the two empires could be friends.
On either bank of the “great river” were drawn up the mighty hosts, which,
within a few days, if no agreement were come to, would be loosed at each
other’s' throats. 1 The two chiefs, accompanied by an equal number of
attendants, passed from their respective banks to the island, and there, in the
full sight of both armies, proceeded to hold the conference. An arrangement
satisfactory to both sides was made, the chief proviso of which was the
evacuation of Armenia by the Parthians. Feasting and banqueting followed. The
Parthian king was first entertained by Caius on the Roman side of the river,
after which Caius was in his turn feasted by the Parthian on the opposite bank.
Cordial relations were established. For once in the course of the long struggle
with Rome, Parthia seems to have actually made up her mind to relinquish
Armenia to her adversary. She gave up her claims, withdrew her troops, and,
during the serious troubles which followed—troubles wherein Caius lost his
life— honourably abstained from all interference,
either by intrigue or arms, in Armenian affairs, and allowed Rome to settle
them at her pleasure.
The willingness of Phraataces thus to efface himself, and concede to Rome the foremost position in Asia,
arose probably from the unsettled state of the kingdom, and the internal
difficulties which threatened him. To be a parricide was not in Parthia an
absolute bar to popularity and a quiet reign, as had been proved by the
prosperous reign of Phraates IV., but there were circumstances connected with
the recent palace revolution, which threw special discredit upon the principal
agent in it, and grievously offended the pride oi the Parthian nobles. Private
and selfish motives had alone actuated the young prince, who could not even
pretend any public ground for the extreme step that he had taken. His
subjection to female influence, especially when the female was a foreign
slave-girl, enraged the nobles and drew down their contempt. The exalted honours which he heaped on her offended their pride. Rumours, which may have had no foundation in fact,
increased his unpopularity, and covered his companion on the throne with even a
deeper shade of disgrace. The Megistanes consulted
together, and within a few years of his establishment as king raised a revolt
against his authority, which terminated in his deposition or death. An Arsacid,
named Orodes, was chosen in his place; but he too, in a short time, displeased
his subjects, and was murdered by them, either at a banquet or during a hunting
expedition. It then occurred to the Megistanes to
fall back on the legitimate heir to the throne, who was still at Rome, whither
he had been sent by his father Some fifteen years previously. Accordingly, they despatched an embassy to Augustus (AD. 5) and asked
to have Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV, sent back to Parthia, that he
might receive his father’s kingdom. Augustus readily complied, since he
regarded it as for the honour of Rome to give a king
to Parthia, and Vonones was sent out to Asia with much pomp and many presents,
to occupy a position which was the second highest that the world had to offer.
It is said that princes are always popular on their
coronation day; and certainly Vonones was no exception to the general rule. His
subjects received him with every demonstration of joy, pleased like children
with a new plaything. But this state of feeling did not continue very long. The
foreign training of the young monarch soon showed itself. Bred up at Rome,
amid the luxuries and refinements of Western civilisation,
the rough sports and coarse manners of his countrymen displeased and disgusted
him. He took no pleasure in horses, seldom appeared in the hunting-field,
absented himself from the rude feastings which formed a marked feature of the
national manners, and, when he showed himself in public, was usually seen
reclining in a litter. He had brought with him, moreover, from the place of his
exile, a number of Greek companions, whom' the Parthians despised and
ridiculed. The favour which he showed these
interlopers excited their jealousy and rage. It was to no purpose that he
sought to conciliate his angry subjects by the openness and affability of his demeanour, or by the readiness with which he allowed access
to his person. Virtues and graces, unknown to the nation hitherto, were, in the
eyes of the courtiers, not merits but defects. Dislike of the monarch led them
to look back with dissatisfaction on the part which they had taken in placing
him upon the throne. “ Parthia had indeed degenerated,” they said, “in asking
for a king who belonged to another world, and into whom there had been
engrained a foreign and hostile civilisation. All the
glory gained by destroying Crassus and repulsing Antony was utterly lost and
gone, if the country was to be ruled by Caesar’s bond-slave, and the throne of
the Arsacidae to be treated as if it were a Roman
province. It would have been bad enough to have had a prince imposed upon them
by the will of a superior, if they had been conquered; it was worse, in all
respects worse, to suffer such an insult, when they had not even had war made
upon them.” Under the influence of these feelings, the Parthians, after they
had tolerated Vonones for a few years, rose in revolt against him (about AD 10),
and summoned Artabanus, an Arsacid, who had grown to manhood among the Dahae of
the Caspian region, but was at this time subject-king of Media Atropatene, to
rule over them.
A crown, when it is offered, is not often declined,
though a few crowns may have gone begging in the modern world, now that
kingship has lost its glamour; and Artabanus, on receiving the overture from
the Parthian nobles, at once expressed his willingness to accept the proffered
dignity. He invaded Parthia at the head of an army consisting of his own
subjects, and engaged Vonones, to whom in his difficulties the bulk of the
Parthian people had rallied. This engagement resulted in the defeat of the
Median monarch ; and Vonones was so proud of his victory that he immediately
had a coin struck to commemorate it, bearing on the obverse his own head, with
the legend of, BASIALEUS ONONIS, and on the reverse a Victory with the
legend—BASILEUS ONONHS NEIKISAS ARTABANON—“King Onones on his defeat of Artabanus.” But the self-gratulation was premature. Artabanus
had made good his retreat into his own country, and, having there collected a
larger army than before, returned to the attack. This time he was successful.
The forces of Vonones were defeated, and he himself, escaping from the battle
with a few followers, fled on horseback to Seleucia, while his vanquished army,
following more slowly in his track, was pressed upon by the victorious Mede,
and suffered great losses. Artabanus, entering Ctesiphon in triumph, was
immediately acclaimed king. Vonones took refuge in Armenia, and, the throne
happening to be vacant, was not only given an asylum, but appointed to the
kingly office. Artabanus naturally remonstrated, and threatened war unless
Vonones were surrendered to him. Armenia was alarmed, and began to waver;
whereupon Vonones withdrew himself from the country, and sought the protection
of Creticus Silanus, the Roman governor of Syria, who
received him with favour, gave him a guard, and
allowed him the state and title of king, but at the same time kept him in a
sort of honourable captivity.
It was under these circumstances that the Roman
Emperor, Tiberius, who had recently succeeded Augustus, determined to entrust
the administration and pacification of the East to a personage of importance—one
who should combine the highest rank with considerable experience, and should
strike the imagination of the Orientals, and command their attention, at once
by the dignity of his office, and by the pomp and splendour of his surroundings. It may be that, in his selection of the individual, he was
actuated by motives of jealousy, and by the wish to separate one, whom he could
not but regard as a rival, from an army which had grown too much attached to
him. But it seems scarcely fair to attribute these motives to him upon mere
suspicion, and it is difficult to see what better choice than the one he made
was open to him under the circumstances of the period. Germanicus was, at the
time, the second man in the State. He had knowledge of affairs ; he was a good
soldier and general; his manners were courteous and agreeable ; and he was
popular with all classes. At once the nephew and the adopted son of the sovereign,
he would scarcely seem to the Orientals to shine with a reflected radiance;
they would see in him the alter ego of the great Western autocrat, and would be
awed by the grandeur of his position, while fascinated by the charm of his
personality. The more to affect their minds, Tiberius conferred on his
representative none of the ordinary and well-worn titles of Roman
administrative employment, but coined for him a phrase unknown in official
language previously, investing him with an extraordinary command over all the
Roman dominions east of the Hellespont. Full powers were granted him for making
peace or war, for levying troops, annexing provinces, appointing subject kings,
concluding treaties, and performing other sovereign acts without referring back
to Rome for instructions. A train of unusual magnificence accompanied him to
his charge, calculated to impress the Orientals with the conviction that this
was no common negotiator. Germanicus arrived in Asia in the spring of AD 18,
and within the space of a single year completed the task, which he had
undertaken, satisfactorily. Having visited Artaxata in person, and ascertained the feelings and disposition of the Armenians, he
made up his mind not to demand the re-instatement of Vonones, which would have
been throwing down the gauntlet to Parthia, nor yet to allow the establishment
of an Arsacid on the Armenian throne, which would have been exalting Parthia to
the shame and dishonour of Rome, but to pursue a
middle course, at which neither the Armenians nor the Parthians could take
offence, while Roman dignity would be upheld, Roman traditions maintained, and
something done to soothe the feelings and gratify the wishes of both the
irritated Asiatic nations. There was in Armenia, where he had grown up, a
foreign prince, named Zeno, the son of Polemo, once
king of the curtailed Pontus, and afterwards of the Lesser Armenia, who was in
very good odour among the Armenians, since he had,
during a long residence, conformed himself in all respects to their habits and
usages. Finding that it would please the Armenians, Germanicus determined on
giving them this man for ruler, and at the seat of government, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast multitude of the
people, and with the consent and approval of the principal nobles, he placed
with his own hand the diadem on the brow of the favoured prince, and saluted him as king under the Armenian name, which he had never
hitherto borne, of “Artaxias.” For the satisfaction of the Parthian monarch,
who required that Vonones should either be delivered into his hands or removed
to a greater distance from the Parthian frontier, he “interned” the unhappy
prince in the Cilician city of Pompeiopolis—a change
of residence so much disliked by the prince himself that the next year he endeavoured to escape from it, but, his attempt being
discovered, he was pursued, overtaken, and slain in a skirmish on the banks of
the river Pyramus. The pacification of the East was thus, with some difficulty,
effected ; and Germanicus, quitting Asia, indulged himself in the luxury of a
pleasure trip to Egypt.
The dispositions which Germanicus had made sufficed to
preserve the tranquillity of the East for the space
of fifteen years. Artabanus, at peace with Rome and with Armenia, employed the
time in the chastisement of border-tribes, and in petty wars, which however
increased his reputation. Success followed on success ; and by degrees his
opinion of his own military capacity was so much raised that he began to look
upon a rupture with Rome as rather to be desired than dreaded. He knew that
Germanicus was dead; that Tiberius was advanced in years, and not likely to
engage in a distant military expedition; and that the East was under the rule
of an official who had never yet distinguished himself as a commander. When,
therefore, in AD 34, the Armenian throne was made vacant by the death of
Artaxias III, the nominee of Germanicus, he boldly occupied the country, and
claiming the disposal of the vacant dignity, bestowed it upon his own eldest
son, a prince who bore the name of Arsaces. Nor did he rest content with this.
Insult must be added to injury. Ambassadors were despatched to Rome with a demand for the restoration of the treasure which Vonones had
carried off from Parthia and taken with him into Roman territory; and a threat
was held out that Artabanus was about to reoccupy all the territory which,
having been once Macedonian or Persian, was now properly his, since he was the
natural successor and representative of Cyrus and Alexander. According to one
writer, the Parthian monarch actually commenced military operations against
Rome by the invasion of Cappadocia, which had been for some time a Roman
province.
It is uncertain what response Tiberius would have made
to these demands and proceedings had the internal condition of Parthia been
sound and satisfactory. He was certainly averse to war at this period of his
life, and had actually sent instructions to Vitellius, the governor of Syria,
after the seizure of Armenia by Artabanus, that he was to cultivate friendly
relations with Parthia. But the Parthian kingdom was internally in a state of
extreme disquiet; insurrection was threatened; and the nobles were in active
correspondence with .the Imperial court on the subject of bringing forward a
pretender. “Artabanus,” they said, “had, among his other cruelties, put to
death all the adult members of the royal family who were in his power, and
there was not an Arsacid in Asia of age to reign; but for a successful revolt
an Arsacid leader was absolutely necessary: would not Rome supply the defect?
Would she not send them one of the surviving sons of Phraates IV, to head the
intended insurrection, which would then be sure to succeed? One son, named
Phraates, like his father, was still living, and was, they understood, at Rome;
if Tiberius would only send him, and he were once seen on the banks of the
Euphrates, they guaranteed a successful outbreak—Artabanus would be driven from
his throne without difficulty. Tiberius was prevailed upon to do as they
desired. He furnished Phraates with all things necessary for his journey, and
sent him into Asia, to lay claim to his father’s kingdom.
Phraates, however, was unequal to the task assigned
him. The sudden change in his life and habits, which his new position
necessitated, broke down his health, and he was but just arrived in Syria when
he sickened and died. Tiberius replaced him by a nephew, named Tiridates,
probably a son either of Rhodaspes or of Seraspadanes, and proceeded to devote to the affairs of the
East all the energies of a mind eminently sagacious and fertile in resources.
At his instigation, Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, a
portion of the modern Georgia, was induced to take the field, and invade
Armenia; where, after removing the reigning Parthian prince, Arsaces, by
poison, he occupied the capital, and established his own brother, Mithridates,
as king. Artabanus met this movement by giving the direction of affairs in
Armenia to another son, Orodes, and sending him with all speed to maintain the
Parthian cause in the disputed province; but Orodes proved no match for his
adversary, who was superior in numbers, in the variety of his troops, and in
familiarity with the localities. Pharasmanes had
obtained the assistance of his neighbours, the Albanians, and opening the
passes of the Caucasus, had admitted through them a number of the Scythic or Sarmatian hordes, who were always ready, when
their services were well paid, to take a part in the quarrels of the south.
Orodes failed to secure either mercenaries or allies, and had to contend
unassisted against the three enemies who had joined their forces to oppose him.
For some time he prudently declined an engagement; but it was impossible to
restrain the ardour of his troops, whom the enemy
exasperated by their reproaches. After a while he was compelled to accept the
battle which Pharasmanes incessantly offered. The
troops at his disposal consisted entirely of cavalry, while Pharasmanes had, besides his horse, a powerful body of infantry. The conflict was
nevertheless long and furious ; the Parthians and Sarmatians were very equally
matched ; and the victory might have been doubtful, if it had not happened that
in a hand-to-hand combat between the two commanders, Orodes was struck to the
ground by his antagonist, and thought by most of his own side to be killed. As
usual under such circumstances in the East, a rout followed. If we are to
believe Josephus, “many tens of thousands” were slain. Armenia was wholly lost
to Parthia; and Artabanus found himself left with diminished resources and
tarnished reputation to meet the intrigues of his domestic foes.
Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In the
spring of AD 36, having levied the whole force of the empire, he took the field
in person, and marched northwards, with the intention of avenging himself on
the Iberians and recovering his lost province. But his first efforts were
unsuccessful; and before he could renew them the Roman general, Vitellius, put
himself at the head of his legions, and, moving towards the Euphrates,
threatened Mesopotamia with invasion. Placed thus between two dangers, the
Parthian monarch felt that he had no choice but to abandon Armenia and return
to the defence of his own proper territories, which in his absence must have
lain temptingly open to an invader. His return caused Vitellius to change his
tactics. Instead of challenging Artabanus to an engagement, and letting the
quarrel be decided by a trial of strength in the open field, he fell back on
the weapon of intrigue so dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish expenditure
of money to excite disaffection once more among the Parthian grandees. This
time the conspiracy was successful. The military disasters of the last two
years had alienated from Artabanus the affections of those whom his previous
cruelties had failed to disgust or alarm ; and he found himself without any
armed force whereon he could rely, beyond a small number of the foreign guards
whom he maintained about his person. It seemed to him that his only safety was
in flight; and accordingly he quitted his capital, and removed himself hastily
to Hyrcania, in the immediate vicinity of the Scythian Dahae, among whom he had
been brought up. Here the population was friendly to him, and he lived a
retired life, waiting (as he said) until the Parthians, who could judge an
absent prince with fairness, although they could not long continue faithful to
a present one, should repent of their behaviour to
him.
When the flight of Artabanus became known to the
Romans, Vitellius immediately advanced to the banks of the Euphrates, and
introduced Tiridates into his kingdom. Fortunate omens were said to have
accompanied the passage of the river, and these were followed by adhesions, the
importance of which was undoubted. Ornospades, satrap
of Mesopotamia, and a former comrade of Tiberius in the Dalmatic war, was the
first to join the standard of the pretender with a large body of horse. Next
came Sinnaces, who had long been in correspondence
with the Romans, with a contingent; then his father, Abdageses—“the
pillar of the party,” as Tacitus calls him—and the keeper of the royal
treasures, together with other persons of high position. Vitellius, on seeing
the pretender thus warmly welcomed by his countrymen, regarded his mission as
accomplished, and returned with his troops into Syria. Tiridates proceeded
through Mesopotamia and Assyria, receiving on his way the submission of many
Greek and some Parthian cities, as Halus and Artemita.
The Greeks saw in his Roman breeding a guarantee of the politeness and refinement
which had been wholly wanting in Artabanus, brought up among the uncivilised Scyths. In the great city of Seleucia he was
received with an obsequiousness that bordered on adulation. Besides paying him
all the customary royal honours, both old and new,
they flatteringly compared him with his predecessor, who, they said, had been
no true Arsacid. Tiridates was pleased to reward these unseemly compliments by
a modification of the Seleucian constitution in a
democratic sense. From Seleucia he crossed the Tigris to Ctesiphon, where,
after a short delay, caused by the absence of some important governors of
provinces, he was crowned King of Parthia according to the established forms by
the Surena, or Commander-in-chief of the period.
Tiridates thought that now all was secure. Artabanus
was in hiding in Hyrcania, leading a miserable existence. The whole of the
western provinces had declared for him, and no signs of hostility appeared in
the East. He deemed his rule acquiesced in generally, and there is reason to
suppose that his anticipations would have proved correct, had not discontent
shown itself at the Court and among the higher officials. There had been many
who had hoped for the office of Grand Vizier, and in nominating one to it
Tiridates had displeased all the rest. There were also many, who through
accident or hesitation in making up their minds had been absent from the
coronation ceremonial, and who believed themselves to be on that account
suspected of disaffection, or at any rate of lukewarmness. It is also more than
probable that the “Roman breeding” of the new monarch, which delighted his
Grecian, offended his Parthian subjects. At any rate, however we may account
for it, disaffection certainly broke out. Emissaries from the nobles sought the
dethroned monarch in his obscure retirement, and placed before him the prospect
of a restoration, which they declared themselves anxious to bring about. Distrustful
at first of what seemed to him mere levity and fickleness, Artabanus was
ultimately persuaded that the overtures made to him were sincere, and that if
he himself were not the object of any very devoted affection on the part of the
malcontents, Tiridates at any rate was the object of a very real and pronounced
hostility. He therefore placed himself in the hands of the conspirators, and,
having first secured the services of a body of Dahae and other Scyths, marched
westward with all speed, anxious at once to cut short the preparations which
were being made to resist him by his enemies, and to forestall the desertions,
which he could not but anticipate, on the part of his friends. The good policy
of this rapid movement is unquestionable. It startled and greatly discomposed
Tiridates and his counsellors. Of these, some recommended an immediate attack
on the troops of Artabanus before they were recovered from the fatigues of
their long march ; while others, and among them Abdageses,
the chief vizier, advised a retreat into Mesopotamia, and a junction with the
Armenian levies, and with the Roman troops, which Vitellius, on the first news
of the insurrection, had thrown across the Euphrates. The more timid counsel prevailed,
and a retreat was determined on. But reculer pour mieux sauter is a
maxim only suited to the West. In the East the first step in retreat is the
first step towards ruin. No sooner was the Tigris crossed and the march through
Mesopotamia begun than the host of Tiridates melted away like an iceberg in the
Gulf Stream. The Arabs of the Mesopotamian desert were the first to break up
and disband themselves, the nearness of their homes offering an irresistible
attraction; but their example was soon followed by the rest of the army, which
had no such excuse. Some directed their steps homewards; others joined the
enemy; Tiridates was at last left with a mere handful of adherents, and,
hastening into Syria, put himself once more under Roman protection.
The attempt to establish the influence of Rome over
the Parthian kingdom, by fixing a Roman puppet on the throne of the Arsacidae, thus proved altogether a failure. But the
general effect of the struggle was advantageous to Rome, and reflects credit on
the prince who, at the age of seventy-seven, at once vindicated the Roman honour and baffled the schemes of one of the ablest of the
Parthian monarchs. Artabanus, when after his various vicissitudes he recovered
his throne, had no longer any stomach for great enterprises. He took no further
steps to disturb Mithridates in his possession of Armenia, and he left
Vitellius unmolested on the Euphrates. When, towards the close of AD 36, or
very early in AD 37, he had an interview with the Roman proconsul halfway
between the two banks of the river, he distinctly renounced all claims to the
Armenian kingdom; at the same time agreeing to send one of his sons, Darius, to
Rome in a position which Rome regarded as that of a hostage, and further
consenting to offer incense to the emblems of Roman sovereignty—an act, as the
Romans understood it, of submission and homage. Artabanus, by these
concessions, the meaning of which he did not perhaps fully understand,
decidedly lowered the prestige of his nation, and yielded to Rome a
pre-eminence which was scarcely admitted by any other monarch, or at any other
period. We cannot be surprised that the credit of concluding such a peace,
though belonging really to Tiberius, was falsely claimed by his flatterers for
Caligula, the new emperor, soon after whose accession in March, AD 37, the news
of the successful negotiations reached Rome.
ASINAI AND ANILAI—AN EPISODE OF PARTHIAN HISTORY.
