

# A HISTORY *of* RUSSIA



VOLUME FIVE

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## CHAPTER I

The origin and upbringing of Catherine II—Her marriage and position at the Court of the Empress Elizabeth—Her early line of conduct—Her early ideas with regard to the Russian throne—Her position during the reign of her husband.

THE *Funk* revolution of 1762 raised to the throne of Russia the consort of the fallen Emperor. Catherine was one of those political accidents on the Russian throne so many of which were witnessed during the eighteenth century. On her mother's side she came of the petty House of Holstein, and on her father's side she came of the equally petty House of Anhalt-Zerbst. Her father, a small ruling prince, held various positions under the Prussian King. First of all he commanded a Prussian regiment, and then he became Military Commandant of Stettin, and then he became the town's Governor, and, lastly, failing to be elected Hertzog of Courland, he ended his career merely as a Prussian field-marshal. But on 24 April (N.S. 2 May), 1729, he had born to him at Stettin a daughter. And this daughter, Sophia Augusta, came to be the Empress Catherine, and combined in herself two North German petty-princely dynasties.

In the eighteenth century the petty principalities of Northern Germany formed a curious corner in Europe. Thence came minor proprietorial princes who, with their kindred, played, in more than one instance, a considerable role in European Powers' fortunes. Everyone in those principalities subsisted upon expectations of a "lucky chance," upon hopes of forming European family ties. In those principalities there was always a goodly collection of minor suitors seeking important brides, and of needy damsels seeking rich *partis*, and of heirs and heiresses seeking thrones. In that world of political cosmopolitans not country, but career, was thought of. For that world, "country" meant wheresoever a career offered.

Especially was the House of Holstein, in the eighteenth century, a forcing-bed of proprietorial princely vagabondage of the kind. And already the House had acquired a certain importance in Russia's

political history through the fact that Peter I had married one of his daughters to a Holsteiner Hertzog; whilst from the beginning of the century Catherine's maternal forbears, one and all, either served, and died in, a land other than their own or sought (and occasionally found) a foreign throne. Hence an old church dignitary of Brunswick had some reason for foretelling for Catherine a brilliant future. When her mother brought her to him, whilst she was yet but a child, he said: "On your daughter's forehead I see three crowns." In general, the world looked upon princely-proprietary Houses of the stamp of Anhalt and Holstein as so many heads wanting crowns, and crowns wanting heads.

In short, it was quite in a straitened setting that Catherine was reared, with, for father, a Lutheran of the strictest, the ancient, the orthodox school, and, for mother, a restless, difficult woman who was always ready to participate in a subterranean affair, and constituted intrigue perambulant, adventure incarnate, one who found herself well placed everywhere save at home, and one who was agreeable to all save her husband and children. Almost the whole of Europe did she cover in her time, whilst, amongst other things, she earned high favour from Frederick II by performing for him diplomatic commissions which diplomatists proper scrupled to undertake. Yet when she died in Paris, not long before her daughter's accession to the Russian throne, it was in circumstances purely of wretchedness. Catherine had some reason to thank fortune for her mother's infrequent sojournings at home, for the Stettiner Commandant's lady observed the simplest possible pedagogic rules in her daughter's education, and, as Catherine later revealed, made her expect a box upon the ears for each and every blunder.

At an early period two favouring circumstances set Catherine close to the Russian throne. In the first place, one of her many Holsteiner-Hertzog uncles had, before his premature decease, in the days when the Empress Elizabeth had, as yet, been only a Grand Duchess, ranked as the latter's betrothed; and the result was that Elizabeth ever afterwards preserved tender memories of him, and showed her niece and her niece's mother such attentions as sending them her portrait in a diamond-studded frame, an article then worth about 18,000 roubles, and certainly able for a considerable while to fortify the family of the Commandant of Stettin against the ills of existence. And, in the second place, Catherine was

favoured by what seemed to be her insignificance. Everyone attached to the Russian Court was then seeking a bride for the heir to the Russian throne, and the more prudent of Elizabeth's politicians advised the Empress only to select one from a modest European House, lest a bride from a House of importance should fail to show the Empress and her nephew due respect. In the affair every one who had to do with court matters busied himself. Especially so did the ex-tutor of the heir, a Swede named Brummer, who stood devoted to Holsteiner interests; the Marquis de la Chatardet, the French Ambassador, who was out to arrange a Russo-Franco-Prussian alliance; Lestocq, the Court Physician, who received a large pension from France; and, lastly, Lestocq's many adherents in Russia. Also, amongst Catherine's kinsfolk there was one of the most notable personages in Europe of the day—Frederick II. And he had good reason to strive for establishment of the daughter of his late Commandant of Stettin in the Russian throne's vicinity, since he hoped one day to see her afford him effective support in the capital of the, to him, remote and sinister Empire. Indeed, in his subsequent memoirs he openly avowed that the marriage of Peter and Catherine had been work of his doing, since he had deemed the marriage necessary for the State interests of Prussia, and had thought Catherine the most suitable agent for their warranty. All of which the more inclined Elizabeth to consider Catherine favourably in choosing a bride; especially as she, Catherine, happened also to be her intended husband's second cousin. So in 1744 Catherine and her mother reached the Russian capital after a carefully concealed journey, and thereby struck with amazement the whole political world of Europe.

Catherine reached St. Petersburg, nevertheless, as a very needy bride-elect. Indeed, in later days she confessed that she came thither with twelve bodices and three or four skirts only—and even these made only with the help of the bill of exchange sent from St. Petersburg in advance, as a contribution towards travelling expenses. Truly this was a small wardrobe on which to cut a figure at a Court the Empress of which lost, on the occurrence of a fire in the palace, four thousand costumes! Catherine's early position there, in fact, was in every way precarious. An illustration of this is the following episode, related in her own memoirs. Once in the days previous to her marriage, when she and her betrothed were jesting together

in the suite of the Troitskaia Sergieva Monastery, Lestocq suddenly entered and said: "Very soon is that gaiety of yours going to come to an end." Then to Catherine in particular he added: "Yes, you can pack up your things. Before long you will be returning homeward." The reason turned out to be that Catherine's mother had, after setting every one at Court by the ears, got herself mixed up with the Marquis de la Chatardet's pet diplomatic scheme, and led Elizabeth to decide to return her and her daughter to Holstein. But though the mother was in very truth banished from Russia, the daughter remained. Similarly did there arise, towards the close of Elizabeth's reign, an idea of banishing, in their turn, Catherine and her husband, and then proclaiming as heir the Tsarevitch Paul, their infant son.

In Catherine's new setting, therefore, she had constantly to be on her guard. Fortunately she had come to Russia equipped against all mischances—the experience of life, and the education, which she had received helped her to maintain due equilibrium even on the slippery pavements of the Russian metropolis. Not for nothing did she hail of a German House of the sort whose family tradition it was to be at home never, and amongst strangers always. So fully had she inherited the tradition that, like all homeless people, she could feel at home anywhere and everywhere. Very much had she seen in her early girlhood, for, though born at Stettin, she had stayed with her grandmother at Hamburg, subsequently sojourned in Brunswick, Kiel, and Berlin, and, in the latter city, seen the establishment of the Prussian King. All of which had caused to accumulate in her a plentiful stock of impressions, a wide development of *savoir faire*. The same *savoir faire* accounts, possibly, for the fact that she attained maturity with a precocity leading people, even when she was but fourteen, to stand amazed at a stature and an advancement so disproportionate to her age.

Another result of her upbringing was to free her of many of the prejudices which so often militate against success in life. Northern Germany was, in those days, flooded with Huguenot refugees from France, in consequence of revocation of the Edict of Nantes; and these Huguenots (mostly of the middle, the hardworking, class of France) soon got the trades of Northern Germany into their hands, and then started also to acquire the tutorial business, and to be found in homes even of the best North German social circles. Thus

Catherine studied under, at one and the same time, a Catholic Father named Perara, a zealous servitor of the Pope; a Calvinist named Loraine, a detester of the Pope; and a Lutheran pastor named Wagner, a detester equally of the Pope and of Calvin: whilst when she had arrived in Russia she had her introduction to the verities of the Orthodox Faith entrusted to Archimandrite Simeon Todorski—a detester impartially of the Pope, of Calvin, and of Luther. Not difficult, therefore, is it to understand that Catherine derived from this diverse tutorial *personnel* a most varied stock of religious knowledge.

Established in Russia, she found her relations with her husband open for her, after a while, a period of enforced leisure. For very soon he came to grow tired of her society, and eager to exchange it for others'. Jestingly she said in a self-composed epitaph of 1778 that at least her eighteen years of lonely and tedious married life had afforded her the time for much reading. That reading, at first, was limited to novels, and indiscriminately at that; but after a little book by Voltaire had come into her hands her choice of literature underwent marked modification. From that time onward, she herself subsequently said, her one wish was to read nothing less well written than that little book, nothing less capable of affording her help. So, with these external and internal resources for armament, she worked at her position in Russia with continuous steadiness. Her initial step was assiduously to study the creed of Russian Orthodoxy, to engage in earnest prayer and fasting (but more especially in public), and even to exceed, at times, in the regard named, the pious Elizabeth's own wishes—as when the Empress once requested her to fast during the second week of Lent, and Catherine responded by asking to be allowed to fast until Lent was over. Also, attendants would find her with a prayer-book in her hands, and she would rise at night to commit to memory Russian phrases: until ill-timed avocations of the sort even ended by making her seriously ill. Again, during her accumulation of resources towards ultimate success she ever kept an eye upon the social circles around her. In the time of Elizabeth the society of the Russian Court was mixed in the extreme, and permeated with intrigue; so Catherine at least did not let squeamishness act as a bar against that society's thorough comprehension. She, in fact, "converted" herself "into a spectator possessed of much suffering, much modesty,



and much seeming indifference.” Also, she questioned servants, nor scrupled to listen by stealth: as when, during her illness, she closed her eyes in imitation of sleep, and, thus leading her ladies to take advantage of the fact, and to beguile themselves with gossip, learnt thence a good deal which otherwise she might never have come to know.

In notes on the life which she lived before her accession she describes her line of conduct and self-propounded aims in full—she states that always she strove to gain the general goodwill, and, whilst adhering to no party in particular, nor even interfering in anything, to keep her face invariably cheerful, to display universal politeness and willingness to oblige, to prefer no one to anyone else, to respect profoundly a mother who did not love her, to submit implicitly to an Empress whom she derided, and to tend in all things a husband whom she despised. Nothing did she leave undone to win public favour; and with the aid of all this she persistently maintained her advance towards what really was the aim of her every thought and every care—namely, the throne of Russia. The fixed dream of her ambition did it become; in her memoirs she says outright that she could at any time have parted with her husband, but that by no means were her feelings indifferent to the Russian crown. And though, as she pondered her future on the eve of her marriage, she could not foresee for herself happiness—she felt marriage to bode for her only misery—she still remained ready to meet anything and everything. “Only ambition sustained me,” she says in her memoirs when recalling that time. “For deep in my soul I had something (I know not what) which never allowed me an instant’s doubt but that sooner or later my end would be achieved, and I become Empress of Russia.” Which end smoothed all her road’s roughnesses. True, she lived profoundly wounded by a husband’s neglect—it hurt her both as wife and as woman; but always her pride forbade her to display her sufferings, or to complain of her degradation, lest she should find herself an unwilling object of public sympathy. And though she wept bitterly in solitude, she soon would wipe away the tears, recompose her features to gaiety, and rejoin her ladies as though nothing were amiss.

In short, Catherine qualified herself to yield to untoward circumstances, and to reconcile herself to that unenviable role, the role of a slighted wife. And the long effort eventually was crowned with

success—she, in her own words, caused every one to regard her as “interesting, and anything but stupid.” The English Ambassador, for one, thus describes her Court position five years before the demise of Elizabeth. “From the day of her arrival in Russia she has, to the utmost, striven to win the people’s love, so that persons have come not only to love her, but also to hold her in fear, and many—yes, even of those who also are on good terms with the Empress—to seize every opportunity of conciliating the Grand Duchess.” Thus Catherine, after taking the position by storm, rendered it too secure to be shaken even by her husband’s six months’ term of rule.

From that term’s very beginning Catherine met with contempt at Peter’s hands. De Breteuil, the French Ambassador, thus describes her plight in April 1762. “The Grand Duchess always endeavours to fortify herself with philosophy, a course opposed to her natural character, but certain of those who have seen her of late declare her to be no longer recognisable, so wasted is she grown, and so like soon to be departing to the tomb.” But Catherine did not “depart to the tomb”: on the contrary, she maintained a steadfast step along her self-appointed path, after standing reverently beside the tomb of, in her stead, Elizabeth, and observing the burial rites of the Russian Church with an earnestness exceeding that of all the rest. Our Ambassador writes again: “Much did this touch clergy and people alike, so that all felt grateful unto her. And still she observes every festival and every fast, whereas the Emperor treats them lightly, and the people indifferently.” And early in June 1762, the Ambassador had further to confute his prophecy concerning Catherine and the tomb by recording: “The Empress is displaying more fortitude now, and is loved and respected by all, even as the Emperor is detested.”

We have seen already how the fact that St. Petersburg society formed a special circle of persons of interests coincident with her views led to the hatching of a pro-Catherinian conspiracy. Properly to make clear to ourselves Catherine’s character and political fortunes, the following biographical details are pertinent.

Born in a very modest setting, she early experienced the cares and the privations inevitable where insecurity of status obtains. Yet from that poor and cramped native *milieu* fate projected her to a spacious, bustling political stage, a stage where great people walked, and weighty events occurred, and she beheld splendour and puissance,

brilliance and wealth, and met such characters as Frederick II (characters still hazarding everything to acquire those things), and such characters as the Empress Elizabeth (characters already, through hazard, in possession of the things named). The spectacle of these examples tempted and aroused ambition's appetite, whilst also Catherine was not wanting in the qualities whence, if properly cultivated, there tend to develop the talents necessary for success in hazardous, alluring fields. All her life had she grown up in the idea that she alone could make her road, her career, and form the capacity indispensable for the task. Then her marriage afforded her excellent practice, for it at once pointed out to her ambition its precise aim, and made the attainment of that aim depend upon her personal security: after which the aim's tireless pursuit, added to painful trials experienced by the way, gave her that splendid training, that splendid "tempering of the spirit," upon which she always so prided herself, and which developed in her her main principle of life wisdom, the principle which mainly brought her her eventual success. From childhood life meant to her *work*; and since her chief work in life became inducement of persons encountered in a strange country to set her towards her self-designated goal, and to bring her to it at the appointed hour, her chief occupation in life became acquirement of the art of so moulding persons and circumstances as to turn them to the best use. This occupation placed her, through its very nature, in need of others more than in need by others—for long fate forced her to live and move amongst persons stronger (albeit less far-sighted) than herself, and remembering her only when a use for her occurred to them. And therefore she early reached the conclusion that the best way to utilise persons and circumstances was temporarily to figure as an obedient (but not blind) instrument in the former's hands, and temporarily to float with the latter's current. True, she, on more than one occasion, committed herself to the hands of others; but when she did so she did so but that they might bear her to the destination where she would be, a destination unattainable on her own legs. From this life rule flowed all the strong sides of her character, and also all the weak. Capable of effort, and of strenuous, even excessive, toil, so that she struck herself and others as possessing powers beyond what really were hers, she yet worked more at her manners than she did at her thoughts and sentiments, and so gave rise at once to the unfailing elegance of the

former and to the sometimes explosive crudity of the latter. In her personality pliability and receptiveness exceeded depth and penetration; talent for correction exceeded capacity for creation; nervous vivacity exceeded spiritual force.

For the same reasons her literary compositions present much interest. Much she wrote; and she wrote in *genres* of great diversity. Even before her accession she read literature ranging from annals of Russia to the booklets of the French philosophy of the day; and therefore, as we know her to have studied and reflected at least to the extent named, we wonder the more that her literary imagination was so poor, and her ideas and sentiments so restricted, and even niggardly. None of her compositions contains anything to strike, or to cut into, the memory. In them there are no robust conceptions, and not even a few happy terms of expression. Still less do they contain naturalness and ease. Even her most friendly letters (those, for example, to her diplomatist Baron Grimm) seem to show her as merely playing a well-studied part, as striving to make assumed jocosity and manufactured wit conceal emptiness of content and stiffness of diction. The same features occur in what she did. No matter amongst whom she might be moving, or upon what she might be engaged, she seems always to have been conscious of being on a stage, and acting first and foremost for show (indeed, openly she confesses, once, that "I do love to be in company"). For her an act's setting and effect mattered more than either the act itself or the act's results; and therefore her form of activity always stood superior to its evoking motives. Always, too, she studied contemporary opinion more than the opinion of posterity; and therefore the former set her on a higher level than the latter does. Always, too, she concerned herself with popularity more than with utility; and therefore the energy which she displayed had for its basis less the intrinsic interest of an act than the attention of the act's spectators. In short, her activity contained more brilliancy and "effect" than greatness or creativeness; she knew better how to make an affair go off well than to initiate it; and therefore her personal memory will outlive the memory of her accomplishments.

## CHAPTER II

The influence of the revolution of 1762 upon Catherine's policy—The Manifesto of 6 July—Certain contradictions in the new Government's programme—Russia's international relations after the death of Peter the Great—An Austro-Russian alliance—The Turkish and Polish questions—Those questions' importance for Russia, and the means which were adopted for their decision.

CATHERINE gained the throne through force, through revolution. And the effect of this origin of her authority was markedly to affect her Government's programme, since, inasmuch as the new Government's creation came of a movement of the community in opposition to that Government's predecessor, it had perforce to act in a direction diametrically opposite to its predecessor's bent. The Government which lay fallen had aroused the community against it by its contempt for national interests and popular beliefs and customs. The new Government, therefore, had to act in a spirit pre-eminently of nationalism. The Government which lay fallen had aroused the community against it by its gratuitous tyranny, and this tyranny had revived in the society of the capital the long-forgotten ideas of 1730—just before the revolution occurred we find Nikita Panin telling the Princess Dashkov that the need of the hour was to proclaim as Sovereign the Tsarevitch Paul, and to reorganise the State on the Swedish model, as, that is to say, a purely constitutional monarchy. So far had the late Government's highhanded doings evoked political unrest amongst every section of the community as to have converted even humble citizens into bitter critics of the order in being, and to have made of them involuntary politicians. Bolotov, a contemporary writer, tells us that quite openly, quite boldly, altogether without fear of consequences, did men then constitute themselves judges of the things done and misdone by the late Emperor, whilst Catherine adds to that, in her second Accessional Manifesto, the Manifesto of 6 July, that "no one any longer did aught but curse the Emperor outspokenly, frankly, and with hardihood."

To dissipate such a popular impression, the new Government had, naturally, to adopt a liberal form of policy: it could calm the community only by assuring it that the late Government's arbitrary proceedings were not going to be repeated. Finally, the fact that the new Government had been created by the Guards, and that the Guards represented the *dvorianstvo*, represented the class which, ever since Peter the Great's departure, had been more and more succeeding in its attempt to dominate the community, and become the community's ruling class—this fact forced the new Government to act also in that class's, its creator's, interest. This, then, was the programme which the origin of her authority pre-dictated to Catherine.

This programme we find developed in the verbose version of the Manifesto of 6 July which later was withdrawn. Here she says that she considers herself to have been called to the throne for her people's welfare, and therefore is conscious of obligations to preserve intact the Faith, to defend, and to strengthen, the country, to introduce equity everywhere, and to root out all oppression and injustice. Also, she expresses herself strongly against highhanded governance. "An Autocracy which good and philanthropical qualities in the Sovereign ruling autocratically do not check is an evil commonly tending to bring about many a pernicious consequence": wherefore she solemnly pledges her Imperial word to carry into law such "Ordinances of State" as shall cause administration to be operated "only within the authority of the same, within proper bounds alone, so that in future every Office of State may be possessed of limits and regulations for maintenance of, in all things, orderliness": to which she adds that the late Governmental tyranny had been possible for the very reason that no institution of State had yet got fixed at its basis a set of exact, immutable rules defining its power and working. Likewise, although the Manifesto was not quite the place in which openly to favour the special class interests which the new Government inevitably had to safeguard, the Manifesto added a hint that one of the causes of the late Emperor's fall had been the late Emperor's hostility to the Brigade of Guards, a force which he had dowered with "an alien and repellent guise" in the shape of a Prussianised uniform.

Thus the programme which the new Government was to adopt would need to be at once popular, liberal, and pro-*dvorianin*. Yet

easily we see that these three principles of the programme agreed little amongst themselves, and even to a certain extent contradicted one another. For a popular form of Governmental action, a form inspired by social equality, would have been liberal, but at the same time indifferently agreeable to the interests of the ruling class as represented by the *dvorianstvo*: it would have been impossible, for instance, popularly-liberally to reorganise the position of the bonded *krestianstvo* without at the same time sacrificing the interests of the bonded *krestianstvo*'s masters, the *dvoriané*. And, had the promised "Ordinances of State" consistently set forth a liberal programme inspired by the period's ideas as to what represented a constitutional State order, such a programme would inevitably have brought Catherine's Government into collision equally with time-honoured administrative habits and with old-established popular-political notions. Nor would the form of administration pondered by Panin and others have proved much to the taste of the masses.

Acting popularly, the Government could not act in the interests of the *dvorianstvo*. Acting liberally, the Government could act also popularly through class equalisation, but only non-popularly if introduction of constitutional freedom likewise were involved, since constitutional freedom would benefit no one but the upper classes. And, finally, Governmental action in the interests solely of the *dvorianstvo* would be neither popular nor liberal.

So, unable to reconcile these diverse problems, yet not feeling disposed to relinquish any individual one, the Government effected division of them—assigned each of them to a separate sphere of administrative activity. National interests, that is to say, popular aspirations, were given scope in foreign policy. Popular political notions were met by causing the changes now made in the Central Administration to leave the bases of the order of State untouched, but the provincial administrative system to undergo a process of reform at least sufficient to meet the interests of the *dvorianstvo*, even if it at the same time sacrificed those of the *dvorianstvo*'s fellow-classes. Also, a place in the programme was allotted to the liberal ideas, to the political influences, which had emanated from abroad, and fast were permeating Russia's upper circles, despite that, as yet, their expression was limited to exchanges of opinion, to embellishment of administrative activity and social life, to private conversations of the Empress's, and to drawing-rooms, schools, literature, unsubstantiated

drafts for legislation, and preambles to laws. Lastly, the Government developed and strengthened the indigenous factors which, evolved long before Catherine’s time, were neither liberal nor popular, and agreed neither with the foreign-imported ideas mentioned above nor with the nation’s interests.

In sum, the new Government’s programme consisted of, firstly, propaganda on behalf of certain *contemporary ideas*, and, secondly, legislative reinforcement of certain *native factors* which contradicted those ideas.

Next, beginning with foreign policy, let us see how the programme was fulfilled. In that connection Peter the Great had given Russia a voice of weight in Europe’s politics and international relations already, but left Russia’s direct and current relations restricted exclusively to the three nearest Powers, namely, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey (the Crimea), with no immediate contact, geographical or political, with the remaining States. For that matter, the three nearest States differed not a little in their importance for Russia. Thus, with Sweden all accounts of major significance, all questions of more burning instance, had been closed by the Treaty of Nystad. And though Sweden dreamed of revenge, her external and internal position prevented those dreams from causing Russia uneasiness, or threatening danger. And as regards Poland, Poland had not, when Sweden had retired into the background so far as Russia’s policy was concerned, advanced to the foreground. From the first these two States had been divided by important interests, but, for all that, Russia never raised the supremely burning question, the question of Poland’s Russian Orthodox populations, during the first half of the eighteenth century, for Poland, during that period, was too necessary to her in her relations with Turkey. Hence Turkey was the one antagonist of the Russian Empire now left in the field.

When Peter was dead Russia’s statesmen, fearing to wage a struggle with Turkey single-handed, cast about them for a reliable ally. And as Peter already had made efforts to draw Austria into the business, Russia, in 1726, concluded an anti-Turkish offensive and defensive alliance with that Power. In the diplomatic diction of the day the alliance came to be known as “Peter the Great’s System,” and it steadily was followed by all Russia’s Governments up to the time of the accession of Peter III. During Anna’s reign



Ostermann pursued it with lustre and success, and, under Elizabeth, his diplomatic pupil and personal foe, Bestuzhev-Riumin, Elizabeth's Chancellor, still kept it in force. Wherefore during the former of those reigns Russia fought Turkey, and during the latter she fought Poland. But the "System" also had its disadvantages, for to march hand in hand with an Austrian Government, a Government existing merely from day to day, and as much without definite plans then as now, and expectant always of a "lucky chance," was not an easy matter. Hence the only tangible fruit which the Russo-Austrian alliance brought Russia was a treaty of Belgrade (1739) giving her a few square versts of waste land between the rivers Dnieper and Bug, and the loss of a hundred thousand Russian soldiers whom Münnich left stretched upon the steppes.

Thus between the year 1725 and the year 1762, Russia tackled her two fundamental questions of foreign policy merely with indecision and lack of success as regards the one, and almost not at all as regards the other.

Those questions were as follows. The Empire's southern frontier had dwelling upon it hordes of semi-nomadic, predatory Tartars who, whilst making no use of the soil of the steppes themselves, refused to admit thither an agricultural population from elsewhere. Hence Russia's need in that quarter was to advance her boundary line to its natural limit of the Black Sea littoral. That was the one, the Turkish, fundamental question of foreign policy. And that question, so far, consisted solely of the foregoing. Next, the State of Poland-Lithuania had dwelling within it a considerable proportion of purely Russian population. For centuries Russia's two halves, the eastern and the western, had desired to effect political re-unification: and therefore Russia's need in this regard was to wrest Western Russia from Polish possession. That was the other, the Polish, fundamental question of foreign policy. And that question, so far, consisted solely of the foregoing. Both the one question and the other stood directly posed by history, with their respective characters clearly, simply defined. And decision of the Turkish question was necessary for Russia's popular industry because that industry was being deprived of large, fertile areas of the Russian plain; whilst decision of the Polish question was imperatively demanded by Russia's national-religious sentiment. The first was an economic question alone. The second was solely of the character just

named. Already, too, they had been perspicuously, succinctly formulated by those prosaic, shrewd, hardworking statesmen the Muscovite Tsars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who roundly had said that they were not going to lay down arms against Poland so long as she held Western Rus: Ivan III had declared peace with Poland under such circumstances to be impossible, and that Moscow's rulers must wage the struggle continuously save for recuperative armistices; whilst his grandson, Ivan IV, had taken the same view, and, in rejecting a proposal for permanent peace from Sigismund Augustus (the last of the Jagiellos to sit upon the Polish throne), motived the refusal thus: "Still there lieth in the hands of the Polish King our ancient *otchina* of Kiev and Volhynia and Vitebsk and Polotsk and many another Russian town. How, therefore, would it advantage us to make with him a constant peace, seeing that, if I should thus make peace for ever, and kiss the cross upon the same, I could never again seek to recover mine *otchina*—I being one who, the cross kissed, never could forswear himself?"

So these two fundamental questions of foreign policy were extant when Catherine came to the throne. However, she did not lack means for the questions' decision. One of those means lay in Russia's and Western Europe's respective positions in consequence of the Seven Years' War, since, whilst that struggle had left Russia far from exhausted as regards further efforts, it had almost completely done so in the case of the struggle's other participants; it had left them, after signing the Treaty of Hubertsburg in 1763, neither able nor willing to renew the contest. Moreover, with the death of Augustus III in the same year there ended the personal Saxon-Polish alliance which always had been disadvantageous for Russia. Russian bayonets then hoisted upon the throne of Poland a Russian tool, Stanislas Poniatowski, whilst Russia also had to aid her in Poland, firstly, a powerful pro-Russian party under Prince Czartoryski, uncle to Stanislas, and, secondly, Poland's Russian Orthodox population, which now stood needing merely a signal from St. Petersburg to rise to the last man.

Well, how did Catherine use the foregoing means for decision of the two fundamental questions stated, her predecessors' bequest? We shall see.

### CHAPTER III

Count Nikita Panin and his "Northern System"—The disadvantages for Russia of that "System"—An alliance with Prussia, and the harmful results thence—Course and decision of the Turkish and Polish questions—The importance for Russia of the three Partitions of Poland—The results and defects of Catherine's foreign policy.

FOREIGN policy was where Catherine's political activity showed its most brilliant side, so that whenever people wish to commend her reign they refer first to what she accomplished abroad—to the two Turkish wars, and to the Partitions of Poland. Foreign policy also seemed to Catherine the field in which she could best win the popular goodwill; whilst, finally, it was questions of foreign policy that, from the beginning, called most insistently for solution. So at once she turned her attention pre-eminently in that direction.

The questions' very characters enable us easily to note the essentials towards their decision. Both of them purely Russian, they yet differed to a certain extent in nature. Hence they ought to have been divided from one another, respectively to have been localised: they ought not to have been decided together, but mutually apart. And Catherine, at the very start, made blunders which militated against their decision.

In the first place, her Government abandoned the heretofore system of foreign policy, and replaced the "System of Peter the Great" with what was called the "Northern System." Of this system the chief sponsor was Count Nikita Panin, a new-school diplomatist who had been Ambassador to Stockholm in Elizabeth's time, and tutor to the Tsarevitch Paul since 1760. Remarkable for clarity of brain, he also was remarkable for invincible dilettantism, and differed from his diplomatic mentor, Bestuzhev-Riumin (a mediocre and opportunist mover in diplomatic affairs), in most things, but especially in representing, in diplomacy, "ideas" or "principles." Wide, daring, complex schemes were most to his taste; yet, with that, he had no love for entering into those schemes' details as regards

subsequent execution, and therefore was a "diplomatist-sybarite"; whilst, as, also, he laid at the basis of his every conception a dream of introducing peace and concord all round amongst the European Powers, he might be called, in addition to a "diplomatist-sybarite," a "diplomatist-idealist." Such, then, the man who, responsible for the foreign policy pursued during the first half of the reign, enjoyed, meanwhile, his Sovereign's high esteem.

The "Northern System" meant that, under Russia as chief, the northern and non-Catholic States of Europe (though Poland also was included) formed a coalition against the existing Austro-Franco-Spanish union of Southern European Catholic Powers. Of this new coalition the members bound themselves to mutual assistance, and to defence of the weak against the strong: Poland was to march always with Russia, and Russia with Prussia and Sweden, and Prussia with Saxony, and Saxony with England, and the rest. But the disadvantages of the "system" are obvious, for, firstly, States so variously organised as autocratic Russia, constitutional-aristocratic Sweden and England, semi-autocratic Prussia, and anarchical Poland could not well act together in amity; whilst, in the second place, the coalition's members possessed few common interests—England stood concerned with Continental Europe only as regards her trading and colonial interests, and Prussia had no mind to defend Saxony (but, rather, to lay hands upon her, as she had done with Silesia), and Poland's affairs mattered nothing to Sweden. Thus in the "Northern System" we see merely a mad attempt to yoke to the same diplomatic wagon a swan, a crab, and a pike. Nevertheless, for Panin the "System" was going to give Europe peace for ever. As regards Russia especially, the "System's" crowning drawback was that it sundered her ties of long standing with Austria, and shattered her friendship with France, despite that she needed these two Powers more than all others in her Turkish relations.

Catherine's second blunder in foreign policy was to conclude an alliance with Prussia for the special purpose of deciding the Polish question. Of the treaty signed to that end on 31 March, 1764 (just when the death of Augustus III had aroused in Poland a great agitation over the matter of electing a successor to him), the principal conditions were that the two signatories should mutually guarantee one another's territories, and that neither of them should permit Poland to carry through any political reforms. And the alliance

brought upon Russia unlooked-for and untoward results. For, in the first place, the alliance was altogether superfluous: without it Frederick would still have been bound to keep on friendly terms with Russia, seeing that the Seven Years War had left him absolutely broken, exhausted, very awkwardly placed, alone, helpless, destitute both of allies towards renewed warfare and of material means for the same, and awestruck of Russia whenever there recurred to his mind the Berlin visit of Russia's Cossacks and Kalmuks, a visit which, later he confessed, caused him again and again to see the unwelcome guests in his dreams. Besides, his memoirs frankly state how much he needed Russia's goodwill at that period. Manifestly, then, he would have been forced to frame his action in her favour—obligations on her side, or no obligations. Again, a result of the Prussian alliance was to make Catherine contradict her own word, solemnly pledged, seeing that her Accessional Manifesto had dubbed Frederick "the most cruel of all Russia's existing enemies," and that now of her own accord her was offering him her hand. Moreover, Russia's and Prussia's interests in Poland differed. At that time affairs in Poland were dominated by a group known as the Party of Patriots which, hand in hand with Stanislas, the recently appointed King, was occupying itself with far-reaching plans of political reform designed to rescue Poland from anarchy, the result of her inept political system. The Princes Czartoryskis' idea was to have the Diet's *liberum veto* abolished in favour of a majority of votes, a regular army created in place of temporary armings of the *shliakhtha*, an hereditary monarchy established instead of the existing elective one, and so forth. But whereas these reforms threatened no danger to Russia, who stood, rather, to gain through an access of Polish strength, seeing that that would further qualify Poland to serve as a useful ally in the Turkish struggle, Frederick supremely feared a Polish political resurrection, and in 1768 pushed Catherine into making a new Polish treaty whereby, inasmuch as Russia guaranteed Poland's existing political system, that is to say, declared that it should be allowed to undergo no change, she drew down upon herself the enmity of the King's and the Czartoryskis' reform party, and caused Russia, in short, to become Prussia's Polish instrument. And as the Russo-Prussian treaty already referred to incensed Austria (who considered Russia thereby to have deserted her), and at least disturbed France and Turkey (who feared, next, a Russo-Prussian disruption

of Poland), Austria and France ended by inciting Turkey to a Russian struggle, one of the consequences of which was definitely to prevent settlement of the Turkish question apart from the Polish.

Such, then, were the difficulties which the "Northern System" and the Russo-Prussian treaty of 31 March jointly created for Russia. For, owing to the former, Catherine's Government set itself only remote and fanciful and impossible aims, and, owing to the latter, Russia became but an instrument of another's policy, and, owing to the two in combination, obstacles were placed in the way of realisation of Russia's historically indicated, direct, immediate objectives. From a mere glance at the course and methods of Catherine's foreign policy we shall see how the two blunders influenced her decision of the fundamental problems outstanding, in the respect named.

To begin with the Turkish question. The two blunders caused Catherine's Government to cease to be able either soberly to view immediate ends or soundly to estimate available resources. The Turkish question was confined exclusively to pushing forward Russia's southern frontier to its natural limit, the Black Sea littoral: yet as soon as ever the first war with Turkey (declared in October 1768) was begun there was initiated also an agitation for complete expulsion of Turkey from Europe—Voltaire had written jestingly to Catherine, not long before the war's inception, that quite possibly an outcome of the contest might be conversion of Constantinople into a new Russian Imperial capital: and St. Petersburg seems to have taken the *mot* for serious prophecy. So in 1769 a Russian squadron left the port of Kronstadt, and, after parading the shores of Western and Southern Europe, made for the Archipelago, in order at once to bombard Turkey, and to raise the Morean Greeks. But the enterprise had not been properly prepared: only when, for example, the Russians had duly reached the Archipelago, and were setting about raising the Greeks, did they discover that they had on board no interpreter for Greek negotiations, and that adequate plans had not been thought of as regards landing a force in the Greeks' support. Certainly, the Greeks rose; but no sooner did some Turks reach the peninsula than the Russians left their friends to their fate. Also, though the Turkish fleet was inferior to the Russian, and the latter eventually shattered it off the port of Chesmé (Gulf of Chios), Alexis Orlov, the officer in command, failed to pass the Dardanelles in time, and so could not, as planned, return home

via the Black Sea, and had to remain in the Mediterranean. Lastly, although the true goal was the Crimea, and even Frederick considered that after the sea and land victories of 1770-71 Russia was fully justified in annexing the peninsula, a war begun with the idea of conquering Turkey as a whole ended in the Russians failing even to keep the Crimea in secure possession, so that a region worth not one war led, ultimately, to a waging of two.

In precisely the same way was the second Turkish campaign waged in 1787-91. The direct aim of this second contest was consolidation of a hold upon the Crimea, annexed in 1783; but with it there came to be proposed a "Greek project," or plan for a re-establishment of the ancient Byzantine Empire, so that ultimately the fruits of the arduous and costly expedition did not amount to more than acquisition of Otchakov, with retention of what in any case was Russia's by the treaty with which the first Turkish struggle had ended.

Similar faults of policy occurred in Catherine's decision of the Polish question. That question lay exclusively in reuniting Western Rus to the Empire, but the St. Petersburgan Cabinet began by resting satisfied with such a straightening of Russia's western frontier as to make it run from Polotsk to Orsh-on-the-Dnieper, and include Vitebsk and Mogilev: and this, of course, meant substitution of the territorial question for the national-religious. The immediate cause of the re-raising of the Polish question was the matter of the Dissidents, of Poland's oppressed Russian Orthodox population. Herein various interests clashed. The Russian Government's demand was for equalisation of the Dissidents with the dominant Catholic population—such equalisation to be political and religious alike; but the Dissidents wanted only religious equalisation, and claimed freedom to profess their faith, restoration of the Orthodox churches seized by the Polish Government and Catholic clergy, and permission to forcibly converted Uniates to revert to their Orthodox fathers' creed. The St. Petersburgan Cabinet, however, did not consider these religious claims altogether safe. And herein, undoubtedly, Panin was guided by political motives, since, as masses of Russian peasantry and old believers still were emigrating to Poland, and were restrained from doing so only by fear of Catholic persecution there, Panin believed that concession of freedom of profession of faith would swell yet further the exodus.

So an attempt was made to convert the national-religious question into, rather, a police question. The reason why the Orthodox Dissidents had no desire for political equalisation was that, even if given it, they could not have used it, seeing that most of the Orthodox Russian *dvoriané* in Poland had undergone Catholicisation and Polishisation, and the remainder were such poor, ill-educated men that few of them would have been fit to execute public functions—to occupy a seat in the Diet, or in the Senate, or to fill a State office of any sort. This we know further from notes by Repnin, the then representative of Russia in Warsaw, who wrote that “here customarily our Orthodox *dvoriané* do plough their land themselves, whilst, withal, they lack all species of schooling.” Even Georgii Konyski, though head of Poland’s Orthodox faithful, and qualified, as a White Russian prelate, to sit in the Senate at Warsaw, could not attend that body, owing to his non-*dvorianin* origin. However, the Russian Government obtained from the Diet of 1767–8 at least political equalisation of Poland’s Russian Orthodox *dvorianstvo* with Poland’s Catholic *shliakhta*: and upon that there disclosed themselves the difficulties mentioned, and Catherine was forced to renounce the few political rights for the Dissidents which had been so painfully extorted. Again, although Russia’s policy might have found good and reliable support in the *gaidamaki*, or Russian peasant serfs of the Polish *pani*, the fact that those *gaidamaki* already had risen—and more than once—against Poland’s *pani* and Government on behalf of faith and nationality, and, as Orthodox believers, had been supported, and even encouraged, by St. Petersburg in doing so, but afterwards, as peasants had been handed over to the *pani* again, since St. Petersburg had considered all peasant risings subversive and dangerous; this fact, this obscurity of Russian policy, had left the Orthodox Dissidents wondering what Russia really wanted: whether their total emancipation from Poland, or only their equalisation with the Catholic population; whether their emancipation as Orthodox Christians, or their emancipation as the *pani*’s serfs; whether their delivery from the Catholic priest alone, or their delivery also from the Polish *pan*. So for long Poland’s Orthodox population could make neither head nor tail of it all.

Eventually the lack of a really clear, determined programme forced Catherine to adopt Frederick’s more soberly devised and perspicuously expressed plans in the matter. Those plans he carried



out by coming to an agreement with Austria shortly before the close of the first Turkish war, and then coolly proposing to Russia that she should, as a reward to herself for her Turkish victories, annex a portion of Poland's Russian population, and permit a like strange recompence (seeing that it would have been won by conquering others than the proposal payers) to go to Prussia and Austria, who for its deserving had done nothing whatsoever! And this was the source whence ultimately there arose, and grew, in Berlin the idea of the Polish Partitions. The idea was adopted by Catherine in careless fashion, but it altogether changed the Polish question's tendency, and converted the matter of a political annexation of Western Rus into a matter of, through the three Partitions, Poland's political extinction. In those Partitions Russia annexed Western Rus (save for Galicia, which she let go elsewhere) and the Lithuanian and Courlander Principalities, whilst Prussia carried her eastern frontier to the river Niemen. Neither with the interests of Russia nor with history's postulation of the problem did this decision agree. For now Poland disappeared altogether from the European political map. Hitherto she had been a weak buffer State between the three powerful neighbours Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Now that buffer State ceased to exist, and any future collision between the three Powers named would inevitably assume a sharper character than otherwise would have been the case, and react upon Russia more. Besides, it was a case of "Our corps has suffered a casualty," in that now there was a Slavonic State the less, a Slavonic State had become part of two Germanic States: and that could not but be a loss for Slavdom. What Russia's interest had demanded had been annexation of Western Rus; it had not been Poland's blotting out: history had bidden Russia recover from Poland what was Russia's, but it had not also suggested that Russia should go shares with two Germanic States in Poland's possession. It had been necessary to set back Poland within her true ethnographical boundaries, and to recover from her the Russian provinces which she had seized and oppressed, and to make of her a Poland solely Polish; but it had not been necessary to make of her a Poland Germanised. Set back within her true ethnographical boundaries, Poland would, even with her existing order of State left unreformed, and even as a Poland still independent, have been incomparably less dangerous to Russia than inevitably would be a Poland converted into two disaffected

Germanic provinces. It had been necessary to deliver Western Rus from being Polishised, but it had not been necessary to make over Poland to a process of being Teutonised. As things were, independent Poland's extinction did not in the least save us later strife with the Polish people. Thrice had we, during the nineteenth century, to fight the Poles. Whence it would seem that if one wishes to avoid hostility with a nation one should continue to conserve to that nation its State.

Thus we cannot minimise the significance of what came of Catherine's foreign policy. The results of that policy cut too deeply for that. At the time when Catherine ascended the throne the population of her Empire amounted to 20,000,000 only. By the year 1796 the Empire's population was numbering 36,000,000. Such an increase can have come only of Russia's western acquisitions of territory.

For the rest, Catherine solved, of her two main questions of foreign policy, the Turkish question a little the more satisfactorily, a little the more easily. For her decision of the Polish question was accompanied with consequences the drawbacks of which greatly diminished the decision's successes: the decision gained less than was necessary, and less than was sought, and at the same time gained more than had been proposed, and more than could be done with.

Also, there went with Catherine's foreign policy an extraordinary amount of commotion. Each of her two main questions of foreign policy her Government staged grandiosely, loudly, in dimensions of exaggeration. Thus, when, in 1769-70, the Russian squadron paraded from the Baltic to the Mediterranean there somehow became disseminated reports that it was about speedily to annihilate Turkey *en bloc*. Tremulously the simple-minded Western publics watched the ships' progress; seriously those publics believed that the squadron was out for Turkey's complete destruction, and that when Turkey had fallen before the guns of Russia the rest of Europe would see its turn arrive. For long this tale of Russian plans of universal conquest found credence: it even received support from St. Petersburg itself during Catherine's time, seeing that, in addition to both of Russia's wars with Turkey being entered upon with projects for remodelling the map of Western Europe, Potemkin made a great hubbub with his notorious "Greek Scheme," and Zubov, the last of Catherine's favourites, at least tried to follow in Potemkin's

footsteps. From Zubov, indeed, there has come down to us a document curious in the extreme. Written partly in Russian and partly in French, the document amounts to nothing less than a list of Europe's States and dynasties as eventually they would appear when Russia should have done with them. But lacking from the list are Sweden, Prussia, Poland, Austria, Denmark, and Turkey: so what had become of these States, seeing that from historical records of undoubted authenticity we know them to have been existing in the eighteenth century? Well, the answer is to be found the same Zubovian forecast of a composition of the Russian Empire. For in that Empire there figure six capital cities—St. Petersburg, Moscow, Astrakhan, Vienna, Constantinople, and Berlin, each of them with its Court, but—with only one chief administration for the whole of the vast Empire. Over this brief, but eloquent, document there stands the expressive superscription, "General Political Considerations."

Such the defects in Catherine's foreign policy. On the other hand, it was at least irreproachable both in the æsthetico-ethical regard and in its diplomatic-literary style. Therein, indeed, it produces a very pleasant impression upon the student, so high does it soar above the Western European diplomatic world of the day, and, alone amid the sphere of brazen intrigue and gross mendacity and sheer fraud, preserve some polish of manner, a measure of nicety in political method. Only in Panin's despatches do we meet with such then, as at all times, *diplomat*-detested terms as "sympathy" and "humanity," and with expressions of dislike of might as right, and with calls to the strong to defend the weak. Yet also it must be said that St. Petersburg's diplomacy joined with good breeding a lack of technical training, so that, whilst it contained ideas, it did not contain industry and knowledge to correspond. St. Petersburg's diplomacy, in other words, thought a lot, but studied little, and therefore failed to achieve correct historical perspective, and, though possessed of a taste for complex combinations and grandiose projects, developed an inability to divine, and to pursue, the most immediate ends, or to weigh resources available, or to foresee given conditions and junctures, or to carry through what it had begun upon.

## CHAPTER IV

Catherine's insecurity of position at the beginning of her reign—Her assistants at that period—Her and their relations—Her study of the country's internal condition—Her idea that a new *Ulozhenie* was necessary—Her form of political views—Her *Nakaz*—The *Nakaz'* literary sources—Its contents, structure, character, and fundamental *motif*.

THE qualities displayed in foreign policy by Catherine's Government distinguished also that Government's doings at home. In the beginning Catherine possessed only small knowledge of how affairs stood in Russia, and of what resources were available, and of what obstacles confronted her. Yet she stood none the less bound to smooth away the impression which the revolution had created, and to justify the illegal origin of her authority. A position of the kind always tends to breed a danger of bombastic, rather than serious, action. And certainly Catherine's programme made immediate, modest aims give place to remote, alluring objectives.

Just at first, after her accession, neither she nor her assistant could resist a certain intoxication born of their successful seizure of power. Yet, even so, Catherine found this intoxication tainted with her sense of insecurity, seeing that the Guards already were mooted disturbing ideas about alternatively placing the young ex-Emperor Ivan Antonovitch upon the throne or proclaiming as Emperor the Grand Duke Paul. And beyond a doubt conspiracies towards both of these ends were hatched.

Besides, Catherine experienced much trouble with the assistants who had prepared the revolution's way. For those assistants felt Catherine to be greatly in their debt, and hastened to avail themselves of the position. Frederick told Ségur, French Ambassador to the Russian Court, when proceeding to St. Petersburg, that Catherine had not so much been the originator of the revolution as its instrument: and indisputably he was right. And now, young, weak, and lonely, as well as an alien and unable at once to cope with things, Catherine was only too glad to throw herself into the arms of men who, though ready enough to help her, were in a hurry also to set about garnering the

fruits of "the Great Event," as the *coup d'état* of July always figured to Catherine and her circle. Those assistants, moreover, did not rest satisfied with their rewards, even though Catherine gave them 18,000 peasant souls, 180,000 roubles, and life pensions. The leaders of the band were the Brothers Orlov (subsequently, at the Coronation, promoted "Counts"). And, with regard to the band's entire *personnel*, foreigners stood amazed at their faulty education, an education rendering them inferior even to Elizabeth's Panins, Razumovskis, Shuvalovs, and Vorontzovs. The members of the band were, foreigners said, "just *otyavlennii rusaki*," or "real Russian boors." Anyway, they beset the Empress, importuned her with their opinions and interests, and sometimes did not scruple even to demand more money. The truth is that during the period of the conspiracy's hatching they had become so accustomed to treating her only in rough and ready fashion that now they either could not or would not drop the habit. However, though Catherine had no choice but to keep on good terms with these fellows, the task, even if unpleasant, was not difficult, since for the purpose she needed only to fall back upon her resources of a matchless talent for listening, an ability always to return a smooth reply, and resourcefulness in awkward moments. An example of her deftness in employing these resources is to be met with in Princess Dashkov's memoirs. It is that whilst the two ladies were talking together on the fourth day after the revolution Lieutenant-General Betski suddenly rushed into the room, and, falling upon his knees, besought Catherine, almost with tears, to declare to whom she stood the most indebted for gaining the throne. "To God, and to my subjects' choice," was her reply. "Then I am unworthy any longer to hold this distinction," he retorted as he sought to strip from his breast the ribbon of Alexander, just conferred upon him. The Empress, however, restrained him. "What is the meaning of this?" she asked. "The meaning of it is," he replied, "that unless your Majesty here and now recognises that I, more than all others, prepared the road to the crown for you, I shall be the most miserable of mortals. Did not I, more than all others, incline to you the minds of the Guards? Did not I, more than all others, throw money to the people?" Whereupon Catherine, who at first had been alarmed, recovered herself, and said: "Yes, I do recognise my debt to you for the crown. And as that is so, to whom better than yourself could I entrust the task of preparing the

crown and all else my wearings for the Coronation? So herewith I give you charge of the jewellery stores throughout my Empire." And the General took these words for sound coin, and, half beside himself with joy, saluted, departed, and left the ladies long unable to laugh sufficiently. No; to keep on good terms with such men cost little trouble.

A far more difficult affair lay in justifying the new Government in the popular eye, in making the people feel that the new Government could be of use. Of the people's position Catherine knew little as yet. Up to the time of her accession she had had small means of learning of that position, for the Russian Court of Elizabeth's day stood, geographically and morally alike, at too great a distance from Russia. Now, however, Catherine set about ascertaining the true situation, and, to that end, assiduously attended the Senate's sittings, inquired into the Senate's business, listened to the Senators' debates, stored up impressions, and questioned all and sundry. From these early years of her reign there have been preserved to us certain notes of hers, setting forth what she gleaned, and showing precisely how the then position of affairs struck her. We learn that not for eight months past had the army in Prussia received any pay; that Russia's foreign trade was in the hands of foreigners; that all the more important articles of domestic production had been monopolised; that Russia's credit had fallen; that, earlier, the Empress Elizabeth had been unable to persuade Holland's bankers to advance a loan of 2,000,000; that the Russian peasantry were becoming restless; that, according to Catherine's computation, 50,000 factory peasants and 150,000 monasterial and *pomiestie* peasants were in revolt; that military detachments had been sent against them, and the troops found themselves forced to resort to arms, even to artillery; that Senatorial business was transacted so slowly as to have led to the Senate spending six weeks over a mere trifling case of pasturage for the town of Moselsk; that provincial administrative officials had ceased to receive salary, and become forced to "live upon affairs" in spite of the many *ukazi* forbidding acceptance of bribes; that, when appointing *Gubernatori* and *Voevodi*, the Senate had no list of the Russian provinces to help it (Catherine discovered this only through happening once to ask for such a list); that, in addition, the Senate did not possess a map of the Russian Empire (wherefore the Empress purchased one at her own expense, and made the Senate

a present of it); that, though the Senatorial registers showed the State's revenues as amounting to 16,000,000 roubles only, Catherine had had the accounts audited, and found the revenue to have been as much as 28,000,000—the 12,000,000 of difference having, *en route*, stuck to palms, or slipped through fingers; that when, in 1765, Catherine ordered a review of the Baltic fleet the ships kept colliding with one another, breaking their tackle, failing, despite their name of “ships-of-the-line,” to form line at all, and failing to hit the target—wherefore Catherine adjudged the Russian fleet to be fit only to catch herrings, although a few years later she sent it to bombard Turkey.

Also, for a still nearer view of the position, and for still further implementation of her personal knowledge of Russia, Catherine made a series of tours. In 1763 she visited Rostov and Yaroslavl. In 1764 she journeyed about the Baltic Provinces. And in 1767, deciding to visit “Asia,” that is to say, the lower Volga, she embarked at Tver with a suite of 2,000, and the Diplomatic Corps, and, after descending the river for some way, disembarked at Simbirsk, and returned to Moscow by an overland route. Much useful information did she collect during these progresses, for, in the first place, she perceived the good administrative material which her subjects constituted, and, in the second place, she perceived the small amount of effort needed to win their goodwill. Indeed, she was received with great and universal enthusiasm. True, her Parisian friends often hailed her as “a goddess,” but that was only a drawing-room compliment. Here the simple-hearted masses expressed the same simile with full measure of sincere, even if of naive and crude, sentiment. Indeed, once when the Empress was standing in a village church the villagers distributed candles to the smart Imperial aides-de-camp, and begged of them to set the offerings before “the Tsaritsa, our Little Mother.” Of course, these cursory observations on tour were not competent fundamentally to reveal to her the position of affairs, but at least they suggested to her some useful administrative notions. Everywhere, too, she adjudged the towns “fairly situated, but mean of building,” whilst Kazan particularly impressed her with its heterogeneousness of population. “Here there is a place which is a region to itself. Such a multitude of objects meriting attention does it contain that with ease one might spend ten years in gathering from them new ideas.”

Well, let us see how Catherine used her ideas. Beyond doubt her efforts, her notes *en voyage*, her conversations, her study of the Senate's proceedings, and her questionings of everyone helped her to understand things better. And at last she made up her mind to begin reform with legislation.

Of Russia's legislation, as it existed, we find her, in 1767, taking a very despondent view: travelling during that year, she wrote that "the laws of now bear little correspondence with the Empire's position," and that they had driven from the country a countless mass of people, and caused the State's prosperity to decline. Wherefore, although certain of her assistants asserted the need of the day to be merely systematisation of Russia's legislation, she decided upon a more radical process in the shape of composition of an altogether new *Codex*.

This resolve, as well as her manner of setting about its fulfilment, is explained by her then position. Revision and systematisation of Russia's laws would need to bring those laws into consonance with the people's condition and requirements. Hence some knowledge of that condition and those requirements was imperative, whereas there was much in both of these factors of which Catherine was ignorant, and much in her knowledge of them which could not advisably be drawn upon without infringing the personal and class interests most closely bound up with her. Gradually, therefore, her legislative activity had to leave the field of actual, practical interests, and to devote itself to the only field left open to it, to the field of general theories and political "good intentions."

Happily this exalted, innocuous sphere was one for working in which she had a personal liking. We have seen that her education was French entirely, and that subsequently she came to be a devotee of the French "literature of enlightenment," and to devote study to Bailly, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and other leaders of the movement. The effect of that reading was to imbue her throughout with those leaders' vague liberalism, a liberalism equally remote from practical questions and from everyday necessities. Yet not for nothing did she customarily style herself "one of the champions of liberty and equality." Indeed, notes of hers which can be referred to the first few years of her reign express political ideas of the greatest daring. An example is a conviction that "if subjects do disapprove of their Sovereign the Sovereign invariably is at fault," whilst another note exclaims, "O



Liberty, the soul of all things, without thee were all things dead!" Of course, we may look upon these utterances as but the political excesses, the immature impulses, of the heart of a woman of thirty-five; but, even so, political sentimentality of the kind was no more than in keeping with the mental attitude of St. Petersburg's social leaders, all of whom had become permeated with the sort of formless, indefinite liberalism which halts always in the realm of ideas, and, though serving to titillate the nervous system, never proceeds to expression in everyday acts.

These, then, were the resources which Catherine had to go upon in her meditated reform of Russia's laws *in toto*. But, as those resources lay solely in a rich store of abstract theories and beautiful aphorisms, Catherine found herself able to take only a philosophical share in the practical legislative task, and had, for actual composition of the new *Codex*, to convene representatives of certain of the corporate social classes, whilst; to give what she thought was a proper direction to the representatives' work, she vouchsafed them, as a guide, her well-known *Nakaz*, or "Instruction."

We know from herself her manner of composing the document; and the description is the more interesting because it constitutes so excellent an expression of the sort of sentimental fussiness with which the minds of St. Petersburgan society then were dominated. "During the first three years of my reign I perceived that all men were desiring and demanding better legislative ordering: and that led me to the conclusion that it was not possible to amend either the form of our legislative ideas or the form of our Civil Code save by establishing, after inscription and confirmation by myself, rules meet for all dwellers and matters throughout the Empire. And for this purpose I then set myself to read, and to write, material wherewith a Commission for a new *Ulozhenie* might be instructed. Two years did I read and write thus, as well as for one-and-a-half years search my whole mind and heart in a fervent desire to confer advantage, honour, and happiness upon my Empire. And then, deeming myself to be sufficiently prepared for the task, I began to show the articles which I had inscribed to persons, according to each one's particularities, portion by portion, with never more than one sheet, or two, at the most, displayed. And, lastly, I prepared a Manifesto for convoking the necessary Deputies." Also, seeing that she states in a letter of 28 March, 1765, to a Parisian friend, a Madame Joffre, that these

two months past she had been devoting three hours every morning to work upon her Empire's laws, we have in the statement a clear indication that the *Nakaz* began to be composed in January of that year, whilst the above shows us that it became finished early in 1767. But before exhibiting it to the world Catherine had it subjected to strict censorship. That censorship was as follows. First of all she showed the composition to a few intimates and high ecclesiastical dignitaries, and, on their declaring any portion of it to be inexpedient, crased that portion. And we know from statements of her own that she either burnt or tore up more than half of what she had written. And during the time that the Deputies to the Commission were assembling in Moscow she summoned to her presence also "certain persons of the most diverse thought possible," and read to them the *Nakaz*' articles, and had those articles severally debated by this second set of censors (whose scrutiny was as drastic as the scrutiny exercised by their predecessors), and charged the censors to mark and erase anything and everything which they thought should be so treated. Her own testimony shows the second band of censors to have deleted fully another half of what had been written. And then this last-surviving half—merely a fourth of Catherine's original script—was printed. We find the reason for the stringency exercised by the two sets of censors in the *Nakaz*' very character. The *Nakaz* was a production composed wholly under the influence of the French political literature of France of the day. And, at that, it expressed completely the author's bent towards political ideas of the boldest possible kind. In a letter to Madame Joffre Catherine makes open confession of that bent. "I shall soon be sending him," she writes in reference to d'Alembert, "a manuscript to show him how serviceable the works of writers of genius [such as himself] may prove to them who will but put them to use."

The same bent explains the *Nakaz*' sources as well. For the contents of the *Nakaz* derive from the works which represented Catherine's favourite subjects of reading: chief amongst which was Montesquieu's *De l'Esprit des Loïs*, so that, misusing words as she only too often did, she calls it in one passage "a prayerbook for all rulers possessed of sound understanding." Montesquieu she drew upon for, in all, no fewer than some two hundred and fifty of the printed *Nakaz*' total of five hundred and twenty-six articles. And the *Nakaz*' second chief source was a work published as recently

as 1764, but already stirring the whole literary world of Europe, and undergoing translation into French and German. I refer to *Dei Delitti e delle Pene*, the well-known treatise by the young Italian philosopher-criminologist Beccaria. Thence Catherine borrowed the *Nakaz*' tenth (and longest) chapter, the chapter of over a hundred articles on the bases of law and procedure with regard to criminal offences.

As for the precise manner of the *Nakaz*' creation, we readily perceive that by comparing the document with its sources. For then we see how, as she read Montesquieu and Beccaria and the rest, Catherine kept noting their general positions and more striking passages, and then reducing those positions and passages to system, and, lastly, translating them (either literally or in paraphrase) into either slightly shortened or slightly augmented Russian versions. Catherine's attitude towards her sources is described also by herself, in a letter to Frederick II which she sent him along with a copy of the document. In this letter she says: "Like the raven in the fable, I have, you will perceive, decked myself out in peacock's feathers. Nothing in the composition is mine beyond just the ordering of the material, and an occasional line, or an occasional word." To which she adds that she estimates her total additions to her sources to have covered, at most, three sheets of paper.

The contents of the *Nakaz* are diverse in the extreme—they comprise practically every chief point occurrent in legislation. The document treats successively of the natural position of a State; of administration and laws; of "laws in detail"; of forms of crime and punishment; of mitigation of penalties; of judicial procedure in general; of "the ceremonial to be observed in criminal courts" (which means jurisprudential and court procedure with regard to criminal matters); of slavery; of the position of bonded peasantry; of States' growths of population; of "middling orders of persons" (middle classes); of towns; of orders of inheritance; of "the composition and style of laws"—which otherwise meant rules for legal formulation; and, in the last or twentieth chapter, of matters special exposition of which was necessary, such as offences of *lèse majesté*, extraordinary courts ("courts of special appointment"), religious tolerance, and the question of "the manner whereby it may be seen that a State is approaching downfall and ruin for ever." In 1768, too, the *Nakaz*' original twenty chapters (containing five hundred

and twenty-six articles) had added to them supplementary chapters on police forces and State economy (the revenues, the expenditure, the taxation, and so forth, of a State).

In the logical regard the basis of the *Nakaz*' structure is a syllogism developed in the document's preamble. The syllogism practically amounts to the following. The Christian Law teaches us to do good to one another. And every virtuous man must wish to see his country attain the highest possible degree of glory and well-being, with its citizens dwelling under the protection of laws. For speedy attainment, therefore, of this desire we should consider, first of all, the natural position of the given State, in that the laws most natural are the laws most consorting with the allocation of them for whom the laws may be composed. Wherefore all legislation should have for its basis the conditions of the position of the people concerned.

So in the *Nakaz*' first two chapters we find set forth the "conditions of position" of the Russian people in particular. They number, as Catherine adduces them, two only, and are, firstly, the fact of Russia being a European State, and, secondly, the fact of Russia being a State needing autocratic rule. Of these, Catherine seeks to prove the fact of Russia being a European State by the following considerations: The reforms of Peter the Great succeeded as well as they did because, as Russian manners in no way corresponded with Russia's atmosphere, but merely were imported as a consequence of "minglings of the people, and of conquests of other parts," Peter no sooner introduced his European customs and manners to the Russian, a European, people than those European customs and manners prospered in Russia even beyond his own expectations. And as regards the fact of Russia being a country needing autocratic rule, the *Nakaz* seeks to prove this by, firstly, the general consideration that "better is it to have to submit to laws under a single Sovereign than to have to seek the pleasure of many," and, secondly, the local, or geographical, consideration that, owing to the Russian Empire's vast extent, there exists absolute necessity of concentration of authority solely in one person, that State business may be hastened in its course. Wherefore we might express the *Nakaz*' basic idea as: "All legislation should correspond with the given people's position. And inasmuch as the position of the Russian people in particular renders that people a European people, all legislation for the Russian people should be founded upon a European basis."

All this makes it clear that, as regards its logical structure, the *Nakaz* was not wholly guiltless of art. However, the real reason why Catherine enlisted the aid of the syllogism was to attempt extrication of herself from the difficulty of having to base legislation for Russia upon external borrowings: it is a reason rendering intelligible the fact that she took for her legislative basis Montesquieu's, Beccaria's, and similar works, the latest achievements of Western European political thought. Ignorant in large degree at once of Russia's laws and of Russia's needs, yet desiring to superintend the composition of a new *Ulozhenie*, Catherine had, for offering guidance to the Commission, only ideas general, ready-made, borrowed from Western publicists. And then there remained the question of how far those ideas contained anything in common with the legislative needs of Russia especially, and Catherine, foreseeing and forestalling the question, made her *Nakaz* say practically: "All laws should correspond with the position of the people concerned. And inasmuch as the position of the Russian people in particular renders that people a European people, I have borrowed the ideas of the *Nakaz* from European sources alone."

Also, in addition to not being wholly artless in the logical, or, rather, the dialectical, regard, her syllogism is a sophism, rather than a syllogism, in the historical. For even if it was true that Russia's legislation needed to be based identically with legislation of Western Europe, there was, at the time, not a single European legislative code founded upon Montesquieu's and Beccaria's theories, and therefore how could Catherine's legislation for Russia look to become European through formulation upon a basis supporting no other European system of laws?

The truth is that the *Nakaz* constitutes merely Catherine's political "confession." From a statement of her own we know her to have put into it her whole "say" on the subject, to have emptied into it her whole walletful, and so left herself free of the necessity of ever again having to say a word upon the matter. But though the *Nakaz* stands full to the brim of the sort of general *dicta* launched into circulation by the French literature of the period, those *dicta* at least stand interspersed with thoughts on subjects never before given public mention in Russia. Thus we meet with a definition of liberty, and even with a definition of political liberty; and with a remark on abuse of landowner rights; and with a note on the

necessity of bettering peasant fortunes; and with a sharply expressed condemnation both of torture ("an institution opposed to all sound thought") and of excessive taxation ("an evil which, at the last, cannot but lay a waste State"); whilst also the Russians were enabled by the *Nakaz* to read, for the first time, that "he who converts mere words into an offence punishable with death doth but pervert and contravert." Finally, the *Nakaz* reflects with regard to the necessity of religious tolerance: "Persecution only angers men's minds, whereas sufferance of each to believe according unto his own rule will soften hearts even of the hardest."

The reason for the double censorship's drastic treatment of the document lay, of course, in the fact that it was over the Sign Manual itself that the foregoing novel ideas were about to be published. Indeed, Panin said jestingly to Catherine after reading the *Nakaz*: "Herein there are maxims able to shatter walls!"

These, then, were the character and the contents of the *Nakaz*. But before we can determine the composition's practical importance in the history of our legislation we must study the document in connection also with the proceedings of the Commission to which it was furnished as a legislative guide.

## CHAPTER V

Legislative Commissions after the year 1700—The Legislative Commission of 1767—The composition, tasks, organisation, and proceedings of that Commission—The course of the Commission's work, and the reasons why the Commission failed—The Commission's and the *Nakaz*' importance in the history of Russian legislation.

As early as 1700 a legislative Commission was constituted of a number of superior officials and a few *diaki*, or ecclesiastical clerks. The duties of the Commission were to revise, and to supplement, the *Ulozhenie* of 1649. And thence onwards the same task was unsuccessfully worked at by a whole series of Commissions composed mainly of *chinovniki*, but augmented, on occasions, with class experts ("good and knowing men") nominated by the Government, and with class representatives elected from the *gubernii*: which composition of Commissions puts us to a certain extent in mind of the manner in which *Zemskie Sobori* helped in compiling Russia's two principal codes, the *Sudebuik* of 1550, and the *Ulozhenie* of 1649; whilst undoubtedly the same composition suggested to Catherine the form of assembly now convened for legislative labour.

She convened her Legislative Commission by a Manifesto issued on 14 December, 1766. The members of the Commission consisted of two categories—of, firstly, representatives of the chief administrative institutions, and of, secondly, delegates elected by certain social classes. Thus, the Senate, the Synod, the Colleges, and the Chief Chancellories sent one Deputy each, and so did the several *dvorianstva* of *uezdi* and towns, and so did the *odnodvortsy*, the *datochnie soldaty*,<sup>1</sup> the small militia-service landowners, and the State *chernososhnie*<sup>2</sup> of each *provintzia*, and so did, without distinction of religion, the colonies of aliens who had settled in the Empire, at the rate of a Deputy per race per *provintzia*; whilst the number and system of election of the

<sup>1</sup> See vol. iv, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> "Blacksoil ploughing" peasantry, personally free, but assessed to taxation.

Cossack Deputies to the Commission were determined by the various Cossack *atamans*.

