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BIOGRAPHYCAL UNIVERSAL LIBRARY |
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ARSACES I (247- 217 BC) ARSACES II. (217-209 BC) ARSACES III (191-176 BC)
PHRAATES I ( 176-165 BC) MITHRIDATES I. (165 - 132 BC) PHRAATES II. (132 - 127 BC) ;ARTABANUS II. (127 -124/3 BC). I.
ARSACES I. 247- 217 BC
The grand attempt of Alexander the Great to unite the
East and West in a single universal monarchy, magnificent in conception, and
carried out in act with extraordinary energy and political wisdom, so long as
he was spared to conduct his enterprise in person, was frustrated, in the first
place, by the unfortunate circumstance of his premature decease; and, secondly,
by the want of ability among his “Successors.” Although among them there were
several who possessed considerable talent, there was no commanding personality
of force sufficient to dominate the others, and certainly none who inherited
either Alexander’s grandeur of conception or his powers of execution, or who
can be imagined as, under any circumstances, successfully accomplishing his
projects. The scheme, therefore, which the great Macedonian had conceived,
unhappily collapsed, and his effort to unite and consolidate led only to
increased division and disintegration. He left behind him at least twelve rival
claimants of his power, and it was only by partition that the immediate
breaking out of civil war among the competitors was prevented. Partition itself
did but stave off the struggle for a few years, and the wars of the “Successors,”
which followed, caused further change, and tended to split the empire into
minute fragments. After a while the various collisions produced something like
a “survival of the fittest,” and about the close of the fourth century, after
the great battle of Ipsus (BC 301), that division of the Macedonian Empire was
made into four principal parts, which thenceforward for nearly three centuries
formed the basis of the political situation in Eastern Europe and Western Asia.
Macedonia, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt became the great powers of the time,
and on the fortunes of these four powers, their policies, and lines of action,
depended the general course of affairs in the Oriental world for the next two
hundred years at any rate.
Of these four great monarchies the one with which the
interests of Parthia were almost wholly bound up was the Syrian kingdom of the Seleucidae. Originally, Seleucus received nothing but the
single satrapy of Babylonia. But his military genius and his popularity were
such, that his dominion kept continually increasing until it became an empire
worthy of comparison with those ancient Oriental monarchies, which, in remoter
times, had attracted, and almost monopolised, the
attention of mankind. As early as BC 312, he had added to his original
government of Babylonia; the important countries of Media, Susiana, and Persia.
After Ipsus he received, by the agreement then made among the “Successors,” the
districts of Cappadocia, Eastern Phrygia, Upper Syria, Mesopotamia, and the
entire valley of the Euphrates; while, about the same time, or rather earlier,
he, by his own unassisted efforts, obtained the adhesion of all the eastern
provinces of Alexander’s Empire, Armenia, Assyria, Sagartia,
Carmania, Hyrcania, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Aria, Sarangia, Arachosia, Sacastana,
Gedrosia, and probably part of India. The empire thus established extended from
the Mediterranean on the west to the Indus valley and the Bolor mountain chain
upon the east, while it stretched from the Caspian and the Jaxartes towards the
north to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean southwards. Its entire area
could not have been much less than 1,200,000 square miles. Of these some
300,000 or 400,000 may have been desert; but the remainder was generally
fertile, and comprised within its limits some of the very most productive
regions in the whole world. The Mesopotamian lowland, the Orontes valley, the tract
between the Southern Caspian and the mountains, the regions about Merv and
Balkh, were among the richest in Asia, and produced grain and fruit in
incredible abundance. The fine pastures of Media and Armenia furnished
excellent horses. Bactria gave an inexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants in
large numbers were readily procurable from India. Gold, silver, copper, iron,
lead, tin were furnished by several of the provinces, and precious stones of
various kinds abounded. Moreover, for above ten centuries, the precious metals
and the most valuable kinds of merchandise had flowed from every quarter into
the region; and though the Macedonians may have carried off, or wasted, a
considerable quantity of both, yet the accumulations of ages withstood the
strain; and the hoarded wealth, which had come down from Assyrian, Babylonian,
and Median times, was to be found in the days of Seleucus chiefly within the
limits of his empire. It might have seemed that Western Asia was about to enjoy
under the Seleucid princes as tranquil and prosperous a condition as had
prevailed throughout the region for the two centuries which had intervened
between the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus (BC 538) and its
destruction by Alexander (BC 323). But the fair prospect was soon clouded over.
The Seleucid princes, instead of devoting themselves to the consolidation of
their power, in the vast region between the Euphrates and the Indus, turned all
their attention towards the West, and frittered away in petty quarrels for
small gains with their rivals in that quarter—the Ptolemies and the princes of
Asia Minor—those energies which would have been far better employed in
arranging and organising the extensive dominions
whereof they were already masters. It was symptomatic of this leaning to the
West, that the first Seleucus, almost as soon as he found himself in quiet
possession of his vast empire, transferred the seat of government from Lower
Mesopotamia to Upper Syria, from the banks of the Tigris to those of the
Orontes. This movement had fatal consequences. Already his empire contained
within itself an element of weakness in its over-great length, which cannot be
estimated at less than two thousand miles. To counteract this disadvantage a
fairly central position for the capital was almost a necessity. The empire of
Seleucus might have been conveniently ruled from the old Median capital of
Ecbatana, or the later Persian one of Susa. Even Babylon, or Seleucia, though
further to the west, were not unsuitable sites ; and had Seleucus been content
with either of these, no blame would attach to him. But when, to keep watch
upon his rivals, he removed the seat of government five hundred miles further
westward, and placed it almost on his extreme western frontier, within a few
miles of the Mediterranean, he intensified the weakness which required to be
counteracted, and made the disruption of his empire within no great length of
time certain. The change loosened the ties which bound the empire together,
offended the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their
monarch withdraw from them into a remote corner of his dominions, and
particularly weakened the grasp of the government on those more eastern
districts which were at once furthest from the new metropolis, and least
assimilated to the Hellenic character. Among the causes which led to the
disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom, there is none which deserves so well to
be considered the main cause as this. It was calculated at once to produce the
desire to revolt, and to render the reduction of revolted provinces difficult,
if not impossible.
The evil day, however, might have been indefinitely
postponed, if not even escaped altogether, had the Seleucid princes either
established and maintained throughout their empire a vigorous and efficient administration,
or abstained from entangling themselves in wars with their neighbours upon the
West—the Ptolemies, the kings of Pergamus, and others.
But the organisation of the
Seleucid Empire was unsatisfactory. Instead of pursuing the system inaugurated
by Alexander, and seeking to weld the heterogeneous elements of which his
kingdom was composed into a homogeneous whole, instead of at once conciliating
and elevating the Asiatics by uniting them with the
Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting intermarriage and social intercourse
between the two classes of his subjects, educating the Asiatics in Greek ideas and Greek schools, opening his court to them, promoting them to
high employments, making them feel that they were as much valued and as much
cared for as the people of the conquering race, the first Seleucus, and after
him his successors, fell back upon the older, simpler, and ruder system—the
system pursued before Alexander’s time by the Persians, and before them perhaps
by the Medes—the system most congenial to human laziness and human pride—that
of governing a nation of slaves by means of a clique of victorious aliens.
Seleucus divided his empire into satrapies, seventy-two in number. He bestowed
the office of satrap on none but Macedonians and Greeks. The standing army, by
means of which he maintained his authority, was indeed composed in the main of Asiatics, disciplined after the Greek model; but it was
officered entirely by men of Greek or Macedonian parentage. Nothing was done to
keep up the selfrespect of the Asiatics,
or to soften the unpleasantness which must always attach to being governed by
foreigners. Even the superintendence over the satraps seems to have been
insufficient. According to some writers, it was a gross outrage offered by a
satrap to an Asiatic subject that stirred up the Parthians to their revolt. The
story may not be true; but the currency given to it shows of what conduct to
those under their rule the satraps of the Seleucidae were thought, by those who lived near the time, to have been capable. It may be
said that this treatment was no worse than that whereto the subject races of
Western Asia had been accustomed for many centuries under their Persian,
Median, or Assyrian masters, and this statement may be quite consonant with
truth ; but a new yoke is always more galling than an old one; in addition to
which we must take into consideration the fact, that the hopes of the Asiatics had been raised by the policy of assimilation
avowed, and to some extent introduced, by Alexander; so that they may be
excused if they felt with some bitterness the disappointment of their very
legitimate expectations, when the Seleucidae revived
the old satrapial system, unmodified, unsoftened,
with all its many abuses as pronounced and as rampant as ever.
An entire abstention on the part of the Seleucidae from quarrels with the other “Successors of
Alexander,” would perhaps scarcely have been possible. Their territory bordered
on that of the Ptolemies and the kings of Pergamus, and was liable to invasion
from either quarter. But by planting their capital on the Orontes they
aggravated the importance of the attacks which they could not prevent, and
became mixed up with Pergamenian and Egyptian, and
even Macedonian, politics far more than was necessary. Had they but made
Seleucia permanently their metropolis, and held lightly by their dominion to
the west of the Euphrates, they might certainly have avoided to a large extent
the entanglements into which they were drawn by their actual policy, and have
been free to give their main attention to the true sources of their real
strength—the central and eastern provinces. But it may be doubted whether the
idea of abstention ever presented itself to the mind of any one of the early
Seleucid princes. It was the fond dream of each of them, as of the other “Successors,”
that possibly in his person might one day be reunited the whole of the
territories which had been ruled by the Great Conqueror. Each Seleucid prince
would have felt that he sacrificed his dearest and most cherished hopes, if he
had withdrawn from the regions of the west, and shunning engagements and adventures
in that quarter, had contented himself with efforts to consolidate a great
power in the more inland and more thoroughly Asiatic portions of the empire.
The result was that, during the first half of the
third century (BC 300-250), the Seleucid princes were almost constantly engaged
in disputes and wars in Asia Minor and Syria Proper, gave their personal
superintendence to those regions, and had neither time nor attention to spare
for the affairs of the far East. So long as the satraps of these regions paid
regularly their appointed tributes, and furnished regularly the required quotas
of troops for service in the western wars, Seleucus and his successors, the
first and second Antiochi, were content. The satraps
were left to, manage the affairs of their provinces at their own discretion ;
and we cannot be surprised if the absence of a controlling hand led to various
complications and disorders.