It was during the troubled reign of Artabanus the
Third, when the state was distracted between foreign war and domestic feud,
that disturbances broke out in Mesopotamia, which have been graphically
described by the Jewish writer Josephus, and which serve to throw considerable
light on the internal condition of the Parthian Empire at this period. There
was a large Jewish element in the population of the more western provinces of
the empire, an element which dated from a time anterior to the rise, not only of
the Parthian, but even of the Persian monarchy. That system of “transplantation
of nations,” which was pursued on so large a scale by the Assyrian and
Babylonian sovereigns of the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries before
Christ, had introduced into the heart of Asia a number of strange
nationalities, and among these there was none more remarkable than that of the
Hebrews. Whatever had become of the descendants of the Ten Tribes—whether in
any places they still constituted distinct communities, or had long ere this
been absorbed into the general population of the country —at any rate, colonies
of Jews, dating from the time of Nebuchadnezzar’s Captivity, maintained themselves,
often in a flourishing condition, in various parts of Babylonia, Armenia,
Media, Mesopotamia, Susiana, and probably in other Parthian provinces. These
colonies exhibited very generally the curious but well-known tendency of the
Jewish race to a rate of increase quite disproportionate to that of the
population among which they are settled. The Hebrew element became continually
larger and more important in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and the adjacent
countries, notwithstanding the large draughts which from time to time were made
upon it by Seleucus Nicator, and others of the Syrian princes. And this alien
element in the population, for the most part prospered. The Jewish settlers
seem to have enjoyed under the Parthians the same sort of toleration, and the
same permission to exercise a species of self-government, which both Jews and
Christians enjoy now in several parts of Turkey. In many cities they formed a recognised community under their own magistrates; some
towns they had wholly to themselves; those who dwelt in Mesopotamia possessed a
common treasury; and it was customary for them to send up to Jerusalem from
time to time the offerings of the faithful, escorted by a convoy of thirty
thousand or forty thousand armed men. The Parthian kings treated them well, and
probably regarded them as a valuable counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and
Syrians of this part of the empire. They laboured under
no disabilities; suffered no oppression; had no grievances of which to complain;
and it would have seemed beforehand very improbable that they would ever become
the cause of trouble or disturbance to the state; but circumstances seemingly
trivial threw the whole community into commotion, and led on to disasters of an
unusual and lamentable character.
There were two young Jews, named respectively Asinai and Anilai, brothers,
natives of Nearda, the city in which the general
treasury of the community was established, who, on suffering some ill-usage at
the hands of the manufacturer in whose service they were, threw up their
employment, and, retiring to a marshy district enclosed between two arms of the
Euphrates, made up their minds to exchange the dull career of honest labour for the more exciting one of robbery. The vagabonds
of the neighbourhood, by the attraction which draws
like to like, soon gathered about them, and a band was formed which in a little
time became the terror of the entire vicinity. They exacted a black mail from
the peaceable population of shepherds and others who lived near them, occasionally
made plundering raids to a distance, and required a contribution from all travellers and merchants who passed through their district.
Their proceedings having become notorious and intolerable, the satrap of
Babylonia thought it his duty to put them down, and marched against them with
the troops at his disposal, intending to take them by surprise on the Sabbath
day, when it was supposed that their religious scruples would prevent them from
making any resistance. But his intentions got wind, and the robber band, having
agreed among themselves to disregard the obligation of the Sabbatical rest,
turned the tables upon their assailant, and, instead of allowing themselves to
be surprised, surprised him, and inflicted on him a severe defeat. Tidings of
the affair having reached Artabanus, who had his hands already sufficiently
occupied, he thought it best to make pacific overtures to the victors, and
having induced them to pay him a visit at his Court, instead of inflicting any
punishment, assigned to Asinai, the elder of the two
brothers, the entire government of the Babylonian satrapy. At first the
experiment appeared to be a success. Raised from the condition of an outlaw to
that of a vitaxa, or Persian provincial
governor, Asinai was perfectly content, and administered
his province with zeal, diligence, and ability. For the space of fifteen years
all things went smoothly in Babylonia, and no complaint was raised against the
administration. At the end of that time, however, the lawless temper which from
the first had characterised the two brothers,
reasserted itself, not, however, in Asinai, but in Anilai. Having fallen in love with the wife of a Parthian
nobleman, who seems to have been the commander of the Parthian troops stationed
in Babylonia, and not knowing how otherwise to accomplish his purpose, he made
an open attack upon the chieftain and killed him. Having thus removed the
obstacle to a marriage, he, within a short space, made the object of his
affections his wife, and having established her as the mistress of his house,
allowed her to introduce into it the heathen rites whereto she had always been
accustomed. But this gave great offence to the entire Jewish community, who
were shocked that idolatrous practices should be permitted in a Hebrew
household, and laid their complaint before Asinai,
calling upon him to interfere in the matter, and compel Anilai to divorce his Parthian wife. Asinai came into their
views, and would probably have enforced them upon his brother, had not the
lady, alarmed at her impending disgrace, and, it may be, sincerely attached to
her Jewish husband, anticipated the accomplishment of the project by secretly
poisoning her brother-in-law. On the death of Asinai the authority which he had wielded with so much satisfaction to all concerned,
passed, apparently without any fresh appointment by the crown, into Anilai’s hands, who thus became satrap of the extensive
province of Babylonia, at this time the most important in the empire.
Anilai,
however, possessed unfortunately none of his brother’s capacity for
administration and government. His instincts were those of a mere ordinary
freebooter, and he was no sooner settled in his province than he proceeded to
give them free vent by invading, without so much as a pretext, the territory of
a neighbouring satrap, named Mithridates, who was not
only a Parthian noble of the highest rank, but was connected with the Royal
house, being married to a daughter of Artabanus. Mithridates flew to arms in
defence of his province, but Anilai, who had military
if he had no other talent, fell suddenly upon his encampment in the night, completely
routed his troops, and took Mithridates himself prisoner. The unhappy captive
was subjected to extreme indignity; by the orders of Anilai,
he was stripped naked, set upon an ass, and in this guise conducted from the
battlefield to the camp of the victors, where he was paraded before the eyes of
the soldiery. Not daring, however, to put to death a connection of the Great
King, of whose vengeance he had a wholeome dread, Anilai felt compelled after a time to release his captive
and allow him to return to his satrapy. There the account which he gave of his
sufferings so exasperated his wife, that she set herself to make his life a
burden to him, and never rested until he consented to collect a second army and
continue the war. His forces advanced against Anilai’s stronghold, but the Jewish captain was too proud to remain within it. Quitting
the marshes, he led his troops a distance of ten miles through a hot and arid
plain to meet the enemy, thus foolishly and quite unnecessarily exhausting
them, and exposing them to the attack of the enemy under circumstances of the
greatest disadvantage. The natural consequence followed. Anilai was defeated with great loss, but he himself escaped, and having enrolled fresh
troops of a worthless character, proceeded to revenge himself by carrying fire
and sword over the lands of his own Babylonian subjects, whom he must have
looked upon as on the point of escaping from his jurisdiction. The unfortunate
natives sent to Nearda and required that Anilai should be given up to them; but the Jews of Nearda, even supposing them to have had the will, had not
the power to comply. Negotiations were then tried, but with no better result,
except that, in the course of them, the Babylonians contrived to obtain an
exact knowledge of the position which Anilai and his
troops occupied, together with a general notion of their habits. Taking
advantage of the knowledge thus acquired, they one night fell suddenly upon
them, when they were all either drunk or asleep, and at one stroke exterminated
the whole band. Such was the end of Anilai.
Up to this point, though the occurrences had been
strange and abnormal, indicative of extreme disorganisation and weakness on the part of the Parthian government, yet no very great harm had
been done. Two Jewish bandits had been elevated into the position of Parthian
satraps, and had borne rule over an important province, with the result, in the
first place, of fifteen years of peace and prosperity, and subsequently of a
short civil war, terminating in the destruction of the surviving robber chief
and the annihilation of the entire band of marauders. But worse consequences
were to follow. The bonds of civil order cannot be relaxed or disturbed without
extreme danger to the whole social edifice. There had long been a smouldering feud between the native Babylonian population
and the Jewish colonists in Babylon, which from time to time had broken out
into actual riot and commotion. Diverse in race, in manners, and in religion,
the two nationalities were always ready to fly at each other’s throats when a
fitting occasion offered. The present seemed an occasion not to be missed;
authority was relaxed; the Jewish element in the population of Mesopotamia was
at once disgraced and weakened. It had made itself obnoxious to the dominant
power in the state, and was not likely to receive government support or
protection. Moved by these considerations, the native Babylonian population,
very shortly after the destruction of Anilai, rose up
against the Hebrews settled in their midst and threatened them with
extermination. Finding themselves unable to make an effectual resistance, and
receiving no assistance from the government, the Hebrews came to a determination
to withdraw from the conflict by retiring altogether from a city where they
provoked such hostility and were subjected to such ill-usage. Notwithstanding
the enormous pecuniary loss which such a migration necessarily entails, and the
vast difficulty of finding new homes for a population of many scores of
thousands, they quitted Babylon in a body and transferred themselves to
Seleucia. Seleucia, originally a Hellenic city, had at this time a tripartite
population, consisting of Greeks, Syrians, and Jews. The Greeks and Syrians
were opposed to each other, but hitherto the Hebrew element had managed to live
on tolerably friendly terms with both the other nationalities. Now, however,
the new-comers felt themselves drawn to the Syrians, who were a kindred race,
and, uniting with them against the Greeks, forced these last to succumb, and to
accept a subordinate position. But such a condition of things could not last;
the Greeks found it insupportable; and before many months were past they
succeeded in gaining over the Syrians to their side, and persuading them to
join in an organised attack upon the Hebrews.
Too weak to make head against so powerful a combination,
the Hebrews were utterly overpowered, and in the massacre that ensued they
lost, it is said, above fifty thousand men. Those who escaped crossed the
Tigris, and transferred their abode to Ctesiphon, but the malice of their
enemies was still unsatisfied. The persecution continued, and did not come to
an end until the entire Jewish population, deserting the metropolitan cities,
withdrew to the smaller provincial towns, which had no other inhabitants.
The series of events here related derives its interest,
partly from its connection with the Jewish people, whose history will always,
more or less, command our sympathies, but partly also, and indeed mainly, from
the light which it throws on the character of the Parthian rule, and the
condition of the countries under Parthian government. Once more the resemblance
between the Parthian and the Turkish systems is brought vividly to our notice,
and the scenes enacted in Syria and the Lebanon before our own eyes—the mutual
animosities of Christian and Druse and Maronite, the terrible conflicts, and
the bloody massacres that have been an indelible disgrace to Turkish
administration, present themselves to our thoughts and memories. The picture
has the same features of antipathies of race, unsoftened by time and contact,
of perpetual feud bursting out into occasional conflict, of undying religious
hatreds, of strange combinations, of massacres, of fearful outrages, and of a
government looking tamely on, and allowing things for the most part to take
their course. It is clear that the Parthian system failed utterly to blend
together or amalgamate the conquered races; and not only so, but that it rubbed
off none of their angles, rendered them after the lapse of centuries not one
whit more friendly, or better disposed one towards another than they had been
at the first, did absolutely nothing towards producing the “unity, peace, and
concord,” which ought to knit together the subjects of a single government, the
constituent elements of a single kingdom. Moreover, the Parthian system, as set
before us in the events which we are considering, was impotent even to effect
the first object of civil government, the securing of quiet and tranquillity within its borders. If we were bound to regard
the events of the Asinai and Anilai episode as representing to us truthfully the normal condition of the peoples
and countries with which it is concerned, and to take the picture as a fair
sample of the general condition of the empire, we should be forced to conclude
that Parthian government was merely a euphemistic name for anarchy, and that it
was a rare good fortune which prevented the State from falling to pieces at
this early period, within three centuries of its establishment. But, on the
whole, there is reason to believe that the reign of Artabanus III puts before
us, not the normal, but an exceptional state of things—a state of things which
could only arise in Parthia when the machinery of government was deranged in
consequence of rebellion and civil war. We have to bear in mind that Artabanus
III was actually twice driven from his kingdom, and that during the greater
part of his reign he lived in perpetual fear of revolt and insurrection. It is not
at all improbable that the culminating atrocities of the struggle which we have
described, synchronised with the second expulsion of
the Parthian monarch, and are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary weakness
of the Parthian rule, as an indication of the terrible strength of the forces
which that rule for the most part restrained and held under control
END OF THE REIGN OF ARTABANUS III—GOTARZES AND HIS
RIVALS.
Artabanus did not continue on the throne very long
after his undignified submission to Vitellius. His proceedings probably
disgusted his subjects, who vented their indignation in murmurs and threats of
revolt. These threats coming to the knowledge of the king, provoked him to
adopt severe measures against the malcontents; who thereupon banded themselves
together, and from malcontents became open conspirators. Artabanus felt himself
unequal to the task of coping with the movement, and, quitting his capital,
fled to the Court of Izates, tributary king of
Adiabene, who received him hospitably, and undertook to replace him upon the
throne from which he had been driven. It lends an interest to this portion of
Parthian history to learn from Josephus, who relates it, that Izates, and his mother, Helena, were converts to Judaism,
and entertained so much affection for the Jewish people as to send supplies of
corn to Jerusalem, when (about AD 44) that city was threatened with famine.
Meanwhile, however, the Parthian Megistanes had
deposed Artabanus, and elected in his place a certain Kinnamus,
or Cinnamus, a distant relation of the cashiered
monarch, brought up by him in his house. War would probably have broken out had
not Cinnamus, who was of a gentle disposition, waived
his claim in favour of his benefactor, and written to
him, inviting him to return. Artabanus upon this remounted his throne, while Cinnamus carried his magnanimity so far as to take the
diadem from his own head, and, replacing it on that of the old monarch, to
salute him as king. It was a condition of the restoration, guaranteed both by
Artabanus and Izates, that the transaction should be
accompanied by a complete amnesty for all political offences. Such mildness,
very unusual among the Parthians, may perhaps be ascribed to the gentle
councils of the Judaean Izates.
It seems that Artabanus died very shortly after his
restoration to the throne. His last days were clouded by the calamity of the
revolt of Seleucia, far the most important of the Hellenic cities of the
empire. We may assume that the disturbed condition of the Parthian kingdom, the
frequent revolts, the occasional civil wars, the manifest tendency to
disruption which the empire about this time showed, had raised among the
Hellenic subjects of the Parthian crown, always disaffected, a belief, or at any
rate a hope, that they might succeed in shaking off the yoke of their barbaric
lords. Seleucia, naturally, took the lead. Had she succeeded in establishing
her independence, other lesser towns, as Apollonia, Nicephorium,
Edessa, Carrhae, might have followed her example. Rome might have been called
in as a protector, and might perhaps have undertaken the charge. An imperium
in imperio might conceivably have been
established. But, as the event proved, the attempt now made was ill- judged. Though
Artabanus himself failed to recover the revolted city, which maintained a
precarious independence for the space of over six years (AD 40-46), yet there
was at no time any reasonable prospect of a prosperous issue. Rome held aloof.
The unhappy Greeks were overmatched. Though Parthia was thought to have
incurred some disgrace by her inability to reduce a single rebel city to
subjection for the space of nearly seven years, yet ultimately she prevailed.
Seleucia succumbed to a son of Artabanus in AD 46, and resumed a subject
position under her old masters.
On the death of Artabanus, the succession was disputed
between two of his sons, Vardanes and Gotarzes. According to Josephus, the
crown was left by his father to the former, who was probably the elder of the
two; but, as he happened to be at a distance, while Gotarzes was present in the
capital, or close at hand, the last named had the opportunity of occupying the
throne, and, being an ambitious prince, availed himself of it. He reigned,
however, at this time only for a few weeks. Having put to death a brother,
named Artabanus, together with his wife and son, and otherwise shown a
tyrannical disposition, he so alarmed his subjects, that they sent hurriedly
for Vardanes, and offered him the post of king. Vardanes, a man of prompt
action, instantly complied, and, having accomplished a journey of 350 miles in
two days, drove Gotarzes from the kingdom; after which he received the
submission of the provinces and cities generally, the only exception being
Seleucia, which maintained its revolt, and resisted all his efforts to reduce
it. Meantime Gotarzes had fled to the Dahae of the Caspian region, and thrown
himself upon their support and protection. The Dahae, who wee not Parthian
subjects, willingly gave him an asylum; and from this secure retreat he
proceeded to seduce the neighbouring Hyrcanians from
their allegiance to his brother, and drew together so large a power, that
Vardanes felt himself under the necessity of raising the siege of Seleucia, and
marching in person to the distant East. The two armies confronted each other in
the plain country of Bactria, but before they came to an engagement, the
commanders on either side thought it expedient to hold a conference, and
arrange, if possible, terms of peace. It had come to the knowledge of Gotarzes,
that there was a design afloat among the chief nobles in either army to get rid
of both the brothers, and elect to the throne a wholly new king. Having
informed his brother of this alarming discovery, he succeeded in arranging a
secret meeting with him, where pledges were interchanged, and an understanding
come to with respect to the future. Gotarzes agreed to relinquish his claims to
the Parthian crown, and was assigned a residence in Hyrcania, which was
probably made over to his government. Vardanes returned to the West, and
resuming his siege operations, finally compelled Seleucia to a surrender in the
year AD 46, the seventh year of the insurrection.
Regarding himself now as firmly settled in his
kingdom, and as having nothing more to fear from his brother, Vardanes thought
that the time was come for taking in hand a new and important enterprise. This
was no less than the recovery of Armenia from the Roman influence. That
country, relinquished to Tiberius by Artabanus III in AD 37, and placed by Rome
under the government of Mithridates, an Iberian, had suffered various
vicissitudes, and was now (AD 46) extremely discontented with its ruler, as
well as with his Roman patrons and upholders. Vardanes thought that there would
be no great difficulty in driving out Mithridates from the kingdom upon which
he had so weak a hold, and replacing Armenia within the sphere of the Parthian
rule and influence. But for success in such an enterprise he required the
hearty concurrence and support of his principal feudatories, and especially of
the great Izates, whose services to Artabanus had
been rewarded by an important enlargement of his dominions, and who was now
king both of Adiabene and of Gordyene or Upper
Mesopotamia. Accordingly, he took this prince into his councils, arid requested
his opinion as to the prudence of the course which he was contemplating. Izates gave the project his most strenuous opposition. He
was profoundly convinced of the military strength and greatness of Rome, and on
that account wholly disinclined to quarrel with her, while further he had a
private and personal motive for desiring to maintain amicable relations with
the great Western power from the fact that five of his sons were residing in
Rome, whither he had sent them in order that they might receive a polite education.
He refused, therefore, to abet Vardanes in his design, and the latter,
indignant at a refusal, which he regarded as an act of rebellion, proceeded to
engage in hostilities against his feudatory.
It was probably this condition of things which induced
Gotarzes suddenly to come forth from his retirement, and again assert his claim
to the Parthian throne—a claim which he had only withdrawn under the pressure
of necessity. The quarrel of Vardanes with Izates had
weakened his power, and inclined even the nobles who had hitherto supported his
cause to desert him, and go over to his adversary. Many of them invited
Gotarzes to resume the struggle; and Vardanes found himself compelled for the
second time to march eastward. Several battles were fought between the two
pretenders to the throne in the country between the Caspian and Herat, in which
the advantage mostly rested with Vardanes; but his successes in the field
failed to overcome the aversion in which he was held by his subjects; and on
his return from the war a number of them, in spite of the glory which he had
acquired, conspired against him, and treacherously slew him in the
hunting-field.
Gotarzes was then unanimously accepted as king, and
reigned for some years in peace. But he had the common Parthian defect of a
cruel and suspicious temper, while he added to this defect the comparatively
unusual faults of indolence and addiction to luxury. In a short time he
alienated the affections of his subjects from him, partly by his severities, partly
by his luxurious living, and to some extent by his ill-success in some small
military expeditions. In the year AD 49, steps were taken by those especially
opposed to him, for relieving their country from the incubus of a thoroughly
bad king. Claudius, the Roman Emperor, was approached, and entreated to come to
the aid of his Parthian “friends and allies.” “The rule of Gotarzes,” they
said, “had become intolerable, alike to the nobility and the common people. He
had murdered all his male relations, or at least all those who were within his
reach—first his brothers, then his near kinsmen, finally even those whose
relationship was more remote; nor had he stopped there; he had proceeded to put
to death their young children and their pregnant wives. He was sluggish in his
habits, unfortunate in his wars, and had betaken himself to cruelty, that men
might not utterly despise him for his want of manliness. They knew that Rome
and Parthia were bound together by the terms of a treaty, and they wanted no
infringement of it. Let Rome send them an Arsacid worthy of reigning in the
place of the unworthy scion of the house under whose tyranny they groaned. They
asked for Meherdates, the son of Vonones, and
grandson of Phraates IV, who was resident at Rome, and, having been so long
accustomed to Roman manners, might be expected to rule justly and moderately.”
This speech was delivered in the Roman Senate, Claudius being present, and also Meherdates, the candidate for the Parthian throne.