However, to understand aright the Commission's structure in point of representation of classes, we had better once more recall the administrative system of the provinces which Peter I created. Dividing his Empire into twenty large *gubernii* (still existent when Catherine came to the throne), he, again, divided these into *provintzii* largely coincident with our modern *gubernii*, and the *provintzii* into *uezdi*, or cantons. Now, at the time of Catherine's Commission the purely class Deputies to that Commission were elected according to these *provintzii* and *uezdi* of Peter's. Of methods of election there were two—the one direct, simple, and the other one complex, multigrade. Thus, whereas the *dворяне* of an *uezd* merely assembled under an *ad hoc* president, and elected a Deputy direct, the, for example, *chernososhnie* of a *pogost*, or church - possessing village, assembled and chose a delegate for the *pogost*, and then all the delegates of *pogosti* in the *uezd* proceeded to the chief town of the *uezd*, for choice of a delegate for the *uezd* as a whole, and then, finally, all the delegates of *uezdi* proceeded to the chief town of the *provintzia*, for choice of one of their number to join the Commission as the *provintzia's* Deputy of *chernososhnie* in actuality. Whence the two characteristics of representation on the Commission were (1) complexity, (2) diversity of basis. The Commission had represented on it (1) the State's chief administrative institutions, (2) certain social classes, (3) alien stocks in the Empire, and (4) the towns (in each town the householders choosing one of themselves irrespective of calling, so that the town's Deputy might be a non-class representative, and not a representative exclusively of the local commercial-industrial section). Hence, as we scrutinise the Commission's social elements, we perceive there to have been absent thence the parochial clergy and the court, privately bonded, and "economic" categories of *krestiane*—"economic *krestiane* being the *krestiane* whom an Ordinance of 1764 had taken out of the hands of the ecclesiastical institutions, and made a portion of the category of "free rural dwellers."

The total number of Deputies chosen was five hundred and sixty-five, but as representing the different classes only in varying degree. The largest aggregate came from the towns. These amounted to thirty-nine per cent. of the whole, for the reason that, no matter what the population and the economic importance of a town, that



town still was represented in identical ratio with the rest—the metropolitan city of Moscow and the little *uezd* town of Bui, for example, each sending one Deputy. And next came the *dvorianstva*; the Deputies of which bodies amounted to thirty per cent. of the whole. And then came the *chernososhnie* and the other free taxpaying rural dwellers, to the extent of fourteen per cent. And then the institutions of the Central Administration, to the extent of twenty-eight Deputies, or five per cent. So that to such other sections of population as were represented on the Commission there fall, for their share, only twelve per cent.

The Deputies attended armed with instructions from their respective electoral units. Also, they received certain personal rights during their period of service (immunity from the capital penalty and torture and corporal punishment, for example, in spite of any offence committed) and a Government salary. And to them the Manifesto of 14 December set a double task. Firstly, said the Government, it wished them to acquaint it with “the people’s needs and lackings.” Secondly, the Government said, the Deputies should be “admitted to” the Commission on condition that they drafted a new *Ulozhenie*. Hence the Manifesto left the Commission’s precise nature altogether vague. It did not state whether the Commission was to be an institution in itself, an institution independent of the popular representatives “admitted” thereto, or whether the Commission itself was to consist of those popular representatives. Also, the Manifesto failed to show whether the representatives were to be granted “admittance” solely that they might set forth “the people’s needs and lackings,” solely that they might furnish material for a subsequent legislative task, or whether they themselves were independently to perform that task.

However that may be, the organisation which was given the Commission turned out to be an extremely complex one, since that organisation divided the Deputies into a number of dispositive and special-codificatory committees. The former category of committees was made to include a “Directional Committee,” a “Scrutinising Committee,” and a “Preparatory Committee.” As a first step, the Directional Committee requested the Commission in full assembly to choose from itself five members, or less, for each of some special sectional codificatory committees which were to draft the new *Ulozhenie* in portions; and when that had been done it, the Directional

Committee, superintended those committees' labours, and examined their drafts, and compared those drafts with the *Nakaz* and its principles, and, if need be, corrected the drafts accordingly, and, lastly, laid the drafts before a full assembly, and had them finally considered.

As for the Scrutinising Committee, it was a purely editorial body: it revised, and, if need be, reformulated, drafts of sectional committees, and "positions" of general assemblies—in both cases "according unto the rules of speech and proper style," whilst removing thence "any speech and words either not to be understood, or obscure, or ambiguous." In short, the Scrutinising Committee gave drafts a final editing. And the Preparatory Committee examined the Deputies' electoral instructions, abstracted those instructions, and laid the abstracts before full assemblies.

The sectional committees which had elaboration of the new *Ulozhenie's* several portions distributed to them amounted in number to sixteen. And sometimes their work of elaboration was a task of a highly specialised nature, so that we meet with a committee for "consideration of certain species of dwellers within the Empire" (that is to say, of the corporate classes), and with a committee "concerning the middling order of persons" (the middle class), and with a committee "concerning minings, plantings and preservings of forests and tradings in general," and with a committee "concerning increases of the people, and husbandry, and building work." The result of this complex organisation was to render the course of business exceedingly slow. Thus, when a given question had been subjected to consideration by a full assembly it, and the assembly's remarks on it, were forwarded to the Directional Committee; which, for elaboration of a draft, forwarded the question to one of the sectional committees; which, when the draft had been made, forwarded it back to the Directional Committee; which examined the said draft, compared it with the *Nakaz's* principles (and, if need be, returned the draft to the sectional committee yet again), and then sent it on to the Scrutinising Committee, which finally edited the draft, and laid it before a full assembly.

On 30 June, 1767, the Commission was accorded a State opening in Moscow's Hall of Angles, and devoted its first few sittings to having read to it the Empress's *Nakaz*, to settling its organisation, to choosing a "Marshal" (President) for full assemblies (one Bibikov,

*dvorianin* Deputy from Kostroma, being the member chosen), and to electing *personnels* of sectional committees by ballot. Not until the Commission's eighth sitting did it begin upon legislative work proper. First of all it read and considered Deputies' instructions from two categories of electors—soldiers of the line and *chernososhnie*. And this occupied fourteen sittings more, for the instructions in question evoked a considerable amount of debate. The first set of instructions to be considered was that from the *chernososhnie* of the *uezd* of Kargopol. And this operation alone produced twenty-six comments and speeches. And then, when eleven sets more had been read, the Commission put aside the remainder (even including those of peasant electors), and passed to a process of reading and reviewing existing laws definitive of *dvorianin* rights, and so occupied a further eleven sittings. Next, once more leaving the matter in hand unfinished, in favour of delegating it to the Directional Committee, and the latter having it elaborated by the sectional committee on "certain species of dwellers within the State," the Commission set itself to read and consider existing laws on the mercantile community—reading and considering these laws throughout, even as it had done with the laws on *dvorianin* rights, so that it spent upon them an additional forty-six sittings. Then leaving the question in hand unfinished, as usual, and delegating it to the Directional Committee in order that it might be dealt with by the committee on "the middling order of persons," the Commission set about considering a purely local question, the question of the Esthlander and Courlander *dvorianstva's* special rights. Then, having meanwhile (towards the end of 1767), been transferred from Moscow to St. Petersburg, the Commission, on 18 February, 1768, resumed its labours by reading and considering existing laws on justice (legal procedure), and devoted five months, or seventy sittings, to that study. And then, once more leaving the matter in hand uncompleted, the Commission reverted to consideration of *dvorianin* rights in general, in that by now there had come to hand the sectional committee's draft on "the rights of divers noble persons." But towards the close of the year, just when the Deputies had entered upon audition of and consideration of existing laws on *pomiestia* and *otchini*, they received an Imperial *ukaz* bidding them, owing to war with Turkey, bring general sittings to an end, and disperse pending fresh writs of summons. Meanwhile the sectional committees remained in operation, and

did so until 1774; but summonses to the rest of the Commission to reassemble never eventuated, and it finished with having sat, during its one-and-a-half years of existence, two hundred and three times.

Thus the Commission of 1767 failed to fulfil its function of drafting a new *Ulozhenie*. For that matter, it was bound so to fail. One of its hindrances to success lay in its composition, seeing that the Deputies came of most heterogeneous social statuses, and attended representing greatly diverse, or even absolutely irreconcilable, interests and aspirations. Side by side there sat Privy Councillors and Senators, Deputies from, say, the Cheremissi of Kazan, and Deputies from, say, the Tepteri of Orenburg. To perform one and the same difficult task there might be called upon, for instance, a member of the Holy Synod, a mullah, and the Deputy of an unbaptised tribe. So how could workers so mutually remote arrive at mutual agreement of interests and ideas?

A second hindrance to the success of the Commission lay in the Commission's functions. For, for what purpose precisely was the Commission convoked? It was convoked, firstly, to inform the Government concerning "the people's needs and lackings," and, secondly, to draft a new *Ulozhenie*. Which draft, it was commanded, should be framed (1) to conform, so far as possible, with existent Russian legislation, (2) to conform with the *Nakaz*, and (3) to conform with "the people's needs and lackings." Hence the Deputies found themselves landed between three differing orders of interests and ideas: on the one side they stood confronted with the peaks of Western Europe's political thought, with the supreme points to which the thinkers of Western Europe had risen, and on the other side they stood confronted with a disorderly, tangled heap of Russian laws issued at various times, and lacking any common idea, and not seldom placed in mutual contradiction: until debates in the Commission finally disclosed to the Deputies the full existing diversity, irreconcilability, of class interests. No sooner, for example, did the representatives of the mercantile community have read to them the articles of the *Nakaz* on general equality before the law than they demanded for their class the *dvorianin* privileges of serf-ownership and sword-carriage. And no sooner did the representatives of the *dvorianstvo* have read to them the articles of the *Nakaz* on political freedom than they demanded for their class not only maintenance, but extension, of serf-right, and also increase of participation in local government.

How could interests so incongruous, interests dragging the Commission hither and thither, possibly attain reconciliation? Finally, to augment the Commission's difficulties further, the Commission's relation to the *Nakaz* stood only vaguely defined. On the one hand, the *Nakaz* was offered the Commission as a guide to law-making, but, on the other hand, the document carried no legal force—merely the Directional Committee was charged to hold up any such draft of a sectional committee as might be found to conflict with the *Nakaz'* principles, whilst the maxims cramming the *Nakaz* were, for the most part, of such a general, or abstract, or, at best, well-meaning character as to render their elaboration into practical formularies of law an extremely difficult task. Under conditions of the sort neither the Commission of 1767 nor any other Commission could have been expected to turn out a good working *Ulozhenie*. For if the Commission had fashioned an *Ulozhenie* out of the legislation existent, the resultant Code would not have agreed with the Empress's *Nakaz*. And if the Commission had fashioned an *Ulozhenie* consonant with the *Nakaz*, the resultant Code would have conflicted with the legislation existent. And, probably, neither the one nor the other Code could have been made to meet "the people's needs and lackings."

The Commission also affords much scientific interest because in it we have excellent material for studying the period of its operation. Yet we must not exaggerate the Commission's importance in Russia's legislative history: in its day the Commission made a great stir, but the results which it achieved in no way corresponded with the impression which it produced upon its contemporaries. In fact, its influence upon Russia's legislation was very limited. True, its labours did not pass without trace left—far from it, and when we come to treat of Catherine's subsequent reforms we shall see that she did but base her *gubernia* institutions and urban organisations upon materials already prepared by the Commission, as well as that her charter of 1785 to the *dvorianstvo* was but a revision of the sectional committee's draft on "noble rights"; yet even this gives the Commission of 1767 no importance as an epoch in Russia's legislative history: no matter how one views its results, one inevitably ends by seeing that it was an All-Russian ethnographical rally rather than a law-making body.

The results in question also determine for us the *Nakaz'* impor-

tance. The *Nakaz* occupies but a modest place alike in our literature and in our legislation. As a literary memorial, it does no more than head a long series of compilations which merely snipped off the topmost leaves of Western civilisation, and skimmed the surface of Western thought, and inaugurated the custom (one from which we suffer to this day) of seeking an answer to each problem of Russian actuality in theories which non-Russian minds have evolved from non-Russian life experiences. And in any case the *Nakaz* remained practically unknown to the public, for the Senate ordered that even in the chancelleries secretaries should keep the document under lock and key, rather than that it should be read by inquisitive clerks. Which goes to show that the Government regarded it as so much "forbidden fruit" of its author's brain. Neither new principles nor new articles did the *Nakaz* introduce. That which Catherine achieved in the legislative sphere less developed from the *Nakaz* than confirmed and continued certain old-established factors in our history. Interest further attaches to the *Nakaz* because it shows that for at least once in Russia's history Russia's Supreme Power became smitten with dissatisfaction at Russia's legislative system, even though that Power had to recognise its incompetency for the system's reform.

In short, we see in the *Nakaz*, not an historical stage of our legislative progress, but a purely pathological phase; not a factor in our country's record, but a feature in the biography of the document's composer.

## CHAPTER VI

Restriction of the corporate class element in local administration, and the influence which the official aristocracy exercised upon the Central Administration—Panin's scheme—Catherine's provincial administrative reforms—Her new *gubernia* division—Her administrative and financial institutions of *gubernii*—The structure of her legal institutions—Her basic principles throughout the foregoing—The connection between her *gubernia* institutions and the submissions which the *dvorianin* deputies made to the Commission of 1767—The *dvorianstvo*'s predominance in local administration.

As I have said earlier, the Commission of 1767 exercised a decided influence upon Catherine's subsequent activity in reform. This was because, through electoral instructions, and through debates, the Commission brought to light some of the popular sections' needs and wishes, certain contemporary demands, and the Government's available means for those demands' satisfaction. And Catherine also took this view. Said she on one occasion: "The Commission at least has given me information and advice both as to what we have to deal with, and as to what must first be done." As an initial attempt at putting the result of her observations and political ideas into practice, she carried into operation her *gubernia* institutions of 1775, and thereby communicated to Russia's provincial administrative system an entirely new aspect.

We have seen how Peter I reformed the old Muscovite administration. That administration was of a dual nature—class-bureaucratic; but Peter so changed it that, whilst the dual nature in question remained, features formerly one became inter-distinct; the Central Administration came to be bureaucratic alone, and, as regards the administrative system of the provinces, the leading social classes acquired in their local communities a larger share of the work of local government. Then, when Peter was dead, the administrative institutions which he had created again became changed, for his successors found his system complex to excess, and initiated a process of abolishing certain individual chancellories and posts deemed superfluous, and of re-unifying certain excessively disintegrated

departments. Peter had thought entirely to separate, in the provincial system, legal functions from functions of administration pure and simple, and therefore had created aulic courts of *gubernii*; but these courts were abolished in the time of Catherine I, and their judicial-police functions transferred to the Central Government's local administrative organs as represented by the *Gubernatori* and the *Voevodi*. Also, whereas Peter, desiring to develop urban self-administration, had created *ratushi*, or municipal councils, and likewise town magistracies under a Chief Magistracy of the *gubernia* (instead of under the local *Gubernator*), Catherine I's Government placed these town magistracies under both *Gubernatori* and *Voevodi* of *gubernii*, whilst Peter III, for his part, annulled their principal, the Chief Magistracy. The effect was greatly to weaken the class element in administration of the provinces, and to restrict the share of the local communities in *gubernia* management. (With that, though, it should be said that in reality the restriction in question had been begun by Peter himself, when, towards the close of his reign, he had done away with the *dvorianin*-elected councillors, or *Landrathen*, under the *Gubernator*.) Also, the Central Administration underwent changes, although these changes were changes in a different direction. Formerly the Central Administration had had for its motive agency the *boyarstvo*; but, on the latter dissolving, there arose to replace it, as an administrative class, a superior *chinovnichestvo* which gradually came, as the result partly of its recollections of its predecessor the *boyarstvo*, and partly of familiarity with the political systems of the West, to adopt aristocratic airs, and to strive to advance from being merely an administrative organ to being both an administrative class and a self-acting political force. We may call this new social section "the official aristocracy."

That official aristocracy's, that Table-of-Ranks aristocracy's, influence, then, was what most changed Peter's administrative system after Peter's departure. Until that time the Senate had been the chief directional and financial organ, but now it began to be succeeded by institutions wherein representatives of the new official class enjoyed principal posts. The institutions in question were, as we have seen, Catherine I's and Peter II's Supreme Privy Council, Anna's Cabinet of Ministers, Elizabeth's Conference, and Peter III's Legislative Council of nine members.

There was another regard, too, in which the new official aristocratic



class came increasingly to manifest influence. At one period the most bureaucratic element in the Collegiate institutions of State was, without exception, the Department of the Procurator-General, for it stood attached to the Senate as "the Sovereign's Eye," and exercised control over that body's makings of laws. Hence, as we can well understand, it was a Department peculiarly likely to cramp the official aristocracy's style. At all events, it is to that alone that there would seem to be due a phenomenon so rare in the history of our institutions as that by the year 1730 the office of Procurator-General had ceased to exist, and no official of the sort was sitting with the Senate, and no plain Procurators were operating in attachment to the Colleges, and no one knew, apparently, what had become of these functionaries. For Anna herself said in her Manifesto of 2 October, 1730, for restoration of the Department: "Verily, even We Ourselves know not what *ukaz* did, after Our Uncle's demise, cause this Office to cease, and to be abolished." However, the Department was annulled a second time during the Regency of Anna Leopoldovna; and a significant fact in this regard is that the person most responsible for the step was Count Ostermann, a leading member of the official aristocracy, Titular "Grand Admiral," and Director of Foreign Affairs.

Thus the period after Peter's day saw the administrative system of the provinces begin to lose its old local class participation, and the administrative system of the centre begin to acquire a character strictly corporate-official-aristocratic. The result was that the Central Administration accorded an ever-increasing preponderance over the law to one class in particular, and the provincial administrative system more and more rendered it possible for individuals, that is to say, for the Central Administration's local representatives, to override the local communities. And, next, those local representatives coming to form part of the official aristocracy, they rid themselves both of legal pressure at the centre and of social supervision in the provinces, and thereby enabled the new official class as a whole to infuse into the administrative task unlimited personal freewill.

These administrative faults Catherine and her advisers clearly recognised. The faults in question were lack of a sound basis for Russia's administrative institutions, and non-restriction of these institutions' activity within limits exactly defined. Catherine herself says in a confidential letter to Prince Viazemski, Procurator-

General: "Our Administrative Offices, even the Senate, have one and all left their foundations. Partly this is because of my fore-runners' want of application to affairs. Partly it is come of the whims of persons serving in those Offices." The next step, therefore, was to give each of the Offices concerned a durable basis, and an exact indication of scope. All of which Catherine promised in her Manifesto of July 1762 duly to do.

Very soon after that date, indeed, one of her statesmen did present a scheme of institutions so based. The statesman concerned was Nikita Panin, a man with a leaning towards the aristocratic ideas of 1730, and one disposed especially to regard Sweden's Council of Aristocrats as the best existing model of a supreme institution of governance. Immediately after the revolution of July, therefore, he submitted to Catherine a project for a permanent Council of State. The scheme had for its fundamental *motif* the notion that a Sovereign functions to advantage only if that Sovereign's authority is prudently shared with "a small number of persons specially chosen thereunto." For Panin considered the prime cause of the faults in the existing administrative system to be the fact that "all things therein are ruled more by force of individual persons than by authority of the State's Offices"—the fact, that is to say, that governance lacked such essential bases as might render solid its forms. Catherine at first decided to accept the scheme—she even went so far as to sign a Manifesto appointing the desired new Council of State, and specifying its members; but presently, on someone explaining to her what Panin's real idea in the matter was, she left the project, for all that it had received her signature, unpublished. True enough, Panin had for his aim limitation of the Supreme Power with an institution obligatory in its force, and recognised by law as regards its political authority. In other words, his scheme's projected permanent Council of State was to be absolutely the supreme legislative institution in the State, and to crown, by means of its composition, the edifice which the official aristocracy had been working to erect from the moment of Peter the Great's departure.

Thus the Central Administration remained as devoid of organisation and definition in Catherine's time as it had been before it: still there operated in that Administration merely "force of individual persons." True, Catherine sometimes did, for matters of special weight, convoke a Conference of her intimates, and that Conference

did, after 1769, become a permanent Council; but never did it come absolutely to bind the Supreme Power, or directly to have its status recognised by law.

So there remained open to Catherine, for reform, only the provincial administrative sphere. The faults in the *gubernii*'s existent institutions she realised clearly, for in 1764, in an "Instruction to *Gubernatori*," she describes the *gubernii* as "of all the State the portions which most do call to be improved." Besides, special circumstances inclined her to choose provincial-institutional reorganisation rather than central. For one thing, there broke out, and raged during 1773-4, the terrible Pugachev rebellion. This affair the provincial authorities had failed to foresee; and for long now they could not crush it. And, for another thing, any attempt to reconstruct the Central Administration according to Catherine's pet theories would have forced her also to submit to limitation of the Supreme Power—and Catherine still held to the conviction that Russia needed autocratic rule alone: whereas she could easily enough apply her pet theories to the provincial administrative system, and yet not have to see her autocratic authority suffer. Lastly, reconstruction of the provincial administrative system, rather than of the central, was what the *dvorianin* Deputies upon the Commission of 1767 had most insisted upon. Wherefore the foregoing joint considerations led to it that on 7 November, 1775, Catherine published a Manifesto ordaining "new institutions for administration of Our *gubernii*." Briefly let those institutions be expounded.

As the prime faults of the *gubernii*'s existent administrative system the foregoing Manifesto pointed to (1) the fact that the existing *gubernii* were too large to be suitable administrative areas, (2) the fact that they still stood inadequately equipped with institutions and administrative staffs, and (3) the fact that the jurisdictions of their institutions had fallen into such confusion that one and the same office often performed functions of administration, of financial control, of preservation of order, and of civil and criminal dispensation.

Well, Catherine's institutions of 1775 removed these faults. First of all she effected a new division of provinces, and, in place of Peter I's twenty large *gubernii*, cut up Russia into fifty smaller ones. And whereas the boundaries of the old *gubernii* had been determined by, in part, geographical considerations and, in part, historical, the new system of provincial division was given a statistical basis alone—each

new *gubernia* containing from 300,000 to 400,000 inhabitants, and being subdivided into *uezdi* of a population of from 20,000 to 30,000.

Also, all the new *gubernii* received an identical system of organisation. And under the system the administrative institutions proper were strictly separated from the institutions of justice and finance. Thus the chief institution of administration proper was a *gubernskoe pravlenie*, or *gubernia* directorate, headed either by the *gubernia's* *Gubernator* or by the *gubernia's* *Namiestnik* (Lord-Lieutenant), and designed to serve as an institution at once of police and of executive and dispositive functions, with, for duties, proclamation and execution in the *gubernia* of laws and *ukazi* issued by the Central Administration, superintendence of the course of business in its fellow *gubernia* institutions, compulsion of those institutions to perform properly their tasks, and general supervision of peace and orderliness within the *gubernia*. And for the organ immediately subject to it in the *uezdi* the *gubernskoe pravlenie* had a *nizhni zemski sud*, or inferior local court, an institution presided over by an *ispravnik*, or local captain-superintendent of police, and designed to serve as at once a police and an executive agency—the duties of its *ispravnik* being to put into execution all orders received from the institutions of the given *uezd's gubernia*, and to supervise trade within his *uezd*, and to guard the latter against epidemic disease (“to see to preservation and to cure of the human species therein”), and to maintain in good repair all roads and bridges, and to observe how far good morality and political soundness subsisted amongst the inhabitants, and to forestall and suppress crime, and to assist in legal dispensation as regards at least preliminary inquiries and the rest, and, with that, to do all this “with zeal ever, yet likewise with discreet kindness and benevolence and humanity as concerns the people”: whilst, as regards the scope of the *ispravnik's* authority, it covered all the *uezd* save only the local chief town, where corresponding to him there was a *gorodnichi*, or police commandant of the town.

In financial matters the *gubernia* was to be managed by a *gubernskaia kazennaia palata*, or *gubernia* chief treasury, an institution having acting under it, firstly, a *gubernskoe kaznacheistvo*, or *gubernia* sub-treasury, and, secondly, a number of *uezdnie kaznacheistva*, or *uezd* sub-treasuries, as institutions intended for revenue collection and storage locally.

Legal dispensation in the *gubernii* had a peculiarly complex

organisation given to it. As regards criminal cases, they were centred in a *palata ugolovnikh diel*, or chamber (court) of criminal affairs, and as regards control of civil cases, it was centred in a *palata grazhdanshikh diel*, or chamber (court) of civil affairs. And, together, these two institutions formed the topmost stratum of the *gubernia's* institutions of justice, with their business apportioned strictly according to its nature. And under this stratum there lay a second one, business in which was mixed according to nature, and divided according to class. The stratum consisted of a *verkhni zemski sud*, or superior local court, for *dvoriané*, of a *gubernski magistrat*, or *gubernia* magistracy, for merchants and the middle class, and of a *verkhnaia rasprava*, or superior correctional court, for *odnodvortsii*, State, court, and "economic" peasantry and other free agricultural persons. And in each case these legal institutions held their sittings in the chief town of the *gubernia*, and covered with their competency the whole *gubernia*. Lastly, a third stratum of legal institutions—of the *uezd*, and of class character—consisted of an *uezdni sud* (court of *uezd*) for *dvoriané*, of a *gorodovoi magistrat* (urban magistracy) for merchants and the middle class, and of a *nizhnaia rasprava* (lower correctional court) for all free agriculturists, as institutions directly subordinate to the class institutions of the *gubernia* in point of revision and appeals, even as the latter were to the two *palati*. Also, there were added to the *gubernii's* and the *uezdi's* legal institutions tribunals designed for business solely of a special nature. One such was a *gubernski soviestni sud*, or *gubernia* "conscience" court, for action in, as regards criminal jurisdiction, cases where the offence had come, not of the conscious will, but of misfortune, or of some conjunction of untoward circumstances, or of youthfulness, or of dementia, or of superstition (in particular, of "witchcraft"), and for action in, as regards civil jurisdiction, cases similar to those dealt with by modern courts of arbitration, courts functioning only if voluntarily approached, and designed only to effect mutual reconciliation of the two contending litigants. Another such tribunal, that is to say, a tribunal created solely for a special purpose, was a *prikaz obshchestvennago prizrenia*, or board of public control, an institution designed to manage schools, orphanages, and charitable establishments of all kinds within the *gubernia*. And for protection of *dvoriané's* widows and orphans there was instituted, and attached to the *uezdni sud*, under the

presidency of the *uezd's* association of *dvoriané*, a *dvorianskaia opeka*, or board of *dvorianin* guardians; whilst, under the *govodovoi magistrat*, a *sirotski sud*, or orphans court, had committed to its care widows and orphans left behind them by merchants and members of the middle class.

Merely a bare enumeration of the foregoing institutions will serve to show the complexity which distinguished Catherine's provincial-administrative mechanism. By what principles, then, was her legislation guided in that mechanism's creation? Firstly, we note readily the prominence given to the *Nakaz'* principle of departmental separation, since at that period it was a fashionable political notion that a State was not conceivable without strict severance of legislative authority from legal and executive. Catherine's *gubernia* institutions, therefore, paid full tribute to the notion. Yet scarcely consonant with the *Nakaz'* theory of equality of all before the law (or, in general, with the whole spirit of her new, her cherished, political maxims) were the strictly class legal institutions which she created. These institutions smack, rather, of the spirit of feudalism, of medieval class division. And, accordingly, we have here a feature the source of which must have been other than her self-adopted liberal principles.

We discover the source in question by reading the electoral instructions and submissions laid before the Commission of 1767 by the *dvorianin* Deputies to that assembly. For the *dvorianstvo* expresses in those instructions and submissions a desire for authority to organise itself into *dvorianin* associations of *uezdi* under presidents of the class, and for those associations periodically to meet and choose for themselves a president-in-general, and then to take part in local administration both legal and ordinary; whilst some of the electoral instructions even call for election of the provinces' *Gubernatori* and *Voevodi* by the *dvorianstvo*, and, in particular, the instructions given to the *dvorianin* Deputy for Borovsk voice a desire to hold biennial assemblies of *uezdi's dvoriané*, for ensurance that all things were being done in the *uezdi* according to law, and for arrestment of any irregularities—to which end the assembled *dvoriané* should choose *Landrathen* for the *uezdi*, and each such *Landrath* have to assist him a number of "district commissars," and, with his fellow *Landrathen*, operate the *uezdi's sudi* and *raspravi* over the inhabitants of the *uezdi* without distinction of class, and be assisted in the task, as regards preliminary enquiries and the rest, by the

“district commissars.” Well, in the *gubernia* institutions of 1775 we see clearly reflected these *dvorianin* aspirations of 1767: in Catherine’s *gubernia* institutions we see the suggested *Landrath* take form as the *ispravnik*, and the “district commissar” merely undergo postponement in order to arrive as, under one of Catherine’s successors, the *stanovoi pristav*, or rural police captain. In short it was from the demands and petitions to which the *dvorianin* Deputies to the Commission of 1767 gave utterance that Catherine derived the contradiction in her *gubernia* institutions to which I have referred. True, the *Nakaz* too voices the idea that every man should be tried by his peers; yet it is not difficult to see that Catherine’s execution of the idea in her *gubernia* institutions, an idea ill-consorting with her theory of legal equality of all, came of considerations inspired rather by the interests of one class in particular than by the interests of all classes in general.

To sum up, we have noted that Catherine’s administrative and legal institutions severally consisted of three strata which those strata’s several principles rendered inter-distinct. The topmost stratum contained institutions statutorily non-class of character, intended to serve as the Central Administration’s immediate instruments in the provinces. These institutions were the *gubernskoe pravlenie*, and the *palati* of justice and finance. All three of them were framed on Collegiate lines, and included, in each case, a president, councillors, and assessors nominated variously by the Central Administration, by the Senate, or by the Sovereign, so that the local communities had no say in their appointment. Next, the second stratum of *gubernia* institutions contained institutions purely class, in the shape of one-class tribunals and the all-class *sovietstnie sudi* and *prikazi obshchestvennago prizrenia*, as institutions framed, like the institutions of the topmost stratum, on Collegiate lines, but not possessed of exclusively bureaucratic *personnels*, seeing that a share in the formation of their *personnels* was granted to their local communities, and only their presidents were nominated by the Crown, whilst their councillors and assessors were elected triennially by the corporate classes of their localities before confirmation by the local *Gubernator*. And, lastly, the lowest stratum of institutions contained institutions of the *uezd*, as represented by the *uezdni sud*, the *gorodovoi magistrat*, and the *nizhnaia rasprava*, institutions wholly non-bureaucratic as regards their *personnels*—the president of the *nizhnaia rasprava*

alone being nominated by the *gubernia's gubernskoe pravlenie* "from men of *chini*," and the rest being chosen by the local corporate classes. So at first sight both the class institutions of the *uezd* and the class institutions of the *gubernia* had distributed to them class representation in equal measure; but if we examine more closely the structure of the tribunals of the *uezd* in particular we shall see that they had a notable preponderance of representation apportioned solely to one class. For example, we shall see that the *nizhni zemski sud*, the police institution of the *uezd*, the institution charged to maintain law and order, and to supervise the laws' working, and to serve as the local executive organ of the *gubernia's* administrative and legal institutions, was purely *dvorianin* of composition. True, in matters which affected solely the class subject to the *nizhnaia rasprava* (the free agriculturists) there were added temporarily to the *dvorianin* assessors of the *nizhni zemski sud* two assessors from the *rasprava*; but the *ispravnik*, the president of the *nizhni zemski sud*, was chosen always by the local *dvoriané*, and, likewise, it was not everywhere that there existed a *nizhnaia rasprava* at all, since a court of the kind could be instituted in an *uezd* only if the *Gubernator* considered the *uezd* to have resident in it sufficient *odnodvortsy*, State, court, and "economic" peasantry and other free agriculturists to form a *nizhnaia rasprava's* jurisdiction of from 20,000 to 30,000 souls. Also, the very fact that the police authority of the *nizhni zemski sud* was an authority covering the *uezd's* whole population without distinction of class shows how greatly the *dvorianstvo* now came to rule the roost in administration of the *uezd*.

The same predominance is seen also in another form. In Catherine's *gubernia* institutions the topmost stratum was non-class altogether, since the source whence the institutions of that stratum drew their authority made of them Crown or bureaucratic departments. Nevertheless, seeing that the Governments recruited those institutions' *personnels* from the same class as furnished likewise the elective representatives to the exclusively *dvorianin*-class institutions, the *gubernia* still stood, made over solely to the *dvorianstvo*.

Thus *dvorianin* predominance in local administration found expression in two forms. It did so, firstly, as regards choice of *personnels* for the exclusively *dvorianin*-class institutions, and, secondly, as regards *dvorianin*-class origin of the *personnels* staffing the statutorily non-class (Crown) institutions.



## CHAPTER VII

Development of Catherine's *gubernia* institutions through charters of 1785—The reason why *dvorianin* local administration proved more successful than urban self-government—The connection between Catherine's *gubernia* institutions and the history of the *dvorianstvo's* administrative standing (i) in ancient Rus, (ii) during the eighteenth century—Traces of Catherine's political ideas in the system of her institutions—The importance of those institutions in Russia's administrative history.

HAVING thus noted the structure of Catherine's *gubernia* institutions, let us go on to study the importance of those institutions in the history both of the *dvorianstvo* and of Russian administration. At one and the same time the *dvorianin* exercised administrative functions in the Capital and in the *gubernii* as a Crown *chinovnik*, and exercised administrative functions in the *gubernii* and in the *uezdi* as an elected class representative. This corporate organisation of the *dvorianstvo* the introduction of Catherine's *gubernia* institutions completed. The institutions in question took twenty years to become practically operative, but meanwhile the *dvoriané* of a given *gubernia* could assemble in their local capital, and there elect from their number a president, seeing that although at first, in 1775, Catherine's institutions gave the class a right merely of electing presidents in *uezdi*, a charter of ten years later added a right of doing the same thing in *gubernii*—a right, that is to say, of forming *gubernskie obščestva*, or *gubernia* associations. The charter of 1785 likewise defined formally, exactly the *dvorianstvo's* rights in general—recognised *dvoriané* as absolute owners of their immovable property and attached *krestiané*, gave them exemption from personal payment of taxes, allowed them to be judged only by their peers, exempted them from all punishment save by formal sentence of court, exempted them from corporal punishment in any case, and secured to them validity of a sentence of court only after Imperial confirmation.

In the same year (1785) a "Towns Ordinance" completed the existing system of urban self-government by the towns' corporate classes. This Ordinance enacted that the towns' legal institutions

for urban social statuses should remain the *gorodovie* and *gubernskie magistraten* as before, but that, as regards matters of industry and police, the towns' institutions of management should thenceforth be a general *duma* of elective representatives presided over by the *gorodskaia golova* (mayor), and a *duma* of six members only—one to represent each of the corporate statuses into which the populations of the towns now stood divided. The general *duma* in question enjoyed a dispositive authority only, and assembled only at intervals. The *duma* of six members, however, enjoyed an executive authority, and remained permanently in session.

At the same period the towns' commercial industrial populations were divided, according to amount of capital possessed, into three guilds, with the first guild having assigned to it persons possessed of at least 10,000 roubles, and the second guild persons possessed of at least 5,000 roubles, and the third guild persons possessed of at least 1,000, whilst persons not possessing even 1,000 went to form a *miestchanstvo*, or category of citizens plain and simple.

Nevertheless the heavy hand of the *gubernii's* Crown representatives, that is to say, of the *Gubernatori*, or of the *Namiestniki*, as the case might be, caused self-government by the towns to advance but slowly; whereas *dvorianin* local administration went briskly ahead. The reason of this was the influx of new life which Catherine's *gubernia* institutions communicated to the *obstchestva* of *dvoriané*—those unions sowing themselves far and wide now that the *dvoriané* of a *gubernia* could meet triennially in chief towns of *gubernia* or *uezd*, and, during the process of electing members of their body to administrative and legal posts, enjoy the feasting and other entertainment always offered them by their president, or by the local *Gubernatori*. To such a pitch did these gatherings attain as to lead foreigners who listened to their speeches and discussions to set them down as not a little dangerous in the political regard—two Frenchmen who toured Russia during the nineties of the eighteenth century prophesying with particular emphasis that “these assemblies will, sooner or later, give the signal for a revolution, and, at that, a very great one.”

Incidentally, there went with the *dvorianstvo's* consummation of corporate organisation the grant of a corporate uniform, diverse in colour and trimmings according to *gubernii*.

Another reason for the superior success of *dvorianin* local

administration lay in the historical preparation for independent action which the class had received. We have seen that the class took an energetic part in such administration in ancient Rus, until it had come to be formed into fairly solid corporations of *uezdi*, and, in this organisation, to act as defender of the *uezdi*'s capitals, to constitute those capitals' territorial garrisons, to march afield as territorial regiments, to elect of its body *okladchiki* for management of business connected with service estates, and to bind itself together under mutual service guarantees. Then these unions of *dvoriané* fell asunder in consequence of Peter I's creation of a regular army, and were replaced with regiments permanent and wholly non-territorial, and had their service associations succeeded by regimental corporations wherein officers of the superior ranks were appointed by election of, and under guarantee of, the regimental officers as a whole, and staff officers were appointed by election of, and under guarantee of, a division's whole complement of general and divisional officers. Nevertheless Peter did maintain the local agrarian connections of the *dvorianstvo*, and enable the class, when he was gone, to acquire ever-increasing importance in the economy of the State because the Government made the class its estate financial-police agent. Next, as the result, there followed further regularisation of the *dvorianstvo*'s share in local government, a process expressed, firstly, in the class becoming dowered with a right to choose a body of *Landrathen* as councillors, under the presidency of the local *Gubernator*, and, secondly, in the class being permitted to choose local commissaries of *uezdi* for exercise of police authority. Another aid to consolidation of the *dvorianstvo*'s local ties came in a gradual lightening of the class's State service obligation, and in a legal recognition of *dvoriané* to be absolute owners of their *otchini* or *pomiestia*. All this, from 1731 onwards, helped the class more and more to acquire a settled position; until, on an *ukaz* setting the *dvorianstvo* free of State service altogether, and finally transferring the class from regiment to estate, and leaving it solely with an agrarian standing, the *dvorianstvo* definitely became attached to the provinces. So long as the class had borne upon its shoulders the burden of State service it had had its interests riveted to the capital, to the centre, to the Central Administration, exclusively: yet, whereas it had formed more than one Government after Peter's time, and Anna's *dvorianin* petitioners had, when requesting her to restore the Autocracy, requested also

that their class should be accorded a right of election both of Senators and of the Collegiate chief dignitaries (or, in other words, evinced a desire to influence the Central Administration direct), we find, on coming to the Commission of 1767, the *dvorianstvo* absolutely silent as to a desire for such influence—we find it asking, rather, for a greater share in provincial, not in central, administration. The source of this change in the political tastes of the class is, however, intelligible, for abolition of the obligation of State service caused the centre of gravity of the class's interests to shift from metropolis to *gubernia*, where, in spite of its now possessing an agrarian status only, the class proceeded to make good its provincial position, and to convert itself into the ruling class of its communities—the more so as already it held in its hands one-half of those communities' populations, in the shape of the bonded *krestiané*. Finally, Catherine's *gubernia* institutions of 1775 satisfied this aspiration, and sealed the class's long-continued efforts.

We shall remember still better what were the chief stages in the *dvorianstvo's* acquisition of local importance if we mark them off according to their leading features: as follows. In ancient Rus the *dvorianstvo* took no part at all in the work of administration, yet at the same time performed State service both at the centre and in the provinces. During the first half of the eighteenth century the *dvorianstvo* formed Governments at the centre, continued to perform State service at the centre, and at least made a beginning of provincial administrative work. Finally, during the century's second half the *dvorianstvo* formed a last Central Government of its construction, ceased to perform State service even at the centre, and entered definitely upon administration of the provinces.

This, then, was as far as the *gubernia* institutions of 1775 proved themselves of importance in the history of the *dvorianin* class. Then what part did Catherine's pet administrative-political ideas play in creating those institutions, in completing that long-established socio-political process? Well, the position which the institutions in question established for the *dvorianstvo* did not come of those ideas at all: the class attained what it had long been working for, and what it had long been undergoing preparation for, through the mere course of Russia's politico-economic life, until finally the class passed out of the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War into the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, and became the Central Government's

accredited provincial instrument.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless Catherine's political ideas, or, rather, Catherine's political textbooks, did play a part in the scheme of her *gubernia* institutions in so far as they influenced those institutions' mere forms, arrangement, working, and mutual relations, and in so far as they influenced even the theory upon which a few of the subsidiary departments were based. True, none of the institutions in question exercised much effect upon the course of practical affairs; but at all events we see Catherine's hand in the scheme's inter-separation of jurisdictions, demarcation of operative limits, complexity of legal mechanism, and structural principles of "conscience" courts, boards of public control, and the like. All that is meant by the above is that Catherine created neither the political relations which the forms of her institutions concealed nor the social interests which it was those institutions' function to preserve: whilst present throughout, as regards her reform of local administration, we see once more the feature distinctive of all her domestic policy, the feature that, although, with her, ideas new to the community of Russia marched always in the van, those ideas did but serve as cover for old-established historical factors which would in any case have continued to attain development and consolidation.

The same non-correspondence between results pre-announced and results forthcoming also determines in part how far the institutions of 1775 are important in our administrative history. Well, we cannot look upon them as in the smallest degree a step forward. For, to begin with, they did nothing to remove—rather, they did much to increase—the prime fault which the administrative system of the eighteenth century contained in its structure. An administrative system of a country is good only if identical principles both at the centre and in the provinces form its basis. Under Catherine some of the social classes were given no small share in the task of Russia's local government, but at the same time the Central Administration remained as bureaucratic as before—nay, by then it had come to lack even the seventeenth-century ties which once had linked it with the community. This fault has been noted already in the structure of Peter I's administrative system, but now Catherine's *gubernia* institutions aggravated the fault, since, whilst on the one hand, those

<sup>1</sup> See vol. ii, p. 140.

institutions infringed due balance between social rights and social duties (the *dvorianstvo* had, until then, possessed administrative status only in proportion to its fulfilment of State obligations, whereas under Catherine it came to acquire great importance during the very act of its sloughing its most onerous public functions), they, on the other hand, suffered from inclusion of the contradiction that, though they took their start from the *Nakaz*' principle of every man having a right to be judged and administered by his peers alone, they went on to a development which accorded undue political preponderance to one class alone. And, finally, the joint effect of the institutions of 1775 and 1785 was to render local administration complex absolutely to excess, so that where some ten or fifteen *chinovniki* once had worked there now came into evidence a full hundred, and administrative costs increased greatly—which at all times is an administrative defect.

## CHAPTER VIII

The development of serf-right from the time of Peter I onwards—A change in the position of the rural population during his time—The growth of serf right after the First Revision—*Pripiska* and *pozhalovanie*—The *pomiestchik's* authority over his *krestiané* under the *Ulozhenie* of 1649—The extension of his authority after the Petrine period—His authority over the person of his *krestianin*—His right to the labour and the property of his *krestianin*—His obligations with regard to the same—Origin and development of the view of the serf as the landowner's private possession.

THE extensive share in local administration which the institutions of 1775 and 1785 conferred upon the *dvorianstvo* had for its source the *dvorianstvo's* agrarian status. That is to say, the reason why the class entered upon direction of local administration was that in any case, apart from the administrative position held by the class, the latter had about half the local populations dwelling upon its estates, and so already possessed it. And inasmuch as the *dvorianstvo's* agrarian standing thus rested upon serf-right, let us dwell upon the history of that right during the eighteenth century.

Earlier we have noted a change in the rural bonded populations' position during Peter's period. The change came of the fact that the *ukazi* of ordination of the First Revision fused together two statuses which hitherto had been legally distinct from one another. Those statuses were the statuses, respectively, of the bonded *kholop*, and of the bonded *krestianin*. From the first the bonded *krestianin* had been bound to the landowner's person, but now he became bound also to his own status, so that even his landowner could not set him free of it, and thenceforth the bonded *krestianin* had to remain permanently, compulsorily the State's payer of taxes. As for the *kholop*, he too had always been bound to his master's person, but he had not always been bound to his own status, for he had been competent at any time to be given his freedom, and become a free wanderer, and, therefore, a non-payer of State taxation; but now Peter's legislation extended State tax-payment to him as well. From this combination of old-established relations there arose a new status

altogether—that of the *kriepostni chelovick*, or serf: and from it, again, as a foundation, there arose, after Peter's death, serf-right. It was a right which developed in two directions—in quantity, and in quality: in, that is to say, the fact that more and more persons came to fall within the bonded-dependent category, and in the fact that the bonded dependency itself came constantly to grow greater. The two processes may be studied between the time of the death of Peter I and the time of the accession of Catherine II.

In the first, the numerical, regard, the bonded status spread through a double means: through *pripiska* (ascription), and through *pozhalovanie* (conferment). As concerns the former, it was a system under which persons of inferior standing who had chosen no definite walk in life, and belonged to none of the basic social classes, in particular, had within a given period, to find for themselves a master (whether an individual or an institution), and be entered upon that master's souls-list, on pain, otherwise, of being handed over to the disposal of the police. In the system we see merely a continuance of the social purging begun during the seventeenth century,<sup>1</sup> but gradually, through the Second and the Third Revisions, it brought into the bonded condition all such persons as men of illegitimate birth, freedmen, persons who could not remember their kinsfolk, vagrants, orphans, adopted persons, prisoners of war, superfluous church attendants and deacons and sextons, sons of superfluous officials of the sort, sons of soldiers, and so forth. Inevitably much high-handedness took place in connection with this *pripiska*, and the law itself came to recognise that highhandedness as permissible, and to forbid persons forcibly *pripisannie* (ascribed or enrolled under the *pripiska* system) to a master to enter suit against him, whilst the Senate acted, as always, in the interests of its class, and contemplated the abuse through its fingers only, and suffered an arrangement begun solely for police purposes to assume the not infrequent character of a raid upon the community by the community's leading class.

*Pozhalovanie*, conferment, was, though a variant of the old *pomiestnaia dacha*, or *pomiestie* endowment,<sup>2</sup> distinguished from the latter both by its subject of possession and by the scope of its right. Up to the *Ulozhenie's* period, up to, that is to say, the time when the *krestianin* became bound to his status, and therefore to *tiaglo*, or

<sup>1</sup> See vol. iii, p. 159 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ii, p. 128.



tax-payment, *dacha* gave the *pomiestchik* no more than a right of occupation and usage of his, the *pomiestchik's*, lands; but when the *krestianin* became bound to the soil, and to *tiaglo*, *dacha* added to the *pomiestchik's* existing right a right of exacting a Treasury-fixed *obrok* income from any *krestiané* of his who belonged to the number of Treasury-taxpaying peasants; and when, after Peter I's time, the *pomiestie* became fused with the *otchina*, and an end was put to bestowals of *pomiestnia dachi*, *pozhalovanie* came to denote absolute conferment of lands with their attached souls. Moreover, *pomiestie* possession was temporary possession only—possession for life; whilst also it was conditioned by service: whereas through *pozhalovanie* lands and *krestiané* were conferred for, up to 1730, partial, and, after 1730, absolute, heritable, unconditional possession. Again, *pozhalovanie* sometimes was used to replace salary, or was awarded for military or civilian service. And in that case it represented either a substitute for or an addition to a grant of cash. Thus, an *ukaz* issued in 1737 assigned to each of a party of *dvorianin* officers doing duty at a group of Treasury mines not only a monetary allotment, but also ten *dvori* (representing forty peasant souls) in Treasury and court villages; whilst to each sub-officer of the party there was allotted half these grants. With the foregoing, however, there went the condition that, for the homesteads to be possessed permanently, both the officers and their sons should do permanent service at the mines. Also, *pozhalovanie* sometimes represented a mark just of Imperial favour and goodwill. Awards of *krestiané* were made on the occasion of every accession, and not infrequently in celebration of a victory, or at the end of a successful campaign, or simply "for joy" when there happened to occur an Imperial christening, the cutting of a first Imperial tooth, and so forth. Not an important event at court, not a palace revolution, not a feat of Russian arms took place without the State becoming poorer by some thousands of free peasantry. *Pozhalovanie* it was that created all the great landed fortunes of the eighteenth century: by the time of Peter's death Menshikov, the son of a palace groom, stood possessed of 100,000 peasant souls, and *pozhalovanie* converted the Razumovski Brothers into South Russian estate owners on a prodigious scale, and Count Cyril, in particular, originally a plain Cossack, into a proprietor of souls by the hundred thousand, and even the Razumovski Brothers' brothers-in-law—one Budlianski (originally a weaver), one Zakrevski

(originally a woodcutter), and one Daragan (originally a plain Cossack)—into *pomiestchiki* and personages of *dvorianin* rank, and one of Budlianski's sons into an owner of peasantry numbering at least not less than 3,000. Indeed, very great, by the middle of the century, was the proportion of the country's heretofore free rural dwellers (Court and Treasury peasantry) which *pripiska* and *pozhalovanie* had made become private property.

Next let us pass to development of the *pomiestchik's* authority over the serf. Inasmuch as his authority in this regard nevertheless stood limited to legally recognised bounds, and this constituted serf-right's juridical substance, what precisely was serf-right according to the legislation of the eighteenth century? Well, the question is one of the most intricate in all our legal history, but serf-right had for its supremely characteristic feature the fact that during the eighteenth century a bonded person was looked upon as the private possession of his master. How came this idea to arise and become established?

From the time of the *Ulozhenie* the *pomiestchik's* authority over his bonded peasantry stood compounded of two elements which corresponded to his dual status in relation to his lands' attached *krestiané*. In relation to those *krestiané* he was, firstly, their immediate administrator, the local authority to whom the State had entrusted regular collection of its dues from his *krestiané*, and the position, therefore, of local industrial-police overseer; and, secondly, the owner of the soil on which the *krestiané* dwelt, and their creditor in respect of it. In the former of these capacities, as his *krestiané's* immediate administrator, he had to superintend both their conduct and their industry, to exercise over them a limited judicial power, and to award punishment when necessary. And in his second capacity, as owner of the soil on which his *krestiané* dwelt, and their creditor in respect of it, he possessed a right to part of their labour in return for the soil's usage by them, and could, on the strength of that, impose either given tasks or rendition of an *obrok*. Until Peter's day both the police-financial right and the industrial right were limited variously by law and by custom. At that period the *pomiestchik*, though permitted to judge his *krestiané*, and to award penalties for faults, had his jurisdiction confined to "peasant affairs" alone, and could not extend it to include criminal matters as well. Indeed, the *Ulozhenie* had it that a *pomiestchik* who judged a

*krestianin* on a charge of theft could himself be stripped of property, or, alternatively, if no *pomiestie* was his, subjected to the *knut*. Moreover, the *pomiestchik*, until Peter's day, could lawfully be held to account for allotment of any penalty excessive or illegal. Again, up to that time either the Legislature or custom protected the labour of the *krestianin* from a master's arbitrariness. Not that the law furnished exact definition of the measure of *obrok* or of labour demandable. What it did in that connection was at least to give *krestiané* a right of appeal to the Government if the master's exactions were ruinous outright. And then, if subsequent investigation confirmed the plea presented, the *pomiestchik* had his property forfeited to the Crown if the *pomiestie* was either a conferred or an inherited estate, and transferred to relatives of his if the *pomiestie* was an estate obtained through purchase—the presenters of the plea, with that, being recompensed at the expense of their despoiler.

Such the system of *pomiestchik-krestiané* relations which law and custom jointly established during the seventeenth century. But gaps in the system were plainly manifest, and Peter's legislation did nothing to fill them up. Not that he ever made open legislative acceptance of the view of the *krestianin* as the landowner's private possession. Even though his *ukazi* sometimes are found to contain expressions seemingly giving occasion for that view (for example, where the *ukazi* ordaining the First Revision command that the *krestiané* about to be registered towards soul-tax assessment "shall be for ever unto whom they now shall be ascribed"), these careless, nebulous phrases did not establish a hard-and-fast principle. But, for all that, even the fact that the bonded *krestiané* paid the State's taxes, and therefore could not become a private possession in any event whatever, did not prevent, after Peter's day, a rapid increase of the view mentioned.

Even a cursory survey of the legislation passed by Peter's successors will show us the manner of this increase's occurrence. And inasmuch as the legislation in question treated, firstly, of the *pomiestchik's* authority over his *krestianin's* person, and, secondly, of the *pomiestchik's* right to dispose of his *krestianin's* industry, we too will take these aspects in the order named.

We have seen that the *pomiestchik's* authority over his *krestianin's* person came of the estate administrative commission entrusted to the former. For the *pomiestchik* was at once his *krestiané's* tax collector

and his *krestiané's* industrial-police overseer, and, in virtue of the latter capacity, could judge and punish them, and at all times superintend their behaviour and industrial activity. We have seen, too, that up to Peter's time the *pomiestchik's* jurisdiction in these respects was limited to "peasant affairs" (a term of some vagueness which best were taken to signify matters springing out of agrarian relations, or out of such points as now are dealt with by courts of arbitration) exclusively. As regards really important criminal matters, "*otchinniki* and *pomiestchiki*," says Kotoshikhin, "are none of them bidden to pursue, and to fulfil, *ukazi* in respect of such matters." Yet in Peter's time the landowner's authority never became defined with any exactitude, and landowners, for that reason, more and more arrogated to themselves rights of criminal adjudication as well. Ancient custom from the first allowed the landowner to subject his *krestiané* to corporal punishment, and in Elizabeth's day the Legislature sought to consult the interests of the Treasury by granting the landowner likewise a right, through *ukaz* of 1760, "where the offence hath been very rank," to banish a *krestianin* to Siberia. Said the *ukaz*: "Thus do the State's interests demand, for Siberia hath in it many regions meet for settlement and for husbandry."

So the real object of this ordinance was furtherance of Siberian colonisation. But, even so, the Legislature circumstanced it with restrictive conditions. Thus, a *pomiestchik* could send to Siberia only healthy workers of not more than forty-five years of age. And the *pomiestchik* was to obtain a recruitmentittance for every man so dispatched, and to comply with the Church's law by letting his wife accompany him, and by retaining in his own care only the man's non-adult children; whilst if, vice versa, the *pomiestchik* should elect for those non-adult children to depart with their parents, he, the *pomiestchik*, was to receive from the Government a certain compensation. Also, the seventeenth-century *krestianin* enjoyed a right of lodgement of a complaint against his landowner when exactions proved excessive. Only under Peter and his successors did this right fail to be maintained. In short, never did the legislation of the former define precisely, in the regard named, the landowner's powers.

The same irregularity is seen in the *pomiestchik's* rights in respect of disposal of his *krestianin's* industry. The sources of the rights in question were two. Firstly, the *pomiestchik* possessed the usual

right of property in the land on which his *krestiané* dwelt, and for which they had had advanced to them a *ssuda* (landlord's starting loan). Secondly, the landowner for whom the *krestiané* worked possessed a right arising out of the State service which he himself was compelled to render. And the two rights together led to the landowner being entrusted with disposal of at all events a portion of his *krestiané's* labour; whilst towards the close of the seventeenth century landowners began to dispose not only of their *krestiané's* labour, but also of the *krestiané* themselves, apart from land; which proceeding, again, led to development of a right to remove and sell *krestiané* apart from land. True, Peter circumstanced the right of transferring *krestiané* from estate to estate with such restrictive formalities as that the *pomiestchik* who desired to act in this manner had previously to ask the *Kamer-Collegium* for a permit, and to effect the removal directly under the auspices of that institution, and, until the Revision next ensuing, to undertake regular continuance of payment of soul-tax upon the removed *krestiané*; whilst Anna affirmed these restrictions by *ukazi* of 1732 and 1733: but when Peter III's time arrived the Government decided that more scope must be afforded landowners with regard to such disposal, and by *ukaz* of 29 January, 1762, the Senate ordained that, "with a view to devising the most satisfactory means for landholders," such persons might thenceforth remove *krestiané* merely after giving notice to the pertinent institution. And, not unnaturally, this permission to (in reality) sell souls individually and without land caused serf-right still further to approximate to sheer slavery. The period during which the process moved towards its fullest was just before Peter came to the throne. Yet Peter himself accorded the process indirect support: an *ukaz* of 1720 empowered merchants, *miestchané*, and "all those free persons who be not of the *shliachetsvo*" to send as recruit-substitutes for themselves certain "purchased men": and, of course, this concession gave rise to, amongst the lesser *dvoriané*, a widespread traffic in substitutes—in other words, to a yet added activity in the matter of selling *krestiané* individually and without land. Eventually even Peter seems to have lost hope of bringing the abuse to a halt: anyway it is only as the expression of a wish that an *ukaz* which he forwarded to the Senate in 1721 voices the opinion that whenever a new *Ulozhenie* may come to be compounded it ought to take measures to "arrest such a selling of men like cattle as nowhere else in the world is done."

With similar inadequacy did the law define the *pomiestchik's* rights with regard to his *krestiané's* labour. In the case of ancient Rus the latter never felt the need of such definition, since the relation of the *pomiestchik* to the labour of his *krestiané* was, in those days, determined by the ordinary competition of supply and demand—the *pomiestchik* being forced to have peasant working-hands at his disposal, and, for their retention at that disposal, to employ them on terms of not too exigent a nature (true, there is extant an item that once Tsar Boris Godunov did really attempt to fix landowner-*krestiané* agrarian relations by law; but of any working of such an *ukaz* after his time no trace occurs, and probably the *ukaz* was never published, never got beyond the stage of preparation for publication); but by the time of ordination of the First Revision some more exact specification by law of the forms and the extent of a *krestianin's* liabilities towards his landowner had become, as regards State reorganisation, an absolute necessity. Neither during nor subsequently to Peter's time, however, did the Legislature meet the necessity in full. Similarly, the Government never made a genuine effort to establish norms of plot reservable for the *krestianin's* use; it seems never to have occurred to the administrative circles of the day that the *krestianin* ought to be given an agrarian guarantee, since the need for such a guarantee had never existed in ancient Rus—we have seen the *krestiané* of that period to have striven all they could to curtail, rather than to increase, their arable holdings, and thereby to lighten the dues incident upon tillage, whilst neither Government nor landowner possessed, in those days, any means of forcing the *krestiané* to more extensive ploughing, and therefore there arose no need of a law requiring the landowner to furnish his *krestiané* with fixed-minimum plots: for all that it was in the landowner's interest that his peasantry should increase their area of cultivation, he could not well have brought about that increase either with or without the help of a legal ordinance. Nor, either in Peter's time or subsequently, did the authority of the *pomiestchik* over the property of his *krestiané* become precisely specified. Previously to Peter the question was not even understood; never in those days did men so much as imagine that the landowner could, merely *qua* landowner, possess a right to the private belongings of his *krestianin*. This view Peter also held. During his time, however, the privately-owned *krestianin* was not looked upon as owner outright even of his own possessions, despite that if at any time he chose

to engage in transactions on credit, or to answer in court in person for a debt, or to undertake a Treasury contract, it was at his own risk that he did so.

On the other hand, there did become established under Peter and his successors certain industrial obligations which forced a landowner to maintain the working efficiency of his *krestiané*. Thus, Peter required that a *pomiestchik* should feed any *krestiané* of his who became destitute, and levy tolls for the purpose upon his more prosperous peasantry. And, later, a law of 1734 bound a *pomiestchik* to feed all his *krestiané* during lean years, and to furnish them with seed corn "to the end that the land lie not idle."

These enactments with regard to the *krestianin* which the Legislature ordained between the time of Peter and the accession of Catherine II are seen at once to have contained more gaps than clear and precise definitions. They are readily seen, too, to have been one-sided. Under those enactments the *krestianin* bore a double responsibility: he had, on the one hand, to pay the State's taxes, and, on the other, to support his landowner. Meanwhile the Legislature was careful to elaborate fully none but the matter's financial aspect: with its other aspect, that of the private relations between *krestianin* and landowner, the Legislature concerned itself but little. This dereliction of the Legislature's caused landowners' arbitrariness to become more and more extensively operative. Whenever mutual relations between two parties of divergent interests are not given exact definition by law, but have their definition delegated either to the parties themselves, or to practice, or to custom, those relations always become defined in favour solely of the stronger party. And this was what occurred in the history of serf-right: derelictions on the part of the Legislature brought about development of, and juxtaposition of, *two* serf-rights, a legal serf-right and a serf-right of practice. True, the law at no stage made entire surrender of the *krestianin* to the landowner—for that matter, it could not have done so in view of the fact that the *krestianin* was the State taxpayer; but it did entrust to the landowner disposal of part of the *krestianin's* labour. Then, availing himself of this, the landowner went on to dispose also of the *krestianin's* person, and of the *krestianin's* labour as a whole, even as he disposed of all other articles in his agrarian industry: he went on to transfer *krestiané* from one plot to another, and to sell them, and exchange them, and devise them. And though

these operations' objective was less the *krestianin* himself than his labour-portion, men in those days could not distinguish such juridical subtleties, and, disposing of the *krestianin* as they disposed of any other industrial asset, came to view as an industrial asset the *krestianin* as well. True, the Legislature never, as I have said, made the *krestianin* actually the private possession of the landowner, but it did acquiesce in certain results of the *dvorianstvo's* rooted view of that dependence. Already the *Ulozhenie* permitted a *pomiestchik* one of whose *krestiané* had been slain by another *pomiestchik's krestianin* to demand either the latter or a substitute in compensation, so that the working strength of his estate might be made good again—an arrangement wherein we see the *krestianin* regarded solely as a chattel; whilst a landowner seeking an absconded *krestianin* might agree with the harbourer to receive a *krestianin* in exchange—an arrangement wherein we see the law permitting dealings in the person of the *krestianin* of a purely civil nature: but let us at the same time remember that the agrarian customs of the *pomiestchik* of ancient Rus owed their birth to the slave-owner's co-operation, seeing that the ancient Russian landowner exploited his *otchina* largely with slave labour. Naturally, therefore, attachment of the *krestianin* to the soil caused the old slave-owning customs to transfer themselves to him, and to evolve thence, aided by the Legislature's omissions and inconsistencies, practical serf-right, serf-right of *fait accompli*, a system resting upon the pristine view of the *krestianin* as his landowner's private possession. It was towards the middle of the eighteenth century that that right attained its greatest development: the electoral instructions of one of the Deputies of the Chief Administrative Institutions to the Commission of 1767 are found requesting a legal ruling as to what should be done with a landowner who had beaten a serf to death: wherefore the question arises whether the Government had earlier let lapse a pre-Petrine law framed for just such a *casus* as this, a law enacting that if a landowner brought about a *krestianin's* death through ill-treatment, that landowner himself should be put to death, and the family of the murdered *krestianin* compensated out of the landowner's property. Again, we see that when a *dvorianin* Deputy to the Commission named Korobyin was expounding to the Commission the chief causes of peasant "flights" he declared those abscondings mostly to be due to harsh acts on the part of *pomiestchiki*, and to the latter's excessive tasks and exactions, and to illegal seizures of



*krestiané's* substance. Then was there in existence any law giving the *pomiestchik* a warranty for such proceedings? And when Catherine, recognising what had come of this swift development of serf-right, mentioned the matter in her *Nakaz* we none the less read that "well might laws now establish something of advantage to the property of *rabi*." Then how came bonded *krestiané* to be spoken of as legally recognised "*rabi*," slaves, when all the time they were payers of the State's taxes—whereas *rabi* proper had been non-tax-payers? The truth is that Catherine, too, was accepting as a *fait accompli* the view that what belonged to the *krestianin* belonged also to the landowner.

## CHAPTER IX

Catherine's problems with regard to serf-right—How she decided them—Extension of serf-right by means of *pozhalovanie*—Extension of serf-right in consequence of suppression of free peasant migration—Extension of the authority of the *pomiestchik* through *ukazi* of Catherine's—Three ways in which the emancipation question might have been decided—Catherine's part in the history of serf-right—The manner in which she augmented and rounded off that right.

By this time the problems confronting Catherine's Legislature with regard to landowner-*krestiané* agrarian relations are intelligible enough. What required to be done was to fill up the gaps in the existing legislation, and to enunciate general principles for the bases of those relations, and, whilst keeping legal equity strictly clear of any established factors conflicting with such equity, to specify where the authority of the *pomiestchik* ended, and the power of the State began. Possibly the time was early as yet, the Government was unable as yet, to take the further step of complete emancipation of the bonded *krestianin*; but at least there was needed some better regularisation of the bonded *krestianin's* relation to his proprietor. In the beginning Catherine herself considered that the *krestianin's* lot called for amelioration. Indeed, when sweeping claims to an increased usage of the *krestianin's* labour were voiced at the Commission of 1767, and certain Deputies even demanded that serf-right be extended to conferment of the privilege of owning serfs upon the mercantile community, the Cossacks, and the clergy as well, Catherine lost her temper. That, at least, is the only inference to be drawn from a note which we may refer to the Commission's period, and which, in reply to claims such as the above, remarks: "If so be that we are not to recognise the *krestianin* as a person, he is not a human being either. So pray take him to be a beast, and from all the world there will be ascribed unto you, in consequence, no small honour and humane feeling." However, the note proved to be but a passing, pathological episode in the life of its writer, for all that her

counsellors never ceased to insist upon the necessity of having the *krestianin's* relations to the landowner more precisely delimited. Thus, Count Peter Panin told Catherine, in a Minute of 1763, that her first act should be restriction of the *pomiestchik's* "at present boundless power" over his peasantry—the *pomiestchik* being engaged in burdening his serfs with sheerly intolerable tasks and imposts: to which end the law should fix, absolutely to exactitude, the amounts in labour and in *obrok* which the *krestianin* properly should render. As regards the labour portion, the *barstchina*, Panin's suggestion was for a maximum of four days per week; and as regards the *obrok*, he suggested a maximum of two roubles per soul (nowadays, fourteen to sixteen). *Sivers*, *Gubernator* of Novgorod (a cultured, well-born administrator in no way inclined towards Liberalism, but at the same time well-acquainted with the true position), similarly reported to the Empress that existing dues and labours in the connection named "are such as to surpass all belief," and, with that, insisted upon legal fixation of a norm both for the amount of *barstchina* demandable and for the sum whereby a serf's freedom should become able to be purchased. Nor even at the Commission of 1767 were voices wanting to advocate amelioration of the fortunes of the *krestianin*: wherefore, had she so chosen, Catherine would have found support for her schemes of humanitarianism both at court and amongst the community, and at the same time the Government would have acquired from the *ukaz* of relief of the *dvorianstvo* from further service of State a fresh incentive towards the *krestianin* question's decision. Up to that time service of State was one of the chief conditions of the landowner's authority; but as soon as ever the *dvorianstvo* won clear of that service serf-right lost its meaning, and further distribution of lands and *krestiané* in return for State functions came to represent a means devoid of an end, an effect devoid of a cause. However, Catherine did more than fail to better the *krestianin's* lot, or to lessen the number of enserfed, and weaken the *pomiestchik's* authority: she caused the *krestianin* to become set in a position even worse than before, so that when she departed she left Russia a slave State to a degree greater even than she had found it.

There now stand indicated, therefore, the problems with regard to landowner-*krestiané* relations which Catherine's Legislature needed to solve. The labour of the bonded *krestianin* was owned

by the *pomiestchik* and the State in common. Hence the first requisite was to specify by law where the *pomiestchik's* rights ended, and the State's began. Let us look at Catherine's manner of decision of the problem. Although she ought to have begun by putting a stop to distribution of settled Court and Treasury lands to private persons (for that distribution had been connected solely with compulsory *dvorianin* service, and should have ended on that service's cessation), she continued the operation more lavishly even than her predecessors had done. Her mere accession was accompanied with conferment of 17,000 peasant souls upon twenty-six assistants. And all through her reign she granted serfs for State and court services—even past services, until, without enumerating these gifts in full, it may be said that the total number of additional persons who became occupants of the bonded status, and, therefore, private property, during her term upon the throne cannot have been less than 400,000 revisional souls, or 1,000,000 actual.

