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DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS ALBINUS
A HISTORICAL STUDY

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PREFACE

Since M. Paulus published his dissertation *De Decimo Iunio Bruto Albino commentatio historica* (Münster, 1889), much light has been thrown on the period in which Decimus Brutus lived and played his part by the researches of Ganter, Gardthausen, Groebe, Holzappel, Krueger, Schelle, Schmidt, Schwartz, Sternkopf, and other scholars. Aided by the results of their labors, I have prepared from the sources a new treatment of the life of Decimus and its setting, in which, as it will be seen, my interpretation of his motives and conduct differs essentially from that of Paulus.

To Professor Frank Frost Abbott, under whose supervision this investigation was carried on, I am indebted for kindly encouragement and patient criticism. My thanks are also due to Dr. Edward A. Bechtel, of the University of Chicago, and Dr. Tenney Frank, of Bryn Mawr College, who read my manuscript and made many helpful suggestions for its improvement.

B. C. B.

TALLAHASSEE, FLA.

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DATES OF IMPORTANT EVENTS CONNECTED WITH THE
CAREER OF DECIMUS BRUTUS AFTER
THE DEATH OF CAESAR

44 B. C.

March 15—

1. Caesar is assassinated between 11 A. M. and 12 M., and the *liberatores* proceed to the Forum, hold a *contio*, and then go up to the Capitol. pp. 56 ff.
2. Slaves bear Caesar's body through the Forum to his house. p. 59
3. Cinna appears in the Forum and lays aside the *insignia* of the praetor. . . p. 59
4. Dolabella assumes the consulship. pp. 59 f.
5. M. Brutus and Cassius are summoned from the Capitol, address the people in the Forum, and then return to the Capitol. pp. 60 f.
6. Dolabella, Cicero, and other prominent men go up to the Capitol in the evening and consult with the *liberatores*. p. 61
7. The *liberatores* send certain *consulares* to Antonius and Lepidus to arrange terms of peace. Antonius and Lepidus defer their answer to the next day. .
8. Decimus Brutus leaves his confederates on the Capitol and goes down into the city. pp. 62 ff.

March 16—

1. Before daylight Lepidus occupies the Forum with troops and at dawn holds a *contio*. p. 64
2. Antonius gives his reply to the representatives of the *liberatores*. p. 64
3. Many flock to the standards of Antonius and Lepidus, who are in arms. Messengers summon the veterans of Caesar settled in the towns near Rome to join the consul and the *magister equitum*. pp. 65 f.
4. Conference of the Caesarians late in the afternoon. pp. 65 f.
5. Antonius summons the senate for the 17th and takes measures to preserve order in the city during the night of the 16th-17th, App. ii. 125. pp. 65 f, 68
6. Conference of Decimus Brutus with Hirtius in the evening. Decimus demands for himself and confederates a *legatio libera*. pp. 62 f.

March 17—

1. At daylight the senate assembles in the Temple of Tellus. p. 68
2. Decimus Brutus writes *Fam.* xi, 1. 1-5. After a second interview with Hirtius he writes *Fam.*, xi. 1. 6 and dispatches the whole letter probably before 9 A. M. pp. 62 f, 68
3. Marcus Brutus addresses the people and the veterans on the Capitol and declares that the *liberatores* did not intend to invalidate the acts of Caesar. p. 69
4. *Senatus consulta* passed, conferring amnesty, confirming the acts of Caesar, and especially ratifying Caesar's grants of land to the veterans. p. 69
5. The *S. C.* confirming Caesar's acts made a *lex* by vote of the people. . . . p. 69
6. Public reconciliation effected between the *liberatores* and the consuls. . . . p. 69

March 18—Senate decrees that Caesar's will be published and that he be given a state funeral. pp. 69 f.

44 B. C.

- March 20 or 21—Burial of Caesar. *Laudatio funebris* of Antonius p. 79
- April 8 (about)—Decimus Brutus leaves Rome for his province p. 71
- April 13—Execution of the Pseudo-Marius p. 71
- June (beginning)—The *lex tribunicia de provinciis consularibus* and the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* give Antonius the two Gauls for six years, including the year 44. Antonius also secures control of the Macedonian legions pp. 72 f.
- June 8—At a conference with Cicero at Antium, M. Brutus and Cassius find fault with the inactivity of Decimus Brutus pp. 71 f.
- June, July, and August—Decimus Brutus wages war with the Inalpinei p. 73
- September—Decimus Brutus encamped at Mutina, writes *Fam.* xi. 4 requesting confirmation of his title of *imperator* p. 73
- End of September or beginning of October—Cicero¹ answers in *Fam.* xi. 6. 1 p. 74
- October 9—Antonius² leaves Rome for Brundisium to meet the four Macedonian legions p. 74
- October (middle)—Cicero leaves Rome p. 74
- October 9–November 5—Octavianus collects an army of veterans in Campania and seeks advice from Cicero pp. 74 f.
- November 9—Octavianus holds a *contio* at Rome against Antonius p. 75
- November (middle)—Antonius returns to Rome and calls a meeting of the senate on November 24 pp. 75 f.
- November 24—Antonius does not attend the meeting of the senate and adjourns it until November 28 p. 76
- Between November 24 and November 28—*Contio* of Antonius at Tibur p. 76
- November 28—Meeting of the senate. Antonius learns of the desertion of the fourth legion. Hasty distribution of the praetorian provinces. Antonius leaves the city by night and leads his army to Cisalpine Gaul p. 76
- December 9—Cicero returns to Rome and in *Fam.* xi. 5 urges Decimus Brutus to hold his province against Antonius p. 76
- December 12 (?)—Cicero replies in *Fam.* xi. 7 to a lost letter of Decimus in which he had asked for a decree of the senate authorizing him to hold Cisalpine Gaul p. 77
- December 15—Decimus Brutus issues an edict refusing to surrender his province to Antonius p. 78

¹ Cicero returned to Rome August 31 (*Fam.* xii. 25. 3). In the senate on September 1 Antonius threatened to pull Cicero's house down upon his head because Cicero did not attend the meeting (*Phil.* i. 12, v. 19). On September 2 Cicero delivered *Philippic* i against Antonius who was absent (*Phil.* i. 16, v. 19; *Fam.* xii. 2. 1, 25. 3). Between September 2 and 19 Antonius spent several days at the villa of Metellus at Tibur (*Fam.* xii. 2. 1; *Phil.* v. 19. 20). On September 19 Antonius harangued the senate against Cicero who, together with other prominent leaders, was absent owing to fear of violence from the armed men whom the consul had stationed about the building (*Fam.* x. 2. 1, xii. 2. 1, 3; *Phil.* ii. 112, v. 20). It was probably not until October 25 that Cicero began to circulate privately his reply (*Philippic* ii) to Antonius' tirade against him (*Att.* xv. 13. 1).

² In the beginning of October (before the 6th) Antonius erected a statue to Caesar on the Rostra (*Fam.* xii. 3. 1). On October 2 he indicated to the people his intention to avenge the death of Caesar (*Fam.* xii. 3. 2, 23. 3; *Vell.* ii. 64. 3). About October 5 or 6 assassins who had been hired by Octavianus made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Antonius (*Fam.* xii. 23. 2).

44 B. C.

- December 20—Edict of Decimus Brutus published at Rome. The senate meets. Cicero delivers *Philippic* iii. The senate authorizes Decimus and the other governors to continue to hold their provinces until successors had been appointed. Cicero delivers *Philippic* iv to the people. Writes *Fam.* xi. 6. 2, 3. . . . pp. 78 f.
 December 20 (?)—Antonius begins the siege of Mutina. pp. 78, 80

43 B. C.

- January 1—Meeting of the senate. Peace embassy to Antonius proposed. Cicero delivers *Philippic* v. pp. 80 f.
 January 3—Senate praises Decimus Brutus, votes a statue to Lepidus, decrees honors to Octavianus, and rewards to the soldiers who had deserted Antonius. . pp. 80 f.
 January 4—Senate decrees an embassy to Antonius. *Philippic* vi delivered to the people. pp. 81 f.
 January 5—Ambassadors to Antonius set out from Rome. p. 82
 Soon after January 5—Hirtius leaves with a small force for Cisalpine Gaul. . . . p. 82
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 February 2—*Tumultus* decreed, the *senatus consultum ultimum* probably passed, and Lepidus and Plancus summoned to Italy. p. 84
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 February 4—*Saga* is assumed. p. 84
 February (beginning)—Cicero delivers *Philippic* ix in eulogy of Servius Sulpicius, and, a few days later, *Philippic* x. pp. 83, 85
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³ The two remaining letters of commendation (*Fam.* xi. 16, 17) that Cicero wrote to Decimus have not been dated. They belong probably to May or June and concern the candidacy of L. Lamia for the praetorship.

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I

THE CAREER OF DECIMUS BRUTUS TO THE YEAR
45 B. C.

Decimus Junius Brutus Albinus was probably born in the year 85 B. C. He was praetor in 45,¹ and Caesar, in preparing for his intended absence from Rome on the Parthian expedition, had designated him consul for 42.² If he was legally old enough to be praetor in 45, he would have reached the consular age in 42, and the year of his birth must have been not later than 85.³ Of course, it is possible that Caesar disregarded the age requirement in designating him for the consulship, as he did in the case of Dolabella⁴ and of Antonius.⁵ But in the case of Decimus, that part of the law which required an interval of two years between the praetorship and the consulship was observed, and this favors the presumption that the provision in regard to the age requirement was also followed. On the other hand, it may be assumed that Decimus was not born before 85; for it is likely that a man of his ability and influence would attain the magistracies at the earliest age allowed by the law. The fact that Caesar in the *De Bello Gallico*⁶ as late as 51⁷ designates him as *adolescens* throws little light upon the question of his age at that time: Caesar could very well have called him *adolescens* to distinguish him from his father of the same name,⁸ who may have been still living. The day that the news of Decimus' release from the siege of Mutina became known in Rome—that is, April 27⁹—was the anniversary of his birth. Hence April 27, 85 B. C., may be assumed as the date of his birth.

He was the son of that Decimus Junius Brutus who was consul in 77.¹⁰ This is made evident by their identical *praenomina*, con-

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 37.

² Vell. ii. 60. 5; App. B. C. iii. 98; Dio xlv. 14. 4.

³ Cic. *Phil.* v. 49; Abbott, *Roman Political Institutions*, p. 160.

⁴ Dio xliii. 51. 8; xlv. 22. 1, 53. 1; *Phil.* ii. 80; App. ii. 129; iii. 88.

⁵ Antonius, consul in 44, was born in 82. Groebe's Drumann, I, *Anhang*, p. 401.

⁶ iii. 11. 5; vii. 9. 1, 87. 1.

⁷ When the *De Bello Gallico* was published: Schanz, *Geschichte der Röm. Lit.*, I, pp. 204 f.

⁸ *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, s. v. *adolescens*, I. B.

⁹ Cic. *Ad Jam.* xi. 14. 3; *Ad Brut.* i. 15. 8; Schmidt, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1892, p. 333, and *infra*, pp. 94 f.

¹⁰ *C. I. L.*, I (2), Pt. 1, p. 154.

sidered in connection with the respective periods in which their activities fell, and by the fact that the Decimus Brutus who was consul in 77 and his wife Sempronia are known to have had children at the time of the conspiracy of Catiline in 63.¹¹ The father of this Brutus was in turn Decimus Junius Brutus, consul in 138, who was called Gallaecus. The father of Gallaecus and great-grandfather of our Brutus was, as we learn from Cicero,¹² a Marcus Junius Brutus. This could not have been the Marcus Brutus who was named by Pomponius¹³ as one of the three founders of the civil law. The Brutus named by Pomponius, inasmuch as he flourished just before the times of Marius,¹⁴ was a contemporary of Gallaecus and, if we may judge by his *praenomen*, an older brother. Hence Gallaecus must have been the son of some other Marcus Brutus, and none fits better from the point of view of time than the consul of the year 178. Thus it will be seen that the father, grandfather, and great-grandfather of Decimus Brutus Albinus were all consuls.

Marcus Junius Brutus, the great-grandfather of Decimus, rose to place and influence at a time when the senate was the supreme power in the state. His political success is evidence for the belief that he was thoroughly loyal to the rule of the senatorial oligarchy. His conservative attitude is shown by the opposition which, as tribune, he, together with his colleague and brother, Publius Junius Brutus,¹⁵ made to the repeal of the *lex Oppia*—a law that had been passed in the stress of the Second Punic War to restrain the luxury of women. Elected to the praetorship for 191, the double jurisdiction of *praetor urbanus* and *praetor peregrinus* fell to his lot. The further task of superintending the dock-yards, and refitting and equipping old ships for the war with Antiochus the Great, was imposed upon him in consequence of the departure to Greece of his colleague, C. Livius, with the ships already prepared.¹⁶ As praetor, he dedicated the temple of the Great Idaean Mother; on which occasion the *Pseudolus* of Plautus was presented for the first time.¹⁷ In 189 he was one of the ten *legati* sent by the senate to arrange terms of peace with Antiochus.¹⁸ Consul in 178, he undertook with his colleague the war against the Histri and brought it to a success-

¹¹ Sall. *Cat.* 25, 40.

¹² Cic. *Brut.* 85, 107.

¹³ *Digest* I. 2. 2. 39.

¹⁴ Cic. *Brut.* 175; *Ad fam.* vii. 22; *De oral.* ii. 224; *De fin.* i. 12; *Pro Cluent.* 141.

¹⁵ Liv. xxxiv. 1, 3 f.; Val. Max. viii. 1. 3.

¹⁶ Liv. xxxvi. 2. 6, 14, 15.

¹⁷ Liv. xxxvi. 36. 4. Schanz, *Geschichte der Röm. Lit.*, I, p. 57.

¹⁸ Liv. xxxvii. 55. 7.

ful end in the following year.¹⁹ With two other commissioners,²⁰ he was sent to Asia in 171, to induce the allies, especially the Rhodians, to make war on behalf of the Romans against Perseus of Macedon, whose title of king had been bestowed on him by the senate in Brutus' own consulship.²¹ We last hear of this Brutus as an unsuccessful candidate for the censorship in 169.²²

Decimus Junius Brutus Gallaecus, son of the preceding Brutus (consul, 138), signalized his consulship by the opposition which he, in conjunction with his colleague, P. Scipio Nasca, made to the tribunes and the populace. According to Valerius Maximus,²³ the tribune C. Curiatius cited the consuls to appear before the assembly, and there tried to induce them to submit to the senate a measure providing that grain be purchased for the people by the state and that commissioners be appointed to attend to the matter. Scipio, who seems to have been the presiding consul at that time, did not hesitate to express his opposition to the suggestion of Curiatius. From the *Epitome* of Livy we learn that when the tribunes did not obtain the right of exempting ten men apiece from the levies which the consuls were making for the wars in Spain, they ordered the consuls to be cast into prison.²⁴ This Brutus also distinguished himself by his military achievements in Further Spain. He gave lands to the Lusitanian captives who had been taken in the wars with Viriathus and established for them a new town, Valentia, near Saguntum.²⁵ He then completed the subjugation of Lusitania, being the first Roman commander to advance as far as the Atlantic Ocean.²⁶ He also conquered the Gallaeci, a people of northwestern Spain, by a great battle in which 50,000 of them were slain, 6,000 captured, and only a few escaped.²⁷ From this victory he earned the *cognomen ex virtute* of Gallaecus.²⁸ Summoned from Further Spain by Aemilius Lepidus in 136, Brutus assisted that officer in the siege of Pallantia, a town of the Vaccaei, in north central Spain. This war, undertaken by Lepidus against the orders of the senate and without provocation on the part of the Vaccaei, was a failure. Lepidus and Brutus, when their armies had been reduced

¹⁹ Liv. xli. 5, 7, 10, 11; Jul. Obs. 62.

²² Liv. xliii. 14. 1.

²⁰ Liv. xlii. 45.

²³ Val. Max. iii. 7. 3.

²¹ Liv. xlv. 9. 3.

²⁴ Liv. *Epit.* 55; Cic. *De legg.* iii. 20.

²⁵ Liv. *Epit.* 55.

²⁶ Liv. *Epit.* 55; App. *Hisp.* 73-75; Cic. *Pro Balb.* 40.

²⁷ Liv. *Epit.* 56; Oros. v. 5. 12; Strabo iii. 3. 1 (p. 152); Flor. i. 33. 12; Val. Max. vi. 4. *Ext.* 1.

²⁸ Vell. ii. 5; Schol. Bob. in *Arch.* (Orelli), p. 359.

almost to starvation, were forced to raise the siege and retire by night, and nothing but the enemy's failure to pursue them saved them from utter destruction.²⁹ Brutus, however, in 136 celebrated a triumph over the Gallaeci and Lusitani.³⁰ There is a story in Valerius Maximus which seems to imply that his conduct in dealing with the Spaniards was marked by avarice.³¹ Be that as it may, he showed his liberality at home by dedicating temples from the spoils of war,³² one of which was the Temple of Mars erected near the Circus Maximus.³³ The fronts of these temples he adorned with the verses of his friend, the poet Accius.³⁴ We learn from the *Epitome* of Livy³⁵ that in 129, although C. Sempronius, the consul, had at first been unsuccessful in the war with the Iapydes, he was afterward victorious, thanks to the valor of Decimus Brutus. In the beginning of 121 Brutus commanded the armed force of the aristocracy that attacked and slaughtered the partisans of Gaius Gracchus, who, under the leadership of Marcus Fulvius, had intrenched themselves on the Aventine.³⁶ According to Cicero, he was an augur³⁷ and a polished orator, well trained for his times both in Latin and Greek literature.³⁸ His death occurred before that of the poet Accius.³⁹ His wife Clodia survived him.⁴⁰

Decimus Junius Brutus, the father of the Decimus Brutus with whom we are chiefly concerned, first appears in history, so far as we know, in the eventful year 100. It is a significant fact that he is expressly mentioned by Cicero⁴¹ as one of those who took up arms against the tribune Saturninus, the praetor Glaucia, and their party when, besides the magistrates, *cuncta nobilitas ac iuventus* ran together in rage to put to death those turbulent leaders of the democracy. Brutus was at the time probably a very young man, but he must, from this passage, have shared in the indignation of the *nobilitas* at the test oath for senators embodied in the agrarian law of Saturninus, and thus have been quite ready with the rest to repay mob violence in kind and to wreak vengeance on those democrats whom he considered enemies of the state.⁴² During the inter-

²⁹ App. *Hisp.* 80-83.

³¹ Val. Max. vi. 4. *Ext.* 1.

³⁰ Eutrop. iv. 19; Plut. *Tib. Gr.* 21.

³² Val. Max. viii. 14. 2.

³³ Plin. *N. H.* xxxvi. 5. 26; Schol. Bob. in *Arch.* (Orelli), p. 359.

³⁴ Cic. *Pro Arch.* 27; Val. Max. viii. 14.2; Schol. Bob. *loc. cit.*

³⁵ Lib. 59.

³⁶ Oros. v. 12.

³⁷ Cic. *De amicis.* 7.

³⁸ Cic. *Brut.* 107.

³⁹ Cic. *loc. cit.* Accius lived until about 86—Teuffel & Schwabe (Warr), I, p. 191.

⁴⁰ Att. xii. 22. 2.

⁴¹ Cic. *Pro Rabirio* 21.

⁴² App. *B. C. I.* 28-33.

val between 100 and 77, a period marked by the Social War and the legislation resulting therefrom, by the civil wars between Marius and Sulla, by the Mithridatic wars, and by the triumph and domination of Sulla, not a word do we hear of Decimus Brutus.

Even for the year 77, when he was consul, we have no record of his activity either as statesman or as general. From the *senatus consultum ultimum* which was passed in the beginning of that year against Lepidus, the leader of the democratic revolt against the Sullan constitution, *uti Appius Claudius interrex*, etc.,⁴³ we infer that the consuls for the year had not yet been elected. But we know from a speech that Sallust puts in the mouth of Lepidus that Decimus Brutus was reckoned as one of the leaders of the conservative *nobilitas*⁴⁴ even though he had no active part in putting down the sedition of Lepidus. We do not hear of him again until the year 74, when Verres was praetor. It seems that the young son of P. Iunius Brutus, a relative (perhaps a brother) of Decimus Brutus, held by inheritance a contract which called for the keeping in repair of the Temple of Castor at Rome.⁴⁵ The business of inspecting the condition of this and of other public buildings was assigned to the praetors, C. Verres and P. Coelius. Although the temple was in good repair, one of the minions of Verres suggested to him that the shafts of the columns were not perpendicular. Verres seized upon this flimsy pretext and demanded that the young Brutus forfeit his contract with the state on the ground of non-performance. The estate of Decimus Brutus was involved as security, and he was forced to pay over to Verres' secretary 560,000 sesterces forfeit money. When the contract had been let anew, Verres was constrained to refund 110,000 sesterces.⁴⁶ From this transaction it will be seen that Decimus Brutus was a man of considerable wealth. He was also a scholar and busy pleader, as we learn from the testimony of Cicero: *Multum etiam in causis versabatur isdem fere temporibus D. Brutus, is qui consul cum Mamerco fuit, homo et Graecis doctus litteris et Latinis.*⁴⁷

Sallust⁴⁸ informs us that Sempronia, the wife of Decimus Brutus and mother of Decimus Brutus Albinus, was involved in the conspiracy of Catiline. He mentions her as one of a number of women

⁴³ Sall. *Ex. hist.*, *Or. Phil.* 22.

⁴⁴ Sall. *Ex. hist.*, *Or. Lep.* 3.

⁴⁵ *In Verr. Act.* ii. lib. I. 130.

⁴⁶ *In Verr.*, *loc. cit.* and 144, 150.

⁴⁷ *Cic. Brut.* 175.

⁴⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 24, 25.

who had lived immoral and extravagant lives and who, with the passing of their youth, had lost their means of gain and were now overwhelmed with debt. It was this class of women that, according to Sallust, Catiline had attached to his cause in the belief that through them he could enlist the slaves under his banner, set fire to the city, and secure either the co-operation or the destruction of their husbands. In this account Sempronia is represented as a woman of extraordinary passion and daring, utterly regardless of her honor or chastity, a reckless spendthrift, and even a murderess. She was, at the same time, "quite fortunate in her birth and personal beauty, her children and her husband." Possessed of unusual literary attainments, she was a conversationalist of rare versatility, wit, and charm. At the time of the conspiracy of Catiline, she took advantage of the absence of her husband from the city⁴⁹ to open her house to the intrigues of the conspirators. It was thither that P. Umbrenus brought the ambassadors of the Allobroges, unfolded to them the details of the plot, and secured their promise of alliance and assistance.

From this narrative we can infer that Decimus Brutus had nothing to do with the conspiracy of Catiline and, from what we know of his previous history, we can readily believe that such a movement was utterly foreign to his sympathies. On the other hand, it is quite natural that Sempronia, with the democratic traditions of her ancestry, should have been in sympathy with the radical leaders of the day. There was also a difference in character as well as in the politics and ancestral traditions of the husband and the wife. Sallust, however, probably exaggerated the bad side of Sempronia's character. She was doubtless a brilliant society woman—reckless and daring, and much too free in her manners for the good of her reputation. But Sallust wished to paint a picture of the corruption in Roman society of the times, and so he chose Sempronia as a type for his rhetorical characterization. His well-known partiality for Caesar and his consequent hostility to Decimus Brutus Albinus, the son of Sempronia and one of the conspirators against the dictator, furnished him an additional motive for blackening the character of the mother.⁵⁰

Such was the parentage and ancestry of Decimus Junius Brutus,

⁴⁹ Sall. *Cat.* 40.

⁵⁰ Cf. Schwartz, "Die Berichte über d. Catilinarische Verschwörung," *Hermes*, XXXII, p. 570.

who in our Greek sources⁵¹ has the additional cognomen of Albinus. This was the cognomen of the *gens Postumia*, and hence we infer that Decimus was adopted into that well-known family.⁵² The correctness of this inference is established by coins of various types, one of which bears on the obverse the legend *A. POSTVMIVS. COS.*,⁵³ with the idealized head of the illustrious progenitor of the *gens Postumia*, Aulus Postumius Albus (or *Albinus*) Regillensis, who is said to have defeated the Latins in the battle of Lake Regillus, 498 or 496 B. C., and to have prevented the return of the Tarquins to Rome.⁵⁴ On the reverse is the inscription *ALBINVS BRVTI F.* within a wreath of grain. But just which Postumius Albinus it was that adopted Decimus Brutus, it is hard to determine. It is sometimes stated that it was the Aulus Postumius Albinus⁵⁵ who was consul in the year 99.⁵⁶ But if we can believe the testimony of Orosius,⁵⁷ this Postumius was put to death by his own soldiers in 89, which was four years before the birth of Decimus Brutus. In that case he certainly was not Decimus' adoptive father. From the literary sources we know of only two Postumii with the cognomen Albinus who could have adopted Decimus: first, the Aulus Postumius Albinus, propraetor, who in 110 B. C. was left by his brother, Sp. Postumius Albinus, in charge of the army in Africa and who suffered an inglorious defeat at the hands of Jugurtha;⁵⁸ second, the Aulus Postumius Albinus who was appointed by Caesar governor of Sicily in the latter part of 49.⁵⁹ Of these, the former died probably soon after Decimus was born, if not before, and the latter was presumably no older than Decimus, if as old. Hence who his adoptive father was must be left an open question.

⁵¹ Dio xlv. 14. 3; Plut. *Brut.* 12, *Caes.* 64, *Ant.* 11.

⁵² This method of indicating adoption, i. e., adding the cognomen of the adoptive father to the three names of the natural father, is exceptional. But toward the end of the republic there was no hard and fast rule for naming adopted persons. *Vide* Ruggiero, *Dizionario Epigrafico*, s. v. *Adoptio*.

⁵³ Eckhel, V. p. 229. Another type has on the obverse, the head of Mars; reverse, *ALBINVS BRVTI F.* with two Gallic trumpets crossed and two shields, one Gallic, the other Greek, indicating that it was struck after the capture of the Greek city of Massilia in 49. *Vide* Head, *Coins of the Ancients*, p. 118, No. 23; Babelon, *Monnaies de la République romaine*. p. 111.

⁵⁴ Liv. ii. 19, 20, 21; Dionys. vi. 2 ff.; Val. Max. i. 8. 1; Cic. *De nat. deor.* ii. 6 and iii. 11 ff.

⁵⁵ As by Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I. i, p. 22 and Babelon, *Monnaies de la République romaine*, II, p. 111.

⁵⁶ Plin, *N. H.* viii. 7. 19; Jul. Obseq. 106; Gell. iv. 6; Cic. *Post Red. ad Quir.* 11.

⁵⁷ Oros. v. 18. 22; cf. Liv. *Epit.* 75; Val. Max. ix. 8. 13.

⁵⁸ Sall. *Jugurtha* 37, 38.

⁵⁹ App. *B. C.* ii. 48.

The first historical notice we have of Decimus Brutus is in Caesar's account of the war with the Veneti in the *De Bello Gallico*. What his motives were in accepting service under Caesar we can only surmise. We have seen that his ancestors on his father's side for three generations had been prominent in the party of the *nobilitas*. His father had helped to put down by force of arms the revolution of Saturninus and had been an outspoken opponent of Lepidus. But his mother had ardently espoused the cause of Catiline, and it was not a far cry from Catiline to Caesar. Sempronia must have been well acquainted with the latter, the real head of the Roman democracy, and must have foreseen the advantage of attaching her son's fortunes to Caesar. The young man himself, like many young men of that day, was doubtless attracted by the force and originality of the great popular leader. The prospect of a successful military career in Gaul was alluring. What more natural than that Decimus, whose grandfather was the most distinguished soldier of his time, should have waived his political prejudices and should have been influenced by his mother to take service under Caesar as the shortest road to almost certain military success? At any rate, Decimus went to Gaul with Caesar, not as a *legatus*, but as a young man of birth attached to the staff of the general⁶⁰ and ready to take any military duty Caesar might assign him. And it so happened that the first responsibility placed upon him was one of great importance.

It was in the year 56, when Caesar had already been two years in Gaul and had had time to make trial of the mettle of young Decimus, that he placed him in command of the fleet intended for the subjugation of the Veneti. These people occupied the southern portion of the peninsula of Brittany and were the most powerful maritime state of Gaul.⁶¹ Possessing a large number of ships, they traded with the islanders across the channel, had the best ports on the coast, and exacted tribute from the neighboring tribes that used them. Trouble with the Veneti arose in this way. Caesar toward the end of 57, thinking that all Gaul had been subdued, placed his legions in winter quarters among the Carnutes, Andes, Turones, and other people in the region of the Loire valley, and set out for Italy and Illyricum.⁶² In his absence, P. Crassus, commanding the seventh legion located among the Andes, dispatched officers to the various states near by for the purpose of securing provisions. The

⁶⁰ Cf. *Caes. B. G.* i. 39. 2.

⁶¹ *B. G.* iii. 7 ff.

⁶² *Caes. B. G.* ii. 35.

Veneti take the initiative, detain the men sent to them, put them in chains, and influence the Curiosolites and the Esubii to do the same. By active proselyting, the Veneti secured as allies all the people along the coast north of the Loire, including the Osismi, the Lexovii, Namnetes, Ambiliati, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii. They also summon aid from Britain. These tribes unite in sending an embassy to P. Crassus to demand that he restore their hostages, if he wishes to get back the men he has sent among them for grain supplies. On hearing the news of the measures taken by the Veneti and their allies, Caesar orders ships of war to be built on the Loire, oarsmen to be provided from Narbo, and sailors and pilots to be collected. Returning to his army, in the early spring, he finds almost all the Gauls ready to revolt. In order to prevent a general uprising, he divides his army into several detachments and sends *legati* into different quarters of the country to restrain the inhabitants of the various sections. Placing Decimus Brutus in command of the fleet and the auxiliary ships provided by the Pictones, Santoni, and other faithful tribes, he orders him to proceed as soon as possible to the seat of war among the Veneti. Caesar himself hastens thither with his land forces.

Decimus with the fleet was detained for some time near the mouth of the Loire, owing to the storms together with the difficulty of ocean navigation along a coast where there were high tides and hardly any ports. Such a sea the Romans had never before encountered. Meanwhile Caesar had made a vain attempt to conquer the Veneti by land. But he found that he could not subdue this resourceful, seafaring people by merely capturing their towns and destroying their property on land; and so, after having consumed most of the summer, he determined to wait for his fleet. His army was encamped upon the heights of St. Gildas de Ruis, while the enemies' ships were anchored at the mouth of the Auray below, when the Roman fleet finally, toward the end of the summer, entered the Bay of Quiberon.⁶³ The enemies' ships, two hundred and twenty strong, on the approach of the Romans, stood out to meet them. They were heavy craft with flat bottoms, sails of skin or leather, and lofty sides. They were so constructed that they could be easily moved from the shoals if left there by the ebbing tide, could withstand the high waves, and protect the sailors within from the

⁶³ For the scene of the battle, cf. Holmes' *Conquest of Gaul*, pp. 663 ff.

missiles of the enemy. The vessels of Decimus were much lighter, were equipped with oars instead of sails, and excelled in swiftness. But they were less suited to sustain the shock of the waves and rocks, and were unequal to the dangers of the shoals. Besides, the Roman ships could make no impression with their prows on the stout sides of the Gallic vessels, and when turrets were run up on the decks, even these were surpassed in height by the lofty poops of the enemy. Decimus, however, had contrived a device for overcoming the disadvantages under which the Romans labored. He had caused sharp hooks or sickles like mural hooks to be fastened to the ends of long poles. With these the Romans, two or more galleys acting together, would seize the ropes that fastened the sailyards to the masts of a ship of the enemy and by rowing off in haste would cut them and thus would succeed in dismantling the craft. When the Roman soldiers had thus disabled, boarded, and captured one by one many of the enemies' ships, the rest turned and hastened to flee with the wind. But suddenly a calm arose, the flight of the barbarians was stayed, and the Romans, continuing their method of attack, suffered very few of the enemies' vessels to escape.⁶⁴ The Veneti and their allies had staked their fortunes on the issue of this single battle. They had engaged all their ships in this one spot. Those lost, their means of refuge were gone. So they made a complete surrender.