The Emperor made a favourable response—“He would
follow the example of the Divine Augustus, and allow the Parthians to receive
from Rome the monarch whom they requested. That prince, bred up in the City,
had always been remarkable for his moderation. He would (it was to be hoped)
regard himself in his new position, not as a master of slaves, but as a ruler
of citizens. He would find that clemency and justice were the more appreciated
by a barbarous people, the less they had experience of them. Meherdates might accompany the Parthian envoys; and a Roman
of rank, Caius Cassius, the prefect of Syria, should be instructed to receive
them on their arrival in Asia, and to see them safely across the Euphrates.”
Meherdates thus set out for his proposed kingdom under the fairest auspices. He
had a large party devoted to his cause in Parthia itself; he was backed by the
great name of Rome; and he had the active support of a Roman of distinction,
well acquainted with the East, and of good antecedents. Moreover, when he
arrived at Zeugma on the Euphrates, he found himself welcomed, not only by a
number of the Parthian nobles, but by a personage of great importance in those
parts, no other than Abgarus, the Osrhoenian king,
who commanded the passages of the Euphrates, and held the country to the east
of the river, probably as far as the Khabour, or at
any rate of the Ras-el-Ain, its western tributary.
The parting advice of Cassius to his young protege was, that he should lose no
time in pressing forward against his rival, Gotarzes, since the barbarians were
always impetuous at the commencement, but lost their energy, or even grew
perfidious, if there was delay. Meherdates, however,
fell entirely under the influence of the Osrhoenian monarch, who seems to have been a traitor, like his predecessor in the time of
Crassus, and to have determined from the first to lure the young prince to his
destruction. By the persuasions of Abgarus, Meherdates was induced, first of all, to waste precious time while he indulged in a series
of feasts and banquets at Edessa, the Osrhoenian capital, and then to proceed against his antagonist by the difficult and
circuitous Armenian route, which followed the course of the Tigris by Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh,
instead of striking directly across Mesopotamia to Ctesiphon. The rough mountain
passes and the snow-drifts of Armenia harassed his troops and seriously delayed
his progress, ample time being thus given to Gotarzes for collecting a strong
force and disposing it in the most convenient situations. Fortune, however,
still continued to smile on the pretender. When he reached Adiabene, Izates, the powerful monarch of that tract, openly embraced
his cause, and brought a body of troops to his assistance. Pressing forward
towards Ctesiphon, Meherdates possessed himself of
the fort which occupied the ancient site of Nineveh, as well as of the strong
post of Arbela, and there found himself in the near vicinity of his adversary.
But Gotarzes was unwilling to risk all on the fate of a battle. He stood on the
defensive, with the river Corma in his front, and would not suffer himself to
be provoked, or tempted, to an engagement. Reinforcements were still reaching
him, and he had a good hope of drawing to his own side, or at any rate
persuading to neutrality, a portion of his adversary’s adherents, if he could
set his emissaries at work among them. These tactics were crowned with success.
After a brief hesitation, Izates, the Adiabenian, and Abgarus, the Osrhoenian monarch, proved faithless to the cause which they had professedly espoused, and
drew off their troops. Meherdates feared that other
desertions might follow, and resolved, before losing more of his army, to precipitate
a fight. Gotarzes being also willing to engage, since he was no longer
outnumbered, the battle took place. It was stoutly contested. For a long time
neither side could boast any decided advantage ; but at last Carrhenes, the chief general on the side of Meherdates, having repulsed the troops opposed to him, was
tempted to pursue them too far, and being intercepted by the enemy on his
return was either killed or made prisoner. His misfortune decided the
engagement. The loss of their principal commander caused a general panic among
the soldiers of Meherdates, who dispersed in all
directions. The pretender might perhaps have escaped; but having entrusted his
person to a certain Parrhaces, a dependent of his
father’s, who promised to conduct him to a place of safety, he was seized,
bound, and delivered up to Gotarzes. Gotarzes seems to have been touched with
compassion by his rival’s youth and helplessness. Instead of awarding him the
usual punishment of rebels and pretenders who fall into their enemies’ hands,
he contented himself with inflicting on him a slight mutilation, sufficient,
according to Oriental ideas, to incapacitate him from ever exercising
sovereignty.
This victory which brought the troubles of Gotarzes
with his rivals to an end, was regarded by him as worthy of commemoration in an
unusual way. The Parthians had but little taste for mimetic art, and seldom
indulged in artistic representations of any of the events of their history. But
Gotarzes on this occasion took the exceptional course of commemorating his
achievement by a rock tablet. On the great and sacred mountain of Behistun (originally, Baghistan,
“The Place of the Gods”), which was already adorned by a sculptured tablet
representing the Achaemenian monarch, Darius, the son of Hystaspes, with two
attendants, receiving a number of conquered rebels, he caused to be engraved a
second, though much smaller tablet, representative of his own exploit. In this
he appeared seated on horseback, with a heavy spear in his right hand, while a
Victory flying in the air crowned him with a wreath or diadem, and behind him
his army galloped over the plain in pursuit of the flying foe. Some of the figures
formed, apparently, a walking procession; while an inscription in the Greek
character and language explained the intention of the monument. This
inscription is now almost illegible, but, when first found, contained in two
places the name “Gotarzes,” and in one the name “Mithrates,”
an undoubted equivalent of “Meherdates.”
It appears that the successful monarch did not long
survive his victory. His death, which is assigned by the best authorities to
the year AD 50, is variously related by the historians. According to Tacitus,
it was natural, the result of disease; but according to Josephus it was
violent, and effected by a conspiracy. There would be nothing surprising in
this, since through his whole reign he was unpopular, and must have had many
bitter enemies. But Tacitus is an authority who cannot be lightly set aside;
and his emphatic words — “morbo obiit”
— have generally been accepted as closing controversy on the subject. The reign
of Gotarzes must be considered to have helped forward in no small degree the disorganisation of the Parthian state. It showed Rome how
easy it was to interfere in the internal affairs of her eastern neighbour, and
to paralyse her action beyond her frontier, by
raising troubles within it. It accustomed the Parthians themselves to intrigue,
civil war, and confusion. It must have tended, moreover, to exhaust the
resources of the empire. At any rate the downward course of the state from this
time, though not rapid, is marked and continuous; and, though the tenacity of
the race enables it to prolong its independent existence for nearly two
centuries longer, yet the student of the history clearly sees that a decline
has set in from which any real recovery is impossible.
PARTHIA IN THE TIME OF NERO—VOLOGASES I AND CORBULO.
Gotarzes was succeeded by a distant relative, an
Arsacid called Vonones, and known in Parthian history as “Vonones the Second.”
This prince did not occupy the throne more than about two months, and is
chiefly remarkable as the father of three kings much more celebrated than
himself—Vologases I, King of Parthia, Tiridates, King of Armenia, and Pacorus,
dependent King of Media. Tiridates appears to have been the eldest, Pacorus the
second, and Vologases the third son; but, on the death of their father, the two
elder princes agreed to cede the Parthian throne to their younger brother. This
was the more remarkable as Vologases was the son of Vonones by a Greek
concubine, whereas his two brothers were legitimate. Probably he had given
indications of an ability, which they did not recognise in themselves, and for which he may have been indebted to the foreign blood
that flowed in his veins. At any rate he found himself; in AD. 50 or 51,
established upon the throne, and able to reward Pacorus for his complaisance by
bestowing on him the quasi-royal government of Media. For Tiridates something
more was needed, and Vologases may be presumed to have been anxiously on the
watch, during the earlier portion of his reign, for an opportunity of
conferring on his other brother a dignity worthy of his acceptance. The
opportunity came in AD 51, through circumstances which had lighted up the
flames of war in the neighbouring territory of
Armenia.
The origin of the strife was the following. Rhadamistus, the eldest son of Pharasmanes,
King of Iberia, was a youth of such recklessness, and possessed with such a
lust for power, that, for the security of his own crown, his father thought it
necessary to divert his son’s thoughts to the acquisition of another. He
therefore pointed out to him that his uncle, Mithridates, King of Armenia under
the Romans, was a most unpopular ruler, and that it might not be difficult to
supplant him, if he took up his residence at his court and gave his mind to ingratiating
himself with the Armenian people. The ambitious youth followed the advice
offered him, and ere long succeeded in making himself a general favourite, after which, having contrived to get Mithridates
into his power, he ruthlessly put him to death, together with his wife and
children. This was a challenge to the Romans, who had established Mithridates
in his kingdom; but the Roman officer, Ummidius Quadratus, president of Syria,
whose business it was to take up the challenge, neglected to do so, and another
official, Julius Pelignus, procurator of Cappadocia,
even went further, and authorised Rhadamistus to assume the title and insignia of king. A large party in Armenia was,
however, adverse to the new rule, distrusted Rhadamistus,
and condemned the course which he had pursued. The country was accordingly
thrown into a ferment; and Vologases, having recently ascended the Parthian
throne, and needing a principality for his brother Tiridates, thought he saw in
the situation of Armenia an excellent opportunity of at once gratifying his
brother and advancing his own reputation. To detach Armenia once more from the
dominion of Rome and re-attach it to Parthia would be a happy inauguration of
his reign, and one that would draw down upon him the open applause and secret
envy of his neighbours.
Accordingly, Vologases, in AD 51, the year of his
accession, having collected a large force, led an expedition into Armenia. At
first it seemed as if he would effect an easy conquest. The Iberian garrison,
on whose support Rhadamistus principally relied,
quitted the field without risking a battle; his Armenian troops made but a poor
resistance; Artaxata and Tigranocerta, his two
principal cities, opened their gates to the foe; Vologases took possession of
Armenia, and established Tiridates at Artaxata, the
capital. But this fair beginning was soon clouded over. A severe winter, and
some defect in the commissariat arrangements, caused the outburst of a
pestilence, which so thinned the Parthian garrisons that Vologases was
compelled to withdraw them. Rhadamistus returned,
and, though ill-received by his subjects, and occasionally in danger of losing
his life, on the whole contrived to maintain himself during the three years
extending from AD 51 to 54, and was still in possession when Vologases, in the
last-named year, having brought some other wars to an end, found himself in a
position to resume his designs upon Armenia.
The delay in grappling with the Armenian difficulty
had had a double origin. In AD 52 a dispute had arisen between Vologases and
one of his principal feudatories, Izates, vitaxa of Adiabene, whose pretensions to exclusive
privileges appeared to his feudal lord excessive and even dangerous. After
fruitless negotiations, Izates appealed to arms, and
took up a position on the Lower Zab, which was the southern limit of his
territory. Vologases had advanced to the opposite bank of the river, and was on
the point of crossing, and attacking his adversary when tidings reached him of
the invasion of his own dominions by a foreign enemy. The Dahae, and the
Scythians in their neighbourhood, had passed into
Parthia Proper from the Caspian region, and were threatening to carry fire and
sword through the entire province.
Domestic revolt could be chastised at any time, but a
foreign foe must be met as soon as he showed himself. Vologases, accordingly,
marched away from Adiabene to the Parthian and Hyrcanian frontier, east of the
Caspian sea, where he met and repulsed the band of marauders, who had probably
only ventured to invade his territory because they knew him to be engaged in a
serious quarrel at a considerable distance, and imagined that they would
therefore be unresisted. Successful in this quarter, he was about to resume his
operations in Adiabene, when information reached him of the death of Izates, which brought his domestic difficulties to an end.
The pretensions of the deceased monarch had been personal, being grounded upon
special privileges granted him by Artabanus III., which would not pass to a
successor, and Vologases had consequently no quarrel with Monobazus, Izates’ brother, who had inherited his throne. He
thus found himself, at the close of AD 53, wholly his own master, and free to
engage in whatever enterprise might seem to him most promising.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that,
in AD 54, he turned his attention once more to Armenian affairs, and resumed
his project of establishing his brother, Tiridates, upon the throne of that
ancient, and still semi-independent, kingdom. Rhadamistus,
though he continued in possession of the nominal sovereignty, had failed to
establish his power, or to obtain any firm hold on the affections of his
subjects, and might be attacked with a good prospect of success, unless he
received external assistance. The real question was, would Rome interfere?
Would she come to the aid of a monarch, who had not received his throne from
herself, but had obtained it by supplanting, and finally murdering, her protégé
Vologases was probably aware that a new sovereign had recently ascended the
Imperial throne, a youth not yet eighteen years of age, one wholly destitute of
military tastes or training, devoted to music and the arts, who could not be
credited with very keen patriotic feelings, or with a very full comprehension
of the niceties of the political situation. Would this raw youth grasp the
meaning of a diminution of Roman influence in the far East, or rush to arms
because a border kingdom—not a Roman province—wavered in its allegiance?
Vologases, it would seem, answered three questions in the negative: or perhaps,
while recognising the risk, he may have thought the
immediate advantage so great as to make it worth his while to encounter the
hazard. At any rate, early in AD 54, he made his invasion, drove Rhadamistus out of Armenia, reduced the whole country to
subjection, and established his brother, Tiridates, as king in the capital city
of Artaxata.
The boldness of this stroke took the Romans by
surprise, and produced something like a panic in the Imperial city. But the
traditions of Imperial policy were too firmly fixed in the minds of the
official class for any doubt to be entertained as to the necessity of meeting
and resisting the aggression. Orders went forth at once for recruiting the
Oriental legions up to their full strength, and for moving them nearer to the
Armenian frontier; preparations were made for bridging the Euphrates; Agrippa
II, King of Chalcis, and Antiochus, King of Commagene, were ordered to raise
troops and make ready for an invasion of Parthia; new governors were appointed
over Sophene and the Lesser Armenia; above and beyond
all, the brave and experienced Corbulo, universally
allowed to be the best general of the time, was summoned from his command in
Germany, and given the general superintendence of the war in Armenia, with
Cappadocia and Galatia as his provinces. Ummidius Quadratus was maintained in
the proconsulship of Syria, but required to
co-operate with Corbulo, and made practically his
second in command. Four legions, together with numerous auxiliaries were
concentrated on the Armenian frontier, and it seemed as if the next year would
see the contest between Rome and Parthia renewed on a scale which would recall
the times of Antony and Phraates IV.
But to ardent spirits the new year brought nothing but
disappointment. Instead of rushing to arms, and pouring their combined legions
into Armenia or Parthia, the two Roman commanders suddenly showed a disposition
for peace. Emissaries from both sought the Court of Vologases with offers of
peace—offers which implied an acceptance of the status quo, provided that the
Parthian monarch would take no further steps in opposition to Rome, and would
place some Parthians of importance in the hands of the Romans as hostages. This
he was quite willing to do, as he knew many of the nobles to be disaffected,
and their absence from his Court would relieve him of the necessity of watching
them. Internal troubles, probably fomented by Rome had commenced by the open
revolt of his son, Vardanes, whose defection from his father Tacitus places in
AD 54, and whose coins show that he had assumed the royal title, and set
himself up as a rival to Vologases, certainly before the end of the next year.
A truce with Rome was, consequently, what the Parthian monarch must earnestly
have desired; and we can only feel surprised that the Roman commanders should
have consented to play into his hands, and have left him wholly unmolested in
the time of his greatest difficulties. Probably they were already jealous of
each other, and disinclined to press forward a war in which each felt that mere
accident might give the chief laurels to the other.
Vologases was thus able to give his whole attention,
during the three years from AD 55 to AD 58, to the contest with his son. Its
details have not come down to us; but it appears to be certain that by the
spring of 58 he had succeeded in crushing the revolt, and re-establishing his
authority over the whole kingdom. Aa Vardanes is no more heard of, we may
presume that he either perished in battle, or was executed. His coins, which
are numerous, belong to the years 55-58, and show a strong, masculine, type of
face, with an expression that is fierce and determined.
The Great King, being now at liberty to resume the
projects and plans, which his son’s rebellion had compelled him to drop, took
up once more the Armenian question, which was still unsettled between his own
Court and that of Rome, and by his envoys pressed for a final arrangement. He
claimed that of right, and by ancient possession, Armenia was a Parthian
province, or at least a Parthian dependency, and required that not only should
Tiridates be left in undisturbed possession of it, but that there should be a
distinct understanding that he held it, not as a Roman, but as a Parthian,
feudatory. To this the Romans, and especially Corbulo,
demurred. Armenia, they said, had been added to the Roman Empire by Lucullus,
or at any rate by Pompey, and it was not consistent with the greatness of Rome
to surrender territory which she had once acquired. Let Tiridates remain quiet,
and the matter be settled by negotiation; otherwise Rome would be compelled to
use force. Corbulo had utilised the three years of waiting by recruiting his legions from Cappadocia and
Galatia, by tightening their discipline, and by accustoming them to the
hardships of winter marches and movements; he had also obtained an additional
legion from Germany; and he now felt ready for a campaign.
Tiridates soon gave him the opportunity which he seems
to have desired. Having received a contingent of troops from Vologases, he
commenced proceedings against the Roman partisans in Armenia, harrying them
with fire and sword; whereupon Corbulo crossed the
frontier to their relief. A number of partial engagements were fought in which
Rome had the advantage, and at last, after three years’ fighting, Tiridates,
having lost his capital city, Artaxata, in AD 58, and
Tigranocerta, the second city of his kingdom, in AD 60, withdrew from the
contest, and yielded the entire possession of Armenia to the Romans. By the favour of Nero, Tigranes, grandson of Archelaus, a former
monarch of Cappadocia, was made king; but, as his ability to administer so
large a territory was doubted, portions of it were detached from his rule, and
made over to the neighbouring princes. Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemo of
Pontus, Aristobulus of the Lesser Armenia, and Antiochus of Commagene, profited
by the new arrangement, which could not, however, but be distasteful to the
Armenians, who saw the country of which they were so proud, not merely
conquered, but broken into fragments.
Corbulo’s success must be attributed in a great measure to the absence of
Vologases from the scene of contest. The Armenian monarch had been called away
in AD 58 to his north-eastern frontier by a revolt, perhaps fomented by Rome,
of the distant province of Hyrcania, and had found full occupation there for
his utmost energies, so that he was wholly unable to lend effectual aid to his
brother. But, about the year AD 62, the Hyrcanian troubles came to an end, and,
the hands of Vologases being once more free, he had to consider and determine
whether he should accept the state of things established in Armenia by Corbulo, or interfere by force of arms to modify it. To
what conclusion he would have come, had his own dominions been left unmolested,
it is impossible to say: as it was, the intolerable aggressions of Tigranes
upon his rich province of Adiabene, and the bitter complaints of his subjects,
who threatened to transfer their allegiance to Rome, left him no choice. His
own interests and the honour of his country alike
required him to assert his cause in arms; and Vologases, having made up his
mind to declare war, announced his intention to a council of his nobles in a
speech which is reported as follows: “Parthians, when I obtained the
sovereignty of Parthia by the cession of my brothers’ claims, my intention was
to substitute for the old system of fraternal hatred and strife, a new one of
domestic affection and agreement; my brother Pacorus, accordingly, received
Media from my hands at once; and Tiridates, whom you see now present before
you, I shortly afterwards inducted into the royal appanage of Armenia, a
dignity reckoned the third in the Parthian kingdom. Thus I put my family
matters on a peaceful and satisfactory footing. But these arrangements are now
disturbed by the Romans, who have never hitherto gained anything by breaking
faith with us, and will scarcely do so on the present occasion. I shall not
deny that up to this time I have proposed to maintain my right to the dominions
left me by my ancestors by fair dealing rather than by shedding of blood, by
negotiation rather than by arms; if however I have erred in this, and have been
weak to delay so long, I will now amend my fault by showing the more vigour. You at any rate have lost nothing by my holding
back; your strength is intact, your glory undiminished. Nay, you have added to
your other well-known merits, the credit of moderation—a virtue which not even
the highest among men can afford to despise, and which the gods view with
special favour?” His speech ended, Vologases placed a
diadem on the brow of Tiridates, in token of his determination to restore him
to the Armenian throne, at the same time commanding Moneses,
a Parthian noble, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian king, to take the field and invade Armenia,
while he himself collected the whole strength of the empire, and marched to
attack the Roman legions on the Euphrates.
The campaign which followed was of less importance
than might have been anticipated from these preparations for it. Vologases,
instead of invading Syria, marched no further than Nisibis, which was well
within the limits of his own dominions. Moneses and Monobazus, on the other hand, carried out the concerted
programme, and having invaded Armenia, and advanced to Tigranocerta, which had
now become the capital of the kingdom, besieged Tigranes in that city (AD. 62).
But the Parthian attack on walled places was always ineffective, and Tigranocerta
happened to be exceptionally strong. The walls are said to have been
seventy-five feet in height, the river Nicephorius, a
broad stream, washed a portion of them; a huge moat protected the remainder;
the town was strongly garrisoned; and the besieging force, though not wanting
in gallantry, proved unable to make any serious impression upon the place.
Vologases, as time went on, began to despair of effecting very much under
existing circumstances by force of arms, and leant towards negotiation, which Corbulo invited. His army, which consisted almost entirely
of cavalry, was reduced to inaction by want of forage, Mesopotamia having
recently suffered from a plague of locusts. Hence he consented to conclude a
truce with his antagonist, and to send a fresh embassy to Rome for the purpose
of making a satisfactory arrangement. The truce was to last until the
ambassadors returned ; and, meanwhile, Armenia was to be evacuated by both
parties, and care was to be taken that no collision should occur between the
soldiers of the two nations.