Also, her term upon the throne saw serf-right spread to a quarter of the Empire where it had not existed previously. Up to her day the *gubernii* of Little Russia had always had proceeding within them a migratory movement from landowner to landowner of *pospoliti*, or the State peasantry of Little Russia. On the other hand, the Cossack *starshini* of that region had never ceased from efforts to procure these State peasants' attachment to themselves under conditions of serf-right; and the same with the plain Cossacks. One who had given prime assistance to the *starshini* had been Count Cyril Razumovski, the local Administrator during 1750-64. He, indeed, had been the first to allot settled Treasury lands in Little Russia as permanent, heritable properties, instead of as temporary (the latter, in this case, meaning on terms akin to those governing Russian *pomiestie* right in that right's original form). And he had done so at such speed that soon after his retirement the number of Little Russian *dvori* still left intact, still not made over to private ownership, was estimated to amount to less than 2,000. Catherine, too, from the first took measures to combat the peasant migratory movement referred to. By *ukaz* of 1763 she ordained that no *krestianin* of Little Russia might leave his landowner without previously obtaining from the latter a permit: and, of course, from that time onwards landowners, wishing to hold their *krestiané* as long as possible, strove to make the concession as difficult as possible. Finally, an *ukaz* of

1783 altogether forbade migration of the Little Russian *krestiané*, and serf-right entered the region, and all the more so because at the same period the local Cossack *starshini* came to have extended to them privileges equal to those already possessed by the *dvorianstvo* of Great Russia. In the two *gubernii* of Kiev and Chernigov alone the *ukaz* of 1783 was reckoned as adding 1,000,000 *krestiané*—that is to say, the greater portion, if not the whole, of all the local peasant class—to the bonded condition.

So during Catherine's reign the serf status underwent multiplication through two means: through *pozhalovanie*, and through suppression of free peasant migration in Little Russia. Yet in Catherine's time the State's legislation as to landowner-*krestiané* relations remained as incomplete, and as lacking in consecutiveness, as ever. All the results of it favoured the landowner. We have seen that Elizabeth, in the interests of Siberian colonisation, empowered a *pomiestchik* to banish a *krestianin* thither. But she did so under given conditions only, whereas in 1765 Catherine converted this conditional right of banishment for settlement alone into a non-conditional right of banishment for hard labour (*katorga*) as well—the only new limitation being permission eventually to recall the exile thence. Again, whereas the Administrations of ancient Rus had accepted pleas of ill-treatment entered against landowners by rural communities, and duly inquired into pleas of the kind, and, if need be, punished the persons in fault (though Article 13, Chapter II, of the *Ulozhenie* forbade mere “*izviete*,” mere non-formulated, non-juridical allegations presented by individual *krestiané*, whilst there stretches from the reign of Peter a whole series of *ukazi* forbidding the subject, no matter what his status, to present a petition to the Sovereign over the head of the pertinent local institution), and Catherine, on her inception of rule, formally reaffirmed the system, and, for a while, continued to allow acceptance of pleas against *pomiestchiki*, both to the pertinent local institution and to the Sovereign direct, the Senate eventually proposed that Catherine should take measures altogether to stop such pleas from being lodged, and the Empress followed the Senate's advice, and a Senatorial *ukaz* of 22 August, 1767 (the very time when there were being read to the Commission the *Nakaz*' articles on freedom and equality!), ordained that “if any unauthorised person or persons soever shall henceforth presume to offer a petition against a *pomiestchik*, more especially in

the event that this be done into her Majesty's very own hands," both the petitioners and the framers of the petition should be awarded the *knut*, and then banished to Nerchinsk<sup>1</sup> without term, and the *pomiestchik* in the matter be accorded the necessary recruit quittance. Which *ukaz* the priest of every village church of the Empire was ordered to read aloud during a month's round of Holy Days and Sundays. The effect of the *ukaz*' wording was to deprive *krestiané* of all further power of complaint, whether to the throne, or to the pertinent local institution, against a *pomiestchik*. Again, although an Ordinance of 1771 forbade *krestiané* to be sold by auction in a public market-place for satisfaction of their master's debts, the *ukaz* remained wholly inoperative afterwards, whilst twenty-one years later a second *ukaz* in the connection restored the right of sale in a public market-place—provided that the hammer was not used. Furthermore, although the *Nakaz* recalls the fact that Peter's time saw promulgated a law by which the *krestiané* of an insane or a cruel *pomiestchik* had to be "placed under superintendence of kinsfolk of his, for their guardians," and adds that, though the portion of the law referring to insane *pomiestchiki* had always been kept, the other portion had "rested of none effect," Catherine herself did nothing to supply the deficiency. Lastly, her charter to the *dvorianstvo* of 1785 wholly omits from enumeration of the *dvorianstvo*'s personal and proprietary rights any distinction between serfs and the general substance of *dvorianin* property, and so recognises serfs only as a constituent portion of the *pomiestchik*'s industrial stock.

Such were Catherine's more important dispositions defining landowner-*krestiané* relations. The effect of her laws in the connection named was to cause the *pomiestchik*'s inveterate view of his land-attached bondsmen to acquire yet further support. We have seen that the eighteenth-century landed proprietor learnt to look upon his serf as a private possession of his, as a mere part of his seigniorial inventory: and though nowhere in Russian legislation concerning bonded *krestiané* was the view upheld in so many words, it gained fresh support, when we come to Catherine, less from what her laws said in plain speech than from what they did not say at all, but tacitly accepted. As a matter of fact, there were three possible ways in

<sup>1</sup> A settlement in Siberia where State factories were run with forced and penal labour.

which the *krestianin* question might have been decided. The question might have been decided by setting the *krestianin* free of the person of the landowner, but not binding him to the land. Or the question might have been decided by setting the *krestianin* free of the person of the landowner, and at the same time binding him to the land. Or it might have been decided by binding the *krestianin* to the land, but not at the same time setting him free of the person of the landowner. The first method would have accomplished the emancipation without land of which certain Liberals used to dream early in Catherine's reign. And also, we cannot but suppose, it would have brought about not only an economic catastrophe, but likewise a political one. And the second method would have created a system similar to the system which the Decree of Emancipation of 19 February, 1861, introduced, seeing that it would have transferred the *krestianin* from attachment to the landowner's person to attachment to the land independently of the land's owner. And the third (and best) method would have attached the *krestianin* to the land, but, with that, left him subject only to a seignorial authority properly, legally defined. Of course, this third method would have necessitated passage of further legislation; but still it, and none other, was the solution most insisted upon by really expert administrators.

None of the three methods, as a matter of fact, did Catherine choose. What she did was instead to strengthen, and yet further to extend, the landowner's authority, and to confirm his view of the *krestianin* as a private possession. Wherefore we cannot but hold Catherine responsible for serf-right in the respect that, though she was not its creator, she made of it less a variable factor which needs of State in all things justified than a recognised right which scarcely anything justified—that she converted, that is to say, a question of State economy into a question of *pomiestchik* rural industry.

## CHAPTER X

The effects of serf-right upon rural industry—The systems of *obrok* and *barstchina* up to the middle of the eighteenth century—Predominance of the former under Catherine—The weight of the *obrok*—The manner in which *barstchina* took *krestiané* from their plots—*Pomiestie* estate management—The serf trade—Serf-right's influence upon *dvorianin* landownerships, upon *pomiestie* industry, and upon peasant husbandry

NEXT let us study the results of serf-right in the new formation of that right. The results in question were exceedingly diverse, for serf-right came to be a mainspring governing every single sphere of the nation's life. Indeed, it might be said that in Catherine's time the whole domestic history of the country became the history of serf-right, so closely connected with the political, the economic, and even the moral life of the people did the phenomenon come to be. Briefly let us summarise those political, economic, and moral effects.

In the first place, serf-right greatly influenced the nature of the *pomiestchik's* rural industry: under cover of it there became created some very peculiar rural-industrial relations indeed. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century the *dvorianstvo* lived subject to a rendition of State service which quite prevented the service class from also developing into a class of independent rural squires. Hence by the end of that period there had established itself in *pomiestie* industry a system of estate-exploitation variously through *obrok* and through *barstchina*. This means that if circumstances were favourable the *pomiestchik* exploited his lands through *barstchina*, through labour of his bonded *krestiané*, and that if circumstances were not so favourable he committed his lands' working to his *krestiané* in return for an *obrok*, or tithe in money. But inasmuch as the *dvorianstvo* became released from the State service obligation during the century's second half, we might have expected to see the class then take advantage of its new-found leisure to engage independently in agriculture. Yet what, as a matter of fact, do we see? As we observe the rural-industrial phenomena of the period named we



encounter the precise opposite; we encounter the spectacle of the *dvorianstvo* not only continuing the *obrok* system, but even extending it, and altogether forbearing from personally entering upon control of its rural-industrial affairs. Evidence of this is to be found both in statistical records and in contemporary testimony. Writes Catherine in her *Nakaz*: "Well-nigh all our estates now are on *obrok*." And at the close of her reign we find the statistician Storch and the agronomist Rychkov equally complaining of the harm which the *obrok* system was causing to the national industry. As the reason certain men of the day such as Prince Stcherbatov suggested *dvoriané's* continuance of State service in the towns, and thereby their necessity of entrusting the working of their estates to *prikazchiki*, or bailiffs. And towards the close of her reign Catherine herself told Ségur that the number of *dvoriané* still remaining in the States' service was not less than 10,000—all of them, therefore, unable meanwhile to find the leisure personally to participate in industry on their estates. And certain registers of the year 1777 show most of the class then to have been resident in towns. So altogether it is clear that release from the service obligation did not at once transfer the class from capital to country seat, but left it halted in, as half-way points, chief towns of *gubernii* and *uezdi*. We can conceive two reasons for this temporary absenteeism. These reasons are a political reason and a reason of an economic nature. We know that the beginning of Catherine's reign was marked with peasant risings, and that eventually all these risings became merged into the great and sinister Pugachev movement. Evidently, therefore, *dvoriané* were so alarmed at events of the sort that they could not make up their minds at once to relinquish town life, but preferred to remain close to such powerful friends of theirs as the local *Gubernator* and the local *Ispravnik*. At all events this would seem quite to explain why the class so long continued to make its *krestiané* work upon *obrok*. As for the other, the economic-industrial, reason, it is to be found in the pages of Catherine's *Nakaz*. "The most of our masters," says the *Nakaz* at one point, "are now dwelling but little, or even not at all, on their estates, yet imposing upon their peasant souls a rouble, two, or even five, apiece, without respect unto the souls' means of furnishing the moneys." *Pomiestchiki* of the day, then, preferred *obrok* industry to *barstchina* as the system not only of superior convenience, but also of superior lucrativeness.

For through the former system the *pomiestchik* was saved both from the petty cares of rural industry and from the necessity of having to spend many a sleepless night as he lay waiting for a possible peasant attack upon his rural establishment: whilst, with that, he could always raise to any extent the *obrok's* amount, and derive thence, where population was scanty and the soil poor, such an income as the *barstchina* system could never have brought in.

Rates of *obrok* met with during Catherine's time vary considerably. What determined them was local conditions. Here and there the *krestianin* paid one rouble. Elsewhere he paid, perhaps, twenty roubles, or even a hundred—nay, a thousand, with the highest rates falling upon such well-to-do *krestiané* engaged in trade as those whom, for example, the Sheremetev family possessed. However, to note the normal, the most usually met with, rates of *obrok*, the normal rate during the eighteenth century's sixties was two roubles. And during that century's seventies it was three roubles. And during the ensuing decade it was four. And at the close of Catherine's reign it was standing at five. Correctly to determine these rates' economic significance, we must take into consideration the period's monetary values. Early in Catherine's reign the silver rouble equalled seven or eight modern; and by the close of the reign it equalled five or six of to-day. Precisely what, then, was the Catherinian *obrok's* weight? During her time the *tiaglo* (in this sense, the taxable peasant *dvor*, containing the *krestianin* himself, with his wife and his non-adult children) had attached to it from five to six *desiatini*, in three fields, of tillage and pasture; though, of course, in the less densely populated *gubernii* of the blacksoil region plots were a good larger deal than those elsewhere. So if the *tiaglo* of the non-blacksoil *gubernii* had attached to it six *desiatini* on the average, we may then assume that there went to each revisional soul (the *dvor*, the *tiaglo*, meant two-and-a-half such souls according to the reckoning of the day) two *desiatini*. Suppose, then, that at the close of Catherine's reign the revisional soul was paying five roubles as *obrok*, those five roubles were, in grain values, equal to twenty roubles of to-day, and the *tiaglo* as a whole was paying sixty-five roubles as *obrok*. Lastly, if we spread this sixty-five *obrok* of roubles over the *tiaglo's* plot of six *desiatini*, we shall find that the *obrok* system enabled the *pomiestchik* to receive an annual income of some eleven roubles from each *desiatina*, or an income larger by

several times than the rental per *desiatina* obtaining in the non-blacksoil *gubernii* of now. But, of course, this non-correspondence between landed income-producing capacity and weight of *obrok* was less great, to a sensible degree, in the *gubernii* of the blacksoil region.

None the less, the *barstchina* system existed on not a few estates. Early in Catherine's reign certain persons in high places founded an association for developing, and diffusing instruction in, agricultural science; and after Catherine had, in 1765, given the association her approval it took for its title the "Free Economic Society." Next, the better to become acquainted with the rural industry of Russia, the Society sent out to *gubernii* a *questionnaire*. And it is some of the replies to this *questionnaire* that afford us interest in the matter. From certain *gubernii* it was reported that the rule as to the *krestianin's* working time was that one-half of it should go to the *pomiestchik*, but that whenever the weather was favourable the *krestianin* had to work for his master the week through, or until the tasks in hand were finished—that only then had the *krestianin* an opportunity of attending to his own affairs. Many *pomiestchiki*, also it was reported, demanded of the *krestianin* at all times a weekly *barstchina* rendition of four or five days. Other reports, too, stated that local agriculture was declining as it had never done before—the cause being masters' onerous tolls and ceaseless tasks. Count Peter Panin also (a practical man, and only a very moderate Liberal) wrote that the tithes and the labour exacted by masters not only exceeded, in all cases, what obtained amongst Russia's neighbours abroad, but exceeded, in many cases sheer human capacity. And by the end of Catherine's reign we see the vagueness of landowner-*krestiané* relations evoking a phenomenon making supremely clear what was the serf-right of the period. For we read in Rychkov's memoirs that some *pomiestchiki* supplied their *krestiané* with a monthly ration of food, and then set them tasks on every day without exception: a fact meaning that the Legislature, through failing to fix a norm for *krestianin*-landowner obligations, had enabled the *pomiestchik* to take his serfs from their plots, altogether to convert his estate into a "plantation" such as existed in pre-Abolition America.

Serf-right communicated to *pomiestie* industry other peculiarities as well. So long as the *dvorianstvo* had to perform service of State the class needed staffs of household serfs with whom they could march afield, and through whose means they could have their estates'

industry carried on without having themselves to reside on those estates, except on infrequent occasions. On the cessation of *dvorianin* service of State those staffs of household serfs were not curtailed as one might have expected, but, from the middle of the century, made larger, very much larger, still. Contemporary observers even found the mansions of *pomiestchiki* of the period to contain from three to five times as many domestics as obtained on equally wealthy German manors. Storch, for one, says that such manors are past description—never could peoples of other countries so much as imagine their multitudes of household serfs. These staffs of household serfs served *pomiestchiki* also as instruments of control of their *krestiané*.

For it must be remembered that the *pomiestchik* was lord absolute of the *krestianin* world on his estate: he supervised, in that world, morality and order, and was a legislative-judicial authority of wide jurisdiction, and could fix the *krestianin's* every social and industrial relation. We have seen, too, that, "if the offence hath been very rank" he could even deport a *krestianin* to Siberia. In Elizabeth's time this deportation was exclusively for settlement, but Catherine made it able to include hard labour as well. And throughout the century's second half *pomiestchiki* the more availed themselves of the right because they could always obtain recruit quittances for the deported. Thus, rather than part with workers of value, *pomiestchiki* would, when a recruits' muster was nearly due, deport a batch of infirm or inefficient *krestiané*, receive recruit quittances for them, and so both lighten their recruitment liabilities in general and avoid having to send into the army their stronger and more orderly working-hands. But, naturally, this did great harm to the army, and in 1773 Sivers informed Catherine that at the local recruits' muster of two years earlier the right had deprived the military forces of at least 7,000 or 8,000 efficient soldiers. To which Sivers added expression of a doubt as to whether so much as a fourth of the contingent deported would ever reach its Siberian destination. Not long afterwards the well-known Academician Pallas toured Siberia, and interviewed many such exiled *krestiané*. Not a few, he reported, were there without their wives or children, despite Elizabeth's enactment that married couples amongst them should never be separated. With tears these men told him how much they missed their little ones. And to this some of them added that otherwise, had they but been sent thither along with their families, they would have thought

themselves better off in Siberia than they had been in Russia, where they had lived under a master's immediate hand. In the year 1772 the *gubernia* of Tobolsk and part of the *provintzia* of Yeniseisk alone had dwelling in them 20,500 such exiles of both sexes.

Of *pomiestchiki's* estate "legislation" and adjudication some highly characteristic memorials have come down to us. Particularly interesting do we find a set of instructions which Count P. A. Rumiantsev gave to his estate steward in 1751. At that time Rumiantsev was still a young officer—he was not yet the military notable that later he became; and, as one accustomed, therefore, only to army discipline, he loved orderliness in all things. The result was that for any and every misdemeanour and dereliction on the part of the serf there were to be imposed, according to the instructions, the heaviest possible penalties. Those penalties were to range, indeed, from fines of two kopeks—five roubles to fetters and flagellation and beatings with rods (Rumiantsev did not care for the birch, it seems—he considered the impression of rods to go far deeper). Even a petty theft was to cause the culprit to suffer deprivation of property, flagellation with whips, and, lastly, consignment to the military authorities without word sent to the *barin*. True, the *Russkaia Pravda* also knew the sentence, and called it "*potok i razgrablenie*," "flow and stripping"<sup>1</sup>; but at least it was never inflicted by the *Pravda* save for the heinous offences of brigandage, horse stealing, and arson. Also, if at any time one of Rumiantsev's *krestiané* should fail of church attendance without due cause he was to be made to benefit the church by paying to it a fine of ten kopeks. And any *krestianin* who should insult a *dvorianin* was to be subjected to rods "until he who may have been insulted shall stand satisfied," as well as to be mulcted in two roubles to his master. Even these stringent penalties, however, pale before those read of in another memorial of serf-right, in a certain "journal of household administration" (domestic regulations) which a *pomiestchik* compiled during the years 1763-5. For here we see the *krestianin* have heaped upon him, for every sort of offence, whip strokes by the hundred, and birch strokes by the thousand, with the ratio between the two calculated as one whip stroke equal to a hundred and seventy with the birch. Also, as this *pomiestchik* had household serfs of his

<sup>1</sup> Or "letting" (of blood) "and stripping" (of belongings).

resident in Moscow, where variously they traded on terms of an *obrok* to himself or learnt handicrafts, he made them, if he too happened to be resident in the city, appear before him on every festival day, and present their respects. And if any such serf then failed to attend he was awarded 1,000 birch strokes. And if any serf played truant from Communion he was awarded 5,000 strokes of the sort, despite that he might have made the Communion preparation in full. All serfs, after castigation, were lodged in hospital. But in each case a term was fixed for the patient's duration of lying up, according to amount of punishment sustained. Thus, a serf might, after 100 whip strokes or 17,000 with the birch, lie in hospital for a whole week; but the recipient of anything less than 10,000 birch strokes might only lie there for half a week. And any serf who exceeded these and similar terms had his food in hospital stopped, and his wages docked in proportion.

Also, *pomiestchiki* took advantage of their legislatively-accorded licence over the *krestianin's* person and labour to develop a large trade, with or without land, in souls. At that period two sets of prices, an officially fixed (fiscal) set, and a market or free, existed in the *krestianin* traffic. Early in Catherine's reign an estate could be bought for 30 roubles (225) per revisional soul with land; but by 1786 the establishment of a *ssuda* bank had largely raised prices, whilst in 1774 Sivers reported that the revisional soul which once had been worth no more than the sum first named was now gone up to 50. When accepting estate mortgages, the bank, for its part, valued the revisional soul with land only at 40; but by the close of the reign no estate could well have been bought at a rate not reaching 100. And as regards individual souls without land, any such serf fetched, at the beginning of the reign, if recruitment-fit, 120. And at the end of the reign he fetched 400.

We see, then, the sort of organisation of *pomiestie* rural industry which serf-right brought about. The right's effects upon the *dvorianstvo's* landownership and agrarian position are discernible easily enough. As soon as the class was relieved of the obligation of State service it ought, properly, to have become both an order of agricultural proprietors and, seeing that it held in its hands not only the country's land, the country's prime productive force, but also the agricultural labour attached to the land, the chief motive agency of the nation's industry. Yet it did nothing of the sort. Almost all through

Catherine's reign it forbore to take up independent rural industry. Instead, it handed over the task to stewards, or settled its lands with *krestiané* on *obrok*. Indeed, it is clear from the above-cited records of *pomiestie* management that the *pomiestchik* concerned himself far less about working for his land's development than about arranging for his *krestiané*'s governance. And so there faded gradually into the background solicitude either for advancement of agrarian culture or for application of improved methods and implements to husbandry. In *pomiestie* rural industry the principal task became administration of serfs, not tillage of soil. At the end of the century we find some leading *pomiestchiki* themselves taking this view of their personalities and their duties; we find them speaking of themselves as "hereditary *chinovniki* unto whom the Government has committed the land for settlement, and therefore the care of the dwellers thereon, and responsibility for them under every circumstance." In other words, serf-right not only led the *pomiestchik* less to exploit his land with the help of the *krestiané* who dwelt on that land than to exploit the *krestiané* who dwelt on his land with the land's help, but also caused *dvorianin* ownership of estates to come to mean, rather, *dvorianin* ownership of souls, and the owners themselves to become converted from agriculturists into police overseers of peasantry. And, to look at another aspect, the fact that serf-right deleteriously affected rural industry on the *dvorianstvo*'s estates caused that right deleteriously to affect also the class's economic position, seeing that, as *krestianin* labour was unpaid labour, the *pomiestchik* could always meet a new requirement of his with imposition of a new task—thereby losing his last incentive to store up a sum of working capital. Of this the outcome was to create in *pomiestie* industry the curious politico-economic sophism that capital of the sort could be replaced with labour. At all events, everyone of to-day who knows what *pomiestie* industry was under serf-right considers serf-right to have been the exclusive source of the defects in that industry up to the time of serf-right's abolition: such experts ascribe to serf-right alone the *pomiestchik*'s uniform lack of thrift and enterprise and forethought, his indifference equally to improved methods of agriculture and to technical inventions and achievements evolved in the rural industry of other countries. Hence serf-right also deprived the *krestianin* of technical guidance: after imposing upon him the *obrok* the *pomiestchik* just left him to make experiments on his own account,

rather than came to his assistance with expert knowledge and an aid of current capital. Overburdened, therefore, with the *obrok*, the *krestianin* could but turn to "side lines" which took him away from home, and parted him from his family. In no other way could he meet his rural-industrial budget. And we see in all this the source of the faults afflicting peasant husbandry to this day: the *krestianin's* inability, or unwillingness, to exchange obsolete methods for improved, or to plough better in addition to ploughing more, or to gain a knowledge of intensive culture.



## CHAPTER XI

The effects of serf-right upon the nation's industry—The period's geographical distribution of agricultural labour and agrarian capital—Serf-right's influence upon, firstly, growth of the urban class, and, secondly, progress of urban manufacturers and trades—Details of the First and Fifth Revisions—Serf-right's influence upon State economy—The soul-tax and the State *obrok* after Peter's time—Growth of the liquor revenue during Catherine's reign—State credit—Increase of the State's indebtedness, internal and external.

THE effects of serf-right did not stop short at the country's rural industry: they also found expression in the nation's industry as a whole. And above all did they check the natural geographical distribution of agricultural labour and agrarian capital. We know, as external circumstances in our history, the reasons which caused popular settlement to thicken in the central regions of our plain when such settlement had been driven out of the fertile southern blacksoil area. But though, when once more the blacksoil area of the South was opened to agricultural labour, merely two or three generations might have sufficed to restore the infringed balance between density of agricultural population and quality of agricultural soil—all that was needed for the purpose was freedom of movement of agricultural labour—serf-right, again, intervened, and the further course of the process was checked, and the serf population caused to become concentrated most densely on the Upper Volgan clay lands, until by the middle of the century the *gubernia* of Moscow (corresponding to the *gubernia* of now, with the *gubernii* immediately adjacent, save for those of Smolensk and Tver) had got contained in it over a third of all the bonded peasantry in the Empire. During Catherine's reign too, the outflow of agricultural workers from the central *gubernii* to those of the southern blacksoil region proceeded less actively than might have been looked for. And as late as the middle of the nineteenth century the same historically created discrepancy between density of population and nature of soil is traceable. Thus,

the last, the Tenth, Revision (1858) shows the *gubernia* of Voronezh, a blacksoil *gubernia*, then to have been containing no more than twenty-seven per cent. of the serf population of the country, whereas the non-blacksoil *gubernia* of Kaluga had in it sixty-two per cent., and the still less fertile *gubernia* of Smolensk sixty-nine, but the fertile *gubernia* of Kharkov thirty only—so unequally distributed had the check offered to agricultural labour by serf-right caused that labour to become.

Again, serf-right hindered growth of the urban class, and, therefore, development of urban manufactures and trades. After Peter's day the urban populations increased slowly. According to the First Revision, those populations constituted no more than a little under three per cent. of all the country's taxpaying aggregate. And even by the beginning of Catherine's reign they had come only to equal three per cent. precisely—a truly negligible increase for a period so long as half a century. Nevertheless Catherine concerned herself a good deal about augmenting the "middling order of persons," the commercial-artisan social category, for the reason that all her economic textbooks cited it as the mainspring of a nation's prosperity and enlightenment. She reveals this aim and intention in correspondence with Madame Joffre, when the latter insisted upon her, Catherine, creating a third Russian section of society. Writes Catherine in response to her friend's desire: "Once again, Madame, I promise that you shall behold your middle class, despite that its organisation will be very difficult." Certainly the class developed in her time only with difficulty. This was the more so because Russia's trade, foreign and domestic alike, was still in the hands of alien capitalists. These capitalists established firms of their own in St. Petersburg, issued Russian paper roubles of their own, and brought it about that the otherwise advantageous economic position of a prevalence of exports over imports told solely in their favour, and left Russia's native merchants unaffected. Above all things, serf-right retarded progress in the matter of Russia's industry of manufacture. It did so from two sides. On the one hand, it brought about an extensive development of purely household crafts. A *pomiestchik* of the more well-to-do order now organised his own staff of craftsmen, from blacksmith to artist, musician, and even actor, from his household serfs, and, thus meeting his domestic requirements out of private resources, and merely resorting to foreign

stores for the few articles which those private resources could not furnish, made of the serf village and the household craft two dangerous rivals to the town of free manufacture, and caused urban labour and urban capital to lose in the person of the *pomiestchik* their most lucrative purchaser-bespeaker. On the other hand, as *krestiané* came to have fewer and fewer earnings left at their disposal, according as the *pomiestchik's* authority over their person and labour waxed and waxed, the towns lost in those *krestiané* a mass of at least numerous, even if cheaply-purchasing, customers. Certain statesmen of the day saw clearly the harm thus done to national industry by serf-right. In 1766 one such, Prince Dimitri Golitzin, Ambassador to Paris, told his Chancellor that never would Russia's commerce become prosperous "before that we introduce a *krestianin's* right to own what movable goods are his property." Finally, the Fifth Revision showed that by the close of Catherine's reign the urban-commercial-manufacturing class had come to stand at no more than 745,000 revisional souls out of the country's total of 18,000,000—that, in other words, the class was constituting of that total no more than four per cent. Whence we see how small, in general, was the growth of the class throughout the eighteenth century's course.

Serf-right likewise exercised a depressive effect upon the State's economy. Recently there have been published for our use a few particulars of Catherine's State revenues, and these particulars, for all that resort to them is disadvantageous in certain respects, disclose some very interesting facts. Upon all *krestiané*, as we have seen, there was imposed a soul-tax: but whilst that tax did not, before 1794, exceed 70 kopeks, and did not reach even a rouble until the year named, the growth of the State *obrok* which fell upon Court and Treasury *krestiané* equally with the soul-tax proved to be much more rapid. Thus, though the First Revision shows that *obrok* to have stood at 40 kopeks only at the Revision's period, it had by 1760 risen to a rouble, and by 1768 to two, and by 1783 to three. In other words, we see that, though, between the time of the First Revision and 1783, the Government could multiply the State *obrok* seven times over, it failed to multiply the soul-tax by more than slightly under one-and-a-half. This arose from the fact that, whilst bonded *krestiané* had to pay the soul-tax equally with the court and Treasury *krestiané*, the Government could not raise the fiscal dues incident upon the former as much as it could those incident upon the latter,

for the reason that the *pomiestchik* always stepped in to snatch away his *krestiané's* earnings and savings, and to deprive the Government of their use. We shall best understand what the Budgets of State lost in this way if we remember that at that period the serf portion of the community constituted nearly one-half of all the population of the country.

Nevertheless the requirements of Catherine's State constantly grew. So whence did the State obtain the means to meet those requirements? The answer is that, as increases even of the soul-tax, even of the tax falling directly upon the majority of taxpayers, could not be made to keep pace with what was needed, the Government had to resort to curious extraneous resources before new springs of revenue could be tapped. We find what these new springs were by studying the above-mentioned particulars of Catherine's State incomings, and perceive that, though jointly, during her time, the two direct imposts, the soul-tax and the State *obrok*, were increased 2.7 times, the liquor revenue grew with much greater rapidity—the method employed being constant augmentation of the sums charged for that revenue's leasing. Indeed, comparison of revenues from liquor-leasing sums for the years 1764 and 1795 shows the total revenue thence to have multiplied itself, during the period named, nearly by six. Also, if we take the particulars of Catherine's State revenues in general, and likewise the census returns at the beginning and the end of her reign, we can calculate exactly what the revisional soul paid to the Treasury each year, and how much the actual soul drank, each year, for the Treasury's benefit. As regards the first detail, the revisional soul earned-paid to the Treasury, in 1764, an average sum of 1 rouble, 23 kopeks: and in 1795 the same soul earned-paid to the Treasury an average sum of 1 rouble, 50 kopeks—1.3 times as much as in 1764. And as regards the second detail, the actual soul drank for the Treasury's benefit, in 1764, an average sum of 19 kopeks: and in 1795 the same soul drank for the Treasury's benefit (thereby rendering itself proportionately unfit for work and for tax-payment alike) an average sum of 61 kopeks—three times as much as in 1764.

Another extraneous resource to which the Government resorted was one of which Catherine's predecessors had had very little knowledge, even if any. That extraneous resource was credit. The Government's method was that in 1768 it established a bank of

issue founded upon an exchange fund of 1,000,000 roubles, and at the same time put into circulation a like sum in paper currency, for replacement of the current copper coinage. And in six years the Government, to cover running expenses, increased the volume of paper to 20,000,000 roubles. Yet no difficulty, even so, arose in the way of the paper's exchange, and therefore the notes of the bank of issue retained their value unimpaired, or even yielded a modicum of profit when presented against copper. But in 1786 one effect of the second Turkish campaign was to compel extraordinary spendings—wherefore the total of notes in circulation was raised to as much as the equivalent of 100,000,000 roubles. True, the accompanying Manifesto promised that that should be the only increase made, but somehow, by the close of the campaign in question, 150,000,000 roubles were found to be afloat, and, by the close of the reign, a number yet greater, so that the exchange value of the paper rouble fell, first to 70 kopeks, and then (in 1796) to 50. And with internal indebtedness of State went external also; so that by the close of Catherine's reign the latter was standing at a total of 44,000,000, after that the Governments of Catherine's last few years had had annually to budget for an interest sum of 5,000,000. Finally, if we add to the bank notes in circulation the total of external indebtedness, we obtain that, taking 68,000,000 roubles as a Budget average, Catherine borrowed of her generation's posterity at least three Budget years. Hence serf-right not only exhausted direct impost revenues for the Treasury, but also compelled Governments to resort to extraneous sources which either overtaxed the productive forces of the country or would fall as a burden upon the country's future descendants.

## CHAPTER XII

The influence of serf-right upon the community's intellectual and moral life—The influence of serf-right upon the relations of the people to the State order—Changes in the intellectual and moral life of Russia's fashionable society—The influence of serf-right upon that life's artistic side—The first stage of the change, as represented by a demand for elegancies and embellishments—The decline of technical education after Peter's day—"Fashionable" culture—Spread of the French language—Tuition in government educational establishments, and in private—The French *gouverneur*—The period's literary tendencies—Growth of a taste for eclectic reading—The morals of *dvorianin* society during Elizabeth's time, and early in Catherine's.

WE have now studied both the popular-industrial and the financial effects of serf-right. All that remains is to examine the right's effects as expressed in the intellectual and moral life of the community. During the eighteenth century that life took its tone exclusively from the *dvorianstvo*. And the element in it which most impressed itself upon the consciousness of the masses at large was serf-right. First let us recall the community in old Muscovite Rus. At the head of that community there stood a privileged class, the State service social corporation, a class which enjoyed certain important economic and political prerogatives, and paid for them with fulfilment of certain weighty State obligations—with defence of the country, with action as the Central Government's agency, and, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, with propagation of popular enlightenment. Yet sometimes, in remembering the *dvorianstvo's* services to the community, we are apt to forget what privileges the *dvorianstvo* possessed, and the fact that half-way through the century there occurred a break in the balance between social rights and social duties upon which the Russian political structure of the day rested. The break came of the circumstances that, in proportion as one class in particular acquired more and more prerogatives and amenities, it more and more put off its obligations of State.

This infringement of the balance between rights and duties exercised upon the popular masses the direct effect that it aroused, and caused to grow, amongst them a notion that the basis of Russia's political order was, after all, injustice. Particularly in one form did the notion find expression. Often the taxpaying masses rebelled during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but when they did so the motives evoking their outbreaks were not always identical. During the seventeenth century, for instance, such movements were aimed mostly at the Government's provincial agents, as represented by the *Voevodi* and the representatives of the central *Prikazi*: an example is seen in the case of the Razin upheaval. But in none of these seventeenth-century affairs can we trace anything of a social tendency; they were affairs purely of rebellion of administered persons against their administrators, and not of inferior sections of society against superior: whereas, as regards the peasant outbreaks of which Catherine's reign (particularly its first half) proved so prolific, popular discontent had about it a social character, and was aimed less against the Government's local agents than against the one privileged class. In the change we see yet another expression of serf-right's results—the latter having altered the order of State, and established it upon a basis of political non-equity.

Serf-right gave rise also to important phenomena in the intellectual and moral life of Russian society; those phenomena came solely of the peculiar position created for the *dvorianstvo* by the right in question. As the most privileged social class, the *dvorianstvo* gradually came not only to act as director of the country's local administration, but also to get hold of the bulk of the country's fundamental capital, and, in addition, of the people's labour. This status finally severed the last of the ties linking the class with the rest of the community, whilst, with that, the class's privileges made of it more than ever a corporate organisation, and set it apart both from the mass of rural serfs and from its fellow social classes. Even participation in local government did not furnish the *dvorianstvo* with serious public work: wherefore by the beginning of Catherine's reign local administration by the *dvorianstvo* had lost all importance, and come to be a mere caricature of administration, a mere butt for the *dvorianstvo's* fellow-classes, and for literature. *Dvorianin* gatherings for elections developed into a mere arena for intrigue between families and neighbours. *Dvorianin* assemblies proved

but schools for empty oratory, or show-grounds for *dvoriané's* ladies. And rural industry afforded the *dvorianstvo* equally little serious interest: the class exploited its unpaid labour without introducing into it any practical improvements, or making the least attempt to take anything of a productive part in national work—as soon as the *Gubernator*, the *Ispravnik*, and the *Predvoditel* had, together, relieved the class's slumbers of the Pugachev phantom the class just carelessly, supinely set itself to live upon others' toil, and before long, of course, began to feel that employment for its energies was none the less a current necessity. The first signs of this important factor, of this self-realisation, came into evidence immediately after the middle of the eighteenth century, and during the century's subsequent half there became founded upon the *dvorianstvo's* politico-industrial idleness a truly curious social *régime* which possessed relations, morals, and tastes solely of its own. Always, when persons set their lives apart from the life of the surrounding popular masses, they tend to create an artificial existence peculiar to themselves, and then to fill that existence with illusory interests, and to ignore actual phenomena as phantasmagoria, and to assume that their dreams alone are the phenomena of actuality. An existence of the sort was what the *dvorianstvo* now formed for itself. It did so from the time when the class realised itself to be devoid of occupation. The existence's first results became noticeable in Elizabeth's reign: wherefore to advantage we may study its chief stages up to the opening of the nineteenth century.

The first stage begins definitely to be seen at the eighteenth century's half-way point. For then, in proportion as the *dvorianstvo* entered upon a process of being relieved of compulsory service, and scented liberty to be approaching, it felt arise in it a need of filling up the void of leisure with fruits of intellectual and moral labour which others had produced, of borrowing flowers of culture for which the class itself lacked the material. So more and more there grew amongst the class a demand for life elegancies, for æsthetic interests. And inasmuch as the accession of Elizabeth brought to the ground the German influence previously prevalent at court, and, instead, introduced a French influence, France's fashions, clothes, manners, and tongue came to permeate *dvorianin* society, and to serve as adornments to *dvorianin* existence. The theatre now became an important life interest, and Russia's court and society more than ever



developed a taste for "spectacles," and theatres began to be established also in the provinces.

Next, these borrowings of alien amenities and elegancies gave rise to a realisation that education capable of enabling the imported blessings to be put to the best use was needed. And this, again, communicated to *dvorianin* scholastic education a new direction altogether. In Peter's time the *dvorianin's* studies had had to follow a rigidly prescribed programme—he had had to acquire a given amount of arithmetic, of ballistics, and of navigation as likely requisites for service of a military nature, and a given amount of political economy and of law as likely requisites for civilian service: but when Peter was gone this educational obligation weakened, and Peter's technical study, a study which he had imposed as a natural duty, became replaced with study essentially different. A document particularly illustrative of the decline of the older educational style is a report presented to the Senate in 1750 by the Admiralty *Collegium*. Under that *Collegium's* jurisdiction there existed two Naval Academies—more simply, two Schools of Navigation. The one was situated in St. Petersburg, and the other one in Moscow, in the Sukharevskaja Tower. And the report shows that, though, in 1731, the two Schools had had their complements of pupils fixed at, respectively, 150 and 100, these numbers had never been consistently sustained; that, though, in Peter's time, none but scions of the more eminent and wealthy *dvorianin* families had been sent thither, the Schools had, since that time, become resorts also for sons of minor or landless *pomiestchiki*; and that some of these had, at that, been forced "through penury" to cease attendance, and to seek extraneous means of support, despite the small official allowance of which they had been in receipt. So much for Peter's pet project of schooling the *dvorianin* in navigation!

In short, for the *dvorianin* the college of artillery or of navigation now gave place to a college of fashionable deportment, of what had, at the beginning of the century, been known as "passage through the elegancies of France and Germany." As early as in Peter's time a guide to polite behaviour had been translated into Russian. This compilation, a manual of "modish proprieties" entitled *The Honourable Mirror of Youth*, set forth, first of all, the alphabet and the numerals, and then rules as to how one should bear oneself in company, sit at table, control one's knife and fork, manage one's handkerchief

and nose, and pose oneself when executing a bow. Thus the manual was designed to turn out polished "young *shliachtichi*—persons wholly different from a rustic *muzhik* or an ignorant clown." And as the manual was, "by Order of her Imperial Majesty," re-issued in a second edition in 1740, and in others subsequently, we may conclude that there existed for the work a clearly felt need.

At the beginning of Catherine's reign two general-educational establishments in particular were very adversely affected by this new programme of *dvorianin* culture. The two establishments in question were the University attached to the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, and the University of Moscow, with their respective gymnasia. Both of them now became set in a very parlous position. As regards the former, the University attached to the Academy of Sciences, we find Lomonosov writing: "Naught now is to be seen in it of the form, or of the likeness, of a university," in that, despite the Academicians' obligation to lecture at the University, they were not doing so at all, whilst the students resorting thither were students come mostly from the spiritual educational establishments of Moscow, and *dvorianin* students were attending only against their will. However, if the University taught the students nothing, at least it caned them. Even when, in 1756, a number of those attending for study complained to the Senate of their lot, and added that they were receiving no instruction from their professors, a Senatorial command to the latter to resume lecturing led to no more than that, after doing so for a little while, they put the students through a sort of examination, gave them all "good *attestats*," and—once more ended the matter at that. In the case of the University of Moscow, the institution, though possessed of a hundred students at the time of its opening in 1755, had in it, some thirty years later, no more than eighty-two, and, ten years later, again, a Faculty of Law comprising one only. Delivery of lectures in the University was carried out variously in French and in Latin, but upper-class students found acquisition of learning there as impossible as they found it possible to leave behind them their good manners. Similarly situated did the two Universities' gymnasia become. Wherefore failure resulted also as regards Peter's pet project of grafting upon the *dvorianstvo* stock "a schooling in economy and citizenship."

General education (in so far as general education was then understood) did, however, succeed in weaving for itself a nest in a spot

where its discovery might scarcely have been expected: it did so in two purely military educational establishments—in the Sukhoputni Shliachetski Cadet Corps which was founded in 1731 in accordance with plans framed by Münnich, and in the Naval School which had arisen at a later period. Yet though these resorts were designed for *dvoriané* in particular, we shall err in supposing that their pupils were set to do many exercises of a warlike character. And from the programme of the Sukhoputni Cadet Corps, especially, we see that one day in the week, and no more, was apportioned to military practice, “lest teaching of the other sciences be hindered.” “The other sciences” are shown by the programme in question to have been surprisingly comprehensive: in addition to elementary mathematics and grammar, the cadets had to study geometry, rhetoric, philosophy, jurisprudence, political economy, history, heraldry, fortification, gunnery, astronomy, seamanship, engraving, painting, “the making of statues,” and (after Alexander Sumorokov, the dramatist, had come into prominence) the art of the stage. Hence wits did not without reason declare that both the one and the other Cadet Corps merely turned out officers acquainted with anything and everything save the one thing wanted, and acquainted only superficially with the one thing at that. The Shliachetski Corps contained students ranging in age from five to twenty-one, and divided them into five separate ages for, in each case, three-year periods of study, and gave them separate curricula. In the youngest age six hours per week were devoted to the Russian language, six hours to the art of dancing, fourteen to French, and a portion of one to Holy Writ. And in the third age (of lads from twelve to fifteen) chronology and history were supposed to be studied, but the chronology was not taught in actuality because chronology formed part of history, and the history was not taught in actuality because, “owing to preceptors’ weak understanding of the same, and to much time being used upon study of languages,” the class had not first come to gain acquaintance with the geography which it was supposed to have passed through in the preceding age. Whence we see that the community’s new cultural tastes caused even the Government schools of the period to adopt curricula broadly, practically designed to prepare pupils, no longer for service of State, but for prowess in the *salon*, and in polite society. The same with the purely private academies which began to appear during Elizabeth’s

time. A particularly good description of such an establishment is furnished by a Smolenskan *dворянин* of the name of Engelhardt who, in the century's seventies, himself studied in the school under a master named Ellert. By this Engelhardt we are told that, for all that Ellert stood quite untrained in "the sciences," he made his programme include a superficial exposition of almost every "science" in existence—of mathematics, Holy Writ, grammar, history, mythology, and many another one, but, above all, of the French language. Indeed, no pupil might speak in any other tongue, under pain of severe punishment. And, as Ellert was altogether a harsh pedagogue, "veritably a tyrant," even a single word of Russian earned for the delinquent a cut over the knuckles with a ferule made of sole-leather. Yet though a result was that the academy contained a large number of scarred scholars, whilst its tutorial fees were heavy—they amounted to 100 (700) roubles a year—the academy's complement was always complete. Lastly, twice a week the master held a dancing class attended also by maidens of the neighbourhood's *dворянство*, "for acquirement of the minuet and the country dance." And even with these young ladies Ellert did not stand on excessive ceremony. Not only did he charge them 30 roubles each, but once when one of their number proved clumsy he, before all the company, rapped her knuckles against the back of a chair.

Only the superior *dворянство* educated its children at home, where at first the tutor usually was a German immigrant, but, after the reign of Elizabeth, a French *émigré*. And the French *gouverneur* in question imprinted a deeply cut mark upon the history of our pedagogy. Yet the initial, the Elizabethan, importation of these *gouverneurs* consisted of what I might call "artisan pedagogues only." So limited was their tutorial capacity that the *ukaz* which, on 12 January, 1755, instituted our University of Moscow complained bitterly of their ignorance, and said that Moscow's *pomiestchiki* were paying high fees to tutors most of whom not only could not impart "the sciences," but themselves did not know those "sciences" even in the "sciences'" first rudiments—that, indeed, *pomiestchiki* were taking no trouble to look for better men, but engaging fellows who previously had been lacqueys, or barbers, and the like, and that therefore it had become indispensable to replace these incompetent tutors with "worthy, learnedly-schooled men of our own nation." But, unfortunately, "men of our own nation" of the sort were still

few, exceedingly few: wherefore for long the *dvorianstvo* had to go on putting up with its French-imported *gouverneurs*. None the less, those *gouverneurs* did at least render the *dvorianstvo* familiar with the tongue of France, and so spread a leading means of culture amongst the class. And at last, at about the middle of the century, when this new tendency had been communicated to *dvorian* education throughout, and the ground well prepared, there sprang thence, glittering, two types in particular of the *dvorianstvo's* new social life. The two types in question were the *petit-maitre* and the *coquette*. As regards the former, he was a gentleman who had been brought up solely on the principles of *The Honourable Mirror of Youth*, a gentleman for whom anything Russian had no existence, or an existence only that it might serve as a butt: whilst for Russia's tongue he had a contempt equal to his contempt for Germany's. In fact, he wished to remain wholly ignorant of Russia. We see the type depicted in many an eighteenth-century play and satire, whilst, in particular, Sumarokov's comedy *The Monster* makes a *petit-maitre* exclaim on learning for the first time that the *Ulozhenie* stood in being: "The *Ulozhenie*? What strange beast is that? Of Russia's laws I desire to know nothing whatever. Oh, that I did not know even the Russian tongue! How vile a speech it is! Whence come I to have been born a Russian at all? To learn to dress myself, to put on my hat, to open my snuffbox for a pinch—that alone would take a century to acquire, and zealously I have studied it in my country's service." The *coquette* too, was sprung of fashion; she was one, indeed, who might almost have been called the *petit-maitre's* own sister but for the fact that the relations between the two sometimes came scarcely to partake of a brotherly-and-sisterly nature. The *coquette*, the modish lady, was at home everywhere save in her own house. And her catechism of life lay in dressing with taste, in leaving a room gracefully, in executing a bow with elegance, and in smiling with captivation. And she succeeded so well in all this that foreign observers were apt to declare that, except for the Frenchwoman born, no one knew as well as she did how to heighten her charms, and to embellish her deportment.

In the void of such a social *milieu* there was, of course, much of the tragi-comical; but gradually, owing to a growing taste for literature of a sort, that void began to undergo a filling-up process. The literature indicated represented, at first, no more than a means of

killing time, of giving tedious indolence employment; but, as, under such circumstances, always ends by being the case, it came, next, to constitute a definite mode, an actual *sine-qua-non*, a sheer indispensable of fashionable manners and good-breeding. And thenceforth people just read anything and everything, from Quintus Curtius's *History of Alexander of Macedon* to Stepan Yavorski's *Rock of the Faith*,<sup>1</sup> and Dimitri of Rostov's *Chetii Minei*,<sup>2</sup> and Le Sage's *Gil Blas*, and Sumarokov's ponderous tragedies. Next, the reading acquired a tendency more definite: it had been evoked in the first instance as a mere weapon against ennui, but now it turned the *dvorianstvo*'s tastes towards purely eclectic literature, and also towards ultra-sentimental verse. For this reason that kindly observer Bolotav names the beginning of the second half of the eighteenth century as definitely the period when "our present life of fashion acquired really a basis." It was the epoch of the appearance of Sumarokov's tragedies, Russia's initial productions of the kind, and the fashionable world flung itself upon those creations of the Russian Muse, and was not debarred even by their turgid versification from memorising their monologues and dialogues. Lastly, there succeeded to tragedies and comedies a whole series of Russian romantic novels which the smart world committed to memory to a similar extent, until practically they never were absent from the tongues of the day's ladies and gentlemen.

Thus did the foregoing features develop in the *dvorianstvo*'s new social life under the influences which I have mentioned. And observers of the period have described them for us. Lower down amongst the *dvorianin* community, however, there remained a stratum scarcely, if at all, touched by those influences. That stratum consisted of the rural *dvorianstvo* of the minor order, a stratum in which the old predilections still prevailed, and of which we have an excellent picture given us by one Major Danilov. Writing in the first half of the eighteenth century, Danilov relates how a relative of his, the widowed owner of a *pomiestie* of Tula, never let a day pass without, though ignorant of her letters, opening a book at random, and reciting the Acathistus to the Mother of God. Also, this lady was very fond of mutton stew. And so much was this the case that during its consumption she would have the maid by

<sup>1</sup> See vol. iv, p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 238.

whom the dish had been prepared set in front of her, and flogged as a proceeding not in any way designed to punish the wench for having done the cooking amiss, but to give the mistress a relish.

Such, then, the cultural subsoil upon which the fashionable world of the metropolis and the chief towns of *gubernii* became based—a world of the tongue of France and the frivolous novel, a world created of Elizabeth's day, a world composed of "modish dandies and elegant exquisites," a world peopled with persons who spoke a *jargon de salon*, and searched listlessly the pages of contemporary romances in order to cull thence phrases and ideas of the "unbuttoned" order. Even in the second half of Catherine's reign Ségur came upon society of the sort. And, observing it and its European gloss, he was none the less able to discern under that gloss survival of more than one custom and taste of an earlier age. Yet so successfully for fifty years past (he said) had St. Petersburg's upper circles been imitating the inhabitants of other countries that by now the Metropolis had quite made everything to do with subtle deportment and fashion's decrees its own, with the ladies of society taking a particularly prominent part in the work, so that it was altogether a common thing in the capital to meet with persons able to speak four or five languages, to play upon several musical instruments, and to display familiarity with all the most widely known novelists of England, France, and Italy. But an unfortunate result of these literary-æsthetic tastes was to cause the nerves of Russia's cultured world to become adversely affected. Never before had the educated Russian possessed a nervous system so weakened. The highest of dignitaries wept easily, and on any occasion, when strongly moved. Thus we see some of the Deputies to the Commission of 1767 shedding tears as they listened to the *Nakaz'* articles. And one Chernyshev wept during a banquet at Kostroma, for the mere reason that the Empress had been well received in the town. On that occasion, too, he dubbed Peter I "Russia's veritable god."

This, then, was the first, or Elizabethan, development stage of a new social life amongst the *dvorianstvo*. Behind it, in Russian manners and ideas, the stage left a sediment merely of fashionable correctitude, æsthetical addiction, and hyper-sensitive debility.

## CHAPTER XIII

The second stage in *dvorianin* social development—Persons and preparatory factors causing the “literature of enlightenment” to influence that development—The influx of the new ideas—Those ideas’ effect upon the *dvorianstvo*’s form of political thought—The relation of that form to the realities of Russian life—Some typical representatives of *dvorianin* society in Catherine’s time.

THE second stage in the development of the new *dvorianin* social life introduced therein yet another feature. For now there became added to embellishment of external existence embellishment of the inward. We may refer the stage’s preparatory process to the Elizabethan epoch. And that process lay, firstly, in acquisition of the French language, and, secondly, in a taste, thenceforth, for eclectic literature. In combination the two factors helped French literature especially to exert an influence. For that was just the time when Russia happened to make France her model in taste and deportment; whilst also it was just the time when France’s literature was acquiring a special tendency, and affecting all Europe. Of the middle of the eighteenth century, indeed, came the French “literature of enlightenment’s” crowning works, works influencing the European cultural world in general, and the Russian cultural world in particular. It was at the Russian court that the new ideas supremely found encouragement and assistance. Quite early in the process that court formed close, direct relations with France’s intellectual leaders: for instance, Voltaire, during Elizabeth’s reign, was elected an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences, and commissioned by the Government to serve as historian of Peter the Great (a result also contributed to by a correspondence which earlier had passed between Voltaire and Count I. I. Shuvalov, a man altogether devoted to the new French literature, and possessed of considerable weight in Elizabeth’s *milieu*). Catherine, too, worshipped that literature, and no sooner ascended the throne than she set about a further strengthening of the ties with France’s new literary



movement. Her impulse in this was probably due in part to the impulse generally prevalent; but also she must have been inspired to the step by her peculiar form of diplomatic considerations, seeing that at all times she set much store by what the Parisian literary world thought of her and her country, and strove to win its approval. Thus, during her well-known correspondence with Voltaire between 1768 and 1778 (the latter the year of the great poet's death) she showed herself lavish of compliments as for her benefit he sketched extensive plans of foreign policy, and, amongst other things, broached a scheme for total expulsion of the Turk from Europe, and rehabilitation of the land of Sophocles and Euripides. Also, on publication of the *Encyclopédie* Catherine asked d'Alembert, Diderot's colleague, to come and act as tutor to the Imperial Heir. And when he declined she reproached him bitterly. None the less she did not leave d'Alembert's coadjutor forgotten for that reason. As soon as she heard that Diderot was becoming pressed for money she paid him 15,000 francs for his library, and then, that he might still continue in enjoyment of it during his lifetime, appointed him its librarian, and assigned him a salary of 1,000—a magnanimous, enlightened act which all Europe applauded.

A particularly important fact in the same connection is that the new French ideas came also to form part of the Russian pedagogic routine, and to enter into educational programmes both in the school and in the schoolroom. And they were especially widely disseminated by the purely class establishments of training and education. Thus we find even the Head of the Sukhoputni Cadet Corps beginning a course of lectures on natural history and physics with an address (in French, of course) on Europe's growing philosophic tendency in general, and the might of Reason's influence in particular. And to the same ideas schoolroom utterance was given in leading *dvorianin* mansions, in the mansions where still, during the century's second half, the French *gouverneur* was retaining the pedagogic monopoly, even as he had done during the first. But that *gouverneur* was a different *gouverneur* now; he was altogether unlike the Elizabethan *gouverneur*, for he held to conceptions and methods quite other than the latter's, and constituted practically a new, a second, importation. The reason of this was that by this time the *gouverneur's* services were resorted to by a more discriminating metropolitan society than of old, so that many such imported tutors were men at the very

head of their profession, men thoroughly acquainted with the latest utterances of France's literature, and, for the most part, men adhering to the French political movement's more extreme tendencies. Herein, too, the Russian court boldly supported Russian society with its example. For, in spite of d'Alembert's refusal to come and act as Imperial Tutor, Catherine, wishing to have at least her grandsons brought up according to the period's pedagogic rules, turned for the purpose next to a declared Swiss Republican named La Harpe. And as, of course, the court's courtiers imitated the court, French visitors to the capital at the end of Catherine's reign stood struck with surprise at the number of *gouverneurs* of democratic views serving in the great houses of Russia. The tutor, for instance, of Count Stroganov (who afterwards came to be one of Alexander I's first statesmen) was a Frenchman named Romme, a man subsequently prominent in the French National Convention, as a member of the "Mountain" Party. And Saltykov actually had his children taught by a brother of Marat's. True, the brother did not altogether share the well-known demagogue's principles, whilst after the execution of Louis XVI he requested that Catherine should let him change his name to the name of Boudry, his native town; but, for all that, he never made any secret of his Republican leanings when attending the Russian court with his pupils. Meanwhile the *dvorianstvo* paid handsome salaries for such tuition. An instance is that Bruckner received 35,000 roubles for fourteen years' service in the household of Prince Kurakin, and that, translated into modern currency, the sum works out at 10,000 roubles yearly. Naturally, exponents of the new ideas of such a standing caused those ideas to spread apace throughout the *dvorianstvo's* more prominent and cultured section. Another important point, too, is that contemporary French literature now became accessible even to the general reader—Catherine solemnly declaring it not only to be innocuous, but to be actively beneficial, and, through her *Nakaz*, seeking further to propagate the notions inculcated by France's new literary works, and to diffuse them amongst all her subjects. But Catherine moved faster in this than did certain other Governments of Europe: the French authorities rated even the subsequently modified form of her *Nakaz* to be so radical that they ended by forbidding it to be translated for issue on French territory. Nevertheless, when the same authorities interdicted French publication of the *Encyclopédie*

Catherine invited Diderot to bring out the work in Riga, even as she suggested St. Petersburg itself to Beaumarchais as a place in which to produce both Voltaire's proscribed works and his own play, *The Marriage of Figaro*. Protection of the sort in high places at least had for its effect an enlargement of the Russian cultured amateur's available stock of interesting, agreeable reading, since French works now could always enter Russia, be translated there, and undergo re-issue. Indeed, we could never estimate the total of such works which penetrated to the Russian book market at that period. And in contemporary writers we encounter abundant testimony to the enthusiasm with which Russia studied them. Thus, when the Princess Dashkov was as yet but a girl of fifteen or sixteen she sat up many a night to read Bailly and Boileau and Helvétius and Rousseau; until at last a nervous breakdown came upon her as the result. And we know that a Little Russian *dvorianin* named Vinskai who had served in the Guards during the seventies found both his military and his civilian acquaintances in the Metropolis to possess libraries so well stocked with reading matter that he was enabled thence to make himself thoroughly conversant with Rollin and Le Sage and Voltaire; as also that when, later, his irregular life caused him to be banished to the *gubernia* of Orenburg he none the less re-encountered Voltaire and Rousseau and Montesquieu in the library of the Governor of Ufa, and, this time, became so carried away by those authors that he started upon their translation into Russian, and, owing to the commendation lavished upon extracts from his translations which he sent to his friends, went on to increase the extracts' circulation until issue of the whole came to have suggested for its title *A Literary Novelty from Farthest Siberia*. The translator himself, too, says: "They now are known to very many persons, both in Kazan and in Simbirsk." And another result of the revolution in cultural taste was to give *dvorianin* youths' foreign tours a new aim. In the beginning these youths were sent abroad to study gunnery and navigation, and then in order that they might acquire elegant manners; but now they journeyed thither for the purposing of paying their respects to Europe's philosophers, and especially to Voltaire at Ferney, at the establishment which Voltaire came jestingly to call "The Rest House of all Europe." The majority of such travellers were young officers whom the revolution of July had enabled either to swim or to be borne to the

surface: and Catherine writes to the great French author on one occasion: "Some of the officers whom you have deigned to receive at Ferney have returned home in transports about you and your welcome. All our young people are longing for a sight of you, and to hear you discourse." Also, Russian youths went to stay at foreign universities, and in Parisian hotels: with the result that when the Emperor Paul recalled all Russian subjects residing abroad no fewer than thirty-six Russian students were found to be members of Leipzig University, and sixty-five to be members of the University of Jena. And the fashionable literary *salons* of Paris also made Russia's young *dvoriané* welcome, familiar guests.

Such, then, were the means which caused the new ideas of France and her philosophy to reach the upper Russian *dvorianstvo*, and to graft themselves there. Certain junior scions of that *dvorianstvo* attained, in fact, a perfect virtuosity as regards familiarity with French life and literary productions, despite that the familiarity was as useless as it was complete. Indeed, some of the smart St. Petersburgan youth knew Paris as well as the oldest Parisian. Once a Parisian native who was talking to Russia's Count Buturlin about the city found himself much astonished at the Count's precise, detailed acquaintanceship with the city's streets, theatres, hotels, and memorials. And this astonishment became sheer stupefaction when also the Count informed him that never in his life had he, the Count, so much as set foot in the French capital—that what he knew about it he had learnt either in Basmarka Street or from books. For long, too, the literary worlds of Paris and St. Petersburg continued to rhapsodise over a certain poem entitled *Un Message à Ninon* which, written anonymously and in French, was of a quality so excellent as to cause it to be attributed to Voltaire's pen, when all the time the author of it had been the Russian Count A. P. Shuvalov, a son of Elizabeth's well-known statesman. In short, many French observers who had knowledge of the "great world" of the northern capital deemed that capital's gilded youth to surpass, despite its, for the most part, home upbringing, even students educated in universities of Germany, and, in fact, to be the most polished and philosophical in all Europe.

In the influence of France's "ideas of enlightenment" upon the community of Russia we see the final phase of the process of development of the *dvorianstvo's* intellectual and moral life. The significance of the influence in question is appraisable by the significance of the

French "literature of enlightenment" itself. The "literature of enlightenment" constituted, as we know, "Reason's" first wild, hectic outburst against the system of custom and tradition upon which the political order and the moral outlook of France had hitherto rested. Of that political order the roots lay in Feudalism; and of that moral outlook the basis was Catholicism. And therefore the "literature of enlightenment's" movement against both had about it a good deal of a local character; and this local character, added to the movement's aims and origin, served to render the affair a thing altogether alien to the interests of a European East where the Feudal order and the Catholic outlook did not exist. At the same time, that literature accompanied its blows at the still active, and still powerful, remnants of Feudal and Catholic antiquity with a flood of general ideas and formulæ: and whilst in their own country, in their country of origin, these general ideas and formulæ possessed a quite well understood, and a merely conditional, significance (for no Frenchman for a single moment forgot the real, the practical, meaning of such terms as "Liberty," "Equality," and other like abstractions which he aimed at the world's existent human relations, but behind which there lurked the very actual, and, in some cases, the altogether debased, interests of France's more oppressed classes), the educated section of the *dvorianstvo* of Russia stood naturally remote from those interests, whilst Russia's need remained, not destruction, but construction, and, therefore, removal from her life of the abuses of yesterday which had crept therein, and still were continuing to emanate more and more from the class taking the lead in a precipitate gravitation towards French Liberalism and its contemporary productions. Such a position of affairs merely enabled the intellects of Russia's *dvorianstvo* to adopt, of the contents of the "literature of enlightenment," only its general formulæ and abstract terms, and then to interpret them solely in connection with Russia's local actuality and interests, and so to convert those conditional, general formulæ and abstract terms, divorced from their native soil, into non-conditional political and moral dogmas which the *dvorianstvo* learnt without reflection, and thereby had its intellects, when full-fed with them, alienated still further from everyday life around, a life possessed of nothing whatsoever in common with the dogmas concerned. Consequently the influx of new foreign ideas brought upon Russia two direly grave results. Those results consisted of, in the

first place, a decline of Russian willingness to think, and, in the second place, a loss of the power to apprehend true Russian actuality. More than all things else were these two features characteristic of the educated society, and of the literature, of Catherine's day. In no other period of our history do we see our literature treat so extensively of subjects abstract and elevated. And in no other period of our history do we see our literature so remarkable for absolute paucity of content. For that literature now became fairly flooded with general formulæ, with resounding phrases, with all-comprehensive, abstract theories. And the reason was that such things saved Russian society the trouble of having to reflect, even as the unpaid labour of its serfs saved it the trouble of having to work. Whence our literature of the day assumed two tendencies. On the one hand, it sought the idyllic. On the other hand, it sought the satirical. Various it gushed over systems and notions of the age and belaboured, dubbed "monstrous phenomena," those same systems and notions. In both cases it ranted. And in neither case it thought.

These failings found expression even in Russia's then best literary representatives, one of the wisest and most gifted (as well as the most successful) of whom was von Wizin. Yet even in von Wizin's plays (rather, in his treatises on virtue) we see Pravdius and Starodums as unreal, as abstract, as much figures taken from goodness only knows what soil, as much lifeless caricatures as his characters in *The Minor* and *The Brigadier*. His plays, indeed, were less types of existence than series of anecdotes.

Such the new French influence's immediate results. It was an influence which left upon Russian society a sediment of politico-moral Liberalism insufficiently thought out, and not really adaptable to any soil. And at times it found expression in forms sheerly childish. Thus, in a biography which the French Academician de Faillu wrote of Madame Svietchina, a Russian lady once well known in the literary world of Paris, the author relates the following. Madame Svietchina had for father a principal member of Catherine's private secretarial staff: wherefore he had rooms in the Palace itself. And one evening in the summer of 1789 he, on retiring to his rooms, was surprised to find preparations for illuminations there, and this led him to ask his seven-year-old daughter (the Madame Svietchina of later days) what the matter was.

"Oh, papa!" she cried, "Surely we must celebrate the fall of the Bastille, and the release of the poor French prisoners?" At least this enables us to understand what then formed the chief subject of conversation amongst the child's elders. Liberalism of the sort neither bound to anything nor taught anything. Always there lurked behind the new words, behind the new tastes and ideas, the old hardness and crudity of civic and moral consciousness. That hardness, at times, took forms repellent outright. Thus, although the Princess Dashkov, in her youth, leant strongly towards the literature of France, and came to be a shining light as President of the Academy of Sciences, she, in her old age, grew insensible enough to let all her affections go upon rats which she succeeded in taming in her mansion in Moscow. Seldom or never then did she receive guests. And to the fortunes of her children she remained indifferent. And between her and her servants quarrels reigned constantly. Yet should one of her rats happen to meet with an accident, she at once became touched to the very depths of her soul. Truly, none but an Elizabethan Russian could start off with Voltaire, and end with rat-taming! Again, there lived, at one time, in the *gubernia* of Penza a wealthy *pomiestchik* named Struiski who formerly had served on the staff of the Governor of Vladimir, and then, retiring, settled on his estate, and surrounded himself with a luxurious setting. And amongst his other accomplishments he was a *littérateur-versifier*, and, as such, had his verses printed on a private press which was one of the best of its time, and cost large sums from Struiski's income to instal, and read them aloud (they were imitations of Voltaire and other French poets) to acquaintances, and meanwhile, quite unconsciously, fell to pinching his nearest auditor until the latter's flesh was black and blue. To this day his compositions constitute a bibliographical rarity; but otherwise their only distinction is that their mediocrity surpasses the mediocrity even of Trediakovski's works. Also, Struiski was an almost fanatically enthusiastic jurist, and, in judging his *krestiané*, did so in strict accordance with the jurisprudential rules of Europe—both read the act of indictment, and delivered the speech for the defence. But the unfortunate point is that this highly civilised jurisprudential routine was accompanied with a purely Russian, barbaric method of interrogation. That is to say, there went with it torture. And in his cellars, to that end, Struiski kept a regular arsenal stocked. Wherefore he

was a true son of Catherine's age. Nor did he, for that matter, survive that age. No sooner did the news of his Empress's demise reach him than so also did a stroke. Losing the use of his tongue, he soon was, like Catherine, passed away.