As time went on these disorders would naturally
increase, and matters might very probably have come to a head in a few more
years through the mere negligence and apathy of those who had the direction of
the state; but a further impulse towards actual disintegration was given by the
character of the second Antiochus, which was especially weak and contemptible.
To have taken the title of “Theos”— never before assumed, so far as we know, by
any monarch—was, even by itself, a sufficient indication of presumption and
folly, and might justify us, did we know no more of him, in concluding that the
calamities of his reign were the fruit of his unfitness to direct and rule an
empire. But we have further abundant evidence of his incapacity. He was noted,
even among Asiatic sovereigns, for luxury and debauchery; he neglected all
state affairs in the pursuit of pleasure; his wives and his male favourites were allowed to rule his kingdom at their will,
and their most flagrant crimes were neither restrained nor punished. The
satraps, to whom the character and conduct of their sovereign could not but
become known, would be partly encouraged to follow the bad example set them,
partly provoked by it to shake themselves free from the rule of so hateful yet
contemptible a master.
It may be added, that already there had been examples
of successful revolts on the part of satraps in outlying provinces, which could
not but have been generally known, and which must have excited ambitious
longings on the part of persons similarly placed, from the very beginning of
the Macedonian period. Even at the time of Alexander’s great conquests, a
Persian satrap, Atropates, succeeded in converting his satrapy of Upper
Media—thenceforward called Media Atropatene—into an independent sovereignty.
Not long afterwards, Cappadocia had detached itself from the kingdom of Eumenes
(BC 326), and had established its independence under Ariarathes, who became the
founder of a dynasty. Still earlier, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus, once
Persian provinces, had revolted, and in each case the revolt had issued in the
recovery of autonomy. Thus already in Western Asia, beside the
Greco-Macedonian kingdoms which had been established by the “Successors of
Alexander,” there were existent some five or six states which had had their
origin in successful rebellions.
Such were the circumstances under which, in or about
the year BC 256, which was the sixth year of Antiochus Theus, actual
disturbances broke out in the extreme north-east of the Seleucid Empire. The
first province to raise the standard of revolt, and proclaim itself
independent, was Bactria. This district had from a remote antiquity been one
with special pretensions. The country was fertile, and much of it readily
defensible; the people were hardy and valiant; they had been generally treated
with exceptional favour by the Persian monarchs; and
they seem to have had traditions which assigned them a pre-eminence among the
Arian nations at some indefinitely distant period. “Bactria with the lofty
banner ” is celebrated in one of the most ancient portions of the Zendavesta. It remained unsubdued until the time of Cyrus.
Cyrus is said by some to have left it as an appanage to his second son, Bardes,
or Tanyoxares. Under the Persians, it had for satrap
generally, or at any rate frequently, a member of the royal family. Alexander
had conquered it with difficulty, and only by prolonged efforts. It was
therefore natural that disintegration should make its first appearance in this
quarter. The Greek satrap of the time, Diodotus, either disgusted with the
conduct of Antiochus Theus, or simply seeing in his weakness and general
unpopularity an opportunity which it would be foolish to let slip, in or about
the year BC 256, assumed the style and title of king, struck coins stamped with
his own name, and established himself without any difficulty as king over the
entire province. Theus, engaged in war with the Egyptian monarch, Ptolemy
Philadelphus, did not even make an effort to put him down, and the Bactrian
ruler, without encountering any serious opposition, passed into the ranks of
autonomous sovereigns.
The example of successful revolt thus set could not
well be barren of consequences. If one Seleucid province might throw off the
yoke of its feudal lord with absolute impunity, why might not others? There
seemed to be actually nothing to prevent them. Syria, so far as we can discern,
allowed Bactria to go its way without any effort whatever either to check the
revolt or to punish it. For eighteen years no Syrian force came near the
country. Diodotus was permitted to consolidate his kingdom and rivet his
authority on his subjects, without any interference, and the Bactrian monarchy
became thus a permanent factor in Asiatic politics for nearly two centuries.
It was about six years after the establishment of
Bactrian independence that the Parthian satrapy followed the pattern set it by
its neighbour, and detached itself from the Seleucid Empire. The circumstances,
however, under which the severance took place were very different in the two
cases. History, by no means repeated itself. In Bactria the Greek satrap took
the lead; and the Bactrian kingdom was, at any rate at its commencement, as
thoroughly Hellenic as that of the Seleucidae. But in
Parthia Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The native Asiatics rebelled against their masters. A people of a rude
and uncivilised type, coarse and savage, but brave
and freedom-loving, rose up against the polished but comparatively effeminate
Greeks, who held them in subjection, and claimed and succeeded in establishing
their independence. The Parthian kingdom was thoroughly anti-Hellenic. It
appealed to patriotic feelings, and to the hate universally felt towards the
stranger. It set itself to undo the work of Alexander, to cast out the
Europeans, to recover for the native race the possession of its own continent.
“Asia for for the Asiatics,”
was its cry. It was naturally almost as hostile to Bactria as to Syria,
although danger from a common enemy might cause it sometimes to make a
temporary alliance with the former kingdom. It had, no doubt, the general
sympathy of the populations in the adjacent countries, and represented to them
the cause of freedom and autonomy. Arsaces effected for Parthia that which
Arminius strove to effect for Germany, and which Tell accomplished for
Switzerland, and Victor Emmanuel for Lombardy.
The circumstances of the revolt of Parthia are
variously narrated by ancient authors. According to a story reported by Strabo,
though not accepted as true by him, Arsaces was a Bactrian, who did not approve
of the proceedings of Diodotus, and, when he was successful, quitted the
newly-founded kingdom, and transferred his residence to Parthia, where he
stirred up an insurrection against the satrap, and, succeeding in the attempt,
induced the Parthians to accept him as their sovereign. But it is intrinsically
improbable that an entire foreigner would have been accepted as king under such
circumstances, and it is fatal to the narrative that every other account
contradicts the Bactrian origin of Arsaces, and makes him a Parthian, or next
door to a Parthian. Arrian states that Arsaces and his brother, Tiridates, were
Parthians, descendants of Phriapites, the son of
Arsaces; that they revolted against the satrap of Antiochus Theus, by name Pherecles, on account of a gross insult which he had
offered to one of them; and that finally, having murdered the satrap, they
declared Parthia independent, and set up a government of their own. Strabo,
while giving currency to more than one story on the subject, lets us see that,
in his own mind, he accepts the following account: “Arsaces was a Scythian, a
chief among the Parnian Dahae, who inhabited the valley of the Ochus (Attrek?). Soon after the establishment of Bactrian
independence, he entered Parthia at the head of a body of his country-men, and
succeeded in making himself master of it.” Finally, Justin, who no doubt, here
as elsewhere, follows Trogus Pompeius, a writer of
the Augustan age, expresses himself as follows: “Arsaces, having been long
accustomed to live by robbery and rapine, attacked the Parthians with a
predatory band, killed their satrap, Andragoras, and seized the supreme
authority.” This last account seems fairly probable, and does not greatly
differ from Arrian’s. If Arsaces was a Dahan chief, accustomed to make forays
into the fertile hill country of Parthia from the Chorasmian desert, and, in one of them, fell in with the Greek satrap, defeated him, and
slew him, it would not be unlikely that the Parthians, who were of a kindred
race, might be so delighted with his prowess as to invite him to place himself
at their head. An oppressed people gladly adopts as ruler the chieftain of an
allied tribe, if he has shown skill and daring, and promises them deliverance
from their oppressors.
The date of the Parthian revolt was probably BC 250,
which was the eleventh year of Antiochus Theus. Antiochus was at that time
engaged in a serious conflict with Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt, which,
however, was brought to a close in the following year by his marriage with
Berenice, Ptolemy’s daughter. It might have been expected that, as soon as his
hands were free, he would have turned his attention towards the East, and have
made an effort, at any rate, to regain his lost territory. But Antiochus lacked
either the energy or the courage to engage in a fresh war. He was selfish and
luxurious in his habits, and seems to have preferred the delights of repose
amid the soft seductions of Antioch to the perils and hardships of a campaign
in the rough Caspian region. At any rate, he remained quietly at home, while
Arsaces consolidated his power, chastised those who for one reason or another
resisted his authority, and settled himself firmly upon the throne. His capital
appears to have been Hecatompylus, which had been
built by Alexander in the valley of the Gurghan river. According to some late authors of small account, he came to a violent
end, having been killed in battle by a spear-thrust, which penetrated his side.
It is certain that he had a short reign, since he was succeeded in BC 248 by
his brother, Tiridates, the second Parthian monarch.
ARSACES II. 217 BC. In 209 BCTiridates, on ascending the throne, followed a
practice not very uncommon in the East, and adopted his brother’s name as a “throne-name,”
reigning as Arsaces the Second. He is the first Parthian king of whom we
possess contemporary memorials. The coins struck by Arsaces II commence the
Parthian series, and present to us a monarch of strongly-marked features, with
a large eye, a prominent, slightly aquiline nose, a projecting chin, and an
entire absence of hair. He wears upon his head a curious cap, or helmet, with
lappets on either side that reach to the shoulders, and has around his forehead
and above his ears a coronal of pearls, apparently of a large size. On the
reverse side of his coins he exhibits the figure of a man, seated on a sort of
stool, and holding out in front of him a strung bow, with the string uppermost.
This may be either a representation of himself in his war costume, or an ideal
figure of a Parthian god, but is probably the former. Tiridates takes upon his
coins the title either of “King,” or of “Great King.” The legend which they
bear is Greek, as is that of almost all the kings his successors. The coins
follow the Seleucid model.
Tiridates was an able and active monarch. He had the
good fortune to hold the throne for a period of above thirty years, and had
thus ample space for the development of his talents, and for completing the organisation of the kingdom. Having received Parthia from
his brother in a somewhat weak and unsettled condition, he left it a united and
powerful monarchy, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in its defences, in alliance with its nearest and most formidable
neighbour, and triumphant over the great power of Syria, which had hoped to
bring it once more into subjection. He witnessed some extraordinary movements,
and conducted affairs during their progress with prudence and moderation. He
was more than once brought into imminent danger, but succeeded in effectually
protecting himself. He made a judicious use of the opportunities which the disturbed
condition of Western Asia in his time presented to him, and might well be
considered, as he was by many, a sort of second founder of the State.