But this well-meant effort at pacification was
entirely without result. Nero gave the envoys no answer; and, indeed, he had
made arrangements before their arrival, from which he anticipated a triumphant
issue to the contest instead of a mere patched-up and unstable convention. At
the request of Corbulo, who was anxious not to arouse
his jealousy, he had sent out a second commander to the East, a special favourite of his own, and from the conduct of the war by
this new leader he looked for immediate results of the most important
character. L. Caesennius Paetus was a man of energy and boldness, confident in himself, and contemptuous of the
prudence and caution of his colleague. He held a separate command, with forces
equal to those led by Corbulo, and soon let it be
known that he was about to carry on the war in a new fashion. “Corbulo,” he said, “had shown no dash or vigour; he had neither plundered nor massacred; if he had
besieged cities, it had been in name rather than in reality. His own method
would be different. Instead of setting up shadowy kings he would bring Armenia
under Roman law, and reduce it to the condition of a province.” These brave
words were followed up by a show of brave deeds. Crossing the Euphrates, Paetus invaded Armenia with two legions, and spreading his
troops over a wide extent of country, burnt the strongholds, ravaged the territory,
and carried off a considerable booty. But he neither fought a single battle,
nor ventured to besiege a single town. As winter approached, he withdrew his
troops into Cappadocia, but, intent on pleasing his Imperial master, he gave in
his despatches an exaggerated account of what he had
achieved in his short campaign, and spoke as if the war was well-nigh over.
Corbulo,
on his part, maintained the prudent attitude habitual to him. He bridged the
Euphrates in the face of a large opposing force by anchoring vessels laden with
military engines in mid-stream. He then passed his troops across, and occupied
a strong position in the hills at a little distance from the river, where he
caused his legions to construct an entrenched camp, and remained on the
defensive. He greatly distrusted Paetus, and would
not allow himself to be so entangled in military operations as not to be able at
any moment to march to his colleague’s assistance if he should hear that he was
in any danger.
The prudence of this course soon became evident. Paetus, regarding the season for war as over, sent one of
his legions to winter in Pontus, while he himself with the other two took up
his quarters in the country between the Taurus and the Euphrates, and allowed
free furloughs to all the soldiers who applied for them. While his legions were
in this way much weakened, he suddenly heard that Vologases, braving the inclemency
of the season, was advancing against him at the head of a strong force. The
crisis revealed his incapacity. He was uncertain whether to await the enemy in
quarters or to take the field against him, whether to concentrate his troops or
to disperse them. Now he adopted one course, now another. The only consistency
that he showed was in imploring aid from Corbulo, to
whom he sent messenger after messenger. That general, however, was in no hurry
to render help, since he did not wish to appear upon the scene as deliverer
until it was clear that the danger threatening Paetus was imminent. Vologases, meanwhile, steadily pursued his way. Without
attempting any rapid movements, he closed in upon Paetus,
his adversary, swept away the small force that Paetus had detached to guard the passes of Taurus, and blocked up the remainder of his
army in a position from which extrication, unless his colleague, came to his
aid, was almost impossible. Corbulo was now on his
march, and pressing forward with all speed, but a panic had seized on Paetus and his soldiers. Though he had abundant provisions,
and might have prolonged the defence for weeks, or even for months, yet in his
cowardly alarm he preferred to precipitate matters, and having entered into
negotiations with Vologases, he practically capitulated to him. The terms
granted were, that the blockaded army should be allowed to quit its
entrenchments, and be free to march away, but that it must at once quit
Armenia; its stores and its fortified posts must be surrendered; no further
hostilities must be engaged in; and Paetus should
obtain from Nero the exact conditions on which he would now be willing to make
peace. These terms were carried out, not however without the addition of some
further insults and indignities. The Parthians entered the Roman entrenchments
before the legionaries had quitted them, claiming and seizing whatever they
professed to recognise as Armenian spoil; they even
took possession of the soldiers’ arms and clothes, which were tamely
relinquished to them with the object of avoiding a conflict. Armenia was then
quitted hastily, and not without disorder, Paetus setting the example of unseemly hurry. Corbulo was
reached after a three days’ march, and received the fugitives without reproaches,
and with every demonstration of sympathy.
Vologases followed up his success against Paetus by at once re-establishing his brother, Tiridates,
in the Armenian kingdom. At the same time he devised a plan whereby, he
thought, the interminable quarrel between the two empires of Rome and Parthia
might be made up, and a modus vivendi arrived at. Rome, under Nero at any rate,
was not really bent upon further conquests. It was rather her honour for which she was jealous than her power which she
desired to see augmented. Vologases therefore sent an embassy to the Court of
Nero, and explained that, so long as his brother was accepted and acknowledged
by Rome as Armenian king, he would offer no objection to his going in person to
Rome and receiving investiture from the Imperial hands. Nero and his
counsellors in reality approved this compromise, but they felt that it would be
too palpable a surrender of former claims, and too manifestly a concession
extorted by recent disaster, if they closed with the suggestion of the
Parthian monarch at once. No; Rome must not make an open confession of defeat;
her recession from a claim must be glossed over, cloaked. Dust must be thrown
in the eyes of the nations, and they must be induced to think that, whatever
change Rome made in her political arrangements was made of her own free will,
and because she regarded it as for her advantage. Accordingly, the envoys of
Vologases were dismissed with an ambiguous answer. Paetus was recalled from the East, and Corbulo reinstated in
sole command, and invested with a new and almost unlimited authority. The
number of his troops was augmented, and their quality improved by draughts from
Egypt and Illyri- cum. He was bidden once more to
take the offensive, and, in the spring of AD 63, he crossed the frontier, and
penetrated to the heart of Armenia by the road formerly opened by Lucullus.
Tiridates met him, not however in arms, but for negotiation. On the site of the
camp of Paetus, an interview was held between the
Roman general and the Armenian monarch, where the terms suggested by the envoys
of Vologases at Rome were accepted. It was agreed that Rome should withdraw her
support from Tigranes, and acknowledge Tiridates as rightful monarch, while
Tiridates should perform an act of homage to Rome for his kingdom, and be
nominally Rome’s feudatory. To indicate his acceptance of these terms,
Tiridates, in the presence of Corbulo and his suite,
divested himself of the regal ensigns, and placed them at the foot of the
statue of Nero, undertaking not to resume them except at Nero’s hands. For
actual investiture he undertook to journey to Rome as soon as circumstances
permitted, and meanwhile he placed in the hands of Corbulo one of his daughters as a hostage. Corbulo, on his
part, undertook that Tiridates should be treated with the utmost honour and respect, both during his stay at Rome and on his
journey to and from Italy, should be entitled to wear his sword, and have free
access to all the provincial authorities upon the route. Peace was made upon
these terms to the satisfaction of both parties, and it only remained that the
terms should be. faithfully executed.
The execution was delayed for the space of above two
years; but in the spring of AD 66, Tiridates, having set the affairs of Armenia
in order, started upon his promised journey, accompanied by his wife, by a
number of the Parthian princes and nobles, including sons of Vologases,
Pacorus, and Monobazus, and by an escort of three
thousand Parthian cavalry in all the glittering array of their gold ornaments
and bright-gleaming panoplies. The long cavalcade passed, like a magnificent
triumphal procession, through two-thirds of the Roman Empire, and was
everywhere received with warmth, and entertained with profuse hospitality. The
provincial cities which lay upon the line of route selected were gaily
decorated to receive their unwonted visitors, and the loud acclamations of the
assembled multitudes showed that they fully appreciated the novel spectacle.
The whole journey, except the passage of the Hellespont, was made by land, the
cavalcade proceeding through Thrace and Illyricum to the head of the Adriatic
Gulf, and then descending the peninsula. The Roman Treasury defrayed the entire
expenses of the travellers, which are said to have
amounted to an average daily cost of 800,000 sesterces. As this outlay was
continued for nine months, the entire sum expended by the Treasury must have
exceeded a million and a half pounds sterling. Audience was given to the
Parthian prince at Naples, where Nero happened to be residing, and passed off
without serious difficulty. At first, indeed, an obstacle presented itself; it
was the etiquette of the Roman Court that those introduced to the Emperor were
to be unarmed, and consequently the usher, when Tiridates approached the Hall
of Audience, requested him to lay aside his swords This he refused to do, since
he was entitled to wear it by the terms of his agreement with Corbulo. The affair might have ended in a deadlock, had
not it been ingeniously suggested, that the Emperor’s safety might be assured
and the Parthian prince’s honour saved, by the simple
expedient of fastening the obnoxious weapon to its scabbard with half a dozen
nails. This done, Tiridates was introduced into the Imperial presence, where he
made obeisance, bending one knee to the ground, interlacing his hands, and at
the same time saluting the Emperor as his “lord.”
The investiture was reserved for a subsequent
occasion, and was made a spectacle to the Roman populace. On the night
preceding, all the streets of the city were illuminated and decorated with
garlands; as morning approached, “the Tribes,” clothed in long white robes and
bearing branches of laurels in their hands, entered the Forum and filled all
the middle space, arranged as was customary; next came the Praetorians, in
their splendid arms and with their glittering standards, stationing themselves
in two lines which reached from the further extremity of the Forum to the
Rostra, to maintain the avenue of approach clear; all the roofs of the houses
which gave upon the Forum were hidden beneath the masses of spectators; at
break of day Nero himself entered, accompanied by the Senate and by his own
bodyguard, wearing the garb appropriated to Triumphs, and, passing down
between the two lines of Praetorians, ascended a raised platform near the
Rostra, and took his seat in an archaic curule chair. Tiridates was then
introduced; silence was proclaimed; and in a short speech of a sufficiently
abject character, the Parthian prince placed himself at the Roman Emperor’s
disposal. Nero responded haughtily, but executed the covenanted investiture.
Saluting Tiridates as king of Armenia, he handed him to a seat prepared for the
purpose at his own feet,, gave him the kiss which sovereigns only gave to
sovereigns, and with his own hand placed upon his brow the coveted diadem, the
symbol of Oriental sovereignty. Magnificent entertainments followed, with shows
and games of various kinds, in which the emperor himself took part; but this
condescension astonished, more than it pleased, the Asiatic. However, he doubtless
appreciated better the closing act of the entire drama, which was a parting
gift from his nominal suzerain.
Tiridates returned to Asia across the Adriatic, and by
the ordinary route through Greece, no doubt well pleased with his visit. At the
cost of a formal submission, and a certain amount of personal humiliation, he
had obtained a sum which not even a king could despise, and an assured title to
the throne of a considerable kingdom. Vologases, who must be regarded as the
moving spirit throughout the whole transaction, may also well have been
satisfied. He had firmly established his brother upon the Armenian throne, and
if he had conceded to Roman vanity the honour and
glory of the arrangement, yet he had secured for himself the substantial
advantage. As Dean Merivale well observes, “While Tiridates did homage for his
kingdom to Nero, he was allowed to place himself really under the protection of
Vologases.”
VOLOGASES I AND VESPASIAN—PACORUS II. AND DECEBALUS OF
DACIA.
The establishment of peace between Rome and Parthia,
while no doubt a fortunate circumstance for the subjects of the two empires, is
one vexatious to the modern historian of the Parthians, since it places him at
a considerable disadvantage. Until the conclusion of the peace, he is able to
obtain tolerably ample materials for his narrative from the Greek and Roman
writers who describe the condition of affairs in the East under the early Roman
Emperors, and who have to trace the causes and course of the hostilities in
which the two countries were engaged almost continuously. From the date of the
pacification he wholly loses the benefit of this consecutive history, and has
nothing to rely upon except a few scattered and isolated notices, not always
very intelligible, occurring here and there in the pages of the classical
authors, together with the series, which now becomes very confused and
confusing, of the Parthian coins. The view obtainable of Parthian history is
thus, for the space of above half a century, most imperfect and disjointed.
Even the succession of the kings is uncertain; and the attribution of the coins
to this or that monarch, rests frequently on conjecture.
The latest authorities seem to be of opinion that
Vologases I—the monarch who ascended the Parthian throne in AD 50 or
51—continued to reign until about AD 77. If so, he must have been contemporary
with six Roman Emperors—Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius and
Vespasian—reigning contemporaneously with the last named of these for about
eight years. The relations between the two rulers were, for the most part,
friendly. When Vespasian first came forward as a candidate for empire (AD 70),
Vologases went so far as to offer him the services of forty thousand
horse-archers to assist in his establishment upon the throne; but the successes
of his generals in Italy enabled the Emperor to decline this magnificent
proposal, and so to escape the odium of employing foreign troops—“barbarians,”
the Romans would have said—against his own countrymen. In the same spirit,
when, a year later, Titus paid a visit to the Roman station of Zeugma on the
Euphrates, the Parthian monarch sent to congratulate him on his successful
conclusion of the Jewish war, and begged him to accept at his hands a crown of
gold. Titus, with his usual amiability, consented; and, to show his appreciation
of the compliment paid him, invited the envoys of Vologases to a banquet and
sumptuously entertained them.
Shortly after this, however, by the machinations of Caesennius Paetus, the
unsuccessful general in the last Armenian campaign, who had been recently promoted
to the office of Syrian proconsul, these pleasing prospects were overclouded,
and a rupture in the amicable relations that had hitherto subsisted between the
two monarchs, appeared to be imminent. Caesennius Paetus—on what grounds it is impossible to say, perhaps on
no reasonable grounds at all—sent a report to Vespasian, in AD 72, of a most
important and alarming character. He had discovered a plot, he said, for the
transfer of the Roman dependency of Commagene, a portion of Upper Syria, from
the Roman to the Parthian allegiance—a plot concerted, he declared, between
Vologases and the Commagenian king, Antiochus, and
about to be almost immediately put into execution. Samosata, the capital of
Comma- gen6, which commanded the passage of the Euphrates, was to be put into
the hands of the Parthian monarch by the Commagenians,
and a ready access thereby given him to the Roman provinces of Cappadocia,
Cilicia, and Syria itself, which could all be easily invaded from the important
site. Unless he were authorised at once to take steps
to prevent the transfer, it would within a very short space be accomplished,
and the East once more thrown into confusion. Vespasian, who had no reason to
doubt the correctness of the proconsul’s information, replied to him without
delay, and gave him full liberty of acting as he thought best. Hereupon, Paetus, who had made every preparation in anticipation of
such a response, immediately marched a strong force into Commagdne,
and meeting with no resistance, proceeded against Samosata, which he carried by
a coup de main. It cannot but be suspected that the whole story told to
Vespasian was the invention of Paetus, who desired
war as a field for his energies. His sudden invasion only failed to produce the
crisis that he sought to bring about, owing to the moderation and prudence of
the two sovereigns against whom his charges had been made. Antiochus, the Commagenian monarch, refused altogether to assume the part
of rebel which had been assigned him, and, though his sons took arms against Paetus, himself withdrew from the country, and passing into
the Roman province of Cilicia, took up his abode at Tarsus. Vologases declined
to give the action taken by the sons of Antiochus any support. He folded his
arms, and simply looked on while they contended with Paetus;
when, on their father’s withdrawal into Cilicia, their troops abandoned them,
and they were forced to take to flight, he contented himself with allowing them
a temporary refuge in Parthia, and writing a letter to Vespasian on their
behalf. It was probably this letter which induced Vespasian so far to pardon
the young princes as to allow them to reside in Rome with their father, while
at the same time he made the family an ample allowance from his privy purse.
It was not long after he had escaped the danger of a
Roman war that Vologases was attacked by a savage enemy from another quarter.
The Alani, a Scythic, or more probably a Finnish
tribe from the regions east of the Caspian, having made alliance with the
important nation of the Hyrcanians, which in later Parthian history gave many
signs of being disaffected, burst through the Caspian Gates suddenly in the
year AD 75, and, pouring into Media, drove King Pacorus, the brother of
Vologases, to take refuge in the fastnesses of the mountains, while they
carried fire and sword over the open country. From Media they passed on into
Armenia, which was still held by Tiridates, defeated him in a pitched battle,
and very nearly succeeded in making him prisoner by means of a lasso.
Vologases, in great alarm, sent an embassy to Vespasian, and relying on his own
offer, a few years previously, to lend the Roman Emperor, if he required it, a
body of forty thousand horse archers, asked that an efficient contingent of
Roman troops might now be placed at his disposal. He further requested that
their commander might be either Titus or Domitian. The latter prince, jealous
of his brother’s military fame, was most anxious to be selected, and to be
placed at the head of a powerful army, so that he might have an opportunity of
rivalling the great achievements of Titus. But Vespasian, with the caution of
old age, felt averse from embarking the State in fresh adventures, and bluntly
declared that he saw no reason for making himself a busybody in affairs that no
way concerned him. Had he accepted the proffered support of Vologases in years
previously, the case would have been different, but, as he had declined it, his
hands were unshackled, and he was free either to consent or to refuse as he
chose. The best interests of the State seemed to him to require abstention, and
he therefore sent a negative reply to Vologases. The Parthian prince was not
only disappointed, but angered, and vented his spleen by withholding from the
Emperor, in subsequent diplomatic correspondence, his rightful titles.
Vespasian, with a sense of humour rare in persons so
highly placed, made no remonstrance beyond the ironic one of adopting in his
reply the humble style assigned him by his correspondent. To the salutation— “Arsaces,
King of Kings, to Flavius Vespasianus sends greeting,” he answered, “Flavius
Vespasianus, to Arsaces, King of Kings, sends greeting.”
A coolness in the relations between the two powers now
set in. Parthia, thrown on her own resources, was forced to submit to
considerable loss in the way of booty at the hands of the Alani and their
allies, and was unable to take any revenge upon them for their unprovoked
attack; but she succeeded in maintaining her western territories intact, and in
recovering both Media and Armenia. Hyrcania, it may be suspected, was from this
time detached from her rule, and the cause of continual trouble and
disturbance, falling under the dominion of pretenders who claimed Arsacid
descent, and even took the full titles of Parthian sovereignty.
Vologases died about AD 78, and was succeeded by a
certain Pacorus, not his brother, but probably his son, who appears by his
coins to have been, at his accession, a very young man, and seems to have
reigned for thirty years, from 78 to 108 AD. This prince was thus contemporary
with five Roman Emperors—Vespasian, Titus, Domitian, Nerva, and Trajan—but with
none of these does he seem to have held any communications. The “coolness”
which had set in under his father gradually deepened into hostility; and, when
the warlike Trajan came to the throne, it was soon apparent that an open
quarrel could not be long avoided. Rome’s pretensions to a predominating
influence in Armenia were revived, and Parthia, not knowing how soon she might
be attacked, began to look out for allies among the avowed enemies of the Roman
Empire. Relations were established between Pacorus and Decebalus,
the Dacian monarch, who had been at war with Rome in the reign of Domitian (AD
81-90), and was now (AD 101) again threatened by Trajan. Pacorus, however, had
not the courage to lend his ally any active assistance, either by sending
troops to his aid in the struggle that went on upon the Danube, or by effecting
a diversion in his favour upon the Euphrates. When Decebalus fell, in A.D. 104, and Dacia became a Roman
province, Pacorus must have felt that he stood alone, and that, having provoked
the hostility of Rome by his relations with her enemy, he might expect at any
moment an attack. Trajan, however, was too wise and too cautious to precipitate
matters; an invasion of the East needed careful preparation; and the invasion
which he contemplated was one of unusual importance and magnitude: he therefore
abstained for the present from all offensive measures, and contented himself
with paving the way for his intended expedition by intrigues in Armenia and
elsewhere, by accumulating warlike stores, and increasing the strictness of
military discipline. Pacorus was thus left in peace to the termination of his
long reign (AD 108), and the storm which had so long threatened did not burst
until the time of his successor. A pretender, however, Artabanus IV, who has
left coins, falls into this reign.
CHOSROES AND TRAJAN—TRAJAN’S ASIATIC CONQUESTS—RELINQUISHMENT
OF THESE CONQUESTS BY HADRIAN
Pacorus the Second was succeeded upon the throne by
Chosroes, his brother, whom the Parthian Megistanes preferred over the heads of Exedares and Parthamasiris, Pacorus’s two sons, as more fit to rule
under the difficult circumstances of the period. It was known, or at any rate
suspected, that the warlike and experienced Trajan designed an expedition
against the East, and it therefore seemed necessary to entrust the government
of the Parthian state to a man of mature age and sound judgment. The sons of
Pacorus were young and rash, certainly incompetent to cope with so dangerous an
antagonist as Trajan. Chosroes was of ripe age, at any rate, and, though
untried, was believed to possess ability, a belief which after events, on the
whole, justified.
The ostensible cause of quarrel between Rome and
Parthia was, as so frequently before, Armenia. On the death of Tiridates, in or
about the year AD 100, Pacorus appears, without any consultation with Rome, to
have placed his own son, Exedares, upon the Armenian
throne. This was certainly throwing out a challenge to Trajan, and was a
high-handed proceeding, not justified by the previous relations of the countries.