So never in Russia has there reigned such cultured savagery as Russia witnessed during the eighteenth century's second half. In the *dvorianstvo's* indifference to surrounding life, and in the *dvorianstvo's* loss of all appreciation of the actualities of its native land, we see the ultimate (we have already studied the immediate) results of the foregoing intellectual-moral movement amongst the class. But here and there, in individuals, the instinct towards indifference developed to the point that the prevalent contempt for all things native, the prevalent cosmopolitan urge, brought, at last, disillusionment in its train. One of the victims to the process was a certain *pomiestchik* of Yaroslavl named Opotchinin, a man who, though no more of a freethinker than others of his class, was more sincere and open than usual. Hence, when, in 1793, he found that his ideals had brought him into absolute opposition to Russian life as it really was, he put an end to himself, but, before doing so, framed a testament beginning: "What now is constraining me to decide my own fate is abhorrence of our present Russian existence." Then the testament enjoined manumission of two named families amongst his household serfs, with division all round of the estate's existing produce, and added: "But oh, my books, my beloved books! Verily I know not unto whom to bequeath them, seeing that unto no man in this land could they, I feel assured, be useful now. So humbly I beg that my heirs will commit them, one and all, to the flames. They have been my chief treasures throughout. Only they have sustained me during my existence. If I had not possessed them, all my life would have been passed in sorrow, and contemptuously I should long ago have taken my departure." His last act during his few remaining moments of consciousness was to begin translating Voltaire's well-known poem, "O God, the God who art unknown to us!"



## CHAPTER XIV

The significance of the historical moment of Catherine's accession—The order of State when Peter ended his reign—The problems confronting Catherine's Government—Release of the classes from State obligations, and emancipation of the *krestianstvo*—The bent which Catherine's doings gave to Russian life, and the contradictions which resulted thence.

Now let us collate our data of Catherine's reign, and use them to appraise the reign's importance. But first we must recapitulate certain factors already studied, and add certain further considerations.

Catherine ascended the throne at a moment not merely rare, but unique, in our history. The moment had for its direct origin the reforms of Peter I, owing to the manner in which, during the seventeenth century, he decided the essentially economic question of reorganisation of the people's labour, and the therewith inseparably connected State economy. The question of reorganisation of the people's labour lay in raising that labour's capacity to the level of the economic needs of the State, but Peter so decided the question as to evoke a wholly different question, and to leave it undecided. The second question related to the State's rights. Continuously throughout his reforming activity rights remained his weak point—in this regard he only completed the edifice of State which ancient Moscow had founded upon class *tiaglo*. Of the significance of this latter term we shall be reminded by recalling what I have said earlier as to the significance of Peter's work in general: we shall then remember the term *tiaglo*, in this connection, to have connoted a system whereby given obligations of State were apportioned to the several State classes, in order that the State might meet its need both for agents of administration and for resources of finance.

That order of State, as existent towards the close of Peter's reign, may be outlined as follows. What then ruled the course of State life was the position occupied by the two chief classes of State—by the landowning class, and by the class of landworkers. None of

the other classes in the community exercised any influence to speak of. And those two chief classes of State's position was ruled, again, by the fact that each of them had to bear for the State's benefit not only the State obligations falling upon the population in general, but also certain burdens in addition. Thus, the *dvorianin* landowner who was bound to permanent service in a Government Department as a *chinovnik* had also to act permanently as the Government's agent of police and finance in the serf village on his estate, and to undertake, and to fulfil, certain purely technical functions necessary to the Central Administration. And the *krestianin*, the landworker, for his part, had not only permanently to work, and to pay taxes upon, either State or private land, but, if he was one bound to the latter sort, to let the landowner have a portion of his labour. The unfortunate point is that this system of allotment of obligations according to classes never, in Peter's time, attained clear, fixed, legal warranty. Until then the absence of such warranty was met by resort to hard-and-fast custom, but, owing to Peter's activity, this custom often fluctuated during his day, whilst he did nothing to fill up the existing gaps in the law, but added to them other gaps yet. The worst such gap had to do, with the order of Imperial succession. Owing to Peter's untoward relations with his son, the throne, contrary to custom, became left without an heir: and then the well-known Law of 1721 finally shattered the heretofore order of succession, by entrusting the next heir's appointment always to the reigning holder of the Supreme Power—to, in other words, that holder's purely personal discretion, and to the sheer mercy of chance. Such the fundamental error which robbed what Peter accomplished in reform of its best fruits, of its greatest historical value. Everything in the State now became a question mark; everything now fell under the sway of individual freewill and fortuitous accident; persons and accident—more precisely, accidental persons—now ruled autocratically. And, of course, interplay of accident and freewill of this kind ended by initiating in the Petrine-completed structure of State a process of gradual disruption, and enabled one class more than all others, the class which had at its disposal both the largest stock of material resources, and the best stock of political training, and the right to walk armed, to enter upon independent management of the throne's fortunes, upon conversion of itself from an administrative instrument into an administrative

class, upon self-riddance of State obligations, and upon assumption of new privileges coupled with retention of the old.

Such the historical moment through which the Russian community was passing at the time of Catherine's accession. I have alluded to the moment as one not merely rare, but unique, in our history, for the reason that it was then that, for the first time, Russia's State life left its accustomed rut, and that, for the first time, Russia's order of State shifted from its agelong basis. The basis of the old order had been compulsory, semi-bonded labour of all classes for the State's benefit. Now one class in particular, on gaining release from State obligations, took to living for its own benefit alone, and to acting on behalf of certain corporate, or personal, interests which formerly had constituted part of the country's interests at large. Whence it is not difficult to imagine the problems arising, and calling for decision, as the community continued upon its historical way. The old State order might have been harsh, but at least it had been equitable. Hence one of the community's problems now was to remove that harshness, and yet to retain that equity. That is to say, release of one class in particular from obligations of State called for release of the other classes as well, save that the other classes' relief needed to be carried out on lines differing from those on which the *dvorianstvo* had won to freedom. As a matter of fact, the *dvorianstvo* not only went on to legislative extension of its freedom until the Law of 18 February, 1762, set upon it the crown, but previously prepared the way with revolution, with less than legal action (for assuredly the class would never have gained such swift and easy emancipation without the *révolutions de palais* in which it had actively participated), whilst similarly, though another class too, the bonded *krestiané*, thought to acquire freedom through a revolutionary methods (undoubtedly that was the idea underlying the peasant risings of Catherine's early days, the peasant risings which culminated in the Pugachev affair), that class's emancipation called, in the interests of the public good, and of public orderliness, to be accomplished through purely legal, rather than through violent, means, to the end that, all round, the existing system of chance and freewill should be succeeded by a system purely legal and just. Herein lay the problem of State equity involved in the second question to which Peter's reforms gave rise. The question's proper solution lay in legal, equitable definition of the relations existing between the *dvorianstvo* and the

bonded *krestianstvo*. So how was that definition to be effected? The history of Russia's State equity stood prompting the answer with all the insistency of a logical syllogism or a mathematical formula. In the *pomiestchik's* authority over his bonded *krestiané* there were contained two elements: the element of his commission as his *krestiané's* police-financial-administrative overseer, and the element of his private, civil right of ownership of the land of which those *krestiané* had the use. The former element ought, as bound up with the *dvorianin's* compulsory service of State, to have lapsed when that service was done away with. And, seeing that the *pomiestchik's* right of ownership of the land also was bound up with compulsory State service, in that the *dvorianin* landownership of the eighteenth century was a landownership developed straight from the old tenures of *pomiestie* and *otchina*, the latter of which tenures had always been conditioned by service, and the former of which tenures had always been conditioned by, and acquired through, service until the Law of 1714 had fused both into a single juridical form, and the Law of 1731 had recognised both to be full and free ownership save as continuing to be conditioned by service (service of the sort not then having yet come to an end), and, even on that service's termination, *dvorianin* landownership had not become wholly pure and unconditional, but still remained conditioned and restricted by the *krestianin's* right of usage, by a right legally based upon a law of *krestianin* soil-attachment which was not abolished by the *Ulozhenie*, but merely ill-formulated therein, and still more ill-interpreted by administrative practice thenceforth, so that the *dvorianin* could take it upon himself to sell *krestiané* without land to a colleague, and to give individual *krestiané* without land their freedom (though, also, he could not evict his *krestiané* from his estate wholesale—that went without saying, despite that no expression of it existed in law, for the reason that during the eighteenth century, at the time when the *krestianin* still was standing bound to his master's person, and still was paying the State's taxes, the question never arose)—seeing that all this was so, and that the *dvorianin's* right of ownership of the land was, like the other right, bound up with compulsory State service, continuance of that right of ownership after that service's abolition ought to have involved continuance also of the *krestianin's* right of usage of the land: the right of usage, for its part, stood bound up with the bonded condition's liability to pay the State's taxes, and

ought not to have begun to cease in proportion as practice weakened the *krestianin's* attachment to the soil, and the history of Russian State equity contained nothing to justify the idea of emancipating the *krestianin* without land which certain liberal intellects envisaged in Catherine's early days. Of course, the State may not then have possessed either the means or the machinery for realising the scheme dreamed of by that seventeenth-century Liberal, Prince V. V. Golitzin, a scheme for emancipating the *krestianin* without land by buying out the whole of the country's *pomiestchiki*; but, however that may be, the right course would have been at least to have defined the *krestianin's* agrarian-industrial relation to the *pomiestchik* legally, clearly, and precisely, and at the same time to have abolished the *pomiestchik's* estate-administrative and police-financial functions, and completely to have re-established the *krestianin's* soil-attachment. Already, in Peter's day, Pososhkov had thought of this solution. And it is said that it was thought of by Peter himself. And in any case it was pondered by some of Catherine's abler, more practical assistants. Certainly, if, at that time, legislation had succeeded in making the bonded *krestianin* independent, in the agrarian regard, of the *pomiestchik*, and done so without either a personal bond or a bond of property, we can quite well imagine the form which, with Russia's State thus based upon general legal equality, Russia's life would then have gone on to assume. For, under those circumstances, the *dvorianstvo*, whilst utilising its *krestiané's* labour in proportion to the amount of landed capital ceded to those *krestiané* by the class, would also have had no option but to put forth efforts on its own account before it could set its economic circumstances in order, and therefore would have been drawn into the round of rural-industrial pursuits, and become director of the nation's industry at large. And, after so becoming, the class would, through the fact that it possessed the greatest amount of political training, have gone on to guide everywhere the trend of local life, and to take so active a share in local administration that, together, these serious agrarian-industrial and administrative responsibilities would have evoked a demand for an education of the class that should be commensurate with its everyday needs, and led the class to mark out for itself a programme of sound and practical mental culture. And, lastly, that activity and that culture would have formed a basis for composition of a well-regulated order of social life all round. Invariably an order of

social life has its character determined by the nature of its combination of constituent elements. Those elements are social relations, interests, morals, and ideas. Hence in Russia of the day a law of equal justice for all would have established relations consonant with the historical bent of Russia's life, yet have purged that life of accident and freewill. And such relations would have caused the several interests of the classes to undergo mutual reconciliation, and this unification of interests would have become a basis for equal class participation in popular labour, and such participation would have evolved sound morals, and those morals would automatically have given birth to ideas naturally cognate to the life with which practice might connect them—or, in other words, labour, freed, would have bred, as always, independence of thought.

Nevertheless, what, as a matter of fact, was the trend communicated to Russian life by Catherine's legislation? The task confronting her was to rid the State's structure of the layer of oppression with which it stood coated, and yet to preserve the structure's equitable bases. Well, her Accessional Manifesto did, without doubt, adumbrate vaguely such a policy—it did promise that Russia's State order should come to be based upon legality: but, for the very reason that she had ascended the throne through revolutionary means, through a sheer seizure of authority, her interests stood permanently bound up with those of the class in particular already mentioned. The effect of her thus having to show partiality to the politically active, and the politically experienced, social section in question was to pervert that social section, and to make it lose its political traditions.

Through possession of unpaid labour the *dvorianstvo* never became the motive lever of the nation's industry. And through the position guaranteed to the class by the Government there stood destroyed any need for the class to gain, through useful agrarian authority, the submission and the respect of the local populations. All this opened up to the class an abundant leisure which, in turn, caused independence of thought to decline in the class, even as the absence of equal legality for all caused social relations to become warped in favour of the strongest social section alone, and the one-sided tendency in question to disintegrate social interests by setting some in opposition to others, and rendering amicable class activity in common impossible. Next, that activity's absence gave rise to *dvorianin* frivolity, and to a weakening of *dvorianin* morals: and,

with the class become thus, the *dvorianstvo* took to attempting to fill the intellectual void with alien, ready-made ideas; whilst at the same time the class's ability to live upon others' toil destroyed in the class the habit of mental exercise. Such is history's logic in all such cases: and in the fact there stands explained the formula to which I resorted for characterisation of Catherine's reign when beginning the study of her times, when I remarked that the two essential features of those times were an irregular, one-sided development of certain native factors, and an uncalled-for propagation of certain alien ideas to which those native factors stood opposed. The net result of such a trend in Catherine's policy was to evolve two special contradictions, as that policy's eventual consequences. The one contradiction was that at the very moment when Catherine's Empire gained external political unity, and when the south-western branch of the Russian nation attained release from a foreign yoke, the bulk of the root stock of that nation underwent subjection to internal servitude. And the second contradiction lay in the fact that Catherine's policy entrusted further guidance of the Russian community along the road of development to the very class which stood least willing for, and least capable of, the task: that is to say, her policy entrusted it to the cultured *dvorianstvo*.

The more clearly to understand that *dvorianstvo's* then available stock of political means and moral forces, we had better recall once more the chief stages of the *dvorianstvo's* evolution during the eighteenth century. During that century the class's moral and political progress proceeded closely in relation to the class's record as regards service of State. Under Peter there was demanded for such service a military-artisan course of training which, in many cases, never was put to any practical use. And under Peter's successors service of State called, rather, for a course in polite manners, since that, if not absolutely necessary for service, was at least an aid towards service advancement. The inward connection between the study of navigation to which Peter's Guardsman was set and the study of the elegancies which Elizabeth's *petit-maitre* traversed is seen in the two studies' equal futility. In Catherine's time neither the one study nor the other was called for, since then service too ceased to be called for. Yet still the class retained, if not a realisation of the necessity of education, at least a measure of educational accustomedness, or a measure of recollection of education as an indispensable

acquisition. And, possessed of this recollection, the class proceeded to assume the position which jointly the Law of 1762, Catherine's *gubernia* institutions, and serf proprietorship had created for it. Yet even participation in local administration failed to stir the *dvorianstvo* to acquire serious administrative training: whilst, with that, the ownership of serfs stripped the class of all incentive to accumulate stocks of politico-economic and agricultural knowledge. And, seeing that, also, this position conferred upon many of the class a leisure time needing somehow to be filled, the *dvorianstvo's* sense of pride, nourished by compulsory service; its habituation to service during the years of youthfulness only, and to retirement as soon as the years of maturity approached; and its ideas and habits, come of a short-lived service career, all helped to change the class's interests and tastes, and so to complicate *dvorianin* education that to the demand for *galanterie de salon* Catherine's times added a demand for literary polish, and therefore an addiction to the pursuit of reading. That reading was not, at first, accompanied with any idea of making practical use of what was read; but later the pursuit became more serious, and directed itself at least towards refreshing intellects jaded with ennui, and towards stimulating thought become drowsy with desire, through new and daring ideas.

So the sequence of things was that Peter's artillerist-navigator became Elizabeth's *petit-maitre*, and Elizabeth's *petit-maitre* gave birth to Catherine's man of letters, and Catherine's man of letters became, towards the close of the century, the philosopher-Freemason-Voltairian. The latter type especially represented the social section which came to be entrusted with the Russian people's further guidance along the road of progress. Let us, therefore, note the principal features of the type. Before the philosopher-Freemason-Voltairian attained his social position, a position based upon injustice, and rounded off with lack of serious occupation, he passed from the hands, probably, of a village deacon into those of the French *gouverneur*, and then, having finished his education in the theatres of Italy and the restaurants of France, applied his acquired knowledge in St. Petersburg drawing-rooms, and at last, with some book of Voltaire's in hand, ended his days in his Muscovite, or his manorial, study. Truly he presented a strange phenomenon, seeing that his every manner, his every habit, his every taste, his every sympathy, his every faculty, even to his speech, was a thing alien, imported. At



home, devoid of any living, organic ties with his surroundings, he saw himself left with absolutely nothing to do in the world. And though, as he was a stranger amongst his own, he strove to become his own amongst strangers, European society always looked upon him as an immigrant, as a Tartar in disguise, even as his people in Russia looked upon him as a Frenchman born upon Russian territory. So much of the tragical was there in this position of a nondescript, of an historical superfluity, that possibly we might have sympathised with the occupant of the position if the position had in any way mortified the occupant himself; but the Catherinian freethinker knew not, as yet, low spirits: it was only in the time of Alexander I that he began to experience depression, and in the time of Nicholas I that he flagged, and in that of Alexander II that, worn out with excitement over the Emancipation, he finally succumbed. No, in Catherine's day he only just—idled. But he idled, at that, quite briskly and cheerfully, for still he was celebrating his release from departmental or military service, for all that his hatred of the special *dvorianin* uniform then conferred upon him could have been equalled only by the hatred of a youngster just set free of duty in a cadet corps. Nor had any of the more serious cares of life yet arisen to confront him. Nor had he yet come really to examine his circumstances. Rather, he was still living intoxicated with his and liberty's honeymoon. True, the very ideas which he held so strongly, and the very books which he read with such enthusiasm, might have been expected to make him feel at odds with his surroundings, and a contradiction in himself; but no—the Catherinian freethinker still was in no way inclined to find fault, in no way disposed to recognise the contradiction involved, since all his head was full to the brim of ideas and literary works which seemed to brighten his brain, and to titillate pleasantly his nerves. Indeed, never at any other period has fine diction so easily moved the cultured Russian to tears. Yet those tears and ecstasies represented only a pathological impulse, only a nervous spasm. Never did they find reflection in an exercise of will; never did they translate ideas into action; never did they make of words facts. Calmly the Catherinian freethinker would give his women serfs readings from a work on human rights, and then repair to his stable premises, and there pass judgment upon his peccant *krestiané*. For him theories and phrases served as sentiments. They exercised no effect upon the social order. All that they

did was, without bettering morals and social relations, to mitigate perception. In this divorce between thought and act we see the fundamental characteristic of the educated Russian of Catherine's day. Yet let us not run away with the notion that that Russian's generation proved fruitless completely, or that his form of mental process represented as much an historical futility as did conferment upon him of a uniform at the very moment of his service's cessation. True, he, as a psychological curiosity, still awaits the hand of an artist; but yet he has a place in our history, for he served to show forth a special intellectual influence, and to act as a transitional point between one set of ideas and aspirations and another. Of course, the Catherinian freethinker's generation made no use of its ideas; but at least it conserved those ideas, and therewith educated the next generation, a generation which came to take a more serious view of its problems.

These, then, were the character and the results of the reign of Catherine II.

## CHAPTER XV

The chief factors of the period ensuing—Reign of the Emperor Paul—His upbringing and character—His law to regulate the Imperial succession—His administrative policy—The foreign policy of Russia during the nineteenth century.

NEXT let us study the phenomena of Russia's history between the death of Catherine II and the accession of Alexander II. This period forms the last to be included in our Course, and it is distinguished by certain special features. For throughout the period in question we shall see Russia's State and social life retain its basic factors unchanged, but those factors have come into view beside them certain factors which, if not new in themselves, represent new aspirations; whilst, in addition, we shall witness certain attempts to found altogether a new State and a new social order, and to do so, with regard to aspirations and attempts alike, both in the foreign policy of Russia and in her internal life of State. Then, the process completed, or nearly completed, the Russian Empire will be seen set within its natural geographical and ethnographical boundaries. And then, with those boundaries (Russia's hereditary, age-long goal in foreign policy) attained, her policy in external affairs will assume a direction entirely new. That policy, having accomplished, or nearly accomplished, national political unification, will advance to political emancipation of the group of peoples religiously and racially (rather, religiously-racially) akin to the main national stock—an aspiration already manifested in the course of Catherine's reign, but prematurely, abortively only. And as regards Russia's domestic policy, we shall see brought to completion, or nearly to completion, certain old or obsolete social and political factors, and, conceived, new aspirations towards initiation of a fresh State order. And though, at the same time, we shall not see the last-mentioned task consummated—indeed, we shall scarcely even see it begun upon—we shall be able to mark its chief features, and to note the close connection between it and the State edifice which ancient Muscovite Rus erected, and between it and the changes introduced into that edifice during the eighteenth century.

As we know, the State system of ancient Muscovite Rus rested upon appointment of State obligations to the three chief social classes of State—to the State service class, to the commercial-industrial class, and to the class of landworkers. And though, during the seventeenth century, the Legislatures of the day introduced much further differentiation amongst those classes, they still remained in a measure possessed of their power of State activity in common, and even at the middle of the century sent elected representatives to the capital, for session in *Zemskie Sobori*, whilst in the provinces they met periodically for election of *gabnie starosti*, and so forth, as the country's chief local preservers of law and order. During the century's second half, however, and especially during the reign of Peter, this joint State activity began more and more to decline, and the interests of the three chief classes more and more to diverge: until at last, just before Catherine introduced her *gubernia* institutions, we can scarcely trace such activity at all—for we cannot reckon the Catherinian participation of class assessors in "conscience" courts, courts of *uezdi*, and boards of public control as anything but the faintest of substitutes for the classes' earlier work of State in common. Meanwhile the course of that work's decline was accompanied with the fact that one special class assumed more and more the headship of the community, and not only served as the Central Administration's organ in the provinces, but itself created Central Administrations. Such, up to the close of the eighteenth century, was the course of Russia's State and social life.

Closely connected with that course were new tendencies which first came into actual evidence at the beginning of the century ensuing. Let us note two of them in particular. Those two tendencies were (1) that, whilst the Legislature gradually weakened and broke up the *dvorianstvo's* administrative status, it entered upon a re-approximation of classes through legal equalisation, through limitation of certain privileges, and through definition of, and extension of, certain rights; and (2) that this re-approximation of classes enabled the Central Administration to make preparation for gradual resumption of all-class joint State activity. The two factors are factors carefully to be noted in our survey of historical phenomena after the close of the eighteenth century.

During the epoch in question we see the character of Russia's life of State become demarcated very clearly indeed. In proportion as

the administrative status of the *dvorianstvo* declined, there came administratively to predominate a bureaucracy, as the direct, independent organ of the Supreme Power. And therefore the period 1796-1855 may well be termed our supremely bureaucratic period. We will sketch the sequence of events during its course.

In studying those events, events close to our own day, and greatly affecting us both now and in the past, we readily note three stages, or "steps," or "approaches," towards resolving the period's problems of domestic policy. The phenomena created by each phrase followed an identical or a similar sequence. That sequence was that if voices, loud or faint, protested against established relations during a given reign, the Government of the next one made the community's desire its own, and either diffidently or firmly embarked upon reconstruction of the system in being, but was led by confrontation with one or another external or internal obstacle to halt half-way in its labours, and to let the movement pass into the depths of the community and find expression there in forms which varied both according to circumstances and according to the nature of the social *milieu* receiving the movement from higher up. And so, in like sequence, a fresh succession of phenomena. During Catherine's reign, for example, protests were raised against the relations existing between the *dvorianstvo* and the bonded *krestianstvo*: wherefore the Governments of Paul and Alexander sought, in each case, to meet those protests, and reconstruct the existing order either piecemeal or throughout, and then, owing partly to the personal qualities of the two Sovereigns, and partly to factors external of nature, and, above all, to the wars begun upon at the end of the eighteenth century, had prematurely to pause, and let the abandoned movement be taken up by a social section which brought about the catastrophe of December 1825. In the same way did Nicholas's Government try, according to its lights, to set on foot, and resolve, the question. And during the forties of the century that Government's non-success gave rise to yet another great social movement against the established order, and during the next reign, the reign of Alexander II, the open or covert demands of the movement were not only taken in hand, but had some of their number decided with a measure of boldness and success. Here, however, we begin to impinge upon a period extraneous to our proposed limits of study.

This, then, was the course of events, with its phenomena, within our period proper. As regards the questions of the period, we see a first approach made towards their broaching and resolving during the reign of Paul. The State and social system which the eighteenth century had established had for its bases an unjust, oppressive predominance of one class over the rest: but Paul, as the first what I might call "*anti-dvorianstvo*" Tsar of the period, and one who always, by instinct, made orderliness, discipline, and equality his policy's guiding motives, took for his foremost task warfare against class privilege. He expressed that task's principle very clearly in a conversation held with the Swedish Representative Steding, when, on (so it is said) Steding happening to refer to Russia's nobles as "great ones," Paul exclaimed: "Only he is great in Russia to whom I be speaking, and so long as I be speaking." The predominance of the *dvorianstvo* owed both its creation and its maintenance to a lack of fundamental laws, and, above all, of a law to regulate the Imperial succession—a lack always facilitating *révolutions de palais*, and always helping the *dvorianstvo* to retain its State position. Hence Paul made his first step a tackling of the problem of elaborating such laws. And by *ukaz* of 5 April, 1797, a new order of Imperial succession became duly established. Then, for the reason that the class self-government created by Catherine's *gubernia* institutions and *dvorianin* and urban charters had given the *dvorianin* and urban corporations, especially the former, a privileged status over the rest of the community, Paul abolished both *dvorianin* and urban self-government by altering the two charters concerned in some of their essential portions, and by instituting a Crown *chinovnichestvo*, in order to squeeze the *dvorianstvo* out of *gubernia* administration, and by depriving the *dvorianstvo* and the upper commercial stratum (which consisted of leading burghers of the towns, and of merchant members of the first and second guilds) of such rights as immunity from corporal punishment when a criminal offence had been committed. Also, for the reason that, as we know, the absence of legislative definition of the *pomiestchik's* relations with his *krestiané* had caused the authority of the former to increase to excess, Paul set about an attempt at such definition, and caused the *ukaz* of 5 April, 1797, likewise to fix a weekly norm of three days as a *barstchina* maximum.

The unfortunate point, though, was that Paul's efforts in these

directions invariably lacked both continuity and firmness. The cause was defects in his character which came partly of his form of education, and partly of the unnatural attitude maintained between him and his mother. His education under Panin constituted, at best, an irregular affair, whilst his strained relations with Catherine caused him early to be set apart from matters of State, and, during Catherine's lifetime, made to live shut up at Gatchina—his only companions there a miniature Guards Brigade, and his only diversions interests of a petty order. Gradually the unobtrusive, yet always humiliating, surveillance kept upon him joined with his mother's distrustfulness, with the insolence of time-servers, and with exclusion from all State business to develop in the young man irritableness, to render him ever ready to condemn his mother's policy, and to incline his vision to view things in their darkest colours. Nor can his irritableness have been diminished by long, impatient waiting, by long, never-satisfied hunger for action and power, by the idea that all the better years of his life might have to be spent before he could up and do, by the fear lest, when the moment should arrive, but little time might be left to him in which to repair the evils of his mother's reign. Thus at last he relapsed into a sort of moral fever, and, on ascending the throne, did not take with him thither a really thought-out plan of policy, nor yet a sufficiently practical knowledge of men and things, but, instead, a mere seething mass of bitterness and resentment. In short, his policy thenceforth came less of the fact that he realised the existing order to be inequitable and inadequate than of the fact that he still bore antipathy to his mother, and still cherished wrath against her assistants. Whence his every scheme of reform came to have underlying it a trend towards reaction, and the stamp of personal enmity to mark and warp even measures of his which otherwise might have proved useful. This tendency of Paul's policy as concerned his mother's is most clearly seen in his momentous law to regulate the Imperial succession. During his mother's later years there arose and ran a rumour that she intended eventually to exclude Paul from the throne, and set there in his place Alexander, her eldest grandson. And Paul may have apprehended this; and it may have been the fact of his doing so that so increased his mental instability. At all events there exists an item that when, in 1789, Ségur, the French Ambassador, was about to leave St. Petersburg for home, and went to Gatchina to

pay the Grand Duke a farewell visit, Paul, as usual, referred to the relations between himself and his mother, criticised her form of policy, and added: "Pray tell me why it is that Sovereigns in other European Monarchies can succeed one another, unhindered, on the throne, whereas with ourselves it is not so?" And when the Ambassador suggested the cause to be Russia's lack of an Imperial successional law in tail male, so that the reigning Sovereign had sole discretionary power of nominating the next heir, which was a system inevitably conducing to schemes of ambition, and to conspiracies and underhand dealings, the Grand Duke replied that, the Russian custom certainly being as Ségur had stated, any change in it might prove risky, and the more so as the Russian people always preferred a petticoat on the throne to a tunic. Upon this, nevertheless, Ségur suggested introduction of such a change on some more than ordinarily solemn occasion at the beginning of the next reign—say, on the Coronation day, a day when the whole people would be feeling disposed to complacency; and the Grand Duke commented: "True. I will think on this further." Of that further thinking there resulted the purely personally-motived Law of 5 April, 1797. And duly the day of Paul's crowning was selected for its publication.

Thenceforth Paul's policy became steadily directed towards obliterating the traces of Catherine's governance, irrespectively of whether her measures had been bad or good. For example, her assistants having been members of the more liberal *dvorianstvo*, of the section of the class which fed its leisure upon the French ideas, Paul for that very reason set about annulling all the *dvorianstvo's* privileges without exception, and banning every sort of liberal notion. And the effect of this participation of rancour and hysteria in the Emperor's policy caused the latter to become a policy pathological rather than political, and to comprise passing, impulsive moods rather than thought-out ideas and well-pondered aspirations, and to lead to the fact that the extensive reform programme with which he acceded gradually crumbled down to superficial, unimportant trifles, and that the struggle with systems became mere persecution of individuals, and that the hostility to class privilege became merged into suppression of elementary human rights, and that the notions of equality and orderliness yielded to fits alternately of cruelty and of kindness, yielded to the political "scenes" which mostly composed his reign. In fact, all the fluctuations and contradictions distinguishing



his policy came of the circumstance that the endeavour to neutralise the ill effects of the preceding reign caused to stand set at naught the few useful innovations which he himself introduced. Those innovations included an extension of the *gubernia* institutions of 1775 to the *gubernii* of East Zealand which had been wrested from Poland. To have the whole Empire covered with a single, uniform system of provincial administration was, of course, a policy well calculated to facilitate and accelerate the process of moral-political absorption of Russia's alien, outlying races; but in this regard too Paul let himself be guided by no political consideration whatsoever save hostility to the late-existing Government, and therefore coupled the step with abolition of Catherine's *gubernia* institutions from other provinces of the Empire which had belonged to Poland or to Sweden, and with re-establishment in those provinces of the special systems which had prevailed there previously.

Also, he was the first Russian Sovereign really to attempt introduction of legality into the arbitrary and chaotic system of landowner-*krestiané* relations. Yet, with that, he rivalled his mother in his multiplication of the population of enserfed, and distributed *krestiané* in reward for past and present services in numbers as great as she. Merely his accession cost the State 100,000 Treasury souls and nearly 1,000,000 Treasury *desiatini*. Also, a smart retort was sufficient to win from him a gift of the sort. Once, during an Imperial review of troops, an officer named Kannabich received an order, and was galloping off to fulfil it when the wind deprived him of his cap. "Kannabich, Kannabich!" the Emperor shouted. "Your cap is gone!" "Aye, your Majesty," was Kannabich's reply without drawing rein, "but my head is not." Whereupon the smiling, delighted Emperor issued the command, "Give him a thousand souls," and later, at the beginning of Alexander's reign, we hear of Kannabich again because of his almost unbelievably cruel treatment of his serfs. In general, Paul's attempts to introduce legality into relations in which freewill and accident were the sole operating agencies were so ill-conceived, and put forward so faultily, that there resulted less a weakening of the freewill than so great an increase of fear and confusion in every heart, so complete a subjection of the whole community to depression and weariness, as never had been witnessed the eighteenth century through. We see the atmosphere best illustrated in the fact that whenever an officer was about

to attend an Imperial review (a ceremony from which one might depart either straight to Siberia or promoted a step in rank) he would take with him to the review sufficient money to cover long-journey travelling expenses. And as for officers' wives, they stood so intimidated with the prevalent system of nocturnal arrests that, when retiring to rest, they would do so only if they had a hand of their husband clasped in one of theirs, that at least he might not be spirited away without their becoming aware of the fact.

On the other hand, Paul's successor carried out the new principles, both in his foreign policy and in his domestic, seriously, and with a measure of continuity. Here let us sketch Russia's foreign policy in general during the nineteenth century.

We have seen that during that century a new problem posed itself—the problem of summoning into political existence the Eastern European Orthodox-Slavonic nationalities. But the problem did not pose itself all at once, its adoption was gradual only, and meanwhile the foreign policy of Russia continued to work at its old task of expanding the Empire to the latter's natural territorial limits. For that matter, the national-religious problem was not even understood in Catherine's reign: that is clear from the famous "Greek Project" which led Russia, in 1782, at the time when she was preparing for the second Turkish war, to agree with Austria that, the struggle over, the two would form Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia into an independent State entitled Dacia, and that Austria, besides, would take the Turkish provinces of Serbia and Bosnia, and also the mainland territories of the Venetian Republic, and give the Republic, in exchange, the Morea, Cyprus, and Crete. It is scarcely possible to imagine the welter of conflicting political combinations which would have resulted when Turkey's Slavonic provinces had been united to Austria, and Turkey's Greek Orthodox provinces to Venice. Indeed, if the scheme really had materialised, there would have been added to the blunder of the Polish Partitions a national-religious crime. In point of fact, the new national-religious problem was "stumbled upon" by Russia, encountered unexpectedly, and by the way; Russia had it imposed upon her extraneously, and as the result of conditions originating partly within the actual circle of Orthodox-Slavonic peoples, and partly elsewhere. Some of the Orthodox-Slavonic regions subject to Turkey had once been independent States themselves, and therefore still retained traditions of a political

past (Greece and the Danubian Principalities, Bulgaria and Serbia, were instances of this): and now the French Revolution and the French Empire's policy of conquest revived once more those political memories.

The French Revolution and Napoleon's conquests affected the different nationalities of Europe in different ways, owing to those nationalities' different political positions. We may divide them, therefore, into three categories. Some of them were political bodies enjoying external independence, but not internal liberty. Examples are Spain and Portugal. Others, though enjoying external independence, lacked internal liberty and political unity. Examples are Italy and Germany. And, lastly, others possessed neither external independence nor internal liberty. This category was composed solely of the Eastern European Orthodox-Slavonic races. The French Revolution and the Empire's policy of conquest aroused nationalities of the first category to aspire to internal liberty. The same factors aroused nationalities of the second category to aspire to internal liberty and national unity. And the same factors aroused the nationalities of the third category to aspire to national emancipation.

Gradually the Nationalist question, a phenomenon characteristic of the international life of all Europe of the nineteenth century, became Russia's ruling principle of foreign policy, the aim which she especially had in view when she waged the wars of Alexander's reign. Let us enumerate the treaties severally ending those wars, and the results of the treaties. After fighting Persia and Turkey, and concluding Persian treaties at Gulistan in 1813 and Tourkmantchai in 1828, and Turkish treaties at Bucharest in 1812 and Akkerman in 1826 and Adrianople in 1829 and Unkiar Skelessi in 1833 and San Stefano in 1878, Russia thereby got her southern frontiers pushed forward, for thereby she gained of Persia the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan, and she gained of Turkey the Provinces of Georgia, Imeritia, and Bessarabia, and most of Armenia, and so added fresh Orthodox-Slavonic units to the family of European nations—the treaties of Bucharest and Akkerman conferring independence upon the Danubian Principalities, and the treaties of Bucharest and Adrianople creating a new Principality of Serbia, and the Conference of London (between Russia, England, and France) creating a new Kingdom of Greece, and the treaty of San Stefano creating a new Principality of Bulgaria.

At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish motives from programme in Russia's foreign policy of the period. Russia's motives in that policy were bequeathed to her from an earlier policy which had indicated to her, as her object, expansion of the Empire territorially; and now the new programme included also the motive of summoning into political existence the Eastern European Orthodox-Slavonic nationalities. It was a duality of motive and of programme which brought about a duality of results. One set of results gave the Empire new frontiers: the other one created new political bodies in Europe, and thereby opened up a new stage of, if not a new principle in, Europe's international life, in that the nineteenth-century history of Europe saw international policy have everywhere established in it a tendency to form political bodies of extensive bulk through unification of scattered national fragments, until Europe contracted, crystallised, into a family of no more than a few large national States, with Russia, the summoner of the Eastern European Orthodox-Slavonic populations to political existence, constituting the counterpoise to the general process of national-political crystallisation.

We cannot yet foresee whether, after all, this was a new programme, or a new principle, or whether it was not, rather, the first stage of the same process as already is being accomplished in the West. It is not yet possible to determine whether the Eastern European Orthodox-Slavonic nationalities which Russia then summoned to political existence have begun a process merely of disintegrating Europe into a number of petty political communes, or whether those nationalities themselves are not yet destined to combine into a single great Orthodox-Slavonic Empire.

## CHAPTER XVI

Alexander I's upbringing and character—His early experiments in reform.

NEXT let us study Russia's internal policy from the time of the accession of Alexander I.

I have said that up to that time there developed and ruled in Russia's internal policy two factors in particular—the two factors concerned being legal equalisation of classes, and their re-citation to joint political activity. Now there became added to the two fundamental problems which those two factors involved certain problems either necessary to, or necessarily preparatory to, the first two, or inevitably resultant thence. This was because two indispensable requisites for the community's reorganisation on principles of class equality and class political activity in common were, firstly, a new Central Administration, and, secondly, equipment of the new Central Administration with departmental jurisdictions governed by fixed, well-ordered legality. Fixed, well-ordered legality still stood requiring to be elaborated, and meanwhile social reforms evoked from two quarters a certain amount of social discontent. Some persons were against change of any kind whatever in the existent order. Others found fault with the slow and halting progress of change. And therefore the Government had to face yet another task, the task of guiding, restraining, inspiring, and educating the popular intellect. Indeed, at no period so much as during the nineteenth century have the functions of the censor and the popular instructor shared so intimately in Government schemes of reform. Lastly, as external warfare and internal reform now had jointly upset the State's economy, we see the questions awaiting us for study—namely, the class question (or question of abolition of the serf status), the administrative question (or question of construction of a new Central Administration), the legislative question (or question of reduction of the State's existent laws to order), the political-educational - intellectual - directional question, and the financial question (or question of reorganisation of the State's economy).

Alexander I acceded with a programme broader, and more thoughtfully, consecutively ordered, than his predecessor had done. Under two influences was the programme worked out. It was worked out under the influence, firstly, of political ideas which the Emperor had borrowed from others, and, secondly, of views of his own upon the country's position which he based upon personal observation. An intimate connection existed between the two influences and the education which he had received. Hence his education constitutes an important factor in our State history.

For my own part, I do not think, as very many do, that Alexander's education was a good one, and that he owed it to Catherine. His education was fussy, but it was not good. And possibly it was not good just because it was fussy. Alexander was a son of Paul by Paul's second marriage—to Princess Maria Fedorovna of Württemberg, and, born on 18 December, 1777, was taken from his mother by Catherine at an early age, so that he might be educated altogether according to the then fashionable pedagogic spirit, "according to," that is to say, "reason and nature, and on the principles of rational and natural virtue." For Rousseau's *Émile* was the general educational handbook of the day. And as the work demanded, amongst other things, that the human creature should derive from education a measure of "hard-tempering" against the physical, as well as the spiritual, ills of life, Catherine early had her grandson lodged in a room of the Winter Palace which overlooked the Admiralty Place, that thereby the sound of heavy guns being fired might become familiar to his hearing. But as the boy's auditory nerve failed to sustain this "hard-tempering," he remained deaf in one ear to the end of his days. As soon as ever he and his brother Constantine reached boyhood their grandmother had a guide to philosophy compiled for their benefit, and a staff of tutors selected. For the Grand Dukes' intellectual development the personage summoned was a Swiss colonel who, La Harpe by name, held Republican views, cultivated in all things ideas of the latest political type, and, for the rest, was a walking, wordy manual of French Liberalism. And for the Grand Dukes' tuition in Russian language and history, and in moral philosophy, the personage sent for was Michael Nikititch Muraviev, a worthy, cultured individual whose compositions in the liberal-sentimental-didactical mode could at least pass muster. And, lastly, the Grand Dukes' physical conduct and health were entrusted

to the care of General N. I. Saltykov, who had for qualifications for the post the fact that he was thoroughly *au fait* with court deportment, that he always did what his wife told him to do, and that he always signed what his secretary asked him to sign. His particular part in the tutorial orchestra was to safeguard the Grand Dukes against draughts and overloadings of the stomach. As for La Harpe, he himself says that, deeply conscious of his duty to a great nation, he took his pedagogic task very seriously indeed. At all events he accompanied his pupils through such leading classical authors as Demosthenes, Plutarch, Plato, and Tacitus, and through such leading English and French philosopher-publicists as Locke, Gibbon, Rousseau, and Mably. And to all that he read or said he added remarks on, for example, the power of reason, human welfare, the "contract origin of States," justice, equality, and (above all) liberty, tyranny's ugliness and deleteriousness, and the abomination of servitude. Lastly, the good and wise Muraviev contributed oil to the flames by reading his own works (stylistic models treating of philanthropy, freethought, law-abidingness, and so forth) to the young people, and by making them translate Gibbon, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. At the time when Alexander had all this read and dinned into his ears he was aged ten to fourteen. Hence he was at least young enough! As a matter of fact, he was at the age when the young human creature lives upon, more than anything else, impressions and instincts of its own, and, as regards purely abstract ideas, converts them into practical images, and, as regards moral and political principles, translates them into sentiments.

Neither La Harpe's nor Muraviev's teachings had the effect of imparting real knowledge or logical mental training, or of introducing to actuality, or of guiding thought. Rather, in the mentality of Alexander, the little twelve-year-old politician-philosopher, the two teachers' high-flown ideas expressed themselves merely as political and moral conceptions, which charged the imagination with non-boyish images, and agitated the immature heart with the sentiments of an adult. And if we add likewise General Saltykov's home-manufactured course in manners and hygiene, we shall understand all the more what a vacuum existed in Alexander's nurture. Taught how to feel and to behave, he yet was never taught how to think and how to act, for he never had set him questions of science or everyday life which he might have solved for himself through error and self-correction.

No; always he had supplied to the political and moral dogmas which less called for meditation and proof than for feeling and acquiescence the ready-made answer. Hence he was not made to cudgel his brains and exert himself. Rather, he was, like a dry sponge, set to soak in a sort of moral-general-humanitarian-ethical distillation, and to consume European-intellectual titbits. Never did he know the schoolroom's true labour, with those miniature sorrows and joys of the schoolroom which, perhaps, represent the schoolroom's true value. No; as soon as ever he began to grow up there were clamped upon him La Harpe's Republican theories. And, though he learnt to listen to his preceptor with pleasure, he learnt to listen to him with pleasure and no more. In notes by another of his tutors we read bitter complaints of Alexander's "ease, tardiness, and sloth"—of his reluctance to make an effort, to engage in, according to the tutor, "assured reasoning." The truth is that La Harpe's lessons were for Alexander merely an artistic exercise: they were not in any way an intellectual exertion. And always it is a prime misfortune, if tutor and pupils come to stand to one another in the relation of entertainer and audience, if the former's instructions become the latter's amusement—yes, even though the amusement be one æsthetical of nature. Another result of this dosing with politico-moral idyllicism was an early turning of Alexander's thoughts in the direction of rural seclusion, so that he came to be unable even to pass a wayside flower or a *krestianin's* cot without rhapsodising, and to send glancing over life's phenomena the facile eye of one who sees nature as nothing but a great garden, and the world as nothing but a great sanctum designed for æsthetical experiment and operation.

As the years went on a change in all this might have taken place: the dreams might have yielded to sober observation, the sentiments might have congealed into convictions. But at all events any salutary process of the kind was prematurely made impossible, for, knowing by personal experience that, even when passed through the refrigerator of philosophy, virtue can all too easily be thawed again by the warming action of passion, Catherine early (in 1793, when Alexander was only in his sixteenth year) made sure of the Grand Duke's heart by marrying him off to a selected bride. Against marriage in itself, of course, nothing can be said; but, for all that, von Wizin had reason for declaring in his play *The*



*Minor* that marriage only too frequently spells the end of education, since then there arise new sentiments and interests which develop in a manner widely different from the old, and, by interrupting the latter, cause irreparable loss, bring about a truly lamentable break.

For what had Greece and Rome, had Republics, Liberty, and Equality, had all that kaleidoscope of heroic images, to do with Russia and her grim past—in what manner was the mentality of the young Grand Duke to make La Harpe's teachings consort with Russian actuality? Well, Alexander's mentality did so, nevertheless. It did so quite simply. It recognised that actuality to be a fact, but one of an inferior order only. Then—it ignored it, treated it as something of which one need not wish to know any more. In other words, La Harpe saw to it that things followed the course adopted by the species of elderly governess who used to direct the education of the Russian maiden. Such a governess would draw for her charge's benefit a picture of a world the relations in which were based exclusively upon the most stringent modesty and most inexorable decorum, so that even to protrude a toe from under a skirt was a deadly sin, a sheer fall from grace. And if the two ladies all of a sudden came upon a naturalistic scene, a scene showing at a glance that men and women did wrangle and brawl, did quarrel and kiss, so that the younger lady was led to throw a timid, inquiring glance at her elder, the latter at once tendered the confused reassurance: "Quite so, quite so. But never mind. That is no concern of ours. Home, now. Let us forget it."

So when Alexander entered life with his stock of antiquated, grandiose mental images mingled with ultra-modern political ideas life met him less grimly than ambiguously. For he found himself standing in a difficult position between his father and his grandmother, owing to the fact that still two courts, two separate worlds existed. Every Friday had the young Alexander to go to Gatchina. And every Saturday, after leading his regiment past on parade, and then witnessing much rude barrack-room behaviour, he would return to St. Petersburg in order to present himself in the Hermitage, in the rooms of the Winter Palace where Catherine nightly entertained a select company. In those rooms people talked of important political matters, bandied witty repartees, cracked elegant jests, beheld French plays, and veiled wrongful acts and sentiments under

decorous coverings. And, revolving in this way between the two spheres, young Alexander necessarily had to cultivate two minds, to show two faces (in fact, three—a third one for his own home life), and to observe two separate sets of manners, sentiments, and ideas. Oh, this new schoolroom of his was indeed unlike the Muravievian-La Harpian auditorium!

To this ambiguous existence there succeeded for Alexander, on his father's accession, a uniform round of daily alarms. For though his father appointed him Governor-General of the capital and Commandant-in-Chief of the Guards, Alexander, blameless for what was the position of affairs under Paul, always looked upon the latter with distrust, and trembled as much as did many others in the Monarch's presence. In fact, the shadow which that reign cast upon Alexander's young spirit never really left his character. So far from his road to the throne being smooth and straight, he was, from the first, made the object of fantastical educational experiments, subjected to a course of naturalistic-rationalistic instruction, turned into a precocious politician-philosopher, constituted a "family man" even before the faculty of thought had become his, and compelled to have what should have been his smoothly flowing domestic life and domestic pursuits rudely cut into by alternations of the Hermitage's frivolous distractions with the barrack-room's rough discipline. Ill-timed, of course, all this was—not at all the thing wanted. What, before all things, was Alexander's need was inurement to patient and persistent labour of a practical sort, and inurement to the world which he would one day have to govern, whereas it was impossible to gain either the one or the other requisite from the "Emilian" school-room, the La Harpian auditorium, the Catherinian *salon*, and the Pauline orderly-room. Not even to speak his native language properly did Alexander ever learn: by contemporaries we are told that he never, his life long, came to be able to keep up his end of a Russian conversation if the subject involved was one at all of a complex nature. Thus he was in every possible way debarred from coming to have a real knowledge of surrounding actuality as it really was.

Necessarily the political ideas which Alexander derived from such a boyhood landed him, eventually, in a great deal of trouble. Already, before Catherine's reign was over, he confided to Prince Czartoryski that he abhorred despotism in its every form; that he

sympathised with liberty, and considered that it should be possessed by everyone; that it was liberty that had most brought about the French Revolution; that hereditary rule ought to be reckoned a wrongful, clumsy institution; and that he thought that the supreme power in a State should not be entrusted according to accident, or according to birth, but as the popular voice, the one agency which was competent to select the person administratively most capable for the task, might decide. And, of course, anyone owning such a stock of political notions as the foregoing could not possibly find it an easy matter to live and move amongst Russian actuality. So far as that goes, Alexander never was trained to perceive the existence of actuality, or to adopt anything of a practical outlook. Such perception and such an outlook call for, before they can be acquired, persistent toil in life's constituent dross. And Alexander had no love either for dross or for stubborn, independent drudgery and movement in it. True, he knew well the showy, elegant dross which was to be encountered in the *salon* of his grandmother, even as he did the dross which was to be encountered in his father's barracks; but of the healthy muck in which God bade men immerse themselves with the words, "Earn ye your bread in the sweat of your brows," he had absolutely no knowledge at all. No; his spiritual possessions, when he ascended the throne, were limited solely to a stock of virtuous, lofty aspirations designed instantaneously, and automatically, and without the least trouble or hindrance, to introduce, as at a magic "Now!", general freedom and prosperity. So, on really getting to work, and meeting with one or another obstacle, he soon lost heart and head. The very first failure in an attempt with life and men disgusted him with both, left him plunged in depression. His reluctance to fight, instead of to give in to, difficulties increasingly developed his habit of readily lowering his hands, and letting weariness overcome him. No sooner would a task even be entered upon than he would find it a burden: as early as in 1790, when his age, as yet, was only eighteen, his sense of the tediousness of things led him to meditate renunciation of the throne, withdrawal to some habitation on the banks of the Rhine, and study of natural phenomena in the society of his wife and a few friends. And in later days disillusionment alike with dreams and reality caused him altogether to cool towards current tasks of domestic policy, and to transfer his ideals to Poland, and even to regions outside of his

own Empire, until the second half of his reign saw the internal affairs of that Empire occupy him less, far less, than did efforts to reorganise the political systems of Western Europe, and his political idealism for Russia's benefit yield to a sort of universal-religious idealism for the benefit of a union, the Holy Alliance, the basis of which was a notion of rearrangement of Western Europe's political orders strictly on New Testament lines, strictly on principles of purely private, personal morality. Yet, next after Alexis, Alexander remains, because of his individual qualities, the Tsar who most readily wins our sympathy. He was a rare plant, but a hothouse plant, a plant either unfitted to or unable to achieve acclimatisation in Russian soil. So long as there reigned fine weather the plant luxuriated, flourished. But the moment that a north wind blew, and rains of autumn made their appearance, it shrivelled—drooped.

All the same, Alexander's accession (which took place on 12 March, 1801) acted like magic upon the community, and especially upon the *dvorianstvo*. Everywhere joyous hopes became evoked. Contemporaries tell us that in house and street people wept, and embraced one another, and exchanged mutual congratulations as at Eastertide. And Alexander, at first, justified these expectations. The people beheld him walking about absolutely in simple style—unattended by suite or trappings or even constables—and giving all persons whom he met a civil response to their greetings. Also, in order that the new Government might at once make clear the direction in which it meant to move, the Emperor caused his Accessional manifesto to promise that from that time onwards rule should be carried on according to law and his grandmother's intentions only. And, indeed, for quite three or four months after that date *ukazi* and manifestoes to the same effect poured forth in a perfect stream, with each one removing an evil trace of the late reign, or abolishing an unnecessary restriction, or expressing as incisively as Alexander's private letters and utterances of the day the fundamental principles which the Emperor was resolved should guide him in his task of rule—namely, the principles that freewill should be abolished, and the strictest legality should be introduced. In fact, when, once, Princess Golitzin, a lady of fashion, made of him some request that was not wholly in consonance with the law, and added that the Sovereign stood above law, Alexander retorted that, even if he could, he would not infringe legality, since no authority could be recognised as

regular unless legality were its source. This, of course, was but giving expression to the ideal that the first requisite before a sound system of State could be introduced, and the State be protected from freewill, was the as yet lacking code of fundamental, or "radical," laws—that they, and they alone, could remove the chief fault, the fault which Alexander himself called "our arbitrariness of administration," from the State order.

From the first the Emperor posted new statesmen around him for his assistance. And those statesmen, men reared in the eighteenth century's more advanced ideas, stood quite familiar with Western European orders of State, for they represented the generation next following upon Catherine's statesmen and high officials, and had attained maturity during her reign's second half, and belonged to the fashionable world which cultivated the manners of the French *salon*, and the notions of the "literature of enlightenment." The statesmen concerned were Count Kotchubei (nephew to Prince Bezborodko), Novosiltsev, Stroganov, and Prince Adam Czartoryski, and they formed an intimate circle known, eventually, as the "Committee of Neophytes." Assembling in the Emperor's study every evening, after dinner and coffee, they and he worked out, in comfort, draft laws and schemes of reform which at least are interesting, as illustrating the ardour distinctive of the new Government. Not an administrative, legislative, or social question did the Committee not touch upon, for, to quote the Committee's own Minutes (written in French, of course!), "we, the trusted fellow-workers of the Tsar, have been summoned for his assistance in systematic labour upon the as yet ill-ordered administrative structure of the Empire." As a first step, the Committee determined the sequence in which it would pursue its tasks: the members of it proposed to begin with a study of the Empire's true position, and then to consider recasting the administrative system in its every department, and, lastly, "to set as a crown upon all the administrative institutions a warranty comprised in an *Ulozhenie*" (as I would translate the French term "*Constitution*" used by the Minutes) "based upon the true spirit of the Russian people."

The Committee gave pride of place to the institutions of the Central Administration. As we have seen already, Catherine left the administrative edifice in a state of non-completion, for, though she created complex provincial-governmental machinery, she allowed

the Centre to remain as much chaos as ever—she omitted to give the roof of the edifice the institutions with properly defined jurisdictions and securely fixed boundaries which she had promised, in her Manifesto of July 1762, should be forthcoming. Accordingly Alexander had to take up her work in this respect, but, in doing so, modelled the edifice's roof after his own designs and spirit, and therefore made of it a roof differing widely from the main, the provincial-administrative, structure, and not altogether consorting with the structure's basement.

Also, the Council of State, a body hitherto meeting solely at the Sovereign's pleasure, became replaced with a twelve-membered, non-departmentally divided *Navremenni Soviet*, or Temporary Council. And then Peter's Colleges were recast. Those Colleges now had lost their original character: during Catherine's reign they had undergone pressure from the two omnipotent administrative dignitaries represented by Potemkin, President of the College of War, and Prince Viazemski, the Procurator-General—as regards foreign and military affairs by the former, and as regards everything else by the latter: with the result that, helped by the very nature of Collegiate forms, the Central Administration had then acquired something of a personal nature throughout. But now a Law of 8 September, 1802, replaced the Colleges with eight Ministries. Of course these Ministries too, were unipersonal institutions, but at least their directors, the Ministers, stood responsible to the Senate. The first such Ministry to begin functioning was a new Ministry of Popular Education. But in general these Central institutions were institutions ill-consorting with those of the provinces, since the latter were left to retain their Collegiate organisation as completely as before.

Such was Alexander's first attempt to reconstruct the administrative centre. But he did not, at this period, confine his activities in reform solely to administrative changes: he at once tackled also social relations. In this regard he had his direction clearly pointed out to him: only too evident was it that what was needed was to establish those relations upon a basis of equality of all classes before the law. Alexander expressed dislike of class privilege at more than one sitting of his "Neophytes' Committee." And though one of his first measures was an *ukaz* to let the *dvorianstvo* and the towns have Catherine's charters restored to them, the Emperor none the

less told the Committee that he regretted the step, especially with regard to the charter to the *dvorianstvo*, and that such was his repugnance to any such re-conferment of exclusive rights that that re-conferment would be against his will. And a debate upon *dvorianin* rights arose again when the terms of the contemplated Coronation Manifesto came up for consideration. But eventually the draft document merely repeated the whole *dvorianstvo* charter of 1785 in its essential features. The charter rendered *dvorianin* participation in *dvorianin* elections conditionable by service attainment of at least the rank of over-officer. And whilst Novosiltsev proposed abolition even of that restrictive condition, in favour merely of disqualification of *dvoriané* who were illiterate, or were ignorant of their duties and rights, or had earned disgrace for cruel treatment of their serfs, the Emperor again expressed his protests against class privilege, and proposed, rather, strict distinction of rights as between *dvoriané* actually in service and *dvoriané* otherwise—his ground being that not the *dvorianstvo* as a whole ought to enjoy favours over others, but only those of them whose service merits had earned such favours. However, as already stated, the Coronation Manifesto retained, as regards qualification for the participation in question, the old conditions of attainment of over-officer's rank. Equally timorous was the Government's approach to the supremely ticklish question of the condition of the serfs. However, the authorities did at least lose no time as regards measures of preparation for the question's decision. For one thing, the Government forbade official publications any longer to accept notices of sale of *krestiané* apart from land. And, again, it abolished bestowal of already settled lands. Once when a certain personage of high position requested lands and *krestiané* of the Government the Emperor replied that he was familiar with the bonded *krestiané*'s piteous plight, and determined not to increase those unfortunates' number by transferring more *krestiané* into private possession. And, thirdly, the Government began more stringently to watch for instances of abuse of landowners' authority. Finally, on 12 December, 1801, it published a law whereby the already free classes of the community thenceforth might acquire immovable property. True, as yet this new right fell only to the mercantile and the professional classes, and to the Treasury *krestiané*; but still it marked a first step towards a decline of the *dvorianstvo*'s agelong agrarian monopoly. An effect of it was at once to lead certain "advanced" *pomiestchiki* to

conclude agreements releasing *krestiané* of theirs, with the latter's plots, on mutually stipulated terms. An instance of this is seen when a Voronezhian *pomiestchik* named Petrovo-Slovovo arranged to release 5,000 of his *krestiané*, with their working lands, in return for a payment of 1,500,000 roubles, spread over nineteen years. Similarly Count Sergei Rumiantsev (son of Catherine's Field-Marshal) released 199 of his *krestiané*, with their working lands, and then submitted for the Government's consideration a scheme for voluntary agreements in general. This scheme the Government adopted, and on 20 February, 1803, a "Law Concerning Agricultural Workers" empowered *pomiestchiki* thenceforth to release both whole serf villages and individual serf families, with their working lands—the *krestiané* so freed not to be ascribed to another existent status of any sort, but to a new status ordered to be known as "free land-workers." In which Law we see a first definite step towards abrogation of serf-right *in toto*.

Such the new authorities' first attempts at administrative and social reconstruction. But the foregoing features of the initial period of Alexander's reform activity suffered from inherent defects. The chief defects of the sort were, firstly, lack of a worked-out plan in general, and, secondly, an excess of haste in adoption of new measures. And, next, external events distracted the Tsar's attention. Those external events lay in Russia's participation in an Austrian coalition against France in 1805, and in Russia's participation in a Prussian coalition against France in 1806. Also, Alexander's original circle of helpers broke up then, since the new views and experiences which the Tsar had gathered from the campaigns mentioned caused his first mood to cool, and rendered him dissatisfied with his *entourage*, so that gradually the members of the "Committee of Neophytes" departed, and into their place there stepped a man who was destined to act with Alexander, as his sole confidant, throughout the whole of the second phase of his activity in reform, as well as to impart to that activity both a wholly new principle and a wholly new direction. The man in question was Speranski.

Although Speranski fills a very prominent place in our political history, we need not linger over biographical details with regard to him beyond a few chief points in his career previously to the time when he gained the Tsar's sole confidence. For the rest the



student may be referred to the well-known work by Baron Korf. Come of a wholly different world from that giving birth to his more notable predecessors, Speranski had for father the priest of a village named Cherkutino, in the *gubernia* of Vladimir, and was born in 1772. For a beginning he received his education in the Seminary of Suzdal, and then he went on to the chief Metropolitan Seminary, which later (in Paul's time) became, rather, a theological college. There he passed through the course with distinction, and subsequently was retained as lecturer upon, first of all, his favourite subject of mathematics, and, later, rhetoric, physics, philosophy, and so forth. The remarkable point in this is not that Speranski could expound so large a number of subjects—for that, after all, was a common enough feature in the seminaries of the day; but that he could expound them well—which everywhere then, as everywhere now, was a feature wholly exceptional. Next, as, in his own words, "my thirst for learning" impelled him to exchange spiritual employment for secular, he thought of going abroad to complete his education in the universities of Germany, but, after a term of service as private secretary to Prince Kurakin, passed with the Prince, when, in 1797, the latter was appointed to the Procurator-Generalship, into the chancellory of that Department, and so, at twenty-five, became, from a lecturer in a theological college, a Titular State Councillor. Thence onward his service advancement proved extraordinarily rapid. It did so because he brought to the chancellory of the Procurator-Generalship a well-ordered mind, a capacity for work without limit, and a great talent alike of speech and of composition—the latter a combination inevitably bound to constitute him an administrative "find," and to render his promotion secure. Even before Paul's reign was over a reputation was his, and, on Alexander's accession, the Titular State Councillor received further promotion, for he was transferred to functions in connection with the new Temporary Council, and, as that institution's State secretary, had to supervise the Council's whole spiritual and secular business. Lastly, on formations of the eight new Ministries, Count Kotchubei, who was about to become the first new Minister of the Interior, invited him to combine service in that Ministry's chancellory with his already existent duties with the Council. And in that Ministry's chancellory Speranski drafted the more important laws of Alexander's early years.

In 1808, after the departure of the Emperor's original advisers,

Speranski was deputed to frame and present to him a certain report: and though Alexander knew of him already as a particularly clever, expeditious worker, he became more than ever astonished at the skill displayed in the report's composition and exposition. Thence onward he and Speranski drew increasingly close together. And when the Emperor went to Erfurt for the famous interview with Napoleon he took Speranski with him as civilian "observer." Speranski had a good acquaintance with the French tongue, and, by keeping watch upon the representatives of the French Government, learnt much. Later, when Alexander asked him, at a ball, how he found foreign countries compare with his own, he replied: "Your Majesty, they, I conceive, have better institutions than we, but we have better men." "Then," was Alexander's reply, "we will speak further on this after returning home." And, after that return, Speranski received the post of Assistant Minister of Justice, and, with the Emperor, worked out further administrative reforms yet. His general plan has not the less value in the history of our institutions because certain of that plan's features stand closely related with Speranski's personal character.

Speranski was not only a product of the olden-time spiritual-academic school, but, at that, a rare product—forcing-beds of the kind did not turn out a prodigy equal to him with every year that passed. Also, he was what was then known as an "ideologist," and what would now be called a "theorist," since, having developed his intellect predominantly upon abstractions, he had come to view the ordinary phenomena of life, life's (to use the jargon of philosophy) "more concrete and empirical factors," with a certain contempt. Eighteenth-century philosophy often bred intellects of the kind—the spiritual academies of ancient Russia turned out plenty of them; but in Speranski there was more than a philosophical brain—there was also the kind of sound, strong brain which has been unusual at all periods of the world, and was particularly unusual during the peculiarly philosophical age of which we are speaking. Yet though that brain drew from its prolonged work upon abstractions such an exceptional energy and suppleness as to enable it to tackle the most difficult, abstruse combinations of ideas as easily as a pianist-virtuoso's fingers can tackle Liszt's most arduous passages; and though that work also enabled Speranski's head to store up in it a most varied and extensive stock of knowledge and notions; and

though included in that stock there was much that was qualified to satisfy the demands of refinement and intellectual "comfort," the stock also had in it an excess of the superfluous, and a deficiency of what is required for man's lower needs, for an actual comprehension of actuality. Herein, indeed, he resembled Alexander himself. And that may have been what most of all drew the two together so closely. But in any case there existed this difference between Speranski and the Emperor: that the former at least had his stock neatly ordered, as well stowed in place as a fashionable lady's trinkets. No intellect equal to his had stood beside the Russian throne since Ordin-Nastchokin's day. And no intellect equal to his has, so far as I know, appeared there since. Speranski constituted system personified, and as he projected his strong, tireless, nervous energy into a metropolitan society grown weary of the task of doing nothing, he stirred, shook, that society's atmosphere as a blast of fresh air stirs the close, artificially scented atmosphere of a sickroom. Yet, unfortunately, he did not communicate to the order of State the amount of movement which he communicated to the State's administrative circles. The cause was his intellectual bent itself. His intellect was powerful, but it worked too constantly upon analysis and abstraction, and so came to be incapable of envisaging likewise the concrete: in setting about a reorganisation of the State order, that intellect tended to view Russia merely as a tablet upon which it could draw, with mathematical precision, any political figures which it chose. The general administrative plan, therefore, which he devised was, though remarkable, though wonderful, for its symmetry and exactitude and continuous suitability for application, too lofty for the framer and his Sovereign ever to accomplish its reduction to the level of Russia's needs and resources as those needs and resources really existed.

## CHAPTER XVII

### Speranski's plan—His central institutions.

Now, to set forth and examine Speranski's plan. It was a plan which, though composed with extraordinary speed, embraced every side of an order of State. Begun only late in the year 1808, it yet was lying on the Emperor's study table early in October of the year following, ready for the Emperor to (as he did) consider it, and here and there to add supplementations and corrections. Speranski himself says that the plan did but reduce to order political ideas devised by the Emperor alone, but, even if that was so, the credit for the logical development of those ideas in the plan belongs exclusively to the plan's framer. As a matter of fact, we have no knowledge of the plan as originally composed, of the plan in full and detailed length. Our judgment of it has to be formed only on the strength of a contemporary's extracts thence. The purpose of the plan was (so Speranski told the Emperor in an accompanying letter) "establishment of the Government's authority upon permanent principles aided by laws, and, thereby, communication to the working of that authority of a greater amount of dignity and true power."

First the plan expounds an order of State's general bases. Such an order's authority, it says, comes exclusively of the people, and therefore, for a Government to be legal, that Government must be based upon the will of the people. Also, a Government can act only in accordance with given conditions, and act lawfully only if those conditions be fulfilled. Conditions of the sort are expressed in regulations called fundamental laws. A State's fundamental laws, therefore, flow solely from the will of the people. But inasmuch as the people, though the composers of the laws, cannot, as a single whole, superintend their working, a requisite for the purpose is an upper social class of a given degree of education and independence, as well as one whose interests are identical with the people's. And inasmuch as an upper class, a monarchical aristocracy, of the sort acts on commission from the people, the political position which it

occupies rests upon a popular majority. A due State order, therefore, possesses three bases. Those three bases are (1) a constitutional monarch, limited by fundamental laws, (2) a monarchical aristocracy, for superintendence of the working of those laws and all their authority, and (3) a free people, the link between whom and the monarchical aristocracy in question is unity of interests.

