THE RISE OF
THE SPANISH EMPIRE
IN THE
OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW

BY
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THE history of Spain is one of the most attractive fields that lie open to the historical student. Its variety is infinite, and the possibilities of new and important discoveries are unexhausted. To most Americans the principal interest of the subject will inevitably center around Spain’s activities as a great conquering and colonizing power; for the increased importance of the countries of Iberian origin has been perhaps the most remarkable political and economic fact in the recent development of the Western Hemisphere. Popular attention has been focused as never before on their language, government, and commerce during the past twenty years; and much progress has also been made in the line of historical investigation. The labors of writers and students, however, have thus far been directed chiefly to the more recent periods of the Revolutions and of national independence. The long centuries of colonial administration have been less thoroughly explored, and the history of Spain herself, which forms the background for the entire picture, has not hitherto been considered from the standpoint of the great Empire which sprang from her.

The following pages are an attempt to supply this deficiency. It is my purpose to carry the story, in four volumes, down to the death of Philip II, under whose rule the Spanish Empire attained its greatest territorial extent, through the annexation of Portugal and of her dominions. The long period of ‘decline and fall’ I am content to leave to others, the more so because the tendency to regard Spain and the Spanish administration as synonymous with inefficiency and decadence is so common that it is a pleasure to emphasize the other side. The reader must not be surprised to find that practically the whole of the first volume is devoted to the mediaeval period. If he is willing to accept the first and most fundamental of my theories in regard to the development of the Spanish Empire, he will readily agree that a knowledge of the early stages of its development is indispensable to any real comprehension of what follows.

The original plan of the chief divisions and the principal chapters of the book was drawn up nine years ago, in general accordance with the scheme of a course of lectures at Harvard University which I had been giving intermittently since 1903. Although there have been some changes of detail, the main features of that plan have never been altered. The first two volumes, published herewith, are almost exclusively based on printed sources and standard secondary works. Manuscript material has been utilized in Chapters IV, V, XV, and XVI; but most of the unpublished documents that I have collected deal with the period of Charles V and Philip II, and therefore concern only my last two volumes. It would have been by no means difficult to find more manuscripts in the archives on the mediaeval period and on the reign of the Catholic Kings, but the field to be covered was so vast and so little known outside of Spain, that I felt that I could employ my time to better advantage in a thorough exploration of the material already in print. The fact that an unusually large number of documents, edited by Spanish scholars, have remained almost unutilized by historians, confirmed this decision.

My thanks are due to the editor of the American Historical Review for permission to reprint several paragraphs of an article on “The Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms in the later Middle Ages” which I published in the issue of April, 1911 (Vol. XVI, No. 3).

The list of friends and scholars both here and in Europe who have aided me in my work is very long: for the ramifications of my subject have been so divergent that I have been obliged to depend, to an unusual degree, on the knowledge and counsel of others. The names of Professor Edward Channing of Harvard and of Professor Henry Morse Stephens of the University of California come at the head of the list; for without their advice and encouragement I should hardly have ventured even to undertake the task. Their methods of exhortation have been characteristically different; but they have always pointed in the same general direction, and the measure of my gratitude to them both is difficult to express. I have had the great privilege of discussing some hard problems with Professor Rafael Altamira of the Universidad Central at Madrid, and with Professor Alfred Morel-Fatio of the College de France; and the help which they have freely given me, both in letters, and by word of mouth, has shown the way to the solution of many difficulties. My Harvard colleagues have been unfailingly generous in placing at my disposal the results of their learning and experience, and I would gratefully acknowledge my deep obligations to them; particularly to Professor C. H. Haskins for invaluable assistance on the chapters on mediaeval constitutional history; to Professor A. C. Coolidge for helpful suggestions in regard to North African affairs and matters of foreign policy; to Professor J. D. M. Ford for answering perpetual questions in regard to Spanish literature, language and accentuation, and to Professor J. R. Jewett for
guidance in the spelling of Moorish names; to Mr. G. P. Winship for his criticisms of the chapter on the Indies; and to Professor C. N. Greenough for advice in regard to style. Mr. G. W. Robinson of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences has not only made the index and helped me to prepare the manuscript for the press; he has saved me from numerous errors of fact and faults of expression, and he has offered a number of positive suggestions of the highest value, particularly concerning the field covered by the Introduction and the earlier chapters of Volume I. Finally I cannot forbear to pay tribute to the constant and devoted assistance of my wife; she has gone over my work again and again at the various stages of its progress, and has never failed to improve it.

When one’s knowledge of a subject is largely derived from the teaching of it, one must not forget to render thanks to one’s pupils. Certainly my indebtedness to four friends who have studied Spanish history with me at Harvard in the course of the past twelve years is fully as great as any services that I may have rendered them. The researches of Professor C. H. Haring of Yale have furnished a large part of the material for my account of the early administration of the Indies; and those of Dr. Julius Klein of Harvard form the basis for my paragraphs on Castilian economic history, and more especially on the Castilian Mesta. The investigations of Professor J. G. McDonald of the University of Indiana have been of material assistance to me in studying the office of the corregidor; and Dr. C. E. McGuire of the International High Commission at Washington has indicated the solution of several puzzling problems, by giving me the benefit of his wide knowledge of mediaeval ecclesiastical history and institutions. All these gentlemen, moreover, have helped me with suggestions concerning passages not directly connected with their special fields. Their criticisms, always unrestricted, and often severe, have afforded me the highest satisfaction that a teacher can enjoy, namely the knowledge that his pupils have gone beyond him.

Eighty-one years have now elapsed since William Hickling Prescott published the first edition of his “History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella.” Much new material has been discovered since that day, and the fashions of historical writing have greatly changed; but Prescott’s work still remains the standard authority on the reign of the Catholic Kings. For fifteen years I have had the rare privilege of using his books and manuscripts in the Harvard College Library; I have scrutinized the passages he underscored and read his penciled notes in the margins. I have thus had the opportunity to follow, step by step, the process of the composition of his masterpiece, and can testify to the profound learning, deep insight, and above all to the unfailing honesty with which his work was done. Such errors as he made were due to lack of material, and to a really noble inability to comprehend a policy of treachery or deceit. My debt of gratitude to him is the deepest of all; and his granddaughter has kindly permitted me to give expression to it, by dedicating these volumes to his memory.

R. B. M.

CAMBRIDGE, March 10, 1918.
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INTRODUCTION

The Spanish Empire of Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors has its origins in the earliest periods of antiquity. Far more than the British Empire, to which it has often been compared, it is linked with the history and traditions of the past. England’s insular position, which ultimately forced her into a maritime career, is of course the fundamental explanation of her modern imperial domain; but this insular position did not actually bear fruit in voyages of distant exploration and conquest until after she had practically relinquished her mediaeval ambitions to win land on the European continent from France. The Tudor period, which witnessed the beginning of the one and the abandonment of the other, forms a sharp dividing line in English history; and it is possible to make an intelligent study of the British Empire without going back of the sixteenth century. But the story of the empire of Spain is at once more complicated and more continuous. The geographical position of the Iberian Peninsula tempted its inhabitants to expand both by land and sea. From the very dawn of history its fate has been closely associated with that of North Africa, southern France, and the islands of the western Mediterranean. At times it has formed a portion of empires which controlled all these territories, either wholly or in part; and at times its own rulers have, in turn, dominated large portions of them. The European lands outside the limits of the peninsula which acknowledged the rule of Spanish sovereigns in the year of the discovery of America were already extensive, and they were to be substantially increased during the first century of the conquest and exploration of the New World. At the greatest crises of her imperial career Spain has been confronted by a bewildering array of irreconcilable opportunities. In her refusal to choose between them, in her heroic but misguided attempts to utilize them all, lies the explanation of some of her most disastrous defeats. The present chapter will endeavor to trace some of the earlier geographical and historical antecedents of this intricate imperial development.

Whoever glances at the map of the Iberian Peninsula with a view to investigating the history and civilization of the different peoples who have occupied it will first be impressed by the apparent definiteness of its external limits. On three sides and more than one half of the fourth it is bounded by the waters of the Mediterranean and of the Atlantic. Across the greater part of the remaining portion of its perimeter is built the mountain barrier of the Pyrenees, whose loftiest summits reach a height of over ten thousand feet. For the casual observer Iberia seems to be almost as completely shut off from contact with the outside world as if it were an outlying island.

More careful scrutiny, however, reveals a number of facts which considerably modify this original impression. First let us glance to the southward. One of the most important things for every student of Spanish history to bear in mind is the narrowness of the Straits of Gibraltar, the ease with which they may be crossed, and the essential similarity of the coasts of Spanish Andalusia and Morocco. The well known phrase “Africa begins with the Pyrenees” should always be interpreted to mean rather that Spain and North Africa are one, than that Spain and France are divided. The fact that Spain and Morocco are today regarded as belonging to two different ‘continents’ has blinded many people to the intimate connection that exists between them. In times comparatively recent, geologically speaking, they were probably joined. The flora and fauna of Spain resemble those of Africa rather than those of France. The hilly coasts of both sides of the Straits are very much like one another; a glance over the intervening waves suggests, rather than discourages, the idea of crossing. The Pillars of Hercules were indeed the western barrier of the ancient world, but the water that flows between them has never offered serious hindrance to peoples who have been desirous of travelling north and south.

From the very earliest times we encounter many evidences of this. Controversy still rages so hotly over the primitive inhabitants of Spain that it would be the height of folly for a layman to step in where specialists fear to tread; but from all the welter and confusion of polemick a few fundamental facts emerge unscathed. The ancient inhabitants of Spain and North Africa are unquestionably branches of the same Mediterranean race, far more closely allied to one another than were the Iberians with the
primitive inhabitants of the greater part of France. On both sides of the Strait we find the same generally dolichocephalic type—predominantly brunette, but with an appreciable element of blondness, which gradually diminishes on the African side as one moves east. Some of the Rif Berbers today can only be distinguished from Europeans by their slightly earlier hair, which is doubtless to be ascribed to intermixture with the negro tribes south of the Sahara. Many recent scholars incline to favor the theory that the Berbers were not indigenous, but migrated to their present territory from Europe (probably about 1500 B.C.); or, at least, that the indigenous Libyans were powerfully affected by such a European immigration. Others maintain, on the contrary, that the current flowed chiefly in the opposite direction, and that the Iberians, who are generally regarded as the primitive inhabitants of Spain, originated in North Africa and crossed over thence into Europe. For our purposes it is immaterial whether the trend was north to south, or south to north; but it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the fact that Abyla and Calpe were in constant and intimate relations with one another throughout this early period.

The primitive inhabitants of Spain were also closely in touch with those of the eastern Mediterranean lands at a very early date, and these relations led, indirectly, to the first incorporation of the Iberian Peninsula in an empire whose seat was in North Africa. It is not necessary to take seriously the opening sentence of Stevens’s translation of Mariana’s famous history, to the effect that “Tubal, the son of Japheth, was the first man that peopled Spain after the Flood”; yet its incessant repetition for several centuries past has unquestionably invested it with a very real importance. The Tarshish of the Old Testament is generally understood to signify Spain; though the “navy of Tarshish” which brought to King Solomon “gold and silver, ivory and apes and peacocks” was a general term used to designate any large vessels built for distant voyages, rather than those specifically limited to Spanish ports. The date of the Biblical reference to Tarshish is usually given as approximately 990 B.C.; but it was probably more than a century earlier than that when the Phoenicians first visited Spain, set up trading posts, and pushed through to the shores of the Atlantic’, and certainly less than three centuries later that the Greeks made their first appearance there. Archaeological discoveries, and the persistence in Spain of certain eastern mythological legends, have done something to illuminate the history of this obscure period, and it is abundantly clear that the new visitors were intent rather on commerce and the search for metals than on colonization or conquest; certainly, they made no effort to subjugate the original inhabitants, or to penetrate into the interior.

For us the main importance of the occupation by the Phoenicians lies in the fact that their presence in Spain ultimately paved the way for a new union of Iberia and North Africa. In 585 B.C. Tyre, the centre of the Phoenician empire in the east, was overpowered by Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, after a siege of thirteen years, and the heirress of Tyre was Carthage in North Africa, originally a Phoenician colony, but now fast rising towards the zenith of her fame and destined to control the entire western Mediterranean. The Carthaginians had already established a small colony in the island of Iviza in the year 654; less than a century later they had ousted the Greeks from the western portion of the island of Sicily; about the same time, they occupied Sardinia, Majorca, and Minorca, and seized Malta and Gozzo. To complete their great political and economic system, to make the western Mediterranean a Carthaginian lake, the control of Spain alone was lacking. Here they would have to deal with their kinsmen, the Phoenicians, as well as with Greeks and natives, but that did not deter them. Indeed, the historian Justin tells us that it was an appeal by the Phoenician colonists of Cadiz, for aid in repelling an assault by the primitive inhabitants, that gave the new conquerors the needed excuse for interference. At any rate, the Carthaginians entered the peninsula, attacked and defeated both the natives and the Phoenicians there, and finally established themselves as lords of Cadiz, the key to southern Spain and to the commerce of the far West. They subsequently extended their sway over most of the neighboring settlements, and they also engaged in sundry rather unsuccessful conflicts with the Phocaean Greeks, whose headquarters were at Marseilles, and whose chief settlement in Spain was at Ampurias, north of the Ebro. Like the Phoenicians before them, they were apparently unable to advance into the interior of the peninsula, at least down to the time of Hamilcar Barca; but they controlled the entire coast from Cadiz to Mastia (the modern Cartagena), and also the opposite shore of North Africa. The position they had won for themselves gave them unchallenged predominance in the western basin of the Mediterranean. And it is interesting to note several curious parallels between the way in which the Carthaginians regarded and treated Spain, and that in which Spain subsequently regarded and treated her American colonies. In both cases the metropolis looked upon the colony primarily as a place from which to derive revenue: Carthage expected Spain to furnish funds for the prosecution of her wars, just as Spain, two thousand years later, strove to utilize the Indies for a similar purpose. Both powers also made strenuous efforts to maintain rigidly monopolistic control of the territories they had won, and to exclude all outsiders from participation in their profits. Eratosthenes
tells us that the Carthaginians made it a practice to “drown any strangers who sail past on their voyage to Sardinia or to the Pillars; hence much of what is related of the parts towards the west is discredited.”

The transference of Spain from Carthaginian to Roman domination was simply part of a larger movement which embraced the entire western Mediterranean world, both north and south of the Straits of Gibraltar. There was a change of masters, indeed, and the capital to which men owed allegiance was shifted to southern Italy; but Spain, North Africa, and the other neighboring lands all ultimately shared the same fate; the combination was virtually unbroken. The ensuing period of the Roman occupation of the peninsula lasted roughly six centuries, of which the first two were marked by a series of desperate conflicts, and the last four by comparatively uninterrupted peace. It was a far more serious occupation than that of the Phoenicians or Carthaginians. The newcomers were not satisfied with mere commercial control. They were determined to make themselves the real masters of the land, and thoroughly to Romanize its inhabitants. They left their stamp on the peninsula in a way that none of its previous or subsequent invaders were able to do. Not until the reign of Augustus was the process really complete, but in the course of the long struggle the native Spaniard and the invading Roman learned to respect one another; the terrible war was succeeded by a lasting reconciliation, and the victors and the vanquished fraternized and intermarried. The Romanized native type that emerged furnished the empire with some of her most distinguished men; it gave her Trajan, Hadrian, and Theodosius, and almost all the great names of Roman literature from Ovid to Martial. It subsequently imposed a large share of its civilization and culture on its Visigothic barbarian conquerors. Under Roman domination, then, the native Spaniard cannot be regarded, as under the Carthaginians, in the light of a mere passive spectator of the development of the empire of which he formed a part. He was conquered, indeed, but respected and finally taken up into the life of the great system to which he had given his allegiance. He bore his share in guiding and controlling it. He was given the elements of an imperial education.

The development of the provincial divisions of Roman Spain presents certain interesting features. At first, Spain was treated as an entity by itself; its political boundaries were drawn to coincide with its natural ones; it was separated from North Africa and from Sardinia and Sicily. From 197 B.C. to 27 B.C., except for a short period before 167, it was divided into two provinces: Citerior and Ulterior, the boundary between them being the Douro from its mouth to the modern city of Toro, and an irregular line drawn thence in a southerly and southeasterly direction, through Villanueva de la Serena and Jaen, to the mouth of the Almanzora in the Mediterranean. In 27 B.C. Hispania Ulterior was divided into two
parts: Baetica to the south, with the capital Corduba (Cordova), ‘the patrician colony’, and Lusitania to
the west, with Augusta Emerita (Merida) as its capital. Hispania Citerior, or Tarraconensis, as it was
sometimes called from its capital Tarraco (Tarragona), was partitioned also, but not until much later; in
216 or 217 A.D., the northwest portion of the peninsula was marked off from it as a fourth province,
called Asturias and Gallaecia, or Hispania Nova Citerior. Meantime, from at least as early as the second
half of the second century, the rich lands of Baetica, on the south, had been constantly raided by pirates
from Mauretania Tingitana, the westernmost of the two new provinces on the opposite North African
shore, which the Romans had somewhat neglected since it had fallen into their hands. No convenient
land route connected Mauretania Tingitana with its eastern neighbor, Mauretania Caesariensis. The
journey was a voyage of over two hundred miles along the desolate and insubordinate coast of the Riff,
while Baetica was not only nearer, but also much more important to keep in touch with, on account of
the hostile incursions that surged to and fro across the Strait. Of all these facts the Emperor Diocletian
took full account when he reorganized the empire in 293, and erected Hispania into a diocese of the
prefecture of Gaul.

To the four provinces already existing, three more were added. One, Carthaginiensis, was carved
out of the southeast of Tarraconensis, as Gallaecia had previously been carved out of the northwest. A
second, established between 369 and 386, comprised the Balearic Islands. The last was the African
province of Tingitana, whose union with the diocese across the Strait was, in Mommens’s words, “only
the outward carrying out of what in reality had long subsisted. It was for Baetica what Germany was for
Gaul; and, far from lucrative as it must have been, it was perhaps instituted and retained for the reason
that its abandonment would even then have brought about an invasion of Spain similar to that which
Islam accomplished after the collapse of the Roman rule”. Such was the organization of Spain in the last
century before the barbarian invasions. It bore striking witness to the closeness of its natural association
with North Africa and the adjacent islands of the Mediterranean; and the memory of it endured, so
that its influence can be plainly traced at many subsequent stages of the development of the Spanish
Empire.

During the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries Spain, like the rest of Western Europe, was inundated
by barbarian hordes. First the Suevi, Alans, and Vandals poured over the peninsula; then came the
Visigoths, whose rule attained some measure of permanence, but was at best little more than that of a
dominant minority, which gradually lost its power and ended by adopting the religion, the language, and
a great measure, of the law of the Romanized natives already on the ground. In such turbulent times it
was inevitable that many of the political bonds which had previously united the peninsula with the rest
of the Mediterranean world should be snapped; but the tie with North Africa was strong enough at least
partially to survive the shock. Certainly, the Visigoths had their eye on Morocco from the moment of
their first occupation of Spain. King Wallia (415-419) attempted to supply the agricultural deficiencies
of the Peninsula by an expedition to North Africa in search of corn; King Theudis (531-548) made a
strenuous though not permanently successful effort to cross the Strait and capture Ceuta, in which he
recognized, like the Romans before him, an indispensable bulwark for southern Spain. In this enterprise
he encountered the East Romans, who had already conquered the Vandals in North Africa (533-539),
overrun southern Italy and the islands of the western Mediterranean, and were now, like others who had
possessed the adjacent lands before them, beginning to cast longing eyes at the Iberian Peninsula. An
internal war among the Visigoths, in which one of the parties called on their Byzantine neighbors for
aid, furnished the needed pretext, and the Emperor Justinian seized upon it at once. In 554 Liberius,
governor of Africa, was ordered to cross the Straits with a large force. After uniting with the party that
had invited him into Spain, he defeated the rival army, whose chief was soon after murdered. But the
Visigothic faction who had summoned the East Romans to the peninsula soon discovered that their
guests were by no means anxious to depart. The orthodox natives welcomed them; and although they
were sometimes defeated in the open field by their Visigothic rivals, they clung closely to the walled
towns, and soon commanded a strip of the southern coast of Spain extending from Cape St. Vincent
to the mouth of the Jucar in the Mediterranean. Had it not been for internal trouble in Constantinople,
and the invasion of Italy by the Lombards, it is probable that the entire Peninsula would have been
conquered and the days of the Roman occupation renewed. As it was, the East Romans were not
expelled from Spain until the reign of the Visigothic king Swintila (621-626); and it is not
impossible that certain Spanish ports were subsequently reconquered by them from the Visigoths in the
end of the seventh century.

The decisive event in mediaeval Spanish history is the great Moorish invasion of 711; it
determined the lines of the development of the Peninsula during the next five centuries, and explains,
more than anything else, the special features which differentiate Spain and Portugal from the other
European states. The Arabs, who had become masters of Egypt before the middle of the seventh
The history of the events that led to the crossing of the Saracens into Spain will probably never be accurately known. That the Gothic empire was tottering to its fall and furnished a tempting quarry is certain; that the representations of oppressed Israelites hastened the inevitable is highly probable. The famous story of Count Julian and Florinda la Cava is scarcely more than a legend; some authors have gone so far as to deny the existence of Count Julian; and if there ever was such a person it seems more likely that he was an East Roman or a Romanized Berber than a Goth. But it is somewhat curious that historians should have been at such pains to search for the cause of an action which, to anyone who has been on the scene and has known its earlier history, must inevitably seem perfectly natural—so natural, indeed, as not to require any explanation at all. The barrier between Spain and Morocco, as we have already observed, is far more imaginary than real; one cannot possibly stand on either side of the Strait without feeling an impulse to cross it. Lastly, we must never forget that what is often somewhat misleadingly designated as the ‘Arab invasion of Spain’ was in reality to a far greater extent an incursion by North African Berbers such as the Iberian Peninsula had several times experienced before. The relative numbers of Arabs and Berbers under Tarik’s command in 711 have been very variously estimated. Some authorities place them at 17 and 7000; but, in any case, it is clear that the latter were enormously preponderant, so that the conquering army may, in effect, be regarded as an essentially North African force.

The story of the subsequent development of the political and administrative relations of Moorish Spain to North Africa and the East further emphasizes this point. In theory, during the years immediately following the conquest, the so-called dependency of Andalusia (including the Iberian Peninsula, Gascony, Languedoc, and part of Savoy) was an integral part of the caliphate, and its governor was appointed from Damascus. Practically, however, during this period Spain was regarded as a subordinate dependency of Ifrikia, and the viceroy of Kairawan usually nominated the governors of Andalusia, without sanction from the capital. Sometimes, when there was not time even to apply to Kairawan, the ruler of Spain was elected on the spot by the army. Such was the case when Yusuf, a descendant of the conqueror Okba, was chosen in 745-747, as a sequel to a series of bitter factional struggles; and this event is taken by some historians to mark the beginning of Spain’s virtual independence of all connection with the East. Whatever the final verdict on this point may be, it is certain that the control of Spain by Damascus was definitely terminated a few years later, with the fall of the Omayyad caliphs in the East at the hands of their rivals, the Abbassides. One of the members of the deposed dynasty was fortunate enough to escape the vengeance of his triumphant foes; he was a son of the Caliph Hassan and bore the fortunate name Abd-ar-Rahman. After a series of romantic adventures and hairbreadth escapes he found refuge at last among the hospitable Berbers of Morocco, crossed the Straits, and possessed himself of Spain, where he founded a dynasty that endured until the eleventh century. A formal declaration of independence of the caliphate followed; prayers in the mosques were no longer offered for the Abbasside ruler in the East, but for the new Omayyad upstart in Spain; in 763 an attempt of the Abbassides to reassert their supremacy suffered disastrous defeat, and the heads of their generals, preserved in camphor and salt and wrapped in the black banner of the Abbassides, were sent scornfully back to the Caliph at Bagdad. Finally, in 929, when the Abbasside dynasty had reached the nadir of its fortunes, the greatest of the Spanish Omayyads, Abd-ar-Rahman an-Nasir, dared openly to take to himself the title of Caliph; thus, incidentally asserting his Abbasside rival to be a pretender, and Cordova to be the centre of the Moslem world.
We revert to the relations of Spain and the Moorish powers in North Africa. As long as the Berber states continued to acknowledge their dependence on the Abbasside Caliph, they were naturally committed to an attitude of semi-hostility towards the Spanish Omayyads; and at first they made some small show of aiding the efforts of the Abbassides to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula. They soon found, however, that nothing was to be gained by fighting the battles of a distant overlord against their immediate neighbors; before long they reversed their policy, and, following the example of their coreligionists across the Straits, declared their independence of the caliphate of the East. First in Morocco, in the year 788, the founding of the Idrisite kingdom ended the rule of the Abbassides there and gained for western Mauretania complete autonomy. Twelve years later, in 800, the Abbasside Caliph, Harun al-Rashid, in return for an annual grant of forty thousand dinars, ceded to Ibrahim, the founder of the Aghlabid dynasty, hereditary possession of Ifrikia, which thenceforth also became an independent principality. But the Aghlabites retained possession of Ifrikia for little more than a hundred years. In 909 they were themselves dethroned by a new dynasty, the Fatimites, who shortly afterwards made a determined effort to oust the Idrisites from Morocco. In 920 they besieged Fez, forced the Idrisite ruler there to recognize their sovereignty, and would probably have ultimately annexed all his lands, had it not been for the interference of the Omayyad Caliph in Spain, Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir, then at the summit of his power. From private information Abd ar-Rahman was convinced that the Fatimite conquerors entertained aggressive designs on Spain, and he fully realized that the possession of the southern shore of the Strait would afford an admirable vantage ground, as it had so often done before, for a descent on the Iberian Peninsula. It scarcely seemed worth while to bolster up the tottering buffer state of the Idrisites, after the proofs of incompetence which they had already given. Abd ar-Rahman had been helping them since 917, but they had proved far too feeble a barrier to arrest the Fatimite onslaught. The corollary was obvious. If Spain was to be safe, Abd ar-Rahman must possess himself of the strong places on the North African coast. In 926, accordingly, he sent over a large force to attack and take Melilla. Shortly afterwards he made common cause with an independent Berber tribe, which had shown more ability than the Idrisites in resisting the Fatimites and persuaded it to conquer for him the whole strip from Tenes to Oran. Five years later the Caliph himself intervened and seized Ceuta. His mind was cast in an imperial mould; and had it not been for internal revolts in Andalusia and the Christian advance in northern Castile, he would doubtless have devoted all his energies to this campaign and driven back his foes to the boundaries of Ifrikia. As it was, a long and desultory struggle was waged in Morocco between the Omayyad and Fatimite powers, in which the dwindling faction of the Idrisites espoused first one side and then the other, according to the ebbs and flows of victory and defeat. Finally, in 973, the Fatimites renounced all efforts to maintain themselves in Morocco and departed to the eastward. The Omayyads thereupon redoubled their efforts, defeated the last remnants of the Idrisites, repelled several invasions from Ifrikia, and gradually secured the submission of the independent Berber tribes. Thenceforth they were unquestionably the leading power in Morocco down to the dissolution of their empire in the eleventh century; though they probably never exercised effective political control there, in the modern sense of the term. The pressure of the Christians in northern Spain prevented the Omayyads from giving their exclusive attention to the African problem, and forced them, against their will, to follow the policy of utilizing the more powerful of the Berber chieftains as the representatives of their own overlordship. Very often these Berber viceroys renounced their allegiance to their masters across the Straits; sometimes they even took the leading part in revolts against the sovereign power at Cordova. It would be quite useless to attempt definitely to fix the boundaries of the lands in North Africa which theoretically acknowledged Omayyad suzerainty during this period; but it is doubtful if Spain has ever claimed sway over an equally large extent of territory in that region, though her power may have often been more effective within the limits of the places she has held. Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir deserves an honorable place in the long list of rulers who have pointed the way to the foundation of the modem Spanish Empire.

The fall of the Omayyad caliphate in the first part of the eleventh century put an end to the power of Spain in North Africa for many years to come. None of the twenty-eight states into which the Iberian Peninsula was divided after the central authority had broken down could possibly hope to control any territory in Morocco, where anarchy reigned supreme. But the eleventh century was not to close without seeing Spain and North Africa once more reunited under another empire; this time, however, the center of gravity was to be in the south. The Berbers of the Sahara had been converted to the Moslem faith in the ninth century, and as usual had developed rapidly from converts into fanatics. They were inspired and led by holy men, or Morabitin; hence the name Almoravides, by which they are known to history. Their religious enthusiasm soon made them a mighty conquering power; by the middle of the eleventh century, they came into hostile contact with the scattered Berber tribes in southern Morocco and Algeria. Then arose the great leader who was to become the real founder of their empire—the famous Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, simple, austere, devout, warrior and mystic combined. In 1063 he seized Fez.
Shortly afterwards a revolt against his power gave him the pretext for an atrocious massacre, by which he rid himself at one blow of all possible rivals to his authority. In 1084 he pushed through to the shores of the Mediterranean and took Tangiers and Melilla; meantime one of his lieutenants farther eastward conquered Tenes and Oran, and besieged Algiers. But the prospect to the north, on the other side of the Strait, was far more alluring to Yusuf than the extension of his dominions in North Africa, and the distance between the headlands was not sufficient to deter him from crossing. On June 30, 1086, he landed at Algeciras. With reinforcements furnished by the Emir of Seville, he pressed forward to meet the army of Alfonso VI; and on October 23 he utterly routed his Christian foes at Zallaka, near Badajoz. Troubles in Morocco soon recalled the conqueror to North Africa and enabled the Christians to maintain their southern boundary at the Tagus, but the petty Moorish states in the south of the peninsula were forced to submit to the harsh domination of their arrogant guests. Yusuf’s Puritan spirit had been shocked by the luxury of his coreligionists in Spain; at Zallaka, indeed, he apparently rejoiced in their slaughter, on the ground that they were his enemies as well as the Christians. One by one they were dethroned and replaced by the faithful adherents of the North African zealot. By the year 1095 the whole of Moorish Spain was in the hands of the new invaders, forming an integral part of a vast empire whose center of gravity was in Morocco, and whose southern limit was in Senegal.

Yusuf died in 1106, and the empire that he had founded rapidly crumbled away; but it was almost immediately succeeded by another of a very similar sort. About the year 1120 a new movement, that of the Al-Muwahtihidin, Almohades, or Unitarians, arose in the mountains of Morocco, its aim, like that of the Almoravides which preceded it, being to bring back pure religion to the Moslem world. Its founder, Ibn Tumart, was an Arab who had been adopted by one of the Berber tribes; but the real source of the greatness of the new sect, and one of the most notable figures in the entire history of North Africa, was his chief lieutenant and successor, Abd al-Mumin. For several years the struggle between the Almoravides and the Almohades for the domination of Morocco hung in the balance; in 1143, however, the death of the son of Yusuf the Almoravide turned the scale. The Almohades promptly overran the whole of Mauretania, making a clean sweep of the Almoravide rule there; in 1149 they crossed to Spain. The Christians of the north had meantime improved the opportunity afforded by the dissolution of the Almoravide empire and advanced again into Andalusia, but they were powerless to resist the onslaught of the new invaders. In various minor encounters the Almohades drove them back, and at the same time they reduced the remaining Almoravide governors to obedience. By 1157 nearly half of the Iberian Peninsula recognized their rule. Curiously enough, their most notable military victory over their Christian foes did not occur until July 19, 1195, at Alarcos, after their empire had reached its zenith. In fact, that great battle may be justly regarded as the event that gave the signal for their decline. It caused the Christians in the north to forget their internal quarrels, and, uniting in an effective advance against the common foe, to win the final and decisive victory of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. In the succeeding years “the whole of Andalusia became a prey to civil war”, and the Christians, pouring down from the north, reaped a rich harvest out of the quarrels and selfishness of the Moslem chiefs. One only of the Moorish rulers showed sufficient ability to withstand them— Ibn al-Ahmar, ‘the Conqueror through God’, who, by a mixture of military skill and political astuteness, finally succeeded in possessing himself of Granada and the adjacent lands, and in welding them together into a little kingdom which defied the efforts of the Christians to conquer it for two and one half centuries to come. A little later the authority of the Almohades across the Straits was challenged by that of a new rival, the Merinites, who established themselves at Fez in 1248, and completed the conquest of Morocco in 1269; the king of Granada, moreover, immediately sought and obtained the alliance of the new dynasty, just as his predecessors had gained that of the Almohades. In a subsequent chapter we shall see that throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the different powers to the north and south of the Straits were constantly in relation with one another in a multitude of different ways. The destinies of Spain and Morocco had been too often and too closely linked in the past to be permanently separated, even though the Christian conquest of the peninsula was virtually complete. During at least three stages of her history—under Carthaginians, Almoravides, and Almohades, and, occasionally, during the half century which immediately followed the first Moorish invasion—the whole or part of Spain had been more or less completely controlled by powers whose seat was in North Africa. Under the Romans, possibly under the Visigoths, and certainly in the reign of Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir, Spain had held considerable possessions in Morocco. North Africa was perhaps the most normal and natural field for her expansion, when the days of her internal union and imperial greatness should come.

The historical bonds that united Spain with North Africa are in some degree rivalled by those which connected her with the islands of the western Mediterranean, and particularly with Majorca and Minorca. The Carthaginians had controlled western Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearics, as well as the
Iberian Peninsula, and the Romans succeeded them in all; moreover, the Balearics, from the time of their conquest by Quintus Caecilius Metellus in 123 B.C., were regarded as part and parcel of Spain, and in the fourth century, as we have seen, they were definitely erected into a province of it. The Vandals, who entered Spain in 409, mastered Majorca and Minorca before they left it, and subsequently united them with Corsica and Sardinia under a single government. Whether or not the Visigoths followed them in the Balearics is still a matter of dispute, but it is certain that the East Romans made their presence felt in those islands and all the others of the western Mediterranean, as well as on the southern coast of Spain. The Arabs crossed over to Majorca and Minorca soon after their arrival in the peninsula, and established there a pirates’ nest; in the course of the ninth century it appears that both islands were for a time definitely subjected to the authority of the Moorish king of Bona in North Africa, so that we find the bishoprics of Majorca and Minorca assigned to the ecclesiastical province of Mauretania in a clerical schedule of the period. Meantime Corsica and Sardinia were constantly raided by Moslem corsairs who sidled from Iberian ports; the conquest of Sicily for the Crescent was also in some measure accomplished through the efforts of invaders who came from Spain. Even Crete was seized about the year 823 by certain Moorish adventurers who had been expelled from Andalusia by the Omayyad Caliph of Cordova. They were evicted by Nicephorus Phocas in 960, and their coreligionists in Sicily shared the same fate a century later at the hands of the Norman Roger; but during a long and important period it is not too much to say that the Spanish Moslems exercised a dominant influence over the destinies of all these islands. As to the Balearics, despite incessant Christian raids, and their temporary association with Africa, they soon fell back completely into the control of the Moors of the Iberian Peninsula. The Almoravides took them from the Saracen chieflain who was in possession soon after their advent in Spain but were ousted in turn by the Almohades in 1187. Clearly there were abundant precedents in the previous history of the Iberian Peninsula for the acquisition by Aragon of the islands of the western Mediterranean in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.

From the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, on the south and east, we now turn to the mountain wall on the north, whose importance as a natural boundary, or rather as an historical barrier, in the development of the Iberian Peninsula has also been somewhat overestimated. It has been justly said that the idea contained in the phrase already cited, “Africa begins at the Pyrenees”, may be equally well expressed by the formula, Europe ends at the Sahara. The famous words, “Il n’y a plus de Pyrénées,” which Voltaire placed in the mouth of Louis XIV in 1700, when his grandson, Philip of Anjou, was recognized as heir to the Spanish realms, might have been spoken with even greater truth at various earlier stages of the history of Iberia.

We must observe at the outset that the mountain chain of the Pyrenees does not extend unbroken all the way across the neck of land that connects France and Spain. There are passes to the westward and in the center, and the whole range gradually fades away as it approaches the Mediterranean, so that its eastern end is comparatively easy to cross. Of the first occasions on which men availed themselves of these breaks in the mountain chain we have no definite information. It seems reasonably certain, however, that the Celts, who arrived in Spain at a very early date and mingled with the primitive Iberians there, came into the peninsula from France, and traversed the mountain barrier, probably to the westward. In the days of the conflict of the Carthaginians and the Romans the armies of both sides crossed and recrossed the Pyrenees at the other end, over the foothills near the Mediterranean Sea. During the subsequent struggles between the Romans and the native Spaniards, there are at least two occasions when parts of southern France were administratively joined to Spain. When Pompey was sent to invade the peninsula, in 76 B.C., he appointed one of his subordinates as governor of Narbonese Gaul. Again, from 43 B.C. until after the battle of Philippi, the province of Narbonese Gaul was united with Hispania Citerior and Ulterior under the direct command of the triumvir Lepidus. Of course, these were extraordinary and exceptional arrangements, justified by the unprecedented conditions of the time. But the fact that it should ever have been found convenient to unite the political destinies of Spain and France at this period is not without interest in its bearing on the future.

The Visigoths, at the time of their arrival in Spain, were already in possession of southern Gaul; and though they were seriously threatened there by the armies of the Emperor Honorius, they succeeded in retaining and increasing their lands north of the mountains, while they subdued or expelled the other barbarian tribes who had preceded them in the Iberian Peninsula. In the second half of the fifth century, under the mighty Euric, the Visigothic kingdom attained its greatest extent. It stretched from the Loire on the north, to Gibraltar on the south, from the Rhone and the Mediterranean on the east, to the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic on the west; its capital and center of gravity was on French soil, at Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Narbonne. But the bulk of the Gallic portion of it was soon to be lost. It is curious to think of Spain, whose loyalty to the faith in later times was so potent a cause of the increase of her imperial domain, as being ruled by sovereigns whose espousal of the heretical side of one of the
The Moorish invasion did not stop at the Pyrenees. Recklessly ignoring the small band of Christians who had intrenched themselves in the mountain fastnesses of the northwest of Spain, the Saracens began within eight years of their arrival in the peninsula to carry their raids into southern Gaul. In 720-721 the conquest of France was systematically taken up. Narbonne was besieged and captured, and Toulouse only rescued at the last extremity by Duke Eudes of Aquitaine. A subsequent expedition under another leader saw the invaders follow up the valleys of the Rhone and the Saône into Burgundy. After another interval of five years a new viceroy, Abd ar-Rahman al-Ghafeki, having set the peninsula in order, marshalled all his available forces and once more crossed the mountains by way of Navarre. First he crushed the army of the Duke of Aquitaine, which attempted to oppose his passage of the Dordogne; then, turning westward, he seized and plundered Bordeaux. He then advanced northward, ravaging and devastating as he went, finally to encounter the hosts of Charles Martel in October, 732, in the famous battle of Tours. The Frankish victory there was rendered more decisive by the death of the Arab leader; a rapid retreat of the Moslem army, and the loss of the bulk of their recently won possessions north of the mountains were the inevitable consequences, though the army of the conqueror was at first too exhausted to pursue. The region of Septimania, however, still remained for a time in Moorish hands; nay more, its limits were temporarily somewhat extended by several subsequent invasions from the south, one of which reached so far eastward as to threaten the Lombard kingdom in northern Italy. It was not until the year 759 that Pippin, the father of Charlemagne, succeeded in taking Narbonne and permanently driving the Moors to the south of the mountain range.

The Frankish conquest did not stop at the Pyrenees. Expeditions by Charlemagne and his son Louis the Pious carried their armies southward as far as the Ebro. Saragossa they were unable to win; but along the Mediterranean shore they had better fortune. Barcelona was permanently taken in 801; Tarragona and Tortosa were besieged and temporarily captured in the immediately succeeding years. The last two were soon retaken by the Moors, and the limits of the Frankish territories were pushed back nearly as far as Barcelona; but the northeastern corner of the peninsula remained in Christian hands, and was connected, politically and administratively, for three quarters of a century to come, with a greater or lesser portion of the south of France. At first the Spanish conquests formed an integral part of the great duchy of Aquitaine, owing to the fact that the bulk of them had been gained by Louis the Pious, who was established during his earlier years in the Aquitanian capital, Toulouse. In 817 this connection was severed, but when the break occurred the nearer Septimian territories followed the lead of the Spanish lands with which they had previously been so long united, and together with them were erected into the so-called county of Barcelona, or Catalonia. For a time, the county owed feudal allegiance to the crown of France, so that French rule continued, in theory at least, to prevail south of the Pyrenees; but before many years had elapsed the situation was exactly reversed. The weak Carolingians found it impossible to exert any real authority over territories so remote. The counts whom they appointed as their local representatives were for the most part able men, ambitious to attain complete autonomy; finally, towards the close of the ninth century, the inevitable occurred, and Catalonia declared and vindicated its independence. Most of the territories north of the mountains had been meantime stripped away through the efforts of Charles the Bald; but now that independence had
been won, the counts of Catalonia set themselves busily to work to regain them. In this task they had
history and tradition on their side and were extraordinarily successful. An excellent start was made by
Ramon Berenguer I (1035-76) who was able to leave to his son Carcassonne, Redes, Lauraguais, and
“all that he had in the county of Toulouse, in Minervois, in Narbonne, in Foix, and in Comminges”. The
bulk of the work, however, was done by Ramon Berenguer III (1096-1131), partly through skilful
diplomacy and superior military power, but still more by a policy of advantageous marriage. His most
important acquisition was the county of Provence, together with Millau and Gévaudan, through his
union with its heiress Dulce in 1112; other adjacent territories followed under his immediate successors,
so that in the early years of the thirteenth century the influence of Catalonia (which had meantime been
strengthened south of the Pyrenees by its union with Aragon in 1137) may be justly described as
preponderant in the south of France. The story of the loss of the greater part of these territories in the
reigns of Pedro II and James the Conqueror will be told in another place. Yet in the present connection
it is well to remember that, even after James the Conqueror had been forced, at the treaty of Corbeil in
1258, to give up the bulk of his French holdings and renounce forever his grandiose plan of founding a
single Romance state which should extend from the Durance to the Segura, the boundaries of Catalonia
were not driven quite back to the line of the Pyrenees. Montpellier was not wholly lost until 1349, and
Cerdagne and Roussillon, save for one brief interval at the end of the fifteenth century, remained in
Spanish hands until the days of Louis XIV. Though territorially insignificant, stirring memories were
sure to be roused by the mention of their names, and later Spanish kings went to desperate lengths to
retain them. They remained for many years to come a possible nucleus for further conquests in the
north, a lure to induce the descendants of the ancient counts of Catalonia to emulate the deeds of
their ancestors and to enlarge their holdings beyond the mountain range.

The early history of the little saddlebag kingdom of Navarre may also be adduced as evidence that
the Pyrenees do not set so formidable a barrier between France and Spain as might at first sight appear.
Navarre lay partly to the north though mostly to the south of the range; its passes were a frequent route
of invasion in both directions; previous to its division in the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic, its
sovereignty had been held for long periods on both sides of the mountains. It was a link, as well as a
bone of contention, between Spain and France, and furnished a medium of institutional exchanges
between the two countries. The fact that Basque is spoken today on both slopes of the Pyrenees, and the
close linguistic affinity between Valencia, Catalonia, and Provence are also significant in the
same connection. Not only, then, to the south, on the Straits of Gibraltar, nor to the east, in the
Mediterranean Sea, but also to the north, across the Pyrenees, did Spain inherit precedents for expansion
beyond her natural boundaries. Small wonder if, at the time that the daring and faith of Christopher
Columbus opened up a new and far greater field of development, the possibilities of which were at first
but remotely conceived, she should tend in some respects to neglect it, in favor of other enterprises
nearer at home, and sanctioned by some of the strongest precedents of Spanish history and tradition.

We have thus far considered some of the external geographical features of Spain, and also certain
events of her ancient and mediaeval history, with reference to her capabilities for external expansion,
and her fitness for the possession of an imperial domain. But before the background for the foundation
of the Spanish empire can be regarded as complete, we must supplement what has gone before with a
few words concerning some of the most salient internal peculiarities of the peninsula—peculiarities
which, though at first sight they may seem of slight importance in moulding Spain’s imperial career,
were destined ultimately to exert an influence fully as great as the external ones.

Of these internal peculiarities the first, and by all odds the most fundamental, is the tendency
towards diversification and separatism. It is almost impossible to exaggerate its importance; even more
than is the case with Germany down to the nineteenth century, the whole history of Spain “may be
summed up in the one word ‘Particularismus’. Geographical and climatic conditions form the basis of it.
Racially, historically, socially, and economically the effect of the separatist trend may be traced
from the beginning to the end of the story. Its influence has been deep-seated and permanent. It is the
key to many of the most important problems with which the Spaniard is confronted today.

Let us take, in the first place, the geographical features of the peninsula. The average altitude of
Spain is very great; in fact, it ranks next to Switzerland among the European countries in this respect.
The whole of the north central portion forms a high, arid plateau, which slopes off somewhat abruptly
toward the Mediterranean on the east, and more gradually toward the Atlantic on the west. On the
eastern half of the northern side, it rises rapidly into the mountain chain of the Pyrenees, while on the
western it merges into the rainy pastures of Asturias and Galicia. On the south it falls away quite
suddenly, but far inland, leaving the wide, rich Andalusian plain, watered by the Guadiana and

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Guadalquivir, and cut off in turn from the Mediterranean by the snowy summits of the Sierra Nevada, whose loftiest peak (Mulhacen) exceeds in altitude the highest of the Pyrenees. Then, in addition to these general physiographical differentiations, the peninsula is subdivided by a number of minor mountain chains, which run for the most part in an east and west direction and form the valleys of the five principal Spanish rivers—the Ebro, on the east, and the Douro, Tagus, Guadiana, and Guadalquivir, on the west. A river may be either a highway for those who desire to travel along its course, or a barrier for those who wish to cross it; but the Spanish rivers, with the possible exception of the Guadalquivir, are emphatically the latter rather than the former. Since they all rise on the high north central plateau, their current is for the most part so swift as to render it impossible for those journeying east and west to navigate them, while the same fact renders them the more difficult to ford for travelers going north and south. By its rivers and mountain chains, as well as by its high north central plateau, low-lying coasts, and Andalusian plain, the Iberian Peninsula is parceled out into a number of sharply separated districts, each of which naturally tends to lead a life of its own.

Peculiarly and widely divergent climatic conditions follow as an inevitable corollary of these physiographical facts. Moisture is never evenly distributed in a mountainous country, and Spain is no exception to the general rule. The long and parching droughts, followed by sudden inundations, which are a familiar feature of the great plateau, result from a concentration of the rains among the mountain peaks, and the sudden flooding of the swiftly rising streams, which either carry the water off to the sea before it has had any opportunity to benefit the surrounding lands, or else, if the rain has been unusually heavy, overflow their banks. Sudden alternations of heat and cold are another characteristic feature of the high north central plain or meseta. These unfavorable conditions, however, do not obtain on all the coasts, while in Andalusia moisture is abundant and the temperature warm and even. In the extreme northwest, in Galicia and Asturias, the action of the Gulf Stream brings equable weather, though it is also unusually wet. In Spanish climatic as well as physiographical conditions, variety is again the dominant note.

Let us turn for a moment to some of the effects of this internal geographical and climatic variety and separatism on the historical development of the peninsula. The earliest writers on Spain were struck by it. There are even faint traces of it in the Carthaginian Peripli, or accounts of the earliest voyages along the coast, and Strabo’s famous treatise may be described without exaggeration as an extended commentary thereon. It is evident that the number and variety of the tribes which inhabited the peninsula made a profound impression on all observers. The prolonged and heroic resistance of the native Spaniard to the Roman legions in the last two centuries B.C. would have been impossible in a less mountainous and divided land; the Lusitanian shepherd Viriathus and his followers won their greatest victories by skillfully taking advantage of the deep ravines and rocky summits of the west. “The Romans”, says Strabo, “lost much time by reason of the number of different sovereignties, having to conquer first one, then another”. That the victors, after their conquest was complete, found it convenient to exchange their original partition of the land into Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior for a division into three, four, and finally seven provinces is certainly significant, as is the difficulty which the Visigoths subsequently experienced in subjecting the remoter part of the land to their control, and in blotting out the various distinctions which separated them from the mass of the Hispano-Roman inhabitants. The whole internal history of Moorish Spain may be said to center around the efforts of the sovereign power to check its subjects’ natural proclivity to dissolve themselves into a number of petty states, and the tendency to division and subdivision among the Christian rulers in the north is the key to many of the most difficult questions in the mediaeval period. The common statement that the history of united Spain begins with the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile is in some respects very misleading. The particularistic trend was much too strong to be eradicated by mere personal union of the crowns. Through Hapsburg and Bourbon days it continued to mold the destinies of the Iberian Peninsula; and it presented one of the most serious problems which confronted the builders of the Spanish Empire.

The results of the peculiar geographical features of the Iberian Peninsula are also plainly visible in its constitutional, social, and economic life. Variety and differentiation are the dominant features of the national assemblies, of the municipal fueros, of the ranks and classes of men, and of their multifarious interests and occupations. The difficulty of communication between the different parts of Spain has always discouraged internal commerce, and accounts in some measure for the average Spaniard’s marked economic incapacity and his proverbial aversion to a business career. Generally excellent harbors, on the other hand, furnish admirable opportunities for maritime intercourse with other lands, of which the inhabitants of the Mediterranean coast took advantage at an early date. On the Atlantic seaboard, however, the rise of Portugal as an independent kingdom in the twelfth century deprived Castile of her best ports, crippled her foreign commerce, and probably postponed for at least a
The climatic and physiographical conditions within the peninsula are especially favorable to pasturage—perhaps the principal national occupation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The rainy slopes of the Asturian mountains afford the best of summer grazing grounds, and the sunny regions of Andalusia are correspondingly valuable in winter. On the other hand, the barrenness of the Meseta is profoundly discouraging to the agriculturist; it goes far to explain, if not to palliate, the prevalence of the sentiment expressed in the phrase “deshonor del trabajo;” it is one of the principal reasons why the Spaniard has always tended to concentrate in cities. It is true that this agricultural poverty is in some measure compensated by a plentiful supply of running water and considerable mineral wealth. But the full significance of the first of these natural advantages was not perceived until very recent times, and foreigners fully as much as Spaniards have been the ones to profit by it; while the second, at least in the influence which it indirectly exerted on the Spanish fortunes in the New World, was certainly not an unmixed blessing.

The mineral richness of the peninsula was not sufficient to make the search for it a national occupation, but it was so much more considerable than its agricultural possibilities that it led the inhabitants to neglect to till the soil, and to confuse real wealth with its outward and visible symbol. It partly accounts for the proverbial thirst for gold which was the bane of the Spaniards in the New World, and for their inability to realize that agriculture is the most permanent and stable source of a new country’s material prosperity. Some of the most disastrous blunders in the Spanish administration of the Indies are in large measure to be attributed to the peculiar conditions under which the conquerors had been reared in the peninsula.

Everything considered, then, Spain is a country whose natural advantages for the life of mankind have been fully counterbalanced by its disadvantages. There have always been a number of unfavorable and hostile facts to be wrestled with and overcome, and the age-long struggle against these hostile conditions has powerfully affected the character of the inhabitants, and their fitness for the difficult and arduous task of building an empire. The internal divisions of the peninsula, and the tendency of each portion of it to live a life apart from the rest, reacted most unfavorably upon the development of Spain’s external possessions. They have kept the inhabitants of the peninsula as a whole from concentrating their efforts in any one direction. They are the fundamental explanation of the extreme complexity and diversity of interests, which prevented even the powerful monarchs of the sixteenth century from endowing their immense and widely scattered territories with that unity which is the best result of absolutism. They account in large measure for the essentially decentralized character of Spanish imperial administration. On the other hand, we may be sure that the inhospitality of the Meseta was an important element in encouraging the Spaniards to seek pleasanter lands abroad; and it is hard to conceive how any explorer born and brought up in a more smiling country than the desolate plains of Old Castile could have persevered in his advance across the yellow wastes of Arizona and New Mexico, which bear such striking resemblance to them. Certainly, the predominantly unattractive interior of the peninsula helped to make its earliest inhabitants perceive the advantages of a seaboard existence, the first step on the road to empire. From the days of the Phoenicians and Carthaginians the coasts have been the most rich, populous, and progressive portions of the land. Spain is, in fact, one of the classic examples of the truth of the famous dictum of Plato that “men tend to establish themselves on the shore of the sea, like frogs on the edge of a pond.”
BOOK I
CASTILE
CHAPTER I
THE RECONQUEST

The mediæval history of Spain is first and foremost the history of a crusade. For nearly eight centuries the Christians of the North devoted themselves to the task of expelling the Moors from the Peninsula. It was in the accomplishment of that task that the different Spanish kingdoms were gradually evolved, and the final victory at Granada in 1492 celebrated the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile. Many of the distinctive features of modern Spain are to be directly traced to the influence of this age-long struggle, and it powerfully affected the destinies of the Spanish Empire. In fact, the reconquest of the peninsula and the conquest of an imperial domain beyond the sea really form two intimately connected chapters of the same story. From the cave of Covadonga to the annexation of Portugal and her dominions in 1580, which carried the Spanish Empire to its greatest territorial extent, the process of expansion is continuous.

We have seen that the Iberian Peninsula had been ruled both in ancient times and in the early Middle Ages by sovereigns who had also dominated parts of northern Africa, southern France, and the Mediterranean islands. Spain's connection with all these territories was traditional, natural, and intimate. When, therefore, the mediæval Spaniard looked back at the previous history of his native land, he did not see her boundaries as we see them today. After the Reconquest had reached the shores of the Mediterranean and of the Atlantic, he saw no reason why it should stop. Expansion overseas had in fact begun even before the peninsula was clear of infidels. James I of Aragon captured the Balearics before he took Valencia. Castile won the Canaries before Granada fell, and the year of the surrender of that stronghold was the year of the discovery of America. The foundations of the Spanish Empire were thus laid before the mother country was wholly in Christian hands. Moreover, the interlocking and continuity of the two movements are as easy to recognize in the spheres of constitutional and social development and of national ideals as they are in that of political affairs. The early divisions of the Christian kingdoms have their counterpart during the sixteenth century in the regulations limiting the participation of the Aragonese in the affairs of the Indies; they are vividly recalled by the difficulties which the Hapsburgs experienced in bringing the institutions of the Mediterranean states into alignment with those of Castile. The same religious fervor with which Archbishop Roderic of Toledo strove to inspire the Christians to do or die on the bloody plains of Las Navas de Tolosa was invoked by Hernando Cortez when he burned his ships on the shore of Vera Cruz, and planted the symbol of the Faith above the reeking altars of the Mexican war god; it was utilized by Francisco Pizarro in justification of his ruthless slaughter of the Incas. The Cross of Christ was alike the emblem of reconquest and of conquest; Santiago was the Spanish battle cry in the old world and in the new.

No apology, then, is needed for beginning the story of the foundation of the Spanish Empire in the earliest days of the Reconquest. During the entire period of the Middle Ages, however, it is important to observe that the allied tasks of expelling the Moors from the peninsula, and of winning new territories beyond it, were very unevenly distributed between the eastern and western parts of Spain. It was Castile on the westward that assumed the lion’s share of the work of recapturing Spain from the infidel, while the realms of the Crown of Aragon to the eastward took the lead in the great work of expansion in the Mediterranean Sea. The relative geographical extent of the lands held by Castile and Aragon within the peninsula and without it at the accession of the Catholic Kings bears striking testimony to this. While Castile and Leon occupied more than three times as much territory as did the Aragonese realms in Spain, their sole external possession, the Canaries, was less than one seventeenth the size of the Mediterranean islands and Italian lands that had been won by the eastern kingdoms. The mediæval Castilian background of the Spanish Empire is primarily, therefore, a history of internal expansion, while that of the realms of the Crown of Aragon deals for the most part with the conquest of realms abroad; and this fundamental difference in national occupation and object was to give rise to an enormous number of subsidiary ones in a multitude of other, respects. Two very divergent currents united under Ferdinand and Isabella to form Spain and the Spanish Empire, and much study will have to be devoted to the growth and development of each, before any adequate appreciation can be gained of the nature and complexity of the problems with which the Catholic Kings and their successors
were confronted. The present chapter will deal with the narrative history of Castile during the first five and a half centuries after the Moorish invasion.

Time-honored tradition, so often more significant and important than established historic fact, assigns of the Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula and of the modern Spanish Empire to the cave of Covadonga in the Asturian mountains. To this cave a small band of Christians, led by a certain Pelayo, who gave out that he was a descendant of the ancient line of Visigothic kings, retired before the advancing hosts of one of the Arab chieftains; and, favored by the mountaneous character of the country, offered desperate resistance to the overwhelming forces of the invaders. The date usually assigned to this episode is the year 718, and the ancient Spanish historians vie with one another in telling of the marvels that were there performed. “The Infidels”, says Mariana, “attack’d the mouth of the Cave, pouring in a Shower of Stones and Darts. Here the Hand of God appeared in defence of the Christians; for all the Weapons cast against them, flew back upon the Moors, with great slaughter of them. At this Miracle the Infidels stood astonished, and the Christians taking heart, rushed out upon them; the Fight was Disorderly, but the Enemy amazed at what they had seen, turned their Backs and fled. 20000 were killed in the Battle and Pursuit”. If we cannot accept this astounding story word for word, we may well believe that a desultory guerilla warfare was waged in the Asturian highlands, and that the Moors, discouraged by the difficulty of the country, and thinking perhaps that the Christian forces were too insignificant ever to cause them serious trouble, finally decided to withdraw without crushing the last embers of resistance. It was a terrible mistake, as they were afterwards to learn to their cost. “Would to God”, exclaims the Moorish historian Makkari, “that the Moslems had then extinguished at once the sparks of a fire that was destined to consume the whole dominions of Islam in those parts.”

Slowly Pelayo and his little band increased their territories, and gradually other scattered groups of neighboring Christians joined with them. Before long their united holdings came to be known as the kingdom of Asturias; and the capital which Pelayo had established at Cangas de Onis was transferred before the end of the eighth century to Oviedo. The boundaries of the little realm in this period are impossible definitely to determine. They varied from day to day, though in general the Christians gained more than they lost, particularly during those times when the Moorish part of Spain was in confusion, as in the years immediately preceding the arrival of the first Omayyad. Most of the fighting in the eighth century occurred in the Douro basin; but the limits of the Christian kingdom did not extend so far south as that river, nor those of the Moorish territories so far north. Whenever the infidels withdrew from a district they deliberately devastated it, so as to prevent their foes from following close upon their heels; they thereby created a wide neutral zone or ‘No Man’s Land’, which, coupled with the natural poverty of the great Meseta, opposed the most effective barrier to the Christian advance. These intermediate devastated regions were constantly raided by both parties, but they could not permanently support large armies, hence the desultory haphazard character of the wars of the Reconquest, and the notable absence of important pitched battles. The progress of the Christians was also considerably impeded, during this early period, by the unwillingness of these sturdy warriors to permit their monarchs to enter into any alliance with the Emperor Charlemagne against the Moors, lest the terms demanded should imply a derogation of Spanish autonomy, and possibly connote some measure of inferiority to foreign imperial power. The famous legend of Bernardo del Carpio, voicing the national disapproval of such external entanglements, is no longer accepted, but its constant repetition for many generations is a striking proof of the haughty pride of independence and bitter hatred of every kind of restraint, which are traditionally associated with the ancient Spanish aristocracy.

Before the middle of the ninth century, however, several causes had combined to endow what had begun as a mere struggle for existence with a new aim and purpose, and to strengthen the foundations of the Spanish Empire with the sanction and blessing of the church. In the first place the Christians who flocked to the standard of Pelayo and his successors brought with them all the later Visigothic traditions of ecclesiastical power in the government, so that there was fruitful ground ready prepared for the perpetuation of theocratic rule. Secondly, the kings of Asturias soon began to realize that under the peculiar circumstances in which they found themselves the clergy could readily be converted into priceless allies in the task of expanding the boundaries of their little state. The churchmen could easily be induced to represent the work of driving back the Moor as a sacred duty obligatory on all, in fact even to threaten with ecclesiastical censures those who held back, and thus to contribute directly to the enlargement of the territories of the Christian king. In return for this favor the Asturian sovereigns would hand over to the church a generous share of the lands they conquered—the more readily since the clergy was a far less dangerous foe to the monarchy than the proverbially restive nobility; they would further the building of churches, cathedrals, and monasteries, and maintain as far as possible ecclesiastical influence in the government of the realm. It was a remarkably harmonious case of mutual
and reciprocal aid; king and clergy played into one another’s hands to a very unusual degree. The credit for originating this practice of alliance with the church in the cause of territorial expansion is usually given to Alfonso I (739-757), of whom the Moorish chronicler tells us “that he slew tens of thousands of the Faithful, burned houses and fields, and that no treaty could be made with him”. His services to his country and to Christendom have earned him the appellation of ‘the Catholic’; and though the policy which he inaugurated seems to have perished temporarily at his death, it was subsequently revived and continued, and in the ninth century received additional impetus from the birth of the national Spanish legend of Santiago.

The story of the miraculous discovery of the remains of St. James the Greater in the rocky fastnesses of Galicia is picturesquely related in the following words by the translator of Mariana’s famous history:

“Theodomerus, Bishop of Iria Flavia, hearing great Lights were seen in a wild part of a Mountain, went thither, and causing the Bushes and Briars to be cut down, and digging up a heap of Earth, found the holy Body in a Marble Sepulcher. Overjoy’d at this, he went to Court to acquaint the King, who in Person repair’d thither, and caus’d a Church to be erected in that place, dedicated to St. James, but mean, as having only mud Walls. He also instituted Benefices belonging to it, and assign’d them Revenues. The Fame of it being spread abroad, brought People from all parts of Christendom; and to this day it is one of the most frequented Pilgrimages in the World. Some grave and Learned Persons have made a doubt, whether St. James the Apostle ever was in Spain, and consequently of the Invention of his Body. I will not undertake to discuss the point but must confess I think the general consent of all Christendom in this behalf appears to me more convincing than all the Arguments they can bring to oppose it”.

It is the last sentence in this account that contains the gist of the whole matter. The story spread and was universally believed. A noble church was erected on the sacred spot and consecrated in 899. During the succeeding centuries it became the goal of pilgrims so numerous that Spaniards use the phrase ‘the road to Santiago’ to express the myriad of stars that compose the Milky Way. But the effect of the legend within the peninsula and the empire subsequently to be controlled from it was far more important than Santiago’s distinction as the Mecca of the pilgrims of the West. Arising as it did just as the kingdom of Asturias was completing the first century of its troublous existence, it furnished an inspiration, an ideal, a battle cry, which committed the Christians to a steady continuance of their advance up to and beyond the borders of Spain. It gave the vigorous but disconnected efforts of the Asturian warriors the added inspiration of a crusade. It cemented the alliance of church and state in the sacred duty of reclaiming the peninsula for the faith and of carrying that faith beyond the seas. It linked the Reconquest to the Empire and emphasized the continuity of their development. Never was national legend of deeper and more lasting significance.

Powerful as was its influence for the advance of the Christian arms, the legend of Santiago was unable to endow the Asturian realm with the internal unity which was essential for lasting success. The clergy, indeed, had been brought into line, though the grants which rewarded their loyalty played havoc with the royal patrimony; but the nobles, whose existence did not depend on the success of the crusade, grew steadily more restive and uncontrolled. The tradition of elective kingship, inherited from Visigothic days, had not been forgotten, and served to keep the central power weak. Often the haughty barons revenged themselves for fancied insults at the hand of their monarchs by deliberately taking sides with the infidel, who suffered them to enjoy complete religious liberty and a considerable measure of political autonomy as well. The fact that the Cid, the most faithless of them all, could so easily attain the position of national hero shows that such betrayals were not generally regarded as in the least reprehensible. The nobles moreover were continually fighting among themselves; and the deadly feuds, sometimes prolonged for centuries, between the different aristocratic houses of the West Spanish realms, were the most fruitful of all the sources of internal anarchy and unrest, and of impotence abroad. From the earliest days of the Reconquest to the times of Ferdinand and Isabella, the management and control of the baronage was much the hardest problem with which the West Spanish sovereigns were confronted, harder by far than the crusade against the Moors.

It is a singular fact, in view of these tendencies toward decentralization, that the monarchs themselves, whom every consideration would naturally urge to work for the unity of their kingdom and the increase of their own power, deliberately adopted the ruinous policy of parceling out their realms among their children at their deaths. The first instance of this disastrous practice occurred in the end of the reign of Alfonso the Great, who died in 910, and whose long rule of forty-four years had witnessed a considerable extension of the Asturian state. Victorious against the infidel, the old king was not master in his own house; sick at heart over the revolts of his turbulent children, he
finally determined to renounce the throne. Plainly foreseeing, however, that his sons, who had previously joined forces against him, would not, after his abdication, permit the elevation of any one of their number to a position of supremacy over the rest, he weakly attempted to satisfy them all by dividing his inheritance between them. To the eldest and most ambitious, named Garcia, he left the southerly territories of León, relatively newly won, and probably carrying with them a certain measure of suzerainty over the rest. To the second, Ordoño, he gave the western lands of Galicia and northern Lusitania, and to the third, Fruela, the parent kingdom of Asturias; while he himself retired to the town of Zamora, stipulating that it should remain in his hands till his death, which occurred shortly afterwards. During the next four years the energy of Garcia, king of León, which was chiefly directed toward the repeopling of the devastated lands, carried all before it, and made his portion unquestionably the center of gravity of the Christian state. The capital was definitely transferred from Oviedo to León, which had the advantage of Roman fortifications, and the name León began gradually to be adopted as the general designation of the Christian kingdoms of the northwest. But in 914 Garcia died, leaving no children, so that his younger brother Ordoño, to whom his father had assigned Galicia, succeeded him in León as well; and ten years later Ordoño died also. In his case there was no lack of surviving sons, but it seems that the nobles, to whom considerable influence in the choice of monarchs still belonged, determined that none of these was so fit to rule as Ordoño’s younger brother Fruela, the heir of Asturias, whom they accordingly elevated to the throne of León. The kingdoms of the northwest, deliberately separated into three parts by Alfonso the Great, were thus after fourteen years reunited. The episode is of no special importance in itself, but the process of division was constantly repeated, and had not a considerable number of the early monarchs died leaving only a single son, there is no telling where it would have ceased. Whenever such partitions occurred, defeat by the Moors was the inevitable consequence; but the fact that repeated disasters did not lead to the abandonment of the practice shows how deeply the trend toward separatism was ingrained in the character of the mediaeval Spaniard. Certainly, the sort of divide which he practised was not calculated to produce impera.

The tenth century witnessed important events on the eastern frontier of the kingdom of León, which were destined to give wider scope to this same tendency toward division. The Leonese kings had found it advisable to entrust the government of the eastern portions of their domains to vassal counts who resided there, and would consequently be interested for their own sakes both in repelling the raids of the Moors and in winning new territories at their expense. The plan worked well, at least in the ninth century: under the leadership of their counts, the inhabitants of these eastern regions made steady advances to the southward. In 860 their capital was at Amaya; in 884 it had been moved forward to Burgos. During the succeeding years still further progress was made; even León to the westward was outstripped, and the Christians came in sight of the Guadarramas. But the Moorish resistance was fierce; every mile was stubbornly contested, and conquered territory was likely to be immediately retaken. The inhabitants were therefore constantly under arms, and, in order to protect themselves against sudden raids, they covered the land with castles, so that it soon became known as Castile. Consciousness of military power naturally begat aspirations for autonomy, and the counts of these eastern regions gradually became restive under the control of the Leonese kings. The nature of their relationship in this early period is impossible accurately to define. The principle of hereditary succession in the countship had not yet formally prevailed over that of royal appointment; but it is evident that at an early date sons often followed father without interference from León. It seems probable, moreover, that the counts of Burgos soon established a certain right of suzerainty over the less ambitious lords of the territories adjacent to them. They occasionally refused to obey their sovereigns’ summons to military service, and we are even told that they sometimes nominated judges on their own authority, thus arrogating to themselves what had been invariably regarded as a royal prerogative. Out of the different and variously authenticated statements that have come down to us one fact emerges clear. By the end of the first quarter of the tenth century the counts of Burgos were aiming to secure complete independence of the kingdom of Leon and absolute control over their own dominions. It was only a question of time when a man should come to the head of affairs at the Castilian capital with sufficient ability to realize these ambitions.

Such a man was found at last in the valorous Fernán Gonzalez, who was established at Burgos about 930, and was master of the destinies of the Castilian lands till his death in 970. Legend has been very busy with his name, and many of the main facts of his career are still in doubt. We do not even know how he succeeded in gaining his place; but it seems likely that his own efforts were quite as important in effecting this result as any appointment by the king of León; and he was apparently the first definitely to assume the title of ‘count of Castile’. He was a bold, resourceful man, equally proficient at plotting and at war, and it was by skillful and unscrupulous utilization both of the internal broils of the Christians in the north and of the ebbs and flows of the war of the Reconquest that he
finally achieved Castilian autonomy. A disastrous expedition of his Leonese overlord Ramiro II against the mighty Caliph Abd ar-Rahman III, in 939, gave Fernán Gonzalez his first opportunity. Instead of aiding his liege lord against the infidel he began by remaining neutral; then later, when Moorish bands began to penetrate the Christian territories, he joined forces with the invader and broke out into open revolt. On the field of battle Fernán Gonzalez was defeated and taken prisoner; but Ramiro was so hard pressed by the troops of the Caliph that he dared not reap the fruits of the victory he had won, and, yielding to the almost unanimous demands of the Castilians, soon sent back the rebel to his own dominions. Nay more, he even sought to cajole his turbulent vassal into friendship and alliance by arranging a marriage between the latter’s daughter Urraca and his own son Ordoño. Small wonder that Fernán Gonzales was not won over by methods like these. Rightly regarding the match that had been made as a confession of Ramiro’s weakness and of his own strength, he promptly returned to his plots with greater zest than ever. The history of the period that follows is one long chronicle of anarchy and intrigue. Fernán Gonzalez permitted Abd ar-Rahman to use Castile as a base for new attacks on León, and continually interfered in the internal affairs of that kingdom. When, in 950, his son-in-law Ordoño III succeeded Ramiro there, he supported against him his younger half-brother Sancho the Fat; then, six years later, when Ordoño died and Sancho ascended the Leonese throne, Fernán Gonzalez reversed his policy and made common cause against the new monarch with his cousin, Ordoño IV. The situation was also complicated at this critical moment by the entrance upon the scene of the king of the little realm of Navarre. The Navarrese monarch was uncle to King Sancho of León, and warmly espoused his cause: but even his help was not sufficient to enable his ally to recover his throne, still less to bring the terrible Fernán Gonzalez to his knees. The intrigues of the count of Castile were shaking all the realms of Christian Spain to their foundations.

There was only one method by which the wretched Sancho could possibly hope permanently to extricate himself from his difficulties. No combination of Christians had so far been successful in vanquishing Fernán Gonzalez: the only chance of bringing him to book was to outbid him for the friendship of the great Caliph in the South. A strictly personal reason, moreover, confirmed the Leonese king in his resolution to apply for aid to Abd ar-Rahman. His corpulence was so excessive that it amounted to a serious infirmity and made him a jest in the mouths of his subjects; his sole hope of being cured rested in a Jewish doctor, named Hasdai, residing in Cordova, whom Abd ar-Rahman would not permit to go to León. The Caliph, however, was only too glad to have Sancho come to the Moorish capital for his treatment: he also was not averse to a political alliance, and before long the two sovereigns came to terms. Sancho journeyed southward to Cordova, where Hasdai’s cure was highly successful; Abd ar-Rahman gave him Moorish troops to aid him in the recovery of his dominions, in return for the surrender of ten fortresses; in 959 he was able to regain possession of his realm. His triumph, however, was but short. It had by this time become the fashion for dispossessed Christian kings to seek reinstatement through alliance with the infidel: Sancho had used that weapon against Fernán Gonzalez, and now his cousin, Ordoño, the protégé of the count of Castile, determined to use it against him. The death of Abd ar-Rahman and the succession of Hakam II at Cordova (961) made the reversal of policy all the easier, and the remaining years of Sancho the Fat saw León constantly raided by Moorish troops. Ordoño did not live to reap the reward of his treachery, but the indefatigable Fernán González utilized the result of it for his own purpose—namely, the winning of Castilian independence. The details of the story are wellnigh impossible to follow. We can only be sure that during the last years of the life of Sancho the Fat, who died in 966, and still more during the minority of his infant son, Ramiro, the count of Castile was unceasingly active; and that at his death in 970, his title was recognized as hereditary in his house, and passed to his son Garcia Fernández without interference from León.

Castilian autonomy had thus been attained, in practice at least, if not in theory; but greater things were soon to come. The countship was ultimately destined to dominate and virtually to absorb the land that gave it birth. During the half century after Fernán González’s death several marriage alliances were made between the ruling families of León, Castile, and Navarre—an incidental evidence that the middle countship was now recognized as of equivalent standing with the kingdoms to the west and east of it. In 1029 these alliances resulted in a close union of Castile and Navarre under a certain King Sancho the Great, who thereafter attempted to carry his power even farther into the west and to possess himself of the kingdom of León. This ambitious project he was unable completely to accomplish before his death in 1035; furthermore, he followed the evil example of many of his predecessors and divided his realms between his different children at his death. But his ambitions to conquer Leon survived in his second son Ferdinand, who succeeded him in Castile, defeated and slew the Leonese monarch on the field of battle in 1037, and finally celebrated his triumph by assuming the royal title in the eastern countship, so that he ruled over both states as king of Castile until his death in 1065. The two
The capture of Toledo by Alfonso VI in 1085 marked the culmination of the campaign in the west coast of the Peninsula between the valleys of the Minho and the Tagus; these regions had anciently formed the southern part of the kingdom of Galicia, but were now erected into a separate county, with the name of Portucalia or Portugal. At the outset it appears that Count Henry was in some degree subject to his cousin the ruler of Galicia, and that, in consequence, the relations between them were considerably strained in the ensuing years. Each distrusted the other and wished to absorb the other’s dominions in his own. Both, however, were united in a common jealousy of their father-in-law and feudal suzerain Alfonso of Leon and Castile, whose lands they both coveted, and of whom they were resolved to render themselves independent. A long and bitter struggle ensued, and Portugal in the end was the only power to reap any permanent benefit from it.

The conflict began in earnest with the death of Alfonso VI in 1109. Though five times married, he left no legitimate male children, and was succeeded in both Leon and Castile by his daughter Urraca, whose Burgundian husband Raymond, the ruler of Galicia, had died two years before, leaving her with...
an infant son Alfonso. But Urraca was not long to remain a widow. Partly owing to the pressure of the nobles, who did not wish to see an unmarried woman occupy the throne, and partly because she dreaded the consequences of refusing him, she accepted, as her second husband, her kinsman, Alfonso the Warrior, the restless and ambitious sovereign of Aragon, who looked with covetous eyes upon the Leonese-Castilian inheritance. At first it was hoped that the union of all the Christian kingdoms of the north, effected by this marriage, would bring peace and quiet to the land, and bear fruit in glorious Christian victories against the Moors; but precisely the reverse was the case. Urraca profoundly disliked her Aragonese husband, whom she had married rather from fear than from inclination. She dreaded his ambition to make himself king of Leon and Castile. Open quarrel soon broke out between them. It was clear that the queen desired a divorce; and in this she was supported by the mass of the clergy, who had always protested against the Aragonese marriage on the ground that the parties were within the forbidden degrees of kinship. The Galicians also, who hated the thought of the intrusion of the Aragonese sovereign in their affairs, took sides at first with Urraca, and, under the lead of the famous Diego Gelmirez, archbishop of Compostela, supported the claims of Alfonso her son against those of Alfonso her husband. In 1113 a solemn decree of a church council at Palencia annulled the marriage of Urraca and Alfonso of Aragon but did not thereby eliminate the latter from the affairs of western Spain. A furious war broke out between the divorced husband and wife; and the situation was further complicated by the fact that Urraca also became involved in a conflict with Alfonso her son, whose Galician supporters had previously aided her in getting rid of Alfonso her husband, but in whom she now recognized a dangerous rival to her own power.

The prevailing confusion afforded the rulers of Portugal a golden opportunity to win their independence, and they did not neglect it. Vigorous campaigns were launched in León and in Castile, invariably directed against whichever of the parties in those unhappy realms threatened to become predominant: even when, for one brief interval, Urraca and her son united their forces against the powerful rebel to the west of them, they were forced to agree to a peace which granted their foes a large addition to their territories. At one moment it almost seemed as if Count Henry’s ambition would not be satisfied with the mere winning of freedom but would extend as far as the conquest of the thrones of León and of Galicia; but after his death in 1114, the separatist forces in Portugal once more gathered headway, and independence rather than the annexation of adjacent realms became the national watchword. For fourteen years Teresa, the widow of Count Henry, ruled in the name of her son Affonso Henriquez, and tided Portugal over one of the most critical periods of her existence; in 1128, however, she was forced to retire in favor of the Infante, who, though but seventeen years of age, refused to be kept longer in tutelage. In 1130 he invaded Galicia; and after a struggle of varying fortune, was obliged (1137) to sign a peace with Alfonso, the son of Urraca, in which he specifically acknowledged the condition of feudal vassalage which it was his object to shake off. But this state of affairs was not destined to endure. The restless Portuguese ruler could not stay his hand from fighting. If he could gain nothing at the expense of his Christian neighbors to the north and east, he would enlarge his dominions by attacking the infidel. In 1139 he won a creditable victory over the Moors at Ourique, far to the southward, and then returned with enhanced prestige to Galicia. After an indecisive battle, in which the Portuguese king was slightly wounded, it was apparently agreed, in accordance with the customs of chivalry, to commit the question of Portuguese independence to the issue of a tourney, between picked knights of the two opposing hosts, in the historic meadow of Valdevez. From the encounter the Portuguese emerged victorious, but long delays ensued before full acknowledgment of their freedom could be extorted from the king of Castile; for though the latter recognized his rival’s right to the royal title, he craftily arranged to cede him certain Castilian lands to be held by him in feudal vassalage, and thus in some measure to preserve the relation of dependence which had previously existed. To elude this danger the king of Portugal approached the papacy and asked permission to hold his kingdom as vassal of the Holy See. This plan of playing off the pontiff against the king of Castile was not immediately successful; there were further difficulties about titles and tributes; but all the time the position of Affonso Henriquez grew steadily stronger. He was greatly helped by the conquest in 1147, with the aid of foreign crusaders, of the town of Lisbon. Finally, in 1179, Pope Alexander III not only acknowledged the validity of his title as king, but also the independence of his realm, and thenceforth the result of the struggle was a foregone conclusion. Whatever the claims of his rival in Castile, the king of Portugal had won virtual autonomy for his kingdom, and in the immediately succeeding centuries, while the tendency of the other peninsular realms was on the whole to coalesce, its destinies continued to remain separate from them.

A few comments on the significance of the attainment of Portuguese independence for Spain and for the Spanish Empire will not be out of place. The fact that it could be attained and maintained at all is, of course, the strongest evidence of the intensity of Spanish particularism, and of the weakness of the
central power in León and Castile. There was almost no natural or geographical reason for it. The rivers and mountain chains run on the whole east and west, and consequently form no barrier between Portugal and Spain. Though the character of the country changes somewhat as one crosses the present frontier, “it is impossible to find an adequate explanation of the separate existence of the two nations in the land: history furnishes the only key to this phenomenon”. And the results of Portuguese independence are of even more immediate interest to us than its causes. That another nation held the greater part of the western coast of the Iberian Peninsula retarded the process of Spanish expansion in the Atlantic, and, when it finally came, probably altered its direction. The Portuguese sailed south and east before they sailed west, and thus forestalled Spain in Africa and India. Had Portugal not been there, Spain would probably have won extensive lands in these regions before she was tempted out into the western seas. On the other side of the peninsula also the effects of Portugal’s presence are distinctly traceable. Had the western seacoast been free for the use of Castile, it is difficult to believe that she would have been so completely outstripped by the realms of the Crown of Aragon in maritime expansion during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Imperial experience would have been much more evenly divided between the two component parts of Spain before their union; and the Mediterranean possessions would not have been suffered to divert so large a share of her attention from the Indies. The course of Spain’s imperial development was thus largely moulded by the fact that Portugal had won her independence; and when at last, in 1580, the destinies of the two nations were temporarily joined, the divergences of over four centuries proved ineradicable, and the union was really never more than a union in name.

The progress of the Reconquest was naturally much impeded by the constant recurrence of quarrels such as we have just described among the Christians of the north. That it progressed at all is indeed a wonderful tribute to the energy and valor of the mediaeval Spaniard, whenever he could spare time and attention from his particularistic strivings to aid in the completion of the national task. Obviously also, the rapidity of the Christian advance, besides being dependent on the state of internal affairs in Castile and León, was bound to vary in inverse proportion to the strength and unity of the Moslem foe to the southward. The Douro valley had been attained during the period of confusion in Moorish Spain which preceded the arrival of the first Omayyad. The boundary was pushed forward to the Tagus in the days when the infidels were divided into a number of petty states. The third great forward movement by the Christians, which was to limit the foe to the little kingdom of Granada, coincides with the gradual disintegration of the Almohade empire in the first part of the thirteenth century. In the long intervals that elapsed between these advances there was a constant series of raids and forays by both combatants, in which the offensive was naturally assumed by whichever side had temporarily attained preponderance. Under Abd ar-Rahman III and Almanzor, in the latter part of the tenth century, when the general line lay just south of the Douro basin, Moorish expeditions were constantly penetrating to the Galician and Asturian mountains and even to the Bay of Biscay. In 997 Almanzor removed the bells from the great church of Santiago de Compostela and carried them south to Cordova, to make lamps for the ceiling of the Mezquita there. On the other hand, Alfonso VII of Castile and León, seizing the favorable moment which succeeded the decline of the Almoravides and immediately preceded the arrival of the Almohades (1144-47), carried fire and sword throughout Andalusia, and finally crowned his achievements by temporarily capturing the town of Almeria with the aid of the fleets of Catalonia and Genoa. Whenever to the rare and happy circumstance of domestic peace and unity in León and Castile there was added the still rarer one of aid and succor from the Indies. The course of Spain’s imperial development was thus largely moulded by the fact that Portugal had won her independence; and when at last, in 1580, the destinies of the two nations were temporarily joined, the divergences of over four centuries proved ineradicable, and the union was really never more than a union in name.

Such a crisis was occasioned by the Almohade victory at Alarcos, on July 19, 1195, over the forces of Alfonso VIII of Castile. The Christians in the north had been lulled into a false sense of security by the fact that the Almohades had been in the Peninsula since 1149 without achieving any notable military success. They felt no fear of the infidel, and in time-honored fashion were quarreling among themselves. Portugal and Navarre were too much occupied with their own affairs to think of bearing aid to the king of Castile in his distress. The sovereign of León was actively hostile and permitted some of his most prominent warriors to serve in the armies of the infidel leader, while others ravaged the Castilian lands. In 1197 an attempt was made to secure peace between the two realms by the marriage of Berengaria, the daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile, to Alfonso IX of León; but the union was declared void on the ground of consanguinity by Pope Innocent III. The pair were
commanded to separate, and, on their refusal to yield, were promptly excommunicated, while the kingdom of León endured for seven years all the horrors that accompanied a thirteenth-century interdict. But the haughty pontiff was concerned for the welfare of Christian Spain, as well as for the observance of the laws of the church. When Berengaria and Alfonso acknowledged their fault and the invalidity of their marriage, he consented to legitimize their offspring; so that the eldest of their children, known to history as St. Ferdinand, was able in 1230 to ascend the united thrones of León and Castile. Furthermore, Innocent promised to excommunicate any Iberian potentate who should refuse to bear a part in the crusade on which the salvation of the Peninsula depended, and which was preached with feverish energy by the clergy throughout the length and breadth of the land. By threats and concessions, the kings of Portugal and Navarre were brought into line. Pedro of Aragon was enthusiastic for the cause. Only the jealous king of León held aloof, but his opposition was enough to cause disastrous delays; in 1211 an expedition into Andalusia had to be given up because Alfonso did not dare to leave his realm. Finally, however, in the spring of 1212 all was ready. Toledo was the rendezvous, and thither the knights of all the Iberian realms as well as crusaders from southern France and other European lands flocked for the great adventure. On June 20 the united forces turned southward. Whether they were discouraged by the long hot march across the desolate plains and by the lack of plunder, or whether treachery again was rife in the ranks, it is hard to tell; but the fact remains that despite all that clerical exhortation could do to prevent it, there were numerous desertions, particularly among the foreigners from north of the Pyrenees, who ravaged the Castilian lands in the course of their retreat, and were justly rebuked for their disgraceful conduct by being refused admission at the gates of Toledo. But the bulk of the Spanish levies remained loyal to the cause. The enemy, in superior numbers and confident of victory, permitted the Christians to occupy the chief passes of the Sierra Morena, and, guided by shepherds, to issue out into the great plain of Las Navas de Tolosa. The battle that ensued there on July 16 was the greatest of the Christian victories over the Moors recorded in the long history of the Reconquest. Prodigies of valor were performed by King Alfonso of Castile, and also by Archbishop Roderic of Toledo, who animated the spirits of the Christian troops and has left us a personal description of the fight. A sudden and desperate rush of the Castilians against the silken tent of the Moorish leader was the crucial event of the day. The Christian losses were apparently small, while those of their foes are reported in all the contemporary chronicles to have been enormous: the figures given are obviously absurd, but there is every reason to think that the infidels suffered very heavily in the battle and still more in the flight that ensued.

Las Navas was unquestionably a glorious triumph; but it proved absolutely impossible for Alfonso to hold together his heterogeneous forces long enough to reap all the fruits of it. No sooner was the Moorish danger past than the allies began quarrelling among themselves, and the Castilian king spent the last years of his life in vain attempts to reconcile their differences. Then on his death (1214) all the elements of anarchy and discord broke forth afresh. Henry, the son and heir of Alfonso, was a boy of ten; a regency was installed first under his mother and then, on her death a month later, under his sister Berengaria, the divorced wife of Alfonso, king of León. The Laras disputed the control of the government and were supported by the Leonese monarch; nay more, when in 1217 Henry was killed by the fall of a tile, and Berengaria, chosen queen in her own right, abdicated in favor of her son Ferdinand, the king of León forgot that Ferdinand was his son also, and prepared to wage war on Castile. The rebel barons aided him, and the wretched strife began anew. The father fought the son, and the son was supported by his mother. But Ferdinand had the better cause, and Berengaria proved the wisest of counsellors. All the hostile coalitions were put down. The Laras were forced to flee to the Moors, and Ferdinand strengthened himself by his marriage to Beatrice of Swabia, cousin of the Emperor Frederick II. In 1230 Alfonso died, and although he attempted in his will to oust Ferdinand from the succession in León, the energy and skill of Berengaria prevented this catastrophe, so that the two kingdoms were finally brought together under her son, never again to fall apart. And even before this happy consummation of his hopes, the new sovereign had signalized his advent to power by an outburst of renewed activity against the Moors.

Peace had been made between Castile and the infidels in December, 1213, just before the death of Alfonso VIII; and eleven years later, the uprisings of a number of local Moorish rulers rang the death knell of the empire of the Almohades in Spain. The opportunity was most favorable for Ferdinand of Castile; he made common cause with the principal one of the rebel chieftains and carried fire and sword through the upper valley of the Guadalquivir. The ruler of the Almohades crossed over shortly afterwards to Morocco, where another insurrection had broken out against his power; nay more, he even applied to the Castilian king for aid in suppressing it. Ferdinand was fully alive to the importance of establishing the Christian faith on the North African coast, and though the conquest of Andalusia was far from complete, he hastened to take advantage of the embarrassments of the Moorish ruler across
the Emir of Granada, he probably could have conquered that kingdom then and there, and anticipated by nearly two centuries and a half the work of Ferdinand and Isabella. But as Ibnar al-Ahmar had loyally inland as far as Antequera and the upper waters of the Guadalquivir. Had Ferdinand turned at once on realm of Granada, which stretched from Tarifa to the mouth of the Almanzora on the seacoast, and incomplete fulfilment of the stipulations concerning the Christian bishopric at Fez. In the midst of Almohades soon after the fall of Seville, and had furnished him an excuse for intervention by their 1248. With its fall the reconquest of southern Spain was practically complete, save for the Nasride his preparations, however, the king was overtaken by an untimely death (May 30, 1252) instead to making ready a great expedition against Morocco, where the Merinites had supplant ed the Almohades in Morocco. Its fleet was composed of Christian soldiers serving in the Moorish armies, of Christian captives, and of Christian merchants established in the North African ports; but it finally perished after the fall of its Merinite protectors in the early years of the sixteenth century.