On the last occasion of the throne being vacant, though Parthia had nominated
the prince, Rome’s right to give investiture had been admitted, and Tiridates
had, in fact, received his diadem from the hands of Nero. But Pacorus probably
knew that Trajan had his hands fully occupied with the Dacian troubles, and was
therefore not likely to engage in another war, while he may perhaps have
thought that the right of investiture was too shadowy a matter for Rome greatly
to value it. Events so far justified his expectations that Trajan made neither
remonstrance nor threat at the time, but seemingly acquiesced in the new
departure. When, however, the Dacian War was over, and the country reduced into
the form of a Roman province (about AD 114), the Emperor, whose appetite for
conquest was whetted rather than satisfied by his Danubian successes, considered that the time was come for taking the affairs of the East
into his serious consideration, and for placing them on a footing which should
give Rome security against the troubles that had now, for about a century and a
half, threatened her from this quarter.
Two views might be taken of the Oriental question. It
might be regarded in the light in which the greatest of the Roman
Emperors—Augustus, Tiberius, Vespasian—had hitherto regarded it, as chronic—a
fatal necessity involving continuous trouble, continuous effort, and at the
best of times only admitting of a sort of patched-up arrangement. Or it might
be viewed in a more heroic light, as Alexander the Great had viewed it in his
day, as an evil to be conquered, a difficulty to be overcome, an intolerable
state of things, which might be brought to an end, and ought to be brought to
an end as soon as possible. Ordinary minds would naturally see it in the former
light. There had always been an East, there would necessarily always be an
East, set in antagonism to the West, with a perpetual quarrel going on between
them. The case would then only admit of palliatives, partial remedies, modi vivendi, such expedients as a wise
diplomacy might suggest, and carry out, for avoiding collisions or minimising them, and carrying on such intercourse as was
necessary with as little friction as possible. The other view opened a wider
range both of thought and action. Might it be practicable to crush the East, to
get rid of the constant antagonism; and if so, by what means, and at what cos ?
That this latter alternative was not an altogether
hopeless one had been shown by Alexander himself. Alexander had conquered the
East, and for a century and a half there had been no great barbaric Oriental
monarchy standing over against the West, thwarting it and threatening it. The
ambition of Trajan seems to have been fired by the thought of what Alexander
had achieved, and an idea of rivalry seems to have taken possession of him.
Without divulging his intentions even to his intimates, much less, like
Crassus, making an open boast of them, he determined on an attempt to bring the
Eastern question to an end by the subjugation of Parthia. At first, however, he
veiled his designs under a cloak of pretended moderation. He professed that his
sole object was the vindication of the Roman honour in respect of Armenia. Both Pacorus and Chosroes, he said, had insulted Rome by
dealing with Armenia as if its government were altogether a Parthian, and not a
Roman, affair. He maintained, on the contrary, that the authority of Rome was
paramount. It was in vain that Chosroes offered to fall back upon the modus vivendi which had been accepted by Nero, and to allow Trajan to invest his nephew, Parthamasiris, a son of Pacorus, and younger brother of Exedares, with the diadem. Trajan replied ambiguously that
he would see what was fittest to be done when he arrived in Syria, and
proceeded to hasten his march, to augment the number of his troops, and to make
preparations of an unusual character. The autumn of AD 114 saw him at Antioch,
and in the spring of the ensuing year, undaunted by the terrible earthquake
which had almost destroyed the Syrian capital in the winter of AD 114-5, he set
out upon his march from Antioch to the Armenian frontier. The satraps and petty
princes of the region made submission as he advanced, and sought his favour with gifts of various kinds, which he was pleased to
receive graciously, while he made his way from Zeugma, the Roman outpost, to
the passages of the Euphrates at Samosata and Elegia.
Here, on the frontier of the Greater Armenia, he awaited the arrival of Parthamasiris, who, after attempting to negotiate with him
as an equal, and being treated with disdain, had been encouraged to present
himself as a suppliant in the Roman camp, and to ask his crown of Trajan. There
can be no doubt that the Armenian prince understood that the scene was to be a
repetition of that enacted at Rome in AD 66, when Tiridates received the diadem
from Nero. But Trajan was otherwise minded. When the young prince, having
ridden into the camp at the head of a small retinue, stript the diadem from his own brows and laid it at the feet of the Roman Emperor,
then stood in dignified silence, expecting that his mute submission would be
graciously accepted, and that the emblem of sovereignty would be returned to
him, Trajan made no movement. The army, which stood around, prepared, no doubt,
for the occasion, shouted with all their might, and, saluting Trajan anew as
Imperator, congratulated him on his “bloodless victory.” Parthamasiris saw that he had fallen into a trap, and would fain have fled; but the troops
had closed in upon him on all sides, and he found his retreat intercepted.
Hereupon he once more confronted the Emperor, and demanded a private audience,
which was granted him. A short conference was held between the two in the
Emperor’s tent, but the proposals of Parthamasiris were rejected. He was given to understand that he must submit to the forfeiture
of his crown, and summoned a second time before the Imperial tribunal, to show
cause, if he desired to do so, against the proposed forfeiture, and to hear the
Emperor’s decision. Parthamasiris, justly indignant,
spoke at some length, and with much boldness. “He had neither been defeated,”
he said, “nor made prisoner by the Romans, but had come of his own free will to
hold a conference with the chief of the Roman State, in full assurance that he
would suffer no wrong at his hands, but would be invested by him with the
Armenian sovereignty, just as Tiridates had been invested by Nero. He demanded
to be set at liberty, together with his retinue.” Trajan answered curtly that
he did not intend to give the sovereignty of Armenia to any one. The country
belonged to Rome, and should have a Roman governor. Parthamasiris might go where he pleased with his Parthians; but any Armenians that he had
brought with him must remain—they were Roman subjects. Parthamasiris,
upon this, rode off; but Trajan had no intention of allowing him to escape, and
become the leader in an Armenian war. He ordered some of his troops to follow
and arrest him, and, if he resisted, to put him to death. These instructions
were carried out, and Parthamasiris was killed, as a
recent historian says, “brutally.”
Cruel and brutal acts are frequently successful—at any
rate, for a time. Trajan’s “sharp and sudden blow ” was effective, and produced
the prompt and complete submission of Armenia. No resistance was made. It did
not, perhaps, much matter to the bulk of the inhabitants whether a Parthian vitaxa or a Roman proconsul governed them. Trajan
found no difficulty in carrying out his intention of absorbing Armenia into the
empire. The two Armenias— the Greater and the
Less—were united together, placed under a Roman governor, and reduced into the
form of a province.
Attention was then turned to the neighbouring countries. Friendly relations were established with Anchialus, king of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and gifts
were sent him in return for those which his envoys had brought to Trajan. A new
king was given to the Albanians. Alliances were concluded with the Iberi, Sauromatae, Colchi, and
even with the distant tribes settled on the Cimmerian Bosphorus. These names
recalled to the Romans the glorious times of the great Pompey, and made it
evident to them that Roman influence was now paramount in the entire region
between the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the Araxes.
Still, the Emperor viewed what he had achieved as a
mere prelude to what he was bent on achieving. It was Parthia, not Armenia,
against which his expedition had been really aimed. Accordingly, having
arranged matters in the north-east, and left garrisons in the principal
Armenian strongholds, he made a counter-movement towards the south-west, on
which side Parthia seemed to him most assailable. Stationing himself at Edessa,
the capital of the province of Osrhoene, which was
still administered by a Parthian vassal, bearing the usual name of Abgarus, he
partly terrified, partly coaxed, that shifty prince into submission, after
which he entered into negotiations with Sporaces,
phylarch of Anthemusia, Mannus,
an Arabian chieftain, and Manisares, a Parthian
satrap, who had a quarrel of his own with Chosroes. Having drawn these chiefs
to his side, he commenced his attack on the great Parthian kingdom by a double
movement. Part of his troops marched southward, by the route which Crassus had
followed, and made themselves masters of the tract known as Anthemusia,
or that between the Euphrates and the Khabour; part
proceeded eastward against Batnae, Nisibis, and Gordyene, or the country of the Kurds. No serious
resistance was offered to the invaders on either route. Chosroes had withdrawn
his forces to the further side of the Tigris, and left the defence of the
provinces to his vassals, who were for the most part too weak to venture on
opposing the march of a well-appointed Roman army. By the end of the year the
whole tract between the Euphrates and the Tigris, as far south as the town of
Singara and the modern range of Sinjar, had been overrun, and occupied; Upper
Mesopotamia, in the broadest sense of the term, had become Roman; and the
conqueror, pursuing the system which he had resolved on adopting from the
first, absorbed the newly won territory into the empire and made Mesopotamia a
Roman province. At Rome these successes were greeted with enthusiasm : medals
were struck, on which the subjected countries were represented as prostrate
under the foot of their conqueror, and the Senate conferred on him the titles, which
now appear upon his coins, of “Armeniacus” and “Parthicus.”
As winter approached, the Emperor quitted his army,
and retired to Edessa or Antioch, leaving his generals to maintain possession
of the conquered regions, and giving them very special instructions with
respect to the preparations that they were to make for the campaign of the
ensuing year. As Trajan had resolved not to attempt the passage through the
desert which intervenes between the Sinjar range and Babylonia, the crossing of
the Tigris would be the first important operation to be accomplished. But the
banks of the Tigris were, as Trajan knew, very deficient in wood, or at any
rate in wood suitable for the construction of such boats as were required for
the building of a bridge across the river. He therefore gave orders that, during
the winter, a large fleet should be prepared at Nisibis, the headquarters of
the army, where timber was excellent and abundant, so constructed that the
vessels could be readily taken to pieces and put together again. These, when
the spring came, were conveyed in waggons to the
western bank of the Tigris, probably at the point where it debouches from the
mountains upon the low country, a little above Jezireh.
Trajan and his army accompanied them, meeting with no resistance until they
reached the river and began their preparations for passing it. Then, however,
the inhabitants of the opposite bank —not disciplined soldiers, but brave
mountaineers —gathered together in force, to dispute the passage. It was only
by launching a number of his boats at different points, laden with companies of
heavy-armed and archers, which advanced into mid-stream and engaged the enemy,
while at the same time they threatened to land at many different points, that
Trajan was able, slowly and with difficulty, to complete his construction, and
finally bridge the river. His troops then effected their passage, the enemy
dispersing; and the Emperor rapidly overran the whole of the rich country of
Adiabene, between the river and the hills, occupying in succession Nineveh,
Arbela, and Gaugamela, and nowhere meeting with any resistance. Chosroes
remained aloof, waiting till he had drawn his enemy further away from his base
of operations, and nursing his own resources. Mebarsapes,
the vitaxa or subject-king of Adiabene, who
had hoped to be able to defend the line of the Tigris, finding that forced,
appears to have despaired, and withdrew from the struggle. One after another
the forts and strongholds of the district were taken and occupied. Adenystrae,
a place of great strength, was captured by a small knot of Roman prisoners,
who, when they found their friends near, rose upon the garrison, killed the
commandant, and opened the gates to their countrymen. In a few weeks all Adiabene,
the heart of the ancient Assyria, was conquered; and a third province was added
to the empire.
It might now have been expected that the Roman army
would advance directly upon Ctesiphon. The way was open; and Trajan might well
have anticipated, as Napoleon did in 1812, that the capture of the enemy’s main
capital would conclude the war.
But for reasons that are not made clear to us, the
Emperor determined otherwise. Having repassed the Tigris into Mesopotamia, he
took Hatra, one of the most considerable towns of the Middle Mesopotamian
region, and, crossing to the Euphrates, visited the bitumen pits at Hit, so
famous in the world’s history, whence the march was easy to Babylon. As still
no enemy showed himself, Babylon was approached, invested, and taken—so far as
appears—without a blow being struck. Seleucia soon afterwards submitted; and it
only remained to attack and reduce the capital in order to have complete
possession of the entire region watered by the two rivers. Here a fleet was
again needful; and Trajan, accordingly, transported the flotilla, which he had
taken care to have in readiness on the Euphrates, across the narrow tract between
the streams in N. lat. 330, on rollers, and launched it upon the Tigris. He was
prepared for a vigorous resistance, but once more found himself unopposed. Ctesiphon
opened its gates to him. Chosroes had some time previously evacuated it, with
his family and his chief treasures, withdrawing further into the interior of
his vast empire, and seeking to weary out his assailant by means of distance,
natural obstacles, and guerilla warfare. The tactics pursued resemble those
which have not uncommonly been adopted by a comparatively weak enemy when
attacked by superior force, and remind us of the method by which Idanthyrsus
successfully defended Scythia against Darius Hystaspis in the sixth century BC, and by which the Russian Alexander baffled the Great
Napoleon in the days of our own fathers or grand-fathers. But Trajan may be
excused if he took his enemy’s retreat for entire withdrawal from the contest,
and the apathy of the Western provinces for the complete submission of the
empire. Ctesiphon was his; Babylon was his; Susa, the old capital of the Achaemenidae, was his; the war might be regarded as over;
and so, not troubling himself to pursue his flying foe into the remote and
barbarous regions of the far East, he proceeded to enjoy his triumph, embarked
on a pleasure voyage down the Tigris, and even launched his bark upon the
waters of the Persian Gulf. The career of Alexander the Great presented itself
vividly to his imagination; and he sighed to think that, at his age, he could
not hope to reach the limits which had been attained by the Macedonian. He
instituted inquiries, however, with respect to India, and may have contemplated
sending an expedition there, when he had had time to settle and arrange his
Parthian conquests, and to place Mesopotamian affairs on a satisfactory
footing. No suspicion seems to have crossed his mind that the conquests which
he had so rapidly effected were insecure—no prevision of coming trouble appears
to have disturbed his self-complacency. In a fool’s paradise he dreamed away
the closing weeks of the summer of AD 116, and was still lazily floating on the
waters of the Southern Sea, when intelligence of a startling character was
suddenly brought to him.
Revolt had broken out in his rear. At Seleucia, at
Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa, the natives had flown to arms, had ejected the
Roman garrisons from their cities, or in some instances massacred them. His
whole line of retreat was beset by foes, and he ran a great risk of having his
return cut off, and of perishing in the distant region which he had invaded.
The occasion called for the most active exertions and for the greatest energy;
fortunately for the Romans, Trajan was equal to it. Personally, he hastened
northwards, while he issued peremptory orders to his generals that they should
everywhere take the most active measures against the rebels, and do their
utmost to check the spread of insurrection. The chastisement of Seleucia was intrusted to Erucius Clarus and
Julius Alexander, who stormed the city, and ruthlessly delivered it to the
flames. Lucius Quietus succeeded in recovering Nisibis, and punished its
rebellion in the same way. He also plundered and burnt Edessa. Maximus,
however, one of Trajan’s most trusted officers, on coming to an engagement with
the enemy, was defeated and slain. A Roman army with its legate was cut to
pieces. Trajan himself, having returned to Ctesiphon, and made himself
acquainted with the whole condition of affairs, woke up from his dream of an
easy conquest, and saw that a complete change of policy was necessary. Parthia
must not be treated like Armenia and Mesopotamia—its people must be humoured and conciliated. A native king and a show of
independence must be allowed them. Accordingly, he selected a certain Parthamaspates, a man of Arsacid descent, who had embraced
the side of Rome in the recent struggle, and summoning the Parthians of the
capital and its neighbourhood to a great meeting in a
plain near Ctesiphon, he produced before them the individual whom he favoured, commended him to their loyal affection in a
speech of considerable length, and, after magnifying somewhat injudiciously the splendour of his own achievements, placed the diadem
with his own hand upon his brow. He then commenced his retreat. Taking the
direct line through Mesopotamia, he marched, in the first instance, upon Hatra,
one of the towns which had revolted from him, and had not yet been reduced. The
place was small, but strongly fortified. It lay in the desert between the
Tigris and Euphrates, nearer to the former, and was protected, by the
scantiness of its water, and the unproductiveness of the region around, from
attack except by a small force. Trajan battered down a portion of the wall, and
attempted to enter by the breach; but his troops met with a decided repulse,
and he himself, having rashly approached too near the walls, was in the
greatest danger of being wounded. The horseman nearest to him was actually
struck by an arrow and slain. After this the siege did not last long. As autumn
approached the weather broke up, and thunderstorms prevailed, with rain and
violent hail. It was believed that whenever the Romans proceeded to the
assault, the fury of the elemental war increased in severity. Moreover, a
plague of insects set in. Gnats and flies disputed with the soldiers every
morsel of their food and every drop of their drink. Under these circumstances
the Emperor felt compelled to relinquish the siege and beat a retreat. He
retired through Mesopotamia upon Syria, and took up his quarters at Antioch,
having suffered, it would seem,1 considerable loss upon the way. At Antioch the
effects of his heavy toils and exertions began to show themselves. He fell
sick, and quitting his army, made an attempt to reach Rome, but succumbed to
his malady before he had proceeded very far, and died at Selinus, in Cilicia,
August, AD 117.
On the retirement of Trajan, the Parthian monarch,
quitting Media, returned to Ctesiphon, expelled Parthamaspates without difficulty, and re-established his own rule over the regions which
Trajan had overrun, but had not reduced into the form of provinces. Armenia,
however, Upper Mesopotamia, and Assyria, or Adiabene, were still held in force
by the Romans, and might probably have been maintained against any attack that
Parthia could have made, had the new Emperor, Hadrian, who had succeeded
Trajan, regarded their retention as desirable. But Hadrian, who, as prefect of
Syria, had been a near witness of Trajan’s campaigns, and possessed an intimate
acquaintance with the general condition of the East, was deeply convinced that
the attempt of Trajan had been a mistake, and that the true policy for Rome was
that laid down in principle by Augustus—that the possessions of the empire
should not be extended beyond their natural and traditional limits. He resolved,
therefore, to withdraw the Roman legions once more within the Euphrates, and to
relinquish the newly-conquered provinces, of which so great a boast had been
made—Armenia, Mesopotamia, Adiabene. It is generally allowed by modern
historians, that the resolution was a wise one. “ There was no soil beyond the
Euphrates,” says Dean Merivale with excellent judgment, “in which Roman
institutions could take root, while the expense of maintaining them would have
been utterly exhausting.” As far as the Euphrates Greek colonisation had so leavened the original Asiatic mass as to render it semi-Euro-pean, and
so to prepare it to a large extent for the reception of Roman ideas and Roman
principles of government: beyond, the Greek infusion had been too weak to
produce much effect—Orientalism pure prevailed—and Western institutions, if
introduced, would have found themselves in an alien soil, where they could only
have withered and died. Even apart from this, the Roman Empire was already so
large as to be unwieldy, and to endanger its continued cohesion. The chiefs of
provinces east of the Euphrates would have been so far removed from the seat of
government as to be practically exempt from effectual control and supervision.
They would have had enormous forces in men and money at their command, and have
been under a perpetual temptation to revolt and endeavour to secure for themselves an independent position. The garrisoning, moreover, of
such extensive countries would have been a severe drain upon the military
resources of the empire, and would have exercised a demoralising influence upon the soldiery, such as was already felt to some extent with
regard to the legions quartered in Syria. Altogether, it is clear that the
course pursued by Hadrian in contracting once more the eastern limits of the
empire was a prudent one, and entitles the prince who adopted it, not only to
the praise of “moderation,” but to that of political insight and sagacity.
The evacuation of the conquered countries brought
about a return to the condition of things in the East which had prevailed ever
since the time of Augustus. Rome and Parthia resumed their ancient boundaries.
Armenia reverted to its old condition of a kingdom nominally independent, but
too weak to stand alone, and necessarily leaning on external support, at one
time practically dependent on Rome, at another on Parthia. Its first ruler,
after it ceased to be a Roman province, was Parthamaspates,
to whom Hadrian seems to have handed it over, and in whose appointment Chosroes
must have acquiesced. Chosroes could not but be well disposed towards the ruler
who, without being compelled to do so by a defeat, had restored to Parthia the
two most important and valuable of her provinces; and the consolidation of his
power in them probably gave him ample occupation, and made him satisfied to
have a time of repose from external troubles. He seems to have continued on
friendly terms with Hadrian during the remainder of his life. Once only, in AD
122, was the good understanding threatened. The exact causes of complaint have
not come down to us; but it appears that in that year rumours of an intended Parthian invasion reached the Emperor, and induced him to make a
journey to the far East, in order, by his personal influence and assurances, to
avert the danger. An interview was held between the two monarchs upon the
frontier, and explanations were given and received, which both parties regarded
as satisfactory The Parthian prince gave up his intention of troubling the
peace of Rome, and the two empires continued, not only during the rest of the reign
of Chosroes, but till some time after the death of Hadrian, on terms of
friendship and amity. Hadrian went so far as to restore to Chosroes (about AD
130) a daughter who had been taken prisoner at Susa by the generals of Trajan
fourteen years before, and had remained at Rome in captivity; and he is even
said to have promised the restoration of the golden throne captured at the same
time, on which the Parthians set a special value.