Russia's position of the day, the plan goes on, offers reasons in plenty for introduction of a new order of State, but, at the same time, few effective elements for such an order's creation. The reasons, the plan says, are as follows. It is manifest that from the period of Alexis onwards Russia's tendency has ever been towards freedom. And, in view of the conditions governing her present position of affairs, she now needs freedom more than ever. Already existent in Russia there is a system of civil law, but, to guarantee that system, there is existent nothing—the system may at any moment be shattered upon the rock of absolutism. At present popular enlightenment would be to no purpose—it would even be harmful. For what avails it to give a slave enlightenment when enlightenment can but render him more than ever sensible of his grievous plight? In the prevailing universal dissatisfaction, in the prevailing universal tendency to criticise, says the plan's framer, we see expressed the fact that all are grown weary of the order in being. Manifestly that order corresponds with public opinion no longer. Unfortunately, that order does not, as yet, comprise the elements of a new one, of one correctly compounded. True, there are laws in existence, and there are institutions in existence, and there exist certain charters to define certain rights and duties; but none of these things have a durable basis, and, above all, Russia does not possess a monarchical system proper. The Russian community has for its two chief social classes the *dворяне*, the landowners, and the *крестьяне*, the landworkers. But the former are only Crown slaves, and the latter are only the former's slaves, and not a human being in Russia is really free save only Russia's mendicants and Russia's cultivators of philosophy. Reform of the order in being, therefore, should begin with abolition of class relations as they at present subsist—with abolition, that is to say, of the position of the social classes as it at present subsists (whence it is clear that Speranski meant to begin quite at the beginning, as the first Russian reformer ever to define, and to indicate, where the beginning lay). But how, the plan asks,

are the necessary elements for the foundation of a due, a legal State order in Russia to be created? Well, an aristocracy might, as the laws' supervisor, be able to create those elements if to the composition of that aristocracy there be assigned the first three or four grades of the existing *dvorianin*-service hierarchy. True, such a category will, at the start, include many persons without significance or worth, but in time, within a few generations, these will disappear, owing to the influence of apportionment of serious work to the class. And as for the community in general, it must, if it is properly to carry on its affairs, and also to participate in its own administration, consist of free members exclusively. Wherefore social reform should begin with emancipation of the bonded *krestiané*. Any difficulties arising in this regard must simply be overcome. For serf-right is an institution so utterly opposed to all sound sense that it may be looked upon as a temporary evil bound eventually to disappear. And as regards the bonded *krestiané*'s emancipation, it must be effected through two methods. First, there must be defined exactly the dues lawfully demandable of the bonded *krestianin* by the landowner. And, next, there must be instituted certain courts for adjudication of differences between the two parties concerned. Only in this manner can the bonded *krestianin* pass from a status of personal attachment to a status merely of soil-attachment. Next, again, there must be re-established his, the *krestianin*'s, right to change his landowner. And when that shall have been done the *krestianin* will stand emancipated outright (whence it is clear that Speranski's proposal for the class's release nevertheless comprised no *nadiel*, no apportionment of plot, on release). From this there will become created two social classes altogether new—a monarchical aristocracy, and a free *krestianstvo*, and the Russian community as a whole will be divided into three social classes, consisting of a *dvorianstvo*, of a middle class, and of a class of manual workers, with all three such classes enjoying civil rights, but only the first two political rights as well. The administrative system to be built upon this vertical social division will consist of Ministries, and of institutions elective and local of character. Which institutions, again, will consist of three parallel series—of a legislative, of a judicial, and of an executive.

As regards the legislative institutions, they will be *dumi* of *volosti*, *dumi* of *okrugi*, *dumi* of *uezdi*, *dumi* of *gubernii*, and a supreme State

*Duma*. Of these, the *dumi* of *volosti* will be composed of landed proprietors of *volosti*, and of deputies of the Treasury *krestiané* of *volosti* in the proportion of a deputy per 500 souls. And as regards the *dumi* of *uezdi*, they will be composed of deputies chosen by the *dumi* of *volosti*. And as regards the *dumi* of *gubernii*, they will be composed of deputies chosen by the *dumi* of *uezdi*. And as regards the supreme State *Duma*, it will be composed of Deputies elected, to a number fixed by law, by the *dumi* of *gubernii*. Again, all the local *dumi* will meet triennially, but the State *Duma* annually. Also, the State *Duma* will have a legislative status, will be charged to review all laws and legal drafts submitted for its consideration by the Government, by, that is to say, either Ministers or members of the State Council. And in certain matters the State *Duma* will have, in addition, a legislative initiative. Such matters will include representations made to the State *Duma* with respect to popular needs, and representations made to it with respect to Ministerial responsibility.

As for the executive institutions, they will consist of administrations of *volosti*, administrations of *uezdi*, administrations of *gubernii*, and Ministries placed over those three series of administrations. Their members, save as concerns the Ministries, will, in each case, be chosen by the local *dumi*. The Heads of Ministries alone will be nominated by the Sovereign.

And as regards, lastly, the judicial institutions, they will consist of courts of *volosti* (which courts will be arbitrational, or conciliatory, of character), courts of *uezdi*, courts of *gubernii* (both of which species will be composed solely of elective judges, and will act always with juries), and a Senate as at one and the same time the country's court of supreme instance and superintendent-in-chief of judicial procedure in general—its members being chose by the *Duma* of State.

Hence over the Administration in general there will stand three supreme institutions: a legislative—the State *Duma*; an executive—Ministries responsible to the *Duma*; and a judicial—the Senate. And the working of all three will meet in a State Council made up of members of the aristocracy, and be charged to supervise the laws' execution by the administrative branches severally.

Such Speranski's plan in the skeleton, fragmentary form which the extracts mentioned have preserved to us. Even in that form it

is well calculated to impress the student. Indeed, we may say that not the whole aggregate of Russian publicists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries voiced so many acute and profound ideas on the subject of a State order as are to be found expressed in this one document. For Speranski's plan is more than a political draft: it is, in addition, a philosophical treatise, and, whilst setting forth the principles on which a political system should be built, makes logical deduction of the ideas which should inspire those principles. Finally, whilst thus drawing in bold outline a scheme for a future State order, the plan exposes all the faults in the State order existent. Then what precisely was the plan? Was it a political dream, or was it an historical possibility? In other words, could it ever have been made to become a fact, and, if so, to what community was it adaptable? For though, merely and exclusively as a scheme for its particular State order, it suited every age and every people, it, as a scheme for an order to undergo practical development, stood impossible of application to any age or any people. To see the reason is not difficult. Every order of State consists of two elements—of institutions, and of social relations regulated and directed by those institutions. The institutions are created of legislation, and the object of them is to establish social relations in a given form, and to guide these relations. The relations operative in a community need to agree with the community's institutional system. Otherwise the institutions of the system will either fail of their purpose or become warped. Never is an order of State possible unless its institutions rest upon principles of liberty, and its social relations stand free of tincture with the instincts of servitude. Institutions, therefore, cannot function and succeed unless both they and the relations existent in the community mutually harmonise. So what ought the legislator to do in an original absence of such harmony? He ought to preface introduction of his institutions with preparation of suitable relations. A community's relations are evidence of the interests operative in that community, and each such relation has meeting in it, and there variously combining or clashing, interests not only naturally different from one another, but constantly mutable of form. The creation of interests does not lie within a legislature's power. For example, a legislature cannot ordain that a village shall trade if the villagers have no subject of traffic. But a legislature can, and ought to, establish and regulate relations: in that respect its function is to



bring the relations into mutual agreement, to check any interests harmful to them, to encourage any interests useful to them, and to guide all towards the common welfare. Similarly, love of freedom cannot be created at word of command, but it is both possible and proper to forbid such an act as self-sale into servitude.

Unfortunately, the framer of the plan which we have been considering did not concern himself sufficiently to heed the foregoing elements of a social order. Instead, he created his order of State without previously bringing relations into harmony with that order—he was in too great a hurry to accomplish the second portion of his task before the first stood completed. The mere fact that he entered upon the first portion of the task at the beginning of Alexander's reign, at a period following upon preparation for a new order of social relations through such means as the law that thenceforth members of the free statuses might independently acquire immovable property, and as the "Law Concerning Free Land-workers," should have moved the reformer to take for his immediate concern that preparatory work's continuation, and forthwith to elaborate a series of subsidiary measures designed to set the community's existent interests in the desired new combination, and to give the community's operative relations the desired new bent: but, seemingly, meticulous, arduous labour of the sort was not to the taste of the plan's two composers: and, for that matter, it is possible that, even if it had been so, the composers would never, owing to the labour's very nature, have reached that labour's end. At all events, what they did was to attempt creation of a new order of State first, and of new social relations in that State afterwards. Such their blunder, such, more precisely, their expression of the tendency acquired by Russian thought during the eighteenth century's second half, of the tendency to find for every current question of Russian life a ready-made answer from elsewhere. Speranski's plan was built of elements of a political order already standing compounded in the West: and, owing to his prefacing of his first aim with his second, he failed to achieve either. If only he had worked out a proper scheme of social relations, he would have seen automatically develop thence a new political order. But, as it was, he strove for establishment of the latter before the former. And to this day a proper political order, and proper relations in correspondence with such an order, are lacking.

## CHAPTER XVIII

Alexander's reform of the country's central institutions—His revolution in domestic policy—The bonded *krestianstvo* question

SPERANSKI indicated in his plan the plan's intended order of substantiation, and even its time of entry into operation—the autumn of 1811. But the plan never did really achieve substantiation: such portion of it as was fulfilled was a portion not in any way directly, organically connected with the whole. That portion (which materialised during 1810–11) was a reform of the central institutions in the shape of a new Council of State and some new Ministries. A scheme for reorganising the Senate as well which Speranski composed during the years just mentioned failed of substantiation in like degree.

The opening of Speranski's new Council of State took place on 1 January, 1810. The following is the institution's order, an order which the Council of State retains to this day as regards at least the institution's fundamental features. The Council's members included both members nominated by the Sovereign and *ex-officio* members—that is to say, the Ministers in office, so that it constituted a College, and operated an advisory authority under the presidency of the Sovereign, or, alternatively, of any such person as annually he appointed for the purpose. And as regards functions, the Council exercised legislative superintendence over the Administration's several departments, and scrutinised draft laws, and considered draft administrative measures sufficiently important to approximate closely to legislation proper, and saw to judicial business in general. And as regards composition, it consisted of general assemblies and four Departments—a Laws Department, a Department of Civil and Spiritual Affairs, a Department of Military Affairs, and a Department of State Economy. Previously to a question being submitted to the Council it was scrutinised by the pertinent Department, and then by a joint session of Departments. That done, a general assembly passed it in review, and, finally, it and the Council's opinion upon its merits went before the Sovereign himself, who signified

his assent either by signing the Council's opinion or by committing to the Council's State Secretary an oral command. And under the Council there operated a State Chancellory divided into sections under staff secretaries, and presided over by the just mentioned State Secretary, who had for duties settlement of order of presentation of business to the Council, and execution of opinions of the Council after their Imperial confirmation. A similar (though a rather more elaborate) organisation did Speranski give to his Ministries. The Ministries instituted earlier, by the Law of 1802, Speranski found to have in them two faults in particular. Those faults were an inadequate system of fixing Ministerial responsibility, and an irregular system of apportioning departmental business. Now, however, Laws of 1810 and 1811 set the Ministries upon a basis more orderly of character. For one thing, the Ministry of Commerce disappeared, and was replaced with a Ministry of Police, a Ministry designed for general departmental concentration of the various matters concerned with the internal security of the country which formerly the Ministry of the Interior had supervised. Also, a new series of "Chief Administrations" ranking as additional Ministries came into being, as made up of a "Chief Administration for Revision of Accounts of State" (State Control), a "Chief Administration for the Spiritual Affairs of Alien Faiths," and a "Chief Administration for Means of Communication." Whereby the principal institutions of State now were made to number eleven instead of eight. Earlier a Committee of Ministers had been constituted for matters affecting Ministerial Departments, and this Committee now received a new organisation with the rest.

As regards the Senate, an institution whose functions were, as we know, partly administrative and partly judicial, the plan of 1811 proposed to divide it accordingly. That is to say, the plan proposed to centre the Senate's administrative functions solely in an Administrative Senate of Ministers, Assistant Ministers, and Departmental Heads (thus taking the place of the Committee of Ministers), and to centre the Senate's judicial functions solely in a Judicial Senate of four sections acting in four Chief Judicial Districts (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Kazan): whilst in respect of composition this joint Senate was to have some of its members nominated by the Crown, and others elected by the *dvorianstvo*. We see, then, herein a trace of the ideas forming the basis of Speranski's scheme

of reforms as a whole. The project, however, met with great opposition, and especially because of its detail of proposed *dvorianin* election of Senators, a detail in which many foresaw eventual limitation of the Supreme Power. In the end, therefore, the Senate retained its vague status of an administrative-judicial nature, and continued, as before, to mar the form of the Central Administration as a whole.

Only to the foregoing extent, then, did Speranski's comprehensive plan attain substantiation. In every case the plan's new institutions bore the stamp of his administrative intellect in their definite, precise relations, their thoroughly worked-out form, and their clearly cut outline. All of them, too, stood based upon the theory which was his guiding principle of activity, the theory that it is not life which should give form and tendency to institutions, but institutions which should give direction and regulation to life—a true illustration of bureaucratic self-assurance born of specifically administrative experience. For though Speranski understood the mechanism of institutions perfectly, he, like the Emperor, had but scanty knowledge of the physiology of popular life. Hence we may regard him primarily as the founder of the new bureaucracy of the day, and as one who, through his personal character, represented in Russian administration a new type, a type replacing the *dvorianin*-Guardsmen of the eighteenth century with the *chinovnik*-commoner of the next. Yet for reasons which have purely a biographical interest he failed throughout, and in 1812, almost before the new central institutions which have been described had been introduced, was dispatched into retirement at Nizhni Novgorod, in an odour of enmity from court circles and the general public alike. The chief cause of this resentment was certain financial reforms which, in addition, he projected for Russia's rescue from impending bankruptcy as she entered upon a patriotic war. Those reforms were to have involved increase of taxation, both direct and indirect, and alterations in, and stoppages of, Treasury note issues.

For a while, naturally, the thunderous events of 1812 and the next few years altogether distracted the Government's and the community's attention from internal reorganisation: and when the storms of war were gone Russia's domestic policy assumed another direction from formerly. The effect of the recurrences of 1812-15 upon the Government and upon the community was not by any means identical, for in the case of the community those recurrences

aroused much moral agitation and political unrest, as the result of a first realisation that at critical moments of the sort the people had its importance. That ferment remained manifest long after that the Russian armies had returned from abroad. True, it is difficult for us, at this distance of time, to imagine the excited thoughts and sentiments prevailing in the country's leading circles during those years, but at least we know that the ferment extended even to the official press, so that the Government's own publications printed articles urging the necessity of liberty for the people and the printed word, and leaders of scholastic circles presided over meetings in their establishments at which they termed freedom "God's best and latest gift," and private journals, vociferating "Oh for a Constitution!" set forth the "excellence" of institutions on the representative principle, and fashionable drawing-rooms called upon their young people to use their intellectual powers, and military officers discussed the existent lack of special knowledge, and declared book-reading and culture in general to be indispensable.

Upon the Government, however, the events of the last few years exercised an effect altogether different, for those years' burden of anxiety left the authorities utterly exhausted, in no way disposed to resume with energy their former domestic policy, and even a little disabused of their political ideals. Besides, Russia's domestic policy had begun to feel the influence of that of certain other countries—events outside Russia had brought the Russian Administration into contact with results born of revolution, and constituted her, as it were, Conservatism's representative in Europe's international relations, and Legality's guardian, and Authority's upholder, and novel theories' opponent. Next, not unnaturally, this trend towards Conservatism in domestic policy transferred itself to Russia's international procedure as well, since it was not an easy matter simultaneously to support reaction in the West and to forward "revolutionary" reform plans at home: so from 1815 onwards the Russian Government acted in domestic affairs without the spirit of formerly, and on principles less daring. The result, of course, was still further to estrange it from the community, to an extent never before, in all probability, known.

One outcome, again, of the estrangement was to render the community dissatisfied even with Governmental measures which did slightly evince the old tendency, and did resume work earlier begun upon. An instance is Poland. The Congress of Vienna rewarded

Russia for her part in the liberationist struggle of the nations with the Duchy of Warsaw, a State formed by Napoleon from provinces of the old Rietch Pospolita which the Third Partition had seen pass to Prussia. But though the Congress handed this State to Russia without conditions and in perpetuity, Alexander insisted that, in addition, all other provinces which once had belonged to Poland ought to be given national-constitutional administrations: with the result that eventually the Congress's Act had appended to it a clause whereby Poles resident in Prussia, in Austria, or in Russia were in each case to be granted such representative-national institutions as the several Governments administering those Poles might approve and deem advisable. Accordingly, for Russia's new Kingdom of Poland there was worked out a Constitution to which Alexander gave his consent on 12 December, 1815. That Constitution ordained that the legislative authority in the Kingdom should pertain to a Diet composed of, firstly, a Senate and, secondly, a House of Representatives; of which Chambers the Senate was to consist of Bishops and Chief Administrators (the latter nominated for life by the Sovereign), and the House of Representatives was to consist of members elected by, respectively, Poland's *shliakhta*, urban class, and rural communes. But on the opening of the first Diet in Warsaw in 1818 Alexander's "Speech from the Throne" jarred unpleasantly upon Russian ears, for it said, amongst other things, that the Emperor now had found it expedient to apply to Poland the liberal institutions which all along had been his most cherished subject of reflection: in other words, that actually he was conferring upon a portion of the Empire which had been acquired through conquest the free administrative system which the main body of the Empire still lacked, so that on the Vistula the Russian Autocrat was to figure as a constitutional monarch, and on the Neva he was still to remain an absolute sovereign! The Russian community became more discouraged than ever. Everywhere it murmured that the Emperor did not trust his own people.

Another question to re-arise was the social question, or question of the bonded *krestiané*. As with the questions just treated of, the source of its resurrection was one of the Empire's more outlying portions—in this case Esthland. It re-arose as follows. In 1811 the Esthlander *dvoriané* petitioned that the Government should arrange for their *krestiané* to be emancipated: and upon that the

Government appointed a Commission to work out the necessary regulations, and, though temporarily interrupted in its labours by military events, the Commission, renewing those labours in 1814, rendered it possible for the Imperial Assent to set the Esthlander *krestianstvo* completely free on 23 May, 1816. Next, an *ukaz* of 25 April, 1817, fully emancipated also the *krestiané* of Courland, and an *ukaz* of 26 March, 1819 did the same by Livland's *krestiané*. On the other hand, when the *krestiané* of East Zealand, in their turn, received emancipation they did so only as regards personal freedom, and, even so, under conditions greatly restricting the new status's advantages, seeing that, for all his release of the person, the East Zealander *krestianin* still stood debarred both from departing to another *gubernia* and from becoming a registered member of an urban community. Besides, previously, that is to say, in the days when the statutes of Sweden still had been locally operative, the *krestianin* had always had some of his *pomiestchik's* land placed heritably, inalienably at his disposal: whereas now the rule was made that, though a given portion of the *pomiestchik's* land was to lie at the *krestianin's* permanent disposal, the *pomiestchik* might, by voluntary agreement with his *krestiané*, lease them their individual plots for given periods at a given rental. Which "voluntary agreement" condition, of course, left the *pomiestchik's* freewill quite unimpaired: he still could evict a *krestianin* from his plot so long as that *krestianin* then were provided with another one. Finally, even the fact that *krestianin* cases had a special court instituted for their decision did little to protect the *krestianin's* interests, since of that court, invariably, the president himself was a *pomiestchik*.

In short, the East Zealander system of emancipation, the system of emancipating without land, proved barren of good, and Russians really conversant with the matter thought application of its principles to Russia's *krestiané* useless. However, the Government still worked at the problem, and a large number of schemes were submitted for its consideration. The unfortunate point about these schemes was that all of them were insufficiently thought out. In most cases they urged the necessity of personal, but landless, emancipation. And some proposed emancipation just with farm premises. And a few were for emancipation with *nadieli*, plots. And almost all were against emancipation in any case. Yet a certain interest attaches to some of these schemes because they so well demonstrate

the then non-preparedness of the public mind for a decision of such a difficult question, and that mind's scanty acquaintance with the real position of affairs. The question stood compounded of two elements. On the one hand it was necessary to establish the *krestianin's* personal and social freedom. On the other hand it was necessary to guarantee his economic circumstances afterwards. The question, therefore, was one in part political, and in part economic. Only too often contemporary observers heeded only the dire phenomena which landowners' abuses of freewill made conspicuous in serf villages, and, judging from those phenomena alone, conceived the first requisite to be conferment of personal liberty, so that the *krestianin* might depart to any quarter of the compass he pleased. Hence, for all their culture, and for all their good intentions, these Abolitionists never so much as gained an inkling that the problem had its economic side. But the *krestianin* was aware of that side.

Two of the schemes of which I have spoken are particularly interesting. The one was worked out by an official named Mordvinov, an administrator of the ultra-Liberal persuasion, and the other was worked out by Araktcheiev, a Conservative of the Conservatives. In the former scheme we see a project devised by a man of knowledge and experience, but a project at once impressing the student with its inconsistencies. Under it the *krestianin* was to be freed without land, and to be freed through a method of self-redemption, through a method of paying a sum fixed according to age, with boys between the ages of five and ten paying 100 (350) roubles, and men between the ages of thirty and forty 2,000 (7,000), and men older than forty proportionately less according as their working strength diminished. At the same time, this self-redemption was to be left exclusively to the will, initiative, and means of the *krestianin*. "Let him alone purchase freedom who can." Hence emancipation was to reward thrift. Nor is it difficult to imagine that the first persons to avail themselves of the right would have been the *kulaki*. In short, there was in Mordvinov's project much of the bourgeois, much of the idyllic. Only toil and savings were to be set at liberty. On the other hand, methods quite different mark the project of the universally disliked Araktcheiev. The project was composed specially by Imperial command. Yet, for all that, and for all that it was issued in his own name, it was only to a very limited extent Araktcheiev's own work. It purported to



provide for emancipation without either Government compulsion of or economic loss to the landowner, but, rather, with clear advantage to the latter, since the Treasury was, by voluntary agreement, to effect gradual purchase of all *pomiestie krestiané* and all *pomiestie* lands, and assign for the purpose, from either the liquor-farming revenue or issues of five-per-cent. Treasury bonds, an annual sum of 5,000,000 roubles. Also, to carry through the operation, there was to be established a permanent Commission. And the *krestianin* was to redeem himself and two *desiatini* of land at such land prices as might be current in his locality; whilst, as regards valuation of estates, that was to be done by equalising land prices with capitalisations of the local *obrok*. Timber and grazing rights, however, were to be redeemed separately, and from the *pomiestchik* himself, even as though the *krestianin* were any other private person. And this system its conceiver thought would confer upon the *pomiestchik* the advantage, firstly, that he would become relieved of any debts outstanding; secondly, that he would have half, or more, of his land left to him; thirdly, that he would acquire floating capital; and, fourthly, that he would retain a full number of working-hands with whose labour to exploit what land might remain to him, since *krestiané* who received such entirely inadequate allotments as plots of two *desiatini* apiece would have no choice but to rent more. In this manner eventually, said the framer of the project, would the relation of the two parties benefit each, in that the one party would acquire capital, and yet lose no working-hands, and the other party would acquire freedom, and yet lose no land. For all the vagueness of the scheme, it is not wholly to be denied sympathy, if we compare it with certain schemes of the period's liberals.

In the main, the *dvorianstvo* opposed emancipation. And prominent amongst those opposers was Speranski's political rival Karamzin. But he who expressed himself with supreme assurance as to what would come of giving the *krestianin* his liberty was Count Rostoptchin, a man reared, like Araktcheiev, in the Gatchina barracks. Evils did Rostoptchin foretell of emancipation equal to those brought upon France by the Revolution, and upon Russia by the incursions of Batu. Abruptly would he picture "a Rus broken in pieces, crushed beneath an alien yoke."

## CHAPTER XIX

Reaction—The affair of 14 December, 1825.

USUALLY the last ten years of Alexander's reign are described as a period of reaction, and therefore it might be well to point out the chief reasons for this. We have seen that after the campaigns of the years 1812–15 the Government resumed its plans of reform half-heartedly only. And, at that, those plans never so much as touched the main provinces of the Empire—they remained confined solely to such western outskirts as the new Kingdom of Poland and the *gubernii* of East Zealand, and proved largely unsuccessful even there. One of the reasons of this was that, by way of gratitude to Russia for having granted its country a Constitution, the Polish House of Representatives evinced such stubborn, virulent opposition in the Diet that the Emperor soon had to put an end to the Chamber's sittings in public, and to introduce an administrative system in supersession of the new constitutional institutions, an administrative system purely Russian of spirit. Also, as we have seen, the conditions governing the emancipation of the East Zealand *krestiané* rendered their position worse rather than better; whilst, equally, the operation of the Russian "Law Concerning Free Landworkers" proved so beset with restrictions as to make even the most humane of *pomiestchiki* chary of concluding agreements with their peasantry, and to bring it about that in a space of twenty years the Law enabled only 30,000 peasant souls, or three-tenths of one per cent. of the Empire's whole bonded population, to acquire freedom and a plot. Nor did the administrative institutions created earlier in the reign do much to renovate the country's political life, whilst, *per contra*, they still further aggravated the mal-adjustment of the political machine through the fact that, whereas the Central Superior Institutions (the State Council, the reformed Senate, and the Committee of Ministers) stood built upon the same Collegiate principle as Catherine's *gubernia* institutions, the Central Sub-Institutions (the Ministries and "Chief Administrations") stood built upon the old principle of personal

authority and responsibility. Indeed, had an observer who had been familiar with the State order of Catherine's later days been able to behold that State order as it had become by the year 1815, he would scarcely have guessed the first half of Alexander's reign to have elapsed at all, so faintly had the Emperor's initial efforts in reform skimmed the surface of Russian life, and disappeared. Alexander's early schemes failed sheerly because of their inherent non-continuity. True, at the base of his schemes, projected and substantiated alike, he laid the notion of legality, of general, fixed law, of law competent to curb the arbitrariness which reigned throughout both State life and social in their every sphere; but quite one-half of an estimated aggregate of 40,000,000 revisional souls still looked upon itself, whilst tacitly recognising the existing legal system, as dependent not so much upon that system as upon the landowners' freewill. Hence both private and civic relations still clashed with the State's established fundamental and public institutions. Those institutions, if they were to agree with historical logic, ought to have been planted in a soil of civic relations previously brought into harmony with the said institutions—whereupon the institutions would have grown thence as effect from productive cause. But Alexander's idea, rather, had been first of all to introduce the institutions, and then to create the relations: wherein he had contravened history's logic by prefacing productive cause with effect. Well, it was the weariness born of realising his failure in this respect, and, possibly, of realising his efforts' non-continuity, that first led him to reaction. And a second cause was foreign policy. The European political order which the Congress of Vienna established was but a highly artificial, a very strained, restoration of an old *régime* over whose decay historical sanction had spread a thin, sorry veneer. All too soon German students, Italian *carabinieri*, Turkish Serbs and Greeks, and the Spanish Cortes began to render the Holy Alliance's somnolent ease a troubled dream, and to force Alexander, the Alliance's originator and director, and Europe's indispensable leader against unquiet minds, to turn and see to intellectual quiescence, not in Europe, but at home. In short, further efforts in reform now became misplaced: it was time less to disturb minds, and to evoke intellectual activity, than to restrain minds, and to discipline them, and to instruct them.

From that time forth there becomes very important in our history

a Department the effects of whose activity necessarily expressed themselves only later. I refer to the Ministry of Education, an institution which in Alexander's reign acquired, for the first time, a political significance as well as a cultural. During the eighteenth century Russia possessed many educational establishments of purely circumscribed, specialised nature, and a few general-educational; but these did not mutually harmonise, and never became bound into a single whole. Only in 1782, when Catherine's reign was drawing to its close, was there elaborated a scheme for popular culture all round—a "Committee on Schools for the People" being formed for the purpose, and this Committee evolving a plan for a general, comprehensive system of popular-educational establishments. Under it each chief town of an *uezd* was to have opened in it a school of two classes, and each chief town of a *gubernia* a school of four classes, and certain leading towns a number of universities for those schools' direction, until the universities' total would exceed even our modern complement of such institutions. And though want of financial resources long caused the Committee's plans to remain largely paper plans, the new Ministry of Education did re-examine them in 1802, and develop some of them, and substantiate others, by converting the smaller schools into gymnasia of *uezdi*, and the larger schools into gymnasia of *gubernii*, and according to both of these series proper charters, *curricula*, and subsidies, whilst at the same time the Ministry let local communities open inferior, or parochial, schools on their own account. Also, for educational purposes the country was divided into districts which were to be subject to the above-mentioned projected universities, and the existing Universities of Dorpat, Vilna, and Moscow were reformed, and new universities opened at Kharkov and Kazan in 1805, and an Institute of Teachers established in St. Petersburg in 1816, and, later, transformed into the present University, and a new university opened at Warsaw in the year following, and plans for universities at Kiev, Tobolsk, and Ustug Veliki at least drafted. All of these establishments' charters conferred upon them a regular, uniform system of organisation, and gave them power to confer degrees, and prescribed that, irrespective of social class of recipient, those degrees should carry with them a right to enter the State's service. And if to all this we add the clergy schools reformed by charters of 1814, and endowed out of the ecclesiastical sale of candles monopoly, and likewise the military

academies which it was planned to establish in the chief towns of *gubernii*, we shall find the result to be a popular-educational system certainly complex, but, for all that, symmetrical. And the community received these effects on the part of the Ministry of Education with ardent sympathy, so that *dvorianin* individuals and associations readily helped the Government in its financial straits—set aside large sums for the new establishments' support: the *dvoriané* of Kharkov and Poltava enabled the former's new university to be opened, and a *dvorianin* named Demilov founded a secondary college at Yaroslavl, and Count Bezborodko organised a gymnasium at Nieshin, and in 1817 Richelieu, the French *émigré* Governor of Rossisk, assisted the Lycée Richelieu of Odessa to become operative.

Nevertheless the fact of these institutions' birth as the result of a sincere official desire for diffusion of learning, and for the task's settlement upon a sound basis, did not prevent a change in the Government's educational attitude after 1815. Norov, the first Superintendent to be set over the new educational district of St. Petersburg, once remarked that "customarily light is born of fire, and possibly it may come also to consume." So after the year 1815 the Government took for its educational objective discovery of some light which should be without the potential consuming tendency—should illuminate without the risk of flame, or, in other words, lighten without the presence of light. Thus, a Law of 24 October, 1817, amalgamated the Ministry of Education with the Office of the Holy Synod, and then the new joint institution, after re-entitlement as the Ministry of Spiritual Affairs and Public Instruction, indicated as the direction which popular education was thenceforth to follow the idea that the basis of all true enlightenment is, exclusively, Christian piety. Popular education, in other words, was now to rest upon the principles of the Holy Alliance, and those principles' additional furtherance was made the care jointly of a "Chief Administration of Schools," and of an "Educational Committee"—the latter in particular receiving an "Instruction" that in future the best possible scholastic manuals must be used towards permeating the community with "a salutary concord between faith and knowledge and authority," between, that is to say, Christian piety, intellectual enlightenment, and the existing order of State. To the headship of the new joint Department there was appointed a close confidant of

the Emperor's, Prince Golitzin, a virtuous, almost fanatically devout man who held to no religious creed in particular. And the first step taken towards attaining the desired "salutary concord between faith and knowledge and authority" was a series of measures for regulation of all existing educational establishments, both superior and inferior. The clearest expression of the tendency now sought to be impartial to popular education is to be found in an "Instruction" which, dated 17 January, 1820, was dispatched to the Head of the Scholastic-Inspectional Department, and also to the Rector of the University of Kazan. Certain unpleasant rumours as to the tutorial tendency at that University had, it seems, reached the Government's ears, and so there was dispatched thither a Departmental ex-colleague of Speranski's, and present colleague of Golitzin's, named Magintski. And after six days' sojourn at the University Magintski returned to report that beyond doubt both strict legality and common equity called for suppression of the institution—and for public suppression at that. This report, however, the Emperor merely docketed with "Nevertheless, why suppress? Amendment were better": after which he committed the task of "amendment" to Magintski himself, appointed him the University's "Warden," and sent him back to Kazan with the "Instruction" above-mentioned. The "Instruction" had for its aim consortment of the University's teaching with the principles of the Holy Alliance. Hence, as a document directed against tutorial freethought and presumption, it furnished guidance as regards tutelage in each and every educational subject, and likewise made regulations as regards the students' personal behaviour. Study of the historical, philosophical, political, and literary sciences was, the "Instruction" said, to be ruled exclusively by Holy Writ and the Fathers. And professors' inculcation of the physical, mathematical, and medical sciences was also to follow the Bible, or at all events to adhere to the Biblical standpoint. And as regards the students themselves, they were, by regulation, to be formed into a sort of quasi-monastical body, and to be governed as strictly as though they were under a monasterial charter, and to observe the full round of the Liturgical Offices. Naturally, the result of this insensate conservatism was to cause scientific education to deteriorate, and hypocrisy to increase. Wherever the teaching of professors became suspect those professors were made to resign their professorial chairs. Instances occurred both at Kharkov and at St. Petersburg. But

the greatest stir of all was caused by the trial of professors named Galitch, Raupach, Hermann, and Arseniev, arraigned for improper tendentiousness of instruction at the Metropolitan University. True, the trial was so conducted that subsequently the Senate quashed its sentences, and declared the proceedings to have been altogether irregular; yet the professors still had to go. Even the country's gymnasia too were subjected to restraint of the sort: they were, by an Order of 1822, bidden to delete instruction in natural law and political jurisprudence from their courses, and to make a corresponding increase of instruction in the Russian and classical languages, and, with that, to devote less time to rhetoric and poetry.

Naturally, this ever-increasing tendency of the second half of Alexander's reign caused the people more and more to succumb to despondency, and that despondency, as one and another source fed it further, to tend to discontent outright. Above all did this come to be the case with the community's more cultured section, now that it saw dashed to the ground the political hopes which the earlier years of the reign had aroused. Never before had that section so experienced a disappointment of expectations; never before had the painfully reformed Administration acted in so sorry a way; never before had the country seen to grow amongst its officials every sort of knavery, of trickery, of fraud, and of embezzlement. In time even the Emperor found himself moved to astonishment at his new institutions' speedy deterioration. And to this, next, there became added disorganisation of economy, both State and popular, with a fall of the exchange value of the Treasury note until seventy-five per cent. of the rouble's worth was gone, and an incubus of high prices ensued. Also, with material tribulation there went moral; there began to run through the community rumours that the Emperor now was indifferent to, or even actively contemptuous of, everything Russian, and had dubbed Russians "either knaves or fools." The national pride, too, was hurt both by the sacrifices which had been made to the Holy Alliance's policy and by the Monarch's preference for Poland—his proposal to re-establish her not only within her boundaries of old, but within them as swelled with Russia's western provinces in addition. And these elements, concentrating, coagulating, gradually drove inwards the social unrest which Alexander's early reforms had evoked, and which the years of warfare had increased, until the dissatisfaction latent turned for a remedy to secret societies,

and those secret societies' activity developed into the catastrophe of 14 December, 1825.

Let us examine the history of that catastrophe. About it there have long reigned, and still are reigning, amongst our community and in our literature some highly fantastic notions. By some people the affair is viewed as a political revolution. By others it is conceived to have been a political misfortune memorable only with bitter regret. However, we can follow the movement step by step, through the aid alike of statements and confessions made by participators at their trial and of, as regards the history, growth, and character of the affair, Departmental documents and extraneous witnesses' circumstantial and impartial testimony. Particularly is the affair's history necessary to us if we are rightly to appraise the affair's importance in the record of the nineteenth century. So let us duly review that history.

Merely need we devote a few words to the secret societies which gave rise to the catastrophe of 14 December. The term "secret society" did not then possess the sinister significance which later it acquired, when Masonic lodges took to rendering our more educated public familiar with the form of social activity connoted: secret societies, at the time of the catastrophe, attained formation as easily as joint-stock companies do now, and held meetings describable as "secret" only in the sense that they were kept hidden from extraneous persons, and not in the sense that the Government did not know of them, or that the members of such societies were not, in the public eye, merely elected delegates to their societies, or Sectarians, rather than conspirators. Nor were such gatherings ever molested by the police, and right up to 1 August, 1822, participation even of Government *chinovniki* in such bodies was tacitly permitted. Only on the date just named did an *ukaz* ordain an interrogation of all persons in Treasury employ as to whether they belonged to a Masonic or other such association, and their compulsory signature of an undertaking that they would neither join nor form such associations in future. The truth is that experience of the events of the campaigns of 1812-15 led many young officers to enter upon, for the first time, discussion of their country's position, and to declare a soldier's duty to involve not only his country's defence through warlike means, but the State's service through peaceful. In fact, even a handful of young officers could not find themselves together in barrack-room



or quarters without again raising the subject of Russia's ills, her people's stubbornness, the bonded *krestiané's* plight, official extortion and venality, and the period's contemptuous view of the human ego.

In particular, there became formed in St. Petersburg in 1816, under the presidency of Prince Trubetskoi, Colonel of the Preobrazhenskis, and a General Staff officer named Nikita Muraviev, a circle composed predominantly of members of the Guards and the General Staff. And this circle took for its special, but rather nebulous, task a "helping of the Government in its good intentions," whilst in 1817 it assumed the titles variously of "The Union of Salvation" and "The Union of True, Faithful Sons of the Fatherland," and by the next year, constantly growing in numbers, had fitted itself out with a charter on the lines of that of the *Tugenbund* (the German patriotic association by which the national rising against the French had been organised), and re-defined its purpose (this time with more precision) as not only a "helping of the Government in its good intentions," but also a helping of the country to win the representative administrative form, and once more given itself a title—this time that of "The Union of Welfare." For the society stood quite assured that even the Emperor would sympathise with its projects. In fact, a proposal even was made to ask him to grant it a licence outright. Then in the society's ranks—now augmented more than ever, mostly with military members—there took place a split, in consequence of certain of the society's more headstrong members expressing views from which their comrades shrank; and from the surviving elements there sprang two new Unions—a "Northern" and a "Southern," with the former having its centre in St. Petersburg, and being presided over by Nikita Muraviev and Nikolai Turgenev, and possessing, after 1823, a prominently influential member in Kondratii Ryleiev (an ex-artillery officer whom the *dvorianstvo* had elected to serve as one of its representatives in the Treasury, and who at the same time managed the affairs of a concern known as the Russo-North American Trading Company), and with the Southern Union (a body composed of officers of the Army Corps drawn from Kiev and Polotsk) having its centre at Tultchin, and being presided over by a man named Pestel whose father had, whilst Governor-General of Siberia, earned notoriety for venal dealings. The views neither of the one Union nor of the other were very definite, but at least they contained this

difference of tendency, that, whilst the cultured, masterful Pestel bent the Southern Union mostly to favour a republican form of notions, Nikolai Turgenev's more moderating influence inclined the Northern Union, rather, towards a programme of a constitutional-monarchical nature. Meanwhile the two Unions' existence remained no secret from the Government—least of all from Alexander, who not only was personally acquainted with many of the Unions' members, but was familiar with the Unions' programmes, and read some of the members' schemes, and had hinted as much to those members, and, in particular, strongly recommended Nikolai Turgenev to amend the error of his ways. Turgenev, as a matter of fact, did eventually resign, and go abroad, where he lived to become the Unions' historian. Yet never were actually overt measures taken against the enterprises conceived by the two associations.

The Emperor died at Taganrog (whither he had taken the Empress because of her ill-health) on 19 November, 1825. And upon that there ensued the famous imbroglio with regard to the Imperial succession. The source of the matter was that, though, by the Law of 5 April, 1797, the late Emperor's younger brother, Constantine, came next in order, he had earlier renounced his successional rights, and the throne therefore stood due to pass to the next brother, Nicholas, a course consented to by the family two years previously, and embodied in a Manifesto formally declaring Nicholas to be the legal heir. But for some reason known only to himself Alexander had never made the contents of the Manifesto generally public, nor even communicated their precise tenor to the heir in person—he had merely had the Manifesto inscribed in triplicate, endorsed its three copies with "Not to be opened until after my death," and deposited them with, respectively, the authorities of the Uspenski Cathedral in Moscow, the Senate in St. Petersburg, and the Council of State in the same city. And now the result was that, on the news of the Emperor's decease reaching the capital, Nikolai, of course, took an oath of allegiance to Constantine, and Constantine (who was acting as Governor-General in Warsaw) took an oath of allegiance to Nicholas. And whilst negotiations for Constantine's formal renunciation of the throne were passing a military revolt broke out in the capital.

Participants in the event have since said that it never would have occurred at all had precautionary measures been taken in time, or had the confusion over the matter of the succession never arisen.

However that may be, the movement began with the leaders of it working upon a section of the soldiery (never, of course, dreaming that Constantine was going to resign in favour of the already unpopular Nicholas), and telling them that Constantine had been arrested, and that Nicholas was scheming to effect acquisition of the throne by force. Then, led away by these rumours, a portion of the Moskovski Guards seized upon the day appointed for swearing allegiance to Nicholas to march out on to the Place of the Senate with unfurled colours, to form square, and to fall to shouting "Hurrah for Constantine!" and also "Hurrah for Constitutsia!"—naively believing "Constitutsia" to be the name of Constantine's Polish consort, since they knew at least that the Grand Duke had taken to himself a lady in that country, and, for the rest—well, Polish folk sometimes *are* rather strangely named. Then to the soldiers of the Moskovski Regiment there added themselves some Grenadiers and the Division of Marine Guards, until eventually these stood mustered on the Place of the Senate, and exposed to all the damp frigidity of a St. Petersburg breeze in winter, a block of fully 2,000 men. Meanwhile the new Emperor, whilst mustering to himself the troops which had remained faithful, wished to avoid bloodshed, and therefore sent to parley with the rebels Miloradovitch, Governor-General of the capital. Unfortunately, the attempt proved unsuccessful. No sooner had Miloradovitch turned round to retire than, before the assailant's brother officers could intervene, a lieutenant named Khakovski shot him in the back, and he fell dead. True, the lieutenant's colleagues at once repudiated the deed, but even when some of the clergy, with cross and robed Metropolitan at their head, arrived to make another attempt at mediation only failure again was experienced. At last General Toll, just home from Poland, sought the Emperor with the words, "Your Majesty, either let us clear the Place with gun-fire or abdicate." So guns were brought to the spot, loaded with blank, and fired. No effect resulted. Then live shell was used, and the men scattered. A third round added to the number of corpses.

There the movement ended. Of the multitude subsequently arrested, one hundred and twenty-one persons were brought to trial before the Supreme Court, and five of these were sentenced to be hanged, and one hundred and sixteen to be deported. The five persons hanged were the leaders of the two Unions, namely, Pestel

Bestuzhev-Riumin and Sergei Muraviev - Apostol as regards the Southern Union, and Ryleiev and Khakovski as regards the Northern. All of them had apprehended failure, and expressed as much on the enterprise's very eve; but Ryleiev had insisted with the words, "None the less, we ought to make a beginning."

Such were at all events some of the details of the affair's origin and development. Externally it would seem to be reminiscent of the eighteenth century's *révolutions de palais*, since both then and in the present case those who took part in the movement were the Guards, and both then and in the present case the movement came of a question connected with the succession, and acted under a standard inscribed with the name of some particular individual, even as we have just seen the standard to bear the name of Constantine. Necessarily men of the day who viewed the affair at close quarters, and remembered the eighteenth-century revolutions, likened the affair to them. In particular, interesting notes by Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, a relative of the Empress-Mother, who visited St. Petersburg shortly before the occurrence in question, have in them an item that, happening to meet Miloradovitch at court, and to hear him give utterance to a doubt as to whether, in view of the Guards' strong attachment to Constantine, the ceremony of swearing allegiance to Nikolai would pass off successfully, the Prince inquired what exactly the term "successfully" signified, whilst adding: "If Constantine should continue to insist upon renunciation, surely we may look to see the throne pass peacefully to the Grand Duke Nicholas? What have the Guards to do with it all?" "This much," was the Governor-General's reply, "that though the Guards certainly have no right to interfere, such has, for ages, been their custom, until they have made it exclusively one of their own." Nevertheless there did exist between the Decembrist movement and the eighteenth-century *révolutions de palais* this profound difference, that, whilst the standard of 14 December bearing the name of Constantine was meant for soldiers whose rising, they were assured, would be on behalf of a wronged Grand Duke and his consort "Constitutsia," the movement's leaders cared as little about the one name as the other, since what they really were working for was, not an individual at all, but a system—their idea was first of all to declare the throne vacant, and then to form a five-membered Provisional Government of which Pestel and Speranski were to constitute part.

None of the eighteenth-century court affairs were initiated on behalf of a system. But, thoroughly to understand how the difference came about, we need to know exactly what was the character of the Decembrist participants. All of them were military men of the old, original *dvorianstvo*. But also all of them were men of a certain age and certain views. Wherefore they represented less their class than a generation of that class. To be precise, of the hundred and twenty-one persons put upon trial after the affair, twelve only were over the age of thirty-five, and four only over the age of forty, whilst, of the rest, even the eldest had been born only during Catherine's later years, and the younger ones dated from more recently still—from Paul's reign, and from Alexander's earlier period; they included few men older than the late Emperor, and fewer yet contemporary with him. This means that the movement of December came of a generation of *dvoriani* standing in a position which our history had not witnessed previously, and has not witnessed since. Between the generation in question and Catherine's Voltairians there was an intimate connection. For some of the sharers in the Decembrist movement the connection was purely genealogical—their fathers had been Catherinian freethinkers. And for others the connection was a moral connection, come of identity of intellectual form. We know already what was the Catherinian freethinker's character, and know that he represented in the history of our cultural progress a "transitional point," as serving to transmit a certain intellectual influence from one epoch to another; as also that, in so doing, he transmitted to his sons political ideals which they knew not exactly how to use. Another thing which he transmitted to those sons was his education, so that the Decembrists were reared precisely after the paternal fashion. That is clear from scrutiny of the list of Decembrists brought to trial—of, that is to say, the columns on the list which contain notes on the accused's previous tutelage. The Decembrists, we see from those notes, had, in most cases, been educated in the Marine Cadet Corps, which always was a disseminator of liberal doctrines. And some had been educated by home *gouverneurs*, and others, for example, the Brothers Muraviev (the well-known Ambassador's sons), at the Pension Gix of Paris, and others at pensions of Moscow or of St. Petersburg, and just a few (Pestel was one) at the University of Leipzig, and just one or two at the University of Moscow. Inevitably education of the sort

set those men as remote from Russian actuality as their fathers had stood. Yet, with that, the sons had not grown up under the same influences as their fathers had experienced. The impressions derived from the influences acting upon the sons had made the character of those sons entirely different. Very many of them could still remember the enthusiasm with which Alexander's Government had been greeted when first it had started upon the road of reform. And many of them, too, had been through the campaigns of 1812-15, and observed things abroad, more especially the respective positions of peasantries abroad, and then had, on returning home in a consciousness of having taken part in events to decide the fate of nations, found themselves newly interested in their own country, and desirous of applying to her the things seen abroad, and disposed to compare foreign systems of State with the State system at home, and to adapt to Russia such theories of other nations' social institutions as they had either beheld operative on the spot or read of in books procured outside of Russia. Of which constant consideration of their country's position the ultimate result was to set those officers in a peculiar relation as regards their country's actuality. From contemporary testimony we know that all of those young participants were men good-hearted, cultured, clever, eager in their country's service, and animated in their action only by the purest motives. The unfortunate point was that, therewith, they were lacking in practical experience and knowledge of the world, of men, and affairs, whilst all the time they were burning with indignation at wrongs which their fathers had never even heeded. Those fathers had known little of Russian actuality, and had ignored it. The sons, however, did not ignore it—they converted their sires' æsthetical-philosophical abstractions into political aspirations, and in their agitated minds Russian actuality inevitably loomed in the darkest possible light. A Collegiate Councillor of the name of Kuchelbecker, one of the few non-military members in either of the two Unions, said at his and his comrades' trial that the reason above all others which had drawn him into the enterprise had been the moral decline initiated amongst the people by oppression, since, as he had contemplated the brilliant qualities with which God had dowered the Russian people, and through which that people had won a foremost place in the world for might and glory, and for such a sonorous, virile tongue as no other quarter of Europe could show,

and for a kindliness and a gentleness and an intelligence altogether unique, he had felt heart-stricken at the thought that possibly all this would nevertheless sink crushed to earth, and wither away, and bring forth no moral fruit. In short, the Catherinian freethinker's careless, sentimental cosmopolitanism became, in the Decembrist, a patriotic despondency. The ideas with which the Voltairian mind had decked itself out took to themselves flesh, in the Decembrist, and expressed themselves as patriotic yearnings. Unfortunately, something more than merely observation and reflection was needed before a sober outlook upon the position of affairs could be developed. And neither of the Unions ever succeeded in working out a programme admitting, as a whole, of practical substantiation, whilst, curiously enough, anything in their members' schemes that was substantiable had either been initiated already or had figured in the projects of Speranski. So this was where the historical difference between the Decembrists' generation and the generation of their fathers lay: that, whereas those fathers had been Russians educated to become Frenchmen, the fathers' sons were French-educated men longing to become Russian.

Such the Decembrist catastrophe's significance in our history. Yet we should do wrong to suppose that that catastrophe was the direct cause of the tendency of the following reign, for the tendency in question owed its origin to quite a different source, and in any case would have operated even if the Decembrist affair had never occurred at all. Hence I find it difficult to agree with a writer of the period who, with the affair's impressions fresh upon him, said that Russia had thereby been put back half a century. In any event, to put back by so much that which already had advanced a few steps would have been impossible.

Also, the Decembrist catastrophe has its special importance in the history of the *dvorianstvo*, for the reason that it was the last purely *dvorianin* movement. Up to that time the *dvorianstvo* constituted the community's ruling class, with a status created for it by the eighteenth-century revolutions of Guards' management: but now, with the affair, the *dvorianstvo* once more became merely the local organ of the Central Administration which it had been during the seventeenth century, and its political role became definitely terminated.

## CHAPTER XX

The reign of Nicholas I—His programme and personality—His legislative work—His central and provincial institutions—The question of the bonded *krestianstvo*—Conclusion.

THERE remains to us now only study of the last stage of the period, as represented by the reign of Nicholas I. And therein I will confine myself solely to two particular processes which that reign saw attain to completion. The two processes in question were a political and a social, with the former comprised in changes introduced into the administrative order, and the latter comprised in measures designed to recast the community's social relations. And even with regard to those I will expound merely the principal phenomena which distinguished both.

It is usual to look upon Nicholas's reign as a period of reaction, and to consider that that reaction was aimed not only at the tendencies of the sort expressed in the Decembrist movement, but at the preceding reign's programme, and at it throughout. But the judgment is not wholly correct: Nicholas took for his policy only change of the programme adopted during the *second* half of the reign before his own, and only, at that, in so far as that he made his policy once more bring to the front questions hitherto relegated to the background. Alexander's Government had sought to alter the bases of the State order without first of all preparing suitable private and civic relations, the relations which make up a people's workaday life. And then, when Alexander's reign had entered upon its second half, the Government had abandoned its programme as regards the first of that programme's two portions, and yet made no resolute approach to substantiation of the second. Hence Alexander's successor resolved that, even though the first portion of that programme should still be left abandoned, he would convert at least the second into a reality. He did so through methods largely attributable to the character of his personality.

Nicholas was born on 25 June, 1796, and, like his younger



brother Michael, formed one of the Emperor Paul's second generation of issue. Yet his education differed widely from the education given to his elders, Alexander and Constantine, in that, whereas Alexander and Constantine spent a boyhood whence they derived political ideas galore, and very little knowledge of political realities, Nicholas received, as a boy, very little political training, and absorbed very few social notions, yet became familiar with the course of affairs, and was able simply and directly to contemplate the State's chief workers, and to acquire information, and to draw inferences, about life in abundance. True, until he was eighteen he held no definite post of State, but at least he spent an hour, or more, each morning at the court reception, and mingled freely with the crowd of military and civilian notables who might be awaiting their turn for audience, or for presentation of report. And as these notables felt in no way restrained by the company of a Grand Duke whom they thought never likely to succeed to the throne, but indulged at liberty in conversation and badinage and initiation of or continuance of intrigue, Nicholas could make free use of his powers of observation, and gain illuminating intelligence concerning one and another personage, and see how things were done. Until at last the sum of his impressions stood at the definite conclusion that one needs not only to possess a plan of action, but also to superintend that plan's fulfilment in detail. Hence there lay between his view-point of affairs and that of his elder brother the difference that, whereas the latter saw the State's mechanism from above, Nicholas saw it from below. And subsequently Nicholas made this view-point the basis of his whole programme of policy, a programme not of introducing innovations into the bases or the forms of the State order, but of working up that order's already existent items, and causing measures to agree with their executants, and doing all this, too, without the participation of the community—yes, even if such a course should involve suppression of social independence. Such the proposed aims and methods of the new ruler. In sum they meant that policy was to have for its foundation revision rather than reform, and systematisation of laws rather than legislation.

The last-mentioned task, of course, was one which every Government during the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth had failed to accomplish: but at last, in Nicholas's reign, it was duly brought to completion. The Commission for the purpose

was the "Committee for Composition of Laws" which had been formed in 1804, and placed under the Council of State: and now, on 31 January, 1826, it was constituted again, appended, as a second section, to the Emperor's Privy Chancellory, and subjected to his personal and independent direction. One of the men whom he invited to assist him in connection with its labours was Speranski, an expert in such work. This statesman had at one time, as we have seen, been sent into retirement; but after terms of seclusion at Nizhni Novgorod and Perm, of service as Governor of Penza, and of service as Governor-General of Siberia, he had once more returned to St. Petersburg, and brought with him a plan for Siberian administration which he had worked out whilst performing his duties there. He himself says that by the time of his return to the capital he had quite resigned his great reform schemes of 1812, and "become but a humble delver in legal soil"; but, for all that, it was with energy unabated that he arrived in Russia once more, even if it was with ardour a little sobered and cooled. First of all he collected his legislative material: four years did he spend in ransacking archives and chancellories, and unearthing thence every possible Act and Ordinance subsequent to 1649. Then he put the whole into chronological order. Lastly, he, in 1830, published with its help a compendium entitled *A Complete Collation of the Laws of the Russian Empire*. The *Collation* in question consisted of forty-five large volumes, and contained over 30,600 sections or memoranda. And to these, again, there became added volumes giving tables and lists and alphabetical and chronological indices. But as this compendium's purpose was merely to serve as the initial source whence operative legislation of the future was to be drawn, Speranski went on from that to take out of the collection the laws as existent, to fashion each of those laws into a separate article, to select from each article the portions suitable, and, of those portions, to refurbish the obsolete, and to reduce them and the rest to order. Finally, the articles thus treated having been fashioned into integral ordinances, statutes, and regulations, according to the speciality of each, and these, again, having been reduced to order, Speranski published, in 1833, his *Digest of All the Laws of the Russian Empire*.

In this *Digest* there were included fifteen volumes and 42,000 articles. The contents of it were as follows. In volumes i-iii there were set forth the existing "laws fundamental and

constitutional"—the existing laws to define the competencies and operative systems of the State's higher administrative institutions. And in volumes iv–viii there were set forth the existing "laws on State resources"—the existing laws on the State's dues, revenues, and properties in general. And in volume ix there were set forth the existing "laws on conditions"—on social classes. And in volume x there were set forth the existing "laws civil and of métayage." And in volumes xi–xiv there were set forth the existing laws on "proper State management and control." And in volume xv there were set forth the existing criminal laws. Likewise, Speranski accompanied all this with supervision of the composition of a number of special and local codices—a *Compendium of Russia's Military Ordinances*, a codex relating to East Zealand and the Western *gubernii* exclusively, and so forth.

Merely if we throw a cursory glance at the contents of the *Digest* we shall perceive its faults. For the work was, in excess, massed raw material, massed extract of Russia's legislative substance. Hence it was too bulky to constitute a convenient reference source, whether for individuals or for institutions. Speranski himself looked upon it merely as the basement upon which the legislative edifice of the future was to be reared. Yet, when all is said and done, we see in the work Russia's first complete exposition and systematisation of her operative enactments.

During Nicholas's reign the administrative institutions of the State remained as before, but nevertheless had introduced into them technical emendations and re-formations and additions—a process causing the administrative system as a whole to become complicated yet further. The chancelleries underwent a particular amount of development, for the Council of State had added to it, as a fifth section, a Department for Poland (a proceeding rendering the reconstructed Council more complicated yet), and the Senate had introduced into it two new Departments for Warsaw (a proceeding involving a like degree of complication), and the ten Ministries had appended to them a Ministry of Treasury Lands and *Krestiané*, and the Committee on Petitions to the Throne, an institution hitherto acting in attachment to the Council of State, was made a separate institution altogether, and, lastly, there became formed a *Sobstvennaia Kantzeliaria*, or Privy Chancellory under the Emperor's sole and independent direction, with one section of it to scrutinise documents requiring

the Imperial Assent, and to get them ready for that act, and to supervise execution of Imperial commands, and a second section to systematise legislation, and a third to manage affairs connected with the superior police, and a fourth to administer the Empress Maria's charitable institutions and educational establishments. I have cited these details in full because I specially wish to show how the Central Administration came to be organised in Nicholas's time.

Changes in the administrative system of the provinces, on the other hand, were fewer, since the *gubernia* institutions of 1775 continued to operate there on the bases of old, and the *dvorianstvo*-staffed institutions alone underwent alteration. We have seen that by Catherine's Act the *dvorianstvo* had accorded to it a marked predominance in local administration. But now, though the institutions wherein the *dvorianstvo's* participation as regards administrative and judicial dispensation found its maximum of expression remained established on their original footing, those institutions none the less had introduced into them certain amendments. For one thing, the class had its administrative-legal rights with respect to *dvorianin* assemblies and elections subjected to clearer definition: an Order issued in December, 1831, drew a sharp distinction, with reference to *dvorianin* local service, between the *dvorianin* right to take part in, and to vote at, a *dvorianin* assembly and the *dvorianin* right to take part in, but not to vote at, an assembly of the kind. For thenceforth the right of the vote on such an occasion was to pertain only to the hereditary *dvorianin* aged at least twenty-one whose service of State had brought him at all events to rank in the fourteenth service class, or who had for not less than three years held a *dvorianstvo*-elective post, and likewise possessed immovable property up to a stated amount in the *gubernia*; whilst, in addition, the right of the vote was to be dual—it was to consist, firstly, of qualification to vote on all assembly matters save elections to posts, and, secondly, of qualification to vote on all assembly matters, and likewise, selectively, on elections. Again, it was enacted that the right to vote should be conditioned by the extent and the quality of the *dvorianin's* immovable property. Also, the vote could be recorded either independently or by proxy, but the former of these rights was only to pertain, firstly, to a *dvorianin* who owned a minimum of a hundred bonded souls, or, alternatively, had got a minimum of a hundred free souls settled upon his land by voluntary agreement, and, secondly, to a *dvorianin*

who owned a minimum of three thousand *desiatini* of tillable (even if hitherto unsettled) land in the *gubernia*. *Dvoriané* not qualified individually in the foregoing agrarian regard were to form joint qualifying units for the purpose, choose one of their number for proxy, and empower him to attend *dvorianin* assemblies as their representative.

Another *dvorianin* right which now underwent extension was the *dvorianin* right to appoint the staffs of the *gubernii's pravlenia* and principal legal tribunals. We have seen that with regard to the legal system of the *gubernii* Paul annulled in that system the class institutions—the *verkhni zemski sud*, the *gubernski magistrat*, and the *verkhnaia zemskaia rasprava*. Also we have seen that, though Alexander, for his part, did not restore them, he opened up participation in the process of appointing the staffs of the two *palati* (the criminal and the civil) by giving the class a right to elect to those hitherto exclusively Crown-staffed institutions two assessors, in order that the latter might sit with the *palati's* Crown-appointed presidents and counsel. But now an Ordinance of 6 February, 1831, equalised *dvorianin* service with Crown outright by according the class a privilege of nominating two candidates for each presidency of a *palata*—of which two candidates, in each case, one was subsequently to receive the Sovereign's final choice.

And yet another *dvorianin* right now underwent extension. This right was the right of making representations to the Central Institutions. Under the *gubernia* system of 1775 the *dvorianstvo* had been permitted to petition those Institutions only with regard to purely corporate needs of the class; but now, by a law of 1831, the class became competent to petition the Central Institutions also as to the work of checking local abuses, and as to removal of irregularities in local administration, if detected—or, in other words, the class became competent to address the Central Institutions on the subject of a locality's whole needs, and on the subject of the needs of a whole local community's every social section.

All this shows clearly that, in spite of the Government's fundamental idea in the matter, the *dvorianstvo*, during the nineteenth century, acquired more local administrative importance than ever. Nevertheless the character of the class's increased share in local government differed from formerly in the fact that now the *dvorianstvo*-staffed institutions became institutions worked solely

by the Crown. We see the principle most incisively illustrated in a process of reorganisation of the provincial police. In 1837 a law framed by Bludovoi, then Minister of the Interior, centred all local police matters in the *nizhni zemski sud*, or inferior local court, of the *uezd*, under an *ispravnik* chosen by the *dvoriané* of the *uezd*. But, with that, the law divided the *uezd* into a number of *stani*, police areas, under *stanovoi pristavi*, district police inspectors, of Crown nomination alone.

Hence, as we look at the structure of *dvorianin* local administration consequent upon these alterations, we see that it had the result of placing *dvorianin* service on a level with Crown, but, at the same time, of converting the old *dvorianin* class institutions into mere auxiliary organs of the Crown administrative system. Once upon a time the *dvorianstvo* was supplementary to the *chinovnichestvo*. Now the *chinovnichestvo* absorbed it. These changes at once completed the bureaucratic system and made of that system a machine highly complicated throughout, and particularly developed at the centre. The machine's working is best illustrated in the documentary output ceaselessly achieved by the Emperor's Privy Chancellory. The free social classes took no part in this bureaucratic process at the centre, and only one of them did so in the provinces, and that but to a very meagre degree—solely in local affairs. The result was a disparity of growth between the administrative system at the centre and the administrative system in the provinces which caused the former to become a huge piece of chancellorial mechanism for which the latter had to continue working solely with the aid of its old resources. Annually the Central Chancellories dispatched to the *gubernii's* institutions hundreds of thousands of documents—all of them numbered, and so bring it about that, despite their best efforts towards due performance of duty upon documents, those institutions hardly could cope with the perpetual flood, and sometimes became overwhelmed with it to the point of having less to give matters proper attention than to hasten to effect of them a "clearance." At last the prime administrative task of the provinces came to be not accomplishment of business at all, but evacuation of paper, and the prime task of the artificially bolstered up central administrative system to be implementation of such paper. In short, the community and its interests were made wholly subservient to the *chinovnik*, even though the machine's very complexity rendered it impossible for the

machine's drivers to see to the proper operation of its every working part. So, though the machine functioned tirelessly, it as steadily, as tirelessly, weakened from the top downwards. With some reason did Nicholas once remark that "now not the Sovereign, but the *stolonachnik*,<sup>1</sup> directs all things in Russia."

Then through how much work did the bureaucratic machine usually get? A single instance will suffice. At the time of Nicholas's accession he was, to his dismay, informed that pending in the various tribunals under the Ministry of Justice there were no fewer than 2,800,000 cases, and that out of them as many as 127,000 persons were making a living at the Treasury's expense. And did the machine work the better, the more rapidly, for its achievement of complexity? Again a single instance, a return furnished by the Ministry of Justice in 1842, will suffice. From it we see that no fewer than 3,300,000 cases then were pending in the various legal institutions, and that for their exposition on paper no fewer than 33,000,000 folios had been used. So much for the Ministry of Justice alone: and probably as many more cases again were pending in each of the other Ministries. Sometimes the machine's complexity even led to occurrences now seeming to us fabulous outright. An instance is that during the late twenties and early thirties the Muscovite Department of the Senate had lying before it a case which related to farming of taxes. Fifteen chief secretaries were employed upon the case, and the extract of it for report alone called for 15,000 sheets of paper, and the full exposition of it called for sheets by the hundred thousand. Yet when the case, on application, was ordered to be transferred to St. Petersburg, and its documents had been loaded on to wagons, the wagons all came to grief between the two capitals, and, with them, their documentary freights.

Naturally, such an administrative-mechanical development rendered working costs increasingly heavy. To estimate what really this meant in Nicholas's reign let us take the following figures. Up to the year 1842 there were distributed to the *chinovnichestvo* (over and above, of course, that body's standard salaries) State properties rented out at four per cent., and bringing in a return equal to the return on a monetary capital of 750,000 roubles. And this is to make no mention of 1,000,000 *desiatini* of non-populated State lands,

<sup>1</sup> Head of a table or desk.

as *chinovniki's* property outright, and not, as in the above case, let to them on twelve-year leases.

However, as Nicholas's reign approached its close the community did begin to realise that, owing to the bureaucratic machine having successfully close-locked itself within its chancellories, its mechanism had become too ponderous for its purpose to be attained. True, nothing was done in the matter during the reign itself, nor were the classes then equalised, nor was class political activity in common increased in any way; but at least, during that time, the Government tackled the question of placing social relations upon a new basis, as the question which, in its essence, consisted of the problem of the *krestianstvo's* position.

At the time of the Eighth Revision in 1836 the Russian community stood made up as follows. The population of Russia, exclusive of Poland and Finland, but inclusive of Siberia, amounted to 50,000,000. Of this population nine-tenths was a rural population. And of this rural population 25,000,000 persons were bonded *krestiané*, and 20,000,000 were variously State or Treasury *krestiané* and *krestiané* of the *udieli* (estates set aside by the Act of 5 April, 1797, for the Imperial Family's upkeep). The remaining 5,000,000 of the popular total consisted of *dvorianstvo*, clergy, *chinovnichestvo*, guild citizens, and middle and lower urban grades. Only the upper classes enjoyed full civil rights. And those upper classes, of course, formed a comparatively negligible percentage of the population—to be precise, they, at the time of the Sixth Revision, comprised 350,000 *dvoriané*, 272,000 clergy, and 128,000 urban guild members. If, then, we exclude the *chinovnichestvo*, the popular section enjoying civil rights in full amounted to no more than 750,000 persons. So now this immense preponderance of individuals lacking complete complement of citizenship left the Government no choice but once more to consider the question of popular reorganisation. From the first, indeed, Nicholas kept the question before him, and especially as regards the bonded *krestiané*, even though in his Accessional Manifesto of 12 May, 1826, he said that no change was going to be wrought in their position. Later, in 1834, on his statesman Kisilev once happening to wait upon him, he pointed to a pile of rolls in a corner of his study, and explained that from the first moment of his occupancy of the throne he had been collecting pertinent documents towards a proper opportunity of



attacking serfdom, so greatly did he desire to set the bonded *krestiané* at liberty. And, certainly, he, on his accession, constituted a series of secret committees (secret because he wished it all to be done quietly, and solely through bureaucratic means), and charged those committees to scrutinise every existent enactment bearing upon the rural-industrial statuses. But though the first committee operated from December, 1826, until 1830, and, during that time, considered a Memorandum on the subject by Speranski, and although a suitable Ordinance achieved print and the State Council's approval, Constantine, Governor-General of Poland, intervened to put difficulties in the way because of a Polish outbreak, and so did the July Revolution.

Accordingly, unable to advance to a decision direct, the Government next sought to prepare for one indirectly, and, to that end, opened, in 1833, a new Ministry of State Properties, an institution designed to reorganise at least the Treasury *krestiané's* economic circumstances in such a way that the amended position of those *krestiané* should thereafter serve for a model for reorganisation of the remaining sections of the free *krestians tvo*. Into the scope of the new Ministry there fell 9,000,000 revisional souls and 90,000,000 tillable *desiatini*: until within a few years Kisilev, the new Ministry's first director, was able to show that a marked improvement had been brought about in the Treasury *krestiané's* fortunes—that the special measures which had been undertaken for their reorganisation had given such of those *krestiané* as were holders of small plots only certain plot allotments in equalisation, and also had transferred poll-tax and *obrok* from soul to soil, and opened for the *krestiané's* benefit loan offices, savings banks, and schools. Certainly the Emperor had been justified in telling Kisilev, when appointing him to the Ministry, that virtually he was making him his "Chief of Staff" as regards the *krestians tvo* question.