Such is, in brief, the account⁶⁵ that Caesar gives of this decisive battle in which Decimus Brutus played such a prominent part. By

⁶⁴ Melber ("Dio Cassius' Bericht über die Seeschlacht des D. Brutus gegen die Veneti," *Commentationes Woelfflinianaë*, pp. 291 ff.) has shown that Cassius Dio in his description of this battle perverts the facts, not only in a conscious effort to imitate Thucydides, but also for rhetorical effect. This investigation of Melber into the trustworthiness of Dio's account of battles has been confirmed by the more comprehensive researches of the Italian scholar, Columba (*Cassio Dione e le guerre galliche*, Napoli, 1902). The points wherein Dio's account (xxxix. 40-43) differs from that of Caesar on which it is based, as noted for the most part by Melber, are as follows: (1) He states that Decimus came with swift galleys from the Mediterranean to aid Caesar. (2) He represents Decimus as having cast anchor somewhere on the coast of the Bay of Quiberon, and the Veneti as sailing with the wind against him. (3) Brutus abandons his ships in fear of the impetus and superior numbers of the enemy and receives their attack on land. (4) The sudden calm occurs at the beginning of the battle, when the enemy were advancing to the attack, and not when they were in full retreat. (5) The ships of the Veneti are propelled by oars. (6) The Roman ships ram the ships of the Veneti with their beaks and thus wreck them. (7) One Roman ship attacks two Gallic ships at a time. (8) The barbarians have neither bows and arrow nor stones, whereas in Caesar's account they are equipped with every kind of weapons. (9) The Romans set fire to some of the ships of the Veneti.

⁶⁵ Some things in the narrative of Caesar require to be explained. Did Caesar make use of ships in capturing the towns of the Veneti before the arrival of Decimus? In *B. G.* iii. 12. 1, the implication is that he did. Again, is it not likely that Caesar had in the vessels furnished by the Pictones, Santoni, and other allies, craft similar in construction to those of the enemy?

his skill on that day he earned Caesar's lasting gratitude. He had fought the first naval battle that is recorded to have been fought on the Atlantic Ocean; he had prepared the way for Caesar's invasion of Britain; and he had extended to naval warfare Caesar's reputation for success on land.

Whether Decimus Brutus accompanied Caesar on his two expeditions to Britain in 55 and 54, our sources do not tell us. But it is highly probable that Caesar did not dispense with the services of his chief naval officer on these important ventures across the channel.

Decimus does not reappear in Caesar's narrative until the beginning of the war with Vercingetorix.⁶⁶ Caesar was in the Cisalpine province when he heard of this uprising of the tribes in central Gaul—an uprising which was started by the Carnutes⁶⁷ and communicated to the Arverni, and of which Vercingetorix of the latter tribe assumed the leadership. On receiving news of it, Caesar hastened with the recruits he had just levied to Narbonese Gaul. His legions were far away in the North, two in the country of the Lingones, six at Agedincum, and two on the borders of the Treveri.⁶⁸ The tribes between him and them were either in open rebellion or of uncertain loyalty. His problem was to get to these legions. To accomplish his object, he stationed troops along the frontier of the province and checked the advance of Lucterius, the ally of Vercingetorix, who was approaching Narbo from the country of the Ruteni. He then proceeded with a part of his forces from Narbo, and with the reinforcements which he had brought from Italy, into the country of the Helvii, whose territory adjoined that of the Arverni. Thence, in the dead of winter, when the snow was six feet deep—for it was in the early part of the year 52—he crossed the Cevennes Mountains into the plains of the Arverni. Decimus Brutus accompanied him. Here Caesar tarried two days, while his cavalry raided the country and spread terror in their wake, waiting until his presence was reported to Vercingetorix and until that chieftain had begun to move from the country of the Bituriges to the defense of that of the Arverni. Then, on the pretense of collecting reinforcements and cavalry, he set out to join his legions, leaving Decimus in charge of the troops and promising that he would endeavor to return within three days. He urged Decimus to have the cavalry traverse the country far and wide in every direction.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ *B. G.* vii. 9.⁶⁷ *B. G.* vii. 2, 3, 4.⁶⁸ *B. G.* vi. 44. 3.⁶⁹ Caesar, *B. G.* vii. 7, 8, 9.

We hear no more of Decimus until the last scene in the siege of Alesia. Holmes ⁷⁰ thinks that he probably returned to the province. It seems to me more likely that he led the recruits under his command to Agedincum; for they were left there to guard the baggage when Labienus set out on his campaign against the Parisii and the Senones.⁷¹ In the *De Bello Gallico* ⁷² we read that, when Labienus had finished the business on which he had been sent to *Lutetia Parisiorum*, he returned to Agedincum, where he had left the baggage of the whole army, and two days later proceeded with all his forces to join Caesar. Decimus Brutus, if our conjecture above is correct, accompanied him. Caesar himself was probably at this time in the country of the Senones, marching to meet Labienus.⁷³

Both Labienus and Brutus ⁷⁴ took part in the siege of Alesia. When the besieged were making the last desperate effort to break through Caesar's works at the foot of Montagne de Flavigny, south of the Oserain, and when they had with a hail of missiles already driven Caesar's artillerymen from the towers, filled up his trenches, and torn down the rampart with its parapet, Brutus was first sent with cohorts to check them, then C. Fabius with other cohorts, and finally Caesar himself brought fresh men to aid, when the conflict raged more violently. The enemy was repulsed, and after Caesar had relieved Labienus on the north side of the mountain on which the town was situated, the victory was won and the place was captured. Thus it will be seen that Brutus had a part in the most desperate fighting of the whole siege.

How he was employed for the remainder of the year 52 and for the following year we have no means of ascertaining. It is probable that he remained in Gaul with Caesar assisting him in his further work of conquest and pacification, and that, in the spring of the year 50, when Caesar came into Cisalpine Gaul to promote the candidacy of M. Antonius for the augurate,⁷⁵ Decimus accompanied him. Certain it is that he was in Rome in the late spring or early summer of 50. For Caelius, writing to Cicero near the first of May, announces the approaching marriage of Decimus.⁷⁶ *Paula Valeria, soror Triari, divortium sine causa, quo die vir e provincia*

⁷⁰ "Caesar's *Conquest of Gaul*, p. 106, n. 1.

⁷² *B. G.* vii. 62. 10.

⁷¹ *B. G.* vii. 57. 1, and Holmes, p. 106, note.

⁷³ *B. G.* vii. 56. 5.

⁷⁴ *B. G.* vii. 87. 1. Caesar was on the slope of Flavigny according to Holmes, p. 143, directing the operations of his troops. Cf. *B. G.* vii. 85. 1.

⁷⁵ *B. G.* viii. 50. 1-4.

⁷⁶ *Cic. Fam.* viii. 7. 2.

venturus erat, fecit; nuptura est D. Bruto. Of what Triarius⁷⁷ Paula Valeria was the sister we cannot with certainty determine. Nor do we know from whom she divorced herself *sine causa*. That she remained faithful to her new husband to the end of his life we infer from what Cicero says in a letter to Decimus written toward the end of January, 43: ⁷⁸ *Eo tempore Polla tua misit, ut ad te, si quid vellem, darem litterarum, cum, quid scriberem, non habebam.*

For the remainder of the year 50 we have no notice of Decimus. Whether he remained in Rome watching the progress of the exciting political events that led up to the Civil War or returned to Caesar in Gaul, our sources do not say. Neither have we any indication of his whereabouts during the first months of active military operations. Like the majority of Caesar's lieutenants, he felt justified by the circumstances in sharing the fortunes of his chief. When men like Cicero hesitated for a long time whether to take the side of Caesar or that of Pompeius, certainly through no partiality to the former, there must have been a large element of justice in Caesar's contentions against Pompeius and the senate. In view of the personal aspect of the quarrel and Decimus' previous relations to Caesar, his choice between the rival leaders seems perfectly reasonable and natural. And his decision in this matter by no means indicates that he had renounced the political traditions of his ancestors and espoused democratic principles, or that he was in favor of the one-man rule which was the unforeseen result of Caesar's triumph over his enemies.

After the Pompeians had been driven out of Italy, and while

⁷⁷ Purser thinks that it was P. Valerius Triarius, who in 54 on behalf of the Sardinians accused M. Scaurus of *repetundae* and later was about to accuse him of *ambitus*. This Triarius was a trained and industrious speaker and the son of that Triarius (L. Valerius) who in 77, as propraetor in Sardinia, bore arms against Lepidus, and afterward, as *legatus* of Lucullus, 67 B. C., suffered a defeat near Zela in Pontus at the hands of Mithradates—Ascon. *In Scaur.* p. 17 (ed. Kiessling); *Att.* iv. 16. 6.; *Ad Q. Fr.* iii. 2. 3; *Att.* iv. 17. 5; *Cic. De Imp. Pomp.* 25; *App. Mithr.* 88, 89, 112, 120; *Dio xxxvi.* 10-12; *Liv. Epit.* 98; *Plut. Lucull.* 35. Others are of the opinion that Paula was the sister of C. Valerius Triarius, one of the interlocutors in the *De finibus* of Cicero, who is highly commended by Cicero as a scholar and orator. He was on the side of Pompey in the Civil War and in command of the Asiatic ships off the coast of Dyrrhachium. He was present at the battle of Pharsalus, and it was on his advice that Pompey ordered his men not to stir from their places, but to await the attack of Caesar. This Triarius died before April 46, and Cicero was the guardian of his children—Orelli *Onomasticon* 2, s. v. *Paula Valeria*; *Cic. De fin.* i. 13; *Brut.* 265, 266 *Caes. B. C.* iii. 5. 3, iii. 9. 2; *Att.* xii. 28. 3. Now it is possible that the two Triarii, Publius and Gaius, were brothers. But had this been the case, Caelius would probably have written *soror Triariorum*. If they were not brothers, of which one Paula Valeria was the sister it is impossible from the data at hand to decide. Since Cicero was a friend of Gaius and was more interested in him than in Publius, it would seem that Caelius would be more likely to mention an occurrence in the family of the former than in that of the latter.

⁷⁸ *Fam.* xi. 8. 1.

ships were being gathered to pursue them, Caesar determined to proceed to Spain and detach the two provinces of that peninsula from the cause of Pompeius.⁷⁹ Before his departure from Italy, having summoned the senate for April 1,⁸⁰ he recounted to it the wrongs to which he had been subjected by his enemies, proposed that peace commissioners be sent to Pompeius,⁸¹ and endeavored to secure control of the funds in the *aerarium sanctius*. L. Caecilius Metellus vetoed the bill passed by the senate intrusting Caesar with these funds and, effecting nothing by his veto, proceeded to guard the treasury doors in person.⁸² Caesar threatened Metellus with death, and his soldiers, under his orders, broke open the doors and carried off all the money of the state.⁸³ By this violence, in contrast with the reputation for clemency which he had courted⁸⁴ and up to this time deserved,⁸⁵ he gave deep offense to the people.⁸⁶ Although justified by the plea of military necessity, this action was nevertheless significant of the absolutism that was to follow.

Caesar left Rome on April 7.⁸⁷ On his arrival in Further Gaul, he learned that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus had already set out to take possession of Massilia for Pompeius with seven fast sailing-vessels which he had secured from private individuals on the island of Igilium and in the neighborhood of Cosa on the coast of Etruria, and which he had manned with a crew of his slaves, freedmen, and tenants. He learned, too, that Pompeius had sent ahead of Domitius the *legati* of Massilia who were in Rome, with the earnest entreaty that they would not suffer their city to be won over from allegiance to him by the kind offices of Caesar. Accordingly, the Massiliots had closed their gates to Caesar, had summoned the neighboring mountaineers to their assistance, had brought grain from the surrounding country into the city, had begun the manufacture of arms, and were already engaged in repairing their walls, gates, and fleet.⁸⁸ Caesar had a fruitless interview with the leading men of the town, who made professions of neutrality and refused to give him aid or to admit him within their walls. Meantime Domitius with his ships arrived, was received by them, and placed in command of the city.

⁷⁹ Caes. *B. C.* i. 29, 30.

⁸² Caes. *B. C.* i. 32.

⁸⁰ *Att.* ix. 17. 1.

⁸³ Dio xli. 17. 2; *Fam.* viii. 16. 1.

⁸³ Dio xli. 17. 2; App. *B. C.* ii. 41; Plut. *Pomp.* 62; *Caes.* 35; *Att.* x. 4. 8.

⁸⁴ *Att.* ix. 7c. 1.

⁸⁵ Caes. *B. C.* I. 23; Dio xli. 15.

⁸⁷ Caes. *B. C.* i. 33. 4; *Att.* ix. 17. 1, x. 8. 6.

⁸⁶ *Att.* x. 4. 8, 8. 6.

⁸⁸ Caes. *B. C.* i. 34.

Smarting under this insult, Caesar ordered C. Trebonius to lead his three legions against the place,⁸⁹ prepared the usual siege works, and, in thirty days from the time that the timber was cut, built, equipped, and armed twelve galleys at Arles. When these had been brought to Massilia, he placed them under the command of Decimus Brutus as *legatus*.⁹⁰ The legions and the siege from the land side he left in the charge of Trebonius.

After the departure of Caesar for Spain,⁹¹ Brutus must have spent some time in training his pilots and oarsmen, who had been procured from merchant vessels and were acquainted neither with the equipment of warships nor with the art of maneuvering them. His ships themselves were slow and unwieldy, owing to the fact that they had been constructed of unseasoned timber. But his fighting force was made up of the bravest men in the legions, centurions and *antesignani*, who were well provided with grappling-hooks, drags, javelins, darts, and other missiles.

The Massiliots had equipped seventeen warships, eleven of which were supplied with decks. To these they added many smaller craft in order to frighten the Roman fleet by the mere force of numbers. They put on board numerous bowmen and a large force of the Albici, a people of the neighboring mountains, whose courage they stimulated with promises of reward. Domitius manned some of their ships with the tenants and shepherds whom he had brought with him from Italy. It was about the 27th of June⁹² when, with their complete equipment and overwhelming numbers—they had twenty-four ships to Brutus' twelve—they proceeded from the harbor to meet Decimus who had his station on the southeast side of the isle of Ratoneau.⁹³ Becoming aware of their approach Decimus brought forth his ships from their haven, and the battle began. Both sides fought with vigor and spirit. The mountaineers and the shepherds, the former with the promises of reward fresh in their minds, the latter in hope of freedom, were of great assistance to the Massiliots and displayed a courage almost equal to that of the Romans. The Massiliots, by the speed of their ships and by their skill, not only

⁸⁹ Hirtius *B. G.* viii. 54. 4; cf. *B. C.* i. 36. 4.

⁹⁰ Liv. *Epit.* 110.

⁹¹ Dio (xli. 19. 3, 4) informs us that Caesar before his departure suffered a repulse from the Massiliots. He had expected to conquer them easily, but finding their opposition stubborn he turned them over to his *legati*. This account of Dio is hardly trustworthy.

⁹² Stoffel, *Histoire de Jules César, Guerre Civile, Livre 1*, pp. 253 ff., 286, 287.

⁹³ Stoffel, p. 84; cf. Rouby, *Siège de Marseille par César*, p. 93. For account of the battle, *vide* *Caes. B. C.* i. 56 ff.

baffled the Romans and eluded their attacks, but, whenever it was possible, they would surround single Roman ships with several of their own, or, sweeping past them would endeavor to break their oars and thus render them helpless. But when they were at close quarters with the Romans, the latter used their grappling-hooks. The men on one Roman ship would grapple and hold two of the enemy's ships, board them, and thus engage the Massiliots in hand-to-hand encounters. In these encounters Brutus' men showed their superiority in valor. They sank three of the enemy's ships, captured six,⁹⁴ and drove the remainder back to the harbor.⁹⁵ The news of Brutus' victory reached Caesar at Ilerda, just when he had completed his pontoon bridge across the Sicoris by means of which he obtained access to the provisions which he had so sorely needed. It marked a turn in the tide of his fortunes,⁹⁶ which for a time had been extremely desperate. It not only produced a good impression on Caesar's own men, but, as Dio⁹⁷ informs us, the story of it, told to the Iberians and purposely magnified, wrought such a change in some of them that they immediately espoused the cause of Caesar.

But the Massiliots did not despair at this defeat.⁹⁸ They brought out old ships from the dockyards, refitted, armed, and manned them with oars, men, and pilots, of whom they had many, and thus brought their fleet up to its former number of vessels. Not content with this, they added fishing-smacks too, which they had decked to protect the oarsmen from missiles. When their fleet was thus repaired and strengthened, they received news of reinforcements. L. Nasidius, sent by Pompeius with a fleet of sixteen ships, had sailed through the Sicilian Straits unnoticed by Curio, whom Caesar had placed in command of the island of Sicily. He had picked up an additional ship at Messina and, setting out with his fleet from that place, had sent a fast little ship ahead to run the blockade, advise Domitius and the Massiliots of his approach, and urge them to unite with him for another attack on the fleet of Brutus. This news filled the Massiliots with high hopes. They embarked upon their ships with fresh courage and confidence. Getting a favorable wind, they set forth, probably before daylight, skirted close along the shore between the islands and the mainland, eluded the fleet of Brutus, and met Nasidius at Tauroentum, the rendezvous appointed. Brutus

⁹⁴ Cf. *B. C.* ii. 5. 1.

⁹⁶ *B. C.* i. 50. 1.

⁹⁸ *Caes. B. C.* ii. 3 ff

⁹⁵ *B. C.* i. 56-58.

⁹⁷ Dio xli. 21. 3, 4. Cf. *Caes. B. C.* i. 60.

did not see the Massiliots' ships until they were safely past his station, but he immediately followed them. The time that had elapsed since the first battle he had employed in repairing the Massiliot ships which he had captured, so that his fleet now numbered eighteen vessels. The combined force of the enemy amounted to over forty galleys. In the face of such odds, Brutus made a speech of encouragement to his men, exhorting them to despise the valor of those whom they had already conquered. He then proceeded to the attack. The Massiliots believed that on the chance of that day depended the issue of all their fortunes, and at the outset their valor was all that the situation which they had made for themselves demanded. As the fight progressed, the ships of Brutus gradually drew apart from each other in order to give room for the skill of the pilots and for greater freedom and speed of movement. Brutus' men made much use of their grappling-hooks, as in the previous engagement, and when they laid hold of a ship of the enemy, they boarded her and fought hand to hand with her crew. At the same time they received many wounds; for a hail of missiles fell upon them from the smaller craft of the enemy. Two Massiliot triremes, recognizing Brutus' ship by its colors, proceeded toward it from opposite directions to ram and perhaps sink it by the double shock. But Brutus escaped by urging his men to row forward with their utmost speed, and thus the two hostile ships, pushed on with violence, collided with one another. Both were disabled by the collision, and then the ships of Brutus attacked and sank them. The ships of Nasidius which were on the left wing had retired unhurt before the battle had fairly begun. Of the fleet of the Massiliots, five were sunk, four captured, and one withdrew from the battle with those of Nasidius. The latter vessels made their way to the coast of Hither Spain.⁹⁹ By this victory¹⁰⁰ Brutus closed the sea to the Massiliots and completed the investment of the city.

This naval battle was fought about the last of July.¹⁰¹ But it was not until the beginning of October that the Massiliots gave up the defense of their city by land. During this time Brutus was employed in maintaining the blockade of the port. A few days, however, before the town surrendered, L. Domitius, having learned of the decision of the Massiliots to give themselves up, resolved to run the blockade and effect his escape. He got together three

⁹⁹ *B. C. ii.* 3-7.

¹⁰⁰ Stoffel, p. 90.

¹⁰¹ Stoffel, pp. 253, 254, 287.

ships, two of which he assigned to his friends, while he himself embarked upon the third. Just then a terrible storm came up, favoring the design, and Domitius and his company started upon their way. But Brutus' ships, keeping daily watch near the harbor, caught sight of them and weighed anchor to pursue. The ship that carried Domitius was faster than its pursuers and with the aid of the tempest soon disappeared from sight. The other two were frightened by the formidable array of Brutus' ships and hastily retreated to the town.¹⁰²

Brutus was probably present in command of his fleet at the surrender of the city. Upon him devolved the duty of receiving the ships which the Massiliots brought forth from their harbor and their dockyards.¹⁰³ What Brutus did with these ships, or what became of his own fleet after the surrender of the city, no ancient writer informs us. Caesar tells us that on his departure for Italy he left two legions as a garrison for the city. Stoffel thinks that these two legions were new recruits, levied in Italy by Antonius in obedience to orders from Caesar and sent to Massilia to occupy the town on the departure of the veteran legions of Trebonius, which Caesar dispatched to Italy.¹⁰⁴ If this be true, Trebonius must have accompanied his three legions into Italy. We know that he was *praetor urbanus* for the year 48.¹⁰⁵ Hence it is probable that Decimus Brutus was placed in charge of the two legions which Caesar left behind at Massilia, and that he was given command of the town together with the fleet in the harbor. For Caesar, during his eleven days' dictatorship toward the end of 49, by virtue of his extraordinary powers, in providing governors for the provinces already under his control assigned Decimus Brutus to Transalpine Gaul.¹⁰⁶ Massilia then became a part of Decimus' province and a base for administering it,¹⁰⁷ while the two legions left there constituted his military force. This seems a small force for so extensive a province and one that had been so recently subdued; yet Caesar seems to have summoned all the legions from Gaul to take part in the campaign against the Pompeians in Spain and for the difficult siege of Massilia.¹⁰⁸ No successor to Brutus was appointed for 47 or 46.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² Caes. B. C. ii. 22. 2-4.

¹⁰⁵ Caes. B. C. iii. 20. 1.

¹⁰³ Caes. B. C. ii. 22. 5.

¹⁰⁶ App. B. C. ii. 48.

¹⁰⁴ Stoffel, *Guerre Civile*, pp. 316, 317.

¹⁰⁷ E. Herzog, *Galliae Narbonensis historia*, pp. 102, 103.

¹⁰⁸ Hirtius B. G. viii. 54. 4, 5; Caes. B. C. i. 15. 3; 18. 5; 25. 1; 36. 4; 37. 1; 39. 2. Cf. Stoffel, pp. 256 ff. and 335 ff.

¹⁰⁹ App. B. C. ii. 111; Liv. *Epit.* 114.

Indeed, it is highly probable that not until the middle of 45 did Caesar deem it expedient to relieve him of this important and difficult post.¹¹⁰ The exceptional duration of his governorship is proof of his success as a provincial administrator. But of what he did we know almost nothing. Merely a single sentence from the *Epitome* of Livy is the sum of the literary evidence that we possess for the history of Gaul during this period; but that brief statement is a tribute to Brutus' efficiency. After an account of the events of the war in Africa we read: *Brutus legatus Caesaris in Gallia Bellovacos rebellantes proelio vicit.*¹¹¹ The Bellovaci had the reputation of being the bravest and most influential of all the Belgic tribes.¹¹² In 57 they had demanded the leadership in the war of the Belgae against Caesar. In 52 they had joined in the general revolt of the Gauls.¹¹³ They refused, however, to furnish their full quota of troops for the relief of Alesia, proudly declaring that they would wage war with the Romans on their own account and would yield obedience to the commands of no one. However, because of their guest-friendship for Commius,¹¹⁴ at his request, they contributed two thousand men to the general levy. In the following year, 51, they made ready to carry out their boast and, with the assistance of several neighboring tribes, were preparing to attack the Suessiones, dependents of the Remi who were allies of Caesar. It required a force of seven legions for Caesar to subdue them. After a tedious campaign, however, he had defeated them in a battle in which their leader, Correus, was slain, and had brought them to terms.¹¹⁵ But their spirit was unbroken, and they were, doubtless, still pre-eminent in military strength among the Gauls and Belgians,¹¹⁶ when in the year 46 they again raised the standard of revolt, with the result as recorded above. The silence of subsequent history concerning them affords convincing testimony to the thoroughness with which they were subjugated by Brutus.

¹¹⁰ Plut. *Ant.* 11.

¹¹¹ Liv. *l. c.* For the location of the Bellovaci, cf. Strabo iv. 3. 5 (p. 194), iv. 6. 11 (p. 208); Ptol. ii. 9. 4; Plin. *N. H.* iv. 17. 106.

¹¹² Caes. *B. G.* ii. 4. 5.; Strabo iv. 4. 3. p. 196, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν Βεργῶν Βελλοάκουσ ἀρίστους φασί.

¹¹³ *B. G.* vii. 59.

¹¹⁵ Hirtius *B. G.* viii. 6-22.

¹¹⁴ *B. G.* vii. 75. 5.

¹¹⁶ Hirt. *B. G.* viii. 6. 2.

II

DECIMUS' PART IN THE ASSASSINATION OF CAESAR

Brutus did not remain in Gaul until the end of the year 45. Caesar probably desired him to be present in Rome on the occasion of his approaching triumph, and he was thus permitted to leave his province in the middle of the year,¹ before a successor had been appointed. Accordingly, he accompanied Caesar on the latter's leisurely and stately progress through the two Gauls and Italy. Plutarch,² after reciting the fact that all the leading men of Rome went out several days' journey to meet Caesar on his return from Spain, informs us that, on the trip through Italy, Antonius enjoyed the conspicuous distinction of riding in the same chariot with the dictator, and that behind them rode Decimus Brutus and Octavius, the son of Caesar's niece, Attia. Octavius had been with Caesar in Spain.³ Decimus Brutus had joined him in Transalpine Gaul; Antonius,⁴ Marcus Brutus,⁵ and other leading men of Rome had met him probably in the Cisalpine province.

On the 13th of September, at his Lavican villa, before his entrance into Rome, Caesar made his will.⁶ When this was read after Caesar's death, it was found that Decimus Brutus had been named among his substitute heirs and, together with others of the *liberatores*, among the guardians (*tutores*) of his son if one should subsequently be born to him.⁷ From the narrative of Suetonius we would infer that Decimus was the only one of the conspirators named *in secundis heredibus*. Dio⁸ states that Decimus, Antonius, and certain others of the conspirators were made guardians of Octavius, and heirs of Caesar's property if Octavius should fail to take. It is not likely that Caesar would name a guardian for Octavius who had already

¹ Nic. Dam. *Vita Caesaris* 10; Lange, III, 460 f.; Schmidt, *Der Briefwechsel des M. Tullius Cicerō*, pp. 360 f.

² Plut. *Ant.* 11.

³ Nic. Dam. *Vita Caesaris* 10.

⁴ Cic. *Phil.* II. 78.

⁵ *Att.* xiii. 11. 2, 23. 1, 40. 1; O. E. Schmidt, *M. Junius Brutus*, p. 176.

⁶ Suet. *Iul.* 83; Schmidt, *Briefwechsel*, p. 370; Lange, III, 461.

⁷ Suet. *Iul.* 83.

⁸ Dio xliii. 35. 2: ὅτι τὸν τε Ὀκταοῦιον ὑἱὸν πεποιήται καὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον τὸν τε Δέκιμον καὶ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν σφαγέων ἐπιτρόπους τε αὐτοῦ καὶ κληρονόμους τῆς οὐσίας, ἂν γε μὴ ἐς ἐκείνον ἔλθῃ. Cf. Plut. *Caes.* 64; App. ii. 143, 146.

assumed the *toga virilis*. Again, Dio would have us believe that Octavius was the sole heir to Caesar *primo loco*, while Suetonius tells us specifically that the dictator appointed as his three heirs the grandsons of his sisters, Gaius Octavius of three-fourths of his estate, and Lucius Pinarius and Quintus Peditus of the remaining fourth. In case of the failure of all three of these to take, the inheritance devolved upon his substitute heirs.⁹ The statement that Appian makes in two passages,¹⁰ that Decimus was adopted by Caesar, is of course false. In fact, Suetonius gives us the only trustworthy information that we have for the terms of Caesar's will. Whether Decimus had any knowledge of the provisions of the document further than the fact that he was to be one of the guardians of a possible future heir, we do not know. Certain it is that the arrangement indicates Caesar's unlimited confidence in his former lieutenant.

Nor are other marks of his confidence wanting. For, owing to the fact that Decimus obtained the province of Cisalpine Gaul for 44 in accordance with the provisions of the *lex Iulia de provinciis*,¹¹ we must infer that he had previously held the praetorship, inasmuch as the scope of that law embraced only *praetorii* and *consulares*. Therefore, though we have no direct testimony on this point, Lange is probably right in supposing that Decimus had been praetor in 45.¹² He was elected at the *comitia* which was held, after the triumph of Caesar and before October 13,¹³ for choosing consuls, praetors, and quaestors to hold office during the latter part of 45. None of these magistrates had been chosen for that year, owing to the absence of Caesar, who alone was empowered to preside over the *comitia* for their election.¹⁴ The control of Caesar over elections was practically absolute, though he claimed the right of selecting only one-half of the magistrates other than the consuls.¹⁵ Hence it was in conformity with Caesar's desire that Decimus was made praetor in order that he might become governor of a province for the following year. The

⁹ Cf. *Codex Justinianus* vi. 25. 10; Roby, *Roman Private Law*, I, p. 203, n. 2.

¹⁰ App. *B. C.* ii. 143, 146.

¹¹ Cic. *Phil.* iii. 38. The law was passed in 46; cf. Dio xliii. 25. 3; *Phil.* i. 19; Lange, III, 456.

¹² Lange, III, 465.

¹³ After the triumph of Caesar and before that of Q. Fabius Maximus. Cf. *Fasti Capitol. C. I. L.* I, Pt. I, p. 50.

¹⁴ Suet. *Iul.* 76; Dio xlii. 20. 4, xliii. 48. 1, 47. 1; Nic. Dam. 22 and Krueger, *De rebus inde a bello Hispan. etc., gestis*, pp. 30, 40. During the absence of Caesar there had been a provisional government of eight *praelecti urbis*. Cf. Lange, III, p. 459.

¹⁵ Suet. *Iul.* 41; Dio xliii 45. 1; Nic. Dam. 20; Dio xliii. 51. 3.

distribution of provinces followed hard upon the election of magistrates.¹⁶ The praetorian provinces were assigned by a decree of Caesar¹⁷ without the casting of lots, and Cisalpine Gaul, considered the best province, was given to Decimus Brutus.¹⁸ At the same time that Hirtius and Pansa were chosen consuls for the year 43—that is, toward the end of February, 44—Decimus Brutus and Lucius Munatius Plancus were designated by Caesar as consuls for the year 42.¹⁹

From what has been said it is clear that Caesar had done much to reward appropriately his able and hitherto loyal lieutenant. But he had bestowed equal favors on others who were less deserving. Among the supposed friends of the dictator, Decimus Brutus possessed unique claims upon his gratitude. We know but little of his life up to this time, but all that we do know of it is to his credit. No breath of scandal in public or in private conduct attached itself to his name. Marcus Brutus with all his virtues was a harsh and sordid usurer; Antonius, notoriously dishonest and corrupt; Dolabella, a licentious demagogue. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Decimus Brutus was actuated by selfish motives. Ancient and modern writers alike ascribe such motives to his colleague, Plancus, to Lepidus, and to Cassius. The support of men like Antonius, Dolabella, Plancus, and Lepidus gave no moral strength to Caesar's cause, whereas the loyalty of Decimus Brutus was a valuable moral asset. Not only did Decimus contribute character to the service of Caesar, he added ability too. He was conspicuous among all of Caesar's lieutenants for his unvarying success and substantial achievement. Lepidus, it is true, had obtained from the dictator the honor of a triumph. But he ill deserved such an honor; a trial for extortion rather was his due. Trebonius, though an able military man, had been deserted by his own troops and compelled to flee from his province. Dolabella as tribune and Antonius as *magister equitum*, in 47, had both done much by their dishonest measures to discredit and endanger the government of Caesar. Up to this time, at least, no failure or breach of trust marred the career of Decimus Brutus. To his skill and valor Caesar was indebted for

¹⁶ Krueger, pp. 30 and 41, n. 6; Dio xliii. 47. 1.

¹⁷ Dio xliii. 25. 4.