Chosroes, during his later years, had to contend with
a pretender to his throne, who bore the name, so common at this time, of
Vologases. The Parthian empire showed, more and more as time went on, a
tendency to disintegration; and there is reason to believe that, during the
space commonly assigned to Chosroes (AD 108-130), different monarchs reigned,
not infrequently, in different parts of Parthia at the same time. The coins of
Vologases II run parallel for many years with those of Chosroes. A coin of a
Mithridates, and another of an Artabanus, fall into the same interval. The
classical writers make no mention of these rival kings; and the native remains
are so scanty that it is impossible to draw any continuous narrative from
them. We can only say, generally, that Parthia has entered the period of her
decadence, and that, even apart from foreign attack, she would, if left to
herself, have probably expired within little more than a century.
VOLOGASES II AND ANTONINUS PIUS—VOLOGASES III AND
VERUS.
The Vologases who had for so many years disputed the
crown with Chosroes, appears, on the decease of the latter, to have been
generally acknowledged as king. He was an aged prince, indisposed to any
unnecessary exertion, and quite content to continue on the friendly terms with
Rome which had been established under his predecessor. He had not, however,
been settled more than three years upon the throne, when hostilities came upon
him from an unexpected quarter. Pharasmanes, who
enjoyed the sovereignty of Iberia under Roman protection, but chafed at his
dependent position, and had private grounds of quarrel with Hadrian, in the
year AD 133, suddenly threw the whole of the East into a blaze. Inviting into
Asia a great horde of the northern barbarians from the tracts beyond the Caucasus,
he induced them to precipitate themselves upon Armenia, Cappadocia, and Media
Atropatene, which was once more a dependency of Parthia, and to carry fire and
sword into the midst of those fertile regions. Vologases at once complained to
Rome of the injury done him by her feudatory, and requested assistance; but
Hadrian regarded troubles in so distant a region as unimportant, and, satisfied
that Cappadocia would be sufficiently protected by its governor, who was
Arrian, the historian of Alexander, he left Vologases to struggle with his
difficulties as he best might. The aged monarch, under these circumstances, had
recourse to an expedient at once impolitic and disgraceful— ‘ he bribed the
horde of Alans, which had invaded his province, to quit the country, and turn
their arms in another direction. Such a policy, though occasionally adopted by
the Romans themselves, can never be other than mistaken and ruinous. Once
entered upon, it is almost certain to be continued, and to bring about at once
the exhaustion and the degradation of the people that condescends to it.
It is not perhaps surprising that Hadrian, always
studious of peace, abstained from taking any active part in the Alanic war; but it certainly seems strange that, instead of
inflicting any punishment on Pharas- manes for his reckless action in
introducing the barbarians into Asia, and actually letting them loose upon the
empire, he should have shortly afterwards loaded him with honours and benefits. He summoned him indeed to Rome, to answer for his conduct, but,
having done this, accepted his explanations, condoned his crimes, and not only
so, but rewarded him by an enlargement of his dominion, and by various other
marks of favour. He permitted him to sacrifice in the
Capitol, placed his equestrian statue in the temple of Bellona, and was present
at a sham fight in which the Iberian monarch, his son, and his chief nobles exhibited
their skill and prowess. It is not likely that Vologases can have been much
pleased at these results of his complaints; but he seems to have submitted to
them without a murmur; and, when Hadrian died (in AD 138), and was succeeded by
his adopted son, Titus Aurelius, better known as Antoninus Pius, he sent to
Rome an embassy of congratulation, and presented his Roman brother with a crown
of gold. The medal, which records this event, was struck in the first year of
Antoninus, and exhibits on the reverse a female figure holding a bow and quiver
in the left hand, and with the right presenting a crown, while underneath is
the inscription, PARTHIA.
Having thus, as he thought, secured the good-will of
the new monarch by a well-timed compliment, Vologases ventured on intruding
upon him with an unpleasant demand. Hadrian, in a moment of weakness, had
promised that the golden throne, captured by Trajan in his great expedition,
should be given back to its proper owners; but, finding that the act would be
unpalatable to his subjects, had delayed the performance of his promise, and
finally died without giving effect to it. Vologases hoped that his successor
might be more accommodating, and instructed his envoys to bring the matter
before Antoninus, to remind him of Hadrian’s pledged word, and make a formal
request for the delivery to them of the much- prized relic. But Antonine was as
much averse to relinquishing the trophy as his predecessor had been, and
positively refused to grant the request made of him. The envoys had to return re infecta, and to report to their master that, for
the present at any rate, all hope must be laid aside of recovering the emblem
of Arsacid sovereignty.
The remainder of the reign of Vologases II was
tranquil and unmarked by any striking incident. No pretensions were put forward
by the Parthians with respect to Armenia, to which, probably on the death Parthamaspates, Rome was suffered, without protest, to
appoint a new monarch. No further Attempt was made to obtain the surrender of
the “golden throne.” The coolness between the two states, which had followed on
Antonine’s rejection of the demand preferred by Vologases, merely tended to
keep the rival powers apart, and to prevent occasions of collision, while
Antonine’s truly peaceful policy preserved Parthia even from internal
disturbance, and allowed the successor of Chosroes to enjoy his throne, unthreatened
by any pretender, for the comparatively long term of nineteen years (AD 130 to
149). The aged monarch left his crown to a successor of the same name as
himself, who was probably his son, though of this there is no direct evidence.
The third Vologases ascended the Parthian throne
either in AD 148 or 149. He took the same titles as his predecessor, but added
to them, upon his coins, a Semitic legend—either “ Vologases, King,” or “ Volagases, Arsaces, King of Kings.” The dates on his coins
extend from AD 148-9 to AD 190-1, showing that he held the throne for the long
space of forty-two years. During the earlier portion of the time (148-161) he
was contemporary with Antoninus Pius, and, though discontented with the
exclusion of Parthia from all influence in Armenia, and meditating a war with
Rome on this account, he suffered himself to be persuaded, by letters from the
pacific Emperor, to keep the peace as long as he occupied the Imperial throne,
and to defer his contemplated outbreak until the reign of his successor. On the
death of Antoninus, however, he was not further to be restrained, but at once
took the field, and marching an army suddenly into Armenia, carried all before
him, expelled Soaemus, Rome’s vassal and creature,
from the kingdom, and placed upon the throne a protege of his own, a certain
Tigranes, a scion of the old royal stock, whose name recalled to the Armenians
the period of their greatest glory. The Roman governors of the adjacent
provinces learnt with surprise and alarm that Armenia was detached from the
empire; and Severianus, prefect of Cappadocia, the nearest to the scene of
action, and a man of an impetuous disposition, being a Gaul by birth, hurried
to the scene at the head of a single legion, partly moved by his own hot
temper, partly yielding to the persuasions of a pseudo-prophet of those parts
named Alexander, who promised him a signal victory. But the result signally
falsified the prophecy. Scarcely had Severianus crossed the Euphrates into
Armenia, when he found himself in the presence of a superior force under the
command of a Parthian general called Chosroes, and was under the necessity of
throwing himself into the city of Elegeia, where he
was immediately besieged and blockaded. Though he offered a strenuous
resistance, it was unavailing. His troops were not of good quality, and, unable
to break through the cordon which surrounded them, they were in a short time
shot down by the Parthian archers, and perished almost to a man. Severianus
shared their fate; and the Parthians obtained a success which was paralleled
with that of Surenas against Crassus, or of Arminius against Varus. Their
mastery over Armenia was confirmed, and the Roman provinces were laid wholly
open to their attacks. Their squadrons crossed the Euphrates, and marched into
Syria, where they obtained a second success. L. Attidius Cornelianus, the proconsul, gathered together the forces of his province, and
gave battle to the invaders, but was repulsed. The situation became nearly such
as had obtained after the defeat of Crassus, or when Pacorus and Labienus, in
the year BC 40, carried ravage and ruin over the region between the Euphrates
and the Orontes. The Parthians passed from Syria into Palestine, and the whole
of the Roman East seemed to lie open to them. Intelligence of what had happened
was rapidly carried to Rome, and threw the Senate into consternation. Aurelius
felt that he could not be spared from Italy, but deputed Verus to represent him
in the East, and bade him hasten to the scene of action with such forces as
could be gathered. Verus, however, was a lover of pleasure. First he loitered
on his way in Apulia, then proceeded at a leisurely pace to Syria, finally
settled himself in the luxurious Antioch, and, giving himself up to its
pleasures and amusements, handed over the cares of war to his lieutenants.
Fortunately for Rome, there were among these several generals of the antique
type, as especially Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius,
and Martius Verus. Cassius, even before the arrival of Verus and his army, had
begun an effective resistance. He had, by almost incredible efforts, brought
the Syrian legions into a state of order and discipline, had with them checked
the advance of Vologases, and had finally found himself in a condition to take
the offensive. In AD 163 he fought a great battle with the Parthians, defeated
them, and drove them across the Euphrates. Meanwhile, Statius Priscus and
Martius Verus had undertaken the recovery of Armenia. Statius had advanced
without a check from the frontier to the capital, Artaxata,
had taken the city, and burnt it to the ground, after which he built a new
city, which he strongly garrisoned with Roman troops, and sent intelligence to
Rome that Armenia was now ready to welcome back her expelled prince, Soaemus. Soaemus upon this
returned, and, though some further disturbances were made by the anti-Roman
party, yet these were successfully dealt with, chiefly by Martius Verus, and,
in a short time, the Roman nominee was recognised as
undisputed king, and the entire country brought into a state of tranquillity.
The success which had attended the first rush to arms
of Vologases III was thus completely neutralised. In
the space of two years Rome had made good all her losses, and shown that she
was fully able to maintain the position in Western Asia which she had acquired
by the victories of Trajan. But the ambitious generals, into whose hands the
conduct of the war had fallen through the incapacity of Verus, were far from
satisfied with the mere recovery of what had been lost. Personal, rather than
patriotic, motives actuated them. In the circumstances of the time military
distinction was more coveted than any other, and was looked upon as opening a
path to the very highest honours. The successful
general became, as a matter of course, by virtue of his position, a candidate
for the Imperial dignity. If, under the great Napoleon, every conscript felt
that he carried a marshal’s baton in his knapsack, still more, under the Middle
Empire, was every victorious commander persuaded that each step in the path of
victory brought him sensibly nearer to the throne. Of all the officers engaged
in the Parthian war, nominally under Verus, the most capable and the most
ambitious was Avidius Cassius. Sprung from the family
of the great “Liberator,” who had contended for the supreme power in the state
with Augustus and Antony, he had a hereditary bias towards pushing himself to
the front, and might be counted upon to let slip no occasion which fortune
should put in his way. His position in Syria gave him a splendid opportunity.
After his first successes against Vologases, Aurelius had made him a, sort of
generalissimo; and, having thus perfect freedom of action, he resolved to carry
the war into the enemy’s country, and see if he could not rival, or even outdo,
the achievements of Trajan half a century earlier. No continuous history of his
campaign has reached our time, but from the fragmentary notices of it which are
still extant we may gather a good general idea of its course and character.
Crossing the Euphrates into Mesopotamia at Zeugma, the most important of the
Roman stations upon the river, he proceeded first to Nicephorium,
near the junction of the Belik with the Euphrates, and thence made his way down
the course of the stream to Sura (probably Sippara)
and Babylon. At Sura a battle was fought, in which the Romans were victorious,
but it was after this that the great successes took place which covered Cassius
with glory. The vast city of Seleucia upon the Tigris, which had at the time a
population of four hundred thousand souls, was besieged, taken, and burnt, to
punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants. Ctesiphon, upon the opposite bank
of the river, the summer residence of the Parthian kings, was occupied, and the
royal palace there situated was pillaged, and levelled with the ground. The
various fanes and temples were stripped of their treasures; and search was made
for buried riches in all the places which were thought likely to have been utilised, the result being that an immense booty was
carried off. The Parthians, worsted in every encounter, after a time, ceased to
resist, and all the conquests made by Trajan, and relinquished by Hadrian, were
recovered. Further, an expedition was made into the Zagros mountain tract, and
a portion of it, considered to lie within the limits of Media, and never yet
possessed by Rome, was occupied. Aurelius owed it to the valour and good fortune of his general that he was thus entitled to add to the
epithets of “Armeniacus” and “Parthicus,”
which he had already assumed, the further and wholly novel epithet of “Medicus.”
The victories of Avidius Cassius, unlike those of Trajan, were followed by no reverses, and they had
further the effect, denied to Trajan’s, of making the permanent addition of a
large tract to the Roman Empire. When Vologases, after five years of unsuccessful
warfare, finally sued for peace to his too powerful antagonist, he was
compelled to surrender, as the price of it, the extensive and valuable country
of Western Mesopotamia. The entire region between the Euphrates and the Khabour passed under the dominion of Rome at this time, and
though not formally made into a province, became wholly lost to Parthia. The
coins of the Greek cities within the area bear henceforth on the obverse the
head of a Roman Emperor, and on the reverse some local token or legend; every
trace of Parthian influence is removed from them.
But, if Rome thus carried off all the honours of the war with Vologases III, still she did not
escape the Nemesis which usually attends upon the over-fortunate. During its
stay in the marshy regions of Lower Mesopotamia, the army of Cassius was deeply
infected with the germs of a strange and terrible malady, which clung to it on
its return, and was widely disseminated along the whole line of the retreat.
The superstition of the soldiers assigned to the pestilence a supernatural
origin. It had crept forth, they said, from a subterranean cell, or a golden
coffer, in the temple of the Comaean Apollo at
Seleucia, during the time that a portion of the army was engaged in plundering
the temple treasures. Placed there in primeval times by the spells of the Chaldaeans, it raged with the more virulence on account of
its long confinement, and amply avenged the Parthians for the many woes
inflicted on them by Roman hands. Every town that lay upon the route of the
returning army was smitten by it; and from these centres it diverged in every direction, east and west, and north and south, into the
adjacent districts. At Rome, the number of victims amounted to tens of
thousands. “ Not the vulgar herd of the Suburra only,
the usual victims of a pestilence, were stricken, but many of the highest rank
also suffered.” According to Orosius, in Italy generally the whole country was
so devastated, that the villas, towns, and fields were everywhere left without
inhabitant or cultivation, and fell to ruin, or relapsed into wildernesses. The
army suffered especially,, and is said to have been almost annihilated. In the
provinces more than half the population was carried off, and the pestilence,
overleaping the Alps, spread as far as the Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean.
The remainder of the reign of Vologases III was
uneventful. He continued to occupy the Parthian throne until AD 190 or 191, but
took no further part, so far as we know, in any military operations. Once only
does he seem to have been so far stirred from his inaction as to contemplate
resuming the struggle against his powerful enemy. This was in 174 or 175, when,
Aurelius being detained upon the Danube, the inordinate ambition of Avidius Cassius drove him into open rebellion, and the
prospect of a Roman civil war seemed to offer a chance of Parthia being able to
reassert herself. But the opportunity passed before Vologases could bring
himself to make any serious movement. The revolt of Cassius collapsed almost as
soon as it had broken out, and the East returned to its normal condition.
Vologases repented of his warlike intention; and when (in 176) Aurelius visited
Syria, sent ambassadors to him with friendly assurances, who were received with favour.
Four years later the reign of the philosophic Emperor
came to an end; and the Imperial power passed into the hands of his weak and
unworthy son, Lucius Aurelius Commodus. A second opportunity for an aggressive
movement offered itself; but, again, Vologases resisted the temptation to rush
into hostilities, and remained passive within the limits of his own dominions.
The reign of Commodus (180-192) was, from first to last, untroubled by any
Parthian outbreak. Vologases was probably by this time an old man, since he had
held the Parthian throne for thirty-two years when Commodus succeeded his
father, and may naturally have been disinclined to further warlike exertion,
Rome was therefore still allowed to maintain her Mesopotamian conquests
unchallenged; and when Vologases died (in 190 or 191), the condition of things
continued as established by Aurelius in 165.
VOLOGASES IV AND SEVERUS.
The third Vologases was succeeded by another prince of
the same name, who is usually regarded as his son, though there is no distinct
evidence of the fact. His coins, which generally present his full face upon
their obverse, instead of the customary profile, have dates which run from AD
191 to 208. He thus appears to have been contemporary with the Roman Emperors—Commodus,
Pertinax, Didius Julianus, Pescennius Niger, and
Septimius Severus. The great Parthian war of Severus fell entirely within his
reign, and it is as the antagonist of this distinguished prince that he is
chiefly known to history.
It was very shortly after the accession of Vologases
IV that the officers of the Court of Commodus, unable any longer to endure his
excesses and cruelties, conspired against the unworthy son of the good Aurelius
and assassinated him in his bedchamber. This murder was soon followed by
another—that of the virtuous, but perhaps over-strict, Pertinax. The
Praetorians, after this, put up the office of Roman Emperor to public auction,
and knocked it down to Didius Julianus, a rich senator. But this indignity
exhausted the patience of the legions, and threw the entire empire into
confusion. In three places—in Britain, in Pannonia, and in Syria—revolt broke
out, and the soldiers invested their respective leaders, Clodius Albinus,
Septimius Severus, and Pescennius Niger, with the
purple. Niger, who, as prefect of Syria, held the second dignity in the empire,
imagined that his elevation would not be disputed, and, instead of straining
every nerve to raise forces, and strengthen himself by alliances, declined at
first the offers of assistance made him by various Parthian feudatories, and
remained inactive in the East, expecting the Senate’s confirmation of his
appointment. But the unpleasant intelligence soon reached him that Septimius
Severus, proclaimed Emperor in Pannonia and acknowledged at Rome, was on his
way to Syria, determined to dispute with him the prize, whereof he had somewhat
rashly thought himself assured. Under these changed circumstances, Niger felt
compelled to alter his own policy, and to implore the assistance which so
shortly before he had rejected. Towards the close of the year A.D. 193 he despatched envoys to the courts of the chief princes beyond
the Euphrates, and especially to the kings of Armenia, Parthia, and Hatra,
entreating them to send contingents to his aid as soon as possible. The
Armenian monarch—Vologases, the son of Sanatroeces—made
answer that it was not his intention to ally himself with either side; he
should stand aloof from the conflict and simply defend his own kingdom if any
attack were made upon it. The reply from the Parthian Vologases was more favourable. He could not send troops at once, he said, as
his army was disbanded, but he would issue an order to his satraps for the
collection of a strong force as soon as possible. Barsemius,
king of Hatra, went further even than his suzerain, and actually despatched to Niger’s aid a body of archers, which reached
his camp in safety, and took part in the war. Vologases IV must have given his
sanction to this movement on the part of his feudatory, who could certainly not
have ventured on such a proceeding against the will of his lord paramount.
Still Vologases was not prepared to commit himself unreservedly to either side
in the impending conflict, and refrained from taking any active steps in
furtherance of his professed design to collect an army, waiting to see to which
side the fortune of war would incline.
The struggle between the rival Emperors was soon
terminated. Niger passed from Asia into Europe, and took up a position near
Byzantium, but, having suffered a defeat at Cyzicus, was soon forced to fall
back upon his reserves, and, passing through Asia Minor, gave his adversary
battle for the second time near Issus, where his army was completely routed,
and he himself captured and put to death. Meanwhile, however, the nations of
the East had flown to arms. The newly-subjected Mesopotamians had risen in
revolt, had massacred most of the Roman detachments stationed in their country,
and had even laid siege to Nisibis, which was the headquarters of the Roman
power in the district. Their kindred tribes from the further side of the
Euphrates, particularly the people of Adiabene, had assisted them, and taken
part in the attack. The first object of Severus after the defeat and death of
Niger was to raise the siege, and to chastise the rebels, with their aiders and
abettors. He marched hastily to Nisibis, defeated the combined Osrhoeni and Adiabeni, relieved
the distressed garrison, and took up his own quarters in the place. He then
proceeded to re-subject Mesopotamia. The inhabitants sought to disarm his
resentment by representing that they had taken up arms, not against him, or
against the Romans generally, but against Niger, his rival and foe, whom they
had endeavoured to distress for his (Severus’s)
benefit. They professed a readiness to surrender the Romans whom they had taken
prisoners, and such portion of the Roman spoil as remained still in their hands;
but it was observed that they said nothing about giving up the strongholds that
they had taken, or about resuming the position of Roman tributaries. On the
contrary, they put forward a demand that all the Roman troops still in their
country should be withdrawn from it, and that their independence should be
respected in the future. Severus was not prepared to accept these terms, or to
sanction the retreat of Terminus. His immediate adversaries—the kings of Osrhoene, Adiabene, and Hatra—were of small account, and he
might expect to defeat them without difficulty. Even if the Parthian monarch
espoused the cause of his feudatories, he was not indisposed to cross swords
with him. The expeditions of Trajan and Avidius Cassius had done much to diminish the terror of the Parthian name; and to
ambitious Romans the East presented itself as the quarter in which, without any
serious danger, the greatest glory was to be won.
Accordingly, the Emperor rejected the Mesopotamian
proposals, and applied himself to the task of reducing their country to
complete subjection. From the central position of Nisibis, where he himself
remained, he sent out his forces under his three best commanders—Laternus, Candidus, and Laetus—in three directions, with
orders to carry fire and sword through the entire region, and to re-establish
everywhere the Imperial authority. His commands were executed. Resistance was
everywhere crushed; the old administration was restored; and Nisibis, raised to
the dignity of a Roman colony, once more became the metropolis of the country.