Meantime in Andalusia the Castilian conquests advanced apace. The departure of the Almohades for Morocco had left three principal centres of Moorish influence in Spain, each of which acknowledged the sway of a different ruling family. With the first of these, Valencia, we shall deal when we come to take up the affairs of the kingdom of Aragon. The other two, at Murcia and at Jaen, were reserved by King Ferdinand for Castile. Of these the former, under the dynasty of the Beni Hud, was at this time the more important. Though its capital lay to the eastward, its domains stretched right across the peninsula and included Cordova and Seville; clearly the Castilian king would have to attack and subdue it before any further advance to the southward could be made. An intermittent warfare, interrupted by a three years’ truce during which Ferdinand and his foe made common cause against the Emir of Jaen, culminated in the capture of Cordova, which fell after a prolonged siege on June 29, 1236. It was a notable triumph for the Christian arms, not only for sentiment’s sake, but because it opened up the entire valley of the Guadalquivir for future operations; and Moorish captives were obliged to carry back on their shoulders to Santiago de Compostela the bells which had been taken by Almanzor in his famous raid of 997. The murder of the leader of the Beni Hud shortly afterwards caused Seville on the west to renounce its allegiance to that family and place itself under the suzerainty of the Almohade ruler across the strait, while to the eastward it enabled the armies of Ferdinand to penetrate to Murcia, whose submission was received in 1241. The Moorish ruler there was permitted to remain for some time longer and to exercise most of his functions, but as he paid one half the state revenues to the king of Castile, and specifically acknowledged his overlordship, he can scarcely be regarded as more than a viceroy. Ferdinand had thus carried the confines of his realm to the Mediterranean and cut off Aragon from the possibility of further expansion in the peninsula at the expense of the Moor.

Finally, in 1246, Ferdinand turned on Ibn al-Ahmar, the Nasride Emir of Jaen. The siege was well under way when the Moorish leader deemed it prudent to surrender his capital to the Castilian king, in return for permission to retain the bulk of his lands to the south of it in feudal vassalage to his victorious foe, and under payment of an annual tribute; he thereupon removed the seat of his authority to Granada, where he and his successors were to maintain themselves for two centuries and a half. One clause in the treaty between the Christian sovereign and the Granadan Emir stipulated that the latter should bear aid to his liege lord in besieging Seville, which, with the support of its Almohade sovereign across the Strait, now prepared to make a last desperate resistance. Situated as it was near the mouth of the Guadalquivir, where it could easily be relieved by its Moroccan master, it was plainly essential that the besieging army be supported by a fleet; and this was furnished for Ferdinand by a certain Ramón Bonifacio, a native of Burgos, and a well-known naval enthusiast and connoisseur, who managed to collect no less than eighteen vessels for the purpose in the Biscayan ports, hitherto the center of the shipping interest of western Spain. With these vessels he contrived to defeat a Moorish squadron off the mouth of the Guadalquivir; and he followed up this achievement by launching two of his victorious ships, on a favoring wind and tide, against a bridge of boats, which had enabled Seville to recruit its forces and replenish its provisions from the town of Triana across the river. The destruction of the bridge settled the fate of the city, which finally capitulated after a heroic resistance on November 23, 1248. With its fall the reconquest of southern Spain was practically complete, save for the Nasride realm of Granada, which stretched from Tarifa to the mouth of the Almanzora on the seacoast, and inland as far as Antequera and the upper waters of the Guadalquivir. Had Ferdinand turned at once on the Emir of Granada, he probably could have conquered that kingdom then and there, and anticipated by nearly two centuries and a half the work of Ferdinand and Isabella. But as Ibnar al-Ahmar had loyally supported him against Seville, he saw no reason to break his treaty with him, and turned his attention instead to making ready a great expedition against Morocco, where the Merinites had supplanted the Almohades soon after the fall of Seville, and had furnished him an excuse for intervention by their incomplete fulfilment of the stipulations concerning the Christian bishopric at Fez. In the midst of his preparations, however, the king was overtaken by an untimely death (May 30, 1252)—one of the
noblest figures in the history of the Spanish Empire, and deservedly venerated by his successors and their subjects long before he was canonized by Pope Clement X in 1671. He had dedicated his life with singlehearted devotion to the work of the Reconquest: he was valiant in war, generous in victory, loyal in the observance of his plighted word.

The first paragraph of the present chapter attempted to emphasize the continuity of the story of the reconquest of the Peninsula from the infidel and that of the conquest of an imperial domain beyond the sea. But like every long and complicated development, it naturally divides itself into a number of different stages, and the end of the reign of St. Ferdinand is one of the obvious places for such a division. It marks the close of the most glorious and fortunate phase of the Reconquest, of the period when the national energies, save when dissipated by internal strife, were chiefly concentrated on the advance against the infidel. Before passing on to the more complicated period which follows the death of St. Ferdinand, a few general observations may be properly inserted in regard to the achievements of the preceding age.

Of course, the constant pressure of the war against the Moors preserved and stimulated all the fighting qualities for which the Spaniard has always been justly famed. The profession of arms was the most highly esteemed of all; it was the typical gentleman’s occupation; the only others that could compare with it were the church, the navy, or the service of the crown. The fact that the Reconquest was preeminently a war of raids is moreover reflected in the military methods and armament of the time. The mediaeval Castilian soldier, as we shall later see, was in general much more lightly armed and better equipped for guerilla warfare in difficult country than the contemporaneous warriors of other European states. Two other distinctively Spanish characteristics, which took their rise in the physiographical peculiarities of the Peninsula, were greatly accentuated by the war against the Moors: namely, aversion to agriculture and concentration in cities. The devastation caused by the interminable incursions of hostile troops rendered the naturally infertile Meseta more barren still, and discouraged men from any attempt to till the soil; moreover, when any region changed hands, the complete or partial displacement of the local population could not possibly be accomplished without immense economic loss. Fear of a Moorish raid also contributed to cause men to desert the open country; they simply dared not live scattered in the fields where they would be at the mercy of a sudden attack, and the same consideration fostered the development of the cities, whose moats and walls alone furnished adequate protection. The immense importance of the municipalities in the history of Castile, as well as the absence of that concomitant of a predominantly agricultural existence—a full-fledged feudal system—are primarily explained by the ceaseless struggle against the infidel. The fact that the western Spanish realms counted for so little in the affairs of mediaeval Europe is also largely traceable to the war of the Reconquest. They were too much occupied at home to care what was going on abroad; and though their isolation was somewhat diminished in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the effects of it were sufficiently permanent to instill into their inhabitants a spirit of dislike and suspicion of foreigners, which powerfully affected the destinies of Spain and the Spanish Empire at a later day.

The nature of the relations of Christians and Moors during the wars of the Reconquest also calls for some explanation. We have already characterized the history of mediaeval Castile as first and foremost the history of a crusade; we have emphasized the fact that the reconquest of the Peninsula and also the conquest of an imperial domain beyond the sea were both undertaken in the name of the Christian faith. But in view of what we know of the relations of the Moors and Christians during most of the Middle Ages, it cannot be maintained that religious enthusiasm was as much of an actual motive force in the Reconquest as it was in the struggle for the dominion of the New World. It was constantly invoked as a means to an end; it was called upon to furnish symbols and war cries; but it was not until the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella that the Spanish soldier became a real religious zealot, and the resolve to propagate the Christian faith a dominant factor in his life. We have already met with numerous instances when Leonese and Castilian sovereigns sought the alliance of their infidel foes against their Christian rivals and rebel subjects at home. When cities and territories were captured by a Christian advance, it was the usual thing for the conquered Moors to remain there in the enjoyment of their own religion, laws, and property, and under the rule of their own local magistrates.

They were generally and rightly regarded as a most valuable portion of the population from a financial and industrial point of view; they bore priceless aid to the Christians in restoring some measure of prosperity to the devastated lands. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century it is scarcely too much to say that they were not only gladly tolerated but highly esteemed. Many of the early Castilian monarchs deliberately strove to render the lot of the Moors who resided on their domains more
agreeable than that which would have been their fate had they remained in the territories of the infidel. Any attempt to persecute them was vigorously resisted; they were protected, and often actively favored. After the early years of the fourteenth century, when the Pope and the ecclesiastical authorities began deliberately to inculcate intolerance, there is, as we shall later see, a different tale to tell; but during the period with which we are at present concerned, the history of the relations of the two faiths remains as an eternal refutation of the still too common statement that the Spaniard has been a bigot and a fanatic at every stage of his development. He has always shown a tendency in that direction; his religious antipathies have always been easy to rouse; and he has unquestionably won his most notable victories when inspired by the conviction that he was fighting the battle of the Cross. But it would be mistaking the outward symbol for the actual substance to assert that the reconquest of the peninsula was primarily due to zeal for the faith, as many of the victories of Spain in the sixteenth century unquestionably were. “A Spanish knight of the Middle Ages fought neither for his country nor for his religion; he fought, like the Cid, to get something to eat, whether under a Christian or a Moslem prince”. What had been a means to an end in the Middle Ages first became under Ferdinand and Isabella an end in itself. In their efforts to instill the largest possible measure of religious fervor into their subjects, the Catholic Kings and their successors had the inestimable advantage of being able to utilize ancient battle cries, and thus to make their program of militant Catholicism seem the logical consequence of what had gone before. Yet the continuity between reconquest and conquest, so striking in a multitude of ways, is in this single respect perhaps more apparent than real.

One other phase of the period we are considering demands passing comment—namely, the occasional use of the title of Emperor in Spain and the gradual development of the imperial idea during the first five centuries of the war of the Reconquest. We have repeatedly pointed out that progress Against the Moors was constantly being hindered by the rivalries of the different kingdoms in the north: if, therefore, any Christian sovereign should succeed in attaining sufficient preeminence over his fellow monarchs to justify him in proclaiming it to the world by the assumption of the imperial title, he would further the cause of Spanish unity and the advance of the Cross against the Crescent. The first of the Castilian kings to do this was Alfonso VI, the conqueror of Toledo, who took the title of Emperor as a means of asserting his superiority over the other Christian kings in the peninsula. It even appears that he went so far as to style himself “Emperador de los dos cultos” in order to emphasize the fact that some of the Moorish kings in the south had declared themselves his vassals. But the imperial title and idea were developed much further in the reign of Alfonso’s grandson, usually reckoned as Alfonso VII, whom we have already encountered as a protagonist in the terrible conflicts of his mother Urraca, his Aragonese stepfather Alfonso the Warrior, and the early rulers of Portugal. By the year 1135 he had extended his power over all the West Spanish realms; many of the Moorish kings of the peninsula paid him tribute; in fact his authority reached so far that Aragon and Catalonia and even some of the counts and dukes of the south of France acknowledged his overlordship. In token of his greatness, he elicited from a church council at Leon a solemn declaration that as King of Kings he should assume the imperial title.

A coronation ceremony of unprecedented magnificence ensued: it was repeated at Toledo (which thenceforth took the name of the Imperial City) and also at Santiago de Compostela. Over and above all this, Alfonso demanded and obtained from Pope Innocent II permission to style himself King of Kings; and it is by no means fanciful to suppose that this new dignity was intended to connote some measure of derogation of the vague overlordship claimed by the Holy Roman Emperors, with whom Innocent was not on the best of terms.

Certainly, Alfonso VII had carried the whole imperial idea much further than his grandfather before him. His assumption of the imperial dignity had been so much more formal and conspicuous than that of the conqueror of Toledo that it made a far deeper impression on his subjects: he is, in fact, usually known as Alfonso the Emperor in the innumerable list of Spanish kings. Furthermore, his negotiations with Innocent II had invested the title with a new significance. What had hitherto been employed merely as establishing a claim to preeminence over the other kings of Spain could henceforth also be interpreted as an assertion of independence of any sort of subordination to any outside power, a matter on which the Spaniard had been proverbially sensitive since the days of Bernardo del Carpio. From the time of Alfonso VII, however, the imperial title gradually drops out of sight. St. Ferdinand, who so greatly enhanced the extent and prestige of Castile, was most anxious to revive it, and was unusually well fitted to do so, both by his character and by the circumstances of his reign; but he did not live to realize his ambition, and the subsequent attempt of his scholarly son to win for himself the crown of the Hohenstaufen was destined to result in a most miserable fiasco. Still the imperial tradition had been too firmly planted in medieval Castile to be entirely forgotten. Coupled with her greater geographical extent, it gave the western kingdom a certain preeminence over the realms of the Crown of
Aragon, which is significantly revealed in the fact that her monarchs were not seldom loosely spoken of as ‘Kings of Spain’ long before the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella. When the imperial dignity was finally revived under Charles V, it was bound to arouse many stirring memories, and the glories which the Spaniards had never ceased to associate with it went far to reconcile them to the government of a foreign dynasty.
The two centuries of Castilian history which elapse between the death of St. Ferdinand and the middle of the fifteenth century form a period of transition, in which the national energies, hitherto principally occupied with the work of the Reconquest, begin to expand in other directions. Measured by the progress which it sees made against the infidel, it is very disappointing. Though often attacked, and somewhat diminished in extent, Granada remained in Moorish hands till after the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile. But there are brighter if less immediately obvious sides to the picture. The foreign relations of the kingdom, not only with the other states in the peninsula, but also with England, France, and the remoter European nations, developed rapidly and assumed an importance which they had never attained before.

In the early fifteenth century Castilian ambassadors penetrated beyond the steppes of Bokhara, and Castilian conquistadores to the islands of the Atlantic. Rapid social and constitutional development is also a notable feature of this period. The growth of the territory and population of the kingdom rendered necessary the creation of new institutions to deal with the problems which arose in connection with it, and a very large portion of the story of this stage of the national development will be found in later chapters on constitutional affairs. The narrative history may, in the meantime, be conveniently treated in topical fashion. Only certain phases of it are essential to a comprehension of the development of the Spanish Empire, and we can therefore omit entirely many subjects which would unquestionably deserve space in a history of Spain. The present chapter will deal with the internal affairs of Castile and her relations with her European neighbors, while the next one will be devoted to an account of her earliest ventures overseas.

Anarchy and disruption at home—the inevitable result of the inability of the majority of the Castilian kings to control and dominate their rebel baronage—are the most prominent features of the history of the time. The struggle which raged between the Castilian crown and the nobles during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has its parallel in contemporary England and France and indeed over all Europe, but it is doubtful if the English monarchs in the darkest days of the Wars of the Roses, or the French during the evil years of the Armagnacs and Burgundians, ever reached such a depth of degradation as was the lot of some of the Castilian sovereigns in the epoch between St. Ferdinand and the Catholic Kings. It is happily unnecessary to describe in detail the ebbs and flows of this paralyzing internal strife: we need only bear in mind that it was almost uninterrupted, and touch briefly upon its course at those points where its history becomes relevant to the matters which more immediately concern us. Yet it may not be amiss to say a word or two about the reasons for it, and to try to explain why the anarchy should have been so unrestrained. Over and above the general tradition of separatism and disunion, always dominant in the Iberian Peninsula, over and above the immediate memories of the humiliation of previous Castilian monarchs at the hands of insubordinate vassals like the Cid, there were several special causes which go to explain the pitiable weakness of the Castilian crown during the period at present under review.

In the first place the fact that the Reconquest was virtually accomplished was inimical to the interests of the monarchy. The energies of the nobles, hitherto largely employed in crusades against the Moors, now found vent in internal rebellion. The fact that Granada remained so long unconquered was also probably more harmful than favorable in its effect. The Moorish realm was not powerful enough to evoke an immediate, united effort to destroy it: yet it constituted a perpetual annoyance, sufficient to prevent Castile from embarking wholeheartedly on any other great national enterprise, which might have served to divert the attention of the nobles from their internal grievances.

Secondly, the period we are considering saw an unusual number of minorities, no less in fact than four out of ten reigns. Ferdinand IV became king at nine, Alfonso XI at one, Henry III at eleven, and John II at two. “Woe to the land whose king is a child.” Moreover, when there was not a minority, there was often a disputed succession. Despite the law of Las Siete Partidas, the grandchildren of Alfonso X were despoiled of their just inheritance by their uncle Sancho: though their rights were never recognized, their claims were not speedily forgotten, and constituted a rallying cry for malcontents until well into the fourteenth century. The whole reign of Pedro the Cruel (1350-69) is one long struggle of
the king to maintain himself against his illegitimate but more attractive half-brother, Henry of Trastamara, who finally emerged victorious after the bloody drama of Montiel. During the entire conflict, in which the Castilian nobles took opposite sides, and France and England intervened, the nation was in confusion and uproar, and the claims of the legitimate monarch were not satisfied till the marriage of Henry the Invalid to the daughter of John of Gaunt in 1388. Even Isabella the Catholic had to fight for her throne against a rival candidate—La Beltraneja—who's legal claims were stronger than her own, and who was supported by King Affonso the African of Portugal. Under such circumstances no monarchy could expect to thrive.

In the third place, the characters and policies of most of the Castilian kings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were certainly not calculated to hold the aristocracy in check. The average level of the ability as rulers of the ten sovereigns between St. Ferdinand and Ferdinand and Isabella was not high. Alfonso X’s remarkable talents were scientific and literary rather than political. Of his nine successors only Alfonso XI, Henry III, and possibly John I have any claim to greatness, while kings like John II and Henry IV were merely the sport of factions, and moved along the line of least resistance, incapable of following any policy of their own. Lavishness in gifts of land and money was also a besetting sin. While the Reconquest was in full blast, there was ample reason why a successful monarch should reward his faithful followers with grants out of the territories that he had conquered, more especially as he would naturally be desirous to repopulate the areas devastated by the war; but now that the boundaries of the realm were approximately fixed, the continuation of such gifts could only mean that the sovereign was obliged to bid for the loyalty of his powerful subjects, which he could not command. Alfonso X distributed his favors without reserve in order to bribe his nobles to support his versatile but ineffective foreign policy. Henry of Trastamara was so eager to reward the supporters of his newly established dynasty that he has gone down to history as El Dadivoso. In neither case did the misplaced generosity of the monarch attain the desired end. The nobles who had enjoyed the largest measure of the royal munificence were almost invariably the leaders in the next revolt. In addition, then, to being crippled by minorities and disputed successions, the Castilian sovereigns were on the whole singularly unfortunate in their methods of handling the principal problem with which they, like other mediaeval monarchs, were perpetually confronted—that of controlling a rebel baronage.

Finally, there can be little doubt that all the disruptive and anarchical tendencies of the time were enormously accentuated by the lamentable inefficiency of the very notable scholar who succeeded St. Ferdinand on the united thrones of Leon and Castile. The reign of Alfonso X saw the Castilian nobility gain a vantage point in its age-long struggle with the Castilian monarchy which it was not forced to relinquish until the time of Ferdinand and Isabella. It also witnessed the beginnings of some of the most significant external developments of Castile during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It came at a most critical moment in the national development, when the Reconquest had been virtually accomplished, when Leon and Castile had been permanently united, when the nation was easily amenable to new influences and unusually ready to follow whithersoever it was led. To the character and career of Alfonso the Learned many of the mightiest currents in the subsequent history of Spain and the Spanish Empire are directly traceable. It is therefore essential that we should become familiar with the principal events of his reign.

It has been well said of Alfonso X that he would have had more success in any other role than that of a king. His intellectual gifts were of the highest order: he was famous for his sabiduría to the ends of the earth. As a lawgiver and codifier, he was unsurpassed. His astronomical tables were a distinct improvement over those of Ptolemy; his historical and poetical contributions to the literature of his native land place him in the front rank of mediaeval Spanish authors. “If I had been present at the Creation”, he is reported to have said, “I could have arranged the world better”. The same extraordinary versatility which marked his activities as a scholar was at once the distinguishing feature and the ruin of his career as a monarch. He closely resembled the Emperor Maximilian I of Germany in his fondness for prosecuting a number of inconsistent projects at the same time, and in his complete inability to carry any one of them to its definite logical conclusion. In this respect he forms the sharpest possible contrast with most of his predecessors, who had usually been so completely absorbed in expelling the Moors from the peninsula, and in dominating their rebel subjects, that Castile had often been completely isolated from the rest of Europe. It was under Alfonso X that the nation began to have more irons in the fire than it could handle, to be launched on a career more ambitious than was warranted by its resources, a foretaste of the imperial days of the sixteenth century.

From his father, the Scholar King had inherited the project of carrying the Christian arms across the Straits of Gibraltar—certainly a logical path of development, though it might have been wiser to finish with Granada first. Armies and a fleet were prepared; the papacy promised support; but before the
expedition could get under way, Alfonso’s attention was distracted by other cares, and the whole affair had to be abandoned. The internal state of the realm gave the gravest cause for alarm. In addition to impoverishing himself by lavish grants to the *ricos hombres*, Alfonso had debased the coinage under the delusion that he could thus alleviate the pitiable poverty of the third estate. Naturally the remedy proved worse than the disease; the evil was increased instead of diminished. Though the king of Granada was, for the time being, friendly, chiefly owing to the fact that Alfonso at his accession had voluntarily diminished by one sixth the tribute annually paid him by his Moorish vassal in recognition of his overlordship, the Scholar King’s relations with all his Christian neighbors were in a most parlous state. With James the Conqueror of Aragon he had already had his difficulties before his accession, over the frontiers between their realms in the region of Murcia and Valencia. To this ground for hostility, others were added by the two kings’ treatment of their respective wives, and by the fact that both were ambitious to control the destinies of the little realm of Navarre, which had recently fallen to the family of the counts of Champagne. Though naturally anxious above all to safeguard their own independence, the Navarrese were less averse to Aragon’s domination than to that of Castile; and shortly after Alfonso’s accession, a marriage had been arranged between the young Navarrese sovereign, Teobaldo, and Constance, the daughter of James the Conqueror, with an implied agreement that the king of Aragon should protect his son-in-law in case of a Castilian attack. Alfonso was not the man to disappoint them, and desultory hostilities along the Navarrese frontier ensued till 1257, when peace was made without advantage to either party; but the whole affair had served to distract Alfonso’s attention from other far more important matters, and to draw off troops which might much more profitably have been elsewhere employed.

Another madcap adventure of the Scholar King carried him across the Pyrenees into France. His great-grandfather, Alfonso VIII of Castile, had been married in 1169 to Eleanor, the daughter of Henry II of England, and his wife had brought him the duchy of Gascony as her dowry. In 1204 Alfonso VIII had failed in an endeavor to substantiate his claims to the territory in question; but they had not been forgotten, and in 1253, taking advantage of the fact that the Gascons were in revolt against their English suzerain, Alfonso X determined to revive them. He prepared a large army, which apparently was in great measure composed of Moorish troops. Not satisfied with the mere prospect of taking Gascony, he laid plans for the invasion of the British Isles. But Henry III of England was in no mood to fight, and at the last moment Alfonso listened to his overtures for peace. Prince Edward of England was married to the ‘good queen’ Eleanor, Infanta of Castile, in the cathedral of Burgos, on October 18, 1254; and was knighted on the occasion by his erratic brother-in-law, who also seized the opportunity to renounce all Castilian claims to Gascony without any countervailing advantage. Episodes of this kind were not calculated to raise the Scholar King’s prestige with his own subjects.

With Portugal also, Alfonso had his difficulties; and their history goes to show that in addition to embarking on remote and hazardous adventures in which he had no reasonable chance of success, the Castilian king not seldom made the complementary error of failing vigorously to pursue more valid claims in matters nearer at home. After being driven back across the Tagus by the Almohades, the Portuguese had again advanced to the southward, hand in hand with their Castilian brethren to the east of them, during the first half of the thirteenth century. Whether or not any boundary between the conquests of the two Christian kingdoms had been agreed on beforehand seems doubtful; the current of the Guadiana was certainly the logical line of demarcation, but it is clear that the Portuguese, as they advanced, captured a number of towns on its eastern bank without the slightest protest from Castile, and they finally drove a wedge through to the sea at the Guadiana’s mouth which included places on both the Castilian and Portuguese sides. In the course of their conquests, moreover, they made extensive territorial grants on both banks of the stream to the Hospitallers and other orders of military knighthood who had borne the brunt of the campaign, thus further increasing complications already great. Meantime, in 1248, St. Ferdinand had captured Seville. Since its sovereign had considered himself overlord of the whole Moorish province of Algarve, which stretched westward along the southern shore of Portugal to the Atlantic, the Castilian king not unnaturally maintained that he had inherited this distinction; and his claim derived additional strength from the fact that his vassal, the Moorish king of Niebla, who had been permitted to retain his kingdom on acknowledgment of the suzerainty of Castile, also strenuously asserted that western Algarve fell within the limits of his dominions. In fact, it was on the pretext of safeguarding the rights of the king of Niebla that Alfonso, while still Infante, made the first move to prevent the Portuguese occupation of the territory in question. For some time, the matter hung fire, owing to the reluctance of St. Ferdinand to quarrel with a coreligionist; though it seems probable that Castilian troops had several times penetrated into western Algarve before the accession of Alfonso X. After he had become king, however, the campaign was prosecuted with greater vigor. The claims of the king of Niebla had by this time fallen into the
background, the disputed territory was obviously destined to become either Portuguese or Castilian; and several towns had fallen before the assaults of the soldiers of the Scholar King, when the representatives of Pope Innocent IV, who wished to see the rival nations cooperate in a crusade against the Moor, induced their respective sovereigns to make peace. In June, 1253, it was arranged that Beatrice, the natural daughter of Alfonso X, should wed Affonso III, king of Portugal, in order to unite the warring dynasties; but there is the widest discrepancy among different historians as to the political conditions which accompanied the marriage. It seems probable, however, that the agreement was that Affonso of Portugal should cede to Alfonso of Castile the usufruct of Algarve, including all the lands conquered by Portugal east of the Guadiana, for a certain specified time, at the expiration of which the entire territory east and west of the stream, including Moura and Serpa, and even Aroche and Aracena, should revert to Portugal.

But Affonso of Portugal was not willing even to allow Alfonso of Castile to enjoy in peace the rights in Algarve which the treaty of 1253 had vouchsafed to him. Taking advantage of the many outside affairs which constantly distracted the attention of the Castilian king, he set himself to work to elbow him gradually out of the disputed territory. For a time, Alfonso X tamely submitted to this invasion of his lawful rights; he even ceased to call himself king of Algarve; but finally, in 1257 a revolt on the part of his quondam protégé, the king of Niebla, induced him to make a fresh effort to assert his claims. In alliance with the king of Granada, he attacked Niebla, and after a nine months’ siege (in which it seems possible that explosives of some sort were used for the first time in the peninsula) captured it. Its surrender included that of the neighboring territories over which its ruler held sway, and also apparently such claims as he exercised over Algarve; certainly, the hold of the Castilian king on the towns claimed by Portugal east of the Guadiana was immensely strengthened by the victory which he had won. It is possible that Alfonso might have pushed his victory further across the river into western Algarve in the succeeding years, had not his ally, the king of Granada, deserted him and broken out into revolt. But in order to deal with this new foe, he needed peace with his rival in the west; so, on April 20, 1263, he appointed delegates to arrange with representatives of Affonso III for the drawing of a permanent boundary between the two realms. In September 1264 a treaty was made in which the whole of western Algarve was definitely ceded to the king of Portugal in return for the latter’s promise to aid his brother of Castile either in money or in men in his war against the infidel.

Three years later, in 1267, at a fresh treaty at Badajoz, this last condition, which possibly carried with it some slight implication of feudal inferiority, was voluntarily removed by Alfonso X in a burst of family gratitude and affection occasioned by the sending to the Castilian court of his little five-year-old grandson, Diniz (the son of Beatrice and Affonso of Portugal and heir to the Portuguese throne), to receive at the hand of his famous grandfather the honor of knighthood. The Scholar King also apparently seized the occasion to renounce the title of king of Algarve and “ceded to Affonso III without any restriction all right which might belong to him in that region in virtue of any former treaty or in any way”. This cession, however, can only be construed as applying to those parts of the ancient Algarve lying west of the Guadiana, for the Castilian conquest of the territories of the king of Niebla and the Portuguese surrender of the castles of Aroche and Aracena confirmed the title of the Scholar King to the territories to the east of it. The natural river boundary between the two realms was thus established from the confluence of the Caya and the Guadiana to the sea, save for the small triangle in which the towns of Moura and Serpa lay. These places were in the hands of the Portuguese Knights Hospitallers, and long negotiations were necessary before Alfonso finally managed to get a temporary hold on them in 1281. The Castilian tenure of them, however, was but short: the Portuguese held that they were included in the dowry of Beatrice under the treaty of 1253 and were determined to get them back. The opportunity came during the minority of Ferdinand IV, when Castile was so weakened by internal confusion that the Queen Regent Maria was glad to purchase immunity from a Portuguese invasion by the surrender of the disputed lands.

With this arrangement the Castilian-Portuguese boundary in this region was finally fixed on the line which it has retained without substantial alteration until this day. It may seem as if Alfonso X lacked adequate justification for a more strenuous assertion of his claims to western Algarve. Geographical considerations were clearly against him, for the channel of the Guadiana was certainly the natural boundary between Portugal and Castile. On the other hand, the history of the previous relations between the two realms, the need of Castile, which Alfonso fully appreciated, for a more extended seaboard on the Atlantic, and finally the fact that, as conquerors of the kings of Seville and of Niebla, the Castilian sovereigns had a right to consider themselves the heirs of their claims, may all be urged in support of the view that in this matter he was unwarrantably slack in enforcing his just rights. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that if he had pursued a more vigorous policy in regard to the land in southern Portugal, the subsequent loss of Moura and Serpa and the territories east of the
From Alfonso’s dealings with Portugal, it is natural to turn to his relations with Ibn al-Ahmar, the king of Granada, who at first had supported him in his struggle for Algarve, but subsequently became a thorn in his side. The Granadan ruler had loyally, though somewhat reluctantly, obeyed the summons of his Christian suzerain to aid him in suppressing a revolt of the Moorish town of Jerez, which lay within the limits of Castile, during the early years of Alfonso’s reign; but it seems highly probable that on that occasion, as well as in the subsequent operations against the king of Niebla, Ibn al-Ahmar had taken the measure of the inefficiency of the Castilian king, and began to plan to rebel against him when opportunity offered. Cautious by nature, however, he determined to put on others the responsibility for the initial step. He secretly encouraged a new revolt at Jerez, and secured money and troops to support it from Yusuf, the Merinite ruler of Morocco across the Strait; he even waited until the rebellion spread eastward into Murcia (where it will be remembered that St. Ferdinand had permitted the local Moorish ruler to remain in the enjoyment of a considerable measure of autonomy) before he was willing openly to join the insurgents. Even then his loyalty to his coreligionists was but evanescent. The power of the king of Castile was still considerable, as was proved by his surprise and capture, on September 14, 1262, of the important town of Cadiz, which the Moors had neglected to defend. James the Conqueror of Aragon, moreover, effectively supported the Scholar King on the eastward by invading the rebel kingdom of Murcia, and finally taking the capital in January-February, 1266; according to previous agreement he loyally handed over his conquest to Alfonso of Castile, who lost no time in definitely incorporating it into his dominions. The significance of these events was not lost on Ibn al-Ahmar, who was the last man in the world to be caught on the losing side. He was jealous, moreover, of the extent of the authority of Yusuf of Morocco, which he feared might ultimately prove, inimical to his own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen.
All the various plans and projects of the Scholar King which we have thus far examined concern themselves with the affairs of the peninsula, or at least with those of the lands directly adjacent to it. But Alfonso was also much involved with the other states of Western Europe. Rightly or wrongly, he was convinced that the name of Castile was not sufficiently often heard beyond the Pyrenees. He was exceedingly anxious to gain for his nation a more considerable place in the eyes of the other sovereigns of the time. He married his half-sister to one of the greatest of English kings, and his eldest son to the daughter of Louis IX of France. His cousin was the wife of the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, and when she came to beg his aid in ransoming her son Philip from the hands of the Venetians, Alfonso granted her thrice the sum she asked for—a proceeding which evoked the bitterest complaint from his people and foreshadowed the way in which Spain was to be drained of its wealth for totally non-Spanish objects in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But there was another opportunity to advance the dignity and preeminence of the Castilian name beyond the borders of the realm which appealed more intensely to the Scholar King than all the rest. Through his mother, Beatrice of Swabia, he was near of kin to the Hohenstaufen emperors, whose dynasty in Germany had come to such an unhappy end only two years after he ascended the throne. The imperial title, as we have already seen, had a certain tradition behind it in Spain, and had been actually assumed, though with a somewhat limited and special significance, by two of Alfonso’s predecessors and namesakes on the Castilian throne. It is not difficult to understand why a man of Alfonso’s peculiar makeup should have hit upon the idea, in the prevailing uncertainty which followed the death of Conrad IV, of putting himself forward as a candidate for the succession in the Empire. The rank and file of his subjects opposed the plan quite as vigorously and for very much the same reasons as their descendants two and a half centuries later opposed a similar attempt by the first Hapsburg sovereign of Spain; but while Charles V silenced complaints by his success, Alfonso only increased them by his failure. It is happily unnecessary for us to enter into the details of the Scholar King’s efforts to win the imperial crown; they continued intermittently for a score of years. He had on the whole the support of France and of the Ghibelline princes in Italy and Germany, and he was lavish in spending money to bribe the electors. On the other hand he had to reckon, save at the very outset, with papal opposition, which became open and pronounced under Pope Gregory X. But the fact that he did not appear personally in the Empire was the fundamental cause of his ill success. Though he held more votes in the electoral college than his nearest competitor, Richard of Cornwall, and was actually proclaimed Emperor, he suffered his rival to come to Aix-la-Chapelle, to be crowned there on May 12, 1257, and to perform various acts of imperial authority, while he himself remained passive in Castile. When Richard died in 1272, Alfonso returned to the charge, only to see the elusive crown once more escape him with the unanimous election of Rudolph of Hapsburg in October, 1273; and a subsequent interview with Gregory X at Beaucaire, in which he protested against the setting aside of his just claims, only served to reveal the full measure of his impotence. He aspired to be emperor, though he was not even able to play the king. He had tried to increase the dignity and preeminence of Castile in Western Europe, but he only succeeded in abasing it, and the chief result of his lamentable failure was to give excuse and opportunity for the great rebellion of his subjects under the leadership of his son which was to bring down his gray hairs with sorrow to the grave.

Alfonso’s eldest and favorite son, Ferdinand de la Cerda, who had married the daughter of St. Louis, had died in 1275 in the campaign against the Moors, and had left two children, Alfonso and Ferdinand, the so-called Infantes de la Cerda, who, under the law of Las Siete Partidas, were the legal heirs to their grandfather’s throne. But Alfonso’s second son, the Infante Sancho, restless and ambitious, determined to claim the succession for himself on the ground of the inexpediency of placing the crown on the head of a child. Taking advantage of the general disgust caused by Alfonso’s imperial adventure, he gathered round himself a large party of malcontents. His two younger brothers also sided with him. So powerful was the Infante, that Alfonso, on his return from his interview with Gregory X at Beaucaire, weakly yielded to his importunities, reversed the order of succession established in Las Siete Partidas, and caused Sancho to be recognized as the heir to the throne. Furious at Alfonso’s failure to support his grandchildren’s claims, the widowed French mother of the Infantes de la Cerda fled with them to Aragon, where she hoped to receive aid from Pedro III; but the latter, besides being anxious to have hostages for the good behavior of France and Castile during his projected expedition to Sicily, had already been won over by Sancho, and the final result was that the Infantes were confined for the next ten years in the fortress of Jativa. Philip III of France, however, came forward to support his nephews. At his instance Alfonso hit upon the fatal idea of dismembering his realm in order to satisfy both parties; he proposed to erect the city of Jaen and the neighboring territories into a separate kingdom for the Infantes, and to leave the rest to Sancho; but the latter would not accept the compromise, and war ensued between father and son. Castile and Leon supported almost unitedly the cause of Sancho; in 1282, the Cortes were summoned by the latter at Valladolid, and Alfonso was
declared deposed. In the following year Alfonso humiliated himself to the extent of begging aid from Yusuf the Merinite against his own subjects and children, and even sent him his royal crown as security for a loan of sixty thousand *doblas*. Such a shameful spectacle provoked the inevitable reaction. Sancho’s party was weakened by desertion. The Pope placed him and his adherents under an interdict, and the cause of Alfonso was by no means hopeless, when he fell ill, and died at Seville on April 4, 1284; the device which is still borne on the city’s shield commemorates its loyalty to its unfortunate sovereign. Alfonso’s last will and testament disinherited Sancho and left the crown of Castile to the Infantes de la Cerda, but it also provided that two separate kingdoms—Seville and Murcia—be carved out of the realm for the benefit of his two younger sons, John and James, with whom he had become reconciled at the last. This arrangement was, of course, in flat contradiction to the fundamental laws of the monarchy, which expressly forbade the dismemberment of the realm; a fact which doubtless made it easier for Sancho to ignore it as well as the provision which disinherited him. At any rate, he succeeded his father on the throne of Castile. The laws and will which the Scholar King had made remained a dead letter for many years to come.

The period of Alfonso X was thus a great turning point in the history of Castile. It saw her launched for the first time on a number of different lines of development which were ultimately destined vitally to affect the fortunes of the Spanish Empire. During the reigns of the nine monarchs who ruled between the Scholar King and Ferdinand and Isabella, the nation moved further along these lines, but undertook little that was new; so that, save for the two great ventures overseas which are recorded in the next chapter, the narrative history of Castile in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries may be adequately covered by following up the results of the policy and impolicy of Alfonso. Of these, as we have already seen, baronial anarchy and monarchical impotence were at once the most important and the worst, but further than that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon them here. The relations of Castile with Aragon, with Portugal, with Granada and North Africa, with France and with England, demand more extended treatment, and we can take up the story in each case at the point where we left it in the reign of the Scholar King.

It would perhaps be natural, in examining the relations of Castile and Aragon during the two centuries which precede the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, to look for some evidence of the gradual growth of a policy and sentiment of union between the two realms, especially on the part of Castile, whose final amalgamation with Leon in the reign of St. Ferdinand might have been expected to stimulate an ambition to repeat the experiment on a larger scale. Some Spanish historians have thought that they have found such evidence. They harp on the precedents of Sancho the Great and Alfonso the Warrior. They lay strong emphasis on the reign of the ‘good regent’ Ferdinand of Castile in Aragon from 1412 to 1416, as a foreshadowing of that of Ferdinand and Isabella, and speak as if the union of the crowns had been inevitable from the very first. But an impartial examination of the relations of the two kingdoms during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which does not assume foreknowledge of what had not yet occurred, reveals few traces of anything like a consistent policy of Castile towards her sister kingdom on the east. If her union with Leon furnished a precedent for union with Aragon, the powerful current of Spanish separatism exercised a strong influence in the other direction. The elimination of serious danger from the Moors removed the strongest force which had hitherto served to drag Christian Spain together. It is difficult, in fact, to find any thread on which to hang the story of the dealings of Castile and Aragon during this period, save perhaps the proneness of each to make the most of the internal dissensions of the other. Their relations resolved themselves for the most part into a number of isolated, and on the whole unedifying, episodes, which doubtless demonstrated the need of union, but did not betoken the presence of any consistent effort to attain it.

When Alfonso X died in 1284, his grandchildren, the Infantes de la Cerda, were still retained in honorable captivity at Jativa by his brother-in-law, Pedro of Aragon; and when Sancho IV succeeded him, he naturally made every effort to have them kept there. Very soon, however, the situation changed. France and Aragon were by this time at open war and vied with one another for the alliance of Castile; and Sancho, on the advice of his counsellors, determined in 1287 that, despite the ties which united him to Aragon, he could gain the most by taking sides with France. The inevitable band of malcontents at once sprang up and took refuge at the Aragonese court, where the new sovereign, Alfonso III, promptly adopted the obvious method of defence against his treacherous neighbor by liberating the Infantes de la Cerda from their captivity, proclaiming the elder of them lawful king of Castile, and finally (in 1289) heading an invasion of that country to vindicate the just rights of his protégé. No serious fighting, however, occurred. There were raids and counter-raids, but neither side was willing to risk a pitched battle. Desultory hostilities, nevertheless, continued into
the reign of Ferdinand IV of Castile; both France and Portugal being occasionally involved, first on one side and then on the other. Finally, in 1304, the warring nations agreed to submit their difficulties to three arbitrators, of whom the chief was the king of Portugal. Their verdict was that the Infantes de la Cerda should renounce all claim to the throne of Castile and receive in return a liberal compensation in money and lands; at the same time the southeastern boundary between Castile and Aragon, which had given so much trouble in the past, was finally fixed on the general line which, though often temporarily changed by subsequent quarrels, has it for the most part followed ever since. The two kingdoms celebrated this reestablishment of friendship, which is generally known as the peace of Campillo, by a joint attack against the Moors on land and sea; but the results of the campaign, which we shall examine in another place, were hardly commensurate with the expectations that had been entertained of it.

The next period offers little of interest. Peace was preserved till 1327, when Don Juan Manuel, the arch disturber of Castile during the minority of Alfonso XI, allied himself with the kings of Aragon and Granada to raid and harry his native land; but friendship was restored again in the following year by the union of Alfonso IV of Aragon to Eleanor, the Infanta of Castile. When Alfonso of Aragon died in 1336, he was succeeded by his redoubtable son Pedro the Ceremonious, who, being the issue of an earlier marriage, dreaded an effort by his stepmother to disinherit him in favor of her own children, and consequently looked askance at the land from which she came. The need of union between the two realms to oppose the last great effort of the Moors to reconquer the peninsula in 1339-40 prevented any open breach till the accession of Pedro the Cruel of Castile in 1350; but with two such violent kings as he and his namesake of Aragon in power at the same time, it was utterly impossible permanently to preserve peace. In 1356-57, the inevitable war broke out, Pedro of Aragon taking the obvious step of allying himself with his rival’s half-brother and enemy, Henry of Trastamara. It continued by land and sea till the latter’s accession in 1369 and was followed by a period of bickering which arose out of the unwillingness of the Aragonese king to recognize the validity of the Castilian title to Murcia. Finally, in 1375, terms of peace were arranged, and cemented by the marriage of John, the son and heir of Henry of Trastamara, to Eleanor, the daughter of Pedro of Aragon—a match which deserves notice as the first step towards the ultimate union of the two kingdoms. Another era of good feeling ensued during the succeeding years, largely owing to the fact that the attention of Castile was chiefly turned towards Portugal, while Pedro’s successors on the throne of Aragon were lazy and unambitious. On the termination, in 1410, of the old Aragonese royal line, which was descended from the counts of Barceloña, the nine commissioners appointed to decide upon King Martin’s successor gave their verdict in favor of Ferdinand of Antequera, uncle and regent of John II of Castile, who accordingly ascended the Aragonese throne in 1412. This judgment, however, does not indicate any settled policy of union on the part of the commissioners, for their decision, as we shall subsequently see in more detail, was rendered on judicial and not on political grounds. Ferdinand was chosen because of his hereditary claims and not for any reasons of expediency. Had another candidate been selected, the great work of the Catholic Kings would in all probability have never been done; but the commissioners were not primarily thinking of plans for the unification of the peninsula when they chose him, and they could not have foreseen the future.

Despite the fact that John II of Castile married the daughter of his uncle, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon the daughter of Henry III of Castile, trouble broke forth again between the two kingdoms toward the middle of the fifteenth century, owing to the ambition of John II of Aragon to possess himself of the neighboring realm of Navarre. His efforts in this direction were constantly thwarted by the king of Castile, and he naturally revenged himself by interfering in the internal affairs of that kingdom, where his large estates furnished him a pretext for meddling. The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile in 1469 did not come as the inevitable sequel and logical climax of a long series of antecedent; it is rather as a divergence from the normal trend of the development of both nations that the event which produced united Spain should be regarded.

With Portugal, on the other hand, there is a different tale to tell. Castile had never forgotten the history of the attainment of independence by the smaller country, and continually longed to reconquer it. From Alfonso X onward there is abundant evidence of a settled policy on her part to reannex the western kingdom, until finally, under Philip II, her efforts were crowned with success. Four times, during the period under review (1250-1450), did Castilian kings marry Portuguese princesses, and three times were Castilian princesses united to Portuguese kings; the corresponding figures for Castile and Aragon are three and two. Castile turned her attention during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the westward rather than to the eastward, and if we look at her problems through the eyes of the statesman of that time, we shall probably agree with him that she was right in so doing. But if her policy in this respect was wise, the ability to carry it out was pitifully lacking. So weak were her kings
and so feeble their resources that sometimes it almost seemed as if Portugal would conquer Castile. To this point matters did not actually go, but down to the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella there can be no doubt that Portugal had the best of the exchanges.

We have already seen how Alfonso X’s ambitions to possess Algarve were thwarted by his Portuguese contemporaries; we have also seen how the latter even succeeded in making good their hold on rich territories east of the Guadiana. Even after he had received these lands from the Castilian Regent Maria de Molina in 1295 in return for a promise of peace, the king of Portugal joined hands with the king of Aragon and invaded Castile in 1297. He raided the realm as far as Valladolid and refused to retire permanently until a double marriage was arranged to unite the rival dynasties—Ferdinand IV of Castile to Constanze, the daughter of King Diniz, and Alfonso IV of Portugal to Beatrice, the sister of Ferdinand. Castile was distinctly on the defensive during this period. The alliance of Portugal and Aragon against her had proved irresistible and had forced her to sue for peace at the hands of the state which it was her ambition to annex. The policy of fostering union by marriage was continued in the next generation; in 1327 Alfonso XI of Castile wedded Maria the Infanta of Portugal. This alliance, however, had the opposite effect to that which had been hoped for; it actually provoked another war. For after Maria of Portugal had borne to her Castilian husband a son, the redoubted Pedro the Cruel, Alfonso XI shamefully neglected her, and devoted himself exclusively to the famous Eleanor de Guzman, the ancestress of the house of Trastamara. Naturally the Portuguese could not brook such an insult to their dynasty. Allying themselves once more with Aragon under Pedro IV, and with some of the rebellious Castilian baronage, they suddenly attacked Badajoz in 1336. But Alfonso was more ready for them than was the wont of the Castilian kings. Not only was the assault on Badajoz vigorously repulsed, but the Castilian fleet won a useful victory over its Portuguese adversaries off Cape St. Vincent in the summer of 1337—a foretaste of the long maritime and colonial struggle in which the rivalry of the two realms was soon to find wider expression. Two years later, however, peace was once more restored, owing to the need of union to repel the great Moorish invasion which ended at Rio Salado; and it was in that battle, that Affonso of Portugal so distinguished himself by his valor that he won the title of ‘the Brave.’

The next stage in the relations of the two realms is exceptionally complicated and difficult. It turns chiefly upon the simultaneous dynastic struggles with which both were convulsed. Portugal naturally sided with Pedro the Cruel, whose mother was a Portuguese princess, in the successional quarrels in Castile, and on Pedro’s death in 1369, Ferdinand the Handsome, the last of the ancient line of Portuguese kings, claimed the Castilian throne against Henry of Trastamara. Like his predecessors, he pursued the obvious policy of making common cause with the king of Aragon, who also had his grudges against the Castilian royal house; the sovereigns of Navarre, Granada, and England also took part; there were combats by land and sea. In 1371 the papacy intervened in the hope of restoring peace, and made the Portuguese monarch promise to wed the daughter of his Castilian rival; but Ferdinand, flighty and amorous, refused to abide by his plighted word, and married his mistress, the famous Donna Leonor. To avenge this insult, the army of Castile invaded Portugal and burned part of Lisbon. During the next ten years, the Portuguese king, unable to fight his own battles, endeavored to make the English fight them for him, at least on land. The marriage of John of Gaunt to the daughter of Pedro the Cruel had made the Plantagenets the natural enemies of the Trastamaras. The Earl of Cambridge was sent to Lisbon with a considerable force, but he accomplished little, while the Castilian fleet again defeated that of Portugal. A second Castilian invasion caused Ferdinand to desert his allies, and, after some delay, peace was again made between the two realms at Salvatierra on April 2, 1383. The treaty was celebrated by the marriage of John I of Castile, then a widower, to Beatrice, the daughter and heiress of Ferdinand of Portugal, with the arrangement that if Ferdinand should die without male heirs, his daughter’s children should inherit the Portuguese throne. It was a long step toward Castilian annexation of the western, kingdom—too long by far to suit the Portuguese. On Ferdinand’s death, October 22, 1383, they rose in revolt under John of Avis, the illegitimate half-brother of the late-king, against the prospective Castilian domination and the detestable widow regent Donna Leonor, who at that moment supported it. John of Avis was proclaimed protector of the realm, and finally, on April 6,1385, king. He once more sought the alliance of England and received a force of five hundred men. Meantime Donna Leonor fled to the court of Castile, and urged an invasion of Portugal. The king prepared an army, in which a number of French adventurers were enrolled, crossed the frontier at Badajoz, and finally, on October 14, 1385, encountered his enemies near the little village of Aljubarrota, some forty miles due north of Lisbon. The Portuguese forces, inferior in numbers, occupied an almost impregnable position on a hill, and successfully repelled two great assaults which the impetuous king of Castile forced his army to deliver without adequate preparation and too late in the day. Froissart has left us a glowing description of the battle, which, as the evening shades began to fall,
was converted into a rout; John of Castile was fortunate to regain unharmed his own dominions. Aljubarrota was a glorious confirmation of the independence which Portugal had first won over three centuries before; it ended for many years to come Castile’s hopes of annexing it. During the next few years, in fact, the Portuguese and English armies invaded and ravaged Castile, which was saved rather by the outbreak of disease in the ranks of its assailants than by any efforts of its own. The English claims to the throne of the Trastamaras were finally disposed of in 1389, as we shall see more fully in another place; while the Portuguese monarch, convinced at last that he could gain no permanent foothold in Castile, finally consented to a truce, which, though occasionally broken, was renewed periodically till 1411, and finally converted into a definitive peace.

During the first half of the fifteenth century, the story of the relations of Portugal and Castile is comparatively unimportant. Peace virtually uninterrupted was preserved between the two realms; the marriage in 1450 of John II of Castile to Isabella of Portugal, who became the mother of Isabella the Catholic, is an evidence that they were, ostensibly at least, on friendly terms. Not that either state had ceased to be jealous of the other—far from it; but both were chiefly occupied with other affairs: Castile with her internal troubles, and Portugal with the fascinating career of maritime exploration and conquest which had been opened for her by the efforts of Prince Henry the Navigator. Yet in this latter fact, namely that Portugal had got a start on Castile in the race for empire, lay the seeds of important developments for the future. The rivalry of the two realms was not dead, but simply temporarily in abeyance; it was soon destined to burst forth again and involve far wider areas than ever before. What had been in the past a purely local matter of Iberian politics, was to develop in the near future into a competition of world empires.

The story of Castile’s relations with Granada and the Moorish states of North Africa from Alfonso X to Ferdinand and Isabella is also extremely complex, and little of permanent importance was accomplished by either side. Christian and Moor were found in alliance, and coreligionists at war, even more frequently than in the preceding age. Each party strove chiefly to attain its own immediate political ends; in selecting its allies each regarded considerations of practical utility alone; and since the fortunes of the struggle changed with incredible rapidity, the combinations were to the last degree evanescent. The fact that the kings of Castile, Granada, and Morocco all possessed numerous rebel vassals, who were ever ready to stretch out the hand of welcome to hostile invaders, naturally served to make confusion worse confounded. All these features had, of course, been present in the struggles of the earlier period, but never to such a considerable extent. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century, it had usually been possible to arouse enough crusading spirit at dangerous crises to dominate the disruptive tendencies. Now, save for one great outburst at the middle of the fourteenth century, religious fervor is almost completely obscured by other less noble aims, until its final revival by the Catholic Kings supplied the impetus for the glorious conquest of Granada.

The three-cornered peace which had been made between Castile, Granada, and Morocco in the first years of Sancho IV lasted till 1290. As it had left several towns, hitherto subject to the king of Granada, in the hands of the Emir of Morocco, it had never been acceptable to the former, who sought the alliance of the king of Castile against his quondam ally across the Straits, and prepared to wage war on the Merinite. The Moroccan sovereign promptly came over to Spain in quest of revenge; but his operations were hampered by the Castilian fleet, and in 1292 one of his remaining strongholds in the peninsula, the town of Tarifa, fell before the combined assaults of the troops of Granada and Castile. In violation of solemn promises to his ally, King Sancho retained the captured place; but the Granadan Emir consoled himself for its loss by buying back Algeciras from his Moroccan coreligionist, who no longer had any ambition to retain his Iberian possessions.

The next act in the drama brought a complete rearrangement of parties. A new Emir, Mohammed III, had ascended the Granadan throne in 1302. At first he sought aid from Morocco against Castile; but finding that he could gain nothing by this manoeuvre, he made peace with his Christian overlord. Then, seizing the opportunity afforded by the Moroccan ruler’s absence on a campaign against Tlemcen, he evened up old scores by possessing himself of Ceuta across the Straits. This town, which had had a most checkered history in the previous century, remained in his hands till 1309, when the aid of the fleet of the king of Aragon enabled the Moroccan Emir to retake it; but the fact that a Spanish ruler, even though he was an infidel, had been able to maintain himself there for seven years was a significant omen for the future. For the present, however, we are more immediately concerned with contemporaneous events in Spain, where Aragon and Castile, temporarily at peace after the settlement of their territorial disputes in 1304, made a somewhat futile joint attack upon Granada. The king of Aragon failed to capture Almeria; while the king of Castile, though he succeeded in taking Gibraltar by
a sudden assault yet wasted so much time before the walls of the then more important town of Algeciras that his army was decimated by disease, and he finally raised the siege of that town in return for the cession of Bedmar and Quesada. That Granada escaped so cheaply from the combined attack was largely due to the fact that the Emir of Morocco, impressed by the temporary union of the Christian kings of Spain, forgave his coreligionist for the various injuries he had received at his hands and sent him timely reinforcements in his hour of need.

The reign of Alfonso XI began with renewed confusion but ended with a glorious repulse by the united Christian kingdoms of the last great effort of the Moors to reconquer Spain from North Africa. Hostilities broke out in 1327 between Castile and Granada; and in the midst of them there occurred a Moroccan invasion from across the Strait. The king of Granada was this time equal to the occasion. He utilized the Moors against Castile; then, turning his arms against his allies, he expelled them from the peninsula. The habit of invasion, however, once acquired, was not easily forgotten; and when a few years later the Granadan Emir, again attacked, and this time defeated by Castile, begged aid and succor of the Merinite, the latter returned to the onset, and in 1333 recaptured Gibraltar, which Alfonso was unable to retake. A lull followed during the next six years, but it was emphatically a lull before the storm. The Moroccan Emir yearned to reconquer Spain. The fiery king of Granada lent himself to his plans. Their alliance presaged the revival of the Holy War as it had been waged in the palmy days of Islam in the Peninsula and evoked a counter-alliance among the Christian kings of Spain. Castile and Aragon forgot their quarrels and made common cause against the invader by land and sea. Though the Castilian admiral sought and found a heroic death in a desperate dash into the center of the Moorish galleys, he failed to offer any effective resistance to the landing of the Moorish invader, who promptly joined forces with his Granadan ally and laid siege to Tarifa. The town, however, was able to hold out, largely because of the aid of a fleet of Genoese galleys which Alfonso of Castile had bought for the purpose; and the delay before its walls gave the Christians time to advance against the infidel with an army which is usually estimated at twenty thousand men. The inevitable battle finally took place on the banks of the little stream called the Rio Salado, just north of Tarifa, on Monday, October 30, 1340. Countless acts of heroism were performed by the Christian forces, most of all by the young king of Castile, who was only prevented from plunging single-handed into a group of his foes by a gentle warning from the Primate. A sortie by the garrison of Tarifa against the rear of the Moorish forces finally decided the day. The Christian victory was by all odds the most important that had been won in the peninsula since the days of Las Navas de Tolosa, of which it has been rightly called a fitting pendant. It marked the complete defeat of the last serious effort to invade Spain from North Africa. The Merinite ruler retreated with the remnant of his shattered forces to Morocco, and the vigilance of the Christian fleet which guarded the Strait prevented a repetition of the attempt.

Two years later the triumphant Castilian monarch laid siege to Algeciras, which with Gibraltar and Ronda had been left after the battle of Rio Salado in Moroccan hands. So great was the fame of Alfonso’s previous exploits that all Western Christendom listened to his appeal for men to come and aid him close the last door open to invasion from the South. Many valiant sons of France and Italy rallied to his standards: Henry of Lancaster, great-grandson of Henry III, came on from England with the Earl of Salisbury; it will be remembered that Chaucer’s “Gentle Knight” was “at the siege of Algezir”. Finally, after a struggle of more than twenty months, the town capitulated on March 26, 1344. A truce of five years’ duration ensued; but in August, 1349, Alfonso was able to continue the task that he had so well begun, by laying siege to Gibraltar. Had his life been spared he would in all likelihood have captured it; as it was he fell a victim to the Black Death, before the walls of the great fortress, in March, 1350, cut off in the midst of his labors at the early age of thirty-nine. The fact that the siege was raised immediately after his death shows what a factor he had been in the victories already won. Even among his enemies he was held in high esteem. Yusuf of Granada and all his court wore mourning for him, and many a Moor went unarmed to the Christian camp in order to attend his funeral. Alfonso was unquestionably the greatest of the Castilian sovereigns between St. Ferdinand and Queen Isabella; he is even worthy, though on a somewhat smaller scale, of comparison with St. Louis.

From 1350 onward the nature of the struggle changes and on the whole degenerates. The battle on the Salado ended forever all chances of Granada’s receiving effectual aid from the Merinites. In the succeeding years the latter not only lost all their holdings in the peninsula, but even saw their own ports temporarily occupied by Spanish Moors and Spanish Christians. The strife between Castile and Granada is no longer complicated by Moroccan interference as before and resembles rather the quarrels and bickerings between a suzerain and his rebel vassal on questions of overlordship and tribute than a struggle between Christian and infidel. During the reign of Pedro the Cruel both realms were paralyzed by successional quarrels; but the king of Granada was on the whole loyal to Pedro, and consequently hostile to Henry of Trastamara, from whom, in the first year of his reign, he wrested
Algeciras. Rightly believing that he would be unable to maintain himself there against a hostile attack, he determined to destroy the town, and this he so effectively accomplished that it figured no more in the struggles of the time. The remaining thirty years of the fourteenth century saw both Granada and Castile carry their arms across the Strait. The former was in possession of Ceuta during much of the time previous to the Portuguese occupation of it in 1415; and in 1399 Henry III of Castile, who had visions of crusades which his untimely death left him small opportunity to realize, sent over a fleet which seized Tetuan and carried off most of its inhabitants to Spain. During the early years of John II, under the regency of his uncle Ferdinand, some progress was made by Castile at the expense of Granada, from which Antequera was taken in 1410; but in 1411 Granada recouped itself for this loss at the expense of the Merinites by capturing Gibraltar, their last holding in the peninsula. The fortress, however, was not long to remain in the hands of the Spanish Moors. The news of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 had filled the Emir of Granada with such reckless enthusiasm that he boastfully hurled defiance at the king of Castile and refused to pay the tribute, which was the token of his vassalage, thus giving the latter an excuse for waging war on him; and nine years later an internal revolt in Granada itself furnished the Christian monarch with the desired opportunity. In 1462 Gibraltar was attacked and taken and has remained ever since in Christian hands. In the following year the town of Archidona to the northward also fell before the Castilian armies, and the payment of the ancient tribute was soon after renewed.

The territorial results of this desultory strife were certainly meagre; and the fact that Granada was able to maintain itself practically undiminished for so long affords the strongest possible proof of the weakness and inefficiency of Castile. The feudal relationship between the two realms, and the tribute, which of course ceased at every declaration of war, only to be renewed again, though in varying amount, at every conclusion of peace, were a perpetual bone of contention; it seems little short of marvellous that the situation should have been tolerated for so many years. One of the most important results of these two centuries of intermittent warfare was that they served to keep the attention of Castile fixed on events across the Strait. The affairs of Granada and Morocco were so closely related that the former served in a sense as a bridge between Christian Spain and North Africa. When it fell, it was the logical and inevitable consequence that Ferdinand and Isabella should carry their arms across to the opposite shore, which possessed so much in common with the Iberian Peninsula.

The dealings of Castile with France and England during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries claim our attention for a few moments; for it is important that we should know something of the early history of her relations with the two great states whose enmity was to be the principal factor in preventing the full realization of Spain’s dreams of world dominion in the crucial years of the sixteenth century. In general it may be said that it was the desire of the Castilian king to live in peace and amity with both these nations. They had plenty to do south of the Pyrenees without interfering to the north of them. Even the versatile Alfonso X, as we have had occasion to observe, sought to cultivate good relations with both England and France by marrying his half-sister to Edward I, and his eldest son to the daughter of St. Louis. But as things fell out, it proved ultimately impossible to maintain an equally close friendship with both powers at the same time. The Hundred Years’ War broke out in 1338; both France and England sought the alliance of Castile; and it was ultimately France that won it. For the next hundred years the friendship of France and Castile was virtually uninterrupted. It became a tradition of national policy on both sides; it was renewed at the beginning of each reign; there are in fact few examples in all history of a continuance of friendship between two states more cordial and more prolonged. Yet all this time Castile strove her hardest to avoid being drawn into war with England on account of her friendship with France. She had no real cause of quarrel with England, and when, in spite of all her efforts, she was forced to open hostilities against her, she seized the first honorable opportunity to terminate them. Such are the main lines of the picture; it now remains to fill in the most important details.

At the death of Alfonso X, the good relations between France and Castile were temporarily clouded by the disinheriting of the Infantes de la Cerda. The French kings, however, were so much more interested in ousting the Aragonese from Sicily than in defending the rights of their kinsmen in Castile that no open breach ensued. Even before the affairs of the Infantes were finally settled by the agreement of 1304, France sought the friendship of Sancho IV and his successor in order to be able to concentrate her energies upon Aragon. In 1317 it was arranged that Alfonso XI of Castile should wed Isabella, daughter of Philip V of France, as soon as she should have attained suitable age, and that a lasting peace should unite the two nations. Though the marriage project was subsequently abandoned, and though there is no further record of any relation between the two states for a number of
years, there is every reason to think that their friendship was uninterrupted. But with the opening of the Hundred Years’ War matters entered upon a much acuter stage. The contiguity of Castile to the English lands in the south of France made her friendship of paramount importance to both Edward III and Philip VI, who promptly engaged in a diplomatic duel to obtain it. Alfonso XI fully appreciated the strength of his position and did his best to keep the two rival monarchs bidding against one another for his alliance. In 1336 and in 1345 he signed two treaties with France, the second of which was distinctly anti-English in character; yet in 1346 he strove to secure himself against the hostility of the Plantagenets by arranging for the marriage of his son, Pedro, to Jane, the daughter of Edward III. As the princess, however, died suddenly at Bordeaux on her way to Spain, the union never took place. It is worth noting that no treaty of alliance had been spoken of in connection with it; in fact, at the very moment that it was being agreed upon, the king of Castile was actually furnishing ships to France to aid her in liberating Calais from its English besiegers. In other words, Alfonso was still endeavoring to preserve good relations with both countries, though events were gradually tending to drive him more and more into the arms of France.

The beginning of the reign of Pedro the Cruel saw the Franco-Castilian treaties formally renewed; and on June 3, 1353, the young Castilian monarch married Blanche, the daughter of Pierre de Bourbon. But this match, instead of strengthening the ties that united the two realms, almost resulted in severing them, for Pedro’s maltreatment of his bride was so outrageous that no considerations of political expediency could prevail upon the French king to ignore it. At the time of Blanche’s arrival in Spain, Pedro had fallen a victim to the charms of Maria de Padilla. He was only with difficulty prevailed upon to go through with the ceremony of marriage with Blanche; almost immediately after it he left her, to return a little later for another visit of two days, after which he never saw her again. No wonder that the Franco-Castilian alliance was shaken by such an episode as this; and had Pedro succeeded in preserving the throne of Castile, the whole history of the relations of the two realms would in all probability have been changed. But France’s need of Castile’s friendship was so pressing that she could afford to neglect no honorable means of retaining it, and when Pedro’s wild career of crime and outrage in Spain evoked a counterclaimant to his throne in the person of Henry of Trastamara, she was quick to seize her opportunity. She made common cause with the pretender and sent him a host of marauding mercenaries under the famous Bertrand du Guesclin, this the more willingly since a temporary peace with England made her anxious to be rid of these turbulent soldiers of fortune. She enlisted the support of Pedro, king of Aragon. Meantime Pedro of Castile threw himself for protection into the arms of England, taking refuge at the court of the Black Prince at Bordeaux, together with his two daughters, one of whom was later to become the bride of John of Gaunt. The dramatic story of the successional struggle which followed in Castile does not directly concern us, save to note that it was France that had espoused the winning cause. When Pedro fell a victim to his brother’s dagger in 1369, and Henry of Trastamara mounted the Castilian throne, the Franco-Castilian alliance which the reign of Pedro had threatened to break emerged stronger than ever before. It was by French aid that the pretender had been set on the Castilian throne; and in the succeeding generations he and his descendants were to repay the debt with interest by supporting their ally against the common enemy, England.

The naval side of the ensuing struggle was chiefly entrusted by France to Castile, whose attacks on England in the fourteenth century furnished a number of interesting precedents for the days of the Spanish Armada. Certainly, far more damage was done on this occasion than was effected two centuries later. It seems probable that the French, knowing that Castile had already made great progress in maritime affairs, and realizing from the very first their own inferiority in this respect, approached Henry of Trastamara with a definite request for naval aid in August 1371. It was by a Castilian fleet that the Earl of Pembroke was decisively defeated on June 23, 1372, in the harbor of La Rochelle, his landing prevented, and his ships destroyed. In 1373 the English strove energetically but unsuccessfully to detach Castile from the French alliance: several indecisive actions and a truce of one year’s duration ensued; but finally, the French and Castilian fleets made a joint demonstration off the southern shore of England in the summer of 1377. The Isle of Wight was overrun and put to ransom; Winchelsea was saved by the efforts of the abbot of Battle; but Hastings and Rottingdean were sacked, and the prior of Lewes was carried off. Most of the contemporary English chroniclers represent these raids as a purely French affair, but there is little doubt that Castilian ships did the lion’s share of the work. The climax was reached in the spring of 1380 when the Castilian Admiral Fernán Sanchez de Tovar sailed up the Thames with twenty galleys, burned Gravesend, and penetrated almost to the city of London, “whither hostile ships had never attained before”. This raid was obviously regarded as a feat of unparalleled audacity at the time and stands out in striking contrast to the fate of the Spanish Armada.

In return for the naval aid, he brought his ally, the king of Castile not unnaturally expected help on land from the French. By this time, too, there was serious need of it, owing to England’s support of
Portugal in the campaign of Aljubarrota, and to John of Gaunt’s subsequent claiming of the throne of Castile by virtue of his marriage with the daughter of Pedro the Cruel. To substantiate this claim, the Duke of Lancaster sailed from England in the ships of the king of Portugal, with more than three thousand soldiers and vast quantities of provisions and stores: for, as Froissart shrewdly remarks, “the English do not willingly go unfurnished with such things”. They finally landed at Corunna on July 25, 1386; but were unable to take the town. Hunting rather than fighting was their chief preoccupation, but they finally succeeded in establishing themselves at Santiago, which surrendered without resistance. Meantime Charles VI of France had great difficulty in raising troops to succor his ally. Heavy taxes were imposed for the purpose, but men grumbled at being obliged to pay “in order to comfort the king of Castile and expel the English from his dominions”. In 1387, however, an advance guard of two thousand men entered the peninsula, and their arrival was enough to cause the army of John of Gaunt to scatter to the four winds of heaven. Clearly the continuance of the semblance of war, at least on land, would be little more than a farce; and the king of Castile, whose only desire was to rid his realm of the presence of his foes, made haste to treat of peace. In return for a liberal money compensation, John of Gaunt agreed to evacuate Galicia and renounce all claims to the throne of Castile; it was further arranged that his daughter Catharine should marry the heir to the Castilian throne, so as to put an end to the succession struggle between the descendants of Pedro the Cruel and Henry of Trastamara, as well as to the quarrel between Castile and England. The treaty was arranged without consulting the court of France, which was naturally furious when it heard the news: the Admiral Jean de Vienne was sent to express to the Castilian monarch France’s opinion of his conduct, and to warn him to do nothing in prejudice of his alliance with France; and so vigorous was his language that when the king and his council heard him they were all “abasshed, and ech of them loked on other; there was none that gave any answere but satte styll.” The French king, however, had no reason to be alarmed. The Castilian government had not the slightest intention of breaking with him, and the alliance of the two nations was formally renewed, as the custom was, at the beginning of the next reign.

Henry III, however, was exceedingly careful that alliance with France should not again bring his country into open conflict with England. When the French king sent him a fresh demand for a fleet, he was slow to reply, took advantage of every possible opportunity to delay its preparation and departure, and when it finally did set sail, gave it instructions which condemned it to ineffectiveness. Under all the circumstances it is not surprising that the first half of the fifteenth century saw a considerable loosening of the bonds of the Franco-Castilian alliance. Formally it was continued until after the middle of the reign of Henry the Impotent, despite an attempt of Henry VI of England in 1430 to break it, but the Castilian kings were unwilling, and also too weak, to give France any effective help in expelling: their foes, and the French kings revenged themselves by refusing to aid their Castilian brethren against their rebel barons and the Aragonese. The palmy days of the alliance were in fact over. Interest and enthusiasm for it had visibly cooled on both sides. Whatever the letter of the treaties might say, the Castilian monarchs were obviously determined to live at peace with England, so that the advantages which France could draw from their friendship were but slight. Finally, in 1467, two years before the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, Edward IV of England won away the Castilian alliance from France, and though eleven years later Louis XI succeeded in temporarily regaining it, the old cordiality of feeling was utterly gone, and the way had been already opened for that great regrouping of the powers which bore fruit in the Italian Wars of the sixteenth century. All this, however, may be more profitably considered in connection with the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. For the present we need only remember that Castile had an unusually long and uninterrupted tradition of amity, during the later Middle Ages, with the nation which was to be her principal foe in the days of the Catholic Kings and of Charles V; while with England, who was to deal the death blow to her imperial ambitions in the reign of Philip n, her relations had on the whole been more friendly than the reverse.
DESPITE her manifold activities at home and abroad, despite also the limitation of her coastline by Portugal’s attainment of independence, Castile did not emerge from the Middle Ages without giving the world a slight foretaste of the tremendous development of her dominions beyond the seas which awaited her under Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs. During the reign of King Henry III (1390-1406), whose instincts were far more cosmopolitan than those of most of his predecessors and successors, the conquest and colonization of the Canaries were begun, and a long step incidentally taken on the road to the discovery of America. At the same time the name and fame of Castile were borne eastward to the plains of Central Asia, as far as the court of the redoubtable Tamerlane at Samarcand.

The existence of the Canary Islands was well known to the ancients. Situated in the ocean, which the Homeric poems treated as the barrier between the known world and the Elysian Fields, they were popularly supposed to be the habitation of the blest, hence the classical name of Insulae Fortunatae. Their primitive inhabitants—the so-called Guanches—were almost certainly of Berber stock. All the testimony to be derived from physical aspect, language, religion, and customs, seems to point to that conclusion, and the fact that the islands can be seen from the western extremity of Mauretania (as Strabo was the first to observe) tends to strengthen it still further. Plutarch tells us that Sertorius, in his flight from the ships of Annius, fell in with some Lusitanian sea captains who had visited them, and was almost persuaded by their glowing descriptions to withdraw thither and seek repose from the cares of military life. Fuller and more definite information is to be found in the pages of Pliny, who got hold of a vague itinerary drawn up by a certain Statius Sebosus in B.C. 52 from accounts of navigators of his time; and, still more important, has preserved to us a fragment of a report from King Juba of Mauretania to the Emperor Augustus of an expedition which he had sent out for the express purpose of exploring the archipelago. Finally, the Arab geographer, Edrisi, who finished his famous description of Spain and Africa at the court of King Roger of Sicily in the year 1154, tells at length of a journey of certain Moorish adventurers from Lisbon, to islands whose description tallies closely with what we know of the Canaries. This account has been regarded as apocryphal by the majority of writers, but the naïveté and realism of the story make it seem unlikely that the tale was invented out of whole cloth. In general, however, Europe’s knowledge of the Canaries can only be regarded as vague and scanty to the last degree down to the period of the Renaissance.

With the fourteenth century, however, we emerge on firmer ground. A passage in Petrarch and several contemporary maps of Genoese, Venetian, and Catalan authorship indicate the presence of Genoese sailors on the island of Lanzarote, the easternmost of the archipelago. Far more important than this was an expedition sent out to explore the Canaries by King Affonso IV of Portugal in 1341, which is interestingly described by Boccaccio. It was composed chiefly of Portuguese and Castilians, but Florentines and Genoese took part in it, and it had a Genoese pilot. The adventurers made no attempt to settle in the islands, but they gained a good deal of knowledge of them and of their inhabitants, and certainly accomplished enough to give Portugal a strong claim to priority of discovery and possession against any other European power. Indeed, the expedition of 1341 furnished the basis of Portugal’s later refusal to acknowledge the validity of Castile’s occupation of the Canaries; it was the origin of the first of a long series of quarrels between the two nations concerning the limits of their overseas possessions. But the Portuguese were not aroused to the importance of vigorously prosecuting their claims until it was too late. When, in November 1344, Luis de la Cerda, great-grandson of Alfonso the Learned, was invested by the Avignonese Pope Clement VI with the lordship of the Canaries as a fief of the Holy See, they did indeed object, on the ground of their expedition of three years before, and of the fact that the archipelago lay nearer to Portugal than to Castile. No one, however, seems to have paid much attention to them, and though Luis himself made no serious efforts to realize his sovereignty, “the theory of a Spanish right to the Canaries was established” from that moment, “and all that was done in the remaining years of the fourteenth century for the conquest, exploration, and Christianizing of the Fortunatae seems to have been the work of Castilians.” In fact, she “considered that she had
eared the Canaries through Don Luis’; and when, years later, she prepared to take real possession of the archipelago, Portugal discovered that her opportunity was gone, and that “it was too late to put back the hands of time.”

We now come to the famous expedition of the year 1402, which will always be associated with the names of the Norman, Jean de Bethencourt, and of the Poitevin, Gadifer de La Salle. Both were filled to the brim with instincts of maritime adventure and piracy; both had taken part in a Genoese expedition against Tunis in the year 1390; both were keenly desirous to embark in some fresh enterprise, where all the risks and profits should be their own. Joining forces accordingly at La Rochelle, they set sail thence on the first of May, 1402, “for the lands of Canary, to see and explore all the country, with the view of conquering the islands, and bringing the people to the Christian faith. After an adventure at Corunna, indicative of somewhat loose notions of the rights of property, and a brief detention at Cadiz and Seville, from which they were liberated by order of the Royal Council, they continued their voyage; finally, in July, they landed at the island of Lanzarote, and built a fort and called it Rubicon. Most of the inhabitants were very friendly and listened attentively to the priests’ instructions in the elements of the Christian religion, but a few held off in fear and half-hostile suspicion. Soon afterwards Bethencourt and Gadifer passed over with some of their followers to the island of Fuerteventura, where the inhabitants fled before them; but lack of provisions and fears of a mutiny soon obliged them to return without having accomplished anything. At Rubicón, moreover, they found things in evil case. Many of the sailors were discouraged and longed to get away; clearly the conquest of the archipelago was going to prove a far more difficult and serious undertaking than had at first been supposed. The two partners must renounce their original idea of an independent realm. Help from some European sovereign would be indispensable to success, and help would plainly not be given without recognition of overlordship in return. Nothing was to be hoped for from the king of France, for Charles VI, already a victim of insanity, had too many troubles at home to think of such remote possessions; consequently, the adventurers were thrown back on the king of Castile, whose government had on the whole treated them generously at Seville earlier in the year. Leaving Gadifer, therefore, in charge of Rubicon, and taking with him such followers as were most anxious to return, Bethencourt set sail in October and landed soon after in Spain. At the Castilian court he was most cordially received, as soon as his errand was known. Henry the Invalid was not likely to neglect such a favorable opportunity to consolidate and reinforce the vague claims to the Canaries which Castile had maintained since the days of Luis de la Cerda. Fair and complimentary words were exchanged between sovereign and adventurer, with much discussion of the advancement of the Christian faith. Bethencourt begged the king to be permitted to do him homage for the islands. The king congratulated him on his bravery and enterprise and assured him that he showed an admirable disposition in coming to do him homage for a land which as far as he could make out was more than two hundred leagues distant, and of which he had never heard before. The account really sounds as if the first outpost of Spain’s Western Empire was almost forced upon the crown of Castile; certainly, her first effective acquisition of the sovereignty of the Canaries cost infinitely less trouble than the retention of it. At any rate King Henry accepted the good fortune which chance had thrown in his way. He received Bethencourt’s homage for the archipelago and granted him the right to appropriate to his own use one fifth of all merchandise brought thence to Spain, the privilege of coining money there, and of preventing any one from landing in the islands without his leave. Finally, Bethencourt made the most of his partner’s absence to secure all these important concessions in his own name, and thus to relegate Gadifer to a position of inferiority to himself. In fact, the Norman lord was fully as much occupied in feathering his own nest at the Castilian court as in securing the support and protection of King Henry III. He had promised to return to the archipelago at Christmas, 1402, but he did not actually arrive there till April 1404, and in the intervening months he had contrived so to arrange matters that the game was left completely in his own hands.

Meantime poor Gadifer in Lanzarote had not only been experiencing grave difficulties with the Guanches but had also been weakened by the outbreak of rebellion and mutiny among his own followers. One of the most prominent members of Bethencourt’s company, a certain Berthin de Berneval, irritated by the fact that the expedition had not been a more pronounced success, determined to recoup himself for the funds he had invested in it by capturing a number of natives and taking them to Europe to be sold as slaves. Availing himself of a temporary absence of Gadifer, he gathered a small faction of malcontents, pillaged the castle of Rubicon, seized a number of the Guanches, and finally escaped to Spain in a ship that chanced to touch at Lanzarote, together with his confederates, and prisoners to the number of twenty-two; these he handed over to the ship captain and sailors, as the contemporary chronicler says, “after the example of the traitor Judas Iscariot, who betrayed our Saviour Jesus Christ, and delivered Him into the hands of the Jews to crucify Him, and put Him to death”. Some of Berthin’s accomplices, whom he abandoned at the last moment, were so fearful of the wrath of
Gadifer that they attempted to escape to the coast of Africa, where they perished miserably or were enslaved. Meantime Berthin himself was arrested and imprisoned at Cadiz, while the master of the ship in which he had sailed made off to Aragon with his Canarian captives and sold them there. Berthin’s misdeeds, however, had an important effect on Gadifer’s colony, for they convinced the Canarians that those who had advocated friendship with the Europeans were mistaken, and that a war of extermination must be waged against the invaders. Under the leadership of a certain native by the name of Asche, who aspired to the throne of Lanzarote, a double plan was laid. Asche was to attempt to utilize Gadifer in getting rid of the reigning king, with the intention of turning on his ally and the foreign intruders who had come with him, when the first part of the programme had been accomplished. But the plot ultimately recoiled on the head of its originator. With the aid of Gadifer the king was duly captured, and Asche, thinking that he had the game in his own hands, rashly attacked one of the followers of the Frenchman before putting his prisoner to death; the latter escaped from confinement, gathered his friends, seized the treacherous Asche, and had him stoned and afterwards burned. Gadifer and his men also took summary vengeance on the party of his quondam ally, so that many of the Canarians fled to the caverns in the hills, and more than eighty were terrorized into being baptized at Pentecost, “with a good hope that God would confirm them in the faith and make them a means of edification to all the country round about”. The whole story would fit well into the history of Cortez in Mexico or that of Pizarro in Peru.

The next chapter of the story witnesses the culmination of the inevitable quarrel between Bethencourt and Gadifer. After the rebellion of Asche had been put down, Gadifer started on an exploring expedition among the western islands of the archipelago, accompanied by a number of Castilians who had just been sent out by Bethencourt. Fuerteventura, the Grand Canary, Gomera, Ferro, and Palma were visited; but the explorers apparently did not dare land at Teneriffe, because of the tales of the strength and ferocity of its inhabitants. On their return to Rubicon in the autumn of 1403, it was found that the garrison had virtually completed the conquest of the Guanches of Lanzarote, and in February, 1404, the king of the island and a large majority of his subjects accepted the Christian faith and were baptized. The ‘instruction’ which was drawn up for their guidance by the priests Bontier and Le Verrier is a marvelously inaccurate farrago of some of the most famous passages in the Pentateuch and the Gospels; whether its divagations were due to the ignorance of the authors or to their desire to be intelligible and interesting to the natives it is difficult to say. At this juncture (April 19, 1404) Bethencourt finally arrived from Spain. He showed no gratitude for what his partner had accomplished in his absence and did not hesitate to let him know that the chief result of his own negotiations at the Castilian Court had been to deprive Gadifer of all authority and interest in what had been originally organized as a joint enterprise. He entirely refused to accede to Gadifer’s very reasonable request that some of the islands be given to him as a reward for all that he had done, so that the latter, failing to get immediate satisfaction, threatened to abandon Bethencourt and return to France. Discussions of the feasibility of a settlement on the adjacent African coast, and unsuccessful expeditions and slave hunts in Fuerteventura and the Grand Canary, postponed for a time any open breach; but the interests of the two adventurers had now become irreconcilable, and late in the summer of 1404 they went back to Spain to settle their disputes, travelling, however, by different ships. The result was naturally a complete triumph for Bethencourt, who was already well known and popular at the court and was solemnly reinvested with the islands; Gadifer’s just claims were scornfully set aside, and shortly afterwards he retired to France. The struggle between the two leaders, however, had a far deeper significance than a mere personal quarrel; its most permanent result was to secure the Spanish hold on the archipelago. Throughout the dispute, Bethencourt had been continually reinforced by ships which brought men and provisions from Castile; his own original following of Frenchmen was by this time far outnumbered by the later Spanish arrivals. He had gradually become, in fact, the representative of the king of Castile, while Gadifer, who had not accompanied him on his first expedition to Seville, naturally tended to hark back to the early days of their partnership, and perhaps feebly to cling to the idea of holding the islands as a fief of France. But he had neither the ability nor the resources to carry his plans into effect. Bethencourt remained at the head of affairs, and for the time being reaped all the rewards; and his triumph was the triumph of his patron, King Henry the Invalid of Castile.

In October, 1404, Bethencourt returned again to the archipelago. During the next three months he devoted himself to the subjection of Fuerteventura, an enterprise whose difficulty was enormously enhanced by the not unnatural ill will of the remnant of Gadifer’s party, led by the latter’s illegitimate son, Hannibal. In January 1405, Bethencourt went back to France to fetch supplies and colonists, and was highly successful: about one hundred and sixty men accompanied him on his return, of whom twenty-three brought their wives; among them were knights, mechanics, handicraftsmen, and laborers. All of them, however, came on their own initiative. There is no evidence of support by the French
government or even of a request for it; Bethencourt obviously was determined to stand loyally by his liege lord, Henry of Castile, and to hold the Canaries as his vassal. In May he arrived triumphant at Lanzarote, where he was accorded a reception so enthusiastic that “God’s thunder would have been drowned in the noise of the music that they made”. This time Fuerteventura also received him with open arms and gladly acknowledged his supremacy. But when Bethencourt attempted to extend his dominion to the rest of the archipelago, he met with many misfortunes. Expeditions against the Grand Canary and Palma were repulsed by the valor of the natives after a number of bloody encounters. At Gomera the invaders had a comparatively friendly reception; but at Ferro the clamorings of his followers caused Bethencourt to exchange his schemes of conquest for an attempt to capture slaves. The native king and one hundred and eleven others were decoyed, unarmed, into an ambush and taken prisoners, but almost no progress was made towards the subjugation of the island. Lust for slave hunting was, in fact, one of the most serious difficulties with which the conqueror had to contend. He was by no means entirely superior to it himself, but he was not one to let it interfere with larger aims. With most of his followers, however, it soon took the precedence of everything else. It not only crippled their efficiency in effecting the conquest of the islands; it also constantly diverted their attention to the adjacent African coast, where the opportunities for slave hunting were much more favorable. A great expedition for the purpose was sent over to Cape Bojador in the months immediately succeeding Bethencourt’s arrival at Lanzarote. The inhabitants fled at its approach, but a number of them were captured and sold in the slave markets of Spain.

After these various attempts to enlarge his own territories and to satisfy the cupidity of his men, Bethencourt returned to Fuerteventura, and there established his headquarters. He next occupied himself with drawing up regulations for the government and administration of the islands which acknowledged his authority. The land was divided up between the loyal natives and the conquerors, the latter receiving the lion’s share and the control of all fortified places. Over each of the larger islands two judicial and administrative officers were set, who were to be aided in the discharge of their duties by an assembly of prominent men; “the customs of France and Normandy” were to be observed as nearly as possible “in the administration of justice and all other points.” Everyone except Bethencourt’s Norman friends, who were exempted from all taxation for nine years, was to pay annually one fifth of all his income of whatever sort to support the government: but the most valuable product of the island, the orchi, Bethencourt reserved for himself; no man might sell any without his express permission. The interests of the church were to be scrupulously guarded. Finally, Bethencourt installed his nephew, Maciot, who had come out with him from Normandy in 1404, as his representative with full powers. On December 15, 1405, amid protestations of loyalty and gratitude from natives and followers, he sailed for Spain, partly to get more men and munitions of war with which to complete the conquest of the archipelago, and partly to secure from the Pope the appointment of a bishop of the Canaries who would aid him to bring the inhabitants to the Christian faith.

Bethencourt, however, was not destined to visit the Canaries again. He was received with royal pomp at the Castilian court at Valladolid. King Henry entered warmly into his plans for establishing a bishopric in the islands, and recommended for the purpose a Franciscan, of noble Castilian family, by the name of Albert de Las Casas; for he doubtless fully realized that the appointment of a Spaniard as the chief ecclesiastical authority in the archipelago would incidentally serve to strengthen his own claims to it. To secure the bulls for the new bishop, Bethencourt betook himself to the papal court. The needed formalities were soon completed; and a little later Las Casas was solemnly received in the Canaries, and his see established at Rubicon in Lanzarote. Meantime Bethencourt returned to his Norman home, where he became the victim of successive misfortunes. The last years of his life were embittered by family quarrels and bereavements, the loss of rich cargoes of merchandise from his island realm, and the total failure of his plans for collecting a large military force with which to return and complete the subjugation of the archipelago. One authority says that he maintained close relations with the Castilian court, and actually journeyed there in 1412, to renew his homage for the Canaries to the unfortunate king, John II; but the story lacks confirmation. The year of his death is usually given as 1422, but some authorities put it in 1425, and an inscription, placed in 1851 in the church at Grainville where he lies buried, adopts the later date.