It was within two years of the accession of Tiridates
to the Parthian throne that one of those vast, but transient, revolutions to
which Asia is subject, but which are rare occurrences in Europe, swept over
Western Asia. Ptolemy Euergetes, the son of Philadelphus, having succeeded to
his father’s kingdom in BC 247, made war on Syria in BC 245, to avenge the
murder of his sister Berenice, to whose death the Syrian king, Seleucus II, had
been a party. In the war which followed he at first carried everything before
him. Having taken Antioch, he crossed the Euphrates, and, in the course of a
couple of years, succeeded in effecting the conquest of Mesopotamia, Assyria,
Babylonia, Susiana, Media, and Persia, while the smaller provinces, as far as
Parthia and Bactria, submitted to him without resistance. He went in person, as
he tells us, as far as Babylon, and, regarding his power as established,
proceeded somewhat hastily to gather the fruits of victory, by compelling the
conquered countries to surrender all the most valuable works of art which were
to be found in them, and sending off the treasures to Egypt, for the adornment
of Alexandria. He also levied heavy contributions on the countries which had
submitted to him, and altogether treated them with a severity that was
impolitic. Bactria and Parthia cannot but have felt considerable alarm at his
victorious progress. Here was a young warrior who, in a single campaign, had
marched the distance of a thousand miles from the banks of the Nile to those of
the Lower Euphrates, without so much as receiving a check, and who was
threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What resistance could the little
Parthian state hope to offer to him? It must have rejoiced the heart of
Tiridates to hear that, while the conqueror was reaping the spoils of victory
in his newly-subjugated provinces, dangerous disturbances had broken out in his
own land, which had forced him to withdraw his troops suddenly (BC 243), and
evacuate the territory which he had overrun. Thus his invasion proved to be a
raid rather than a real conquest, and, instead of damaging Parthia, had rather
the effect of improving her position, and contributing to the advance of her
power. On Ptolemy’s departure, Syria recovered her sway over her lost
provinces, and again stood forward; as Parthia’s principal enemy; but she was
less formidable than she had been previously; her hold over her outlying
dominions was relaxed, her strength was crippled, her prestige lost, and her honour tarnished. Tiridates saw in her depression his own
opportunity’ and, suddenly invading Hyrcania, his near neighbour, and Syria’s
most distant dependency, succeeded in overrunning it and detaching it from the
empire of the Seleucidae.
The gauntlet was thus thrown down to the Syrian king,
and a challenge given, which he was compelled to accept, unless he was prepared
to yield unresistingly, one after another, all the fairest of his remaining
provinces. It was not likely that he would so act. Seleucus II was no coward.
He had been engaged in wars almost continuously from his accession, and, though
more than once defeated in battle, had never shown the white feather. On
learning the loss of Hyrcania, he proceeded immediately to patch up a peace
with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, against whom he was at the time contending,
and having collected a large army, marched away to the East. He did not,
however, at once invade Parthia, but, deflecting his course to the right,
entered into negotiations with the revolted Bactrian king, Diodotus, and made
alliance with him against Tiridates. It may be supposed that he represented
Tiridates as their common foe, as much a danger to Bactria as to Syria, the
head of a movement, which was directed against Hellenism, and which aimed as
much at putting down Bactrian rule as Syrian. At any rate, he succeeded in
gaining Diodotus to his side; and the confederate monarchs, having joined their
forces, proceeded to invade the territory of the Parthian sovereign. Tiridates
did not await their onset. Regarding himself as overmatched, he quitted his
country, and fled northwards into the region between the Oxus and the Jaxartes,
where he took refuge with a Scythic tribe, called the Aspasiacae, which was powerful at this period. The Aspasiacae, probably lent him troops, for he did not remain
long in retirement; but, hearing that the first Diodotus, the ally of Seleucus,
had died, he contrived to draw over his son, Diodotus II, to his alliance, and,
in conjunction with him, gave Seleucus battle, and completely defeated his
army. Seleucus retreated hastily to Antioch, and resumed his struggle with his
brother, whom he eventually overcame; but, having learned wisdom by experience,
he made no further attempts against either the Bactrian or the Parthian power.
This victory was with reason regarded by the Parthians
as a sort of second beginning of their independence. Hitherto the kingdom had
existed precariously, and as it were by sufferance. From the day that the
revolt took place, it was certain that, some time or other, Syria would
reclaim, and make an attempt to recover, its lost territory. Until a battle had
been fought, until the new monarchy had measured its strength against that of
its former mistress, it was impossible for any one to feel secure that it would
be able to maintain its existence. The victory gained by Tiridates over
Seleucus Callinicus put an end to these doubts. It proved to the world at
large, as well as to the Parthians themselves, that they had nothing to
fear—that they were strong enough to preserve their freedom. If we consider the
enormous disproportion between the military strength and resources of the
narrow Parthian state and the vast Syrian Empire—if we remember that the one
comprised at this time about fifty thousand, and the other above a million of
square miles; that the one had inherited the wealth of ages, while the other
was probably as poor as any province in Asia; that the one possessed the
Macedonian arms, training, and tactics, while the other knew only the rude
warfare of the Steppes—the result of the struggle cannot but be regarded as
surprising. Still, it was not without precedent; and it has not been without
repetition. It adds another to the many instances, where a small but brave
people, bent on resisting foreign domination, have, when standing on their
defence in their own territory, proved more than a match for the utmost force
that a foe of overwhelming strength could bring against them. It reminds us of
Marathon of Bannockburn, of Morgarten. We may not sympathise wholly with the victors, for Greek civilization,
even of the type introduced by Alexander into Asia, was ill replaced by Tatar
coarseness and barbarism; but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spectacle
of a handful of gallant men determinedly resisting in the fastnesses of their
native land a host of aliens, and triumphing over their would-be oppressors.
The Parthians themselves were so impressed with the importance of the conflict,
that they preserved the memory of it by a solemn festival on the anniversary of
their victory, which was still celebrated in the days of the historian Trogus Pompeius.
It is possible that Seleucus would not have accepted
his defeat as final, or desisted from his attempt to reduce Parthia to
obedience, if he had felt perfectly free to continue or discontinue the
Parthian war at his pleasure. But, on his return to Antioch, he found much to
occupy him. His brother, Antiochus Hierax, was still a rebel against his
authority, and the proceedings of Attalus, King of Pergamus, were threatening.
Seleucus was engaged in contests with these two enemies from the time of his
return from Parthia (BC 237) almost to his death (BC 226). He was thus
compelled to leave Tiridates to take his own course, and either occupy himself
with fresh conquests, or devote himself to the strengthening and adorning of
Tiis existing kingdom, as he pleased. Tiridates chose 1 the latter course; and during
the remainder of his long reign, for the space of above twenty years, employed
his leisure in useful labours within the limits of
his own territories. He erected a number of strong forts, or castles, in
suitable positions, fortified the Parthian towns generally, and placed
garrisons in them, and carefully selected a site for a new city, which he
probably intended to make, and perhaps actually made, his capital. The
situation chosen was one in the mountain range known as Zapavortenon,
where a hill was found, surrounded on all sides by precipitous rocks, and
placed in the middle of a plain of extraordinary fertility. Abundant wood and
copious streams of water existed in the neighbourhood.
The soil was so rich that it scarcely required cultivation, and the woods were
so full of game as to afford endless amusement to hunters. The city itself was
called Dara, which the Greeks and Romans elongated into Dareium.
Its exact site is undiscovered; but it seems to have lain towards the east, and
was probably not very far from the now sacred city of Meshed.
We may account for the desire of Tiridates to
establish a new capital by the natural antipathy of the Parthians to the
Greeks, and the fact that Hecatompylos, which had been hitherto the seat of
government, was a thoroughly Greek town, having been built by Alexander the
Great, and peopled mainly by Grecian settlers. The Parthians disliked close contact
with Hellenic manners and Hellenic ideas. Just as, in their most palmy days,
they rejected Seleucia for their capital, and preferred to build the entirely
new town of Ctesiphon in its immediate vicinity, as the residence of the Court
and monarch, so even now, when their prosperity was but just budding, an
instinctive feeling of repulsion caused them to shrink from sharing a locality
with the Greeks, and make the experiment of having for their headquarters a
city wholly their own. The experiment did not altogether succeed. Either
Hecatompylos had natural advantages even greater than those of Dara, or, as the
growth of the Parthian power was mainly towards the west, the eastward position
of the latter was found inconvenient. After a short trial, the successors of
Tiridates ceased to reside at Dara, and Hecatompylos became once more the
Parthian capital and the seat of Parthian government.
ARSACES IIITiridates, having done his best, according to his lights,
for the security of Parthia from without, and for her prosperity within, died
peaceably after a reign which is reckoned at thirty-four years, and which
lasted probably from 248 to 214 BC. He left his throne to a son, named
Artabanus, who, like his father, took the “throne-name” of Arsaces, and is
known in history as Arsaces the Third.
Artabanus I, if we may judge by his coins, was not
unlike his father in appearance, having the same projecting and slightly
aquiline nose, and the same large eye; but he differed from his father in
possessing abundance of hair, and wearing a long beard. He has discarded,
moreover, the cap of Tiridates, and, instead
of it, wears his own hair, which he confines with a band (the diadem), passing
from the forehead to the occiput, there knotted, and flowing down behind. He
takes the later legend of his father—“Arsaces, the
Great King.”
It was the aim of Artabanus to pursue his father’s
aggressive policy, and further enlarge the limits of the kingdom. He was
scarcely settled upon the throne, when he declared war against Antiochus the
Great, the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, who had inherited the Syrian
crown in BC 223, and was entangled in a contest with one of the satraps of Asia
Minor, named Achaeus. Proceeding westward along the skirts of the mountains, he
made his way to Ecbatana in Media, receiving the submission of the various
countries as he went, and (nominally) adding to his dominions the entire tract
between Hyrcania and the Zagros mountain chain. From this elevated position he
threatened the low-lying countries of the Mesopotamian plain, and seemed
likely, unless opposed, in another campaign to reach the Euphrates. The
situation was most critical for Syria; and Antiochus, recognising his peril, bent all his energies to meet and overcome it. Fortunately he had
just crushed Achaeus, and was able, without greatly exposing himself to serious
loss in the West, to collect and lead a vast expedition against the East. With
an army of a hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, he set out for
Media in the spring of BC 213, recovered Ecbatana without a battle, and thence
pressed eastward after his startled enemy, who retreated as he advanced. In
vain Artabanus attempted to hinder his progress by stopping, or poisoning, the
wells along the route which he had necessarily to take; Antiochus caught the
poisoners at their work, and brushed them from his path. He then marched
rapidly against Parthia, and entering the enemy’s country, took and occupied
without a battle the chief city, Hecatompylos.