Nor was Severus contented with the mere restoration of the Roman power. He
caused his troops to cross the Tigris into Adiabene, and though the inhabitants
offered a stout resistance, succeeded in overrunning the district and occupying
it. Further aggressions and further conquests would probably have followed, but
the attitude of Albinus in the West made it imperative on Severus to quit these
distant lands and return to his capital, which was menaced on the side of Gaul
by the commander of the Western legions. The Emperor left Nisibis, and returned
to Rome early in the year 196.
No sooner had he retired than the flames of war burst
out more fiercely than before. Vologases, roused from his inaction by the
threatened loss of a second province, poured his troops into Adiabene, drove
out the Roman garrisons, and, crossing the Tigris into Mesopotamia, swept the
Romans from the whole of the open country. Even the cities submitted
themselves, excepting only Nisibis, which was saved from capture by the
courage and capacity of Laetus. According to Spartianus,
the victorious Parthians, not content with recovering Mesopotamia, even passed
the Euphrates, and spread themselves once more over the fertile plains of
Northern Syria, as they had done in the times of Pacorus and Labienus. Severus,
engaged in his doubtful contest with Albinus on the western side of the empire,
could do nothing to relieve the pressure upon the east, and the Syrian
prefecture continued open to the Parthian raids for the space of nearly a full
year. An enterprising monarch might have done much during this interval; but
Vologases frittered away his opportunity, and at length the victory of Lyons
set Severus free, and allowed him again to turn his attention to Oriental
affairs. In the summer of 197 he made a second Eastern expedition for the
purpose of recovering his lost laurels, and of justifying the titles, which he
had already assumed, of “Arabicus” and “Adiabenicus.” It is probable that in his own mind he
entertained still loftier aspirations, and, like Trajan, had hopes of reducing
the whole Parthian Empire under the Roman yoke.
One of the most important points to be secured by an
assailant of Parthia from the west, was the friendship, or at any rate the
neutrality, of the two kings of Armenia and Osrhoene.
Armenia had professed itself neutral when the quarrel between Severus and Niger
first broke out, but had subsequently, in some way or other, offended the
former, and on his arrival in the East, was viewed as hostile to the Roman
designs. The first intention of Severus was to fall with his full force on
Armenia, and to endeavour to reduce it to subjection;
but, before the fortune of war had been tried, the Armenian monarch, Vologases,
son of Sanatroeces, made overtures for peace, sent
gifts and hostages, assumed the attitude of a suppliant, and so wrought upon
Severus that he not merely consented to conclude a treaty with him, but even
granted him a certain extension of his dominions. The Arab king of Osrhoene, who is called, as usual, Abgarus, made a more
complete and unqualified submission. He rode into the Roman camp at the head of
a large body of archers, whose services he offered to the Emperor, and
accompanied by a number of his sons, whom Severus was requested to look upon as
hostages. All being prosperous thus far, Severus had only to determine by which
line of route he should advance against the Parthian monarch, who had taken up
his position at Ctesiphon, and to make his preparations accordingly. He fixed
on the line of the Euphrates, but at the same time masked his intention by
sending a strong body of troops under generals across the Tigris to ravage
Adiabene, and create an impression that the main attack would come from that
quarter. Meanwhile, following the example of Trajan, he was causing a fleet to
be built in Upper Mesopotamia, where timber was plentiful, and was preparing to
march his main army down the deft bank of the Euphrates, while his transports,
laden with stores, descended the stream. In this way he reached the neighbourhood of Seleucia and Ctesiphon without suffering
any loss, or even incurring any danger, and took the Parthians by surprise, when,
having captured the cities of Babylon and Seleucia, which were deserted by
their defenders, he made his appearance before the capital. His fleet, which he
could easily transfer from one river to the other by means of the great canals
that traversed the alluvium, would give him the complete command of the Tigris,
and enable him to attack the city on either side, or indeed entirely to invest
it. Vologases appears to have fought a single battle in defence of his capital,
but, being defeated, shut himself up within its walls. The defences,
however, were not strong; and, after a short siege, Severus took the city, by
assault, without much difficulty, the king escaping with a few horsemen in the
confusion of the capture. Thus the Parthian capital fell easily—a third time
within the space of eighty-two years—into the hands of a foreign invader. On
the first occasion it had opened its gates to the conqueror, and had
experienced gentle treatment at the hands of a benignant emperor. On the second
it had suffered considerably. Now it was to learn what extreme severity meant
at the hands of a monarch whose character accorded with his name. The captured
city was given up to massacre and pillage. The soldiers were allowed to plunder
both the public and the private buildings at their pleasure. The precious
metals accumulated in the royal treasury were seized, and the rich ornaments of
the royal palace were taken from their places and carried off. All the adult
male population was slaughtered; while the women and children, torn from their
homes without compunction, were led into captivity by the victorious army, to
the number of a hundred thousand.
Thus far the expedition of Severus had been completely
successful. He stood where Trajan stood in AD 116, master of the whole low
region between, the Arabian desert and the Zagros mountains, lord of
Mesopotamia, of Assyria, of Babylonia, of the entire tract watered by the two
great rivers from the Armenian highlands to the shores of the Persian Gulf.
What use would he make of his conquests? Would he, like Trajan, endeavour to retain them, or would he, like the wiser
Hadrian, relinquish them? He endeavoured to take an
intermediate course. Recognising the fact, that to
retain the more southern districts was impossible, and that the more eastern
portions of the Parthian Empire were beyond his reach, he neither pursued the
flying Vologases into the remote tracts in which he had taken refuge nor
attempted to organise his southern conquests into
provinces, but resolved at once to evacuate them. Notwithstanding the elaborate
preparations which he had made for his invasion, and the care which he had
taken to carry supplies with him, he found himself, about the time that he
captured Ctesiphon, in want of provisions. He had exhausted the immense stores
of grain which Lower Mesopotamia commonly furnished, or else the inhabitants
had destroyed or hidden them, and his troops had, we are told, to subsist for
some days on roots, which produced a dangerous dysentery. He was obliged to
retreat before famine overtook him. Moreover, as the march of his army along
the course of the Euphrates had stripped that region of its supplies of corn
and fodder, he could not return as he had come, but was compelled to confront
the perils of a new route. The line of the Tigris was the only route open to
him, and along this he advanced, still supported by his fleet, which with some
difficulty made its way against the current up the course of the stream. It
does not appear that any opposition was offered to him ; but, after he had
proceeded a moderate distance, he found himself in the vicinity of Hatra, the
capital of a small state subject to Parthia, which had given him special
offence by lending active support to the cause of his rival, Niger. His troops
had now obtained sufficient supplies of food in an unexhausted country, and
were ready for a fresh enterprise. Severus regarded his honour as concerned in the chastisement of a state which, without provocation, had
declared itself his enemy. He may also have remembered that Trajan had attacked
Hatra unsuccessfully, and have hoped to place himself above that conqueror by
the capture of a town which had defied the utmost efforts of his predecessor.
At any rate, whatever his motives, it seems certain that, when in the latitude
of Hatra, he diverged from his previous line of march, and, proceeding
westward, encamped under the walls of the city which had given him such dire
offence, and engaged in its siege. He had brought with him a number of military
engines—probably those employed with complete success at Ctesiphon, and,
putting them in position, made a fierce attack upon the place. But the
inhabitants were not daunted; the walls of the town were strong, its defenders
brave and full of enterprise. They contrived to set on fire and destroy the
siege machines brought against them, and repulsed with heavy loss the attacking
soldiers. The army, upon this, grew discontented, and threatened mutiny;
Severus was obliged to punish with death some of his leading officers, among
them his best general, Laetus. This, however, only increased the exasperation ;
and, to smooth matters over, he had to pretend that the execution of this
officer had taken place without his knowledge. Even so the soldiers’ minds were
not calmed down, and at last, in order to bring about a better state of
feeling, he had to discontinue the siege and remove his camp to a distance.
He had not, however, abandoned his enterprise. Reculer pour mieux sauter was among the principles that guided his
actions, and it was in the hope of returning and renewing the attack ere many
weeks were past, that he had drawn off his army. In the tranquillity and security of the place whereto he had removed, he constructed fresh engines
in increased numbers, collected vast stores of provisions, and made every
preparation possible for a repetition of his attack and for bringing it to a
successful issue. It was not merely that his honour was concerned in overcoming the resistance offered to him by what had always
been regarded as no more than a second-rate town—his cupidity was also excited
by reports of the rich treasures that were stored up in the city, and especially
of those which the piety of successive generations had accumulated in the
Temple of the Sun. He therefore, when his preparations were complete, once more
put his troops in motion, and proceeded to renew the siege with a more
efficient siege-train, and a better appointed army than before. But the inhabitants
met him with a determination equal to his own. They had a powerful cavalry
which hung upon the skirts of his army and crippled his movements in every way,
often inflicting severe loss upon his foragers; they were excellent archers,
and shot further and with greater force than the Romans; they possessed
military engines of their own, of no contemptible character; and they had at
their disposal a particular kind of fire, which did considerable damage, and
created yet greater alarm. Flames believed to be inextinguishable were hurled
both against the Roman machines and against their soldiers with an effect that
is said to have been remarkable. A great number of the machines were burnt; and
it the soldiers were more frightened than hurt, the advantage to the defenders
was still almost as great. Still the Romans persevered. The presence of the Emperor,
who watched the combat from a lofty platform, encouraged every man to do his
best; and at length it was announced that a practicable breach had been effected
in the outer wall of the place, and the soldiers were ready, and indeed eager,
to be led at once to the assault. But now Severus hung back. By Roman usage a
town taken by storm must be given up to the soldiery for indiscriminate
pillage; and thus, if the soldiers had their way, he would lose the great
treasures on which his heart was set. He therefore refused to give the word,
and resolved to wait a day; and see whether the Hatreni would not now, seeing further resistance to be useless, surrender their town.
The delay was fatal. In the night the Hatreni rebuilt
the wall where it had been battered down, and manning the battlements, stood
boldly on their defence. Severus, seeing that they had no intention of
surrendering, repented of his resolve of the day before, and commanded the
soldiers to attack. But the legionaries declined. They probably suspected the
Emperor’s motive. At any rate they were unwilling to imperil their lives for an
object which but yesterday they might have attained without incurring any peril
at all. Severus, not to lose a chance, commanded his Asiatic auxiliaries to see
if they could not force an entrance, but with no other result than the
slaughter of a vast number. At last he desisted from his attempt. The summer
was far advanced; the heat was intense; and disease had broken out among his
troops, who suffered from drought, from malaria, and from a plague of insects.
Above all, his army was thoroughly demoralised, and
could not be depended on to carry out the orders given it. Severus himself told
one of his officers that he had not six hundred European troops on whom he
could place any reliance. The second siege of Hatra by Severus lasted twenty
days, and terminated in an ignominious withdrawal. Severus returned to Rome
with a slur upon his military reputation which was not regarded as cancelled by
all his previous successes.
Still, actual disaster was escaped. Had Vologases been
an active and energetic prince, or had the spirit and audacity of the Parthian
nation been such as once characterised it, the result
might have been widely different. The prolonged resistance of Hatra, the
sufferings of the Romans, their increasing difficulties with respect to
provisions, the injurious effect of the summer heats upon their unacclimatised
constitutions, would have presented irresistible temptations to a prince, or
even a general, of any boldness and capacity, inducing him to pursue the
retreating enemy, to hang upon their flanks and upon their rear, to fall on
their stragglers, to cut off their supplies, to harass and annoy them in ten
thousand ways, and render their withdrawal to their own territory a matter of
extreme difficulty. A Surena of the temper and calibre of the general opposed to Crassus might not improbably have annihilated the
Imperial army, and the disaster of Carrhae might have repeated itself at the
distance of between two and three centuries. But Vologases IV was a degenerate
descendant of the great Arsacids, and remained inert and apathetic when the
circumstances of the time called for the most vigorous action.
As it was, the expedition of Severus must be
pronounced glorious for Rome and disastrous for Parthia. It exposed for the
third time within a century the extreme weakness of the great Asiatic power. It
lost her such treasures as had escaped the cupidity of Avidius Cassius. It both exhausted and disgraced her. Moreover, it cost her a second
and most valuable province. Severus was not content with fully re-establishing
the Roman sway in Mesopotamia. He overstepped the Tigris, and firmly planted
Roman authority in the rich and fertile region between that river and the
Zagros mountains. Henceforth the title of “Adiabenicus”
became no empty boast. Adiabene, or the tract between the two Zab rivers—the
most productive and valuable part of the ancient Assyria—became a Roman
dependency under Severus, and continued to be Roman till after the destruction
of the Parthian Empire. For the remainder of the time during which Parthia
maintained her independence, the Roman standards were planted within less than
two degrees of her capital.
Vologases reigned for the space of about eleven years
(197-208) after his defeat by Severus. Parthian history is for this interval a
blank. The decline of national feeling and of the military spirit went on, no
doubt, without a pause, and the power of Parthia must continually have grown
less and less. No pretenders arose, since there was probably no one who coveted
the position of ruler over a state evidently nodding to its fall. Rome
abstained from further attack, content, it would seem, with the gains which she
had made, and a brief calm heralded the storm in which Parthian nationality was
to perish.
ARTABANUS IV. AND CARACALLUS—THE LAST WAR WITH
ROME—DEFEAT OF MACRINUS.
The death of Vologases IV was immediately followed by
a dispute between his two sons, Vologases V and Artabanus IV, for the
succession. We do not know which was the elder; but it would seem that at first
the superiority in the struggle rested with Vologases, who was recognised by the Romans as sole king in 212, and must have
then ruled in the western capital, Ctesiphon. Afterwards Artabanus acquired the
preponderance, and from the year 216 we find no more mention of Vologases by
the classical writers. It is Artabanus who negotiates with Caracallus,
who is treacherously attacked by him, who contends with Macrinus, and is
ultimately defeated and slain by the founder of the New Persian monarchy,
Artaxerxes. Similarly, the Persian historians ignore Vologases altogether, and
represent the contest for empire, which once more carried Persia to the front,
as one between Ardeshir and Ardevan. Still, the
Parthian coins show that Vologases, equally with his brother, both claimed and
exercised sovereignty in Parthia to the close of the kingdom. The probability
would therefore appear to be that about 216 a partition of the kingdom was
amicably made, and that while Artabanus reigned over the western provinces, the
eastern were ceded to Vologases.
It was while the struggle between the two brothers
continued that the Emperor Severus died, and the period of tranquillity inaugurated by him, on his return from the East in 198, came to an end. His son
and successor, Caracallus, a weak .and vain prince,
nourished an inordinate ambition, and was scarcely seated on the throne when he
let it be known that in his own judgment he was a second Alexander, and that he
was bent on imitating the marvellous exploits of that
mighty hero. He adopted the Macedonian costume, formed his best troops into a “Macedonian
phalanx,” made the captains of the phalanx take the names of Alexander’s best
generals, and caused statues to be made with a double head, presenting the
countenance of Alexander on one side and his own upon the other. As Alexander,
he was bound to conquer the East; and, as early as his second year, he began his
predetermined aggressions. Summoning Abgarus, the tributary monarch of Osrhoene, or north-western Mesopotamia, into his presence,
he seized upon his person, committed him to prison, declared his territories
forfeited, and reduced Osrhoene into the form of a
Roman province. Soon afterwards he attempted to repeat the proceeding with
Armenia; but, although the Armenian king was weak enough to fall into the trap,
the nation was on the alert, and frustrated his efforts. No sooner did they
learn that their king was arrested and imprisoned than they flew to arms,
placed their country in a position of defence, and made themselves ready to
resist all aggression. Caracallus hesitated, and
when, three years later (215), he sent Theocritus, one of his favourites, to effect their subjugation, they met him in
arms, and inflicted a severe defeat on the utterly incompetent general. It was
perhaps this disaster which suggested to Caracallus a
change in his method of proceeding. Professing to put away from him all
thoughts of war and conquest, he propounded a grand scheme for the permanent
pacification of the East, and the establishment of a reign of universal
happiness and tranquillity. Having transferred his
residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, the luxurious capital of the Roman
Oriental provinces, he sent ambassadors with presents of unusual magnificence
to the Parthian monarch, Artabanus, who were to make him a proposal of a novel
and unheard-of character. “The Roman Emperor,” said the despatch in question, “could not fitly wed the daughter of a subject, or accept the
position of son-in-law to a private person.”
No one could be a suitable wife for him who was not a
princess. He therefore asked the Parthian monarch for the hand of his daughter.
Rome and Parthia divided between them the sovereignty of the world; united, as
they would be by this marriage, no longer recognising any boundary as separating them, they would constitute a power which could not
but be irresistible. It would be easy for them to reduce under their sway all
the barbarous races on the skirts of their empires, and to hold them in
subjection by a flexible system of administration and government The Roman
infantry was the best in the world, and in steady hand-to-hand fighting must be
allowed to be unrivalled. The Parthians surpassed all nations in the number of
their cavalry and the excellence of their archers. If these advantages, instead
of being separated, were combined, and the various elements on which success in
war depends were thus brought into harmonious union, there could be no difficulty
in establishing and maintaining a universal monarchy. Were that done, the
Parthian spices and rare stuffs, as also the Roman metals and manufactures,
would no longer need to be imported secretly and in small quantities by
merchants, but, as the two countries would form together but one nation and one
state, there would be a free interchange among all the citizens of their
various products and commodities. To the Parthian king and his advisers the
proposition was as unwelcome as it was strange. The whole project appeared to
them monstrous. Artabanus himself misdoubted the Emperor’s sincerity, and did
not believe that he would persevere in it. But it threw him into a state of
extreme perplexity. Bluntly to reject the overture was to offend the master of
thirty-two legions, and to provoke a war the results of which might be ruinous.
To accept it was to depart from all Parthian traditions, and to plunge into the
unknown and the unconjecturable. Artabanus therefore temporised.
Without giving a positive refusal, he stated certain objections to the
proposal, which made it, he thought, inexpedient, and begged to be excused from
complying with it. “Such a union as was suggested could scarcely,” he said,
“prove a happy one. The wife and husband, differing in language, habits, and
modes of thought, could not but become estranged one from another. There was no
lack of patricians at Rome, possessing daughters with whom the Emperor might
wed as suitably as the Parthian kings did with the females of their own royal
house. It was not fit that either family should sully its blood by mixture with
a foreign stock.”
Upon this answer reaching him, Caracallus,
according to the Court historian, Dio Cassius, immediately declared war, and
invaded the Parthian territory with a large army. Herodian, however, who seems
here to be more trustworthy, gives a different account. Caracallus,
he declares, instead of quarrelling with Artabanus for his qualified refusal,
followed up his first embassy with a second; his envoys brought rich gifts to
Ctesiphon, and assured the Parthian monarch that the Emperor was serious in his
proposals, and had the most friendly intentions possible. Hereupon Artabanus
yielded, either satisfied with the assurances given him, or else afraid to give
offence; he addressed Caracallus as his future
son-in-law, and invited him to come with all speed, and fetch home his bride.
“And then,” continues the historian, “when this was noised abroad, the
Parthians made ready to give the Roman Emperor a fit reception, being
transported with joy at the prospect of an eternal peace. Caracallus thereupon crossed the rivers without hindrance and entered Parthia, just as if
it were his own land. Everywhere along his route the people greeted him with
sacrifices, and dressing their altars with garlands, offered upon them all
manner of spices and incense, whereat he made pretence of being vastly pleased. As his journey now approached its close, and he drew
near to the Parthian Court, Artabanus, instead of awaiting his arrival, Went
out and met him in the spacious plain before the city, with intent to entertain
his daughter’s bridegroom and his own son-inlaw.
Meanwhile, the whole multitude of the barbarians, crowned with freshly
gathered flowers, and clad in garments embroidered with gold and variously
dyed, were keeping holiday, and dancing gracefully to the sound of the flute,
the pipe, and the drum—an amusement wherein they take great delight after they
have indulged freely in wine. Now, when all the people had come together, they
dismounted from their horses, hung up their quivers and their bows, and gave
themselves wholly to libations and revels. The concourse of barbarians was very
great, and they stood arranged in no sort of order, since they did not
apprehend any danger, but were all en deavouring to catch a sight of the bridegroom.
Suddenly the Emperor gives his men the signal to fall
on and massacre the barbarians. These, amazed at the attack, and finding
themselves struck and wounded, forthwith took to flight. Artabanus was hurried
away by his guards, and lifted on a horse, whereby he escaped with a few
followers. The rest of the barbarians were cut to pieces, since they could not
reach their horses, which, when they dismounted, they had allowed to graze
freely over the plain; nor were they able to make use of their legs, since
these were entangled in the long flowing garments which descended to their
heels. Many, too, had come without quivers or bows, which were not wanted at a
wedding. Caracallus, when he had made a vast
slaughter, and taken a multitude of prisoners and a rich booty, moved off
without meeting with any resistance. In his retreat he allowed his soldiers to
burn all the cities and villages and to carry away as plunder whatever they
chose.”