For years after Bethencourt’s departure in 1405, the history of the Canaries is utterly confused and of little significance. Its salient features are the ebbs and flows of Castilian control, and the challenging of it by the Portuguese. Bethencourt, as we have seen, had always upheld the overlordship of Castile, and his brother Reynauld, to whom he bequeathed his conquests, did nothing to alter the situation. But meantime Bethencourt’s nephew, Maciot, whom he had left in the archipelago as his representative, began to plot to emancipate it from Castilian overlordship and to place it under the protection of the crown of France. His conduct naturally provoked the resentment of the Queen Regent Catharine of
Castile, who at once sent out three war caravels under Admiral Pedro Barba de Campos to force him to return to his allegiance. Resistance was obviously out of the question; so Maciot, coolly ignoring the fact that the Canaries were not his to dispose of, first ceded them to the admiral, and then fled to Madeira, where he sold them to Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal. This highly fraudulent proceeding, coupled with the memories of the claims and counterclaims of the fourteenth century, reawakened the long dormant conflict between Castile and Portugal over the possession of the islands. It continued for many years and became inextricably interwoven with other matters which embroiled the two realms. Prince Henry vigorously prosecuted the rights that he had acquired, the more so because the possession of the archipelago would obviously strengthen and facilitate Portuguese progress down the West African coast. Powerful expeditions were sent out in 1424-25 and again in 1445-47; but, owing to the valor of the native resistance and the protests of the king of Castile, they met with no success. The Venetian, Alvisi Cadamosto, also visited the islands in 1455, while in the service of Prince Henry the Navigator, and has left us a most interesting account of them. Meantime on the Spanish side the title which Maciot had turned over to Barba de Campos was passed around with bewildering rapidity among a number of prominent Castilian families—the best possible evidence of the small amount of importance that was attached to it—until finally, in 1443, it fell to Ferdinand, a scion of the ancient house of Peraza. Under this Ferdinand Peraza, and still more under his son-in-law, Diego de Herrera, who inherited his claims, renewed attempts were made to effect the subjugation and conversion of the western islands. But the old lust for slave hunting continued to cripple the efforts of the leaders. Heroic resistance by the natives prevented any effective success in Palma and the Grand Canary; and though the Guanches of Teneriffe showed themselves amenable to gentle treatment at the outset, a subsequent experience of Spanish treachery led to the expulsion of the invaders. Only in Lanzarote and Fuerteventura was Herrera’s dominion in any sense fully established.

The solution of all these rival claims was reached in a most unexpected manner. In 1455 King Henry the Impotent of Castile increased complications already great by disregarding Peraza’s title, and conferring the islands on the Count of Atouguia, who had brought him his Portuguese bride; the latter sold them to the Marquis of Menisco, who promptly resold them to the Infante Ferdinand of Portugal, younger brother of King Affonso the African. In 1466 an expedition was fitted out under the Portuguese count, Diego da Silva, to substantiate the claims of the Infante; but Diego de Herrera was on hand to oppose him with a force so impressive that da Silva took refuge in negotiations, which were measurably advanced by the fact that he fell promptly in love with Herrera’s daughter. The two were shortly afterwards betrothed, and Spaniards and Portuguese jointly attempted once more to carry their conquests to the western islands; but after various failures and repulses, Silva and his Portuguese followers tired of such a strenuous campaign and longed to return to their native land. Herrera was not sorry to be so cheaply rid of one who, though at present friendly, might easily develop into a dangerous rival. The wedding of his daughter to Silva was celebrated at Lanzarote, and the happy pair departed for Lisbon, whither Herrera soon after followed them for the purpose of extinguishing any surviving Portuguese claims to the archipelago. Meantime, on December 11, 1474, King Henry the Impotent died, and was succeeded by his sister, Isabella, who five years previously had married Ferdinand of Aragon. In addition to effecting the union of the crowns and expelling the Moors from Granada, the royal pair were keenly desirous to carry their conquests across the straits to Africa; and for this end they recognized, as the Portuguese had done before them, the great advantages of a firm foothold in the Canaries. A series of complaints against the administration of Herrera arrived most opportune for their purpose; and the latter, realizing that the cards were stacked against him, saw the necessity of coming to an agreement. It was finally arranged that he and his heirs should be secured in the possession of Lanzarote and Fuerteventura, which had been thoroughly conquered, and of Ferro and Gomera, which were at least partially so; but that they should yield to their Catholic Majesties, for the sum of 5,000,000 maravedis, all right to the as yet unsubjugated islands of Grand Canary, Palma, and Teneriffe. This treaty, which marks the inception of the formal taking over of the archipelago by the Castilian government, was signed at Seville, October 15, 1477. Herrera consoled himself for his losses by organizing a series of terrible slave, camel, and cattle hunts on the adjacent West African coast northward from Cape Bojador. A fort was erected, attacks by the local Sherif and his followers were repulsed, and raids were organized far into the interior. It is said that the Berber who served as Herrera’s guide on these expeditions died at Lanzarote in 1591 at the age of one hundred and forty-six.

Though it seems a far cry from the Canaries to Central Asia, the spirit of foreign adventure and exploration which swept over Castile during the reign of Henry in sufficed to bridge the gap. Hitherto Spain had taken practically no part in that extraordinary series of travels and missionary enterprises which immediately followed the age of the Crusades and gave to the states of Western Europe their
first knowledge of the Far East. The period of the Polos and of Sir John Mandeville saw her too fully occupied with internal troubles to think of Asiatic exploration. Yet she was to contribute one last stirring scene to the first act of the great drama of the unveiling of the East, before the outbreak of anarchy beyond the Euxine and Caspian and the obstruction of the ancient trade routes by the advance of the Ottoman Turks caused the curtain to fall for another hundred years. The famous mission of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo to the court of the great Mongol conqueror Tamerlane deserves an honorable place in the history of Spanish enterprise beyond the seas.

A nation whose life work had been dedicated to the task of driving back the Saracens in the West, could not fail to regard with sympathetic interest the rise of a great empire to the eastward which was hostile to the Ottoman Turk. For nearly half a century the mighty Tamerlane had been building such an empire in the steppes of Asia on the ruins of different kingdoms which had been conquered by his barbarous Tartar hordes, and he was now advancing against the easternmost of the possessions of Bajazet I. Agreement in religion could obviously not long postpone the clash that was necessitated by the rival territorial ambitions of the two ‘scourges of God’; and Henry III of Castile determined to inform himself concerning the power and intentions of the great Asiatic potentate whose advent on the confines of the western world promised, temporarily at least, to divert and check the onset of the more immediately terrible Turk. For this purpose he sent two knights, Pelayo de Sotomayor and Hernan Sanchez de Palazuelos, into Asia Minor, where they witnessed, on July 20, 1402, the famous battle of Angora, in which Tamerlane conquered Bajazet and took him prisoner. After the fight Tamerlane learned of their presence and summoned them before him. Equalling Henry III in his appreciation of the value of a possible ally on the other side of the domains of his principal enemy, the Turk, he surpassed him in his curiosity concerning remote lands and the customs of their inhabitants, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity to gratify it. The Castilians were most honorably entertained, and dismissed with gifts; and on their departure, they were accompanied by a Tartar ambassador bearing messages of admiration and friendship for Henry in, and by two lovely Christian ladies who had been rescued by Tamerlane from the harem of his Turkish rival.

Henry III promptly responded to these amicable overtures by despatching direct to Tamerlane’s court his chamberlain Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, a nobleman of Madrid, accompanied by two other persons, and also by the ambassador whom Tamerlane had sent to him. As the latter had retired eastward after his victory at Angora, and was finally found by Clavijo beyond the Oxus at Samarcand, the journey of Henry’s representatives turned out to be considerably longer and more arduous than was expected. It has in fact been rightly designated as the “earliest important venture of the Spanish people overland”. It started from St. Mary’s Port, near Cadiz, on May 22, 1403; it returned to San Lucar on March 1, 1406.

Clavijo kept a careful journal of his experiences, and his descriptions of the places through which he and his companions passed constitute one of the most precious narratives of travel that have come down to us from the Middle Ages. They journeyed by sea as far as Trebizond, touching at Malaga, Naples, Messina, Rhodes, Mitylene, Constantinople, and Sinope by the way. From Trebizond their route lay overland through Erzingan, Tabriz, and Teheran, over the Murgab and the Oxus, which they crossed on a huge bridge of boats constructed by Tamerlane “for the passage of himself and his host”. On Monday, September 8, 1404, they reached Samarcand and were summoned into the presence of Tamerlane, whom they found “seated in a portal, in front of the entrance of a beautiful palace... Before him there was a fountain, which threw up the water very high, and in it there were some red apples... He was dressed in a robe of silk, with a high white hat on his head, on the top of which there was a spinal lay overland through Erzingan, Tabriz, and Teheran, over the Murgab and the Oxus, which they crossed on a huge bridge of boats constructed by Tamerlane “for the passage of himself and his host”. On Monday, September 8, 1404, they reached Samarcand and were summoned into the presence of Tamerlane, whom they found “seated in a portal, in front of the entrance of a beautiful palace... Before him there was a fountain, which threw up the water very high, and in it there were some red apples... He was dressed in a robe of silk, with a high white hat on his head, on the top of which there was a spinal
above the representatives of his Eastern overlord he could pay a most welcome compliment to his ‘Western son’. "When the lord saw the ambassadors seated below the ambassador from the lord of Cathay, he sent to order that they should sit above him, and he below them. As soon as they were seated, one of the Meerzas of the lord came and said to the ambassador of Cathay, that the lord had ordered that those who were ambassadors from the king of Spain, his son and friend, should sit above him; and that he who was the ambassador from a thief and a bad man, his enemy, should sit below them; and from that time, at the feasts and entertainments given by the lord, they always sat in that order. The Meerza then ordered the interpreter to tell the ambassadors what the lord had done for them.”

Many and wonderful are the tales related by Clavijo concerning his experiences at the court of Samarcand. The feasts were horrible orgies: “sometimes the company drank wine and at others they drank cream and sugar”. Caño, the wife of Tamerlane, “called the ambassadors before her, and gave them to drink with her own hand, and she importuned Ruy Gonzalez for a long time, to make him drink, for she would not believe that he never touched wine. The drinking was such that some of the men fell down drunk before her; and this was considered very jovial, for they think that there can be no pleasure without drunken men.” At one of the festivals, there were several terrible executions; “the custom is, that when a great man is put to death, he is hanged; but the meaner sort are beheaded”. Tamerlane had fourteen elephants, each one “equal in size to four or five great bulls, and their bodies were quite shapeless, like a full sack. Their legs were very thick, and the same size all the way down, and the foot round and without hoofs, but with five toes, each with a nail, like those of a black man.... They had much entertainment with these elephants, making them run with horses and with the people, which was very diverting; and when they all ran together, it seemed as if the earth trembled”.

Clavijo’s embassy to the court of Tamerlane is usually regarded by Spanish historians as an isolated event. It occurred, as we have already pointed out, at the very end of that long series of eastern travels initiated by the Polos almost one hundred and fifty years before and had no immediately tangible results.

Yet on the other hand, if taken in conjunction with the precisely contemporaneous expedition of Bethencourt to the Canaries, it certainly indicates that the tide of enthusiasm for foreign discovery and exploration was running strong in Castile in the opening years of the fifteenth century. What set the tide in motion, is difficult to tell; but the example of Portugal and possibly of Italy, who were already in the field, was doubtless responsible for much. Why it did not continue is, perhaps, an even harder problem; but the internal anarchy and confusion of the reigns of John II and Henry IV furnish the most obvious answer: Spain was too much disrupted at home to think of the prosecution of foreign colonization and conquest till the days of the Catholic Kings. Whatever the final explanation of these different problems, the embassy of Clavijo will always be remembered as an early proof of the Spaniard’s passion for adventure in distant lands—of the quality which furnishes the key to his later conquests in the New World. It showed that he had the stuff in him of which empire builders are made. It also afforded an interesting precedent for the attempts which were to be made in the reigns of Charles V and of Philip in to establish relations between the kings of Spain and the shahs of Persia.
CHAPTER IV
THE MEDIAEVAL CASTILIANS

From what has been already said concerning the predominant Spanish tendency towards internal separatism and differentiation, it will be readily inferred that the task of portraying the social, constitutional, and economic condition of the Iberian Peninsula at the close of the Middle Ages is unusually difficult and complex. The only generalization which can be made with absolute accuracy is that generalization is impossible. In every realm of life diversity and variety are the invariably conspicuous facts. There are, in the first place, innumerable lines of cleavage between the two great component parts of Spain—between Castile on the west, and the realms of the Crown of Aragon on the east. In their aims and ideals, in the character and aspirations of their inhabitants, in their social, institutional, and economic life, the two kingdoms were utterly divergent. Then again, within each of the two realms the process of differentiation continues, until the student finds himself confronted with a vast number of apparently unrelated petty units—social, geographical, institutional, and economic. Indeed the process goes so far that the units ultimately become almost indistinguishable from individuals. Another kindred fact which greatly enhances the difficulty of our problem, particularly in Castile, is the wide gulf which separated theory from practice. To read in Las Siete Partidas one might imagine that the mediaeval Castilian government was an effective royal absolutism, tempered perhaps by an unusually large measure of democratic power in municipal affairs, and of popular participation in the Cortes. As a matter of fact, both king and third estate were practically dominated by the rebel aristocracy during most of the two centuries previous to the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella—that is, during the period when the institutional development of the realm made its most rapid strides. In other words, the character of the subject before us does not lend itself to the summarized treatment prescribed for a book which attempts to cover as wide a field as does this. Abridgment, though necessary, is even more than usually likely to give rise to misconceptions.

Let us begin our inquiry by taking up the different ranks and classes of which mediaeval Castilian society was composed, and the conditions under which they occupied the land.

Next below the king, whose positions and powers may best be described in another place, there come, first of all, the nobles. As a class they had inherited high traditions of independence and power from later Visigothic days. Throughout the age of the Reconquest they had improved the various periods of weakness of the monarchy to intrench themselves firmly in the enjoyment of their innumerable privileges and immunities; and in the period just previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings they reached the summit of their power. Neither sovereign above, nor burgess below could withstand them; and they made the continuance of peace and efficient government impossible throughout the land. Of these nobles there were, broadly speaking, three different categories: the ricos hombres, or, as they came to be called in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, grandes; the infanzones or hidalgos; and the Caballeros. Authorities differ widely as to the precise meaning to be attached to these different distinctions, but their divergent conclusions may perhaps be roughly summarized as follows. The title of rico hombre or grande at the head of the list, though it might occasionally be given in recognition of notable services or as a meed of valor, was primarily indicative of ancient and noble lineage ‘beyond the power of the king to confer’. That of hidalgo, on the other hand, though its very name connotes distinguished ancestry, came gradually to be granted as a reward of merit, or of wealth, and was sold so frequently by the crown as to lose its original significance, and to become the broad general term most frequently used to indicate the rank and file of the Castilian aristocracy. The title of Caballero also, though it was at first only applied to men of noble birth, was afterwards conferred on chosen warriors who went forth to fight equipped with arms and a horse at their own expense—thus indicating how from an early date the career of a soldier was held to be a sure road to social distinction in Castile. Along with these general categories, the special titles of duke and count make their appearance in the twelfth century, and that of marquis in the fourteenth. The first two were of Visigothic origin and were revived after a period of temporary desuetude by Henry II and Alfonso XI; that of marquis was granted for the first time by Henry II. Recipients of these dignities, though often deficient in ancientness and nobility of lineage, were for all practical purposes on a par with the ricos hombres or grandee. The hereditary character of these last three titles was only gradually established;
originally they were held for the lifetime of the recipient, and the remembrance of that fact not infrequently enabled later kings on flimsy pretexts to revoke hastily granted donations and to interrupt lineal successions.

We pass from these different grades to the privileges which they conferred. All the rank and file of the Castilian aristocracy held themselves to be generally exempt from direct taxation; from imprisonment or seizure of property for debt; from derogatory punishment such as chastisement with rods or death by the hangman; and save in cases of treason and a few other exceptional crimes from torture. In theory they were preferred over the burgesses in the distribution of offices and other royal favors; they had a separate place in processions; and, if arrested, they were confined in a separate prison. They all were entitled to the riepto and desafio, that is, to the right to avenge an injury or insult and to prove their valor in a formal judicial duel in the presence of the king and twelve of their peers. But the special privileges inherent in the upper ranks of this curiously subdivided baronage go much further still. The rico hombre, at the head of the list, could display a standard and a cauldron, as emblems of his cherished right to raise and maintain an army at his own expense. He had the undoubted prerogative of renouncing his obedience to his king and sovereign without further ceremony than sending a follower to make declaration thereof as follows: “Sir, for so and so I kiss your hand, and from henceforth he is no longer your vassal”. He possessed, theoretically at least, an important place in the royal councils; he could remain seated and retain his hat in the royal presence; when he entered the royal chamber the queen rose to receive him. Within his own domains he often exercised criminal and civil jurisdiction; saving always the high justice of the king he levied taxes, and even granted fueros, which were usually confirmed by the crown; in some cases the royal officers were forbidden to enter his lands to collect revenue, punish criminals, or attach their goods. Next below him, the hidalgo was considerably less fortunate, especially in the measure of his authority and jurisdiction within his own estates; and the caballeros in turn lacked much which the hidalgos possessed. Still, taken as a whole, it is impossible to deny that the Castilian aristocracy was possessed of privileges thoroughly incompatible with orderly or centralized government and inimical to the best interests of the state. The strange jumble of the trivial and the important in this long list of baronial prerogatives is particularly significant. It shows that the Castilian nobles could not distinguish the form from the substance of power, and that they knew not how to make a modest use of their liberties; it indicates little political sagacity, but unlimited amour propre. Yet it would be an error to regard them as totally deficient in good qualities.

They certainly formed the backbone of the Castilian armies in the great struggle of the Reconquest, to which the hidalgos proudly boasted that they went of their own free will, at the invitation and not at the orders of the crown. They kept alive more than anyone else the military qualities of the Castilian nation, and the high traditions of the profession of arms. If they were a constant menace to their sovereign at home, they were to prove exceedingly valuable in winning new realms for him abroad, in the age of imperial expansion which was so soon to come.

In other countries of mediaeval Europe we are accustomed to attribute the excessive power of the nobles to the opportunities afforded them by the feudal structure of society; it may, therefore, seem difficult to reconcile the extraordinary rights and privileges of the aristocracy of Castile which we have just enumerated with the fact that there was never a fully developed feudal system there. Local conditions—particularly the constantly shifting boundary and the agricultural poverty of the Meseta—were distinctly unfavorable to it: “Castile yielded to the current that pushed the world towards feudalism indeed, but did not abandon herself to it”. Like Anglo-Saxon England, she possessed “much feudalism but no feudal system”. For the act of alienating land by lord to vassal was not regularly accompanied in mediaeval Castile by the setting up of the same complicated array of reciprocal rights and obligations by which, under a thoroughly organized feudal system, the two parties to the bargain were almost inextricably bound together. The process here was, in theory at least, much more simple. Ownership as a general rule was granted fully and unreservedly with land, but the crown usually managed to avoid the alienation of political authority with it; so that the vassal was seldom legally entitled to anything like the same measure of jurisdiction over the inhabitants of his domains that he would have had in a thoroughly feudal country like France. To this latter rule there are of course numerous exceptions. The various rights granted to the ricos hombres, as described in the preceding paragraph, show that the monarchy occasionally permitted its greatest vassals to exercise powers on their own estates which were wholly incompatible with the maintenance of effective political authority in the hands of the crown. A few instances have even been found in Castile of conditions which possibly justify the statement that the only difference between feudalism there and in other countries is a difference in quantity, not in quality. But it is scarcely fair to argue from special cases such as these. As a general rule the ties that united suzerain and vassal in mediaeval Castile were much too loose and too impermanent to be comparable with those created by a full-fledged feudal system. They could be broken, as we have
already seen, at the shortest possible notice. There was no feudal hierarchy. On the basis of the powers which they possessed under the codes, the Castilian aristocracy should have been far less turbulent and troublesome for the central government than the nobles of a country where feudalism was firmly established; it was only the weakness and lack of statesmanship of the majority of the monarchs that permitted the magnates to usurp authority and privileges to which they had no just title, and thus to become a menace to all law and order in the land. Moreover, the evil increased after the middle of the thirteenth century, at the very moment when with the gradual breakup of feudalism in Western Europe it began elsewhere to diminish. There are two chief reasons for this. In the first place the slackening tide of the Reconquest deprived the barons of an outlet for their restless energies in foreign war, and thus increased their proneness to internal revolt. In the second, the power of the aristocracy was enormously enhanced by the institution in the reign of Alfonso X of the mayorazgos or great entails estates. Originally, like their monarchs above them, the nobles had weakened themselves by dividing their domains among their children. Now at last they had perceived their error, and by establishing the principle of primogeniture they handed on their lands undiminished to their heirs, thus perpetuating from generation to generation all the various powers and prerogatives which inevitably went with them.

Next after the nobles come, of course, the clergy, whose valuable services in preaching and supporting the crusade against the Moors as a sacred duty obligatory to all had been rewarded since the earliest days of the Reconquest by numerous grants and privileges. Like the nobles, they were exempt from the payment of regular taxes; in fact, there were certain local levies to which the nobles contributed which the clergy refused to pay. Many of the other privileges of hidalguía, such as immunity from certain penalties, or the right to the sum of fifteen hundred sueldos as an indemnity for a blow, were conferred on different groups of clerics at different times by different kings. Often these privileges were gradually extended so as to be enjoyed not merely by their original recipients, but also by their servants, dependents, and relatives. Meantime the landed possessions and personal property of the clerics increased by leaps and bounds. They were the beneficiaries not only of the royal munificence, but of that of every other estate in the realm as well. Many of the bishops became virtually kings in the territories immediately adjacent to their sees, for the monarchs deliberately divested themselves of their sovereign rights in their favor, and even suffered the episcopal power to extend to the maintenance of special armies to defend the ecclesiastical lands against attacks from neighboring nobles and foreign foes. There can be no doubt that the church rendered numerous services—economic and administrative, as well as military and religious—in return for the privileges which it received from the government. There are constant references in the charters and chronicles of the early periods of the Reconquest to the skill and energy of the clergy in reclaiming the devastated lands, and in tilling the arid soil of the Meseta. But the very fact that the interests of the clerics had become so miscellaneous necessarily encroached upon their ecclesiastical activities, and, as time went on, considerably diminished their prestige in the eyes of the mass of the people; certainly their wealth, power, and luxury were a constant source of complaint from the Cortes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A large portion of the laymen, however, preferred to accept the situation as it was, and if possible to make capital out of it for themselves. So valuable was the possession of ecclesiastical privilege from a purely mundane point of view, that many essentially non clerical persons obtained admission to the ranks of the churchmen, and then, having secured to themselves all the rights and immunities inherent in that status, continued to devote themselves to business, law, and even to the occupations of mountebank and buffoon, thus bringing into contempt and disrepute the sacred calling which they had outwardly embraced.

The ecclesiastical hierarchy of archbishops, bishops, and their subordinates was substantially the same in Castile as in other Western European lands. As elsewhere, too, there was a prolonged contest between king and clergy over their respective shares in the important matter of ecclesiastical appointments; and in the early fourteenth century this struggle became three-cornered through the papal claim to the right to ‘provide’ to certain benefices—a pretension which was resented the more in that it was usually exercised in favor of foreigners, “to the great prejudice of our people and the common weal”. The Cortes made vigorous complaints against this practice, which naturally increased apace during the period of the Babylonian Captivity and the Schism, but the monarchs failed effectively to press the national cause at the papal curia. The matter remained in an unsettled and highly unsatisfactory condition down to the accession of the Catholic Kings.

The members of the great orders of military knighthood demanded for themselves the privileges of the clergy and of the aristocracy as well. The ever-present necessity of driving back the Moor rendered the soil of mediaeval Spain particularly favorable to the growth and progress of these institutions: some
of which were indigenous, while others, like the Templars and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, were merely branches of orders which had been instituted abroad. Those of purely Castilian origin were three in number. The oldest was that of Calatrava, founded in 1158 and confirmed by the Pope in 1164, in celebration of the fact that certain soldier monks had successfully defended the town and fortress of that name, which the Templars had been unable to hold against the Almohades. The beginnings of the order of Santiago are more obscure; despite the fact that it disputed the priority of that of Calatrava, there seems no question that its formal establishment must be placed at least a decade later. It apparently arrogated to itself the special duty and privilege of protecting the pilgrims who journeyed to the shrine of Compostela. The order of Alcántara originated in an attempt of Ferdinand II of Leon to introduce that of Calatrava (which was founded in Castile) within his own realm. The members of the new branch, however, were unable to endure the idea of subjection to a body which originated in another state; and before long they obtained from Lucius III (in 1183) the privilege of complete independence, and adopted the name of the town of Alcántara, which the king of Leon had conferred on them as their headquarters. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century these orders did noble service against the Moors and were rewarded by a constant stream of privileges and dignities and donations in money and land, by dint of which they were able to constitute themselves veritable regna in regno. But the coincidence of this immense accretion of wealth and power with the virtual cessation of the crusading work which they had been called into existence to perform subsequently converted them into a grievous menace to the state. They exchanged the high ideals of their earlier days for the selfish ambitions characteristic of the mass of the Castilian aristocracy; and their power and the extent of their lands made them a rallying point for malcontents. The extinction of the Templars in Castile in 1312—sequel and counterpart of their abolition four years previously in France—was indubitably a heavy blow to the morale of the other orders, whose internal discipline and condition deteriorated rapidly in the succeeding years. They had in fact outlived their usefulness and were devoting their energies to unworthy ends. The grand master of each one of them was a serious rival to the monarchy; a combination of them all might conceivably overthrow it. One of the very first measures adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella to bring order out of chaos, and to cause a strong central government to prevail in the land, was to terminate the independence of these ancient and powerful institutions.

We now turn from the upper ranks of society to the middle and lower classes. These were subdivided, like every group of the population of Castile, into a bewildering number of different categories and varieties, but for our purposes it will be most convenient to classify and consider them under two main heads—rural and urban.

The conditions of the rural portion of the third estate were largely moulded, like those of the clergy and baronage, by the peculiar circumstances of the war of the Reconquest. The repopulating of the devastated lands, as the Christians gradually advanced to the southward, constituted a most difficult problem, and reacted on the whole unfavorably upon the enfranchisement of the lower classes; for the dangers of living in a spot exposed to Moorish attack were so obvious and imminent that few could be induced to settle there without the promise of protection from nobles or king. Protection would not be accorded without demanding service in return; so that the mass of the agricultural population remained in varying degrees of slavery, semi-slavery, or dependence upon the magnates as the price of the latter’s support. Down to the end of the twelfth century, at least, they not unnaturally considered their safety first, to the detriment of their aspirations towards liberty. Gradually there emerged, however, groups of men who were willing to settle in dangerous territory in return for a larger measure of autonomy. They were by no means ready as yet entirely to dispense with royal or baronial protection, but they demanded at least the privilege of selecting their own lord. Thus originated the benefactoria or behetrias, as they were called, of which there were two kinds—the behetrias de linaje or de entiere parientes, which were obliged to choose their protector from the members of one family, and the behetrias de mar, which could select him anywhere within the boundaries of the realm. The latter, if the master that they had chosen failed to give satisfaction, had the right to change him, and even to repeat this process “up to seven times in one day”. Below these were the various grades of the tierras de señorío. The cultivadores libres paid tribute to the king or one of the great feudal lords, in return for the permission to till a portion of their territories and make their living thereon; they might abandon their master if they chose to do so but lost their lands in consequence. The serfs below them were subdivided into various minor categories. They enjoyed some personal rights and privileges, but, generally speaking, were adscripti glebæ—that is, inseparable, either by their own volition or the act of their masters, from the land on which they worked. The slave at the bottom of the social structure could hold no property of any kind; but his master, even in the darkest periods, was not entirely absolved from responsibility for the elementary needs of his existence.
Such in brief was the very complicated situation which obtained among the lower and middle classes on the agricultural lands in the period of the height of the Reconquest. In the last two centuries before the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella, however, numerous changes and improvements had occurred. In the first place, a general movement of emancipation of the slaves had taken place; the influence of the church, the increasing need of free men to repopulate the conquered lands, the efforts of the slaves themselves, and the fact that the cities almost invariably granted aid and protection to fugitives, combined to bring about this happy result. Save for captives taken in the Moorish wars, or in expeditions to unknown lands like the Canaries, there was probably no one left in fifteenth-century Castile who had not succeeded in winning complete personal freedom; so that slavery in the full sense of the term had virtually ceased to exist there. Moreover, the lot of the solariegos or serfs improved immensely at the same time. Both economically and socially their condition was generally ameliorated by (1) the increasingly strict definition and limitation of the tributes due from them to their masters, (2) the loosening of the ties which bound them to the land on which they worked, and (3) the frequent recognition of their right to many without their lords’ consent. It is, however, even more dangerous than usual to lay down any general rules in this matter; and we must not for one moment imagine that the privileges just mentioned attained anything approaching universal application. In the fourteenth century, when there are numerous evidences of a reactionary movement, it was maintained in certain districts of Castile, notwithstanding all laws to the contrary, that the lord “had the right to take the body of his serf and all that he has in the world”. But certainly the status of the servile classes in Castile during this period was distinctly preferable to that of the corresponding portion of the population in Aragon, as will be more apparent in subsequent pages. The most salient characteristic of the mediaeval Castilian has often been described as impatience of restraint and desire to shake off all authority. As strong government impossible. It may, however, be plausibly argued that lower down in the scale it manifested in the upper ranks of society, this trait was productive of many evils, and rendered order and administrative efficiency impossible. It may, however, be plausibly argued that lower down in the scale it engendered aspirations towards liberty, which survived the absolutism of the Hapsburgs and the early Bourbons, and proved the salvation of the national fortunes in a later age. Meantime, while the emancipation of the lower orders had been progressing, the condition of the inhabitants of the behetrias tended to deteriorate. No more striking example could be desired of the wild confusion of titles and jurisdictions which characterized land tenure in mediaeval Castile than that afforded by the situation in these holdings in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The unrestricted right of the behetrias de mar to change and choose their protectors at their own discretion gave rise to numerous dissensions and clashes. In the behetrias de linage the rights and privileges of the overlord were often divided up among the different members of his family, so that, instead of one master, the behetria not seldom had three or four. When the king intervened to remedy these difficulties, the usual result of his efforts was to add himself to the already excessive number of suzerains which he was attempting to diminish. Manifold difficulties also resulted from the fact that many pueblos de solariego, or groups of serfs, attempted to convert themselves into behetrias, or at least to seek annexation to them, thus rendering confusion worse confounded. The Becerro de las Behetrias—a sort of Domesday Book of the time of Pedro the Cruel—describes this curious network of conflicting rights and jurisdictions in great detail. Certainly things had reached such a pass that reform was quite impossible. Nothing short of abolition by royal command, or extinction through internal decadence, could really remedy the situation which had come into being. It was the second of these two possibilities that actually occurred. The prevailing anarchy and confusion of the period immediately preceding the accession of the Catholic Kings made protection more desirable than autonomy, and the nobler aspirations of earlier days sank temporarily into the background. The comparative freedom of the behetrias was no longer attractive, and we find constant petitions from their inhabitants to be converted into pueblos de solariego. The close of the Middle Ages, then, saw a meeting of the extremes of the long list of categories into which the bulk of the agricultural population had in previous centuries been divided. A general levelling and simplifying process had in fact taken place, from which the large majority of the persons concerned had unquestionably derived advantage. The situation, however, in this as in other matters was far from satisfactory, and was bound to remain so until the overpowerful magnates were curbed and prevented from transgressing the laws of the land.

Far more interesting and important than the development of the agricultural communities is that of the Castilian cities. We have already seen that the natural conditions of the Iberian Peninsula favored the tendency to concentrate in urban communities. In Roman and in Visigothic days the cities had attained a high degree of importance—the constant state of war contributing still further to foster the natural inclination of the population to seek safety by gathering together behind fortified walls. Whether the constitution of the mediaeval Spanish municipality can be directly traced back to Roman or even to Visigothic days is perhaps the most eagerly debated question in mediaeval Spanish history. Whatever
the final verdict on the question of lineal descent may be, we cannot doubt that the high traditions of
municipal organization inherited by the mediaeval Castilian from his predecessors favored the evolution
of a type of urban constitution which, at its height, gave scope to all that was highest and best in the
political life of the time.

Before proceeding further in our consideration of the Castilian municipalities, we must pause to
explain some of the principal meanings of a word which one encounters in every phase of mediaeval
Spanish history—namely, the term fuero. It is descended from the Latin forum, one of whose meanings
is a tribunal or court, but in Spanish its primary significance is a constitution or code of laws. A fuero,
however, was quite as frequently a law of special as of general application; the Fuero Viejo, for
instance, purported to be a code of privileges of the aristocracy. More often still, a fuero might be
granted to the inhabitants of a certain locality, and thus become, in effect, a constitution or set of
privileges for that particular spot, which the inhabitants invariably defended with the utmost resolution,
down to the minutest detail, against encroachment by crown or magnates, in spite of the fact that it was
often in manifest contradiction to the provisions of the general law of the land. The number and variety
of these local fueros which were given out at different times by different sovereigns, and also, through
deleagated or usurped authority, by the greater lords and higher clergy, was probably the most fruitful
cause of the social and constitutional diversity of mediaeval Castile. Though not infrequently granted to
rural communities, they were principally employed to encourage the founding of cities, and it is in that
connection that we have to consider them here.

The problem of repeopling the conquered lands was in reality far more urban than rural. The
boundaries were continually shifting; land which had been captured one day, was likely to be raided and
possibly recaptured by the enemy the next. The ‘neutral zone’ between the rival forces could not
possibly be occupied by a scattered and consequently defenceless agricultural population; it was
essential for those who ventured to take possession of it to concentrate and intrench themselves in
compact groups—in other words, to found cities. Even with this precaution, the sovereigns had to offer
strong inducements to persuade their subjects to settle in these outposts of Christendom; and the
most obvious of these inducements was to grant to them, as to the agricultural communities which
followed on behind, a considerable measure of autonomy in return for the risks which they ran.
Consequently, the fueros, constitutions, or charters of the newly founded Castilian cities contained from
the very first a greater or lesser number of concessions of the right of self-government. The sovereign
voluntarily divested himself in their favor of certain political and judicial powers which normally
belonged only to the crown. The measure of their autonomy was obviously, ceteris paribus, the degree
to which the position which they occupied was exposed; and the terms of their different fueros varied,
in general, accordingly. At first the diversity of these fueros was absolutely unchecked; there was a new
constitution for each new town; but they all had certain features in common, and as time went on it
became the practice to make increasingly frequent use of certain model charters—to grant to a newly
founded municipality, for example, the Fuero of Leon or of Sepulveda—and thus, in some small
measure at least, to standardize the methods of local government. Variety rather than homogeneity was
doubtless still the rule; but there is at least a sufficient degree of family resemblance between the
various municipal constitutions to warrant an attempt to summarize their most striking features.

Almost all the municipal fueros began by granting the inhabitants the right to form a general
assembly, concilium or concejo. It was ordinarily composed of the vecinos—heads of families or
property owners—and often included many who resided outside of the city walls, for the territory
covered by the fuero usually extended some distance into the surrounding country. In this essentially
democratic body the chief municipal officers were annually chosen. The methods of their selection
varied widely. What we should now call a ‘free election’ did not invariably prevail even in the most
flourishing periods of municipal independence. Ancient local and aristocratic privileges had often to
be considered, and a fondness for drawing lots and for a system of rotation in office manifested itself at
an early date; still we may fairly say that the municipal magistrates were invested with their several
offices under the auspices of the popular assembly, which could thus justly claim for itself the supreme
local authority within the town. Of these magistrates the following were the most important. The
regidores, whose numbers varied from eight to thirty-six, were general administrative officials, whose
duty it was to oversee and give advice concerning the management of municipal affairs. They were
usually drawn in equal numbers from the ranks of the burgesses and of the Caballeros. The municipal
alcaldes were judges with criminal and civil jurisdiction, and usually fell into two
categories—maiores and ordina rios. Some cities had two, others four, six, or even ten. The alguacil
was a police officer or bailiff; the alguacil mayor led the municipal levies in war; the alferez carried the
standard. The term fieles was used to describe minor functionaries with various duties who acted as
secretaries of the concejo, as inspectors of weights and measures (fieles almotacenes), or as
superintendents of the public lands and properties of the municipality; sometimes they were employed
to prevent merchants from charging excessive prices for the necessaries of life. The alarifes took charge
of the erection and preservation of the municipal buildings, and of the status of the workmen employed
thereon; andadores and mensajeros carried messages for the concejo: and veladores kept watch over
the city at night. The whole body of these local municipal magistrates, selected in the concejo and
exercising their functions in its name, was generally known as the ayuntamiento.

But the powers of the concejos did not cease with the appointment of the principal municipal
officers. Regulations for the internal administration of the city, for the raising and collection of its
revenue (which was derived from contributions in money and in labor, from fines, and from the income
of public lands), for the policing of the streets, for the management of the municipal food supply, and
for the punishment of minor delinquents, etc., etc., emanated in the first instance from the general
assembly of the citizens. The concejo, in other words, both laid down the lines on which the city should
be governed and appointed the magistrates who were charged with the execution of its will.

Questions of external, as well as of internal policy were also frequently submitted to it, such as whether
or not the city should send its levies on a raid into Moorish territory, or wage war on some overpowerful
baron. Some of the Cantabrian cities even went so far as to intervene on their own initiative, without
sanction of the central government, in the desultory struggle between France and England during the
first half of the thirteenth century; on one occasion their boldness in seizing English ships evoked a
vigorous claim for reparation from King Henry III to St. Ferdinand. Finally, the concejos enjoyed, in
theory, at least, the right to elect the procuradores or municipal representatives to the brazo popular or
third estate in the Cortes; though we shall later find that here, as in the case of the local magistrates, the
methods of choice were too various to permit the full realization of this privilege.

We have here all the appurtenances of a thoroughly democratic regime, and from the middle of the
twelfth to the middle of the fourteenth century, when the development just outlined attained its climax,
the vigor and liberty of the municipal government of Castile was probably unsurpassed anywhere in
Western Europe. Even after the virtual accomplishment of the Reconquest had freed the monarchy from
the necessity of seeking the alliance of the cities as outposts in the campaign against the infidel,
the value of their friendship in the internal struggle against the turbulent nobles was at once perceived
by all the ablest kings. The advice of James the Conqueror to Alfonso the Learned, to court the favor of
the municipalities, embodied one of the best recognized principles of strong monarchical government.

Fears lest the aspirations of the Castilian cities for democracy and autonomy might someday prove a bar
to the progress of the power of the crown, were on the whole far exceeded by the dread of the
overweening ambitions of the aristocracy which threatened both. Parcere subjectis et debellare
superbos was the motto of the monarchy, though it was not always carried out; and the confidence
and favor of the crown were often rewarded by the cities undertaking on their own initiative to aid it in
suppressing the outbreaks of their common foe. When the days of monarchical absolutism arrived and
the nobles were crushed, the triumphant kingship avoided the danger of democratic opposition by a
clever utilization of the ever-potent forces of Spanish separatism. But that is another story, which does
not for the moment concern us. During the period at present under review, royal favor and Spanish
impatience of restraint combined to give the Castilian cities a measure of independence and self-
government which goes far to justify the claim that Spain was in some respects the most democratic
country in mediaeval Europe. Her democracy was, of course, rather local than national in its scope.
It manifested itself in characteristically various ways, not only in the different kingdoms of the
peninsula, but also in the different parts of each of those kingdoms and could not make itself fully felt
as a national ideal for many centuries to come. No one, however, can study the history of the Castilian
municipality without recognizing the high character of the spirit with which it was animated. On the
walls of the great staircase of the town hall at Toledo, the visitor may still read the lines of a fifteenth
century Castilian poet, Gomez Manrique, which express a lofty conception of the duties of a municipal
magistrate:

“Nobles discretos varones
Que goberñas en Toledo
En estos escalones
Desechad las aficiones
Codicias, amor y miedo.
Por los comunes provechos
Dejad los particulares

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Pues Dios os hizo titulares
De riquísimos techos
Estad firmes y derechos”

Modern democracy cannot fail to be stirred by admiration and sympathy for the ideal which these words proclaim.

One of the most significant proofs of the power and prestige of the Castilian municipalities is afforded by the hermandades or brotherhoods which they formed for the maintenance of their privileges and the law of the land. Faint traces of such organizations are discernible in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but it is at the end of the reign of Alfonso X that they first emerge as an important factor in the life of the state. In 1282, at the height of the successional struggle between the Scholar King and his rebellious son, an association of the cities of the kingdom of Leon was formed at the instigation of the latter to help him dethrone his father. Two years later, on discovering that the evils of the time had been rather increased than diminished by the change of rulers, the league which Sancho had called into existence reversed its policy and directed its efforts against him. This hermandad of 1282, however, differs from those which followed it in two respects. In the first place, it was formed, not spontaneously, but as a result of a plot of the pretender to the throne of Castile; in the second, it was avowedly anti-royal in its aims. A hermandad which was created by the cities of Castile in a meeting at Burgos in the first year of the reign of Ferdinand IV was, however, much more typical. It was a voluntary association of the representatives of the different municipalities, who, recognizing the dangers of a royal minority, banded themselves together “for the honor and security of the king and his successor and for the honor and safety of the land”; and another hermandad of the towns of Leon and Galicia, which was formed simultaneously at Valladolid, proclaimed the same intentions. Both of them pledged themselves to protect the lives and property of their members, to maintain justice, and to prevent illegal taxation. Their constitutions were solemnly confirmed by the king in 1295 and again in 1297. But it is clear that they were not intended to be in any sense permanent. After having tided over the crisis which had evoked them, it was expected that they would cease to exist. Each one had a central deliberative assembly of the representatives of the different cities that composed it, to decide on its method of action. Its expenses were defrayed from a common fund; its letters were dispatched under a common seal. Other smaller hermandades appeared in the same period in Murcia, Cuenca, and elsewhere, for purposes similar to those of Leon and Castile, and there were also special ones with definite objects of local and particular interest. Among these may be mentioned the famous Hermandad de las Marismas, composed of the principal towns on or near the Biscayan coast, which had been given special privileges since the time of Archbishop Diego Gelmires to stimulate their interest in naval affairs. In this region the tradition of autonomy and independence was so strong that the Hermandad de las Marismas could not help being affected by it. Its members refused to trade with the interior of Castile, if their local privileges were not observed; it inaugurated what amounted to a separate independent foreign and commercial policy of its own with Portugal, France, and England, and it sent its own representatives to deal with these countries.

We are, however, principally interested in the larger and more general hermandades whose primary object was the maintenance of law and order in the realm, and which consequently tended to gravitate towards the monarchy, as the symbol of the governance which Castile so sadly lacked. The long minority of Alfonso XI gave them an admirable opportunity to demonstrate their usefulness. When a new hermandad, including “Leon, Castile, Toledo, and Estremadura”, was formed in the Cortes of Burgos in 1315, the regent, Maria de Molina, made haste to confirm it, as the best possible means of strengthening the throne. In the century that elapsed between the accession of Pedro the Cruel and the death of John II, the hermandades were much less conspicuous. The frequent meetings of the Cortes during this period gave the municipal representatives of the cities a better opportunity than they had previously enjoyed of laying their demands before the king; moreover, the sovereigns of the time, though they did not cease to recognize the value of the hermandades in cases of special stress and emergency, had also begun to realize that if suffered to establish themselves permanently they might ultimately be converted into a menace to the royal power. The fact that similar associations of nobles and magnates for less patriotic purposes had already begun to make their appearance furnished an additional cause for the misgivings of the crown. During the reign of Henry IV, the hermandades again emerged into great prominence, but we can more conveniently consider their development under that monarch in connection with the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella.

The diminished importance of the hermandades which is observable after the middle of the fourteenth century is accompanied by the beginnings of decay in the internal government of the cities
that composed them. Royal interference and desire to control, which had adversely affected the
development of the one, were also the obvious and immediate causes of the contemporaneous decline
of the other; but it is a nice question how far the king’s meddling in the internal affairs of the
municipalities was caused by his dissatisfaction with the rule of the concejos, and how far by his fear
that unless the crown stepped in to protect and control them the city governments ran grave danger of
being subjected to the domination of the rebel baronage. The constant complaints in the proceedings
of the Cortes of violent internal upheavals within the city walls seem at first to lend color to the belief
that the progress of municipal liberty had outrun administrative order; but when one comes to look
beneath the surface, one finds that most of these broils were rather the result of baronial incursions and
ancient family feuds than of any abuse of their privileges by the concejos. The fact that many of the
cities petitioned the crown for cartas forbidding the nobles to enter their domains is also significant and
indicates that many of the municipal revolts were but a by-product of the excessive powers of the
aristocracy.

Whatever the cause of their action, the Castilian sovereigns, from Alfonso XI downward, did their
utmost to undermine the independence of the cities of their realms. From open violations of the fueros,
the wiser of them shrunk. They preferred to work by stealth whenever possible; but their principal
methods of operation are reasonably clear. The most important was unquestionably the institution of the
concejos, royally appointed officials sent down to the concejos to cooperate with, and ultimately to
supersede, the locally elected magistrates; as these magistrates, however, were primarily representatives
of the central administration, they can most conveniently be considered in connection with it. But the
changes which were effected within the municipalities are almost as notable as the authorities which
were superimposed upon them from without. On all sides we have evidence that the cases of free and
open annual election to offices by the concejo steadily diminished. Life tenures, royal appointments,
and declarations of the hereditary character of this or that function are encountered with increasing
frequency. When the sovereign found that a city obstinately refused to permit the abrogation of the
traditional methods of election of existing magistrates, a host of new positions were often created, and
their holders, invariably royal appointees, gradually elbowed aside their municipally elected
colleagues. Multiplication of officials and great increase of the funds that had to be raised to pay their
salaries are accompanying phenomena of this method of procedure. In the reign of John II occurs the
first case of the sale of a municipal post by the crown as a means of replenishing the royal treasury, an
event the significance of which it is unnecessary to emphasize. And royal interference extended to other
things than the appointment of city mayors. Sometimes all the local ordinances of the concejo for
the government of the city were so radically reformed by the royal minions as to retain little or nothing
of their original meaning. The concejos in fact had little left to do. All the real power had passed from
their hands into those of the ayuntamiento of officials, which now no longer represented the voting
body of the inhabitants. Small wonder if the ancient municipal traditions were forgotten and the spirit of
the earlier centuries died away. Doubtless the cities themselves were much to blame. The early fifteenth
century is in every respect a dark period in the history of Castile, and even if the crown had left them
alone, it is doubtful whether the municipalities could have preserved their ancient ideals intact in view
of the universal deterioration which was in progress all around them. But their decadence was certainly
accelerated by royal intervention; for though the king’s interference may have been helpful at the outset,
as a means of protection against baronial control, it ultimately served to undermine the foundations of
the finest and freest life in mediaeval Castile. The complaints of the Cortes of John II and Henry IV
concerning the infringement of the ancient fueros showed that some men realized the meaning of the change
even at that early period; and a century later its results were evident to all.

It must not be forgotten that the nobles and higher clergy, who had been granted or else usurped
the right to issue fueros, founded cities on their own domains as well as the king. These cities never
attained at all the same measure of autonomy as did those which received their charters from the crown,
and their decline in the fifteenth century was considerably more rapid. Hardest of all was the lot of the
town whose lordship was disputed by two hostile magnates. It was invariably a storm center of
disturbance, and its streets frequently ran with the blood of opposing factions.

A few words remain to be said in regard to the status of the two non-Christian portions of the
population of mediaeval Castile—the Jews and the Moors. We have already seen that the Moors who
remained on the territories which had been won for the Cross were treated, down to the close of the
thirteenth century, with a very remarkable degree of tolerance and liberality by their Christian
conquerors; and the same may be said of the Castilian Jews. The reign of Alfonso X marks the
culmination of the prosperity of both races under the sovereignty of the kings of Castile. The Partidas
contain numerous laws describing their rights and privileges. Both races were segregated in special communities (aljamas) surrounded by walls (barrios) in the principal cities, and the Moors, or Mudejares, as they were generally called, were sometimes given exclusive possession of smaller towns, which Christians were forbidden to enter. They retained their local officials, their minor courts, and their law codes; and as the Moors came gradually to forget their native language, their law books were translated into Spanish so as to be available for general use. The Christians were strictly forbidden to vex or oppress them, or to force them into acceptance of baptism; no Jew could be summoned to attend court on Saturdays, nor might his religious observances be interfered with in any other way. The value of both races as economic assets was early recognized. In addition to all the regular taxes, they paid a number of special imposts peculiar to themselves; moreover, the management of the capital and commerce of the realm was in large measure intrusted to them; and many of the royal almojarifes or tax gatherers were Hebrews. Yet on the other hand, even in the time of the Scholar King, the government made every effort to keep both Jews and Moors from consorting with Christians, and to preserve and accentuate the barriers that kept them apart. In addition to their segregation in separate quarters, they were forbidden under pain of heavy penalties to eat, drink, or bathe with Christians, while sexual intercourse between the different races was punished with terrible barbarity. Finally, regulations insisting that the Jews or Moors wear some distinctive dress or badge, or cut their hair in some peculiar fashion, so as to render them easily recognizable, are found throughout the thirteenth century codes, though the records seem to show that the regulations to this effect were by no means universally observed. Precisely what factors combined, and in what proportions, to alter these generally satisfactory conditions for the worse in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is not entirely clear. That the church pointed the way towards persecution is evident; but it is hard to believe that its attempts in that direction would have met with much success, had they not been supplemented by the great jealousy which the wealth and prosperity of the Moors and Jews aroused throughout the length and breadth of Castile. The association of the Jews with the proverbially unpopular occupation of money-lending rendered them particularly obnoxious, and is probably the chief explanation why they suffered so much more acutely than the Mudejares in the century preceding the accession of the Catholic Kings. Against the Moors, indeed, a number of laws were passed to restrict their acquisition of Christian property, to limit the jurisdiction of their tribunals, and even to increase the facilities for their conversion; but it does not seem to have been possible to enforce these regulations, and it is significant of the continuance of friendly relations between the two faiths, that in 1410 the Mudejares of Cordova and Seville had contributed to the expense of the campaign of the Infante Ferdinand against the Granadan outpost of Antequera. There was, moreover, a notable increase of Mudejarism in the third quarter of the fifteenth century during the reign of Henry the Impotent.

With the unfortunate Israelites, however, the situation was very different. An evil tradition of Hebrew persecution inherited from Visigothic days had not been entirely forgotten, and lay hatred was far easier to stimulate against the Jews than against the Moors. In the Cortes of Burgos in 1315 a number of galling restrictions were imposed upon them. All laws permitting usury were revoked, and many of the provisions by which the Jews had been guaranteed fair treatment in the courts were abrogated. Other privileges were successively removed in the following years, and the fact that the ravages of the Black Death were popularly attributed by superstitious persons to the malign influence of the Hebrews served still further to increase the hardness of their lot. Finally, in the reign of John I, ecclesiastical denunciations and appeals to fanaticism and greed had their inevitable effect. Furious crowds entered and sacked the aljamas of the different cities of Castile and massacred hundreds, if not thousands, of the inhabitants; the only sure way to escape death was to submit to compulsory baptism. Thus, emerged the class of so-called Marranos or Conversos—converted Jews, some of whom for a time were not ashamed to lend aid to the Christians against the loyal Hebrews who had refused to abandon the faith of their fathers. By perseverance and efficiency they succeeded in regaining for themselves all the power, wealth, and privileges of which their ancestors had been deprived; but as soon as their position was secured their loyalty to their adopted religion began to waver, so that by the middle of the fifteenth century we find numerous complaints that they were Christians only in name.

How far these complaints were justified by the facts, it is difficult to say. Forced conversions are notoriously insincere, and it is altogether probable that a large proportion of the Conversos secretly yearned for the faith of their fathers. On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that by this time “the hatred which of old had been merely a matter of religion had become a matter of race”. Detestation of the Jew had been so deeply implanted in the heart of the average Castilian that he was very apt to make groundless accusations of apostasy against the objects of his dislike. Sometimes the kings, fearful of the financial effects of attacking the Conversos, feebly attempted to extend to them their protection; but the mass of the population, and the bulk of the grandees, who dominated the royal policy, were
consistently hostile, with the result that there were frequent riots and unpunished murders of the Conversos throughout the reigns of John II and Henry IV. Meantime the professing Jews who had not been killed or exiled and had not sought refuge in baptism to escape from persecution, lived on, sadly reduced in numbers and wealth, till their expulsion by the Catholic Kings. A schedule, drawn up for purposes of taxation in the year 1474, shows that there were only about twelve thousand families of them left in Castile at that time, and that the large revenues which the Jewish communities or aljamas had annually rendered two centuries previously to the Castilian monarchs had by that time dwindled almost to nothing.

The seeds of the evil plant of racial and religious hatred, which was to bear such fearful fruit under Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs, had thus been thoroughly sown in the immediately preceding age. Yet the comparatively liberal and enlightened policy which prevailed in the earlier centuries of the Reconquest should not be forgotten. It shows that the spirit of persecution and intolerance is not a necessary and ineradicable characteristic of the Spaniard, as the modern student is often prone to assume. The fact that the climax of its revival coincided with the age of Spain’s unification and expansion was destined, as will subsequently appear, to cary the Spanish reputation for bigotry and fanaticism to the uttermost parts of the earth; but in this, as in the kindred matter of the religious and crusading enthusiasm of her warriors, there is less real than apparent continuity between the periods of Reconquest and of Empire.
CHAPTER V
THE INSTITUTIONS OF MEDIAEVAL CASTILE

From the different ranks and classes of mediaeval Castilian society we pass to the various organs of the central government, and take up in the first place the king, at the apex of the political structure of the realm.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and afterwards the kingship of Castile was unquestionably hereditary; but certain explanations and amplifications of this apparently simple statement are essential to a full understanding of it. The Visigothic monarchy, from which the Castilian was descended, was partly hereditary and partly elective. Theoretically, indeed, the elective principle was predominant, for though strong men occasionally seized the throne by deeds of violence, and having obtained it, sometimes contrived to hand it on to their descendants, such actions were always recognized to be at variance with the laws of the land. The practice of election, moreover, was continued in the earliest days of the Reconquest in the kingdom of Asturias. The legend that Pelayo was descended from the ancient Visigothic monarchs was merely a subsequent invention to strengthen the title which he had derived from the consent of his people on account of his success in war. On the other hand, we may well believe that the circumstances of the time, especially the pressure of the Moorish war, tended strongly to promote the counter development of the practice, if not the principle, of hereditary succession. The very existence of the little state was so frequently threatened by external dangers that constitutional purism had to yield to the paramount need of the moment the continuity of an efficient executive. Opinions differ widely as to the precise epoch when the practice of hereditary succession can be regarded as definitely established in the kingdom of Leon; but the preponderance of authority tends to favor the reign of Ferdinand I (1037-65), who first united the realms of Leon and Castile. This new method of determining the succession, however, rested as yet on no law or ordinance. The Fuero Juzgo, which remained valid down to the time of Alfonso X, upheld, in theory at least, the elective principle. It was in Las Siete Partidas, for the first time, that a definite law of inheritance of the throne was laid down. This law provided for the succession of all descendants in the direct line, male and female, before collaterals; and though it was transgressed by the succession of Sancho the Bravo in 1284, it was confirmed in the Ordenamiento of Alcalá in 1348, and remained valid thenceforth till the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth century. From the year 1388, when the future Henry III of Castile was betrothed to the daughter of John of Gaunt, the heir of the Castilian throne took the title of Prince of Asturias.

These different declarations and legalizations of the hereditary character of the Castilian succession were fortified with elaborate assertions of the divine origin and right of kingship, and with lengthy disquisitions on the way in which a monarch should be treated and honored by his people. They abound in statements of the rights, powers, and prerogatives inherent in the crown. But enough of the remembrance of the days of elective kingship was preserved to make it impossible accurately to speak of the sovereigns of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Castile as absolute, even in theory, still less as tyrants. There was a distinct understanding that the monarch must not abuse his power; that he must govern according to equity and righteousness. It was perhaps not enough to warrant the statement that there was an actual contract between sovereign and subject, or to justify the deposition of an unjust king; but it was perfectly adequate as a basis of a protest against arbitrary uses of royal power. Various passages in the Partidas show this; particularly noteworthy is the declaration by which the king grants to his people a certain right of inspection of his political conduct, and the privilege of guarding him from evil by word and deed—a privilege which the rebel nobles attempted to utilize for their own selfish advantage in the fifteenth century, thereby evoking an angry protest from the Cortes of Olmedo in 1445. The kingship had become hereditary and the succession fixed before the close of the Middle Ages; the turbulence of the times demanded this as the first and most essential condition of necessary centralization. On the other hand, it was impossible for either subjects or sovereign to forget the past, or the limitations on monarchical absolutism which the days of the elective kingship implied.
Yet it was not chiefly the theoretical restrictions of the royal authority that prevented the strong governance which mediaeval Castile so sadly lacked. The powers with which the Partidas endow the king, if not enough to create a tyranny, are at least sufficient to satisfy the demands of a strong and efficient sovereign. He is there declared to be the chief lawgiver and judge of the land. He is vested with supreme administrative and executive authority; he is the head of the army and the arbiter of the policy of the realm at home and abroad. In at least one place he is conceded the right to dispose of or alienate any portion of his realm at will as if he possessed all its territories in full ownership; for the distinction between the private domain of the monarch (patrimonio privado del rey) and the revenues which came to him as head of the state (patrimonio real) was not always sharply drawn in the mediaeval codes, and their confusion was not seldom utilized by the monarchs to their own temporary advantage, and the ultimate impoverishment of the kingdom. According to the laws of the land, the royal position was quite strong enough; the trouble lay not with the codes, but with the impossibility of enforcing them. Our examination of the narrative history of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Castile has revealed some of the special circumstances which account for the turbulence of the times: the weak character of the monarchs, the numerous minorities and regencies, the prevalence of the trend toward separatism, and above all the conduct of the rebel nobles. But this description needs to be supplemented on the constitutional side before the picture can be regarded as complete. As the king obviously did not exercise in fact the rights with which the law theoretically invested him, it will be necessary for us to take up one by one the organs of the central government and discover what measure of political power (in so far as it was not entirely dissipated by baronial anarchy) was enjoyed by each. In theory they were all created to aid the king in the discharge of his numerous functions, but as time went on, they often used the authority delegated to them not so much to help the sovereign to govern, as to enable themselves to govern in his stead.

Like all the monarchs of mediaeval Europe, the kings of Castile surrounded themselves with a coterie of intimate friends and counsellors, whose titles carry us back to the earlier days when each was assigned some special function in connection with the management of the royal household. Such were the capellán mayor or royal chaplain, the camarero or chamberlain, the aposentador or superintendent of lodgings, the portero or door keeper, the mayor domo or steward, and a host of others. All of them continued, in theory at least, to discharge the duties indicated by their names; they were also entrusted with minor secretarial and administrative offices in connection with the government of the realm. The canciller or chancellor, who was almost invariably a cleric, had charge of the royal correspondence and the promulgation of the royal orders, “so that he represented the living law, and was the faithful guardian of tradition”. His signature or seal was generally required to give validity to the king’s decrees; he was naturally cognizant of all the different branches of the government’s service; a large number of notarios and escribanos aided him in the discharge of his various duties. The adelantado del rey or sobrejuez represented the king in his capacity as supreme judge, when the monarch was unable to serve. He also had the duty of supervising, supporting, and, if necessary, of removing the minor judicial officials of the kingdom. The condestable and almirante, instituted respectively by John I and Ferdinand III, were the heads under the king of the army and navy of Castile; both offices gradually became hereditary, the one in the family of the Velascos, the other in that of Enriquez. The collector of the royal taxes was originally known as the almojarife mayor, but the popular wrath at the frequent conferring of this office on a Jew extorted from Alfonso XI a promise that his revenues should in future be gathered by Christians, and that the collectors should no longer be called almojarifes but tesoreros. Hebrews, nevertheless, were soon appointed to the new office, and it was not long before the tesorero mayor was replaced in turn by a contador de Castilla; under John II there were two of these, and under Henry IV three. The struggle over the incumbency of this high financial position is very significant. The sovereigns strove their hardest to prevent it from following the lead of those of the constable and admiral and becoming a hereditary possession in some baronial family which would infallibly abuse ill; but the tendency of the time was strongly in the other direction, and the royal revenues suffered woefully at the hands of those who administered them in the dark days of the fifteenth century. The kings of Castile were too weak to control even those officials whose duties brought them most closely under the shadow of the throne.

The early development of the Consejo Real or Royal Council next claims our attention. The subject is of the utmost importance, for the Council was to become under Ferdinand and Isabella the principal organ of the central government, and the cornerstone of the great administrative system of Spain and the Spanish Empire.
In Visigothic times, and during the earliest days of the Reconquest, the sovereigns of the different Iberian realms usually sought the advice of counsellors of proved wisdom and sagacity whenever any important political or judicial decision was pending. This was indeed the universal custom in all the states of Western Europe. But there is no evidence of the existence of any permanent body of royal counsellors in that remote period. When the king felt in need of advice, he asked it of those who seemed to him best qualified to give it, but any ‘meetings of counsellors’ which took place were purely accidental in their nature and were composed on each occasion as the monarch should direct. Even the famous doce sabios of the reign of Ferdinand m, in whom Salazar de Mendoza and the learned Padre Andrés Marcos Burriel thought they discerned the origin of the Consejo Real, have now been shorn of that distinction. They were apparently rather a body of scholars who occupied themselves principally with discussions of ethical questions, and definitions of “loyalty, covetousness, generosity, piety, and justice”, and the office which they held was but temporary. The King’s Council had not yet attained definite existence. Its functions were still fulfilled by a vague, accidental, amorphous body of advisers, composed and summoned at the royal will.

The century that followed the reign of St. Ferdinand saw the Consejo emerge on firmer ground. The creation by Alfonso X of a central tribunal, or royal court, relieved it of a large share of its judicial functions, and enabled it to concentrate its attention on political affairs. Legists and hombres buenos from the third estate were summoned with increasing frequency in this period to take their places beside the magnates; their ‘approximation’, as Torréanaz cautiously terms it, to the Royal Council coincides with their advent to power in the Cortes’ The long periods of royal minorities in the fourteenth century were also highly favorable to the increase of the power and permanence of the Consejo, and to the development of the representativeness of its membership. During the minority of Ferdinand IV, his mother, Dona Maria, turned to the cities for help, in order to counteract the influence of the Haros and of the Laras in the government; and accordingly those of the cities gave her twelve hombres buenos to serve and advise the king and his guardians in matters of justice, finance, and all other affairs of the land. The phrase in the cuaderno is far too vague for us to estimate with any certainty the method by which these ‘good men’ were chosen; but it seems fair to assume that the inhabitants of the municipalities had a considerable share in selecting them. In the early years of the reign of Alfonso XI, moreover, while the king was yet a child, we find the government being carried on with the advice of four prelates and sixteen caballeros and hombres buenos, “without whose consent nothing might be done”. Apparently these sixteen were chosen on a basis of geographical distribution—four from each of the four quarters of the realm; and a similar method of procedure was adopted by Henry of Trastamara during the stormiest period of his struggle with Don Pedro. When normal times returned, however, the sovereigns continued to choose their advisers, as in earlier days, irregularly, occasionally, and at their own discretion, so that the body of royal counsellors lost much of the stability that it had gained during royal minorities and in the days of civil war.

It was in the reign of John I that the Royal Council became established for the first time on a definite and permanent footing; indeed that sovereign merits the title of the founder of the institution. On his departure in 1385 for the invasion of Portugal, which ended so disastrously at Aljubarrota, he put forth a sort of political testament, in which he stated that “the most necessary of all things is to have a great and good council composed of all sorts of persons, especially of those who bear the burden of the charges and good government of the realm”. After his defeat on the field of battle, he returned to Castile and began to give effect to this proposal, by creating in the Cortes of Valladolid (December 1, 1385) a Council composed of twelve persons—four prelates, four nobles, and four citizens—all of whom were named in the royal ordinance. All traces of any principles of popular election or representation of geographical divisions now disappear; the crown reserved to itself full power to choose its own advisers, though it actually did select them equally from the three estates of the realm. The functions of the body thus composed were theoretically well-nigh all-inclusive. It was supposed to deal with all the affairs of the realm, save the administration of justice and certain specified matters—chiefly appointments—which the sovereign reserved for himself; and even in these he promised not to act without the Consejo’s advice. The organization was further amplified and elaborated in the Cortes of Briviesca in 1387, but the cuaderno of the petitions of this body clearly shows that the composition of the Council did not in fact follow the lines laid down for it, and that the representatives of the third estate did not actually take their seats there. At the end of the reign of Henry in, the king provided that the number of councillors should be sixteen “prelados, condes, Caballeros y doctores”, thus indicating that the place of the hombres buenos or ciudadanos had now been taken by the letados. Clearly the institution had by this time come to stay. Its composition had not been permanently determined, but it had been invested with powers so extensive that it could never again be crushed out of existence.
During the reign of John II and Henry IV the Council fell once more on evil days. It was a period of reaction and retrogression in every respect, and the Consejo shared the common lot. The entire reign of John II was dominated by the masterful personality of Alvaro de Luna, the first of the great privados or validos of Spanish history; and it was not that magnate’s intention to have his omnipotence limited by any regular body of advisers, who might conceivably refuse to follow his lead. In various ways he contrived to diminish the prestige and importance of the Council. Places in it were distributed with reckless prodigality. In the year 1426 there were no less than seventy-five councillors, many of whom drew fat salaries without rendering any corresponding service, and the distinction which ancienly attached to that office was consequently lost. Men complained bitterly of the financial burden which resulted; and finally Alvaro, taking advantage of the revulsion of public feeling, forced the weak king to expel from his court all the magnates, “even though they were of the Consejo”, except a small group of his own immediate adherents; so that thenceforth the Council became merely a docile instrument of the favorite’s ambition. During the temporary retirement of Alvaro from 1441 to 1445, an attempt was made to reestablish matters on the ancient footing, but without permanent success. After the battle of Olmedo, the valido returned to office; and until his execution eight years later, the composition and functions of the Consejo were once more completely dependent on his will, just as they had been on that of the sovereigns of the early days of the Reconquest. The next reign brought no real improvement. In 1459 an effort was made to return to the better ways of the previous century by ordaining that the Council should be composed of twelve persons—two bishops, two knights, and eight legists—who were named in the decree; but a glance at the petitions of the Cortes of the period proves that these men did not fulfil the hopes that had been reposed in them. Another attempt at reconstitution in the beginning of 1465 met with no better success—in fact, the king never permitted it to have a fair trial, for fear that it would put too much power in the hands of the most turbulent of his vassals, the Marquis of Villena. Before the year was out, however, the control had been suffered to fall back into the hands of that unruly magnate, who, with Diego de Arias and Alfonso Carrillo, archbishop of Toledo, exercised all authority, in the name of a new council of ten persons which was called into existence chiefly in order to give a show of legality to his usurpation. Certainly, the Cortes regarded the crown as having capitulated to the baronage and as having abdicated all pretensions to the exercise of royal power. “Your Highness has placed in the Council certain persons, more for the purpose of granting them favors and honor and of acceding to their requests than for that of strengthening the government, with the result that the office of councilor, which used to rank so high, has now fallen into disrepute... Your commands which emanate from such Councilors are neither fulfilled nor obeyed”. In these trenchant words the procuradores of the Cortes of Ocaña in 1469 told King Henry their opinion of his government; but the evils of which they complained were irremediable, until strong monarchs should come to rescue the royal power from the slough of despond into which it had fallen.

The Consejo had passed through so many vicissitudes that Ferdinand and Isabella could not be at a loss to find precedents for remodeling it along any lines that should seem to them desirable. Since the middle of the thirteenth century it had at one time been recruited, theoretically at least, according to the principle of popular election; at another the notion of equal geographical distribution of the councilors had prevailed. After it had become permanently and regularly established under John I, the king reserved to himself the choice of his advisers, but for a time he selected them equally from the three estates of the realm. Subsequently the hombres buenos had given way to the letrados, and, last of all, the entire body had been dominated by one or more ambitious nobles. The functions of the Council had also varied from reign to reign, almost as often as its composition; but it never forgot that, with its various political attributes, it had also inherited from the days of St. Ferdinand and his predecessors a claim to be regarded as the highest court in the land. During one of its many remodeling in the reign of John II, it was temporarily divided into two salas—a sala de gobierno and a sala de justicia. The Catholic Kings were in no sense violating tradition when they determined to utilize the Royal Council as a means of concentrating the administration of justice in their own hands.

The Royal Council during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had certainly given little promise of the mighty future that awaited it in the sixteenth and seventeenth. We have studied it not so much for what it actually was at the close of the Middle Ages, as for what it was subsequently to become. But with the Castilian Cortes, which come next in order, the picture is precisely reversed. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries see the culmination of their power and prestige; under Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs they rapidly decline. Yet even though our examination of the Castilian constitution at the close of the Middle Ages is chiefly important as furnishing a background for what was to follow, it is essential to the truthfulness of the picture that careful attention be given to this very notable national assembly. Its numerous rights and duties afford the best possible evidence of the strong
tendency towards democracy characteristic of mediaeval Castile. Its records and petitions furnish an excellent guide to the aims and aspirations of the third estate. Even after it had been deprived of all real power, the history of the realm is in large measure to be read in its proceedings. Like the other organs of the central government, it was first summoned to aid and advise the king in the discharge of his various duties; but also like them, it gradually developed a measure of independent authority, and ultimately limited in a variety of ways the extent of the royal prerogative.

It is generally agreed among Spanish historians that the origin of the Cortes of Castile and Leon is to be found in the powerful Councils of Toledo, composed of nobles and clergy, which played such an important part in the government of church and state during the last century and a quarter of Visigothic rule in the peninsula, and survived the shock of the Moorish invasion. Soon after their reappearance in the Christian kingdoms of the north, however, the ecclesiastical functions of these councils began to pass to special assemblies of the clergy alone, so that the attributes of the older body were gradually restricted to temporal affairs. The culmination of this secularization of the functions of the old Visigothic councils is reached in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the kings, discerning in the third estate the strongest possible support against the preponderant power of the nobles, began to summon the representatives of the municipalities to the national assembly—in Leon at least as early as 1188, in Castile probably not till 1250, but in both cases considerably before the corresponding event took place in England. At the same time the name of the institution changed; the older title of concilio (and sometimes curia) disappeared, and was replaced by that of Cortes, which, though sometimes loosely used to designate assemblies of the earlier sort, is in strict accuracy applied only to those bodies in which the third estate was present. After the final union of Castile and Leon under St. Ferdinand (1230-52) the custom of holding separate Cortes for each of the two kingdoms gradually fell into disuse and was replaced by the practice of summoning a common assembly composed of the representatives of both. For the purpose of the present inquiry, therefore, it will suffice to describe the united body.

No one had a right to sit or be represented in the Castilian Cortes during this period; in this respect the national assembly of the western kingdom forms the sharpest possible contrast to those of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. The Castilian Cortes, being, in theory at least, a council of the king, were composed as the king desired, and varies from session to session accordingly. No two Cortes: this period were composed in exactly the same way. Neither the same prelates nor the same nobles were invariably summoned, nor were the same towns ordered to send procuradores. The clergy were represented by archbishops, bishops and the grand masters of the military orders selected by the monarch. Custom indeed prescribed the presence of the archbishop of Toledo, and such of the higher churchmen were resident at court; but even these the king had the unquestioned right to omit to summon if he wished. The representation of the nobles was similarly irregular and was determined on each occasion by the royal will. All the various ranks of the nobility, down to the Caballeros ant escuderos, were apparently eligible for summons to the estate, as were also the great officers of the crown, and after it had been definitely established in the reign of John I the members of the Royal Council; but the king selected whomsoever he pleased on each occasion. Subject kings of the crown of Castile were also expected to attend or send representatives, if asked to do so; when the king of Granada acknowledged himself the vassal of Ferdinand III, he promised to come to the Cortes with one of his ricos hombres, and the name of ‘Don Mahomat Abenazar, rey de Granada, vasallo del Rey’, heads the list of those who confirmed the ordinances of Ferdinand IV in the Cortes of Medina del Campo in 1305. Attendance, when a summons had been received, was absolutely obligatory in this estate; failure to appear, if not excused, was tantamount to a declaration of revolt.

In theory at least, the representation of the third estate was inseparably attached to the municipalities; as the urban limits, however, did not stop at the city walls, but included neighboring hamlets and isolated houses, the rural communities were not really excluded. During this period, the king selected for summons on each occasion as many towns as he pleased, and whichever he pleased; but the tendency was steadily towards a diminution in the number. In the Cortes of Leon of 1188, of Seville in 1288, and of Alcalá in 1348, there is reason to think that all the towns in the realm were called on to send representatives. In the Cortes of Madrid in 1391, forty-nine municipalities sent procuradores; in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the number was finally fixed at eighteen. The causes which combined to bring about this decrease were very numerous and may be profitably compared to those which effected a similar result in contemporary England. We have not space to examine them here, but we may observe, in passing, that the blame for this unfortunate development is to be laid less at the door of the kings than of the towns themselves, which not only lost their early privileges by failing to insist on their observance, but also actually labored, in a spirit of local antagonism eminently characteristic of Spain, to exclude one another from the right of representation.
The number of representatives or procuradores that each town could send varied, until it was fixed at two by a law of John II at the request of the Cortes of Madrid of 1429-30. Another law of the same period specifies that the procuradores must be persons of quality, and not manual laborers. The methods of choice of the procuradores varied according to the fuero or charter of the town that sent them and were for the most part in general consonance with the methods of selection of the local municipal officers. Usually the matter was determined by lot; sometimes by election by a more or less restricted number of inhabitants; sometimes by a system under which certain leading citizens served in turn; sometimes by a combination of these methods. Whatever the local practice, it seems clear that down to the second quarter of the fifteenth century the choices were fairly made, without royal interference; but it is equally obvious that from the beginning of the dictatorship of Alvaro de Luna to the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella there were increasingly scandalous corruption and intimidation by the crown and the magnates, until in the reign of Henry the Impotent the king on several occasions actually gave away outright the privilege of representation.

Every city represented in Cortes gave its procuradores credentials and letters of instruction and guidance, or poderes, as they were called. These were carefully worded and the procuradores were forbidden to deviate from them in the slightest degree. If some unexpected question arose in the Cortes, the procuradores usually consulted their constituents before giving their votes, and they attempted, though unsuccessfully, to wrest from the king the right of interpretation of the poderes, in case there was some doubt as to their meaning. Until the character of these poderes was modified in the sixteenth century, their comprehensiveness and definiteness, and the strictness with which they were obeyed, constituted one of the most important safeguards of Castilian parliamentary liberty. The salaries and journey money of the procuradores were paid by the towns that sent them, down to the latter part of the fourteenth century. Under John II the salaries began to be paid by the king, but in the sixteenth century, as we shall later see, it came to be the practice for the Cortes regularly to add a fixed sum for that purpose to the amount: which they granted to the crown for the expenses incident to their sessions.

The right to summon the Cortes was inherent in the crown, an inalienable royal prerogative; in case the king was absent, ill, or under age, it was exercised by his representatives in his name and not of their own right. Time and place of meeting were left absolutely to the royal discretion; there was no rule as to the frequency of sessions, or the size, locality, or importance of the place where they occurred; on one occasion the Castilian Cortes met at Bribiesca in Aragon. At the opening session, which was attended by the king and all three estates, the first business was the presentation of the poderes by the procuradores. Then followed the speech from the throne, in which the purposes of the meeting were set forth, and formal replies were made by each estate: the head of the house of Lara answering first, for the nobles; the archbishop of Toledo next, for the clergy; and finally the city of Burgos for the third estate. These formal proceedings over, the estates usually separated for deliberation, but communicated with one another by messengers. Of the nature of the debates, it is almost impossible to learn anything, but it seems probable that they were very quiet and generally ineffective and disorganized. The session lasted till the business was done, but there is no record during this period of prolonged meetings such as took place in the time of Philip II. Lastly occurred the presentation of petitions by the estates to the crown. There was apparently no final meeting of the king and the three estates for formal ratification of what had been done. The estates usually separated without any guarantees that their wishes would be respected, though it was the usual custom for the government to send back to the cities, and sometimes to the bishops and nobles, full copies of the cuadernos, or lists of petitions, with the royal answers.

Parliamentary privilege in the Castilian Cortes stood very high. In 1302 and 1305 complete security and freedom from arrest and seizure of property were promised the procuradores during sessions of the Cortes and while they came and went; and in 1351 this promise was confirmed, save in a few exceptional cases, though subsequent petitions would seem to indicate that the rule was not always enforced. By an ordinance of 1379, the procuradores were granted the same entertainment which Las Siete Partidas accorded the king and his immediate followers—a privilege which, again, was by no means invariably realized in fact. There was apparently no restriction whatever on freedom of speech during sessions in the period which at present concerns us. The sole recorded instance in which the king attempted in any way to rebuke or punish a procurador for his conduct was that of Mosen Diego de Valera, who wrote a most insolent letter to John II, “on account of which he was in great peril, and it was ordered that nothing which was due him from the king should be paid him, not even his wages”; but this was for an act done outside the Cortes, not a part of his official functions.

The powers of the Castilian Cortes in this period may be classified under three heads—financial, legislative, and miscellaneous.
From at least as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, it was a recognized custom that when the king desired an extra grant, or *servicio*, over and above what came to him regularly of his own right, he must ask it of the national assembly. In 1307 this custom passed into written law and was confirmed as such in 1329, 1391, 1393, 1420, and afterwards. At the close of the fourteenth century, when the Cortes were at the height of their power, this important privilege was fortified by several temporarily successful demands for an audit, and occasional insistence on a reduction of the sums the king required. Three times the Cortes even secured a partial right of appropriation of the sums they voted, and once they forced the king to deposit their grant with two persons, with the stipulation that nothing should be taken from them save for the Moorish war, for which it had been given. This seemingly impregnable financial position was, however, seriously weakened in two different ways. First, the fact that the nobles and clergy were generally exempt from taxation (despite several attempts to subject them to it) left the procuradores to bear alone the brunt of every financial struggle against the crown, so that they usually submitted tamely to the royal demands, as the records plainly show. Secondly, by utilization of loans, invention of new imposts, and above all by perpetually postponing the definite settlement of the difficult question as to whether or not certain taxes (especially the blighting *alcabala*) could be levied without the consent of the national assembly, the crown was able to gain alternative means of supply, and thus to circumvent the opposition which it might occasionally be unable to overthrow. Their failure to make the most of their financial rights naturally undermined the position of the Castilian Cortes in other respects.

The share of the Castilian national assembly in legislation rested on a somewhat different basis. The power to make laws, as we have already seen, resided exclusive in the crown. According to an ordinance of 1387 the consent of the Cortes was necessary for the revocation of a valid law, though it is by no means clear that this enactment was rigidly enforced during this period; certainly it was not in the sixteenth century. The most important part of the Cortes’ share in legislation, however, lay not here, but in their right to draw up a set of petitions to the crown, which if accepted became the law of the land. This practice, begun in 1293, became fixed in 1317, and was utilized sometimes by the nobles and clergy, though most frequently, of course, by the third estate. The petitions range over the very widest diversity of topics—administration of justice, measures of police and public safety, dealings with Moors and Jews, granting of letters of naturalization, standards of weights and measures, *barraganía*, or licensed concubinage of the clergy, etc.; some were of general, some of local, import. Though the Cortes had no means of enforcing compliance with these requests, they were often accepted and acted upon. That the Castilian assembly was unable to turn this right of petition into a right of legislation (as did the English Parliament in this period) was due to its ineffective procedure, to its failure to make redress precede supply, and to the general lack of cooperation and of political opportunism which characterized its members.

Though based on royal promises and valid ordinances, most of the powers of the Castilian Cortes not included under legislation or finance were really only exercised according to the discretion of the crown. Such was the case in respect to their control of the foreign policy, and the provision that they must be consulted in matters of importance to the wellbeing of the realm. Their share in the recognition of a new sovereign, however, demands more careful definition. The theory of the older historians, that the validity of a king’s accession depended on his recognition by the Cortes and on his oath in their presence to observe the established laws, can certainly no longer be maintained. It was customary, indeed, for the national assembly to meet when a king died, to swear to the heir and receive his oath, but this was by no means indispensable to the making of a new monarch. In the case of the accession of a king under age the powers of the Cortes were somewhat more extensive, and included considerable influence in the nomination of regents and their exercise of power; and they usually recognized the heir to the throne during the lifetime of his predecessor, and were empowered to accept royal abdications.

Allowing for all limitations, the composition and powers of the Castilian Cortes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries indicate, in theory at least, a very high degree of parliamentary development for that period. Whether their authority would have been greater or less, had the realm been in order and the aristocracy controlled, is a question which it is easier to ask than to answer. Certainly they were to furnish priceless aid to Ferdinand and Isabella in deposing the rebel nobles from the high place they had usurped; but after the common enemy had been subdued, they were to show themselves pitiable unable to reap any of the rewards of the victory they had helped to win.

The contrast between theory and practice, which we have already encountered in so many different branches of the government of mediaeval Castile, is particularly evident in the administration of justice. All the various codes, from the *Fuero Juzgo* down, declare the king to be the highest judge in the land;
they provide for a complete hierarchy of courts, all of them directly or indirectly dependent on the royal authority; they proclaim all the principles of a perfectly centralized judicial system. But as a matter of fact, the condition of mediaeval Castile in this respect was utterly chaotic. More perhaps than in any other branch of the government service was the weakness of the monarchy reflected in the shortcomings of the law courts.

Let us begin at the top of the ladder with the highest judicial bodies. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century, it is impossible to discern any trustworthy evidence of the existence of a regularly organized royal court. When the king meted out justice, he surrounded himself with a number of magnates whose advice he valued, and the tribunal thus constituted soon came to be known as the Curia or Corte, but it was not always composed of the same persons; its authority was purely consultative; and no clear line of demarcation was as yet drawn between it and the equally irregular and amorphous Royal Council. Under Alfonso X, however, whose zeal for the creation of the forms of strong monarchical government was only exceeded by his inability to invest them with any real vitality or power, the first steps were taken toward the definite, permanent, separate organization of a central royal court. By an ordinance of the Cortes of Zamora in 1274 he created a supreme tribunal, composed of twenty-three alcaldes de corte—nine of them from Castile, eight from Leon, and six from Estremadura—some of whom were to be always present in the royal household to administer justice continually. In addition to these twenty-three alcaldes, the Ordinance of 1274 also provided that there should be three special judges, “good men who knew and understood the fueros of the land, to hear appeals”; it also laid down rules for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and enumerated the cases of which the king claimed cognizance in the first instance. At the outset Alfonso promised to sit in person three days a week for the administration of justice; but as time went on, the pressure of other business limited the royal presence to Friday, which became and remained from thenceforth the special day for the sovereign to exercise his function as the highest judge in the land. When the king was absent, the alcaldes sat in judgment under the leadership of the adelantado del rey o sobrejuez; in other words, the central court, whose function had hitherto been solely advisory, was gradually beginning to acquire a jurisdiction and authority of its own.

From the death of Alfonso the Learned to the accession of the house of Trastamara, the royal tribunal fell on evil days. During the reign of Sancho the Bravo, who owed his throne to the support of the aristocracy, it practically ceased to exist. Under Henry II and his son John I, however, it was reconstituted on a more permanent basis and came to be known as the Audiencia or Cancillería. At first it held its sessions at the court of the king; in 1387 it was ordered to divide its time equally between Medina del Campo, Olmedo, Alcalá de Henares, and Madrid; in 1390 it was set up at Segovia; in 1405, at Valladolid; but the constant complaints of the Cortes show that when separated from the monarch it was not seldom terrorized by the aristocracy into neglecting its duties. During this period and subsequently its composition varied again and again. Its judges were of course exclusively recruited from the ranks of the clergy and of the letrados; and efforts were made to apportion them fairly among the different quarters of the realm. By 1433 the Audiencia was divided into two main salas for civil and criminal suits; the judges in the former were generally known as oidores; those in the latter as alcaldes. There was also a special sala de los hijosdalgo for the adjudication of baronial suits, and a procurador fiscal, or special prosecutor on behalf of the crown. From the verdicts of the Audiencia there was, generally speaking, no appeal; but the records show that the king not seldom inhibited it from proceeding with the more important cases that came before it, in order that he might deal with them himself. The complaints of the procuradores, as well as the frequency with which changes occurred in the composition and powers of the tribunal, furnish ample proof that the institution was not working satisfactorily in the period immediately preceding the accession of the Catholic Kings.

Below the Audiencia was a whole hierarchy of minor local courts, presided over for the most part by adelantados menores (de comarca or fronterizos) and merinos. These functionaries were originally crown appointees, but from the thirteenth century onward their offices, particularly that of the adelantados, tended to become hereditary in certain prominent families, greatly to the prejudice of the effective administration of justice in the districts committed to their charge. They possessed executive and military as well as judicial powers; one authority describes the adelantados as “captains rather than magistrates”, and the merinos as “magistrates rather than captains”. They often lost touch, however, with the central power they were sent out to represent, and their tribunals were frequently overawed by the aristocracy. At the bottom of the ladder came the municipal alcaldes, whose selection had usually been delegated by the sovereign to the Consejo in the local charter or fuero; there were, moreover, a certain number of minor judges whose appointment had been usurped by the great lords in defiance of the rights of the crown. Numerous conflicts of jurisdiction were the natural result. In certain exceptional cases the lesser authorities claimed the power of overriding the decisions of the
central government; but, generally speaking, the theory was that appeal lay from the locally appointed magistrate to the lowest crown judge, and from him through the successive grades of merinos and adelantados to the Audiencia and the king.

This apparently adequate system of local judicial officers, however, broke down in practice even more completely than the central court, or Audiencia, above it. Very significant in this connection are the numerous efforts of the kings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to strengthen and protect their minor judges in the faithful performance of their duties. Royal inspectors, called pesquisidores, were frequently sent out to inquire about them, and to report on their work at headquarters. The name of these officials recalls the fact that there was inaugurated, in this period, a new form of judicial procedure called the pesquisa, by which the king or his judges were empowered to bring action, motu proprio, against any notorious delinquent, without waiting for specific accusation by a regular plaintiff. Henceforth this new method gradually began to supersede the older forms of public and oral trial, which had often resulted in the past in the escape of powerful hidalgos whom lesser men dared not openly accuse. More important still was the sending out of the first corregidores in the reign of Alfonso XI. These were royally appointed magistrates imposed upon the municipalities for the purpose of aiding openly accuse. More important still was the sending out of the first corregidores in the reign of Alfonso XI. These were royally appointed magistrates imposed upon the municipalities for the purpose of aiding and ultimately of superseding those who had been locally elected. They may be regarded as the successors of the so-called jueces de salario, whom we find mentioned in the Cortes of 1293, and were intended, like them, to carry the king’s authority and jurisdiction into every corner of the realm. The corregidores, however, soon attained a measure of authority which their predecessors had never known. In addition to their judicial functions, they rapidly developed wide powers in administration and in finance. They were not merely judges; they soon converted themselves into the ‘state’s men of all work’. For the present the possibilities of their office were not evident to the world at large, because of the abasement of the central power which they represented. But when the monarchy had emerged triumphant over the factions, and the crowns of Castile and Aragon had been united, the corregidores were to become the cornerstone of the administrative edifice of Spain and of the Spanish Empire.

It must not be imagined that the municipalities endured these invasions of their liberties and privileges without a protest. The procuradores in the Cortes steadily maintained that no corregidor could be imposed on any town without a definite request from the inhabitants, on the ground that such action was a breach of the fueros. The constant recurrence of petitions to this effect is doubtless an indication that the principle was not always fully observed, but there were certainly many cities which succeeded in preserving their immunity. The cuadernos are filled with requests that the corregidores be not permitted to hold office for more than one year, that they be selected, not among the minions of the king, but from the inhabitants of the region over which they are set, and that they be men of character and ability suitable to their exalted functions. In the weak reigns of John II and Henry IV we find many complaints that they abused their authority, increased the evils that they were sent out to suppress, and, above all, that they were scandalously corrupt, and cared only for the money that they could make out of their positions. And finally, as a means of controlling the acts of wicked appointees, the procuradores demanded of the crown, at least as early as the year 1419, that corregidores, at the expiration of their term, be obliged to remain for at least fifty days in the region where they had held office, so that anyone who believed himself to have been wronged by their verdicts might state his case and have justice. This seems to be the first intimation in Castile of the institution of the residenia, which was to be developed so much further under the Catholic Kings. All these items show that the corregidores were far from popular among the mass of the people; but the fact that most of the complaints occur during the reigns of the weaker kings is an indication that the protests were evoked quite as much by the unworthy character of the officials themselves and of the monarchs they served, as by the principle of centralization which they represented. Certainly local conditions were bad enough to demand a remedy, provided one could be discovered that was not worse than the disease.