¹⁸ App. *B. C.* iii. 2; Dio xlv. 9. 3; Nic. Dam. 28.

¹⁹ Vell. ii. 60. 5; App. iii. 98; Dio xlv. 14. 4; Cic. *Fam.* xi. 4; Nic. Dam. 22; Dio. xliii. 51. 2; Suet. *Iul.* 80 for the *comitia*.

four notable victories, and in a fifth engagement he had played an honorable, though subordinate, part.

Modern writers are wont to place undue emphasis upon the marks of friendship that Caesar bestowed upon Decimus, neglecting the *quid pro quo* of service rendered by the latter. And thus they are enabled to paint in blacker hues the conduct of Brutus on the Ides of March. For it is the almost universal judgment of historians that of all those who had a share in that day's deed, Decimus was the arch-traitor. Of the moderns only Gardthausen²⁰ and Seeck²¹ have essayed to present his conduct in a better, and, I think, a truer, light.

Decimus had inherited from an honorable ancestry on his father's side a loyal devotion to the republican tradition that the senate should have a large share in the government of the state. He had been adopted into a family no less faithful to conservative political principles. Although, as a young man, he had entered military service under Caesar, it is by no means a necessary inference that he adopted the political faith of which Caesar was the recognized leader. He doubtless regarded the Civil War as a contest between Caesar and Pompey, with the balance of justice on the side of Caesar; and he naturally followed his former leader, while at the same time he must have cherished, in some degree at least, the traditions of his real and adoptive ancestry.²² But he was primarily a soldier, not a politician, and his political convictions had lost in definiteness and intensity during a life of engrossing military activity involving as it did long absence from Rome, the scene of party strife and turmoil.

In the autumn of 45, when Decimus Brutus returned to Rome, he was still, comparatively speaking, a young man—not over forty. He had, so far as we know, not yet held a city magistracy and was without experience in city politics. He probably entertained the hope that Caesar, now that all his enemies had been conquered, would restore the free republic²³—an idea prevalent at the time and

²⁰ Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, 1, p. 23.

²¹ Seeck (*Kaiser Augustus*, pp. 17 f.) thinks that Decimus was a democrat, but could not endure the idea of Caesar's being a king and tyrant. I do not believe that Decimus was ever a member of the democratic party.

²² Both Seeck and Gardthausen cite the coins of Decimus that bear the image of the victor of Lake Regillus, Aulus Postumius Albus (or Albinus), the ancestor of the family into which Brutus was adopted, to show that Brutus honored the memory of the man who prevented the return of the Tarquins to Rome (*vide supra*, p. 23).

²³ *Fam.* xiii. 68. 2 (of September, 46).

cherished by not a few lovers of the old régime. But at Rome he found, along with this hopeful attitude, a feeling of despair and a strong undercurrent of opposition to Caesar—an opposition that found voice in the mutual intercourse of friends, and was sometimes even bold enough to address the public ear.²⁴ Of this opposition we have abundant evidence in Cicero's letters of the time. Its causes are not far to seek. The senate had become a mere instrument for registering the will of Caesar; the magistrates were puppets for the execution of that will; and the popular assembly, which had long ceased to be a healthy political body, was now but rarely permitted to elect magistrates, and then only to ratify the choice of the dictator.²⁵ "You tell me of Catulus and of the times in which he lived," writes Cicero in 46; "what similarity is there between those times and these? Then I did not like to be free from the care of public business either, for any length of time. For I sat by the helm (of the ship of state) and held the tiller; while now there is scarce room for me in the hold."²⁶ "Can anyone who knows anything be happy now?" he asks in an earlier letter.²⁷ There is no escape from the tyranny of Caesar.²⁸ Freedom of speech and action is alike impossible. The result of the Spanish war boded no good to Rome in Cicero's opinion, for it would mean either massacre or slavery.²⁹ In May of the next year, 45, Cicero had written a letter of political counsel to Caesar, a *συμβουλευτικόν*, such as Aristotle and Isocrates had been wont to write to kings and princes, to Alexander in particular; but its tone did not exactly suit the friends of Caesar.³⁰ Cicero gives the matter up. "For how base is flattery," he exclaims, "when life itself for me is base."³¹ Just about the time he had written this letter to Caesar, which he did not send, he intimated in a letter to Atticus that he would rather see Caesar dead and deified than safe on earth.³² When the ivory statue of Caesar was borne in the procession of the gods at the *ludi circenses*, it called forth sarcastic comment from Cicero: *Populum vero praeclarum quod propter malum vicinum ne Victoriae*

²⁴ Cf. the book of Aulus Caecina against Caesar, *Fam.* vi. 7. 1; *Suet. Iul.* 75; *Fam.* vi. 5.

²⁵ *Att.* xii. 8. 1; *Fam.* v. 13. 3.

²⁶ *Fam.* ix. 15. 3.

²⁹ *Fam.* iv. 14. 1. Cf. *Fam.* vi. 21. 1.

²⁷ *Fam.* vii. 28. 1.

³⁰ *Att.* xiii. 26. 2; xiii. 27. 1, 28. 2.

²⁸ *Fam.* iv. 8. 2.

³¹ *Att.* xiii. 28. 2; cf. 30. 2.

³² *Att.* xii. 45. (3) 2: *De Caesare vicino scripseram ad te, quia cognoram ex tuis litteris. Eum σύνναον Quirini malo quam Salutis.*

*quidem ploditur!*³³ In another letter, a fortnight later, Cicero makes it clear that he is opposed to Caesar, but he adds: "The king knows that I have no spirit in me." From a letter of Cicero written early in August, 45, we learn that Marcus Brutus, after having gone to meet Caesar on his return from Gaul, was of the opinion that he would restore the republic. Cicero is skeptical of such news, his comment is exceedingly bitter, and he strongly hints that Marcus Brutus should imitate the examples of Ahala and the elder Brutus.³⁴ It is inconceivable that Cicero should have been the only man in Rome or Italy who entertained such sentiments as we find above. He must have voiced a feeling common especially among the members of the senate—men of sensitive pride who had been deprived of the substance of their power and now were mocked by its shadow.

It was into this atmosphere of discontent and silent opposition that Decimus Brutus entered on his return to Rome. He was soon to realize the difference between service under a superior military authority and the conduct of civil business under the irresponsible and despotic will of one man—between the freedom of the camp and province and the sickening subserviency of the city.

Caesar's was a mild and benevolent tyranny, they tell us, but, for all that, it was oppressive to men's spirits. The change from the old to the new was too sudden, too radical, for those who cherished republican principles to be reconciled to it. Nay, they recoiled from it, and there was reaction, organized opposition, and conspiracy. A brief review of some of the events that culminated in the Ides of March will help us to understand the motives that actuated Decimus Brutus on that day.

The news of Caesar's victory at Munda had reached Rome on the eve of the 20th of April. Soon thereafter it was decreed by the senate that in all the festal assemblies Caesar should have the right of appearing in the *vestis triumphalis*, of wearing always the laurel wreath of the *triumphator*,³⁵ and red shoes such as had been worn by the ancient Alban kings³⁶ to whom he claimed kinship through Iulus. The servile senate voted him the title of *Liberator*, recorded it in the *Fasti*, and decreed a temple to *Libertas*.³⁷ The *praenomen*, *Imperator*, an appellation that victorious generals were wont to

³³ *Att.* xiii. 44. 1; cf. *Suet. Iul.* 76 and *Cic. Att.* xiii. 28.3.

³⁴ *Att.* xiii. 40. 1.

³⁶ *Dio* xliii. 43. 2.

³⁵ *Dio* xliii. 43. 1; *Suet. Iul.* 45.

³⁷ *Dio* xliii. 44. 1.

receive on the field of battle, was decreed to him *in perpetuum* and also to his children.³⁸ They voted that he should have a *domus publica* distinguished by a *fastigium*, the usual ornament of temples,³⁹ and that movable festivals (*dies feriati*), on the days of the victories of himself and his *legati*, should be celebrated in his honor.⁴⁰ Other distinctions of this kind they granted him, says Dio,⁴¹ by means of which they made him a monarch without disguise. He was to have the right of nominating magistrates—even those of the *plebs*—and to hold the consulship *sine collega* for ten years. The decrees of the senate granting the latter honors were probably ratified by the people.⁴² The people also voted that Caesar alone should be empowered to have soldiers and to control the public revenues.⁴³ Somewhat later, probably about the middle of May, the senate decreed that an ivory statue of him should be borne upon the *ferculum* in the *pompa circensis*⁴⁴ along with the images of the gods. When this was actually done a month later, the people showed their indignation by the silence which they maintained when Caesar's image was borne past.⁴⁵ Another statue the senate decreed to him, to be set up in the Temple of Quirinus and inscribed *Deo Invicto*, and they also placed one upon the Capitol with those of the ancient kings of Rome.⁴⁶ Caesar did not accept some of these honors, we are told. For instance, soon after his entrance into the city, he relinquished the consulship with a self-denial, as Lange has suggested,⁴⁷ more apparent than real, since in the previous year he had been vested with the dictatorship for ten years.⁴⁸ About the 7th of October⁴⁹ Caesar celebrated his triumph *ex Hispania*—a triumph that angered the Romans beyond anything else, says Plutarch.⁵⁰ For they were indignant that Caesar, having destroyed the family of their greatest man who had been unfortunate, should lead a procession in celebration of the calamities of his country and that he should exult in those things, the one excuse for which, in the eyes of gods and men, was the plea of necessity. It was on the occasion of this same

³⁸ Dio xliii. 44. 2. 3; Suet. *Iul.* 76.

³⁹ Dio xliii. 44. 6.

⁴⁰ Dio, *loc. cit.*; App. ii. 106.

⁴¹ Dio xliii. 45. 1; Suet. *Iul.* 76; App. ii. 106; cf. Nic. Dam. 20.

⁴² προχειρίσαντο, says Dio (xliii. 45. 1).

⁴⁴ Dio *loc. cit.*; Suet. *Iul.* 76; *Att.* xlii. 28.3.

⁴³ Dio xliii. 45. 2.

⁴⁵ *Att.* xiii. 44. 1; *Pro rege Deiot.* 33.

⁴⁶ Dio xliii. 45. 3; *Att.* xii. 45 (3) 2; *Pro rege Deiot., loc. cit.*

⁴⁷ Lange, III, pp. 462-63; Dio xliii. 46. 2; App. B. C. ii. 107.

⁴⁸ Dio xliii. 14. 4.

⁴⁹ Krueger, p. 30.

⁵⁰ Plut. *Caes.* 56.

triumph that, when Caesar passed the seats of the tribunes, Pontius Aquila, a member of the college, did not rise to do him honor. Caesar was angered beyond measure at this show of independence and did not soon forget the incident.⁵¹ He increased the membership of the senate to nine hundred, admitting many foreigners and semi-barbarous Gauls, and making no discrimination against soldiers and sons of freedmen.⁵² This act called forth jests and sarcasms from the people, expressed in placards and popular songs.⁵³

A golden statue of the dictator was placed upon the Rostra.⁵⁴ This too aroused unfavorable comment, as we gather from Cicero's speech in behalf of King Deiotarus,⁵⁵ delivered some time in November.⁵⁶

At the time of the *Saturnalia*, when Quintus Fabius Maximus, Caesar's three-months' consul, was entering the theater and the lictor had given the usual warning of his approach, from all sides the cry arose: "He is no consul!"⁵⁷ To show still further his contempt for their chief republican magistracy, on the death of Fabius on the last day of December, Caesar had Caninius Rebilus elected consul for the remainder of the year—that is, for a few hours. Such mockery of a venerable office made Caninius the butt of Cicero's biting wit, although the incident saddened Cicero. "These occurrences seem ridiculous to you," he writes to Curius,⁵⁸ "for you are not here. Were you to see them, you could not restrain your tears."

Caesar placed his private slaves in charge of the mint and the public revenues, and he committed the command of the three legions that he had left at Alexandria to a favorite, the son of his freedman Rufinus. His lack of self-restraint was apparent in his utterances to those about him: "The republic is nothing," he is reported to have said, "a mere name without form or substance." "Sulla was an ignoramus to lay down the dictatorship." "Men must speak more respectfully to me and must consider my word as law."⁵⁹

At the beginning of the next year (44) other honors were decreed to Caesar.⁶⁰ It was made lawful for him to appear anywhere, even in the city itself, clad in the *vestis triumphalis*, and to sit upon the *sella curulis* on any official occasion, save at the games, where he

⁵¹ Suet. *Iul.* 78.

⁵² Suet. *Iul.* 76, 80; Dio. xliii. 47. 3.

⁵³ Suet. *Iul.* 80.

⁵⁷ Suet. *Iul.* 80. For date *vide* Krueger, p. 42, n. 12; *C. I. L.*, I², p. 28.

⁵⁸ *Fam.* vii. 30. 1.

⁵⁴ Nic. Dam. 20.

⁵⁵ Cic. *Pro Deiot.* 34.

⁵⁶ Krueger, pp. 31, 41, n. 10.

⁵⁹ Suet. *Iul.* 76, 77.

⁶⁰ Dio xlii. 4. 1-3.

occupied a seat with the tribunes in token of the fact that he possessed the *tribunicia potestas*. He was also empowered to dedicate the *spolia opima* to Jupiter Feretrius, just as if he had slain the commander of the enemy with his own hand; always to have lictors with laurel-wreathed *fascēs*; and to enter the city on horseback (*ovans*) when he returned from the *Feriae Latinae* on the Alban Mount.

Already the title of king was being applied to Caesar by those about him without any marked disapproval on his part, though he ostensibly rejected the honor, when one day his statue on the *rostra* was found crowned with a laurel wreath. Two tribunes, C. Epi dius Marullus and L. Caesetius Flavus, caused the symbol of monarchy to be removed. At the same time they spoke with praise of Caesar to the multitude, said that such flattery was contrary to his desires, and accordingly had the offenders imprisoned. This action of the tribunes displeased Caesar not a little, but he took no immediate steps against them.⁶¹ Soon after, however, when on January 26 Caesar was entering the city in ovation, returning from the Alban Mount, some of the people meeting the procession ventured to greet him in their acclamations with the title of king. Caesar deprecated this salutation, saying: "I am not king, but Caesar." The same tribunes, Marullus and Caesetius, caused the man who had first raised this shout to be brought before their tribunal. Caesar could no longer conceal his anger at the interference of the tribunes. He laid an accusation against them before the senate. Some of the senators were in favor of inflicting the death penalty on them, but Caesar, through the instrumentality of Helvius Cinna, their colleague, deprived them of their office by a vote of the assembly, and, by virtue of his powers as censor, he removed them from the senate,⁶² new tribunes being chosen in their stead. Thus Caesar brought upon himself the odium of really desiring the kingly title and of being a tyrant.⁶³

But the senate with still greater zeal occupied itself with devising new honors for its lord and master. To soothe the irritation

⁶¹ Dio xlv. 9; App. ii. 108; Suet. *Iul.* 79; Vell. ii. 68. 4.

⁶² Dio xlv. 10; App. ii. 108; Suet. *Iul.* 79, 80; Vell. ii. 68. 4, 5; Liv. *Epit.* 116; Nic. Dam. *Vit. Caes.* 20. The account of Dio, as Schelle (*Todeskampf der Römischen Republik*, pp. 2 ff.) has shown, is incorrect in stating that Caesar, though angered, refrained from taking action against the tribunes until they had issued an edict complaining of a lack of freedom in discharging the duties of their magistracy. For such an edict there would have been no motive whatever until Caesar had in some way manifested his displeasure. Schelle has also shown in the same connection that Nicolaus and Appian (ii. 122, 138) are in error in stating that the tribunes were banished. They probably went into voluntary exile.

⁶³ App. ii. 108.

caused by the tribunes in their zeal for the old order of things, the senate voted that Caesar be called *Pater Patriae*, and that this title should be indicated on coins; that his birthday should be a *dies feriatius*; that statues of him be set up in all the *municipia* and in all the temples of Rome, and that, in addition, there should be two statues of him placed upon the *rostra*, one adorned with the *corona civica* and the other with the *corona obsidionalis*; that a temple of Concord, on the ground that the people enjoyed peace through Caesar, should be erected in his honor, and that there should be an annual festival in reminder thereof.⁶⁴ Most of the business transacted by the senate during the months immediately preceding the Ides of March consisted in heaping upon the dictator honors that gradually raised him to the rank of a god.

He was authorized to construct a new *curia*.⁶⁵ For the *curia Hostilia*, rebuilt both by Sulla and by Sulla's son, had been demolished, apparently in order that room might be made for the temple of *Felicitas* erected by Lepidus, but really that the name of Sulla might not be preserved on such an important building, and that Caesar's name might be honored in its stead. By a decree of the senate, the month (*Quintilis*) in which he was born was called *Iulius*, and one of the tribes chosen by lot was likewise called *Iulia*. It was voted that Caesar be the sole censor for life; that his person should be sacrosanct and inviolable everywhere;⁶⁶ and that his own son, if any should be born to him, or his adopted son, should be *pontifex maximus*. Some time between the end of January and the 15th of February,⁶⁷ Caesar, after resigning his ten years' dictatorship, was made *dictator perpetuus*. Other honors were decreed to him as follows:⁶⁸ That he should have a golden throne (*sella aurea*), the *vestis regia*, and a bodyguard of senators and knights; that public prayers should be annually offered in his behalf; that men should swear by his "Fortune;" and that all his acts should have the force of law.

But the senate's ingenuity was not yet exhausted. It decreed that to Caesar, as to a hero, *ludi quinquennales* should be celebrated; that at the *Lupercalia* another *sodalitas* of *Luperci* should be added to the *Fabiani* and the *Quintiliani*, which should be called *Luperci Iuliani*; and that in all gladiatorial games in Rome or elsewhere

⁶⁴ Dio xliv. 4. 4, 5.

⁶⁵ Dio xliv. 5.

⁶⁶ Nic. Dam. 22; App. ii. 106, etc. Cf. Lange. III. p. 470.

⁶⁷ C. I. L., I², 38, 40; Phil. ii. 87.

⁶⁸ Dio xliv. 6.

in Italy one day should be consecrated to Caesar. When he showed his gratification at these honors,⁶⁹ the senate decreed him a *sella aurea* in the theaters,⁷⁰ a crown of gold set with jewels like those of the gods,⁷¹ and a *tensa* of ivory in the processions of the *ludi circenses*.

We are told that, owing to the confidence produced in Caesar by these extraordinary distinctions, he did not accept the body-guard of senators and knights which had been voted to him, and even diminished the Spanish guard which had hitherto attended him.⁷² On the 15th of February, the occasion of the *Lupercalia*, as on the previous day, the auspices were taken and found unfavorable.⁷³ Caesar was said to have reached such a pitch of arrogance⁷⁴ that on the announcement that the omens were unpropitious he remarked: "They will be more propitious when I will it; and even if a beast does not have a heart, it ought not to be considered a sign of coming evil." Thus Suetonius represents Caesar as showing a haughty disdain, not only for the political traditions of the Romans, but for their religious rites as well. All of our sources give us some account of what happened on this *Lupercalia*. In the main features of the occurrence they all agree. Caesar in royal robe sat upon the *rostra* on his *sella aurea* and watched the procession of the *Luperci* as they entered the Forum. Antonius, naked and anointed according to the custom of the *Luperci*, placed upon Caesar's head an ivy-wreathed diadem. Caesar cast it from him. Antonius placed it on his head again and again. Caesar refused to accept this token of kingship and sent it to the Capitol for the statue of Jove. The people applauded his apparent self-denial. Both Dio⁷⁵ and Cicero⁷⁶ inform us that he had it recorded in the *Fasti* that M. Antonius at the bidding of the people had offered him the royal power, and that he had refused to accept it. Why Caesar thought it worth while to concoct the falsehood that Antonius did this *populi iussu*, it is hard to see. "For this," says Dio, "he was suspected of having acted with premeditation and of having desired the name of king, but of wishing to have it thrust upon him. And so he was cordially hated." Schmidt has hardly succeeded in showing that the account of Nicolaus of Damascus, who tells of this incident in greater detail

⁶⁹ Dio xliv. 6. 3.

⁷⁰ Cf. Suet. *Iul.* 76, *suggestum in orchestra*.

⁷¹ Flor. ii. 13 (iv. 2). 91.

⁷² So says Suetonius.

⁷³ Cic. *De divin.* I. 119; Val. Max. viii. 11. 2.

⁷⁴ Suet. *Iul.* 77.

⁷⁵ Dio xliv. 11. 3.

⁷⁶ Cic. *Phil.* ii. 87.

than any other author,⁷⁷ is the true one.⁷⁸ It is difficult to believe that there were, as Nicolaus asserts, many who really wished Caesar to become king.⁷⁹ In fact, from Cicero and Plutarch we get a contrary impression. Cicero says that when Antonius showed the diadem there was a groan throughout the Forum (*gemitus toto foro*). Plutarch⁸⁰ has it that there was slight applause, which had been planned beforehand. Again, Nicolaus fails to mention the fact that Caesar had the incident recorded in the *Fasti*. He evidently considered this act little creditable to the great man.

In the consular elections which occurred soon after the *Lupercalia*, a goodly number of votes, probably in consequence of what was done on that day, were cast for the former tribunes, Caesetius and Marullus.⁸¹ Nicolaus⁸² tells us that L. Cornelius Cinna, a praetor, with the consent of Caesar, had already secured the passage of a law for the return of these tribunes and for the restoration of their right to hold office. But, as Schelle⁸³ has shown, there would have been no point in the people's voting for these tribunes to spite Caesar, after such magnanimity toward them as Nicolaus would ascribe to him.

Not long after this election came the climax in that long and wearisome list of distinctions⁸⁴ which were voted to Caesar. It was enacted that he should be called *Divus*, that a temple should be consecrated to Caesar and his Clemency, and that Antonius should be *flamen Caesaris*. And what, says Dio, especially showed the purpose of the senators, at the same time that they voted these things, they enacted that a tomb be made for him within the *Pomerium*, and that the decrees in his honor be inscribed in gilt letters upon silver columns.

Helvius Cinna, a tribune of the *plebs*, acknowledged, we hope with shame, that he had drafted a motion which Caesar had bidden him to introduce in his absence, to the effect that the dictator, in order that he might have children of his own, might lawfully marry whomsoever he chose.⁸⁵ But this motion was never introduced. These extraordinary distinctions were usually voted to Caesar in

⁷⁷ Nic. Dam. 21.

⁷⁸ O. E. Schmidt, "Die letzten Kämpfe der Römischen Republik," *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, Supplbd. 13, pp. 674 ff.

⁷⁹ Nic. Dam. *loc. cit.*: πολλοῖς δ' ἦν καὶ βουλομένοις βασιλέα αὐτὸν ἀναμφιλόγως γενέσθαι.

⁸⁰ Plut. *Caes.* 61.

⁸³ Schelle, pp. 3 f.

⁸¹ Suet. *Iul.* 80; Dio xlv. 11. 4; Nic. Dam. 22.

⁸⁴ Dio xlv. 6. 4, 7. 1.

⁸² Nic. Dam. 22.

⁸⁵ Suet. *Iul.* 52; Dio xlv. 7. 3.

his absence, in order that they might seem the free-will offerings of the senators.⁸⁶ On one occasion, probably when the last and highest honors were bestowed on him, the senate, led by the consul Antonius and the other magistrates and followed by the people, proceeded in a body to make known to Caesar its extravagant decrees.⁸⁷ Caesar at the time was seated in the *pronaos* of the Temple of Venus engaged in making contracts with the architects for his new Forum. When the procession approached, consisting as it did of the leading men of Rome, Caesar feigned not to notice it, but, keeping his seat, went on with his work. Not until one of his friends called his attention to the presence of these dignitaries of the state, did he give them an audience; and then he showed his contempt for the representatives of the Roman people by refusing to rise from his seat to receive them. Both the senate and the people went away indignant at the insult.⁸⁸ Various excuses were offered for this show of pride on the part of Caesar, but they failed to satisfy then as they do now.⁸⁹

It is worth while to inquire how far the opposition to Caesar—for that there was a party of opposition to him we have seen reflected in the letters of Cicero and elsewhere—shared in the responsibility for the decrees with which the senate endeavored to satiate his ambition and gratify his vanity. If we are to believe Plutarch,⁹⁰ Cicero was the author of the first decrees conferring on Caesar distinctions of a human sort. Others in emulation carried these to excess and made Caesar an object of hatred even to moderate men. His enemies, says Plutarch, are thought to have had no less a share in this than his flatterers. Their object was to secure as many pretexts and grounds of accusation as possible against him. Dio hints at similar motives on the part of his enemies.⁹¹ And Nicolaus⁹² is quite positive in his statement that some welcomed these extravagant honors to Caesar and published them abroad that they might excite envy and suspicion, and that Caesar, simple and guileless (!) as he was, fell into the trap which had been set for him. Antonius, in his letter to Hirtius and Octavianus,⁹³ accuses

⁸⁶ Dio xlv. 8. 2.

⁸⁷ Nic. Dam. 22; Dio xlv. 8.

⁸⁸ Cf. with Nicolaus and Dio, Suet. *Iul.* 78; Liv. *Epit.* 116; App. ii. 107.

⁸⁹ Plut. *Caes.* 60 and Dio xlv. 8. 8. mention illness as one. But Dio informs us that he afterward walked home, thus invalidating this plea. Again Plutarch and Suetonius (*Iul.* 78) mention a story to the effect that Caesar was restrained by Cornelius Balbus when he was on the point of rising. But Jullien (*De Balbo Maiore*, p. 127) has vindicated Balbus from the charge of such ineptitude.

⁹⁰ Plut. *Caes.* 57.

⁹¹ Dio xlv. 3. 1.

⁹² Nic. Dam. 20.

⁹³ *Phil.* xiii. 40.

Cicero of having boasted that Caesar had been deceived by these distinctions. And Cicero himself says that the senators of the opposition used to be present in the senate under the tyranny of Caesar.⁹⁴ But there is no evidence that those who had a part in putting Caesar to death were responsible for the measures which tended to make him an object of ridicule and hatred to the people. Indeed, we are told by Dio⁹⁵ that Cassius and some others became conspicuous because they did not vote for decrees to exalt Caesar. These "others" were in all probability those who became the associates of Cassius on the Ides of March. The prime mover in all these measures was, at least in the year 44 B. C., when they were multiplied to excess, the consul Antonius, who in the absence of Caesar was the presiding officer of the senate. It is expressly stated that M. Antonius proposed the law changing the name of the seventh month from *Quintilis* to *Iulius* because it was the time of Caesar's birth.⁹⁶ Again, it was Antonius who proposed that the fifth day in the *ludi circenses* should be consecrated to Caesar.⁹⁷ No one of the conspirators is named as the author of any of the decrees above mentioned. In the absence of direct testimony, and in view of the facts just cited, it would seem that the extraordinary titles and honors voted to Caesar were conceived in the brains of corrupt politicians like Antonius and Dolabella, men who were greater enemies of the dictator than the conspirators themselves. The latter probably made no very vigorous protest against the acts of the senate, and that is about all that can be alleged against them.

We come now to consider the origin of the conspiracy that resulted in the death of Caesar. We have seen that the dictator, notwithstanding the mildness of his rule, had on more than one occasion given deep offense to the conservative elements in Roman society and politics. Indeed, had he made a studied effort to do so, he could not have succeeded better in making himself unpopular, not only with the senate, but with many of the people as well. The consequence was that a large part of the senate—perhaps, a majority of that body—and a considerable element among the people came to look upon Caesar as a tyrant, an aspirant for the title as well as the power of a king, and an enemy to republican institutions. That the senate viewed him with no friendly eye

⁹⁴ *Phil.* xiii. 18.

⁹⁵ *Dio* xlv. 8. 1.

⁹⁶ *Macrob. Sat.* i. 12. 34.

⁹⁷ *Phil.* ii. 110.

we know from their silent acquiescence in his death;⁹⁸ and the comparative complacency with which the people contemplated that tragedy was changed to anger only by the sensational *laudatio funebris* of Antonius. It would be nothing short of folly to assume that sixty or even eighty men constituted the entire opposition to Caesar. It would be nearer the truth to say that all those who were opposed to monarchy were in a state of passive opposition to the dictator, and that out of this passive opposition was developed among a few individuals an active agitation against the would-be king and tyrant. This agitation took shape in a definite plan of action—a plan of action that was suggested, and in a measure justified, by historical precedents.

Men naturally recalled the fate of those who according to tradition had aspired to kingly power. They remembered how Spurius Maelius nearly four hundred years before, because he was accused of designing to make himself king, had been slain by Servilius Ahala, the *magister equitum*, acting under the authority of Cincinnatus who had been illegally appointed dictator. Yet this "judicial murder"⁹⁹ had been sanctioned by the people of that time and by posterity on the plea of the terrible nature of the accusation.¹⁰⁰ Again, a mob of senators, knights, and plebeians, led by P. Scipio Nasica, attacked and killed Tiberius Gracchus with three hundred of his friends.¹⁰¹ This violence too was approved at the time and afterward by a large party in the state, the senate legalizing the death of Gracchus by voting him a public enemy (*hostis*).¹⁰² Scipio Aemilianus expressed the opinion of the Optimate party when he said that Tiberius was justly slain, if his intention had been to gain control of the state.¹⁰³ The death of Gaius Gracchus¹⁰⁴ and of two hundred and fifty of his adherents was also compassed by an illegal *senatus consultum ultimum*, giving the consul Opimius the *imperium sine provocazione*.¹⁰⁵ The acquittal of Opimius when he was brought to trial, *quod indemnatos civis in carcerem coniecis-*

⁹⁸ Cic. *De divin.* ii. 23.

⁹⁹ Mommsen, *History of Rome*, I, p. 378.

¹⁰⁰ Liv. iv. 13, 14, 15; cf. Liv. iii. 55. 5. By the Valerio-Horatian law: *Ne quis ullum magistratum sine provocazione crearet*. Cf. Festus, p. 198. Cicero mentions other precedents (*Phil.* ii. 114): *Sp. Cascius, Sp. Maelius, M. Manlius propter suspicionem regni appetendi sunt necati*. Cf. ii. 87.

¹⁰¹ Vell. ii. 3; Plut. *Ti. Gracch.* 19.

¹⁰² Val. Max. iv. 7. 1.

¹⁰³ Cic. *Pro Milone*, 8; Vell. ii. 4. 4; Sall. *Iug.* 31. 7: *Occiso Ti. Graccho quem regnum parare aiebant*.

¹⁰⁴ Orosius v. 12; Liv. *Epit.* 61.

¹⁰⁵ Cic. *Pro Rab. perd.* 12; *Cat.* iv. 10; i. 4.

set,¹⁰⁶ gave legal sanction to the death of Gaius Gracchus and his followers. There is no doubt that the prejudice caused by the suspicion that Gaius was aiming to secure the regal power was the excuse for the failure to condemn those who slew him.

Saturninus and Glaucia were the next to suffer a violent death for usurpation. In their case the action of their fellow-magistrates and the nobility under the authority of the *senatus consultum ultimum* was justified only by the precedent established in 121.¹⁰⁷ But the democratic party probably did not admit that these men came by their deaths in a constitutional manner.¹⁰⁸ Indeed there was no strictly legal justification for any of these acts of violence. The only reasonable plea that the senatorial party, which was responsible for them, could make, was that they were done for the security of the state.¹⁰⁹ Yet they were not only approved of in after-times, but they were considered among the glorious achievements of the Optimate party.¹¹⁰ Thus a sentiment grew up among the members of that party that the slaying of a dangerous citizen was under certain circumstances not only just, but also necessary and highly commendable.¹¹¹ It was on this principle that the senate, at the suggestion of Cicero, exceeded its constitutional powers in having the adherents of Catiline strangled. On this plea Cicero undertook to justify Milo for the killing of Clodius. The removal of a political opponent, who was suspected of aspiring to be a king, by mob violence or by judicial murder was a traditional policy of the Optimate party. Hence this method of ridding the state of Caesar readily suggested itself to a few leaders of that party; and, though they would have to proceed in his case without any pretense to legality, yet they felt that, in view of Caesar's extravagant usurpations and his manifest desire of kingly power, their action would meet the hearty approval, not only of the men of their own time, but of posterity as well.