The advance of Caracallus had been through Babylonia, probably along the course of the Euphrates; his
return was through Adiabend and Mesopotamia. In
Adiabene he still further outraged and offended the Parthians by violating the sanctity
of the royal burial-place at Arbela, where, as a rule, the Parthian kings were
interred. Arbela had been regarded from of old as a City of the Dead; and the Arsacidae had made it their ordinary place of sepulture. Caracallus caused the tombs to be opened, the bodies
dragged forth from them, and the remains dispersed to the four winds. No insult
could be greater than this, and the act seems rather that of a madman than of a
mere ordinary tyrant. We are reminded of Aristotle’s observation, that “families
of brilliant talents go off after a time into disposition bordering upon
madness,” and see that that of the Antonines was no
exception. Caracallus can scarcely have been in his
senses to have committed an action from which no possible good could arise, and
for which, as he might have anticipated, a severe reckoning was afterwards to
be exacted.
Meanwhile, however, he was pursuing his gay career, no
whit alarmed, and no whit abashed. He wrote to the Senate in the lightest
possible tone, to declare, without giving any details, that the whole East was
subject to him, and that there was not a kingdom in those parts but had
submitted to his authority. The Senate, though not imposed upon, wrote back in
flattering terms, and granted him all the honours that would have been suitable to a veritable conqueror. For his own part, he
remained in Mesopotamia, passing the winter there, and amusing himself with
hunting and chariot-driving. There were still lions in the Mesopotamian region,
as in Assyrian times, and the young Antonine, though a poor soldier, seems to
have been a bold hunter. He had, apparently, persuaded himself that no external
danger threatened him, and was content to idle away his time in the grassy
Mesopotamian plains, which now—in early spring—must have been an earthly
paradise. April was reached, and it was high time for an active commander to
have commenced the marshalling and exercising of his troops, or even the
initiatory movements of the designed campaign; but Caracallus continued impassive, occupied in his amusements, his suspicions of his
officers, and his consultations of augurs, magicians, and oracles as to what
fate was in store for him. He was on his way to visit an oracle in the Temple
of the Moon-God, near Carrhae, when some of his inquiries having leaked out, a
conspiracy was formed against him in the camp, and he was murdered by Julius
Martialis, one of his guards, on April 8, AD 217.
In the place of Caracallus,
a new emperor had to be appointed. The choice of the soldiery fell upon Macrinus,
one of the Praetorian Prefects, the chief mover in the recent conspiracy. His
elevation almost exactly coincided with the advance of Artabanus, who, having
reunited and increased his army during the course of the winter months, and
brought it into excellent condition, had now conducted it into Roman Mesopotamia,
and was anxious to engage the Romans in a pitched battle, in order to exact a
heavy retribution for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the wanton
impiety of Arbela. But Macrinus was scarcely prepared to meet him. Though
Praetorian Prefect, he had none of the instincts of a soldier, but was far more
versed in civil affairs, and adapted to hold office in the civil administration
or in the judiciary. Accordingly, no sooner did he find himself menaced by the
Parthian monarch than he hastily sent ambassadors to his camp with an offer to
surrender all the prisoners carried off in the late campaign as the price of
peace. But Artabanus had higher aims. “ The Roman Emperor,” he said in reply, “must
not only restore the prisoners unjustly captured in a time of peace, but must
also consent to rebuild all the towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, must make compensation for the wanton injury done to the
tombs of the kings, and must further cede Mesopotamia to the Parthians, and
retire behind the line of the Euphrates.” It was morally impossible for a Roman
Emperor to consent to such demands as these without first trying the fortune of
war; and accordingly Macrinus felt himself compelled, much against his will, to
risk a battle. He had with him a large army, which, if not exactly flushed with
victory, had at any rate not known defeat; and he had, besides, the prestige of
the Roman name, always a source of confidence to those who boasted it, and of
terror to their adversaries.
Artabanus, on his part, had done his best to make his
army formidable. He had collected it from all quarters, had made it strong in
cavalry and archers, and had attached to it a novel force of considerable
importance, consisting of a corps of picked soldiers, clad in complete armour, and carrying spears or lances of unusual length,
who were mounted on camels. The Romans had, besides the ordinary legionaries,
in which their strength mainly consisted, a large number of light-armed troops,
and a powerful body of Mauretanian cavalry. The
battle, which lasted three days, and was fought near Nisibis, in Upper
Mesopotamia, began at daybreak on the first day by a rapid advance of the
Parthians, who, after saluting the rising sun, rushed with loud shouts to the
combat, and, under cover of a sleet of arrows, delivered charge after charge.
The Romans, receiving their own light-armed within the ranks of the
legionaries, stood firm, but suffered greatly from the bows of the
horse-archers and from the lances of the corps mounted on camels; and though,
whenever they could reach their enemy, and engage in close combat, they had
always the advantage, yet after a while their losses from the cavalry and the
camels forced them to retreat. As they retired they strewed the ground with
spiked balls (or caltrops) and other contrivances for injuring the feet of
animals, and this stratagem was so far successful that the pursuers soon found
themselves in difficulties, and the two armies respectively returned, without
any decisive result, to their camps.
On the following day there was again a combat, which
is said to have lasted from morning till night, and to have been equally
indecisive with the preceding one; but of this, which is wholly ignored by Dio,
we do not possess any description. The third day arrived, and the fight was
once more renewed; but this time the Parthians had recourse to new tactics.
Hitherto it had been their aim to rout and disperse their enemies; now they
directed all their efforts towards surrounding them, and so capturing the
entire force. Their troops, which were far more numerous than those of the
Romans, spread themselves to right and left, threatening to turn the Roman
flanks and envelop the whole army. Macrinus, to meet these tactics and baffle
them, was forced more and more to extend his own line, and consequently to attenuate
it unduly, so that at last it broke up. Confusion once begun was speedily
increased by the cowardice of the Roman Emperor, who was among the first to
take to flight, and hurry back to his camp. As a matter of course his army
followed his example, and having a refuge so close at hand, suffered no very
severe losses. The defeat, however, was acknowledged, even by the Romans
themselves; and, in the negotiations which followed the battle, Macrinus had to
accept terms of peace, which, though less disgraceful than those at first
proposed, must be regarded as sufficiently onerous. The cession of Mesopotamia
was not, indeed, insisted on; but, besides restoring the captives and the booty
carried off by Caracallus in his raid, Macrinus had
to pay, as compensation for the damages inflicted, no less a sum than a million
and a half of our money. The transactions of Rome with Parthia were thus
brought to an end, after nearly three centuries of struggle, by the ignominious
purchase of a peace. Macrinus retired within his own frontier in the summer of 217,
and before Rome was again called upon to make war in these parts the
sovereignty of the Parthians had terminated.
REVOLT OF TIIE PERSIANS—DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN
EMPIRE.
The tendency of the Parthian Empire to disintegration
has been frequently noted in these pages. From the first there was a want of
attachment among its parts, and a looseness of organisation which boded ill for the prolonged existence of the body politic. It was not
only that the races composing it were so various, the character and conditions
of the provinces so unlike, the ideas prevalent in different parts so diverse,
but the entire system by which it was sought to give compactness and unity to
the disjecta membra was so deficient in vigour and
efficacy, that a long continuance of cohesion was almost impossible. “Kingdom-Empires,”
as they have been called, are always unstable; and, unless the dominant power
possesses a very marked preponderance, they are sure sooner or later to break
up. In the widespread empire built up by the Arsacidae the Parthians could not really claim any very decided superiority over the
other principal component parts, either in physical or in mental
characteristics. They were not braver than the Medes, the Hyrcanians, the
Armenians, or the Persians ; they were not more intelligent than the
Babylonians, the Bactrians, or the Assyrians. That they had some qualities
which brought them to the front, cannot, of course, be denied; but these were
not such as to strike the minds of men very strongly, or to obtain universal
and unqualified recognition. Their rule was acquiesced in so long, rather
because the Oriental appreciates the advantages bf settled and quiet
government, than because the subject races regarded them as having any special
aptitude or capacity for governing. Each of the principal nations probably
thought itself quite as fit to hold the first place in the commonwealth as the
Parthians; and under favourable circumstances each
secondary monarch was quite ready to assert and maintain his independence.
Revolts of subject kingdoms or tribes were thus of
frequent occurrence during the entire period of the Parthian monarchy; but, as
time went on, they became more frequent, more determined, and more difficult to
subdue. It has been already related how, as early as the time of Vologases I,
Hyrcania broke off from the empire, and was probably not reduced subsequently.1
Bactria was also from time to time a sort of separate appanage, conceded to a
prince of the Royal House, who accepted it in satisfaction of his claims to the
chief authority. Armenia was still more loosely attached to the empire, being
more often and for longer periods reckoned an independent state than a
subjected one. At one time Babylonia is found almost independent under Hymerus. The single tie of a nominal subjection to a
distant suzerain proved a weak bond when any strain was put upon it, and there
was constant danger of this or that province detaching itself from the great
mass of the empire, and entering upon a separate existence.
We are thus entitled to say that there was something
like a general discontent of the provinces with their condition under the
central government, at any rate for the last century and a half of Parthian
rule. It is difficult, however, to analyse the
grounds of this discontent, or to decide what elements in it had the greater
weight, and which were of minor importance. An alien rule must always be more
or less irksome to those who have to submit to it, and must more or less chafe
and gall them, as they exceed or fall short in pride and sensibility. The friction
will be increased or diminished by the character of the rule fits consonance
with justice, its regard for promises and engagements, its care for its
subjects, its clemency, its power and will to protect, its general fairness and
equity. It cannot be said that the Parthians fell flagrantly short in any of
these particulars, or deserve to be regarded as either on the one hand weak and
careless, or on the other harsh, unjust, and oppressive. They no doubt took the
lion’s share of pomp, power, and privilege ; but beyond this advantage, which
is one taken by all dominant peoples, it does not appear that their subjects
had any special grievances of which to complain. The Parthians were tolerant;
they did not interfere with the religious prejudices of their subjects, or
attempt to enforce uniformity of creed or worship. Their military system did
not press over-heavily on the subject races ; nor is there any reason to
believe that the scale of their taxation was excessive. Such tyranny as is
charged upon certain Parthian monarchs is not of a kind that would have been
sensibly felt by the conquered nations, since it was exercised on none who were
not Parthians. If at any time the rulers of the country failed to perform the
great duties of civil government, it was rather in the way of laxity that they
erred than of tension, rather by loosening the bonds of authority than by
over-tightening them.
Some tangible ground for the general discontent,
beyond the “ignorant impatience” of a dominant race which is so usual, may
perhaps be made out by careful consideration, in two respects, but in two only.
In the first place, there were times when the Parthian government very
imperfectly accomplished its great duty of preserving internal order and tranquillity. The history of Anilai and Asinai, which has been dwelt upon at some length
in a former chapter, brings out very strongly this defect in the Parthian
governmental system, and reveals a condition of things which, if it had been
permanent, must have been intolerable. We can only suppose that the anarchical
times, of which we have so melancholy a picture, were occasional and
exceptional, the result of internal disorders, which ere long came to a head,
and then passed away ; or we should have to imagine a government, which
fulfilled none of the functions of a government, lasting for centuries, and some
of the most spirited nations on the earth submitting to it and seeking no
better.
The other failure of the Parthians belongs to the
later period only of their history. It consisted in the general decline of the vigour of the nation, which rendered it less competent,
than it had been previously, to afford adequate protection to the conquered
states —especially protection against the wholly alien power, which had
intruded itself into Asia, and which sought to bring all the nations of Asia
under subjection. The suzerainty of Parthia had been accepted by the other
Asiatic powers as that of the one out of their number which was most competent
to make head against European invaders, and to secure the native races in
continued independence of an influence which they recognised as antagonistic, and felt to be hateful. It may well have appeared at this time
to the various vassal states that the Parthian vigour had become effete, that the qualities which had advanced the race to the
leadership of Western Asia were gone, and that unless some new power could be
raised up to act energetically against Rome, the West would obtain complete
dominion over the East, and Asia be absorbed into Europe. Vague thoughts would
arise as to which nation might be conceived to be the fittest to take the lead,
if Parthia had to be deposed; and the instinct of self-aggrandisement would lead the more eminent to contemplate the possibility of themselves
aspiring to the position, if not even to take measures to push their claims.
Probably for some considerable time before the movement headed by Artaxerxes,
son of Babek, commenced, such thoughts had been
familiar to the wiser men among many of the Asiatic nations, and a long
preparation had thus been made for the revolution, which seemed to break out so
suddenly at last
If, again, we ask, what peculiar grounds of grievance
had the Persians above the other subject races, or why did the burden of
raising the standard of revolt fall especially upon them, we have a further
difficulty in obtaining an answer. There is no appearance of the Persians
having been in any way singled out by the Parthians for oppression, or having
had any more grounds of complaint against them than any other of the subject
nations. The complaints which are made are negative rather than positive, and
amount to little more than the following : — 1. That high offices, whether
civil or military, were for the most part confined to those of Parthian blood,
and not thrown open in any fair proportion to the Persians. 2. That the priests
of the Persian religion were not held in sufficient honour,
being even less accounted of in the later than in the earlier times; and. 3.
That no advantage in any respect was allowed to the Persians over the rest of
the conquered peoples, notwithstanding that they had for so many years
exercised supremacy over Western Asia, and given to the list of Asiatic
worthies such names as those of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis.
It was thus not because they were worse treated than their brother subjects
that the Persians were dissatisfied, but because their pretensions were higher.
They thought themselves deserving of exceptional treatment, and, since they
did not receive it, they murmured. In fact, the Persians had at no time ever
forgotten that they had once been “ lords of Asia,” and it angered them that
their conquerors seemed to have forgotten it. They had at all times submitted
to Parthian hegemony as it were under protest; now they were no longer inclined
to submit to it. They believed, and probably with justice, that, under the
changed circumstances of the time, they were better suited than the Parthians
to direct the affairs of Western Asia, and they resolved at any rate to make
the attempt. Their justification is to be found in their success. As the
Parthians had no right to their position but such as arose out of the law of the
strongest, so, when the time came that they had lost this pre-eminence,
superiority in strength having passed to a nation hitherto counted among their
subjects, it was natural and right that the seat of authority should shift with
the shift in the balance of power,-and that the leadership of the Persians
should be once more recognised.
In one respect the Parthian rule must always have
grated upon the feelings of their Persian subjects more than upon those of the
generality, since there was in the Parthians an ingrained coarseness and
savagery which could not but be especially distasteful to a people of such
comparative refinement as the Persians. Persian art, Persian manners, Persian
literature had a delicacy and a polish which the rude Parthians, with their
Tatar breeding, could not appreciate; and the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius,
of Firdausi and Hafiz, must have had an instinctive aversion from the nomadic
race whose manners were still deeply tinged with Scythicism.
It may also be suspected, though of this there is less
evidence, that the revolution which transferred the dominion of Western Asia
from the Parthians to the Persians, from the Arsacidae to the Sassanidae, was to some extent a religious
one. The “Book-Religion” of Zoroaster, with its dualism, its complicated spiritualism,
and its elaborate ritual, was unsuited for the rough times through which
Western Asia had to pass between the invasion of Alexander and the foundation
of the Neo-Persian state, and it appears to have been superseded, except in
Persia Proper, by a ruder system, of which the principal elements were devotion
to the Sun and Moon and the worship of ancestral images. But the time was now
again come when more complicated ideas were in the ascendant. The various forms
of Gnosticism show how mysticism once more asserted itself among the Western Asiatics in the first and second centuries of our era, and
how speculations were rife which reopened all the deepest problems of spiritual
religion. The stir had begun which issued ultimately in Manicheism, and the
Persian aspirations after leadership may have been partly caused by a desire to
push their religion to the front, and to take advantage of the popular favour with which dualistic tenets were beginning to be
regarded. It is certain that among the principal changes consequent upon the
success of the Persians was a religious revolution in Western Asia—the
substitution for Parthian tolerance of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly
enforced uniformity in religion, the establishment of the Magi in power, and
the bloody persecution of all such as declined obedience to the precepts of
Zoroaster.
The space of about six or seven years seems to have
separated the conclusion of peace with Rome from the outbreak of rebellion
under Artaxerxes. During this time the division of sovereignty between
Artabanus V and Vologases V continued without interruption, and the power of
Parthia was still further weakened by Arsacid intrigues originating with
branches of the royal family which were settled in Bactria. No doubt internal
debility showed itself in various ways, and the tributary king of Persia, a
young, active, and energetic prince, became daily more convinced of his
ability, if not to recover the empire of Cyrus, at any rate to shake off the
rude yoke which had galled and chafed his nation for so many centuries.
Independence was probably all that he originally looked for; but, in course of
time, as the struggle went on, wider views with respect to the possibilities of
the situation opened themselves before him, and the contest became one for life
or death between the two kingdoms. After establishing his authority in Persia
Proper, he turned his arms eastward against Carmania (Kerman), and in a short
space of time easily reduced that sparsely peopled and not very desirable
country. He next took in hand a more daring enterprise. The valuable and
fertile country of Media adjoined Persia to the north. Artaxerxes proceeded to
make war in this quarter, and to annex to his dominions portions of the Median
territory. But this was to attack the Parthian kingdom at its heart, since
Media, Assyria (Adiabene), and Babylonia formed the main strength and the
central mass of the Empire. Artabanus, who had thought but lightly of a Persian
revolt, and had probably regarded incursions into Carmania with absolute
indifference, as concerning his brother rather than himself, was now effectually
roused. Collecting his forces, he took the field in person, invaded Persia
Proper, and engaged in a desperate struggle with his rival. Three great battles
are said to have been fought between the contending powers. In the last, which
took place, according to the Persian authorities, in the plain of Hormuz,
between Bebahan and Shuster, on the course of the Jerahi river, Artabanus was, after a desperate conflict,
completely defeated by his antagonist (AD 226), and lost his life in the
battle.
The struggle, however, was not yet over. Artavasdes,
the eldest son of Artabanus, claimed the crown, and was supported by a large
number of adherents. His uncle, Chosroes, who had received the throne of
Armenia from Artabanus, espoused his cause, gave the Parthian refugees an
asylum in his kingdom, and even fought a battle with Artaxerxes in their
defence. In this he was so far victorious that the Persian found it necessary
to retreat, and retire to his own dominions in order to augment his forces. But
the struggle was too unequal for long continuance. Within a very few years of
its commencement the contest was everywhere ended; the arms of Artaxerxes
prevailed, and the Parthian Empire was overthrown. All the provinces submitted;
the last Arsacid prince fell into the hands of the Persian king; and the
founder of the new dynasty sought to give legitimacy to his rule by taking to
wife an Arsacid princess.
The duration of the Parthian monarchy was a little
short of five centuries. It commenced about BC 250, and it terminated in AD
227. It was the rule of a vigorous tribe of Tatar or Turkic extraction over a
mixed population, chiefly of Semitic or Arian race, and, for the most part,
more advanced in civilisation than their rulers.
Though its organisation was loose, it was not
ill-adapted for Orientals, who prefer a flexible system to one where everything
is “cut and dry,” and are opposed to all that is stiff and bureaucratic.
Western Asia must be considered to have enjoyed a time of comparative rest
under the Parthian sovereignty, and to have been as prosperous as at almost any
other period of its history. The savage hordes of Northern Asia and Europe
were, in the main, kept off; and, though the arms of Rome from time to time
ravaged the more western provinces, and even occasionally penetrated to the
capital, yet this state of things was exceptional; for the most part European
aggression was averted, or quickly repulsed ; very few conquests were made, and
when they were made, they were not always retained; and to the last the limits
of the Parthian dominion remained almost the same as they had been under the
first Mithridates. Still, there was no doubt a gradual internal decay, which
worked itself out especially in two directions. The Arsacid race, with which
the idea of the empire was closely bound up, instead of clinging together in
that close “union” which constitutes true “strength,” allowed itself to be torn
to pieces by dissensions, to waste its force in quarrels, and to be made a
handle of by every foreign invader or domestic rebel who chose to use its' name
in order to cloak his own selfish projects. The race itself does not seem to
have become exhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the throne,
never sank into mere weaklings or faineants, never shut themselves up in their
seraglios, or ceased to take an active and leading part, alike in civil broils
and in struggles with foreign princes. Artabanus, the adversary of Artaxerxes,
was as brave and capable a monarch as had ever sat upon the Parthian throne in
previous ages. But the hold which the race had on the population, native and
foreign, was gradually weakened by the feuds which raged within it, by the
profusion with which the sacred blood was shed by those in whose veins it ran,
and the difficulty of knowing which living member of it was its true head, and
so entitled to the allegiance of all those who wished to be faithful Parthian
subjects. Further, the vigour of the Parthian
soldiery must have gradually declined, and their superiority over the mass of
the nations under their dominion must have diminished. Marked evidence was
given of this when, about AD 75, Hyrcania became independent; and it is
possible that there may have been other cases of successful rebellions in the
remoter eastern regions. Oriental races, when they are suddenly lifted to
power, almost always decline in strength, and sometimes with extreme rapidity.
The Parthians cannot be said to have experienced a rapid deterioration; but
they too, like the dominant races of Western Asia, both before and after them,
felt in course of time the softening influence of luxury, and had to yield
their place to those who had maintained manlier and hardier habits.
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