Artabanus, bent on avoiding an engagement, retreated
into Hyrcania, perhaps flattering himself that his adversary would not venture
to follow him into that rugged and almost inaccessible region. If so, however,
he soon found that he had underrated the perseverance and tenacity of the
Syrian king. Antiochus, after resting his army for a brief space at
Hecatompylos, set out in pursuit of his enemy, crossed by a difficult pass,
chiefly along the dry channel of a mountain torrent, obstructed by masses of
rock and trunks of trees, the high ridge which separated between Parthia and
Hyrcania—his advance disputed by the Parthians at every step—fought and won a
battle at the top, and thence descending into the rich Hyrcanian valley, endeavoured to take possession of “the entire country. But
Artabanus, brought to bay by his foe, defended himself with extraordinary
courage and energy. One by one the principal Hyrcanian towns were besieged and
taken, but the monarch himself was unsubdued. Carrying on a guerilla warfare,
moving from place to place, occupying one strong position after another, he
continued his resistance with such dogged firmness that at length the patience
of Antiochus was worn out, and he came to terms with his gallant adversary,
conceding to him that which was the real bone of contention, his independence.
Parthia came out of the struggle with the Great Antiochus unscathed: she did,
not even have to relinquish her conquered dependency of Hyrcania. Artabanus
moreover had the honour of being admitted into the
number of the Great King’s allies. As for Antiochus, he turned his attention to
the affairs of Bactria, and the remoter East, and having arranged them to his
satisfaction, returned by way of Arachosia,
Drangiana, and Kerman to his western possessions (BC 206).
The retirement of Antiochus, however honourable to Parthia, must have left her weakened and exhausted
by her vast and astonishing efforts. She had been taxed almost beyond her
strength, and must have needed a breathing-space to recruit and recover
herself. Artabanus wisely remained at peace during the rest of his reign; and
his son and successor, Priapatius, followed his
example. It was not till BC 181 that the fifth Arsaces, Phraates I, son of Priapatius, having mounted the throne, resumed the policy
of aggression introduced by Tiridates, and further extended the dominion of
Parthia in the region south of the Caspian. The great Antiochus was dead. His
successor, Seleucus IV (Philopator), was a weak and unenterprising prince, whom
the defeat of Magnesia had cowed, and who regarded inaction as his only
security. Aware probably of this condition of affairs, Phraates, early in his
reign, invaded the country of the Mardi, which lay in the mountain tract south
of the Caspian Sea, overran it, and added it to his territories. Successful
thus far, he proceeded to make an encroachment on Media Rhagiana,
the district between the Caspian Gates and Media Atropatene, by occupying the
tract immediately west of the Gates, and building there the important city of Charax, which he garrisoned with Mardians. This was an
advance of the Parthian Terminus towards the west by a distance of nearly two
hundred miles—an advance, not so much important in itself as in the indication
which it furnished, at once of Parthian aggressiveness and of Syrian inability
to withstand it. The conquests of Phraates added little either to the military
strength or to the resources of his kingdom, but they were prophetic of the
future. They foreshadowed that gradual waning of the Syrian and advance of the
Parthian state, which is the chief fact of West Asian history in the two
centuries immediately preceding our era, and which was to make itself
startlingly apparent within the next few years, during the reign of the sixth
Arsaces.
MITHRIDATES I. 165 - 132 BC.
Mithridates the First, a brother of Phraates, was
nominated to the kingly office by his predecessor, who had shown his affection
for him during his life by assuming the title of “Philadelphus” upon his coins,
and at his death passed over in his favour the claims
of several sons. Undoubtedly, he was a born “king of men”—pointed out by nature
as fitter to rule than any other individual among his contemporaries. He had a
physiognomy which was at once intelligent, strong, and dignified. He was ambitious,
but not possessed of an ambition which was likely to o’erleap itself”—strict, but not cruel—brave, energetic, a good general, an excellent
administrator, firm ruler. Parthia, under his government, advanced by leaps and
bounds.” Receiving at his accession kingdom but of narrow dimensions, confined
apparently between the city of Charax on the one side
and the river Arius, or Heri-rud, on the other, he
transformed it, within the space of thirty-seven years—which was the time that
his reign lasted—into a great and flourishing empire. It is not too much to say
that, but for him, Parthia might have remained to the end a mere petty state on
the outskirts of the Syrian kingdom, and, instead of becoming a rival to Rome,
might have sunk after a short time into insignificance and obscurity.
To explain the circumstances under which this vast
change—this revolution in the Asiatic balance of power—became possible, it is
necessary that we should cast our eye over the general condition of Western
Asia in the early part of the second century before our era, and especially
consider the course of events in the two kingdoms between which Parthia intervened,
the Bactrian and Syrian monarchies.
The Bactrian kingdom, as originally established by Diodotus,
lay wholly to the north of the Paropamisus, in the
long and broad valley of the Oxus, from its sources in the Pamir to its
entrance on the Kharesmian Desert. The countries to
the south of the range continued to be Syrian dependencies, and were reckoned
by Seleucus Nicator as included within the limits of his dominion. But it was
not long before the empire of Alexander in these parts began to crumble and
decay. Indian princes, like Sandracottus (Chandragupta) and Sophagasenus, asserted their
rights over the Region of the Five Rivers (Punjab), and even over the greater
portion of Afghanistan. Greek dominion was swept away. At the time when Bactria,
having had its independence acknowledged by Antiochus the Great, felt itself at
liberty to embark in ambitious enterprises, as Parthia had done, the
Greco-Macedonian sway over the tracts between Parthia and the Sutlej was either
swept away altogether, or reduced to a mere shadow ; and Euthydemus, the third
Bactrian monarch, was not afraid of provoking hostilities from Syria, when,
about BC 205, he began his aggressions in this direction. Under him, and under
his son and successor, Demetrius, in the twenty years between BC 205 and BC
185, Bactrian conquest was pushed as far as the Punjab region, Cabul and Candahar
were overrun, and the southern side of the mountains occupied from the Heri-rud to the Indus. Eucratidas, who
succeeded Demetrius (about BC 180), extended his sway still further into the
Punjab region but with unfortunate results, so far as his original territories
were concerned. Neglected, and comparatively denuded of troops, these districts
began to slip from his grasp. The Scythian nomads of the Steppes saw their
opportunity, and bursting into Bactria, harried it with fire and sword, even
occupying portions, and settling themselves in the Oxus valley.
While matters were thus progressing in the East, and
the Bactrian princes, attempting enterprises beyond their strength, were
exhausting rather than! advantaging the kingdom under their sway, the Seleucid
monarchs in the West were also becoming more and more entangled in
difficulties, partly of their own creation, partly brought about by the
ambition of pretenders.' Antiochus the Great, shortly after his return from the
eastern provinces, became embroiled with the Romans (BC 196), who dealt his
power a severe blow by the defeat of Magnesia (BC 190), and further weakened it
by the support which they lent to the kings of Pergamus, which was now the
ruling state in Asia Minor. The weakness of Antiochus encouraged Armenia to
revolt, and so lost Syria another province (BC 189). Troubles began to break
out in Elymais, consequent upon the exactions of the Seleucidae (BC 187). Eleven years later (BC 176) there was a lift of the clouds, and Syria
seemed about to recover herself through the courage and energy of the fourth
Antiochus (Epiphanes); but the hopes raised by his successes in Egypt (BC
171-168) and Armenia (BC. 165) were destroyed by his unwise conduct towards the
Jews, whom his persecuting policy permanently alienated, and erected into a
hostile state upon his southern border (BC 168-160). Epiphanes. having not only
plundered and desecrated the Temple, but having set himself to eradicate
utterly the Jewish religion, and completely Hellenise the people, was met with the most determined resistance on the part of a moiety
of the nation. A patriotic party rose up under devoted leaders, who asserted,
and in the end secured, the independence of their country. Not alone during the
remaining years of Epiphanes, but for half a century after his death,
throughout seven reigns, the struggle continued; Judaea taking advantage of
every trouble and difficulty in Syria to detach herself more and more
completely from her oppressor, and being a continued thorn in her side, a
constant source of weakness, preventing more than anything else the recovery of
her power. The triumph which Epiphanes had obtained in the distant Armenia,
where he defeated and captured the king, Artaxias, was a poor set-off against
the foe which he had created for himself at his doors through his cruelty and
intolerance. Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (BC 164) improve the condition of
affairs in Syria. The throne fell to his son, Antiochus V (Eupator),
a boy of nine, according to one authority, or, according to another, of twelve
years of age. The regent, Lysias, exercised the chief power, and was soon
engaged in a war with the Jews, whom the death of the oppressor had encouraged
to fresh efforts. The authority of Lysias was further disputed by a certain
Philip, whom Epiphanes, shortly before his death, had made tutor to the young
monarch. The claim of this tutor to the regent’s office being supported by a
considerable portion of the army, a civil war arose between him and Lysias,
which raged for the greater part of two, years, terminating in the defeat and
death of Philip (BC 162). But Syrian affairs did not even then settle down into tranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid house,
Demetrius by name, the son of Seleucus IV, and consequently the first cousin of Eupator, was at this time detained in Rome as a
hostage, having been sent there during his father’s lifetime, as a security for
his fidelity. Demetrius, with some reason, regarded his claim to the Syrian
throne as better than that of his cousin, who was the son of the younger
brother; and, being in the full vigour of early
youth, he determined to assert his pretensions in Syria, and to make a bold
stroke for the crown. Having failed to obtain the Senate’s consent to his
quitting Italy, he took his departure secretly, crossed the Mediterranean in a Carthaginian
vessel, and landing in Asia, succeeded within a few months in establishing
himself as Syrian monarch.
From this review of the condition of affairs in the
Syrian and Bactrian kingdoms during the first half of the second century before
Christ, it is sufficiently apparent, that in both countries the state of things
was favourable to any aspirations which the power
that lay between them might entertain after dominion and self-aggrandisement.