Moreover, Nicholas was the first Tsar of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to attempt the bonded *krestianin's* agrarian warranty. As yet *pomiestchiki* let their *krestiané* have no more than what plots those *pomiestchiki* either could or would allot for the purpose. And some even sold portions of land from under their *krestiané's* very feet, and so curtailed the *krestiané's* plots yet further. But now (in 1827) an instance of a lady owner pledging portions of land from under the feet of her twenty-eight *krestiané* until only

ten *desiatini* were left for their actual use led to a law whereby, on 15 February, 1827, it was enacted that on all estates there should be set aside at least four and a half *desiatini* per soul, and that where this should be found not to have been done the estate should pass to Treasury management.

Next, in 1839, Kisilev submitted a Memorandum on the bonded *krestianstvo*. This Memorandum came of the fact that the "Law Concerning Free Landworkers" of thirty-six years earlier had proved so little successful that negligibly few *krestiané* had thereby attained freedom. The chief cause had been reluctance of *pomiestchiki* to allow any land of theirs to pass into the *krestiané's* absolute possession. Kisilev, therefore, now proposed enactment of a law whereby landowners should, on mutually agreed terms, transfer land to their *krestiané* for permanent usage only, rather than for permanent possession. And the Emperor affirmed this proposal on 2 April, 1842. And the number of *pomiestchiki* who took advantage of the new law's provisions proved to be three! However, other measures of gradual preparation for full emancipation followed. One set aimed, in particular, at limitation of the *pomiestchik's* authority. Laws of 2 May, 1833, and 23 June, 1847, forbade the *pomiestchik* to sell *krestiané* apart from their families—thereby definitely recognising the serf family to be an indivisible juridical unit; and a law of 29 November, 1841, forbade the *pomiestchik*, if he was not actually a landowner (some 17,000 such, or fourteen per cent, of the whole, then existed), to carry through acquisition of bonded *krestiané* without acquisition likewise of land; and a law of 11 August, 1847, empowered the new Ministry of State Properties at all times, if necessary, to take over the settled lands of a *pomiestchik*; and a law of 8 November, 1847, granted the bonded *krestiané* of estates due to be auctioned for their owners' debts a right first to redeem themselves and their plots; and, lastly, a law of 3 March, 1848, conceded to bonded *krestiané* a right of acquisition of immovable property if their masters should previously consent to the course.

Such the reign's more important enactments on the bonded *krestianstvo* question. Their effect, in sum, was a dual effect, even though feasibility of direct application of them proved to be negligible, and they improved the *krestianin's* position but little. The responsibility for this was due to the actual manner in which the Government put them into execution. Of course, it is not easy for us of the

present day to understand such a relation between the executive organs of a State and the supreme, autocratic will in a State as allowed of the former frequently supplanting the latter, but at all events, although the above-mentioned law of 1827 for giving the *krestianin* security of plot duly appeared in the first edition of the *Digest of Laws* (1833), that law did not appear in the *Digest's* second edition (1842)—and it had not meanwhile been annulled. Again, although the above-mentioned law of 3 March, 1848, duly gave the bonded *krestianin* a right to acquire immovable property after obtaining his master's consent to his doing so, that law found expression thereafter only in such limited, mutilated form as rendered acquisition of the sort sheerly impossible: the law at one and the same time conferred upon the bonded *krestianin* a right and subjected usage of that right to the *pomiestchik's* unfettered freewill, since the *krestianin*, merely through asking for his master's consent to the acquisition of immovable property, revealed to that master his possession of savings—whereupon the master either refused the consent, took note of the savings, and annexed them, or gave the consent, but at the same time so limited both future disposal of and future usage of the property as to make its defence from claims upon it in the future impossible—the *krestianin* being legally debarred from the master's pursuance at law. Again, although the above-mentioned law of 8 November, 1847, duly allowed the bonded *krestiané* of an estate arranged to be sold for its owner's debts to redeem themselves and their plots beforehand, the right ill consorted with the period's auctional system; the *krestiané* were allowed only thirty days in which to furnish the redemptory sum, and of course they could not easily collect so much in so short a time, and the law did not, with the rest, make provision for State redemptory loans, and, in short, the enactment proved so prolific of difficulties, and necessitated so many Departmental reports to the Government, that at last the latter had first of all to suspend working of the law, and then to relegate it to abeyance, and leave the Government's executive organs free to take the yet further course of, whilst not actually setting the law aside, at least according it no place in the next edition of *Regulations Concerning Valuation of Landed Properties*.

Thus the supreme will in the State gave laws, and the State's executive institutions quietly took and hid them. Yet though the result was to cause legislative enactments, when promulgated, never

to attain direct, practical application, the enactments at least exercised a strong indirect effect—they increased yet further the discontent of the people in general, and the desire for freedom of the serfs in particular.

Meanwhile, and apart from the Government's dispositions in the matter, the industrial circumstances of the *krestianin* population underwent a break which helped as much in the direction aimed at as did the Government's legislation. That break came principally of a change in the industry of *pomiestie* properties. We have seen that in such industry, during the eighteenth century, the *obrok* system predominated markedly over the system of *barstchina*: but with the coming of the nineteenth century the latter system began greatly to increase—and to render the position of the bonded *krestianin* worse than ever, in that, whereas the *obrok* system, irrespectively of the *obrok's* weight, at least had left the *krestianin's* energies and resources at his own disposal, and himself remaining independent in the matter of the ways and means whereby he should pay the *obrok* when due, and, therefore, free to make use of his wits in life, he now, when transferred to the system of *barstchina*, became a mere instrument, a mere passive instrument, in his master's hands. In short, the transference entailed discouragement, slackness, and industrial disorganisation—the whole a phenomenon which the better-intentioned landowners of Nicholas's day bitterly deplored. True, the personal freewill which so long had characterised *pomiestchik-krestiané* relations now began to weaken under the influence of more stringent administrative-institutional oversight, but there set in, on the other hand, an increase of systematic pressure upon the bonded *krestianin's* labour which, with the disorganisation of that worker's economic circumstances, incensed still further the serf population, and still further made it aspire to liberty. At last things reached the point of merely the smallest seeming hint at emancipation proving sufficient to stir the bulk of that population to excitement. This was when an *ukaz* of 29 January, 1855, commanded that there should be enrolled a force of militia to supplement the regular forces which were operating against the English-Turkish-French Coalition. Instantly there ran through the *krestianin* population of the country a report that any man who enlisted would have himself and his family set free. And upon that the *krestiané* of Riazan grew restless, and the *krestiané* of Voronezh and Tambov and elsewhere followed

suit, until, pervading the whole Povolzhia, and extending even to Kiev and the Dnieper, the ferment everywhere brought cudgel-armed *krestiané* flocking to their local capitals, and asking, as they averred their readiness to enlist, to be shown "the Tsar's Manifesto which promises us freedom as well." In vain did the authorities declare that no such Manifesto existed: the *krestiané* only changed to the belief that the Manifesto was being kept concealed. At last armed force had to be exerted before they could be disabused.

Towards the end of the reign the industrial circumstances of landowners and *krestiané* alike became such as to render serf-right's continued existence sheerly impossible. At the Eighth Revision (1836) the number of *dvoriané* of European Russia, less Poland, Finland, and the Don Cossack country, who were owners of both lands and *krestiané* was found to be 127,000; of *dvoriané* who owned household serfs alone to be 17,000; of the household serfs in question to be 62,185; and of the country's whole tale of bonded revisional souls to be 10,766,000. Let us compare these figures with those of the Tenth Revision (1858). Of this Revision the first three corresponding totals are 103,880; 4,000; and 12,000. Also, it shows *pomiestchiki* of the medium category to have come largely to predominate—especially as regards owners of up to 21 souls, whom the Eighth Revision had shown to number 58,500. And, lastly, it proves that during the interval of twenty-two years between the two Revisions the total of bonded souls in the country shrank from 44½ per cent. of the population as a whole to no more than barely 37½. True, this shrinkage may be in part explained by the fact that during the interval a great many bonded *krestiané* passed into the possession of the Treasury; yet more probably the principal cause of the phenomenon is to be gleaned from a return which Kisilev compiled shortly after the beginning of the next reign. For in that return the total popular growth between the Ninth Revision and the Tenth (between, that is to say, the year 1851 and the year 1858) is shown to have been 1,500,000, but no less a proportion of that total than 1,200,000 to have belonged solely to the category of State, not privately owned, *krestiané*. This means that during the seven years of the interval the bonded section had either undergone no increase at all or increased only negligibly—serf-right having not only worsened the bonded population's economic position, but checked its natural multiplication.

Such, then, was, during Nicholas's reign, the Government's policy with regard to reconstruction of social statuses and a decision of the *krestianstvo* question. And though that Government did not actually decide the question, it rendered such a step at once politically imperative and juridically feasible. Above all, it made the question cease to concern the private proprietorship of the landowner, and come to concern redemption of the land by the *krestianstvo* when emancipated, and so to pass from the ground of civil right to the ground of State right, and to enable the Government of the reign ensuing legislatively to give the serf freedom of person without also redemption of person. In the legislation of Nicholas's Government we at least see set forth the idea that the serf was not the mere property of an individual in the State, but a subject of the Supreme Power in the State: whereby that legislation rendered a decision of the *krestianstvo* question more than ever imperative, for it excited more than ever the serfs' impatience. Thus, whilst Nicholas's Government did not actually attain its end of itself, it legislatively prepared the ground for attainment of that end by another.

Here our study of the fourth historical period of our Course must come to a close. In beginning that study, I specified certain features as specially distinctive of the period: and now we have seen that those features were as follows. At first, during the period, the order of State stood based upon a system of strict individualisation of classes in the State. Each such class had allotted to it its own State obligations; and to those State obligations each such class remained permanently bound. The result was to render joint class political activity impossible, and to bring to the ground the old *Zemskie Sobori*, or All-Territorial Assemblies. Such the bases of the political system of the period. And as regards the economic order and the popular industry of the period, both stood based upon the principle that labour must compulsorily be performed by the bulk of the rural masses, and that, through that labour, that bulk should stand bound variously to State institutions and to certain privileged individuals. Up to the second quarter of the eighteenth century these two factors developed steadily, whilst experiencing their maximum of tension during the time of Peter the Great. Then signs of a beginning of a process in the opposite direction made their appearance, in proportion as the State classes began to slough, one by one, their special State obligations. Only one of those classes, however, attained complete

self-riddance of its obligations. That one class, of course, was the *dvorianstvo*. In turn the class acquired freedom from State service, participation in local government, and an urban status. But, as regards the rural masses, they remained unchanged of position, and continued to perform forced labour, until Nicholas's reign was nearly over. Then at last, the situation having become absolutely impossible, the knots of the social relations existent began to wrench apart.

## APPENDIX

NOTE.—Originally the following four chapters formed the opening portion of Volume I. For one reason and another they were omitted when the English translation was begun upon, and now are added as an Appendix. The italics in them are, save in the case of Russian and other foreign words, the author's exclusively.





## CHAPTER I

The scientific task in study of local history—The historical process—The history of culture or civilisation—Historical sociology—The two points of view in study of history, the cultural and the sociological—Methodological conveniences and didactical expediency of adoption of the latter in local-historical study—A plan of the sociologico-historical process—The importance of local and temporary combinations of social elements in the study of history—Advantages, as regards method, of adopting the sociological point of view in study of Russian history.

IN beginning this *History*, let me first set forth a few general and elementary considerations, with the aim of connecting observations in and impressions from general history with the tasks and the methods of study of Russian history in particular.

The practical interest which incites us to study the history of Russia, to separate it from the substance of general history, is intelligible. For it is the history of our own country. Yet the scholastic, practical interest will not exclude the scientific, but, on the contrary, give the latter still greater didactical force. In entering upon this special course of Russian history, let us ask ourselves the general question: What scientific purpose have we in studying the history of one country in particular, one people in particular? We can deduce that purpose from the tasks of general-historical study, from the tasks of studying humanity in general.

The language of science used the word "history" in two senses: as a movement in time, or process, and as that process's understanding. All, therefore, that is accomplished in time has history. History as a separate science, history as a special branch of scientific knowledge, has for its content the *historical process*—the progress, conditions, and achievements of human social life,<sup>1</sup> of human social life in its development and its results. Human social life is a factor of world existence equally with the life of surrounding nature. And acquisition of a scientific knowledge of that factor is a bounden necessity

<sup>1</sup> Or common life.

of the human intellect equally with investigation of the life of surrounding nature. Human social life finds expression in human unions. Those unions are termed "historical bodies," and arise, grow, multiply, pass the one into the other, and fall apart—are born, live, and die—even as in the case of natural organic bodies. To those unions' rise, growth, and interchange, with all the conditions and the results of their existence, we apply the term *historical process*.

The historical process is revealed in phenomena of human life. And information concerning those phenomena is preserved in historical records, or historical sources. The phenomena are diverse to infinity. They concern international relations, the external and internal life of peoples in general, and the activity of individual peoples. And, combined, they constitute the great life struggle which humanity has carried on from the first, and is carrying on now, as it strains forward towards its self-appointed ends. Yet constantly there emerges from that struggle, a struggle for ever changing its working and character, something of more stable, fixed nature. The something in question is a life system, an organisation of human relations and interests and sentiments and morals and ideas. And men conserve a life system thus compounded until the historical drama's never-ceasing movement replaces it with another such system. Throughout these changes the historian applies himself to two fundamental subjects—seeks to distinguish them amid the undulating stream of historical existence as expressed in historical sources. And the subject in general of historical study lies in the sum of experiences, knowledge, needs, customs, and amenities of life which, on the one hand, ameliorate individual man's private and personal being and, on the other, establish and consummate human beings' social relations—the subject is, in fact, the development of man and of human social life. Usually the degree of development which a given people attains is called that people's *culture* or *civilisation*. And the tokens whereby historical study determines that degree form the content of a special branch of historical research known as *historical culture*, or *historical civilisation*. And another subject of historical observation lies in the nature and the working of the historical forces whereby human communities are constructed—the properties of all the multiform material and spiritual threads which help casual, diverse human units which otherwise would have but a transitory existence to

become formed into regular and durable communities of centuries-long duration. As for historical study of communities' structure, of human unions' organisation, of such unions' development of and exercise of their organs—study, in short, of all the properties and workings of the forces whereby human social life is created and directed—this species of historical study is the task of the special branch of historical learning which investigates the community, and is distinguished from historical study in general as *historical sociology*. Its essential difference from history of civilisations lies in the fact that the latter's content consists of the historical process's results, and that relevant to observation in the former there are, rather, the historical process's forces and means of movement—its, as it were, kinetics. Owing to the difference of subject, the two investigatory processes necessarily differ in method.

What precisely, then, is the relation of general, and of local, history to the foregoing subjects?

It is more easy to inter-distinguish the two subjects in compiling an abstract classification of scientific branches than in actually carrying out their pursuit. Both in general history and in local we investigate at once the achievements of human social life and the structure of communities: and we do so in such a manner that study of the achievements of human social life enables us also to study the nature and the working of the forces constructing that life, and study of a community's structure enables us to measure the achievements attained by the social life of the community. Yet likewise let it be said that, in the case both of general history and of local, our two subjects of historical study are never in equipoise, since the one subject predominates in the one, and the other in the other. So first let us compare the scope and the material offered the historian of culture within the limits respectively of general history and of local, and then do the same with regard to the historian propounding to himself purely sociological questions.

The achievements of human social life, the gains of culture, or of civilisation, enjoyed in greater or less degree by individual peoples—these are not exclusively the fruits of the activity of the individual peoples, but, rather, the creation of joint or successive efforts of cultured peoples in the mass. It is not possible to expound the course of the accumulation of those gains within the narrow framework of local history, for such history can indicate only the connection

of the given local civilisation with general, and the share of a given people in the cultural labour of humanity at large—or, at all events, the share of the given people in the fruits of that cultural labour. All of us know the general progress of that labour; each of us has before him a general picture of the accomplishments of human social life. Peoples and races have interchanged, one stage of historical life has followed another one, systems of life have undergone modification, but never has a break in the thread of historical development occurred. And gradually, as peoples and generations have experienced replacement, and the stage settings of historical existence have successively shifted, and orders of society have been subjected to alteration, and civilisations have, like peoples, or like generations, been born of one another, and begotten a third, there has accumulated an agelong cultural store. And such of that store as has survived whole has descended to ourselves, and become part of our being, and, through us, will pass to our successors. The complex process in question is general history's chief subject of study. Practically, and with sequential connection of causes and effects, that history describes the lives of peoples which have, through joint or through successive efforts, attained success in social life development. Also, whilst general history's observation of phenomena is on the large scale, that history concentrates principally upon the cultural victories which one or another people has gained. And, on the other hand, study of the history only of an individual people causes the student's purview to stand limited by his very subject. For such study looks neither to mutual reactions of peoples, nor to their comparative cultural significance, nor to their historical sequence: rather, peoples replacing one another are viewed less as consecutive stages of civilisation, or as successive phases of human development, than as themselves, by themselves, alone—as so many individual ethnographical entities wherein certain processes of human social life, certain combinations of conditions of social existence, repeat themselves, and undergo dicolation: the gradual advances of social life are, in sequence of cause and effect, viewed only within a limited field, only within given geographical and chronological boundaries: thought centres itself also upon others aspects of life, and penetrates to the actual structure of human society, to the productive source of the causal chain of phenomena—to, that is to say, the actual properties and the working of the historical forces constructing

human life in common. And therefore study of local history it is that affords historical sociology its richest store of material.

Such the difference between the two points of view, with their comparative advantages. The two view-points are not mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary, mutually complementary. And it is not general and local history alone that can be investigated from either of those aspects: the same can be done with individual historical factors. Maine's *Ancient Law* and Fustel de Coulanges' *La Cité Antique* treat of an identical subject—the tribal union: and whilst the former observes that union as one of humanity's ages, and as a fundamental element in human social life, the latter observes it as a stage of bygone civilisation, and as the basis of the Greco-Roman community. Of course, collocation of the two view-points in historical study is desirable towards acquisition of a comprehensive knowledge of the subject, but a whole series of considerations nevertheless inclines the historian to constitute himself, in study of local history, first and foremost a sociologist.

Hitherto general history has been formed, not through the joint life of all humanity existent at a given period, nor through uniform interaction of human life's whole forces and conditions, but through individual peoples, or small groups of peoples, which have succeeded one another in connection with a local and temporary assortment of forces and conditions nowhere repeated since. Which unbroken sequence of peoples on the historical stage, which perpetually interchanging assortment of historical forces and conditions, might seem to be play of accident, and to deprive historical life of all regular plan and order. So what use can there be in studying historical combinations and positions which once, for some unknown reason, became compounded in a given country, and have never been experienced subsequently? Well, we desire those combinations and those positions to show us how, in the past, the inner nature of man has revealed itself both in association with his fellows and in the struggle with nature around him: we desire to see how, in the past, humanity has developed its hidden forces in the phenomena constituting the substance of the historical process. In short, our object in following up the endless chain of vanished generations is to fulfil the injunction of the ancient Oracle—to gain a knowledge of ourselves, and of our inward qualities and capabilities, and then to use that knowledge towards setting our earthly existence in order.

But in consequence of the conditions of our earthly circumstances human nature, whether in individuals or in whole peoples, reveals itself neither all at once nor integrally, but only gradually and in fragments—it stands subordinated to conditions of place and time. And the same conditions have caused given peoples to take particularly prominent parts in the historical process, and to manifest especially clearly one or another of the forces of human nature. The Greeks, split up into a number of weak town republics, yet displayed unsurpassed vigour and thoroughness in developing in themselves artistic creativeness and philosophic thought. And the Romans, after founding of their conquered world a military Empire without precedent, contributed to the world a marvellous civil code. And in what these two peoples did we see their historical missions. But was there any element of fate in their fortunes?—was there pre-ordained to Greece her idea of beauty, and to Italy her instinct for law? The ancient Romans were mediocre artistic imitators only, yet their descendants, mingling with their barbaric conquerors, revived the ancient art of Greece, and made of Italy Europe's model *atelier*, whilst those of the barbarians' kinsfolk who had remained in the forests of Germany received eagerly, within a century, Rome's jurisprudence. On the other hand, though Greece, with Byzantium, fallen Rome's successor, experienced a like bracing through a barbarian inundation, she left behind her, save for the Code of Justinian and the Cathedral of Saint Sophia, no notable memorial of the sort, whether in law or in art. Or, if we take a more modern example: up to the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth no European people existed which was more pacific, more idealistic, more philosophical, and more scorned of its neighbours than the German: yet less than a hundred years after the appearance of *Werther*, and only one generation after the occurrence of Jena, that people almost overcame military France herself, proclaimed "Might is Right" as a principle in international relations, and placed all Continental Europe under arms.

It follows that the secret of the historical process does not really lie in countries and in peoples—it does not, at all events, lie in those countries and peoples themselves, in any gifts of inward qualities with which those countries and peoples stand permanently endowed, but in multiform, variable, fortunate or unfortunate combinations of external and internal conditions of development which have become

compounded in given countries, for given peoples, during longer or shorter periods. The combinations in question form the basic subject of historical sociology. And the fact that they stand stamped with local character, and that they have never undergone repetition outside of the locality concerned, does not deprive them of scientific interest, for always, through the communities subjected to their action, they have revealed various qualities of humanity, and thereby made further revelation of humanity's nature from one or another aspect. In varying ways all historically compounded communities are local combinations of conditions of development, and therefore, the more we study combinations of the sort, the more shall we gain full knowledge of those conditions' properties and action—either in isolation or in some essentially distinctive assortment. Thus it may fall to us to set forth a general rule as to *when*, for example, capital destroys labour's freedom without increasing labour's productiveness, or as to *when* capital helps labour to become more productive, and yet does not enslave it. In short, study of local history enables us to know what is the composition of human social life, and the nature of the elements of that composition. And knowledge of the manner in which social life has undergone construction may lead also to—which would indeed be a triumph for historical science—formation of a general-sociological-historical department, as the science of the *general* laws governing construction of communities which have become compounded independently of contributory local conditions.

With the correlation in which the two points of view (the cultural-historical and the sociological) should stand in study of local history thus determined, we may next proceed to examine the question of human communities' conditions of development, and of those conditions' differing combinations.

The historical process, as defined, consists of the joint working of certain forces which clamp individual human beings into social unions. Taking our stand, therefore, in the domain of experimental, or observational, science rather than in that of contemplative, or theological, research, we can discern that two fundamental and primary forces create and actuate mankind's life in common. Those two forces are, firstly, the human spirit, and, secondly, external, so-called physical nature. But history does not notice the abstract human spirit: so to do is the province of metaphysics. Nor does history



notice man in isolation, man apart from the community—he is not, in himself, a subject for historical study, which is, rather, man's life in association with man: pertinent to historical observation, with regard to the human spirit, are solely the concrete shapes or forms assumed by that spirit in life of the sort, in that those shapes or forms make up individual human *personality* and the human *community*. Here, of course, in viewing the community as an historical force, I am using the term "community" not as denoting a human union as such specifically, but, rather, as denoting the fact that human beings do live in association with one another, and, in that life, exercise mutual influence. And in the structure of social life the mutual influence forms a peculiar element possessed of peculiar qualities, and of a distinctive nature, and of a distinctive sphere of action. A community is composed of persons: but those persons differ widely in isolation from what they represent in the composition of the community as a whole. In the latter case they actively manifest given qualities, conceal others, develop aspirations not in place in isolated life, and produce, through conjunction of personal effort, results beyond the capacity of the worker in detachment. For instance, we all know what important parts are played in human relations by example, by imitation, by envy, and by rivalry: and hardly need it be added that those four potent springs of social life are called into action only when we encounter our neighbours. Thus, in other words, we have them fastened upon us by the community. Nor does, in the same way, external nature anywhere, or at any time, act upon humanity identically, or with all its resources and influences. Rather, external nature's action stands subject to many varying modifications of a geographical character: different portions of humanity have dispensed to them by external nature, according to their disposition on the globe, differing amounts of light, of warmth, of water, of malaria, or of unhealthiness in general—of in a word, either gifts or ills: and upon such disparity of admeasurement depend the local characteristics of mankind. Of course, I am not here referring to definite anthropological stocks, to white and black and yellow and brown and the rest, for those stocks' origin cannot in any case be explained wholly by local-physical influences. No, I have in mind, rather, the specific conditions of ordinary life, and the specific spiritual attributes, developed in human masses by the influence of their natural environment, and constituting, in sum,

that which we call *national temperament*. When external nature comes under observation in historical life it does so as the *nature of the country* dwelt in by a given human union. And when it comes under such observation as a force it does so in so far as it may influence the workaday existence and the spiritual attitude of human beings.

Thus, human *personality*, the human *community*, and a given *nature of country*—here we have the three fundamental historical forces of which human social life is built. Each such force introduces into the substance of human social life a stock of elements, or of links, in which that force's action reveals itself, and which binds human unions together, and maintains them. Elements of human social life are either qualities and needs of our physical and spiritual nature or aspirations and aims which, with the participation of external nature and of other human beings (the community), spring from those qualities and those needs, or, lastly, relations which arise amongst human beings as the result of such aspirations and aims. Also, agreeably with one or another of these origins, some elements may be looked upon as simple, or primary, and others as produced, or of secondary (or further) formation due to joint action of simple: whilst, agreeably with the fundamental qualities and needs of man, those elements may be divided into *physiological* (such as sex, age, and blood relationship), *economic* (such as labour, capital, and credit), *iuridical* and *political* (such as authority, law, equity, and obligations), and *spiritual* (such as religion, science, and the moral sense).

Thus compounded of elements, human social life is maintained through two means—through *intercourse*, and through *succession*. For intercourse amongst human beings to become possible, there needs to exist amongst them something in common: and that something in common becomes possible under two conditions only: that the human beings concerned can understand one another, and that, needing one another, they realise the need. Such two conditions are created through two general means: through *reason* acting in accordance with identical laws of thought and in virtue of a common demand for mutual comprehension, and through *will-power* evoking action to satisfy that demand. Then, with reciprocity of human beings' ability both to engage in and to communicate action thus brought into existence, the exchange of action enables individual human beings who possess reason and will-power to undertake affairs in common, and so to clamp themselves into communities.

But, for all that, human beings cannot form communities of a lasting nature without common ideas and aims, without sentiments and interests and aspirations which all or a majority share. Vice versa, the more that such ties arise amongst the human beings concerned, the more will the ties gain power over the wills of the human beings united by them, and the more will the community come to be lasting, and the more will, as time establishes and confirms the ties, the latter merge into manners and customs. And the same conditions which render possible a connection between individuals render possible also a connection between whole consecutive generations. And that connection is *historical succession*. Historical succession consists of transmission of material and spiritual heritage from one generation to another. The means of that transmission are *inheritance* and *education*: whilst time confirms the heritage acquired in this manner with the new moral tie of *historical tradition*, a tie acting from generation to generation, and transforming fathers' and forefathers' bequests and benefits into qualities and addictions of posterity. Thus do isolated individuals become compounded into permanent unions which lead personal existences, and constitute more or less complex *historical types*. And, gradually, consecutive connection of generations has developed a chain of unions which progressively have tended to complexity according as into such unions there have entered, successively, new elements of secondary formation, elements come of reciprocal action of primary. First of all there became built upon the physiological basis of the blood tie the primitive *family*. And then families proceeding from the same root came to form another blood union, the *stock*, a union into whose composition there entered also religious and juridical elements, such as respect for the stock's head, ancient authority, common possession of property, and the rotary self-defence system, or stock feud. Next, reproduction caused the stock to grow into the *tribe*, the genetical tie of which expressed itself in a common language and common customs and traditions. And from the tribe, or tribes, subdivision, combination, and assimilation compounded the *nation*, when ethnographical ties had added to them a moral—the tie of realisation of spiritual unity, a tie nourished by common life, and by joint activity, and by oneness of historical fortunes and interests. And, lastly, when the sense of national unity acquired expression in political ties, and in oneness of supreme power and of law, the nation became the *state*, and, in

it, became, as well as a political personality, an historical personality possessed both of a more or less clearly expressed national character and of a consciousness of world importance.

These, then, have been the basic forms of human social life, and that life's successive stages of growth. Beginning with the blood tie of the closed family, the process came to completion in the complex State union, with each successive union entering into the composition of the one which followed, and developed from, it, and all attaining co-ordination in the supreme stage, the State. First of all the family, together with what remained of the stock union, took rank as a private union, and became the fundamental cell of the social organism as a whole. And then tribes and nations either established themselves upon a basis of class division or remained plain ethnographical groups possessed of moral ties and historical memories in common, but not of the juridical significance pertaining to States composed of different stocks, and of several peoples. And during the time that the State was attaining formation through unions of blood relationship the social composition of the State underwent a reverse process, a process of internal comminution, according as its material and spiritual interests of a private nature became more multifarious, and many different private unions arose to constitute part of the civic community.

This, of course, well-known plan of the socio-historical process I have enunciated for the purpose of pointing out the phenomena to be observed during its local study. The endless variety of unions of which human social life consists is due to the fact that the basic elements of such life manifest themselves in no uniform assortment in different localities and at different periods, but pass into diverse combinations the variety of which, again, is created both by the number and assortment of their constituent parts, by the greater or less complexity of their human unions, and by variations of correlation of identical elements in them—for example, by predominance of one over the rest. The most important feature in that variety (the root cause of which is the infinitude of permutations of reciprocal action of the historical forces) lies in the fact that the elements of human social life manifest non-identical qualities and action in different combinations and positions, and devolve before the observer's eye in more than one aspect of their nature. Even in one-stock unions, owing to this, identical elements exist, yet act non-identically.

For example, is there anything in human social life which could be at once simpler and more uniform than the family? Yet see the difference between the Christian family and the pagan, and between the olden-time family in which the serving-maids formed part of the stock, and all domestics had submissively to remain dumb in the presence of the head of the household, and the modern family in which, though, again, a union based exclusively upon blood relationship, each and every member's position is guaranteed both with juridical definitions and, still more, with moral, and the parents' authority manifests itself less in a monopoly of rights over the domestics than in a monopoly of duties towards, and of care for, the children. Whence it is clear that the presence of elements negligible in the composition of the primitive pagan family have changed the union's whole character. Also, I have said that identical elements may act non-identically in different combinations. Hence, if we notice that in one and the same country capital has, at different periods, enslaved labour; helped to develop free activity of labour, and to increase that labour's productiveness; served as a source of honour, of respect, paid to wealth; and inflamed poverty to envy or contempt, we are justified in concluding that the social composition and moral attitude have experienced so many profound breaks. Again, consider the manner in which the co-operative principle may vary its aspect in, respectively, the family, the *artel*, the joint stock company, and the business partnership. Again, note how the authority of a State may vary its form of action in accordance with the social conditions governing the community at different periods of the State's life—how now it may act independently of the community, and now it may act in active consonance therewith; how now it may confirm existing class inequalities, or even create new ones, and now it may effect class equalisation, and maintain due balance of the social forces. Again, one and the same persons who have formed unions differing in character may be led by the non-uniformity of the interests ruling those unions to act differently in, say, the commercial office from the manner in which they act in the boardrooms of scholastic, artistic, or charitable associations. And yet another instance. Labour is a moral duty, and the basis of the whole social order. But labour is not all alike; every one of us knows that labour which is not voluntary, but serf, of nature produces a very different effect from that produced by free labour, seeing that the former destroys energy,

weakens enterprise, depraves morality, and can even ruin a race's physique. During the last few decades before the emancipation of our serf population that population began to come to an end—fully one-half of rural Russia began to die out. Hence abolition of serf-right ceased to be a question merely of equity or of humanity, and became a question of necessity outright. And a last instance of all. It is known to us that under the pressure of the senior of the primitive blood union personality in that union tended to disappear—wherefore we cannot but look upon personality's release from that pressure as a notable achievement in civilisation's progress, and one imperatively needed before the community could undergo organisation on lines of equality of rights, and of personal liberty. But before the principles in question finally triumphed the fact that the individual's emancipation left him standing by himself led to a vigorous growth of servitude, to development of a form of personal *kabala*, of indenture bondage, often more oppressive even than the old stock relations had been. Whence personal emancipation in a given form of human social life may bring about re-suppression of personality. And when we read the article in Alexis Mikhailovitch's *Ulozhenie* whereby the free man entering into personal dependency upon his fellow is threatened with the *knut* and banishment to the Lena, we are at something of a loss to know whether most to sympathise with the law's equalitarian motive or to deplore the severe manner in which the law converted one of man's most cherished rights into a grave State offence.

From the instances which I have cited it is clear that the composition of a community in different combinations *establishes a non-identical relation of the constituent elements of the community*, and that changes in the elements' mutual relation cause them to *manifest different qualities, and to act non-identically*.

Next, now that we are aware of the questions with which we should address ourselves to historical phenomena, and also of what we should seek in those phenomena, we can determine the scientific importance of the history of a given people in relation to the general historical study of mankind. The importance in question may be a dual one. On the one hand, it may be determined by the given people's energy of development, and by, connected with this, the given people's degree of influence upon others, and upon, through those others' means, the cultural progress of mankind at large: whilst, on the other hand, a given people's separate history may be important

for the peculiarity of its phenomena independently of the cultural significance of those phenomena, provided that the history in question affords the student opportunities of developing processes which specially illustrate the mechanism of historical life and are especially exemplary of the historical forces under conditions of operation either seldom repeated or never beheld since, for all that the processes may have exercised only a negligible influence upon the general historical movement. Hence the scientific interest of the history of a given people is, from this aspect, determined by the number of peculiar local combinations which the history contains, and by the qualities of the elements of human social life which the history evokes. The history of a country which could offer only repetition of phenomena and processes already occurred in other countries would afford, if such a case were possible in history, merely scanty interest.

The history of Russia in particular offers certain advantages of method as regards sociological study. They are (1) the comparative *simplicity* of the processes which have been dominant in our history, a simplicity which helps us to observe with something like exactitude the historical forces' working, and the effect and importance of the springs entering into our social life's comparatively non-complex composition, and (2) the *distinctiveness* of the combinations of conditions of popular life which have operated in our history. Nevertheless the comparative simplicity of structure of our historical life has not ruled out all peculiarities from that structure's construction. In it we observe acting the same historical forces, and the same elements of human social life, as in other European communities, but, with us, those forces acting with another tension than theirs, and those elements manifesting themselves in another assortment than theirs, and assuming dimensions, and disclosing qualities, not remarked elsewhere. All of which has caused our community to acquire uniform composition and character, but the movement of our popular life to take on a special *tempo*, and to enter upon unusual positions and combinations of conditions. Let me cite a few examples of this. In every country it is the river system that has directed trade, and it is the nature of the soil that has conditioned character of industry. During our history's early centuries, whilst yet the bulk of the Russian population was concentrated on the blacksoil of the Middle Dnieper and its right and left tributaries, the more important rivers of Southern Rus directed Russian trade towards the markets

of the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the area of the Caspian Volga, where there was a brisk demand for honey and wax and furs, the products of the forest, and for, in a lesser degree, grain. Which fact made external trade the ruling force in the popular industry of the then Russian Slavs, and evoked an energetic development of forest trades and hunting and wild apiculture. Later, however, when pressure on the steppes traversed by the Russian trade routes occurred, most of the Russian population migrated to the region of the Upper Volga and the Alaunian clay. Then remoteness from the southern maritime markets weakened external sale, and brought about a diminution of forest industry: so that, next, arable cultivation became the basis of industry of the Russian population—the population which had exploited forestal wealth and trade on the open blacksoil of the Dnieper now, when settled upon the forest-clad clay of the Upper Volga, set about, rather, felling and ploughing. Meanwhile the external and international relations which had influenced distribution of population in this way became interwoven with the geographical features of the country to the extent of causing popular labour to yield to certain conditions, and to acquire a direction non-consonant with others. Naturally, a popular-industrial round compounded in so peculiar a way furnished phenomena out of conformity with norms habitually encountered. In 1699 Peter the Great bade his merchants engage in trade after the fashion of other States only—in companies of pooled capital sums: but unusedness and lack of commercial confidence always caused the matter to drag, and meanwhile ancient Rus worked out its own trade partnership form, a form in which combination of capital sums gave place to combination of persons on a basis of kinship and indivisibility of property. In this form non-apportioned kinsmen carried on, under the direction, and on the responsibility, of their senior member, a trading concern the principals in which were not partner-shareholders in the concern, but the senior's subordinate agents. Which represented the *trading house* of a merchant and his "merchant brethren," "merchant sons," and the like. This form of co-operation clearly illustrates how the need of collective activity, added to lack of commercial confidence, sought self-satisfaction under the domestic ægis, and caught at the last remnants of the blood union.

In our past, therefore, the historian encounters not a few phenomena revealing the multiform flexibility of the human



community, and its capacity to adapt itself to given conditions, and to make available resources answer to needs. We have just seen how the action of economic necessity caused the stock union of ancient Rus to evolve the idea of the trading house. And in time we shall see how the action of local conditions made the idea of a certain moral system serve to satisfy popular-industrial requirements. For Christianity brought with it from the East the notion that to renounce the world was the only true road to salvation, and, therefore, Christianity's supreme achievement. And the Russian community adopted the notion so actively that in less than a hundred years from that time the Petcherski Cell of Kiev was displaying asceticism in very high forms, and, three or four centuries later, the notion was leading whole bands of recluses to seek the forest fastnesses of the Northern Zavolzhie. Eventually, however, the multitude of forest monasteries founded by recluses came involuntarily to acquire a standing conflicting with the spirit of desert habitation cultivated by Thebes and Athos. Not that the original idea of such monasticism underwent eclipse: merely, local needs complicated it with interests not directly derived thence, and caused the region's desert monasteries to become, variously, rural parish churches, homes of rest for aged members of the surrounding population, and agricultural and industrial communes and *points d'appui* on a non-family basis—in general, migration stations for the *krestianstvo*-colonisation movement.

I repeat, then, that, though comparatively simple of structure, our community underwent peculiar construction as the result of a local assortment, and a local correlation, of conditions of popular life. And if we examine those conditions during the earliest period of our history, and compare them with those operating in Western Europe of the day, we shall discover the primordial source of the two features in our history which facilitate so greatly examination of that history's social phenomena. The Eastern Slavs, though possessed of the primitive cultural stock proper to all the Aryan tribes, increased that stock but very little during their migrating epoch, since as soon as ever they set foot within the limits of Rus they found themselves in a geographical and international setting altogether unlike that into which their Aryan kinsmen, the Germanic tribes, had fallen a little earlier, before causing Western Europe to enter upon a new history. For whereas the Germanic nomad had settled amongst ruins directly subjecting his forest-derived customs and ideas to the in-

fluence of a vigorous culture, in that he had settled amongst Romans, or Roman provincials, of the Empire which he had conquered, and those Romans had become for him living exponents and interpreters of that culture, the Eastern Slavs now found themselves set upon a boundless plain whose rivers debarred compact settlement, and whose forests and marshes impeded industrial production; set in a domicile the neighbours surrounding which were alien by origin, inferior in development, and destitute of anything to exchange, yet needing always to be fought; set in an unsettled and, as yet, untouched country whose past had left to newcomers neither life amenities, nor cultural traditions, nor even ruins—merely the numberless tombs, or kurgans, which still stud steppe and forestal Russia. The result of such primordial life conditions was to entail upon the Eastern Slavs a comparative slowness of development and a comparative simplicity of social composition—yet also a great distinctiveness both of development and of composition.

Let us lay this first stage in our history thoroughly to heart, since thereby we shall be the more helped to orientate ourselves as we enter upon our confronting road.

## CHAPTER II

Plan of the *History*—Colonisation as the fundamental factor of our history—Successive periods as chief stages of colonisation—The dominant factors of the periods—The obvious insufficiency of the plan—Historical factors as distinguished from ideas—The differences of their origin and mutual action—When an idea becomes an historical factor—The essence and the methodological significance of the political and economic factors of our history—The practical purpose of historical study of the student's own country.

I HAVE now dealt with the scientific tasks of study of local history, and found such study to have for its fundamental task acquisition of a knowledge of the nature and the working of the historical factors which operate in local combinations of social elements. So next, with that task for our guide, let us determine the aims of the present *History*.

Throughout the whole of our history we see forms, sets, of social life replace one another. The forms in question owed their creation to different combinations of social elements, and the fundamental condition which governed their successive replacement was the peculiar relation of our population to the country, a relation operative for several centuries in our history, and operative now.

In our history's earliest days the extensive plain in Eastern Europe where the Russian Empire came to be formed was not yet settled throughout by the people which still is making the history of that Empire. Our history opens, rather, with the phenomenon of the Eastern Slavic branch which subsequently became the Russian people entering upon the Russian plain from the plain's south-western corner, in the direction of the Carpathians, and for centuries remaining insufficient for the plain's compact, anything like equal occupation, in that the Slav population's life conditions and geographical setting caused its overspreading of the plain to take place not gradually, not through growth, not through *expansion of settlement*, but through *change of settlement*—the population constantly migrating,

as do birds, from one region to another, abandoning a locality lately tenanted, and settling again in a new one. And, as each removal subjected the Slav population to the action of new conditions born of the physical peculiarities of each newly occupied region, and of new external relations compounded, these physical peculiarities and external relations caused each fresh distribution of the population to communicate to the Slav population's life a peculiar direction, and a peculiar form and character. Russia's history, throughout, is the history of a country undergoing colonisation, and having the area of that colonisation and the extension of its State keep pace with one another. To this day, now waning, now waxing, is that movement of centuries in progress. A great increase of it was reached when serfdom was abolished, for then there began a vigorous outflow of population from the central blacksoil *gubernii*, where forcible detention had long kept the population congested, to New Russia, to the Caucasus, to the Trans-Volgan and Trans-Caspian regions, to Siberia, and even to the Pacific. Into Turkhestan alone, on that region being opened to colonisation during the second half of the nineteenth century, there moved over 200,000 persons, 100,000 of whom formed themselves into some 150 village settlements constituting, in many cases, large oases of population almost homogeneously of an agricultural nature. Still more active was the outflow into Siberia: official records show that, though the annual total of emigration to Siberia did not at any time, up to the eighties, exceed 2,000, the total rose to 50,000 during the early nineties, and after 1896, thanks to the Siberian railway, to four times that figure. True, the movement proceeded predominantly from the central blacksoil *gubernii*, and, in view of Russia's then popular increase of 1,500,000 per year, was insignificant enough, a movement making itself felt only by almost imperceptible spurts; yet, as time went on, it, as it was bound to do, found expression in no small effect upon the general position.

Thus in migration, in colonisation, we see our history's fundamental factor. With it every other factor in that history has been more or less bound up. Setting aside, therefore, the origin of the factor, let us halt upon the factor itself. It was one serving to establish a peculiar relation between the Russian population and the country. And as the centuries went on that relation changed constantly, and this, again, gave rise to more than one form of social life in succession.

The factor, therefore, may be taken for the basis of the plan of this work, and our history divided into so many periods, or compartments, according to the movements of population observed in each. The periods of our history represent the successive stages traversed by our people during that people's occupation and development of such country as it acquired up to the time when natural growth *plus* assimilation of other races brought it about that the Russian population not only overspread the whole plain, but passed beyond its boundaries. Also, the periods represent, in sequence, the series of halts or rests which, interrupting for a time the Russian population's movement over the plain, saw that population's social life always become reorganised, at each halt, on lines different from those obtaining at the previous one. So I will enumerate those periods, and point out in each the ruling political factor and the ruling economic, and also specify the portion of plain where, not the whole population, but the bulk of it, the portion which has made history, was concentrated during the given period.

Only from, approximately, the eighth century of our era can we follow up, with any assurance, the general growth of our people, or observe its life, as regards that life's external setting and internal organisation, within the boundaries of our plain. Between that time and the thirteenth century the bulk of our population was concentrated upon the Middle and the Upper Dnieper, with those waterways' tributaries to right and left, and their historic continuation, the line of the Lovat and the Volkov. During that time Rus remained politically disintegrated into a number of separate, more or less individualised areas whose political and economic centre, in each case, was a large trading town, as our political system's first builder and director, though one destined presently to encounter a rival—the immigrant prince,<sup>1</sup> despite that it lost but little of its importance under the immigrant prince's sway. This period's ruling political factor, then, was political division of the country into areas subject to towns, and, the period's ruling factor of economic life was foreign trade, with the forest industries (such as trapping and wild apiculture) which that trade evoked. The Rus of the period, in short, was *Rus of the Dnieper, the urban centre, and trade*.

Between the thirteenth century and, approximately, the middle of the fifteenth we see a general process of dispersal and national disloca-

<sup>1</sup> Or stray, roving prince, prince from elsewhere.

tion causing the bulk of the Russian population to figure upon the Upper Volga, with its tributaries: where now that bulk lived split up, politically, not into town provinces, but into appanages of princes—which represented quite a different form of political life. The period's ruling political factor, therefore, was disintegration of Rus of the Upper Volga into appanages ruled by princes, whilst the ruling factor of its economic life was rural-industrial, agricultural exploitation of the Alaunian clay with free *krestianin* labour. This was *Rus of the Upper Volga, the appanage prince, and free agriculture*.

From about the middle of the fifteenth century to the second decade of the seventeenth the bulk of the Russian people percolated southward and westward along the blacksoil strip of the Don and the Middle Volga, until colonisation overspread the Upper Povolzhie throughout, and a special branch of the people, the Great Russian branch, became formed. Yet, though thus flowing geographically apart, this new Great Russian stock combined itself, politically, into a whole under a Lord of Moscow, a ruler who administered his State with the help of a *boyar* aristocracy of ex-appanage princes and *boyaré*. Hence the ruling political factor of the period was State unification of Russia, and the ruling factor of economic life was rural-industrial development at once of, as before, the Upper Volgan clay lands and of the newly acquired blacksoil lands of the Middle Volga and the Don with *krestianin* labour still free, but none the less beginning to suffer constriction in proportion as ownership of land began to undergo concentration into the hands of a new State service corporation, a new military class which the State had enrolled for purposes of external defence. This was *Rus of Great Russia, the Muscovite Tsar and boyaré, and military agriculture*.

Between the opening of the seventeenth century and the middle of the nineteenth the Russian people completed its overspreading of the plain—it did so from the Baltic and the White Seas to the Black Sea, the Caucasian Range, the Caspian Sea, and the Urals—and also penetrated southward and eastward. And during that time the several portions of the Russian land underwent political combination under one sole authority—Great Russia had joined to it, successively, Little Russia, White Russia, and New Russia. And so an All-Russian Empire stood constituted. Now, however, the combining, new, All-Russian authority acted, not with the help of a *boyar* aristocracy, but with the help of the military service class, the

*dvorianstvo*, formed by the State during the preceding period. And this political "assemblage" and unification of all the portions of the Russian land constituted the period's ruling political factor, even as it had for the basic factor of its economic life agricultural labour finally enserfed, *plus* factorial-industrial labour of mill and workshop. This was *All-Russian Russia of the Imperial-dvorianstvo period and the period of agricultural-factorial serf industry*.

These successive periods of history through which we passed, and in which there expressed themselves various forms of social life successively developed in our midst, may to advantage be enunciated again according to portions of plain where the bulk of the Russian population happened successively to be concentrated. And, on those lines, the periods constituted, respectively, the Dnieperian, the Upper Volgan, the Great Russian, and the All-Russian epochs of our history.

Here let me say that I have a fear lest from the foregoing plan of this *History* there may arise a grave misunderstanding. For, as I propose to do no more than expound political and economic factors, and their diverse results, and their diverse means of manifestation, the question may be put: "But—domestic life, manners, achievements of art and learning, literature, spiritual interests, factors of intellectual and moral life, all that colloquially is known as ideas, have these too no place in history, are these too not factors of the historical process?" Well, I would say neither the one nor the other. I know of no community destitute of ideas, however small the development of those ideas may be. For a community is, in its very self, an idea: a community begins to exist from the moment when those who compose it begin to realise that a community is what they are. And this makes it more difficult than ever for me to suppose that ideas do not play a part in the historical process. So, as the question of ideas' historical competency is where a misunderstanding might otherwise arise, let me, as follows, express my views on the subject.

First, I would direct attention to the fact that political and economic factors are distinguished from what we call "ideas" by origin, and also by forms or means of manifestation. For such factors are social interests and relations, and the source of them is a community's activity, the cumulative efforts of the persons of whom a community is composed. For this reason their manifestation lies

in acts collective rather than individual—it lies in legislation, operation of institutions, procedure of law, enterprise in business, and the whole round of affairs political, civic, and industrial. Vice versa, ideas represent the fruits solely of personal creation—they evince solely the isolated activity of individual minds and consciences, and, in their purest, original form, are to be beheld in scientific and literary memorials, in the works of great artists, in the achievements of self-denial for humanity's sake, and so forth. Thus we observe in the two phenomena activity of the two historical forces represented by, respectively, the person and the community.

Between these two forces, the person and the community, the individual intellect and the collective consciousness, there is for ever in progress an exchange of services and of influences. On the one hand, the community nourishes individual thought, trains individual character, serves as a subject of individual convictions, and acts, for the individual, as a source both of moral rules and sentiments and of æsthetic impulses—for to every system there pertain its cult, its rules, and its poetry. On the other hand, when individual convictions attain ascendancy in a community they become part of the common consciousness, morals, and law—become, that is to say, rules obligatory even upon those who do not share them—become, in other words, social factors.

Thus ideas derive from social relations, and social relations derive from ideas. But let us not confound the one with the other in historical study, since they are phenomena belonging to different orders entirely. History concerns itself not with man, but with men: it looks to man's relations with others, but leaves his isolated activity to other sciences. It will therefore be understood quite readily when a personal idea becomes a social idea—becomes, in other words, an historical factor. It does so when, passing beyond the limits of personal being, it comes to be general property and an obligatory (that is to say, generally recognised) rule or conviction. But before it can acquire obligatory effect of the sort there need to exist various means for the effect's support, such as public opinion, the demands of law and decorum, pressure of police authority, and so forth. Ideas, in fact, become historical factors even as do forces of nature. For æons after the creation of the world lightning seemed to lighten the darkness of night to no purpose, and even with destruction in its wake, and, whilst terrifying the imagination of man,



to increase by not a jot the amount of light which he required, even to the extent of replacing the night dip by the cradle's side! Yet eventually the electric spark was caught and tamed—disciplined—yoked to apparatus designed for the purpose, and made to illuminate streets and rooms, to transmit messages, and to haul weights. In short, it was converted into a means of culture. The same with ideas: they need just such another process of elaboration before they can become culturo-historical factors. How many splendid thoughts arising in detached minds have perished, and are perishing, without trace left upon humanity, simply through want of proper finish and ordering! Even ideas which adorn private life, and give light and warmth to the family, or to the family circle, and aid the domestic hearth, may yet fail to raise the temperature of public welfare by so much as a single degree if also they fail to discover for themselves in law, or in the economic round, suitable apparatus in the form of institutions or conditions able to promote them from the realm of bright expectations, of, that is to say, vain imaginings, to the realm capable of enabling them actually to affect the social order. Never do merely undeveloped, "raw," as it were, ideas become historical factors: the place of such ideas lies not in history, but in biography or philosophy.

Now, to turn again to the programme of this work. In studying political and economic factors, we find each of them to be based upon an idea which, it is reasonable to suppose, underwent long wandering in some individual mind before it gained general recognition, and became a guide in politics, it may be, or in legislation, or in the industrial round. Such successful ideas alone are recognisable as historical phenomena. And herein life assists historical study, for it effects a practical differentiation of ideas—separates the practicable and the "happy" from the dilettante and the unfortunate. In literature too we encounter what I might call a "precipitation process" of detached thinkers' reflections and sentiments at given periods. But by no means the whole stock of personal thought and sentience enters into life's currency, or comes to be the property of a whole community, and part of the general culturo-historical stock: social life adopts of that stock only so much as can be embodied into institutions, or into juridical or economic relations, or into social demands. Embodiment, practical elaboration, of the sort serves also to introduce the idea into the historical process, as a factor therein. Ideas merely glimmering in, merely languishing in, individual minds

or private, personal existence augment the stock of social life about as much as the ingenious toy watermills erected over brooks by children augment the stock of popular-industrial apparatus.

It will be seen from this that I would by no means ignore the presence and importance of ideas in the historical process, or deny the capacity of those ideas for historical action. Merely I mean that it is not every idea that enters into the historical process, and that an idea which does so does not necessarily enter therein in its pure and original shape. For in such shape, as just an idea, the idea may remain a personal impulse, or a poetic ideal, or a scientific discovery, and no more; but, once it gains ascendancy over any such practical force as authority, a popular mass, capital, or anything capable of developing it into a law, or an institution, or an industrial or other enterprise, or a custom, or a mass addiction, or a universally intelligible artistic creation (as where pious conception has poured a presentment of the Heavenly Heights over the cupola of Saint Sophia)—once the idea does this, it becomes an historical factor.

With these considerations in explanation of the plan of the work to help us, we next can draw thence certain methodological deductions. I do not say, when basing historical study upon political and economic processes, that all historical life is made up of those processes, and of them alone—that historical investigation should stand limited to government offices and market-places. I merely mean that, though it is not through such processes alone that historical life moves, it is with them, nevertheless, that we can most conveniently begin our study of the life in question. Always, as we approach a given community from the political and industrial aspects of social life, we find ourselves entering within a circle of intellectual and moral ideas and interests which no longer are the concern exclusively of private intellects, of personal, detached consciousnesses, but have become the property of all the community, have become factors of the community's life in common. Hence political and economic orders at a given period may be taken to indicate what is that period's intellectual and moral life; they may be taken as such indicators in so far as they have become permeated with the ideas and interests dominating the community's intellectual and moral life, and directing the community's juridical and material relations. But, with that, it is always the case that we find in certain individual minds, in the sphere of private mental process, assortments of notions and

aspirations which have not attained such dominance, but remained practically abortive. For a politico-economic order which has its basis in ideas generally dominant, with their dominance confirmed through means of compulsion, may arouse in individual minds, or in a portion of the given community, notions, sentiments, or aspirations non-consonant with the basis of the order, or even directly protestant against that basis. And in that case the non-consonant notions, sentiments, or aspirations either die out again or await their time. In the eighteenth century complaints against the injustices of serf-right made themselves heard from the serf world sooner than from the ranks of educated society. Yet for long the Government paid those complaints as little attention as it did to representations from cultured persons. Only fear of the serf world's attitude at length effected the progress of the emancipation question more potently than higher considerations had done.

The reason why we investigate political and economic factors is to see what they can furnish us in historical study. Politico-economic life does not constitute a whole, anything homogeneous; it is not a special sphere of human existence which includes no room for the higher aspirations of the human soul, and in which there prevail solely the baser instincts of our nature. To begin with, political life and economic life represent separate provinces of life, and, in their essence, have little in common, or that is akin. Dominant in them, too, are two principles diametrically opposed to one another, with the one principle always demanding sacrifice, and the other one always insatiably nurturing egoism. Yet both draw into their working certain effective spiritual resources possessed by the community. Private, personal interest is, through its very nature, always inclined to oppose the common good. Yet it is through reciprocal action on the part of the two constantly contending forces that human social life attains construction. Such reciprocal action is rendered possible through the fact that in private interest there are elements which, nevertheless, tend always to curb its egoistical impulses. Unlike an order of State (which is based, of course, upon authority and submission), economic life is a sphere of personal freedom, and of personal initiative, as expressed in freewill. But the two forces which animate and govern economic activity constitute also the soul of spiritual activity, so that, in purely personal, material interest, energy may come to be aroused less by an interest itself than by a

wish to secure personal liberty, external and internal, intellectual and moral: and that wish for liberty, in its highest development, attains expression in recognition of interests common to all, and in realisation that work on behalf of the general good is a moral duty. Thus there becomes established on this moral ground agreement of the two contending forces. It so becomes established in proportion as social-conscious development restrains personal interest in the interest of the good of all, and furthers that good's demands, without at the same time causing restriction of the lawful field required by personal interest. Hence it is the mutual relations between the two principles, political and economic (whether dominance of the one over the other, or a just balance of the two), that determines the level of attainment of social life. And the source of establishment of the one or the other relation is degree of development of social instinct, and degree of recognition of moral obligation. But how, through what signs, is it possible to determine the extent to which such level indicates the strength of the spiritual elements comprised in the given order of social life? To begin with, this is shown by the course of events in political life, and by the sequence of phenomena in economic. And in the second place, historical observation of events and phenomena of the kind can take for its standard legislation, administrative practice, and legal dispensation. We have available a very illuminating example. In ancient Rus moral influences emanating from the Church constantly opposed the growth of serf-ownership. And sometimes those influences were accorded support by the Government, which had for its motive in seeking to restrain and regulate the trend towards servitude the interests of the State. This struggle of Church and State with private interest varied in success with conditions of the day: and it is by those fluctuations, as expressed in memorials of law and industry, that we are enabled to estimate the effective strength exerted by the humanitarian ideas of the period, and to estimate from that, again, the period's moral level of social life. In the same way, we can determine the moral conditions of a community, not by subjective impressions or prepossessions, nor by contemporary testimony (which, again, is subjective), but by what we find to be the community's practical correlation of social life elements, and by what we find to be the community's degree of mutual agreement amongst the various interests operative in that community.

Also, I purpose to base this work upon political and economic factors according to those factors' importance, not in the historical process, but in historical study. The importance is one of method alone. Intellectual toil and moral effort ever are the best constructors of a community, ever are the most potent agents of human development, ever are what lays the most durable foundations of a life order corresponding with man's true needs and humanity's high calling. But the conditions of historical life cause those factors not always to operate with equal tension, or to affect a given life order proportionately to their tension. Such forces enter into the general historical process only through their action upon a given life order; and it is because of their doing so that they enter also into historical study. An order of study is not the same as an order of life. It passes, rather, from effects to causes, from phenomena to forces. What subjects precisely confront us in study which takes its start from political and economic factors? And how far can such study embrace popular life? The subjects of study of the sort are the State and the community—their construction, their mutual relations, the persons directive of their construction, the external (international) and internal (physical and moral) conditions by which their mutual relations are established, the internal struggles which the given people experiences meanwhile, the forces of production which create the given people's industry, and the forms in which the State and the industrial circumstances of the given people become cast. Upon all of these things we will touch only in a more or less leisurely way, and upon some only in passing. Here and there, true, I may halt to call attention to one or another profound moral break experienced by the community; but my chief desire is that from this work the student at least may derive a perfectly clear presentment of the two processes whereby the foundations of our political and national being have been laid, and which I consider most vividly to illustrate the combinations and positions constituting the especial peculiarity of our history. Study of the one process will enable us to trace how the practice of life elaborated and clarified in the popular consciousness the notion of a State, and how the notion attained expression in the idea of action of a supreme power in the State; and study of the other process will enable us to see how, in connection with the growth of the State, there became joined and knitted together the fundamental threads whose complex fabric has now

become our nationality. And if this programme still should be thought to be too restricted, I will not dispute the matter, but—merely adhere to the programme. For a course of history, as this work is to be, is not an entire history: it is impossible for a course to embrace the width and depth of a people's historical life throughout: within the limits of a course an historian and his readers can only follow such streams of history as he deems to be the chief, the dominant streams, whilst addressing himself to others only in so far as they approach, or mingle with, the main flow. At all events, provided that, despite omissions, this exposition of mine enables its reader to derive, in general outline, a true presentment of the Russian people as an historical personality, I shall consider my work's scientific aim to have been attained in full.

So now we have deduced from the tasks of general historical study the scientific purpose of study of local history, and that, in turn, has given us a plan-basis for this work, and indicated to us the best order and methods of studying Russian history in particular. But another question in our task still calls for decision. That question is the question of the purely practical result, as distinguished from the purely scientific, to be gained from studying local history. It is the more important a question because the local history whose study we are about to undertake is the history of our own country. So are the scientific observations and deductions made during the task bound to remain in the realm merely of pure learning, or is it possible for them to issue thence, and influence our aspirations and our acts? That is to say, can there be in the scientific history of a country a portion which actually can be applied to the children of that country? I think that there both can be and ought to be such a portion, in that the end of all learning depends upon the closeness of its connection with our needs and aspirations and acts: otherwise learning would become so much ballast in the memory, would become stuff fit only to assuage the life buffetings of an empty barque, or at all events of a barque not sailing with any valuable cargo. Then what is the practical, applicable aim concerned? That aim I will point out now, so that we may not need to recall it during the work's actual exposition, yet still have it by us as a tacit stimulus to our endeavours.

Just now I spoke of the "historical personality" of a nation. In the study of the history of a nation that "personality" forms the

fundamental subject. A nation's significance as an historical personality lies in its historical destiny. And that destiny is to be seen expressed in the nation's world position as created by its efforts, and in the substantiable ideas striven for by the nation through activity in that position. A nation fulfils its role on the stage of the world through means of the forces which its historical education helps it to develop. And a nation's ideal in its historical education should be fully and harmoniously to develop its several elements of social life in such a correlation as shall cause each of them to grow and act in proportion only to its normal importance in the social composition—neither suppressing itself unduly, nor oppressing its fellows. The means for the nation's notation of that historical education's progress is historical study. For if a nation's history be scientifically set down, that history becomes the nation's receipts-and-disbursements ledger, and from that ledger there can be computed the deficits and excess expenditures of the past. Whereupon the nation's direct task becomes an immediate cutting down of the excess expenditures, and an immediate making good of the deficits, that a just balance between tastes and means may be established again. In the same connection the final deductions of historical study come closely home to our own practical needs—they call upon every one of us Russians of to-day to achieve responsible apprehension of what have been the shortcomings of our historical education. For us Russians that apprehension is more necessary than for all others, in that, though Russia has, through centuries of effort and of sacrifice, formed an Empire whose like, for composition and dimensions and position in the world, has not been seen since the fall of the Roman Empire, the people which created that Empire has not yet come to stand in the front rank of European nations—internal historical conditions have led to it that that people's internal development has failed to keep pace with that people's international position, or even has been retarded by it. No, we have not yet begun to live up to the measure of the external forces which we realise, but have not fully matured, so that even now we cannot rival certain others in the scientific, the socio-political, and similar spheres. The level of national forces attained by a people, the stock of national resources accumulated by a people—these come of the toil of forefathers through centuries; they represent the result of those forefathers' successes. And those forefathers' non-successes too need to be known, since their

failures perforce constitute not only our own tasks, but the tasks of the generations destined to follow in our steps.

How, then, can the combinations of social elements which long ago became compounded in our history, and now are about to be studied, help us in deciding our problems? Sometimes it befalls that persons feel uncomfortable in their given position, or find the social order under which they are living irksome, yet cannot define or explain precisely the irksomeness or the discomfort. Then historical study brings to light the existing irregularities in the community's adjustment which those individuals are feeling dimly and painfully, and points out the existing abnormal correlation of social elements, and also that correlation's origin, and thereby renders possible a devisal of means towards the broken balance's re-establishment. If we note that certain social elements have, in the past, failed to develop proportionately to, or only at the expense of, to the detriment of, other elements equally lawful with themselves, then we know what elements should be given most vigorous development in the future if we are to attain due symmetry and regularity of the social composition. To every nation history sets a double cultural task: the task of work upon the nature of the country in which the nation is fated to live, and work upon the nation's nature itself—upon the nation's spiritual forces and social relations. For centuries our people was forced to contend with Russia's forests and marshes, to bend its whole efforts upon rough preparatory toil of civilisation: and that should show us that, lest we lose the faculty of facing life given us by that toil, we must ever expend labour upon ourselves, develop our intellectual and moral forces, pay heed, above all, to establishment of proper social relations, and so enable study of our history to help us to discern our tasks and direction in our confronting practical activity. Each generation ought to have its ideals: woe to the generation to which none pertain: but before we can substantiate our ideals we need energy of action and enthusiasm of conviction. Nor can conflict and sacrifice be avoided during the process of substantiation. Nor is this all that we need if our ideals are to triumph: we need also strong nerves, self-denying characters, and discriminating intellects. How easy it is to spoil good work! And how many lofty ideals have not men let decline, or else besmirched with ignorant, unpractised hands! Ideals of ours are not solely our own property; they have not been ordained solely



for ourselves, but either have been transmitted to us from our fathers and forefathers through inheritance or have reached us from other communities through cultural succession, as created by the life experiments and intellectual exertions of peoples so labouring there-upon before, or in greater measure than, ourselves that those ideals have, during the process of creation, figured in connection with different forces, resources, and positions than our own. Ideals, therefore, are not always suitable generally, at all times, and everywhere. To know which, and how much of them, to substantiate in a given community at a given period, we need carefully to examine the stock of effective forces and resources which the given community has accumulated. And for this, again, there is needed a due process of weighing and appraising the historical experiences and impressions which the community has surviving in it, and the manners and customs which thereby have become bred in the community. This last is the more imperative a task because our life is being lived in a period rich in ideals, but only in ideals which are warring with one another, and are irreconcilably hostile one to another. The fact, indeed, embarrasses expedient selection of ideals, and only a knowledge of the past can facilitate selection. And therefore such knowledge is both a demand of the thinking mind and an essential condition of sensible, proper activity—the historical sense thence developed gifting the community which comes to possess it with that true perspective of position, and with that true perception of the moment, which alone can afford preservation from, on the one hand, inertia and, on the other, excess of haste.

In sum, if we are rightly to determine the tasks and the direction of our activity, each of us should become something of an historian, and so become also both a consciously and a conscientiously working citizen.

### CHAPTER III

The formation of European Russia's surface—The climate of the country—The geological origin of our plain—Its soil—Its botanical belts—The plain in relief—Its soil waters and atmospheric deposits—Its river basins.

As soon as we begin to study the history of a given nation we always encounter the force which holds in its disposition the nation's cradle. That force is the nature of the nation's country.

Also, a geographical sketch prefixed to a survey of the history of a country should always note the physical conditions which most have affected the country's historical life.

When we say "Eastern Europe" and "European Russia," what we mean to indicate is, respectively, the geographical relation of Russia to her westward neighbours, and her Cis-Uralian territory apart from her territory beyond that range. Customarily we repeat, "Europe is divided from Asia by the Urals," and have grown so habituated to the formula that we never either suppose it possible or deem it necessary to express ourselves more exactly. Yet by no means have geographical presentments adopted by the cultured world always coincided with that habitual phrase. Ancient Greek geographers, for instance, drew their dividing-line between Asia and Europe along the track of the river Tanais or Don, and so placed considerable portions of modern European Russia altogether outside of Europe, and, if Moscow had yet been in existence, might have set that city on Europe's extreme frontier to the east. Yet, after all, the ancient geographers' presentment could find some historical justification for itself, even though from a phenomenon derived from the farthest-opposed pole of human development. For centuries immemorial Asia, the true, nomad Asia, roamed, with her tilt wagons and her herds, what now is Southern Russia. And at last she seems dimly to have realised that she was in Europe, and some of her hordes rolled onward across the Carpathians, and, halting in modern Hungary, and finding that they could no longer maintain their Asiatic order of existence, definitely settled down, whilst those

of her hordes which spread over the broad plain from the Volga to the Dniester, and followed up the Don, never came to feel the same necessity, but lived on for centuries as had been their custom on the steppes of Central Asia.

Thus the coincidence between the Asiatic barbarian's practice of life and the educated Greek's geographical outlook had some reason behind it. Two geographical peculiarities pre-eminently distinguish Europe from the rest of the world, and especially from Asia: which two peculiarities are difference of form of surface and extremely sinuous formation of coast lines. All of us know what a powerful and many-sided effect each of these peculiarities can exercise upon the life of a country and its inhabitants. And Europe in particular has been forcibly acted upon in the respect named. Nowhere, indeed, as in Europe do mountain ranges and tablelands alternate with plains so frequently, and within such comparatively small areas. And nowhere as in Western and Southern Europe does the shore line present such a fretwork of in-running bays and far-projecting headlands and peninsulas. Indeed, thirty square miles of Western and Southern European mainland go to a mile of coast line; whereas in Asia a mile of coast line goes to a hundred square miles of mainland. The most typical locality in this respect is the eastern coast line of the southern portion of the Balkan Peninsula, or ancient Hellas, where, as nowhere else, the coast line lies fantastically indented by the sea. Also, the diversity of land surface in that region is such that between only two degrees of latitude one can encounter every European-growing species of tree, although Europe herself stretches over a latitudinal distance of thirty-six degrees.