It will be evident that the different institutions described in the preceding paragraphs represent rather the longings and aspirations of the Castilian kingship for a more efficient central government than any accomplished result. Nothing permanent could be effected until order had been reestablished by the strong hand of the Catholic Kings; and the chief significance of the constitutional experiments of their predecessors lies far less in what they achieved at the time, than in the fact that they afforded Ferdinand and Isabella precious material to work with, when at last the opportunity came. Confusion remained the salient feature of the Castilian judicial régime throughout the period at present under review; and if we are to appreciate the full extent of it we must supplement our examination of the hierarchy of courts and judges with a brief account of the various legal codes which they were supposed to administer. Of all the nations of Western Europe, Spain traces her legal system back to that of Rome in most direct descent; but the struggle between the Roman and Visigothic elements was long and bitter and was immensely complicated by the incorrigible particularism which caused each class and each locality to
lay claim to a special law of its own. In the twelfth century, at the time of the great revival of Roman law in Western Europe, Castilian students visited the famous schools of northern Italy and southern France and brought back the knowledge they had gained there to their native land. This furnished a foundation for Alfonso the Learned to build on, so that he was enabled to infuse the Roman principles into the greatest and most notable of his law books, and to evoke some measure of order from the wild confusion which had reigned in earlier years. But precedents in the legal history of his native land were as essential to the great legislative work of the Scholar King as were the teachings of the glossarists of Bologna; and in order to discover what these precedents were, we must briefly trace the development of legislation in León and in Castile from the time of the barbarian invasions.

When the Visigoths arrived in Spain, in the early fifth century, they brought with them all their barbarian customs, which were subsequently written down by King Euric. The native Hispano-Romans, however—numerically by far the largest portion of the population—were suffered to retain their own laws, which were, of course, almost exclusively Roman in origin. Nay more, Alaric II in the year 506, before his departure for the battle of Vouillé, took pains to codify and arrange these Roman laws for the use of the conquered population in the famous Breviary of Alaric or Lex Romana Visigothorum, based chiefly on the Theodosian Code, the Institutes of Gaius, and the Sententiae of Paulus. But the Visigoths did not long remain content with this double system of law, which divided them from the subject population. Of all the barbarian nations they were the most inclined to imitate the ways of imperial Rome, whose superiority they clearly discerned. As long as the barrier of religion separated them from the native Spaniards a complete fusion of the two legal systems was out of the question; but with the conversion of Reccared in 587, the way was opened for a new code, which should be valid for both portions of the community. Such a code was put forth in the seventh century, chiefly through the instrumentality of Kings Chindaswinth and Recceswinth; and it is commonly known as the Fuero Juzgo. Dispute rages hotly over the relative strength of the Visigothic and Roman elements in it, but the weight of opinion seems to favor the view that the latter was distinctly predominant. Whatever the facts may be in this particular, it is certain that the Fuero Juzgo remained the law of most of Christian Spain down to the middle of the thirteenth century, except in so far as it was contradicted or superseded by local fueros.

The importance of this last exception, however, is almost certain to be underestimated by anyone who has not studied in detail the history of mediaeval Spain. In addition to the struggle for mastery between the Visigothic and Roman systems, the traditions of Spanish separatism rendered impossible, for centuries to come, the observance of any universally binding central code. In the first place, each locality had its own fuero, or custom, which was not seldom invoked to the prejudice of the law of the land. In the second, each class of society had its often special privileges and immunities. Those of the nobles were naturally of first importance; they were apparently written down and codified at the so-called Cortes of Najera in 1137. Exactly to what extent and for how long they were valid are disputed questions; but they were certainly regarded as a basis for the definition of the rights of the aristocracy in later codes of undoubted authenticity. Those of the clergy and of the monasteries, and of special corporations like the Mesta, were scarcely less extensive. Many communities recognized no law whatsoever and were governed merely according to local custom and tradition, and the judgments of arbiters selected among the inhabitants, “por hazañas, albedríos, y costumbres” as the phrase ran. All these incongruities were considerably less obnoxious to the mediaeval jurist than they would be to his successor of today; but even contemporaries realized the crying need of unification and reform.

St. Ferdinand cherished plans of far-reaching improvements, but death cut him off in the midst of his labors, and he bequeathed the unfinished task to his learned son. No better illustration could be desired of the many contrasts and contradictions in the character and career of Alfonso X than is afforded by the history of his various legislative enterprises. Whatever their faults and the inability of the monarch to enforce them, they entitle Alfonso to a fame as a lawgiver which will long outlive his reputation as a king. In general, the codes which he put forth fall into two fairly distinct groups. The first includes those in which the national Visigothic features predominate; the second comprises those in which the influence of Roman law is supreme. To the first belong the Fuero Real and its various special supplements and the mass of municipal charters; to the second, the Especulo and Las Siete Partidas.

The Fuero Real or Fuero de las Leyes was promulgated in 1254-55, and is in effect a summary, codification, and reconciliation of all existing fueros, whether of local or national scope, from the Fuero Juzgo down—an attempt to substitute one law book for the many partially conflicting ones previously in force. In the Prólogo we find the statement that the king, having taken counsel with his advisers and those learned in the law, had determined to give the people this fuero to be judged by at their own request. Pursuant to this intention, the Fuero Real was adopted as law by the royal courts; it was granted
as a local municipal fuero to a number of important towns; for seventeen years it apparently even superseded the aristocratic privileges promulgated at Najera, until their reestablishment in the Cortes of Burgos in 1271. In general, it may be said that the Fuero Real remained the principal law book of the realm for nearly a century after its promulgation, and was actually observed whenever it did not conflict with the established custom of this or that locality or place. This is perhaps an unsatisfactory definition of the state of affairs; but in view of the facts as they have come down to us, it is impossible to be more specific. The national tendency towards diversity and variety—more noticeable perhaps in the domain of law than anywhere else—was destined to withstand for many generations to come all the strivings of the monarchy for unification.

The minor codes supplementary to the Fuero Real are chiefly important as indicating the immense range of Alfonso’s knowledge and interest in matters of legislation; they also show the difficulties which the central government experienced in obtaining any general observance of the Fuero Real. The Leyes Nuevas deal with questions of usury and debt, inheritance, and the relations of Christians and Moors; in their Prólogo they frankly state that the judges cannot determine how these matters are to be treated under the Fuero Real, and that additional regulations are necessary to enlighten them. The Leyes del Estado are rather a statement and explanation of the law by eminent jurists than a code in the proper sense of the word. They comprise two hundred and fifty-two capítulos and attempt to reconcile the differences between the Fuero Real and the many local laws with which it came into conflict. The Leyes de los Adelantados consist of a set of five ordinances concerning the rights and duties of these magistrates. Of another character was the Ordenamiento de las Tafurerías, or ordinance concerning gaming houses, which paid the state a tax in return for the permission to remain in existence, and which had not been adequately regulated in the earlier codes.

The other side of Alfonso’s legislative work—including the Especulo and the Partidas—shows foreign Roman influence as plainly as the Fuero Real shows the national, and represents far more accurately the real leanings and theories of the Scholar King. The Especulo or Espejo de todos los derechos, which is generally regarded as the first legislative work of Alfonso in point of time, has been only partially preserved. Its preface states that it comprises a choice of all the best fueros of the land, made with the advice and consent of the ecclesiastical authorities, ricos hombres, and jurisconsults, and given to the people to be ruled by; but there is no evidence that the latter part of this programme was ever actually carried out. The Especulo was in fact only the first attempt of Alfonso radically to alter legislation in Castile by the introduction of Roman principles; it served as “a preliminary sketch of the Partidas” and was “intended to pave the way for the greater code, to which, as Alfonso plainly foresaw, there was bound to be strenuous opposition”. It never was recognized as the law of the land, but was doubtless utilized by the jurists of the period as a book of reference and consultation.

We are thus brought to the last and greatest of the legislative works of the Scholar King, the Libro de las Leyes, or Las Siete Partidas, as it is usually called on account of the seven great sections into which it is divided. It seems probable that it was begun in 1256 and finished in 1265 by a number of jurists whose names have not come down to us, under the supervision and direction of the king himself. Its sources were: (1) the fueros and good customs of Castile and Leon, such as the Fuero Juzgo and Fuero Real, and the principal municipal charters; (2) the canon law as set forth in the Decretals; and (3) the Pandects of Justinian and the commentaries of the most famous Italian jurists thereon.

Of these three elements the last two were unquestionably predominant, so that the Partidas may justly be described as an attempt to unify the laws on a Roman basis; but the principles of the older Castilian legislation were by no means entirely forgotten. Alfonso knew that his people could never be induced to abandon their ancient laws and customs at once; and every now and then one encounters passages in the Partidas which betray a defiantly Germanic origin utterly at variance with the Romanist ideals of the Scholar King. One illustration will suffice: “If a father is so closely besieged in a castle which he holds for his lord, as to be utterly deprived of all food, he may kill and eat his son without prejudice to his honor, rather than surrender the castle without his lord’s command.”

But the Partidas are much more than a mere compilation of laws. They contain a number of moral and philosophical reflections of a legal nature, a quantity of political maxims, and many disquisitions on the qualities and characteristics which ideally perfect rulers and institutions should display. A few titles may be cited by way of illustration. “How a king should be moderate in eating and in drinking”; “How the children of a king should be trained to be well dressed and cleanly”; “How doctors and surgeons who represent themselves as learned and are not so, deserve to be punished if anyone dies through their fault”; “That no monk should be permitted to study physic or laws.” And this curious medley of apparently incongruous elements naturally leads us to inquire what was the real purpose of Alfonso in preparing this great code. Was it intended to be a great legal encyclopaedia, a guide to the basic
principles of legislation, for use by the king and great jurists of the realm. Or, did the Scholar King intend to put it at once into practice as the common law of the land to the prejudice of the Fuero Juzgo, the Fuero Real, and the different local charters? The Chronicle of Alfonso X states that the king commanded all his subjects to accept the Partidas as their law and fuero, and ordered his judges to decide cases accordingly, and there are passages in the code itself which support this assertion; yet on the other hand, the prologue to the Partidas describes them as a ‘book for the instruction of kings’, while a royal order to the alcaldes of Valladolid, of August, 1258, specifically prohibits the use of Roman law in Castile. Besides, if the Partidas were intended to be observed as the law of the land, why, in addition to promulgating the Fuero Real, did Alfonso continue to confirm ancient local charters and also to issue new ones almost down to the day of his death? Was it understood that these local charters should be valid save when they conflicted with the law of the land? These questions are scarcely susceptible of definite answers; they will probably long remain among the unsolved problems in which the career of this strange sovereign abounds. A possible explanation may be offered by the theory that though the king himself preferred the absolutist principles of the Roman law, he realized the charters should be valid save when they conflicted with the law of the land? These questions are

Whatever the final verdict on these matters, the fact remains that Las Siete Partidas were never formally declared to be the law of the land during the lifetime of the Scholar King; not until the famous enactment known as the Ordenamiento de Alcalá in 1348 did they attain even theoretical validity. During the eighty-three years which elapsed between their completion and their definite acceptance, the Fuero Real and the municipal charters remained in force. On the other hand, it would be a great mistake to suppose that Las Siete Partidas exerted no influence during this period. Though technically invalid, they were being constantly consulted by lawyers, legal professors, and students at the universities. They turned a generation of jurists to the study of the Roman law—the predecessors of the letrados who were to render such invaluable service to the monarchy in the days of the Catholic Kings. Some of their principles were undoubtedly introduced into the actual practice of the courts; the Ordenamiento de Alcalá itself speaks of the conflicts of jurisdiction which arose as a result of this. We may well believe that Alfonso XI, who was as ardent a believer in royal absolutism as his namesake had been before him, and far more capable of carrying his ideas into practice, was not slow to seize an opportunity to strike a blow for the code which formed the basis for his own theories of government. If, without formal promulgation, Las Siete Partidas could vindicate themselves to the extent that they had already done, might they not hope to take precedence of all other codes and charters, when supported by a solemn declaration of their validity by the king. At any rate, Alfonso XI thought it worthwhile to give the plan a trial; and in the year 1348 he accordingly established Las Siete Partidas as the law of the land, save where they were contradicted by the Fuero Real, the municipal charters, and the privileges of the aristocracy; the great code was thus formally declared for the first time to be in force in Castile, though it was relegated to a subordinate position. Several important modifications in the Partidas were introduced at the same time—most of them in the direction of concessions to the national fueros—which served to increase their popularity. The legislative activity of the kings and Cortes of the period further strengthened the forces of unification and centralization; while the increasingly absolutist sentiment of the age all over Western Europe furnished an invaluable support for the tendencies which Alfonso desired to promote. To imagine that variety, diversity, and confusion ceased to be the distinguishing features of Castilian law after the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, would be a grievous misconception; but the period which elapsed between Alfonso XI and Ferdinand and Isabella saw them sensibly diminish and the Partidas emerge “from the position of a subordinate and supplementary law to that of the principal law of the land”. During that long interval there was in theory no alteration in the relative position of the different codes established in the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, but as a matter of fact the Partidas steadily increased in prestige and popularity, and the national fueros correspondingly declined. The extreme turbulence of the times prevented the meaning of this change from being entirely apparent to contemporaries, but it is doubtful whether Ferdinand and Isabella could have found an adequate legal basis for their absolutism, had it not been for the various legislative reforms of their predecessors.

A number of changes in judicial procedure and penalties were also effected during the two centuries between Alfonso X and the Catholic Kings. In addition to the use of the pesquisa, which we have already noticed, and the corresponding decline in the practice of oral accusation, all the so-called pruebas vulgares, such as judicial combat and the ordeal, were definitely abolished after the early fourteenth century, excepting the rieptos or duels of the aristocracy, which Alfonso X and his successors wisely judged it to be impossible to do away with, and therefore attempted to regulate. The
legislation on this subject in the various codes is extremely interesting, and gives a vivid picture of the spirit of the Castilian aristocracy. The cruel and ferocious punishments of earlier days were little abated, if at all. One section in the Partidas forbids branding in the face, cutting the nostrils, exsanguination, lapidation, crucifixion, and throwing over a precipice; but these regulations were not observed, and some of them were specifically contradicted in another part of the same code. The use of torture continued, but was strictly limited to certain types of criminals, and was only permitted in the presence of witnesses. Cognizance of the crime of heresy, which was regarded as a heinous form of treason, was vested by the Partidas in the bishops; if found guilty, the culprit was handed over, as in other lands, to the secular arm for punishment. Death by the fire was the penalty prescribed in the Alfonsine codes; and at an earlier date St. Ferdinand caused several heretics to be boiled alive.

Still another illustration of the wide gulf that separated theory from practice in the institutional life of mediaeval Castile is presented by the state of the national finances at the close of the period under review. The number and variety of the revenues to which the king was in one way or another legally entitled were enormous; elaborate machinery had been devised, and numerous officials appointed for their collection, and yet the poverty of the Castilian monarchs was a jest in the mouths of their subjects. Undoubtedly a similar condition obtained in the treasuries of all the sovereigns of Western Europe during the period of baronial anarchy immediately preceding the establishment of absolute monarchy. The emptiness of the royal coffers was everywhere the measure of the impotence of the central government. The situation in Castile, however, was probably much worse than the average, just as the abasement of the royal power was more complete; and it presents a number of features of special interest.

In the early days of the Reconquest, the royal revenues were largely derived from contributions of a preeminently feudal nature. These did not vary essentially in number or variety from those prevalent in mediaeval times in other lands. The petitum or moneda, a special contribution levied by the crown on occasions of special importance, such as the marriage of a member of the royal family; the conducho or yantares, that is, the royal right of purveyance and entertainment or its pecuniary equivalent; the fonsadera, or indemnity for exemption from military service; and the calonna, or fine incident on a locality for permitting a crime to go unpunished within its limits, may be cited as typical examples. But as time went on, and the framework of a regular central government gradually made its appearance, these feudal dues began to fall into the background and to be supplanted by a more modern set of revenues. In other words, a system of national taxation began to emerge. Sometimes the feudal due was itself converted into a national tax, as, for instance, the moneda, which was at first levied on special occasions, but after the thirteenth century apparently became a regular annual contribution, until it was abolished in the reign of Henry III. The moneda forera also, which was originally a lump sum paid by the municipalities for exemption from all feudal dues, except from the fonsadera and the yantares, appears in the sixteenth century as a septennial levy incident on all men in recognition of the sovereignty of the crown. Often the feudal due was gradually suffered to fall into abeyance and the newer types of taxation permitted to replace it. Of these the most important were as follows.

1. The capitación incident on Moors and Jews who were permitted to remain in Christian territory. A petition of the Cortes of Valladolid in 1312 indicates that the standard rate was six thousand maravedis per day from each aljama or community in the realm; but there were numerous local variations, and even complete exemptions, which were the cause of constant complaint. In Segovia it appears that the Jews paid annually thirty dineros apiece as a perpetual reminder of the sum for which Christ was betrayed, but as this impost was collected by the bishop, it seems probable that it was a special local levy in excess of the regular capitatio.

2. The servicio, or special tax, which could be voted only by the Cortes, and has already been considered under that head. The procuradores made strenuous, though not always successful, efforts to subject forced loans or empréstitos to the same condition.

3. The sisa, or tax on food stuffs, first established by Sancho IV, but withdrawn, owing to its intense unpopularity, by his widow Doña Maria during the minority of Ferdinand IV. It was, however, to reappear.

4. Revenues from mines and salt pits. Laws of Alfonso X and Alfonso XI declared these to be a part of the royal domain and their products the property of the crown. In the case of the mines, the demands of the monarchy were apparently often satisfied by an arrangement that a fraction of their output should be handed to it; with the salt pits the royal monopoly, theoretically at least, was maintained in full.
5. The so-called tercias reales, or royal thirds of the tithe that was due to the church, which the kings retained on the pretext that the clergy ought to contribute directly to the crusade against the Moors. This right, which was only provisionally recognized by the ecclesiastical authorities in the Middle Ages, became regular and permanent in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella. As the government usually handed back one third of the third received, for the benefit of the buildings of the parish churches, its share was ultimately reduced to two ninths.

6. National customs duties, or derechos de aduana. From the thirteenth century onward, all commodities were subject to the payment of a duty on entering and leaving the realm. The rate was ordinarily one tenth the value of the commodity in question, which doubtless accounts for the fact that the word diezmo was often used to denote it as well as the ecclesiastical tithe. This duty was levied in return for the protection given to the traveler or merchant and his goods; and it is worth noting that the treatment which strangers were accorded at the frontiers of mediaeval Castile contrasts favorably with that meted out in many European and American custom houses today. The personal effects of the average traveler were exempt from payment; the oath or declaration of the merchant was accepted in regard to the content of the cases he brought with him, which he was not obliged to unpack; but if an intent to defraud was discovered, the penalty was death and the confiscation of the goods. Some commodities could not, in theory, be exported at all, especially silver and gold; and there were an infinite number of local exceptions and exemptions. Theories of protection of national industries, however, were not yet fully developed, and the revenues from the aduanas, though considerable, were not comparable to the income derived from this source by Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors.

7. Local customs duties. The traditions of Castilian separatism favored the maintenance of internal tolls. The foreigner who had passed the frontier found other barriers awaiting him within the realm, and those Castilians whose business took them from one end of the country to another were obliged to pay dearly for that privilege. The terms portazgo, pontazgo, and montazgo indicate the sums levied for the right to pass with one’s belongings through the gates of a town, over a bridge, or across a wooded pasture (monte). Their meanings varied, however, as time went on, and portazgo, and still more montazgo came to be used almost exclusively of the heavy imposts levied on the great flocks of sheep which annually migrated from the rainy pastures of Galicia to the sunny plains of Andalusia and back again.

8. The alcabala, or tax on commercial transactions, the most lucrative of all, but also the most disastrous in its ultimate effects on the economic welfare of Spain. This source of revenue, which is generally believed to have been borrowed from the finances of the Moors, was first regularly established in the reign of Alfonso XI, though there are occasional and local traces of its existence at an earlier date. It was apparently imposed in 1342 to provide for the special needs of the campaign against Algeciras, with the distinct understanding that it should cease when peace was made. The rate was one twentieth the value of the transaction, and there is no evidence that the Cortes formally sanctioned it. But instead of ceasing when the war was over, it continued, and the rate was increased in 1366 to one tenth. The Cortes apparently had not yet entirely relinquished all claim to control it; in 1388 they granted it for special purposes for a period of two years, and again, three years later, for one. In 1393 they granted a servicio on the express understanding that the alcabala should not be levied again without the consent of the three estates of the realm; but the lack of any adequate machinery for enforcing the bargain rendered their action nugatory. Meantime, the kings continued to treat the new impost according to their own desires. During the minority of Henry III, the rate was once more dropped to one twentieth; but when the young monarch took the reins of government into his own hands, it was restored to one tenth and there remained. This tax, which had originated in such irregular fashion, was to become a cornerstone of the royal finances in the succeeding centuries and was bound to operate unfavorably to the general economic welfare of a nation which had little natural aptitude for trade. Exactly how blighting its effects were, cannot be accurately determined, till far more minute and painstaking research has been accomplished in the still almost totally unexplored field of Spanish economic history.

In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a royal treasury (hacienda) was gradually organized for the collection and administration of these revenues. At the head of it was the almojafír or tesorero mayor; under him were a number of subordinates—diezmeros, cojedores, etc.—each of whom was charged with the collection of the revenue of the source or locality committed to his care, and its keep track of these officials and to check up their results. Nevertheless, there were constant complaints by the Cortes of the period concerning the harshness and corruption of the royal tax-gatherers. The procuradores doubtless exaggerated the extent of the evil, but their grievances were certainly not imaginary, particularly under the weaker kings. Curiously enough, the turbulent reign of John II
witnessed several efforts to estimate the yield of the different sources of revenue. Schedules of rates for the various customs houses were prepared in 1431 and 1446; and in 1429 a sort of budget was drawn up, in which the total annual income of the Royal Treasury was estimated at 60,812,930 maravedis. Payments were ordinarily made in money during this period, though contributions in kind were not wholly unknown.

Theoretically, then, the revenues to which the sovereigns of Castile were legally entitled were amply sufficient to provide for the needs of their government. Of all the sources of income which we have described, only one, the servicio was entirely within the control of the Cortes; the status of the empréstito and alcabala was possibly doubtful; but the levy and rate of the others remained entirely in the hands of the crown. The almost proverbial emptiness of the Castilian treasury thus demands some explanation; and the causes which combined to account for it may be briefly summarized as follows.

1. Exemptions. The payment of taxes was essentially an affair of the third estate—so much so, in fact, that the word pechero, or taxpayer, connoted an absence of social distinction. The exemption of the nobles and clergy was not in any sense complete; they were subject to many of the indirect taxes, notably (despite violent protests) to the alcabala, and to certain minor contributions for the upkeep of roads and bridges, and for the destruction of grasshoppers. Alfonso X, moreover, protested against the canons of the Lateran Council declaring all payments of imposts by the clergy to be of a voluntary or exceptional nature; and strenuous efforts were made by various Castilian sovereigns to prevent lay property from passing into clerical hands, and, in case it did so, to provide that it should continue to be taxable as before; still there is no denying that the wealthier portions of the community got off much more cheaply than they deserved. Local as well as class exemptions were not infrequent. Cities whose position exposed them to Moorish attacks were often granted immunity from certain imposts. Sometimes the crown handed over directly to the municipal treasury the product of some of the national taxes levied in that locality. And there were also countless special cases and individual immunities which defy classification. Certainly the incidence of national taxation was far from general or uniform.

2. The lavishness of the crown in grants and donations, of which we have had constant examples from the earliest days of the Reconquest. Since these grants were originally a product of the circumstances of the Moorish war, they might have been expected to cease when the enemy was limited to the little kingdom of Granada. Unfortunately the Castilian monarchs found the nobles at home even more difficult to cope with than the infidel abroad; and it was by the continuance and increase of ill-considered munificence that most of them purchased immunity from baronial revolt. Alfonso X started the ball rolling in the wrong direction, and Henry of Trastamara made matters much worse. In the reigns of John II and Henry IV the central power was so deeply abased that the barons scarcely waited for the crown to give but seized what they desired for themselves. Moreover, the confusion which had been suffered to grow up between the private personal patrimony of the king, and the national property of which he was the trustee, extended the scope of these royal donations. The monarchs disposed of both with equal freedom in this period, to the ruin of the national fortunes.

3. Last, but not least, the general state of anarchy, which marked the end of the Middle Ages in Castile, was incompatible with the prosperity of the national finances. It was literally impossible, under the conditions which actually prevailed, to collect the sums due to the crown. The restoration of the national resources in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella was not brought about by the invention of new imposts. It was not primarily due to the great Act of Resumption or to the annexation of the grand masterships. The fundamental explanation of it was the reestablishment of peace and strong government, which enabled the central power to make itself felt in every quarter of the realm, and made possible an approximation between the amount theoretically due to the crown and the sums which it was able to gather in.

Warfare was one of the principal occupations of mediaeval Castile, and the special function of the aristocracy; the caballero who was unable to provide himself with aims and a horse soon fell back into the social limitations of the ‘pecheros’. The first duty of all the nobles was to follow the king’s banner when called upon, with whatever forces they could muster; the privileges of the ricos hombres might entitle them to an invitation rather than a summons from the king to go to war, but they were supposed invariably to accept it. The higher clergy too were expected to accompany the monarch in his campaigns against the Moors, or if not, to send someone in their place; a kind of scutage was apparently paid by those who were unable to join the royal forces. The obligations of the municipalities were far less clear. Their fueros often entitled them to exemptions of one sort or another; but since every city was
Castilian forces was the valor of the individual soldiers—a quality in which the Spaniard has never been deficient, but one which, if unsupported by discipline and effective leadership, was bound to be useless. The rate of progress towards the desired goal was very slow. The best asset of the mediaeval army was that the Castilians were not heavily armed like those of France and England. The nobles and the military orders furnished a nucleus of knights of the standard mediaeval pattern (though their steeds were unprotected by armor), but the greater part of the Castilian cavalry consisted of genetes, so-called from the jennets or light courser which they rode. They were equipped with a steel cap, shield, and quilted jacket for defense, and a couple of darts or javelins which they hurled at their foes. Their favorite maneuver was to hover around and harass their opponents, in the hope of breaking their formation and gaining an opportunity for a swift charge. Against the Moors, who were similarly armed, these troops were fairly successful; but against a combination of knights and bowmen, such as had been evolved in the first half of the fourteenth century in England, they were almost powerless, as the battle of Navarrete (1367) was to prove. Unfortunately, the Castilians did not profit at once by the lessons of that fatal campaign. Heavier armor was only gradually and irregularly adopted by them in the succeeding century, and missile weapons did not make any notable progress till the days of Gonsalvo de Cordova; but on the other hand, the tradition of speed and mobility, inherited from the earliest times, was not forgotten, and was to be cleverly utilized by the Great Captain when he recreated the military forces of the Catholic Kings. The date of the introduction of gunpowder and cannon in Spain is a much-disputed point, but it is safe to say that neither attained any great importance until the final siege of Granada. For the capture of walled towns, huge catapults, movable wooden towers, and battering rams were usually employed. Tactics and strategy were practically nonexistent; only in the perennial occupation of devastating the enemy’s lands and terrorizing their defenseless population was there any sort of system. Yet even for these rudimentary stages of the development of the military art, a number of rules and regulations were evolved. The second of the Siete Partidas and the earlier Fuero Viejo de las Cabalgadas lay down laws for the conduct of campaigns and describe the military methods of the day.

The mediaeval Castilian navy was by no means equal to that of the realms of the Crown of Aragon; the fact that Castile had been deprived of the best part of her sea-board by the declaration of Portuguese independence is probably the best explanation of her backwardness in this respect. From the middle of the ninth to the middle of the eleventh century, the Galician, Cantabrian, and Asturian coasts were frequently raided by Scandinavian and occasionally by Moorish pirates. In 970 the former penetrated inland and sacked Santiago de Compostela; and, by a bit of poetic justice, it was one of the most famous archbishops of that ancient see—the restless Diego Gelmiirez—who afterwards took the lead in providing his native land with a navy adequate for her defence. As there was no one in Spain at that time who understood the art of naval instruction and navigation, he applied to the maritime republics of Italy for aid; and about the year 1120 he induced a Genoese master shipwright named...
Ogerio to come and visit Galicia. A dockyard was prepared at Iria; shipbuilding began; and before the end of the twelfth century a Christian fleet had fought the Moors on the sea. We must not suppose, however, that anything like a regularly organized Castilian navy existed at this early period.

The ships were owned by private persons or by the municipalities; if the sovereigns needed them for national purposes, they simply summoned them to their aid like the feudal array. The chief center of Castilian maritime affairs remained in the Biscayan ports down to the middle of the thirteenth century, when the scene of interest shifts to Seville. When St. Ferdinand captured that town with the aid of Ramón Bonifacio of Burgos, he rewarded the followers of his victorious admiral by granting them a special quarter of the conquered city, with special privileges and a special jurisdiction, and a number of naval men from the northwest migrated thither in the succeeding years. The office of almirante, as we have already seen, was created by Ferdinand III. From that time onward, Seville and the Guadalquivir became the naval center of Castile. Alfonso X, whose zeal for maritime affairs fully equaled that of his father, established a shipyard and arsenal there, and took the first steps towards the creation of a permanent royal navy for purposes of war. The capture of Cadiz from the Moors (September 14, 1262), which greatly enhanced the security and importance of Seville, may be regarded as the first signal triumph of the king’s ships. Meantime Alfonso also strove to keep alive the naval interest in the Biscayan towns. Whether new shipyards were constructed there is not certain; but a sort of subsidiary admiralty was created at Burgos to stimulate and direct the shipping of the northwestern ports, and the Castilian contingents which cooperated with the French against the English in the naval struggles of the Hundred Years’ War were chiefly recruited in that region. Altogether, the prestige of the Castilian navy, both in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, was distinctly high during the two centuries following the death of St. Ferdinand. Even England was not ashamed to take hints from it in the construction of ships, and in battle she treated it with marked respect. The naval foundations for Castile’s future career of imperial expansion to the westward were firmly laid before the close of the Middle Ages. One of the most essential links of the chain that bound the Reconquest to the conquest had been forged previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings.

The ships were of various sorts and sizes and depended for the most part on both oars and sails for their propulsion. The two principal types were the lighter vessels called cocas, which were introduced by the Cantabrians but chiefly used in the Mediterranean, and the heavier galleys or naves gruesas such as were employed in the Hundred Years’ War; the largest of these had complements of over two hundred men. There was no very notable variation in the general lines of construction during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though there were a number of minor improvements, and the size tended steadily to increase. Fighting was almost exclusively done in close contact by ramming and boarding; there is some reason to believe that Alfonso XI began to use artillery in his ships in his wars with the English navy, but it is by no means certain. The Partidas devote an entire chapter to “La Guerra que se faz por mar,” explaining in detail its rules and conditions, the number and quality of the men and the armament, and the ranks and duties of the different officers.

During the first five centuries of the Reconquest the conditions of existence rendered wellnigh impossible any considerable development of agriculture, pasturage, industry, or commerce; but when the Moors were at last driven back to the confines of Granada the earlier difficulties were largely removed, and serious efforts were made to develop the resources of the land. The agricultural problem was, of course, by far the most discouraging. Some progress was made, but not sufficient to enable the fields to support the population or to render their tillage generally profitable or successful. The lists of foodstuffs imported into the realm during this period plainly indicate its agricultural shortcomings; the natural infertility of the bulk of the land, coupled with the devastations of the war of the Reconquest, were a constant discouragement to activity in this direction, and stamped on the average Castilian an aversion to labor in the fields which has duned to him ever since, and was to affect most adversely his imperial ambitions at a later day. Pasturage, on the other hand, had flourished in the peninsula from the time of the Romans, and during the later Middle Ages made rapid strides. The rainy valleys of the northwest furnished admirable facilities for grazing sheep in the summers, as did the warmer plains of the south in the winters; during the intermediate seasons vast flocks were driven back and forth across the intervening lands along certain well-established routes called cañadas. Since the passage of the sheep could not fail to injure the agricultural interests of the localities which they traversed, there was a constant series of quarrels between farmers and graziers. The latter, in order to protect themselves against the complaints of their enemies, obtained permission, at least as early as the reign of Alfonso the Learned, to form themselves into an association or gild, called the ‘Mesta’, which secured from the crown, particularly under Alfonso XI, a number of important privileges, jurisdictions, and immunities,
and a regular code of laws defining them. The policy of favoring pasturage at the expense of agriculture, which was to be continued and carried much further under the Catholic Kings, was another contributory cause of Castile’s poor showing in the latter field.

The industrial and commercial organization of mediaeval Castile was naturally of a preeminently local type—far more so in fact than that of the other Western European states of the period, for the separatistic character of the country revealed itself in economic as well as in political affairs. The products of the different towns of the realm varied widely, as did the organization of the various gilds which controlled their output, and the lines of local custom houses discouraged communication between the different parts of the realm. The crown favored the establishment of annual or biennial fairs of two to four weeks’ duration in the principal cities, in order to facilitate the exchange of commodities. Those of Seville, Medina del Campo, and Murcia were perhaps the most important, but they did not suffice to break down or even seriously to lower the economic barriers by which the land was internally divided. Endless confusion in money, weights, and measures was an accompanying phenomenon of the times. Several different types of currency were in circulation, and also much debased coin; it will be remembered that the Scholar King himself set his subjects an evil example in this respect. The foreign commerce of the realm was in somewhat better case. The Castilian merchant marine developed rapidly during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, hand in hand with the Castilian navy, and Castilian traders were to be found in all the great markets of Western Europe. There was a gild of Biscayan pilots, established at Cadiz soon after the capture of the town from the Moors, and consuls were appointed every year to settle all questions which came up in connection with navigation and commerce. The idea of helping the nascent industries of the realm by the imposition of protective tariffs appears plainly in different places in the Alfonsine codes, and various aranceles or schedules of the period bear witness to the crown’s desire to regulate the commercial activities of the realm in accordance with universally applicable standards. The royal interference in this matter, however, was nothing in comparison with what it was to become in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs. Fishing, also, received the royal attention and encouragement from an even earlier date, and was expected to yield a portion of its profits to the crown; in a fuero which he granted to the little Biscayan town of Zarautz in the year 1237, St. Ferdinand provided that whenever the inhabitants succeeded in capturing a whale, they should give him a strip of its flesh the length of the body.

The intellectual life of Castile during the later Middle Ages was naturally somewhat stunted by the turbulence of the times. At the time of the accession of Alfonso the Learned, there was only one university in the realm—that of Salamanca—which had been projected in 1230 by Alfonso IX of Leon and was really founded twelve years later by St. Ferdinand. The Scholar King’s zeal for learning led him to draw up extensive regulations for it, and to confer upon it numerous privileges; and a long section in the Siete Partidas dealing with the organization of study in the realm bears further witness to Alfonso’s interest in education and to his determination to keep it under royal control. Without doubt he expected that other universities would soon spring up, and in 1293 his successor Sancho IV took the first measures to found a studium generale at Alcalá, which was to become under Ferdinand and Isabella the foremost centre of learning in Spain. But from Sancho’s reign to that of the Catholic Kings not a single new university was established in Leon or Castile, a fact which is the more remarkable when we consider that no less than six similar institutions were set up within the same period in the much smaller realms of the Crown of Aragon. Lack of governance was, as usual, the underlying cause. The kings, some of whom were really interested in education, and whose authority and control were, in theory at least, more dominant in university affairs than was the case in any other country in Europe, were too completely in the hands of the rebel baronage to be able to carry their plans into effect.

Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Castile was so completely wrapped up in its own internal troubles during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as to be incapable of literary, artistic, or scientific productivity, or deaf to the intellectual influences of other lands. In art, architecture, and literature one can easily find traces, all the way from Alfonso X to Ferdinand and Isabella, of the fashions of the other states of Western Europe, especially of Italy, with which Castile had numerous opportunities to become intimate owing to the Aragonese expansion in the Mediterranean. In painting, the style of Giotto was carried over to Castile by the Florentine artist Gherardo Stamina during the years 1380-87; a sort of ‘Giotto School’ was subsequently set up at Seville, but the attempts of the native Castilian painters to imitate the foreign models which had been set before them were not remarkably successful. In the reign of John II, a certain Nicolao Florentino, who was almost certainly none other than Dello Delli, visited Spain; the mural paintings in the apse of the old cathedral of Salamanca furnish perhaps
the best existing examples of the work that he did there. Flemish influences are also traceable in Castilian painting of the fifteenth century. The famous journey of Jan Van Eyck to the peninsula in 1428-29 was probably the origin of them, though their results were not evident in the work of the native artists till some thirty years afterwards.

In sculpture and architecture Gothic models began to be introduced from France in the course of the twelfth century, and gradually took their place beside the native styles; the cathedrals of Burgos, Toledo, and Leon (all begun in the thirteenth century) exhibit them at the climax, of their power, and the wonderful towers of the first named, which is usually considered the most beautiful church in Spain, were apparently the work of a fifteenth-century German, Meister Hans of Cologne. In architecture, however, the national and Moorish fashions were by no means forgotten. ‘Mudejar’ buildings of various sorts were constantly being erected in Castile till well into the sixteenth century. Indeed, traces of Arab influence keep continually cropping out even in edifices built by architects who had been imported from north of the Pyrenees. There was certainly no ‘pure’ style of any kind in the Castile of the later Middle Ages.

In the domain of literature Italian influence again comes to the fore. From the end of the fourteenth century onward, we find numerous writings which evince a keen appreciation and understanding of Dante, and a lively interest in Boccaccio; at times it almost seems that the popularity of the older literary works of the distinctively national type, like the Poema del Cid, was quite overshadowed by that of the new importations. Francisco Imperial, the son of a Genoese jeweler established at Seville, is generally regarded as the first of these Italianate Castilians; the famous Marquis of Santillana, Enrique de Villena, and Juan de Mena, carried the new fashion considerably further a half century afterwards. English literature also had some few followers in Castile during this period. Robert Gower’s Confessio Amantis was translated into Spanish by a certain Juan de Cuenca in the reign of John II, whose chief title to fame was his passion for learning and letters.

Altogether it is evident that in her intellectual as well as in her political life, Castile was no longer cut off from the rest of Western Europe, as she had been before the virtual accomplishment of the Reconquest by St. Ferdinand. The great national task on which the full force of her energies had been concentrated for five centuries was practically finished; she was beginning to reach out into new fields. Internal chaos prevented her from accomplishing anything very great in these new spheres of activity until the advent of strong government under the Catholic Kings, but at all events she had succeeded in immensely broadening her horizon. In every phase of the national life, the two centuries which followed the accession of Alfonso the Learned are a period of necessary transition between isolation and empire.
BOOK II
THE REALMS OF THE CROWN OF ARAGON
CHAPTER VI
ARAGON AND CATALONIA IN FRANCE, SPAIN, AND NORTH AFRICA

The interest of the mediaeval history of the realms of the Crown of Aragon lies quite as emphatically on the side of external expansion, as does that of the contemporaneous development of Castile in internal affairs and the war of the Reconquest. The Spanish Empire was even more preponderantly Aragonese in the Middle Ages, than Castilian in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We must therefore deal with the growth of the eastern realms in the Iberian Peninsula and the adjacent lands as rapidly as possible, in order to have more space to devote to their conquests overseas.

The origins of the little kingdom of Aragon are even more obscure than those of Asturias. It appears in the first place as a countship, rather than as an independent realm, and its original territories lay along the banks of the river Arago, from which it took its name. In the ninth century its capital was at Jaca; and it subsequently extended its dominions at the expense of the Moors in the regions of Sobrarbe and Ribagorza. In these early years of its existence, however, the question of its independence or subjection to foreign overlordship was far more important than the speed of its progress against the infidel. At first it seems to have been often under the suzerainty of the Frankish monarchs; at times, in all probability, it was virtually autonomous; but as the years went by it gradually fell more and more completely under the control of Navarre. This kingdom, by the middle of the ninth century, had successfully vindicated its independence of the domination of Charlemagne’s successors, thus greatly enhancing its own prestige, and incidentally weakening the Frankish hold over Aragon. The latter, on the other hand, was still too small and weak to be able permanently to dispense with outside protection and support; so that the Navarrese monarchs naturally fell heirs to all the authority over its rulers which they had forced the Carolingians to relinquish. For a time it was overlordship: later, owing to deaths, marriages, and unwise divisions of inheritances, it became considerably more. By the end of the tenth century Aragon had lost all claims to existence as a separate state; she had been practically absorbed by the kingdom of Navarre.

The next period saw Navarre take the lead of all the Iberian states, and for one brief moment unite them under her sceptre. The hero of this most glorious epoch of his country’s history was King Sancho the Great, who ruled from 970 to 1035. Already master of his own realm and of Aragon, he skillfully alternated and combined the time-honored methods of matrimony, intrigue, and war, to win for himself the succession in Castile, and the effective occupation of most of Leon. At the close of his life he ruled over an uninterrupted expanse of territory which stretched from the mountains of Galicia to the confines of the county of Barcelona. But it was not possible for such an extended realm to remain long united in mediaeval Spain. The reign of Sancho was a final and most brilliant outburst of the flame of Navarrese power south of the Pyrenees; but the succeeding period witnessed its virtual extinction. At his death in 1035 the great king divided his realms. To his eldest son, Garcia, he gave Navarre. To his second, Ferdinand, he left Castile and his claims to Leon, which the latter subsequently prosecuted with such vigor that the two kingdoms were united under his rule in 1037. To the third, Gonzalo, he gave Sobrarbe and Ribagorza, and to the fourth, Ramiro, the original territory of Aragon; as Gonzalo, however, soon after died and left no heirs, Ramiro was able to gather in his inheritance. The latter also increased his dominions by conquests to the south, and on his death in 1063 was able to leave to his son an Aragon territorially more extensive than ever before, and, for the first time, completely independent of foreign sovereignty.

From 1063 to 1134, the history of Aragon offers the usual spectacle of internal confusion, intrigues with the neighboring realms, and sporadic progress against the Moor. In 1076 the murder of the Navarrese king gave it an opportunity to turn the tables on the realm which had previously absorbed it; for fifty-eight years after that date Navarre was annexed to Aragon. The most famous monarch of this stormy period was Alfonso the Warrior (1104-34), whom we have already encountered as the second husband of Urraca of Leon and Castile, and a notable disturber of the peace of those kingdoms. His victories over the Moors have entitled him to a fairer fame. Under his leadership the Christian arms were carried across the Ebro. In 1118 Saragossa was taken—an event which, for Aragon, is comparable
to the capture in 1085 of Toledo for Castile; the surrender of many minor places to the south of it followed shortly afterwards, and raids were made into Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, as far as the shores of the Mediterranean. Unfortunately Alfonso had no surviving children to whom he could leave these conquests; he therefore provided in his will that his dominions should be parcelled out between the Templars and the Knights Hospitallers. As this arrangement, however, was highly distasteful to his subjects both in Aragon and in Navarre, they coolly ignored it, and both states chose new rulers to suit themselves. The Navarrese, who were above all anxious to regain their autonomy, elected as their sovereign a grandnephew of their king who had been murdered in 1076; from the descendants of this monarch the realm finally passed, in 1234, into French hands for more than two centuries, so that we lose sight of it henceforth for a long time to come.

The Aragonese, in the meantime, dragged from a monastery in Narbonne a brother of their late king, named Ramiro, and set him on their throne. Nay more, in order to make the succession safe, they persuaded this Ramiro to procure a papal dispensation from his vows of celibacy, and to marry a sister of the duke of Aquitaine. But Ramiro had no desire or talent for reigning. The nobles were restless at home. The Moors harried his frontiers. Navarre and Castile on the north and west clamed for revenge for the insults and humiliations to which they had been subjected by the late king. Alfonso the Emperor actually invaded the realm, and temporarily incorporated Saragossa and other towns in the domains of the crown of Castile; only by recognizing his feudal overlordship was it possible to check his advance. Ramiro was only too glad to acknowledge himself incompetent to cope with all these dangers, and when, in 1135, his Aquitanian wife presented him with a daughter, Petronilla, he saw a way out of his difficulties. The little princess was betrothed while still in the cradle to Ramon Berenguer IV, the reigning count of Catalonia, with a provision for the latter’s succession to the Aragonese throne in case Petronilla should die without issue. The important support of the powerful eastern countship was thus secured against the manifold dangers which threatened Aragon at home and abroad, and the continuance of that support was guaranteed in the future by the assured prospect of the union of the crowns. Ramiro, on his own confession incapable of reigning, had probably done more for his native land than a powerful monarch could have accomplished. In 1137 he retired into a monastery, leaving his infant daughter under the guardianship of her future husband. He had certainly earned his rest.

The separation of Aragon from Navarre, and its union with the county of Catalonia, are epoch-making events in the history of Spain and also of the Spanish Empire. Ramiro could not possibly have foreseen the consequences of his work. He had sought union with the eastern state as a means of protecting Aragon against foreign and internal dangers. What he had really accomplished was far more than that; he had changed the whole current of his country’s development and laid the basis for her imperial domain. Hitherto her history had been, like that of Leon, Castile, and Navarre, an alternation of internal feuds and Moorish raids. Her attention had never been directed to events beyond the limits of the peninsula. She was narrow, self-absorbed, and totally without cosmopolitanism or ambitions for empire. Now, all at once, her destinies were I permanently linked with a state of Frankish origin, whose boundaries crossed the Pyrenees, which was possessed of a long seacoast and splendid harbors, and whose fleets had already begun to cruise in the Mediterranean Sea. An entirely new and dazzling prospect was suddenly opened before her. Naturally she could not abandon and forget all her ancient traditions in a moment. On the contrary, she clung to them tenaciously, and the fact that she maintained her separate institutions (despite the union of the crowns) gave her an opportunity to assert herself which she did not neglect. Still, the operation of Catalanian influence, however strongly resisted, was bound ultimately to make itself felt; and though the name of the kingdom prevailed generally over that of the county in designating the united realms, the triumph of the maritime, commercial, and imperial influence of the latter is evident in the diminishing effectiveness of the Aragonese opposition to the great ventures of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which emanated from Catalonia. The coincidence that Castile was partially shut off from access to the sea by the declaration of the independence of Portugal, at almost precisely the same moment that Aragon acquired its union with Catalonia, produced results of lasting importance. It explains why Spain’s first imperial ventures were made to the eastward, in the Mediterranean Sea, rather than to the westward in the Atlantic. Had the positions been reversed, the history of the two chief states of the peninsula in the next three centuries would in all probability have been utterly different, and the policies of the empire which arose from their united resources more different still.

In an earlier chapter we have had occasion to speak briefly of the Frankish origin of the county of Catalonia, of its attainment of independence of French control in the end of the ninth century, of its subsequent turning on the land that gave it birth and annexing, at its expense, important territories north of the Pyrenees. At the time of its union with Aragon in 1137, these territories included Cerdagne and the greater part of Provence, Millau, and Gévauden—the lion’s share of the country of the Langue
d’Oc—a generous portion of the south of France. In the next two generations these Catalanian holdings were further augmented by the addition of Roussillon (1172), and, under foreign suzerainty, of Montpellier (1204), by the acquisition of the overlordship of Foix, of Nîmes, and of Beziers (between 1162 and 1196), and by temporary extension of direct authority over the county of Urgel. But the counts of Catalonia were also interested in expansion in other directions than across the Pyrenees in France. They bore their share in expeditions to the southward against the Moors. Though their gains in that direction were not very permanent, they had raidied the lands of the infidel as far as Murcia before the end of the eleventh century. Last but not least, they had already evinced a lively interest in maritime affairs. In 1114-15, in alliance with the Pisans, they had made an expedition against Majorca and Ivi. Its success in its main objective was but evanescent, as the Moors soon retook the islands, but it led indirectly to the permanent occupation of Tarragona and the neighboring coast, which had not hitherto been safe from Moorish attack. Maritime commerce also began to flourish. Barcelona was already known as a seaport of real importance. Clearly, then, at the time of its union with Aragon, the Catalanian state was confronted with a large variety of opportunities for growth and expansion in at least three different directions—northward in France, southward in Spain, eastward in the Mediterranean Sea. Vital, ambitious, and cosmopolitan, reinforced and encouraged by the acquisition of Aragon, the descendants of Ramon and Petronilla began to push their fortunes with equal vigor in all these fields at once, but with very different success. In France, after heroic efforts, the tide turned against them and they had to acknowledge defeat. In the south, against the Moors, under the leadership of Aragon, they succeeded in annexing those portions of the peninsula in which they had not been forestalled by their neighbors on the west. The capture of Valencia was the crown and fine flower of the Reconquest on the eastward, but, as we have already seen, the glory of driving the Moors out of Spain is preeminently the glory of Castile. It was to the eastward, in the Mediterranean, that the destiny of the Aragonese-Catalonian state really lay; and even before the possibilities of expansion by land had been entirely exhausted, on the north by failure, and on the south through accomplished success and the fact that there was no more territory to regain, Catalonia had perceived that the future of the eastern kingdoms was on the sea. From that moment onward she proudly led the way, with Aragon rather reluctantly tagging at her heels.

Everything which it is essential for us to know in the narrative and external history of the realms of the Crown of Aragon down to the middle of the fifteenth century may, in fact, be most conveniently summarized under these three heads: the loss of the French lands; the completion of the Aragonese reconquest in Spain and the ensuing relations with the Moslem powers of Granada and North Africa; and the acquisition of an empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean. The first two were virtually accomplished before the end of the reign of James the Conqueror in 1276, and may, therefore, be dismissed in short space in the present chapter. The history of the third, on the other hand, is exceedingly complicated and difficult, and prolongs itself not only to the close of the mediaeval period but beyond. The study of it will, therefore, necessarily demand more space, and will involve some investigation of the principal events of the different reigns in chronological order; for, with a single possible exception, every one of the Aragonese kings from James the Conqueror downward was more or less intimately concerned with the development and increase of the Aragonese possessions beyond the seas. But though, for the sake of convenience, we shall take up these different lines of development one by one, it would be the greatest possible mistake to conceive of them as unconnected with one another or as succeeding each other in any strict chronological order. In the critical period of the thirteenth century, they were all closely interdependent and synchronous. The loss of the French lands, though chiefly caused by the events of the reign of Pedro II (1196-1213), was not formally legalized till the treaty of Corbeil in 1258, twenty years after the conquest of Valencia had virtually completed the reconquest of the eastern part of the peninsula. The conquest of Valencia was undertaken largely in deference to the demands of the kingdom of Aragon, which had been somewhat offended by the fact that King James had given precedence to the maritime ambitions of his favorite Catalanians, and had sent out the first expedition against the Balearics nine years before. It was only after the Conqueror’s death that the Mediterranean program of the East Spanish realms began to eclipse their activities in other directions.

The story of the gain and loss of the lands north of the Pyrenees was largely determined by the fact that the Aragonese-Catalonian sovereigns, like their Castilian contemporaries to the westward, were often unable to resist the temptation to divide their inheritance by will be-tween their different children. Though well-planned marriages, assertions of feudal suzerainty, and fortunate extinctions of collateral lines not seldom served to draw the errant portions of their extended domains together, the Aragonese sovereigns were so addicted to the practice of division that any hopes of permanently welding all their
lands into a single homogeneous realm were necessarily foredoomed to failure. Ramon Berenguer III (1096-1131), who, as we have already seen, was one of the founders of the territorial greatness of Catalonia north of the Pyrenees, was also one of the most flagrant offenders in this regard. To his eldest son, Ramon Berenguer IV, the husband of Petronilla of Aragon, he left only the lands south of the mountains; the French territories, which he had labored so hard to augment, passed to a younger son, Berenguer Ramon. Fortunately, instead of flying at one another’s throats at fratricidal strife according to the Castilian fashion, the two sons of Ramon Berenguer III maintained most cordial relations with one another. Nay more, when the younger was threatened in the possession of his domains in France, the elder, in alliance with the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, successfully maintained him and his heirs in the possession of their lawful inheritance. A happy result of this act of fraternal loyalty was the temporary reunion of all the territories north and south of the Pyrenees under Alfonso II, the son and heir of Ramon Berenguer IV, who possessed himself of Provence on the death without male heirs of his cousin, the son of Berenguer Ramon, and subsequently defended himself there against the attacks of the count of Toulouse. But unfortunately the old mistake was once more repeated in the next generation, and in a manner which prepared the way for the final loss of the French holdings in the thirteenth century. Alfonso II (1162-96), who had inherited all the lands on both sides of the mountains, was also successful in increasing them. We have already seen that Roussillon and the feudal suzerainty of Nimes and the adjacent lands were acquired under his rule. To the south, also, he made notable advances against the Moors, taking from them the territories about Caspe and Albarracin, and founding the city of Teruel. In 1177, moreover, he captured Cuenca for his ally, the king of Castile, who, in gratitude for this notable service, withdrew the claim of feudal overlordship over Aragon which Castile had maintained, in theory at least, since the days of Alfonso the Emperor. But it was probably this very preoccupation about Spanish affairs that led Alfonso of Aragon to turn over Aragon which Castile had maintained, in theory at least, since the days of Alfonso the Emperor. To the south, also, he made notable advances against the Moors, taking from them the territories about Caspe and Albarracin, and founding the city of Teruel. In 1177, moreover, he captured Cuenca for his ally, the king of Castile, who, in gratitude for this notable service, withdrew the claim of feudal overlordship over Aragon which Castile had maintained, in theory at least, since the days of Alfonso the Emperor. But it was probably this very preoccupation about Spanish affairs that led Alfonso of Aragon to turn over the administration of Provence to his brothers Ramon Berenguer and Sancho, and finally, in 1193, to his second son, who bore his father’s name. On the elder Alfonso’s death in 1196, this second son inherited Provence and some of the smaller territories adjacent to it, under the feudal suzerainty of his elder brother Pedro; while the latter succeeded his father as ruler of all the Spanish lands south of the Pyrenees, together with Roussillon, and later acquired Urgel and the fief of Montpellier. But Provence had once more passed out of the direct possession of the kings of Aragon, and this time it never really returned.

The confusion and disunion which reigned in these Aragonese-Catalonian holdings north of the Pyrenees were greatly increased, at the close of the twelfth century, by the progress of the heresy of the Albigenses. Alfonso of Provence strove hard, and for a long time successfully, to prevent his lands from being involved, but numerous converts were made within the French territories of his brother and feudal suzerain Pedro of Aragon; while Raymond, count of Toulouse, who had married Pedro’s sister Eleanor, was the staunch friend of the heretics from the beginning, and did his utmost to enlist the sympathies of the Aragonese monarch in their behalf. But King Pedro was still a most devoted son of the church. In November, 1204, he actually went to Rome to receive the crown of Aragon at the hands of Innocent III, declaring himself at the same time the faithful vassal of the Holy See, and even promising the payment of an annual tribute. Eight years later he played a prominent and heroic part in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa against the Moors, and Innocent III doubtless felt that when the affair of the Albigenses should finally come to a head he could count on the active support of the king of Aragon. During the early years of the thirteenth century the crisis gradually approached. Despite the thunderings of St. Dominic, the heresy increased so fast as to constitute a real menace to the Church; and at last the murder of Pierre de Castelnau, the papal legate, on January 15, 1208, gave the signal for an army of crusaders to collect under the banner of Simon de Montfort, and carry flame and sword throughout the Albigensian lands. For four years more, until after the campaign of Las Navas had been concluded, Pedro abstained from taking arms, and did his best to mediate between the belligerents. But in the year 1213 his hesitations came to an end. The Moorish danger was past. The Pope had refused his offers of mediation. His subjects, who had suffered cruelly from de Montfort’s armies, begged him to intervene. His brother-in-law, the count of Toulouse, came and threw himself on his protection. Honor, and loyalty to his relations and vassals, forbade him any longer to withhold his hand. First he made sure that the king of France would hold aloof. Then, after signing an offensive alliance with the counts of Foix and Toulouse, he gathered his armies and declared war on Simon de Montfort. Finally, on September 12, 1213, the rival forces met on the plain beneath the ramparts of Muret. The battle there was brief and decisive. The generalship of de Montfort and the exhortations of St. Dominic rendered the charge of the crusaders irresistible. Their victory was speedy and complete, and the body of King Pedro was found among the slain.
The results of the Albigensian crusade presaged the ruin of the power of Aragon in the south of France. The war kept on during the minority of Pedro’s son James, Simon de Montfort continuing to advance until his own death in 1218. His son Amaury inherited his claims, but, being unable to substantiate them unaided, finally made them over to Louis VIII, king of France, who captured in rapid succession Avignon, Nimes, and Carcassonne (1226), and all the country up to the walls of Toulouse. By the peace of Paris in 1229, Nimes, Beziers, and Carcassonne were ceded to the French crown, without regard to the Aragonese claims of feudal suzerainty; and in the succeeding years the count of Toulouse further complicated matters by turning around on the ancient allies of his house, attacking the count of Provence, cousin and feudal vassal of the king of Aragon, and even attempting to oust the latter from the tenure of Montpellier.

By this time James the Conqueror, the son and successor of Pedro the Catholic, had reached man’s estate and was firmly seated on his throne. In 1226 also St. Louis had become king of France; so that the claims of the two states were worthily represented wherever they came in conflict. Of the two monarchs James was decidedly in the less advantageous position, and his only hope of complete success lay in uniting the rival counts of Provence and Toulouse in amity with one another and in joint allegiance to himself. To this truly Herculean task he bent his efforts during the crucial year 1241, but without success. Divorce and remarriage were to be the means to the end. The count of Toulouse was to be separated from his wife in order that he might be wedded to Sancha, the third daughter of the count of Provence; it was doubtless James’s ultimate intention that the issue of this union should someday marry one of his own descendants, and thus pave the way for the reunion of all the Aragonese holdings south and north of the Pyrenees. The divorce was duly secured; but the long interval which elapsed between the death of Pope Gregory IX and the election of his successor caused fatal delays in securing the dispensation for the count’s second marriage, and in the meantime the lady who had been selected for him became the bride of Richard of Cornwall. With Sancha thus disposed of, the Conqueror centred his attentions on her younger sister Beatrice. It seems probable that he favored a scheme of substituting her for her sister as the bride of the count of Toulouse in the early part of 1245: but when her father died on August 19 of that year, he suddenly changed his tactics, and advanced to Aix in the hope of seizing her for himself; had he been successful in so doing, there is little doubt that he would have found means of making her his wife. But he had not a sufficient number of troops to enable him to carry out the attempt, and on January 31, 1246, he was once more forestalled by the celebration of the marriage of Beatrice to the redoubtable Charles of Anjou. With this, all hope of Aragon’s retaining Provence vanished forever. All that the Conqueror could hope for hereafter was to retain the scattering bits of French territory which he continued to claim or hold farther westward, some as feudal suzerain, some as vassal, and others in full ownership.

Of these the most important and also by far the most troublesome was the county of Montpellier, which had been acquired in 1204 by the marriage of its heiress, the granddaughter of the Eastern Emperor Manuel Comnenus, to James’s father, Pedro the Catholic. Its suzerainty, however, had been retained by the bishops of MAGUELONNE, who were almost never on good terms with the kings of Aragon and tended to support against them the counter claims of the kings of France. On the other hand, the ancient pretensions of the French monarchs south of the mountains, in the county of Barcelona or Spanish Mark, had never been entirely forgotten; and they had been recently revived, doubtless in retaliation for James’s intrigues with the counts of Provence and Toulouse. There were, moreover, an enormous number of conflicting claims of a minor nature, provocative of ill will and of occasional acts of violence. Obviously, from every point of view, the time was ripe for a definite and permanent settlement of all these outstanding questions. At last, on March 14, 1258, at Tortosa, the king of Aragon appointed three commissioners to take up the whole series of problems with France, and also to arrange, if possible, a marriage between his daughter Isabella and Philip, the second son of Louis IX. These representatives finally found the French court at Corbeil, near Paris; and there, on May 12, signed a treaty in which the king of France renounced all claim to Barcelona, Urgel, Besaltsi, Ampurias, Gerona, and Osona, south of the Pyrenees, and to Roussillon, Cerdagne, and the subsidiary territories of Conflans and Valespir, to the north of them; while the commissioners for the king of Aragon gave up his rights in Carcassonne, Agde, Foix, Beziers, Nimes, Albi, Redes, Narbonne, Toulouse, Millau, and Gévaudan, and all other territories north of the mountains over which he pretended to authority or jurisdiction, save Montpellier, which he retained under the suzerainty of the king of France. The marriage contract of Philip and Isabella was drawn up at the same time, and both treaties were confirmed on July 16, 1258, by James the Conqueror at Barcelona; and on the following day the king of Aragon solemnly divested himself of any last shadow of a title to the possession of the suzerainty of Provence, by making over all his claims to that territory to Margaret, the eldest daughter of the late count, who had married Louis IX.
In general the king of Aragon was undeniably the loser in this treaty. The rights to the lands south of the Pyrenees which Louis IX renounced may have been historically and theoretically valid in the eyes of a feudal lawyer, but they were for all practical purposes obsolete; while the Aragonese claims to Provence and most of the other French possessions which James the Conqueror gave up rested on far more recent and solid foundations. Geographically, however, the facts were on the whole against him, as was also his constant preoccupation with outside matters; though we may incidentally observe that his sporadic though unsuccessful efforts to acquire Navarre may be regarded as an attempt to indemnify himself for his losses at Corbeil. On the other hand, we must remember that the Conqueror’s territorial losses in France, though heavy, were as yet by no means absolutely complete. Cerdagne and Roussillon and Montpellier (the latter under French suzerainty) still remained, and, in pursuance of the ineradicable Spanish practice of dividing royal inheritances, were erected, together with the Balearic Islands, into a separate realm with the title of the kingdom of Majorca; this kingdom was conferred at the Conqueror’s death on his younger son James, under the suzerainty of the latter’s elder brother, the heir of Aragon. The relations of the subsidiary dynasty thus set up with the sovereigns of the older line were distinctly the reverse of cordial, and finally, in the reign of Pedro IV, gave way to open war, with the ultimate result that Cerdagne, Roussillon, and the Balearics were reunited to the Crown of Aragon, and Montpellier was sold by its despairing sovereign to the king of France. The lopping off of that rich fief, however, put a term to the losses of the Crown of Aragon north of the Pyrenees for over three centuries to come. Cerdagne and Roussillon, save for a temporary session to France in the end of the fifteenth century, continued to remain in Spanish hands until the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659.

From the story of the loss of the Aragonese lands in France, we pass to that of the completion of the Aragonese reconquest in Spain and its results, and therewith return once more to the reign of James the Conqueror. His grandfather and father before him had set him a glorious example by their victories against the Moors; the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa had been fought when the Conqueror was four years old, and the story of it may well have been the delight of his childhood hours. But the memory of that great campaign served not only to recall past triumphs to the mind of the youthful king; it also spurred him on to seek new ones. Though it had been won by the united armies of Christian Spain, its fruits had been reaped almost exclusively by Castile. The eastern realms had gained much glory but little land; and James was determined to right the balance, and increase the extent of his peninsular dominions.

It was some time, however, before the young king could give his attention to foreign conquest. He had not completed his sixth year, when his father’s death before the walls of Muret left him heir to a realm with sadly diminished prestige; indeed, he remained a prisoner for several months in the hands of Simon de Montfort, before a stern mandate from Pope Innocent III procured his release. Suppression of internal rebellion occupied all his energies during the next fourteen years. Everyone seized the opportunity afforded by the weakness of the monarchy to compass his own advantage; not until the year 1228 could the young king call his throne his own. By this time his character had fully developed. Warmth and intensity of passion, both good and bad, formed its basis; restraint and self-control had no part in it at all. Waves of ferocious anger and tender pity succeeded one another like the showers of an April day. In the heat of a terrible campaign against the Valencian Moors, when it was essential for him to be everywhere at once, he found that a swallow had made her nest by the roundel of his tent, and “so I ordered the men not to take it down till the swallow had taken flight with her young ones, as she had come trusting in my protection”. None could punish or avenge more cruelly; none, on the other hand, could be more generous or loyal to his friends. His valor in war was famous throughout Western Europe; yet he could not bear to sign a death warrant, “and when it was necessary to let justice take its course, he bewailed the heavy responsibility of being forced to cause a man to die”. He was a scandal to Christendom for his licentiousness; “but the fault seemed the less, when allowance was made for his unrivalled beauty and his noble and gentle mien, which caused all women to cast longing eyes upon him, so that his only problem was to choose between them”. His genius was preeminently military. He inherited notable ability in this respect from his maternal great-grandfather, the Emperor Manuel Comnenus, and it is as a warrior and conqueror that he won his most enduring fame; but as a statesman, administrator, and lawgiver he stood very high, while his various literary productions, as well as those of his descendants, have earned for the sovereigns of the house of Barcelona an honorable place in the history of mediaeval poetry and prose. With such energy and versatility, it was obvious, now that the factions had been dominated at home, that the new king would not long rest content without embarking on conquests abroad. The rich kingdom of Valencia still remained in Moorish hands, and offered a tempting prey. The heart of the kingdom of Aragon was set on acquiring
Some preliminary measures had, in fact, already been taken. As early as 1225, three years before the flames of civil war had been entirely extinguished within the realm, a strong force had been launched against the fortress of Peñíscola, a miniature Gibraltar, some forty miles south of Tortosa. The campaign was unsuccessful; but when word came of renewed preparations in the following year, Abu Zeid, the Moorish king of Valencia, took alarm and offered to pay tribute to the extent of one fifth of his revenues as the price of peace. James gladly accepted these terms, the more so as the success of his projected campaign was, for the time being, more than dubious; but three years later, on the very eve of his departure for the conquest of Majorca, the whole affair was reopened by the dethronement of Abu Zeid, who fled to the court of Aragon to demand the Conqueror’s aid in the recovery of his realm. All that James could do for the moment was to conclude a most advantageous treaty with the Moorish sovereign, in which he promised the latter the military aid he desired in exchange for an extensive territorial compensation. Abu Zeid, however, was unable to regain his kingdom, so that in 1232, on his return from his third visit to the Balearics, the Conqueror prepared to take up the question of the Valencian campaign and press it vigorously himself. Adequate pretexts for war were not lacking. The new Valencian ruler who had displaced Abu Zeid was contemptuous and belligerent; he refused to pay all the tribute due to Aragon since James’s treaty with his predecessor, and even raided the Christian lands. Funds were granted by the Cortes of Aragon and Catalonia. Abu Zeid, going beyond the terms of the treaty of 1229, now transferred to the Conqueror all his claims to his former kingdom. A bull of Pope Gregory IX, declaring the forthcoming campaign to be a crusade, was published with due solemnity at Monzón. In January 1233, the campaign began, interest centering in the siege of the little town of Burriana on the seacoast north of Valencia. The forces engaged on both sides were apparently very small, despite the exaggerated estimates of earlier writers, but the resistance was heroic, and the place did not fall till midsummer. In the succeeding months, most of the towns northward from Burriana to the Catalonian border, including Peñíscola, surrendered to the forces of the king of Aragon.

The years 1234 and 1235 saw a lull in the Valencian campaigns, the Conqueror’s attention being chiefly occupied with his marriage with Violante of Hungary, and with disputes with the sovereigns of France, Castile, and Navarre. In 1236, however, he returned to the attack and possessed himself, after considerable resistance, of the fortress of Puig de Cibolla, twelve miles north of Valencia, and two miles from the coast, valuable as a base of operations against the Moorish capital. During the next year and a half, the king’s attention was again distracted by other problems in the northern part of his dominions. The unpatriotic conduct of the Aragonese nobles, who placed the maintenance of their privileges before the welfare of the realm, gave him constant cause for alarm. In the summer of 1237, the Moorish sovereign of Valencia attacked Puig with a large force and was only with great difficulty beaten off. Finally, however, in January 1238, all other difficulties were cleared away, and the Conqueror led his armies to the southward, swearing a solemn oath not to return to Catalonia or to Aragon until Valencia was in his hands. A proposal of the Moorish sovereign to hand over a number of strongholds and to pay an annual tribute of 10,000 byzants in return for peace, elicited from James the ominous reply that ‘he intended to have both the hen and the chickens’; and so deeply were the Moors impressed by the vigor of his preparations, that before the end of April the most of the country north of the Guadalaviar surrendered itself at discretion. The siege of the city of Valencia now began. At first James’s army did not exceed 1500 men, but subsequent reinforcements, some of them from foreign lands, brought it up to several times that number. At one time, a fleet of twelve galleys arrived from Tunis to succor the beleaguered town, but it sailed away without accomplishing anything. The details of the siege are of the characteristic mediaeval sort. They exhibit the Conqueror’s military skill, and occasionally the ferocity of his vengeance against those who resisted him. When the defenders of one of the city’s towers refused to yield, the tower was set on fire and its inmates burned alive, despite subsequent offers of surrender. In September it became obvious that the town could hold out no longer, and generous terms of capitulation were finally granted by James, who permitted the inhabitants to depart with their goods, and promised them an escort as far as Cullera, some twenty-five miles to the southward. The bishops and nobles, when they learned of this arrangement, “lost color, as if someone had stabbed them to the heart”, so disappointed were they at being deprived of an opportunity to enrich themselves; but the king was undeterred by their grumblings, and actually executed some of his own soldiers who dared to offer violence to the departing Moors. The surrender of Valencia virtually placed in James’s hands all the towns north of the Jucar, except Denia and Cullera, which remained temporarily in Moorish control; and five years later an infidel raid into the conquered land gave him a pretext for attacking the strip of territory which lay between the Jucar and the confines of Murcia. Jativa and Biar alone offered effective resistance, but the first surrendered in June, 1244, and the second
in February, 1245; and with the expulsion of the Moorish king from Cullera and his voluntary surrender of Denia the triumph of the Conqueror was complete. His difficulties had not been lessened during the campaign by the fact that representatives of his future son-in-law, Alfonso the Infante of Castile, constantly hovered around with the obvious intention of picking up whatever territories they could for their master—a performance which the entirely indefinite state of the boundaries rendered less difficult than might have been supposed. Though furious at this invasion of his rights, the Conqueror saw that he could not afford, at that moment, to quarrel with Alfonso; and in March, 1244, a temporary arrangement for the division of the disputed territories was made between the two realms. The line then adopted, however, was soon destined to be rectified to the advantage of the king of Aragon, as the sequel will show.

During the next eighteen years James was so busy with other cares that he did not push his conquests against the Moors any further in the Iberian Peninsula. In 1263, however, a fresh opportunity came, when the Moorish ruler of the province of Murcia, who had been suffered by his Castilian conquerors to remain and to retain some measure of autonomy, was incited by the Emir of Granada to break out in revolt. Alfonso X had, as usual, far too many irons in the fire himself to undertake the task of quelling the insurrection; he therefore sent his wife to beg aid of his father-in-law, who, with wise generosity determined, against the advice of his counsellors, not to refuse it; for “if the king of Castile happen to lose his land”, he shrewdly remarked, “I shall hardly be safe in mine”. An exhortation from Pope Clement IV contributed to whet his crusading ardor; and in 1265 the Conqueror invaded Murcia. Until he sat down before the capital of the realm in 1266, his advance was little more than a triumphal procession. Most of the towns gave up without striking a blow, though the surrender of Elche had to be accelerated by a brief interview with one of its notables, during which James seized the opportunity to drop “into the sleeve of his gown 300 byzants”, at which “he was delighted, and promised on his Law that he would do all he could for my advantage.” A month’s siege was necessary before the city of Murcia would consent to treat, but in February, 1266, it bowed to the inevitable, and with its fall the resistance of the surrounding country was at an end. When James returned to Valencia in the following April, he left 10,000 men behind him to prevent a recurrence of the revolt. A number of Catalans, moreover, were subsequently transplanted to Murcia and settled there, and lands were freely distributed to some of the Aragonese nobles who had aided in the conquest. The possession of the entire territory, however, was definitely given over by the Conqueror to Castile, in loyal fulfilment of his plighted word; and Alfonso the Learned lost no time in formally incorporating it in his own dominions.

The boundary between it and the Aragonese kingdom of Valencia remained in doubt until the year 1304, when it was finally drawn under Portuguese arbitration, as we have already seen, considerably to the south of the line fixed by James and Alfonso in 1244? The resulting enlargement of the lands of the king of Aragon may be fairly regarded as a recognition of the fact that James had done the lion’s share of the work of subjugating the Murcian realm and deserved some territorial reward an important turning point in the history of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. From henceforth they were no longer contiguous at any point to land held by the infidel; and this fact exercised an important influence on the development of their national ambitions and ideals. On the one hand, it naturally caused them to lose interest in the great task of expelling the Moors from the peninsula, because they could no longer hope to reap any territorial reward from its accomplishment. When Granada should fall, Castile, which completely encircled it on the land side, would obviously be the sole beneficiary; the western kingdom, therefore, now became more than ever the land of the Reconquest par excellence. But there were other sides to the picture as well. If Granada was ‘a hope for Castile’, whose capture would bring a great reward, it was also, until that capture should be effected, very much of a thorn in her side. Aragon had no such thorn, and could, therefore, concentrate freely on other things—especially on her career of maritime expansion to the eastward—in a way that was impossible for her western neighbor. Moreover, in that career of expansion and in other matters, she needed no longer to feel herself burdened, as Castile, in theory if not in practice, still was, by the weight of mediaeval crusading traditions. She was comparatively free to deal with the Moorish states of Granada and North Africa on the same basis as she would with any foreign land—to make commercial treaties and traffic with them, to forget that they were the ‘hereditary foe’. What she lost in possibilities of territorial aggrandizement within the peninsula, Aragon more than regained by increased freedom of action outside of it. All these different considerations go far towards explaining the wide divergence between the paths travelled by the eastern and western portions of Spain during the period previous to their union.

The points that have been made in the preceding paragraph are well illustrated by the story of the relations of Aragon to Granada and the Moorish states of North Africa during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Towards Granada her attitude was primarily determined by the ebbs and flows of her policy in regard to Castile and Morocco. It was during the reign of James II (1291—1327), who made
forces; they were also usually subject to recall at the will of their lawful sovereigns; but they were preponderantly friendly was due chiefly to the fact that Aragon was so often in difficulties with Castile that she could not afford to neglect any obvious opportunity to make trouble for her; and the settlement of the Murcian boundary removed all cause of hostility between Aragon and Castile. The natural result of these developments was that the king of Aragon made common cause with the king of Morocco against Granada, and sent him a fleet, with the aid of which he was able to expel the latter from Ceuta; then, joining forces with the king of Castile, the Aragonese monarch attacked the Emir of Granada in his own dominions. But the results of the campaign were disappointing. The capture of the town of Almeria had been assigned as his share to James of Aragon, but though he remained four months and three days before the town, and won a notable battle outside its walls, he was unable to take it. The siege was raised on January 26, 1310, and though peace was not finally made between the two states until thirteen years later, James’s failure before Almeria may justly be said to mark the last appearance of Aragon as a ‘reconquering power’. Thenceforth her relations to Granada were determined solely by the political exigencies of the moment. They varied almost from year to year, but it is not worthwhile to follow them in detail. That they were preponderantly friendly was due chiefly to the fact that Aragon was so often in difficulties with Castile that she could not afford to neglect any obvious opportunity to make trouble for her; and the desire of Aragon to maintain mercantile relations with Morocco also doubtless contributed to the same result. The only notable deviation from this policy occurred in 1340, when Aragon made common cause with Castile to repel the last great Moorish invasion from across the Strait, which was supported by the Granadan king. The fate of that expedition has already been recounted. It only remains to observe that the king of Aragon hastened to make peace with both Morocco and Granada at the earliest opportunity, in 1345, leaving Alfonso XI of Castile to conduct alone his final campaign against the infidel.

If Aragon, in this period, was far less deeply involved with Granada than was Castile, she was much more intimately concerned than was her western neighbor with the Moorish states of North Africa. Castile, as we have already seen, was frequently brought into contact with the Merinite rulers of Morocco through her bickerings with the Emirs of Granada; and the North African lands to the west of the Muluya River were specifically assigned to her as a field for conquest under an arrangement between Sancho IV and James II of Aragon in 1291. But at the same time that she obtained recognition of the priority of her own rights in the territories to the west of the Muluya, Castile conceded to Aragon the same privileges in those to the east of it; and the majority of the Aragonese sovereigns strove their hardest to make the most of them. They aspired to commercial predominance in all the North African ports; and, except in Morocco, where Castile had forestalled them, they also cherished the ambition to demonstrate their military and political superiority over the different Moorish rulers, and whenever possible to collect tributes in token of it. Their political dealings with Tlemcen, Tunis, and the occasionally independent state of Bugia form a significant if subsidiary chapter in the history of their foreign policy; while their commercial activities in these states, and also in Morocco, give us an admirable illustration of their keen interest in economic advancement.

Before entering upon the story of Aragon’s relations with each one of these different realms, it is worth noting, as a striking evidence of the complete extinction of the ancient religious animosities between them, that large numbers of Aragonese and Catalan mercenaries were enrolled during this period in the armies of the various emirs. The king of Morocco had at one time as many as ten to twelve thousand Christian soldiers in his service, while the rulers of Tunis and Tlemcen each maintained a force of two to three thousand. And it must not be supposed that the men who composed these levies were all, or even chiefly, renegades. Their recruitment and employment by their Moorish masters were specifically approved by various Christian kings, and even by the Popes. Pedro III of Aragon set the example by a treaty with the king of Tunis on June 12, 1285. The practice spread rapidly to Italy, France, Germany, and even England. Castilians also occasionally enrolled themselves among these foreign mercenaries, but the majority of them invariably came from the East Spanish realms. They almost always retained their own banners while on service in the North African forces; they were also usually subject to recall at the will of their lawful sovereigns; but they were
highly esteemed and eagerly sought for by the Moorish rulers, who generally used them as a sort of rampart to give solidity to their more lightly armed and mobile native troops. There were also considerable numbers of Berber soldiers serving at various periods, and on a more informal basis, in the armies of the Christian kings of Spain; they were, for the most part, cavalry, and were used for scouting duty and for sudden raids.

Coming now to the relations of Aragon with the individual North African states, we find that in Morocco, where the interests of Castile were recognized as paramount, the story is principally economic. In the early years of the thirteenth century Catalan merchants were established at the town of Ceuta, and in 1227 James the Conqueror, jealous of the competition of the Genoese, put forth an ordinance providing that no merchandise of Aragonese origin should be borne to that port in foreign vessels as long as national ones were available for the purpose. In 1274 the Merinite sovereign successfully appealed to the king of Aragon for military aid in suppressing a revolt of the inhabitants of the town; and in 1309 another Aragonese army earned his gratitude by expelling from Ceuta the troops of the king of Granada, who had seized it seven years before. During the next three decades there was a violent reaction, owing to the fears awakened by the sudden increase of the power of the Merinides, which gave them temporary preponderance over the other North African states, and finally led to the last great Moorish invasion of Spain in 1340. But as soon as that danger was past, the kings of Aragon made haste to return to the policy of their predecessors. In 1345 Pedro the Ceremonious formally renewed friendly relations with the Moroccan ruler, and twelve years later concluded with him a most complete and inclusive treaty, political and commercial, against their common enemy, Pedro of Castile. In this case there is no evidence of any effort to assert any kind of political superiority. Peace, in order to facilitate commerce, was the main object on both sides, and was thenceforth for the most part preserved.

With regard to the kingdoms of Tlemcen and Bugia, on the other hand, there is a different tale to tell. Lying east of the River Mulya, they fell within the Aragonese sphere of influence; smaller and weaker than their neighbors, and perpetually at odds with one another, they offered a much more favorable opportunity for the exercise of some measure of political domination. During the reign of James II (1291-1327), who took the liveliest interest in North African affairs, vigorous efforts were made to obtain specific acknowledgement of overlordship from the kings of both these realms; and if no formal or explicit recognition of vassalage was ever received, a certain amount of tribute of an irregular sort was unquestionably collected. James utilized every chance to play off Bugia against Tlemcen, and vice versa; his warships were constantly present in the ports of both nations and exercised no considerable influence on the ebbs and flows of their rival powers. All these efforts to attain political dominance could not fail to react unfavorably on the commercial activities of Aragon in this part of North Africa. The economic side falls distinctly into the background here; though this is partly explained by the fact that the trade of Tlemcen and of Bugia was less valuable than that of their neighbors.

In Tunis, as in Tlemcen and in Bugia, we find a conflict between the political and the commercial objects of the Aragonese monarchs, in which the former, at least during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, remain distinctly to the fore. As that side of the story, however, is much more intimately bound up with the Aragonese power in Sicily than in Spain, it may be most conveniently reserved for consideration in that connection. But the economic relations of the two states were also of considerable importance. Tunis was unquestionably the chief center of European trade in North Africa, and regular Aragonese factories and consulates were set up there during the reign of James the Conqueror. Vigorous competition not unnaturally ensued with the Genoese, Florentines, Venetians, and other Italian powers who were already on the ground; but the Aragonese were generally able to hold their own? During its brief period of separate existence, moreover, the kingdom of Majorca possessed its own factories and officials in Tunis, and also in Tripoli and Alexandria. It signed commercial treaties with the Moorish kings and threatened to enter upon a really serious rivalry with its parent realm. There was an elaborate set of duties and tariffs on this thriving trade; but in return the European merchants were most effectively protected against fraud or maltreatment in the North African ports. Most of the custom houses there employed a Christian scribe, selected by the European residents; moreover, the chief Moorish officials, who were invariably men of rank and importance, often performed the functions of consuls, and acted as guardians and protectors of resident and transient Christians in all their dealings with the native inhabitants. Much of this admirable organization was directly traceable to the needs and demands of the merchants of the Aragonese realms, whose preeminence among the various foreign traders in the North African ports was unquestioned for a brief period during the first half of the fifteenth century.
In dealing with the various North African activities of Aragon, we have used that name in its larger sense, as the sole convenient means of designating all the three realms which were ruled by the Aragonese kings; strictly, it would have been much more accurate if we had spoken instead of Catalonia. For Aragon, in the more limited meaning of the word, had little or no interest in such distant things. It was at Barcelona that all the foreign and naval activity of the realm, both political and commercial, was centered; it was the Catalans who built the ships and manned them; it was the Catalans who cherished visions of expansion and a maritime career. When, therefore, just after the middle of the fifteenth century, the county was paralyzed by internal revolt and civil war, their effects were promptly felt in North Africa. After a period of unexampled strength and prosperity, the commercial relations of the East Spanish kingdoms with the Moorish states began rapidly to dwindle and decay; and before any real recovery could take place, the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella united the crowns of Aragon and Castile, and altered the whole course of the development of the Iberian realms. North African projects were by no means abandoned in the succeeding age, but they were pursued under different auspices, with changing methods and divided aims, and they were subordinated, even more completely than before, to the prosecution of other schemes. One of the most logical and hopeful paths of Iberian development was gradually suffered to fall into desuetude, owing chiefly to the multitude of new interests which presented themselves in the age of Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs.
CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST CONQUESTS OVERSEAS
In the subsidiary phases of the external history of the Crown of Aragon during the later Middle we turn for the next three chapters to the study of conquests in the Mediterranean. This remarkable of territorial expansion deserves the most prominent in the mediaeval portion of any history of the Spanish realm. It laid the foundations for Spain’s preeminence during the sixteenth century. It directed her aspirations to the eastward before the discovery of America diverted them to the west. It made the conquest of the Canaries by Castile seem almost insignificant, must we forget that the glory of taking the lead in this outburst of maritime and territorial expansion in Mediterranean—even more than in the contemporaneous activities of the realms of the Crown of Aragon in North Africa—is essentially the glory of Catalonia. Not only was through Catalan energy and valor that the necessary expeditions were made possible and the majority of land and battles fought; it was in deference to Catalan traditions that the movement was first begun. In the early twelfth century, as we have already seen, the Catalans had made joint attacks with the Pisans on the Moors of Majorca and Ivissa; and from that time onward they never ceased to cherish the ambition to repeat the experiment on a larger scale. The Balearics had formed a part of Spain under the Carthaginians, the Romans, and possibly under the Visigoths: their reconquest for Christendom was, therefore, quite as obvious a duty as that of Valencia; for the Catalans, indeed, there was no question that it should have precedence. James the Conqueror shared their feelings, and his determination was further strengthened by the fact that his Catalan subjects had given him far less trouble than the Aragonese during the stormy years of his minority. To reward them, he initiated his reign with the expedition in which they were preeminently interested: if the Aragonese supported the Balearic campaign at all, they did so as the king’s feudatories and not by national sanction.

The Almohades had taken the Balearics from the Almoravides in the year 1203; and though they had been unable after Las Navas to retain complete control of them, they maintained in the islands a pirates’ nest which menaced the commerce of the entire western Mediterranean. The seizure of two ships of Barcelona had evoked from James the Conqueror a demand for reparation, and when the ruler scoffingly inquired, “Who is the king who makes this request?” he promptly received the minatory reply, “The son of that king of Aragon who won the battle of Las Navas”. When the subject of an attack on the Balearics was broached at a meeting of the Catalan Cortes in December 1228, the three estates responded with enthusiasm; and though the Aragonese held back, and urged the superior advisability of an expedition against Valencia, King James pushed forward his preparations vigorously in the early months of 1229. Realizing the importance of clothing the enterprise of which he was to reap the benefit in the panoply of a crusade, the king received the Cross with his followers at the hands of the papal legate; and on September 5, 1229, they set sail from the harbor of Salou with 155 ships, including those contributed by Genoa, Provence, Marseilles, and Narbonne, carrying probably some 15,000 foot and 1500 horse.

The expedition arrived in the nick of time, for the Moorish king, Abu Yahya, had not yet received the reinforcements which he had solicited from North Africa, and he was also threatened by rebellion at home. Nevertheless, the Balearic sovereign was able to prevent the Christians from landing at Palomera near the western extremity of Majorca, where they first cast anchor. A hot race for the harbor of Santa Ponza then ensued; but King James, with a detachment of his swiftest ships, outstripped the Moors on shore who attempted to head him off, so that he was able to land his men in spite of some resistance from the advance guard of the Saracens. The young king slew four or five of his enemies with his own hand and was gently rebuked by his followers for his rashness. On Wednesday, September 12, a pitched battle was fought, in which the Moors were finally forced to abandon a strong position on an eminence above Santa Ponza. The victory, however, was dearly bought by the death of James’s trusted friends and counsellors, Ramon and Guillon Moncada, whose loss drew from the Conqueror a flood of tears. Meantime the other ships had brought up the rest of the troops, and the reunited Christian forces advanced to the attack of the city of Palma. For three and a half months the siege continued. All the regular mediaeval engines for attack and defense were employed—mines and countermines, windlasses and catapults, mantlets and trebuchets. At one time a Moorish detachment on the hillside above the Christian camp cut off the stream that supplied it; but the hostile party was eventually dislodged and captured, and the head of its leader was slung over the walls of the town. On a later occasion fortune unexpectedly came to the rescue of the Christians, when a disloyal Moorish chief brought them an “angel’s present” of supplies. Twice did the besieged attempt to buy off the besiegers, but in vain; a savage lust for slaughter animated the army of the Conqueror, who finally, on December 31, marshalled all his forces for a grand assault. After a violent struggle the Moors gave way. Their king was found hiding in a house and was made prisoner. A ruthless butchery of the inhabitants ensued; though it would be foolish to accept literally the figures of the contemporary chroniclers, there can be no doubt that the horrors of the surrender were unusual even for that barbaric age.

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Indiscriminate looting followed; and afterwards there was an auction of the prisoners and booty taken, at which everyone bought but refused to pay for his purchases. Discontent and quarrelling were the natural result, until James interfered: “I will first hang so many of you in the streets”, he threatened the rioters, “that the town will stink of them”. A systematic pursuit of the Moors in the mountain country now began. The enemy took refuge in huts and caves hewn out of the face of a high cliff; from these they were finally expelled by a Christian soldier who was lowered on a rope over the face of the rock, with fire brands which he hurled among the foe; “and I was very glad,” as the Conqueror naively records, “to see the fire as I was eating.”