The kings of the two countries indeed, at the time of the accession of
Mithridates to the Parthian throne (BC 174), were, both of them, energetic and
able princes, but the Syrian monarch was involved in difficulties at home which
required all his attention, while the Bactrian was engaged in enterprises
abroad which equally engrossed and occupied him. Mithridates might have
attacked either with a good prospect of success. Personally, he was at least
their equal, and though considerably inferior in military strength and resources,
he possessed the great advantage of having a perfectly free choice both of time
and place, could seize the most unguarded moment, and make his attack in the
quarter where he knew that he would be least expected and least likely to find
his enemy on the alert. Circumstances, of which we now cannot appreciate the
force, seem to have determined him to direct his first attack against the
territories of his eastern neighbour, the Bactrian king, Eucratidas.
These, as we have seen, were left comparatively unguarded, while their
ambitious master threw all his strength into his Indian wars, pressing through
Cabul into the Punjab region, and seeking to extend his dominion to the Sutlej
river, or even to the Ganges. Naturally, Mithridates was successful. Attacking
the Bactrian territory where it adjoined Parthia, he made himself master,
without much difficulty, of two provinces—those of Turiua and of Aspionus. Turiua recalls the great but vague name of
“Turanian,” which certainly belongs to these parts, but can scarcely be
regarded as local. Aspionus has been regarded as the
district of the Aspasiacae; but the two words do not
invite comparison. It is best to be content with saying that we cannot locate
the districts conquered, but that they should be looked for in the district of
the Tejend and Heri-rud,
between the Paropamisus and the great city of Balkh.
It does not appear that Eucratidas attempted any retaliation. Absorbed in his schemes of Indian conquest, he let
his home provinces go, and sought compensation for them only in the far East.
Mean-time Mithridates, having been successful in his Bactrian aggression, and
thus whetted his appetite for territorial gain, determined on a more important
expedition. After waiting for a few years, until Epiphanes was dead, and the
Syrian throne occupied by the boy king, Eupator,
while the two claimants of the regency, Lysias and Philip, were contending in
arms for the supreme power, he suddenly marched with a large force towards the
West, and fell upon the great province of Media Magna, which, though still
nominally a Syrian dependency, was under the rule of a king, and practically,
if not legally, independent. Media was a most extensive and powerful country.
Polybius calls it “the most powerful of all the kingdoms of Asia, whether we
consider the extent of the territory, or the number and quality of the men, or
the goodness of the horses produced there. For these animals,” he says, “are
found in it in such abundance, that almost all the rest of Asia is supplied
with them from this province. It is here, also that the Royal horses are always
fed, on account of the excellence of the pasture.” The capital of the province
was now, as in the more ancient times, Ecbatana, situated on the declivity of
Mount Orontes (Elwand), and, though fallen from its
former grandeur, yet still a place of much importance, second only in all
Western Asia to Antioch and perhaps Babylon. The invasion of Mithridates was
stoutly resisted by the Medes, and several engagements took place, in which
sometimes one and sometimes the other side had the. advantage; but eventually
the Parthians prevailed. Mithridates seized and occupied Ecbatana, which was at
the time an unwalled town, established his authority over the whole region, and
finally placed it under the government of a Parthian satrap, Bacasis, while he himself returned home, to crush a revolt
which had broken out.
The scene of the revolt was Hyrcania. The Hyrcanian
people, one markedly Arian, had probably from the time of their subjugation
chafed under the Parthian yoke, and seeing in the absence of Mithridates, with
almost the whole of his power, in Media a tempting opportunity, had resolved to
make a bold stroke for freedom before the further growth of Parthia should
render such an attempt hopeless. We are not told that they had any special
grievances; but they were brave and high-spirited they had enjoyed exceptional
privileges under the Persians; and no doubt they found the rule of a Turanian
people galling and oppressive. They may well have expected to receive support
and assistance from the other Arian nations in their neighbourhood,
as the Mardi, the Sagartians, the Arians on the Heri-rud, &c., and they may have thought that Mithridates
would be too fully occupied with his Median struggle to have leisure to direct
his arms against them. But the event showed that they had miscalculated. Media
submitted to Mithridates without any very protracted resistance; the Parthian
monarch knew the value of time, and, quitting Media, marched upon Hyrcania
without losing a moment; the others Arian tribes of the vicinity were either
apathetic or timid, and did not stir a step for their relief. The insurrection
was nipped in the bud; Hyrcania was forced to submit, and became for centuries
the obedient vassal of her powerful neighbour.
The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians into
contact with the important country of Susiana or Elymais, an ancient seat of
power, and one which had flourished much during the whole of the Persian
period, having contained within it the principal Persian capital, Susa. This
tract possessed strong attractions for a conqueror; and it appears to have been
not very long after he had succeeded in crushing the Hyrcanian revolt, that
Mithridates once more turned his arms westward, and from the advantageous
position which he held in Media, directed an attack upon the rich and flourishing
province which lay to the south. It would seem that Elymais, like Media, though
reckoned a dependency of the Seleucid Empire, had a king of its own, who was
entrusted with its government and defence, and expected to fight his own
battles. At any rate we do not hear of any aid being rendered to the Elymaeans in this war, or of Mithridates having any other
antagonist to meet in the course of it, besides “the Elymaean king.” This monarch he defeated without difficulty, and, having overrun his
country, apparently in a single campaign, added the entire territory to his
dominions.
Elymais was interposed between two regions of
first-rate importance, Babylonia and Persia. The thorough mastery of any one of
the three, commonly carried with it in ancient times dominion over the other
two. So far as can be gathered from the scanty materials which we possess for
Parthian . history at this period, the conquest of Elymais was followed almost
immediately by the submission of Babylonia and Persia to the conqueror. Media
and Elymais having been forced to submit, the great Mithridates was very
shortly acknowledged as their sovereign lord by all the countries that
intervened between the Paropamisus and the Lower
Euphrates.
Thus gloriously successful in this quarter, Mithridates,
who may fairly be considered the greatest monarch of his day, after devoting a
few years to repose, judged that the time was come for once more embarking on a
career of aggression, and seeking a similar extension of his dominions towards
the East to that which he had found it so easy to effect in the regions of the
West. The Bactrian troubles hack increased. Eucratidas,
after greatly straining the resources of Bactria in his Indian wars, had been
waylaid and murdered on his return from one of them by his son Heliocles, who chose to declare him a public enemy, drove
his chariot over his corpse, and ordered it to be left unburied. This ill
beginning inaugurated an unfortunate reign. Attacked by Scythians from the
north, by Indians and Sarangians on the east and the
south-east, Heliocles had already more on his hands
than he could conveniently manage, when Mithridates declared war against him,
and marched into his country (about BC 150). Already exhausted by his other
wars, Heliocles could bear up no longer. Mithridates
rapidly overran his dominions, and took possession of the greater part of them.
According to some he did not stop here, but pressing still further eastward
invaded India, and carried his arms over the Punjab to the banks of the
Hydaspes. But this last advance, if it ever took place, was a raid rather than
an attempt at conquest. It had no serious results. Indo-Bactrian kingdoms
continued to exist in Cabul down to about BC 80, when Hellenism in this quarter
was finally swept away by the Yue-chi and other Scythic tribes. The Parthian Empire never included any portion of the Indus region, its
furthest provinces towards the east being Bactria, Aria, Sarangia, Arachosia, and Sacastana.
The great increase of power which Mithridates had
obtained by his conquests could not be a matter of indifference to the Syrian
monarchs. But their domestic troubles—the contentions between Philip and
Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius Soter, Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas
and Demetrius II, Demetrius II and Tryphon—had so engrossed them for twenty
years (from 162 to 142 BC), that they had felt it impossible, or hopeless, to
attempt any expedition towards the East, for the protection or recovery of
their provinces. Mithridates had been allowed to pursue his career of conquest
unopposed, so far as the Syrians were concerned, and to establish his sway from
the Hindu Kush to the Euphrates, time, however, at last came when home dangers
were less absorbing, and a prospect of engaging the terrible Parthians with
success seemed to present itself. The second Demetrius had not, indeed,
altogether overcome his domestic enemy, Tryphon; but he had so far brought him
into difficulties as to believe that he might safely be left to be dealt with
by his wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains. At the same time, the condition of
affairs in the East seemed to invite his interference. Mithridates ruled his
new conquests with some strictness, probably suspecting their fidelity, and
determined that he would not by any remissness allow them to escape from his
grasp.
The native inhabitants could scarcely be much attached
to the Syro-Macedonians, who had certainly not
treated them with much tenderness; but a possession of one hundred and ninety
years’ duration confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may have
galled more than one to whose pressure they had become accustomed. Moreover,
all the provinces which the Parthians had taken from Syria contained Greek
towns, and their inhabitants might at all times be depended on to side with
their countrymen against the Asiatics. At the present
conjuncture, too, the number of the malcontents was swelled by the addition of
the recently subdued Bactrians, who hated the Parthian yoke, and longed for an
opportunity of recovering their freedom.
Thus, when Demetrius II, anxious to escape the
reproach of inertness, determined to make a great expedition upon the
formidable Parthian monarch, who ruled over all the countries between the Paropamisus and the Lower Euphrates, he found himself
welcomed as a deliverer by a considerable number of his enemy’s subjects, whom
the harshness or the novelty of the Parthian rule had offended. The malcontents
joined his standard as he advanced; and supported, as he thus was, by Persian, Elymaean, and Bactrian contingents, he engaged and defeated
the Parthians in several battles. Mithridates at last, recognising his inferiority in military strength, determined to have recourse to stratagem,
and having put Demetrius off his guard by proposals of peace, made a sudden
attack upon him, completely defeated his army, and took him prisoner. The
conquered monarch was at first treated with some harshness, being conveyed
about to the several nations which had revolted, and paraded before each in
turn, to show them how foolish they had been in lending him their aid; but when
this purpose had been answered, Mithridates showed himself magnanimous, gave
his royal captive the honours befitting his rank,
assigned him a residence in Hyrcania, and even gave him the hand of his
daughter, Rhodogune, in marriage. It was policy,
however, still more than clemency, which dictated this conduct. Mithridates
nurtured designs against the Syrian kingdom itself, and saw that it would be
for his advantage to have a Syrian prince in his camp, allied to him by
marriage, whom he could put forward as entitled to the throne, and whom, if his
enterprise succeeded, he might leave to govern Syria for him, as tributary
monarch. These far-reaching plans might perhaps have been crowned with success,
had the head which conceived them been spared to watch over and direct their
execution. But Providence decreed otherwise. Mithridates had reached an
advanced age, and, being attacked by illness soon after his capture of
Demetrius, found his strength insufficient to battle with his malady, and, to
the great grief of his subjects, succumbed to it (BC 136), after an eventful
and glorious reign of thirty-eight years.