Nevertheless Russia—I am speaking, of course, solely of European Russia—does not share these natural peculiarities. To be more precise, she shares them merely to the same extent as does Asia. Only a small proportion of her frontiers consists of sea, and her shore lines are insignificant in comparison with her mainland area—fully forty-one square miles of her mainland go to a mile of her littorals. As for the form of her surface, its distinctive feature is uniformity. Almost all over it one form alone prevails. Which form is an expanse of undulating plain some 90,000 square miles (over 400,000,000 *desiatini*) in extent (and therefore equal to nine Frances), but rising at no point to more than a moderate height,

to more than, on the average, 80 *sazheni* (560 feet), above sea-level. Even Asia's vast and compact and uniform areas would not force our plain to take the lowest place amongst them, for, to select only one example, the Iranian Plateau is only a little over half as large. Also, to southward, to complete our plain's geographical kinship with Asia, that plain merges into huge, and almost waterless, and almost treeless steppes of an area of about 10,000 square miles, and of an elevation nowhere exceeding 25 *sazheni* (175 feet) above sea-level. The steppes' geological structure is exactly like that of Central Asia. And geographically the steppes' surface is a direct continuation of Central Asia—it is joined on to the latter by a gateway lying between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, whence the steppes spread eastward in, at first, a wide strip, and, later, in a narrowing one which skirts the Caspian, the Sea of Azov, and the Euxine. This steppe strip constitutes, as it were, an Asiatic wedge thrust into Europe's mainland. And between it and Asia a close connection historical and of climate exists. For ages dread visitors from the depths of Asia entered through the Uralian-Caspian gateway, and surged thence towards Europe along this steppe high road. Hordes they were as past numbering as their own steppe herbage, or as their own desert sand. Lastly, as Western Europe has a temperature merely moderate and even, she does not know our steppe plain's exhausting summer droughts and fearful winter blizzards as they come borne to us from Asia, or at least receive reinforcement thence.

So much, then, for the extent to which Asia lies within European Russia. Of course, Russia is in no way Asia historically. The point is that Russia is not wholly Europe geographically. Rather, she is a transitional country, she stands between two separate worlds. Culture has knitted her indissolubly to Europe, but nature has imposed upon her certain features and influences which variously have drawn her to Asia, and Asia to her.

The uniformity of surface of our country is largely responsible, also, for our *climate*, for our distribution of atmospheric warmth and atmospheric humidity, and for, in part, the direction of our winds. It goes without saying that one would naturally expect sharp climatic differences in an area covering the 2,500 versts between the Vaigatz's northernmost point of mainland shore, under the 70th parallel, and the southernmost point of the Crimea, or the Caucasian mountains' northernmost spurs, under the 44th parallel. And, as a rule, one

is led by these sharp climatic differences to divide our plain into four definite belts, namely, an *Arctic* belt (lying within the Arctic Circle), a *northern*, or cold, belt (from latitudinal degree 66.5 to latitudinal degree 57—approximately the parallel of Kostroma), a *middle*, or temperate, belt (Russia's central strip southward to the 50th parallel, through the line Kharkov-Kamyshin), and a *southern*, or warm, steppe belt (the strip reaching thence to the 44th parallel). Yet the climatic peculiarities of these belts are not nearly so sharply defined as in the corresponding areas of Western Europe, for the reason that Russia's uniformity of surface mitigates, equally, northward-southward climatic transitions and eastward-westward. In European Russia there are, for example, no meridionally trending surface elevations capable of effecting sharp differences of humidity through means of western and eastern slopes, through means of western slopes' arrestment of the vapours which reach us from the Atlantic quarter, and those vapours' forced dissolution in the form of rain. Nor has European Russia within her any eastward-westward surface elevations which might have given rise to respective differences of temperature to northward and to southward. Hence the winds blow freely over our plain; at no time allow the air to become stagnant; tend to draw together, in the climatic regard, regions geographically inter-remote, and so help to effect equable caloric distribution both in the longitudinal direction and in the latitudinal. Thus height above sea-level possesses but little importance with respect to our climate. Russia's bordering seas also affect her interior, apart from the factors of surface and wind-movement, only faintly. Neither the Black Sea nor the Baltic is large enough to influence the whole of so vast a plain. And even the Arctic and its deep coast line indentations influence only Farther Siberia, since for most of the year that ocean is, save for its western, Murmanskian portion, ice-covered.

These conditions explain entirely the peculiarities of the European Russian climate. The difference of temperature between winter and summer amounts to, in all portions of the mainland which lie remote from the seas, a minimum of 28°, and, in places, of 35°; whilst the difference of mean annual temperature varies between 2° and 10°. Yet latitude is not what exercises much influence upon these differences. Indeed, in no portion of such great mainland spaces of Europe as lie as far removed from the seas as do Russia's

does meridional temperature change as slowly as it changes in Russia. And the latter is the case especially until the 50th parallel (that of Kharkov) is reached. Meridional rise of temperature amounts to, it is calculated, merely  $\cdot 4$  of a thermal degree per latitudinal degree; but longitude affects change of temperature much more markedly; in this respect longitudinal action is so closely bound up with the notable differences between summer and winter temperature that, the farther one goes eastward, the colder the winter becomes, and that northward-southward differences of winter cold, as affected by longitude, much exceed northward-southward differences of summer warmth as affected by latitude. These phenomena will be more readily seen from study of an isothermal chart. At first, it will be seen, the annual mean isotherms starting westwards from the Vistula zigzag frequently from north to south; but notably they straighten eastward after entering our plain, before bending again south-eastward. Hence an identical annual mean temperature pertains to localities widely inter-separated according to degrees of latitude and longitude. For instance, Orenburg, though situated 8 latitudinal degrees southward of Petrograd, has an annual mean temperature coincident with that of the latter, or even slightly below it (by  $\cdot 4$  of a thermal degree), for the reason that Orenburg also is situated 25 longitudinal degrees eastward of Petrograd. Yet the winter (January) difference of temperature between the two cities, namely, 6 thermal degrees, is greater, by 2 degrees, than the summer (July) difference between the two. Still sharper is the south-eastward bend of the January isotherms concerned. For although, as just stated, the annual mean temperatures of Orenburg and Petrograd are practically identical, Orenburg's January isotherm (15 thermal degrees) passes, not through Petrograd, but 2 latitudinal degrees northward of that city, and 20 longitudinal degrees eastward—in fact, through Ust Sysolsk. That is to say, after passing through Ust Sysolsk the January isotherm's south-eastward trend becomes much steeper southward than does the Petrograd-Orenburg annual mean isotherm, though the difference of meridian between Orenburg and Ust Sysolsk is five times less than is the difference of meridian between Orenburg and Petrograd. In Orenburg, indeed, the winter months are colder than the winter months in Archangel, although the mean annual temperature of the latter is immensely lower than is the mean annual temperature of the former: in the former case the difference is  $\cdot 3$

of a thermal degree, and in the latter case it is 3.3 thermal degrees. On the other hand, Orenburg has an appreciably warmer summer than has Petrograd (the difference in July is 4 thermal degrees), and, therefore, a summer more in correspondence with the former town's latitude. Orenburg's July isotherm, in fact, runs a long way southward of Petrograd, and passes through Saratov and Elizabetgrad. We see, then, that summer temperature depends mostly upon latitude, and winter upon longitude; that in July isotherms straighten in the westward-eastward direction, and tend to coincide with latitudinal parallels. Direction of winds likewise influences the climate of European Russia, and constitutes another of our characteristic climatic features. The reason why longitudinal changes of temperature in winter tend to diminish in extent is, amongst other things, the fact that in our plain's northern tract mild westerly winds then prevail, and, in its southern tract, cold easterly, owing to the general distribution of European Russia's air currents. The relation of westerly and easterly winds undergoes alteration according to time of year and to latitude. In our northern tract westerly winds prevail in summer-time as in winter, and, in our southern tract, easterly. The farther one goes southward, the more one finds the easterly preponderance increase. The cause of the climatic differences between European Russia and Western Europe is the fact that air currents from Asia take part in the process—they are imposed upon our country through Russian-Asiatic juxtaposition. Presently we shall see the distinctive effect which the two opposing air streams exercise upon our life—the westerly, European air stream affecting it beneficially, and the easterly, Asiatic air stream the reverse. Involuntarily the contest reminds us of the distant, historical days when Russia was the arena where Europe's peoples fought those of Asia, and Asia triumphed finally, and most of all in the southern steppe tract. Also, if the phenomenon were not so remote from meteorology, that atmospheric contest might remind us likewise of later days, of the days when the northern tract of Russia saw western influences join moral issue with eastern.

Restricting ourselves to the middle tract of European Russia, to the chief stage of our country's past—leaving out, that is to say, the extreme North and the steppes of the South—we find that, as determined by the above conditions, that tract's climate is, in general, characterised by the following features. In the region concerned

the winter is not severe, but long, and sufficient to cover the earth with snow, and the waters with ice, and customarily differs little in temperature in accordance with latitude, but very much more so in accordance with longitude. Spring there is late, and the cold frequently returns. Summer is warm in moderation, and therefore favourable to agriculture. And, whilst temperature in winter and spring changes often and swiftly, temperature in summer and autumn changes more rarely, and in a more gradual manner.

The form of surface of the country is explainable by its geological origin. The soil of the flat-bottomed bowl which the country represents is made up of recently formed layers of porous alluvial. And those layers rest upon a bed of granite and other mountain strata in sufficient compactness and thickness both to cover the whole of the plain's surface and to form thereon a series of ridges and hollows which causes that surface to bear a sort of wave-like appearance. The composition of the layers is, primarily, clay and sand mixed. And in certain localities of the southern steppe tract this composition lacks solidity. The uniformity of structure characterising this more unstable soil is due to its entirely distinctive origin, for its alluvial layers are marine deposits in which constantly there are discovered fossil trees and bones of antediluvian animals, whilst Caspian shells also lie scattered over the steppes' expanse. Owing to these signs, geologists have been led to suppose the surface of our plain comparatively modern of formation, and, if not wholly, at least partially, to represent sea bottom which became exposed during some late geological period, and was flanked by, respectively, the Urals and the Carpathians—which would explain why in each of those two mountain ranges rich deposits of rock salt exist. And when the waters which covered the plain drained away into the great reservoirs of the Caspian and Aral Seas they probably did so as a result of a lowering of those two cavities' beds, until the cavities in question, with the Black Sea, alone remained of the huge ocean which once overlaid Southern Russia and the Caspian lowlands. Also, whilst the regularly disposed and uniformly distributed layers of argillaceous-sandy material of which the soil throughout a large portion of the plain is compounded represent sediment left by the retreating sea, the similar layers of sand mixed with light or heavy clay of the northern tract were left behind by thawings of gigantic icefields which once lay superimposed upon Northern Russia and a



portion of Russia of the centre. Hence, if it were possible to attain a sufficient height to view the whole of our plain's expanse, that expanse would appear to us as the exposed, ripple-patterned bed of a sandy river, or as an ocean surface under a light wind.

In addition to the uniformity of surface which distinguishes our plain, the latter will be found to have about it, if examined in greater detail, certain local peculiarities no less bound up with the geological formation of the country, and no less influencing, in the past, the history of our people.

Geologists also suppose that the sea which covered Southern and South-Eastern Russia did not depart in a single process, but in two, since there have been discovered traces seeming to point to the fact that at one time the line of the sea's northern and north-eastern shores followed the 55th parallel as far as a little southward of the Kama, and thence bent southwards; and that at a later period, when the sea had retreated through 4° of latitude, the northern shore of the waters became Obstchi Syrt, the outcrop running south-westwards towards the Volga from the southernmost extremity of the Urals: and by this supposition geologists explain the sharp differences of soil and flora which distinguish the northern side of Obstchi Syrt from the southern, and, still more, the fact that the surface-level southward of that ridge lies notably lower than does the surface-level northward—from the last southward spur of the ridge the ground falls, in swift descent, from 40 *sazheni* to zero. Hence, say the geologists, it is the area between the 55th parallel and the 51st (the area extending to the southernmost point of Obstchi Syrt) that first the sea left clear. Practically this area coincides with the deepest, strongest strip of blacksoil land: and the blacksoil, again, is supposed to owe its formation to prolonged decomposition of rich vegetation evoked by favourable climatic conditions in the region, since it is a humus in the composition of which there is included as much as ten per cent. of vegetable manure. On the other hand, say the geologists, the area which lies to southward of the blacksoil belt, the area which forms the steppe belt, and is supposed to have been the later area to issue from the sea, has on it, covering the sandy, brackish deposit left behind them by the departing waters, only a thin vegetable layer, and a layer far less rich in natural manure: and nearer yet to the Caspian the steppe soil of Astrakhan lacks even this much covering, as well as has distributed about it deposits

of brine which, with the salt lakes also studding the depression, constitute additional tokens of the fact that the region was, at no very distant period, sea-bed. In the south, bordering upon the Black Sea, the steppes are, by this time, rich in grass, and can even produce cultivated crops; but in the Caspian depression vegetation is scanty as yet, and mostly shows but as shrubs or tufts or creeping growths. At the same time, the thinness of herbage on a blacksoil-vegetable layer which distinguishes the steppes of the south joins with the drying winds always prevalent in that region to prevent the soil from nourishing arboreal growth in open spaces, and to render the tract devoid of forest. Which fact, again, has enabled our plain's southernmost portion the more to retain clear traces of its geological origin and soil-formation process. As already stated, appearances and composition of soil lead us to suppose that the sea drainage from European Russia's southern half took place at a comparatively recent period—even, perhaps, within the memory of man, actually during some historical epoch: and as the process of shrinkage of the Caspian and the Aral Sea (which probably used to form a single whole with one another) is continuing, may it not be a dim recollection of these changes that survives in the Greek and Arabic geographers' tale that the Caspian at one time lay connected with the Northern Ocean on one side, and with the Sea of Azov on the other? At all events, the Sea of Azov's outline and character render it what, in some comparatively recent geological period, may well have been a strait uniting the Caspian and the Euxine; whilst some take the Kuma-Manytch Lagoon veritably to have been that strait's lowest level, even as some suppose the Northern Ocean veritably to have been, during some much earlier geological period, connected with the Caspian by a water system running through our plain in a line parallel with the Urals.

Leaving aside, then, more detailed division, we can distinguish in the geological structure of European Russia two fundamental zones of soil which are of great historical importance: namely, a northern zone of clay and sand mixed with more or less addition of burnt matter, and a southern zone of blacksoil. And these have corresponding to, although not coinciding with, them two botanical belts—respectively, a forest belt and a steppe belt: both of which, again, have influenced our history much. When the sea drained away from the southern portion of the plain the drainage took the

line of the slope to the Black and Caspian Seas: and by this slope's south-eastward trend there became fixed the outline of the steppe tract created by that drainage. Everywhere in that region the "steppe" character of the soil increases towards the south-east. This is because, the later a given portion of the tract emerged from the waters, the less has the sea bottom since had time to cover itself with new formation of soil. Also, judging from the form of the south-easterly slope, the north-western edge of that ancient sea bottom must have become exposed earlier than the north-eastern, and therefore the northern shore of the retreating sea must have bent more to southward in its western portion than in its eastern. At all events, that is how the outlines of the present steppe tract run: the tract figures as a triangle which, based upon the Ural Range, gradually narrows south-westward until its apex is resting upon the Lower Danube.

At the same time, the steppes, though lacking forest, are far from uniform in composition of soil and character of vegetation. Indeed, they may, in this respect, be divided into a northern strip of *meadow* grass, and a southern strip of *turf*. The former, the strip which has an herbaceous covering of meadow grass overspreading its soil, is level, and its blacksoil proportion is the most fertile. And the latter strip has its exposed turf covering still studded with bare patches, and its blacksoil, in its southern portion, steadily growing thinner, and becoming ever poorer and poorer in vegetable manure content. Also, the former strip at least contains "islands" of forest (being known, for that reason, as the "forestal steppe"), whereas the latter strip has forest in it only to the extent of such detached clumps as may have found shelter for themselves in ravines, or have become established on hill-sides specially favoured by local conditions. From these variations we see how largely the soil and the flora of Southern Russia of to-day are dependent upon the drainage which long ago caused Southern Russia's north-western portion to emerge from the sea.

On the north and the north-west of the steppe region there joins itself to it a broad forest belt which emerged earlier from the sea and ice, and so began earlier to accumulate a vigorous vegetable stratum. Yet it is not easy to fix a definite dividing-line between the two regions, owing to their gradual, imperceptible fusion, and to their mutually combined peculiarities of climate and soil and flora,

with the forest belt showing "islands" of steppe amongst timber, and the steppe belt showing forest projecting variously in fragments and in whole blocks. Central Russia's original mass of compact forest growth now exists no longer—man's ceaseless felling and clearing operations have compelled that growth to retreat in a northward direction, until nowadays the steppe lands begin farther north than once they did. For example, at the present period Kiev is almost within that belt, whereas, according to the *Chronicle*, it used to be wholly a forest town—"there stand around the city forests, and a great grove of pines." In my opinion the steppe region first of all extended farther northward than it does now, and then was set back by a southerly spread of the forest growth, and then was helped by man's agency to regain its former boundaries. Also, starting from a point between Perm and Ufa, there is a strip of what might be called transitional soil which, approximating in character to a blacksoil of clay largely mixed with decomposite of foliate timber, and therefore known as "forest clay," flows southward of Nizhni Novgorod, passes through Riazan, Tula, Chernigov, Kiev, and Zhitomir, and, dividing the clay-and-sand area of the northern tract from the blacksoil area of the steppes, forms a dividing-line between the main forest belt and the main steppe belt, and has the two meeting and contending within it.

The forest belt, again, may be divided into two strips according to composition of soil and character of vegetation. In the southern strip blacksoil and forest clay nourish foliate timber, and in the northern strip clay and sand produce coniferous timber; and Moscow stands at, or close to, the two strips' botanical node. Yet in these strips foliate timber and coniferous have become so intermixed that we can speak only of local predominance of the one or the other, rather than of any exact geographical distribution. To this day the forest area of European Russia is a very large one, despite what man, especially Russian man, who is never a great timber conservator, has done to the contrary. From official data of the sixties we see that, of the region's 425,000,000 *desiatini*, no fewer than 172,000,000, or 40 per cent. of the whole, were, at that period, still forest-clad; whilst later information furnished by the Central Statistical Committee of 1881 shows the forest area of European Russia, less Finland and the Vistulan *gubernii*, still to have been occupying 157,500,000 *desiatini*, or 39 per cent. of the whole.

The process of formation of surface which distinguishes our plain, and has made itself so markedly noticeable in our climate, and in the structure of our soil, and in the geographical allocation of our vegetation, also came actively under the influence of fluent and still aqueous distribution. Herein certain features of our plain, as viewed in section, are particularly significant. For within its limits there project, but do not break the plain's generally flat character, a number of separate masses of highland, masses forming, here and there, quite solid, compact blocks, or ridges, of considerable extent and total area, yet nowhere of a greater elevation above sea-level than 220 *sazheni* (1,500 feet); whilst hypsometrical observations which we owe to Lieutenant-General Till have shown that everywhere these highlands tend to follow a meridional direction rather than a latitudinal. The formations in question include, firstly, the *Middle Russian Highlands*, running almost meridionally from a point within the *gubernia* of Novgorod to the *gubernii* of Kharkov and the Don Cossacks (a distance of over 1,000 versts), and there becoming associated with the low tableland of the Donetz, and extending along the Northern Donetz to the Don; secondly, the *Ad-Volgan Highlands*, running from a point within the *gubernia* of Nizhni Novgorod along the Volga's right bank, and then bending southward to continue parallel with the Ergai Hills; and, thirdly, the *Avratinski Highlands*, extending from Galicia (separately from the Carpathians, however) to, in more than one branch, the *gubernii* of Volhynia and Podolsk, and also overspreading with their offshoots the *gubernii* near by, and, finally, forming the Dnieperian Rapids. The elevations are, in each case, inter-separated by depressions of which the two possessing the most historical importance are the *South-Western Lowlands*, from the Poliesie, along the Dnieper, to the Black and Azov Seas, the *Central Muscovite Basin*, and the *Lowlands of the Oka and Don*, inclusive of the valleys of the Oka, the Don, the Kliazma, and the Upper Volga. Severally, the highlands and their offshoots serve the principal river basins of Central and Southern Russia as watersheds, and from them the rivers concerned traverse the highlands' corresponding lowlands, and connect both series with the plain's hydrographical system.

The northern portion of the Central Russian elevation goes to form the Alaunian Plateau and the Valdai Hills. Of these, the latter rise to a height of some 800–900 feet, and occasionally to 1,000.

Their hydrographical significance for our plain is great for the reason that they constitute the plain's hydrographical node. Indeed, the river network of our plain is one of its most conspicuous geographical features—as, long ago, four-and-a-half centuries before our era, the observant Herodotus noted when, in describing “Scythia,” or Southern Russia, he said that nothing about the country was remarkable save its rivers, “which are many and great.” It is a feature which, in the past, has influenced our national life to a many-sided, profound extent belonging to no other.

To our river basins the plain's form of surface and composition of soil have communicated a peculiar direction. And the same conditions afford, and maintain for, those basins abundant means of nourishment. For, as our plain is not furnished either with superficial moisture or with atmospheric humidity to the same degree as is Western Europe, its stores of water from these and similar sources have to look for help also to the plain's superficial and geological formation. The hills of Northern and Central Russia have standing accumulated in their hollows stores of fresh water left in its wake, as marshes and lakes, by the primordial ice sheet; and, leaving out of account the remnants of sea drainage from Southern Russia represented by the salt pans of Astrakhan and Taurida *gubernii*, large and small lakes and marshes can be met with almost all over Northern and Central Russia: in the Upper Volgan *gubernii* of Tver, Yaroslavl, and Kostroma alone there is a series of such waters to the number of some hundreds, and the canton of Mologa, in Yaroslavl *gubernia*, especially, contained until recently a marsh exceeding 100 square versts in extent. But with each year the region of marshes and small lakes diminishes—for ever we can see continuing an agelong process of those accumulations' disappearance, as mosses and weed spread along the margins of lakes, and desiccation reduces their waters to marsh shallowness, and ceaseless clearance away of forest growth drives those soil waters to a lower depth still, until finally, they dry up altogether. Yet even now our area of lakes and marshes remains of great extent. In particular are two localities rich in them, whilst the country's total still is estimated to exceed 5,000. The two localities in question are the so-called “lake district” of European Russia, and the Poliesie. The former, even if taken to comprise only the *gubernii* of Novgorod, Petrograd, and Pskov, without the *gubernii* of Archangel, Olonetz, and Tver (the

latter, especially, containing an abundance of lakes of its own), has marsh waters (I leave out lakes) covering up to 3,000,000 *desiatini* of space; whilst in the Poliesie the area of marshes is estimated to include 2,000,000. How difficult it is to contend with the Poliesie's marshes is shown by the slow progress of artificial drainage. For the Commission formed for that purpose in 1873 has, during a period of twenty-three years, contrived to convert into dry land no more than a quarter of the Polesie's marsh area as a whole, or 450,000 *desiatini*.

Closely connected with Russia's open or surface waters are her sub-superficial or soil waters—the former either feeding or being fed by the latter. As a general rule, Russia's soil waters become more and more deeply sunken as one journeys southward. In the northern latitudes of the country those waters lie quite close to the surface, and mingle with altogether open waters to form marshes. And in the central strip they are found sunken to an average depth of six *sazheni*. And in New Russia they sink quite to a depth of fifteen, or more. Also, in some localities of the central strip they form, held in strata of clay, or of sand, or of lime, veins of fine, clear, colourless, odourless water faintly tinged with mineral admixture, as in the case of the Mytistchin water which feeds the reservoirs of Moscow, with the mineral admixture steadily increasing as one journeys southward.

Our soil waters also derive active support from atmospheric precipitations. The distribution of these depends largely upon wind direction. Between May and August westerly, and, still more, south-westerly, winds, the winds which produce the most rain, prevail in Northern and Central Russia. Also, the Urals catch and retain the vapours which reach us from the Atlantic direction, and compel them to dissolve upon our plain. To which, again, local distillations from spring thawings add themselves. As a rule, therefore, Northern and Central Russia have a larger amount of summer precipitation than is the case in Western Europe, and are therefore looked upon as a rainy locality all round during that season. On the other hand, in summer there prevail in Southern Russia, in Russia of the open steppe, dry easterly winds, as air currents afforded ready access to the steppes through the latter's unbroken conjunction with the deserts of Central Asia. And the result is that æstival precipitation in Central and Southern Russia increases steadily from south, and, still more, from south-east, to north and north-west. In

the *gubernii* of the Baltic and the west the annual rainfall amounts to 475–610 millimetres; in the *gubernii* of the centre it amounts to 471–598 millimetres; in the *gubernii* of the east it amounts to 272–520; and on the southern steppes, as well as in Astrakhan and New Russia, it amounts to 136–475. Whence we see that the minimum experienced in the western *gubernii* exactly equals the maximum experienced in the regions of the South.

Three of the chief rivers of European Russia rise in marshes and lakes amongst the Valdai Hills, and flow thence over the plain in volume bountifully fed through a precipitation of rain and melted snow which exceeds the precipitation anywhere else. The three rivers in question are the Volga, the Dnieper, and the Western Dvina. The Valdai elevation, therefore, constitutes the central watershed of our plain, and strongly influences the whole of the river system. In almost every case the rivers of European Russia rise, like the foregoing, in lakes or marshes, and are fed not only by their sources proper, but also by rain and spring thawings. Accordingly the marshes of the plain hold an established place in our aqueous economy—they serve as our rivers' storage reservoirs, and, on exhaustion of nourishment afforded by rain and melted snows supervening, and a fall in the rivers' level occurring, supplement, so far as they are able, the loss of flow occasioned. Also, the porous nature of the soil readily gives standing waters outlet from the river reservoirs, and, as readily, the local nature of the country's surface leads to very diverse directions of currents' course. In fact, we find nowhere in Western Europe such a complex river system as in Russia, or meet with such fluminal ramification, and with such juxtaposition of fluminal basins. Here and there fluminal basins the main streams of which flow in contrary directions approach one another so closely with their branches as practically to lead to a mutual process of inter-plaiting. And all over the plain there has become formed a fluminal network extremely configurate of character. It is a peculiarity which, with existence of narrow and gently sloping *voloki* (portages), facilitated colonisation from the first, since it rendered our bygone voyagers' task of transferring their river barques from basin to basin a matter of ease. Nor, for the reason that the rivers issue from marshes and lakes situated but little above the level of the sea, have they any great fall, but flow with moderate current, and, encountering, at the same time, *terrain* porous enough to be



easily washed away, execute extremely serpentine windings. In the case of rivers whose origin is mountainous, and which, fed with mountain snow thawings, descend from amongst hard mountain strata, those rivers assume, through swiftness of flow, a rectilinear direction, and, on encountering mountain strata productive of obstacles, deviate from those obstacles either at right angles or acutely. For the most part, that is the way in which the rivers of Western Europe flow. With us, however, the small fall of our rivers joins with the unstable nature of our soil to produce an extraordinary sinuousness of line. The Volga, for example, traverses 3,480 versts in all; yet the direct distance from source to mouth is 1,565 only. For the same reason our chief rivers and river basins embrace enormous areas: the Volga and its tributaries alone drain 1,216,460 square versts.

In conclusion, two more peculiarities of Russian hydrography may be noted as historically important. One such peculiarity is our rivers' spring floodings, so favourable alike to navigation and to grass land culture, and so greatly influencing, in the past, our distribution of riparian population: whilst the other peculiarity pertains exclusively to rivers flowing meridionally, and lies in the well-known fact that, as a rule, such rivers have a high right bank, and a low left—a phenomenon attributed by the Academician Beer, some thirty years ago, to the earth's diurnal revolutions. Like the preceding peculiarity, this feature has, in the past, influenced popular riparian distribution. And still more has it influenced systems of defence—the fortresses around which populations gathered always being reared on the higher banks of such rivers. Merely need we look at the situation of most of the Volgan fortified towns to see this.

Now, with the foregoing details adduced, and confining ourselves to them, let us try to combine all into a single whole.

## CHAPTER IV

Influence of nature of country upon a people's history—The scheme of the relation between man and nature—The importance to Russia of her strips of soil and flora—The importance to her of her river network—The importance to her of the Oka-Volga watershed as the nodal point of her colonisation, her industry, and her political life—The historical significance of her forests, her steppes, her rivers, and her people's relation to the same—The question of whether impressions of nature of to-day can be taken as truly indicating the mental effect derived from nature in the past—Certain phenomena in the nature of our plain which bode misfortune.

WE have now collated our material towards attempting an answer to the question of nature's influence upon our people's history. So next let us dissect that material, and return the answer in fact.

For a beginning, let there be no reservation made as to the circumstance that the question is one not wholly free from difficulties, and therefore one demanding certain methodological precautions. Usually our process of thought starts off with dissection of our subject of study into its constituent parts; but such dissection is not what nature cares for, whether as regards herself, or whether as regards her effect upon human beings. In nature all forces work at once: in her every activity the ruling factor is assisted by imperceptible coadjutors: in her every phenomenon diverse conditions participate. And the coadjutors concerned we distinguish through study. Yet it is with difficulty only that we can define the proportion and character of the shares severally borne in the common task. And it is still more with difficulty that we can determine the extent to which each coadjutor enters into such activity in common. No subject is less amenable to historical study than is the subject of how far the historical process constitutes a single whole: we know only that during his every moment man is either accommodating himself to the nature around him in diverse ways, and to that nature's forces and means of action, or making that nature and the rest accommodate themselves to him, and to such of his needs as he either will not or cannot forgo, and that through this dual struggle with nature and

with himself he develops character, judgment, energy, sentiments, ideas, aspirations, and (in part) social relations, and that, the more that nature incites and fosters such capabilities, the more she reveals in man his inward forces, and the more must we recognise her influence upon a people's history as potent in so far as it be expressed in human activity aroused solely by herself, and applied to herself alone.

The laws of physical life cause nature to be assigned her peculiar sphere of influence in man's historical fortunes. Hence not every aspect of man's activity is subject to her action in equal measure: herein we cannot but postulate, with regard to her, a certain "progressiveness," rather, a certain "digressiveness," of influence. But in any case precise, scientific establishment of the relation concerned is difficult. Reasoning theoretically, and not on any exact basis afforded by historical experience, we can but conclude that physical nature acts with her greatest force upon such aspects of human life as enable man to enter of himself, independently, and as himself in his capacity of a physical being, into the sphere of nature, or at least to come into close contact with nature. Such aspects of human life are constituted of the material needs for the satisfaction of which he is furnished the means by physical nature, and whence the industrial round arises. And to the same category may we relate the means, the, that is to say, juridical and political relations, whereby such satisfaction of man's material needs is regulated, and his necessary internal and external security is guaranteed.

From these general considerations let us pass, next, to the question proper, and, whilst forbearing actually to seek support for our propounded scheme in Russia's history itself, demarcate phenomena in it for which no explanation save nature's participation is apparent, or in which such participation is manifest beyond doubt. Above all ought we to note three geographical features, or three geographically compounded combinations of conditions of our historical life, which favour cultivation of our soil. The features in question are (1) the country's division into soil and vegetable belts possessed of non-identical soil composition and non-uniform floral species, (2) complexity of the country's water system, and diversity of direction of the country's rivers, and inter-proximity of the country's river basins, and (3) the fundamental botanical and hydrographical node represented by the Alaunian-Muscovite region.

In each case Russia's strips of soil and peculiarities of river basin have affected our history strongly, and aspects of our popular life diversely; the differences of composition of soil in different portions of our plain have joined with the strips' non-uniformity of floral species to determine certain peculiarities in popular industry, and to develop economic types according as, at a given period, the bulk of our population has been concentrated in the forest strip or on the steppes. The effect of these conditions, however, did not reveal itself all at once. When the Eastern Slavs settled in the plain they, at first, occupied the strip of Central Russia formed of the strip of forest clay and the northern portion of the strip of steppe blacksoil. Hence one might have expected two inter-differing types of popular industry—respectively, industry of the chase, and industry of agriculture—to have compounded themselves in the two strips mentioned, but in the *Chronicle* we find no such differentiation specified. True, when Ki and his brother had founded the town of Kiev “amongst forests and a great grove of pines” they lived by hunting, they became “takers of wild beasts”; but though the tribes in the southern belt of settlement also occupied forest land, and also hunted, so that their tribute to the Kievan and Khazar princes was paid in pelts, they, in addition, according to the *Chronicle*, grew grain, and we find the Vietitchi tribe in particular, a tribe which reached the dense forest country between the Desna and the Upper Oka, paying the Khozars tribute, not in furs, but “*ot rala*,” “from the plough,” and the Drevlians (whose very name shows them to have been forest dwellers,<sup>1</sup> and who certainly paid tribute of pelts to Oleg) figuring as “men who also did make for themselves fields and lands.” Hence no noticeable industrial differentiation according to soil and strip of vegetation is observable during our earliest centuries.

What, however, does seem early and actively to have effected differentiation of popular industry according to local natural conditions is the network of our plain's rivers. From the first the larger rivers acted as main trade routes. And along those trade routes the population which took the most considerable part in trade massed itself, and centres of trade, the oldest form of the Russian town, arose; whilst such of the population as remained removed from the trade centres grew grain, and engaged in forest industry, in order to furnish articles

<sup>1</sup> From *derevo*, a tree.

of export—wax, honey, and furs—to the traders. Again, this traffic of trade and popular industry early led to the rivers acquiring a political importance exceeding even their industrial—the river basins began by directing the geographical distribution of the population, and then, through that distribution, went on to determine also matters of political significance. For, as the rivers became the country's primordial roads, and populations spread along those river's tributaries accordingly, the basins gradually marked out, during the ninth and tenth centuries, the local groupings, the tribes, of Russian Slavdom which we find the *Chronicle* specifying. And later—again according to river basins—the region became formed into political divisions, into “*zemli*” or “lands,” which for long, whilst the Slav princes were adjusting their inter-relations and systems of rule, remained the country's partitionary order. A hydrographical basis, indeed, can be remarked alike in the original (tribal) partition of Rus and in that partition's successor, the regional (local princely) system. The *Chronicle*, for its part, locates the Russo-Slav tribes exclusively according to rivers. The *zemlia*, or land, of Kiev, according to it, was the area of the Middle Dnieper. The *zemlia* of Chernigov was the area of the Dnieper's tributary, the Desna. The *zemlia* of Rostov was the area of the Upper Volga. And so on. Still more clearly is the hydrographical basis seen in the appanage division of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries: it corresponds almost to exactitude with the complex and ramified Okan and Upper Volgan basins. Nevertheless a check was kept upon this centrifugal action of the river network by another peculiarity of the fluminal system, by the fact that, owing to the chief river basins' mutual proximity, and to the uniformity of surface of the plain, the various scattered popular units never became wholly segregated from one another, or wholly clamped into separate hydrographical “compartments”: always maintained amongst them there was such a mutual process of association as served in time to prepare them for national unification, and to advance the country further towards unification of State.

Also, in time the joint effect of botanical and hydrographical conditions led to fixation amongst the populations inhabiting the plain of an exceedingly diverse and complex set of social relations. We have seen that the Alaunian watershed is the node of the country's river network; and in the same way the area between the Oka and

the Volga, the region adjacent to that watershed, and to the central Muscovite river basin, became the node of popular life: on the bulk of the Russian population beginning to remove thither from the basin of the Dnieper, the region in question became the diffusional centre of settlement, the general rallying-point, of the migratory movement north-eastwards, the rendezvous where the colonists collected before dispersing again towards the northern lands beyond the Volga, or towards (later) the eastern and south-eastern lands across the Oka. For the same reason that central locality became the popular-industrial node, in that, according as division of popular labour adapted itself to existing natural and geographical differences, the locality saw meet within it the inter-connected types of popular occupation represented by forest industry and steppe industry, industry of manufacture and industry of tillage. Next, a threat of peril from the steppes introduced a new element into division of popular labour, and, in proportion as there took place a setting apart of men for purposes of defence, the rural-working populations came more and more to be mingled with an arms-bearing class, a class planted out on *pomiestia*, or in blockhouses, in the more northerly steppe strip, and constantly pushed further and further forward as that strip's barrier against the Tartars. Of this steppe struggle the base of operations was the Oka, as the southern boundary-line of Russia's nodal region; whilst also this "Bereg," or "Bank," as the position then was termed, formed the support-line of military colonisation of the steppes. The period's migratory movement northward from the Kievan *oblasti*, or "provinces," resulted in a swallowing up of the nodal region's indigenous Finns, and in a forming of a compact and homogeneous and vigorous popular mass which maintained a highly complex industrial life, and came more and more to be complex of social composition, as constituting the germ of the Great Russian stock that was to be. And when in this geographically and ethnographically central area there became consolidated likewise a central point of defence the various interests and relations here meeting and intertwining developed further into a political node. Then, naturally enough, as the base of the new State was the region of the sources of the chief rivers of the plain, that State went on to try and extend its authority also to the mouths of the rivers, by following up the multifarious trends of the basins, and constantly moving forward the population necessary for their

defence. Hence the factor which first determined what was to be the centre of the State's territory was the river heads. And what fixed the circumference of the State's territory was the river mouths, was direction of settlement in accordance with the trends of river basins. Wherefore for once in a way our history's course now virtually agreed with natural conditions—the rivers of the country played the largest part in determining programme.

We have by this time seen the cumulative effect of the variations of form of surface peculiar to our plain. That is to say, we have seen the effect of the plain's various conditions of level and water and soil upon the industrial circumstances and political organisation of our people. Forest, steppe, and river—in these we behold the three basic, and the three most historically important, elements of physical nature in Russia. All three jointly, and all three separately, have played an active part in constructing our Russian life. And as it was Russia of the forest that had laid in it the foundations of our present Empire, let it be from that Russia that we begin a circumstantial survey of the three basic elements in question.

Forest has played a great role in our history throughout: from earliest ages it was the setting of Russian life, and in the forest strip most of our people dwelt up to the middle of the eighteenth century, and the steppes intruded into that people's existence only in the form of untoward episodes—of Tartar raids, and of Cossack outbreaks. Indeed, eighteenth-century Muscovy would have struck a Western European traveller journeying from Smolensk to Moscow as one huge forest, and the towns and villages in it as mere forest clearings. To this day, also, the usual landscape of Central Russia is a long horizon fringed with a blue line of timber. Yet the forest rendered the dweller of those times many a service—industrial, political, and even moral. It built for him his habitation of pine or oak; it warmed him with firewood of aspen and birch; it lighted his hut with torch of fir bark; it shod him with lime bast; it furnished him with domestic utensils and twine; it ministered to his industry with the fur-bearing animal and the woodland bee; and it served him as castle or as mountain—as, that is to say, his safest refuge from an external foe. Only when in the distant north, remote from Kiev, this Empire of ours came to have forest in its rear for a protection did that Empire, after the dire experiences entailed upon it through juxtaposition with the steppes, attain a firm footing. For the Russian recluse, again,

the forest performed the same service as did the wilderness of Thebes: it provided him with a retreat from mundane temptings. Beginning with the close of the fourteenth century, constantly it happened that men seeking their souls' salvation through silence of solitude crossed the Volga, and made for sylvan fastnesses whither they alone were able to trace the path. Yet, for all that, these forest seekers, these fugitives from the world, ended by drawing the world after them: hard upon their tracks there began to follow peasant emigrants, until at last the many monastic cells founded in the wilds became regular *points d'appui* of settlement, and the new arrivals made them do duty as parish churches, loan offices, almshouses, and old age asylums. Hence it was forest, again, that communicated to the desert monasticism of Northern Russia its special character—made of it a distinctive form of colonisation. At the same time, even these and other services have never led the Russian to find the forest anything but oppressive. There was too much of it, for one thing, in olden days: it blocked his road with its density, set its troublesome growths to fight his efforts towards formation of pastoral and arable land, and harboured bear and wolf to menace his livestock. Nests of brigands, too, formed themselves there. And all the while the heavy labour with axe and flint and steel that was needed if ever tillage of a grain crop on *pal* (land just cleared through process of felling and firing) was to become an established fact vexed his soul to utter weariness. Only this can explain the Russian's persistently surly, or persistently contemptuous, attitude towards forest. It is something for which he has never felt genuine affection. In early days he never entered its gloomy shade without succumbing to a sense of awe, without being rendered nervous by its somnolent and "dreamy" silence. Everywhere the deep, inarticulate sighing of its ancient tree-tops seemed to have boding in its breath. Always his nerves were racked with a sort of expectation of danger which could not be foreseen, forestalled. Always the forest agitated his imagination, and led him to people it with every species of terror, to look upon it as, in particular, the kingdom of the one-eyed *liesh*, or wood demon, or cruel, waggish sprite, which loved above all things to make sport of the human traveller straying into its domain. Nowadays, however, the forest lands of Russia's southern-central strip are a mere dwindling reminiscence of the past, and preserved as a luxury, whilst to northward the forests are money-making affairs leased to private



companies by a Treasury which annually derives from the timbered riches of those lands a revenue of from 57 to 58 million roubles.

The steppe country, the *polé*,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, has rendered the Russian quite different services, and instilled into him quite different impressions. We may suppose in this region an early and important development of agriculture on the region's open blacksoil, and of, on its grassy, pastoral lands, stock-raising, and especially of horsebreeding. But the auspicious historical significance of the steppes of the South came primarily of their proximity to that which created them—to the southern seas, particularly to the Black Sea, and so to that which early brought Dnieperian Rus into independent contact with the Southern European world of culture. That auspicious historical significance came also of the steppes' great transverse rivers. And it may be that, to an extent which we cannot determine for certain, it was the steppe country, "the," to quote a poem written in the steppes' honour, "far-reaching and abounding land to which there is neither edge nor end," that, through its ceaseless presentment of a boundless horizon, and through its, to use an ancient term, *okoem*, or "embrace of the eye" (perspective), nourished in the Russian of olden days his appreciation of space and distance—for the forest region at least never nourished a conception of the sort. At the same time, the steppes had their own grave historical disadvantages; they bestowed upon their peaceful neighbours to northward almost as many ills as they did gifts. To ancient Rus the steppes were, indeed, a standing menace. Nor did they seldom prove a scourge outright. In fact, the Russian people's direst historical recollection, and the recollection which has most deeply cut itself into, and found its supremely clear expression in, that people's *bylina* poetry, is the struggle with the steppe nomad, with the crafty Polovetz and the cruel Tartar, a struggle continuing practically from the eighth century to the close of the seventeenth. More than one European deficiency in the historical life of our country may be palliated when one recalls that throughout almost a thousand years she lived cheek by jowl with the cunning Southern Asiatic. We see the steppes' historical product most corresponding with their character and significance in him who came to be known as the Cossack. The term *kozak*, or *kazak*, as then understood in Russia, meant a man without a home or a portion, a wanderer, one who stood ascribed to no community,

<sup>1</sup> Open field, open country.

and had no definite pursuit or permanent domicile, but was, in the simplest, the original Southern Russian, form of the type, "free"—that is to say, shunning association, recognising no social ties apart from his *tovaristvo*, or "company," and living as a "brave" whose whole energies went to fighting the unbeliever, and who, whilst an expert in destruction, neither loved nor understood construction, but, in short, represented at once the lineal historical successor of the Kievan steppe *bogatyr*, or "defender of the Russian land at the heroes' barrier," and the moral antithesis of the monk of the northern wilds. Not until the Period of Troubles did Muscovite Rus come invidiously to look upon the *kazak* as a vagrant, as a "despoiler."

Thus the forest's, and, still more, the steppe's, effect upon the Russian was equivocal. But no such feelings, no misunderstanding whatsoever, did he ever experience with regard to his rivers. There he at once became animated, and lived as soul with soul. His river he altogether loved: of no other element of his land has he spoken in terms so kindly. There were reasons for this. During his migrations his river pointed out to him the way: during his periods of settlement his river remained with him as his never-changing neighbour—he could pour out to it his complaints, and set his dwelling, church, and village above flood mark upon its bank. Again, his river fed him during the not inconsiderable portion of the year set aside for fasting. And for trade purposes it provided, in summer time, a ready-made road, and, in winter time, a highway of ice. Nor did it ever offer him menace of storm and sunken rock: one needed but at intervals to shift the helm as constantly, capriciously the river wound along, and to remember where the shallows and the rough waters lay. The river nourished in the Russian of the day both a sense of system and the social sense, for a river itself loves system and order, whilst its regular, strictly seasonal floodings, a phenomenon with which the hydrography of Western Europe has nothing to compare, at once indicated where settlement would not be advisable, and, by temporarily converting even modest streams into navigable waterways, advantaged incalculably river travel, trade, pasturage, and arable culture. The circumstance that no comparison can be drawn between these inundations of purely seasonal occurrence and the unexpected, and often destructive, inundations occasioned by the mountain-sprung rivers of Western Europe is due to the Russian

rivers' moderate degree of fall, even as the circumstance that those rivers trained the dwellers on their banks to social life and the sociable habit is due to the fact that, as diffusion of settlement followed the river system, such settlement always thickened along the brisker and more navigable waterways, and passed over the forest-clad and marshy watersheds between. Could we now look down upon fifteenth-century Russia from a sufficient height, we should see, as it were, a sheet of canvas fantastically patterned with thin strips of water-line amid large dark blotches. Thus Russia's rivers fostered enterprise by accustoming men to work together and in common, and by compelling them to consider means, and to devise resources, and to remember that they were a community, and to engage in intercourse with strangers, and to take due note of manners and interests, and to effect exchange of merchandise and life experiences, and, in short, to learn what was what. Diverse indeed were the historical services rendered to the olden-time Russian by his waterways.

In studying the extent to which nature of country influences man, we are apt to try to imagine how that nature affected a bygone population, and to seek to compare the workings of our popular psychology with those of the popular psychology of Western Europe. But though the subject is very interesting, it is by no means free from scientific risks. Attempts to penetrate to the hidden process through which bygone man received impressions from the nature around him incline us too much to attribute to him limitations of our own. How often, standing upon the summit of Nizhni Novgorod's Kremlin, one has admired the spectacle of the Volga's mighty, moving flood, and the perspective of ulterior plain, and felt disposed to conceive that the old thirteenth-century founders of Nizhni selected that point for a support in warfare with the Morduin and the Ad-Volgan alien because those founders too had stood and looked at that landscape, and been led by its fascination finally to establish the fortified town which ever since has marked the Volga's junction with the Oka! Yet all the while the men of the thirteenth century may have been sheerly incapable of rising to æsthetics and perspective. Again, as an Eastern European traveller first passes from his plain into Europe of the West he finds himself amazed at the region's unfamiliar diversity of vista and sharpness of outline. True, in, for example, Lombardy he gains reminders of his own country through the surface as viewed in relief: but if, within a few hours,

he should pass thence into, say, Switzerland he will once more behold a surface of unaccustomed guise. Indeed, from everything beheld in the West he will derive an impression of frontier, of limitation, of definition, of precision, of man's presence; he will have suggested to him stubborn, long-continued labour. For ever his attention will be occupied, aroused. Only at intervals will he see again the uniformly same picture of his home in the *gubernia* of, perhaps, Orel or Tula, with the dead level of desolate fields hunching themselves like a sea to the horizon, and the rare copses, and the, maybe, black trackway skirting them; and a like picture accompanying him for hundreds of versts as he traverses Russia's *gubernii* from north to south; until it might almost be that he and the picture were journeying beside one another, with all things in it distinguished by vagueness, intangibility of outline, imperceptibility of transition, reticence, diffidence of tone and colour, conveyance of impressions of objects merely dim and indistinct and calm, non-visibility of human habitation on wide spaces, non-audibility of sound anywhere in the vicinity: so that there falls upon the traveller, as he beholds this once more, a sense of oppression, a sense of unshakable inertia and unbreakable somnolence, a sense of desolation and loneliness, a disposition to meditate without clear or precise thought. Is, then, this a sense born of historical contemplation of bygone man and his relation to nature? It must be born of one of two things. Either it is born of an impression of the people's cultural condition as expressed in the external aspect of that people's country, or it is born of the habit of transferring the beholder's geographical observations to the holder's spiritual moods, and retrospectively converting those moods, again, into moral states variously reinforced by or weakened by the energy of long-expired generations. A landscape's evidence of human habitation, however, alters things altogether. There is present, in this case, less of the subjective, and more of the historically understandable, than when reception of impressions from external nature alone is in progress. For human dwellings are built not only in accordance with the resources at the builders' disposal, but also in accordance with those builders' tastes and ruling addictions. Nevertheless forms established by conditions of a given period more often than not outlive those conditions, since there is a static tendency distinguishing individual taste as much as it distinguishes all other moods pertaining to the human spirit. To this day, for example, peasant

settlements on the Volga and elsewhere greatly impress the beholder, particularly the beholder from the West, with their primitive guise, and their lack of even the simplest amenities, so that they look to him merely like the temporary, fortuitous halting-places of nomads about to leave them for new. Well, in the phenomenon we behold testimony both to the peasant's age-long habit of migration, of vagrancy, and to the frequency with which fire consumes his hut. From generation to generation those two circumstances have fostered in him a scornful indifference to domestic orderliness and to environmental advantages.

As we study nature's influence upon man we need to study man's influence upon nature, in that therein we gain further, and in the same way, a revelation of nature's peculiarities. To man's development of nature towards his needs' satisfaction there are limits; that development demands caution, since it is important that increase of, and regulation of, energy of physical forces should not exhaust them, or throw them out of balance, by infringing their natural correlation. Otherwise nature will be set in self-contradiction, and oppose man's intent—break with the one hand what has been created with the other. Thus, though geographical conditions may, *per se*, be favourable to cultivation, incautious treatment may convert them into conditions hindering, rather than prospering, popular welfare. The nature of our own country is, for all its appearance of simple, uniform character, remarkable for instability: that nature is one capable of being thrown out of balance with comparative ease. Difficult would it be for man to destroy the sources of the rivers of Western Europe; but he would need merely to drain off a Russian river's head, and those of its upper tributaries, to cause those waterways at once to run shallow. In our blacksoil and sand regions there are in progress two phenomena which are wholly or partially products of cultivation, or, more precisely, of cultural non-provision, and have come to be at once quasi-geographical features and chronic physical evils. Those two phenomena consist of *ravines* and of *flying sand*. In the case of the former, they come of the fact that when tillage divests porous soil of its solidifying turf, and rain and melting snow send down volumes of water upon the soil from a higher level, the soil is easily washed away, and there forms itself, in consequence, a maze of ravines and offshoots which our oldest surviving cadastral records show to have been very numerous even in those records' day, and which now constitute

such a huge, complex, ever-extending, and ever-ramifying mesh as, in the aggregate, to rob agriculture of an enormous total of good, cultivable land. In the South these ravines are especially many in number, and supremely so in the more developed portion of the steppes, in, that is to say, the *gubernii* of Volhynia, Podolsk, Bessarabia, Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, and the Don Cossacks, where they not only work great harm with their multitude, but entail a second misfortune, the misfortune that, as they come to constitute a sort of natural system of drainage causing rainwater deposits quickly to run off the fields in its vicinity, they exhaust the soil of contiguous localities of its moisture before that soil has had time properly to nourish itself upon precipitation of rain or snow, and cause woodland growth thereby to become sparse, and soil waters to descend to levels increasingly manifested in drought. Equal damage is wrought by the flying sand, wide strips of which traverse the blacksoil. Travelling long distances, this sand heaps itself upon roads, fills up lakes and ponds, befouls rivers, destroys crops, and lays waste whole estates. In European Russia such sand lies covering, it is estimated, at least 2,500,000 *desiatini*, and observations show this area annually to be growing at a rate of, approximately, one per cent., with the sand so steadily strewing itself over the blacksoil as steadily to be preparing for Russia the fate of Turkhestan, and the process receiving further assistance through the fact that ever, as the hooves of steppe-grazing cattle render the soil's top layer more friable, the wind catches and blows away the organic substance which otherwise would have kept the soil consolidated, and that substance becomes volatile. Ceaselessly is the evil being struggled against through such expensive measures as dikes and fascines and tree-plantings: between the years 1898 and 1902 the Ministry of Agriculture covered more than 30,000 *desiatini* with strengthening and solidifying arboreal and shrub growths; but in the main these figures testify but to the difficulty, to the slow progress, involved in the contest.

Here let us end our preliminary labours towards equipping ourselves for study of our country's history, since by this time we have set ourselves our conditions in the matter of tasks and methods, and composed for the *History* a plan, and, lastly, exercised ourselves in certain points standing in more than ordinarily close relation to the story of our land. Let us enter, in fact, upon the *History* itself.



SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL PHENOMENA  
OF RUSSIAN HISTORY FROM THE TIME  
OF PETER THE GREAT





## SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL PHENOMENA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY FROM THE TIME OF PETER THE GREAT

WHEN Peter the Great was gone there displayed themselves in Russia's external and internal position a series of changes which, springing either directly or indirectly from the policy of the Reformer, altered the frontiers and the international situation of the Empire, the structure of its administration, and the composition of its community.

So long as Peter had devoted his attention to the seaboard of the Baltic, and joined Poland in waging war upon Sweden, he had dismissed from mind (especially after the Turkish campaign of 1711) the Black Sea, or, in other words, the Eastern question, as well as the question of recovering Western Russia; but during the reigns subsequent to his those ancient and vexed problems of Russian policy automatically recurred. Reformed Russia now had gained for herself a prominent place amongst the European Powers, but still, even as formerly, the barbarians of the Crimea were threatening her southern frontier, and their incursions during Anna's reign evoked a successful, but arduous and most costly, Turkish war which, in 1739, ended only with the fruitless treaty of Belgrade. Also, although, ever since the pact of Andrusovo, concluded in 1667, Russia had lived at peace, or even in alliance, with Poland (since both the one State and the other had had Turkey and Sweden for foes), a result of this unwonted friendship between the two long mutually hostile neighbours had been greatly to worsen the position of the Orthodox believers in Poland, and to involve their subjection to forcible "conversion" to Catholicism, to ill-treatment of their priests, to contumely of their liturgical ornaments and rites, to prohibition of their construction and restoration of churches, to debarment of them from public functions and membership of the Diet, and to their imposition with taxatory burdens for the benefit of the Roman clergy. Peter and his successors had complained of these matters to the Polish Government, but without avail. And another result of this policy of Poland's (which the Russian alliance

had protected, or even encouraged) had been to weaken, or actually to threaten with destruction, the national-religious ties of Russia with Western Russia which represented the former's most hopeful means towards ultimate national-political reunion, and towards ultimate territorial recovery. At last, therefore, Catherine II tackled the two questions. Unfortunately, under her guidance neither the Eastern question nor the Western-European kept wholly to the direct path pointed out by Russia's historically indicated interests. Equally little did the course of those questions run as Catherine had hoped it would do. Two successful, but difficult, wars with Turkey were waged. Both of them were entered upon with fantastical schemes of freeing the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula, and then building up again, upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the Empire of Greece. But the only tangible result of the wars was to give Russia Otchakov and the Crimea. And as for reunion of Western Rus with Russia, Catherine's decision of the matter was merely to extinguish the Rietch Pospolita, and to surrender Poland, a Slavonic country, and one possessed of a purely Russian province in Galicia, to a couple of Germanic Powers. The true reason why matters followed this course was that the Turkish and Polish questions ought to have been decided jointly and simultaneously—not separately and consecutively; as also that two extraneous Powers were given a share in their resolution, and that much vacillation occurred as to whether Russia should form an alliance with Austria or with Prussia—with, in other words, one of two States which were rivals of one another, and foes of Russia and of Slavdom. Nevertheless Russia gained considerable successes: she acquired over 6,000,000 mostly original-Russian population from Poland, and she opened the steppes of the South to Russian labour and Christian-European civilisation. Indeed, her gains so far advanced her territorial extension towards its goal that all that subsequently required to be done in the matter of finally setting Russia within her natural geographical boundaries was annexation of Finland (by treaty of Frederikshamn, in 1809) and acquisition of Bessarabia (by treaty of Bukharest, in 1812). Then, at last, the Empire's constituent portions stood, save for Galicia, fully marshalled, and Russia had absolutely secured for herself a place in the family of European Powers. Earlier, ways and means presented themselves towards further decision of the Eastern question. A treaty of Kutchuk-Kamardzi

of 1774 gave Russia's merchant vessels free passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and her diplomatists in Constantinople a right of approaching the Porte on all matters affecting Moldavia. And after annexation of the Crimea a Russian Black Sea fleet materialised, and Sevastopol was made the direct base of a Russian protectorate of the Eastern Christians.

Whilst Russia's foreign policy thus was accomplishing territorial and national unification of the European portion of her area that policy also tackled problems either propounded earlier or again become current. The problems concerned were more or less directly connected with the old Eastern question. And as soon as the nineteenth century opened that question again became the governing regulator of all Russia's policy in foreign quarters. Then its substance grew until the question ceased to be merely the local one of freeing the Balkan Christians from the Turkish yoke, and became the general question of establishing Russian relations with the whole body of Asia's peoples in accordance with the demands of European and Christian civilisation. And, as such, the question spread from the Balkan Peninsula to Transcaucasia and Central and Eastern Asia, and there evoked collisions with, in turn, Turkey, Persia, China, and the Turkhestanian Khans. But, unfortunately, the progress of this general question was hindered from time to time by having woven into it interests from other quarters, interests such as the Western Powers' desire to maintain in Europe what was known as "political equilibrium," and as considerations of Eastern trade, and as Austria's apprehensions concerning her Slav subjects' continued quiescence, and as England's apprehensions concerning her Asiatic influence; and the like. And, to add to these impediments in the way of the difficult question's decision, Russian policy vacillated much as to choice of means towards the decision. At one moment Russia devoted herself to procuring at least a partial amelioration of the position of Turkey's Christian subjects; at another she leant towards an international division of Turkey—a division amongst Austria and France and England and Spain and herself; at another she so far yielded to the influence of the Holy Alliance's Conservative-Legitimist principles as to harm her status in the East by inducing the Congress of Vienna of 1822 to furnish armed assistance to the anti-Turkish insurgents in Greece; and at yet another she demanded that the Balkans' Christian nationalities should be given completely

independent internal government. Nicholas I, who stood free of obligations to the Holy Alliance, preferred this last plan most, and, by doing so, succeeded in postulating the Eastern question in more conformity both with Russia's interests and with the traditions of her policy. But since swift dissolution of Turkey into her component portions might breed all-round anarchy in the East, Russia selected for her basic rule of policy in that direction only furtherance of the emancipation of Turkey's Christian peoples in proportion to those peoples' national-political awakenedness—Russia worked through the method of procuring independent internal government for those peoples, but at the same time leaving them temporarily subject to the Sultan as authority-in-chief, so that Turkey might not immediately be brought to the stage of decomposition, and the Christian nationalities' transitional position previous to emancipation might yet have guaranteed to it Russia's protection.

Thus, then, did Russia's old-established, historically-begotten desire to contend with the Turks in support merely of those of the oppressed Eastern peoples who were one with her in faith, and partially one with her in blood, come to be, rather, a desire to obtain an international, treaty-recognised right to take Eastern Christendom as a whole under her charge. So she proceeded to struggle for the right, and bargained with the Turkish Empire for successive fractions of that Empire according to geographical proximity and political awakenedness. Some of the fractions concerned she embodied in herself. Others she aroused to independent political life under her guardianship and rulers of their own, but on condition that still they paid annual tribute to the Sultan in recognition of his continued supreme authority. Which successes included Russia's self-emancipation from the Crimean Tartars through treaty of 1774; her annexation of Bessarabia in 1812; and her accomplishment of emancipation for Moldavia and Wallachia through treaties of Bukharest of 1812, Akkerman of 1826, and Adrianople of 1829. Originally, too, there was mooted a proposal that on similar terms Russia's, England's, and France's treaty of London of 24 June, 1827, should set the Greek insurgents free after their six-years efforts in rebellion; but two years later, when the Peace of Adrianople had been concluded, the Protectorate Powers decided, rather, to free the Greeks by, through Protocol of London executed on 3 February, 1830, forming them into an independent Hellenic Kingdom. At the

same period a like aspiration to defend Christian believers from Turkish and Persian oppressors drew Russia to Transcaucasia before even she had overcome the non-Christian mountaineers of the Caucasus proper, and led her to protect for a while, and then to cover with her full authority, the Christian provinces of the region, whilst subduing the Mahomedan. Earlier (in 1783) Heraklius, King of Georgia, had found himself unable to withstand Persia, and placed his dominions under Russia's sovereignty. And subsequently his successor, Georgii XII, bequeathed them outright to the Russian Tsar, and in 1801 they were appended to the Empire. Again, in 1804 and 1810 Imeritia, Mingrelia, and Guria successively did as Georgia had done: and, to defend these Transcaucasian gains of hers, Russia fought Persia and Turkey more than once, and thereby wrested from them, in addition, the adjacent Mahomedan provinces represented by Derbent and the maritime parts of Daghestan (1795), the Persian Khanates of Shirwan, Karabakh, Erivan, and Nakhichevan (through treaties of Gulistan and Tourkmantchai of 1813 and 1828), and the eastern portion of the Black Sea littoral and portions of Turkey's section of Georgia (through Treaty of Adrianople of 1829).

Thus weakened by Russia's victories, Turkey ceased to be of much further account in hindering regeneration of the Eastern Christians. In fact, an effect of that weakness was almost to make her seem desirable as a neighbour. And when (in 1831) a revolt begun by Turkey's Egyptian Viceroy, Mehmet-Ali Pasha, threatened to end in Turkey's ruins having founded upon them a powerful new Mahomedan State Russia listened to the Sultan's request for auxiliary sea and land forces, and, in requital for saving his Empire from downfall, was granted a treaty (signed at Unkiar Skelessi on 8 May, 1833) allowing Russia's ships of war to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles without hindrance, whereas for warships of other European Powers the Straits were still to remain closed. In this manner Russia acquired in Constantinople a position weighty enough absolutely to secure for her protectorate rights of the Eastern Christians. Unfortunately, the Western Powers, for their part, deemed this position a menace to "European equilibrium," and therefore started to work for a lessening of the position's efficacy through interference in Eastern affairs. In 1839, in particular, when Nicholas, for the second time, lent the Sultan help against an even

more dangerous rebellion of Mehmet-Ali than the former one had been, the Powers constrained the Tsar to concede a share in the matter to England, Austria, and Prussia, and to continue to do so until, through a treaty of London, the four States concerned could compel the insurgent Pasha to submit. Russia's support of Turkey had for its aim, on each occasion of Mehmet-Ali's uprising, prevention of such a Mahomedan political resurrection as conceivably might substitute Arabic-Egyptian rule in the East for Ottoman, and so give all Mahomedanism such a fresh access of strength as further to render difficult the Eastern Christians, deliverance from Muslim oppression. In short, Russia's determination with regard to her policy in the Eastern question was neither to let Turkey become a Turkey shared amongst the European Powers nor to suffer a Turkish revolution to render a political revival of Mahomedanism possible, but, rather, to utilise Russia's exclusive protectorate rights in respect of the Eastern Christians in such a way as at once to further those Christians' emancipation and to leave them Turkish vassals for the time being. Western diplomacy, however, had another goal before it: that diplomacy saw beyond possibility of doubt that if really Turkey was to be maintained intact Russia's exclusive rights in the quarter stated must somehow be put an end to, and Russia's contemplated release of the Sultan's Christian subjects obviated. So in 1853 the Powers seized upon the occasion of a fresh Russo-Turkish collision over the question of the Holy Places to form with Turkey an anti-Russian alliance.

The outcome of this coalition war of 1853-6 was quite to change the postulation of the Eastern question so far as Russia was concerned, for through it she lost one of her chief supports of Eastern influence—her Black Sea fleet, scuttled by its own crews off the Bay of Sevastopol; whilst the treaty subsequently signed in Paris (18 March, 1856) bound her not to build a Black Sea fleet in the former one's stead, nor to organise any naval defences along the Black Sea coast, and, with that, neutralised, threw open to all nations' merchant vessels the Black Sea's waters, transferred the guardianship of the Eastern Christians to the Great Powers, declared continued existence of Turkey to be necessary towards "European equilibrium," and received the Ottoman Empire into the system of European States, or at any rate made it their ward in the capacity of a State not possessed of rights in full. Hence the Eastern European question ceased to be

solely a Russo-Turkish matter, and became an international, or All-European, concern, and, as such, assumed, in its further development, a new postulation and character.

Nevertheless Turkey's protection by the Great Powers failed to effect peace in the East, to bring about a reconciliation between Turkey's Christian subjects and her Mahomedan. Also, though the Treaty of Paris had bound the Porte to accord both the one and the other equal rights, Western Europe's diplomatic hopes of regenerating Turkey through reform, and of retaining her Christian nationalities permanently under her authority, all broke shattered against Turkey's inertia and fanaticism, and against the Eastern Christians' irrepressible longing for release. So Turkey's dismemberment went on, and faster than ever. First the Danubian provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia, formed themselves, against Turkey's wish, into a State of Roumania, and chose to administer them a Moldavian *dvorianin* named Albert Kuy, and then, after his dismissal (1866), a Hohenzollern, a certain Prince Karl. In the same year the Greeks of Crete came out in rebellion, and petitioned to be united with the new Kingdom of the Hellenes, which had accorded them support. And, next, the Nationalist, or Young Serb, Party, which was all for Russia, and had as leaders men named Boutchitch and Garashanin, headed its country in a display of opposition to the Obrenovitch Dynasty, and cleared out the Turkish garrisons from Servia's fortresses, and thereby rendered the Sultan's authority over their land practically null and void. And eight years later, again, a rising of Bosnia and Herzegovina not only was accorded ready support by Servian and Montenegrin volunteers, but evoked an equally vigorous response the Peninsula over, and most of all in Bulgaria, and so gave rise to, in the first instance, a Servian-Montenegrin war with Turkey, and, in the second (1877), another Russo-Turkish struggle which, on 19 February, 1877, ended in a treaty of San Stefano. However, the Western Powers, and especially England and Austria, sought, as before, to maintain Turkey's integrity, and to withstand the Eastern Christian movements which have just been mentioned. Which opposition found its culminating display in a treaty of Berlin of June 1878, when England and Austria took occasion to have the conditions of the San Stefano agreement reviewed. The latter had stipulated that Turkey should pay Russia an indemnity, and also restore to Russia the portions of Bessarabia of which the Treaty of



Paris of 1856 had deprived her, and, lastly, make over to her a portion of Armenia, the fortress of Kars, and the Black Sea port of Batum; that, in addition, Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro should have their independence recognised in full, and their frontiers extended; that, in return for a rendition of tribute to the Sultan, and of continued recognition of his sovereignty, Bulgaria should become a principality reaching without break from the Danube to the Ægean, under a national Government of her own; and that Bosnia and Herzegovina too should have internal autonomy accorded them. But now the Congress of Berlin limited the new independent Principality of Bulgaria to a Northern Bulgaria only, whilst leaving Southern Bulgaria (Eastern Roumelia) once more under the Sultan's authority, save for administration by a Christian Governor nominated by him, and approved by the Powers. All of which resulted in the fact that, owing to the Congress's action, yet another Bulgarian revolution had to occur (1885), and yet another unsettling of the whole Peninsula, before the two halves of the Bulgarian State could finally achieve consolidation. Bosnia and Herzegovina the Congress handed over to be administered by Austria-Hungary. And as soon as the latter sent an army to occupy the Provinces they met it with the most strenuous opposition. Lastly, England (whose futile support of Turkey had prolonged the struggle indefinitely, and much increased the number of its victims) received as reward—independently of the Congress, and even to the surprise of the Congress—a Turkish gift of cession of the Isle of Cyprus (June 1878).