The Moors now began to surrender in large numbers. The conquered land was divided into allotments between the king and his nobles; and after the arrival of reinforcements sufficient to remove all chance of any hostile outbreak, the Conqueror returned to Spain in the end of October, 1230, after an absence of nearly fourteen months. A rumor that the Hafside king of Tunis was preparing a fleet for the recovery of Majorca caused him to revisit the island in 1231. The alarm proved false, but James persisted with his expedition, and gained the submission of a number of the mountain Moors. In the following year the Conqueror returned to the island for the third time to receive the surrender of the last bands of his enemies; by the use of an ingenious stratagem, he also secured the recognition of his overlordship by the king of Minorca on this occasion. More than three hundred bonfires were lighted at Cape Pera on the Majorcan shore, and the Minorcan ruler was thus led to believe that a mighty host was preparing to attack him, whereas in reality, as James assures us, “I had with me only six knights, four horses, one shield, five esquires to attend on my person, ten servants and some scouts.” In 1235 the Sacristan of Gerona, who was prince elect, aided by the Infante of Portugal and other knights, took possession of Iviza and Formentera (the latter of which was uninhabited), and the reconquest of the islands was therewith complete.

Most of the Moors who had offered to surrender in Majorca were made slaves and distributed among the various estates into which the island had been divided. Colonists from the seaboard cities of Catalonia and also from Marseilles were imported in great numbers, and freedom from customs duties was granted alike to all classes of the inhabitants, so that the population of Palma became “the most honorable and cultured in the world”, and “its liberties and franchises superior to those of any other city.” In Minorca, on the other hand, where there had been no conquest but merely a recognition of his overlordship by the king of Minorca on this occasion. More than three hundred bonfires were lighted at Cape Pera on the Majorcan shore, and the Minorcan ruler was thus led to believe that a mighty host was preparing to attack him, whereas in reality, as James assures us, “I had with me only six knights, four horses, one shield, five esquires to attend on my person, ten servants and some scouts.” In 1235 the Sacristan of Gerona, who was prince elect, aided by the Infante of Portugal and other knights, took possession of Iviza and Formentera (the latter of which was uninhabited), and the reconquest of the islands was therewith complete.

Though virtually completed so early in his career, the capture of the Balearics was the last great venture overseas which was undertaken by James the Conqueror. During the remaining forty years of his life, his attention was constantly distracted from the work of maritime expansion, which was nearest his heart, by the pressure of other and less welcome cares. Still, it is as a conqueror and a crusader that the great king deserves chiefly to be remembered, for to the day of his death his mind was filled with schemes for different expeditions beyond the boundaries of his realm. A project for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre was entertained in 1260, and the king actually set sail, only to be driven back by a storm. Again, in 1268-69, invitations from the Khan of Tartary and from the Emperor Michael Palaeologus urged him for a last time to the East: again he embarked, and again a gale forced him back into the port of Aigues Mortes, so that he finally returned to Aragon. “It seems to me”, so he said to his knights, “that it is not our Lord’s will that we should go beyond sea, as once before when we had prepared”. Events which paved the way for the Aragonese acquisition of Sicily and southern Italy in the succeeding reigns took place during his lifetime, but the Conqueror did not live to see the results of them. In 1276 he died at Valencia, worn out by his ceaseless activities, in the sixty-ninth year of his life and the sixty-fourth of his reign—a great hero of the Reconquest, and one of the principal founders of the Spanish Empire. But so deeply was this mighty monarch imbued with the separatistic traditions of his native land, that he endangered the fabric that he had reared with so much difficulty by dividing his realms at his death. By his first wife Eleanor, daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile, he had a son, Alfonso; by his second, Violante of Hungary, four sons and six daughters; he also had several bastards by various mistresses. Beginning in the year 1229, he had made a number of different wills disposing of his inheritance, dividing it and subdividing it as the number of his children increased. By his testament of 1250, his dominions were actually parcelled out among all five of his legitimate male heirs. Of these five, however, Ferdinand, a younger son of Violante, died in 1251, and Alfonso, the son of Eleanor, in 1260; while another, Sancho, who had entered the church, became archbishop of Toledo in 1268. With the number of his male heirs reduced to two, James, in 1270, made his last will
and testament, by which Pedro, the eldest son of Violante, was declared his successor in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia; while James, his younger brother, was assigned the Balearics and the lands north of the Pyrenees which had remained to the Conqueror after the treaty of Corbeil. The unhappy result of this unwise division of the Aragonese inheritance was corrected in the succeeding century, when the Majorcan realm was reincorporated with the rest of the kingdom; but the bad example was followed by James’s successors in the disposition of the later Italian conquests, to the grave prejudice of the unity of the Aragonese empire.

The importance of the long reign of James the Conqueror, both in the internal and the foreign history of his native land, is equaled if not exceeded by that of the brief rule of his elder son and successor, Pedro, who amply deserves the appellation of the Great. At home, the constitutional struggle which accompanied and profoundly influenced the course of external affairs reached its climax; while abroad, the mounting energies of Pedro’s subjects were given a new direction by the acquisition of Sicily. To the origin and early phases of this great drama of foreign conquest we now turn. It irrevocably committed the realms of the Crown of Aragon to the career of territorial expansion in the Mediterranean on which they had been already launched. It ultimately paved the way for that long struggle between the royal houses of France and Spain, around which the whole development of the Spanish Empire.

The source of the Aragonese claims to Sicily and southern Italy lies in Pedro’s marriage on June 13, 1262, to Constance, daughter of the Hohenstaufen Manfred, and granddaughter of the Emperor Frederick II. On the Hohenstaufen side the match was arranged primarily as a means of support against the hostility of the Holy See, possibly also against the imperial ambitions of Alfonso the Learned of Castile. For Aragon, it offered far reaching visions of external conquest, the more welcome because of the recent defeat at Corbeil of James the Conqueror’s plans of expansion in southern France. Against the allies was arrayed the might of the papacy and Charles of Anjou, who came and slew Manfred at Benevento in 1266, and received the kingdom of Sicily as a fief of the Holy See. Two years later, Manfred’s nephew Conradin, last scion of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, was defeated by the terrible Angevin at Tagliacozzo, and soon after suffered a traitor’s death, with heroic fortitude, on a scaffold overlooking the bay of Naples. Tradition tells us that, before he bowed his head to the executioner’s axe, the youthful victim took off his glove and tossed it down to the crowd below, where it was picked up and carried overseas by an Aragonese knight and delivered to Conradin’s cousin, the Lady Constance. It was a royal gage that cried for vengeance, but James’s hands were tied by the recent treaties with Louis of France, and by his fears of the hostility of Castile and of internal rebellion. Not until the Conqueror had been six years in his grave was Conradin’s death avenged.

Meantime the kingdom of Sicily groaned under the cruel and oppressive rule of its new sovereign. The rights and privileges of the inhabitants were consistently ignored. Frenchmen were preferred for almost every office. Complaints were answered by barbarous executions. Charles cared little or nothing for the wishes of the people over whom he ruled. His entire attention was centered on conquests in the eastern Mediterranean, and he regarded his Sicilian realm chiefly as a means to provide funds for that end. Only from Aragon could the oppressed inhabitants have any hope of redress. While James the Conqueror was still alive, John of Procida, the friend and counsellor of the last of the Hohenstaufens, arrived at the Aragonese court, and begged for aid; together with Roger de Lauria, foster brother of the Princess Constance, he besought the heir to the throne to devote himself to the recovery of his wife’s inheritance. The result of these efforts was plainly evident when Pedro succeeded his father in July, 1276. The young sovereign burned to distinguish himself in the field of foreign conquest. For a long time he had been obliged to restrain his martial ardor in deference to the cautious policy of the Conqueror’s later years; now, at last, his chance had come. But first it was essential to make sure of the attitude of Castile and of France. In the former kingdom the struggle between Alfonso the Learned and Sancho the Bravo was reaching its height, and in January, 1278, Pedro took the decisive step of seizing and imprisoning the Infantes de la Cerda, thus putting himself in possession of hostages for the friendship of both factions in the western realm and also for that of Philip of France. Protracted negotiations with all three parties followed: the Aragonese king utilizing his advantage to the utmost, alternately betraying Alfonso and Sancho into advantageous territorial concessions, and hoodwinking Philip III. Treaties were made with the king of Portugal and with Edward I of England, whose daughter Eleanor was subsequently betrothed to Pedro’s son and heir, Alfonso. An alliance was also concluded, through the instrumentality of John of Procida, with the Eastern Emperor Michael Palaeologus, who was threatened by the projects of Charles of Anjou. Meantime Pedro used all possible efforts to provide himself with an adequate fleet, men, and armaments. He was resolved no
longer to be dependent on aid from Genoa and Pisa, as his predecessors had been whenever they undertook a naval campaign in the Mediterranean. At all the ports in his realm there was feverish activity and excitement. At Collioure the blacksmiths forged nothing but anchors; ships were constructed in all the coast towns as far south as Valencia. Even the inland cities occupied themselves with the manufacture of arms and munitions of war; provisions were plentifully supplied by the country districts; all parts of the king’s dominions seemed anxious to do their share.

Pedro’s subjects, however, were not enlightened as to the true object of all these preparations; for the king had spread it abroad that he intended to use them for a campaign against the Moors. It is not difficult to discern the policy that lay behind this announcement. War against the infidel was sanctioned by the most ancient of national traditions. Enthusiasm for fighting on purely religious grounds was doubtless practically dead, but interest in possibilities of territorial and commercial conquest at the expense of the Moslem ran higher than ever and would unquestionably evoke far more unanimous support from Pedro’s subjects than an expedition against a protégé of the church. Moreover, the particularistic Aragonese, cut off from the sea and intensely jealous of the Catalans, might very likely have opposed a plan for the conquest of Sicily, which, if successful at all, would inevitably redound chiefly to the advantage of their maritime neighbors; of a crusade, however, even though they might not be precisely informed of its destination, they would find it almost impossible to complain. Most important of all would be the effect of King Pedro’s announcement upon Pope Martin IV, a Frenchman through and through, and the servile instrument of his terrible Sicilian vassal. However great his hostility to the king of Aragon, the head of the church could scarcely refuse to approve of his plan for attacking the infidel. He doubtless guessed what Pedro’s real objective was, and it is significant that he forbade him to appropriate the tithes of the province of Tarragona for the purposes of the holy war. Nevertheless, the king of Aragon had publicly proclaimed his zeal for the welfare of the Church of Christ in a way that could not easily be forgotten and would stand him in good stead when the moment for his attack on the kingdom of Sicily should finally arrive.

It will readily be conceived that Pedro of Aragon was not the man to announce his intention of going on a crusade without being able to carry out the pretense in deeds as well. Fortunately for his purposes, the situation in one of the Moorish kingdoms of North Africa was such as afforded him an admirable opportunity to do this, and at the same time to realize his original plan for the conquest of Sicily. From at least as early as the year 1180, the Moslem rulers of Tunis had maintained good relations with the Norman and Hohenstaufen sovereigns of the court of Palermo, and had paid them, with some measure of regularity, a small annual tribute, as a guarantee of immunity from attacks by Sicilian pirates and of access to Sicilian ports for the purpose of buying grain. But when Charles of Anjou was invested with the Sicilian crown in 1266, the Hafside sultan across the sea refused to recognize him as the rightful heir of his Hohenstaufen predecessors. The tribute ceased, and hostilities threatened to break forth. Tunis became a place of refuge at his court. After the death of El...
A diligent German scholar has conclusively shown that the old idea that Pedro of Aragon bore a part in the conspiracy leading up to the famous massacre of the Sicilian Vespers, which began in Palermo on March 30, 1282, is no longer tenable. News of the massacre reached him in Valencia probably about April 20, and was almost certainly unwelcome, because the rebels at the outset put themselves under the protection of the Holy See, thus threatening to render doubly difficult a conquest by the king of Aragon. Pedro had, however, by this time gone too far to draw back; and he fully realized the advantages of a foothold in Tunis for the purpose of negotiating with the insurgents. In early June of 1282, therefore, he set sail with a considerable force, which was apparently in ignorance of its destination, and landed on the twenty-eighth of the month at Collo on the North African coast. On his arrival he found that his protégé, Abu Bekr, the governor of Constantine, had already been defeated. A few encounters with the Saracens sufficed to save his reputation as a crusader and to keep his army in fighting trim; but his attention was chiefly directed towards Sicily and her affairs. Negotiations with the rebels there began at once; the conditions under which the Aragonese monarch should govern the realm were discussed at length; in early August, at Palermo, the Sicilians definitely decided to summon Pedro to be their king. Four knights and four burgesses were sent across to the Aragonese ruler, to tell of the woes they had suffered under Angevin rule and to beg him to hasten to their rescue. The envoys, clad in deep mourning, were conveyed in ships with black banners and black sails. After hearing their story, Pedro hesitated no longer. He utilized the Pope’s refusal of help for his crusade to persuade some of the more reluctant of his followers that he was justified in accepting the proffered throne. In late August he left the North African coast. On the thirty-first he arrived at Trapani. On September 4 he was welcomed at Palermo by the enthusiastic plaudits of the rejoicing populace, assumed the crown of Sicily in the cathedral there, and sent a formal defiance to Charles of Anjou, who was already besieging Messina. An insolent reply caused Pedro to make ready for battle, and the Sicilians, seeing his preparations, asked what he intended to do. “I go”, said the Aragonese monarch, “to attack King Charles”. “In the name of God”, replied the Sicilians, “take us with you and do not leave us behind”.

A detachment of 2000 light-armed troops was sent on in advance to prevent the fall of Messina before the king’s arrival. They slipped through the besieging forces of Charles of Anjou by night, and subsequently made a sortie which wrought havoc among their foes, so that the Messinians, who had been at first unfavorably impressed by their beggarly equipment, took courage and prepared to resist to the last. The time of their deliverance, however, was now at hand. The king of Aragon came on from Palermo with all his available troops. Every male Sicilian between the ages of fifteen and sixty had been summoned to join him; while the Aragonese fleet advanced along the coast, ably led by the gallant Roger de Lauria, “the most illustrious of those great seamen whom Pedro had attracted to his service by permitting them to enjoy at once the authority of an admiral, and the liberty of a corsair”. Their united forces were plainly irresistible, and Charles of Anjou did not await their onslaught, but transferred himself with as many of his followers as possible to Reggio on the mainland. Those that were left behind, together with an enormous quantity of provisions and booty, fell into the hands of Pedro’s army; and “so great”, says Muntaner, “was the loot, that Messina became rich for evermore, and florins were as plentiful as coppers”. The Aragonese fleet was meantime sent in chase of the Angevin ships in the strait; they were but twenty-two against one hundred and fifty, if the figures of the contemporary chroniclers are to be believed, but they won a glorious victory and captured forty-five of the foe. Apparently the Messinians could not believe their eyes when they saw the returning vessels, and thought, at first, that Charles was coming back with reinforcements to take a terrible revenge. But for the moment at least the Angevin was reduced to impotence. From the shores of Calabria he had witnessed his rival’s triumph without being able to lift a finger to prevent it; in fact some of Pedro’s forces even succeeded in crossing the strait and sacking Nicotera, almost under his very eyes. Charles, however, was by no means at the end of his expedients. Defeated in open war, he determined to try his fortune in other fields, and as a preliminary sent a challenge to his rival to meet him, each with a hundred knights, in a battle d’outrance, in closed lists at Bordeaux on English ground, June 1, 1383—the issue of the combat to determine the fate of Sicily. Pedro, though by no means blind to the advantageous position he had already won, was chivalrous enough to accept; and the two rivals, leaving their sons to represent them in Sicily and Italy during their absence, departed for their respective countries to prepare for the coming encounter.

It is more than doubtful whether either of them had ever taken it seriously or thought that there was any likelihood of its actually occurring. For Charles of Anjou it was probably but a pretext to enable him to gain papal aid, and possibly to obtain possession of the person of his rival; and it was not long before Pedro was informed of the Angevin’s plots. On his way back to France, Charles passed through Rome and obtained the support of Pope Martin IV, whom he persuaded to forbid the combat at Bordeaux, to declare that Pedro had forfeited his dominions as penalty for his interference in Sicily, to
preach a crusade against him as the enemy of the church, and to place his realms under an interdict. It was, in a sense, the age-long struggle between the empire and the papacy that threatened to break forth afresh. The mantle of the Hohenstaufen had fallen on the shoulders of the king of Aragon, whose offence was doubtless aggravated by the memory of the way in which his grandfather—another Pedro—had championed the cause of heresy against the church. Clearly, Rome could not rest quiet till the dynasty was brought to its knees. Charles of Anjou was to be used as the chief instrument for the attainment of that end and could rely at the outset on the support of Philip of France, who longed to carry further the work that his father had begun at the treaty of Corbeil and make new conquests to the south of the Pyrenees. Altogether, the king of Aragon was confronted by a most formidable array of foes; but he never faltered. Returned to Spain, he set about the selection of the hundred knights who were to accompany him to Bordeaux; but on learning, in the midst of his preparations, that the king of England would not undertake to guarantee him a fair combat in closed lists, and that if he appeared with his followers, he ran grave danger of capture and death, he changed his plans. Disguised as the servant of a horse dealer, he crossed the mountains, and three days later arrived at Bordeaux. He made known his identity to the English seneschal, formally demanded that the combat which had been arranged should take place, circled the lists on horseback, with his lance in rest, and finally, after repairing to a church, solemnly and publicly to thank God for His support and protection, regained his own dominions in safety, having loyally fulfilled his pledged word as a gentleman and a king.

When this romantic but inconclusive farce had been terminated, the forces of the rival monarchs began to struggle with one another again. Roger de Lauria defeated the French fleet off Malta, which he finally captured in June, 1284, and subsequently won another victory in the Bay of Naples. On this occasion the young Prince of Salerno, son of Charles of Anjou, was taken prisoner and condemned to death, as retribution for the execution of the youthful Conradin in 1268; but the Infante of Aragon relented at the last moment and preserved his life. On the sea there could be no question of the rights of two rivals was superior. The Aragonese fleet was already triumphantly asserting its control of the entire western Mediterranean—a long step towards the upbuilding of the Aragonese empire. Charles of Anjou led an army into southern Italy, in the hope of retrieving his fortunes by land, but death overtook him before he could accomplish his purpose (January 7, 1285). Meantime, however, in France and Spain there was another tale to tell. The papal sentence hung like a dark cloud over the Aragonese realms. The king of France had collected a formidable army to give effect to it. Worst of all, a terrible rebellion against King Pedro had broken out in the kingdom of Aragon. We shall have occasion to follow the course of this great revolt in another place; for the present we need only observe that one of its chief causes was the resentment of the Aragonese at Pedro’s absorption in enterprises overseas, for which they had no interest or enthusiasm, and that its principal result was temporarily to paralyze the efficiency of the resistance to the French invasion. And to cap the climax of the king’s misfortunes, his younger brother, James, who had been left by his father in possession of Cerdagne, Roussillon, Montpellier, and the Balearics, turned traitor and joined forces with Philip of France. On January 20, 1279, Pedro had forced him formally to acknowledge himself his feudal vassal; and James, who had never forgiven his brother for refusing to recognize his independence, seized this opportunity to take his revenge.

But Pedro was one of those from whom the most desperate crises evoke the most splendid efforts. A dash at Perpignan failed to capture the wretched James, who fled away under cover of night; but when the invading French army reached the mountains, they were exposed to all the hazards of a guerilla warfare with which they knew not how to cope. Night attacks decimated their forces. Stones were hurled down on them from the cliffs above. Singly or in small companies they were lured away into devious paths and cut off. Finally, after having crossed the range, they made the grievous error of waiting to lay siege to the comparatively unimportant fortress of Gerona, instead of pushing straight on and striking at the Catalanian capital. Meantime the courage of Pedro and his adherents was roused by the news of a fresh naval victory near Rosas, won by the few ships which he had kept in Catalanian waters over the much larger fleet that had been sent to cooperate with the army of the king of France. Even the rebel Aragonese, who had hitherto stood aloof from the contest, came forward, in July, 1285, with offers of aid, when they saw the heroic fight which their king was making against tremendous odds. Finally, after a magnificent resistance of two months and a half, Gerona fell; but the long delay before its walls had given Pedro time to organize the defense of the country to the south of it, so that the French could advance no farther; and in the meantime the arrival of Roger de Lauria from Sicilian waters served to complete the destruction of the French fleet, and necessitated the retreat of the invading army which it supplied. The retirement of the French forces was to the last degree disorderly. Pedro’s troops hung mercilessly on their rear and pillaged their baggage train; not until they had reached the shelter of Perpignan and the protection of the forces of the king of Majorca could they feel
that they had escaped from the 'gates of hell'. For King Philip the issue of the conflict brought complete though tragic disillusionment. During the long and weary retreat, the conviction forced itself upon him that he had been throughout merely a tool in the hands of Rome. More and more harshly did he reproach the papal envoy who accompanied him for all the disasters that he had suffered; more and more bitterly did he bewail the loss of the “noblest army that had ever followed the Oriflamme”. Under the circumstances his death at Perpignan, on the fifth of October 1285, doubtless came to him as a deliverance: he had no ambition to outlive his defeat.

The same year, 1285, saw, in fact, a clean sweep of all the protagonists in the great drama which had arisen out of the Aragonese conquest of Sicily. Besides Charles of Anjou and Philip of France, Pope Martin IV had died on March 29, and on November 11 Pedro of Aragon, the best and greatest of them all, followed his rivals to the grave. The moment that the French army had been driven, from his realms, he had planned to punish his traitor brother, the king of Majorca, who had given Philip free passage through Cerdagne and Roussillon and had otherwise aided and abetted him. He had determined to strike his first blow in the Balearics: he had already gathered together a fleet and an army for the purpose, when he was seized with a chill and fever, to which he soon succumbed. His son Alfonso, who was to have accompanied him, hastened to his bedside, only to be sent off to carry through the Balearic campaign alone. “Who told thee to come hither, Infante?” queried his dying father; “Art thou a doctor that canst cure me? Thy presence here can do no good. Depart at once for Majorca; for God wills that I should die, and neither thou nor anyone else can prevent it.” Reverently and obediently the Infante kissed his parent on the hands and feet, and Pedro kissed him on the mouth and gave him his blessing; “and the Infante went forth with the grace of God.” Anxious to see his realms reconciled with the Holy See, the king, in his last moments, persuaded the archbishop of Tarragona to raise the interdict which Pope Martin had placed upon his dominions, in return for an admission by Pedro of his fault, and for his promise to do all in his power to have Sicily restored to Rome. This was obviously, however, merely a case of deathbed repentance, whose sincerity was more than doubtful; moreover it was in flat contradiction to the will which Pedro had previously made, and which was accepted as valid by his successors. By that will the king bequeathed to his eldest son, Alfonso, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, with the suzerainty of the Balearics and the French lands pertaining to them; and to his second, James, the kingdom of Sicily and all his conquests in Naples. Two younger sons were left, for the time being, without inheritance; but the death of Alfonso without male heirs, and the subsequent succession of James to the Spanish realms, was ultimately to bring the elder of them, Frederic, to the Sicilian throne? The fatal tendency to division had not, in this case, been permitted to go to its customary extremes, though the cutting off of the newly won realm of Sicily, under a separate king, indicated that it was by no means extinct. The history of Sicily during the succeeding century, however, makes it very doubtful whether any other arrangement would have been practicable under the existing circumstances.

Pedro was one of the greatest of mediaeval kings. Many of his predecessors, both in Aragon and Castile, had been either heroes or saints; but Pedro was almost, if not quite, the first in whom the virtues of valor and discretion were so mingled as to entitle him to be regarded as a statesman. Dante’s verdict upon him goes, as usual, straight to the heart of the whole matter:

“D’ogni valor portò cinta la corda.”

When we come to the examination of the internal history of his reign, we shall perhaps conclude that he died at the most fortunate moment for his reputation. Be that as it may, there can be no question of the importance of what he accomplished in the brief nine years of rule that were allotted to him. Pedro was the first mediaeval Spanish sovereign to make his influence deeply felt in the settlement of problems of Pan-European importance. Hitherto the Iberian realms, chiefly occupied by the Reconquest, had been largely ignored in the regulation of international affairs; but henceforth Aragon at least would have to be reckoned with as an important power. The conquest of Sicily had opened for her a splendid imperial vision, whose realization was to be the glory of the succeeding age. Lastly, it is important to remember that this first important entrance of the East Spanish kingdoms into the international arena brought them at once into the sharpest conflict with Rome. Like his grandfather and namesake before him, Pedro did not shrink from battle with the Holy See when the interests of his people demanded it. Together with the crown of Sicily, he gladly assumed the arduous task of carrying on the great struggle against papal supremacy from the point where his Hohenstaufen predecessors had laid it down; in the long list of champions of the temporal power against the spiritual he deserves an honorable place. His reign forms the indispensable link between those of the Emperor Frederick II and of King Philip the Fair. It was a step on the road to Anagni. That a French monarch ultimately reaped the rewards of his efforts in this direction, and perhaps abused his triumph, is one of the ironies
of history, but it must not be suffered to dim the glory of King Pedro. Whatever the Spanish Empire of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became, its Aragonese progenitor was certainly not conceived in
subservience to Rome.

The history of the Aragonese realms, both internal and foreign, continues to unfold itself in
dramatic fashion during the brief six-year reign of Pedro’s son and successor, Alfonso III. The new king
was by no means the equal of his father. All the contemporary accounts unite in praising his
personal bravery and energy in war, but he lacked the statesman’s power of determining in advance the
main aims and methods of his policy, and of resolutely adhering to them. He never seemed quite to
know his own mind and was consequently too much swayed by the advice of others. At home his rule
witnessed a further humiliation of the monarchy by the rebel baronage; while abroad, though the story
of territorial expansion and political development becomes steadily more intricate and confused, the
power of Aragon makes little permanent progress.

The principal achievement that stands to Alfonso’s credit is the completion, in 1287, of the
conquest of Minorca, which had never been captured from the Saracens except in name. Its subjugation
was the logical sequel to the expedition against Majorca, on which he had gone forth, obedient to the
wishes of his dying father, in the autumn of 1285. Contemporaries would have us believe that
he experienced little difficulty in winning away the larger island from his treacherous uncle, James: the
latter had never been popular in the Balearics and was frequently absent in Montpellier and Roussillon.
It seems, however, that considerable resistance was encountered and overcome before Alfonso, who
was powerfully seconded by the fleet of Roger de Lauria, could enter Palma on December 19, and
receive the oath of allegiance from its citizens. Had he not been recalled to Aragon by the news of his
father’s death, he would probably have attacked Minorca then and there. Certainly he had ample
justification for so doing, because the arrauz or local Moorish ruler, who had been permitted to remain
there, virtually supreme under the suzerainty of Aragon, had lent treacherous aid to the North African
enemies of Pedro III at the time of his expedition to Tunis, and still remained unpunished. But for the
time being Alfonso was obliged to content himself with a smaller expedition to make sure of the loyalty
of Iviza; the more arduous Minorcan campaign was postponed for a more favorable opportunity. This
came at last in the autumn of 1286, on the conclusion of a temporary truce with France which afforded a
brief respite from the never-ending cares and worries of the Sicilian problem; and Alfonso made
the most of it. He sought and obtained a special grant of funds from his Catalan subjects. He collected a
large fleet of his own, and again received aid from the ubiquitous Roger de Lauria. On November 22,
1286, he left Salou. Two days later he arrived at Majorca, where he levied a tribute in money and kind
on the inhabitants and sent a declaration of war to the Minorcan ruler. Tempests and cold of unusual
severity delayed him and scattered his fleet. When he finally arrived at Port Mahon, on January 5, 1287,
he had only twenty ships with him; but after eight days’ fruitless waiting for the rest to arrive, he
determined to risk a battle against superior numbers, and marshalled his forces for the attack. The
Minorcans had meantime received considerable reinforcements from North Africa, and apparently made
a desperate resistance; but when a decisive battle ensued on January 17, they were unable to withstand
the onslaught of the Catalans and Aragonese and retreated to the shelter of the castle of Port Mahon. On
January 21, the capitulation was signed. Minorca was handed over to Alfonso. The arrauz and his
immediate following were given free transportation to the Barbary coast, while the rest of the Moorish
inhabitants were declared slaves of the crown, and sold as such in Catalonia and Sicily. Catalan
colonists were soon established in the island, and concentrated in the neighborhood of Port Mahon,
which increased rapidly in prestige and importance, and soon became an invaluable halfway station for
the ships which plied between Spain and Sicily. All the Balearics remained in the possession of the
Crown of Aragon till after Alfonso’s death, though his uncle, James of Majorca, succeeded in
maintaining himself in Montpellier, Cerdagne, and Roussillon. It was not till 1298 that the latter was at
last restored, under Aragonese suzerainty, to his island realm, where he and his successors continued to
hold sway until the separate existence of the whole Majorcan kingdom was finally terminated in the
middle of the following century.

But the affairs of the Balearics were by this time scarcely more than a side issue. The crux of the
situation lay in Sicily. Alfonso’s younger brother, James, had been crowned there, at Palermo, on
February 2, 1286, in accordance with the wishes of his father; but from the first moment of his reign he
was threatened by internal rebellion, foreign attack, and above all by the bitter hostility of the new
Pope, Honorius IV, who promptly excommunicated him and ordered him out of his dominions.
Everything depended on the attitude of the new king of Aragon. Would he take advantage of his father’s
dying promise to do his best to restore Sicily to the papacy as an excuse for abandoning his brother. Or
would he choose the harder part, follow his father’s political testament and the career of empire and expansion to which his country had so recently been committed, and support James against every foe in his own dominions? It was a momentous question, and it is greatly to the credit of Alfonso that he chose the latter alternative. There were strong inducements for him to decide the other way; for though the papal legate in France had published his excommunication, and preached the holy war against Aragon, Honorius used every pretext to postpone any definite action against him. The Pope obviously drew a sharp distinction between the positions of the two sovereigns. With James there could be no possible reconciliation, but for Alfonso, if he would abandon his brother and acknowledge his fault, the road to forgiveness was still open; it was the papal policy to separate and, if possible, to embroil the two kings. But Alfonso, for the time being, was staunch. What his father had won at so much labor and cost, he could not bear to let go. With the fleet of Roger de Lauria he held unquestioned command of the western Mediterranean, and could therefore easily communicate with his brother in Sicily. An alliance for mutual defense in their respective possessions was made between them on Christmas day, 1285, and confirmed on February 12, 1286. They were also both encouraged by the increasingly obvious fact that Philip the Fair, the new king of France, was far less enthusiastic than his predecessor for the prosecution of the papal and Angevin claims, and if anything desirous of an excuse to withdraw from the conflict. But even without him the array of foes with which the two brothers were confronted was extremely formidable. The bitterness of the papal hostility was increased rather than diminished when Nicholas IV succeeded Honorius in February, 1288. The Angevins in Naples were still exceedingly powerful. James of Majorca was in hand in glove with any combination which promised to injure his Aragonese kinsman; while Castile, under Sancho the Bravo, was eager to deprive Alfonso of those invaluable political pawns, the Infantes de la Cerda, and lent a willing ear to the summons of his foes. It is needless to add that both sides sought aid from the Moorish states in North Africa. At one stage in the proceedings, James and Alfonso made an alliance with the Soldan Kelawun of Egypt against their Christian foes.

We need not follow the story of the desultory fighting by land and sea which continued intermittently during the rest of the reign. No military or naval action of decisive importance occurred, and hostilities were constantly interrupted by negotiations, truces, and temporary pacts, arranged through the mediatorial offices of Edward I of England but never loyally observed. On at least two occasions, Alfonso could have had satisfactory terms as far as Aragon and his own reconciliation with the papacy were concerned; but the question of Sicily, “which no one seemed willing to renounce”, remained apparently insoluble. Finally, in November, 1288, the Prince of Salerno, son and heir of Charles of Anjou, who had remained in the hands of the king of Aragon since 1284, was set at liberty, on the understanding that he should bring about a three years’ peace within two months, or else return to captivity. In March, 1289, he departed for Rome on this errand, together with certain Aragonese ambassadors, but he did not fulfil his promise. Whether he had ever intended to do so is more than doubtful; in any case it is certain that he was but wax in the hands of Nicholas IV, who soon converted him into a servile instrument of papal policy, and finally crowned him king of Sicily on May 29, 1289. The crusade was thereupon preached against his rival James from one end of Italy to the other. Alfonso’s excommunication was proclaimed afresh. All the treaties previously concluded with him were declared null and void; and Philip the Fair was granted the ecclesiastical tithes within his realms to finance an invasion of Aragon. Of the two brothers, James was unquestionably threatened the more seriously; but he put a bold face upon the situation and proceeded to besiege Gaeta so vigorously that his rather inefficient adversary soon agreed to a two years’ truce. Alfonso, on the other hand, was by this time heartily tired of fighting over the interminable question of Sicily. The internal situation in Aragon and the necessity of dealing with Sancho of Castile imperatively demanded his attention. Everything dictated the wisdom of seeking reconciliation with Rome. Yet on the other hand he did not intend absolutely to abandon his brother if he could possibly help it; most anxiously did he seek for some middle way, which should offer to all parties concerned an honorable escape from an intolerable situation. Throughout the latter part of 1289 and most of 1290, matters trembled in the balance. Alfonso kept sending messengers to Rome to induce the Pope, if possible, to consent to a discussion of terms, while James in Sicily bravely attempted to make his policy keep time with the ebbs and flows of that of Aragon. A touch of comedy was supplied by Charles of Salerno, who, on the expiration of the time within which he had promised to secure peace, presented himself for reincarceration in fulfilment of his pledged word: but took great care to come so well guarded by Majorcan troops, and to select so discreetly the time and place of his appearance, that no jailer was on hand to receive him. Finally, with the aid of the pacificatory efforts of Edward I, the Pope was induced to send two cardinals to France to discuss a peace; after protracted negotiation, a treaty was signed at Tarascon, in February, 1291, between all the parties concerned in the Sicilian quarrel, except James, on terms which most historians have agreed in regarding as humiliating to the dignity of Aragon. The provisions which
affect the king of France do not concern us here; the Aragonese-Castilian quarrel was suffered to run its
course; the main lines of the settlement of the affairs of Aragon and Sicily were as follows.

In return for a formal acknowledgment of his faults and a request for forgiveness, to be
subsequently repeated in a personal interview between Alfonso and Nicholas, the former’s
excommunication and the various papal edicts against his realm were to be revoked, and he was to
be recognized as lawful sovereign in his dominions, including the Balearics. The king, furthermore,
promised to take the Cross at the Pope’s behest, with 5000 foot and 200 horse, for the recovery of the
Holy Sepulchre, in formal ratification of their reconciliation. Thus far the text of the treaty, which
contains no word of any promise to pay tribute to Rome, nor any mention of Sicily; to judge by it alone,
James was simply left to his fate, while the Aragonese difficulty was solved on terms generally
favorable to the king. But in all the histories, from the usually trustworthy Zurita down, we find it
recorded that the king bound himself to pay to Rome an annual revenue of thirty ounces of gold, in
token of the vassalage of his realm, as in the days of Pedro II; and also, if necessary, to lend
armed support for the expulsion of his brother from Sicily and the restoration of the Angevins there.
Obviously the final verdict on Alfonso’s reign must depend on whether or not the statements of these
historians are true. On the one hand, it does not seem likely that so many writers would have asserted
that such humiliating conditions were imposed on the Aragonese king without some basis in fact; on
the other, all that we know of the earlier history of Alfonso’s reign is in flat contradiction to such an
unworthy abandonment of his brother and the Sicilian inheritance, as are also the provisions of his will.
The difficulty of the problem is, of course, greatly enhanced by the fact that Alfonso outlived the treaty
of Tarascón but four months; had he been granted a longer life his subsequent actions would
have spoken for themselves. His most recent historian strongly inclines to the opinion that, whatever
concessions he may have made at Tarascón, it was Alfonso’s ultimate intention to arrange an acceptable
peace for his brother in Sicily; certainly he wrote to James and also to the king of Granada to that effect.
Possibly he may have had some plan of directing the crusade, which he had bound himself to undertake,
against Sicily rather than the Holy Land; such things had often been done before, and at times when
crusading enthusiasm was at a far higher pitch than at the end of the thirteenth century. Clearly matters
were still far from their final solution, when everything was upset and all the work of the reign
thrown into the melting-pot again by the sudden death of the king, at the early age of thirty-seven, on
June 18, 1291. Unmarried and childless, he left his throne and that of Majorca to his brother James, with
instructions that the latter should hand over Sicily to his younger brother, Frederic. If James should die
childless, Frederic was to succeed him in Aragon and in Majorca, and Sicily was to go to Pedro, the
youngest brother of all. Under no circumstances were Aragon and Sicily to be united under a single
monarch.

The new king, however, was energetic and ambitious, and at first saw no reason why he should
renounce Sicily as the price of his succession in Aragon. In sharp contrast to his father and brother, who
had appreciated the difficulties in the way of uniting the two realms under the same ruler, he fully
believed that he could retain them both. When the news of Alfonso’s death called him across to
Aragon to receive the homage of his subjects there, he summoned the Sicilian estates to Messina, and as
a pledge of his future intentions presented to them his younger brother Frederic, not as their king but
merely as his own lieutenant and representative. This policy, however, did not have the effect that was
expected of it. The hearts’ desire of the Sicilians was national autonomy and independence. They had
no mind to remain subjects of a sovereign whose principal possessions lay in another part of Europe.
They had aided the Aragonese to expel the Angevins, because they had been encouraged to believe that
they would ultimately be permitted to have a king of their own; and the events of the reign of Alfonso
III had naturally served to strengthen this expectation. But now that it was apparent that James
of Aragon intended to retain Sicily in his own hands, to convert the island into a portion of the
Aragonese empire, and to stifle all aspirations for independent national existence, the enthusiasm of the
Sicilians for their Aragonese liberators was exchanged for enmity and distrust. A patriotic party,
recruited largely among the more highly educated citizens, began to take shape; and it gained added
strength day by day from the fact that the young Frederic steadily gravitated towards it. The latter had
lived long enough in Sicily to have become imbued with all the native aspirations for autonomy. He
naturally was ill pleased with the way in which he had been deprived of the kingship of the island in
defiance of the will of Alfonso. He was not, indeed, openly at odds with the king of Aragon; ostensibly
they maintained friendly relations, and James repeatedly professed himself to be most solicitous to
safeguard his brother’s interests. But, on the other hand, it must have been increasingly plain, as time
went on, that the permanent retention of both realms under a single sovereign was impracticable, as
long as the enemies of the house of Aragon remained so numerous and powerful.
It was, indeed, the attitude of the outside powers that ultimately proved to be the determining factor in the situation, and finally convinced James that his original plan could not possibly be carried out. His attempts to retain Sicily and incorporate it into the Aragonese empire had nullified all the efforts of his predecessors to secure a durable peace. The treaty of Tarascón was a scrap of paper; and the enemies of the king of Aragon began to arm themselves for a fresh trial of strength. But no military events of decisive importance occurred either on land or sea. ‘Glorious victories’ were constantly reported by both sides, but in reality there was little fighting; the solution, if it came at all, was obviously going to be reached by diplomacy and not by war. For four long years, by constantly shifting his methods of defense, James managed to hold his various enemies at bay. He succeeded for a brief moment in relieving himself of the hostility of Sancho of Castile by abandoning the cause of the Infantes de la Cerda. He was fortunate, also, in having a temporary respite on the side of the papacy, his bitterest foe; for Nicholas IV died in April, 1292, and the cardinals were unable to elect a successor till July, 1294. The absence of leadership in Rome was significantly reflected in the evanescence of the political combinations of the period, and James took advantage of it to stave off his inevitable defeat as long as possible. His period of grace was prolonged for five months beyond the end of the interregnum at Rome by the pitiful pontificate of Celestine V, but finally the foes of the king of Aragon got the leader for whom they had looked so long by the election, on Christmas Eve, 1294, of the redoubtable Boniface VIII, masterful and dominant, raised to the papacy by the votes of the French cardinals and the support of the son of Charles of Anjou—a truly strange introduction for the pontiff who was to be smitten by Sciarra Colonna at Anagni. But if nine short years sufficed to send France all the way from the extreme of intimate alliance with the Holy See to that of open defiance of it, an even briefer space was enough to swing Aragon an equal distance in the opposite direction. Ever since the reign of Pedro II, and more especially since that of his grandson, she had struck out a line of policy notable for its attitude of independence and even hostility toward Rome. She had picked up the torch of Ghibellinism where the Hohenstaufens had set it down, and had borne it bravely forward; but now her turn to relinquish it had come. For in Boniface James of Aragon recognized a power with whom he could not hope to contend—another Hildebrand or Innocent III—no servile tool of princes and potentates, but an arbiter of the destinies of monarchs and of realms. The new Pope had obviously resolved to restore peace in Christendom on his own terms. At the very beginning of his pontificate he had taken the decisive step of opening negotiations with Frederic, offering him a marriage with Catharine of Courtenay, daughter of the titular Emperor of Constantinople and niece of Charles of Anjou, together with her claims to the succession of the Empire of the East, in return for his abandonment of Sicily. Frederic did not accept this proposal. His increasing love and respect for his Sicilian subjects, as well as a natural scepticism concerning the Pope’s ability to perform his promises, held him back; but he at least consented to negotiate, and thus gave Boniface a chance to make overtures to Aragon, France, and Anjou. It is probable that James, before this time, had been convinced that his original plan of retaining Sicily could not be carried out; and provided territorial compensation was elsewhere forthcoming, he did not propose to stand by Frederic. He had, moreover, for some time past been secretly negotiating with France, with a view to indemnifying himself for a loss which he foresaw was inevitable. He had even gone so far as to offer to marry the daughter of Charles H of Anjou on condition that the Pope should grant him Sardinia; and he had also spoken of a match between himself and that Catharine of Courtenay whom Boniface had offered to his brother, in the hope of gaining the succession to the Latin Empire of the East. All this made it comparatively easy for Boniface to carry out his plans for the settlement of the Sicilian question. The representatives of Aragon, France, and Anjou were accordingly summoned by him to Anagni in June, 1295, and they there evolved a most comprehensive treaty, of which the following stipulations concern us here.

James renounced all his rights and titles to Sicily, which was to be restored to the Holy See for the house of Anjou. The king of Aragon agreed to marry the daughter of his Angevin rival as sign and seal of their reconciliation, and there was to be a mutual surrender of captives and hostages. The excommunication and interdict against James and Frederic and their dominions were to be raised, and the king of France renounced all right and pretension to the realms of the Crown of Aragon. At the same time, a papal bull commanded in categorical terms that the Balearics be restored to James of Majorca, under the suzerainty of the Aragonese king—a sentence which, however, was not fully executed till three years afterward. Lastly, we may be reasonably sure that the cession to the Aragonese king of Corsica and Sardinia, as indemnification for his renunciation of Sicily, was at least fully discussed at Anagni. James had had his eye on these islands for some time past, and was exceedingly anxious to annex them to his dominions. They were held at the time by the Pisans and Genoese, but the church had claimed the overlordship of them since the end of the eleventh century, and Boniface, who bore no love to their actual occupants, was not averse to handing them over to James, to conquer if he could on his own resources, and to hold at an annual tribute of two thousand silver marks.
under the suzerainty of Rome. The matter was not settled till January 1296; the formal ceremony of investiture was deferred till April 3, 1297; and it was many years later before the king of Aragon was able to enter into possession of his new dominions. The first military expedition against them was not launched till 1233 and must be reserved for examination in another place; but there seems every reason to think that their cession was virtually arranged in 1295.

Altogether, the peace of Anagni was only a partial triumph for Boniface VIII. He had succeeded, it is true, in wresting Sicily from the possession of James and in settling for the time being the quarrels of Aragon with France and Majorca. But he had by no means put an end to the war to which the Sicilian question had given rise; he had rather altered and perhaps enlarged its scope and changed the personalities of the combatants. For the Sicilians found in Frederic a worthy champion of their independence, so that the struggle in that quarter continued with unabated violence; while the contest for Corsica and Sardinia and the campaigns of the Catalan Grand Company in the eastern Mediterranean simply served to transport the war to other lands. The current of Aragonese imperial ambition had begun to run so strongly that even Boniface VIII was powerless to stop it. Checked in one direction, it promptly burst forth in others, constantly gathering headway, and seeking for new worlds to conquer.

From 1295 to 1327, that is, during the remainder of the reign of James II, the history of the expansion of Aragon in the Mediterranean Sea falls into three separate divisions, which correspond to the three principal ramifications already noted of the war over the question of the Sicilian inheritance. The first is the struggle of Sicily under Frederic to maintain itself against the assaults of Pope and Angevin. The second is the beginning of the conquest of Sardinia. The third is the origin and early progress of the Aragonese domination in Greece. The affairs of Sicily and of Sardinia, down to the end of the reign, can conveniently be recounted in the immediately succeeding pages, while the rise and fall of the Catalan duchy of Athens forms an episode so remote from the rest of the Aragonese Empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean that it will be easier to describe it in a separate chapter.

In Sicily there was consternation when the news of the peace of Anagni was known. Ambassadors were sent to the king of Aragon to beg him to reconsider his decision. On their arrival at Barcelona, they found preparations being made for the marriage of James to the Angevin princess, ‘the Queen of the Holy Peace,’ which they regarded as the sign and seal of his dishonor; when they learned that the king of Aragon had already abandoned all his rights in Sicily to Charles of Naples, “they grieved like men who have received sentence of death,” and caused the sails of the ships that bore them home to be painted black. But the valor of the Sicilians was proof against the desperate circumstances in which they were placed. Their desertion by the king of Aragon was perhaps a calamity; but it also could be converted into a great blessing, if only they could maintain themselves against the papacy without his aid; for in case of triumph their reward would be the greater—namely, the national autonomy of which they had so long dreamed, instead of continued subjection to a foreign prince. Young Frederic, brave, handsome, and beloved, was by this time completely won over to the cause of Sicilian independence. On December 11, 1295, the Sicilian parliament conferred on him supreme power, with the title of ‘Lord of the Island’ and received in return his pledge to defend his subjects with his life and his substance. On May 25, 1296, followed the more solemn act of his coronation and anointing as king of Sicily, in the cathedral church of Palermo; and this was accompanied by an extensive remodeling of the Sicilian constitution, which remedied sundry abuses, strengthened and confirmed individual liberties and franchises, and increased the power of the national estates.

Having thus made doubly sure of the enthusiastic loyalty of his Sicilian subjects, Frederic persuaded a large proportion of the Aragonese troops in the island to enroll themselves in his service, and to ignore the missives which James sent forth to summon them home. He then turned his thoughts to war. Comprehending the immense advantage of seizing the initiative, he promptly crossed the strait of Messina with a considerable force and began to ravage Calabria and Apulia. The feeble Angevin levies of the indolent Charles of Naples were quite unable to stem the onrushing tide; and Boniface saw that immediate measures would be necessary to save his protégé. The most obvious plan was to draw closer to James of Aragon, who would be more than ever anxious to please the Pope in order to ensure the satisfaction of his ambition to annex Corsica and Sardinia; to call on him as a loyal son of the church to aid in effecting the subjugation of Sicily, and even to take arms if necessary against his own brother. Negotiations for this purpose were prolonged throughout the latter part of 1296 and 1297. James, who, not unnaturally, was reluctant to comply with the papal mandates, used every effort to persuade Frederic to come to terms. The latter, however, proved obdurate, and as Boniface possessed a strong hold over the king of Aragon through his control over the as yet unsettled question of
Corsica and Sardinia, James finally came to Rome early in 1297, prepared to enlist in the papal service. The next weeks were occupied in winning away the all-powerful admiral, Roger de Lauria, from the service of Frederic, who had been unable to avoid disagreements with this haughty and independent spirit; and when Lauria finally passed to the papal side, the naval preponderance passed with him. In the summer of 1298 there assembled under his leadership, in the harbor of Naples, one of the most formidable fleets that had ever sailed the seas—upwards of 100 galleys—to which most of the Western Mediterranean states had furnished their contingents. The undaunted Frederic did not hesitate to appear at the mouth of the harbor with an inferior force, but soon after deemed it prudent to retire to Sicily without a battle; according to a contemporary historian, his withdrawal was caused by the receipt of a secret warning from his brother, who had not really desired to fight him, and hoped to fulfill his obligation to Boniface without a serious conflict. A series of inconclusive operations followed; but finally, on July 4, 1299, the king of Aragon and the admiral won a bloody victory off Cape Orlando, which ended the resistance of the Sicilians on the sea. Frederic, however, managed to effect his escape with nineteen galleys. Far from discouraged at his defeat, he and his followers gloriied in the fact that they had so long held at bay the fleets of the principal maritime state of the time, and they were more than confident that they could retrieve their fortunes by land at the expense of the armies of the prince of Naples. Their hopes were justified by the event. At Falconaria, on December 1, 1300, Frederic’s infantry, by an impetuous charge, drove the horsemen of their foes in headlong flight, and vindicated the honor of a noble cause.

The effect of the desperate resistance of the Sicilians was enhanced by the fact that after the naval battle off Cape Orlando, James of Aragon had departed for Spain. He had accomplished the task which had been assigned to him, and though still in much terror of Boniface, he felt bitterly ashamed of the part he had been made to play. The Pope was hard put to it to find a champion for his cause. Charles of Naples had already proved a broken reed, and the Count of Valois, to whom Boniface next applied, lost the bulk of his forces through a pestilence before Sciacca. No one else seemed to be immediately available, and the final result was the signature of a peace at Caltabellotta in August, 1302, which finally terminated a struggle of twenty years’ duration, and rewarded Frederic for his splendid fight against overwhelming odds. He was recognized as king of the island of Sicily during his lifetime, in absolute sovereignty, independent alike of Naples and of the Pope, and all previous papal sentences against him and his subjects were revoked. His Angevin rival retained the whole of Naples on the mainland, including Calabria, and there was a mutual restoration of conquered places on both sides of the strait of Messina, so that the historic kingdom of Sicily was henceforth divided. Frederic further agreed to marry Eleanor of Anjou, the daughter of his foe, in token of the reconciliation of the rival houses; and there was further inserted, to save the papal dignity, a clause which, as everyone must have realized, stood little or no chance of fulfillment, to the effect that after Frederic’s death Sicily should revert to the Angevins, in return for an indemnity to his children of 100,000 ounces of gold. Even with these concessions, however, the peace of Caltabellotta proved too bitter a humiliation for Boniface to accept. Before he would consent to ratify it, he obliged Frederic to exchange the full and complete sovereignty over Sicily, which had been conferred upon him by the original treaty, for an arrangement by which he should consent to acknowledge the feudal supremacy of Rome and pay 3000 ounces of gold in recognition of it. “The terms honorably obtained by the sword,” says Amari, “were thus defaced by negotiation.”

Despite all these modifications and reservations, it is undeniable that at Caltabellotta the papacy suffered an important loss of prestige. Seven years before, at Anagni, James of Aragon had forsaken the ways of his fathers and bowed the knee of submission to Rome; but Frederic had proved more obstinate and was finally rewarded with the recognition of the virtual independence of his kingdom. More than a century later the separate line of Sicilian sovereigns which had been founded by Frederic died out, and the island was finally and formally incorporated in the Aragonese Empire; but nothing in the checkered course of Sicily’s later history should cause us to forget that its first acquisition by a Spanish monarch was effected through open defiance of the Holy See. In the conquest of Sardinia, however, which next claims our attention, we shall find Aragon and the papacy in alliance.

We have already seen that in 1296-97 Pope Boniface had granted to King James of Aragon, as a part of the price of his abandonment of his brother Frederic, the right to conquer and hold the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, under the suzerainty of the see of Rome. This apparently magnificent papal donation, however, was emphatically of the sort that it is more blessed to give than to receive. Bitterly as he detested the rival republics of Genoa and Pisa, which were actually in occupation of the two islands, Boniface realized that he did not possess the military power to expel them; he was,
therefore, only too happy to find a sovereign amenable to his authority who would engage, on his own resources, to do so for him. It is also quite clear that the king of Aragon fully realized the difficulty of the task he had undertaken. He postponed action again and again, until the pressure of other more immediate problems had abated, and thus gave Boniface and his successors an opportunity to prepare the way for the final military campaign by ecclesiastical admonition and diplomatic intrigue.

The existing conditions in both islands, more particularly in Sardinia, furnished an admirable opportunity for the exercise of the papal talents in this direction. Not only were Pisa and Genoa at odds with one another over the possession of them; but both, in different ways and degrees, were exceedingly unpopular with the natives. They had been called over from Italy in the eleventh century to expel the Saracens from the islands; having successfully accomplished that task, they felt that they were entitled to remain, and this the inhabitants not unnaturally resented. In Sardinia, the latter had been governed since very ancient times by four giudices or judges, each of whom was virtually a king in the district committed to his charge; at the period with which we are dealing the most powerful of them was unquestionably the Judge of Arborea, whose domains occupied the southwestern quarter of the island. The Pisans, who were dominant in that region, had irritated these magistrates by sundry exactions and demands. They were generally unpopular also because of their intense Ghibellinism, and since their power in both Corsica and Sardinia was distinctly on the wane (the Genoese held practically all of one and the bulk of the other) the Pope and the king of Aragon determined to concentrate their efforts against them. At first they strove to widen the breach between the Pisans and the Judges of Arborea, and with excellent results. Secret negotiations were opened between Hugo, Judge of Arborea, and the king of Aragon in 1321; they terminated in an arrangement by which the former was given assurance that he would be maintained in all his dignities and titles, in return for his support against the common foe. Next King James approached the Genoese in Sardinia and made sure that they would not actively support the Pisans. The powerful families of the Dorias and the Malespini, the greatest feudatories in the island, were even won over to the cause of Aragon; while in the commune of Sassari, where the Genoese showed some signs of taking the other side, the inhabitants rose and expelled them. Only in Iglesias and Cagliari did the Pisans keep the upper hand, and even there signs of the presence of an Aragonese party kept constantly cropping out; one man was beheaded for having been heard to exclaim, "Please the devil that those Catalans come!" Meantime the papacy, transferred to Avignon in 1309, continued to do everything in its power to emphasize its ancient claims to the overlordship of both Corsica and Sardinia, and its consequent right to dispose of them; it also interfered on all possible occasions in the affairs of the Sardinian clergy, in order to assure itself of their loyalty and support. In Italy, too, matters shaped themselves in a way favorable to the Aragonese invasion. Pisa was weak, distracted by internal broils, and discouraged by the death, in 1313, of the Emperor Henry VII; on the other hand, all the Guelf powers in the peninsula supported the Pope and the king of Aragon. The king of Naples formally approved of the enterprise, while Frederic of Sicily, unable to prevent it, vainly attempted to mediate between his brother and the Pisans.

By the time, then, that King James was ready to begin military operations, the diplomatic foundations for them had been pretty thoroughly laid. Meantime, no precautions had been neglected in Aragon and Catalonia that would serve to insure success. The Infante Alfonso was placed in command of the expedition, and was furnished with a fleet so great, says Muntenar, "that the whole world trembled every time that the eagle of Aragon made ready to fly." The names of those who rallied to Alfonso’s standard included all the best and bravest in the realm, and such was the enthusiasm for the enterprise that no less than 20,000, according to the contemporary chronicler, were forced to remain behind. At the very last moment the Avignonese Pope, John XXII, grew faint-hearted and attempted to draw back, reminding King James "that there were already wars and tribulations enough in Christendom"; but the latter was not thus to be diverted from his purpose. On May 31, 1323, the Aragonese fleet left Portfangos under the orders of the valiant admiral Francisco Carroz, with upwards of 10,000 soldiers under the Infante. A small detachment furnished by the kingdom of Majorca joined them at Port Mahon. On June 12 they anchored in the Gulf of Palmas, as had previously been arranged with Hugo of Arborea. After the latter had met them and solemnly recognized the overlordship of Aragon, preparations were made to attack the two chief Pisan strongholds, Iglesias and Cagliari. The first-named was considerably the less formidable, but it required a four months’ siege by the bulk of the invading forces before it yielded, on February 7, 1324, to starvation and thirst. After its surrender the Infante was able to concentrate his army and navy before Cagliari, where Admiral Carroz had already preceded him. As an earnest of his determination to capture it at any price, he proceeded to construct directly in front of it a fortified town and castle, which he called Bonayre, so placed that it enabled him immediately to detect any attempt at a sortie of the garrison or at relief from without, and there awaited developments. A Pisan squadron, reinforced by a detachment of Germans, which attempted to break
through the blockade, was beaten off with great slaughter, and the expected sortie of the garrison of Cagliari met with a similar fate; the invaders were, moreover, still further strengthened by the arrival of a fresh fleet from Aragon. On the other hand, the forces of the Infante had been decimated by the ravages of the terrible ‘intemperia’ or Sardinian fever, which had made the climate of that island the synonym for death since Roman times. Bonayre, as its name implies, was far less destructive than the region of Iglesias in this respect, but Alfonso’s losses were quite sufficient to make him think twice before refusing terms somewhat less favorable than he had originally hoped to obtain. Through the mediation of Bernabé Doria and Hugo of Arborea, a treaty was finally arranged on June 19, 1324, by virtue of which the Pisans surrendered to the Infante all their possessions in Sardinia, except Cagliari, and promised to hold that as a fief of the Crown of Aragon, at an annual tribute of 3000 lire.

This somewhat lame and halting peace served rather to postpone the end of the struggle than to terminate it. Cagliari became a center of Pisan intrigue; the Genoese, reversing their policy, now joined forces with their quondam foes. It was not until Admiral Carroz, a year and a half later, won a decisive victory over their combined fleets in Sardinian waters that the town was finally delivered up, and the king of Aragon could boast that he was really master of the whole island. According to Muntaner, the treaty of 1324 led the inhabitants of Corsica, which was practically entirely under the control of Genoa, to follow the example of their brethren in Sardinia and acknowledge the suzerainty of King James; but Zurita offers a number of excellent reasons for doubting this statement, the chief of which is the fact that King Pedro IV of Aragon, who afterwards did much fighting in Sardinia, makes no mention of the matter in his chronicle. Certain projects which were broached, though not accomplished at the time, for the invasion and conquest of Corsica seem to afford additional evidence that the claims of the Aragonese monarch to the overlordship of that island can in no sense be regarded as established, despite the fact that he undoubtedly continued to style himself the king of it in virtue of the papal donation of 1297.

A few other scattering events of this important reign remain to be mentioned, all of them indicative of the spirit of foreign enterprise and expansion that animated alike the sovereigns and subjects of the realms of the crowns of Aragon and Sicily; in some respects it never rose so high again. The most significant of these was the struggle over the possession of the little island of Gerba, just west of Tripoli, and close to the North African coast. Captured from the Moors, first by the Normans and later, in the end of the thirteenth century, by the Admiral Roger de Lauria, it was defended with difficulty by the heirs of the latter against repeated infidel assaults. Outside aid was indispensable to its permanent retention in Christian hands, and in 1310 Frederic of Sicily sent the chronicler, Ramon Muntaner, who had abundance of military experience, to organize and maintain its defence. The latter accomplished his mission so effectively that he was rewarded by his grateful master with a three years’ grant of the lordship of Gerba and also of Kerkeni, to the northwest of it, under the suzerainty of the Sicilian crown. At the expiration of his term he went back to Spain, leaving the island in the possession of Frederic; for the faire of continuing to recognize the rights of the heirs of Roger de Lauria had by this time been given up, so completely incapable were they of enforcing them. A score of years later, in 1335, the Saracens won Gerba back, and the subsequent attempts of Genoa and Sicily to recapture it for Christendom were not attended with permanent success. The little island of Pantellaria, however, was reconquered in this period from the Saracens, and subjected to the payment of a tribute by King Frederic. After numerous vicissitudes it passed to the Crown of Aragon in the early fifteenth century, and in 1492 it was conferred on the great family of Requesens, which continued to administer it as a hereditary possession for three hundred years.

The struggle over Gerba brings us back to the question of the status of the tribute to Aragon from the king of Tunis, of which mention has already been made. Certain sums had been irregularly paid by the Hafside sultans to the Aragonese kings during the previous century, in return for the Christian soldiers whom the latter had permitted to serve in the Moorish armies. In 1285, moreover, Pedro III had established a claim for himself and his successors to a more permanent contribution from the same source, when the Tunisian sovereigns recognized him as lawful king of Sicily, and as heir to the annual tribute which the rulers of Tunis had anciently paid to the Sicilian crown. But when on Pedro’s death Sicily was separated from Aragon under an independent line of kings, this Tunisian tribute naturally became an object of competition between the two rulers. The Angevins in Naples also refused to abandon their claim to it; and the triple controversy thus aroused finally resulted in a complete cessation of the disputed revenue, pending its settlement. In 1309, after King James of Aragon had abandoned all rights to Sicily, he was selected as arbiter between the two remaining claimants, and finally gave his verdict in favor of the king of Naples, on the ground that the exact title of his brother
Frederic was only king of Trinacria. As the Angevin, however, was totally unable to enforce his claim, the sentence remained practically inoperative, and the king of Aragon subsequently acknowledged the right of Frederic of Sicily to collect a fresh tribute from the king of Tunis, if he could do so, by force. The fact that the Christians were established in Gerba, where they could menace the Tunisian coast, apparently enabled Frederic to accomplish this, down to the recapture of the island by the Saracens in 1335; it seems that the king of Aragon was also in receipt of an annual contribution of 5000 dobłas from the Hafside ruler during this period, on the old ground that the latter had Christian soldiers in his service. Other evidences of the interest and enthusiasm of King James for the extension of the power and prestige of Aragon in distant lands are his second marriage in 1314 with Mary, the sister of Henry of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, and his sending of an embassy, apparently with the most successful results, to the Soldan of Cairo, to ransom all the Aragonese and Catalan crusaders and merchants who were prisoners within his domains? His reign marks an important epoch in the development of the Aragonese Empire. James was neither great, save possibly as a legist, nor beloved, and it is hard to forgive his treatment of the Sicilian question and his abandonment of his brother Frederic; but he profited by his early errors and did not repeat them, and as time went on, he gave evidence that he possessed caution and determination, quickness to seize his opportunities, and many of the other qualities of statesmanship.
CHAPTER VIII
THE CATALAN GRAND COMPANY

Before proceeding further with our study of the development of the Aragonese empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean, we must devote one short chapter to the story of a much remoter outpost of it, which was won and lost during the fourteenth century in the Levant. The history of the Catalan Grand Company and of the duchy of Athens under its dominion is one of the dramatic episodes of the Middle Ages and has been described from many different points of view; but as the whole affair exercised no lasting influence on the fortunes of the Spanish Empire, it need only be dealt with briefly here. We shall also find it convenient to carry the story through to its conclusion in the present chapter, even though by so doing we shall be taken somewhat beyond the point which we have reached in the development of the more permanent portions of the Aragonese Empire farther westward. The matter is episodic rather than fundamental for our main purpose and may therefore best be considered by itself.

The terrible confusion into which Greece had been thrown by the Fourth Crusade had been in no wise diminished by the reconquest of Constantinople by the Emperor Michael Palaeologus in 1261. The domains of the reestablished Empire of the East were small and scattered, “a feeble, crippled body, which could ill support its enormous head.” The bulk of the Grecian peninsula remained more or less completely independent of it, split up into a number of 368 minor principalities, most of which acknowledged the sway of Western rulers. Even the parts which remained nominally under Byzantine control were in reality managed by rival Genoese and Venetian mercenaries and colonists, who were practically masters of the situation. The way in which Charles of Anjou contrived to extend the dominion of his house into this sadly disrupted land need only be briefly touched on here; we have already seen that the possession of an empire in the East had been the goal of his ambition from the very first, and, indeed, that he regarded the conquest of Sicily chiefly as a stepping-stone to that end. He began in 1267 by seizing the island of Corfu, which had belonged to his rival, Manfred of Sicily. In the same year a treaty with Baldwin II, the deposed Latin Emperor of Romania, gave him the suzerainty over the great principality of Achaia, which was held by William of Villehardouin and comprised the bulk of the Peloponnesus; and soon afterwards a marriage between his second son and William’s daughter converted the Angevin suzerainty into virtual possession. The rich duchy of Athens also, comprising ancient Attica and Boeotia, and ruled over from 1205 to 1308 by the French house of de la Roche, specifically acknowledged the authority of Anjou; even in Cephalonia and Epirus Charles considered himself to be overlord. “In almost every part of the Greek world the restless Angevin had a base for his long-projected attack on Constantinople”; and the Emperor Michael Palaeologus and his son, Andronicus II, had fully as much cause to dread the assaults of the fierce Frenchman on the west as those of the infidel Turk on the east.

It was entirely natural that in seeking aid to ward off the threatened danger, the Byzantine emperors should look to the house of Aragon. That dynasty was already at swords’ points with the Angevins in the western Mediterranean, and it had also been in close touch with Oriental affairs ever since the marriage of Pedro II to the granddaughter of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus in 1204. During the reign of James the Conqueror, Aragonese traders had frequently made their appearance in the Levant; and just before the Sicilian Vespers the rulers of Aragon and Constantinople had been drawn nearer than ever together in common enmity to Charles of Anjou, through the instrumentality of John of Procida. On the other hand, the famous ravaging expedition of Roger de Lauria into Grecian waters in the year 1292 must have made the Byzantine emperors think twice before employing the warriors of the West. Plunder, ransom “enough to satisfy five armies,” and indiscriminate slaughter, sufficient, according to Muntaner, to explain the lack of good men to defend the Morea at a later day, were the sole objects of Lauria’s men; and apparently the territories of the Byzantine emperor suffered quite as severely as those of his Angevin foe, for the admiral justified himself in attacking the former on the ground that Andronicus had failed to pay the king of Aragon a subsidy promised to the father of Pedro the Great. The expedition, however, certainly served the purpose of reminding these western marauders of the glories of the East, whatever it may have caused the East to think of them. It had indicated to them an unrivalled opportunity for booty and spoil, and when the chance came they would not fail to take advantage of it.
The latter did not wait till they got to Constantinople to show the stuff they were made of: they incidentally ravaged the Angevin island of Corfu as they passed. At Constantinople there were great rejoicings over their arrival. Roger was solemnly invested with the promised title of Grand Duke, and married, with ceremonies of the utmost magnificence, to the Emperor’s niece. But in the midst of the festivities a violent quarrel broke out between Roger’s troops and the Genoese, who had dominated Constantinople for some years past, and hated the sight of the Emperor’s allies. Furious fighting ensued, and Muntaner tells us that over 3000 Italians were found dead in the city streets. Andronicus, angered beyond expression by the ‘insolent Latin vagabonds’ whom he had enthusiastically welcomed so shortly before, was now all on fire to get rid of them, and the threatening approach of the Turks on the other side of the Bosporus gave him the desired excuse. In January 1304, Roger and his warriors were induced to cross over into Asia Minor, nominally for the purpose of fighting the battles of Andronicus against the infidel, practically as an independent and wellnigh irresistible band of marauders, whose savage bearing had already cowed their titular master into sullen submission. After a bloody encounter with the Turks, from which they emerged victorious, the Almogavares settled down to pass the remainder of the winter at Cyzicus, where they gave themselves up to every sort of orgy and outrage. With the coming of spring they were once more on the march. Southward across the great plain of Anatolia they took their way, forcing the Turks to raise the siege of the ancient city of Philadelphia, but subsequently levying a war contribution of such immense proportions on the inhabitants that the latter’s joy at their deliverance was speedily exchanged for mourning. It was much the same story in the succeeding weeks at Magnesia, Thyrea, and Ephesus. Meantime the company kept receiving numerous reinforcements from Constantinople and from the West; for the fame of its exploits had spread far and near, and all the adventurers of Europe longed for a place in its ranks and a share in its spoils. In midsommer, with strengthened forces, the Almogavares penetrated south and east to the famous Cilician Gates, which connect the mediaeval Armenia and Anatolia, and there, on St. Mary’s day, under the scorching rays of an August sun, drove a huge army of hostile Turks in headlong-flight. Only the prudence of Roger de Flor prevented the hand from pushing on to the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. As it was, they returned by slow stages, impeded by their enormous booty, to Magnesia, where Roger had left the spoils which had been captured in the previous spring. But the town was now in full revolt against him. The Emperor Andronicus, who had by this time begun to hate the Catalans “even worse than the double procession of the Holy Ghost,” had doubtless inspired the uprising, as a means of putting a spoke in the wheel of his too powerful allies; and when the Almogavares sat down to a siege, he at once intervened and recalled them to Constantinople, on the pretext that he needed them to defend it against a threatened attack by the Bulgars; permission to remain longer in Asia Minor could not fail to render them absolute masters there. With no very good grace, Roger decided to obey, the more readily because of the stout resistance of the Magnesians. It doubtless cost him many a pang to abandon his dream of an independent realm, which had come so
near to being realized, but some of his men were getting out of hand, and the risks of staying where he was were very great. In the autumn of 1304, accordingly, the whole Company crossed the straits, and went into winter quarters on the Gallipoli peninsula, which Muntaner describes as “the most delightful cape in the world, with good bread, good wine, and all the fruits in great abundance.”

It will readily be believed that the winter of 1304-05 was largely occupied with wrangles between the Emperor and the Catalan leader over the question of pay; Roger kept going back and forth between Constantinople and the Gallipoli peninsula to settle them. Meantime, matters were greatly complicated by the arrival of a fresh detachment of Catalans, under the famous Berenguer de Entença of ancient Spanish lineage, “in every way Roger’s equal as a warrior and plunderer, and his superior in insolence and pride”. Very reluctantly, Roger was obliged to recognize the new arrival; he finally passed over to him his title of Grand Duke, though not until he himself had been given permission to assume the still more resounding one of Caesar. But Roger’s days were numbered. His negotiations with the Emperor concluded, on terms generally satisfactory to himself, he prepared, in April, 1305, to cross over once more to Asia Minor. Before his departure, however, he visited Constantinople to bid farewell to Michael, the son and colleague of Andronicus, who was vastly less yielding than his father, and was angered beyond measure at the concessions that the Catalan leader had already obtained. The only way to rid himself of the man whom he detested and feared was by murder, but Michael did not shrink from it. A great feast was tendered to Roger at the palace; at the conclusion of it a band of soldiers rushed into the hall, and cut down the guest of honor and his companions.

Furious at the murder of their chief, the Almogavares, under the leadership of Entença, intrenched themselves at Gallipoli and sent a formal defiance to Michael; but the latter put the envoys to death, and ordered the massacre of all the Catalans that could be found in Constantinople. The ranks of the Company were further depleted by numerous desertions, but several thousand still remained; and as the old lust for conquest and rapine burned stronger than ever within their breasts, they improvised a fleet, and began a wild career of piracy in the adjacent waters. They were no less efficient on sea than on land. A number of victories were won against superior forces, till finally Entença and his followers were induced to board a Genoese galley under a safe conduct, which was promptly violated. The Catalan fleet was dispersed, and Entença was held by his captors for an enormous ransom, first at Trebizond, and finally at Genoa. But even now the courage of the Almogavares never flagged. Berenguer de Rocafort, a soldier of humble origin, was chosen captain of the band in solemn council. With his election all traces of aristocratic influence in the Company’s organization disappeared. An ultra-democratic form of government was gradually installed, in which military efficiency was the only road to authority, the supreme power being vested in a council of twelve captains. In vain did the Greeks besiege the Gallipoli peninsula. A handful of men sufficed to hold at bay the entire Empire of the East. Catalan ravaging expeditions into Thrace and Macedonia invariably returned laden with booty and captives, which were sold at enormous profit. From 1305 to 1307 Gallipoli became in fact the great slave market of the East, and a source of supply for the harems of the emirs of Asia Minor. In the midst of all these activities, Entença returned, liberated at last from his Genoese prison through the efforts of James of Aragon, to whom the Company had thrice applied for the purpose; as he could not possibly get on with the plain, blunt Rocafort, the Company soon split into two independent bands. The inevitable quarrel between them broke out in the end of the year 1307, and resulted in the death of Entença, Rocafort being left for the time the dominant personality in the situation. At about the same time the Company, having exhausted the possibilities of Gallipoli, moved across to the mainland of Thrace and Macedonia, where its previous devastations had convinced the inhabitants of the futility of resistance.

And now new factors came into play, which were destined to terminate the wanderings of this strange marauding band. Even in its palmiest days, it had never abandoned the pretence of being in the service of King Frederic of Sicily. Officially all its acts were accomplished in his name, and it carried the banners of Sicily and of Aragon with it into battle. All this made it natural that the Sicilian monarch should attempt to recover effective control of it and of the territories which it had conquered; and as a preliminary step toward this end, he sent out his cousin Ferdinand, a younger son of King James I of Majorca, to take command of it. But Rocafort, who had tasted the sweets of independent power and had no mind to surrender his leadership to this scion of Aragonese royalty, plotted against him from the moment of his arrival, and forced him to return with his mission unaccomplished; then, realizing that his action amounted to a declaration of revolt against his sovereign, he anxiously cast about him for means of support in case his authority should be challenged again. In so doing he naturally turned his attention first of all toward the potentates of the Grecian peninsula, to whose domains he was being brought nearer and nearer every day, as the Catalans pursued their spoliations in Macedonia and Thrace; and he finally opened negotiations with the last of the de la Roche dukes of Athens, who had been established...
there as a result of the Fourth Crusade. There were plans of a marriage between the Catalan leader and a
kinswoman of the duke, and of joint action against their various foes; but before matters could come to
any definite conclusion a strong faction in the ranks of the Company itself, irritated at Rocafor’s
dealings with outside powers, and suspicious of his personal ambitions, rose in revolt, and finally
handed him over to the custody of a French noble, Thibaut de Chevoy; the latter surrendered him to the
tender mercies of the Angevin king of Naples, and he died shortly afterwards of starvation in the
dungeons of Aversa. But the elimination of Rocafor did not terminate the dealings of the Company
with the Athenian authorities. The Catalans were by this time ravaging Thessaly with a vengeance; but
that warlike country yielded them more hard knocks than booty, and the fierce inhabitants pointedly
assured their unwelcome guests that better opportunities for plunder awaited them in Boeotia and
Attica. Obviously the Company was destined to appear in the neighborhood of Athens before many
months elapsed; obviously, also, it would depend on the attitude of the authorities there whether it came
as friend or foe. Meanwhile the last of the de la Roche dukes died (October 5, 1308) and was succeeded
by his cousin, Walter de Brienne; and the latter, who had taken the measure of the Catalans and did
not relish the prospect of having them any nearer to himself than was absolutely necessary, offered them
a substantial reward to remain in Thessaly and complete the conquest of it in his name. This programme
was successfully carried out in the summer of 1310; but its accomplishment was followed by a violent
quarrel between the Athenian duke and the Company, because of the latter’s unwillingness to vacate the
territories it had won. On the insolent refusal of the Catalans to depart, Walter contemptuously
announced that he would expel them, and summoned all the great princes of the Morea to rally to his
standard. The friendly Angevins in Achaia, for whose cause he had fought in Sicily, gladly sent him a
large contingent; the Venetians in Negropont supported him: whether we accept Muntaner’s estimate—
24,700—that of the Chronicle of the Morea—6000—as the size of his army, we may rest assured that it
was the mightiest host that had ever assembled under the banner of a duke of Athens, brimful of
confidence, and eager for victory. But the savage Catalans were more than equal to the occasion.
Issuing out into the great Boeotian plain, they took up their position in some marshy ground, which they
further extended by diverting the waters of an adjacent stream, hard by the spot where Philip of
Macedon, more than sixteen centuries before, had won “that dishonest victory of Chaeronea, fatal to
liberty”; and there they awaited the onslaught of the chivalry of Frankish Greece. On March 15,
1311, the battle of the Cephissus took place. Walter’s horsemen plunged all unsuspecting into the
treacheroius morass; stuck fast in the clinging mud, they were ingloriously shot down or stabbed by their
crafty foes; Walter and the great majority of his knights were numbered among the slain. Like the battle
of Courtrai, nine years before, it was one of the earliest and most striking demonstrations of the
superiority of infantry, properly handled, over cavalry; of a democratic over an aristocratic fighting
machine. Thus at last, after a life of a hundred and six years, the French duchy of Athens came to a
sudden and tragic end.

By this time the Catalans were ready to abandon their roving life, and they accordingly determined
to settle down and establish themselves permanently in the territories they had won. With the adoption
of a sedentary existence, however, they began to feel the need of outside recognition and support. They
were surrounded on every side by foes whom they could not, unaided, hope permanently to withstand;
they consequently reversed the policy of Rocafor, and applied to Frederic of Sicily to send them one of
his children, to be their leader in peace and war. Frederic was only too glad to avail himself of this
opportunity to extend his dominion over the conquests of the Almogavares. As his oldest available son,
Manfred, was still too young to assume the Company’s leadership, he sent out Berenguer Estañol, a
knight of Ampurias, to govern for the time being as Manfred’s representative. From the date of
Berenguer’s arrival, we may justly regard the duchy of Athens as formally connected with the kingdom
of Sicily, and therefore as a semi-independent eastern outpost of the Aragonese Empire. On Estañol’s
death in 1316, King Frederic appointed his illegitimate son, Alfonso Fatridrique, in his stead; since
Manfred, whose representative the latter theoretically was, died in November, 1317, Alfonso Fatridrique
governed Athens in the name of Frederic’s third legitimate son, William, who was likewise a minor,
until his retirement in 1330. In the following period the duchy continued to be ruled by a series of
governors in the name of the successive descendants of King Frederic, who one after another inherited
the title of duke of Athens, though they never visited Greece. In 1355 the Catalan conquests in the East
were bound for the first time in personal union to Sicily, through the deaths of all Frederic’s legitimate
offspring except one grandson, who bore his name, and fell heir to all his dominions. At the death,
twenty-two years later, of this Frederic—whose feeble rule in Sicily was painfully reflected in the
incompetent government of his representatives in Athens—he left all his domains to his daughter Maria.
The Sicilians accepted her, but the Catalans in the East refused. Knowing that they stood in need of
more vigorous outside aid against their many foes than Maria would be able to accord, they offered
their sovereignty to Pedro IV, the mighty king of Aragon, who promptly accepted it, and promised to
occupants were no longer invincible. Their dominion was approaching its end.

At the same time that their status was being secured with the outside world, the Catalans proceeded to remodel the internal government of the duchy of Athens. Beginning under the rule of Estañol, they gradually evolved a constitution, closely resembling that of Catalonia, for their new domain, of which Thebes, not Athens, was the capital. There were a vicar-general and a marshal, appointed by the king’s representative, and holding under him the chief political and military powers in the state; there was an elaborate system of local government under vequers, castellanos, and capitans; there was a large measure of popular liberty, and a sort of parliament, or meeting of the sindici, representing the principal towns and villages. No offices were to be granted to any outsiders, not even to Sicilians or Aragonese; Attica was to be for the Catalans who had taken it and their descendants—the ‘Conquistadores’, as they called themselves, like the later Castilian empire builders in America. ‘The Usages of Barcelona’ supplanted the ‘Assizes of Romania’, and Catalan became the official as well as the ordinary language. The conquered Greeks were treated as a subject race; they were excluded as a rule from the enjoyment of civic rights, and the Greek church was relegated to a position of inferiority to that of the West. During the early part of their rule, moreover, the Catalans continued to extend their conquests. After successfully repelling an attempt of the heirs of Walter de Brienne to recover the duchy, they attacked the Venetians in Negropont, and would probably have conquered the island had they not been ordered by Frederic of Sicily to desist. In 1318, on the extinction of the reigning dynasty in Thessaly, they promptly occupied the southern part of that country and erected it into the Catalan duchy of Neopatras, whose title was proudly borne, together with that of Athens, by Sicilian kings and Aragonese sovereigns long after the effective domination of the Catalans in the Near Bast had passed away. But it is interesting to observe that the subsequent years of the Catalans’ dominion in Athens saw no further extension of these easy conquests. The period of the rule of Alfonso Fadrique (1316-30) witnessed the zenith of their power; from that time onward they began to lose those magnificent fighting qualities which had won them their place in the world. Despite occasional raids into hostile territory to kindle enthusiasm for war, the life of Thebes and Athens bore little resemblance to that of the Anatolian plains and the peninsula of Gallipoli. Discipline could no longer be maintained; luxury and corruption crept in; the drunken descendants of the hardy victors of the Cephissus surrendered themselves to a life of sloth and debauchery on their great estates. By the time that the Catalan duchy had transferred itself (1377) from Sicilian to Aragonese obedience, its occupants were no longer invincible. Their dominion was approaching its end.

The power that was ultimately destined to oust the Catalans from their possessions in Attica and Thessaly was an upstart family of Florentine ‘steel kings’ and bankers, called the Acciajuoli, who had long been attached to the Angevins in Naples, and, while furthering their patrons’ ventures in the Morea, financially and otherwise, had incidentally managed to acquire territory there for themselves. In 1358 they got Corinth, and in 1373 Megara—this last on the ground of the refusal of the Catalans to hand over to them certain fugitive vassals—and thus possessed themselves of the high road into the Athenian duchy from the south. Further than this they did not venture for the present to advance, for the Catalans were still regarded as formidable foes more formidable by far than they actually were—and the Acciajuoli did not dare to attack them until the assaults of other enemies had weakened them still more. This necessary preliminary, however, was speedily accomplished by the famous Navarrese Company, composed, like its Catalan predecessor, of a host of professional soldiers, whom the peace of Bretigny had permitted their original employer, the notorious Charles the Bad, to dismiss from his service, but whom Jacques de Baux, a claimant of the duchy of Achaia and also one of the numberless titular Emperors of Constantinople, had determined to utilize for purposes of his own. As a preliminary to the conquest of Achaia, de Baux launched these Navarrese mercenaries against the Catalan Grand Company from the northward; in 1380 they advanced triumphantly across Boeotia, but were finally stopped by the defences of the Acropolis. The delay before the walls of the Athenian citadel gave the Catalans time to meet and memorialize their absent sovereign, Pedro IV of Aragon. In a petition which clearly indicates how completely their pristine vigor had been sapped, they begged him to send them a vicar general who would protect them from the invaders. After some delay, the king complied, and finally despatched to Athens Philip Dalemar, Viscount of Rocaberti; the
latter arrived in the autumn of 1381, and, turning on the Navarrese Company, speedily drove it out of the duchy into the Peloponnese, where it subsequently established itself in Achaia. But the expulsion of the Navarrese was only a preliminary to a fresh invasion of the Acciajuoli. The latter had keenly watched from their outposts at Corinth and Megara the gradual disintegration of the Catalan state, and realized how completely the expulsion of the Navarrese had exhausted it. When at last Rocaberti fell into disfavor with King Pedro and was recalled, they saw that their chance had come. The scornful rejection by the chief heiress of Catalan Athens of an offer of marriage from the leader of the Acciajuoli served as the pretext for launching the long-postponed attack. The details of the invasion are almost unknown to us. It probably began in 1385, but the conquest was not finally accomplished till May, 1388, owing to the resistance for sixteen long months, after the rest of Athens had surrendered, of a handful of men in the Acropolis. Frequent embassies were despatched to the home government to beg for relief; but Pedro, though his enthusiasm for the architectural glories of ancient Greece was outspoken and unbounded, was unable to render any practical aid in the defence of his distant dominions. With the fall of the Acropolis in 1388, the Catalans disappeared from the soil of Attica like clouds in the rays of a summer sun. Whither they all went, and how they were so rapidly dispersed, it is impossible fully to explain. Many took ship and sailed westward to Sicily or Barcelona; others lingered on in the East, but there was no element of permanence in their conquests. Few, if any, traces of their presence can be detected in Athens today; and the fact that the word ‘Catalan’ was long used there as a term of opprobrium and reproach sufficiently indicates the general impression they left on the native Greeks. The sister duchy of Neopatras fell to the Acciajuoli with that of Athens, but the Catalans managed to maintain themselves in the adjacent county of Salona till 1394, and their pretensions to the island of Aegina were not entirely abandoned until 1451.

It is not easy to pass judgment on this curious episode in the development of the Aragonese Empire. However remiss they may have been in failing to take practical measures to prevent the loss of their possessions in Greece, it is certain that the Aragonese and Sicilian sovereigns, their successors, and their subjects were intensely proud of their brief connection with the home of classical civilization. The humanist Alfonso the Magnanimous actually made an abortive attempt to recover the lost duchies, and the titled to them continued to figure among the dignities of the Spanish crown down to the end of the seventeenth century. But whether or not it would have been ‘practical politics’ for Pedro IV to have attempted to retain them, in the circumstances that obtained in the end of the fourteenth century, is quite another question. They were, after all, remote, and isolated amidst hostile states; moreover, since they had been acquired as it were accidentally, rather than by a regularly organized national effort with the support of the home government, there was comparatively little of other problems, of greater importance and far nearer home, and could ill afford to dissipate their energies. When one remembers how the Spanish Empire suffered in later days from the wide dispersion of the territories that composed it, one is inclined to applaud the restraint of the monarch who declined to exhaust his resources in the endeavor to preserve a dominion so remote.
CHAPTER IX
A MEDITERRANEAN EMPIRE

We now return to the realms of the Crown of Aragon and their dependencies in the western basin of the Mediterranean, which we left at the death of James II in 1327. The brief and generally unimportant reign of the latter’s son and heir, Alfonso IV, is little more than a transition period. As far as the history of Aragonese expansion in the Mediterranean is concerned, it is absolutely without significance, save for a serious revolt in the newly conquered island of Sardinia. In this the lead was taken by the Genoese, who had now turned their arms against their quondam allies from Aragon, and attempted to expel them from the island. The rebellion began at the instigation of the Dorias, who had come into conflict with the Aragonese officials in the commune of Sassari. As the viceroy who represented Alfonso in the island was unable to maintain himself alone, it became necessary to send him reinforcements; and in order to obtain these in sufficient numbers the king was obliged to desist from a campaign which he had begun against the Moors of Granada. Meantime the Genoese redoubled their efforts. A furious struggle blazed up all over Sardinia and in the adjacent seas as far as the coasts of Italy and Catalonia. On land, the Genoese had emphatically the better of the argument. In a few years they mastered all the island except Sassari, Cagliari, and Iglesias; and these might well have fallen also, had not Alfonso opened negotiations for a treaty, which was not concluded till after his death, and was in general so lame and ambiguous as to make it little more than the prelude to another war. On the sea the contest was somewhat more even, and the fighting violent in the extreme; so much so, in fact, as to suggest that there was more at stake between the rival powers than the possession of an unprofitable and unhealthy island. As a matter of fact, the conflicting economic interests of the two powers were the underlying cause of their hostility. Both aspired to the commercial hegemony of the western Mediterranean, and were determined to go to any length to attain it. They had already encountered one another in North Africa and in the Levant, and now the Sardinian question had brought them more openly into collision than ever before; but the title to the island was, after all, rather a pretext than a cause of their strife. The struggle between them went on intermittently throughout the remainder of the fourteenth century and beyond, until the decline of Genoa made it impossible for her to continue it; and it was in Sardinia that she contrived with the aid of the native population to maintain the fight the longest. The island was not wholly conquered by the Aragonese, as we shall later see, till 1421.

Alfonso IV was twice married, first to Teresa de Entença, a noble dame of Aragonese birth, and second to Eleanor, sister of Alfonso XI of Castile. Each wife bore him two sons: those of the first were called Pedro and James, and those of the second Ferdinand and John; and the last years of Alfonso’s life were clouded by a bitter feud between Queen Eleanor on the one side and the Infante Pedro on the other. For us the main interest of the conflict, in which at one time it seemed probable that Eleanor would win for her children the crown that was unquestionably Pedro’s by hereditary right, lies in the fact that it served to develop at a very early age the character and ability of the Infante. When in his twentieth year he finally succeeded to the throne of his father—Eleanor and her children having fled to Castile at the last moment—he had already reached maturity. Within a frail and sickly body he concealed a bold, crafty, rancorous, and defiant heart. To reign in fact as well as in name was his life’s study and object, relentlessly pursued through all the vicissitudes of fortune. Neither family ties nor friendships held him back. The attainment of the end justified in his eyes the use of any and every means. He was most dangerous when seemingly impotent, and a past master of sheltering himself in his most atrocious acts behind the technicalities of the law. He has often been compared to Louis XI of France; but he differed sharply from that monarch in his fondness for pomp and outward magnificence, and in his implicit belief in their value as a means to impress the multitude. He is known in the long history of the Aragonese kings as the ‘Ceremonious’; he was the author of a special treatise on the duties and privileges of the officials of his court; and like King Frederick I of Prussia, and in defiance of ancient precedent, he insisted on crowning himself at his accession, “to show that he held the throne of God alone and of no earthly power.”