PHRAATES II. 132 - 127 BC.
The death of Mithridates, and the accession of a
comparatively unenterprising successor, Phraates II, encouraged Syria to make
one more effort to thrust the Parthians back into their native wilds, and to
recover the dominion of Western Asia. So great a position was not a thing to be
surrendered without a final, even if it were a despairing, struggle ; and in
the actual position of affairs it was quite open to question whether, on the
whole, Parthia or Syria were the stronger. The dominion of both countries was
comparatively recent; neither had any firm hold on its outlying provinces;
neither could claim to have conciliated to itself the affections of the Western Asiatics generally, or to rest its power on any other
basis than that of military force. And in military force it was uncertain which
way the balance inclined. Both countries had a nucleus of native troops, on
which absolute reliance might be placed, which was brave, faithful, stanch, and
would contend to the death for their respective sovereigns. But, beyond this,
both had also a fluctuating body of unwilling subjects or subject-allies,
unworthy of implicit trust, and likely to gravitate to one side or the other,
according as hope, or fancy, or the merest caprice might decide. The chances of
victory or defeat turned mainly on this fluctuating body, the instability of
which had been amply proved in the wars of the last half-century. Those wars
themselves, taken as a whole, had manifested no decided preponderance of either
people over the other; at one time Parthia, at another Syria, had been hard
pressed; and it was natural for the leaders on either side to believe that
accidental circumstances, rather than any marked superiority of one of the two
peoples over the other, had brought about the results that had been reached.
In the last war that had been waged success had
finally rested with Parthia. An entire army had been destroyed, and the Syrian
monarch captured. Demetrius “the Conqueror,” as he called himself, was
expiating in the cold and rugged region of Hyrcania, the rashness which had led
him to deem himself a match for the craft and strategic skill of Mithridates.
But now a new and untried monarch was upon the throne—one who was clearly
without his father’s ambition, and probably lacked his ability. Settled in his
kingdom for the space of six years, he had not only attempted nothing against
Syria, but had engaged in no military enterprise whatever. Yet the condition of
Syria had been strongest possible temptation such as to offer the to a
neighbour possessed of courage and energy. Civil war had raged, and exhausted
the resources of the country, from 146 to 137 BC, after which there had been a
protracted struggle between the Syrians and the Jews (137-133), in which the
Syrian arms had at first been worsted, but had at length asserted their
superiority. Had Phraates II, the son and successor of Mithridates, inherited a
tenth part of his father’s military spirit, he would have taken advantage of
this troubled time to carry the war into Syria Proper, and might have shaken
the Syrian throne to its base, or even wholly overturned it. In the person of
the captured Demetrius, he possessed one whom he might have set up as a
pretender with a certainty of drawing many Syrians to his side, and whom he
might, if successful, have left to rule as Vitaxa, or
subject king, the country of which he had once been actual monarch. But
Phraates had no promptitude, no enterprise. He let all the opportunities which
offered themselves escape him, content to keep watch on Demetrius—when he
escaped from confinement, to pursue and retake him—and to hold him in reserve
as a force of which he might one day make use, when it seemed to him that the
fitting time was come for it.
The result of his long procrastination was, that the
war, when renewed, was renewed from the other side. Antiochus Sidetes, who had succeeded to the Syrian throne on the
captivity of his brother, Demetrius, and had taken to wife his brother’s wife,
Cleopatra, having crushed the pretender, Tryphon, with her assistance, and then
with some difficulty enforced submission on the Jews, felt himself, in 129, at
liberty to resume the struggle with Parthia, and, having made great
preparations, set out for the East with the full intention of releasing his
brother, and recovering his lost provinces.
It is impossible to accept without considerable
reserve the accounts that have come down to us of the force which Antiochus
collected. According to Justin, it consisted of no more than eighty thousand
fighting men, to whom were attached the incredible number of three hundred
thousand camp-followers, the majority of them consisting of cooks, bakers, and
actors. As in other extreme cases the camp-followers do but equal, or a little
exceed, the number of men fit for actual service, this estimate, which makes
them nearly four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. The late
historian, Orosius, corrects the error here indicated; but his account seems to
err in rating the supernumeraries too low. According to him, the armed force
amounted to three hundred thousand, while the camp-followers, including grooms,
sutlers, courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third of the number. From
the two accounts, taken together we are perhaps entitled to conclude that the
entire host did not fall much short of four hundred thousand men. This estimate
receives a certain amount of confirmation from an independent statement made
incidentally by Diodorus, with respect to the number' on the Syrian side that
fell in the campaign, which he estimates at three hundred thousand.
The army of Phraates, according to two consentient
accounts, numbered no more than a hundred and twenty thousand. An attempt which
he made to enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries from the
regions beyond the Oxus failed, the Scyths being quite willing to lend their
aid, but arriving too late at the rendezvous to be of any use. At the same time
a defection on the part of the subject princes deprived the Parthian monarch of
contingents which usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support
of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these circumstances it is more
surprising that he was able to collect a hundred and twenty thousand men than
that he did not succeed in bringing into the field a larger number.
The Syrian troops were magnificently appointed. The
common soldiers had their military boots fastened with buckles or studs of gold;
and the culinary utensils, in which the food of the army was cooked, were in
many instances of silver. It seemed as if banqueting, rather than fighting, was
to be the order of the day. But to suppose that this was actually so, would be
to do the army of Antiochus an injustice. History, from the time of
Sardanapalus to that of the Crimean War of 1854-6, abounds with instances of
the somewhat strange combination of luxurious habits with valour of the highest kind. No charge of poltroonery can be established against the
Syrian soldiery, who, on the contrary, seem to have played their part in the
campaign with credit They were accompanied by a body of Jews under John
Hyrcanus, the son of Simon and grandson of the first Maccabee leader, who had
been forced to take up temporarily the position of a Syrian feudatory. As they
advanced through the Mesopotamian region after crossing the Euphrates, they
received continually fresh accessions of strength by the arrival of contingents
from the Parthian tributary states, which, disgusted with Parthian arrogance
and coarseness, or perhaps attracted by Syrian luxury and magnificence,
embraced the cause of the invader.
Phraates, on his part, instead of awaiting attack in
the fastnesses of Parthia or Hyrcania, advanced to meet his enemy across the
Assyrian and Babylonian plains, and, either in person or by his generals,
engaged the Syrian monarch in three pitched battles, in each of which he was
worsted. One of these was fought upon the banks of the Greater Zab or Lycus, in
Adiabene, not far from the site of Arbela, where Antiochus met and defeated the
Parthian general, Indates, and raised a trophy in honour of his victory. The exact scene of the other two
engagements is unknown to us, and in no case have we any description of the
battles, so that we have no means of judging whether it was by superiority of
force or of strategy that the Syrian monarch thus far prevailed, and obtained
almost the whole for which he was fighting. The entire province of Babylonia,
the heart of the empire, where were situated the three great cities of Babylon,
Seleucia, and Ctesiphon, fell into his hands, and a further defection of the
tributary countries from the Parthian cause took place, a defection so widespread,
that the writer who records it says, with a certain amount of rhetoric, no
doubt—“Phraates had now nothing left to him beyond the limits of the original
Parthian territory.” He maintained, however, a position somewhere in the Lower
Babylonian plain, and Still confronted Antiochus with an army, which, though
beaten, was bent on resistance.
When affairs were in this state, Phraates, recognising the peril of his position, came to the
conclusion that it was necessary to attempt, at any rate, a diversion. He had
still what seemed to him a winning card in his hand, and it was time to play
it. Demetrius, the brother of Antiochus, and de jure the king of Syria, was
still in his possession, watched and carefully guarded in the rough Hyrcanian
home, from which he had twice escaped, but only to be recaptured. He would send
Demetrius into Syria under an escort of Parthian troops, who should conduct
him to the frontier and give him the opportunity of recovering his kingdom. It
would be strange if one, entitled to the throne by his birth, and its actual
occupant for the space of six years, could not rally to himself a party in a
country always ready to welcome pretenders, and to accept, as valid, claims
that were utterly baseless. Let troubles break out in his rear, let his rule
over Syria be threatened in Syria itself, and Antiochus would, he thought,
either hasten home, or, at the least, be greatly alarmed, have his attention
distracted from his aggressive designs, and be afraid of plunging deeper into
Asia, lest, while grasping at the shadow of power, he should lose the
substance.
Demetrius and his Parthian escort set out, but the
distance to be traversed was great, and travelling is slow in Asia. Moreover,
the winter time was approaching, and each week would increase the difficulties
of locomotion. The scheme of Phraates hung fire. No immediate effect followed
from it. Antiochus may not have received intelligence of the impending danger,
or he may have thought his wife, Cleopatra, whom he had left at Antioch,
capable of coping with it. In any case, it is certain that his movements were
in no way affected by the bolt which Phraates had launched at him. Instead of
withdrawing his troops from the occupied provinces and marching them back into
Syria, thus relinquishing all that he had gained by his successful campaign, he
resolved to maintain all the conquests that he had made, and to keep his troops
where they were, merely dividing them, on account of their numbers, among the
various cities which he had taken, and making them go into winter quarters. His
design was carried out; the army was dispersed; discipline was probably
somewhat relaxed; and the soldiery, having no military duties to perform,
amused themselves, as foreign soldiers are apt to do, by heavy requisitions,
and by cavalier treatment of the native inhabitants.
Some months of the winter passed in this way.
Gradually the discontent of the civil populations in the cities increased.
Representations were made to Phraates by secret messengers, that the yoke of
the Syrians was found to be intolerable, and that, if he would give the signal,
the cities were ripe for revolt. Much hidden negotiation must have taken place
before a complete arrangement could have been made, or a fixed plan settled on.
As in the “Saint Bartholomew,” as in the “Sicilian Vespers,” as in the great
outbreak against the Roman power in Asia Minor under Mithridates of Pontus, the
secret must have been communicated to hundreds, who, with a marvellous tenacity of purpose, kept it inviolate for weeks or months, so that not a
whisper reached the ears of the victims. Sunk in a delicious dream of the most
absolute security, careless of the feelings, and deaf to the grumblings of the
townsmen, the Syrian soldiers continued to enjoy their long and pleasant
holiday without a suspicion of the danger that was impending. Meanwhile
Phraates arranged all the details of plan, and communicated them to his
confederates. It was agreed that, on an appointed day, all the cities should
break out in revolt; the natives should take arms, rise against the soldiers
quartered upon them, and kill all, or as many as possible. Phraates promised to
be at hand with his army, to prevent the scattered garrisons from giving help
to each other. It was calculated that, in this way, the invaders might be cut
off almost to a man without the trouble of even fighting a battle.