It would be a mistake to judge the conduct of men who lived two thousand years ago by the ethical standards that prevail in

¹⁰⁶ Liv. *Epit.* 61.

¹⁰⁷ Willems, *Le Sénat de la République romaine*, Vol. II, pp. 247 ff.

¹⁰⁸ For the democratic view *vide* Sall. *Iug.* 31, 42.

¹⁰⁹ Cic. *De orat.* ii. 106; cf. Willems, *Le Sénat, etc.*, Vol. II, p. 267, and Cic. *De legg.* iii. 8: *Salus populi suprema lex esto.*

¹¹⁰ Cic. *De lege Agr.* ii. 10; *Pro Milone* 83.

¹¹¹ Cauer, *Ciceros politisches Denken*, pp. 115 ff.

our time, just as it would be a mistake to expect their actions to square with the political philosophy that is the product of the last twenty centuries. We have seen that a large and respectable party among the Romans looked upon assassination and mob violence under certain circumstances as essential to the very existence of the state, and therefore highly commendable. Hence it was that Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, could suggest that Marcus Brutus should resist by violence the tyranny of Caesar, and could cite as precedents for such an act the example of the elder Brutus who exiled the Tarquins, and of Gaius Servilius Ahala who slew the would-be king,¹¹² Spurius Maelius.

The assassination of Caesar was therefore planned as a *coup d'état* by the younger leaders of the Optimate party. There is good reason for believing, as I have endeavored to show, that Decimus Brutus was a member of that party; and his distinguished military services doubtless gave him prominence in the counsels of its leaders. Consequently, the friendship¹¹³ between Caesar and Decimus did not deter Pacuvius Antistius Labeo and Gaius Cassius Longinus from sounding him on the subject of the plot against Caesar. And here it is worth while to mention the manifestly erroneous impression conveyed by Plutarch when he intimates that Decimus was not an active or courageous man, and that his value to the conspiracy was due to the fact that he had a troop of gladiators which he was training for exhibition, and to the circumstance that he enjoyed the confidence of Caesar. It is hardly necessary to say that this irrelevant reflection upon the courage of Decimus Brutus, probably found by Plutarch in some highly prejudiced source, is shown to be baseless, not only by the previous career of Decimus but also by his subsequent history.¹¹⁴ Plutarch goes on to tell us that Decimus made no reply to Cassius and Labeo, but that, on meeting M. Brutus privately and learning that he was the leader in the undertaking, he readily agreed to co-operate with him. But there must have been other considerations besides the influence of Marcus Brutus that prompted Decimus to join the conspirators. We know from Orosius¹¹⁵ that the grandfather of Decimus Brutus with a large following of men had taken part in

¹¹² *Att.* xiii. 40. 1.

¹¹³ *Plut. Brut.* 12.

¹¹⁴ *Plut. Brut.* 12. And yet M. Paulus accepts the statement of Plutarch and seeks to justify it by subsequent events, with how much reason we shall see.

¹¹⁵ *Orosius* v. 12.

the riot which culminated in the death of Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus, and that his father had joined the consuls and other magistrates in the attack upon Saturninus and Glaucia.¹¹⁶ Such appeals as were made to the other Brutus on the score of the reputation of his ancestry¹¹⁷ must have been no less cogent in leading Decimus to take part in putting Caesar to death. For he probably had as just a claim as Marcus to the distinction of being a descendant of the first republican consul, Lucius Brutus, who was instrumental in the expulsion of the Tarquins.¹¹⁸ His immediate ancestors on his father's side for three generations had been consistently in opposition to the alleged usurpations of democratic leaders, and he had been adopted into a family which was equally famous in the struggle against the kings, and which had furnished many prominent men to the Optimate party. The writers of Roman history whom Plutarch, Appian, and Cassius Dio followed and copied were bent on heaping obloquy upon Decimus Brutus for joining the conspirators against Caesar, but they do not assign any motive whatsoever for Decimus' conduct. Had he been controlled by selfish considerations, we certainly should have some inkling of the fact from the many sources that have come down to us. The cousin of Tiberius Gracchus had led the mob of gentlemen who put that leader to death, and Scipio Aemilianus, his brother-in-law and friend, after, Tiberius had been murdered, expressed a qualified approval of the deed.¹¹⁹ The conduct of Decimus Brutus in entering a conspiracy against his friend¹²⁰ Caesar is perhaps a little easier to understand in the light of these precedents. But to undertake absolutely to justify that conduct in the light of modern ethical conceptions would be futile and is far from my purpose. And so I have attempted to present his act in the light in which he himself viewed it, and to show that he is not the arch-traitor he is pictured in the pages of such writers as Froude.

Our sources all agree that Decimus Brutus was one of the leaders of the conspirators.¹²¹ His name is generally mentioned after those

¹¹⁶ Cic. *Pro Rabir. perd.* 21.

¹¹⁷ Plut. *Brut.* 9; App. ii. 112; Dio xlv. 12; Nic. Dam. 19: πολλά δ' ἐξώτρυνε καὶ ἡ ἐκ παλαιοῦ Βρούτοις ὑπόστα εὐκλεια τῶν προγόνων τοῦς ἀπὸ Ῥωμύλου Βασιλεῖς τῆς Ῥώμης καταλειυκτότων καὶ δημοκρατίαν πῶτον καταστησαμένων.

¹¹⁸ Nicolaus (19) states expressly that this was the motive influencing both the *Bruti*.

¹¹⁹ Vell. ii. 3. 1, 4, 4; Cic. *De amicis.* 101.

¹²⁰ Vell. ii. 64. 2 says that Decimus was *primus omnium amicorum*.

¹²¹ Suet. *Iul.* 80; Vell. ii. 58. 1, 2; App. *B. C.* ii. 111; Dio xlv. 14. 3; Plut. *Caes.* 64, *Brut.* 12; Nic. Dam. 19.

of Brutus and Cassius. But Nicolaus Damascenus, who, living as he did nearer in time to the death of Caesar than any other of our extant sources, probably had a truer conception of the importance of Decimus Brutus, places his name first, not because the idea of the conspiracy originated with him, but because he was the most considerable figure in it.

The death of Caesar was decided on some time before it was effected.¹²² There was some debate among the conspirators as to the proper time and place. They deliberated whether to slay him while he was holding the centuriate *comitia* in the *Campus Martius* for the election of magistrates, or as he was walking along the *via sacra*, which it was his frequent custom to do, or at the entrance of the theater at the time of some gladiatorial exhibition.¹²³ The activity at Rome in preparation for Caesar's Parthian expedition and the popular interest aroused by that undertaking were peculiarly favorable to the conspirators for perfecting their plans. A meeting of the senate on the Ides of March, four days before Caesar's intended departure from Rome, was announced to take place in the *curia* of Pompey.¹²⁴ There was a rumor current that at this meeting Lucius Cotta, one of the *quindecemviri*, in accordance with a prophecy contained in the Sibylline books to the effect that the Parthians could be conquered only by a king, was going to propose that Caesar be made king of the Roman dominions outside of Italy.¹²⁵ So the conspirators were not slow to decide on this as an auspicious place and occasion for their deed. The approaching departure of Caesar to the East and the probability that he would return thence with new conquests to his credit, thereby rendering his kingly ambitions more tolerable to the people, made the conspirators anxious to accomplish their plan as soon as possible. Another consideration that influenced them to select the time and place they did, was the fact that the gladiators of Decimus Brutus were to give an exhibition on the Ides in the theater that adjoined the *curia*.¹²⁶

¹²² Krueger (p. 33 and note), following the order of events in Nic. Dam., thinks the conspiracy was started about the middle of January. But Trebonius had proposed the assassination of Caesar to Antonius in the previous year at Narbo (*vide* Plut. *Ant.* 13 and Cic. *Phil.* ii. 34, 75). This was probably in the early part of the year 45, when Antonius was ostensibly on his way to join Caesar in Spain to take part in the campaign against the sons of Pompey, and not when Antonius went to meet Caesar on the latter's return from Spain as Drumann (Groebe) following Plutarch would have us believe (Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*, I, p. 55).

¹²³ Suet. *Iul.* 80; Nic. Dam. 23.

¹²⁴ Suet. *Iul.* 80; App. ii. 110, 111.

¹²⁵ Suet. *Iul.* 70; App. ii. 110; Cic. *De divin.* ii. 110; Plut. *Caes.* 60.

¹²⁶ Dio xliv. 16. 2.

On the evening of March 14 there was a state dinner at the house of Lepidus, Caesar's *magister equitum*, to which, according to Appian, Caesar had invited Decimus Brutus.¹²⁷ Paulus¹²⁸ has made use of this incident to show that Decimus was at this time living on terms of intimacy with Caesar, while at the same time he was a participant in the counsels of the conspirators. But this was a state dinner in honor of Caesar, and it is probable that many others of the *tyrannoctoni* besides Decimus Brutus were present.¹²⁹ At any rate, Decimus could not very well have absented himself since the dictator had bidden him.

At dawn on the following day the senate assembled and sent word to Caesar that it was ready for business.¹³⁰ Caesar had spent a bad night and was unwell. The omens and auspices were unfavorable. His friends, his physicians, and his wife Calpurnia entreated him not to go out that day, but to adjourn the sitting of the senate.¹³¹ So Caesar was detained. To the dismay of the conspirators the rumor came that he would remain at home that day.¹³² The conspirators delegated Decimus Brutus, in view of Caesar's friendship for him, to go and use his good offices to induce the dictator to come to the senate house.¹³³ Caesar had already made up his mind to send Antonius to dismiss the senate.¹³⁴ Decimus urged him not to heed the dreams of a woman and the prophecies of foolish men and by remaining at home insult the senate,¹³⁵ a full meeting of which had assembled at his bidding and had long been awaiting his coming.¹³⁶ Decimus is also said by Plutarch¹³⁷ to have assured him that the senate was ready unanimously to vote that he be proclaimed king of the provinces outside of Italy, and that he might wear a diadem elsewhere than in Italy.¹³⁸ Plutarch represents Decimus as appealing also to Caesar's dislike of criticism by suggesting that, if he dismissed the senate then and bade it assemble again when Calpurnia should have better dreams, even

¹²⁷ App. ii. 115; Suet. *Iul.* 87; Plut. *Caes.* 63.

¹²⁸ Paulus, *De Decimo*, etc., p. 8, n. 2.

¹²⁹ For an entertaining account of this dinner, *vide* Willenbücher, *Caesar's Ermordung*, pp. 41 ff.

¹³⁰ Dio xlv. 16. 2.

¹³¹ Nic. Dam. 23; Dio. xlv. 17; Plut. *Caes.* 63.

¹³² Dio xlv. 18. 1.

¹³³ Dio xlv. 18. 1; Nic. Dam. 23; App. *B. C.* ii. 115; Suet. *Iul.* 81; Plut. *Caes.* 64.

¹³⁴ Plut. *Caes.* 63.

¹³⁵ Nic. Dam. 23.

¹³⁶ Suet. *Iul.* 81.

¹³⁷ Plut. *Caes.* 64.

¹³⁸ Willenbücher (p. 53, n. 2), assuming the correctness of Plutarch's narrative, thinks that Caesar did not wish to let the opportunity slip of officially declining the crown before the senate also. Strange in so strong a character as Caesar's, this desire to parade a pretended virtue!

his friends could not defend him against the imputation of tyranny. By such arguments, if we are to believe Plutarch, Decimus Brutus led Caesar to his death. It was already about eleven o'clock in the morning when Caesar in his litter, attended by Decimus Brutus, Antonius, and a throng of people, set out for the senate house.¹³⁹ On his arrival there the usual sacrifices, preliminary to his entering the chamber, were made, but the omens were unfavorable. Many victims were slain at Caesar's bidding, yet no propitious sign could be obtained.¹⁴⁰ The dictator, owing to the entreaties of some of his friends, was again on the point of ordering the sitting of the senate adjourned to another day, when Decimus Brutus a second time intervened, urging him to disregard the warnings of the priests and not to postpone those acts which concerned him and his power, but to consider his own valor an augury of good.¹⁴¹ Thus prevailing on him, Decimus, according to Nicolaus, led him by the hand into the *curia*.¹⁴²

Decimus Brutus seems to have had no part in the actual slaying of Caesar. The testimony of Nicolaus¹⁴³ is as follows: "Decimus Brutus pierces him under the ribs. Cassius Longinus, hastening to give him another blow, misses his aim, and strikes the hand of Marcus Brutus." Paulus has shown that, by an error of Nicolaus or by a slip of the copyist, Δέκμος was written here for Μάρκος. For the person who pierced Caesar under the ribs and he whose hand was struck were the same, as the context shows. Again Appian says explicitly: "Brutus smote him in the thigh."¹⁴⁴ That he meant Marcus Brutus is shown by another passage in which he says: "Cassius and Brutus [Marcus, from the context] at the same time inflicted wounds upon him."¹⁴⁵ Similar is the testimony of Plutarch, who says: "Brutus [i. e., Marcus] inflicted a wound upon him in the groin."¹⁴⁶ Since in no other source do we find mention

¹³⁹ Suet. *Iul.* 81; Plut. *Caes.* 63, 64.

¹⁴⁰ Suet. *Iul.* 81; App. ii. 116; Nic. Dam. 24; Plut. *Brut.* 16.

¹⁴¹ Nic. Dam., *loc. cit.*; Appian (*loc. cit.*) has a similar account of Caesar's hesitation, but does not mention D. Brutus. Cf. Plut. *Brut.* 16.

¹⁴² This meeting-place of the senate, the *curia Pompeia*, was an *exedra* of the *Porticus Pompeia* which was connected with the *scena* of the theater of Pompeius. This group of buildings was erected by Pompeius in the year 55. Cf. Richter, *Topographie von Rom*, pp. 227 ff.

¹⁴³ Nic. Dam. 24: μικρὸν δὲ Κάσσιος ὑποφθὰς εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον ἐγκαρσίαν αὐτῷ πληγὴν δίδωσι· Δέκμος δὲ Βρούτος ὑπὸ ταῖς λαγύσι διαμπερὲς παίει. Κάσσιος δὲ Λογγίνος ἐτέραν ἐπεκδοῦναι πληγὴν σπεύδων, τοῦ μὲν ἀμαρτάνει, τυγχάνει δὲ τῆς Μάρκου Βρούτου χειρὸς.

¹⁴⁴ App. ii. 117: Βρούτος ἐς τὸν μηρὸν (ἐπληξε).

¹⁴⁵ App. ii. 122.

¹⁴⁶ Plut. *Caes.* 66.

of Decimus, it is safe to conclude with Paulus that he was not in the senate house at the time, but that, after going in with Caesar, he had retired to his gladiators whom he had ordered to be in arms in a covered walk¹⁴⁷ of the portico somewhere between the *curia* and the theater of Pompeius. They were there ostensibly to seize a gladiator, who was expected to enter the theater at that time with another troop, but who had previously hired himself to Decimus. Decimus also pretended that he was going to give games in a contest with a man who was then giving an exhibition. But in reality his gladiators were there in order to be able to render immediate aid in case the *liberatores* should meet with any opposition from the senators or others in their attack upon Caesar.¹⁴⁸ When the deed had been done, the gladiators under the command of Decimus hurried to the *curia*.¹⁴⁹ But they were not needed there. For in that full meeting of the senate, made up in large part of those who were members by Caesar's favor, no one raised a hand in defense of the struggling victim or dared to utter a word in protest against his assassination. One would think that there would have been at least one man in that large company ready to die with his master. But amazement and horror held them motionless.¹⁵⁰ Manifestations of loyalty there were none, except in the persons of Gaius Calvisius Sabinus and Lucius Marcius Censorinus,¹⁵¹ who probably after Caesar had been slain made a show of fight and resistance, but only for a moment. When M. Brutus turned to address the senate, and, raising aloft his dagger, called Cicero by name and congratulated him on the recovery of liberty, the members would not stay to hear, but fled precipitately and by their flight filled the people with confusion and alarm.¹⁵² For there was a multitude outside the *curia*, a crowd of citizens and strangers, freedmen and slaves, who but a little while before had followed in the train of Caesar.¹⁵³ These, also stricken with fear, fled in tumult and con-

¹⁴⁷ Nic. Dam. 26; Dio xlv. 16. 2.¹⁴⁸ Nic. Dam. 26.¹⁴⁹ App. ii. 118: ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου διέθεον ἐς τὰ τοῦ βουλευτηρίου παραφράγματα. Appian probably is incorrect in saying that the gladiators ran from the theater. The account of Nicolaus is more detailed (cf. Nic. 25) and probably more accurate. He tells us that some of the people in the theater thought that the gladiators had done the deed. Therefore the gladiators could not have been in the theater at the time. But it is not a matter of great importance, and Nicolaus' account is at least consistent and is supported by that of Dio xlv. 16. 2.¹⁵⁰ Plut. *Caes.* 66, 67; Cic. *De divin.* ii. 23.¹⁵¹ Nic. Dam. 26.¹⁵² Plut. *Caes.* 67; *Brut.* 18; Dio. xlv. 20. 1, 4; Suet. *Iul.* 82; App. ii. 118; Cic. *Phil.* ii. 28.¹⁵³ App. ii. 118.

fusion. The people rushed out of the theater, not understanding what had happened, and, alarmed by the cries that seemed to come from every quarter,¹⁵⁴ ran to their houses and shops and locked themselves in.¹⁵⁵ Among those that fled was Antonius, who, while the deed was being done, had been detained at the door of the senate house by Trebonius,¹⁵⁶ and who, in the general confusion that followed, escaped unnoticed to his own house.¹⁵⁷

The indifference of the senators and even of the people affords conclusive proof of Cicero's words:¹⁵⁸ *Omnes ergo in culpa. Etenim omnes boni, quantum in ipsis fuit, Caesarem occiderunt: aliis consilium, aliis animus, aliis occasio defuit; voluntas nemini.* The guilt of Caesar's assassination must not be borne by Decimus and his coadjutors alone. A great part of the state, and the better part too, shared in his crime, if crime it was. The fact that the *liberatores* met their deaths within three years,¹⁵⁹ and that they failed utterly in their undertaking except that they made Augustus and Tiberius more cautious and more moderate than Caesar, does not prove that they were actuated by base motives.

When everybody else had fled, the conspirators, with their togas wrapped about their left arms as shields and with their bloody daggers in their hands, left the senate house, attended by the gladiators of Decimus Brutus, marched in a body to the Forum, and thence to the Capitol.¹⁶⁰ One of them carried a cap on a spear as an emblem of liberty. As they went they sought to allay the fears of

¹⁵⁴ App. ii. 118; Nic. Dam. 25; Dio xlv. 20. 1, 2.

¹⁵⁵ App. *loc. cit.*; Dio xlv. 20. 3; Nic. Dam. 26; Plut. *Caes.* 67.

¹⁵⁶ Dio xlv. 19. 3; Plut. *Brut.* 17; App. ii. 117; Cic. *Phil.* ii. 34.

¹⁵⁷ Cic. *Phil.* ii. 34; App. ii. 118; Dio xlv. 22. 2; Plut. *Ant.* 14, *Brut.* 18, *Caes.* 67. Appian's statement that some of the senators were wounded in the tumult and others killed, and that many citizens and strangers were also murdered, is undoubtedly false. For (1) it was the express purpose of the *liberatores* to slay no one but Caesar; cf. Nic. Dam. 25; (2) there would be no reason for killing people who were fleeing from them; (3) no other source gives any such information; indeed, Dio (xlv. 20. 4, 21. 2) states expressly that no one was murdered or even harmed. Cf. Plut. *Brut.* 18.

¹⁵⁸ Cic. *Phil.* ii. 29; Boissier, *Cicero and His Friends*, p. 301.

¹⁵⁹ Suet. *Iul.* 89.

¹⁶⁰ Nicolaus (C. 25) says: *ἐξαίαντες δὴ τὸν τεύθεν οἱ σφαγεῖς ἔφευγον θέοντες διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον.* But the testimony of Plutarch (*Caes.* 67) contradicts Nicolaus' statement as to the manner in which they proceeded: *οἱ δὲ περὶ Βρούτου . . . ἐχώρον εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον οὐ φεύγουσιν εὐκότες, κ. τ. λ.* Plutarch's evidence on this point is borne out by the account of Dio (xlv. 20, 21). Nor does Appian (ii. 119) give one the impression that the conspirators "fled in a run." Of course, they were under the strain of suppressed excitement. But their object was to allay the fears of the people. Is it conceivable that they would run as if in flight when they affected above everything else a show of confidence (*μάλα φαιδοὶ καὶ θαρραλεοί*, says Plutarch)—especially when there was no immediate danger to run from? Again, Nicolaus gives contradictory evidence. He states that, owing to their ignorance of what had happened, there was a tumult among the people until they saw the murderers and *Μάρκον Βρούτου παύοντα τὸν θορύβον . . . ὡς οὐδενὸς κακοῦ γεγονότος.* Cf. Plut. *Brut.* 18.

the people, proclaimed that they had slain a king and tyrant, and called the people to their ancestral liberty. They halted in the Forum,¹⁶¹ and, to a crowd that had gathered about them there, they spoke against Caesar and in behalf of popular rule, saying that they had not slain him from selfish motives, but in order that the people might be free and self-governing. The people became quiet, but did not receive them with enthusiasm, and the conspirators, joined by some who had had no share in the deed, proceeded to the Capitol to pay their vows to the gods.¹⁶² When they had arrived there, they stationed guards at intervals around the place. For they feared Lepidus and his recently enrolled legion which was on the Tiber island, as well as the consul Antonius and the veterans of Caesar.¹⁶³

The conspirators had already gone up to the Capitol when three slaves bore Caesar's mangled corpse upon a litter from the *curia* through the Forum to his residence.¹⁶⁴

To the crowd that thronged the Forum, L. Cornelius Cinna, the praetor, appeared and in full view laid aside his official robe because it had been given him by a tyrant, and proceeded to address the people, calling Caesar a tyrant and his slayers *tyrannoctoni*. Glorifying their deed, he urged that they be summoned from the Capitol as benefactors and rewarded as such.¹⁶⁵ The speech of Cinna was probably too violent to meet the approval of the people. They showed no disposition to act on his suggestion. But when Publius Cornelius Dolabella, the young man who had been designated by

¹⁶¹ That the conspirators halted in the Forum and one or more of them addressed the people before going to the Capitol is expressly stated by Dio (xliv. 21. 1 ff.). Nor is the account of Dio contradicted, but rather confirmed, by Appian, who, as Müller has shown, gives a fragment of a speech then made. The truth is that the Forum was their first objective point when they started from the *curia*. There they would find the people to whom they were desirous of explaining their deed and whose approval they confidently expected to obtain. It was only when the people did not join them (τοῦ δήμου δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐ προσθέντος, ἠπὸρου καὶ ἐδεδοίκεσαν—App. ii. 119) that they proceeded to the Capitol. Hence the impression was produced that they fled thither.

¹⁶² Dio xliv. 21. 2. The names of those who joined the conspirators were, Lentulus Spinther, Favonius, M. Aquinus, Murcus, Patiscus, and Gaius Octavius. *Vide* Plut. *Caes.* 67. Appian (ii. 119) also mentions Dolabella in the list, but he probably went up to the Capitol later.

¹⁶³ App. ii. 118, 119; Dio xliv. 21. 2.

¹⁶⁴ Nic. Dam. 26; Suet. *Tul.* 82; App. ii. 118.

¹⁶⁵ App. ii. 121. Appian's charge in chaps. 120 and 121 that the conspirators bribed the multitude is not borne out by the other sources. This accusation must be ascribed to Appian's strong Caesarian bias. Krause (p. 5) shows that the mood of the people was not so hostile to the conspirators at that time.

Plutarch (*Brut.* 18) erroneously places Cinna's *contio* after the descent of the conspirators from the Capitol and after Brutus' speech. Appian's account of the order of these events is the correct one. For Plutarch's error in regard to Cinna *vide* Drumann (Groebe), II. p. 508, n. 10.

Caesar to succeed him in the consulship when he should leave for the Parthian expedition, appeared in the consul's dress and *insignia*,¹⁶⁶ and pretended to have been privy to the plot against Caesar and to have been absent from its execution against his will, then the conspirators were summoned from the Capitol by the people, and Brutus and Cassius went down to the Forum alone, according to Appian, accompanied by the gladiators of Decimus Brutus and by slaves, according to the account of Nicolaus of Damascus. Plutarch states that all the conspirators descended to the Forum.¹⁶⁷ It seems unlikely that the conspirators should have entirely deserted their stronghold, especially as the troops of Lepidus had probably by that time been posted in the Campus Martius¹⁶⁸ in the rear of the Capitoline Hill. How easy it would have been for Lepidus to occupy the Capitol during the absence of Marcus Brutus and his party! Again there was no such danger to Brutus and Cassius alone from the crowd in the Forum as modern writers think. For did not the people request them to come down,¹⁶⁹ and had not Dolabella with impunity just assailed Caesar? At any rate, both Brutus and Cassius addressed the people,¹⁷⁰ Brutus being the principal speaker. They were heard in respectful silence. Neither one, Appian tells us, assumed a humble tone, but spoke of what they had done as something confessedly noble. They praised one another, eulogized the city, and especially commended Decimus because he had furnished them with gladiators in good season.¹⁷¹ They also urged the people to imitate the deeds of their ancestors who had destroyed kings that did not rule by force as Caesar did, and to choose their magistrates in accordance with the laws. They advocated the recall of Sextus Pompeius and the tribunes, Caesetius and Marullus, who

¹⁶⁶ App. ii. 122. Dolabella's assumption of the consulship was on the afternoon of the Ides. For Dio (xliv. 22) places it before the occupation of the Forum by Lepidus with his troops which occurred during the night of the 15th-16th or on the early morning of the 16th. And Appian places it before the descent of the conspirators from the Capitol. It is little probable that the conspirators or their friends, real or pretended, appeared in the Forum on the 16th, when it was occupied by the hostile troops of Lepidus. How much more natural was it for Dolabella at that time to appear in favor of the conspirators, than afterward when popular opinion had been influenced against them by the active measures of Lepidus and Antonius.

¹⁶⁷ App. ii. 122; Nic. Dam. 26; Plut. *Caes.* 67, *Brut.* 18.

¹⁶⁸ App. ii. 118; Dio. xliv. 19. 2. ¹⁶⁹ Plut. *Brut.* 18; App. ii. 122.

¹⁷⁰ App., *loc. cit.*; Nic. Dam. 26; Plut. *Brut.*, *loc. cit.*, *Caes.* 67. As I have already stated, the descent of Brutus and Cassius from the Capitol and their speeches in the Forum must have occurred on the Ides. For so Nicolaus puts it (Schmidt, *Die letzten Kämpfe*, p. 681).

¹⁷¹ This is Appian's own reason why they praised Decimus. Brutus and Cassius would not have been so naïve as to give such a reason for commending their fellow-conspirator.

had gone into voluntary exile when they had been deprived of their office by Caesar,¹⁷²

After their speeches, which were probably not received with the enthusiasm they had anticipated, Brutus and Cassius, not feeling entire confidence in the existing state of affairs, returned to the Capitol.¹⁷³ In the evening the friends and relatives of the *liberatores*, and among them Dolabella, Cicero, and other *consulares* repaired to the Capitol.¹⁷⁴ There was probably a free discussion of the situation and of what was best to be done. Cicero urged with much vehemence that the praetors, Marcus Brutus and Cassius, immediately call the senate to meet in the Capitol.¹⁷⁵ Some one, probably, also advocated that the *liberatores* through their influence in the senate, of which they and their friends constituted a majority,¹⁷⁶ carry out the intention, which Suetonius¹⁷⁷ tells us they originally had, namely, to have a decree passed commanding Caesar's body to be thrown into the Tiber, his property confiscated, and his acts rescinded. But more moderate counsels prevailed. For the conspirators probably saw that, if the senate passed such an act, it would cause an immediate clash between themselves and their gladiators on one side, and the troops of Lepidus reinforced by the veterans of Caesar on the other. They hoped that the republic might be restored without resort to arms. They did not foresee that Roman society (especially the military element) at that time was too much subject to the corrupt influence of powerful and designing leaders for any such hope to be realized. So, instead of accepting Cicero's advice, they proposed to send commissioners to Antonius, the consul, and Lepidus, Caesar's *magister equitum*, with a view to the re-establishment of the republic. They wished Cicero to be one of these commissioners, but he refused owing to lack of confidence in M. Antonius.¹⁷⁸ Other *consulares*¹⁷⁹ then went to Antonius and Lepidus to treat with them on behalf of the *liberatores* for peace,

¹⁷² Schelle, *Todeskampff*, pp. 2-5; App. ii. 122. Fröhlich (*De rebus a Caesare occiso, etc.*, p. 57) puts the descent of Brutus and Cassius to the Forum on the Ides. It was certainly not on the 16th when Lepidus held the Forum.

¹⁷³ Nic. Dam. 27; App. ii. 123.

¹⁷⁴ App. ii. 123; Dio xlv. 22. 1; Cic. *Att.* xiv. 10. 1, *Phil.* ii. 89.

¹⁷⁵ Cic. *Att.*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁷⁶ App. ii. 124, 127.

¹⁷⁷ Suet. *Iul.* 83. Suetonius does not say that the conspirators intended that these acts be authorized by the senate. But his language certainly implies such a *senatus consultum* involving the *damnatio memoriae* of the dictator. Cf. Appian's account in chap. 127 of the debate in the senate on the 17th.

¹⁷⁸ Cic. *Phil.* ii. 89.

¹⁷⁹ Cic., *loc. cit.*

the safeguarding of freedom, and the avoidance of bloodshed.¹⁸⁰ One specific proposition they made as a basis of agreement, namely, that Caesar's appointments to office remain in force.¹⁸¹ They also invited Antonius and Lepidus up to the Capitol to discuss in person the matters proposed.¹⁸² Antonius and Lepidus postponed making their reply until the next day.¹⁸³ They wished to avenge Caesar, according to Appian, on account of friendship, the obligation of their oaths, or because of their own ambition to rule. They thought that all things would be easier for them, if so many powerful men should be removed at a single stroke. But they feared the friends and relatives of the conspirators and the senate, which was favorable to them, and especially did they fear Decimus Brutus, whom Caesar had chosen governor of Cisalpine Gaul, where there was a large army. They resolved to endeavor to attach this army to their own cause.¹⁸⁴ Their policy was delay, and this was especially true in the case of Antonius, who as yet had no military force at his back and who wished time to gain over the veterans of Caesar, many of whom were at that time in the city, having come to see Caesar off for the East.

We have assumed all along that Decimus Brutus had left the *curia* with the other conspirators and had remained with them up to the time when the commissioners returned from Antonius and Lepidus. On the next evening, however, the 16th, Decimus was no longer with his colleagues on the Capitol, but was somewhere else in the city, either at his home or in hiding. For on the morning of the 17th, if Schmidt's dating of the letter (*Fam.* xi. 1) is, as I believe, the correct one,¹⁸⁵ Decimus wrote to Marcus Brutus and Cassius, saying, among other things: *Heri vesperi apud me Hirtius fuit*. It remains for us to explain when and why he left them.

In this letter certain expressions occur which indicate that, wherever Decimus is, he is authorized to speak for his associates

¹⁸⁰ App. ii. 123.

¹⁸² Nic. Dam. 27.

¹⁸¹ Nic. Dam. 27.

¹⁸³ Echoed in *Fam.* xi. 1. 1. *Vide infra*.

¹⁸⁴ This is Appian's report (ii. 124) of the motives and aims of Antonius and Lepidus.