The main interest of his reign lies in domestic affairs, in his successful efforts to raise the monarchy from the depths of degradation to which baronial revolt and constitutional limitations had consigned it; and all this we shall examine in another place. Abroad, however, he was by no means inactive, and in the fifty-one years during which he occupied the throne he succeeded in
strengthening in three different directions the position which Aragon had already won beyond the seas. He put an end to the separate existence of the kingdom of Majorca, and incorporated the greater part of it in his own domains. He kept alive the power of Aragon in Sardinia through a difficult and turbulent period. He prepared the way for the reunion with Aragon of Sicily. We will take up these different phases of Pedro’s activities in the order named.

At the time of Pedro’s accession in 1336, the throne of the Majorcan realm had been occupied for twelve years by the third of the separate line of kings—James, the grandson of that James of Majorca who had been expelled from the Balearics by Alfonso in, but had been subsequently restored to them under Aragonese suzerainty in 1298, as a sequel of the treaty of Anagni. In addition to Majorca, Minorca, and Iviza, it will be remembered that his realms also included Cerdagne, Roussillon, and Montpellier on the mainland; but over the last of these three territories the suzerainty of the king of France had been recognized since the middle of the thirteenth century, while a small part of the town of Montpellier, commonly called Montpellieret, had been ceded, in 1293, in full ownership to the French monarch, and formed an integral part of the royal domain. It will readily be understood that the relationship between the sovereigns of France and Majorca which this complicated situation in Montpellier created was delicate in the extreme. The Majorcan rulers often entirely disregarded the rights of the French kings in the districts in question and insisted on exercising all the jurisdiction and privileges of full ownership; the French kings equally resolutely refused to be elbowed aside. So irksome, indeed, was the position during part of the reign of the comparatively pacific Sancho (1311-24), the second king of the separate Majorcan line, that the latter forgot his grudges against his cousin, the king of Aragon, who was his feudal suzerain in the rest of his dominions, and sought to make common cause with him against the king of France. It was, in fact, by a skilful process of playing off their two overlords, the French and Aragonese monarchs, against one another, that Sancho and his father had managed to preserve the separate existence of their scattered domains; but when in 1324 the second King James, nephew of Sancho, ascended the Majorcan throne, a bolder but ultimately fatal policy was inaugurated. James of Majorca was the equal of his cousin and brother-in-law, King Pedro of Aragon, in violence if not in craft. Nothing short of absolute autonomy in his domain would satisfy him, and he rashly defied both his suzerains at once. He openly flouted the representatives of Philip of Valois in Montpellier, and eagerly availed himself of every possible opportunity to pour contempt upon his overlordship. At the same time he scornfully ignored the repeated summons of Pedro of Aragon to come and do him homage for the Balearics, and intrigued with the latter’s worst enemies in Castile, in Naples, and in Morocco. In the year 1339, indeed, he had a change of heart. Yielding to papal entreaties, he crossed to Barcelona to acknowledge formally the suzerainty of his brother-in-law; but the ensuing ceremony was such as served to increase rather than to diminish the friction between the two monarchs. The Aragonese king apparently took a malicious pleasure in causing James to remain standing for a quarter of an hour, while he solemnly discussed with his counsellors whether or not it would be advisable to provide him with a cushion to sit on; and when the question was finally decided in the affirmative, it was observed that the cushion which was brought was conspicuously lower than that of Pedro. A subsequent clash between the attendants of the two sovereigns angered the king of Aragon so terribly that he was only prevented from killing James on the spot by the fact that the sword of state which he was wearing and attempted to draw could not be extracted from the scabbard. Memories of the past faithlessness of Majorcan monarchs surged up in the mind of the rancorous king of Aragon, and he resolved, then and there, to seize the first possible chance to correct the error of his ancestor James the Conqueror in dividing his inheritance, and definitely and finally to incorporate the Balearic realm and its continental dependencies into his own dominions.

The opportunity which he sought was not long in presenting itself; and it was the direct result of James’s reckless dealings with King Philip of France. In the year 1341 their quarrel in Montpellier came to a head. The Majorcan king had recently strengthened himself by a treaty with Edward III of England, whose armies had already made their appearance in Normandy. More confident than ever in the support of this new ally, he gloried in publicly defying the behests of his French overlord? The culmination of his rebellious deeds was reached in the month of March, when, after publicly protesting that he no longer recognized the suzerainty of France, he presumed to organize and celebrate a tournament at Montpellier, in direct violation of Philip’s commands, and further, on the attempt of the royal representatives to interfere, caused the king’s scutcheons in the city to be torn down and the king’s officers and notaries to be expelled. Open hostilities were sooner or later inevitable, and James, foreseeing them, approached the king of Aragon; for so completely had his last quarrel with the king of France obliterated the remembrance of his earlier broils with Pedro, that he now hoped to convert the latter into an ally. But Pedro had a longer memory than his rash brother-in-law, and a statesman’s ability to discern that the moment for which he had waited so long had at last arrived. To James’s petitions for
aid he replied with deceitful counsels to avoid hostilities, and thus furnished the French king an opportunity to occupy Montpellier. Having thus increased rather than diminished his brother-in-law’s perplexities in one quarter, he subjected him to fresh humiliation in another by convoking the Catalan Cortes at Barcelona and summoning James to appear at once, under threat of a declaration of feudal felony and forfeiture if he refused. Against methods like these the king of Majorca was powerless; on his failure to arrive at the appointed time, King Pedro, in February, 1343, declared that his domains were reunited to the Crown of Aragon. When, too late, James finally did appear, Pedro falsely accused him of plotting against his life, and thus provoked him into a defiance which gave an excuse for carrying the sentence into effect. Needless to add, every preparation had been already made. Tithes which had been wrung from the clergy to be used in a crusade against the Moors in North Africa were diverted to furnish a fleet to attack the Balearics; the king himself was in command of it, while his brother led a simultaneous expedition against Cerdagne and Roussillon. The Balearic campaign lasted only one month. The population was probably less hostile to James than is usually represented, and many isolated deeds of valor were performed in his cause; but the Majorcans stood no chance against the disciplined soldiers of the king of Aragon, and after a feeble attempt to dispute his advance on the heights above Santa Ponza, resistance was virtually at an end. Minorca and Ibiza promptly followed. The Pope, who dreaded the increased power of the king of Aragon, attempted to effect a compromise, but only postponed the inevitable. The incorporation of the islands into the realms of the Crown of Aragon was virtually complete by the end of June, and James of Majorca confessed it by fleeing overseas to Cerdagne and Roussillon, whither he was immediately followed by his implacable brother-in-law.

The struggle over the continental portions of the Majors can realm was much more prolonged. A campaign of devastation, vigorously pursued, finally resulted in the submission of all Cerdagne and Roussillon, except the fortress of Perpignan, which defied every assault of Pedro’s Almogavars; but when his military forces were inadequate, the king of Aragon was more than able to supply their deficiencies by masterful diplomacy and intrigue. On July 15, 1344, he held an interview with his brother-in-law under the walls of Perpignan, which Pedro describes in his chronicle in terms of haughty satisfaction? It resulted in an arrangement by which James gave up Perpignan and all the other strong places in the counties to Pedro, in return for the latter’s pledge “to treat him with pity and grace”—a phrase which was certainly susceptible of many interpretations, but which James, in view of certain preliminary negotiations, was fully justified in regarding as a promise of pardon, peace, and recognition of his royal title. Needless to add, Pedro had no intention of redeeming his pledge in any such way as this; but for the present his treachery had served its purpose. The keys of Perpignan were handed over to him; the garrison welcomed him within its walls. After an entry characterized by all the pomp and magnificence which were so dear to his heart, he proceeded to the church of St. John, and there, on the twenty-second of July, solemnly proclaimed and confirmed the annexation of Cerdagne and Roussillon to the rest of his hereditary domains. The struggle was not, as a matter of fact, quite over, either here or in the Balearics, but the invader had gained a hold on his prey, and was not destined to relinquish it.

It did not take James of Majorca long to discover that the hopes which he had built on Pedro’s promises were the merest castles in the air. His first disillusionment came in the shape of a contemptuous offer from his brother-in-law of a miserable pension of 10,000 livres, in return for his renunciation of all title to Cerdagne and Roussillon and the Balearics, coupled with a scornful promise to recognize his rights in Montpellier, which Pedro, on account of its remoteness and predominantly French sympathies, had wisely determined to leave alone. Stung to madness by this insulting proposal, so different from what he had anticipated, James gathered a few faithful followers around him and fled to France. On the way he passed through a corner of Cerdagne, where the inhabitants, who still cherished some devotion to him, offered their support in an attempt to regain his lands; but the affair was so badly managed and Pedro so keenly on the watch, that after a few encounters, in which James had all the worst of it, the royal fugitive was driven to seek safety in Montpellier. There the representatives of Philip VI received him cordially. The king of France bore no lasting grudge against him for his former conduct, and dreaded the progress of the armies of the king of Aragon north of the Pyrenees. Had it not been for the fact that the war against England, which was going badly, occupied all his attention in the North, it is more than probable that Philip would have actually supported James against Pedro. But as things were, it would have been madness for him to offend the powerful king of Aragon, who, though he was too prudent to attempt to win Montpellier for himself, had determined that the French monarch should not give shelter to his enemy, and loudly complained of an attempted expedition for the recovery of the Balearics, on which James, with French support, embarked in 1347. Finally in the spring of 1349, as the easiest way out of an intolerable
situation, Philip purchased all the rights of the king of Majorca in Montpellier for 120,000 écus d’or, thus terminating the separate existence of the only portion of the Majorcan realm which had escaped the clutches of Pedro by annexing it to the lands of the crown of France. The unfortunate James utilized the funds which he had received from this sale to fit out a final expedition for the recovery of the Balearics. He managed to effect a landing at Majorca, but was completely defeated there on October 25, 1349, in a pitched battle between Palma and Luchmayor, by Pedro’s Almogavares. The latter had been instructed beforehand to secure at all costs, either dead or alive, the body of the Majorcan king; and when one of them, cutting his way through the densest of the mêlée, attained his object and held up James’s severed head to the gaze of the combatants, the battle ceased as if by magic. It was a fitting end for a prince whose dauntless courage redeemed a multitude of faults.

Pedro’s new possessions caused him considerable difficulty during the remaining years of his reign. The old desire for independence in the different portions of the Balearic realm was by no means extinguished, and when the son and namesake of James of Majorca, who had been taken prisoner by Pedro’s Almogavares in the battle of 1349, escaped, thirteen years later, from his jailers, and married, as her third husband, the notorious Joanna of Naples, he managed to breed constant trouble for the king of Aragon until his death in 1375. He played a considerable role in the war with Castile, was the ally of Pedro the Cruel and Edward the Black Prince, and a prisoner of Henry of Trastamara; in the last year of his life he vainly attempted a descent on Catalonia through Cerdagne and Roussillon on the north. His claims passed at his death to his sister Isabella, and from her to Duke Louis of Anjou, who made some show at an attempt to enforce them but failed to accomplish anything. Finally, in 1390, a marriage treaty was arranged between the latter’s son Louis and Pedro’s granddaughter Violante, in which the latter received a large dowry in return for a complete renunciation for herself, her husband, and her successors of all right and title to the Majorcan realm.

Such were the last phases and aftermath of a conquest which had been initiated more than a century and a half before. That the end was delayed so long is simply another testimony to the intensity of the passion for autonomy which characterized the inhabitants of the territories concerned. Most of the historians of Majorca exhaust themselves in invectives against the outrageous means by which James’s spoliation was effected, and emphasize the happiness of the Balearic kingdom under its separate line of sovereigns; but however dastardly his methods, it is impossible to doubt that Pedro’s resolve to terminate the separate existence of the subsidiary realm was justified by every consideration of statesmanship. James the Conqueror V had made a grievous error in severing it from Aragon, with which it had been traditionally united since ancient times; and since Aragon after his death had blossomed into a great Mediterranean power, the wisdom of reannexation was more obvious than ever. During the period of its autonomy it had really been a hindrance to the growth of the Aragonese empire, whereas it ought to have served as an invaluable stepping-stone to the remoter possessions to the eastward; nor was its case for one moment comparable to that of Sicily, for whose independence there were a host of reasons, both geographical and historical, that did not apply in the Balearics. And we must not omit to pay tribute to the practical good sense of Pedro IV in refraining from any serious effort to take Montpellier. Save for Cerdagne and Roussillon, the ancient holdings of Catalonia north of the Pyrenees were gone forever, and it would have been the height of folly to have attempted to maintain an isolated outpost which was so completely at the mercy of the king of France. The solution of the whole matter was probably, in fact, by far the best that could have been devised; and as we shall later see, those portions of the Majorcan realm that were reannexed to the domains of the Crown of Aragon were to some extent consoled for their loss of a separate line of kings by being permitted to retain a very considerable measure of institutional autonomy. Spanish particularism was indeed proof against such trifles as the extinction of a local dynasty.

The Majorcan affair, the pressure of his relations with Castile, and above all his bitter internal struggle with the forces of the Union, which we shall consider elsewhere, prevented King Pedro from seriously attacking the difficult problem of Sardinia during the first fifteen years of his reign. The Aragonese garrisons in the island were only partially and tardily reinforced, while the Genoese, spasmodically aided by the Pisans, utilized every opportunity to solidify and increase the gains they had made in the period of Alfonso IV. They had all the best of sundry desultory military and naval operations in 1347-48, so that by the middle of the fourteenth century the Aragonese power in the island was perilously near extinction. Corsica, despite the papal donation, had never been conquered by Aragon except on paper. Altogether it was only too obvious that Pedro would have to bestir himself vigorously, if he wished to reap the fruits of the labors of his predecessors in these islands.
For this purpose the king of Aragon sought and obtained in 1351 an alliance with the powerful maritime republic of Venice, which shared his hostility to the Genoese. The united fleets pursued their foes to the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, finally overtaking them in the Bosphorus, where on February 13, 1352, there took place one of the fiercest conflicts of the age. At the last moment the Aragonese and Venetians received a reinforcement of nine galleys from the Emperor at Constantinople, and with their aid barely managed to defeat the Genoese; but the losses which the latter inflicted on them were so terrible, both in ships and in men, that they also claimed the victory. No prisoners were spared on either side—all captives being either drowned or starved to death. The battle was, however, totally without effect on Sardinian affairs. The Genoese refused to surrender a single one of their possessions there and were even encouraged to further resistance by the fact that Mariano, son and successor of that Hugo of Arborea who had been one of the staunchest adherents of the Aragonese cause during the reign of James II, abandoned the ways of his father, and rose in rebellion against the authority of Pedro. For two years matters hung in the balance, a continuation of Pedro’s naval victories being more than equalized by Genoa’s diplomatic success in stirring up Mariano of Arborea to make trouble for their common foe by proclaiming Sardinia independent. Finally, in the summer of 1354, the king of Aragon, at the head of one of the most formidable fleets that his country had ever sent forth, crossed over to Sardinian waters and laid siege to the town of Alghero in the northwestern corner of the island. Despite the assistance of Venice, however, he was unable to take it; disease decimated his forces, and negotiations followed, in which the new Judge of Arborea steadily strengthened his own position and the cause of Sardinian independence by playing off Aragon and Genoa against one another. On November 9, 1355, an arrangement was concluded by which the Genoese were permitted peacefully to evacuate Alghero, and Pedro to enter into possession of it; and from that time onward the power and interest of the former in the island steadily waned. They continued to interfere there sporadically, it is true, for many years, but rather with the idea of making trouble for the Aragonese than of gaining control for themselves.

Henceforth the possession of Sardinia lay between the rival forces of the king of Aragon and the natives under the Judges of Arborea. Clear through to the very end of the reign and beyond they continued their inconclusive struggle. In the sixties the Aragonese cause was seriously weakened by the hostility of the Avignonese Pope, Urban V, who was angered at Pedro’s appropriation of the clerical possessions in Aragon to furnish funds for his Castilian wars, and attempted to punish him by depriving him of the title to Sardinia; this naturally encouraged the natives to renewed efforts. During the last years of the reign there was a particularly violent outburst of hostilities between Pedro and Eleanor, daughter of Mariano of Arborea, who had strengthened herself against him by a marriage alliance with the famous Genoese knight, Brancalone Doria; this quarrel was terminated by a treaty, in August, 1386, in which the king of Aragon had distinctly the worst of the bargain. One cannot help feeling a curious lack of enthusiasm on the part of Pedro in reading the weary story of his Sardinian campaigns. He certainly did not exhibit in them anything like the same sustained and relentless energy which characterized his operations elsewhere. Whether it was a haunting memory of the somewhat ignoble origin of the Aragonese claim to the island, or the unexpected tenacity of the natives, or, as seems most probable, the horrible ravages of the detestable climate—a foe more potent than the mightiest army—it is impossible to say; but whatever the cause, it is a noteworthy fact that the king of Aragon consistently postponed the vigorous prosecution of Sardinian affairs in favor of every other problem, internal or foreign, that presented itself for solution. Certainly the completion of the Aragonese conquest of the island cannot be regarded as any nearer at the end of his reign than at the beginning; and under a less energetic king it might well have been abandoned. The reign had seen Genoa eliminated as a serious competitor for the prize; but on the other hand, it had also witnessed the conversion of the natives from alliance and benevolent neutrality to active and effective opposition. From Pedro’s point of view, the change was not altogether favorable; and the most that can be claimed for the Sardinian policy of the ‘Ceremonious’ monarch is that it tided over a danger point in the history of the Aragonese occupation of the island.

The history of Pedro’s policy in Sicily occupies a distinctly minor place in the history of the reign, at least until the very close. Its principal object was to pave the way for the ultimate incorporation of the island in the Aragonese dominions, as soon as the opportunity should present itself through the extinction of the line of monarchs established there by Frederic III. One obvious way to accomplish this was to secure the good will of the Sicilian kings and their subjects by lending them military aid in the interminable struggle with the Neapolitan Angevins which chiefly occupied their reigns; another was to strengthen the ties that united the two dynasties by a series of marriages. Such assistance as Pedro gave his cousins in their difficulties with the sovereigns of Naples cannot be described as generous. Several times Sicilian petitions for help went absolutely unheeded. In 1360 a fleet of galleys was sent to escort
his daughter Constance on her way to marry Frederic IV of Sicily (1355-77), and aided in inflicting a timely defeat on the forces of Joanna of Naples; but further than this little or nothing was done. On the other hand the policy of matrimonial alliance between the two realms was vigorously pursued. In addition to the above mentioned marriage of Constance and Frederic, Pedro himself wedded, as his third wife, Frederic’s sister Eleanor, thus becoming the uncle as well as the grandfather of Frederic’s only legitimate child, Maria. The relationship between the two dynasties was now so close, that when, in 1377, Frederic died without male heirs, Pedro came boldly forward and claimed the Sicilian throne for himself, in virtue of a provision in the will of Frederic III which excluded females from the succession. Papal opposition, the threat of an interdict, and the fact that the liberty-loving Sicilians were as yet in no mood to tolerate annexation to Aragon prevented Pedro, however, from pressing the claim on his own behalf. He prepared a huge fleet, and kept the whole western Mediterranean in suspense for at least two years by threatening a raid on the Sicilian coasts; but his counsellors were almost unanimous in opposition, and the king himself was far too practical a statesman to strike when there was so little hope of success. Yet though he recognized that the moment was scarcely ripe for the actual reunion of the two realms, Pedro was determined to do his best to prepare the way for it. In the year 1380, accordingly, he made over his rights to the kingdom of Sicily to Martin, his second son by Eleanor, the sister of Frederic IV, granting him, in effect, full authority over the island, with the title of vicar general, and merely reserving to himself, during his lifetime, the title of king. The result of this donation was, of course, to establish another collateral line of Aragonese sovereigns in the Sicilian realm, since Martin’s elder brother John was the heir of his father in all his other dominions; it had thus the advantage of placating the Sicilians by securing them a continuance of their separate line of kings, yet on the other hand it brought the two dynasties closer together than they had been for three generations, and consequently facilitated reunion whenever issue should fail in either one. As the Sicilians were at that time divided into various factions, each of whose leaders, as Zurita says, “desired to seize the Infanta Maria, and by marrying her, to acquire the realm,” Pedro deemed it essential to the success of his plan to possess himself of her person and thus forestall all opposition; and in the year 1382 this end was accomplished for him by the Viscount of Rocaberti, of Athenian fame, who, on his way back from the Catalan duchy in Greece, kidnapped the Infanta and had her brought by way of Sardinia to Barcelona. We shall soon see how an unexpected series of deaths without issue among the descendants of Pedro IV effected the incorporation of Sicily in the realms of the crown of Aragon, far earlier than the ‘Ceremonious’ monarch could reasonably have ventured to hope.

The relentless energy and perseverance which formed the basis of the character of Pedro IV were conspicuously absent in that of his son and successor John, who, after issuing triumphant from the throes of the inevitable successions! quarrel with his stepmother, Sibylla of Forcia, abandoned himself to the pleasures of music and the chase. The most notable singers of the day flocked to his court. He possessed the finest collection of falcons in Europe. The grave Aragonese disapproved of these pastimes; the Cortes spoke their mind about them with characteristic frankness, and talked of cutting off the royal revenues if the king did not mend his ways. Their protests, however, were of little affect, for John remained to the end of his days a ‘carefree hunter’, who consistently neglected the direction of the affairs of state. The natural result was that the foreign policy of Aragon, which under Pedro had been so vigorous and well defined, was suffered for a time to drift aimlessly whithersoever the more dominant forces of other powers combined to impel it.

Curiously enough, however, the outside influence to which Aragon first succumbed was exerted in such a way as to lead her into active continuance of the Sicilian policy of the late king. The Babylonian Captivity of the papacy had by this time given place to the Great Schism of the West; and the Avignonese Pope, Clement VII, conceived that the best possible way to breed trouble for his Roman rival would be to unite those ancient foes, the houses of Anjou and of Aragon, in a common hostility against him. In 1390, accordingly, he arranged a marriage between John’s daughter Violante and Louis of Anjou and Provence, who had claims on the kingdom of Naples against Ladislaus of Durazzo, the actual occupant of the throne. He also made a match between Maria, the captive heiress of Sicily, and Martin, nephew of King John, and son of that Martin to whom Pedro IV had granted his rights to the island; he thus brought sensibly nearer the ultimate annexation of Sicily to Aragon, which had been the aim of the late king’s policy from the very first. In March, 1392, the two Martins, father and son, passed over to Sicily, which had been rent by internal anarchy and rebellion ever since the departure of Maria, to try to make good their pretensions to the realm. It was a difficult task. The Roman Pope, Boniface IX, was violently in opposition, and did not scruple to bring the papal weapons of interdict and excommunication to bear. Ladislaus of Durazzo in Naples, jealous of the claims of the younger branch of his family, which was now united to the Aragonese by the marriage of Louis
of Anjou and Violante, showed himself consistently hostile. The Sicilians themselves plainly foresaw that the acceptance of Martin as their king would ultimately mean the end of their independence, which they were determined at any cost to defend; and when they succeeded in blocking up the chiefs of the Aragonese expedition in the castle of Catania, King John was so slow in sending reinforcements to deliver them as to lend color to the belief that his jealousy of his brother took precedence of his solicitude for his success. Had it not been for the energy of the Aragonese admiral, Bernaldo de Cabrera, the real hero of the enterprise, the whole affair might well have ended in disaster. As it was, the struggle continued without any decisive results until the death of John of Aragon, on a hunting party, in May, 1395. As the king left no male heirs, the crown of Aragon devolved on his younger brother Martin, who, after a year’s delay in Sicily, returned to claim it, leaving his son Martin, with his bride Maria, to continue as best he could the struggle for recognition as king of that turbulent island. The fact that the Aragonese Cortes recognized the younger Martin as heir to the Aragonese throne at the same time that they swore allegiance to his father as their sovereign, shows that the fears of the Sicilians for the loss of their independence were by no means groundless. The end of it, however, was to come in a way which none of them could have anticipated.

King Martin of Aragon was a kindly soul, but scarcely more efficient as a monarch than his predecessor. He succeeded in rendering valuable aid to his son in reducing Sicily to obedience, both by the support he gave him before his departure, and still more by despatching a fresh expedition from Barcelona to bear a hand in quelling the last revolt in 1397; but save for this he soon subsided into comparative insignificance. The younger Martin of Sicily, however, was a man of different stamp. With the same restless activity that had characterized his grandfather, he coupled a knightly bearing, and a personal solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, which speedily won for him their devoted affection. As soon as he had secured himself in Sicily against the attacks of internal rebels and foreign foes, he launched boldly forth on a vigorous campaign in North Africa, which resulted in a temporary reconquest of the island of Gerba, and the reopening of the interminable question of the political, financial, and commercial relations of Aragon and Sicily with Tunis. Nay more, as an evidence of his keen interest and solicitude for the welfare of the Aragonese Empire as a whole, the heroic young prince undertook to deal with another problem which properly belonged to his father, but was obviously far beyond the latter’s capabilities—namely, the suppression of a revolt in Sardinia which had been suffered to go on unchecked since the reign of King John. In 1408 the opportunity for this was exceedingly favorable, for the last of the rebel Judges of Arborea, Mariano V, had died in the previous year, and William of Narbonne, whom the natives chose as his successor, was clearly unequal to the task. Martin of Aragon sent reinforcements to his son; the Genoese, as was their custom, supported the Sards; a furious battle between them finally took place near Cagliari on June 26, 1409, from which the Sicilian king, though greatly outnumbered, issued victorious. During the next few weeks the young conqueror passed from one town to another as if on a triumphal march. Resistance seemed at an end, and the Aragonese possession of Sardinia no longer a dream but a fact, when suddenly, on July 24, 1409, the hero of the hour fell ill and expired, in all probability a victim to the Sardinian fever. His death was the signal for new things. His first wife Maria and her son Pedro had predeceased him; his second, Blanche of Navarre, had no children who survived; so that the crown of Sicily passed on his death to his father, and all the scattered dominions of the Aragonese Empire were at last reunited in one hand. But old Martin of Aragon himself was now childless and a widower, so that the future was doubtful and dark. Unwilling to neglect any opportunity to secure the succession, he married again, in September, 1409; but his hopes were disappointed, and in the following May he also passed to the grave—the last of the old line of the counts of Barcelona, which was assuredly one of the most remarkable dynasties in the history of mediaeval Europe. Its most illustrious names challenge comparison with the best and greatest monarchs of any nation. Its average level was exceedingly high; and if the reigns of its last two representatives in Spain were an anti-climax, all its pristine splendors were gloriously revived in the heroic young Martin of Sicily, flaming up in added brilliancy for one fleeting moment, like the light of a lamp before it expires.

A stormy interregnum of two years’ duration followed, and was finally terminated on Tuesday, June 28, 1412, by the selection of Ferdinand of Antequera, brother of Henry III of Castile, as the successor of King Martin in all his dominions. The story of these events is complicated and very interesting, but as it belongs rather to the history of Aragon than to that of the Aragonese Empire we cannot linger over it for long. It is, however, important to observe that the nine magnates who met at the little town of Caspe on the lower Ebro to settle the question of the succession were not ‘electors’ in the true sense of the word, but rather judges; and their function was not to choose one of the rival candidates on the basis of his merits and deserts, but to determine which of them had the best legal
claims, according to the Aragonese law of hereditary succession. The question which lay before them was, in other words, not political but judicial: strictly speaking, Ferdinand of Antequera was selected not because of the admirable qualities which he had displayed as regent for his nephew, John II of Castile, but because, through the fact that his mother was the sister of the last two kings of Aragon and the daughter of Pedro IV, he was lineally nearer the throne than any of the other competitors. The violent invectives that the older Aragonese and Catalanian historians have hurled against the magnates of Caspe, on the ground that their decision was a shameful signing away of the independence of the realm and a bringing in of Castilian bondage, are thus totally without foundation. This important step toward the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile under Ferdinand and Isabella was based on strictly legal grounds; indeed, it is more than doubtful whether a verdict so contrary to the ineradicable tendencies of Spanish separatism could otherwise have survived. But the ‘Nine of Caspe’, conscious of the justice of their case, were strong enough to ignore the menaces and cajoleries of the political factions that stormed around their quiet retreat. It would be idle to deny that their position was immensely strengthened by the spotlessness of Ferdinand’s record, and by the violence of his chief rival, the count of Urgel; but it needed all the majesty of the law and the claims of hereditary right, in a land where respect for the law was ever a dominant characteristic, to bring a scion of the house of Trastamara to the throne of James the Conqueror and Pedro the Great. Zurita has left us a memorable description of the ceremony of the publication of the verdict. From a lofty dais outside the church of Caspe a sermon was preached and the sentence of the ‘Nine’ read to the vast concourse of people by St. Vincent Ferrer. The royal standard was displayed before the altar in Ferdinand’s name; and the multitude, in the fulness of their gratitude at the termination of their long suspense, burst forth into a splendid hymn of praise and thankfulness to God.

From the moment of his accession the new king was naturally confronted with great difficulties in each of his new dominions. His four years’ reign was so brief that he could not possibly deal with them all; the only wonder is that he managed to accomplish what he did. In his Spanish lands he found difficulty in accommodating himself to the various limitations of monarchical power which the Aragonese constitutions imposed: brought up in a land where kingship was, in theory at least, omnipotent, and himself endowed with the highest possible conception of the duties and privileges of the royal prerogative, he could hot restrain his impatience at the checks he received from the national and municipal assemblies and the law courts. The hostility of his unsuccessful rival James of Urgel demanded serious measures; it was not till the latter part of 1413 that the pretender was willing to admit defeat and humbly to accept the royal offer of perpetual imprisonment in lieu of execution. The king was also much preoccupied with the termination of the Triple Schism which had resulted from the Council of Pisa. Gregory XII and John XXIII had been disposed of at Constance; but the Avignonese pontiff, Benedict XIII, a scion of the ancient Aragonese house of Luna, had refused, with truly Spanish obstinacy, either to abdicate or even to recognize his deposition. Since 1403, when he broke with the king of France, he had been established in Catalonia, where he had exerted his influence in favor of the choice of Ferdinand at Caspe; he now expected a return, with interest, of this act of amity, and demanded that the king of Aragon should support him and his claims to the papacy against the steadily increasing opposition of the bulk of the rest of Western Christendom. For a long time Ferdinand stood loyally by Benedict; but finally, foreseeing that complete isolation from the rest of Europe would be the inevitable result of persistence in this attitude, he consented to meet the ubiquitous Emperor Sigismund and the refractory pontiff at Perpignan, in the autumn of 1415, in the hope of arranging a compromise. Benedict, however, was so utterly unreasonable in his demands that Ferdinand bowed to the inevitable and finally withdrew his allegiance, and the haughty prelate, gathering around him such adherents as he could muster, retired to the lonely fortress of Peñíscola, a possession of his family overlooking the Mediterranean, and there continued to defy authority, both temporal and spiritual, till his death at the age of ninety, in 1424. The whole episode, so thoroughly characteristic of the persons concerned in it, forms a curious chapter in the ever-changing history of the relations of the Aragonese kings and the Popes.

In the Mediterranean, the immediate attention of Ferdinand was naturally centred on Sardinia and Sicily, both of which had seized the opportunity afforded by the confusion of the interregnum to rise in revolt. In Sardinia it was the viscount of Narbone, heir to the Judges of Arborea, that sought to overthrow the authority of the Aragonese representatives in the island; he was supported, as usual, by the Genoese, and was in close touch with James of Urgel in Aragon. But after Ferdinand’s accession the latter was defeated, and the former made a five years’ truce with the king; so that in 1414 the viscount of Narbone, recognizing the futility of further resistance, offered to sell to Ferdinand all his holdings in Sardinia for 153,000 florins of gold. The price was so high that Ferdinand, who realized that he had the game in his own hands, refused to pay it, and negotiations dragged on between the two
But before he could hope to set foot in the land of his aspirations, it was essential that he should make certain of the Mediterranean possessions which he already had. Sicily, exhausted by ceaseless parties until the following reign; but the final consummation of the Aragonese conquest of the island, which was reserved for Alfonso the Magnanimous, was inevitable from the time of Ferdinand, if not from that of the expedition of Martin the younger in 1409.

Sicily, too, “ever longing to possess a king who would find her crown so fair that he would not desire any other”, made one last bid for independence in 1410. Against Blanche, the widowed queen of the younger Martin, who had been left in the island as the representative of the Crown of Aragon, two hostile parties arose. The one was led by the Admiral Bernaldo de Cabrera, who had hitherto been the most ardent and efficient champion of the Aragonese cause, but now, according to Lorenzo Valla, aspired to the Sicilian throne and the hand of the regent; the other was composed for the most part of Sicilian barons, who desired to place the crown on the head of Martin’s illegitimate son Fadrique. In the three-cornered struggle that ensued the admiral had the best of it, until at last, in 1412, an accident delivered him into the regent’s hands, and he was thrown into prison; in the following year he was released by the orders of Ferdinand, on acknowledgment of his offence, payment of an enormous fine, and a promise to leave Sicily forever. With Cabrera eliminated, the warring elements subsided. The party of Fadrique saw the uselessness of continued resistance, and somewhat sullenly accepted defeat. Ferdinand, moreover, had the wisdom to use his victory with moderation, and flattered Sicilian pride by ordering that one half the members of the council which aided the Regent Blanche should be natives. The Sicilians now directed all their efforts towards persuading Ferdinand to let them have his second son John as their king, probably in the hope of making ultimately possible the reestablishment of an independent line of sovereigns; and finally, in 1415, Ferdinand yielded to their entreaties to the extent of sending him over to them as his lieutenant. His real reason for taking this step, however, was probably his hope that by so doing he might pave the way for the annexation of the Angevin kingdom of Naples to the Aragonese domains—an end which had not been lost sight of since Pope Clement VII, in 1390, arranged the marriage of King John’s daughter Violante and Louis of Anjou. In January, 1415, before John set sail for Sicily, he was betrothed, at the age of eighteen, to Queen Joanna II of Naples, forty-five years old, sister and successor of Ladislaus of Durazzo, who had died a few months before. According to the accompanying agreement, the Aragonese Infante was to share the throne of his bride, and retain it alone if he survived her. But the fickle Joanna changed her mind while her youthful lover was crossing the seas, and upset everything by marrying instead the Count de la Marche, who was ardently supported by France, Genoa, and the other foes of the house of Aragon, though bitterly unpopular with the queen’s own subjects. Clearly the time was not yet ripe for the Aragonese to win Naples by gentle means, and John was not ready or able to assert his claims by force. He therefore wisely devoted himself to solidifying his power in Sicily and putting out the last embers of revolt, until, a year later, he was recalled to Spain. But Aragon had by this time gone too far with her Neapolitan plans to desist from them. Alfonso the Magnanimous and Ferdinand the Catholic were to carry on and finish the work which had already been begun, and were thereby to give an entirely new complexion to the foreign and imperial policy of the realm.

Ferdinand died on April 2, 1416, at the age of forty-three, and in his final will and testament left all his realms to his eldest son, Alfonso, thus ending John’s hopes of the succession in Sicily, and those of the Sicilians for an independent line of kings. The new monarch was active and energetic, a diplomat of high merit, and a passionate lover of the art and learning of the Renaissance. He lacked his father’s high sense of royal duty, and vastly exceeded him in his detestation of Aragonese constitutionalism. From the moment of his accession he longed to exchange the stern landscapes of his native Spain for the fertile fields and sunny skies of Italy; and the fact that his father had forsaken the testamentary example of his predecessors, and left him to rule over all of his dominions, ultimately gave him the opportunity to gratify his heart’s desire. Nearly all the early acts of his reign may be regarded as paving the way for this change of abode. He at once recalled his brother John from Sicily, and in 1419 married him to the widowed Blanche of Navarre, who had preceded him as regent there; he thus rid himself of all possible rivals for the Sicilian crown, and diverted the ambition of the turbulent Infante in the direction of the little Pyrenean kingdom. One of the last acts of the previous reign had been the arrangement of Alfonso’s marriage to his cousin, Maria of Castile; and in 1418 the new king strengthened the tie by making a match between his sister Maria and his wife’s brother John, which he vainly hoped would forestall the possibility of trouble with the western realm and leave him free to pursue his Italian policy undisturbed. Clearly the young monarch, the first to have a really fair chance to try the difficult experiment of ruling all the scattered territories of Aragon from a single throne, was contemplating a departure which would necessarily give a totally new direction to the activities of that mighty empire: he would make Italy rather than Spain the head and centre of his dominions.
anarchy and civil war, had no longer either the power or the wish to oppose him; but in Sardinia the fact that the late king had not been able to come to terms with the viscount of Narbonne gave rise to a most difficult situation. Neither side trusted the other; the forces of rebellion had been checked but not crushed; the presence of the young king at the head of a powerful army was clearly essential to the establishment of a durable peace. On May 13, 1420, accordingly, Alfonso set sail with a large fleet of galleys and transports, which was strengthened by an additional detachment from Majorca on the way. On his arrival all signs of resistance vanished, and Sassari, where he had anticipated violent opposition, opened its gates to him on August 11. The rights of the viscount of Narbonne were finally bought off for 100,000 florins—a sum less than two thirds the size of that which he had offered to sell them for in the previous reign—and were soon after granted out to the family of Cubello, which was remotely connected with the old line of the Judges of Arborea. These Cubellos remained in possession of the Arborean territories till 1478, with the title of Marquises of Oristano; and as they were from first to last loyal supporters of the authority of the kings of Aragon, no further trouble was experienced from that quarter. The summoning to Cagliari, in 1421, of the representatives of the three estates of the realm, to form a national assembly on the model of the Catalan Cortes, may be regarded as the culmination of Alfonso’s success. From that time onward, the Aragonese mastery of the island was assured.

It was but natural that Alfonso should think of following up his triumphs in Sardinia by an attempt to realize the Aragonese claims to Corsica. These dated, it will be remembered, from the donation of Boniface VIII in 1297; but they had been so utterly neglected that, according to at least one account, the papacy had actually regranted the island to the Genoese. In any case the latter had been in full possession there since the middle of the fourteenth century; but their rule had so alienated many of the principal inhabitants that Alfonso, from his coign of vantage in Sardinia, had little difficulty in persuading one faction among them to deliver up to him the important town of Calvi. Thence he proceeded in October, 1420, to lay siege to the fortress of Bonifacio, which commanded the strait between Corsica and Sardinia. The place was too strong to be taken by assault, but a strict blockade by land and sea had almost effected its surrender when a rescuing squadron, sent by Genoa, broke through to the inner harbor and delivered it. After this mishap Alfonso apparently lost heart, and abandoned the Corsican campaign, so that the island remained thenceforth in the hands of the Genoese. Whether he had ever been really in earnest about it may well be doubted. Certainly he cared far less for it than for the prospect of gaining a foothold in Italy; and it was probably the arrival of an urgent message from Queen Joanna of Naples which really accounts for his sudden raising of the siege of Bonifacio in the winter of 1420-21.

Alfonso had kept a sharp watch on Neapolitan affairs from the moment of his accession. The unspeakable Joanna, who had so unexpectedly thrown over the marriage which had been arranged for her with his brother John, had already cast off and ultimately exiled James, Count de la Marche, the husband of her choice; she was now giving free rein to the adulterous instincts which formed the basis of her character. The condottiere Muzio Attendolo Sforza and the seneschal Giovanni Caracciolo were the principal rivals for her favors and the political power that would naturally go with them; and when the influence and prestige of the former began to wane, he sought to recover them by making common cause with Louis III of Anjou, the son of Violante of Aragon, whom he proposed that Joanna should make her heir. Joanna, under the influence of Caracciolo, refused to entertain this proposal; and both parties, foreseeing the need of further support for their respective causes, simultaneously applied for it to Alfonso of Aragon in 1420, at just the moment when he had completed the conquest of Sardinia. That monarch, who discerned in the situation an admirable opportunity to advance his own designs, made haste to adopt the cause of Joanna; for the succession of Louis of Anjou, though he was descended on his mother’s side from the old line of Aragonese kings, would in no way further the actual interests of Aragon in Naples but rather defeat them, while support of Joanna might ultimately be rewarded by the Neapolitan throne. Moreover Alfonso wisely decided that it would be well to back up his promises with a show of military force. Before his departure for Corsica he detached a portion of his fleet for service in Neapolitan waters; in early September the Aragonese ships appeared off Capri. Sforza and the Angevins mustered their forces to oppose them; and the Aragonese leaders, perceiving that decisive action was inevitable, landed and requested an interview with Joanna in order to make certain of her adherence. The ensuing conference terminated in an arrangement by which the Neapolitan queen agreed to adopt Alfonso as her son and heir, “seeing that the Kings of the House of Aragon had ever been renowned for their justice and clemency, and were known as most Christian and glorious sovereigns”; she furthermore invested him with the duchy of Calabria. In return for these favors it was understood that the king of Aragon should come and deliver the licentious queen from the factions who were striving to control her. The moment that Alfonso learned of her decision, he broke camp before Bonifacio, and at once betook himself to Sicily with all the forces at his disposal. Thence
in the spring of 1421 he crossed to the mainland and engaged the power of his Angevin rival by land and sea. Fortune seemed to smile on him at every turn. His adversaries, Sforza and Louis of Anjou, retreated before him. Joanna welcomed him at Naples, perhaps rather in fear than in love; but she at least delivered up to him the castles that dominated the city and the bay. Meanwhile the Aragonese fleet defeated the Genoese, who had come to the rescue of the Angevins. Pope Martin V, alarmed at the rapidity of Alfonso’s progress, was induced to confirm his adoption and conquest by a threat of the king of Aragon to support Benedict XIII, who was still alive at Peñíscola. At the end of the year 1422 Alfonso was to all intents and purposes in full control of the lovely kingdom which he longed to possess.

But the victories which the Aragonese monarch had won on the field of battle were lost in the heart of the queen. A coolness sprung up between them when Joanna discovered that her adopted son was to be no mere puppet in her hands, and it soon developed into a bitter hate. Joanna longed for the return of Sforza; she loudly proclaimed that Alfonso was practically holding her in captivity; and the fact that each lived in a separate and strongly fortified castle, whence they issued only on rare occasions, and under strong guards, to pay one another formal visits, lent color to the pretence. Finally, in 1423, a battle was fought outside of Naples between the Angevin and Aragonese forces, in which the latter were defeated; and soon afterward Sforza succeeded in carrying off Joanna to Aversa. Liberated from the tutelage of Alfonso, there was little doubt what the fickle queen would do. She revoked her adoption of the Aragonese monarch, and announced her intention of taking his rival, Louis of Anjou, as her son and heir in his stead. Without an overwhelming military and naval preponderance, the king of Aragon was powerless against such treachery as this; and though the issue of such combats as occurred between the rival forces was on the whole favorable to his cause, he determined to retire for the time being to Spain and watch events. Leaving his brother Pedro with a small army to defend as best he could the places which he still retained, he set sail in October, 1423, for Barcelona, taking a mild revenge on his enemies by plundering the Angevin town of Marseilles on the way.

It was nine long years before Alfonso got an opportunity to return to the land of his choice. During that interval his brother was gradually driven from one fortress to another, and finally obliged to take refuge in the Castello dell’ Ovo in Naples, the only place which remained to him. In the diplomatic field, however, fortune veered around in favor of the king of Aragon the moment that he had departed from Italy. Pope Martin, like all the pontiffs of the period, had no desire to see the existing powers in Naples too strong, and had tended in the days of Alfonso’s prosperity to support Anjou and Sforza; but now that the circumstances had changed, he was easily induced to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality. In Henry VI of England, too, Alfonso found a useful ally. He also made successful overtures to the duke of Milan. Even in Naples sentiment began to declare in his favor. The duke of Anjou, relegated to the duchy of Calabria, enjoyed no real authority. The seneschal Caracciolo was the true sovereign of the realm under the queen, and consequently incurred the jealousy and hatred of the Neapolitan baronage. He knew that his power could not possibly be perpetuated beyond the term of his mistress’s life, if indeed as long, unless he obtained outside support. Consequently in the year 1431 he began to make secret overtures to the king of Aragon.

Encouraged by these fresh developments, Alfonso began to prepare a new fleet and army for a fresh campaign against Naples. Since he was somewhat uncertain, however, as to the exact position of the different parties there, he took a leaf out of the book of his illustrious predecessor, Pedro the Great, and gave out that he was embarking on an expedition against Tunis. As usual, pretenses were not lacking: the most obvious being the interminable quarrel over the islands of Gerba and Kerkeni, which, despite an Aragonese ravaging expedition from Sicily in 1424, had fallen back once more into the hands of the Hafside sultans. In August, 1432, Alfonso landed with a considerable force at Gerba, and defeated the forces of the Tunisian sovereign in a battle, which Zurita describes in glowing terms, and in which many splendid trophies were doubtless won. Of permanent political results, however, this victory was absolutely barren. The Moors entirely refused to give up the island, and Alfonso, convinced of the futility of attempting to capture and hold it, soon abandoned all thought of fighting the North African powers. This expedition was in fact the last military enterprise of Spain against Tunis till the time of Charles V. It marks, in other words, the abandonment for one century of the schemes of political domination of the Hafside realm which had occupied earlier kings of Aragon, and the beginning of a period in which commercial relations take precedence of everything else.

But it was Naples, not Tunis, that really interested Alfonso; so that he desisted with but little regret from the North African campaign. In September, 1432, the king of Aragon crossed over to Sicily, where he learned of the sudden fall and death of the favorite Caracciolo; Queen Joanna had cast him off and he was soon after assassinated. As no one paid much attention to Louis of Anjou, the elimination of the
grand seneschal paved the way for negotiations between Joanna and Alfonso; and, thanks to the skill
with which the Aragonese agents manipulated the Neapolitan baronage, an arrangement was made in
December, 1433, by which Joanna’s adoption of Louis of Anjou was annulled, and Alfonso reinstated
in the position which he had occupied twelve years before. But, as on former occasions, the moment of
Alfonso’s apparent triumph was the moment of his greatest danger. Pope Eugenius IV refused to ratify
his recent treaty with Joanna, and soon after formed a league with the Emperor and the North Italian
states to put him out of the peninsula. Before the year was over, Alfonso saw himself again obliged to
retire to Sicily. In 1434 Louis of Anjou died, and his decease was followed, in February, 1435, by that
of Queen Joanna herself; treacherous to the very end, she again disinherited Alfonso in her final will
and testament, and left her throne to René, the younger brother of Louis of Anjou, who was at that time
a prisoner in the hands of the duke of Burgundy. With the chief counterclaimant temporarily powerless,
Alfonso promptly put forward a bold assertion of his rights to the kingdom of Naples, basing them on
his adoption by Queen Joanna and on his descent from Constance, the wife of Pedro the Great.
The immediate effect of this declaration, however, was to draw down upon the king of Aragon the
heavy displeasure of the Pope. Eugenius demanded Naples as a fief of the Holy See, and, supported by
the Genoese and the Visconti) made every preparation to fight for it. Alfonso opened the inevitable
contest by besieging the town of Gaeta; the inhabitants were about to surrender when a Genoese
fleet appeared to relieve it. As the king of Aragon had an enormous numerical superiority in galleys, he
offered battle with absolute confidence, despite a considerable inferiority in lighter vessels; but in the
ensuing action, August 5, 1435, which is usually known as the battle of Ponsa, the Genoese fought with
unusual skill and a truly desperate fury, and were completely victorious. The king and the majority of
his forces were captured, his brother Pedro being the only one of prominence who escaped. Most of his
ships were taken and burned before his eyes. It was a terrible setback for the power which had been
generally and justly regarded as supreme in the western Mediterranean for more than one hundred
years.

Again, however, the spectacle of the humiliation of one side brought the inevitable revulsion of
feeling in its favor, and desertion from the ranks of the other. Fifteenth century Italy, as has been often
observed, was a microcosm of Europe in the succeeding age; the principle of the balance of power had
begun, almost without men’s realising it, to make itself felt, and this time it was the king of Aragon who
was to profit by it. Moreover Alfonso’s charming manners and personality stood him in good stead
at this crisis. The Genoese admiral who had captured him entertained him as a guest of honor at Porto
Vener, thus sparing him the humiliation of a sojourn among the rancorous Genoese. When he was
handed over to Filippo Maria Visconti, who had been the leader of the coalition against him, the
Milanese nobility came to the city gates to welcome him. The duchess of Milan received him on bended
knees, and her husband, though at first he deemed it wise to avoid a personal meeting with his royal
captive, sent word to assure him that, far from regarding him as his prisoner, he was proud to be able to
place himself and his dominions at his disposal. It was a fitting return for countless examples of loyalty
to friends in distress and of chivalry towards vanquished foes which Alfonso had given in the past,
and which had won him his title of the ‘Magnanimus.’ The crafty Filippo Maria was shrewd enough to
discern which way the wind was blowing, and quickly saw that it would be the height of folly for him to
deprive Alfonso of his liberty. Since he could not possibly hope to conquer Naples himself, he preferred
to see it in the hands of Spaniards rather than of Angevins; for the latter would be constantly passing
through his own dominions on their way to and from it, while the former could reach it by sea. It was a
line of reasoning which frequently suggested itself to his Sforza successors in the course of the next
hundred years, and explains many a subsequent French defeat in the peninsula. On this occasion it
received additional emphasis from the popular enthusiasm for Elizabeth, the wife of the captive René of
Anjou, whom that unfortunate prince had sent to represent him in Naples. She was warmly received by
the inhabitants, and her husband was forthwith proclaimed king of the realm. The Aragonese
surrendered one castle after another to her advancing armies, and were finally reduced to the fortress of
Scylla on the strait of Messina. Obviously, if Filippo Maria did not promptly liberate Alfonso, the cause
of Anjou would triumph. In the early spring of 1436, accordingly, the duke set his royal prisoner free,
despite the protests of the unforgiving Genoese, who vented their anger by a revolt against their
Milanese over-lord. Meantime Alfonso, joining forces with his brother Pedro, prepared once more to
invade Naples. Gaeta and Terracina were taken in rapid succession; but much hard work remained to be
done before the king of Aragon’s triumph was complete. The proximity of his forces to the
Patrimonium Petri again aroused the resentment of Eugenius IV, who strove to enlist the support of
Genoa, Florence, and Venice against him, and sent a fresh army of invaders into Naples under his legate
apostolic, Giovanni Vitelleschi, patriarch of Alexandria. Not until Alfonso began to negotiate with the
refractory Council of Basel and the anti-pope elected by it, was Eugenius brought to terms. Angevin
opposition, also, became increasingly vigorous at the same time. In 1438 Alfonso’s rival René was
released from captivity, returned to Naples, and received a royal welcome. The first attempt of the king of Aragon to besiege him there ended in a disastrous failure and the death of his brother Pedro; but finally, in June, 1442, Alfonso’s army found a way into Naples by a subterranean aqueduct, which a tradition, accepted by Zurita, asserts was the same that was used for a similar purpose by Justinian’s famous general Belisarius, nine centuries before. The capture of the town followed at once. Alfonso won golden opinions by forbidding wanton pillage and protecting the Neapolitan women from outrage by the licentious soldiery, while René d’Anjou, defeated beyond the possibility of recovery, escaped on a Genoese galley from the realm over which he had aspired to rule. After making certain of the allegiance of the outlying portions of the kingdom, and as far as possible of the friendship of the papacy, the king of Aragon, on February 26, 1443, celebrated his triumph by a state entry of unparalleled magnificence into the conquered capital. Thus at last, after a struggle of twenty-two years’ duration, the chief goal of his ambition had been attained, and a new realm added to the Aragonese Empire.

Alfonso the Magnanimous did not return again to Spain, but spent the rest of his days in Italy, and for the most part in Naples. He was one of the foremost figures in the wars and diplomacy of the peninsula until the day of his death. He took an active interest in the affairs of the Near East. He rivalled the Medici in his enthusiasm for humanism, and in the generosity of his patronage of the scholars and artists of the Renaissance. The most noteworthy feature of his political career in Italy was his relations with the Visconti and Sforza dukes of Milan. His consistent refusal to fight with the treacherous Filippo Maria prevailed over the latter’s efforts to breed trouble for him; finally, on his death in 1447, the Milanese duke actually bequeathed to him the bulk of his lands, to the prejudice of his son-in-law, Francesco Sforza. But Alfonso, who perceived that the Milanese would not willingly tolerate the rule of Aragon, nor the rest of Italy such an upsetting of the balance of power, wisely refrained from prosecuting his rights. On March 25, 1450, Francesco Sforza entered Milan and was solemnly proclaimed and recognized as duke. The Aragonese claims, however, were not by any means forgotten. Alfonso’s nephew Ferdinand subsequently attempted to revive them, and under Charles V the duchy was finally incorporated in the Spanish Empire. In the last few years of his life Alfonso had the satisfaction of humbling his ancient rivals, the Genoese, with a fleet which he had collected at the instance of Pope Calixtus III to fight the advancing Turks, and, had paid for with the tithes of the church. Genoa itself was blockaded, and was only delivered at the last moment by the withdrawal of the hostile ships on the news of the death of the king; but the days of its greatness were gone forever, and it was henceforth relegated to the position of a satellite of France or of Milan. Outside the peninsula, also, the Aragonese king’s political and diplomatic activity was incessant. He sent aid to Scanderbeg against the Turks in Albania. He might possibly have prevented the fall of Constantinople in 1453, if the other Italian states had supported him. He did his best to revive the Aragonese claims to the duchies of Athens and Neopatras. At his death, on June 27, 1458, he followed the precedent set by the majority of his predecessors, and divided his inheritance. Having no legitimate children, he bequeathed Naples to his bastard son Ferrante, while the rest of his realms, including Sicily, passed to his brother John. It was doubtless the only practical settlement under the circumstances. Aragon would not have tolerated Ferrante, and Alfonso would never have been content to leave Naples to any one else. That he did not attempt to bequeath more than the realm he loved best to the child of his love is a tribute to his political sagacity and restraint.

Altogether the reign of this brilliant monarch was fraught with tremendous possibilities for the future. It had given a new and fateful turn to the destinies of the Aragonese Empire. Alfonso had continued and carried further all the imperial, land-conquering projects of his predecessors, and he had added a host of military, diplomatic, and political responsibilities besides. Most significant of all, he had shifted the centre of gravity of the Aragonese Empire from Spain to Naples. He had refused to dwell in his native land; he either ignored it completely or else attempted to make use of it to pay the bills of his political and diplomatic ventures outside, or of his sumptuous Neapolitan court. All this was gall and wormwood to the sober Aragonese, and even the more enterprising Catalans became increasingly restless. As soon as the Aragonese Empire ceased to be directed from the realms of the Crown of Aragon their enthusiasm for it began to wane. In their eyes the fresh glories which Alfonso’s reign had brought with it were no compensation for the reckless infringement of their constitutional liberties. The language used by a deputation of the Cortes of Aragon sent over to the king in 1452 is very noteworthy: “Sire, the war which has continued for seven years without ceasing has depopulated your frontiers to such a degree that men have ceased to till the soil there; Aragon, during these seven years, has expended four hundred thousand florins in the ransom of prisoners alone; all industry, all commerce is at a standstill. For such manifold evils, the country can find but one remedy—and that is the presence of its king.” No words could have been more prophetic. They sum up the grievances of sixteenth-
century Spain against the Emperor Charles V. They foreshadow a Spanish Empire ruled in non-Spanish interests and in non Spanish ways. The Magnanimous King had sown the seeds of future conflict between national and dynastic interests. He had bequeathed to his successors an enlarged empire, but dissatisfied subjects. What was the solution to be? The future alone could tell, and the future was on the knees of the gods.
CHAPTER X
THE LIBERTIES OF ARAGON

The history of the institutional development of the realms of the Crown of Aragon differs widely, as might be expected, from that of Castile. In the first place, we have here to do with a number of different states, each governed under a constitution of its own. When the Crowns of Aragon and Catalonia were joined by the marriage of Ramon and Petronilla in the twelfth century, each land retained its separate institutions, as did Valencia and the Balearics after they had been conquered. The sole tie between these realms was the fact that they possessed the same king and occasionally sent their representatives to meet in a joint Cortes; even the kingship of the Balearics, as we have already seen, was most of the time separated from that of Aragon until their final annexation in 1349. In the matter of language, moreover, there was the sharpest sort of division. The Catalan tongue is very similar to the Provencal, but quite different from the Aragonese, which is a dialect of Spanish. In Valencia a modified form of Catalan prevailed, but in a few regions which were permanently settled by Aragonese nobles, the Aragonese language maintained itself and is spoken today. The sovereigns of the house of Barcelona spoke Catalan, and were therefore linguistically at variance with their Aragonese subjects; those of the house of Trastamara, which succeeded them in 1412, spoke Castilian and Aragonese, and were therefore unintelligible to the Catalans. In addition to all this internal differentiation, the overseas possessions, Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples continued to maintain their own methods and framework of government after their conquest by Aragon; during much of the time, also, the last two were ruled by collateral lines of kings. Thus the development of Spanish separatism more than kept pace with the growth of the Spanish Empire to the eastward. There was to be no merging in the parent state; the new possessions, as they were acquired, retained their constitutional autonomy.

Each one of these different states possessed certain distinguishing characteristics which reflected themselves in its institutions and political life. In Catalonia, originally an aristocratic and agricultural country, which afterwards became commercial and democratic, we have at first the nearest approach to a full-fledged feudal system which any of the Iberian lands offers; this subsequently gave way to a most remarkable urban development—both political and economic—of which Barcelona was the centre. The Aragonese respect for law is shown by the growth and power of the Justicia—an officer of a sort which no other European state can boast. The preponderance of the city of Valencia is perhaps the outstanding fact in the government of the Valencian kingdom. The Italian and Mediterranean lands also all had their peculiarities. But, though each one of these different realms is sharply differentiated from all the rest, there is noticeable everywhere—or at least within all of the Spanish realms of the Crown of Aragon—a certain unity of purpose on the part of all classes and of the different individuals within each class which stands out in sharp contrast to the conditions prevalent in Castile, and gives to the constitutional history of these eastern realms a meaning and sequence which are conspicuous by their absence in the west. This spirit of cooperation, this sinking of individual differences for the common good, so utterly at variance with all that we have hitherto encountered in the history of Castile, makes itself principally evident in the crises of the great struggle against monarchical absolutism which raged intermittently from the reign of James the Conqueror to that of Pedro IV. The kingdom of Aragon proper was the centre of it. Catalonia and Valencia, too royalist perhaps to initiate such a revolution themselves, were yet powerfully affected by its ebbs and flows, and not ashamed to share in the spoils after the victory was won. A brief glance at the narrative history of this mighty conflict, in which the Aragonese aristocracy constituted itself the protector of the realm against all the encroachments of the royal prerogative, will serve as the best possible background for a study of the institutions of the eastern kingdoms. It will make clear the nature of the spirit that animated them, and will illustrate, as nothing else can do, the many contrasts between the Castilians and the Aragonese. It goes to show that old Lord Brougham was not far wrong in asserting that “we meet with more strict limitations of the prerogative of the Crown in the former constitutions of some of the Peninsular Kingdoms than are anywhere to be found among the old governments of the European Continent, except perhaps in Hungary.”

The struggle begins to take definite shape in the reign of James the Conqueror. At the time of his accession he was less than six years old, and virtually a prisoner in the hands of Simon de Montfort. His father, “the most bounteous king that ever was in Spain,” had reduced the realm to bankruptcy. The land
was torn by factions, in which the king’s uncles and the most powerful nobles disputed the precedence. The situation was in fact closely analogous to that which was constantly occurring in Castile, but the outcome was utterly different. Instead of seizing the opportunity for further abasement of the royal power, the warring barons at once recognized that the king’s immediate liberation and restoration were of paramount necessity to the safety of the state, and accomplished them within eight months of his father’s death. When the young monarch had been restored to his own dominions, the magnates indeed resumed their quarrels, but the aged Ximeno Cornel, “the wisest man in Aragon and the best adviser,” who “grieved for the evils that he saw so great” in the realm, devoted himself to the maintenance of the central power; the church and the cities rallied loyally to its support, and James himself, as time went on, became increasingly expert in the difficult art of reigning. After thirteen years of turbulent minority (1214-27) he emerged triumphant, largely, no doubt, through his own efforts and those of his advisers, but also because of the fact that the mass of his people were thoroughly tired of factional strife and recognized its futility. Even the baronage had apparently realized that excessive restrictions of monopolical power were bound to work out badly in the end.

Half a century later the king and the aristocracy encountered one another again, but with a very different distribution of forces. James had meantime enlarged his dominions by the acquisition of Valencia and the Balearics. Internal strife was for the moment in abeyance. The king had carried the power of the Aragonese monarchy to a far higher point than it had ever attained before. With the aid of the civilians and canonists he had modified the laws of the land by the F ueros of Huesca of 1247 in a sense hostile to feudal privilege. He was recognized as one of the foremost sovereigns of the day. In the hour of his strength his hapless son-in-law, Alfonso X of Castile, appealed to him for aid against the Moors of North Africa, and James deemed it expedient to grant it, even though extra funds were imperatively necessary in order to enable him to fit out a fleet. Maritime Catalonia came forward with a conditional grant of bovage; but when the king attempted to extort a similar tax from the Cortes of Aragon at Saragossa he was met with a stern refusal: “We do not know in Aragon what bovage is”, retorted one of the members. Despite all his power and prestige, the fact that James had dared to propose an unconstitutional levy had put all the Aragonese baronage up in arms; not only was bovage denied him but every other sort of impost as well. Encouraged by this initial success, the Cortes passed from their refusal of funds to an enumeration of their grievances. A Union or league of the nation—fo rerunner of a mightier Union soon to follow—was formed, and twelve articles were drawn up, in which various infractions of the power of the aristocracy by the triumphant monarchy were alleged. In reply the king tried to justify himself, promised respect for the fueros, and grumblingly compared his treatment by the Aragonese nobles to the persecution of Christ by the Jews? Some further concessions were granted at a Cortes at Ejea in 1265, where feudal privilege “attained the highest point it was destined to reach in the Conqueror’s reign”; but others were refused, and “the result of the struggle was a compromise, by which the nobility secured indeed the confirmation of the privileges of their order, but otherwise failed to trammel the King’s liberty of action in any vital respect.” In the fact that complete abasement of the monarchy did not follow the restriction of royal encroachments lies one of the chief differences between mediaeval Aragon and Castile.

In the next two reigns the struggle reached its culmination. Under Pedro III the expedition to Sicily and its consequences served once more to light the fires of Aragonese discontent. To all the old grievances was added anger at the cost of a distant enterprise of which the Aragonese did not see the value, and from which they were sure that Catalonia would derive the real profit. There was also deep dread of the hostility of France, and of the papal interdict which had followed in its train. Altogether, the Aragonese felt that they had not been taken into the king’s confidence, and that the project on which he had embarked without consulting them had ended disastrously. All these grievances burst forth at the Cortes of Tarazona, in September, 1283, after the king’s return from the Sicilian expedition. So deep was the national resentment that the cities supported the nobles, and when Pedro answered their petitions for the observance of their fueros and liberties with a haughty speech, they proceeded to form a new Union for the defense of them. The members of this formidable confederation solemnly promised one another mutual support for the redress of their grievances, saving, their due allegiance to the crown. They agreed to proceed by force against any who should play them false, and to defend one another’s persons and goods against any royal processes initiated without the consent of the Justicia of Aragon—holding that in such cases they were absolved from their oath of fidelity to their sovereign. They even went so far as to declare that under such circumstances they regarded themselves as free to make common cause with the Infante Alfonso, the heir to the throne, and to expel King Pedro from the realm. “They were all of them”, says Zurita, “so unanimous on this point, that the Ricos Hombres and the Knights labored no more strenuously for the maintenance of their privileges and liberties than did the commons and the lower classes; for they all were of the opinion that Aragon existed, not by
virtue of the forces of the kingdom, but of liberty, and it was the will of them all that when liberty should perish, the realm also should perish with it.” The king was naturally alarmed at the seriousness of the opposition he had encountered, and prorogued the Cortes to Saragossa, promising at the same time to examine the complaints alleged. In the interim fresh demands were added to the old. The nation was obviously in deadly earnest, and in view of the threatening aspect of foreign affairs Pedro was obliged to yield. The instrument in which the royal concessions were made is known to history as the General Privilege, and it has sometimes been compared to Magna Carta. Both are singular mixtures of feudal and national claims. Both aim at putting a term to monopolial usurpations without prejudice to the position of a king who keeps within the law. Both strenuously assert that they are not innovations but a return to ancient liberties which had been infringed by the crown. But there is, of course, the widest possible divergence between the circumstances of their origin and the character of the kings from whom they were extorted. The members of the Union continued even in the moment of their triumph to preserve a respect for Pedro III which the barons at Runnymede never accorded to John Lackland. Their great seal represents the sovereign seated on his throne and the members of the Union on their knees before him, in the attitude of suppliants, as a sign of their loyalty. On the other hand, a long line of spears in the background of the picture indicates that the confederates had the means at their disposal to enforce their demands, in case the king should refuse to listen to them.

The chief provisions of this memorable act are as follows. The king swore to observe all the ancient fueros and privileges of the realm, and promised that in future no Aragonese subject should be tried or convicted without due process of law; all lands and goods confiscated during the reigns of Pedro and of his father to be returned; all donations and grants from the royal domain to the ricos hombres were to be validated and confirmed; no fief was to be forfeited without the consent of the Justicia and of the royal council. All nobles were to have the unquestioned right to leave the service of the king and to seek another lord outside the realm for any cause whatsoever; and to recommend to the king’s favor and protection on their departure their wives and children, vassals and goods. No rico hombre was to be obliged to render military service beyond the boundaries of the realm or overseas, on the ground of any fief or honor held of the king. Representatives of all ranks and classes of society were to have a place in the royal council, and to be consulted in regard to peace and war and the general welfare of the realm. Only natives of the kingdom were to be permitted to sit as judges. No new impost or tax was to be established; the salt tax and the quinta were to be abolished. Finally, annual Cortes were to be held at Saragossa, and the members of the Union were to have the right to present fresh demands from time to time.

The concessions of King Pedro to his Aragonese subjects were reechoed in Valencia and Catalonia. As the operation of the fueros in Aragon had been specifically extended to the former kingdom in the reign of James the Conqueror, the Valencians were permitted to appropriate to themselves all the rights granted in the General Privilege as a matter of course; moreover the fact that Valencia and Valencia’s affairs are constantly mentioned in the text of the instrument indicates that this had been intended from the first. A series of parallel privileges was also granted to the Catalonians—the more willingly because they had greatly aided Pedro in the conquest of Sicily, and were about to bear the brunt of an invasion from France. But it was one thing to accede to the demands of his subjects in theory and another to observe them in practice. The Valencians were bullied into a repudiation of the ‘Fuero of Aragon’ within a short time after they had been granted it; while the Aragonese, who discerned unmistakable signs that Pedro intended ultimately to evade his promises to them, strengthened the bonds of their Union, began to raise troops, and opened negotiations, as a sovereign power, with the king’s enemies in Navarre. Whether or not they would have dared to do so much if Pedro had not been laboring under the terrible incubus of papal censure may well be doubted; but as it was, despite the royal entreaties, and the pressure of the danger of invasion from France, they continued in their revolt, and threatened to paralyze the military efficiency of the realm. The fact, however, that zeal for the assertion of class privilege was now beginning to take the precedence of patriotism in the ranks of the rebels was speedily perceived by King Pedro, who cleverly utilized the fact for his own advantage. He wisely ignored the demands of the members of the Union, in the hope that the untimeliness of their complaints would deprive them of popular sympathy, and that their rebellious ardor would cool for lack of an object to vent itself upon. In July, 1285, his foresight was justified by the event. The insurgents decided to postpone the redress of their grievances and aid the king against the French. Pedro, however, was not destined to reap the reward of his statesmanship; for at Perpignan, on St. Martin’s Day, he died.

The absence of Alfonso III on the Majorcan expedition at the moment of his father’s death afforded the members of the Union an opportunity to organize a fresh resistance; while the fact that the danger from France was temporarily set aside gave them an excuse for returning to their grievances.
Beginning with the complaint, unjustifiable under the circumstances, that Alfonso had dared to assume the title of king of Aragon without waiting to swear to the maintenance of their fueros, they went on to demand the reformation of the royal household, and the banishment of all the royal counsellors of whom they did not approve. The monarch was rudely summoned to Saragossa to discuss the affairs of the nation with the Cortes, and to revoke all grants of fiefs made since the death of Pedro. The malcontents threatened to refuse all payment of taxes in case he failed to comply, and to unite to resist him by force. The king appeared, but showed unexpected firmness in refusing the Union’s demands, with the result that the more faint-hearted of the confederates deserted the cause. The rest Alfonso tried to win over by concessions, and was making good progress towards the desired end when he was called away on the expedition against Minorca. Then, when his back was turned, all the elements of revolt broke forth afresh. The malcontents ravaged Valencia. They sent messengers to France, to Castile, and to Granada begging for alliances. They almost went so far as to recognize the right of the papal protége, the French king’s son, to the throne of Aragon. There could no longer be the slightest question that they had gone far beyond the widest possible interpretation of the fueros and privileges of the realm. Constitutional and feudal progress by this time had outrun administrative order with a vengeance, but the king was at present too weak to defend his just rights. All attempts at compromise failed; the Union had the power in its hands and proposed to use it. On Christmas day, 1287, Alfonso made a solemn entry into Saragossa, and there signed two documents known to history by the significant name of the “Privileges of Union,” and described, with only slight exaggeration, as “the most tremendous power ever conceded by a king to his subjects.” By them he promised not to proceed against any of the members of the Union save by sentence of the Justicia and with the consent of the Cortes, which were to be convoked annually at Saragossa; and the national assembly was given the right to elect and assign to the king certain persons who were to have seats in his royal council. Sixteen castles were handed over by the monarch as security for the observance of his promises; and finally, in case he should evade them, he formally recognized the right of the Union to depose him and to choose another king in his stead. In the following year, the members of the Union further declared that the ‘Fuero of Aragon’ and all the liberties and privileges which went with it were extended to the kingdom of Valencia.

Most of the provisions of the Privileges of Union, even more than those of the General Privilege which preceded them, remained unfulfilled in fact. The castles were not all handed over; the decrees and decisions of the Justicia were not executed; though the counsellors whom the Privilege of Union imposed upon the king were chosen, their advice was often ignored; and the Cortes did not meet annually. The organization of the Union, however, remained unshaken throughout the rest of the reign of Alfonso III and the first ten years of that of James II. The latter’s caution and known respect for the law, and also possibly the emigration of a number of the nobles to Italy, which he secretly encouraged, prevented any open breach for a time; but finally, in 1301, the news that an outbreak similar to that of 1287 was imminent forced the king to take vigorous measures for the defense of his authority. On this occasion, however, the royal cause was completely victorious. That the Cortes and the Justicia promptly rallied to its support may be taken as a significant proof that Aragon realized that the Union had gone too far for the good of the realm. Certainly their alliance facilitated the king’s triumph. James was able to pose as defender of parliamentary privilege and of the authority of the courts against the assaults of a disloyal and selfish baronage. After a brief struggle the Justicia pronounced the annulment of the Union as an illegal institution; he revoked all its acts, and delivered over all its members and their goods to the royal mercy. James had the wisdom to use his victory with moderation, and this, coupled with the fortunate circumstances under which he had won it, prevented a recrudescence of trouble for many years to come. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the most notable triumphs of the reign of this king were gained in his dealings with his rebel subjects at home. In a work on the development of the Spanish Empire they must necessarily be relegated to an inconspicuous place, but they are quite worthy of a separate volume in themselves. James’s patience, perseverance, and, above all, his skillful utilization of the legists that flocked to his court, are the chief elements which combined to give him the victory; and his success in converting the Justicia into an ally of the monarchy was the outward and visible sign of his triumph. His deathbed boast was fully justified: “I have passed many a sleepless night,” he protested, “in planning how to cause my subjects to enjoy the blessings of justice and peace.”

The final stage of the struggle of king and barons was postponed till the reign of Pedro IV. For though the Union of James’s day had been dispersed, the Privileges of Union were still extant; and as long as the Privileges remained, a new Union might at any time be created. A quarrel in the royal family over the succession to the throne gave the signal for a fresh outbreak in 1346-47. Pedro’s first wife, Mary of Navarre, had borne him no male children who survived. As the law of Aragon excluded women from the throne, the heir presumptive was Pedro’s younger brother, James. Pedro, however, had many
reasons to dislike and mistrust this man—particularly because of his friendship with King James of Majorca—and determined, in defiance of the custom of the land, to leave the throne to his daughter, Constance, in default of male heirs in the direct line. This decision was much resented by the mass of his subjects, not only as a violation of the fundamental laws, but also because the proud spirit of the Aragonese briddled at the thought of being ruled by a woman. The cause of James found adherents on every hand. The discontent, moreover, spread rapidly to Valencia, always closely in touch with Aragon, and especially so on this occasion since it was the regular residence of the Infante. Feeling that he could not be safe as long as his brother remained in the southern kingdom, Pedro summoned him to leave it, and conferred its governorship in his absence on one of his own adherents. But if James’s departure from Valencia promised to give Pedro quiet in that quarter, his presence in Saragossa, whether he at once repaired, served to redouble the discontent there. Skilful utilization of the magic words ‘liberties’ and ‘fueros’ produced the inevitable effect. The Union, abolished in the reign of James, reconstituted itself with spontaneous and unbounded enthusiasm. The fact that the cities, with but few exceptions, unhesitatingly threw in their lot with the nobles was of evil augury for the monarchy, which was thereby deprived of its strongest support; while their accession to the ranks of the Union relieved the latter of the charge of being devoted merely to feudal and aristocratic ends. The reservation that it pursued its aims “saving its due allegiance to the crown” was also most useful as a rallying cry in a land where respect for the law has ever been very great, and at the same time it was not sufficiently specific to hamper freedom of action. And the example of Saragossa was soon followed by Valencia. Despite all that Pedro’s representative there could do, another Union, modelled on that of Aragon, was promptly formed in the southern kingdom; moreover the two bodies soon came to an agreement that they should fight in unison for their common ends, and that neither should treat with the king without the consent of the other. In Catalonia alone did Pedro find support. There the principles of the Union had not penetrated; and the long-established partiality of the Aragonese monarchs for the inhabirants of this maritime and commercial province was richly rewarded in their hour of danger and distress.

Despite the support of the Catalonians, Pedro was as yet in no condition to defeat his enemies by force; but it was in just such crises as this that he invariably displayed his highest talents as a diplomat and intriguer. After demanding a safe conduct, to the great indignation of his subjects, who could not bear the thought that their honor or loyalty was doubted, he acquiesced in the rebels’ petitions that he should come to Saragossa and summon the national Cortes. Having satisfied himself on his arrival that his foes had the military power to enable them to enforce whatever demands they elected to make, he acceded to most of their demands. Annual Cortes, expulsion of unpopular (Catalonian) counsellors, and acceptance of new ones selected by the Union, together with the confirmation of other concessions embodied in the second of the two Privileges of 1287, were granted one after the other. Hostages were given, and sixteen castles delivered up as security for the performance of the royal promises; Pedro himself was virtually a prisoner of the Union in his palace at Saragossa, while at the same time his presence there served to give a show of legality to the rebels’ cause. But just at the moment that the king of Aragon seemed about to drain the cup of humiliation to the dregs, his fortunes began to revive. Despite all the hostages demanded of him, he had managed to retain about his person his mayor domo, Bernaldo de Cabrera, a violent royalist, whose powers of diplomacy and intrigue were not exceeded by his own. The latter began by detaching from the Union Lope de Luna, the richest noble of the three realms, whom he won over by promising him the much-desired post of governor-general of Aragon; he also opened communications with the remnant of the royalist party in Valencia. Encouraged by these signs of returning fortune, Pedro ventured roundly to accuse his brother James of treason and felony in a solemn session of the Cortes, and to challenge him to mortal combat. The duel was declined, but a scene of extraordinary violence ensued; the crowd broke into the church where the session was being held, but the king and his adherents escaped unharmed. Not even yet, however, did Pedro feel strong enough to appeal to arms. In late October, 1347, he left Saragossa for the friendlier soil of Catalonia, after confirming all his concessions to his foes, and annulling all oaths of allegiance to his daughter Constance. But though he outwardly preserved a calm demeanor, and apparently yielded every point that his enemies demanded, the fires of fury were raging within him at the check he had received. Though seemingly powerless, he was in reality plotting busily to regain all and more than he had lost, as his enemies were soon to discover to their undoing.

The next event was the death of the Infante, on November 19, 1347, at Barcelona, whither he had gone for a meeting of the Catalonian Cortes. So convenient was his demise for the purposes of the king, that Pedro was universally believed to have brought it to pass. Of course James’s death was the signal for the outbreak of war both in Valencia and in Aragon; but it was in Valencia, where the Infante was deeply beloved, that the struggle was by far the most serious. The royal representative there, Pedro de
Exerica, was totally unable to make head against the rebellion. The king, who rushed to his rescue with a small force of loyal Catalanians, was promptly shut up in Murviedro and forced to confirm the Valencian Union, grant the Valencians a Justicia, and exclude Cabrera and other confirmed royalists from his council. A subsequent attempt of Pedro to escape to Teruel was discovered and forestalled. Amid the threatenings of a furious crowd, the king and queen were handed over to the heads of the Valencian Union and escorted to the capital, where the populace welcomed them with jeers. A series of fresh humiliations, vividly described in the king’s chronicles, followed; but even at the lowest ebb of his fortunes Pedro continued to intrigue and plot, while the indefatigable Cabrera labored night and day in Barcelona to fan the fires of Catalan loyalty. Finally the outbreak of the pestilence gave Pedro an excuse for demanding license to depart from Valencia, where he had been kept virtually a prisoner for two months. After extorting from him a renewal of past concessions, the authorities finally suffered him to escape (June, 1348). It was a grave error, for with the king at liberty all the forces of royalism raised their head. The scene of interest shifted in the next few weeks to Aragon. Lope de Luna, the chief of the royalist forces there, prepared for a trial of strength on the field of battle; while the king, by intrigue and bribery, ably seconded his efforts, and actually succeeded in detaching hostile Castile from the ranks of his enemies, and in gaining from Alfonso XI a force of six hundred horsemen. The final encounter occurred at Epila, on the self-same spot where, seven months before, the forces of the Valencian Union had won a temporary victory over Exerica. Despite a considerable inferiority in numbers, the royalists charged with such vigor that the troops of the Union gave way all along the line. Most of the rebel chief’s remained dead on the field, though their principal leader, the Infante Ferdinand, who was wounded and taken prisoner by the king’s Castilian auxiliaries, was ultimately suffered to escape to the western kingdom. On every hand the king’s victory was complete (July 21, 1348)

The battle of Epila was the death knell of the Union in Aragon. Saragossa submitted at once to the royalist forces, and purchased an ignoble immunity from punishment by delivering over those leaders of the insurrection (thirteen in number) who had not taken refuge in flight. They were straightway hung at the gates of the town; and similar executions occurred in other cities of the realm. All the royal concessions of the previous months were, of course, revoked; all the acts and treaties of the Union were solemnly annulled as illegal; its seal was broken and its name formally abolished. The Privileges of Union of 1287, “the root and cause of all the evil,” were destroyed in most dramatic fashion. The original parchment was produced, and in the presence of his subjects the king furiously cut and hacked it into a hundred pieces with his dagger, wounding himself slightly in the process, so careless had he become in his blind rage. “From that time forth,” says Zurita, “the name of the Union was permanently abolished, and also that license and lawlessness which men called liberty, but which, born as it was of a popular uprising and seeking to maintain itself by force of arms, perished justly by them, as is usually the case, and succumbed to the might of the power of the Crown.”

From Aragon Pedro turned on Valencia, where the insurrection had continued at full blast, undismayed by the fate of the Union in the sister kingdom. Though Pedro had a powerful fleet and an army at his disposal, though Aragon as well as Catalonia was now supporting him, and though Castile remained strictly neutral, the Valencians refused to surrender without a struggle. They withdrew within the walls of their capital, making occasional sorties to harass the royal troops, and meantime strove desperately, though ineffectually, to secure relief from without. But when they saw their fair country ruthlessly devastated by the king’s forces, and the lines of the besieging army drawn so tightly round their city as to preclude the possibility of their escape, they were convinced that “the anger of God had fallen upon them to punish them for their sins,” and prepared to treat for peace. So angry was Pedro at the resistance of the Valencians that he was with difficulty dissuaded by his councillors from razing their city to the ground. After much argument he reluctantly agreed to accept its complete submission and an acknowledgment of his unquestioned right to dispose of all its liberties and immunities according to his own discretion. Finally he granted the inhabitants a pardon, from which all active participants in the preceding revolt were specifically excluded. Needless to add, the Valencian Union was utterly shattered by this defeat. “From that day onward,” as Pedro significantly puts it in his chronicle, “Valencia remained in our grace and love.”! But the punishment of the guilty rebels which paved the way for this happy consummation was far more frightful than that which had fallen on their Aragonese comrades a few months before. It reminds us of the horrors enacted in Valencia two and a half centuries before in the days of the Cid; clearly the king had much faith in the power of terrorism. One example will suffice: the metal of the bell which had summoned the leaders of the Union to council meetings was poured, red hot, down the throats of the condemned.

Thus ended after a struggle of more than a century this singular contest between sovereign and subject, around which the whole internal history of Aragon during the period in question revolves, in which Valencia actively participated, and to which Catalonia was not entirely a stranger. It is still too
early to attempt to pronounce definite judgment upon it; much new material remains to be discovered; many doubtful points need to be cleared up. There are two fundamental questions on which the final verdict will inevitably depend. First: Can the aims of the rebels be said to have been in any sense really national in their scope, or was their uprising in effect solely a revolt of a powerful and united feudal aristocracy, bent on the assertion of its special privileges, but clever enough to associate with itself at certain stages representatives of the third estate in order to disguise the true nature of its aims, and to gain for itself the appearance of popular sanction? Second: Even granting that the Union was in some degree national in its character and aspirations, was it safe for any nation, at the stage of development which Aragon had then attained, so considerably to limit the power of its king. Would not anarchy have been the sole real result of a premature attempt to anticipate modern constitutionalism? Was not absolutism, at that period, the only sure road to peace and order, as England, France, and Castile were to learn in the next century, to their cost. Certainly the writings of patriots like Zurita and Blancas are distinctly favorable to the royal cause, and strongly assert that the defeat of the Union was for the best interest of the realm. Moreover, it is worth noting that though Pedro punished ferociously at the moment, he used his victory in later years with remarkable moderation. Against the higher nobility he remained indeed inexorable; their power was broken beyond the possibility of repair; but he extended the rights of the lesser baronage, and restored and amplified the charters of the cities that had risen in arms against him. Most important of all, as we shall see in detail in another place, he confirmed and strengthened the authority of the Justicia, who, though his appointment was now unreservedly in the royal hands, continued in the next period to perform the work which the warmest apologists of the Union had declared to be the true function of his office—the defense of the subject against breach of privilege and sentence contrary to the law. Pedro’s successors, moreover, at least down to Alfonso the Magnanimous, followed on the whole the same wise course, with the gratifying result that the history of Aragon, during most of the century previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings, presents an agreeable contrast to contemporary Castile in the general stability of its institutions, and in the absence of baronial rebellion. Yet, on the other hand, even the bitterest critic of the aims of the Union and the most ardent advocate of royal absolutism will not be prepared to deny that the cause for which the Aragonese rebels lived and died was far more deserving of our sympathy than the savage, wanton, disorganized outbursts of the self-seeking nobility of Castile.

They certainly fought for an ideal; it may have been a wrong one, but it was unquestionably higher than individual aggrandizement. The whole tone of the contest in Aragon connotes a more advanced stage of political development than the western kingdom had yet reached. It has justly been compared to the struggle for the charters in thirteenth century England; it has a meaning and sequence; it appeals to the sympathy and intelligence of the modern student, who often finds himself at a loss to account for the strivings of the aristocracy in Castile. And lastly, though the aims of the Union were not attained, the attitude of the Aragonese sovereigns after the battle of Epila plainly shows that they realized that their subjects would never let them push their victories too far, or tolerate lawless despotism. Though the Union had doubtless attempted to impose excessive limitations upon the king, it had so strengthened the spirit of resistance to unjustifiable monarchical encroachments that things could never go to the opposite extreme. Though the mediaeval Castilian barons subjected their weak sovereigns to humiliations far more degrading than any which their Aragonese contemporaries suffered, they were unable to oppose any barrier to the well organized despotism of Ferdinand and Isabella. In Aragon, on the other hand, the defenses against royal absolutism remained so strong that the Catholic Kings wisely refrained from any attempt to overthrow them by force, and instead followed the policy of leaving the eastern realms alone, in the hope that their passion for liberty would die down from lack of fuel to feed the flames.
CHAPTER XI
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EASTERN KINGDOMS AND OF THEIR DEPENDENCIES

The great internal struggle which has been described in the preceding chapter affords the principal explanation of the fact, already frequently noticed, that Aragon and Valencia held themselves largely aloof from the ambitious plans and enterprises of their sovereigns in Italy and in the Mediterranean Sea. Their attention was turned inward, not outward; they were, in fact, rather negatively than positively important in the upbuilding of the Aragonese Empire. Consequently we are justified in restricting our examination of their institutions to the smallest possible space, in emphasizing only those features which are unique and distinctive, particularly those which served to limit the royal power; for it is really almost as a hindrance to imperial development that we are concerned with them. The constitution and internal conditions of maritime and commercial Catalonia, on the other hand, will have to be more fully discussed: for it was from Catalonia that all the great adventures overseas were launched; she was the true center of the Aragonese Empire. A few words must also be added concerning the methods of governing the Mediterranean possessions as they were successively acquired. Of course the real life of the system we are about to describe was destined to be but short. After the union of the crowns under Ferdinand and Isabella, Castile so completely took the precedence of the eastern kingdoms that she swallowed up many of their institutional peculiarities, in fact at least, if not in name. Though the ancient framework of the mediaeval constitutions of the Aragonese realms and their dependencies was permitted to subsist as a matter of form, Castilian methods and principles practically prevailed after the beginning of the sixteenth century throughout every portion of the Spanish Empire. On the other hand, it would be impossible to give any adequate idea of the real nature of that extraordinary agglomeration without some account of the infinite variety of its component parts. It is therefore essential for us to familiarise ourselves with the more salient characteristics of its eastern and ultimately less important portions.

ARAGON

The predominance and power of the aristocracy of Aragon is the outstanding characteristic of the social structure of that kingdom. In its long struggle with the monarchy it had won for itself a position so high, that, though defeated at Epila, it never ceased to boast that it was the truest guardian of the national liberties. Other forces, moreover, had been at work from earliest times to assure its preeminence. Aragon had played so small a part in the work of the Reconquest that the need to concentrate in walled towns was not felt there to the same degree that it was in Castile. A more sedentary and rural existence was therefore possible, and a system of large, landed holdings—the first essential for a flourishing nobility—grew up and was perpetuated. There was, moreover, something more nearly resembling a regular feudal system in Aragon than in Castile; and it was considerably accentuated by the union with Catalonia—a still more feudal state—in 1137. By the second half of the thirteenth century, at the time of the Cortes of Ejea, a very real feudalism may be said to have been in existence in Aragon, where, curiously enough, it began to flourish at the very moment that elsewhere it showed signs of decadence.

Perhaps the most obvious outward sign of the power and importance of the Aragonese aristocracy lies in the fact that it comprised two great categories—an upper and a lower nobility, each with a separate representation in the Cortes—so that there were, with the clergy and burgesses, not three but four estates of the realm. The upper nobility, who claimed descent from the first conquerors of the land, were known as barons or ricos hombres; of these there were but nine in the reign of James the Conqueror. They held of the king fiefs and ‘honors’ consisting of the revenues of different towns and were obliged in return to render him military service from one to three months each year at the rate of one knight for every five hundred sols of rent. They were exempt from corporal punishment, from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals of the realm, save that of the Justicia, and from the payment of regular taxes; they also possessed the unquestioned right of renunciation of allegiance to their
sovereign. They could be deprived of their lands only for certain specified crimes, one of which was falsely ascribing, under oath, the attributes and privileges of noble birth to anyone who did not actually possess them.