But, before he proceeded to these terrible extremities,
the Parthian prince, touched perhaps with compassion, determined to give his
adversary a chance of escaping the fate prepared for him by timely concessions.
The winter was not over; but the snow was beginning to melt through the
increasing warmth of the sun’s rays, and the day appointed for the general
rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that no time was to be lost.
Accordingly, he sent ambassadors to Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire
on what terms it would be granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according to
Diodorus, was as follows: “If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius,
from captivity, and deliver him up without ransom, at the same time restoring
all the provinces which had been taken by Parthia from Syria, and consenting to
pay a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had; but not otherwise.” To
such terms it was, of course, impossible that any Parthian king should listen;
and the ambassadors of Phraates returned, therefore, without further parley.
Soon afterwards, the day appointed for the outbreak
arrived. Apparently, even yet no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops
were everywhere quietly enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, when,
suddenly and without any warning, they found attacked by the natives. Taken at
disadvantage, it was impossible for them to make a successful resistance; and
it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacred in their quarters.
Antiochus, and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far as we hear,
escaped into the open field, and contended for their lives in just warfare. It
had been the intention of the Syrian monarch, when he quitted his station, to
hasten to the protection of the division quartered nearest to him; but he had
no sooner commenced his march than he found himself confronted by Phraates,
who was at the head of his main army, having, no doubt, anticipated the design
of Antiochus and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious to
engage at once, as his force far outnumbered that commanded by his adversary;
but the latter might have declined the battle had he so willed, and have at any
rate greatly protracted the struggle. He had a mountain region—Mount Zagros,
probably—within a short distance of him, and might have fallen back upon it, so
placing the Parthian horse at great disadvantage; but he was still at an age
when caution is apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true
courage. Despite the advice of one of his captains, he determined to accept the
battle which the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe whom he had three
times defeated. But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by the
army which he commanded. Though Antiochus fought strenuously, he was defeated,
since his troops, were without heart and offered but a poor resistance.
Athenaeus, the general who had advised retreat, was the first to fly, and then
the whole army broke up and dispersed itself. Antiochus himself perished,
either slain by the enemy or by his own hand. His son, Seleucus, and a niece, a
daughter of his brother, Demetrius, who had accompanied him in his expedition, were captured. His troops were either cut to
pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of those slain in the battle, and
in the general massacre, was reckoned at three hundred thousand.
Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was
the last which any Seleucid monarch conducted into these countries—the final
attempt made by Syria to repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces.
Henceforth, Parthia was no further troubled by the power that had hitherto been
her most dangerous and most constant enemy, but was allowed to enjoy, without
molestation from Syria, the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in fact,
had received so deep a wound that she had from this time a difficulty in preserving
her own existence. The immediate result of the destruction of Antiochus and his
host was the revolt of Judaea, which henceforth maintained its independence
uninterruptedly to the time of the Romans. The dominions of the Seleucidae were reduced to Cilicia, and Syria Proper, or
the tract west of the Euphrates between the chain of Amanus and Palestine.
Internally, the Syrian state was agitated by constant commotions from the
claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty; externally, it was kept in
continual alarm by the Egyptians, the Romans, and the Armenians. During the
sixty years that elapsed between the return of Demetrius to his kingdom (BC
128) and the conversion of Syria into a Roman province (BC 65) she ceased
wholly to be formidable to her neighbours. Her flourishing period was gone by,
and a rapid decline set in, from which there was no recovery. It is surprising
that the Romans did not step in earlier, to terminate a rule which was but a
little removed from anarchy. Rome, however, had other work on her hands—civil
troubles, social wars, and the struggle with Mithridates; and hence the Syrian
state continued to exist till the year B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund
condition.
In Parthia itself the consequences of Syria’s defeat and collapse were less important than might have been expected. One would naturally have looked to see, as the immediate result, a fresh development of the aggressive spirit, and a burst of energy and enterprise parallel to that which had carried the arms of Mithridates I, from his Parthian fastnesses to the Hydaspes on the one hand and to the Euphrates on the other. But no such result followed. We hear indeed of Phraates intending to follow up his victory over Antiochus by a grand attack upon Syria—an attack to which, if it had taken place, she must almost certainly have succumbed—but, in point of fact, the relations between the two countries continued for many years after the Great Massacre, peaceful, if not even friendly. Phraates celebrated the obsequies off Antiochus with the pomp and ceremony befitting a powerful king, and ultimately placed his remains in a coffin of silver, and sent them into Syria, to find their last resting-place in their native country. He treated Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, who had been made prisoner in the final battle, with the highest honour, and took to wife Antiochus’s niece, who fell into his hands at the same time. The royal houses of the Seleucidae and the Arsacidae became thus doubly allied; and, all grounds for further hostilities having been removed, peace and amity were established between the former rivals. No doubt a powerful motive influencing Parthia in the adoption of this policy was that revelation of a new danger which will form the chief subject of the ensuing section.
ARTABANUS II. 127 -124/3 BC.
The Turanian or Tatar races by which Central and
Northern Asia are inhabited, have at all times constituted a serious danger to
the inhabitants of the softer South. Hordes of wild barbarians wander over
those inhospitable regions, increase, multiply, exert a pressure on their
southern neighbours, and are felt as a perpetual menace. Every now and then a
crisis arrives. Population has increased beyond the means of subsistence, or a
novel ambition has seized a tribe or a powerful chief, and the barrier, which
has hitherto proved a sufficient restraint, is forced. There issues suddenly
out of the frozen bosom of the North a stream of coarse, uncouth savages—brave,
hungry, countless—who swarm into the fairer southern regions determinedly,
irresistibly; like locusts winging their flight into a green land. How such
multitudes come to be propagated in countries where life is with difficulty
sustained, we do not know; why the impulse suddenly seizes them to quit their
old haunts and move steadily in a given direction, we cannot say; but we see
that the phenomenon is one of constant recurrence, and we have thus come to
regard it as being scarcely curious or strange at all. In Asia, Cimmerians,
Scythians, Comans, Mongols, Turks; in Europe, Gauls, Goths, Huns, Avars,
Vandals, Burgundians, Lombards, Bulgarians, have successively illustrated the
law, and made us familiar with its operation. “Inroads of the northern
barbarians” has become a common-place with writers of history, and there is
scarcely any country of the South, whether in Asia or in Europe, that has not
experienced them.
Such inroads are very dreadful when they take place.
Hordes of savages, coarse and repulsive in their appearance, fierce in their
tempers, rude in their habits, not perhaps individually very brave or strong,
but powerful by their numbers, and sometimes by a new mode of warfare, which it
is found difficult to meet, pour into the seats of civilisation,
and spread havoc around. On they come (as before observed) like a flight of
locusts, countless, irresistible—finding the land before them a garden, and
leaving it behind them a howling wilderness. Neither sex nor age is spared. The
inhabitants of the open country and of the villages, if they do not make their
escape to high mountain tops or other strongholds, are ruthlessly massacred by
the invaders, or, at best, forced to become their slaves. The crops are
consumed, the flocks and herds swept off or destroyed, the villages and
homesteads burnt, the whole country made a scene of desolation. Walled towns
perhaps resist them, as they have not often patience enough for sieges; but
sometimes, with a dogged determination, they sit down before the ramparts, and
by a prolonged blockade, starve the defenders into submission. Then there
ensues an indescribable scene of havoc, rapine, and bloodshed. Ancient cities,
rich with the accumulated stores of ages, are ransacked and perhaps burnt;
priceless works of art often perish; civilisations which it has taken centuries to build up are trampled down. Few things are more
terrible than the devastation and ruin which such an inroad has often spread
over a fair and smiling kingdom, even when it has merely swept over it, like a
passing storm, and has led to no permanent occupation.
Against a danger of this kind the Parthian princes had
had, almost from the first, to guard. They were themselves of the nomadic race—Turanians, if our hypothesis concerning them be sound—and
had established their kingdom by an invasion of the type above described. But
they had immediately become settlers, inhabitants of cities; they had been
softened, to a certain extent, civilised; and now
they looked on the nomadic hordes of the North with the same dislike and
disgust with which the Persians and the Greco-Macedonians had formerly
regarded them. In the Scythians of the Trans-Oxianian tract they saw an unceasing peril, and one, moreover, which was, about the time
of Phraates, continually increasing and becoming more and more threatening.
Fully to explain the position of affairs in this
quarter, we must ask the reader to accompany us into the remoter regions of
inner Asia, where the Turanian tribes had their headquarters. There, about the
year BC 200, a Turanian people called the Yue-chi were expelled from their
territory on the west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu,
whom some identify with the Huns. “The Yue-chi separated into two bands: the
smaller descended southwards into Thibet; the larger passed westwards, and
after a hard struggle, dispossessed a people called ‘Su,’ of the plains west of
the river of Ili. The latter advanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes; and the
Yue-chi not long afterwards retreating from the U-siun,
another nomadic race, passed the Su, on the north, and occupied the tracts
between the Oxus and the Caspian. The Su , were thus in the vicinity of the
Bactrian Greeks; the Yue-chi in the neighbourhood of
the Parthians.” On the particulars of this account, which comes from the
Chinese historians, we cannot perhaps altogether depend; but there is no reason
to doubt the main fact, testified by an eyewitness, that the Yue-chi, having
migrated about the period mentioned from the interior of Asia, had established
themselves sixty years later (BC 140) in the Caspian region. Such a movement
would necessarily have thrown the entire previous population of those parts
into commotion, and would probably have precipitated them upon their neighbours.
It accounts satisfactorily for the unusual pressure of the northern hordes at
this period on the Parthians, the Bactrians, and even the Indians; and it
completely explains the crisis of Parthian history which we have now reached,
and the necessity which lay upon the nation of meeting, and if possible overcoming,
a new danger.