¹⁸⁵ Schmidt, "Correspondenz Ciceros seit Caesars Tode," *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1884, p. 334. This dating is accepted by Tyrell and Purser (*V*, p. 217) and Abbott, *Letters of Cicero*, p. 248. But Groebe (*Drumann, Anhang*, I, pp. 409 ff.) thinks that the letter was written on the morning of the 16th. The only objection that I can see to the dating of Schmidt is that there is no mention of the meeting of the senate that took place on the 17th and was in progress at the time Schmidt supposes Decimus to have written. But why should Decimus speak of that which the conspirators on the Capitol would know? The acts of Caesar had not yet been ratified. The senate had probably at that time come to no conclusion whatever in regard to the issue raised by the death of Caesar, and the debate was still in progress. The letter of Decimus

on the Capitol. In the first two sections he gives an account of an interview he has had with Hirtius. Hirtius had reported to him Antonius' disposition toward him and the rest—that it was the worst and most treacherous; Antonius had said that he could not give him (Decimus) a province, and did not think that any of the conspirators were safe in the city—so excited were the people and soldiers. “Both of these statements I think you understand are false,” continues Decimus, “and, as Hirtius showed, this is true, namely, that Antonius is afraid that, if we should obtain even a moderate support for our position, no part would be left for them to play in the state. Being in this difficult situation, I resolved to demand for myself and the rest of us a *legatio libera*, that some honorable excuse for leaving the city might be found.” The expression, *placitum est mihi ut postularem legationem liberam mihi reliquisque nostris*, shows that Decimus is treating with Hirtius, not only for himself, but also in behalf of his confederates. The letter continues: “Hirtius promised to secure for us a *legatio libera*, but I have no confidence that he will secure it, the general feeling is so overbearing and hostile to us; and if they do grant our request, I believe that, in spite of it, they will adjudge us enemies or sentence us to exile.” In view of his lack of confidence in Antonius and his party, Decimus suggests that they go into voluntary exile, and, if the situation improves, they will return to Rome; while, if the worst comes to the worst, they will have recourse to the last expedient, that is, civil war. But Decimus is against civil war save as a last resort. “Because,” he adds, “we have no rallying-point except Sextus Pompeius and Caecilius Bassus, who, I think, will be strengthened by the news about Caesar. It will be time enough to have recourse to them when we shall know how strong they are. If you and Cassius want me to make any agreement for you, I shall do so; for Hirtius demands this of me. Answer this as soon as possible, for I think

shows that Antonius was the power to be reckoned with; and probably when the senate met on the morning of the 17th, Antonius had not definitely decided whether to let Decimus have his province or not. Antonius was an opportunist and was going to make the best arrangement possible for himself. Again, is it likely that Antonius who had run away in mortal terror at midday and hid himself would have so far recovered his composure by evening as to assume the haughty attitude this letter ascribes to him? To put this letter, indicating as it does that the conspirators had been reduced to desperate straits, on the morning of the 16th is to contradict the testimony of Nicolaus 17: τῇ τε πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ δευτέρᾳ καταπεπλεγμένων ἐπὶ τῶν Καίσαρος φίλων, πολλοὺς αὐτοῖς προσέχειν, ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ ἐκ τῶν περιουκίδων πόλεων κληροῦχοι, οὓς ἐκεῖνος κατώκισε τε καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκατέστησεν, ἤκον παμπληθεῖς ὡς τοὺς περὶ Λέπιδον τὸν ἱπάρχην καὶ Ἀντωνίων τὸν συνύπατον Καίσαρος, ἐπεξίεναι αὐτοῦ τὸν φόνον ὑπὸ χιρνοῦμένους, σκεδασθῆναι τοὺς πολλούς.

Hirtius will inform me about these matters before nine o'clock; write me where we can meet and where you want me to come. After Hirtius' last talk, I have decided to ask that we be permitted to remain at Rome with a public guard. I don't think they will grant this, for we shall make them unpopular. However, I think I ought to demand everything that I consider fair."

It will be noticed that the sentence, *placitum est mihi postulare ut liceret nobis Romae esse publico praesidio*, also indicates that Decimus speaks as a representative of the conspirators as a body. *Pro Cassio et te, si quid me velitis recipere, recipiam* seems to point the other way. But the meaning here is: "If you and Cassius want me to make any specific agreement involving an obligation on your part, I shall do so, for this is what Hirtius demands." In other words, Decimus, who has friends among the Caesarians owing to his long military service with them, either on his own responsibility or at the suggestion of his confederates, had left the Capitol and gone out into the city to use his influence with his former comrades in arms to bring about an agreement between those who had slain Caesar, on the one hand, and Antonius and Lepidus, on the other. He was probably also to bring all the pressure he could to bear upon the members¹⁸⁶ of the senate to bring them into line with the aims and purposes of the *liberatores*; and he was, furthermore, to keep his friends upon the Capitol informed of the attitude of the people.¹⁸⁷ Decimus then must have left the conspirators on the night of the 15th after the return of the messengers from Antonius.

Early in the morning of the 16th—or even on the night before—Lepidus occupied the Forum with his troops, and at dawn harangued the people against the slayers of Caesar.¹⁸⁸ It was probably early in the morning of the 16th, too, that Antonius announced to the peace commissioners who had visited him again¹⁸⁹ to receive his promised answer to those on the Capitol, that all questions raised by the death of Caesar would have to be settled by the senate.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ This is to be inferred from the statement of Appian (ii. 125), referring particularly to the night of the 16th: *καὶ δὲ αὐτῶν ἔθειον ἀνὰ τὴν νύκτα πᾶσαν ἐς τὰς τῶν βουλευτῶν οἰκίας οἱ τῶν ἀνδροφόνων οἰκείοι, παρακαλοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίου πολιτείας.*

¹⁸⁷ Par. 1: *Quo in statu simus, cognoscite.* We get a hint of this also in the expression (par. 2), *tanta est hominum insolentia et nostri insectatio*, and (par. 1) where he says Antonius' statement about the agitation of the soldiers and people is false.

¹⁸⁸ Dio xlv. 22. 2; Nic. Dam. 27.

¹⁸⁹ Cic. *Phil.* ii. 89.

¹⁹⁰ App. ii. 124.

Nicolaus¹⁹¹ gives us some idea of the situation on the afternoon of the 16th—of the light in which the various parties viewed the death of Caesar and of the activities of the Caesarians. His report, condensed, is as follows: When the people saw the troops of Lepidus in the city and Antonius assuming a bold front, those who had before hesitated now took up arms and flocked to the standards of Lepidus and Antonius. Some did this from fear, because they did not wish to appear elated at the death of Caesar, and by siding with Antonius and Lepidus, they hoped to secure their future safety. Messages were sent to those who had received from Caesar benefactions, homes in cities other than Rome, allotments of land, or grants of money, to the effect that they were in danger of being disturbed in their possessions unless they made a demonstration of their strength. The veterans of Caesar were entreated to remember their former chieftain and rally to the standard of his friends.¹⁹² Many were influenced by pity and friendship; many found profit in revolution, especially when they saw the opposite party not so active and strong as they had anticipated.¹⁹³ It was publicly proclaimed that Caesar must be avenged.

The advocates of a free republic, though pleased at what had been done, criticized the *liberatores* because they had stopped short at the death of Caesar and had not made away with others who were then under suspicion, and thus made liberty secure.

There was also the party of the moderates, who placed themselves between the opposing factions. They remembered the sudden changes of fortune in the time of Sulla, when those who seemed to have been destroyed regained their courage and expelled the victors. They believed that Caesar, even though dead, would cause much trouble to those who had killed him and to their party. For large armies under capable leaders were arrayed against them.

Antonius and his associates, before they decided on a plan of action, conferred, through intermediaries, with those who were on the Capitol. Meantime trusting in their force of soldiers increased by those who had taken up arms, they proceeded to administer the

¹⁹¹ Nic. Dam. 27; cf. App. ii. 130.

¹⁹² These appeals to the veterans and colonists of Caesar had much influence. For Appian (ii. 125), after mentioning that Antonius had called a meeting of the senate for the next day (it was then the evening of the 16th), says: ἀντιπαρέθεον δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν κληρούχων ἡγεμόνες, ἀπειλοῦντες εἰ μὴ τις αὐτοῖς φυλάξει τὰς κληρουχίας τὰς τε ἤδη δεδομένας καὶ τὰς ἐπηγγελμένας.

¹⁹³ Cf. App. ii. 125: ἤδη δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν ὁ καθαρώτατος λεῶς ἀνεθάρρει, τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῶν δεδρακότων πυθόμενοι.

government, quelling all disturbances in the city.¹⁹⁴ First, however, they assembled their friends and held a council as to what should be their attitude toward the assassins. Lepidus advocated making war upon them and avenging the death of Caesar. Hirtius favored treating with them and conciliating their friendship. Another, in agreement with Lepidus, said that it would be an impiety to suffer the death of Caesar to go unpunished, and besides it would not be safe for the dictator's friends. For even if at that time the assassins were disposed to be peaceable, as soon as they had the power they would not stop. Antonius took the view of Hirtius; he thought immunity should be granted to the assassins. Some urged that they be sent out of the city under a truce (*legatio libera*).¹⁹⁵

From this narrative, taken in connection with a previous statement of Nicolaus,¹⁹⁶ it will be seen that the Caesarians had by the evening of the 16th recovered from the consternation with which they were stricken by the death of Caesar. The presence of the soldiers of Lepidus in the Forum, the gathering of the veterans and colonists of Caesar under the standards of Antonius and Lepidus—in comparison with the pitifully small force that the conspirators could muster on the Capitol—produced a revulsion of feeling among the people at large and acted as a damper on those who sympathized with what had been done the day before in the *Curia Pompeia*. The situation of the conspirators was precarious. Their handful of gladiators was doubtless merely intended to frighten off any rash friends of Caesar among the senators or people who might be disposed to resent with violence the death of the dictator. They had not anticipated that they would be confronted by a whole army of veterans and recruits under the consul and *magister equitum*. Still less had they expected to be able, with that little band, consisting of a few hundred at the most, to overawe the Roman people, including the armed legion of Lepidus, and thus force their way into power. It is improbable that any such design had suggested itself to them. The truth is that they had formed beforehand no plans at all. Nearly three months after the Ides of March, Brutus and Cassius, the leaders of the conspiracy, were still uncertain what course of action

¹⁹⁴ Appian (ii. 125) states what measures Antonius took for keeping order in the city the night of the 16th when he had gotten things well in hand: ὁ δὲ Αντώνιος τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐκέλευσε νυκτοφυλακεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐκ διαστήματος ἐν μέσῳ προκαθημένους ὥσπερ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ ἦσαν πυρᾶι πανταχοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἄστυ.

¹⁹⁵ Nic. Dam. 27.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. Nic. Dam. 17; *vide* p. 69, note.

to take. They had been letting matters drift as they would; they had taken no aggressive step; in short, they had done nothing. At their conference at Antium, June 8, Cicero¹⁹⁷ told Marcus Brutus that all that they could do then was to consult for his (Brutus') safety. In their perplexity, Brutus and Cassius, especially the latter, bewailed the opportunities that had been lost. Cicero repeated to them his old story¹⁹⁸ of what their plan of action *should have been*: "That the senate should have been summoned; the people, already burning with enthusiasm, should have been still further aroused; the whole government of the state should have been taken in hand." After this fruitless conference, in which Cicero had performed the duty of giving what poor advice he could at that late hour to these hesitating and uncertain leaders, he wrote to Atticus:¹⁹⁹ "In truth, I found the ship (of state) going to pieces, or rather already in fragments. No plan, no system, no method!" This failure of the *liberatores* to form beforehand any definite plan of action, together with their utter lack of aggressiveness after Caesar had been slain, is proof, it seems to me, that the desire to grasp power for themselves was not their controlling motive. Besides, had they wished to supplant Caesar in his rule, their ambition would probably betray itself somewhere in the extant correspondence of Cicero and themselves. They perhaps knew as well as we do that the only justification for such an act as theirs was a sincere desire to restore the ancient liberty. Their lack of foresight and their quixotic belief in the patriotism of the Roman people remain the best evidence of their singleness of purpose. They had evidently imagined that, when the tyrant had been once removed, the people would respond almost *en masse* to the call of liberty, the tyranny would fall by its own weight, and the republic would restore itself.²⁰⁰

If now they were to be saved from the soldiers of Lepidus, their preservation depended upon Antonius. Antonius was ambitious, and it served his purpose to secure the good-will of the senate, which was well disposed toward those who had removed its enemy, Caesar. It was to his interest, too, not to permit Lepidus to secure the whip-hand in the state. Lepidus commanded the soldiers, and if vengeance were to be inflicted on the murderers of Caesar, Lepidus would play the leading part therein, and thus obtain for himself the

¹⁹⁷ *Att.* xv. 11.¹⁹⁸ *Cf. Att.* xiv. 10. 1.¹⁹⁹ *Att.* xv. 11. 3.²⁰⁰ *Cf. Att.* xiv. 4. 1. *Equidem doleo, quod numquam in ulla civitate accidit non una cum libertate rem publicam recipiatum.*

coveted supremacy. Consequently, in the councils of the Caesarians, when Lepidus advocated vengeance, Antonius opposed him. But this did not prevent Antonius from assuming the ugly disposition toward Decimus Brutus and his associates²⁰¹ to which reference is made in the letter of Decimus, the substance of which we have already given at length. To Hirtius, who acted as intermediary between him and Decimus, he purposely exaggerated the excitement of the people and soldiers, in order to make the obstacles in the way of immunity for those who had killed Caesar seem greater than they were. He wished to impress them and their friends, who constituted a majority of the senate, with the idea that the safety of the conspirators was difficult to obtain, and that, if he did obtain it, great should be their gratitude to him. Decimus Brutus saw through this subterfuge and the essential duplicity of Antonius, probably being well aware that the excitement among the soldiers and people against himself and his confederates had been diligently fomented by Antonius and Lepidus. The killing of Caesar, however, was unpopular with the veterans and soldiers of Lepidus, and Decimus feared that whatever strength he and his associates had with the senate and the people at large would not avail against the menacing military force of the *magister equitum* and the consul. Hence his demand for a *legatio libera*—a demand that seems too modest in view of subsequent events. But Decimus, both from motives of self-preservation and from a desire of peace, was opposed to any aggressive action that might result in civil war. Hirtius, after Decimus had written the main part of his letter, returns to him and reports the spirit in which Antonius received the demand for the *legatio libera*. Now Decimus, without having heard from Brutus and Cassius in the meantime, grows bolder and, in *lieu* of his first proposition, asks that he and the rest be permitted to remain in Rome *publico praesidio*. Thus they would be safe from the soldiers, and their plight would arouse among the people sympathy for themselves and hostility toward Antonius and Lepidus.

Early on this same morning on which Decimus wrote to Marcus Brutus and Cassius, the senate assembled at the call of Antonius in the Temple of Tellus.²⁰² All the approaches to the temple were

²⁰¹ *Fam.* xi. i. i.

²⁰² This unusual meeting-place, near his own residence in the *Carinae*, Antonius chose out of consideration for his own safety, says Appian. But it was probably not so much from fear of physical harm at

guarded by armed veterans under the orders of the consul.²⁰³ After much discussion and many proposals, for the most part favorable to the *liberatores*,²⁰⁴ on the motion of Cicero, supported by Antonius and L. Munatius Plancus,²⁰⁵ amnesty was voted to those who had had a part in killing Caesar.²⁰⁶ Then a *senatus consultum* confirming the acts of Caesar, *pacis causa*, was passed.²⁰⁷ Before the senate had come to any decision, Marcus Brutus to an assembly of the people and the veterans on the Capitol, in response to the clamors of the latter, promised that he and his confederates would not invalidate the acts of Caesar. The assassins also distributed handbills in the Forum announcing that Caesar's grants of land, etc., should remain in force.²⁰⁸ And so, in addition to the other *senatus consulta*, a special measure in favor of the veterans was passed ratifying the allotment of land that Caesar had given them.²⁰⁹ The *senatus consultum* confirming the validity of Caesar's acts was then made a *lex* by a vote of the people in the *comitia*.²¹⁰ The men on the Capitol would not come down until Antonius and Lepidus had given them their sons as hostages.²¹¹ A *contio* was held in the Forum, and when the consuls wished to speak they were not permitted by the people until they had publicly shaken hands with the leaders of the conspiracy in token of reconciliation.²¹² That night Marcus Brutus was entertained by Lepidus, Cassius by Antonius,²¹³ and the rest received invitations from their respective friends or relatives.²¹⁴

Next day the senate reassembled and on the motion of L. Piso voted that the will of Caesar be opened and read.²¹⁵ It was also voted that he be given a public funeral. These proposals were opposed by some of the conspirators and their friends, but Marcus

he hands of the conspirators on the Capitol that he did not choose the *Curia Iulia* for a meeting-place. On the one hand, he feared more the conspirators' influence in the senate, and on the other, he did not wish the meeting held in such close proximity to the soldiers of Lepidus who were encamped in the Forum. *Vide.* Cic. *Phil.* i. 31, ii. 80; *Att.* xvi. 14. 1; *App.* ii. 126; *Dio* xlv. 22.3, xlvi. 28. 3.

²⁰³ *Phil.* ii. 89; *Att.* xiv. 14. 2.

²⁰⁴ *App.* ii. 127, 128; *Dio* xlv. 22. 3.

²⁰⁵ *Phil.* i. 1, 31; *Vell.* ii. 58. 4; *Plut. Brut.* 19; *Phil.* ii. 89; *Dio* xlv. 28. 3.

²⁰⁶ Cic., *loc. cit.*; *Vell. loc. cit.*; *Plut. Brut. loc. cit.*, *Ant.* 14; *App.* ii. 135; *Dio* xlv. 34. 1.

²⁰⁷ Cic. *Att.* xvi. 14.1; *Phil.* ii. 100; xiii. 10; *App.* ii. 135; *Phil.* i. 2, 16, etc., etc. *Vide.* Drumann (*Groebe*), I, p. 68; *Lange*, III, p. 488; *Schmidt, Die letzten Kämpfe*, p. 691.

²⁰⁸ *Dio* xlv. 34; cf. *App.* ii. 141; *Att.* xv. 14. 2, 3. 2.

²⁰⁹ *App. B. C.* ii. 135; *Att.* xiv. 14. 2; *Phil.* i. 6. Cf. *Groebe, De legibus anni*, 710, p. 44.

²¹⁰ *Groebe, loc. cit.*, and *Drumann (Anhang)*, I, p. 416. Was this *lex* passed on the 17th or later?

²¹¹ *Dio* xlv. 34. 6; *App.* ii. 142; *Plut. Brut.* 19.

²¹² Cic. *Phil.* i. 32; *App.* ii. 142.

²¹³ *Plut. Brut.* 19.

²¹⁴ *Dio* xlv. 34. 7; *Plut. Ant.* 14, *Brut.* 19.

²¹⁵ *Plut. Brut.* 20; cf. *App.* ii. 136; *Suet. Iul.* 83.

Brutus gave them his sanction.²¹⁶ It was probably also on this day that the will was opened and read in the house of Antonius. The publication of Caesar's will, in which the meanest citizen of Rome was generously remembered, Caesar's spectacular funeral, and the inflammatory *laudatio funebris* of Antonius, stirred the people to such a pitch of anger against the *liberatores* that they endeavored to set fire to their houses, whither they had fled for refuge. But the *liberatores* repelled the attacks of the mob by force of arms.²¹⁷

²¹⁶ Plut. *Brut.* 20; Cic. *Att.* xiv. 10. 1, 14. 3. Groebe, following Appian (136), places these *senatus consulta* on the 17th. But Appian evidently interchanged the time of the *contio* and the descent of the *liberatores* from the Capitol, which occurred according to Cicero (*Phil.* i. 32) on the 17th, with that of the meeting of the senate to discuss Caesar's will and funeral. The chronology of Plutarch, though usually untrustworthy, seems in this case to be in harmony with that of Cicero. Judging from the length of the discussion which Appian represents as having taken place on the 17th, it is hardly probable that the senate disposed of so much business on that day as Groebe, following Lange and Drumann, would have us believe.

Again, Groebe thinks that there was a special *senatus consultum* on the 18th, confirming Caesar's grant of provinces to the *liberatores*. Such action would have been unnecessary and meaningless after the general measures confirming all the acts of Caesar. Schmidt (*Die letzten Kämpfe*, p. 691) has shown that there is no authority for assuming such a *senatus consultum*.

²¹⁷ The funeral of Caesar occurred on the 20th or 21st. The maximum interval of seven days allowed by the Romans between the death and burial expired on the 21st. The meetings of the senate on the 17th and 18th and the holiday on the 19th (*Quinquatrus*) excluded any one of those days. Hence the funeral must have taken place on the 20th or 21st. Cf. Herodian iv. 2. 4; Columella ii. 21 (22). 5; Cic. *Phil.* ii. 91, *Att.* xiv. 10. 1, 11. 1, xv. 20. 2; App. ii. 147, 148; iii. 1, 2; Dio xlv. 35-52; Suet. *Iul.* 84, 85; Plut. *Caes.* 68, *Brut.* 20, *Ant.* 14; Liv. *Epit.* 116. The house of L. Bellienus was actually burned to the ground.

III

DECIMUS' ADMINISTRATION OF CISALPINE GAUL AND THE WAR WITH ANTONIUS

The rage and excitement of the populace against the conspirators that succeeded the obsequies of Caesar had probably subsided when Decimus Brutus left the city for Cisalpine Gaul, his province. The date of his arrival there was not later than the 15th¹ of April. Allowing a reasonable time for himself and retinue of gladiators² to make the journey, the date of his departure from Rome can be fixed as not later than the 9th. He probably set out during that interval of comparative tranquillity³ which preceded the outbreak against the conspirators and their friends instigated by the Pseudo-Marius. The fact that Decimus had reached his province and his legions seems to have aroused unreasonable hopes in the breast of Cicero.⁴ In a letter written about two months later, Cicero tells us that Marcus Brutus and Cassius found fault with Decimus for the opportunities he had lost.⁵ The republicans in Italy probably wished Decimus to march toward Rome with his army, check Antonius' usurpations, and secure their own safety. But as Gardt-hausen⁶ has pointed out, such a step would have been, not only illegal, but also impracticable. Decimus was in favor of civil war only as a last resort—in self-defense.⁷ Then, too, his military strength was not sufficient to cope with that of Antonius. He had but two legions,⁸ and only one of these was made up of veterans.⁹

¹ The news of this reached Rome on the 19th (*Att.* xiv. 13. 1, 2).

² *App.* iii. 49.

³ *Att.* xiv. 2. 1, written on the 8th and referring to conditions in the city on the 7th. Everything was quiet in the city on the 8th also, as we learn from *Att.* xiv. 3. 1: *Tranquillae tuae quidem litterae*. But on the 9th (*Att.* xiv. 4. 1, written on the 10th) trouble seems to be brewing again (*Tument negotia. . . . Horribile est quae loquantur, quae minitentur*). By the 11th it had assumed serious proportions (*Att.* xiv. 5. 1, 6. 1, 7. 1). But on the 13th probably (not later), as we learn from *Att.* xiv. 8. 1 (April 15), the uprising was crushed by the summary execution of the Pseudo-Marius (*De Mario probe, etsi doleo L. Crassi nepotem*). For an extended account of the Pseudo-Marius *vide* *Nic. Dam.* 14; *App.* iii. 2. 3.

⁴ *Att.* xiv. 13. 2: *in quo spem maximam video*. *App.* iii. 6.

⁵ *Att.* xv. 11. 2 (June 8): *amissas occasiones Decimumque graviter accusabant*.

⁶ *Augustus u. seine Zeit*, I, p. 59.

⁷ *Fam.* ii. 1. 3.

⁸ *Nic. Dam.* 28; *Appian* (iii. 6) says that he had three legions, but this statement refers to a later time as is shown in iii. 49, where *Appian* informs us that one of these legions had been recently levied after Decimus' arrival in Cisalpine Gaul.

⁹ *Fam.* x. 24. 3.

He probably did not obtain an enthusiastic reception in his new province—a province that had especial reasons for being attached to Caesar. It doubtless required no little time and tact on the part of Decimus to make sure of the loyalty to himself of these two legions which had been in the pay of Caesar.

That which suggested the complaint of Marcus Brutus and Cassius against the inactivity of Decimus was probably the transfer of Cisalpine Gaul from Decimus to Antonius by the so-called *lex Antonia Cornelia de permutatione provinciarum*.¹⁰ We have already seen that Antonius immediately after the death of Caesar had expressed his unwillingness that Decimus should have Cisalpine Gaul.¹¹ Toward the latter part of April the report was current in Rome that on June 1 Antonius would lay a motion before the senate in regard to the provinces, to the effect that he himself should have the Gauls, and that the tenure of himself and Dolabella should be extended.¹² About a month later Cicero writes, with reference to this rumor, that Antonius will disregard the senate on June 1 and effect his objects through the agency of a popular assembly. He thinks that war is in prospect, if an effort be made to deprive Decimus Brutus of his province.¹³ About the first of June a *lex tribunicia* giving Antonius and Dolabella the pro-consular *imperium* for six years was passed *contra auspicia* and without the formal *promulgatio trinum nundinum*.¹⁴ Most authorities¹⁵ have put the *lex de permutatione provinciarum* somewhat later than the *lex tribunicia* above mentioned. But Schmidt has shown by citations from Appian, Nicolaus, and Cassius Dio that the *lex de permutatione* contained a provision conferring the command of the Macedonian legions upon Antonius.¹⁶ Already in the latter part of June and the early part of July there were persistent rumors of the arrival of these legions at Brundisium.¹⁷ These rumors arose as a result of the passage of the *lex de permutatione provinciarum*. Hence it is safe to place that law in the early part of June and to connect it with the *lex tribunicia*

¹⁰ Liv. *Epit.* 117.

¹¹ *Fam.* xi. 1. 1.

¹² *Att.* xiv. 14. 4.

¹³ *Att.* xv. 4. 1, 5. 3, 10. 1.

¹⁴ *Phil.* v. 7. i. 6, ii. 108, 109. For the date cf. *Att.* xv. 11. 4 (June 8), in which Cicero says that Dolabella, on the 3d, had chosen him *legatus* for a period of five years. Dolabella chose Cicero *legatus* under the *lex tribunicia*. Therefore that *lex* was passed not later than the 3d. That the *imperium* of Dolabella and Antonius was to begin in 44 has been established by Schwartz (*Hermes*, 1898, pp. 138, 189).

¹⁵ Lange (III, pp. 502, 503) and Schmidt (*Die letzten Kämpfe*, p. 718) put it between the Ides of June and July 1; Groebe, after June 15.

¹⁶ Cf. Schmidt, *loc. cit.*, pp. 717 f., and App. iii. 55; Nic. Dam. 30; Dio xlv. 23. 4, 24. 2, 25. 2; xlv. 25. 1; xlv. 20. 3, 4. Cf. also Groebe, *De legibus anni 710*, pp. 11 f.

¹⁷ *Att.* xv. 21. 3 (June 21); xvi. 5. 3 (July 9), 4. 4; etc.

de provinciis consularibus. It gave Antonius both Gauls (excluding Narbonensis, then governed by Plancus)¹⁸ for six years, including the year 44.¹⁹ The patrons of this law were Antonius and Dolabella,²⁰ and Livy informs us that its adoption was secured by violence.²¹

The Macedonian legions thus given to Antonius were not brought to Italy until the middle of October, as Schmidt and Schwartz have shown.²² Three of them marched along the Adriatic coast toward Gaul; ²³ one probably proceeded with Antonius to the neighborhood of Rome and thence to the north; and the fifth, under the leadership of L. Antonius, did not reach Cisalpine Gaul until after the siege of Mutina had begun.²⁴

The only information we get concerning the movements of Decimus Brutus from his arrival in Cisalpine Gaul, in April, until September is derived from a letter ²⁵ of his to Cicero, the date of which cannot be precisely determined, but must in all probability fall in the month of September.²⁶ Decimus, as we learn from this letter, spent the intervening months in an effort to secure the loyalty of his troops. For this purpose he had conducted a summer campaign against the Inalpini who lived in modern Piedmont and Savoy. His efforts had been crowned with success. The soldiers had learned to appreciate his liberality in the distribution of booty and his courage. In the war with these intrepid people he had captured many villages and destroyed many. His soldiers had given him the customary recognition of his success by saluting him as *Imperator*. He had sent dispatches to the senate in the hope of obtaining its confirmation of his title and possibly the additional honor of a *supplicatio*. He asks Cicero's support in the senate on the ground that, if he secures this mark of recognition from that body, he will be stronger in his province and with his troops, and thus be of greater service to the party of the *liberatores*.

¹⁸ *Phil.* I. 8; vii. 2; viii. 27.

¹⁹ In violation of the *lex Iulia de provinciis* of 46, in that it gave the consuls provinces for a longer time than two years.

²⁰ *Phil.* iii. 9; i. 25, 26.

²¹ Liv. *Epit.* 117. Cf. *Phil.* ii. 6; i. 25.

²² Schmidt, *loc. cit.*, pp. 720, 721; Schwartz, *loc. cit.*, p. 190; cf. *Fam.* xii. 23. 2; *Att.* xv. 13. 2.

²³ *Att.* xvi. 8. 2.

²⁴ *Phil.* iii. 31.; App. iii. 45, 46; and *infra*, p. 84, n. 51.

²⁵ *Fam.* xi. 4.

²⁶ Cf. Nake, *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Cicero u. Decimus Brutus*, p. 5; Sternkopf, *Philologus*, LX, pp. 303, 304. The determining points are: (1) Decimus writes while Cicero is still in Rome (Cicero left Rome between the 9th and 20th of October *Fam.* xii. 23. 2 and *Att.* xv. 13. 1). (2) Cicero answers in *Fam.* xi. 6. 1 before he leaves the city.

The reply to this letter of Decimus is, as Sternkopf has shown, found in *Ad fam.* xi. 6, paragraph 1,²⁷ xi. 6 being made up of two distinct letters. Cicero's letter, like that of Decimus, is very brief. Its tone of polite formality is such as Cicero would naturally use toward one who had not been among his intimate friends.²⁸ He did not give Decimus any assurance that he would do the definite thing requested of him, for the reason that at this time he had not the privilege of free expression in the senate, as he informs us in a similar letter²⁹ to Plancus written about the same time. He probably expected Lupus to explain to Decimus the exact situation at Rome.

Decimus Brutus, as we learn from this letter, was already in September encamped at Mutina, and Appian's statement³⁰ that he was still in the open country when Antonius entered Cisalpine Gaul—a statement absurd on its face—is shown to be false.

After Antonius left Rome, October 9,³¹ to meet the Macedonian legions at Brundisium, his friends accused and caused to be condemned a slave named Myrtilus for attempting the life of the consul. They alleged that Myrtilus had been prompted by a bribe from Decimus Brutus.³² Antonius himself was probably responsible for this false charge against Decimus, his object being to make him unpopular with the people and thereby lessen the odium that would attend his own projected invasion of Cisalpine Gaul.

During the absence of Antonius, Octavianus had been busy collecting, by means of large donations, an army of veterans in

²⁷ Sternkopf (*Philologus*, LX, pp. 282 ff.) by a convincing argument shows that the course of the first correspondence between Cicero and Decimus is as follows:

Brutus writes *F.* xi. 4, request for *supplicatio*—September.

Lupus brings this letter in six days from Mutina to Rome—September.

Cicero answers in xi. 6a—September or beginning of October.

Cicero leaves Rome—middle of October.

Lupus comes to Rome with a new letter of Brutus, not preserved—November.

He sends this letter to Cicero, who is out of the city, and a few days after returns to Brutus without an answer.

Cicero returns to Rome—December 9.

Cicero writes xi. 5, probably at once—December 9.

Lupus comes again to Rome and confers with Cicero. Cicero writes xi. 7—middle of December (12?).

A courier brings the edict of Brutus; meeting of the senate; Cicero writes xi. 6b—December 20.

Vide also Sternkopf's article in *Hermes*, XL (1905), pp. 529 ff.

²⁸ Cf. App., iii. 62: *καὶ Δέκμον Καίσαρι μὲν ὄντα φίλον ἐμίσει*; which, however, is probably an exaggeration of Appian.

²⁹ *Fam.* x. 2. 1.

³¹ *Fam.* xiii. 23. 2.

³⁰ App. iii. 49.

³² *Att.* xv. 13. 6, xvi. 11. 6.