The lower nobility were divided into three classes, mesnaderos, caballeros, and infanzones. The first originated in the reign of James the Conqueror, and, as their name (from mesnada or royal household) indicates, were specially attached to the royal person; they were supposed to be descendants in the male line of ricos hombres, and were only slightly inferior to them. They were vassals of the king alone, but could live without dishonor at the expense of a rico hombre—though only as a friend and not as a vassal. Caballeros, or knights, enjoyed exemption from taxation and certain other privileges of nobility, such as that no one should lay hands on the bridles of their horses to detain them. The title, however, connoted rather an acquired dignity than a status by birth, and it could, apparently, be conferred by prelates and ricos hombres as well as by the crown. The infanzones, at the bottom of the ladder, were sons of knights, and were naturally very numerous; but the possession of a number of more or less important privileges marked them off sharply from the burgesses. In general, one gains the impression that the kings deliberately increased the number and prerogatives of these lesser nobles as a counterweight to the excessive powers of the ricos hombres; but they certainly did not succeed in breeding any permanent dissension in the ranks of the baronage. The Aragonese aristocracy stood united, on the whole, in a way which furnishes a most impressive contrast with their self-seeking Castilian contemporaries; and they were not only zealous for the welfare of their order as a whole, but also for that of the entire body politic. Their division into two estates served to strengthen, not to weaken them; they thus constituted themselves one half of the national assembly and vindicated their title to the high position to which they laid claim.

The clergy and the municipalities were far less important in mediaeval Aragon than in Castile, as was natural in view of the comparatively modest part borne by the Aragonese in the war of the Reconquest. Down to the battle of Epila, the churchmen and most of the larger cities tended in general to throw in their lot with the baronage against the monarchy and sought to win for themselves privileges like those of the aristocracy; after the close of the internal struggle, both these orders made some independent gains at the expense of the defeated nobles. The fueros granted to the different cities do not offer the same variety and divergence as do those of Castile; but the capital city of Saragossa claimed to represent one half the brazo real or fourth estate whenever a committee was appointed to do business in its name, and also by the so-called Privilegio de los Veinte, a sort of special constitution granted to the city by Alfonso I in 1119, which vested extraordinary powers in a body of twenty of the principal inhabitants, and conferred exceptional rights and prerogatives upon the municipality as a whole.

The mass of the rural population led a hard existence; and the lot of the Aragonese serf was even worse than that of the Castilian solario. There were but few free landed proprietors, except among the ranks of the nobles; the peasants were all of them more or less at the mercy of their masters, who could “treat them well or badly, according to their own desires, and take away their goods without appeal, without the king’s having any right to interfere”. So completely were some of them bound to the soil, that, in case the land on which they lived was partitioned among the sons of the lord, each of the serfs who dwelt thereon could, according to the strict letter of the law, “be divided in pieces with it.”

The condition of the Aragonese Jews in the later Middle Ages is not strikingly different from that of their coreligionists in Castile. Like them, they were very numerous, and enjoyed in the thirteenth century wider freedom and privileges than were accorded to them in the other nations of Western Europe. They were segregated in special localities, or aljamas, in the most important towns of the realm, and their rights and prerogatives were strictly defined. James the Conqueror was particularly active in protecting them; he recognized their high economic value, and frequently employed them in the financial business of the crown. At the same time, however, the ecclesiastical authorities were mustering their forces for the campaign of proselytism and persecution which began in earnest in the fourteenth century. The Castilian massacres of 1391 had their counterparts in all the realms of the Crown of Aragon, though certainly to a much less extent in Aragon proper than in Catalonia and Valencia. Large numbers of Hebrews were slain outright; most of the rest accepted baptism—some, no doubt, because of the preachings of men like St. Vincent Ferrer and Gerónimo de Santa Fé, others in order to escape from further outrages. In one respect it seems that the lot of the converses, if they showed any signs of relapsing, must have been worse in Aragon than in Castile; for the papal Inquisition, though it had not been extended to the western kingdom, had been established in the eastern realms since the time of its foundation in the thirteenth century, and furnished the machinery,
ready to hand, for the detection and punishment of religious backsliders. But as a matter of fact the Inquisition “had sunk into a condition almost dormant in the spiritual lethargy of the century preceding the Reformation”, while on the other hand the Aragonese as a whole, and especially their rulers, were considerably more alive than the Castilians to the financial and economic value of the Jewish portions of the population, and consequently more reluctant to persecute them. We therefore find the conversos occupying the highest offices in the government, in the army, and at the court, and marrying their children into the foremost families of the land; while the first part of the fifteenth century witnessed a distinct revulsion of feeling in favor of the professed Jews who had remained loyal to the faith of their fathers. Many of the legal restrictions under which they lived were not rigorously enforced; by the time of the accession of the Catholic Kings they had regained, in practice, a large part of the privileges which in theory they had previously lost.

The Moors in the kingdom of Aragon were even better off, and were also more fortunate than their brethren in Castile. The intimate commercial and political relations which most of the Aragonese sovereigns maintained with the North African states had their natural counterpart in the very notable degree of liberality in their treatment of the Moorish inhabitants of their own dominions. A large measure of religious and political freedom was permitted them in return for the payment of certain special and extra imposts, and for their subjection to a number of economic limitations of which the Christian population reaped the benefit. There was virtually no attempt at proselytism or conversion; they had escaped the odium which proverbial Hebrew avarice had fastened on the Jews; there are many evidences that they were generally regarded as valuable members of society. The practice of selling into slavery Moorish prisoners captured in war practically ceased in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with the completion of the Reconquest and the capture of the Balearics.

We pass from the different ranks and classes of society to the various organs of the central government. The Aragonese kingship was hereditary, like that of Castile, but the royal powers and prerogatives, in theory at least, were much less extensive. The king’s oath before the Justicia and the representatives of the four estates of the realm to observe all the laws and privileges of the land was indispensable to the validity of his accession; and the formula of allegiance, which, according to contemporary authorities, was still in use in the sixteenth century, clearly indicates that the sovereign was regarded rather as the servant than as the master of his people. “We who are as good as you”, so it ran, “swear to you who are no better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided you observe all our liberties and laws; but if not, not.” Here there is certainly no trace of absolutism on the one hand or of servility on the other; a contract is made between sovereign and subjects, in which deposition is openly recognized as the proper penalty for a king who seeks to override the laws. And the constitution erected a host of other barriers against the despotism of the crown. Most of them will be taken up incidentally to our study of the position and power of the other portions of the body politic. For the present we need only observe that the Aragonese monarchs were far more limited than their Castilian contemporaries by the extensive powers of the Cortes in legislation, taxation, finance, and even in the management of foreign affairs, and by the authority of the Justicia in matters of justice. Even in the appointment of their intimate advisers and counsellors, and of the officers of their royal household, they had by no means a perfectly free hand. During the period of the Privileges of Union, the Cortes exercised extensive powers in the selection of them; and even after the Privileges were abolished in 1348 there are a number of cases in which they continued to interfere. Particularly strict were the regulations to prevent the king from introducing foreigners—especially Catalonians—into the royal council in Aragon; chiefly, no doubt, for fear lest their presence should further stimulate the king’s interest and ambition for foreign enterprise and expansion, which were always regarded with ill concealed hostility by the law-loving, self-righteous, and rather uncosmopolitan Aragoneses.

The Aragonese Cortes differed considerably from those of Castile in respect to their composition and procedure and enjoyed much more extensive powers. The division of the nobility into two classes raised the number of the estates from three to four. The right to attend was not, as in Castile, primarily dependent on the receipt of a royal summons. Proof of rank and lineage entitled to representation in the two brazos of the aristocracy, while in the brazo de las universidades, or brazo real, such cities and towns as could show that they had sent representatives in the past continued to enjoy that privilege. Membership in the clerical estate was also fairly definitely fixed, so that the complexion of the whole assembly could not be changed, as in Castile, at the behest of the crown. The presence of the Justicia as ‘juez de las Cortes’ was absolutely necessary and constitutes another anomaly of Aragonese parliamentary practice. The clauses in the General Privilege and the Privileges of Union demanding annual Cortes were superseded by a law of 1307 providing for biennial ones: the records show, however, that neither of these requirements was actually observed. In the matter of procedure, extremely minute and careful regulation of the smallest and most unimportant details is the
outstanding feature. There was a complicated arrangement for three prorogations of four days each in order to give tardy members a chance to arrive; the process of habilitación, or formal proving by each member of his right to sit, was exceedingly strict and almost interminable. In theory absolute unanimity of the members of each brazo was required on every measure, a fact which has caused some writers to exclaim that the passage of any law was a miracle in Aragon. The solio or final formal meeting of the king and estates—in which all the measures of the session were solemnly proclaimed and sworn to—served to prevent the sovereign from ignoring those doings of the assembly which were not to his liking; and as a further method to secure this end, a committee of the estates, or Diputacion del Reino, usually composed of two members of each brazo, was chosen to remain in session during intervals between sessions, to watch over the observance of the laws, and report to the Cortes any infractions of them. A full account of the duties and powers of this body will be found in the fueros. They may perhaps be summarized under three heads: (1) to oversee the administration of the public revenue (not the patrimonio real); (2) to deal with all infractions of the fueros by public officials or private persons; (3) to keep the peace, in company with the Justicia of Aragon. Finally, we may note that the consent of the Aragonese Cortes was always necessary to the passing of all laws; the king, unlike the Castilian monarch, could not legislate without them. By them alone could an extra grant, over and above what came to the king in his own right, be made; without their consent no new tribute or duty could be imposed, nor the rate of an old one diminished or increased. The Cortes received the oath of a new king to observe the laws and recognized him as monarch; they alone could grant letters of naturalization; truces, peaces, and declarations of war were usually ratified by them; occasionally they confirmed and even nominated ambassadors. Their claim to a voice in the appointment of the principal officers of state has already been described; and we shall later see that they exercised a large measure of control over the Justicia. Lastly, they had a most extensive power of investigating, in conjunction with the Justicia, greujes, or wrongs done by the king, his officers, or the estates, to one another, to individuals, or groups of individuals of whatever rank, or vice versa, in defiance of the laws, and of demanding that justice be done. The procedure and other powers of the Cortes were such as insured attention to these demands.

There is no need for prolonged consideration of Aragonese finance, local government, or military affairs, interesting and important though they are; for none of them vitally affects the development of the Spanish Empire. The attempts of the Aragonese to restrict arbitrary taxation were numerous and not entirely unavailing: the General Privilege limited to eight the number of imposts to which villeros could be subjected, and the Cortes constantly protested against the introduction of new burdens from Catalonia. Comment on the Aragonese army may most conveniently be made in connection with Catalonia, where it was principally recruited. The efforts of the Aragonese were chiefly directed to limiting it to the smallest possible dimensions. In the domain of legislation and justice, a struggle similar to that in Castile took place between the native and Roman codes and methods; and the victory of the latter was considerably earlier and more pronounced. The famous Fueros of Huesca, compiled in 1247 by the great jurist bishop, Vidal de Canellas, correspond to Las Siete Partidas and the Ordenamiento de Alcalá, and mark the turning point in the conflict; after that time the national laws and customs, from the more or less mythical Fuero of Sobrarbe downward, fall steadily into the background. The hierarchy of royal and local courts was not widely different from that which we have found in Castile, though there are a number of peculiarities of nomenclature—e.g., the zalmedina or petty judge, “without jurisdiction of limbs or blood”. The sobrejuntero was a knight in command of a junta or federation of towns for police purposes—something resembling the Castilian hermandad on a minor scale—though indeed the small size and comparative orderliness of Aragon rendered organizations of that kind for the most part superfluous.

It remains for us to study the office of the Justicia—unquestionably the most original and interesting of Aragonese institutions, and the one which was destined in the sixteenth century to offer the sturdiest resistance to monarchic encroachments from Castile. We are fortunately not obliged to enter here into the thorny question of its origins. Certainly it did not go back to the days of the Fuero of Sobrarbe, as one of its earliest incumbents asserted; and an ingenious theory that it was borrowed from the Arabs in 1118 does not seem to have received general acceptance. Our knowledge of the office during the entire twelfth century is in fact both vague and scanty. Even in the early part of the rule of James the Conqueror it is clear that it was in no sense fully developed. Zurita, it is true, inserts an enthusiastic description of the duties and powers of the Justicia at the close of his account of the rule of Pedro II (1196-1213), referring to him as “a rampart against all oppression and a personification of the Justice from which he took his name”; but Vidal de Canellas, writing a half century later, makes it clear that at that period he enjoyed almost no independent power and was little more than the spokesman of the king, whom he obeyed, and of the magnates, whom he was obliged to consult. However, the Justicia clearly enjoyed sufficient prestige in the reign of James the Conqueror to make his alliance, or
the power to control him, distinctly worth fighting for; and from that time onward to the middle of the fourteenth century there ensued a violent struggle between king and nobles to secure this valuable prize.

From the very beginning of the conflict the king enjoyed and retained the immense advantage of the right of appointment; but even before the death of the Conqueror the barons managed, in some measure at least, to weaken the royal control over the Justicia by investing him with the right to sit in judgment in suits between the king and themselves. They also successfully insisted, at the Cortes of Ejea in 1265, that the Justicia should always be chosen among the knights, and not among the ricos hombres, who were exempt from corporal punishment. In the stormy days of the struggle over the General Privilege and the Privileges of Union, the attempts of the nobles to withdraw the Justicia from crown influence, and to subject him as far as possible to their own, made further progress. For a time baronial support enabled the Justicia virtually to usurp the king’s position as principal judge of the realm, and even to seek, in derogation of the Roman legislation introduced by the Crown, to lead the nation back to the observance of the ancient laws and fueros; in the Privileges of Union of 1287, Alfonso III went so far as to promise not to proceed against any adherent of the Union without the mediation of the Justicia and the consent of the Cortes. But the excesses of the baronial triumph brought the inevitable reaction, and the law-loving James II cleverly took advantage of it both to enhance the authority of the Justicia and to regain his alliance for the monarchy. On every possible occasion he exalted and magnified the powers and prerogatives of the office by appointing notable men to fill it, and above all by declaring that no appeal could be lodged against its decisions; so that the authority of the Justicia, which, as Blancas says, “had hitherto slumbered like a sword in its scabbard, was drawn forth for the first time in this reign and never sheathed again”. The successive Justicias, on their part, were not slow to recognize in the king the true cause of their mounting prestige, and steadily gravitated towards the monarchy; and finally, when in 1348 Pedro the Ceremonious issued victorious from his struggle with the forces of the Union, the results of the developments of the previous half century were for the first time fully revealed. The office enjoyed its greatest power and prestige in the period succeeding the battle of Epila. The nobles, who had hitherto aspired to control it, were broken, while the triumphant monarchy had wisely resolved to respect and defend the independence of the Justicia, as a proof of its own determination to uphold the laws. In the ensuing period the Justicia was recognized as ‘juez superior y medio’—a superior and intermediate judge, with special powers, whom all other judicial authorities of the realm were obliged to consult in the interpretation of the laws. He was declared to be the sole judge of delinquent officials, and in such cases the royal prerogative of pardon was specifically stated to be inoperative. He was given a permanent seat at Saragossa, the capital of the realm, and two lieutenants were appointed to aid him in determining the law and in rendering his decisions. It is true that the king at the same time sought to augment his own judicial power by the organization of a special tribunal which followed him whithersoever he went; he also strengthened his control over the minor, courts of the realm. It could scarcely have been otherwise in the height of the monarchical reaction that followed the battle of Epila. There was, however, plenty of room for his own jurisdiction and for that of the Justicia also; and for many years afterwards the two did not collide.

The Justicia, as we have already seen, was always appointed by the crown. During the period of the struggle over the General Privilege and the Privileges of Union the kings had occasionally undertaken to remove refractory incumbents, but this practice was deeply resented by the Cortes, and after 1348 the national assembly strove to give the occupants of the office a life tenure, in order to render them perfectly independent of crown control. During the latter part of the fourteenth century the efforts of the Cortes in this direction were entirely availing; and in the early years of the fifteenth, when legislation on the subject seemed imminent, the kings attempted to forestall the effects of it by obliging each Justicia at the time of his appointment to sign a letter of resignation, which could be subsequently produced by the monarch in case he should prove himself to be obnoxious. The famous Juan Jiménez Cerdán (1389-1420) was eliminated in this way, and one of his successors, Martin Diaz de Aux (1433-40), who refused to abide by his resignation, was subsequently murdered in prison at the behest of Alfonso V. In the year 1441, a law was finally passed rendering the Justicia irremovable by the king without the consent of the national assembly; but the victory which the popular party had won came so late that it was robbed of any real significance. The office of the Justicia had by this time passed its zenith, and henceforth became practically hereditary in the powerful and generally royalist family of Lanuza; the monarchs were generally satisfied with the attitude and conduct of the successive incumbents, and made no attempt to remove any of them for many years to come.

The efforts of the Cortes to control the Justicia’s tenure of office having thus proved abortive, they centered their energies on a series of attempts to limit the scope of his authority, and to render him responsible to the nation rather than to the king. In 1461 they arranged to have the Justicia’s two
lieutenants drawn by lot, instead of appointed, as previously, by the Justicia himself; and in 1467 the tenure of these magistrates was reduced to one year, so that they should not get out of touch with the national will. In cases of exceptional importance, the lieutenants were empowered to call together all the legal lights of the realm in solemn conclave; and the dicta of this consilium extraordinarium, by which the independent authority of the Justicia was naturally much restricted, were preserved and respected to almost the same degree as the regular laws of the land. And as a final means to prevent the Justicia from becoming the tool of the triumphant monarchy, the Cortes began to appoint, from as far back as the year 1390, a commission of four members, representing the four brazos, to receive complaints against the conduct of the Justicia and his lieutenants and to report accordingly. In 1467, by the so-called Forus Inquisitionis Officii Justitiae Aragonum, this commission attained considerably fuller development. The number of its members was raised to seventeen, and the method of their selection changed to an elaborate system of insaculacion, in which all the four brazos were to be represented. The Aragonese were apparently well aware of the danger of equity being lost sight of amid the technicalities of the law; and great care was taken to prevent this important committee from being exclusively composed of legislators. Elaborate regulations were also made to secure speedy and effective procedure. The net result of all these developments was naturally to diminish the Justicia’s authority and independence; his office was not nearly so important at the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella as it had been a century before. The mounting prestige of the monarchy limited it on the one side; the demands of the Cortes and of the nation, though they doubtless originated in a laudable determination to emancipate the Justicia from royal control, served rather to hamper it on the other. A decline in its power and prerogatives had in fact already set in, and was to continue and increase until the final catastrophe in the reign of Philip II.

A few words remain to be added in regard to the scope of the Justicia’s powers. The office was certainly unique in the countries of Western Europe. Other lands possessed magistrates with attributes which remind one of it—as, for instance, the chancellor in England—but there is really nothing to which it can be fairly or profitably compared. Its chief function was to watch over infringements of the law of the land, to protect subjects from verdicts contrary to that law, “to guarantee the rights of each against the tyranny of all, the liberties of the nation against the encroachments of the central power, the fortunes of the subject against the exactions of the tax collector, the freedom of the individual against the abuses of royal, seigniorial, or ecclesiastical jurisdiction.” These functions were chiefly exercised in two ways, namely, by the utilization of the kindred rights of manifestación and firma, which Blancas justly describes as “two shields to defend all our laws and liberties.” The first was designed to protect prisoners, particularly prisoners awaiting judgment, from violence or maltreatment by jailers or judges. Whenever anyone dreaded such maltreatment he applied to the Justicia, who sent for him and removed him to a special prison—the so-called coral de los manifestados—to which the ordinary authorities were refused access; in case of resistance to such removal, the Justicia was expected to use force. This intervention created no presumption against the validity of the action under which the criminal was accused; and if it was found that it had been demanded without adequate cause, it was promptly revoked. For the purpose for which it was intended, however, it served as a most precious guarantee, which, according to the old Aragonese proverb, it was not too late for the accused to demand, even “after the hangman’s cord had been actually passed about his neck.” Firmas, on the other hand, were special guarantees which were granted by the Justicia to those who demanded them, and which protected their lives and their property from judgments contrary to the laws. Such a firma suspended the trial if it had been begun, or the execution of the sentence if it had been already rendered, until the Justicia should have had time to investigate the case and determine whether or not it had been conducted in conformity to the fueros; and during the period of the suspension, the person of the defendant was especially protected against ill usage of any kind. The Justicia, moreover, according to Blancas, had not only the right but the positive duty of interfering to prevent (1) the torture of any free man in Aragon save for the crime of false money, (2) the imposition of any tax without the consent of the Cortes, (3) the citation, trial, or condemnation of any Aragonese by a foreign judge or beyond the boundaries of the realm, (4) any compulsion to hospitality or entertainment, (5) alterations of the value of the coinage without constitutional sanction, (6) the entrusting to a foreigner of any castle or fortress within the realm, and (7) secret trials or imprisonments. He also was the king’s most eminent counsellor, and, as we have already seen, ‘juez superior de las Cortes.’ Finally, on the occasion of a royal accession it was the Justicia’s prerogative to administer the coronation oath, which he received, seated and covered, from the kneeling and bareheaded monarch; a ceremony, as Prescott rightly says, “eminently symbolical of that superiority of law over prerogative which was so constantly asserted in Aragon.” In the discharge of these exalted functions the Justicia occasionally found himself in the position of umpire or mediator between the king and the nobles, but this was rather an accidental and exceptional result of his more distinctive duties than a regular attribute of his office, as some authors have attempted to represent it. The conjunction of powers which he did possess, however, was certainly
VALENCIA

The internal conditions and institutions of the kingdom of Valencia need not long detain us. Though somewhat more sympathetic (largely on account of its maritime location) than was Aragon with the territorial ambitions of its sovereigns beyond the seas, its small size and the violent conflicts that raged within its boundaries prevented it from rendering any very effective aid in the prosecution of foreign conquest until the early part of the fifteenth century. From the very beginning it was a strange compound of Aragonese and Catalanian influences. Conquered chiefly through the support of the Aragonese aristocracy, it had been largely colonized by burgesses from Catalonia; moreover, the policy of James I and of his successors tended generally to exalt the latter element at the expense of the former, to place the government as far as possible in its hands, and to favor the Catalan language to the prejudice of the Aragonese.

On the other hand, the Aragonese nobles were naturally quite unwilling to see themselves thus elbowed aside, and protested vigorously. They regarded Valencia as their own special perquisite, and in 1285 openly demanded that the new realm be governed by the fueros of Aragon. Around the conflict thus initiated the whole internal history of Valencia centered until the abolition of the Privileges of Union in the middle of the fourteenth century. In the domain of legislation, the effects of the struggle are chiefly visible in the sharp contrasts between the two chief codes in use in the two different portions of the Valencian realm. Most of it was governed under the so-called Valencian ‘Furs’ drawn up by James the Conqueror in 1250 and revised and enlarged in 1271. This code was “saturated with Roman principles, especially on the civil side”, but it also contained many concessions to native and Gothic jurisprudence. It was published in Provencal; it forbade any Roman jurist or advocate to plead in a Valencian court and prescribed that all disputed legal points should be settled “according to the discretion of the justiciar and good men of Valencia and the kingdom to the exclusion of canon and civil law.” It sanctioned private vengeance and even private war, composition for minor offences, a liberal use of torture for non-privileged persons, and regular penalties of extreme severity and barbarity. But there were a number of regions, especially those which belonged to the aristocracy, which were excluded from the operation of this famous code and were subject to the fueros of Aragon. Most of them lay just north of the capital of the kingdom and opposed an insurmountable barrier to the unchallenged predominance of the Furs throughout the realm. Indeed, at certain stages of the struggle over the maintenance of the Privileges of Union, it looked as if the fueros of Aragon were going to prevail over the Furs. Even the city of Valencia itself became, as we have already seen, a most vigorous centre of opposition to the royal cause. But when the monarchy finally emerged victorious, the power of the Aragonese aristocratic party in Valencia began to decay. The urban, Catalan portion of the population, supported by the crown, prevailed in the field of legislation as well as in other respects; so that the lovely realm which Aragon had striven at the outset to mold according to its own laws and traditions, ultimately followed rather the lead of Catalonia, and began to play an active if subordinate part in the process of expansion in Italy and in the Mediterranean.

A few specialties of Valencian institutional history may be briefly noticed. The predominance of the capital was even more marked than that of Saragossa in Aragon. It held no less than five votes in the brazo real of the Valencian Cortes; and it invariably demanded that its representatives should constitute one half of the membership of that chamber, no matter how many other cities sent delegates; this exaggerated pretension, however, was not made good. The estates enjoyed the unusual privilege of meeting separately without the royal summons after the Cortes had been dissolved by the king, to deal with such matters as concerned each one, and to present petitions to the crown; and on these occasions the deputies of the capital were apparently the sole representatives of the brazo real, since the other towns were not permitted to send delegations without the king’s command. When the estates met in this way, they took the name of estamentos. Several attempts were made to introduce into Valencia a Justicia similar to that of Aragon, but they were never permanently successful. The Moorish and Jewish portions of the population were very large. The former were chiefly concentrated in the rural districts, especially in the Aragonese señoríos, where they rendered invaluable service in tilling the soil. The latter, on the contrary, were for the most part found in the capital itself. As in Aragon, the tolerant and liberal policy towards the Jews which had prevailed in earlier days was suddenly exchaged, in the latter part of the fourteenth century, for one of violent persecution; and the massacres, forced conversions, and wanton destruction of Hebrew property which ensued in the city of Valencia were in some respects more horrible and ruthless than anywhere else in the peninsula.
The climax of Valencia’s power and prosperity was reached in the period of Alfonso the Magnanimous. The sunny kingdom was far more congenial to that splendor loving monarch than the barren plains of Aragon or the busy streets of Barcelona. It reminded him of his beloved Italy, and he took pleasure in favoring and beautifying it in every way. Its commercial prestige in this period mounted so high as to arouse the jealousy of the Catalans, who strove to limit its merchant marine by navigation ordinances. It was by Valencian sailors under a Valencian admiral, Juan de Corbera, that Alfonso was enabled to force the harbor of Marseilles and sack the town in the year 1423. We have also many interesting evidences of the closeness of Valencia’s connection with Italy throughout the reign of the Magnanimous King. The Borgias, who were destined to become so famous in the succeeding years, originated in the Valencian town of Jativa; they were introduced into Italy through Alfonso, and one of them was elected to the papacy, with his full approval, in April, 1455, under the name of Calixtus III. It was largely through Valencia, moreover, that the realms of the Crown of Aragon became acquainted with the art and literature of the Italian Renaissance. Ausfas March, the greatest master of the Valencian tongue, “a philosopher who happened to write in verse”, was a devoted admirer and imitator of Petrarch; the “Ladies’ Book” of Jaume Roig owes much to the Decameron of Boccaccio. In all these respects the fame of Valencia spread far and wide in the middle of the fifteenth century, and though its political prestige waned rapidly under the efficient absolutism of the Catholic Kings, it maintained its place as a literary, artistic, and commercial centre until a much later day.

CATALONIA

We now come to the county of Catalonia, the real source and mainspring of the Spanish Empire in the Mediterranean, and consequently, for our purposes, the most important portion of the realms of the Crown of Aragon.

We have hitherto had occasion to emphasize the urban, commercial, and democratic features of it, and from the fourteenth century onward these tendencies were unquestionably predominant; on the other hand, it must never be forgotten that Catalonia possessed an early mediaeval, aristocratic, and feudal background, which had no parallel elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula. Its origin was French, not Spanish; from the time of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious it had taken its customs, institutions, tradition, and language from north of the Pyrenees. On the expulsion of the Moors its territories had been parcelled out among a number of nobles from the South of France, who for a long time vied with one another for preponderance in characteristically feudal fashion. By the end of the ninth century the counts of Barcelona were doubtless primi inter pares, but the forces of centralization operated slowly, and until the union with Aragon in 1137 their triumph cannot be regarded as assured. After that date the political power of the other Catalan nobles was gradually broken, and the history of the county began to revolve around the struggles of the crown and the commercial plutocracy of Barcelona; but the fact that the upper orders succeeded in keeping the third estate from being represented in the Cortes until the year 1283 warns us that the change was not rapidly completed. Even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the student is being constantly reminded of the intensely feudal and aristocratic nature of the country’s origin. In the domain of legislation this feature is particularly prominent. The Usatges, put forth by Ramon Berenguer I in 1064-69, are the earliest known feudal code; and they survived all the efforts of James the Conqueror to supplant them, though they were indeed considerably modified in the next two centuries by different monarchs, and supplemented by the introduction of Roman jurisprudence. Economically, and territorially also, the power of the old Catalan nobility is attested by a schedule of the year 1359 which estimates the number of houses on seigniorial land as more than double that of those situated on the royal domain; while a seventeenth-century author asserts that only twenty-five per cent of the towns and cities of the county were held directly by the crown. This last statement is chiefly explained by the great number of alienations to the nobles which the crown made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the idea of filling the royal treasury; but the fact that such a large proportion of the soil remained in the hands of the baronage must never be forgotten, however absorbing the interest in the political and commercial development of the Catalan cities. Perhaps the most lamentable result of the survival of the feudal and baronial control of the rural portions of the county was the wretched condition of the Catalan serfs. Of course, their treatment varied with the different localities; but, generally speaking, they were unquestionably far worse off than the Castilian solariegos. As elsewhere, they were for the most part bound to the soil (adscripti glebae), unable to leave or dispose of the farms they held without the lord’s consent; their rights over their personal property, and their privileges of marriage and inheritance, were seriously limited by seigniorial interference; and they staggered under a heavy burden of dues of various sorts, which were payable in money, labor, and kind, and were imposed in most vexatious ways. But what made the lot of the
Catalan peasant peculiarly hard was the special set of exactions commonly known as the sets *malos usos*—the six evil customs. The first of these, and in a sense the foundation for all the rest, was the so-called *remensa personal*—that is, the obligation of the serf to purchase personal redemption from his status as such, at a price satisfactory to his lord, before he could be permitted to leave his land. From this the Catalan peasants took their name of *hombres de redemption* or *payeses de remensa*. The second was the *intestia* or the right of the lord to a share—one third or even one half—of the goods of a peasant who died intestate. The third, the *exarquia*, gave the lord the privilege of appropriating a portion of the property of a serf who died without issue. The fourth, the *cugucia*, adjudged to him the whole or part of the property of any peasant’s wife who was guilty of adultery. The fifth, the *arsina*, compelled the peasant to pay the lord an indemnity if the whole or part of his farm should be burned. Lastly, the *firma de spoli* permitted the lord to exact a contribution from a serf who desired to pledge the proceeds of his farm to the woman he proposed to wed, pending the payment of her dowry and the performance of the marriage ceremony. Over and above these *seis malos usos* there were in some localities other occasional and exceptional exactions of an even more outrageous nature. Such was the right of the lord to compel his serf’s wife to leave her own child without sustenance, in order to be able to suckle his own; and his pretension to the infamous *derecho de pernada* or *jus primae noctis*, with his serf’s bride.

Now most of these barbarous customs were familiar enough in all feudal countries; but in Spain, where, with the exception of Catalonia, feudalism had never been thoroughly and firmly established, they were distinctly unusual and provoked much complaint. In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, moreover, a number of different forces were at work which paved the way for emancipation. The steady improvement in the lot of the Castilian *solariego* doubtless had its effect in Catalonia, especially after the house of Trastamara supplanted the old royal line of the counts of Barcelona in 1412. The decline of the political power of the nobles and the growth of that of the king and cities operated in the same direction; and the humanitarian precepts of the church doubtless counted for something. Under James the Conqueror there began a process of granting to certain localities exemptions, more or less complete, from the *malos usos* and other kindred exactions, and it was continued and increased in the succeeding reigns. When a territory was thus exempted the serfs on the adjacent lands naturally strove with might and main to migrate thither; and by the end of the fourteenth century the great majority of the Catalan peasants had managed in one way or another wholly or partially to emancipate themselves. In 1395 there were probably not more than fifteen to twenty thousand families subject to the *malos usos*; and these were, for the most part, localized in the neighborhood of Gerona, Vallés, and Vich, and were situated, curiously enough, chiefly on ecclesiastical lands. In the next half century Maria de Luna, the wife of King Martin I, and the illustrious jurist Tomas Mieres of Gerona labored actively to promote the cause of freedom. Finally, on July 1, 1448, King Alfonso the Magnanimous, in Naples, put forth a ‘constitution’ granting to the serfs the right to meet and discuss the abolition of the *malos usos*; and later, in 1455, he actually proclaimed their temporary suspension. There was a brief reaction under John II, when the question of the liberation of the serfs became for a time fused with other issues of foreign and internal policy, but the process of emancipation had already reached a point from which it was impossible permanently to turn back. The glory of promulgating the instrument which completed the liberation of the Catalan peasant was reserved, as we shall later see, to Ferdinand the Catholic, in 1486; but it is only fair to his predecessors to point out that the famous ‘Sentencia Arbitral de Guadalupe’ did little more than crown and consummate a work of which the greater part had already been accomplished.

Before passing on to the remarkable political and economic development of Barcelona, which is undeniably the salient feature of the domestic history of Catalonia in the later Middle Ages, a few social and constitutional peculiarities remain to be mentioned. There were probably more slaves in Catalonia in proportion to the population than anywhere else in Spain, because of the activity of its foreign and commercial relations. They were acquired either by purchase or as prisoners of war, and during the period of the Catalan Grand Company there were a number of Greek slaves in Barcelona. The story of the gradual superseding of the *Usuages* by the Roman law does not differ widely from that of the corresponding process in the other Iberian realms. In 1409 King Martin, with the consent of the Catalan Cortes, established a ‘hierarchy of Codes’ similar to that set up by the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá* of 1348 in Castile; in this the ‘common’ (i.e., the Roman) law was formally recognized as ‘supplementary’ to the *Usuages*, constitutions, and acts of the king and Cortes, and to the customs and privileges of the realm. There were a large number of different kinds of taxes and tributes, some of which came to the crown of its own right, while others could be imposed only with the consent of the Cortes; of the latter one of the most important was the *bovage*, or tax on each yoke of oxen, first granted in 1217. The crown’s facilities for collecting these imposts, however, were lamentably deficient, and a large share of the financial work of the county consequently devolved upon the *Diputación General de*
Cataluña, or standing committee of the Cortes, which maintained a special treasury and set of revenues of its own, deposited the funds received in the great bank or Taula of Barcelona, and subsequently superintended their distribution and employment.

Consideration of Catalan finances naturally leads on to that of the Catalan Cortes, to which representatives from the Balearics also came; for the Majorcan realm never enjoyed the privilege of having a national assembly of its own, even during the period when it was ruled by a separate line of kings. There were but three brazos in the Catalanian Cortes; several attempts were indeed made in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries to create a braç dels cavallers generosos homens de paratge, on the model of the brazo de Caballeros of the Cortes of Aragon, but they never met with any permanent success. About a dozen towns and cities were usually represented in the third estate; most of them sent one procurador or sindico, several sent two, but Barcelona sent five and sometimes more. Apparently each town had but one vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives, but Barcelona’s predominance was perfectly obvious and deeply resented. The method of selection of the municipal representatives varied in this period according to local custom—not until the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella did insaculación become the regular practice. Full and definite instructions were given to the sindicos by the concejo of the municipality they represented. In Barcelona this function was performed by the Vintiuquatrena de Cort—a most interesting body—a sort of permanent commission of the Concejo, consisting of twenty-four persons selected for the special purpose of supervising and counselling the sindicos, even down to the minutest details of their private life. Neglect of these instructions might subject the delinquents to the censures of the church or even to a revocation of their powers. The process of habilitación was formal, rigid, and very complicated. No less than thirty-six rules were laid down concerning the qualifications of members. Unanimity of votes, theoretically obligatory in all four estates in Aragon, was here restricted to the nobles. There was, of course, no Justicia. At the concluding session or solio, which resembled that of Aragon, the sovereign was obliged to swear to the measures which the Cortes had passed, before he was granted the donativo. But the surest guarantee against any infringement of the rights and privileges of the Catalanian Cortes was the above-mentioned Diputación General. It originated in the end of the fourteenth century, and was composed of six persons, one from each estate and three oidores de cuentas; it held office for a term of three years, and its members had special privileges, special titles, and a special costume. In addition to its financial powers already described, it had the duties (1) of publishing and explaining the acts of the Cortes as well as the Usatges and other codes and of seeing to their observance; (2) of furnishing arms and munitions to the military forces of the county if they were called upon to resist an invasion or to deal with an infraction of the fueros; (3) of sitting in judgment in cases of dispute between the inhabitants and authorities of the land, and of arresting criminals denounced by the public prosecutor; and (4) of providing adequate naval defense for the Catalanian coasts, harbors, and shipping. It performed, in fact, all the functions of the Diputación del Reyno of Aragon, and many of these of the Aragonese Justicia besides, and insured to the Catalanian Cortes, whose servant it was, a measure of efficiency which probably exceeded that of any other similar body in the peninsula.

Besides the separate national assemblies of the three different realms of the Crown of Aragon, there were also the so-called General Cortes of the eastern kingdoms. These were composed of representatives of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, and also of the Balearics, and met ordinarily at Monzón or Lerida, which lay in debatable ground between Aragon and Catalonia. They were summoned only to deal with matters of general concern to all the Spanish dominions of the Aragonese kings, and were in effect little more than a juxtaposition of the separate assemblies already described. By an arrangement made in the year 1383, the king made his opening address, stating the purpose of the meeting, in Catalan, and the Infante answered him in the name of the Cortes in Aragonese.

The organization of the army and navy of Catalonia deserves some notice, since it was largely by Catalan soldiers and sailors that the Italian and Mediterranean conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were made. Feudal methods of recruitment continued throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though most of the work of the Italian and Mediterranean campaigns was done by mercenaries—especially by the light-armed ‘Almogavares’ or skirmishers, who formed the greater part of the Catalan Grand Company. But the real nucleus of the military forces of Catalonia was the armed contingents of the municipalities, who were called out by the process commonly known as the somatent. This could be used in case either of national peril or of merely local disturbance, to punish a murderer, put down a revolt, or prevent the infliction of unjust penalties by rebel barons in contravention of the law of the land. The veguer, or chief royal official of the town, mounted the balcony of the Casa Consistorial, called out the words “Via fora, Somatent” ordered the bells to be rung, and then raised a banner in the public square, around which the gathering inhabitants could rally. Competent leaders were on hand to marshal and direct the troops thus raised; if the cause of
their summons was merely local, they dealt with it alone; in or national danger, they joined forces with the somatents of the adjacent cities, and, with them, formed the backbone of the country’s defense. There was also a less formal and authorized type of somatent known as a sacramental, composed of a voluntary association of the inhabitants of a certain neighborhood, to expel criminals and malefactors; but these sacramentals proved highly dangerous to the public peace, on account of the bitterness of feeling which reigned between the upper and lower rural classes, and Ferdinand of Antequera was obliged to adopt strenuous measures to regulate and control them.1 There are many obvious parallels between these sacramentals and the hermandades of Castile previous to the reforms of Ferdinand and Isabella; but the regular somatents differed sharply from both in the fact that they were not spontaneous growths, but were regularly authorized and controlled by the crown. Indeed, it is not improbable that the reform of the Castilian hermandad accomplished by the Catholic Kings was suggested by their knowledge of the Catalan somatent. These municipal levies served rarely, if ever, beyond the borders of the county. They were primarily intended to preserve order at home and prevent invasion from abroad. That of Barcelona was naturally by far the most important. It was composed of thirty-four companies, organized by the different commercial corporations and gilds, commanded by captains selected therein, all under the leadership of the canceller en cap of the municipality.

The history of the development of the Catalonian navy is also intimately bound up with that of Barcelona, and the commercial side of it will be briefly treated in that connection. But the maritime trend and tradition of the county extended far beyond the limits of its capital, and antedated the period of the latter’s preeminence; they reached back to the ninth century and the early days of the Spanish Mark, when Armengol, count of Ampurias, won a notable victory over a Saracen fleet in the neighborhood of the Balearics. Subsequent rulers did much to increase the national interest in naval affairs, and the Catalans themselves proved the aptest of pupils in all matters pertaining to the sea; so that when James the Conqueror and Pedro III launched their realms on a career of expansion in the Mediterranean, there was no lack of ships to enable them to carry out their program. On the other hand, there was crying need of centralization and system in the entire naval organization. Many of the great lay and ecclesiastical lords of the country possessed small fleets; which they not only often refused to allow to be employed in the royal service but sometimes actually utilized for piratical purposes of their own; even the ships of the capital were by no means always available for the purposes of the crown. By a series of royal privileges and ordinances of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, however, the naval forces of the country were organized in more permanent fashion. Ships of war were thenceforth furnished in four different ways. There were, first, the royal galleys, either constructed, equipped, and maintained at the king’s expense, or else hired, often with their crews, from other lands; these formed the nucleus of most of the conquering expeditions sent forth into the Mediterranean. Next came the ships of the Lonja de Contratacion, or Board of Trade, which were also usually hired, and were dedicated especially to the task of protecting the Catalonian commercial fleets. Thirdly, there were the naval forces maintained and paid by the Diputación General, which were principally employed in defending the coast against the attacks of pirates. Lastly, there were the special ships which Barcelona was permitted to arm and maintain as guardians of the port. The admiral, appointed by the crown as the head of this imposing armament, was, generally speaking, the most important man in Catalonia after the monarch. Sometimes, indeed, his power was so great as occasionally to threaten that of his sovereign, as, for example, was the case with Roger de Lauria, and, a century later, with the second Bernaldo de Cabrera. There were an enormous number of different kinds of ships, of which the most common were the galleys (galeras) both heavy (gruesas) and light (sutiles), and also a special type called ucers, which were distinguished by heavy castellated structures or turrets on the bow and the stern. There were also smaller auxiliary ships called galeotes and corces, besides transports and little boats of various sorts (taridas, cocas, and fatucas). The principal method of propulsion was by oars; sails were distinctly secondary and supplementary. The famous Ordenanzas Navales of 1354, drawn up at the behest of Pedro IV by his admiral, the first Bernaldo de Cabrera, grandfather of the one above mentioned, contains a number of interesting details concerning naval preparations and tactics, sailors’ pay, and sailing directions for the various fleets. Particularly noteworthy were the means employed to guard the coasts against the raids of pirates. An elaborate system of watch towers and lighthouses, with bells, horns, and messengers on foot and on horseback, revealed the peril before it was too late, and notified the adjacent inhabitants to stand to their arms.

All the internal history of Catalonia in this period, political, constitutional, military, and economic, really converges and is focused at Barcelona, whose astonishing growth and prosperity in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries overshadow all other features of the evolution of the Catalonian state, and afford the best possible explanation of its change from a predominantly feudal and aristocratic, to
an essentially urban and commercial existence. The foundations of this remarkable development were laid in the famous charter which was granted to the city by James the Conqueror in the year 1257, and which superseded the primitive constitution inherited from the days of the Spanish Mark. Under this new charter, the veguer and bayle, royal appointees and representatives, were henceforth to be aided in governing the city by a small council of eight burgesses, who met every week and really dominated the entire municipal administration; and also by a larger one of two hundred persons which was occasionally called into consultation. The main features of this charter were preserved throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though the size and method of recruitment of both the bodies it had created underwent a number of important variations. The membership of the smaller (the Concell) was reduced to six and later to four, and finally, in 1265, fixed at five. That of the larger sank to one hundred, where it remained during the fourteenth century, thus causing it to acquire the name of the Concell de Cent; in 1387 it was raised to 120, in 1455 to 128, and finally, in 1493, to 144, where it remained till its extinction in 1714. The original members of the smaller Concell were appointed by the crown and elected their own successors; but after 1274 they were chosen by a body of twelve electors selected by the Concell de Cent, whose members were in turn elected by the smaller Concell. The members of both bodies held office for terms of one year only, and their gradual democratization is very noteworthy. At first they were almost exclusively recruited from the ranks of the richer and privileged citizens, but by the middle of the fifteenth century we find only two of the smaller Concell chosen from the municipal aristocracy; the others had to be taken, one from the merchants, another from the artisans, and the last from the laboring men. In the larger body, also, the popular classes apparently began to predominate at an even earlier date. As time went on the functions of the two councils gradually became defined. The smaller was essentially an executive and administrative body. It saw to the maintenance of public order, to the distribution and spending of the municipal revenues, and the preservation from infringement of all the fueros and privileges of Barcelona. It was perfectly ready, if the circumstances demanded it, to assert its rights against nobles, ecclesiastics, royal officers, or even against the crown itself. It appointed the minor officials of the municipality to carry out its decrees. It had the privilege of petitioning the monarch at any time. Its members bore the proud title of ‘magnificos’. They could sit covered in the royal presence; they were preceded by mace bearers on their journeys; and their representatives at the royal court were afforded all the privileges of foreign ambassadors. The functions of the larger Concell de Cent were, on the other hand, rather legislative and advisory; its approval was necessary for the passing of new ordinances and for the imposition of municipal taxation. Jointly with the veguer and bayle the two bodies possessed many of the prerogatives of absolute sovereignty, particularly in economic matters, as will hereafter more fully appear. They had the right to make independent commercial treaties with foreign powers, and to exercise an extensive mercantile jurisdiction, which they intrusted to two consols de mar. Whether or not, as has been suggested, the development of this interesting system of municipal government was largely directed or influenced by that of the Italian cities of the same period, with which the Catalans became familiar in their commercial and military enterprises to the eastward, it is impossible definitely to say; but it is certain that the resemblances were numerous and very close.

The power of Barcelona did not stop with the city walls. In common with the other chief Catalan municipalities, she managed to extend her jurisdiction over the adjacent villages and territories by granting them what were called derechos de vecindad or carreratge. The places to which this right of carreratge had been given were thenceforth regarded by a legal fiction as streets of the capital itself, endowed with all its privileges and immunities, in fact virtually annexed, so that Barcelona became to all intents and purposes a little regnum in regno. This process of municipal aggregation was generally favored by the Catalan rulers, first as a means of curbing the power of the baronage, and second because it served to replenish the treasury; for almost every extension of the municipal boundary by the method just indicated was purchased by a substantial contribution to the royal coffers. The nobles naturally opposed it, and in the cases of the smaller towns not seldom succeeded in forcing the king to revoke the donations made (though never to return the funds received for them). But the preeminence of Barcelona, fortified by its advantageous maritime location and immense political and commercial reputation abroad, made the right of association with it so valuable that nothing could permanently arrest its extension and development. The name of Catalonia was often quite unfamiliar in foreign lands at the close of the fifteenth century; but everyone spoke of the glories of its capital. Barcelona was the whole county, in the eyes of most of Western Europe, and even in the Catalan legal and judicial treatises of that period one constantly finds the name of the city loosely applied to the entire principality.

The mounting prestige of the capital and the pride and prosperity of its citizens revealed themselves in various quarrels with the Catalan nobles on the subjects of rival jurisdictions and
precedence, and in numerous conflicts of authority with the Diputación General. Some of these were serious, and affected the whole political life of the county; others were absurdly trifling, as when in 1444 the Concellers objected to the placing of a standard on the grave of one of the most noted statesmen and jurists of the day, on the ground that such an honor would show a dangerous favoritism to a counsellor of the king. But the best of all proofs of the high position which Barcelona had won for herself was the dignities and privileges attached to membership in the ranks of her ‘honored citizens’ (ciudadanos honrados). These were the richer and more powerful burgesses, who had raised themselves, principally by their success in business, above the regular level of the mass of the urban population, and were socially regarded as being on the same plane with the lower nobles—the so-called generosos or hombres de parage. Their numbers were limited, but on the other hand any man who possessed the necessary qualifications might gain admission to their ranks by vote of the representatives of the municipal government, who met annually on the first of May to consider possible candidates. The political privileges of the ciudadanos honrados were equivalent to those of the knights of the military orders; they were entitled to the desafio and riepto; they were exempt from all imposts save the municipal taxes of Barcelona. Altogether the ciudadania honrada was unquestionably the highest privilege of urban life which the Iberian Peninsula afforded; and men of today, had they lived at that time, would doubtless have valued it even above admission to any of the ranks of the aristocracy. Yet Barcelona was fully alive to the danger of permitting these privileged persons to monopolize the city government and guarded against it, as is indicated by the changes already described in the composition of the two Concells during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

But, after all, the fundamental cause of Barcelona’s greatness was her commerce. It made her richer than all the realms of the Crown of Aragon put together; “it paved her streets with gold”; it was the ultimate source of her political preeminence. The notion, which one continually encounters in the history of Castile, that trade and manual labor were dishonorable and degrading, never obtained in Catalonia; in fact, commercial success, as we have already seen, was the high road to social recognition. The history of the various gilds and industrial organizations in Barcelona is vastly interesting and important, but as the emphasis in this book is necessarily laid rather on external than on domestic affairs, it seems wiser to forego any attempt to describe them, in order to have more space for the history of Barcelona’s foreign trade. From ancient times the city had been an important commercial centre, and though its prosperity was interrupted during the period of the Goths and Moors, it revived in the early days of the Reconquest. In the second half of the eleventh century Ramon Berenguer II granted his special encouragement and protection to its shipping. Documents of the next two hundred years reveal active trade relations between Barcelona and Genoa and Pisa, whose merchants thronged the Levant; before the accession of James I the way had been prepared for the expansion of Catalanian commerce to all parts of the Mediterranean. We have already seen that great emphasis was laid in the succeeding period on the maintenance of trade with the more westerly states of North Africa, complicated though the situation there was by ambitions for political control. Farther eastward this latter difficulty did not obtain, and we find, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, constant evidences of the efforts of Catalan merchants to establish themselves in Tripoli and in Egypt. The occasional embassies dispatched by the Aragonese sovereigns to the ‘Soldans of Babylonia’ were primarily due to commercial considerations; and in 1437 Barcelona showed that she realized the value of the Egyptian trade by petitioning Alfonso the Magnanimous to make peace with the Soldan in order that it might be reestablished in its pristine vigor. But the commercial ambitions of Catalonia were by no means limited to the Mediterranean. In the fourteenth century her ships began to make their appearance in the ports of England and Flanders; in 1389 a Catalan ‘factory’ was set up at Bruges, and Catalan goods thence distributed to the merchants of Germany and the Baltic lands.

The commodities exported included salt, wine, iron, steel, arms, coral, honey, saffron, and fruit; but unquestionably the most important products which Barcelona sent abroad were raw wool and manufactured cloths. So deafening, in fact, was the noise coming from the cloth factories in Barcelona, that in 1255, on petition of the citizens, they were segregated in especially secluded quarters. Among the principal imports may be mentioned silk, oil, dyestuffs, paper, drugs, and glassware. In the reign of James the Conqueror a number of edicts were put forth to protect Catalonia from the competition of foreign Italian merchants; in 1273 a citizen of Barcelona was authorized to seize the goods of some Genoese who had robbed him, while eight years earlier an order was issued for the wholesale expulsion of all Lombards, Florentines, Sienese, and Luccans trading there. But with the accession of Pedro III a more reasonable spirit began to prevail, and in the next two centuries Catalonia settled down to a policy of permitting the importation at merely nominal duties (usually less than one per cent) of commodities not produced in the principality; at the same time, however, she generally prohibited completely the entrance of such goods as were manufactured at home, and thus
different ways. In language, in outlook, in interests, and in ideals they remained absolutely divergent. They had literally nothing in common save their passion for freedom; and even that they evinced in totally striking contrast than that afforded by the union of these two realms under a single line of rulers. They were objects of most anxious solicitude. In 1227 a royal order was issued to the effect that all traffic with the ports of Egypt and North Africa must be borne by ships of Barcelona alone, to the exclusion of foreign vessels. The application of this edict was extended in the succeeding reigns, until finally in 1454 Alfonso the Magnanimous ordained that no foreign ship whatever could be loaded in the ports of his dominions. The Catalan merchant marine responded bravely to the efforts that were made in its behalf. The ataranzas or dockyards of Barcelona, which had to be frequently rebuilt and enlarged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were the most famous in the Mediterranean, and far surpassed those of Seville. Foreign visitors repeatedly asserted that the Barcelonese equaled the Venetians, and excelled all others, in the number and variety of their ships.

The organization of the thriving foreign trade of the Catalan capital was both liberal and efficient. In 1279 Pedro III issued an important charter of privileges to the town of Barcelona, in which he authorized its merchants to elect two special officers to sit in judgment on commercial cases. In the beginning of the fourteenth century they took the name of consuls de mar; in 1347 their power and jurisdiction were more strictly defined, and the right to elect them was transferred to the city magistrates. They presided over the Lonja de Contratación or Board of Trade, composed of the leading merchants of Barcelona, membership in which was highly prized but very difficult to obtain. The protection of Catalan merchants in foreign lands received the attention of the government at an even earlier date. A privilege of the reign of James the Conqueror authorized the Concell de Cent of Barcelona to appoint consuls to reside in all the foreign lands with which Barcelona traded, and these consuls were given full authority and jurisdiction to govern, punish, and judge not only all the Catalanians, but also all other subjects of the Crown of Aragon, resident in the place to which they were sent. But what unquestionably served to extend the naval and commercial power and prestige of Barcelona more than anything else was the famous Llibre del Consolat, one of the earliest codes of maritime and commercial law, compiled by a group of celebrated sailors and merchants of the Catalanian capital, probably in the reign of James the Conqueror. In the fourteenth century it was enforced throughout the Levant, translated into almost all the different languages spoken there, and universally recognized as the basis for the regulation of the intercourse of the Mediterranean peoples in the matters with which it dealt. It is thoroughly international in form and substance; no mention is made in it of the place of its compilation or of the king of Aragon who sanctioned it; the sums of money set down in it are reckoned in byzants and not in sob of Barcelona. It was a notable contribution to world civilization, unfettered by any national limitations or restrictions; and its speedy and wellnigh universal adoption bears eloquent testimony to the high prestige of the country of its birth.

Cosmopolitanism, enterprise, and greed of gain abroad, restless energy, patriotism, and love of liberty at home were the qualities which these different developments fostered in the Catalanians. They were also naturally led on to celebrate their glorious deeds in stately prose and joyous verse in their native Catalan tongue. The chronicles of the kings of the house of Barcelona rank among the best historical narratives of the later Middle Ages. Troubadours from Provence found the warmest of welcomes in the Catalanian cities, especially at Barcelona and Tortosa; and for a long time the author of the finest poem of the year was rewarded with a magnificent prize, “thus manifesting to the world the superiority which God and nature have assigned to genius over dulness.” And the versatility, progressiveness, and daring of the Catalanians are the more remarkable when contrasted with the sombre conservatism and stiff-necked obstinacy of the Aragonese. Seldom has history furnished a more striking contrast than that afforded by the union of these two realms under a single line of rulers. They had literally nothing in common save their passion for freedom; and even that they evinced in totally different ways. In language, in outlook, in interests, and in ideals they remained absolutely divergent—another of the innumerable examples of the ineradicability of Spanish separatism. The effect of this characteristic upon the development of the empire which had begun to be built up beyond the seas was already very marked; and the union with Castile, through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, was destined to extend that effect to wider fields. When the discovery of America furnished a western outlet to imperial energies hitherto almost exclusively occupied to the eastward, the hardest of all the problems which confronted the Catholic Kings and their successors was that of endowing the gigantic agglomeration with the unity which was essential to its permanence.
THE BALEARICS

We now pass to a brief examination of the constitution and internal conditions of the Aragonese dependencies in the Mediterranean and in Italy, and begin with a few words concerning the kingdom of Majorca. As first constituted under the separate line of sovereigns which began with the death of James the Conqueror, the realm included the islands of Majorca, Minorca, and Ivisa, the counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon and the adjacent lands, and those parts of Montpellier which recognized the sovereignty of the king of Aragon. But with the extinction of the separate line of kings in 1349, the county of Montpellier, as we have already seen, fell out of the combination and was sold to the king of France, so that the history of its internal development, though both interesting and important, particularly on the urban and economic side, ceases to affect Spanish affairs, and consequently need not be considered here.

The counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon, on the other hand, never enjoyed quite the same measure of autonomy as the Balearics. They had insisted, for instance, at the time of the separate constitution of the Majorcan realm, that the Usatges of Catalonia should continue to be in force within their boundaries, while the islands refused to observe them; moreover the fact that Cerdagne and Roussillon were actually adjacent to Catalonia made it inevitable that the measure of their independence should be somewhat diminished in consequence. Theoretically, of course, they remained part of the Majorcan realm even after the termination of the separate line of kings; practically, however, their autonomy counted for so little that we are justified in restricting our attention to the islands.

Under the arrangement by which the distinct Majorcan monarchy was finally constituted in the reign of Pedro III, the Balearics were granted a distinct code of laws and independent judicial and financial systems. Moreover, as we shall later see, the municipal assemblies of the towns of Palma and Ciutadella were permitted gradually to extend their authority over the islands of Majorca and Minorca respectively in such a way as to make them virtually national in their scope. All this certainly savored of complete autonomy. But at the same time the kings of Aragon insisted that the Majorcan sovereigns should render them feudal homage in token of their vassalage, that they should be summoned to the Catalan Cortes with the other great feudatories, that they should never be permitted to hold Cortes of their own, and that they should promise to aid the kings of Aragon against all their foes. Even with these limitations, however, the sovereigns of the separate line labored strenuously and continuously to consolidate and increase their own monarchical power; and though they were unable to shake off the galling suzerainty of the kings of Aragon above, they certainly contrived to assert their authority over their subjects below, more completely perhaps than any of the contemporary kings of the different Iberian realms. The absence of baronial traditions was of course a distinct advantage for them; and they followed with considerable success the policy of impressing their subjects by a show of outward magnificence and ostentation. Naturally the annexation of Majorca to the other realms of the Crown of Aragon in 1349 militated somewhat against these developments, since the executive power was thenceforth represented by a viceroy sent out by the Aragonese sovereign; on the other hand it is important to observe that the termination of the separate line of Majorcan kings did not affect the constitutional autonomy of the Balearics, which, in accordance with the immemorial principles of Spanish particularism, was left entirely untouched. We have therefore to sketch the main features of the independent internal organization and local government of the islands, which survived long after the extinction of the separate dynasty of Majorcan kings.

In Majorca itself the whole story revolves around the efforts of the capital, Palma, to extend its jurisdiction over the entire island, and there is a parallel development of the town of Ciutadella in Minorca. As the Balearics were conquered from Catalonia, the bulk of the expeditionary force and also of the colonists who followed it were of an essentially urban type. The wealth and energy of the Balearics thus became early concentrated in the cities, and the rapid development of Majorcan commerce strengthened the tendency of the more valuable portions of the community to desert the countryside. The numbers and activity of the Majorcan Jews also, to whom the kings extended their special protection, were an added source of prosperity and attractiveness for the municipalities, particularly the capital, so that during most of the fourteenth century the town of Palma monopolized the life of Majorca more completely even than did Barcelona that of Catalonia; all the wealth and talent of the island were concentrated there. The history of its government and administration during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries furnishes a significant commentary on this development, and on the fruitless efforts of the rural communities to arrest it.

At first Palma was ruled by a royal bayle and veguer and a general assembly of the citizens; but about the middle of the thirteenth century this general assembly began to be gradually elbowed aside by a small, self-perpetuating body of six annually elected jurados, who managed to concentrate in their
own hands the chief power, not only over the municipality, but also over the rural districts which it had already begun to dominate and control. In the course of the fourteenth century, however, the situation changed again. The annexation to Aragon, as we shall subsequently see, ruined Majorcan commerce, and caused the inhabitants of the capital to turn back to the country districts with the idea of exploiting them; and this naturally caused the forenses or rural population, who had never had any voice in the government of the island, to clamor more loudly than ever for representation. The most obvious way of meeting this demand, and at the same time of keeping all real authority in the hands of the municipal government, was to revamp the larger and more general assembly (usually called the Consell) of the citizens, and to give the forenses or rural population seats in it. By a number of successive reforms, of which the most important were made in 1398 and 1448, this end was gradually accomplished. The Consell recovered its earlier predominance and the jurados were subjected to it; the rural population was given representation there, though its delegates never formed more than a minority. The foremen, however, were not satisfied with this. As long as the Consell of Palma dominated the entire island, their hands were really tied. They therefore now strove to secure some measure of autonomy for themselves, particularly in financial affairs, and were so far successful as to obtain an arrangement by which a portion of the taxes should be set apart to be used by them for their own special purposes. But even these reforms did not go to the root of the matter. The differences between the forenses and the ciudadanos lay far too deep to be remedied by regulations and institutions. The inhabitants of Palma looked on the rural population with disdain and contempt. The ruin of their commerce by the annexation had led them to gamble and speculate on their country domains, and to overtax and oppress those who labored on them, but they had no real sympathy or interest in agricultural development; indeed, like some of the early conquistadores in America, they regarded their association with it as a disagreeable and degrading necessity. The quarrels and corruption which disgraced the government of Palma were not calculated, on the other hand, to increase the respect of the ciudadamnos; and the final result was that in the year 1450 a peasant insurrection burst forth in the island of Majorca which literally deluged it with blood. A royal amnesty caused a temporary cessation of the strife without any definite decision in the year 1454; but under John II it broke out again and ultimately became involved with the contemporaneous revolt which was in progress against that monarch in Catalonia. At the close of the reign a statement of grievances by both sides was presented to the sovereign, but the differences between the forenses and the ciudadanos lay far too deep to be remedied by regulations and institutions. The inhabitants of Palma looked on the rural population with disdain and contempt. The ruin of their commerce by the annexation had led them to gamble and speculate on their country domains, and to overtax and oppress those who labored on them, but they had no real sympathy or interest in agricultural development; indeed, like some of the early conquistadores in America, they regarded their association with it as a disagreeable and degrading necessity. The quarrels and corruption which disgraced the government of Palma were not calculated, on the other hand, to increase the respect of the ciudadamnos; and the final result was that in the year 1450 a peasant insurrection burst forth in the island of Majorca which literally deluged it with blood. A royal amnesty caused a temporary cessation of the strife without any definite decision in the year 1454; but under John II it broke out again and ultimately became involved with the contemporaneous revolt which was in progress against that monarch in Catalonia. At the close of the reign a statement of grievances by both sides was presented to the sovereign, but the latter died before he was able to provide any real remedies. Meantime the insurrection had so reduced the population that the economic life of the island had virtually come to a standstill; in addition to the number who had perished in the risings, there was a considerable exodus of forenses to Corsica.

But the indubitably miserable and disrupted state of the Majorcan realm at the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella must not blind us to its immense prosperity and wealth in the earlier and happier stages of its development. The soil was rich and fertile, and the Moors had done much to improve it; despite its tragic neglect, due to the urban trend already described, the agricultural output of Majorca was very large, and formed a considerable portion of the wealth of the community. The truest source of Majorca’s greatness, however, was its commerce. Palma was an almost obligately stopping place for ships plying between Spain and the Levant and North Africa. Its inhabitants were inevitably caught up and carried along on the commercial currents which flowed past them. It was a microcosm of Barcelona in this respect, with consuls and factories established for the benefit of its merchants in most of the lands with which it dealt, with a commercial fleet of at least three hundred and sixty larger vessels, and with more than thirty thousand foreign sailors and traders dwelling within its walls. It was especially noted as a center for the exchange and barter of slaves. The extinction of the separate line of Majorcan kings was of course a severe blow to Palma’s commercial prestige. Barcelona did not propose to be hampered any longer by its competition, and soon succeeded in restricting it. Moreover the capture of Constantinople by the Turks a century later further limited the eastern trade of the Majorcan capital, though even at the time of the Catholic Kings it had not fallen so low that it would have been impossible to resuscitate it. But during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries it is not too much to say that Palma was a sort of Mecca for millionaires. All contemporaries bear witness to the luxury and elegance of its houses and of the villas of the neighboring countryside. The children of the greater commercial families were described by a writer of fifty years afterwards as “richer than the merchants of his own day.” And this great efflorescence of Majorcan commerce was accompanied by notable progress in letters and in science. The sailors of the Balearics knew and used the magnetic needle as early as 1272? The Majorcan school of cartography was famous throughout Western Europe, where its maps were almost universally employed for purposes of navigation. Ramon Lull, “knight errant of philosophy, ascetic and troubadour, novelist and missionary,” who travelled through Europe and Palestine and was finally stoned to death outside the walls of Bugia by the Mohammedans whom he was striving to convert, was born in Palma in the year 1235.
**SARDINIA**

Though Sardinia had been granted by the Pope to the kings of Aragon in 1297, it will be remembered that no serious attempt had been made to take actual possession of it till 1323; and that for more than a century after that date the island was in confusion and turmoil, owing to the interminable conflicts of the Pisans, Genoese, and Judges of Arborea with the Aragonese invaders. Even after the judgship was suppressed in 1409 and the feudal marquisate of Oristano substituted for it, there were constant revolts and insurrections; so that the constitutional machinery of the new Aragonese government never fairly got into working order during the period with which we are now dealing. We cannot, therefore, at present do more than indicate the foundations upon which the Spanish administration of Sardinia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was ultimately to be built up.

The chief administrative problem with which the Aragonese were confronted in Sardinia was that of centralizing and unifying the government of the island and of effacing the lines of its ancient division into four separate and independent judgements. As an obvious method of accomplishing this purpose, the kings of Aragon began in 1323 to appoint viceroys to represent their sovereign authority there. Down to the middle of the fifteenth century, or as long as the rebellions and internal wars continued, these viceroys were chiefly occupied with military affairs, and were therefore able to accomplish relatively little in the line of constitutional reform. Moreover, they were not always implicitly trusted by the monarchs who sent them out. The kings of Aragon were alive to the danger that ambitious viceroys might strive to make themselves too independent in their remote domain and strike out a line of policy inimical to their own; and they attempted to guard against this peril by appointing them for very short terms. All the Sardinian historians speak of a stringent regulation which limited the viceregal tenure of office to three years. The records show that this was by no means invariably observed; but it is fair to add that the terms which fell below the statutory limit were more numerous than those which exceeded it. Save, however, for this restriction of the period of their rule, the Sardinian viceroys during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were virtually absolute under the crown. Down to the time of Ferdinand and Isabella there was practically no council or advisory body to aid or control them in the discharge of their duties. Nearly all the minor officials of the island were appointed by them, or on their recommendation, and obediently carried out their instructions. To this general rule, however, there was one noteworthy exception. The Aragonese sovereigns were determined that the administration of the royal revenues in Sardinia should be kept out of the hands of the viceroys, who might otherwise be tempted to use their authority to enrich themselves at the expense of the crown.

In 1341 a procurador real was nominated to take charge of the king’s finances in the island, and the viceroy was strictly enjoined not to meddle with his affairs. This separation of the management of the patrimonio real from that of the other branches of the government of the overseas dependencies grew to be one of the characteristic features of Spanish imperial administration, as will hereinafter more fully appear.

The appointment of viceroys, however, was not the only way of breaking up the old quadripartite division of the island, and of making its inhabitants conscious of the unity of the new administration. Another equally effective means to the same end, and one fully in keeping with the best traditions of the government of all the Spanish kingdoms, was the inauguration of a national assembly. In the reign of King Martin, the Sardinian cities of Cagliari and Alghero were granted the right of representation in the Cortes of Catalonia, but the records do not show that this privilege was ever exercised; the prevailing policy from the outset was to treat Sardinia like Sicily and Naples, as a reino de allá mar—a separate kingdom with a system of administration entirely distinct from that of the realms of Aragon—and therefore to endow it with a parliament of its own. Zurita tells us that in the year 1355 Pedro the Ceremonious summoned the three estates of the Sardinian Cortes to meet at Cagliari, and that they were composed of Aragonese and Catalonians as well as of the inhabitants of the island; but he is exceedingly indefinite as to what was accomplished there, and the Sardinian historian, Dexart, emphatically denies that this body should be given the name of a parliament, “quia nullas leges tuit nec capitula.” No such doubt, however, can exist about the assembly held by Alfonso V in 1421; it marks the real beginning of the Sardinian representative system, and entitles the Magnanimous King to the credit of its foundation. It was modelled in general on the Cortes of Catalonia, in three estates, and had similar regulations for elections, summonses, and meetings. There were six habilitadores to determine the qualifications of members to sit; sixteen tratadores to carry on negotiations between the different brazos and particularly to settle the difficult question of the proportional incidence of taxation; and also eighteen provisores whose duty it was to listen to complaints of the arbitrary conduct of royal officials. It was also customary for the different estates to meet separately as estamentos without special
summons and to deliberate, each one upon its special affairs. Efforts were made to introduce the
Catalonian custom of holding triennial parliaments, but they never attained permanent success; the
intervals between sessions were subsequently limited to ten years, but even this rule was not invariably
observed. The principal function of the parliament of Sardinia, at least from the royal point of view, was
the granting of subsidies or donativos; and the obvious correlative of this was the right to petition the
crown for the redress of grievances, and to present requests, which, if accepted by the monarch or his
representatives, acquired the force of laws. The generosity of the Sardinian estates in voting funds for
the prosecution of Alfonso V’s Italian campaigns was such as to elicit from that monarch, in a burst of
gratitude, a favorable response to a request for the election of a special tribunal (over and above the
provisores) to sit in judgment on the viceroy and other royal officials, in case of alleged violation of the
laws of the land. This institution never came into actual existence, for, as Manno shrewdly observes,
“those things that are born of an excessive effervescence of enthusiasm cannot survive”; nevertheless
the fact that it was even contemplated indicates that the king and the Sardinians were by no means out
of sympathy with one another, and that the island parliament faithfully discharged its function of
informing its sovereign of his subjects’ desires.

There is little more that needs to be said concerning the Aragonese administration of Sardinia
previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings. Some effort was made to settle the interminable
conflicts of lay and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the island—a heritage of the papal claims
to sovereignty there by the election of a special tribunal of appeals in the reign of John II; and in 1460,
at the General Cortes of Fraga and Lerida, that monarch solemnly reconfirmed “the perpetual union and
incorporation” of both Sardinia and Sicily “in the kingdom of Aragon and the royal Crown thereof.”
The institutional autonomy of the island, however, was not disturbed, and we hear little or nothing of
the problems of its administration in the works of contemporary historians. On the whole, one gains
the impression that the Sardinians, though constantly complaining of the corruption, greed, and arbitrary
conduct of the officials of the island, were by no means dissatisfied with the fate that had united them
with the realms of the Crown of Aragon. The very fact that they grumbled about the conduct of the local
administration indicates that they believed that their new sovereigns intended to treat them well. And
it is noteworthy that almost all the Sardinian historians speak enthusiastically of the numerous benefits
conferred on their native land by the rule of the kings of Aragon, particularly of their measures to
eliminate the abuses of antiquated feudal jurisdiction, of their gradual abolition of slavery, of
their solicitude for the military defense of the island, and most of all of the favor they showed to the
Sardinian municipalities, to which they granted privileges and immunities comparable to those of the
cities of Catalonia. Agriculture received far more attention from the government here than in most of
the other lands over which the Spanish monarchs held sway; the commerce of the island, though it was
of course not comparable to that of Majorca or Catalonia, unquestionably improved after the Aragonese
occupation; while the diminution of the population in this period, of which all contemporaries
complained, is probably in great measure to be ascribed to the number of deaths on the field of battle.
Most of the benefits of the Aragonese rule in Sardinia were not fully realized till the time of
Ferdinand the Catholic, who consolidated and enhanced them, but there can be no question that the first
two centuries of Spanish administration in the island, though far from ideal when judged by modern
standards, showed a considerable improvement over the form of government which it supplanted.

SICILY

The Aragonese administration of the island of Sicily was powerfully affected from the beginning
by two special considerations. The first of these was the undying love of independence and liberty,
which was the dominant characteristic of the Sicilians, and which revealed itself in their repeated
demands for a separate line of kings. The second was the high tradition of free institutions and self-
government which the island had inherited from the times of the Norman and Hohenstaufen, and which
the Aragonese, as heirs of these dynasties, felt themselves in some measure bound to maintain.

We have already encountered numerous evidences of the Sicilian passion for autonomy, and of the
readiness of the earlier Aragonese kings to respect it. It is natural to ascribe the establishment of a
separate Sicilian dynasty by the will of Pedro the Great to the irresistible influence of Spanish
separatism, and to attribute James II’s abandonment of his original resolve to rule in Sicily as well as
in Aragon to that monarch’s reluctance to fight with the papacy; but it is impossible to avoid the
conclusion that Sicily’s unwillingness to recognize any sovereign whose attention was distracted by the
government of other realms was a most important element in causing both these decisions. And it will
be remembered that for over one hundred years—from the treaty of Anagni in 1295 to the death of
the younger Martin in 1409—the Sicilians were successful in maintaining a separate dynasty, and
therefore in preventing themselves from being brought under the sceptre of the kings of Aragon. Of the independent Sicilian sovereigns of this period, Frederic, the son of Pedro III and the brother of James II of Aragon, whose reign lasted from 1296 to 1337, was unquestionably the greatest. He had come to the island so young that he felt himself almost a native. As he had defended his realm, not only against the Pope and the Angevins, but also against his brother the king of Aragon, who had deserted him at the treaty of Anagni, he won for himself and for his dynasty the affection and good will of the Sicilians. Instead of serving to make Sicily Aragonese, his reign committed his successors to the cause of Sicilian independence. And in addition to defending his new kingdom against foreign foes, the reign of Frederic did much to improve its internal administration, which had suffered grievously from the cruelties and oppressions of the Angevins. All the free institutions inherited from Norman and Hohenstaufen times were strengthened and renewed. Particularly important was Frederic’s revival of the powers of the Sicilian Parliament, which had been virtually in abeyance under the house of Anjou. In all the greatest affairs of the realm, in peace, in war, in treaties, and in finance, the Sicilian national assembly attained in this period an authority so extensive that the history of its manifold activities is virtually the history of the island. It is true that Frederic’s three rather unworthy successors, Pedro II, Louis, and Frederic IV, were for the most part puppets in the hands of the rebellious baronage, and lost much of the ground that Frederic had gained. The national assembly was rarely convoked under them, and when it did meet was little more than a battleground of factions. Nevertheless the parliamentary tradition was not suffered to die out, and under the younger Martin, who saw the necessity of courting popularity in order to gain recognition, it was once more revived in full force. At a Parliament held in Syracuse a number of ‘good laws’ and regulations were passed to bring back the ancient liberties of the realm; and as a means of diminishing the excesses of baronial power, a royal council of twelve members was created, of which one half was elected by the commons and one half appointed by the crown. Order and free government were on the high road to restoration, when the death of young Martin in 1409 and of his father in the succeeding year threw everything again into confusion, and left Sicily as well as Aragon without a king.

During the interregnum and the first three years of the reign of Ferdinand of Antequera, Blanche of Navarre, the widow of the younger Martin, managed to maintain herself in Sicily as the representative of the Crown of Aragon against the local factions which were attempting, in one way or another, to set up a new line of independent sovereigns. In 1415 Ferdinand sent his younger son, John, to replace Blanche as viceroy; but the Sicilians, foreseeing that the rest of the Aragonese dominions would ultimately fall to John’s elder brother, Alfonso, straightway attempted to revive their autonomy by securing for John the title of independent, king of the island. This naturally resulted in the recall of John to Aragon at the moment of Alfonso’s accession; for the latter did not propose to tolerate any division of the Aragonese inheritance. On the other hand, the Sicilians had no wish to accept Alfonso as their sovereign; in fact, the Magnanimous King, not daring to run the risk of a point blank refusal by the Sicilian Parliament, secured recognition from separate assemblies of barons and the representatives of the third estate, summoned successively to the Castello Ursino in Catania. Moreover, as Alfonso rarely paid his Sicilian subjects the honor of visiting them, they continued their efforts, down to the very close of the reign, to establish a dynasty of their own. When, in 1458, Alfonso died, and John succeeded him as king in Aragon and in Sicily, the islanders attempted to induce the latter to fix his residence among them; failing in this, they sought-to persuade him to set up his son, Charles of Viana, as his representative there, with the thinly disguised intention of making him an independent sovereign. Naturally John II did not accede to these desires; but the fact that he found it advisable solemnly to confirm the annexation and incorporation of Sicily with the realms of the Crown of Aragon in the Cortes of Fraga and Lerida in 1460 may be taken to indicate that the ambitions of his Sicilian subjects for autonomy caused him a good deal of anxiety. Even as late as 1477, when the heiress of the richest fief in the island announced her intention of wedding a prince of the Neapolitan royal house, the king of Aragon was so much worried lest the match result in the setting up of a separate line of Sicilian kings, that he actually attempted, though unsuccessfully, to prevent it, by offering himself, despite his eighty years and his blindness, as a rival candidate for the lady’s hand.

But though the Sicilians failed in their efforts to maintain a dynasty of their own, they strove the harder for that very reason to preserve all the other emblems and organs of their national and institutional freedom. The intensely separatists character of the Spanish methods of government doubtless facilitated their efforts in this direction, but it is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration to the Sicilians themselves for their heroic though not always judicious determination to maintain their liberties. A brief examination of the chief component parts of the Sicilian constitution in the middle of the fifteenth century will serve to make clear the measure of success which these efforts attained.
The representative of the Aragonese king in the island was a viceroy, but the office, in the fifteenth century, was not seldom in commission—conferred, that is, on two or even three persons at the same time. Its duration was exceedingly variable. At a later date the normal term came to be regarded as three years, but it was often less and not seldom more. The viceroys, through the powers delegated to them, could summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Parliament; exercise all the rights of a legate of the Holy See (claimed by the Sicilian sovereigns since the days of Pope Urban II); appoint all subordinate officers, save a few who were nominated directly by the crown; pardon criminals; grant feudal fiefs; put forth proclamations which did not infringe the laws and liberties of the realm; deal directly with the see of Rome in matters ecclesiastical; oversee the publication and execution of papal bulls in Sicily; and represent the island in its dealings with foreign states. They were selected, during the fifteenth century, quite as often from among the prominent families of the island as from those of Aragon. They were paid a large salary; they dwelt in the royal palace at Palermo; and they were invested with all the pomp and prerogatives of kings. Of the great officers of the crown, who had been so prominent in Angevin times, when Sicily and Naples were under a single rule, only the chief Justiciar of the royal court, the Constable, and the Admiral remained in the island; and their functions were rather advisory than authoritative. Over and above the donativo, which, as we shall subsequently see, could be granted only by the Parliament, there was a long category of revenues which came to the viceroy as a matter of course; among these customs duties, profits of jurisdiction, feudal dues, revenues of vacant benefices, and the sale of bulls of crusade were the most important. Taxation was not, however, anywhere nearly so oppressive in this period as it subsequently became; and though it was not absolutely impossible even at this early date for small sums occasionally to find their way across the sea to Spain, the revenues were largely used for Sicilian purposes. The administration of justice was also completely dominated by the viceroy: he had a seat and a vote in both the chief courts of the realm, the Magna Curia for civil and criminal affairs, and the Real Patrimonio for financial ones; they followed him about wherever he went, and were guided by his wishes in rendering their decisions. There was also a so-called Sacro Consiglio, composed of the members of both these courts, and of as many other officials as the viceroy was pleased to summon, by whose advice he was supposed to be guided in judicial questions of supreme importance and other ‘grave affairs’. In spite of vigorous protests from the Sicilians, the practice of sending certain cases across to Spain for final settlement gradually began to establish itself in this period.

The authority of the viceroy, though in general strongly supported by that of the subordinate officers and of the courts, was also seriously limited, throughout the fifteenth century, by the powers of the island Parliament. This body had behind it a strong local tradition; on its maintenance and development the Sicilians concentrated their strongest efforts; and the unquestioned importance of the Cortes of the realms of the Crown of Aragon doubtless operated indirectly in its favor. It was composed of three estates or bracci—barons, clergy, and representatives of the cities; and there were numerous and elaborate regulations concerning parliamentary procedure and privilege. The place and time of convocation were determined by the viceroy. The ancient Hohenstaufen maxim of annual Parliaments had now fallen into desuetude, so that during most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the assembly was summoned whenever convenient; but in 1488 it became triennial, owing to the establishment of a rule that the sums which it was invariably requested to grant should be paid up within three years. Its chief functions were to receive the oath of each new sovereign to preserve the laws and privileges of the realm, and to watch over the subsequent performance of it; to propose capitoli, which if accepted by the kings acquired the force of laws; and to vote taxes, to which, as in Aragon, the significant title of donativos was always given. The fact that the royal treasurer, in his capacity of custodian of the revenues of vacant sees and confiscated fiefs, was given access to both the upper houses, and was generally recognized as the principal representative of the viceroy in the Parliament, indicates that the financial functions of that body were regarded by the government as of primary importance. Various documents in this period bear witness to a constant attempt to make the grant of funds by the Parliament dependent on the acceptance of the capitoli by the viceroy; but it may well be doubted whether this principle was ever rigorously observed in practice.

In one respect the advent of the Spanish domination in Sicily actually strengthened the local Parliament, and that was in the establishment of a Diputazione del Regno, on the model with which we have become familiar in the realms of the Crown of Aragon. This originated during the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous, in a demand that representatives of the realm should oversee the raising, collection, and spending of the donativo in the manner and for the purpose voted. In 1475, under John II, its functions were extended to include the right to defend the nation against all infractions of its privileges and laws. It would seem that the only way it had of actually exercising this right was to complain to the viceroy or to the king himself; but the records show that this prerogative was frequently and effectively
used. The members of the Diputazione were at first nine, then fifteen, and finally twelve in number; each braccio elected one third of them; and they were paid moderate salaries.

Other indications of the determination of the Sicilians to preserve the largest possible measure of independence might be multiplied without number. They invariably held that they had been united to the realms of the Crown of Aragon by their own free will and not by conquest; and that therefore they were entitled to resist any encroachment on their liberties and privileges, in a way that Naples and Sardinia were not. In spite of their annexation to Aragon, they maintained their own system of currency, their own flag, their own consuls abroad, and their own representatives at the church councils of Constance and Basel. When envoys from the Sicilian Parliament came to Barcelona they were received with all the pomp and circumstance of ambassadors of a foreign state. Indeed, in a list of precedence of European lands, published by Julius II in 1504, Sicily was placed fifth in the order, after the Empire, France, Spain, and England; and before Scotland, Hungary, Bohemia, Portugal, and Venice. Theoretically without doubt it was well that the preservation of all these ancient liberties and franchises should compensate for the evils of an absent sovereign; but practically this resulted in the maintenance of feudal anarchy, confusion, and lawlessness—the more pitiful because brought into strong relief by contrast with the orderly if absolute monarchies that were consolidating themselves in other European states. Unquestionably the island lacked governance. Economically it was in a wretched condition. The population was probably little more than half a million souls; the fields were cultivated only when in close proximity to the towns; there were vast waste spaces with few paths and no roads. Commerce was in abeyance owing to the Turkish raids; and the discovery of America and of the new trade routes was soon to bring it almost to a standstill. Nearly all the wealth in the island was in the hands of the Jews, who enjoyed under Alfonso V and John II a very unusual number of privileges, and a large measure of local autonomy under their own elected officers or proti. They were generally well liked, and constituted, in fact, a veritable regnum in regno until the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic, who expelled them. Intellectually the state of Sicily was chaotic. Though printing was introduced at Palermo before 1473, the vast mass of the people was densely ignorant. On the other hand, the founding of the University of Catania by Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1445 relieved law students from the necessity of going to Bologna, while names like those of Antonio Beccadelli (Panormita) and Lucio Marineo Siculo show that the island produced notable scholars, though they unquestionably found more congenial fields for their activities in other countries. In all walks of life we encounter “the same singular contrast of civilization and barbarism, of light and darkness, of apparently heterogeneous and discordant facts, which is the chief characteristic of Sicily in this period.”

NAPLES

“When the Kingdom of Naples was transferred from the Family of Anjou to Alphonsus King of Aragon, although it came under the Dominion of a most powerful King, possessed of so many hereditary Kingdoms, such as Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Majorca, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Roussillon, and many other flourishing Dominions; and new Families, new Customs, and Fashions were brought to it from Spain, yet it luckily happened that this magnanimous King did not treat it as a foreign Kingdom; nor did he look upon it as a Province of the Kingdom of Aragon, but had as great a regard for it as if it had been his antient and native Kingdom.... Whether it was upon account of the Sweetness of its Climate, or its Grandeur, and the vast Number of its illustrious Barons and Nobility; or whether it was his love for his dear Lucretia Alagna, it is evident that he preferred this Kingdom to all his other Dominions, and it never was in so flourishing a Condition, as in his Reign. He fixed his Royal Residence in Naples, where he resolved to pass the Remainder of his Life; and, as if he had forgot his paternal Dominions, all his Care, and all his Thoughts were employed about this Kingdom.”

In these striking words, a famous eighteenth-century historian sums up the essential features of Alfonso’s rule in Naples: he treated it not as a dependency of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, but rather as the head and center of all his dominions. It was of course inevitable that Alfonso should import many “new Families, new Customs and Fashions” into Naples, not only from the realms of the Crown of Aragon but also from Castile, his native land, where he had passed his early years. His edict that all poor and indigent people should have a public audience every Friday and that an advocate should be appointed for them—with a yearly salary from the royal treasury—has a distinctly Castilian flavor. Moreover, he spoke Spanish to the day of his death, in contrast to his illegitimate son and successor, Ferrante, the first ‘Re di Napoli’, who was Italian in speech, in character, and in education. But there can be no doubt that Neapolitan interests generally prevailed over those of the Spanish realms during the reign of the Magnanimous King. It was not till the early years of the sixteenth century, when, under
the lead of Ferdinand the Catholic, the last French attempt to recapture Naples was defeated, that the realm became thoroughly Hispanicized and the inherited local and Angevin traditions and institutions completely superseded by those of its new masters.

The type of administration which Alfonso inherited from his Angevin predecessors in Naples was much more feudal than national; and as it was his aim rather to make himself popular in his new realm than to assimilate it to his other possessions, he continued and maintained the system which he found there. He upheld and increased all the ancient rights and privileges of the Neapolitan baronage and doubled their numbers. He endowed the petty lords as well as the more efficient basis by the fusion into a single body—henceforth known as Camera della Sommaria—of the ancient tribunals of the Mint and of the Royal Chamber. It was supereminent above all the other councils of the realm, with but one exception, of which anon; and a new division of the kingdom into twelve provinces facilitated its proceedings. It was given charge of everything that concerned the royal revenues and patrimony, in order that the king’s ministers “might be more careful and diligent in providing him with Money.”

Despite the recklessness of his grants to the Neapolitan baronage, Alfonso made one heroic effort to centralise the administration of justice by the erection of the Sacro Regio Consiglio di Santa Chiara, so called from the great monastery in which, down to the middle of the sixteenth century, it held the majority of its sittings. It was modelled partly on the type of royal council whose acquaintance we have made in the Spanish realms, and partly on the Roman Rota, with whose forms and procedure Alfonso had become familiar through his friend Alfonso Borgia, bishop of Valencia and afterwards Pope Calixtus III. It was composed, under the king, of a president, who was usually the king’s eldest son or else one of the greatest prelates of the realm, two ‘military’ assistant counsellors to represent the baronage, a vice-prothonotary, and a number of learned doctors of the law—at first nine, later six and seven, and afterwards ten and twelve. It was a general court of appeal from all the minor tribunals of the realm and also from the Camera della Sommaria; and Giannone goes further and maintains that cases were brought up to it from the courts of Sicily, and even from those of the other Aragonese lands as well, “whence we are convinced,” he further adds, “of the Vanity of the Opinion, that [Naples] from the beginning of Alphonsus’s Reign became dependent upon the Crown of Aragon.” The list of authorities cited by Giannone in support of these assertions is certainly impressive; their statements, however, are not always specific, and a large allowance must necessarily be made for the patriotic bias of Giannone himself. It was natural that much of the business of his other realms should be referred to Alfonso, and it is highly probable that he frequently discussed it with the members of the Santa Chiara; but it would certainly be difficult to prove that that tribunal possessed any constitutional authority of its own outside the kingdom of Naples. It was unquestionably the most important body in the realm in which Alfonso fixed his residence, and could therefore scarcely fail to be informally consulted in regard to the affairs of the rest of his dominions; but there is no reason to ascribe anything more to it than this.