In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen to
which we have before alluded, and to which, in ancient times, the civilised world was always liable from an outburst of
northern barbarism. Whether the peril has altogether passed away or not, we
need not here inquire, but certainly in the old world there was always a chance
that civilisation, art, refinement, luxury, might
suddenly and almost without warning be swept away by an overwhelming influx of
savagery from the North. From the reign of Cyaxares, when the evil, so far as
we know, first showed itself, the danger was patent to all wise and far-seeing
governors both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to time guarded against
The expeditions of Cyrus against the Massagetae, of Darius Hystaspis against the European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getae, of Trajan and
Probus across the Danube, were designed to check and intimidate the northern
nations, to break their power, and diminish the likelihood of their taking the
offensive. It was now more than four centuries since in this part of Asia any
such effort had been made ; and the northern barbarians might naturally have
ceased to fear the arms and discipline of the South. Moreover, the
circumstances of the time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on continually
more and more by the newly-arrived “Su” and Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the
Trans-Oxianian regions were under the necessity of
seeking new settlements, and could only attempt to find them in the quarter
towards which they were driven by the new-comers. Strengthened probably by
daring spirits from among their conquerors themselves, they crossed the rivers
and the deserts by which they had been hitherto confined, and advancing against
the Parthians, Bactrians, and Arians, threatened to carry all before them. In
Bactria, soon after the establishment of the Greco-Bactrian kingdom, they began
to give trouble. Province after province was swallowed up by the invaders, who
occupied Sogdiana, or the tract between the Lower Jaxartes and the Lower Oxus,
and hence proceeded to make inroads into Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, or Ak-Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the
highlands between the Upper Jaxartes and Upper Oxus, were permanently occupied
by Turanian immigrants; and, if the Bactrians had not compensated themselves
for their losses by acquisitions of territory in Afghanistan and India, they
would soon have had no kingdom left. The hordes were always increasing in
strength through the influx of fresh tribes. Bactria was pressed to the
south-eastward, and precipitated upon its neighbours in that direction.
Presently, in Ariana, the hordes passed the mountains,
and proceeding southwards, occupied the tract below the great lake wherein the Helmend terminates, which took from them the name of Sacastana—“the land of the Saka or Scyths”—a name still to
be traced in the modern Seistan. Further to the east they effected a lodgment
in Cabul, and another in the southern portion of the Indus valley, which for a
time bore the name of Indo-Scythia. They even crossed the Indus, and attempted
to penetrate into the interior of Hindustan, but here they were met and
repulsed by a native monarch, about the year BC 56.
The people engaged in this great movement are called
in a general way by the classical writers Sacae or Scythae, i.e., Scyths. They consisted of a number of tribes, similar for the most
part in language, habits, and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to
the other nomadic races of Central and Northern Asia. Of these tribes the
principal were the Massagetae (“great Jits or Jats”), the former adversaries of Cyrus, who occupied the
country on both sides of the lower course of the Oxus; the Dahae, who bordered
the Caspian above Hyrcania, and extended thence to the longitude of Herat; the Tochari, who settled in the mountains between the Upper
Jaxartes and the Upper Oxus, where they gave name to the tract known as Tokharistan; the Asii or Asians,
who were closely connected with the Tochari; and the Sacarauli, who are found connected with both the Tochari and the Asians. Some of these tribes contained
within them further subdivisions, as the Dahae, who comprised the Parni or Aparni, the Pissuri, and the Xanthii; and the Massagetae, who included among them Chorasmii, Attasii, and others.
The general character of the barbarism, in which these
various races were involved, may be best learnt from the description given of
one of them, with but few differences, by Herodotus and Strabo. According to
these writers, the Massagetae were nomads who moved about in waggons or carts, like the modern Kalmucks, accompanied by
their flocks and herds, on whose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each
man had only one wife, but all the wives were held in common. They were good
riders, and excellent archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, and
used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, knives, and battle-axes. They had
little or no iron, but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their other
weapons, of bronze. They had also bronze breastplates, but otherwise the metal
with which they adorned and protected their own persons and the heads of their
horses, was gold. To a certain extent they were cannibals. It was their custom
not to let the aged among them die a natural death; but, when life seemed
approaching its term, to offer them up in sacrifice, and then boil the flesh
and feast upon it. This mode of ending life was regarded as the best and most honourable; such as died of disease were not eaten, but
buried, and their friends bewailed their misfortune. It may be added to this,
that we have sufficient reason to believe, that the Massagetai and the other nomads of these parts regarded the use of poisoned arrows in
warfare as legitimate, and employed the venom of serpents and the corrupted
blood of men, to make the wounds which they inflicted more deadly.
Thus, what was threatened by the existing position of
affairs was not merely the conquest of one race by another cognate to it, like
that of the Medes by the Persians, or of the Greeks by Rome, but the obliteration
of such art, civilisation, and refinement as Western
Asia had attained to in the course of ages by the successive efforts of
Babylonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and Greeks—the spread over some of the
fairest regions of the earth of a low type of savagery—a type which in religion
went no further than the worship of the Sun; in art knew but the easier forms
of metallurgy and the construction of carts; in manners and customs, included
cannibalism, the use of poisoned weapons, and a relation between the sexes
destructive alike of all delicacy and all family affection. The Parthians were,
no doubt, rude and coarse in their character as compared with the Persians;
but they had been civilised to some extent by three
centuries of subjection to the Persians and the Greeks before they rose to
power; they affected Persian manners; they patronised Greek art; they had a smattering of Greek literature; they appreciated the
advantages of having in their midst a number of Grecian states. Many of their
kings called themselves upon their coins “Phil-Hellenes,” or “lovers of the
Hellenic people.” Had the Massagetae and their kindred tribes of Sacae, Tochari, Dahae, Yue-chi, and Su, which now menaced the
Parthian power, succeeded in sweeping it away, the gradual declension of all
that is lovely or excellent in human life would have been marked. Scythicism would have overspread Western Asia. No doubt the
conquerors would have learnt something from those whom they subjected to their
yoke; but it cannot be supposed that they would have learnt much. The change
would have .been like that which passed over the Western Roman Empire, when
Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Alans, Heruli,
depopulated its fairest provinces and laid its civilisation in the dust. The East would have been barbarised; the
gains of centuries would have been lost; the work of Cyrus, Darius, Alexander,
and other great benefactors of Asiatic humanity, would have been undone;
Western Asia would have sunk back into a condition not very much above that
from which it had been raised two thousand years previously by the primitive Chaldaeans and the Assyrians.
The first monarch to recognise the approach of the) crisis and its danger was Phraates II, the son of
Mithridates I, and the conqueror of Antiochus Sidetes.
Not that the danger presented itself to his imagination in its full magnitude;
but that he first woke up to the perception of the real position of affairs in
the East, and saw that, whereas Parthia’s most formidable enemy had hitherto
been Syria, and the Syro-Macedonian power, it had now
become Scythia and the Sacae. No sooner did the pressure of the nomads begin to
make itself felt on his northeastern frontier, than, relinquishing all ideas
of Syrian conquests, if he had really entertained them, he left the seat of
empire in Babylonia to the care of a viceroy, Hymerus,
or Evemerus, and marched in person to confront the
new peril. The Scythians, apparently, had attacked Parthia Proper from their
seats in the Oxus region. Phraates, in his haste to collect a sufficient force
against them, enlisted in his service a large body of Greeks—the remnants
mainly of the defeated army of Antiochus—and taking with him also a strong body
of Parthian troops, marched at his best speed eastward. A war followed in the
mountain region, which must have lasted for some years, but of which we have
only the most meagre account. At last there was an engagement in which the
Scythians got the advantage, and the Parthian troops began to waver and
threaten to break, when the Greeks, who had been from the first disaffected,
and had only waited for an occasion to mutiny, went over in a body to the
enemy, and so decided the battle. Deserted by their allies, the Parthian
soldiery were cut to pieces, and Phraates himself was among the slain. The
event proved that he had acted rashly in taking the Greeks with him, but he can
scarcely be said to have deserved much blame. It would have been surprising if
he had anticipated so strange a thing as the fraternisation of a body of luxurious and over-civilised Greeks with
the utter barbarians against whom he was contending, or had imagined that in so
remote a region, cut off from the rest of their countrymen, they would have
ventured to take a step which must have thrown them entirely on their own
resources.
We have, no information with regard to the ultimate
fate of the Greek mutineers. As for the Scythians, With that want of energy and
of a settled purpose, which characterised them, they
proceeded to plunder and ravage the portion of the Parthian territory which lay
open to them, and, when they had thus wasted their strength, returned quietly
to their homes.
The Parthian nobles appointed as monarch, in place of
the late king, an uncle of his, named Artabanus, who is known in history as “Artabanus
the Second.” He was probably advanced in years, and might perhaps have been
excused, had he folded his arms, awaited the attack of his foes, and stood
wholly on the defensive. But he was brave and energetic; and, what was still
more important, he appears to have appreciated the perils of the position. He
was not content, when the particular body of barbarians, which had defeated and
slain his predecessor, having ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to sit
still and wait till he was attacked in his turn. According to the brief but
emphatic words of Justin, he assumed the aggressive, and invaded the country of
the Tochari, one of the most powerful of the Scythian
tribes, which was now settled in a portion of the region that had, till lately,
belonged to the Bactrian kingdom. Artabanus evidently felt that what was needed
was, not simply to withstand, but to roll back the flood of invasion, which had
advanced so near to the sacred home of his nation; that the barbarians required
to be taught a lesson; that they must at least be made to understand that
Parthia was to be respected; if this could not be done, then the fate of the
empire was sealed. He therefore, with a gallantry and boldness that we cannot
sufficiently admire—a boldness that seemed like rashness, but was in reality
prudence—without calculating too closely the immediate chances of battle, led
his troops against one of the most forward of the advancing tribes. But’
fortune, unhappily, was adverse. How the battle was progressing we are not told;
but it appears that, in the thick of an engagement, Artabanus, who was leading
his men, received a wound in the forearm, from the effect of which he died
almost immediately. The death of the leader on either side decides in the East,
almost to a certainty, the issue of a conflict. We cannot doubt that the
Parthians, having lost their monarch, were repulsed; that the expedition failed
; and that the situation of affairs became once more at least as threatening as
it had been before Artabanus made his attempt. Two Parthian monarchs had now
fallen, within the space of a few years, in combat with the aggressive
Scyths—two Parthian armies had suffered defeat. Was this to be always so? If it
was, then Parthia had only to make up her mind to fall, and, like the great
Roman, to let it be her care that she should fall grandly and with dignity.
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