The effect of this European-diplomatic settlement of the East was finally to cut up Turkey's territory, to diminish her Sultan's authority, and to compel her to reform through giving her dictated rules of conduct, appointing international commissions for her supervision and provincial-internal reorganisation, specifying on what conditions she should continue in existence, checking all ominous Eastern Christian movements, and, in short, treating her State as though it were something not fully of maturity, defensive capacity, and legal competence. Thus, on the Concert of Powers taking Turkey into the European circle, the protectorate of Turkey's Eastern Christians against Turkey by the Concert became converted into a protectorate of Turkey by the Concert against Turkey's Eastern Christians.

Earlier, when the treaty of Paris had deflected Russia's foreign

policy from its old-established path, that policy sought what fresh fields interest or necessity variously indicated. As a first step, she, in 1859, subdued to her rule the warlike Eastern Caucasian tribes.<sup>1</sup> Next, she, in 1864, did the same with regard to the tribes of the Western Caucasus. And the result of these successes was finally to assure her Caucasian possessions' security. Then, on the Khans of Khokan, Bokhara, and Khiva adopting a hostile attitude, and Turcomans raiding and plundering Russia's Central Asiatic caravans, she sent expeditions to Turkhestan, and brought it about that in 1865 General Cherniaev overcame Tashkent (Khokan as a whole was not annexed until eleven years later), and in 1868 the Emir of Bokhara was deprived of Samarkand, and in 1873 General Kaufmann got possession of Khiva, and in 1881 General Skobelev subdued the Turcoman Chechenzes, and in 1884 Merv made voluntary surrender—the total result being that Russia's Central Asiatic dominions then lay reaching right to the borders of Afghanistan, of, that is to say, the Russo-British Indian hinterland. Also, Russia now took measures to safeguard her Far Eastern, Pacific, position. As early as the seventeenth century Cossacks of Siberia had penetrated to the Amur, built a fort at Albazin, and long held it strongly against Chinese attacks: but, later (in 1688), ignorance of the country had led the Government of Sophia to conclude a treaty at Nershinsk whereby both banks of the river became China's again. Now, by treaty of Aiginsk of 1858, Muraviev, Siberian Governor-General, recovered for Russia some territory on the river's northern bank, and that territory became known as the Province of the Amur: whilst soon afterwards there was added to it a Province of Ussuraisk which extended to the Korean frontier, and also a region on the river's southern bank (below where the river joins the Ussur) which, named the Maritime Province, speedily saw arise within its confines Russian settlements of Blagoviestchensk, Khabarovsk, Nikolaev, and Vladivostok. In fact, by the year 1870 the two Provinces together had come to have living within them 65,000 Russian inhabitants, and, by the year 1885, 164,000 such inhabitants, and, by the year 1897, 250,000, and, by the year 1900, 350,000.

In 1891 there was begun upon, from two ends simultaneously,

<sup>1</sup>She had been attempting to do this ever since 1816.—*Translator.*

situated at Cheliabinsk and at Vladivostok, the Siberian railway. The section of it starting from Cheliabinsk ran, at first, only to Sretensk, and the section of it starting from Vladivostok only to Khabarovsk. Hence an interval Sretensk-Khabarovsk remained. Next, owing to political events, the Government abandoned the left bank of the Amur, and gave the railway's eastern portion another trend of direction in addition to the first: the Government, that is to say, leased from China, by agreement of 1898, a region of Kwan-Tunsk which abuts upon the never-frozen Yellow-Sea, and Port Arthur—the latter for use as a naval harbour. Also, a year later a town of Dalny became founded upon the Gulf of Da-Lia-Wan, and was granted free trading port rights. Then, again by agreement with China, the Siberian railway's eastern portion was continued westward until completed with a Manchurian extension of the Eastern Chinese line, an extension departing from the main Eastern Chinese Railway a little to the westward of Sretensk, and so, by dividing the route into two branches, giving the Russian line two outlets upon the Pacific—at Vladivostok and at Dalny-Port Arthur. The total cost, including branches and subsidiary undertakings (the work of transferring Russian population to the region, of organising steamboat navigation of waterways and Lake Baikal, of laying out Dalny and Port Arthur, and of building in European Russia, for through Siberian-White Sea traffic, a Perm-Kotlas line) came to many millions of roubles. The most important of the subsidiary undertakings in question was the first-named, the task of effecting Russian settlement of the strip cut by the main line, and especially as regards the wastes of Eastern Siberia. Never, previously to the eighties, had the number of persons conveyed to those regions exceeded 2,000 per year, but now, in 1896, the number amounted to 200,000. One result of the great highway's opening was to bring Russia face to face with some further political and economic problems as represented by, for example, a complication of international relations through the fact of Russia having occupied Manchuria and Kwan-Tunsk, China's opposition to the Far Eastern cultural and colonising progress of her Russian neighbour, the difficulty of making Russia's general customs policy agree with the free trade principles indispensable to her Eastern outskirts, and the difficulty of making her Siberian venture's future importance for world transit agree with development of the region's internal

productive capacity in the present. Not until September 1904 was there completed, at very great expense, the section of the railway which skirts the southern portion of Lake Baikal for a distance of some 260 versts, and runs so almost uniformly through the great granite crags which project into the Lake as, in view of aggregate of bridge and tunnel work, and of hurriedness of construction necessitated by war, and of conditions of labour amid constant frost, to render the section of line one of the most arduously and costlily built in the world (the cost amounted to no less than 200,000 roubles per verst). Any addition to its traffic capacity similarly would entail outlay on an enormous scale.

Though essentially necessary, the Siberian railway nevertheless failed to bring much benefit to the regions traversed, since Western Siberia then began actively to export grain and meat, and this caused shortage of food stocks in the regions, and, above all (a circumstance specially harmful to the child population), of milk and milk products. Nor, as previous attention had not been paid to the matter of other local needs, or proper study made of what might be the freightage likely to be awaiting the line's carrying capacity, did the various sections of the enterprise stand immediately ready, when completed, to meet either popular or Government requirements. And when the Russo-Japanese war arrived the Siberian round of commercial traffic stood in a plight even worse than had been the case before the railway's construction, in that now every train, or at all events every eastward-bound train, was filled with military freightage to the exclusion of all else, and the old wagon roads had long ago fallen out of repair. When, too, the intricate and necessarily slow process of easing off gradients and straightening curves was begun upon, and also the process of doubling the sets of metals (the last a matter in which grave faults of alignment in the first instance often caused the second set to deviate from the first), the work was found practically to constitute a capital rebuilding throughout before the line could adequately cope with the demands of the country's politico-economic life. Then, just when completion of the section around Lake Baikal had linked the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific through a road broken only by the track's change of gauge at the Russo-German frontier, Russia had the railway's south-eastern portion, abutting upon China's ice-free sea, torn forcibly from her hands.

The source of the Russo-Japanese conflict was the fact that Russia

entered the sphere of potent international influences which clustered around the Yellow and Chinese Seas, and in Southern and Central Manchuria, and possessed herself, there, of the best portions of the seaboard, and then united them with the main system through means of a branch line running through holy Mukden and the heart of Manchuria. That done, she occupied a commanding position amongst all the intersecting English, German, American, and Japanese interests of the region, and was able also subtly to affect Korea, into which country Japan long had been wishing to pour her surplus population. On the other hand, the Northern Manchurian line to Vladivostok influenced but little the inception of the Russo-Japanese struggle, for it admitted Russia's dominance only to the region of the Amur's southern bank—and in that region none of the Powers had any particular interest to consult. Russia's own interest there, however, was pressing, for she needed imperatively to consolidate her local position before anyone else should arrive to menace her older properties in the East. At the same time, the fact that the mountainous expanses of Northern Manchuria, added to the course of the river itself, divided the Northern Manchurian line from the Amur and Maritime Provinces made railways advisable on the left bank as well, for that bank was indispensable to Russia if she was properly to colonise, and to use all the natural wealth of, Eastern Siberia: whilst after the war the foregoing problems had joined to them needs of local State defence—after the war the decline of Russia's influence in the locality, and the ever-growing strength of China, rendered Northern Manchuria no longer a safe territory for a future main line, and the Amur railway, the building of which had already been begun upon, would have to perform its function, that of completing the main Siberian system, without at any point overstepping the Empire's frontiers.

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The Act of 1775 whereby Catherine II reorganised Russia's *krestianstvo* gave that class's free sections two tribunals of their own in the shape of the *uezdnaia nizhnaiia rasprava* and the *gubernskaia verkhnaia rasprava*, as well as, with the other two corporate social classes, a measure of participation in the task of provincial government. Yet though things even went to the point of framing a charter of rights for the *krestianstvo's* free sections, that charter

was never carried into practical effect. The truth is that at that time the Legislature had more complicated problems to deal with, as regards the class concerned, than any mere definition of the class's rights. Under the above-mentioned *raspravi* and the two *kazennia palati* the Act placed, equally, the *odnodvortsy* and the State, court, and "economic" *krestiané*: and, as that was so, the task was not merely to define the rights of those sections, but also to organise on identical bases their workaday life, and at the same time to guarantee that life's due supervision and protection through some system or another, since without some system or another the sections concerned would never, of a certainty, be able to exercise rights at all. So Catherine II and her successors took at least local or partial measures towards recasting the sections' administration and workaday life. For instance, Paul divided the Treasury *krestiané* and those of the court these had once more become differentiated from one another, and the (court *krestiané* been formed into a category known as *udielnye krestiané*, or *krestiané* of the private estates<sup>1</sup> of the Crown) into *volosti* with not more than 3,000 souls in each. Every such *volost*, again, had acting in it a *volostnoe pravlenie*, or *volost* administration, consisting of an elective *volostni golova*, or *volost* headman, an elective *volostni starosta*, or *volost* elder, chosen from amongst the inhabitants of the *volost's* principal settlement, and an elective *volostni pisar*, or *volost* registrar. These officials managed the economy of the *volost*, and exercised adjudication in the *volost's* petty cases, and collected the *volost's* taxes; whilst the first-named of the three functionaries also accounted to the local *mirski skhod*, or assembly of local *miri*, for all tax moneys received. Also, Paul preserved to the Treasury *krestiané* the heretofore equal sharing of lands at 15 *desiatini* per revisional soul—or, in the case of *gubernii* standing short of land, at 8 *desiatini* per soul. Another disposition with regard to State peasantry which has great, indeed, capital, importance in our State history is a Law of 12 December, 1801, which accorded to all the free statuses of the community the right of *landownership in person* hitherto enjoyed by the *dvorianstvo* alone. Next, in 1838, there was opened, under Kisilev as director, a new Ministry of State Properties. And this Ministry drew up a complete scheme for reorganisation of the State *krestiané*. Under the scheme the *krestiané* (whom the Eighth Revision of 1834 had numbered at a little short of 8,000,000

<sup>1</sup> *Udieli*, appanages.

souls) were divided into *volosti* with not more than 8,000 souls in each, and subdivided into *obstchestva* (village communes) with not more than 1,500 in each. Also, over and above the existing *mirskie skhodi*, or assemblies of *miri*, there were formed elective administrative assemblies of *volosti* and *obstchestva*, and legal *raspravi* of the same. Lastly, apportionment of lands to the *krestiané* was carried out in as equal a ratio as possible, taxation upon them was transferred from soul to soil, and there were set up village schools, village provision stores, rural banks, and rural savings-and-loans-in-aid offices.

This reorganisation of the Treasury *krestiané* was projected both as a first step towards altogether abolishing serf-right and as a model for reorganisation later, after their release from the bonded dependent condition, of the *pomiestie* peasantry. To Catherine II pertains the credit for most setting the matter of serf-right upon the carpet. This was when she had the matter debated in the Commission which she convoked for drafting a new *Ulozhenie*. Yet she did nothing really to decide the difficult problem. Its inherent difficulty lay most in the fact that the Legislature had all along accepted serf-right merely as that right had become compounded by everyday practice, and so had regulated the right but feebly, and altogether forborne exactly to define its juridical content and composition. We see the first elucidation of serf-right only in the Law (Paul's) of 5 April, 1797, a Law which permitted the *pomiestchik* to make his *krestiané* work for himself on three days per week, and no more, and required him to let them have the remainder for their own labours—since they were the payers of the State taxes. In short, the *pomiestchiki* of Russia thenceforth had allowed them only one-half of the country's bonded labour. This was the first real approach towards a precise definition of the *pomiestchik's legal authority over his serf*, and towards a delimitation of how far in the substance of serf bondage the rights of State and souls-owner, respectively, extended; and six years later a Law of 20 February represented a second step in the same direction. By this Law, a "Law Concerning Free Agricultural Dwellers," *pomiestchiki* thenceforth could free serfs with land, by, variously, separate families or whole villages, on a basis of conditions comprised in mutual agreement. *Krestiané* freed in this manner, however, were not to be ascribed to any other peasant category, but to go to form part of a new category of *free agriculturists*. The practical effect

of the Law proved negligible: by the time that the reign of Alexander I came to an end there had entered into the "free agriculturist" status no more than 47,000 revisional souls in all: and even by the year 1855 the figure stood at only 116,000. But the important feature of the Law lay in its expression of principle. *Pomiestchiki* had long possessed a right to release *krestiané* without land, individually or by families; but neither Legislature nor serf-right in practice had ever created a system of *krestianin* release by villages. At the same time, the Law in question prescribed two fundamental conditions: a condition of apportionment of a *nadiel* (plot of land on release) to the *krestianin*, and a condition of *voluntary agreement* of the two parties. The fact that the *polozhenie* (ordinance) whereby some 400,000 bonded *krestiané* of the Baltic Provinces were accorded liberty during the years 1816-19 was not extended to cover also Russia's other *gubernii* came of the circumstance that that *polozhenie* lacked inclusion of the former, and chief, of the two conditions above-mentioned. Unfortunately, the Law of 20 February, 1803, failed concurrently to specify the *dimensions* of the plot which the *pomiestchik* was to give the freed *krestianin*: that point was left wholly to the *pomiestchik's* individual discretions: and only in 1827 did an instance bring about enactment of a further Law that estates whereon mortgages or sales reduced the amount of available land to an area not equalling  $4\frac{1}{2}$  *desiatini* per soul should pass, with their *krestiané*, to Treasury management.

With the help of the foregoing the Memorandum of 1836 by the statesman Speranski was able to define "wherein there lies, according to the exact and literal sense of our operative laws, the lawful right of bonded servitude in Russia, in its essence." For, according to the Memorandum, "the bonded condition is, by law, and in its essence, the condition of a *krestianin* dwelling on land pertaining to a *pomiestchik*, and dwelling thereon under an hereditary, mutual obligation that the *krestianin*, for his part, shall devote a moiety of his working powers to the *pomiestchik's* benefit, and that the *pomiestchik*, for his part, shall apportion to the *krestianin* a measure of land sufficing to win for the *krestianin* and his family, through usage of the remaining moiety of his working powers upon personal labour, a proper subsistence." This practically declared that the substance of serf-right lay, not in any possession of the *personality* of the bonded *krestianin* by the *pomiestchik*, but solely in the *liability* towards, the obligation



to work for, the *pomiestchik* to which the *krestianin* stood bound. And, even so, the *krestianin* stood bound to that liability only in so far as he did not stand bound also to rendition of taxpayment and of recruit service. Hence, as concerned any dependency of the *krestianin's* person, that dependency was an outcome of, not the basis of, his compulsion to work for the *pomiestchik's* benefit. And this also was the view taken for its support by an *ukaz* of 2 April, 1842, an *ukaz* relating to what became known as "*obligated krestiané*" and empowering *pomiestchiki* to conclude mutually agreed-to contracts with their *krestiané* under the system that, whilst the *pomiestchik* should retain ownership of his lands unabated, the *krestianin* should receive at the *pomiestchik's* hands a landed allotment for usage under certain stipulated obligations. The sense of the Law was that, on becoming an "*obligated*" *krestianin* through voluntary agreement in this manner, the *krestianin* automatically ceased to be *bonded* as well: the very fact of his concluding the agreement as a free person set him clear of the bonded non-possession of liberty—the very fact of that converted his forced labour on the *pomiestchik's* land from the *pomiestchik's* legal property into a mere agrarian obligation by covenant, whilst his voluntarily incurred liabilities, the liabilities incurred through that agrarian obligation, represented an indemnification of the *pomiestchik* for the *krestianin's* use of the land which the agreement *compelled* the *pomiestchik* to allot, and without which the covenant did not stand: those liabilities, that is to say, in no way represented a return for personal freedom acquired, since tacitly, in addition, the Law recognised the person of the *krestianin* not to be in any respect subject to either valuation or redemption. True, up to the close of the reign of Nicholas I the Law of 2 April resulted in no more than 24,708 souls becoming "*obligated*" *krestiané*, but the Law's direct effect was, like that of similar *ukazi* of the day on serf-right, less important than its indirect, for the reason that, whilst not much altering the position of the question as a whole, the Law and those *ukazi* did at least prepare public opinion for the ultimate reform which had become inevitable, and lay juridical foundations for reorganising the bonded *krestiané's* circumstances throughout, and clarify both in the Legislature's and in the *dворянство's* consciousness what serf-right consisted of in substance, and upon what the impending recast of the right must be based, and separate the serf's person from the rest of serfownership's content, and cause the

*pomiestchik's* right to the labour of his bonded *krestianin* to become inseparably bound up with a return obligation upon the *pomiestchik* to fit out that *krestianin* with land—the Law and the *ukazi*, indeed, made such a fitting out an indispensable *condition* of the ex-bondsman's release, and such mutual, voluntary agreement between the two parties the juridical *means*, more than any other, through which the parties' mutual relations should stand defined.

On the same principles were the *polozhenia* of 19 February, 1861,<sup>1</sup> whereby all *krestiané* became released from bonded dependency, composed. The *polozhenia* abolished unconditionally all bonded rights in *krestiané* and in household serfs, in so far as their persons were concerned, and included the value of the *krestianin's* labour, in so far as that labour pertained to the *pomiestchik*, in the appraised value of the plot which was to become assignable to the *krestianin* on his issue from the bonded condition. To household serfs, as landless persons, emancipation in full, and without indemnification of masters, was to be accorded within two years of the date of publication of the *polozhenia*. The "General *Polozhenie*" of the set of *polozhenia* also preserved to *pomiestchiki* their right of property in all their heretofore possessed lands, but bade them make over to their *krestiané*, for permanent usage, both those *krestiané's* dwelling premises and, to secure the *krestiané's* circumstances, and to enable them to meet their obligations to the Government, a given amount of field land. And, in return, the *krestiané* were to render their *pomiestchiki* certain stated liabilities. Such *krestiané* as became established in this transitional status with regard to *pomiestchik-krestianin* agrarian relations acquired the name of "*temporarily obligated*" *krestiané*; whilst as for the dimensions of the individual *krestianin's* land apportionment on emancipation (*nadiel*), with the liabilities, due thence, to the *pomiestchik*, those dimensions were to be fixed by, in the first instance, voluntary agreement, but, if such agreement should fail to attain conclusion, then by law, on the basis of the local *polozhenia* of the series, with the conditions of agreement, or of compulsory conclusion of agreement, as the case might be, notified to the local *obstchestvo*, or else embodied in a separate deed, in an *ustavnaia gramota*, or charter. Also, although *krestiané* were granted a *right* to redeem their farm premises, they could not acquire absolute ownership of the apportioned field land without the

<sup>1</sup> The Act of Emancipation.

consent of their *pomiestchik*. On the other hand, if *krestiané* wished to acquire right of property both in their farm premises and in their field land apportionment, the Government undertook to help to that end through a "*redemptory operation*" (or redemption). The assistance offered by the Government was that it, the Government, would advance a certain sum upon the field land desired to be redeemed, and then spread repayment of the sum over a term of years (forty-nine from the date of the said *redemptory loan*), and undertake itself to recover the instalments, as compounded jointly of interests on the loan made and of the given instalment towards the debt's gradual extinction (in all, 6 *kopeki* per rouble of the loan). This redemption of their *nadieli* by *krestiané* thus "temporarily obligated" put a final close to obligatory relations between them and their *pomiestchiki*, and made of them *free peasant proprietors*. The system on which the *obstchestva* were to manage all this was set forth by the "*General Polozhenie*" in detail, as also were the rights granted to the *krestiané* and the household serfs, and the obligations laid upon both towards, severally, the Government and their *pomiestchiki*.

During the first few years of the working of the "*redemptory operation*" of *nadieli* the progress was very swift: in the course of the years 1862-71 a little over 6,500,000 "temporarily obligated" revisional souls, of a total of 10,500,000, redeemed 23,000,000 *desiatini*, and in the course of the years 1862-91 the Treasury granted redemptory loans of a total of 886,000,000 roubles, and 9,221,000 revisional souls redeemed 32,820,000 *desiatini*. The peasant reforms as a whole were completed with an extension of the fundamental principles of the *Polozhenia* to the *krestiané* (some 1,500,000) of the Imperial *udieli*, and to the *krestiané* (some 10,000,000) settled on State lands. This acquisition of right of property in their *nadieli*, with or without Government help, formed all the peasant categories into one condition, a condition of *free peasant proprietors*, which, in State position, was homogeneous of basis throughout. And an estimate made just before the reign of Alexander III began reckoned the *krestiané* of all categories to be owning, as a whole, more than 130,000,000 *desiatini* of *nadiel*, or as great an area as that of European Russia less Finland and the Vistulan *gubernii*—and that without also taking into account the additional-*to-nadiel desiatini* (at least 5,000,000) acquired.

By this agrarian reorganisation of the *krestianstvo* there became

consummated the work of State formation of class landownership which ancient Rus had begun with State formation of service-*dvorianin* proprietorship of estates. The Legislature created both the one and the other landownership through measures varying with the State's needs: *dvorianin* landownership through endowment of State service persons with Treasury lands on *pomiestie* tenure, for assurance of those State service persons' compulsory service liability; and peasant landownership through endowment of *krestiané* with *pomiestie* or Treasury lands, for temporary-obligatory usage in warranty at once of the holders' livelihood—and of the holders' State obligations-rendition. And just as, with the Government's approval, the *dvorianstvo's* originally temporary, conditional, and service-necessitated landownership gradually became converted into full and hereditary possession, so now, with the Government's help as represented by the redemptory operation and the redemptory payment, the lands allotted to the *krestianstvo* after emancipation are gradually becoming converted into lands in the *krestianstvo's* proprietorial tenure outright.

Nevertheless the Emancipation Act of 19 February, 1861, did not achieve complete conclusion in Alexander's reign, since neither the country's *pomiestchiki* (who lost their cheap labour) nor their ex-serfs (who lost the support of their masters, a support become habitual to them) could quickly adapt themselves to the new conditions of position to which the change gave rise. Hence for both parties, in their difficulties, the Government had, at last, to point out the way, and to provide the means of escape. And ultimately the measures which it took to this end did facilitate, and carry to a finish, the business—cause the bulk of such lands as the impoverished *dvoriané* still retained after *nadiel* distribution to their *krestiané* to pass into the hands of other social sections than their own. So in 1885 the Government sought to give the *dvorianstvo* cheap credit, and thereby broke the total agrarian denudation of the class, by instituting a *Dvorianin Land Bank* with, for its principal function, "the provision of the hereditary *dvorianstvo* with such means as may enable that *dvorianstvo* to preserve to its posterity the *otchini* in its possession at present." And for the other party in the affair Government help was needed still more, owing to the, by this time, very slow progress of some of the "temporarily obligated" *krestiané* towards redemption. Even twenty years after the date of issue of

the *Polozhenia* the central *gubernii*, and more especially the blacksoil *gubernii* amongst their number, had remaining in them a large proportion of *krestiané* still engaged in working off their obligations to their *pomiestchiki*. Hence a Law published on 26 December, 1881 instituted an *obligatory redemption process* in those *gubernii*: it enacted that by 1 January, 1883, all *krestianin-pomiestchik* obligatory relations should come finally to an end. The reason why, in places, the redemptory process advanced so slowly lay in a lack of correspondence between amounts of redemptory payments and livelihood capacities of redeemed plots—a lack of correspondence which ended in accumulation of 13,000,000 roubles-worth of book arrears. Accordingly the new Law of 26 December reduced redemptory payments to a rouble per soul-*nadiel*, and ordered that for substantiation of the measure there should annually be set aside a sum of 12,000,000. Later, again, a Law of 13 May, 1896, dealt with *deferment* and *spreadover* of dates of repayment of arrears outstanding: it authorised prolongation, by a given number of years, of terms for extinction of non-extinguished redemptory debts, and also reduction of redemptory sums to non-burdensome dimensions and interest rates pending inquiries into *krestiané's* capacity to render payment. But the Legislature's most difficult task of all was to discover means of retaining *nadieli* in *krestiané's* hands, and of further adding to *krestianin* landownership. It was unfortunate indeed that the *Polozhenie* of 1861 allowed *nadieli* to be alienated under certain conditions, for during the twenty years 1870–90 no less than 100,000 *desiatini* of *nadiel* plottage passed from *krestianin* into non-*krestianin* possession, and instances of whole *obstchestva* losing their portions of land began to occur. To avert further *krestianin* “delandment,” therefore, a Law of 14 December, 1893, restricted the *krestianin's* rights of disposal of his *nadiel* by, amongst other things, forbidding householders possessed of *nadieli* on *obstchina*<sup>1</sup> tenure to alienate such *nadieli* to any save members of their *obstchestvo*. And pledgings of *nadiel* lands the Law prohibited altogether. Eleven years earlier a *Peasants Land Bank* had been instituted, with the object of affording rural populations long-term and readily accessible credit towards acquiring land on behalf of *krestiané* whose *nadieli* were insufficient for their needs. And during the first twenty years of its working the Bank enabled *krestiané* of the sort to purchase more than 7,000,000

<sup>1</sup> Village land association.

*desiatini* of additional *nadiel* land, and advanced quite two-thirds of the value of the same. Other measures similarly sought either to remove or to weaken such conditions as threatened to disorganise peasant industry. For instance, a Law of 18 May, 1886, regularised peasant *family nadieli*, and a Law of 8 June, 1893 fixed twelve years as the minimum interval between land re-distributions, as well as gave directions concerning *hirings for village works*, and *peasant removals*, and the like, and a Law of 12 March, 1903, abolished the circular guarantee towards rendition of *krestiane's* periodically payable dues of State, of *zemstvo*, and of *mir*, and, lastly, a Manifesto of 3 November, 1905, ended altogether, from 1 January, 1906, payment of redemptory sums on *nadieli*—after which, with the redemptory operation thus brought to a close, the Government found itself able to advance to first steps in the direction of similarly liquidating *obstchina* landownership.

These measures, however, did not remove in whole the conditions which conduced to “delandment” of *krestiané*: those measures, true, kept the land in the *krestianin's* hands, but they did not therewith confer much benefit upon his working circumstances. And meanwhile constant growth of population continued more and more to call for augmentation of land productiveness, and for development of labour upon land. An impediment to each of these necessities was the peasant village's impoverishment, its ever-increasing lack of means towards equipping itself, towards multiplying its livestock, towards procuring artificial fertilisers, towards organising *kustarnie promysli* (home crafts), and towards obtaining markets for its products. And herein the Government did nothing to come to the *krestiané's* assistance: rather, it parted company with the class, and spent the huge sums drawn into the savings-banks by redemptory payments (and, consequently, withdrawn from local circulation), not upon local necessities, and, above all, not upon organisation of readily accessible rural-industrial and domestic-industrial credit, as is done in the West, but upon so-called needs of State. And when a State monopoly of liquor sales had been introduced the *krestianin* class stood deprived even of the usurious species of credit disposed of by the country's tavern keepers. In fact, absence of cash on the spot caused the demand for credit to remain unmet altogether. Even the low-rated, long-distance grain freights (the so-called “differential grain tariffs”) introduced by the

Government for attracting gold currency into the country did no more than mark each autumn with huge exports of cereals through which home prices were brought down sheerly to the level of costs of production, and the populations made to walk proportionately hungry. The *gubernii* most grievously affected by these factors were the central *gubernii*, as it was there that *pomiestie* landownership had attained the greatest development: until "shortage at the centre" came to be an officially-recognised phrase. However, the *krestianin's* untoward conditions of life were largely shared by the *pomiestie* manorhouse, for the reason that in most cases the latter had failed to make the agrarian-cultural progress which it should have done, and let its rural industry either sink or fall to mere exploitation of cheap, want-driven, and sometimes non-local labour, or else to mere exploitation of the *krestianin's* plight by setting him to work upon lands in default of any alternative to that course. Yet the *krestianin's* position was the harder of the two, in that, whereas the *pomiestchik* class still had other outlets offered it by life (such as State service and the liberal professions), the *krestianin* stood hemmed within the limits of the inequitable situation in which the reforms of Alexander III had left him set. Grim application of a passport system which deprived the *krestianin* of the prime basis of popular labour represented by freedom to migrate; restriction of local representation which debarred the *krestianin* from combating vagaries of local assessment; finally, a surveillance by local administrations which grew more and more as more and more it fastened itself upon any evidence of labour displayed by him—these conditions, in sum, led to what once had been Europe's leading granary developing a rural-industrial crisis which, vast of dimensions, and momentous of historical import, waxed, ultimately, to a political crisis through the fact that every branch of popular labour had come to stand more or less fettered and paralysed with poverty, and to feel that its interests and those of the *pomiestchik* class were opposed to one another.

In spite of these conditions, however, the Government, when the village circular guarantee had come to an end during the years 1904–05,<sup>1</sup> concentrated all its policy in connection with the *krestianstvo* question upon measures purely of an administrative nature. Thus, an *ukaz* to the Senate of 4 March, 1906, instituted

<sup>1</sup> According to the provisions of the Law of 12 March, 1903, already mentioned.

*land management commissions* of *gubernii* and *uezdi* which, numbering, up to the middle of the year 1908, 37 of the former category, and 389 of the latter, had for their purpose smooth working of *krestiané* with *pomiestchiki* as regards, firstly, the exchanging, selling, and buying of lands, and, secondly, abolishing the inter-strip system of cultivation,<sup>1</sup> the lengthwise field, and the rest. And, certainly, these commissions of representatives of the *zemstva* and local administrations did succeed in removing the graver ills caused by agrarian co-propinquity without at the same time infringing involved agrarian rights; they did at least obtain from the two parties statements of what those parties wanted in the matter, and help, through the Peasants Land Bank, to get those parties' business adjusted. The basis upon which the institutions rested was the *uezd* land management commission, a body composed of some nine or ten members according as the *uezd* contained bulk of *nadieli*; of certain representatives of the *uezd's* legal, *zemstvo*, and financial administrations, and of three *krestiané* chosen by lot from candidates nominated by the *volost* assembly (*volostni skhod*) of the *uezd*: whilst the corresponding land management commissions of *gubernii* served to unite the work of the *uezd* commissions, and, in turn, had their own work united in a new institution, a *Committee on Affairs of Lands Management*, sitting at the centre. Estimates placed the total cost of upkeep of these bodies at 2,000,000 roubles per annum. Also, all of these commissions were charged to help on the task of transferring *krestiané* to free Treasury and *udiel* lands, an operation which acquired still further importance when *ukazi* of 12 and 28 April, 1906 ordained new conditions of settlement as regards those lands, and, under those new conditions, an estimated total of some 11,000,000 *desiatini* of the lands in question were sold to peasant immigrants.

On 19 September, 1906, the central Committee on Affairs of Lands Management confirmed a *Nakaz*, or "Instruction," to the various land management commissions wherein the commissions' activity was set upon a much wider basis, and the Committee itself became a special institution of an authoritative, quasi-legislative character. Henceforth the local commissions were not only to be charged with transference of *krestiané* to Treasury and *nadiel* lands,

<sup>1</sup> A system of alternation of strips belonging to different proprietors, as distinguished from land "all in one place," an expression occurring more than once in the pages to follow.



but were to supervise allocation of the Peasants Bank's landed reserves, to decide what lands in addition the Bank should purchase, and, whilst continuing their existent task of regulation of agrarian coproinquity, to introduce execution of the Crown's *ukazi* to the Senate of 9 and 15 November, 1906, into the nation's life. Of the two *ukazi* mentioned, the former empowered every householder belonging to an *obstchina* (village land association) to become sole proprietor, on his own account, of a share in his *obstchina's* lands, of a share all situated in one spot; and the latter permitted *nadiel* lands hitherto kept out of the ordinary round of civic dealings to be either pledged to or sold by auction to any person belonging to the rural condition.<sup>1</sup>

The substance of the new Law, which was extended to forty-two *gubernii* of the fifty-two, lay in concessions (1) that a *krestianin* might have both his *nadiel* and his farm-site conveyed to him for sole personal possession—whereupon all other parties' rights to those articles ended, whether of the *obstchina* or of the *krestianin's* own family, with the exception of a usage right by the *obstchina* sharing with him his right to the *obstchina* lands; (2) that if a *krestianin's* *nadiel* was one cut up into several portions he might demand that his *obstchina* should exchange it for a plot situated "all in one place"—whether a *khutor*, or piece to which he could transfer his farm-site, or an *otrub*, or fenced-in piece at a distance from that farm-site, which he would retain as before; and (3) that if a *krestianin* left his

<sup>1</sup> Here the Russian text appends a footnote as follows:

The foregoing legislative measures, added to the working of the Peasants Bank, and to the efforts made to transfer peasantry to other parts (for example, no fewer than 432,601 persons were transported to Siberia during the first six months of 1907 alone), formed, in sum, one general, consistent agrarian policy under Article No. 87 of the Fundamental Laws, an Article providing for presentation during the *Duma's* absence, of laws pressing, but none the less subject to the *Duma's* approval. The measures in question were, later, submitted to the Second *Duma*, but not reviewed in detail by that body. It was only when the Third *Duma* had been convoked that they were severally taken in hand, and advanced to the point of reception of the Imperial Assent. Yet what the Third *Duma* thus took in hand was something which had entered into the nation's life already, and practically been worked out, not by the *Duma* at all, but by the Senate and the land management commissions.

*obstchina*, to become a sole proprietor, he still might remain a member of his village, and even of his agrarian, *obstchestvo*. Again, the new Law preserved to the *krestianstvo* its right to usage, in immutable share, of all grass, timber, and other attached amenities—those amenities to be parcelled out on special, non-*obstchina* principles. And the Law preserved to the *krestianin* power to leave his *obstchina*, yet still retain his share in the non-parcelled out amenities such as *mir* arable, grazing, and pasture lands, added to such *obrok*-paying articles as fisheries, mills, bazaar sites, and the like. Also, householders could still, on leaving their *obstchina*, retain their right to vote at *volost* assemblies, and defend their interests with regard to any question mooted in such an assembly save only allotment of *obstchina* land usage.

In the first stage, after leaving the *obstchina* to become a sole proprietor, the *krestianin* retained almost intact the stamp of the *obstchina* member: his land (his former *nadiel*) shared in the *obstchina* cultural round (for example, every third year each strip of his working under the three-field system became common grazing again), and he could erect buildings, or alter his system of field-cultivation, only by permission of his *obstchestvo*. At the same time, alike in the first stage (before assignment to lands “all in one place”) and in the last the Law did what it could to meet him. Thus, if a decrease of his family led to the ex-*obstchina* member possessing land for a greater number of souls than his family now comprised, he would have the excess conveyed to him at the original redemptory price, which was lower by a good deal than the price ruling in the market. And if an ex-*obstchina* member’s *obstchestvo* objected to him leaving the latter for an *otrub*, the local *uezd* assembly could none the less apportion him the *otrub* under set procedure. Only if such apportionment should bode manifest disadvantage to the *obstchina* might the latter redeem of the would-be acquirer of the *otrub* such portion or portions of the same as lay amongst the *obstchina*’s own lands—but at the “actual,” or market, price solely. And if the would-be acquirer of the *otrub* then found the price fixed by the *volost* court to be not to his liking, he still could, even at the very last moment, refuse the money, and continue in occupation of his old portions of land as before—of, that is to say, the separate portions originally allotted to him by the *uezd* assembly—and thereby embarrass the *obstchina* until his own price should come to hand. Even at the present day *uezd*

assemblies and land management commissions, with their staffs of surveyors, engineers, and soil supervisors, are engaged in sharing out, fencing in, and setting boundaries to portions allotted to householders.

One of the most important points in the *krestianstvo* question is the present position with regard to the *obstchina's* usage right. Owing to increase of population, *nadiel* apportionment has much diminished in extent, and this has involved breakings-up of establishments, and their loss of efficiency. Also, though the *obstchina* periodical re-sharings out cannot be avoided, those re-sharings out deprive the *krestianin* of his best stimulus to good work, in the shape of permanence of usage, and of an assured outlook. Again, external difficulties have prevented the *obstchina* from developing within itself the freedom of labour which the Act of 1861 hoped "to see become a pledge both of domestic prosperity and of public welfare." Always the the artificially maintained *obstchina* has had its liberty of growth restricted: wherever its size has become excessive it has had impediments placed in the way of division into smaller *obstchini* possessing amenities close to their place of settlement: and there has never been abolished the rule which enables a member to abandon his plot without charge, and depart without formal notice—even if empty-handed, so that his successor on the plot perforce has to live there in fear and trembling lest one day the departed shall return, and once more lay hands upon the strips and attached amenities created by the labour of another. Also, at any time the more educated *krestianin* may have to leave his *obstchestvo*, and thereby deprive his *obstchina* of an enlightened member. Otherwise, free of these drags, the *obstchina* might have stimulated in the masses both well-balanced growth and sanitary improvement. As it is, the *obstchina's* undoing in favour of separate homestead tenure on sole proprietorial right may yet cleave Russia's *krestianstvo* into two mutually hostile portions—into a portion of working proprietors extremely conservative in their political bent, and into a portion of weak, ignorant, landless masses constituting but a labour army for the support of the *pomieshtchik's* and the peasant-proprietor's industry.<sup>1</sup>

On 1 May, 1909, the number of *krestiané* applying to leave their *obstchini* was standing at 1,352,036, and the area of "land all in one

<sup>1</sup> The Russian text here has appended to it the footnote: "From the edition of 1907."

place" already conveyed to *krestianin* personal possession at 5,917,030 *desiatini*, and the number of *krestianin* householders to whom such "land all in one place" had been assigned at 28,057 *desiatini*, and the area of land occupied by such householders at 307,314 *desiatini*. It is in the blacksoil regions of the South, where land values are higher than is the case in the northern and central *gubernii* (in which latter the old *obstchina* usage of land still does not wholly lack its advantages), that the village land association is undergoing the most active dissolution. Indeed, the new Law is causing a marked break in the life of Russia's peasant masses: the increased yield from conveyance duties alone shows us how householders are hastening to sell their conveyed land to (according to a Government document) "substantial and effective *krestiané*," and *obstchini* everywhere having their members fall away from them, to join a proletariat which possesses only the labour of its hands for an asset. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the new Law is erecting above the declining *obstchina* a class of petty peasant proprietors: in short, it is replacing the moribund, in every way hampered *obstchina* with new masters and new men, and seeing to it that the latter shall be numerous enough fully to satisfy the former's requirements. The Government's policy is doing this as much in connection with *pomiestie* landownership as in connection with *obstchina*: it is effecting the end in question with the help chiefly of the Peasants Bank. But there exists this profound difference between the two categories of vendors of lands through the Bank, between the ex-*obstchinniki* who are parting with their *nadieli* and the *pomiestchiki* who are selling portions of their estates: that whereas, as a rule, the latter (who are mostly proprietors on a large scale) keep back for themselves a portion of their property, and go on living as landed gentry, the former category not only receive, in almost every case, less, much less, than the market value of their *nadieli*, but become persons altogether homeless and landless. Another effect of the Peasants Bank's activity in guaranteeing to *pomiestchiki* sale of their lands is a great impetus to enhancement of land values: the average price of land per *desiatina* in the eighties, 44 roubles, 70 *kopeki*, has now risen to 139 roubles, 70 *kopeki*, or just three times as much. And these values, again, are immersing the new peasant landownership in enormous indebtedness, and the fruits of the labour of a few generations of the landownership cannot but pass back into the hands of the politically-ruling, absentee class

thus engaged in disposing of its superfluous properties. Satisfaction, therefore, of the *krestianstvo's* agrarian needs through partial sale to it of the country's *pomiestie* estates; re-enrichment of the *pomiestchik* class thereby; creation of peasant proprietors close-locked in a ring solely of their agrarian interests; endowment of landownership and factorial industry with the "delanded" *krestianin* as a cheap worker; and outlet facilities for the surplus *krestianstvo*, either through transference to Treasury estates or through emigration from European Russia elsewhere—such, in brief, constitutes the agrarian policy of the Government at present.

. . . . .

The interrelations of the European Powers which gradually brought about the Russo-Japanese war afford immense general-historical interest.

By the close of the eighties, through steadily contracting foreign loans, and introducing fresh direct taxation, and effecting concentration of the administration of the country, Russia found herself enabled to spend huge sums upon her army and fleet. The attitude of her Government, of a Government independent both of public opinion and of its people's moods, as well as one holding all the threads of State management gathered into its hands, had for long past rendered the European Powers anxiously attentive, and led to them seeking by every means to assure themselves against any sudden political sally from St. Petersburg. And when, in 1900, as part of the result of Russia's change from the conciliatory policy followed by Alexander III, a Japanese mission headed by the Marquis Ito had failed of the Russo-Japanese agreement which was the mission's purpose, there came into being an Anglo-Japanese alliance the effect of which was to paralyse the Franco-Russian understanding in the Far East. Such the events which led up to the Russo-Japanese collision. Japan of the Islands now had put on the State forms of Western Europe, and grown into a compact force. And, owing to the irresistible needs of her working-people, a people whose labour extreme density of population, added to pursuance of an ancient and very distinctive agricultural round in an ultra-fertile country, had caused to become stretched to enormous tension, Japan of the Islands had, of late years, overflowed also on to the mainland. Meanwhile, too, she had (as subsequently transpired) made a close study of Russia's

military strength, and seen to it that her General Staff was well aware of Russia's weak points of organisation and war-preparedness—neither of which had improved much since the conflict between Russia and Turkey, or come adequately to satisfy modern technical requirements. The source of those defects lay in the Russian *régime* of specialised military schools. In those establishments the training was coloured throughout with *dvorianin* class privilege, and made sense of vocation take second place to considerations of routine and of "career," and steadily braked study of war in actuality with the purely external finish deriving from Nicholas' day. Hence few of Russia's military academies afforded the corps of officers ties for drawing it closer to the rank and file, and enabling it to impart to that rank and file, with its multifarious stocks and tongues, due military elaboration. Russia's only method of converting the recruit into a soldier was such a quasi-penal barrack system as inevitably destroyed in the recruit all initiative, and, still more, that first requisite of the warfare of to-day, a free, intelligent spirit of enthusiasm. Besides, the fact that, in most cases, the corps of officers stood wholly dependent upon its professional earnings rendered it powerless to withstand its dominance by the military bureaucracy which, strong in ties, protection, and resources, still manages, autocratically and irresponsibly, our army's affairs, and militates against that army's efficiency.

Prolonged parleys took place between the two Governments previously to the collision. Though guaranteed by her English treaty, and standing fully prepared for war, Japan, at first, sought merely to arrange with her Russian neighbour a delimitation of spheres of influence on the mainland according to respective degrees of strength. And inasmuch as Russia's representatives could not but admit Russia's comparative weakness in the region concerned, and she could the less advisably oppose Japan's interests on the mainland and (partially) in Korea because she, Russia, badly needed Manchuria, and Japan did so only to a lesser extent, Russia began by showing a yielding disposition, and it required Japan's reluctance wholly to evacuate Southern Manchuria, and the fact that certain speculators in Korea inflamed the Japanese public, actually to create the mood necessary for rupture of the negotiations and, on 24 January, 1904, war's definite outbreak. First of all a successful attack by her fleet gave Japan the mastery of the sea, and then, whilst Russia's

forces on land adopted tactics of retreat and slow accumulation, Japan, on land, adopted those of advance and territorial seizure. Finally, when, in this area of the war, both sides had made the mistake of clamping a portion of their forces to Port Arthur, with the object of, on the one side, maintaining communications with that stronghold, and, on the other side, of cutting those communications, the struggle in the region went in Japan's favour, through local engagements of 13 May and 1 to 2 June. The first general engagement lasted from 12 August until 21 August. And though the result of it was to give Japan no very decided advantage, it did at least compel the Russians to further retreat. Then, with the second general engagement (22 to 30 September), the operations for the year came to an end, after that, for all their unprecedented dimensions and bloodshed, they had failed conclusively to resolve the contest. The winter was marked with decision of the fate of Port Arthur, which held out only twenty days after the death of its renowned defender General Kondratenko. No sooner had the northern phase of the campaign reopened than, on 13 to 24 February, there took place, near Mukden, the really deciding affair, an affair to which history affords no parallel as regards numbers of forces engaged and victims slain. True, it, like the earlier general engagements, failed there and then to destroy the Russian army, but it did cause the Russian troops to suffer such losses during the subsequent retreat as to leave the issue of the war no longer doubtful. As for Russia's fleet, a portion of it was sunk by the enemy off Port Arthur, and a portion by the enemy off Tsushima, and a portion by its own men on Port Arthur's surrender; so that at no time did it offer worthy resistance.

The effect of the war was to bring to light the utter uselessness of Russia's fleet in both *personnel* and *matériel*, and the many defects—technical inefficiency, bureaucratic formalism and arrogance in officers of high rank, and want of spirit, of training, and of initiative in officers of the line—inherent in Russia's army.

The treaty of peace signed at Portsmouth (United States of America) on 23 August, 1905, bound Russia to cede the southern half of Saghalien which until then had been her territory, her leasehold rights in Kwan-Tunk, and the costlily built establishments represented by Port Arthur, Dalny, and the railway (some 250 versts) southward of Kharbin. Also, Russia, by the treaty, recognised Japan

as exclusive protector of Korea, but, with that, retained her earlier treaty rights over the northern portions of the Eastern Chinese Railway's system, from Kharbin to Vladivostok. Lastly, both sides undertook to evacuate Korea in the military regard, and, without actually paying Japan an indemnity in general, Russia promised to compensate her for the hitherto keep of the host of Russian prisoners in her hands. Hence the treaty let Japan acquire new territory of an area almost equal to what she possessed already, and left Russia's railway route to Vladivostok altogether without defence for the future, and her Far Eastern strategical position rendered the worse for her being deprived of the Northern Manchurian area which she so needed towards protecting Eastern Siberia and the Maritime Province. Such the end of Russia's conduct of a supremely disastrous and exhausting war. To muster her million men, and to convey them over 7,000 versts, she had had to break up hundreds of thousands of peasant homes; to tear from their labours hundreds of thousands of working-hands who, subsequently, either perished in Manchuria or returned to swell the dire volume of post-war unemployment; and to burden the existing and the following generations' paying capacity with the milliards spent in and upon Russia's Far Eastern possessions as blindly, irresponsibly she squandered her national forces.

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During, and partly under the influence of, the Japanese war the Government also set on foot, and proposed speedily to carry through, some "great internal reforms" both for continuance of the process of class equalisation and for preparation of classes to take part in the task of administrative direction. In forecasting these reforms, the pertinent *ukaz* to the Senate (of 13 December, 1904) commanded that a special conference be convoked on the more important involved questions, "to the end that the Laws with respect unto the free rural dwellers of full rights may be made to conform with the legislation of the Empire at large." Also, the *ukaz* declared it to be "absolutely indispensable" actively to take measures to preserve the full force of the laws; to extend *zemstva's* and urban institutions' participation in organisation of order; to secure to those bodies independence for the purpose; to summon to act on them every popular section interested in local affairs; to supplement the *zemstva*



of *gubernii* and *uezdi* with proper *zemstvo* institutions standing nearer to the people, and acting over a smaller *okrug*<sup>1</sup> than the *uezd*; to further the progress of general equalisation before the law through communication of requisite unity to the legal system's structure, yet, with that, to assure the system's independence; to attend to introduction of State workers' insurance; to review the extraordinary statutes which were published during the time of the late rebellion, and to limit their action and application; to review the legal measures hitherto affecting the rights of Old Believers and other members of non-Orthodox or Dissenting faiths, and to remove thence any restrictions of religious life not established by law direct; to review also the legal measures now affecting the rights of aliens, and of natives of separate portions of the Empire, and to remove thence unnecessary restrictions; and to relieve the Press of like restrictions whilst setting exact legal bounds to the printed word.

True, other Acts of State soon put behind them this *ukaz* of 12 December, but, for all that, it remains one of our State history's most characteristic phenomena. In it the Government, shaken in its position by recent events, confessed that the country hitherto had been administered otherwise than wholly in accordance with its system of laws; that the citizens of the country still were being subjected to restrictions which neither necessity nor law justified; that the people's civic and religious life lacked organisation, and citizens stood debarred from participating in matters of local economy most intimately affecting them; that the law still had not acquired complete assurance of authority in the State; and that the country's administration still rested less upon authority of the kind than upon authority of coercion: wherefore he *ukaz* therewith sketched, as a programme of immediate reforms, the good Conservative measures around which, at the present moment, half a decade later, with popular representation come into force, there is proceeding a bitter political struggle of mutually irreconcilable classes and ideas.

In this *ukaz* the Government's eyes were turned, really, in a backward direction, since the document included only measures and a system which the Government thought could be substantiated without popular representation—of which the very notion was foreign to the *ukaz*. Two months later, as, for various reasons, the old system manifestly had become inadequate for its task, and matters,

<sup>1</sup> The heretofore *zemstvo* territorial unit.

after all, could go no further without an appeal to the country, there were published on one and the same day (18 February) three closely (but not overtly) inter-related State Acts. The first of these, a Rescript to the Ministry of the Interior, announced "an invitation to worthy persons invested with the people's confidence, and chosen from among their fellows, that they shall thenceforth participate in the preparation, elaboration, and consideration of all legislative affairs proposed." But an exceedingly limited horizon only was to be opened up to the purview of those representatives. And as even the fact of their summoning constituted a break with the agelong traditions of Russian rule, the Government next went on to indicate (through a Senatorial *ukaz* of even date) that all that it had in view was not a *community* politically established, but a few *individuals* subordinate to itself. By the Senatorial *ukaz* in question the Council of Ministers was charged to "examine and consider all opinions and proposals with respect unto accomplishment of good order in the State, and unto betterment of the people's welfare, which may hereafter be presented to the Imperial Name either by institutions or by persons." Which meant that no free citizens' association, and no petitioners save individuals or institutions, were to be accorded utterance. Lastly, and in conformity with the foregoing, a third, and, through its character, a very important, document, an Imperial Manifesto (again, of date 18 February), invited all citizens of the State, in their several statuses, to oppose the unrest that was overcoming the community, and to help to substantiate the reforms named, as reforms designed solely to benefit the spiritual life of the people, to assure that people's prosperity, and to perfect the State order.

Then, though the Russo-Japanese war had shown up in a lurid, and most disturbing, light, and before as wide a circle of the people as possible, the Government's absolute bankruptcy in the point of efficiency, that Government, in its eagerness to base all its measures upon the more conservative and influential strata of the community, went on to produce an Act entitled "Institution of a State *Duma*," and to publish it, with an explanatory Manifesto, on 6 August, 1905. The effect of the Act was to establish in Russia's State life Russia's first *popular-representative assembly*, an assembly appointed to meet annually, but to continue in being in permanence. Yet, though the Act was a first departure from the old organisation of *Prikazi* to which, until then, the Russian State had consistently

proved faithful in every structural feature of that State, the prime importance of the *Duma's* ordination lay elsewhere; it lay, rather, in the fact that, though life, as things turned out, never allowed the period's subsequent reforms altogether to become substantiated, those reforms represented, not a supersession of, but a development of, the *Duma*—its lodgment upon a *constitutional* basis dividing the Supreme State Power equally between the Crown and popular representatives. The purpose intended with regard to the *Duma* of 6 August was that that body should be one merely of a *legal-consultative* nature—behind its decisions there was to be no binding force at all. Merely, if a majority of the *Duma* rejected a given legislative proposal, and the Council of State (with which—rather, under which—the *Duma* acted) did the same, the legislative proposal passed no further; it did not pass onward for the Supreme Authority's scrutiny. As regards the matters peculiarly subject to the *Duma*, they consisted of items calling for subsequent issue of Laws and Statutes; of the State registers; of changes amongst Ministers; of the Financial Control's accounts, and so forth. And as regards legislative initiative, action in that respect by the *Duma* was very greatly restricted: a draft Law must emanate from a minimum group of thirty Members, and not from a single Member alone. And even then it must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the *Duma*, and, if subsequently rejected by the Minister of the pertinent Department, pass to review by the Council of State. Still more restricted yet was the *Duma's* right of *administrative supervision*. For presentation of a legislative proposal the *Duma* had to register its votes *once* only, and then to allow the Council of State a month during which to consider any difference of opinion between itself and the pertinent Minister. But where a question of administrative supervision was concerned the *Duma* had to perform a *twofold* registration of its votes—before and after the Minister's response—and, even so, to show a two-thirds majority in the second registration.

In company with the Act entitled "Institution of a State *Duma*" of 6 August there went a *Polozhenie* on *Duma* elections. The electoral reform's chief political importance lay in the extent to which the different sections of the population were comprised amongst the electors. The basic principles of the Law were, firstly, *class* representation, and, secondly, *property* representation. But at the same time it entrusted the franchise right only to very restricted

circles, which were to choose Members for the *Duma* from the given *gubernia* (or *oblast*) in a single, general *electoral assembly* of the *gubernia*, whilst choice of the electors to vote in that general assembly was to be divided amongst three separate, independent *selective conventions*—amongst a *convention of uezd landowners*, a *convention of urban electors*, and a *convention of delegates of volosti and stanitz*.<sup>1</sup> Towns possessed of *okrugi* (*zemstvo* administrative areas) to themselves were to select their electors by wards, and their Members of the *Duma* in assemblies of those electors. Numbers of selectors of conventions the Act distributed according to property-strength of groups, and to conditions of locality—not directly according to total numbers enjoying the right to vote in the various conventions. And, in consequence, the wide disparity between the property qualification for a convention of *uezd* landowners and the property qualification for a convention of urban selectors (respectively, 15,000 roubles and 1,500) brought it about that the voice of the *uezd* landowner came to have much greater selective force than the voice of the urban citizen. Also, the Act added to the *simple* property qualification a *compound* one—a qualification of persons possessing, in an *uezd*, either land equal to at least a tenth of the whole aggregate of *desiatini* allotted to the *uezd*, or other immovable property (but not a commercial-industrial establishment) worth at least the second of the sums mentioned above. Persons so qualified might, in a separate convention, select delegates to the convention of landowners of the *uezd*, at the rate of one delegate per full unit of selective qualification. This, of course, made the voice of such a property-owner possess just ten times less force than that of the *uezd* landowner. With regard to the *krestianstvo*, this class's representation was complicated with yet another stage, with a sequence of, taking the *volostni skhod*, or *volost* assembly, for the first stage, *volostni skhod*—convention of delegates—electoral assembly of the *gubernia*. On the other hand, one of the Members for each *gubernia* had to be a *krestianin*. Again, as regards commercial-industrial persons who did not possess the landed qualification, they were to be included amongst the urban selectors even if they had their place of residence in an *uezd*. All of which features show us that the electoral system instituted by the Act of 6 August was one which pre-eminently favoured the landowning strata of the community.

<sup>1</sup> Cossack villages.

The political unrest with which the country became filled during the autumn of that year (1905) evoked, on 17 October, a Manifesto in which the Government changed its line with regard to the system of dividing the legislative power between the Sovereign and the country's representative institutions. Yet up to now only two of the Manifesto's articles on civic freedom, further extension of the franchise, and the legislative authority of the *Duma* (that is to say, the point that no law should become effective without the *Duma's* previous consent) have been developed into Laws outright. Those two articles are the second and the third. True, by a later *ukaz* to the Senate (11 December) the circle of selectors of voters became so widened as almost to involve franchise all round, but still the document retained the selective *curiae* of the Act of 6 August, and still it said that numbers of selectors per convention should be determined by amounts of dues and taxes severally emanating from selective categories. As regards the new selectors created, the Act's distribution of them was exceedingly unequal, for the manner in which it applied the property qualification of "*domoobzavodstvo*"<sup>1</sup> to the urban elections multiplied by ten, at the least, the selective totals of the urban conventions, whereas its manner of application of a new qualification altogether, a qualification of *lands management*, to, and its lowering of the compound qualification for, the conventions of *uezd* landowners multiplied the selective totals of those landowners' *curiae* scarcely by so much as one-and-a-third—and later instructions by the Senate with regard to second elections extinguished even that small fraction of increment. Also, the *ukaz* left the *krestianstvo* elections altogether unchanged, whilst, in supplementation of the three conventions established by the *Polozhenie* of 6 August, it instituted *conventions of delegates of metal workers and railway artisans* for which the delegates in question were to be selected on a calculation basis of, for undertakings staffed with from 50 to 1,000 male hands, one delegate per undertaking, and, for undertakings staffed with over 1,000 male hands, a delegate for every thousand of those workers. In the result the total number of such delegates to the electoral assemblies of *gubernii* came to 236, or one per each ten thousand workers. Which means that in the electoral assemblies concerned the voice of the labouring masses was drowned by that of

<sup>1</sup> Establishment of a dwelling or home.

their fellow-electors; whilst as, in addition, they lay shut off into *curiae* by themselves, they could not influence the issue of elections in the places where their members lived massed together. Hence the *ukaz* of 11 December merely substantiated a very wide, but a very unequal, franchise right. What further increased the inequality was the fact that urban registers also had entered upon them numerous persons who, in actuality, resided in an *uezd*: by the Act of 6 August the commercial-industrial category had appended to it all persons who, whilst serving in the official, public, or class institutions of a town, had, for a year past, had their domicile in an *uezd*. And this excluded from the conventions of *uezdi*, which were built solely upon the property qualification, many local persons (for example, perhaps, the whole of an *uezd*'s intelligentsia) who had not that qualification at their command. Finally, the Act ordered the selective registers to be compiled partly on the "declaration" system, with anyone not giving the proper notice in time losing his vote for the next-ensuing elections, and partly through the agency of the *ex officio* institutions. Whereby some selectors the Act contrived to exclude, and others it included through artificial means.

Upon this extension of electoral rights there followed publication of a new "Institution of a State Duma," to implement the article terminating the Manifesto of 17 October. That is to say, the purpose of the new "Institution" was "to ordain, and make it a permanent principle, that henceforth no Law shall acquire operative force without the previous consent of the State Duma, and to secure to those elected of the people opportunity actively to participate in supervising the lawfulness of the activities of the Authorities whom We have appointed."

The new "Institution of a State Duma" (which, with the Manifesto accompanying it, was issued on 20 February, 1906) gave expression to this principle in its Article XV. The same principle entered also into a new "Institution of a Council of State," of a Council designed to work with the Duma as Supreme Legal Court, and, superseding the old legal-advisory Council, to consist equally of nominated members and of elected, with a President chosen (annually) by the Supreme Power from amongst the former. Of the elected Members, six were to represent the Orthodox Hierarchy, eighteen the *dvorianin* associations, six the Academy of Sciences and the universities, twelve all commercial-industrial institutions of the type of councils and

committees of trades and manufactures, bourgeois committees, and so forth, and one each of the *zemstvo* assemblies: whilst qualification for candidature was to be, variously, thrice the qualification for *zemstvo* candidature (that is to say, thrice 15,000 roubles) or, if the candidate had previously served in certain elective posts, the same as the *zemstvo* qualification. Whence we see that the new Council of State was to be, save for representation of the Academy and the universities, a purely bureaucratic class affair, and, at that, one faintly of plutocratic hue into the bargain.

Generally speaking, the new "Institution of a State *Duma*" was, save for the Article (No. 50) which established the principle of indispensableness of the *Duma's* consent before any legislative instrument could become effectual, just a reproduction of the "Institution" of 6 August. For in it we encounter once more the old restriction of right of legislative initiative (the *Duma* might elaborate a draft law *only* if the pertinent Minister should decline to undertake that preparatory task), and the same as regards administrative supervision (in the event of a Minister declining to reply to a question twice repeated, any resolution on the point by the *Duma* was to proceed to the Throne, not through the Council of State at large, which possibly might support the *Duma's* opinion, but only through the Council's President, in all cases a bureaucratic-representative functionary). Also, an *ukaz* by the Sovereign might dissolve the *Duma* at any time before the expiry of its Members' five-years term of authorisation, and *on the selfsame day, by the same ukaz*, ordain the elections for the next *Duma*, and fix the date when the new Assembly was to meet. Lastly, Imperial *ukazi* were to determine the nature of the *Duma's* business for each year, and the periods during which such business was to stand adjourned. Which articles, in sum, show, beyond a doubt, that never was there to be secured to the *Duma's* proceedings sufficient time for substantiation of the *Duma's* rights—even of a portion of them.

In the same way, the Fundamental Laws published on 23 April, 1906, were to be capable of alteration at the instance solely of the Sovereign. Firstly, those Laws established separation of the superior administrative authority from the legislative, with the former pertaining inseparably to the Crown, and bearing the title of "Autocratic," and the latter attaining substantiation with the participation of the *Duma* and the State Council. Secondly, the Laws provided

in detail both for a superior administrative system and for a system whereby temporary regulations might be issued during the *Duma's* absence through dissolution. Such measures as might be adopted under the former of the two systems were to stand subject to approval by the *Duma* within two months of that body's convocation. Thirdly, the Laws repeated such articles of the "Institution of a State *Duma*" and the "Institution of a Council of State" as made initiative in their alteration belong to the Imperial Power alone. And the articles in question were precisely the articles delimitatory of the *Duma's* rights.

One essential such delimitatory feature was, in reality, the provision that in legislative matters the *Duma* should stand exactly on a level with the Council of State: that is to say, that the *Duma* was not even to possess the usual privilege of a lower Chamber over a higher, the privilege of supervising expenditure of national resources, for all that, under the "Institution of a State *Duma*," revision and confirmation of the Budget was to be, save as concerned portions of that Budget covered by existing Statutes and by former Imperial Orders, a legislative act, and not a superior administrative—the Superior Administration having to do only with such extraordinary and supplementary-to-estimate disbursements as state of war might necessitate. Hence during absences of the *Duma* Ministers came to have opened up for them credits equal to those of earlier years.

Shortly before convocation (on 27 April, 1906) of the First State *Duma* the authority of the Government began to recover from its shaking by recent events, and, vice versa, the social movement which for some time past had been demanding reforms turned from questions of public policy to those of practical, current abuses, and became split up into a number of separate professional, agrarian, and emigrant movements, and grew feeble and obscure in the struggle against unemployment, bad harvests, and constantly mounting subsistence costs. Meanwhile the standard of public morality declined, and murder and robbery became common, and the masses acquired a passion for shows and sensationalism, and cheap theatres and gaming-houses multiplied apace in the larger towns. Contrariwise, the possessing strata of the community developed active class sentiment in defence of their belongings, and a prudent understanding of their interests, so that everywhere there arose industrial



and agricultural unions and associations permanent or intermittent of operation, and in some cases marked with a strong *dvorianin* tinge, and the threads of social and economic influence and the threads of State authority began rapidly, and to a novel degree, to draw together—this was so as much in the trading-manufacturing circles of the community as in the upper, until upon the surface of the great popular masses, gripped in the throes of a profound, but impotent, ferment, there came into being various social organisations at once solid and standing ready to back the Government's measures and resources in combating the disorder universally latent, and the Government beheld before it once more the same conservative and weighty classes as it had taken care to rely upon when ordaining the legal-advisory *Duma* of 6 August, but now standing there as classes possessed of much added strength and authority. And when those classes failed to have a majority in the Second *Duma* secured for them, and, on 3 June, 1907, that *Duma* was dismissed, the Government framed and issued a new *Polozhenie* with regard to *Duma* elections, and an accompanying Manifesto explained, justified in detail, why the *Polozhenie* was departing from "the customary legislative order" in the matter of publication, the order which had been designed to substantiate Article 3 of the Manifesto of 17 October, and Article 86 of the Fundamental Laws. Certainly the new *Polozhenie* with regard to *Duma* elections did technically adhere to the old one, but also it was notably less democratic in respect of conformity with the correlation of social forces in being. Its chief differences were; (1) redistribution of selectors at the expense of representation of the *krestianstvo*, and in favour of the landowners' conventions; (2) subdivision of the urban electors into two conventions instead of one—the only exception being towns with separate representation, where elections were to be carried out direct by two electoral sections markedly non-identical in numbers; (3) restricted representation of certain outlying *gubernii*, but also assurance of the rights of the local Russian or Orthodox minorities—the restriction in question being to two representatives per western *gubernia*, and two per Polish and Transcaucasian; (4) certain special electoral machinery in electoral assemblies of *gubernii* through which each *curia* was to have its own representative amongst the Members elected to the *Duma*, and each such obligatory Member to be so elected by the *whole* of the given assembly, and not by its several

*curiae* (for example, the representative of the workers' *curia*, a *curia*, which was retained in only six of the *gubernii*, was to be elected by the assembly's body of voters *en masse*, and not solely by the workers), and (5) discretionary power to the Minister of the Interior to divide landowner and urban selectors into separate conventions either by selective qualification or by nationality. In thirty-four *gubernii* of the fifty-two the result was that the landowners' convention selected an absolute majority to the *gubernia's* electoral assembly. And, owing to social character, these conventions were joined in their action by the first-category conventions of urban selectors, of selectors qualified either by, in *gubernia* chief towns, *immovable property* of a value of 1,000 roubles (or, in towns of 20,000 inhabitants and over, immovable property of a value of 300) or by some *commercial-industrial undertaking* paying not less than 30 roubles in taxation. But the selective qualification for first-category selectors in the towns having separate representation (namely, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Riga, and Lodz) was to be higher by far: the immovable property qualification in Moscow and St. Petersburg was to be three times as much, and the industrial qualification ten. All of which features enable us to understand how for the future the *Duma* was bound always to have in it a majority of representatives of the *pomiestie* owners and the larger *bourgeoisie*, and how due representation also of the mercantile communities of Moscow and St. Petersburg was arranged for, and how far the rest of the community would have a chance of voicing its interests and needs!

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At the present time, convoking and dismissing the *Duma*, yet all the while administering the country without its help, and all the while issuing Acts of prime legislative, even of actual institutional, importance, the Government can be seen standing face to face with popular representation, and dodging it, and dodging it, as though it were a wasp. Therein, indeed, there lies the profound difference between the latter-day policy of our Government and the Government's policy up to the period of the Japanese war. Wholly independent in the midst of a community rarely raising its voice in criticism, the Government has not yet encountered, in its proceedings, even the reuniting moment of a Government and *Duma* struggle,

but merely surrendered itself to a course of elemental, arbitrary opportunism. Yet conceivably it is in this interaction of administrative authority with popular representation, as the latter stiffens to a contest with the former for possession of predominance, that we see the best pledge of ultimate Imperial development, and of adoption by our rulers of the more cultivated principles observed by monarchies constitutional in their character.