Campania.³³ He had even sent his emissaries to anticipate the arrival of Antonius at Brundisium, and win over the Macedonian legions with money and liberal promises, as well as by means of circulars derogatory to the consul.³⁴ These measures had the desired result, and the disaffection toward Antonius was increased by his own niggardliness and brutal acts of discipline.³⁵ Octavianus placed himself under the guidance of Cicero and professed a desire to conduct his opposition to Antonius by and with the advice of the senate.³⁶ He was writing frequent letters to Cicero,³⁷ he had demanded a secret conference with him,³⁸ and had sent a special messenger to ask him whether he should proceed to Rome with his three thousand veterans, or should hold Capua and block the way of Antonius who was marching toward Rome with the *legio Alaudarum*, or should go to meet the three Macedonian legions which were advancing along the Adriatic Sea toward Cisalpine Gaul. Cicero urged him to proceed to Rome. He was of the opinion that Octavianus, if he created confidence, would have the support of the Optimate party,³⁹ and, if his forces were strong, he could have (Decimus) Brutus on his side.⁴⁰ Octavianus acted on the advice of Cicero; proceeded to Rome; addressed an assembly of the people before the Temple of Castor⁴¹ and Pollux; and reminded them of Caesar and of the wrongs he himself had suffered at the hands of Antonius, on account of which he had collected the force of veterans as a guard. He also declared his readiness in everything to serve and obey his country. Some of the veterans, learning his intention against Antonius, changed their minds and under various pretexts returned to their homes. Octavianus proceeded to the neighborhood of Ravenna, where he enlisted many new recruits and established his headquarters at Arretium.⁴²

About the middle of November Antonius returned to Rome, leaving the main body of his troops at Tibur, but bringing a con-

³³ *Att.* xvi. 8. 1, 2. (par. 1 *quingenos denarios dat*); *Att.* xvi. 11. 6.; *Res gestae Divi Augusti*, i. 1. Liv. *Epit.* 117; Dio. xlv. 12. 2.

³⁴ *App.* iii. 43, 44; Dio xlv. 12. 1.

³⁵ *Phil.* iii. 4, v. 22, iii. 10, 30, xii. 12, xiii. 18; *App.* iii. 43; cf. *Att.* xvi. 8. 2; Dio xlv. 13. 1, 2; 35. 3.

³⁶ *Att.* xvi. 9.

³⁷ *Att.* xvi. 8. 1, 9. 1, 11, 6.

³⁸ *Att.* xvi. 8. 1.

³⁹ *Att.* xvi. 8. 2.

⁴⁰ *Att.* xvi. 9.

⁴¹ In *Att.* xvi. 15. 3, Cicero writes of this *contio*. He does not like the speech of Octavianus and is not ready to declare himself for him till he learns his attitude toward Casca's candidacy for the tribunate. Casca was one of the slayers of Caesar.

⁴² *App.* iii. 41. 42; Dio. xlv. 12. 4 ff. For Octavianus' professed desire to obey the senate *vid.* *App.* iii. 48.

siderable number into the city to serve as his personal guard and to overawe the senate and the people.⁴³ He ordered a meeting of the senate for November 24, to lay before that body the conduct of Octavianus, but he himself failed to attend and adjourned the sitting until November 28.⁴⁴ Meantime to Tibur, whither he had returned, a number of knights, senators, and plebeians repaired and swore to be loyal to him.⁴⁵ On November 28 Antonius was again in Rome, having called a meeting of the senate for that day on the Capitol.⁴⁶ He had prepared a motion to restrain Octavianus,⁴⁷ but it seems that he did not lay it before the house. While the senate was in session he received news that the fourth legion, under the quaestor, L. Egnatuleius, had deserted his standard. The Martian legion, under D. Carfulenus, had already abandoned him, turned from its northward march along the east coast toward the west, and encamped at Alba near Rome ready to unite with Octavianus. The fourth legion had now joined the Martian at Alba.⁴⁸ At the news of this, Antonius hastily caused the praetorian provinces not yet assigned to be distributed by lot,⁴⁹ left the city by night for Tibur, and hurried thence with his "mutilated army" to Cisalpine Gaul.⁵⁰ At Ariminum he could still count on four veteran legions, the *legio Alaudarum*, two Macedonian legions (II and XXXV), and another Macedonian legion, which, under the leadership of Lucius Antonius, was on its way to join him.⁵¹ In addition to these, he had his bodyguard, auxiliary troops, and recruits.⁵²

Decimus Brutus meantime had received letters from members of the senate urging him to keep a strong hold on his province, and to collect additional men and money to resist Antonius.⁵³ To this effect Cicero wrote on his return to Rome, December 9.⁵⁴ In this letter written in reply to one from Decimus, now lost, which he had received while absent from Rome, Cicero says: *Si enim iste pro-*

⁴³ App. iii. 45, 50, 52; *Phil.* xiii. 19.

⁴⁴ *Phil.* iii. 19, 20, 21.

⁴⁵ App. iii. 46; *Phil.* xiii. 19: *Rediit ad milites; ibi pestifera illa Tiburi contio*; Dio xlv. 13. 5.

⁴⁶ *Phil.* iii. 20; *quod in templum ipse nescio qua per Gallorum cuniculum ascendit.*

⁴⁷ *Phil.* xiii. 19: *parata de circumscribendo adulescente sententia consularis.*

⁴⁸ *Phil.* xiii. 19; iii. 7; Dio xlv. 13. 3, 4.

⁴⁹ *Phil.* iii. 24.

⁵⁰ Non. Marcell. 539. 3; *Phil.* xiii. 20; iii. 31.

⁵¹ App. iii. 46; *Phil.* iii. 31. Cf. Schwartz, p. 227, n. 4. What I have said above is in accordance with the testimony of Appian. But Groebe (Drumann, I, pp. 434, 440) thinks that one of the five Macedonian legions that fell to Antonius in the arrangement between him and Dolabella was left in Macedonia, and that this legion is the one referred to in *Phil.* x. 13: *Legio, quam L. Piso ducebat legatus Antoni, Ciceroni se filio meo tradidit.* At any rate, Antonius had in all six legions at Mutina (*Phil.* viii. 25).

⁵² App., *loc. cit.*

⁵³ App. iii. 27; cf. 32, 33.

⁵⁴ *Fam.* xi. 5.

*vinciam nactus erit, cui quidem ego semper amicus fui, ante quam illum intellexi non modo aperte sed etiam libenter cum re p. bellum gerere, spem reliquam nullam video salutis.*⁵⁵ Cicero also renews his assurance that he will support in the senate Decimus' claims to honor and distinction.⁵⁶

Decimus Brutus had not been idle. After his campaign with the Inalpini he had raised a legion of recruits,⁵⁷ and thus shown his intention of resisting the claims of Antonius to his province.⁵⁸ As soon as he learned that Antonius had left Rome and was hurrying with his army toward Cisalpine Gaul, he probably wrote to Cicero urging him to secure the passage of a *senatus consultum* confirming his right to his province and authorizing him to hold it by force of arms.⁵⁹ It was to this letter, now lost, that Cicero replied in *Fam.* xi. 7,⁶⁰ written not later than December 12. Cicero urges Decimus not to wait for the authorization of the senate in preserving the liberty and safety of the Roman people—for the senate is not yet free to deliberate. He entreats Decimus not to condemn his act on the Ides of March. The freeing of his country then was all the more glorious because it was done *nullo publico consilio*. He cites the example of the young Caesar who had espoused the public

⁵⁵ xi. 5. 3.⁵⁶ *Fam.* xi. 5. 3.⁵⁷ *App.* iii. 49; *Phil.* v. 36.⁵⁸ *Fam.* xi. 7. 3.

⁵⁹ This seems a fair inference from *Fam.* xi. 7. 2: *Caput autem est hoc . . . ut ne in libertate et salute populi Romani conservanda auctoritatem senatus exspectes nondum liberi*. This inference is also supported by the testimony of Appian (iii. 49): 'Αντωνίου δ' αὐτῷ προθεσμίαν ὀρίζοντος μεθ' ἣν ὡς πολέμῳ χρήσεται, μακροτέραν δ' Δέκιμος ἐκέλευεν ὀρίζειν ἑαυτῷ, μὴ θάσσον γένοιτο τῇ βουλῇ πολέμιος; and, *Voluntas senatus pro auctoritate haberi debet, cum auctoritas impeditur metu*; and also *ita animatus debes esse, non ut nihil facias nisi iussus sed*, etc.

⁶⁰ That *Fam.* xi. 7 was written before December 20 has been established both by Ruete (p. 38) and, at greater length, by Sternkopf (*Philologus*, LX, pp. 282 ff.). The considerations presented by them may be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) It would have been idle for Cicero to urge Brutus to hold his province, *privato consilio*, when the latter's edict announcing his intention to do that very thing was already known in Rome.

(2) On or after December 20, Cicero could not have written, *Caput autem est hoc . . . ut ne in libertate et salute populi Romani conservanda auctoritatem senatus nondum liberi*; and *Voluntas senatus pro auctoritate haberi, cum auctoritas impeditur metu*, and *ita animatus debes esse, non ut nihil facias nisi iussus, sed*, etc.; for afterward Cicero (*Phil.* v. 28) says *a. d. XII Kal. Jan. . . . quod ille (D. Brutus) bellum privato consilio susceperat, id vos auctoritate publica comprobastis*. Cf. *Phil.* iv. 8.

(3) Again, the expression *nondum liber* applied to the senate in this letter was no longer true on December 20, as we learn from *Fam.* x. 28. 1: *Ut enim primum post Antoni foedissimum discessum senatus haberi libere potuit*, and from *Phil.* iii. 5 (spoken December 20) *nunc enim primum ita convenimus, ut illius (Octaviani) beneficio possemus ea, quae sentiremus, libere dicere*. Nor, on the other hand, could this letter have been written on the 19th, as Tyrell and Purser think. For, if we assume, as T. and P. do, that *Fam.* xi. 6. 1 (which, following Sternkopf, I think is a separate letter by itself) were written December 20, it is inconceivable that Cicero should have had a conference with Lupus and others at his house on the morning after the arrival of Lupus, and should have written Decimus about that conference, mentioning the fact that it had been called at the instance of Lupus, and then in a subsequent letter to Decimus (*Fam.* xi. 6. 1), on the evening of the following day, should have taken pains to announce the arrival of Lupus in Rome. Hence *Fam.* xi. 7 was probably written several days before December 20.

cause *privato consilio*, and of the legions that had revolted from the consul and by their act declared him a public enemy. He should accept the will of the senate as authorization so long as fear kept it from declaring itself. Finally, he had twice committed himself, first on the Ides of March and again, recently, by the raising of a new army and new forces. He should do that which he knew would be approved and not wait for the senate's bidding.

When Cicero wrote this spirited letter he probably had in mind Brutus' conservatism and his regard for constitutional forms—respect for which, paradoxical as it may seem, had drawn him into the plot against Caesar, and now justified him in resisting Antonius. For the *plebiscitum* and the *lex* of June which had been voted *per vim* in favor of Antonius and Dolabella, whereby Antonius obtained the *imperium* in the Gauls, and Dolabella in Syria, for six years beginning with 44, while they did not abrogate the *lex Antonia de actis Caesaris*, yet violated it, and therefore marked the beginning of the revolution that culminated in the bloody Second Triumvirate. Accordingly, when Decimus Brutus refused to recognize the *imperium maius* of Antonius in Cisalpine Gaul, it was, strictly speaking, a counter-revolutionary movement and not, as Scharwtz⁶¹ maintains, the continuation of the revolution inaugurated by the young Caesar.

Antonius probably on his arrival at Ariminum demanded of Decimus the surrender of his province.⁶² Decimus refused and issued an edict saying, *se provinciam retenturum in senatus populi Romani potestate*.⁶³ The date of this edict was probably December 15, since it was published in Rome on the morning of the 20th.⁶⁴ For that day the tribunes had called a meeting of the senate to propose measures for the safety of the consuls-elect and of the senate on January 1.⁶⁵ Cicero had determined not to be present at the sitting, but, when he heard of the bold stand Decimus had taken, he resolved not to miss the opportunity of urging the senate to place

⁶¹ *Hermes*, 1898, p. 194, n. 5. Schwartz says: "Sein einziges Argument ist, dass das Gesetz und das Plebiscit, auf welchen es beruht, gegen das S.C. über die acta Caesaris verstießen und per vim rogirt seien." Schwartz seems to have overlooked or disregarded the *lex de actis Caesaris confirmandis*, expressly mentioned by Cicero (*Phil.* v. 10).

⁶² *App.* iii. 49. That Antonius bade Decimus to go to Macedonia, as Appian says, is, of course, false.

⁶³ *Phil.* iii. 8. It is impossible to say whether or not Cicero's letter *ad Fam.* xi. 7 had reached Decimus before he issued his edict.

⁶⁴ *Fam.* xi. 6. 2; cf. *Fam.* xi. 6. 1.

⁶⁵ *Fam.* xi. 6. 2; *Phil.* iii. 13, 25.

the stamp of approval upon it. A full senate assembled when it became known that Cicero had gone to the *curia*.⁶⁶ The orator delivered his third Philippic, in which he justified the conduct of the two legions which had deserted Antonius, and the action of Octavianus and Decimus Brutus, by the argument that Antonius was virtually no longer consul.⁶⁷ The senate adopted all of the motions that Cicero advocated.⁶⁸ These were: (1) That the consuls-elect should provide that the senate might convene in safety on January 1. (2) That it was the opinion of the senate that Decimus Brutus by his edict deserved well of the state, since he was defending the authority of the senate and the liberty and majesty of the Roman people.⁶⁹ (3) That, in keeping the province of *Gallia Citerior* and its army under the control of the senate, Decimus Brutus, his army, the *municipia*, and the colonies of the province of Gaul had acted and were acting properly, regularly, and in accordance with the welfare of the state.⁷⁰ (4) That it was the decision of the senate that Decimus Brutus, Lucius Plancus, and others who held provinces should retain them, in accordance with the *lex Iulia*, until by a *senatus consultum* their successors should be appointed, and that they should see to it that those provinces and their armies continued to obey the senate and Roman people and to defend the republic.⁷¹ (5) That the consuls-elect should as soon as possible lay before the senate the matter of honors and rewards for C. Caesar, the *legio Martia*, and the *legio IV*, because of their services to the commonwealth.⁷²

After the meeting of the senate Cicero delivered to a large assembly of the people an impassioned speech (the fourth Philippic), in which he declared that, while Antonius had not been designated by the senate a public enemy in word, he had already been so adjudged in fact.⁷³ After this *contio*, late in the day, probably, Cicero wrote to Decimus, paragraphs 2 and 3 of *Fam.* xi. 6, in which he speaks of Decimus' edict and of his godlike services to the state, of the meeting of the senate and the *contio*, and at the end he gives Decimus assurance of zealous support in all things that pertain to his official position.

⁶⁶ *Fam.* xi. 6, 2, 3; xii. 22, 3.

⁶⁷ *Phil.* iii. 6, 12, 14.

⁶⁸ Sternkopf, pp. 284 ff.; *Phil.* iii. 37 ff.

⁶⁹ *Phil.* iv. 8, v. 28.

⁷⁰ *Phil.* iv. 9; v. 28; x. 23.

⁷¹ *Fam.* xii. 22, 3; xii. 25, 2.

⁷² *Phil.* iv. 2-6, 3, 4, 28; x. 23.

⁷³ *Phil.* iv. 1.

We have already noted the arrival of Decimus at Mutina. On learning of the approach of Antonius, he hastily collected supplies, slaughtered and salted cattle, and closed the gates of the town, anticipating a protracted siege. With his force of three legions (only one of which had seen much service) and a handful of gladiators he did not venture to meet Antonius in the open field.⁷⁴ Besides, he probably preferred to have Antonius assume the offensive, so that it might be made clear that he was defending his province against the consul who was seeking unlawfully to wrest it from him. Antonius probably appeared before the walls of the city about December 20, and began the construction of a moat and trench around the place.⁷⁵

A meeting of the senate was held on January 1 under the new consuls, Aulus Hirtius and Gaius Vibius Pansa. The consuls laid before the senate the state of the republic and the matter of granting rewards to the young Caesar and to the two legions that had deserted Antonius.⁷⁶ Other *consulares* were called upon for their opinion before Cicero.⁷⁷ Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the first, proposed that commissioners be sent to Antonius to bring about peace if possible, between him and the senate.⁷⁸ Cicero in his fifth Philippic opposed the motion of Sulpicius, and after a bitter invective against Antonius moved: (1) That a *tumultus* be decreed, a *iustitium* proclaimed, the *saga* be put on, and that exemption from service be removed and levies be held in all Italy except Gaul. (2) That the *senatus consultum ultimum* be adopted,⁷⁹ and that it be decreed that those who were in the army of Antonius, if they left it before February 1, should be pardoned. (3) That Decimus Brutus be praised for retaining the province of Gaul in obedience to the senate and Roman people, and for having raised so large an army with the aid of the *municipia* and the colonies of Gaul.⁸⁰ (4) That the senate and people express their confidence in M. Lepidus for his loyal services to the state, and that a gilded equestrian statue be erected to him on the *rostra*, or wherever else in the Forum he might wish it.⁸¹ (5) That Gaius Caesar be given the rank of a

⁷⁴ App. B. C. iii. 49.

⁷⁵ *Phil.* v. 24. Antonius had not reached Mutina on the 15th, and the news of his having laid siege to the place was in Rome before January 1, 43. App. iii. 49.

⁷⁶ Lange, iii. p. 520; *Phil.* v. 28.

⁷⁷ *Phil.* v. 5; Lange (III, p. 522) names Q. Fufius Calenus, P. Servilius Isauricus, and Servius Sulpicius Rufus.

⁷⁸ *Phil.* v. 1; ix. 4. 9.

⁷⁹ *Phil.* v. 31, 34.

⁸⁰ *Phil.* v. 36.

⁸¹ *Phil.* v. 40, 41.

propraetor, that he be voted into the senate *inter praetorios*, and that as a candidate for the magistracy he should be in the position of those who had held the quaestorship for the previous year (44).⁸² (6) That L. Egnatuleius, the commander of the *legio IV*, be allowed to sue for, take, and hold the magistracies three years before the legal time; ⁸³ that lands be granted to the veterans who had deserted Antonius; that exemption from military service, except in case of a Gallic or Italian *tumultus*, be voted to them and their children; and that the two legions which had deserted Antonius be given their discharge at the end of the war and be paid the money promised them by C. Caesar.⁸⁴

All these motions, save the first two, in regard to the *tumultus* and the *senatus consultum ultimum*, were adopted on January 3. The one in regard to the young Caesar, however, was modified so that he was given the privilege of expressing his opinion in the senate among the *consulares*.⁸⁵ To the other honors voted him were added, on the motion of his stepfather, L. Marcius Philippus, an equestrian statue.⁸⁶ On the 4th,⁸⁷ owing to the influence of the friends and relatives of Antonius and the *consulares* other than Cicero, the senate, against the latter's earnest protest, voted to send ambassadors to Antonius with instructions that he should abstain from attacking the consul designate, from besieging Mutina, from devastating the province, and from holding levies, and that he should submit to the senate and people.⁸⁸ The senate further demanded that he should withdraw with his army from Cisalpine Gaul across the Rubicon, but that he should not bring it within two hundred Roman miles of the city.⁸⁹ The ambassadors were instructed to proceed to Decimus Brutus and his soldiers, and assure them that their services were appreciated and would be rewarded by the senate and the people.⁹⁰ It was decreed that, if Antonius did not yield to the demands of the ambassadors, the *saga* would be assumed, and it would be considered that Antonius had declared

⁸² *Phil.* v. 46.⁸³ *Phil.* v. 52.⁸⁴ *Phil.* v. 53.⁸⁵ *Phil.* vii. 10, 11, 14; xi. 20; *Res gestae* i. ll. 3-5, and p. 3 (Mommsen); Dio xli. 29. 2, 3; Vell. ii. 61. 3; *Ad Brut.* i. 15. 7.⁸⁶ *Ad Brut.*, *loc. cit.*; Dio xli. 29. 2; App. iii. 51, 66.⁸⁷ *Phil.* vi. 3. On the first three days of January the senate sided with Cicero against the proposition to send ambassadors (*Phil.* vii. 14). But the tribune, Salvius, according to Appian adjourned the debate on the question whether an ambassador should be sent or a *tumultus* declared.⁸⁸ *Phil.* vi. 4.⁸⁹ *Phil.* vi. 5.⁹⁰ *Phil.* vi. 6.

war upon the Roman people.⁹¹ It was also voted that, in the meantime, the consuls, one or both, should depart for the seat of trouble, that levies be held throughout Italy, that exemptions be withdrawn, and that all preparations be made for war.⁹² At this meeting of the senate, too, on the motion of Lucius Caesar, the *lex agraria* of Lucius Antonius, which had been passed in June to win over the veterans to his brother, the consul, was repealed.⁹³

On the afternoon of the same day Cicero delivered to the people his sixth Philippic, in which he criticized the lukewarm conduct of the senate in sending ambassadors to a "gladiator,"⁹⁴ assured his hearers that Antonius would never obey its commands,⁹⁵ and urged upon them the necessity of aiding Decimus Brutus, of collecting troops everywhere, and of avoiding the crime of delay.⁹⁶ Cicero consoled himself, however, with the reflection that the *legati* would return within twenty days, and then his opinion would be unanimously accepted.

The three *consulares*⁹⁷ who composed the embassy, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, L. Calpurnius Piso, and L. Marcius Philippus,⁹⁸ departed from Rome on the morning of January 5.⁹⁹ Soon after their departure, the consul, Hirtius, who was still physically weak from long illness, having been chosen by lot to take command in the field, set out with a small troop of veterans to reinforce Octavianus and carry relief to Decimus. Pansa remained at home to superintend the levies.¹⁰⁰ To Octavianus at Spoletium¹⁰¹ in Umbria the news came that the *imperium* had been conferred on him by the senate. He marched thence to Forum Cornelium¹⁰² on the *via Aemilia* in Cisalpine Gaul, having been joined by Hirtius at Ariminum.¹⁰³

On January 24, Cicero having been asked by Paula, the wife of Decimus Brutus, if he had any communication for the latter, wrote¹⁰⁴ him that nothing had as yet been heard from the *legati*,

⁹¹ *Phil.* vi. 9. and vii. 11, 26; *Fam.* xii. 24. 2.

⁹² *Phil.* vii. 11 ff.

⁹³ Groebe's Drumann, I, *Anhang*, pp. 424 f.; *Phil.* vi. 14.

⁹⁴ *Phil.* vi. 3.

⁹⁶ *Phil.* vi. 9.

⁹⁸ *Phil.* ix. 1.

⁹⁵ *Phil.* vi. 5.

⁹⁷ *Phil.* viii. 17; xiii. 20.

⁹⁹ *Phil.* ix. 9.

¹⁰⁰ *Phil.* vii. 12; xiv. 4, 5. For the illness of Hirtius *vide Fam.* xii. 22. 2. The nucleus of Hirtius' force was made up of veterans who had deserted from the second and thirty-fifth Macedonian legions. *Phil.* v. 53; viii. 5; *Consulem . . . cum exercitu misimus.*

¹⁰¹ Plin. N. H. xi. (73) 100; *C. I. L.*, I, p. 383; xii, 4333.

¹⁰² *Fam.* xii. 5. 2; 2; Dio xlv. 35. 4-7.

¹⁰³ Non. 239. 24 and Groebe's Drumann, I, p. 452.

¹⁰⁴ *Fam.* xi. 8.

and that all were waiting in suspense for news from them. He told Decimus, however, of the deep concern of the senate and the people for his safety and honor, of the wonderful affection for his name and unique love for himself which everybody felt, and of the confident expectation that he would this time free the state from the kingdom as he had already freed it from the king. He added that a levy was being held in Rome and throughout Italy, if it should be called a levy, when all voluntarily presented themselves. In *Philippic* vii, delivered toward the end of January, we have a similar testimony to the zeal of the people in enrolling their names for service, of the *municipia* in furnishing men and pledging money, and of individuals in equipping soldiers for the cause.¹⁰⁵ In this speech Cicero showed the dishonor, danger, and the impossibility of peace with Antonius.¹⁰⁶ The people seemed to realize this, and there is no doubt that there was a genuine feeling of hostility toward Antonius and a corresponding sympathy for Decimus Brutus.

The ambassadors, whose leader, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, had died in Antonius' camp before Mutina,¹⁰⁷ did not return until February 1.¹⁰⁸ Antonius, instead of obeying the mandate of the senate, made counter-proposals and would not permit the *legati* to pass through his lines to inform Decimus Brutus of the senate's decree in his honor.¹⁰⁹ He showed them the damage wrought by his engines to the town and the extent of his siege works, and did not suffer his attack to lag a moment while they were present.¹¹⁰ Yet he seems to have been willing to make one concession, namely, to give up all claims to Cisalpine Gaul. His demands were:¹¹¹ (1) that the senate make grants of land to his soldiers, and that those having obtained lands from him and Dolabella be permitted to retain them; (2) that the decrees of himself and his colleague remain in force; (3) that no account be taken of the money he had drawn from the Temple of Ops; (4) that his *lex iudiciaria* be not repealed; (5) that *Gallia Comata*, with the six legions there brought up to their full complement by soldiers drawn from the army of Decimus Brutus, be granted him for five years, that is, until the end of the proconsular *imperium* of M. Brutus and Cassius. When

¹⁰⁵ *Phil.* vii. 13, 23, 24; Dio xlvi. 31. 4.¹⁰⁶ *Phil.* vii. 9.¹⁰⁷ *Phil.* ix. 1, 2.¹⁰⁸ *Fam.* xii. 4. 1. Cf. *Fam.* x. 28. 1, 2 and Ganter, "Chronologische Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Briefen an M. Brutus u. Philippischen Reden," *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, CXLIX, pp. 613 ff.¹⁰⁹ *Phil.* viii. 21.¹¹⁰ *Phil.* viii. 20.¹¹¹ *Phil.* viii. 25 to 27.

the senate met on February 2,¹¹² a motion to send other *legati* to Antonius to continue the negotiations for peace was lost.¹¹³ Cicero moved that a *bellum* be decreed, involving as it did the declaration that Antonius was a *hostis*. But the substitute motion of L. Caesar, that a *tumultus* be voted and the *saga* assumed on the 4th, prevailed.¹¹⁴ It was also decreed on February 3¹¹⁵ on the motion of Cicero, that those soldiers who should leave Antonius by March 1 should be pardoned. But if anyone save L. Varius Cotyla should go to Antonius, he should be considered to have acted *contra rem publicam*.¹¹⁶

It was probably on February 2 that the *senatus consultum ultimum* was passed.¹¹⁷ About this time also the decree commanding Lepidus and L. Munatius Plancus to march into Italy to the aid of the consuls and Octavianus was adopted.¹¹⁸

On the 3rd Pansa read in the senate a dispatch from his colleague, Hirtius, to the effect that the latter had expelled the garrison at Claterna and occupied the place.¹¹⁹ In a letter to Cassius, written soon after February 4,¹²⁰ Cicero says: "The decision in the whole war seems to rest on Decimus Brutus, and if he, as I hope, has broken out of Mutina, apparently there will be nothing left of the war. Quite small is the force that is besieging him now, for Antonius holds Bononia with a strong garrison. Moreover, Hirtius is at Claterna,¹²¹ Caesar near Forum Cornelium, both with reliable troops. Pansa has collected a large force at Rome from his levy. Up to this time the winter has prevented action. Hirtius, if we may judge from his frequent letters, will be careful in everything he does. Except Bononia, Regium Lepidi, and Parma, we are in control of all Gaul, which is thoroughly loyal. The Transpadani¹²²

¹¹² *Phil.* viii. 1; *Phil.* viii. was delivered February 3 (cf. 2. 6 and Nonius, p. 538); Ganter, p. 616.

¹¹³ *Phil.* viii. 11, 20. Q. Fufius Calenus was the author.

¹¹⁴ *Phil.* viii. 1, 2, 6. ¹¹⁵ viii. 32. ¹¹⁶ *Phil.* viii. 33.

¹¹⁷ *Res gestae* 1. 6.; Dio xlv. 31. 2. Mommsen, in his edition of the *Res gestae*, p. 4, is probably in error in assuming that this decree was a month earlier.

¹¹⁸ Dio xlv. 29. 6; *Fam.* x. 33.1. Lange (III, p. 536) considers that this S. C. was passed after the news of the battle of Mutina had reached Rome. But at this time Plancus was already on his way to Italy. *Vide Fam.* x. 9. 3; x. 11. 2 and Iullien, *Fondateur de Lyon*, p. 49.

¹¹⁹ *Phil.* viii. 6.

¹²⁰ *Fam.* xii. 5. For the date *vide* Ganter, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, CXLIX, pp. 613 ff.

¹²¹ According to Appian (iii. 65), Hirtius, having the chief command, obtained the two legions that had deserted Antonius.

¹²² Cf. *Phil.* xii. 10. *Patavini alios excluserunt, alios eiecerunt missos ab Antonio; pecunia, militibus, et quod maxime de-erat, armis nostros duces adiuverunt.*

too, your clients, are wonderfully attached to our cause. The senate is most resolute except the *consulares*, of whom only L. Caesar is reliable and upright. We have lost a tower of strength by the death of Servius Sulpicius. The rest are deficient, some in energy, others in principle. Some envy the fame of those who they see have won approval in the government. But there is a wonderful unanimity among the people at Rome and throughout Italy." A similar account of the situation is given in the tenth Philippic,¹²³ which was delivered shortly before this letter was written.¹²⁴

Cicero expected too much of Decimus Brutus. For probably the larger part of Antonius' forces—he had six legions¹²⁵ besides his praetorian cohort and cavalry—remained before the walls of Mutina. And even if Decimus who had only one veteran legion and two of recruits,¹²⁶ had been able to break through the strong circumvallation of Antonius, he would most likely have been crushed by the combined forces of his opponent before effecting his escape.¹²⁷ Cicero, in his picture of the situation in Italy, fails to take account of Ventidius Bassus with his three legions, two of which he had raised for Antonius, probably in the previous year, among the veterans of Caesar colonized in Campania, and the third, in the Picene country, in the early part of 43.¹²⁸ In the beginning of March, Ventidius was reported to have arrived at Ancona.¹²⁹

In the latter part of February Titus Munatius Plancus in the service of Antonius was defeated and forced out of Pollentia by Pontius Aquila, a *legatus* of Decimus Brutus.¹³⁰

Decimus himself, in Mutina, had repelled the assaults of Antonius with vigor.¹³¹ The secret agents of the latter, sent into the city to corrupt his men, Decimus detected and arrested. Anto-

¹²³ Paragraph 10.

¹²⁵ *Phil.* viii. 25.

¹²⁴ Cf. Gnater, *loc. cit.*

¹²⁶ *Fam.* x. 33. 4.

¹²⁷ Bononia, where the *magnum praesidium* was, was only twenty-five Roman miles from Mutina, and L. Antonius, at Parma, was only thirty-five Roman miles distant from Mutina.

¹²⁸ *App.* iii. 66. Cf. Schmidt, "P. Ventidius Bassus" (*Philologus*, LI, pp. 198 ff.), and Bodewig, *De proeliis apud Mutinam commissis*, pp. 9 ff.

¹²⁹ *Phil.* xii. 23. March 8 is the latest *terminus* for the delivery of *Philippic* xii (Ruete, p. 45). For the appointment of the second embassy to Antonius, which probably took place the day before the speech was delivered (certainly not more than two days before; cf. xii. 1 ff. and 7), is mentioned in the letter of Antonius to Hirtius and Caesar (*Phil.* xiii. 36) which was brought to Rome March 20. The *terminus post quem* is February 23 (*Phil.* xii. 24). *Philippic* xi, then, must be dated somewhat earlier than Schmidt puts it, as Reute has shown.

¹³⁰ *Dio* xlvi. 38. 3; *Phil.* xi. 14 (cf. *Phil.* xiii. 27). Schmidt (*De epist. et a Cassio et ad Cassium* pp. 34-37) thinks that the *terminus ante quem* of *Phil.* xi. was March 7.

¹³¹ *Dio* xlvi. 36. 1. Cf. *Phil.* viii. 17, 20.

nus had already by the end of January surrounded the town with works, and cut off communication with the outside world. Starvation seemed the only feasible method of reducing the besieged to submission.

In the beginning of March Cicero's anxiety for the safety of Decimus had become so great that he even allowed himself to be named a member of the new peace commission of five *consulares* that the senate voted to send to Antonius.¹³² But this action of the senate proved unpopular in the city, and Cicero, after reflecting that it would be a confession of weakness on the part of the government at Rome, appeared in the senate the next day, and, in the twelfth Philippic, pleaded that he along with the consul Pansa and others had been deceived¹³³ by the false hopes of peace held out by the friends of Antonius, and urged the folly and inexpediency of such an embassy, and especially the impossibility of his being a member of it. The consequence was that the embassy never left the city. From the letter of Antonius which Cicero incorporates in the thirteenth Philippic, it appears that Antonius had made overtures to Hirtius and Caesar, probably for the purpose of forming a compact with them without regard to the senate. Hirtius and Caesar wrote back that there could be no peace unless Decimus Brutus were either released or aided with provisions. They also referred in their letter to the fact that the senate had appointed *legati* to Antonius.¹³⁴ The latter replied in a scornful letter taunting Hirtius and Octavianus for acting with the Pompeians and the enemies of the dictator, after they had received so many favors at his hands.¹³⁵

The meeting of the senate at which this letter was read was held on March 20.¹³⁶ Perhaps Hirtius and Caesar were goaded to action by this stinging epistle which they received about the middle of March. For they now became alarmed for fear that Decimus, owing to the straits to which he was reduced for lack of food, might make terms with Antonius.¹³⁷ Accordingly, Caesar left his camp at Forum Cornelium, joined Hirtius at Claterna, and together they marched toward Bononia.¹³⁸ On their approach the garrison

¹³² *Phil.* xii. 1, 3, 17 ff.

¹³⁵ *Phil.* xiii. 22 ff.

¹³³ *Phil.* xii. 1, 2, 7.

¹³⁶ *Phil.* xiii. 7 ff., 50 and *Fam.* x. 6. 1.

¹³⁴ *Phil.* xiii. 34, 36.

¹³⁷ Dio xlvi. 36. 2; App. iii. 65.

¹³⁸ That Hirtius and Caesar did not winter together as Appian states, is shown by Cicero (*Fam.* xii. 5. 2): *erat autem Claternae noster Hirtius, ad Forum Cornelium Caesar . . . Hiemps adhuc rem geri prohibuerat*, whose statement is confirmed by Dio xlvi. 35. 7.

of Antonius abandoned the place; Hirtius and Caesar took it and proceeded on their march toward Mutina. They put to flight some cavalry of Antonius that had turned to face them; but when they came to the river Scultenna, about five Roman miles from Mutina, they found the bridge guarded by a strong detachment of Antonius' troops, and there they halted.¹³⁹

Wishing to indicate their presence to Decimus, they signalled to him by means of beacons lighted in the tops of the tallest trees. When these were not understood, they sent swimmers across the river in the night with letters written on thin plates of lead and fastened to their arms.¹⁴⁰ These messengers, it must be assumed, swam the river either above or below the place where the troops of Antonius were stationed and thus found their way past the sentinels of Antonius into the town.¹⁴¹ Hirtius and Decimus also made use of carrier pigeons to communicate with each other.¹⁴² Some relief was brought to the destitute condition of the besieged by means of salt and cattle floated down the river to a point from which they could be conveyed unnoticed into the town.¹⁴³

The extremity to which Decimus Brutus and his men were reduced for want of provisions caused disquiet at Rome. In two letters written about the end of March, one to Cassius,¹⁴⁴ the other to M. Brutus,¹⁴⁵ Cicero gives an idea of the desperate straits in which Decimus was. In the letter to M. Brutus, Cicero says: "At the time I write this, the situation is thought to have reached a crisis; for gloomy letters and reports are being brought from our Brutus." He goes on to say that he is not especially alarmed by these reports; that he has confidence in the armies and generals of the senate; he does not agree with the majority of people, for he does not find fault with the fidelity of the consuls, which is very much under suspicion. He does desire in some things foresight and

¹³⁹ Dio xlvi. 36. 3; Front. *Strateg.* iii. 13. 7. The Scultenna (*Scollenna*) is the western tributary of the *Panaro* (cf. Gardthausen ii. 1. pp. 37 f.). Appian (iii. 73) speaks of "bridges," but it is not likely that the *via Aemilia* crossed the Scultenna by more than one bridge.

¹⁴⁰ Dio xlvi. 36. 4, 5; Front. *Strateg.* iii. 13. 7; Plin. *N. H.* x. 37. 110.

¹⁴¹ The assumption of Paulus (p. 34) and Gardthausen (ii. 1. p. 38) that the Scultenna originally flowed beneath the walls of Mutina in the bed of what is now the eastern tributary of the Secchia, and has since changed its course, seems strange and difficult. It is true that the account of Frontinus conveys the impression that the Scultenna flowed close by the town of Mutina, though it does not distinctly say so. But if the troops of Hirtius and Caesar were encamped just across the river from Mutina, why was it necessary to signal their presence to the besieged from the tops of the tallest trees (Dio xlvi. 36. 4)?

¹⁴² Front. *Strateg.* iii. 13. 8; Plin. *N. H.* x. 110.

¹⁴⁴ *Fam.* xii. 6.

¹⁴³ Front. *Strateg.* iii. 14. 3, 4.

¹⁴⁵ *Ad Brut.* ii. 1.

haste, and if they (the consuls) had shown these qualities, they would long before have restored the free state. In the letter to Cassius, written a little later, he seems to have received more definite news from Decimus. "Brutus," he says,¹⁴⁶ "is holding out with difficulty now; if he has been saved, we have already conquered; but if—may the gods avert the omen!—you and Marcus Brutus are the last refuge of all."¹⁴⁷

From the first letter quoted it seems that the long delay of the consuls in making any effort to relieve Decimus caused their loyalty to be called into question. They certainly were singularly slow in bringing aid to Decimus, whose long and heroic defense of Mutina against overwhelming odds affords proof enough of his courage and fortitude as well as of his skill as a commander.

But the siege was not to last much longer. For on March 19¹⁴⁸ Pansa left Rome with the new levies, consisting of four legions of recruits,¹⁴⁹ to reinforce his colleague, Hirtius, and the young Caesar. To avoid Ventidius, who was watching for the consul at Ariminum or Fanum, Pansa marched along the *via Cassia*¹⁵⁰ by way of Faesulae toward Bononia. Hirtius sent Galba a hundred miles on the way to meet him and bid him hurry to the rescue. In the night of April 13–14, Hirtius, who was expecting Pansa to arrive in his camp on the next day, also sent D. Carfulenus with the Martian legion and two praetorian cohorts to conduct him and his recruits safely thither.¹⁵¹ There had already been numerous cavalry skirmishes, and Antonius, anxious for a decisive engagement before the arrival of Pansa, had appeared in battle array before the camp of Hirtius and Caesar. They did not show fight, however, as they were determined to wait for reinforcements.¹⁵² Consequently, Antonius marched with two veteran legions II and XXXV, to cut off Pansa, supposing that he would meet only raw recruits.¹⁵³ He awaited the approach of Pansa at Forum Gallorum, eight miles from Mutina, and having repulsed him, was himself defeated by Hirtius on the same

¹⁴⁶ *Fam.* xii. 6. 2.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *Ad Brut.* ii. 2. 2. (April 11): *Est enim spes omnis in Bruto expediendo, de quo vehementer timebamus.*

¹⁴⁸ *Fam.* xii. 25. 1. *Quinque tribus frequenti senatu . . . Pansa tuas litteras recitavit, and Phil.* xiii. 16: *Caesar coniecit invictum exercitum; duo fortissimi consules adsunt cum copiis.*

¹⁴⁹ *Fam.* x. 30. 1.

¹⁵⁰ *Phil.* xiii. 23; Schmidt, "P. Ventidius Bassus," *Philologus*, LX, pp. 205 f.

¹⁵¹ *Fam.* x. 30. 1.

¹⁵² *App.* iii. 65; *Dio* xlvi. 37. 1–3.

¹⁵³ *Fam.* x. 30. 4, 5.

ground and forced to retreat to his camp at Mutina.¹⁵⁴ While this battle was going on at Forum Gallorum, L. Antonius, at Mutina, made an attack on the camp of Hirtius and Caesar, but was repulsed by the latter.¹⁵⁵ These several engagements were fought on April 14,¹⁵⁶ and the news of them reached Rome on the 20th.¹⁵⁷

Three days before this news came there were rumors to the effect that Antonius had been victorious; whereupon his partisans planned to take possession of the Capitol, the Forum, and the gates of the city. They spread the report that Cicero intended to assume the *fascēs* as consul, and, according to Cicero himself, they plotted to kill him as a tyrant because of his alleged intention to usurp the consulship. But P. Apuleius, on April 20, got up a counter-demonstration on behalf of Cicero, in which a large assembly of the people declared its confidence in the patriotism of the orator. Within two or three hours thereafter came the joyful news of the victory and the dispatches of the republican generals. There was then another demonstration of the people, who in a vast throng conducted Cicero to the Capitol and thence to the Forum, where he responded in a speech to their expressions of good will and shouts of congratulation.¹⁵⁸ On the next day the senate met and, on the motion of Cicero, decreed that a monument be erected to the slain; that the rewards promised them be paid to their heirs; that there be *supplicationes* of fifty days in honor of the two consuls and of Octavianus, who were all three to be designated as *imperatores*; and that the promises already made to the soldiers be renewed.¹⁵⁹

The substance of Appian's report of the events after the battle of Forum Gallorum is as follows: After his defeat at Forum Gallorum, Antonius determined to avoid a pitched battle and to harass the enemy by cavalry skirmishes until Decimus, exhausted by want

¹⁵⁴ *Phil.* xiv. 27.

¹⁵⁵ *Phil.* xiv. 25, 37; *Fam.* x. 30; Dio xlv. 37; App. iii. 67 ff.

¹⁵⁶ Ovid, *Fasti* iv. 621 ff.; *C. I. L.* x. 8375, with Mommsen's discussion in *Hermes* (1882.) pp. 635 f. Mommsen and Holzapfel (*Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1894, pp. 400 f.) endeavor to show that the date of the battle given in the MSS of *Fam.* x. 30. 1, a. d. *XVII Kal. Mai.*, is the correct date, and that the passage in Ovid refers only to the battle fought by Octavianus in defense of the camp before Mutina, and fixes the date of that battle as April 14. But they must assume that the young Caesar fought two battles, one on the 14th and the other on the 15th; whereas Cicero, who had the official reports of the consuls and of the young Caesar himself (*Phil.* xiv. 22), ascribes only one battle to him (*Phil.* xiv. 6 and 28). Or they must assume that Cicero was simply mistaken when he put the battle fought by Caesar on the same day as the battles in which Pansa and Hirtius took part. But Cicero could not have made this mistake with the official dispatches in his hands.

¹⁵⁷ *Ad Brut.* i. 3. 2.

¹⁵⁸ *Phil.* xiv. 14-16; *Ad Brut.* i. 3. 2.

¹⁵⁹ *Phil.* xiv. 14, 34 ff.; Dio xlv. 38. 1. 2.

of food, should surrender. When Hirtius and Caesar, who on account of Decimus' situation were anxious for a decisive engagement, appeared in battle array before his camp, Antonius did not respond to the challenge. Hirtius and Caesar then proceeded toward the other side of the town, which was not so well guarded because naturally difficult of approach, with the idea of forcing an entrance from that quarter. Antonius attacked them with his cavalry only. The cavalry of Hirtius and Caesar halted to receive that of Antonius, while the rest of their army proceeded on its way around the town. Antonius, fearing that the town would be released from his grasp, led out two of his legions. The forces of Hirtius and Caesar turned and gave battle, and Antonius called his other legions from their camps. These legions, owing to the suddenness of the summons and the distance, were slow in coming to the relief, and so the troops of Caesar were victorious. Hirtius penetrated the enemy's camp and, fighting near Antonius' quarters, was slain. Caesar secured the body of the consul and held the enemy's camp until he was forced out by Antonius. Both sides spent the night under arms. On the next day, in a council of war, Antonius was advised by his friends to continue the siege, while abstaining from battle according to his previous plan. They urged that his enemies had suffered as much as he, that Hirtius had been killed, that Pansa was sick, that he had the advantage over them in cavalry, and that Mutina, reduced to the extremity of famine, would soon surrender. But Antonius, under the evil influence of a god, feared that Caesar, by an attack like that of the day before, would succeed in forcing an entrance into the town; or that he would endeavor to surround him with his superior force, in which case his own superiority in cavalry would not avail. He feared too the effect of a defeat on Lepidus and Plancus. So he decided to retire from Mutina with the design of effecting a junction first with Ventidius from Picenum and then with Lepidus and Plancus. With this in mind he proceeded toward the Alps. Such is the account of Appian (iii. 71, 72), the only source that gives any extended report of the battle of Mutina and the departure of Antonius from before its walls.

Dio relates that after the battle of Forum Gallorum, Antonius, when Hirtius and Caesar appeared before his camp at Mutina, at first was frightened and remained quiet, but, having been reinforced by Marcus Silanus with troops from Lepidus, he took courage,

made a sudden sally, and after much slaughter on both sides turned and fled.¹⁶⁰ In another passage¹⁶¹ Dio says that the rewards which the senate had previously promised to the soldiers of Caesar it now voted to give to those of Decimus, *although the latter had contributed nothing to the victory, but had seen it from the walls.*

Dio is in error in regard to the time of the coming of Silanus to the aid of Antonius. For we learn from Galba's account¹⁶² of the battle of Forum Gallorum that the praetorian cohort of Silanus took part in the battle, and therefore Silanus had reached Mutina at least a week before the battle there. Accordingly, the other statement of Dio that Antonius, because of the reinforcement brought by Silanus, made a sudden sally from his camp, thus assuming the offensive, contradicts the account of Appian given above as well as the probabilities in the case. For Appian expressly states that only when Hirtius and Caesar had started to attack another part of his circumvallation, did Antonius send his cavalry in pursuit and then lead out two of his legions. Again, Dio would have us believe that Antonius turned and fled from the battle, whereas Appian conveys a different impression. For he has it that, after Hirtius, who had taken possession of the camp of Antonius, had been slain, Caesar held the camp only a little while before he was dislodged by Antonius. Appian's account is borne out by the report of the battle that reached Asinius Pollio. Says Asinius in a letter to Cicero:¹⁶³ *Nunc haec mihi scribuntur ex Gallia Lepidi et nuntiantur, . . . †Hirtino autem proelio et quartam legionem et omnis peraeque Antoni caesas, item Hirti, quartam vero, cum castra quoque Antoni cepisset, a quinta legione concisam esse; ibi Hirtium quoque perisse et Pontium Aquilam; dici etiam Octavianum cecidisse (quae si, quod di prohibeant! vera sunt, non medeocriter doleo); Antonium turpiter Mutinae obsessionem reliquisse sed habere equitum V, legiones sub signis armatas tris et P. Bagienni unam, inermis bene multos, etc.* From this passage it is seen that Antonius' departure from Mutina was not a flight; that he had probably inflicted as much damage as he had suffered; but that, considering his position no longer tenable, and reflecting on the great advantages of union with Ventidius and afterward with Lepidus and Plancus, he retired of his own accord from the siege. Cicero himself writes,¹⁶⁴ after the true inwardness of Antonius' departure from Mutina became known

¹⁶⁰ Dio xlvi. 38. 5-7.¹⁶² Fam. x. 30. 1.¹⁶⁴ Fam. xi. 12. 2.¹⁶¹ Dio xlvi. 40. 2.¹⁶³ Fam. x. 33. 4.

at Rome: *Qui si ita se habet, ut, quem ad modum audiebam de Gracccio, confligi cum eo sine periculo non possit, non ille mihi fugisse a Mutina videtur, sed locum belli gerendi mutasse.* That Antonius' departure was looked upon at first as a retirement from a strong position and, as it were, an abandonment of the fight is shown by Pollio's expression: *Antonium turpiter Mutinae obsessio-nem reliquisse.*¹⁶⁵ All of this goes to show that Dio's statement that Antonius "turned and fled," whether he means from the battle or from Mutina, in either case conveys an erroneous impression.

Now, in view of the fact that every statement which Dio makes in regard to the battle is either false or conveys a wrong impression, save only his mention of the death of Hirtius¹⁶⁶ and of Pontius Aquila,¹⁶⁷ what he says in regard to the soldiers of Decimus Brutus—namely, that they had no part in the victory except merely as spectators from the walls—may be entirely disregarded. For this statement bears upon its face the stamp of improbability and falsehood, prompted by the desire of its original author to flatter Augustus. Furthermore, it is flatly contradicted by the testimony of both Marcus Brutus and Cicero. Brutus, writing from Dyrrachium in the early days of May on the receipt of the first news of the battle of Mutina, says:¹⁶⁸ *Cum alia laudo et gaudeo accidisse, tum quod Bruti eruptio non solum ipsi salutaris fuit sed etiam maximo ad victoriam adiumento.* Similarly explicit is the testimony of Cicero writing, May 29, after he had received the fullest possible information in regard to the battle, both favorable and unfavorable to Decimus Brutus:¹⁶⁹ *Tantam spem attulerat exploratae victoriae tua praeclara Mutina eruptio, fuga Antoni conciso exercitu, ut omnium, animi relaxati sint,* etc. It is conceivable that Decimus left a portion of his troops in the town to man the walls;¹⁷⁰ but

¹⁶⁵ No doubt it was reported at Rome that Antonius had been utterly routed and compelled to flee, which was only seemingly, not really true. Cf. *Fam.* xi. 14. 1.

¹⁶⁶ Dio xlvi. 39. 1.

¹⁶⁷ Dio xlvi. 40. 2. That Pontius Aquila had a part in the battle cannot be considered as proof of the participation of Decimus whose *legatus* he was. For Aquila had been operating outside of Mutina and was not in the town at the time of the battle, as Schmidt ("Der Tag der Schlacht von Mutina," *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1892, p. 323) seems to think. Cf. Schelle, *Todeskampff*, p. 19, n. 3; *Fam.* x. 33. 4; *Ad Brut.* i. 15. 8, and *supra*, p. 85.

¹⁶⁸ *Ad Brut.* i. 4. 1.

¹⁶⁹ *Fam.* xi. 14. 1.

¹⁷⁰ Schelle has attempted to reconcile the conflicting testimony of Dio and Cicero. His conclusion is (*Todeskampff*, pp. 17 ff.): *Er wird also anfangs sich abwartend verhalten und erst dann, als der Sieg sich auf die Seite seiner Verbündeten neigte, die Mutina einschliessenden Verschanzungen durchbrochen haben.*

that he led out a part against the besiegers, that they fought with desperation, and were an important factor in deciding the battle and influencing Antonius to retire from the town, seems as certain as anything can well be. If Decimus Brutus did not know of the fate of Hirtius and Aquila until the next day, we must assume that he made his sally through the circumvallation of Antonius at some distance from the latter's camp on the opposite side of the town; or, what is more likely, the camp of Antonius where Hirtius and Aquila were slain was some distance from the walls. After making his sally and driving off the besiegers toward the camp of Antonius, Decimus again retired within the walls.

The date of the battle of Mutina, since the conclusive demonstration of Schelle¹⁷¹ and the additional argument of Schmidt,¹⁷² is now generally accepted as April 21. On the 22d Antonius began his march toward the Alps,¹⁷³ and Decimus then learned for the first time of the deaths of Hirtius and Aquila. On the same day Decimus had an interview with the young Caesar,¹⁷⁴ whose camp was probably across the Scultenna, four Roman miles from the town.¹⁷⁵ He urged upon Octavianus the necessity of intercepting Ventidius before the latter could effect a junction with Antonius and advised him to cross the Apennines for that purpose, while he himself marched along the *via Aemilia* in pursuit of Antonius. Octavianus probably gave him no definite assurance of what he would do,¹⁷⁶ but professed loyalty to the cause of the senate.¹⁷⁷ On the morning of the 23d Decimus received a summons from Pansa, who was at Bononia dying from the wounds he had received at the battle of Forum Gallorum. On the way thither Decimus learned that Pansa was dead, and therefore returned to his troops at Mutina. They were very much reduced in number and, owing to their long privations, were in a wretched plight, and utterly unfit for the rapid pursuit of Antonius. Besides, Brutus had no cavalry and was without beasts of burden.¹⁷⁸ Before leaving

¹⁷¹ Schelle, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Todeskampfes der Römischen Republik*. pp. 9 ff.

¹⁷² Schmidt, "Der Tag der Schlacht von Mutina," *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1892, p. 325.

¹⁷³ App. iii. 72.

¹⁷⁴ *Fam.* xi. 13. 1.

¹⁷⁵ App. iii. 73. Appian's account of the interview between Decimus and Octavianus is false. Cf. *Fam.* xi. 13. 1.

¹⁷⁶ *Fam.* xi. 10. 4. *Quodsi Caesar me audisset atque Appenninum transisset*, etc.

¹⁷⁷ *Fam.* xi. 13. 1: *Caesari non credebam priusquam convenissem et collocutus essem*, implying that he trusted Caesar after the interview.

¹⁷⁸ *Fam.* xi. 13. 1, 2.

Mutina, he took over all the recruits of Pansa and Hirtius in the neighborhood, except one legion of Pansa which was under the command of Caesar.¹⁷⁹

On the morning of April 24 Decimus set out in pursuit of Antonius, who had two full days' start of him.¹⁸⁰ According to Schelle and Schmidt, owing to the exhausted condition of his troops, it must have required two days for him to reach Regium Lepidi, seventeen Roman miles from Mutina. There he halted and spent a few days in securing provisions for his army, as well as beasts of burden to convey his baggage. Antonius had just foraged the country, and Decimus' task of victualing his forces was therefore all the more difficult. At Regium he was probably joined by the troops of Pansa that had been stationed at Bononia.¹⁸¹

Meantime, on April 26 the news of the battle of Mutina reached Rome. The senate met immediately and declared that Antonius and his followers were *hostes*,¹⁸² and voted that their property be confiscated; that the *saga* be laid aside;¹⁸³ that there be a *supplicatio* in honor of Decimus in all the temples of the gods;¹⁸⁴ that he be granted the honor of a triumph;¹⁸⁵ that the consuls be buried in the Campus Martius, and that statues be erected to them and to Pontius Aquila, the *legatus* of Decimus.¹⁸⁶ To Octavianus it was voted that he be permitted to enter the city in ovation. The rewards promised to the soldiers were to be paid. That there was discrimination against the soldiers of the young Caesar, as is asserted by Livy, Velleius, and Cassius Dio, is hardly credible in view of the express testimony of Appian to the contrary.¹⁸⁷ The motion of Cicero that the name of Decimus Brutus be entered in the calendar opposite the day on which the news of his release from Mutina was received at Rome, which was also his birthday, failed of passage.¹⁸⁸ On the same day (April 27) it was decreed that Decimus Brutus should

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Schmidt, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1892, p. 328, and *Fam.* xi. 20. 4: *de exercitu quem Pansa habuit legionem mihi Caesar non remittit.*

¹⁸⁰ *Fam.* xi. 13. 2: *Biduo me Antonius antecessit.*

¹⁸¹ Cf. App. iii. 76; Schmidt, *loc. cit.*

¹⁸² *Ad Brut.* i. 5. 1, 3a; *Fam.* x. 21. 4; *Liv. Epit.* 119; Dio. xlvii. 39. 3.

¹⁸³ Dio xlvii. 39. 3.

¹⁸⁴ *Fam.* xi. 18. 3. Cf. Dio, *loc. cit.*, and 40. 1, and App. iii. 74.

¹⁸⁵ *Liv. Epit.* 119; Vell. ii. 62. 4.

¹⁸⁶ *Ad Brut.* i. 15. 8; *Liv. Epit.* 119; Vell. ii. 62. 4; Val. Max. v. 2. 10; Dio xlvii. 40. 2.

¹⁸⁷ Appian (iii. 74) says that the two legions that had deserted Antonius were to be paid 5,000 drachmae and to have the right of wearing an olive crown *in perpetuum*. Cf. *Fam.* xi. 20. 2, 3.

¹⁸⁸ *Ad Brut.* i. 15. 8; cf. *Fam.* xi. 10. 1 and xi. 11. 2. Schmidt, *Jahrb. f. Philol.*, 1892, p. 333, has fixed this date as April 27.

take command of the army of the consuls and should pursue Antonius.¹⁸⁹

Returning to Decimus Brutus, we find, from a letter of his to Cicero,¹⁹⁰ that on April 29 he was still at Regium. The time since he arrived he had spent in giving his troops a much-needed rest, in reorganizing his army, and in equipping it with provisions, baggage animals, and some cavalry. When ready to begin his march anew, he wrote Cicero of his plans. They were briefly: to drive Antonius out of Italy and guard the passes of the Alps to prevent his return, and to meet and defeat Ventidius Bassus, if possible, before he could effect a junction with Antonius. He urged Cicero to use his influence by messengers and letters with that "shifty fellow Lepidus," to prevent his renewing the war in conjunction with Antonius. He was firmly convinced that Lepidus would never do right. Of Asinius Pollio he expressed no judgment, for he thought that Cicero knew what Asinius would do. Lepidus and Asinius¹⁹¹ were important because of the number and reliability of their legions. He wished Cicero also to secure Plancus¹⁹² in whose loyalty Decimus had confidence after the defeat of Antonius.

On the 29th Decimus broke camp at Regium, continued his march along the *via Aemilia*, and on May 5 arrived at Dertona, having traversed the distance of about one hundred and ten Roman miles in seven days.¹⁹³ Here he received news of the decrees passed by the senate after the report of the battle of Mutina and the flight of Antonius had become known at Rome. He also learned of the rejection by the senate of Cicero's motion, that the 27th of April, his birthday, be indicated in the calendar as such, since it was also the day of the announcement in Rome of the victory at Mutina.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁹ *Ad Brut.* i. 5. 1; *Liv. Epit.* 120; *Fam.* xi. 14. 2, 19. 1; *App.* iii. 74, 76. 80; *Dio.* xlvi. 40, 1, 47, 3, 50. 1. For other decrees in regard to Sex. Pompeius, M. Brutus, and C. Cassius, *vide* Lange, III, p. 536.

¹⁹⁰ *Fam.* xi. 9.

¹⁹¹ Lepidus, governor of Narbonese Gaul and Hither Spain, had seven legions (*App.* iii. 84). Decimus' judgment of him was confirmed by the sequel. Asinius, governor of Further Spain, had three legions; *Fam.* x. 32. 4.

¹⁹² Plancus, governor of *Gallia Comata*, was at this time in the country of the Allobroges on his way to Italy in obedience to the command of the senate. (*Cf. supra*, p. 84, and *Fam.* xi. 11. 2.)

¹⁹³ *Fam.* xi. 10.

¹⁹⁴ *Ad Brut.* i. 15. 8; *cf.* Schmidt (*Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1802, p. 333), who says that the motion was that the expression *NAT(alis) D. IVNI BRUTI ALBINI* should be placed in the calendar opposite the 26th or, more correctly, the 27th, since on the latter day the news of the release of Decimus from siege reached Rome. The fact that Decimus received at Dertona the report of the defeat of Cicero's motion is, as Schmidt states, a proof that the battle of Mutina was fought on the 21st and the release of Decimus took place on the 22d. For it would require eight days for the account of the transactions of the senate on the 27th in regard to the good news about Decimus that left Mutina on the 22d, to reach Dertona. That is, the report of the senate's proceedings would get to Dertona about May 5.

In regard to those in the senate who objected to decrees in his honor, Decimus wrote Cicero that he preferred his judgment to that of all those of the opposition. For Cicero's judgment was real and sincere, whereas that of the opposition was warped by malice and envy.¹⁹⁵ "Let them prevent my being honored," says he, "provided they do not interfere with the successful conduct of the business of the state." He refers to the serious danger to the state involved in the loss of the consuls, and apparently hints at the ambition of Octavianus to hold the consulship.¹⁹⁶ He reports that Antonius, who had fled from Mutina with a "small force of unarmed infantry," by seizing gangs of slaves in barracks and impressing men of all conditions, had raised a considerable army. This army had been increased by the force of Ventidius, who had made a difficult march across the Apennines and, probably on May 3, joined Antonius at Vada Sabatia. Brutus complained bitterly of Octavianus because he had not crossed the Apennines and intercepted Ventidius. "For then I should have driven Antonius to such straits," says Decimus, "that he would have perished of destitution rather than by the sword."¹⁹⁷ But orders cannot be given to Caesar nor can Caesar give orders to his army."

After this union with Ventidius the plan of Antonius, according to Decimus, who was not yet sure of it, was either to join Lepidus; or, occupying the Apennines and Alps, to make raids with his large force of cavalry into the country round about; or to march back into Etruria, a part of Italy that was without an army. Decimus feared the effect at Rome of the strengthening of Antonius' army by new recruits and by the junction with Ventidius. The voluntary departure of Antonius from Mutina, having as it did the appearance of a flight, had not only produced the false impres-

¹⁹⁵ Cicero himself, two months later, in a letter to Marcus Brutus (i. 15. 8) says of those who opposed his motion for granting this special honor to Decimus: *Atque illo die cognovi paulo pluris in senatu malevolos esse quam gratos.*

¹⁹⁶ *Fam.* xi. 10. 1, 2: *Quae (res publica) quanto sit in periculo quam potero brevissime exponam. Primum omnium quantam perturbationem rerum urbanarum adferat obitus consulum quantamque cupiditatem hominibus honoris incitiat vacuitas non te fugit. Satis me multa scripsisse, quae litteris commendari possint, arbitror: scio enim cui scribam.*

¹⁹⁷ Schmidt (*Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1892, p. 327; *Philologus*, 1892, p. 208) has shown that the original plan of Decimus was that Caesar should march from Bononia across the Apennines to Florentia and meet Ventidius, who was probably at Faventia when the battle of Mutina was fought, and received orders immediately thereafter to march southwest across the Apennines to Florentia and thence northwest along the *via Aemilia*, in order to effect a junction with Antonius at Vada. This was probably the route that Ventidius did take; i. e., from Faventia by way of Faesulae, Pistoria, Luca, and Genua, to Vada, a distance of 250 miles.

sion at Rome that Antonius was completely routed and was running away as fast as he could with a mere handful of men, but it had deceived Decimus himself, who plainly underestimated the strength of Antonius after the battle.¹⁹⁸

If we are to believe the statement of Pollio, Antonius, after his union with Ventidius, had seven legions and five thousand cavalry under his command, though three of these legions were probably not full. That the army of Antonius was now stronger than that of Decimus it is safe to infer from the language of Cicero,¹⁹⁹ who had received, besides this letter of Brutus, a personal report from Brutus' messenger Graecceius. Decimus himself had but seven legions,²⁰⁰ only one of which had seen veteran service, the rest being for the most part raw recruits. These legions, he wrote Cicero, he was no longer able to support with his private means. He had spent his fortune of more than 40,000,000 sesterces and mortgaged all his property to his friends since he had undertaken the task of freeing the republic.²⁰¹

By the next day, May 6²⁰² Brutus had advanced into the country of the Statiellenses, where he learned definitely that Antonius was on his way to join Lepidus. In memoranda that had fallen into his hands, he found the names of the messengers Antonius had sent to Asinius, Lepidus, and Plancus, respectively. He immediately dispatched a messenger to Plancus urging him not to yield to the solicitations of Antonius, but to oppose him. Within two days he

¹⁹⁸ In *Fam.* xi. 9, Decimus seems to have more fear from Lepidus than from Antonius himself. In par. 3 of the present letter we have his conception of Antonius' force at Mutina: *Revertor nunc ad Antonium. Qui ex fuga cum parvulam manum peditum haberet inermium*, etc. Contrast with this the statement of Pollio, *Fam.* x. 33. 4: *Antonium turpiter Mutinae opsessionem reliquisse, sed habere equitum V, legiones sub signis armatas tris et P. Bagienni unam, inermis bene multos; Ventidium quoque se cum legione septima, octava, nona coniunxisse*. Compare with the estimate of Pollio, that of Lepidus (*Fam.* x. 34. 1.), who writes to Cicero from Pons Argenteus about May 18, not so long after the union of Ventidius and Antonius: *P. Ventidium suas legiones tris coniunxit cum eo et ultra me castra posuit. Habebat antea legionem quintam et ex reliquis legionibus magnam multitudinem, sed inermorum. Equitatum habet magnum: nam omnis ex proelio integer discessit, ita ut sint amplius equitum milia quinque*.

¹⁹⁹ *Fam.* xi. 12. 2: *Qui (Antonius) si ita se habet, ut, quem ad modum audiebam de Graecio, configi cum eo sine periculo non possit, non ille mihi fugisse a Mutina videtur, sed locum belli gerendi mutasse*.

²⁰⁰ To the three legions which had been with him at Mutina, had been added four of the five legions of recruits that had belonged to the armies of Hirtius and Pansa. Pansa had led four legions of recruits into Cisalpine Gaul, but the young Caesar, had retained one of these after the battle of Mutina. Hirtius' and Caesar's army before the arrival of Pansa had consisted of four veteran legions and one of recruits. Three of Pansa's legions and the one legion of recruits of Hirtius and Caesar had joined Decimus after his release from the siege. Cf. Groebe's *Drumann I*, pp. 450 ff.

²⁰¹ One of these friends was Pontius Aquila whose expenditures in behalf of Decimus' army the senate voted to refund to his heirs (*Dio* xlvi. 40. 2). If any proof were needed of Decimus' loyalty to the cause of the republic, this circumstance would seem to furnish it.

²⁰² *Fam.* xi. 11. 2.

expected to receive *legati* from the Allobroges and all Gaul, whom he purposed to send back home confirmed in their loyalty.²⁰³

From the country of the Statiellenses Decimus continued his march to the southwest toward Vada, where Antonius was encamped. When he was within thirty Roman miles of Vada,²⁰⁴ he received the report of a speech that Antonius had delivered to his soldiers in which he besought them to follow him across the Alps, and told them that he had an understanding with Lepidus. The soldiers of Ventidius cried out against this proposal of Antonius, saying that they ought to conquer or die in Italy. They then begged that they might march to Pollentia. Antonius, not being able to withstand their clamor, postponed his march until the next day. When Antonius' projected advance upon Pollentia became known to Decimus, he immediately dispatched five cohorts to anticipate him and directed thither the march of his main body. His cohorts arrived there an hour before Trebellius with the cavalry of Antonius. Decimus considered this an omen of victory.²⁰⁵ When Trebellius found the town already occupied by the troops of Brutus, he retreated southward and rejoined the main body of Antonius' forces, which now continued its march along the Ligurian coast toward Lepidus. Decimus must have arrived at Pollentia about the 11th of May. For on May 6, he was at a point about eight Roman miles east of Aquae Statiellae.²⁰⁶ From that point to Pollentia the distance by the road was about ninety-two miles, five days' march.

Paulus²⁰⁷ thinks that Decimus was deceived in thinking it of advantage to occupy Pollentia. But after the union of Antonius with Ventidius, Decimus probably decided, in view of the superiority of the veteran forces of the enemy to his own untried recruits, to avoid a pitched battle, and to march to join Plancus, especially as he thought that Lepidus would receive Antonius. Antonius doubtless knew that Decimus would direct his march toward the northwest and by taking the route along the upper Durius (*Dorea Baltea*) effect a junction with Plancus, who at this time was encamped upon the Isara near Cularo. Hence his object in sending his cavalry to

²⁰³ *Fam.* xi. 11. 1.

²⁰⁴ *Fam.* xi. 13. 3.

²⁰⁵ *Fam.* xi. 13. 4.

²⁰⁶ Ruete, *Correspondenz*, p. 50. Tyrrell and Purser, note to *Fam.* xi. 13, put Brutus at Aquae Statiellae on the morning of the 7th. But, probably, he spent the night of the 5th-6th at Dertona. And as it was twenty-seven miles from Dertona to Aquae Statiellae, he halted on the evening of the 6th at a point about eight miles east of Aquae Statiellae.

²⁰⁷ *Dissertation*, p. 47.

Pollentia was to obstruct the march of Decimus. In reaching Pollentia before the cavalry of Antonius, Decimus gained at least the advantage of keeping his road to Plancus clear.

Plancus had already on April 26,²⁰⁸ in tardy obedience to the mandate of the senate, crossed the Rhone near Lyons and entered Narbonese Gaul, the province of Lepidus, with the intention of marching into Italy and co-operating in the relief of Decimus Brutus at Mutina.²⁰⁹ He had chosen the route through Bergusium, Labiscum, Lemincum, along the valley of the Isara (Isère) through the Graian Alps to Eporedia.²¹⁰ When he had marched some distance into the country of the Allobroges, he heard the news of the battle of Mutina, halted his march, recalled his cavalry, and held his army in a waiting attitude. Meanwhile, through confidential messengers, he urged Lepidus to act in concert with himself against Antonius²¹¹ and for the republic. Lepidus pledged himself to give battle to Antonius, if he were not able to keep him out of his province, and requested Plancus to march with his forces to join him.²¹² Accordingly, Plancus turned southward and, on May 12, crossed the Isara (Isère) at Cularo by means of a bridge which he had constructed in a single day. On the 13th, having learned of the arrival of Lucius Antonius at Forum Iuli, he sent his brother with four thousand cavalry to meet him. He himself followed by forced marches with four legions and the rest of his cavalry.²¹³

From the statement of Plancus we infer that L. Antonius had reached Forum Iuli by the 8th or 9th. For it would require four or five days for a messenger to bring the news of his arrival to Plancus on the Isère. From a letter of Asinius Pollio, who announces to Cicero the union of Ventidius and Antonius and the occupation of the Alps by L. Antonius, we conclude that L. Antonius, with his contingent of cavalry and cohorts, was several days' march in advance of M. Antonius' main army.²¹⁴ We know from the probabilities in the case, as well as from the text of *Fam.* x. 17. 1, that Marcus Antonius with the vanguard of his main army did not arrive at Forum Iuli until May 15. For it is practically certain that M. Antonius was at Vada on May 6, where he made a speech to his

²⁰⁸ *Fam.* x. 9. 3.

²⁰⁹ *Fam.* x. 11. 2.

²¹⁰ Groebe's Drumann, *I. Anhang*, p. 463, and *C. I. L.*, XII, maps.

²¹¹ *Fam.* x. 11. 3, 15. 1.

²¹³ *Fam.* x. 15. 3, and cf. Groebe, Drumann, *I. Anhang* p. 464.

²¹² *Fam.* x. 15. 2.

²¹⁴ *Fam.* x. 33. 4.

army (*vide supra*, p. 98), probably, on that day.²¹⁵ He apparently did not leave Vada until May 7, possibly not until the 8th. On his departure, or before, he dispatched some cavalry under Trebellius to take Pollentia, or at least to make a feint against it. Whether he had to wait on the way for his cavalry to rejoin him or not, he would not be likely to march from Vada to Forum Iuli, a distance of one hundred and thirty-two Roman miles,²¹⁶ along the route of the *via Iulia Augusta*, in less than seven days. It would probably require eight days. And Antonius was, doubtless, delayed at least a day in waiting for the cavalry that had gone to Pollentia. Consequently, it is entirely reasonable to suppose that he reached Forum Iuli on May 15, just as we read in the text of *Fam.* x. 17. 1: *Antonius Id. Mai. ad. Forum Iuli cum primis copiis venit. Ventidius bidui spatio abest ab eo.* According to Groebe,²¹⁷ two of the best MSS have here *Antonius Idus Maias*, etc. And so, under the mistaken impression that the Antonius here mentioned is L. Antonius, whose arrival at Forum Iuli Plancus chronicles in *Fam.* x. 15. 3,²¹⁸ Groebe, in order to make Plancus consistent, suggests that, instead of the simple alteration in the MSS, *Idus Maias* to *Id. Mai.* (or *Maiis*), that our editors have adopted, we should write *a. d. VIII Idus Maias*. But the Antonius mentioned in *Fam.* x. 17. 1 is none other than Marcus Antonius, as is shown by the absence of the *praenomen* and by the mention of Ventidius in the immediate connection. Probably the truth is that Antonius, when he halted at Vada about May 3,²¹⁹ at once sent his brother Lucius on to meet Lepidus. And Plancus, having already written Cicero of Lucius' arrival at Forum Iuli, now informs him that Marcus with the vanguard of his main army has arrived at the same place. Hence Groebe's suggested change in the present text is unnecessary, incorrect, and impossible.

This same letter to Cicero, written by Plancus on the march from Cularo to join Lepidus,²²⁰ announces that Lepidus was

²¹⁵ *Fam.* xi. 13. 2, 3, 4; cf. xi. 10. 3 and xi. 11.

²¹⁶ *C. I. L.*, V, 2, p. 828, and XII, p. 635. *Tabula Peutingeriana* makes it 123 miles.

²¹⁷ Drumann, *Anhang*, p. 464. The MSS Groebe refers to are evidently *Meduceus* 49. 9 and *Harleianus* 2682. Cf. Mendelssohn, *Cicero Epistulae*, p. 256.

²¹⁸ *Cum vero mihi nuntiatum est L. Antonium praemissum cum equitibus venisse, fratrem cum equitum quattuor milibus, ut occurreret ei, misi a. d. III Idus Mai.* The MSS have *a. d. V Idus Mai.*; but see Tyrrell and Purser's note, Vol. VI, p. 146.

²¹⁹ Schmidt, *Jahrb. f. Phil.*, 1892, p. 326.

²²⁰ *Fam.* x. 17 is dated May 19 or 20 in Müller's and Purser's editions, but Groebe (Drumann, I, p. 467) puts it on May 27.

encamped at Forum Voconi, twenty-four Roman miles from Forum Iuli, and that he had determined to wait there until Plancus joined him. Lepidus himself had already informed Cicero of his arrival at Forum Voconi.²²¹ "On hearing," he wrote, "that Antonius with his troops was coming into my province, and that L. Antonius had been sent ahead with a part of the cavalry, I broke camp and began my march from the confluence of the Rhone²²² against them. And so by continuous marches I have come to Forum Voconi and have pitched my camp beyond on the Argenteus against the Antonians." In the same letter, after reciting the fact that Ventidius had joined Antonius with his three legions, and after stating the strength of Antonius' forces,²²³ he reports that several of the latter's men had crossed over to himself, and that the numbers of the enemy were being continually diminished. Among those who had left Antonius were Silanus and Culleo. Silanus, we remember, had been sent into Italy ostensibly to aid the republic, but had fought on the side of Antonius around Mutina.²²⁴ Q. Terentius Culleo had been stationed by Lepidus to guard the passes of the Alps, but had permitted Antonius to march through unhindered.²²⁵ Lepidus writes that, although he had been grievously wronged by those two in that they had gone over to Antonius, yet, out of regard for humanity and the ties of relationship(!),²²⁶ he had spared their lives, but at the same time he had dismissed them from his service and had forbidden them to remain in his camp. As far as the war was concerned, Lepidus professed loyalty to the senate and the republic. The date of this letter as well as of the arrival of Lepidus at the Argenteus was, probably, May 18.²²⁷ On the 22d he writes another letter²²⁸ to Cicero, referring to certain "false rumors" in Rome which called his loyalty in question, and expressing his pleasure that Cicero did not believe them. However, he made no promise of action against Antonius, but merely asked Cicero to expect him *in re publica administranda* to live up to his previous reputation, which, if we are to believe Dio,²²⁹ was certainly bad enough.

Returning to Decimus Brutus, we find that before receiving his letter, which announced his occupation of Pollentia,²³⁰ Cicero, about

²²¹ *Fam.* x. 34. 1.

²²² With the Druentia (Durance).

²²³ *Vide supra*, p. 96.

²²⁴ *Vide supra*, pp. 90 f.

²²⁵ *App.* iii. 83.

²²⁶ Lepidus was brother-in-law of Silanus.

²²⁷ Tyrrell and Purser, Vol. VI, p. 173, note.

²²⁸ *Fam.* x. 34. 3, 4.

²²⁹ Dio xliii. 1.

²³⁰ *Fam.* xi. 13. 1-4.

the middle of May wrote²³¹ him of the change that men had undergone in the city, when from the universal assurance that Antonius had fled broken-spirited and with a few panic-stricken, unarmed soldiers, they came to realize that he had merely transferred the seat of war and was still a dangerous antagonist. "Some actually complain and say that you did not pursue him; they think that, if you had hurried, he could have been crushed." Cicero apparently did not altogether approve of this criticism. "But still you must see to it," he adds, "that there can be no just complaint. The situation is thus: whoever crushes Antonius will finish the war."

A few days later, on May 19, Cicero wrote another letter²³² to Decimus, in which he censures him for the tone of a recent dispatch of his to the senate. In that communication Decimus had probably expressed in a guarded manner his apprehensions as to the attitude of Octavianus, and his lack of confidence in the position of the senate, and especially of its dominant faction, the party of Cicero and himself, in view of the supposed ambitions of the young Caesar. Accordingly, he advised that the senate take active measures to conciliate both Caesar and his soldiers.²³³ There was probably in the dispatch of Decimus, also, a warning that Lepidus would unite with Antonius against the republic. Cicero wrote Decimus that his advices to the senate were too timid, considering the victory at Mutina. Furthermore, the senate felt offended because he, either in the tone of his recommendations or in so many words, had reflected on its courage. Cicero in this letter not only implied that they were free from fear in regard to the danger at which Decimus had mysteriously hinted (the danger from Octavianus), but he assured him that neither did they fear Lepidus.²³⁴

But even before Cicero wrote this letter Decimus' apprehensions on the score of Lepidus had been removed. For on May 15, he received from Plancus the information that Antonius was not going to be received by Lepidus.²³⁵ This good news, coupled with the announcement that Plancus was on his way to join Lepidus, and that they were going to act in concert against Antonius, doubtless

²³¹ *Fam.* xi. 12.

²³² *Fam.* xi. 18.

²³³ Cf. *Fam.* xi. 20. 3, 4. After the battle of Mutina, Caesar with five legions (four of veterans, one of recruits. *Fam.* xi. 20. 3, 4) had marched southward, apparently to comply with the advice of Decimus to intercept Ventidius. He seems to have got somewhere near Ventidius, but made no attempt to stay his progress toward Antonius (*App.* iii. 80). He was probably engaged in raising additional troops and in political intrigues through his friends at Rome.

²³⁴ *Fam.* xi. 18. 1, 2.

²³⁵ *Fam.* x. 20. 2; xi. 14. 3; cf. xi. 23. 1.

had some influence in causing Decimus to delay his departure from Italy. For he naturally hoped that the combined forces of Plancus and Lepidus would be amply sufficient to crush Antonius. Besides, the menacing attitude of the veterans under Octavianus gave him serious alarm for the safety of his own party at Rome.²³⁶ These considerations seem to explain satisfactorily why Decimus determined to remain in Italy, at least until he heard from Cicero and got further orders from the senate.²³⁷

Consequently, instead of continuing his march by the most direct route to reach the passes of the Alps along the valley of the Durius (Dora Riparia), Decimus, after leaving Pollentia, turned eastward to Vercellae, probably to procure supplies for his needy troops and to obtain recruits. At Vercellae, on May 21,²³⁸ he wrote to Cicero, sending at the same time a dispatch to the senate, which probably contained something that might give offense to the friends of Octavianus.²³⁹ At any rate, Decimus wished Cicero to alter anything in his official letter that it might seem improper to make public. In his personal letter to Cicero he refers for the first time to his disappointment that the fourth and Martian legions had not joined him in accordance with the decree of the senate adopted soon after the battle of Mutina. We do not know what influenced these veterans. Probably they were unwilling, as was reported to Cicero,²⁴⁰ to serve under one who had had a part in killing Caesar, and doubtless the prospect of larger rewards from Octavianus had no little weight with them. In view of the uncertain temper of young Caesar and the threatening attitude of his soldiers, the veterans of the dictator, it was with good reason that Decimus had grave apprehensions as to the situation at Rome. *Nunc vero*, he writes, *cum sim cum tironibus egentissimis, valde et meam et vestram vicem timeam necesse est.*

On the 24th he had advanced northward to Eporedia, where he

²³⁶ *Fam.* xi. 20. 1, 2.

²³⁷ *Fam.* xi. 23. 2. Under the circumstances Paulus (p. 48) and Jullien (*Le Fondateur de Lyon*, p. 72) are unjust in their criticism of Decimus for his delay in crossing the Alps to join Plancus.

²³⁸ *Fam.* xi. 19.

²³⁹ An idea of the contents of the dispatch may be obtained from the letter of Cicero in reply (*Fam.* xi. 14. 2): *Pecuniae, quam desideras, ratio potest haberi eaque habebitur. De Bruto arcessendo Caesareque ad Italiae praesidium tenendo valde tibi adsentior. . . . Ex Africa legiones expectantur.* The summoning of Brutus was in reality suggested by Decimus to protect Cicero and the republicans from the young Caesar and his soldiers. So the reference to Caesar here must be a blind and at the same time intended to conciliate him. Besides, it was probably a good idea to keep him at a distance from Antonius.

²⁴⁰ *Fam.* xi. 14. 2; cf. *Phil.* xi. 38.

wrote²⁴¹ Cicero more in detail concerning the complaints of Caesar and the veterans. Cicero was reported to have made an intemperate remark about Octavianus (*laudandum adolescentem, ornandum, tollendum*), which had been repeated to the latter and, as Decimus hears, had given him offense. Decimus' authority for this story, Labeo Segulius, also wished him to believe that the veterans were angry because neither Caesar nor himself had been appointed on the board of ten that had been designated by the senate to assign lands to the soldiers. The language of the veterans, as Labeo had reported, was violent and threatening toward Cicero. When Decimus heard this, though already on his march toward the Alps, he halted until he could learn what was going on at Rome. In his opinion, the friends of Octavianus, by boasting and threatening, by inspiring Cicero with terror, and by urging on the young man, hoped to make profit for themselves. Still he advised Cicero to be on his guard, to comply with the wishes of the veterans in regard to the *decemviri*, and to secure the passage of a decree granting to them the lands belonging to the soldiers of Antonius and promising that the senate would determine in the future the matter of pecuniary rewards for them. Decimus had made up his mind not to leave Italy unless it were absolutely necessary. But he was not idle. He was arming and equipping new legions so as to have an army "to meet all the changes of fortune and the violence of men." In his next letter, of the following day, May 25²⁴² (he was still at Eporedia), he spoke with renewed confidence of the loyalty of Lepidus. As to Octavianus and the veterans, he seems to have received, after writing on the day before, reassuring news.²⁴³ So that his fears for Cicero and his party at Rome were somewhat relieved, and he could write: *Omni timore deposito debemus libere rei publicae consulere. Quod si omnia essent aliena,*²⁴⁴ *tamen tribus tantis exercitibus, propriis rei publicae, valentibus, magnum animum habere debebas, quem et semper habuisti et nunc fortuna adiuvante augere potes.*

Cicero, in his reply²⁴⁵ of June 4 to the first²⁴⁶ of Decimus' letters

²⁴¹ *Fam.* xi. 20.

²⁴² *Fam.* xi. 23.

²⁴³ Most likely in a letter from Cicero, possibly *Fam.* xi. 18.

²⁴⁴ Paragraph 1. In the expression *quod si omnia essent aliena*, Tyrrell and Purser think that the reference is to Lepidus and that "the three armies are those of Octavianus, of Plancus and his (Decimus') own." On the contrary, the reference in the expression quoted is to Octavianus, and the three armies are those of Lepidus, Plancus, and Decimus.

²⁴⁵ *Fam.* xi. 21.

²⁴⁶ *Fam.* xi. 20.

from Eporedia, avoided a direct denial of having made the remark about Octavianus that he was alleged to have made. He explained why Decimus and Octavianus were not appointed on the board of ten to distribute lands to the soldiers, by the fact that there was opposition to Decimus in the senate on the part of those who were persistently arrayed against any measure in his favor. Cicero makes light of the warning of Decimus that he should take care lest by showing fear he would be compelled to fear all the more:²⁴⁷ "Your injunction that I should be on my guard lest by showing fright I may be forced to be all the more afraid, is a wise and friendly one. But I should like you to persuade yourself, since you are well known to excel in that kind of courage, never to have any fear or alarm that I may attain even approximately to your particular brand of bravery."

In the next letter, written two days later, June 6, in reply to Decimus' second letter from Eporedia, Cicero says:²⁴⁸ *Quod scribis in Italia te moraturum, dum tibi litterae meae veniant, si per hostem licet, non erraris (multa enim Romae), sin adventu tuo bellum confici potest, nihil tibi sit antiquius.* He seems to admit that trouble was brewing at Rome—but he thinks that the ending of the war with Antonius would be the best service Decimus could render at that time.

But more than a week before Cicero wrote this, an event had happened that made the task of ending the war with Antonius under the circumstances almost an impossible one for Decimus. For on the 29th of May, in the early morning (the fourth watch), Antonius and his troops were received into the camp of Lepidus.²⁴⁹ Immediately after the union of the two armies, on the same day, Antonius began his march toward Plancus. Lepidus remained behind at the Pons Argenteus until the next day, May 30, to explain his treachery in an official letter to the magistrates and senate. Plancus, who was encamped at Verdon, forty Roman miles to the northwest of the camp of Lepidus, did not hear the news until Antonius was already within twenty miles of him. He at once began a hasty but orderly retreat. On the 4th of June he recrossed the Isara (Isère), cut down the bridges, and awaited at Cularo

²⁴⁷ *Fam.* xi. 21. 4; cf. xi. 20. 3.

²⁴⁸ *Fam.* xi. 24.

²⁴⁹ *Fam.* x. 35; x. 23; and x. 21 which Groebe (Drumann, I, pp. 465 ff.) puts after the news of the union of Lepidus and Antonius had reached Plancus on May 29. Cf. *App.* iii. 84; *Plut. Ant.* 18; *Dio* xlv. 51; *Vell.* ii. 63.

(Grenoble) the arrival of Decimus Brutus, whom he expected by June 8.²⁵⁰

Decimus must have started from Eporedia not later than May 27. For by the route which he took, along the valley of the Durius (*Dora Baltea*) through the Graian Alps, Darantasia, Obilinum, and down the valley of the Isara, the distance from Eporedia to Cularo was close on to two hundred Roman miles.²⁵¹ Allowing fifteen miles a day, a large number for that rough country, he would have had to leave Eporedia on May 27 to arrive at Cularo on June 8. Since his departure from Mutina he had increased his army by three new legions,²⁵² raised for the most part in the neighborhood of Eporedia. On his march to Plancus he seems to have received the news of the junction of Lepidus and Antonius; for on June 3 he wrote to Cicero:²⁵³ "In my deep grief I console myself with this reflection that men understand that with good reason I feared what has happened. Let them [the senate] deliberate whether or not to bring over the legions from Africa and Sardinia; whether or not to summon Brutus; and whether to give me pay for my soldiers or merely promise it. I have sent a dispatch to the senate. Believe me unless all these things are done just as I write, all of us will be imperiled. I request you to be careful to whom you intrust the business of leading the legions to me. Loyalty and haste are required." It is true that Decimus had early expressed his distrust of Lepidus; but recently he had suffered himself to be deceived by the optimistic reports from Plancus, and his fears from that source had been quieted. This last letter of his to Cicero betrays a petulance and impatience that was more characteristic of Marcus Brutus than of himself. But it is hardly strange that a man in his situation, in view of the slowness and indecision of the senate,²⁵⁴ should have thus expressed himself in a private letter.

Decimus' rapid march across the Alps seems to have surprised Antonius and Lepidus. His arrival at Cularo relieved the fears of Plancus that his army of four legions would be crushed by the combined forces of the enemy. Decimus and Plancus sent forward some cavalry to aid the Allobroges in delaying the approach of Antonius and Lepidus, and they apparently thought of advancing against them themselves, as we learn from their report²⁵⁵ to the

²⁵⁰ *Fam.* x. 23. 2, 3.

²⁵¹ Cf. *C. I. L.*, V, 2, pp. 755, 765, and maps of Vol. XII.

²⁵² *Fam.* xi. 20. 4 and x. 24. 3.

²⁵³ *Fam.* xi. 26.

²⁵⁴ Cf. *Fam.* xi. 14. 1.

²⁵⁵ *Fam.* xi. 13a. 4, 5.

magistrates and senate. "Nevertheless, even if by chance," this report goes on to say. "they should cross the Isara, we shall do our best to see that they do not inflict any damage on the republic." They further announce that the union of their armies is complete, but they urge diligence on the part of the government at Rome in sending them aid.

The junction of Decimus with Plancus raised the hopes of Cicero and those at Rome²⁵⁶ after the feeling of alarm that had followed the report of the treachery of Lepidus. On the 30th of June Lepidus was declared a public enemy (*hostis*) by the unanimous vote of the senate, along with the rest of those who had deserted the republic at the same time as he.²⁵⁷ To the latter, however, an opportunity of returning to allegiance before September 1 was left.

From the middle of June to the end of July the armies of Decimus Brutus and Plancus remained idle, awaiting, and at the same time dreading, an attack from the forces of Antonius and Lepidus. From the last letter²⁵⁸ we have from Plancus to Cicero, dated July 28, we learn why the consuls-designate had not dared to assume the offensive. "Up to this time," Plancus writes, "we have kept the situation unchanged. Although I know how much men desire a victory and not without reason, yet I hope you approve of our plan [of inactivity]. For, if there should be any reverse in the case of these armies, the republic has no great reserve force ready to withstand the sudden rebellious onslaught of these traitors. But I think you know the strength of our forces. In my camp I have three veteran legions, one of recruits which is quite the best of all. In his camp, Brutus has one veteran legion, one of two years' service, and eight of recruits. So the army, as a whole, is imposing in numbers, but weak in strength. Moreover, how much confidence can be put in a recruit in battle, too often we have learned by experience."²⁵⁹ It should be added, to what Plancus says of the state of their forces, that many of Brutus' men had suffered greatly from their privations and from sickness.²⁶⁰ It seems that Octavianus had promised to go to their assistance, and they had been expecting

²⁵⁶ *Fam.* xi. 15; x. 22.

²⁵⁸ *Fam.* x. 24.

²⁵⁷ *Fam.* xii. 10. 1.

²⁵⁹ *Fam.* x. 24. 3.

²⁶⁰ Appian (iii. 81) says that they suffered with the dysentery. Cf. *Fam.* xi. 19. 1, where Brutus says *cum sim cum tironibus egeniſſimis*, App. iii. 97.

the veteran legions from Africa.²⁶¹ Plancus thinks that if Caesar had been willing to come when he had promised, the war would have been ended, or Antonius and Lepidus would have been driven into Spain, which was most hostile to them.

The armies of Lepidus and Antonius were equal to those of their opponents in number of legions, and very much superior in cavalry strength, as well as in point of service and equipment.²⁶² Consequently Decimus and Plancus were probably wise in not risking a pitched battle. But prospect of reinforcement there was none. The urgent appeals of Cicero to Marcus Brutus to lead his army to Italy had been in vain.²⁶³ Cassius too had been summoned by Cicero, but with no better result.²⁶⁴ The African legions had not yet arrived, though a decree of the senate had summoned them.²⁶⁵ Altogether the outlook was exceedingly gloomy for Decimus and Plancus.

It was about a month after Plancus had written the letter above referred to, that, notwithstanding his many protestations of loyalty, he deserted Decimus and the republic and joined Antonius and Lepidus.²⁶⁶ Already on the 19th of August, Octavianus, with Q. Pedius as colleague, had been chosen consul; the decree of amnesty of the preceding year had then been repealed; and those who had occasioned the death of Caesar, together with their allies, had been condemned unheard to exile and the loss of their possessions.²⁶⁷ The army of Decimus Brutus had also by a decree of the senate been transferred to Caesar.²⁶⁸ And so when Decimus, on hearing of his own condemnation and of the understanding²⁶⁹ that had been brought about between Caesar on the one hand and Antonius and Lepidus on the other, proposed to march into Italy against the new enemy of himself and the republic, he was abandoned by Plancus.²⁷⁰ For Plancus found in the proposal of Decimus an excuse for com-

²⁶¹ Paragraph 4, 6; App. iii. 91.

²⁶² *Fam.* x. 33. 4; App. iii. 84. Antonius had seven legions and Lepidus seven. They also had a large body of cavalry and auxiliary troops.

²⁶³ *Ad Brut.* i. 10. 4, 5; *Fam.* xi. 25. 2.

²⁶⁴ *Fam.* xii. 10. 3; cf. App. iii. 85; cf. Dio xlvi. 51. 5.

²⁶⁵ *Fam.* xi. 14. 2; App. iii. 85.

²⁶⁶ Dio xlvi. 53. 2.

²⁶⁷ Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, 1, pp. 125 f. and ii. 1, pp. 47 f.

²⁶⁸ Dio xlvi. 47. 3.

²⁶⁹ App. iii. 96; Dio xlvi. 51. 52.

²⁷⁰ Dio xlvi. 53. 2.

pleting the arrangement between himself and Antonius that had been effected through the agency of Asinius Pollio, who a little while before had joined Antonius with two legions.²⁷¹

Decimus, thus forsaken by his colleague, determined at first to flee through Cisalpine Gaul and along the Adriatic Sea to join Marcus Brutus in Macedonia. He had probably already crossed the Alps into northern Italy, when he learned that his route through his province to Aquileia was blocked by Caesar, who had returned from Rome with his troops and was in the neighborhood of Bononia. He then turned toward the north with the intention of crossing the Rhine near its source and marching through the passes of the Raetian Alps, and thence through the wild country of Raetia and Noricum. But the courage and patience, as well as the physical endurance, of his troops were exhausted. The recruits, many of whom had been levied in Cisalpine Gaul, deserted first and marched to join Caesar. Soon afterward the veterans also abandoned him and proceeded to Antonius. Brutus was left with his bodyguard of Gallic horse. Of these, he released those who desired it from the obligation of further continuing the flight. Having distributed the money in his possession, he pressed on toward the Rhine with only three hundred horsemen. There, since the river was difficult to cross, all save ten deserted him. Having adopted the Gallic garb and being acquainted with the Gallic language, he abandoned his circuitous route across the Alps and now was making directly for Aquileia, thinking that with his small retinue he would not attract attention. But he fell into the hands of a band of mountain robbers and was bound and taken before the chieftain of their tribe, Camelus, to whom he had, as a provincial governor, shown many favors. Camelus greeted Decimus cordially, and pretended to be indignant that he had been bound, but straightway informed Antonius of his capture. Antonius sent some Gallic horsemen to fetch his head. There is a story of Valerius Maximus to the effect that, when Decimus and his party were discovered in hiding in the darkness, Terentius, a member of the little troop, pretended that he was Brutus and offered himself to be slain by the horsemen of Antonius, but, having been recognized by Furius, their leader, he failed even by his own death to save the life of his master.²⁷² In another passage Valerius states that, when Decimus was bidden to present his neck

²⁷¹ App. iii. 97.

²⁷² Val. Max. iv. 7. 6.

to the sword, he was persistent in refusing, saying: "I will give it provided I may live."²⁷³ These tales were probably invented by some flatterer of Augustus to cast a shadow over the name and fame of Decimus Brutus. The report of Appian²⁷⁴ practically agrees with that of Livy, Velleius, and Orosius, and we get therefrom no hint that Decimus died a coward. According to Appian, he was the next one of the *liberatores* after Trebonius to meet his fate, and paid the penalty for the assassination of the dictator within a year and a half of that event.²⁷⁵ His end must have come about the middle of September, 43.

²⁷³ Val. Max. ix. 13. 3; Seneca, *Epist.* 82. 11; Dio xlv. 53. 3.

²⁷⁴ App. iii. 98; Vell. ii. 64. 1; Liv. *Epit.* 120; Orosius VI. 18. 7. *Capenus Sequanus* in Livy's account was probably one of Antonius' Gallic horsemen.

²⁷⁵ App. iii. 98.