As the Aragonese had originally come into Sicily and Naples as heirs of the imperial house of Hohenstaufen, they inherited friction with the papacy, which had claimed suzerainty over Naples as well as Sicily since 1059 and had in general supported the Angevins there. This friction was considerably more serious in the kingdom of Naples than in the island, partly because the Aragonese authority there had been so much more recently established, and partly because of greater geographical proximity. Even after his recognition and investiture by Eugenius IV in 1443, there were interminable quarrels over boundaries, and countless conflicts of jurisdiction between Alfonso and his successors and the contemporary Popes, particularly about the question of the revenues of vacant benefices. Even the Borgia Calixtus III refused to recognize Alfonso’s illegitimate son, Ferrante, as king of Naples, on the former’s death in 1458; and a similar attitude on the part of subsequent pontiffs encouraged John, the son of René of Anjou, to make another effort to expel the Aragonese in 1462-64. Giannone complains that Alfonso and the kings that came after him failed to apply against the papal encroachments “those strong and effectual Remedies which were begun to be made use of in France”, but rather attempted “to cure the wounds with Ointments and Plasters.” In political and institutional ways the accusation is perhaps well merited, but on the other hand we must not forget that it was under the patronage of the Magnanimous King that Lorenzo Valla shattered the foundations of the papal claims to temporal sovereignty by his investigations into the historical validity of the so-called Donation of Constantine. The mention of the name of Valla tempts one to go further and study the development of the Renaissance at Alfonso’s luxurious court, but this fascinating topic lies so far from the field to which this volume is devoted that it must of necessity be left aside.

Nor can we dwell on the internal side of the reigns of Alfonso’s illegitimate son and successor in Naples, Ferrante I (1458-94), nor on the briefer rule of his different descendants during the next ten years. Naples ceases to form a part of the Aragonese Empire in this period, and though an intimate
political alliance was maintained between Ferrante and his uncle John, the history of the kingdom has little to do with that of Spain until the opening of the Italian wars. Certainly Ferrante had absorbed all his father’s passion for the Italy of the Renaissance. There was little or nothing Spanish about him; he possessed the characteristic virtues and vices of the typical fifteenth-century Maecenas and petty despot, and belongs wholly to the annals of the peninsula, where his life was lived. The Neapolitans themselves regarded him with enthusiasm; “they preferred a native bastard to a foreign pretender”, whatever his lineage and descent. In other words, Naples was as yet in no sense truly Aragonese; indeed the fifteen years (1443-58) during which the two realms had been united under a single scepter had served rather to make the Aragonese king Neapolitan.

Yet in spite of all its weaknesses and limitations, we can-not contemplate the position of the great Mediterranean empire which James the Conqueror and his successors had built up without being profoundly impressed by its grandeur. It had been won from infidel and Christian alike, often against heavy odds and by means and for ideate of which there was much reason to be proud and little to be ashamed. It had secured for the East Spanish realms a position of unquestioned predominance in the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea. It went far to counterbalance the isolation from the affairs of Western Europe which characterized fifteenth-century Castile, and to preserve for the Iberian kingdoms as a whole their place in the family of European states. When united with the other dominions which the events of the next century were to bring to Spain, it was destined to contribute its share towards giving her preeminence among the nations of the earth.
VOLUME II
THE CATHOLIC KINGS
BOOK III
THE UNION

CHAPTER XII
THE MARRIAGE OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

“EVER since the wars began in Castile between King Henry and the nobles of his realm, and before the marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, a song used to be sung there by the newcomers within the kingdom; and the words of this song, which was set to very pleasant music, were

‘Flowers of Aragon
Blossom in Castile.’

And the children took little bannerets, and, riding on canes and prancing about, cried, ‘Standard of Aragon, standard of Aragon!’ And I repeated it and repeat it now five times over; for we can now say after our experience of what followed after: ‘Lord, out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise because of thine adversaries, that thou mightest still the enemy and the avenger’. And to this text we may now reverently attribute a fresh significance over and above the gloss which Holy Mother Church appends to it. And this is to the effect that our Lord observed that His people of Castile were suffering from all manner of pride and heresy, blasphemy, avarice and rapine, wars, tumults and quarrels, thieves and robbers, whoremongers, assassins, gamblers and keepers of gaming tables; from whence it followed that the names of our Lord God and of our Lady, the glorious Virgin Mary, were frequently taken in vain and denied by these evil gamblers, and that the Moors were enabled to murder, plunder, and gain ransoms from Christian folk; and further as a remedy for these evils that our Lord of His infinite mercy and goodness placed it in the mouths of innocent children to proclaim, in the guise of warriors with their standards, and joyously to sing the praises of those who had recently come within the realm, before He put an end to the woes with which the kingdom was afflicted. So that from the flowers and the standard which entered Castile from Aragon for the celebration of the holy marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, by which the two sceptres of these kingdoms were finally united, there have proceeded so many and such marvellous benefits in the thirty years of their joint reign, that we, who have been witnesses of what our Lord has accomplished in our day and generation, may well take to ourselves the words of our Lord and Redeemer, ‘Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see. And thus with the union of the royal crowns, our Lord Jesus Christ visited His wrath upon His foes, and destroyed the murderer and the avenger.”
Such are the words in which Andres Bernáldez, the noted chronicler of the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, describes what he believed to have been an augury of the reign of the Catholic Kings.

It certainly seemed that all the miseries which had afflicted the kingdom of Castile in the later Middle Ages had reached their culmination during the first three-quarters of the fifteenth century, in the reigns of John II and Henry IV. The former had not completed his second year when he ascended the throne; and the regency for him, which was initiated under the wise guidance of his uncle, Ferdinand of Antequera, was virtually continued, though under far less skilful and devoted hands, until the day of his death. For the king had no aptitude whatsoever for business, nor ability to rule; he was absorbed in the patronage and pursuit of letters, music, and art; when his uncle, the ‘good regent’, was called away to the throne of Aragon in 1412, the only question was who should replace him. For a time a council of ministers attempted to continue his work, but its members were for the most part tools in the hands of powerful magnates, or pensionaries of the king’s relatives in Aragon and Navarre. Before long, however, a more masterful personality arose, whose proficiency in jousting, dancing, and song insured his favor with his sovereign, while his boundless cupidity and ambition made him aspire to supremacy in the state. From 1420 till 1453, Alvaro de Luna was the undisputed lord of Castile. His audacity impressed; his magnificence dazzled. He was given the office of Constable, and his credit with the puppet monarch mounted so high that all the other counsellors of the realm were soon elbowed aside or overshadowed. The mere fact that the favorite, as well as his master, was the subject of a contemporary chronicle—an honor hitherto almost exclusively reserved for kings—is a significant indication of his preeminence. Nor was it enough that John should hand over the conduct of the government to his all-powerful minister; in the most private actions of his daily life Alvaro’s word was law for him; the Constable was even permitted to exercise some measure of superintendence over his marital relations. Needless to say, such prestige as Castile had won during the comparatively vigorous rule of Henry III was soon thrown away under a regime like this; the waste and corruption at home were only equalled by the weakness and vacillation abroad. The plots to overthrow the favorite were innumerable and kept the realm in an uproar, but one by one they failed; and the state of public confidence and morality is shown by the fact that when the rebels desired to parley with the king and his minister, it was often necessary to find some neutral person of known integrity to preside over the conference, and to furnish him with a large military force as a safeguard against foul play by any of the parties concerned.

In 1418, just at the time that Alvaro was rising into prominence, the king had been married to his cousin Maria, daughter of his uncle and former regent, Ferdinand of Antequera; and three years previously his sister (also named Maria) had wedded Alfonso the Magnanimous; the two branches of the house of Trastámara which occupied the thrones of Aragon and Castile were thus closely connected by a double tie. In 1425 a son, Henry, was born to the king of Castile and his Aragonese wife; but no other children followed, and in 1445 the queen died. It is not necessary to believe the assertions of his enemies that Alvaro was responsible for her demise, but he evidently felt that it was quite within his province to select her successor. Without consulting the king, who apparently desired to wed a French princess, he calmly arranged a marriage for him with Isabella, a cousin of Affonso the African, king of Portugal, and forced his master to conclude it in August, 1447. The motives that inspired the Constable to seek this alliance were probably almost entirely personal; but the match shows that, despite all the struggles and wars of the previous century, Castile still saw the advantages of keeping close to her neighbor on the west. The Portuguese marriage, however, proved the ruin of its originator. Alvaro’s arrogance had at last reached a pitch which even John found it impossible to endure. The new queen could not stomach his influence with her husband, which so completely eclipsed her own, and began plotting for his downfall. Finally, after the Constable had refused to listen to a plain hint to retire, he was arrested at his palace at Burgos, and executed two months later in the public square at Valladolid (June 2, 1453). On July 21, 1454, King John followed his favorite to the grave. In addition to his successor Henry, the son of Maria of Aragon, he left two children by his Portuguese wife: Isabella, born April 22, 1451, at Madrigal, who was destined to be the first queen of a united Spain, and Alfonso, born November 15, 1453.

Great expectations were entertained of the new king, who, as Prince of Asturias, had shown commendable energy and vigor; if he had occasionally risen in revolt against his father, he had also valiantly defended the honor of Castile in the battle of Olmedo, in May, 1445, against a hostile combination of factious nobles supported from Aragon and Navarre. He was accessible to his subjects and extremely liberal in giving. A proclamation of war against the Moors of Granada, issued soon after his succession, induced the belief that the infidel was speedily to be driven from the peninsula. But the
Granadan war was so slackly conducted that the soldiers mutinied for lack of leadership, and the Emir openly expressed his contempt for his Christian foes; while in internal affairs the young monarch developed an apathy so shameless that he not seldom affixed his signature to public documents without taking the trouble to read them through. The coinage was debased in shocking proportions in order to furnish material for the royal munificence. Crime and rebellion stalked unpunished throughout the length and breadth of the land, and the moral degradation of all ranks of society exceeded even the measure common to that licentious age.

The personal aspect and private life of the new monarch were calculated, moreover, to enhance the dissatisfaction created by his career. “All his Face was disagreeable ... his Manners and course of Life were wholly addicted to Debauchery and Lewdness.” In 1440, at the age of fifteen, he had been wedded to his cousin, Blanche of Navarre, daughter by a first wife of the future John II of Aragon; but he had been divorced from her thirteen years later on the ground that he had been unable to consummate the marriage. Examination of the unedifying details of the case leads, however, to grave doubts as to the truth of the pretext alleged; and the fact that negotiations for a second marriage of the Infante with a Portuguese princess were initiated before the first was dissolved is further evidence in the same direction.

It seems highly probable, in fact, that political reasons were at the back of the whole affair. Castile, as has been already pointed out, had quite as many grounds for wishing to unite with Portugal as with Aragon. The constant interference of the Aragonese Infantes in the internal affairs of the realm, where as descendants of the house of Trastamara they possessed extensive estates, had been a fertile source of trouble for many years. Moreover, the second queen of John II, whose influence with her husband had been unbounded, was a cousin of the lady who was under consideration as a bride for her stepson, and doubtless exerted all her efforts to perpetuate Portuguese influence in Castile. In any case the arrangements for the Portuguese match were pushed rapidly forward during the last months of the reign of John II, and the wedding was finally celebrated, on May 20, 1455, at Cordova, ten months after Henry had ascended his father’s throne.

The mass of the nation, however, whose disgust at the fickleness of the new king as a ruler led them the more easily to give credence to uncomplimentary stories concerning his private life, were convinced that the assigned cause of his divorce was the true one; and the fact that the new queen bore no children during the first six years of her married life still further strengthened their belief. The cognomen of El Liberal, which had been previously assigned to the king because of his extreme generosity, was now exchanged for the far less flattering one of El Impotent. But Joanna of Portugal was sprightly and gay; she had many devoted admirers, prominent among whom was a certain Beltran de la Cueva, a brilliant and handsome young nobleman who had gained complete ascendancy over the mind of the king, and, like Alvaro de Luna, had risen with extraordinary rapidity to the foremost position in the Royal Council. At a feast held in honor of the ambassador of the duke of Brittany, Beltran had held the lists against all comers in defence of the supremacy of the charms of his lady love, whose name he refused to reveal, but whom common report identified as the queen; and when, in February, 1462, Joanna was delivered of a daughter, we are told by the contemporary chronicler Palencia that men generally refused to recognize her as the child of the king, but assigned her paternity to the favorite. Whether the popular belief in regard to this matter was correct or not has been the subject of much unprofitable discussion, which from the nature of the case cannot possibly lead to any definite result; yet it is pertinent to observe that it was plainly to the interest of Ferdinand and Isabella, whose rival for the throne of Castile the unfortunate Infanta was subsequently to become, that the tradition of her illegitimacy should be perpetuated, and that the courtly chronicles which were produced in their reign are consequently unsafe guides. Far more important, however, than the actual facts in regard to the paternity of the Infanta, who is usually known as La Beltraneja, was the effect which the doubts about it exercised on the state of the realm. This was to deliver over Castile to an orgy of rebellion and lawlessness, which surpassed even the anarchy of the preceding age.

Three months after the birth of the princess, in May, 1462, the king summoned the Castilian Cortes to Madrid, and received their oath of recognition to her as lawful heiress of the realm. Unfortunately we possess no document to tell us what persons signed this oath. It is certain that the king made every effort to secure the names of all the magnates of his realm, but there is strong reason to believe that a number of malcontents were already preparing to take advantage of the doubts which had been cast on the Infanta’s origin, as a pretext for a revolt against the crown. Chief among these were Juan Pacheco, Marquis of Villena, and his uncle, Alfonso Carrillo, archbishop of Toledo. The former, who was of Portuguese extraction, and had been introduced into the Castilian royal household through the good offices of Alvaro de Luna, was a restless, intriguing spirit, who delighted to fish in troubled
waters. Honor and loyalty were strangers to him. His own advancement was his sole aim, and he cared not what means he employed to attain his ends. The archbishop, who could claim few clerical attributes save his title, was another characteristic product of the age—ferocious in his hatreds, formidable on the battlefield, and exceedingly valuable to any cause which he should elect to espouse, on account of the vast resources which he commanded as primate of Castile. Both these men, who had expected to rule in the counsels of the young king, had fiercely resented the sudden rise of Beltran de la Cueva and the consequent eclipse of their own fortunes. They had been deeply dissatisfied with the way in which the new favorite had carried on the government; now, with the birth of La Beltraneja and the questions that had been raised concerning it, they saw their opportunity for revenge.

How much they could have accomplished by their own resources is exceedingly doubtful, but it so happened that powerful outside support was close at hand. The restless King John of Aragon, who had never ceased to covet the throne of Castile for his own family, had dreamed ever since 1457 of a marriage of his son Ferdinand, the offspring of his second wife, to Isabella, the half-sister of King Henry, as a means to secure that end. The recognition of La Beltraneja as the lawful heiress of the Castilian throne would spell ruin for his plans; and the prospect of it threw the Aragonese king into the arms of the Pachecos. The growing cordiality of the courts of Castile and Portugal, which had been a marked feature of recent years, was also most unwelcome to John, with his aspirations for an ultimate union of Castile and Aragon; and his apprehensions were redoubled when he learned in 1464 that negotiations were on foot for a marriage of the Princess Isabella to Affonso the African—a union which would naturally cut the ground from beneath his feet in another way. Finally, Henry the Impotent had contrived to give offence to the king of Aragon by sending aid to the latter's rebel subjects in Catalonia in the winter of 1462-63; while a year later he had filled the cup of the wrath of the Pachecos by raising the detested Beltran de la Cueva to the coveted dignity of grand master of Santiago. All these things combined to unite the Castilian rebels and the king of Aragon. They had numerous objects in common, and the advantages of cooperation were obvious.

On May 16,1464, Carrillo and Pacheco, together with the latter’s brother, the grand master of Calatrava, solemnly bound themselves together to provide for the security of the Infanta Isabella and of her brother Alfonso, whom they represented as in danger from some frightful conspiracy. A little later (the exact date is not possible to ascertain) the king of Aragon joined with them and with other lords and prelates of the realm to propound to King Henry certain measures which would redound to his good service and to the weal of his kingdom. A public pronouncement of their intentions, which the confederates issued at Burgos in the following September, reveals what these measures were: the recognition of Alfonso in place of La Beltraneja as lawful heir to the throne, and the appointment of a committee of five to consider the state of the realm. At a conference with King Henry, moreover, the rebels secured the person of the prince, and they furthermore extorted from the king a promise to acknowledge him as his heir, on condition that he should marry La Beltraneja. Subsequent events, however, persuaded them that Henry had no intention of abiding by any concessions which he might temporarily be induced to make, especially as they had entirely failed to persuade him permanently to dismiss Beltran de la Cueva. The revolt had, in fact, gone too far to be settled by negotiation, and as the king showed no disposition to fight, the conspirators soon became convinced that their only hope of effecting their ends was by violently and publicly humiliating him. At Avila accordingly they “resolved upon a most Barbarous Action, to the Eternal Infamy of Spain; Without the Walls of that City they Erected a Scaffold, and placed on it the Statue of King Henry in his Royal Robes and Crown. Thither the Villanous Nobles, and a Multitude of People, resorted. Then a Cryer proclaimed Sentence against the King, laying to his Charge many horrid Crimes. Whilst the Sentence was reading, they leasurely stripped the Statue of all its Robes, and at last, with Reprochful Language, threw it down from the Scaffold. This Villany was acted upon Wednesday the 5th of June. Immediately Prince Alonzo, who had been all the while present, was brought upon the Scaffold, there lifted upon the Shoulders of the Nobles, and proclaimed King, the Royal Standard being Displayed in his Name, as was the Custom at the Inauguration of Kings. The Multitude presently cryed, God Save King Alonso, which was ingaging themselves in the Quarrel”.

The opinions of Spanish jurists and historians differ widely as to the rights and wrongs of this dramatic act, but the majority condemn it as an unwarrantable revolt against the constituted authority of the crown. Terrible disruption in the realm was certainly its immediate result. For neither the king’s partisans nor those of the revolutionists were strongly preponderant. A list of the grandees which followed the rival standards indicates that the two sides were evenly balanced; a prolonged struggle seemed therefore inevitable, to the ruin of the peace of the realm. The king was supported by Beltran de la Cueva, whom he promptly raised to the new dignity of Duke de Albuquerque; he also sought the support of the papacy, which he urged to fulminate against the rebels the censures of
The death of the grand master, however, did not break off the negotiations, which continued till the year 1467, though without success. A number of betrayals and desertions characterize this state of the proceedings, but before long it became obvious that a trial of strength on the field of battle was sooner or later inevitable. It occurred at last, on August 20,1467, on the plain of Olmedo, close to the spot where John II of Castile, twenty-two years before, had triumphed over his subjects. Many deeds of reckless valor were performed on both sides—the most dramatic being perhaps the action of Beltran de la Cueva, who, on learning that forty knights in the opposing ranks had sworn to slay him if he ventured to show his face in the fight, promptly notified his foes of the garb he intended to wear, in order that they might not be at a loss to find him. The king’s forces, which were the more numerous, retained possession of the field at the end of the day; but Henry had not the energy to follow up his victory, and less than a month later he permitted Segovia, his favorite town, to fall into the hands of his foes, without striking a blow in its defence. Again the hope of detaching the Marquis of Villena from the confederates led to a renewal of fruitless negotiations, with the usual series of betrayals and counter betrayals as their inevitable accompaniment. This time a new element was introduced by the fact that the young Prince Alfonso, who had hitherto surrendered himself to the dictates of the grandees, had begun to give signs of independence and vigor, which promised to leave small room for the state of the realms and the prevalence of foul play, we cannot wonder that the majority of the contemporary historians incline to attribute his death to the characteristic fifteenth-century cause: Pulgar alone states categorically that he was carried off by the pestilence. In view of the nature of the evidence, we shall probably do well to follow the example of the chronicler Castillo and not attempt to give too definite a verdict; but the words in which that prudent writer comments on the event make it perfectly plain what he believed. “It was assuredly”, he avers, “a most marvellous fact that three days before he died, the prince’s death was divulged throughout the whole realm”.

On July 5, 1468, the prince died, after an illness of four days’ duration. When we consider the state of the realm and the prevalence of foul play, we cannot wonder that the majority of the contemporary historians incline to attribute his death to the characteristic fifteenth-century cause: Pulgar alone states categorically that he was carried off by the pestilence. In view of the nature of the evidence, we shall probably do well to follow the example of the chronicler Castillo and not attempt to give too definite a verdict; but the words in which that prudent writer comments on the event make it perfectly plain what he believed. “It was assuredly”, he avers, “a most marvellous fact that three days before he died, the prince’s death was divulged throughout the whole realm”.

With Alfonso gone, everything depended on the Princess Isabella, who had been in the camp of the insurgents ever since the fall of Segovia in the previous year, and had recognized the late prince as the lawful occupant of the Castilian throne. If she insisted on being acknowledged as queen, and could prevail upon a sufficient number of the insurgents to support her, a continuation of civil war and anarchy would be inevitable; on the other hand, a compromise would infallibly be welcomed by Henry and would probably go far to preserve the peace of the realm. At a meeting held on August 17 to deliberate about the situation, a rift appeared in the ranks of the confederates; the archbishop of Toledo being clearly in favor of immediately recognizing Isabella as queen, while the Marquis of Villena counselled a reconciliation with the king. Isabella, quite as much from policy as from unselfishness, soon decided that if possible she would pursue the latter course. She had no intention of renouncing
what she regarded as her just title as queen of Castile, but she plainly perceived that her reign would be far happier, and the kingdom more united, if she could obtain Henry’s approval. She therefore consented to hold an interview with her half-brother, not indeed as the titular head of a rebel faction suing for peace, but as lawful queen of the realm, willing for the sake of internal quiet to permit him during his life to retain the dignity of king, provided her own right to succeed him was unequivocally recognized. The interview took place on September 19, 1468, at Toros de Guisando, southwest of Avila, in the presence of the archbishop of Toledo, the Marquis of Villena, and other grandees. It ended in an agreement substantially in accord with the Infanta’s contentions, Henry being allowed to live out the remainder of his days on the throne of Castile, while Isabella was recognized and sworn to as princess and heiress of the realm to the prejudice of the claims of La Beltraneja.

At this point we must leave the narrative of Castilian events, in order to bring the affairs of the eastern kingdoms up to date.

John II of Aragon, the younger brother of Alfonso the Magnanimous, and the father by his second wife of Ferdinand the Catholic, was unquestionably one of the most remarkable sovereigns of the fifteenth century. Compact and vigorous in body, and inured to toil, he was filled to the brim with nervous energy and power; even the painful cataract which afflicted him in the latter part of his life, and, until it was removed by an operation in 1468, rendered him at times almost totally blind, was unable to diminish his extraordinary vitality. His physical qualities were fully matched by those of his mind and character. Unceasingly ambitious, a past master of diplomacy and intrigue, he was held back by no moral scruple from the relentless pursuit of his own ends. Had he lived in Italy, half a century later, Machiavelli might well have utilized him instead of Caesar Borgia as a model and pattern for The Prince.

During the last years of the reign of his father, the good King Ferdinand, John had hopes, as we have already seen, of securing for himself the succession in Sicily; but his elder brother, Alfonso the Magnanimous, had no wish to see him established there, and in 1419 succeeded in diverting his attention in another direction by arranging a marriage for him with Blanche, widow of Martin the Younger of Aragon, and daughter of the king of Navarre. We have not had occasion to deal with this little saddlebag realm since the early days of the Reconquest, when it was alternately involved in the affairs of Aragon and Castile. Suffice it to say that after remaining for a long time in the hands of a separate Spanish dynasty, which, however, was closely related to the royal lines in the other Iberian kingdoms, it had passed in the year 1234 to the French family of the counts of Champagne, thence in 1284 to the French crown, and finally, in the early part of the fourteenth century, to the French feudal house of the counts of Evreux; the wife of John of Aragon was the daughter of the third of the Evreux kings of Navarre. During this long period of subjection to French influence, the Navarrese had maintained their pristine independence, and sturdily insisted on the rigorous observance of all their ancient privileges. It is true that some new institutions, notably a Chambre des Comptes, were introduced by the sovereigns of the Evreux line, but the inhabitants were more than ever averse to having their destinies shaped by their more powerful neighbors; and they had thus far succeeded in imbuing the foreign sovereigns whom dynastic changes had brought them with their own zeal for the preservation of their autonomy.

The marriage treaty of John of Aragon and Blanche of Navarre was apparently inspired by the idea of a sort of federation of the little Pyrenean realm with the kingdoms of Spain, and was welcomed by the Navarrese as a guarantee of their independence against the French influences which had been preponderant there for the past two centuries. John of Aragon, however, regarded the matter in a somewhat different light. Elbowed out of Sicily, he was keenly desirous to possess a crown of his own; since it was improbable, at that period, that he would ever be the heir of his brother Alfonso in Aragon, he welcomed the opportunity to satisfy his ambitions in Navarre. But that was not all. Though his accession in Aragon was improbable, it was, to say the least, possible; he was, moreover, exceedingly influential in Castile, and was constantly meddling in its affairs. If fortune favored him, there was certainly a chance that from Navarre as a centre he might ultimately unite all the different kingdoms of Spain under his own or his children’s rule, as they had once been united four centuries before under the sceptre of Sancho the Great. Just when an idea of the possibility of an Iberian unity first took shape in the mind of John of Aragon, it is impossible to say. It was clearly the guiding motive of his declining years, and may well have been dimly conceived of even at this early stage. But the indispensable preliminary was that he should make good his hold on the little mountain kingdom whose heiress had become his wife; and his prospects of accomplishing this were not at first encouraging. In his marriage treaty with Blanche of Navarre, he had been unable to prevent the insertion of numerous provisions
which seriously limited his political authority in that realm. The Navarrese had no intention of making him really king; they expressly stipulated that he should have no sovereign rights apart from his wife, and that, if she predeceased him, her eldest child, whether male or female, should inherit the throne to the prejudice of her husband. The treaty, however, failed specifically to state at what age under these circumstances the royal power and authority should be fully surrendered to the heir; and, as things worked out, this omission ultimately afforded John an opportunity, of which he was not slow to avail himself, to get the government into his own hands.

A son, Charles, was born to John on May 29, 1421; and two daughters, Blanche and Eleanor, followed in the succeeding years. In 1425 Charles the Noble, the old Evreux king of Navarre, died, so that John, as husband of the late monarch’s daughter, became titular king of the realm; but the Navarrese were so violently opposed to granting him any real political power that he soon desisted from any effort to make his authority felt, and left the conduct of the government in the hands of his wife. During the next fifteen years he was almost exclusively occupied in Aragon and Castile; in the former, as lieutenant and representative of his absent brother, Alfonso the Magnanimous; in the latter, as an ambitious intriguer, head and centre of all the various baronial coalitions which aimed to curb the omnipotence of Alvaro de Luna. Finally, in May, 1441, Blanche of Navarre died, leaving the throne of the realm, in conformity with her marriage treaty, to her son Charles, Prince of Viana, but begging him not to assume the title of king “without the consent and blessing of his father”. If the queen hoped in this way to reconcile her son and her husband, she was grievously in error; what she had really done was to render a conflict between them inevitable. Had she left the delicate matter entirely alone, John would probably never have dared to assert any claims at all; as it was, he reappeared in Navarre soon after the death of his wife, and demanded that Charles recognize him as king. After a long struggle, in which he was far more vigorously opposed by the Navarrese Cortes than by his gentle and modest son, he gained his ends; though Charles drew up a secret protestation against the validity of his father’s title to the crown. Ostensibly, however, the victory lay with John, who soon returned to his intrigues in Castile, leaving Charles to govern Navarre as his lieutenant and representative in his absence.

In September, 1444, John of Aragon was betrothed to Joanna Enriquez, the brilliant and charming daughter of the Admiral of Castile, and great-great-granddaughter of King Alfonso XI; their marriage was celebrated in the summer of 1447. This union was a significant evidence that, despite his recent defeat at Olmedo in 1445, John of Aragon had by no means renounced his ambition to make capital for himself out of the domestic discord in Castile. The Admiral Enriquez was the most powerful of the opponents of Alvaro de Luna, and his alliance would mean everything to John in case the latter decided to renew the contest in the western kingdom. Meantime in Navarre the news of John’s second marriage was received with universal apprehension and disapproval. According to the fueros, he was thereby deprived of the last remnant of legal right to the Navarrese throne; but the inhabitants knew him too well to think for one moment that he would acknowledge this, and their worst fears were confirmed, in the autumn of 1449, when he reappeared in the realm, bringing with him a host of Castilian and Aragonese followers, whom he promptly installed in posts of profit and authority, to the prejudice of the Navarrese. Despite the pliant nature of Charles, it was clear that the differences between father and son could only be settled by war. The mass of the Navarrese supported the prince; so did the dominant party of Alvaro de Lima in Castile; in law-respecting Aragon also warm sympathy was manifested for his side. But Navarre itself was so disrupted that John was not entirely without adherents there; that the powerful family of the Beaumonts had decided to throw in their lot with Charles was sufficient reason why their traditional rivals, the Agramonts, should range themselves on the side of his father. In late October, 1451, the rivals met at Aybar, south of Sanguesa. After they had almost succeeded in reaching a satisfactory compromise by parleying, the impatience of their rival partisans reached the breaking point; battle was joined before the opposing chiefs could prevent it, with the result that the young prince was defeated and made prisoner. The Cortes of Aragon showed a disposition to offer mediation between father and son, but John would have none of it. Later a plan was broached for placing the settlement of the affair in the hands of Alfonso the Magnanimous, and pending the latter’s decision the prince was permitted, under harsh conditions, to return to Navarre, in June, 1453; but as the terms on which he had been liberated were not fulfilled, the hope of a peaceful solution of the difficulty vanished, and war blazed forth again between the rival parties. Meantime, in the midst of all these broils and battles, John’s new wife had borne him a son, the future Ferdinand the Catholic, on March 10, 1452, in the little town of Sos. When the baby was christened in the cathedral of Saragossa on February 11, 1453, it was observed that the utmost pomp and magnificence were displayed, “just as if he had been the heir of all these kingdoms”.

It will be readily understood that the birth of Ferdinand was not calculated to diminish the animosity between John and Charles. The chance, which had been slight in 1420, that John might some
day succeed his brother Alfonso in Aragon, was now far greater. The disruption in Castile promised well for the ultimate success of his intrigues in that direction, especially in view of his marriage with Joanna Enriquez. If he could but establish his own authority in Navarre, and hand it on unchallenged to Ferdinand, the latter might some day actually realize his father’s dreams of a union of all the Spanish realms under a single sceptre. And so the struggle between John of Aragon (who most of the time was represented in Navarre by his indomitable wife) and the unfortunate Prince of Viana continued from 1453 to 1456, with occasional interruptions for diplomatic purposes; but the tide turned steadily against the prince, so that he finally abandoned the unequal fight, and, travelling by way of France and northern Italy, sought refuge at the court of his uncle, Alfonso the Magnanimous, in Naples. The latter had little relish for the ways of his brother; on the other hand he had deep sympathy and a high regard for his unfortunate nephew, whose literary and artistic tendencies must have strongly appealed to him; and he was busily engaged in an attempt to reconcile father and son on a basis satisfactory to the latter, when he died, on June 27, 1458. The Neapolitans offered their crown to Charles, in prejudice of the rights of Alfonso’s illegitimate son, Ferrante, to whom the Magnanimous King had left it; but the prince had too much respect for the memory of his uncle to accept, and soon passed over to Sicily, where he hoped to find peace and quiet, if not active support and sympathy in his misfortunes.

The ultimate result of the death of Alfonso the Magnanimous was to widen the scope of the quarrel between Charles and his father, and also to bring it to a head. John succeeded his brother in Sicily, Sardinia, and in his Spanish realms, so that his dreams of Iberian unity were brought measurably nearer realization than ever before; yet, on the other hand, Charles became the legal heir-apparent in all these kingdoms at the same time. If the new king of Aragon desired to pass on all his dominions to his beloved Ferdinand, the Prince of Viana must somehow be set aside. The latter’s presence in Sicily, moreover, was profoundly disquieting to John; for the natives, who retained the happiest memories of the prince’s mother, Blanche of Navarre, and had not ceased to aspire to the possession of an independent sovereign, were obviously desirous to make Charles their king. The upshot of the matter was that in the spring of 1459 John sent over a special messenger to Sicily to order his son to repair to Majorca, where the latter finally arrived on August 20. Meantime negotiations had been in progress between the prince and his father. The former was, as usual, willing to go to any lengths to obtain peace; but his cause had of late been vigorously espoused by the liberty loving Catalonians, who rivalled the Navarrese in their respect for the law, and, detesting the way in which John had dared to override it, urged the prince to make a strong stand for his rights. On the other side, the king and his wife conducted the negotiations with the greatest skill and duplicity; and, pressing their advantage to the utmost, finally extorted from Charles in January, 1460, an agreement by which the latter delivered to his father the principal fortresses of Navarre, allowed his rights as heir in that realm and in Aragon to be passed over in silence, and received in return merely his father’s pardon for faults which he had never committed, and the permission to reside wherever he wished, save in Sicily and in his native land. Two months after the conclusion of this agreement, the prince arrived at Barcelona, where the population, who had followed his fortunes with increasing affection and solicitude, joyously welcomed him as Primogenit, or heir to the throne. Clearly they thought that the fact that his title had been passed over in the recent treaty meant that John had intended to concede it to him; but they were enlightened on this point a few days later in most unsatisfactory fashion by a letter from the king to his chancellor, the bishop of Gerona, in which they were strictly forbidden to treat or address the prince as the heir or successor of his father.

This mandate was taken by the Barcelonese as a violation of their constitution. They resolved to defend the rights of the prince; and from that moment the scene of interest in this singular drama shifts from Navarre to Catalonia. The events of the summer of 1460 served further to widen the breach between father and son. In order to strengthen himself for the struggle which he now foresaw was inevitable, Charles made overtures for the hand of the Infanta Isabella of Castile—a plan doubly distasteful to his father, because the accomplishment of it would necessarily render impossible what was already the darling project of the latter’s heart, namely the marriage of Isabella to his son Ferdinand. In order to prevent it, the king suddenly appeared in Catalonia, where he was received with a coldness which contrasted strongly with the popularity of the prince; and on December 2, at Lerida, where John was holding the Catalonian Cortes, Charles was suddenly arrested and ordered into confinement. But the liberty-loving Catalonians rushed to the rescue of the captive. The Diputación General took his case under its protection, and after the failure of a number of embassies despatched to the king to demand his release, proclaimed the Somatent on February 8, 1461, “against the evil counsellors of the crown”. Taken entirely by surprise, John was forced to yield. After a vain attempt to extricate himself from his difficulties by diplomacy, he liberated Charles, who in March returned to Barcelona amid the cheers of the enthusiastic populace; and in the following June he signed a treaty which was virtually an
admission of defeat. But the prince did not live long to enjoy the victory which the valorous Catalonians had won for him; on September 23, 1461, he fell ill and died at Barcelona.

The death of Charles, however, was by no means the end of the difficulties of the king of Aragon. In Navarre, the prince’s two younger sisters, Blanche and Eleanor, still remained—a bar to the succession of the Infante Ferdinand, if not to John’s own possession of the throne during his lifetime; while in Catalonia the prince’s demise, which was universally believed to have been caused by foul play, insured the continuance and increase of the rebellion. But before we examine the way in which John handled these two problems, we must pause to introduce upon the stage another actor, whose character bears striking resemblance to that of the king of Aragon, though their aims were diametrically opposed—the redoubtable Louis XI of France, who had succeeded his father on the throne of that kingdom on July 22, 1461. The fundamental idea of the policy of this monarch was to increase the domains of the crown of France at home at the expense of his feudal vassals, and abroad at the expense of the neighboring realms; in Spain he specially coveted the county of Catalonia. Memories of the days of the Spanish Mark furnished some historical justification for this ambition; the acquisitions of St. Louis at the expense of James the Conqueror were even fresher in men’s minds; a French reconquest of Cerdagne and Roussillon, and if possible of further territories to the south of them, would be a fitting sequel to the treaty of Corbeil. The outbreak of the Catalanon revolt also, which so nearly coincided with Louis’s accession, apparently afforded a particularly favorable opportunity for the prosecution of his plans. The question was, how would he take advantage of it? Would he support the revolutionists and ultimately attempt to make himself their sovereign? Or would he support King John against them and make the king of Aragon pay liberally for his aid?

A brief testing of the first of these alternatives convinced Louis of its futility from his point of view. The Catalans were bent on the assertion of their rights, but they were not willing to renounce their allegiance to the king of Aragon, and still less to accept the sovereignty or tutelage of the king of France. The latter was consequently thrown back on the policy of supporting John, and on April 12, 1462, signed with him a treaty at Olite, on the basis of mutual guarantees in the possession of their respective states. But in addition to being a general agreement of friendship and alliance between France and Aragon, the treaty of Olite contained special provisions relative to the kingdom of Navarre, where Louis was quite ready to cooperate with John provided he could thereby facilitate his own aims in Catalonia. John’s problem in Navarre was how to deal with the two surviving sisters of the late prince: of whom the elder, Blanche, the divorced wife of Henry the Impotent of Castile, had been pronounced heiress of the realm in her brother’s will, while the younger, Eleanor, had strengthened herself by a marriage with her powerful French neighbor, the brilliant Gaston de Foix. Realizing that he could not possibly hope to dispose of both these princesses at once and thus clear the way for Ferdinand’s succession in Navarre, John had made a virtue of necessity, and adopted the policy of allying himself with the younger, for whose vigorous husband he had a wholesome respect, against her elder sister. Since 1455 he had drawn close to Gaston and Eleanor de Foix, by an agreement which assured to them the Navarrese succession, and to himself the tenure of the throne during his lifetime. Now by the treaty of Olite John obtained Louis’s support in this arrangement, and received the French king’s promise to aid him in the conquest of such places in Navarre as held out against him; it was further stipulated that the unfortunate Blanche should be placed in the hands of her sister Eleanor, as a guarantee against her asserting her own rights to the Navarrese throne. The very day after the signature of this compact, the unhappy lady was informed that she must go to France, in order, so she was told, that she might be wedded to the Duke of Berry. The pretext did not deceive her, and she protested violently, but in vain; her father was obdurate. Two months later she was virtually a prisoner in her sister’s hands at the castle of Orthez, whence she was subsequently removed to Lescar; and there, on December 2, 1464, she died, not improbably a victim of poison. On April 30, 1462, during her journey northward, and with a full realization of the fate that was in store for her, she had bequeathed all her rights to Navarre under her brother’s will and the law of the land to her quondam husband, King Henry of Castile, and his successors, to the prejudice of the claims of Eleanor and her heirs; and Ferdinand the Catholic subsequently adduced this bequest in support of his own pretensions to Navarre by right of his wife Isabella. At this point the Navarrese question falls into the background; and we may leave it in order to return to Catalonia, merely remarking, as we pass on, that the memory of John of Aragon’s desperate struggles to gain for himself full control of the little mountain kingdom furnishes the key to the otherwise inexplicable lengths to which Ferdinand the Catholic subsequently went to regain it. That monarch had been brought up with the idea that Navarre was one day to be his, and it never ceased to haunt him until he had taken measures to realize it.
Less than a month after the signature of the treaty of Olite, which dealt with the affairs of Navarre, the kings of Aragon and France made another and more important pact (May 9) at Bayonne, relative to the revolt in Catalonia. It provided that Louis should furnish John military aid against his rebel subjects, carefully defining its nature and the amount of the money compensation to be paid for it, and further stipulated that as soon as the revolt should have been suppressed, the two border counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon—the only Aragonese lands remaining north of the Pyrenees—should be handed over to the king of France until the payments due from the king of Aragon should have been completed. An entering wedge had thus been driven for the French occupation of Catalonia—the ultimate goal of the ambition of Louis XI. On the other hand, the news of the alienation of the counties naturally completed the measure of the wrath of the Catalonians against their king. Hitherto the revolt had been conducted for the defence of the fueros, but without any thought of the deposition of the monarch; now John and his wife were solemnly declared public enemies and deprived of their royal rights, and the Diputación General arrogated to itself supreme power in Catalonia, on the plea that it must act as regent for the ten-year-old Ferdinand. It was, in fact, only a thinly veiled move for independence, and by the following August even the farce of recognizing the rights of the Infante was abandoned; the ancient traditions of the county, together with its extraordinary economic prosperity, combined to give it the strength and prestige to venture thus early on a struggle for complete freedom. And the deeds of the revolutionists were fully worthy of their declarations. The Diputación General pushed forward its preparations for military defence with energy and success. At the opening of hostilities the queen and her son were besieged in Gerona, and it was only with great difficulty that the rescuing armies of Louis XI and Gaston de Foix effected their deliverance on July 23. A siege of Barcelona in the following autumn by a Franco-Aragonese army under King John was a complete failure. The most important result of the campaign had been to put Louis’s army in practical possession of Cerdagne and Roussillon, and in the early months of 1463 the king of France took advantage of it. On March 2 he replied to a delegation of the inhabitants, who came to inquire what his intentions were in regard to the counties, with a series of casuistic arguments justifying his annexation of them. He had already gone much further than any interpretation of the treaty of Bayonne could possibly have warranted; he was treating Cerdagne and Roussillon as if they were to be permanently an integral part of the kingdom of France.

The occupation of the two border counties by the forces of Louis XI, culminating in this declaration of their annexation, was most displeasing both to John and to the Catalan revolutionists. It enlightened the former as to the true character of his treacherous ally, while it gave the latter their first inkling that their independence was quite as much in danger from France as from Aragon. Revenge was for the moment quite out of the question for John, but the insurgents’ reply to the French invasion was to throw themselves into the arms of King Henry of Castile. The latter had many causes of quarrel with the king of Aragon. The fact that Blanche of Navarre had declared him her heir in that realm created another bone of contention between the two sovereigns, and also between the Castilian monarch and Louis XI; and the latter’s failure promptly to ratify and continue at his accession the traditional Franco-Castilian alliance was another factor which tended to embroil them. Indeed, as far back as August, 1462, when the French armies had been in Cerdagne and Roussillon only one short month, an ambassador was despatched by the Diputación General of Barcelona to the court of Castile formally to offer the sovereignty of Catalonia to Henry the Impotent. In September the latter accepted it, and promised to send an army to the aid of his new vassals; in December Castilian troops arrived on the confines of Aragon. For the French king this development was most unwelcome. If the Castilian army should succeed, as there was good reason to think it might, in completely dispossessing the king of Aragon, Louis would have had all his trouble for nothing, and would stand little chance of retaining Cerdagne and Roussillon. At all costs he must eliminate the king of Castile, and with this end in view he put himself forward as arbitrator in the quarrel between John and Henry; he hoped that a peaceful solution of their difficulties would induce the latter to retire to his own realm. To Louis’s proposal both sovereigns agreed—John as a means of gaining time, Henry out of natural indolence and desire to avoid war; and in the end of April, 1463, Louis gave sentence at Bayonne to the effect that Henry should abandon the Catalans, and John give up to Henry the revenues of his Castilian estates and certain disputed territories in Navarre. The French king had thus got rid of the Castilians, though at the cost of incurring their increased enmity; for they were deeply dissatisfied with his award, and were subsequently to show it to his discomfiture. He had also diminished the difficulties of John of Aragon, ostensibly still his ally but really his enemy, in Catalonia; and yet, on the other hand, he had added to his irritation by the concessions which he had obliged him to make in Castile and Navarre. In other words, he had substantially increased the causes that would naturally lead John to seek ultimately to take revenge on himself; he had also paved the way for that revenge.
John had to bide his time, however, for many years to come; his path was still blocked in a number of different directions. In June, 1463, the Catalans, deserted by Castile, applied to Louis XI, to see if he could be induced to abandon his alliance with the king of Aragon and aid them to win their independence. At first the French king held out the highest hopes to the ambassadors, but his deeds belied his words; and it was not long before the emissaries became firmly convinced that he cared nothing whatsoever for their liberties, and that the real object of his policy was to unite Catalonia to his own domains. The farce of continuing the negotiations was kept up through the remainder of the year, owing to the reluctance of both parties to come to any definite decision; but all real hope of an accommodation had vanished long before. Meantime another power had become involved in the struggle, through the action of the Catalans in offering their sovereignty to Dom Pedro, the Constable of Portugal, whose maternal grandfather had been one of the unsuccessful candidates for the Aragonese throne after the death of King Martin in 1410. This prince arrived in Barcelona on January 22, 1464; but he was feeble and ineffective to the last degree, and under his unhappy tutelage the cause of the revolutionists went from bad to worse till his death on June 29, 1466. With the story of the Constable’s misfortunes we are not particularly concerned, but the episode of his intervention had an important bearing on the relations of Aragon and Castile. The resentment which the sovereigns of these two states had cherished against one another for many years past had visibly cooled since Louis XI’s attempt to arbitrate between them in 1463. Many of their mutual grudges had been forgotten in the heat of their common anger against the arbitrator, and now the process of rapprochement between the two Spanish courts, which the French king had unwittingly initiated, was still further advanced by this affair of Dom Pedro. It was of the utmost importance to John that Henry should bear no aid to the new sovereign of the rebel Catalans; if on the other hand the king of Aragon could induce the king of Castile definitely to abandon the Constable, it would be a long step towards ruining the entente between the Castilian and Portuguese courts, whose recent progress had so greatly worried John. On June 9, 1464, the king of Aragon gained his end by the signature of the treaty of Pamplona of a treaty with the king of Castile, in which the two monarchs promised one another mutual aid against their respective enemies. Castilian support of the Constable, which had been more than possible a few months before, was henceforth out of the question. To be sure, the king of Aragon was not yet certain enough of the loyalty or power of Henry the Impotent to trust his fortunes exclusively to him; and he had by no means abandoned his own intrigues with the malcontents in Castile. Indeed, at the very moment that he was negotiating for the treaty, he was in active relations with the Pachecos; the double game was ever dear to the heart of John II. But, for all that, the signature of the treaty of Pamplona was an interesting evidence of the real tendency of the times, though contemporaries do not seem to have comprehended its meaning. It was a milestone on the road to the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.

Fresh complications ensued on the death of the Constable of Portugal in 1466, when the Catalans offered their sovereignty to a new protector—René the Good of Anjou and Provence—of whom they expected better things. Though too old himself to embark upon such a perilous venture, this ‘titular sovereign of half a dozen empires’ had a son, the gallant John of Calabria, whom he could send to the Catalans as his representative. Though he did not actually possess a rood of the land that he claimed in Sicily, Italy, and Jerusalem, he was solidly established in his French dominions, and his tenure of Provence, which had so many historical and commercial connections with Catalonia, rendered him a particularly valuable ally for the revolutionists. He was also descended, through his mother, Violante, from the old line of the counts of Barcelona, and was therefore not without hereditary claims; while, on the other hand, he was the head of a family that had been the consistent opponent of the house of Aragon in Sicily and the Mediterranean since the time of the Sicilian Vespers, and had himself fought with Alfonso the Magnanimous over the succession in Naples. Finally the new candidate received after some little delay a promise of support and cooperation from his nephew, King Louis of France, who had begun to realize that he could never hope to attain his ends in Catalonia through alliance with John, and therefore quite characteristically had determined to reverse his policy; the Italian ambitions of the French king also combined at this juncture to induce him to favor the new pretender. Indeed, René’s acceptance of the sovereignty of Catalonia and its results may be regarded as a link in the chain that binds the Angevin-Aragonese struggle of the two preceding centuries to the Franco-Spanish wars of the succeeding age. It fills the gap between the triumph of Alfonso the Magnanimous and the raid of Charles VIII.

The Catalan question, in fact, was rapidly becoming a European one, in which all the various powers were to take sides either for or against the king of Aragon. The Angevin military occupation of the county, which began in the spring of 1467, was checked, though not wholly prevented, through the skill and intrepidity of Joanna Enriquez and of the Infante Ferdinand, who received in this campaign his baptism of fire; but the military events are of far less consequence for our purposes than the
diplomatic ones. Here, as may be imagined, it was the old king of Aragon who took the lead; and though he was terribly hampered by his blindness, and weakened in the winter of 1468 by the death of his valorous wife, his efforts were extraordinarily successful. At the crisis of his political fortunes, he was found at his very best. His object was to draw near to any and every power which could possibly be made an enemy of France and Anjou, and his agents all over Europe were busy in effecting this end. In Italy he managed to win the support of the duke of Milan—the more important because Louis had counted the Sforza as an ally of his own. He also approached Charles the Bold of Burgundy and Edward IV of England. But unquestionably his most brilliant victory was won in the kingdom of Castile. He had keenly observed the course of events in that realm since the signature of the treaty of Pamplona in June, 1464: the triumph of the rebels and the humiliation of the king of Avila in 1465, the subsequent wavering of the policy of the crown and the project of the marriage of the Infanta Isabella to the grand master of Calatrava, the second battle of Olmedo, the sudden death of the Infante Alfonso, and finally the reconciliation of Toros de Guisando; so rapidly did fortune change between the conflicting factions that the king of Aragon must have been exceedingly thankful that he had kept in touch with both sides. Still it would obviously be preferable for him if possible to gain his ends in alliance with the de jure power in Castile, rather than in opposition to it; and whatever the internal state of the western kingdom, the course of its foreign policy in the last two years had been such as to give John of Aragon good reason to hope much from the attitude of Henry the Impotent. Two features of the situation were especially encouraging. The first was the Castilian king’s refusal to ratify the treaty with Portugal which his queen had drawn up in 1465 and which provided for the marriage of the Princess Isabella to Affonso the African. The second was his conclusion, in the summer of 1467, of an alliance with Edward IV of England, which marked the definite breach of the traditional entente between Castile and France. Indeed, it is by no means fantastic to suppose that the king of Aragon may have contributed to both these results, though we have no positive evidence of it. And now, with the death of Alfonso and the subsequent recognition of the Princess Isabella as the lawful successor to her brother’s throne, the time had come for vigorous and decisive action. The acknowledged heiress of Castile could not in the nature of things remain unwedded long. If her marriage to the Infante Ferdinand—the cornerstone of the whole policy of John II—was ever to be realized, there was not a moment to be lost.

The king of Aragon and his son did not even wait for the news of the interview at Toros de Guisando to make overtures for Isabella’s hand; an ambassador was despatched to Castile carrying the formal proposals for it in July, 1468, as soon as the death of Prince Alfonso was known. Isabella, who was fully alive to the political advantages of the match, and had received most favorable reports of Ferdinand’s personal charms, accepted at once, and the marriage treaty was drawn up and duly signed in January, 1469. But serious opposition both abroad and at home remained to be encountered and overcome before the union of the royal pair could be actually accomplished. Louis XI of France, aroused too late to a realization of the results of his neglect of Castilian affairs, made haste in the spring of 1469 to despatch to Henry’s court a special ambassador, Jean Jouffroi, bishop of Albi, charged with the double duty of revamping the old Franco-Castilian alliance at the expense of the more recent Anglo-Castilian one, and of offering Louis’s brother, the Duke of Guienne, as an alternative candidate for Isabella’s hand. In the first of these errands the bishop was successful, owing to the vacillations of Henry IV; but in the second and more important one he utterly failed, despite several interviews with the Infanta herself. The marriage which was to unite the Spanish realms was thus accomplished in the teeth of the displeasure and opposition of the king of France; but it had also been greatly facilitated by the mistakes of Louis’s whole Spanish policy in earlier years; so that the Catholic Kings came to the throne with a tradition of hostility to France behind them, which was to bear terrible fruit in the succeeding age.

But John and Ferdinand had other things that worried them far more, for the time being, than the abortive opposition of the king of France. Chief of these was the hostility which the prospect of Isabella’s marriage aroused in Castile. No sooner were the intentions of the princess known, than the majority of the grandees, foreseeing the end of their independence if the monarchy was suffered to become too strong, forgot the reconciliation of Toros de Guisando, and prepared to espouse the cause of La Beltraneja. Nay more, with the aid of the treacherous Marquis of Villena, they won over the fickle king to support them, and still further strengthened their hands by reviving the project of earlier years, that the Princess Isabella should be wedded to Affonso of Portugal. This last plan was wrecked on the firm refusal of the Infanta to entertain it; moreover a considerable number of the grandees, among whom the most prominent was the archbishop of Toledo, rallied to her side, while the popular sympathy for her cause was manifested on every hand in no uncertain tone. Still, her situation in the spring of 1469 was critical in the extreme. She held her court, virtually unprotected and alone, at first at Ocaña, near Toledo, and afterwards at Madrigal, south of Valladolid. She was being constantly spied
upon by her numerous foes, and was subject at a moment’s notice to capture and imprisonment. In the end of August, while her brother and the Marquis of Villena were on a progress in Andalusia, they directed the archbishop of Seville to march with sufficient forces to her residence and seize her; but the plan was frustrated by the energy of her friend the primate, who was never found wanting if a battle of any kind was to be fought, and succeeded in carrying her off in triumph to the friendly shelter of Valladolid.

Nothing, however, could permanently secure the Infanta’s safety so effectively as the speedy completion of her marriage. Envoys were therefore despatched to Aragon to urge Ferdinand to come and claim his bride. As John, in the throes of his struggle with the rebels in Catalonia, was utterly unable to furnish his son with a military force sufficient to cope with his foes, the Infante was obliged to undertake the perilous journey with only a few attendants, disguised as merchants, and at night; not until he reached Burgo de Osma did he receive the protection of the partisans of his betrothed, and it was later still before he was able to throw off all concealment. In the evening of the fifteenth of October he reached Valladolid and held his first interview with the princess; and on the nineteenth, at the private residence of Juan de Vivero, they were married. So great was the poverty of bride and groom that they were apparently obliged to borrow money to pay the expenses of their wedding and of the simple ceremonies which followed it; and the contemporary chroniclers, who usually wax eloquent in their descriptions of such events, are almost silent about the whole affair. But no outward pomp or circumstance could possibly have added lustre to the union which created the mightiest nation of the sixteenth century and laid the foundation for one of the two greatest empires of modern times. The real celebration of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella was the glorious epoch in Spanish annals which it introduced.

The characters of the monarchs whose wedding had been solemnized under such unusual circumstances have been so often and so fully described that it is difficult to add anything more; but as the period of their reign was that in which above all others the personalities of kings determined the policy and prestige of kingdoms, it is impossible to pass over the subject in silence. The contemporary chroniclers are absurdly loud in their praises of both sovereigns, particularly of Isabella; and even some of the modern historians have not entirely avoided exaggeration. Piety, dignity, inflexible determination and high courage, both moral and physical, were the outstanding virtues of the queen; intolerance and excessive fondness for pomp and display her most obvious faults. Her main aim in life was to reduce her kingdom to internal peace, order, and union, and to level all barriers and distinctions under the throne; and for the accomplishment of that mighty task her character and abilities preeminently fitted her. No less heroic a figure could possibly have humbled the rebel baronage, or invested the administration of justice with the majesty which should be inseparable from the law. Her husband, on the other hand, was essentially cosmopolitan in his talents and qualities—as distinctively the product of the land whose main attention had been directly to foreign affairs, as was Isabella of a country which had been chiefly occupied at home. Cautious, calculating, and persistent; parsimonious, though to good purpose, like his contemporary Henry VII of England; he never acted impulsively, never struck unless he was well able to follow up the blow. Deficient in frankness, generosity, and other qualities which win men’s affections, he was on the whole less highly esteemed than was the queen, and was not unnaturally detested by the victims of his political triumphs; but the real man, as revealed by his correspondence, steadily improves on closer acquaintance. Diplomacy was unquestionably his forte; and as the diplomacy of the time consisted chiefly in lying, we need not wonder that Machiavelli held him up as a model for princes in his skill at “playing the fox”. Ferdinand himself was quite aware of his abilities in this regard and gloried in them. It is said that on learning that Louis XII of France had complained that he had deceived him for the second time, he promptly replied, “He lies, it’s the tenth”. Other subsidiary merits and defects of the royal pair will be indicated in the succeeding pages; for the present we need only remark that the above mentioned qualities in each formed the most complete and perfect counterpart of those of the other. Ferdinand and Isabella supplemented one another at every point; where the one was weak, the other was strong, and vice versa. Between them they possessed talents which would make it possible for their united realms to follow up each and all of the multifarious paths of activity that opened before them on every side. At the most critical stage of her development, Spain was thus enabled to pursue all the national objects which had previously animated her component parts, and to assume many fresh burdens besides.
CHAPTER XIII
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE AND THE CONQUEST OF GRANADA

The union of the Spanish kingdoms, which was the ultimate object of the policy of John of Aragon, was far from being fully accomplished by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella. The best possible start had already been made; but there was still much more to be done before the future sovereigns could call their thrones their own. Castile had to be pacified and united, the power of the factions abased, and that of the monarchy exalted. Hostile France and Portugal had to be dealt with, and their recognition won. The Catalan insurrection had to be put down, and the kingdom of Granada conquered from the Moors. The narrative side of the story of these events will occupy us in the present chapter; the social and constitutional aspects will be treated in the two succeeding ones.

The news of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella was most displeasing to Henry IV; while Louis XI of France, who had awakened too late to the true state of affairs in Spain, could not at first believe that his tardy efforts to prevent it had been unsuccessful. The two kings were naturally drawn close together by their common enmity to the newly wedded pair, and speedily prepared to join forces against them. Within a year of the marriage of his sister, the Castilian sovereign, in flagrant defiance of the pact of Toros de Guisando, made oath to the legality of la Beltraneja, once more acknowledged her as lawful heiress of his throne, and finally caused her to be married by proxy to Louis’s brother, the Duke of Guienne, who shortly before had been suing for the hand of the Princess Isabella. This combination, supported as it was by a large number of the Castilian grandees, boded ill for the cause of Ferdinand and his bride; but there were two serious weaknesses in it which ultimately effected its ruin. In the first place, it was largely the work of Louis XI, a foreign monarch, and if it attained its ends, it was bound to carry the sovereignty of Castile across the Pyrenees. This fact naturally elicited vigorous opposition among those whose patriotism was not entirely subordinated to their desires for personal aggrandizement; and it is highly significant that as soon as the news of it was made public, the inhabitants of the northwestern provinces—the traditional cradle of Spanish independence—went over to support the cause of Ferdinand and Isabella. Secondly, and even more important, the entente cordiale between Louis and his brother, which underlay the entire scheme, was only temporary. In less than a year after his proxy marriage, the Duke of Guienne had applied to the Pope for dispensation alike from the oath of fidelity which he had made to the king of France and from his union with his Spanish bride. He was already negotiating with Charles the Bold of Burgundy, in whom he discerned a far more powerful ally than the Impotent King of Castile. In the autumn of 1471, he had even gone so far as to apply for the hand of Charles’s daughter, Mary. But before he could make much progress with this new plan he died, on May 25, 1472. His removal served to relieve Louis XI from serious embarrassments at home, but it also terminated the project of French interference in Castile, of which his marriage with La Beltraneja had been the corner stone. If the French king continued to desire to breed trouble for Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain, he would have to find other methods.

Meantime in Castile everything was in turmoil and confusion. Ferdinand and Isabella held their little court at Dueñas, but were so destitute of resources that they were unable to take arms against their foes. In fact, down to the death of Henry the Impotent, they did everything, short of renouncing their rights to the succession, in order to maintain friendly relations with him. But the king would not abandon La Beltraneja, nor desist from his efforts to find a husband for her. After the summer of 1471, when the match with Guienne had become practically out of the question, he dallied with schemes for wedding her to Frederic, the son of Ferrante of Naples; to Henry of Aragon, a nephew of John II; and finally to Affonso the African of Portugal. None of these projects was realized—at least not in Henry’s day—but the negotiations for them, and the fact that there was no prospect of a permanent reconciliation between Henry and his sister, served to keep the realm in an uproar during the last three years of the Impotent King. Andalusia was devastated by the bloody feuds of the Ponce de Leons and the Guzmanes. All the highways in the realm were infested with robbers and thieves; even the hermandades seemed temporarily powerless. Late in the year 1473, Henry and Isabella held an interview at Segovia, during which they manifested every evidence of outward friendship and cordiality. At Epiphany, 1474, Ferdinand was also received by the king of Castile, and in the succeeding
months there were other meetings. Still, no understanding was apparently reached on the

crucial question of the succession to the throne, and “since many things which it were perilous to set
down were alleged concerning each party, it was impossible to make peace between them”. Finally, on
December 11, 1474, King Henry died in his palace at Madrid. A careful comparison of the statements of
contemporary chroniclers and of the documents bearing on the case points to the probability that he
left no formal or written will; but it seems clear that he declared verbally on his deathbed that he
recognized La Beltraneja as his daughter and as lawful heiress of his throne. There can be little doubt
that she was the legal successor. She was unquestionably the daughter of the queen of Castile, born in
the royal palace; and the allegations of her foes in regard to her paternity were never definitely proved.
Finally, she had been formally acknowledged and sworn to by the Castilian Cortes as the heiress of the
realm, and had been recognized as such by King Henry.

But if the strict letter of the law was on the side of La Beltraneja, expediency and the political

interests of the kingdoms of Spain dictated the recognition of Isabella, who was solemnly crowned
queen of Castile in Segovia two days after her brother’s death. She already represented, in fact, the
nascent idea of Iberian unity, and the principle of freedom from foreign intervention. It was for these
reasons, rather than because of any legal argument which she advanced in support of her claims, that the
majority of patriotic Castilians rallied loyally to her standard. Many of the nobles, also, began to waver
in their allegiance to La Beltraneja, and sought reconciliation with Isabella. The prospect of her strong
rule was probably no more palatable to them than before, but they had begun to discern that the
ultimate victory would probably rest with her, and they did not care to be found in the ranks of her foes.
Among them were the Duke of Albuquerque, reputed father of La Beltraneja, and the powerful house of
Mendoza; even the treacherous Marquis of Villena apparently made secret overtures to the queen at this
period, though the parties were unable to come to any definite agreement. On the other hand, the
archbishop of Toledo, angered at a slight at the hands of Ferdinand, deserted the cause of his spouse,
declaring that ‘as he had released her from spinsterhood, so he would send her back to the distaff again’.
As long as this sort of sentiment was rife in the realm, Isabella could not be said to hold the throne of
Castile. And the forces of the opposition were the more to be reckoned with, because they were to
receive ardent support at the critical moment from King Affonso the African of Portugal.

This impetuous monarch, as we have already seen, had previously entertained high hopes of

winning the Castilian succession by marrying either Isabella or her niece, La Beltraneja. As soon as the
news of Henry IV’s death reached him, he prepared to return to the charge. In early January, 1475, he
had resolved to gather his forces, invade Castile, and, after wedding La Beltraneja, to incorporate it in
his own dominions. On the eighth of that month he wrote to solicit the aid of Louis XI of France, who,
after considerable delay and tentative negotiations with the other side, agreed in September to support
him. Meantime, during the early days of May, Affonso entered Castile with a small but efficient army,
joined forces with the Marquis of Villena, was solemnly affianced to La Beltraneja, and was recognized
with her by their adherents as lawful sovereign of the realm. But the Portuguese monarch was as
unaccountably dilatory in substantiating his claims to the Castilian throne as he had previously been
precipitate in advancing them. At the moment of his invasion, Ferdinand and Isabella were totally
unprepared to resist him. Had he struck at once, before they had had an opportunity to collect their
forces, he might possibly have compassed their defeat. But instead he waited idly for
reinforcements from his Castilian confederates, and thus afforded his rivals a precious respite, which
they well knew how to utilize. Proposals for a settlement of their differences by personal combat
between Affonso and Ferdinand, and also for peace on the basis of the cession to the former of Galicia,
Toro, Zamora, and a large money indemnity were exchanged, but ended in nothing; and in the
meantime, by superhuman exertions, Ferdinand and Isabella recruited every available soldier from those
portions of the realm which remained loyal to them. Finally Ferdinand made a move to capture the town
of Zamora on the Douro, so as to cut his enemy’s communications, and thus brought Affonso to bay;
the Portuguese monarch, who had recently received considerable reinforcements under his son, was
obliged to accept battle on March 1, 1476, on a wide plain to the east of the city of Toro. It was “a noble
combat of the ancient sort”, as one of the Portuguese historians remarks with satisfaction, “for in spite
of the presence of artillery and gunpowder, destined to revolutionize the art of war”, it was decided
for the most part by hand-to-hand conflicts with swords, “making the whole a contest rather of physical
strength than of skill”. Night and a deluge of rain put an end to the fighting, and the Portuguese writers
are fond of pointing out that as Affonso’s son remained in possession of the battleground till the
following morning the conflict can scarcely be regarded as a defeat for his side. But if the forces of
Ferdinand and Isabella were denied the glory of a complete victory in the field, they certainly succeeded
in gathering all the fruits of it. The military and political prestige of their rival was shattered beyond
repair. Zamora surrendered on March 19; in June Affonso retired with La Beltraneja to Portugal,
the remnants of his army were soon dispersed. On the other hand, Ferdinand and Isabella did
everything in their power to make all men believe that they had won an overwhelming victory.
Processions and thanksgiving services were ordered in the chief towns of the realm. The captured
standard of Affonso V was solemnly laid on the tomb of John I of Castile, in reparation for the great
defeat of Aljubarrota ninety-one years before. The convent church of San Juan de los Reyes at Toledo
was founded to commemorate their triumph.

But the fiery king of Portugal was unwilling to desist from his Castilian project without one
more attempt to retrieve his fortunes. French aid, as he now clearly realized, was more than ever
indispensable to success; and with the object of securing it, he repaired in the summer of 1476 by way
of Ceuta and the Mediterranean Sea to the court of Louis XI. But in the meantime that crafty monarch
had taken the measure of Affonso’s incompetence. His own troops, sent to the succor of his Portuguese
ally, had failed to make any impression in the north of Castile. He had begun to realize that he stood
little chance of successfully opposing Ferdinand and Isabella, and that he had better make haste to treat
with them. He therefore put off the requests of Affonso with various excuses, and soon after permitted
him to visit the court of his rival, Charles the Bold, ostensibly for the purpose of mediating between
Burgundy and France. Charles, who was Affonso’s cousin, did not take long to convince him of the
faithlessness of Louis; and on January 21, 1477, the Portuguese monarch was back again at Paris, where
he received news of the Burgundian duke’s defeat and death in the battle of Nancy sixteen days
before. For some months more he hung about the French court, wasting his time in fruitless negotiations
for a papal bull of dispensation for his marriage to La Beltraneja; when at last he was roused to a sense
of the ridiculous and humiliating situation in which he had placed himself, he suddenly resolved to
resign the throne of Portugal in favor of his son, and end his days in a monastery in Jerusalem. But
the protests of his friends and of the king of France prevented the execution of this project; in the
autumn of 1477 the unhappy monarch returned to his own dominions, where his son, who had already
assumed the crown, made haste to relinquish it in his favor. Once more Affonso prepared to try his
fortunes by the sword. He collected his forces, notified the king of France of his intentions, and in the
early months of 1479 again invaded Castile. But his chances of success, slight three years before, had
by this time dwindled to nothing. Ferdinand and Isabella had already begun to reorganize their
kingdom. They had received the submission of the majority of the rebel nobles. A treaty with Louis XI,
though not yet actually signed, was inevitable in the near future. The only battle of the
ensuing campaign was fought near Albuera, February 28, 1479; before hostilities could proceed any
further, negotiations for a settlement had begun between Isabella and Affonso’s sister-in-law, the
Infanta Beatrice of Portugal. In the following September, two treaties, reiterating and confirming
the ancient peace, were concluded by the accredited representatives of both kingdoms. One of them further
provided for a mutual restoration of conquests along the Castilian-Portuguese border; since, however,
its main interest for us lies in its stipulations with regard to the Canaries and the west coast of Africa, it
may be most conveniently reserved for consideration in another place. The other, which more
immediately concerns us, dealt directly with the dynastic question. It decreed that Affonso
should abandon the title of king of Castile, and Ferdinand and Isabella that of sovereigns of Portugal;
that the king and queen of Castile should pardon and restore to their estates such of their subjects as had
supported the Portuguese in the recent war; that their daughter Isabella should wed Affonso, the little
grandson of the king of Portugal, to cement the union and concord between the two realms; and, finally,
that La Beltraneja should either be married to John, the infant son of Ferdinand and Isabella, or else take
the veil.

That unfortunate lady was not long in choosing between the alternatives which had been set
before her. Thoroughly tired of being the sport of factions, she entered the convent of Santa Clara de
Coimbra, with the full approval, if not at the positive exhortation, of Ferdinand and Isabella; and the
wretched king of Portugal, equally weary of the cares of state, was only prevented from retiring to a
monastery by his death at Cintra, August 28, 1481. Seldom, if ever, has a royal career so gloriously
begun had a more utterly farcical termination.

Thus was the union of Aragon and Castile consummated, as it were, in the teeth of the opposition
of Portugal. Accident rather than design was responsible for the way things had worked out.
Geographically and historically, as we have already seen, Portugal possessed many more ties
with Castile than did the eastern kingdoms, at least down to the accession of the house of Trastamara to
the thrones of the realms of Aragon; and linguistically, when we remember that Catalan, Valencian, and
Italian, rather than Spanish, were spoken in the bulk of the Aragonese dominions, she was scarcely
further apart from Castile than were they. Throughout the later Middle Ages Castile had
sought alliances with the royal house of Portugal quite as often as with that of Aragon, and it was
largely by alternative plans of union with Portugal that the enemies of Ferdinand and Isabella attempted
to subvert the ends for which their marriage stood. That Castile turned eastward rather than westward when the decisive moment came, was a fact of the gravest import for her future career. Had she united with Portugal rather than Aragon, she would probably have avoided entanglement in all the weary European wars and diplomacy which issued out of the struggle over the Neapolitan inheritance. She might well have been able to devote herself exclusively to the upbuilding of a great imperial domain on the Atlantic. She might have avoided that multiplicity of conflicting interests, powers, and responsibilities, which, though it doubtless served to enhance her prestige for a time, proved ultimately to be a potent cause of her decline. To speculate on what might have been is proverbially idle; but in the light of our present knowledge it certainly seems that the union of Castile and Aragon, though attended for the time being by most brilliant results, was ultimately productive of effects far less beneficent than would have followed a union of Castile and Portugal. There can be no question that it diverted both parties to the bargain from their normal and traditional lines of development. It forced Castile into Mediterranean politics and Aragon into expansion in the New World; and the final result of it was to create an organism so vast, so complicated, and so cumbersome, that it was literally impossible that it should endure.

We have purposely forborne to carry to a conclusion the story of the relations of Ferdinand and Isabella with Louis XI of France, because it can be more conveniently finished in connection with the affairs of Aragon and Catalonia, to which we now turn.

We left the old king of Aragon in 1469, at the time of Ferdinand’s marriage, in the midst of a military and diplomatic duel with the Angevin suzerains of the rebels in Catalonia. Encouraged by the brilliant success of his Castilian policy, John continued throughout the year 1470 to spin his anti-French intrigues with the Italian states, and to wage desultory warfare with his foes in his own dominions and in Navarre. Finally, on December 16, he had a stroke of good fortune in the sudden death of John of Calabria, the idolized leader of the revolutionists. A triple alliance which John managed to conclude on November 1, 1471, with Ferrante of Naples and Charles the Bold of Burgundy against Louis XI of France, served as an excellent guarantee against the latter’s ability to lend aid to the Angevins for a further prosecution of their designs on Catalonia. It also enabled the king of Aragon, who had hitherto been obliged to stand upon the defensive, to take vigorous measures to crush the revolutionists. Throughout the first part of the year 1472 the Catalans continued to hope; but the promises of old René of Anjou availed nothing without the support of the French king, who was by this time convinced that an Angevin occupation of Catalonia would bring him no nearer the realization of his own ends there, and consequently sought rather to oppose it. The refusal of Galeazzo Maria Sforza to permit the Genoese fleet to revictual Barcelona in September, 1472, when the city was besieged by the forces of the king of Aragon, bore witness to the efficiency of the latter’s Italian diplomacy, and sealed the fate of the revolutionists. On October 17 John entered his capital in triumph. With a moderation, rare in those days, which does high honor to his political sagacity, the victorious monarch forbore to take vengeance on his rebel subjects; he confirmed all their privileges and assured them of his good will. He thereby obliterated many of the bitter memories of earlier days, and laid the foundations for the restoration of cordial relations between the inhabitants of the county and the throne.

There remained the difficult problem of the border counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon, which the armies of Louis XI had occupied in 1462, and which the French king had declared, in defiance of the treaty of Bayonne, to be permanently incorporated in his dominions. John was all on fire to reconquer them. The French maladministration of the counties made their inhabitants long for a return to the obedience of the king of Aragon, and constant plots were hatched, with his connivance, for the overthrow of the existing régime. In February, 1473, John was able to enter the town of Perpignan and inspire the inhabitants with his own indomitable courage; and when, two months later, a French army arrived to besiege it, the vigor of its resistance and the fear of the effects of the obviously cordial relations between Charles the Bold and the king of Aragon convinced Louis of the advisability of coming to terms. On September 17, by the peace of Perpignan, John II had the extreme satisfaction of forcing his ancient rival to agree to an arrangement which practically reiterated the provisions of the treaty of Bayonne. One slight modification was this time introduced by the king of Aragon, in the vain hope that it would insure the observance of the pact which Louis had violated ten years before. Pending the payment of his debt—now estimated at 300,000 écus—to the king of France. John insisted that the counties should be administered, not as before by Louis, but by a governor general selected by the latter from a list of ten proposed by himself. It was as notable a triumph for the diplomacy of the king of Aragon as it was a signal humiliation for the sovereign of France, but it was not destined to be permanent. Notwithstanding all his efforts, John was unable to raise money for the deliverance of the
the succeeding age was foreshadowed with startling accuracy at this early date. A understanding with the house of Austria. The whole framework of the diplomatic combinations of the king of France, but also was apparently in a measure supported in its earliest years by some sort worth noting that the union of the Spanish realms not only was accomplished in the face of the enmity their eldest daughter Isabella (born October, 1470) was, at this juncture, still free. Still it is certain that the family of the Spanish sovereigns could have been contemplated as early as this, though the hand of Archduke Philip was only born on July 22, 1478, it seems scarcely possible that any alliance for him in to a possible destined of necessity to be perpetual enemies of the house of France. Thenceforth the scene of the diplomatic struggle between John and Louis shifts from Aragon to Castile, and Ferdinand begins to replace his father as the protagonist on the Spanish side. Louis’s certainty that neither the king of Aragon nor his son would ever permanently acquiesce in the loss of Cerdagne and Roussillon was doubtless an important element in causing him to ally himself with Affonso of Portugal, when that monarch attempted to secure the Castilian succession; and thus the Franco-Aragonese quarrel of the past began to be transformed into the Franco-Spanish struggle of the future. But there was to be one more lull before the final bursting of the storm. The Burgundian troubles, experience of the inefficiency of the Portuguese king, and the traditional friendship of France and Castile, all combined to persuade Louis XI that, for the time being at least, a policy of peace with the Spanish sovereigns promised better things than a continuation of war. Ferdinand and Isabella, whose hands were more than full with the regulation of affairs in the peninsula, were quite ready to go halfway to meet him. On October 9, 1478, accordingly, a treaty between the representatives of the two nations was signed at Saint Jean de Luz, in which four previous pacts between France and Castile were formally renewed, and each monarch definitely renounced his alliances with the enemies of the other. Among the leagues abandoned by Ferdinand and Isabella in this treaty were specially mentioned “all confederations, compacts, and fraternities begun and completed in whatsoever way and with whatsoever signatures, promises, expectations, oaths, and forms of words, either generally or specifically expressed, with Maximilian, duke of Austria, and his wife, or their eldest son.” The “confederations begun and completed” between the Catholic Kings and Maximilian and his wife, to which these words refer, were doubtless the outcome of a series of negotiations which had been in progress between the two courts in 1477 and 1478. Since Maximilian’s wife was Mary, the daughter of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, it was but natural that Ferdinand should seek his alliance, as the obvious way to keep alive the ancient friendship which had previously united his father with that most inveterate of the foes of Louis XI. The king of England, the duke of Brittany, and the Swiss were also involved in these negotiations, and though we lack precise information in regard to their scope, we may be sure that the shrewd Zurita was not mistaken in thinking that they were based on the fact that ‘all these powers were destined of necessity to be perpetual enemies of the house of France’. What was meant by the reference to a possible understanding with Maximilian’s “eldest son” is much more difficult to conjecture. As the Archduke Philip was only born on July 22, 1478, it seems scarcely possible that any alliance for him in the family of the Spanish sovereigns could have been contemplated as early as this, though the hand of their eldest daughter Isabella (born October, 1470) was, at this juncture, still free. Still it is certainly worth noting that the union of the Spanish realms not only was accomplished in the face of the enmity of the king of France, but also was apparently in a measure supported in its earliest years by some sort of an understanding with the house of Austria. The whole framework of the diplomatic combinations of the succeeding age was foreshadowed with startling accuracy at this early date.

The treaty of Saint Jean de Luz wisely left the thorny question of Cerdagne and Roussillon untouched, and John of Aragon was included in the general peace. On January 20, 1479, the old king died at Barcelona, in the eighty-third year of his age; and was succeeded by his son Ferdinand in all his dominions save Navarre, which by the terms of the treaty of Olite passed to his daughter Eleanor, the wife of Gaston de Foix. In some of his most cherished projects he had met defeat; Navarre had escaped him at the last; at the moment of his death Cerdagne and Roussillon were in the hands of Louis of France; but the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, for which he was primarily responsible, was a triumph beside which his failures shrink into insignificance. The unification of Spain, with all its tremendous consequences, is the contribution of John of Aragon to the history of Europe.

No more fitting celebration of the union of the Spanish kingdoms could have been imagined than that they should jointly proceed to the completion of the great work of the Reconquest, and round out their dominions by the final expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula.
Since the battle on the Salado in the reign of Alfonso XI, the Christians had scored but three important victories against the forces of the kings of Granada. A great battle had been won by the armies of John II at Sierra Elvira, close to Granada, in 1431; in 1410 and in 1462 the town of Antequera and the Rock of Gibraltar had been captured. During the latter part of the reign of Henry IV and the first five years of that of Ferdinand and Isabella the internal troubles of the realm effectively prevented any renewal of attacks against the Moorish strongholds. When in 1476 the queen sent to demand payment of the annual tribute due from the king of Granada, the latter evinced his contempt of his Christian overlords by the famous answer, that the mints of his realm “coined no longer gold, but steel”. Their Catholic Majesties were still too busy with other cares to heed this insolent reply, and their failure promptly to chastise their haughty vassal encouraged him in 1481 to surprise the Christian fortress of Zahara on the confines of the province of Cadiz. But by this time the Christians were in better condition to retaliate. The War of Succession with Portugal had been triumphantly terminated. John of Aragon was dead, and Ferdinand was in full possession of his hereditary domains. A report that the important fortress of Alhama, on a rocky peak in the Vega just southwest of Granada, was inadequately garrisoned and negligently guarded, led to the despatch of Rodrigo Ponce de Leon, the fiery Marquis of Cadiz, in February, 1482, on a desperate attempt to seize it unawares. The expedition, which demanded quite as much proficiency in rock climbing as in fighting, was extremely hazardous but completely successful; and the subsequent efforts of the Moors to retake the place were beaten off. From that moment the campaign against Granada ceased to be a mere series of forays, and assumed the character of a regular, methodically conducted war. The sovereigns took it up vigorously, with the idea of ending once and for all the Moorish hold on the peninsula. The Emir, reading the signs of the times, solicited aid much proficiency in rock climbing as in fighting, was extremely hazardous but completely successful; and the subsequent efforts of the Moors to retake the place were beaten off. From that moment the campaign against Granada ceased to be a mere series of forays, and assumed the character of a regular, methodically conducted war. The sovereigns took it up vigorously, with the idea of ending once and for all the Moorish hold on the peninsula. The Emir, reading the signs of the times, solicited aid.

And now, just at the moment when the Moors of Granada needed all their forces to withstand the Christian attack, they were seriously weakened at home by dynastic quarrels of the typical Mohammedan sort. Jealousies in the harem of the Emir, Abul Hassan, were the source of it; the famous massacre of the Cordovan family of the Abencerrages in the Alhambra and the imprisonment of the queen and her son, Boabdil, were its first results. But the captives contrived to escape from their confinement and to enlist the sympathies of the Granadinos; after a series of bloody feuds the old Emir was expelled, and forced to seek refuge at the court of his brother in Malaga. The latter’s energy and bravery had won him the title of El Zagal or ‘the Valiant’, and his prestige reached its climax in the spring of 1483 by his brilliant victory over an expedition which the indefatigable Marquis of Cadiz had led into the neighboring territories. But the ultimate result of the triumph of El Zagal was distinctly unfavorable to the Moorish cause. It inspired his nephew, Boabdil, to attempt to emulate his exploits; but El Rey Chico, as the Spaniards called him, was proverbially unlucky in everything that he undertook, and instead of eclipsing his uncle’s victory, as he had hoped, he was speedily defeated and captured by the Castilian Count of Cabra. A vigorous debate ensued among the Christian leaders as to the most profitable way to make use of the prize which fortune had placed in their hands; but the final verdict was that Boabdil should be released and sent back to his own dominions, on terms which bound him hand and foot to the cause of Ferdinand and Isabella, and which consequently insured the vigorous continuance of the internal quarrels in Granada. Boabdil did not refuse these degrading conditions. He sneaked back into his capital, where El Zagal had meantime succeeded in establishing himself; though he failed to gain admittance to the Alhambra and the upper town, he soon gathered his adherents on the banks of the Darro and the Jenil, and waged a murderous war upon his rivals. In the midst of the confusion, the old king, Abul Hassan, disappeared, not improbably a victim of foul play.

While revolt and sedition were thus rife in the Moorish camp, the Christian army presented a spectacle of enthusiastic unity and devotion such as Spain had seldom, if ever, witnessed before. A number of different causes contributed to this happy result. In the first place every effort was used to make men feel that it was a national Spanish enterprise—the first of its kind—made possible by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, and not an affair of merely local import. As the kingdom of Granada nowhere touched the realms of the Crown of Aragon, Castile alone could hope to benefit territorially by its reconquest; nevertheless Ferdinand was fully as active in the prosecution of the war as was the queen, whose services, though undoubtedly extraordinary, have probably been somewhat exaggerated in the gallant phrases of the contemporary chroniclers. And as the best possible method of stimulating the spirit of unity so essential to success, the sovereigns did their utmost to instil into their troops the conviction that the war was rather religious than political in its aims. They strove their hardest to awaken the old crusading ardor, which had been dormant for long periods in the past, but which, when thoroughly roused, had shown itself capable of working wonders, as in the campaigns of Las Navas and the Salado. During the year 1486, in the very midst of the struggle, the king and queen...
made a solemn pilgrimage to the shrine of Santiago de Compostela. A huge silver cross, the gift of Pope Sixtus IV, was carried in Ferdinand’s tent throughout the campaign; it was invariably raised by the royal standard bearer on the topmost pinnacle of each conquered town and adored with impressive ceremonies by the assembled hosts. Finally, the constant presence of Ferdinand and Isabella in the midst of their advancing armies was a tremendous asset for the cause. It was the surest possible way of keeping the factious nobles from deserting, of maintaining order and discipline in the ranks, of convincing the soldiers that there was no duty they were called upon to perform in which their sovereigns were too proud to bear a part. And the enthusiasm which the enterprise kindled in Spain extended before long to other lands as well. Volunteers and adventurers, many of them of noble birth, flocked to the Christian standards from Germany, France, and England, longing to have a share in the glorious triumph which all felt certain was soon to be won. Prominent among them was a brother-in-law of the Yorkist king Edward IV, by name Sir Edward Woodville, who was apparently not ashamed, as a means of impressing the Spaniards with a sense of his dignity and importance, temporarily to appropriate the title of Lord Scales. These foreigners brought back to their native lands glowing tales of the power of Ferdinand and Isabella; indeed, the reputation which the sovereigns won in Europe through the Granadan war was no small element in accounting for the extraordinarily rapid rise of Spanish prestige in the immediately succeeding years. On the other hand, the Spaniards learned much from their visitors, at the same time that they contrived to impress them. Particularly was this true of a body of Swiss mercenaries who joined the royal standard, and doubtless furnished Gonsalvo de Cordova and Gonzalo de Ayora with many of the ideas which subsequently enabled them to produce the terrible Spanish infantry of the Italian wars.

Two or three outstanding features of the military side of the campaign deserve passing notice; for the Granadan war really forms the introduction to the period of the most brilliant development of the Spanish arms. The forces assembled were apparently very large—according to one doubtless exaggerated contemporary estimate, the grand total reached 80,000—but the method of their recruitment remained predominantly feudal. The sovereigns saw the difficulty and set themselves to remedy it. Some progress was made toward the formation of a national force by utilizing the troops of the hermandad, which had recently been recreated as a royal institution. The above mentioned Swiss mercenaries were also valuable as a nucleus for an army of the modern sort. The mediaeval methods, however, were much too firmly planted to be eradicated at once, and the sovereigns were obliged to wait until after the conclusion of the war for the full completion of their plans of army reorganization. On the other hand, a number of important changes in the methods of fighting were effected before Granada fell. The exceedingly rocky and mountainous character of the greater part of the territory in which the Moorish capital lay rendered it most unfavorable for cavalry. The struggle was bound to be primarily a war of sieges, in which infantry and still more artillery would have to play the principal part. Consequently we find the Christians making strenuous efforts to increase the number and efficiency of their cannon. Engineers and mechanics were summoned from within and without the realm. Numerous pieces of extraordinary weight and still more extraordinary clumsiness were constructed. It was apparently impossible to alter the direction of their aim, either vertically or horizontally, without moving the gun carriages to which they were firmly attached; and infinite labor was necessary to prepare roads for them through the mountain passes. They fired huge balls of stone and iron; the latter were sometimes heated almost to the molten stage, thus producing the effect of a sort of liquid fire. Yet despite their extreme unwieldiness, these rudimentary cannon accomplished their ends. Fortress after fortress which would have defied assault, was battered down by their projectiles. Systematic forays meantime devastated the adjacent vegas, while the Castilian fleet continued to patrol the Mediterranean; and the success of these methods of starvation may be judged by the fact that the Moors soon began to offer to liberate Christian prisoners in return for supplies, until such exchanges were sternly forbidden by Ferdinand and Isabella. Generous terms were usually granted to the inhabitants of conquered towns, but any subsequent infraction of them by either party was sure to be speedily punished—in case of the Christians by vigorous penalties, in case of the Moors by sanguinary executions and destruction. The solicitude of the queen for the physical welfare of her troops forms one of the pleasantest chapters of the whole story. She was busily engaged in forwarding provisions from their visitors, at the same time that they contrived to impress them. Particularly was this true of a body of Swiss mercenaries who joined the royal standard, and doubtless furnished Gonsalvo de Cordova and Gonzalo de Ayora with many of the ideas which subsequently enabled them to produce the terrible Spanish infantry of the Italian wars.

The year 1484 was marked by no important event, but in 1485-86 the Christian lines were drawn considerably tighter around the Moorish capital. The western outpost of Ronda, perched on the summit of a precipitous cliff, succumbed to the artillery of the Marquis of Cadiz. Wedges were driven into the heart of the infidel realm by the capture of Loja and Illora, and the fall of Marbella on the
Mediterranean coast afforded an invaluable base of operations for the blockading Castilian fleet. In 1487 everything was concentrated on the siege of Malaga, the largest of the outward defences of the kingdom of Granada, and, with the exception of Almeria, its only remaining seaport of importance. An indispensable preliminary was the capture of Velez, situated on the road from Malaga to Granada; and in April Ferdinand crossed the Sierras with a large army and finally sat down before its walls. El Zagal sallied forth from Granada in a desperate effort to relieve it, but was unsuccessful; moreover his treacherous nephew seized the opportunity to make himself supreme within the capital, which shut its gates on El Zagal when he attempted to return thither after his failure, and finally obliged him to seek refuge in the eastern cities of Guadix, Baza, and Almeria, the only portions of the realm which remained loyal to him. Meantime Velez surrendered, and the blockade of Malaga began. It was a long and arduous undertaking. The garrison was largely composed of African troops, who had more stomach for fighting than the Spanish Moors; the fortifications were very strong, and high hopes were entertained of relief from the Barbary coast. But the vigilance of the Castilian fleet prevented that, while the wretched Boabdil attacked and cut to pieces a rescuing party despatched by his uncle, El Zagal; on the other hand the arrival of Queen Isabella in the camp of the besiegers redoubled their enthusiasm, and imbued them with a chivalrous resolve to do or die for the cause. Sudden assaults by the Christians and sorties by their foes varied the monotony of the blockade; but the crucial event of the entire siege was the effort of a Moorish fanatic, who had gained access to the royal tent on the plea that he was inspired with the gift of prophecy, to assassinate the king and queen. Happily the attempt failed, but the news that the lives of their sovereigns had been imperilled served to rouse the loyalty and ardor of the Christians to the highest pitch. Everything was got ready for a grand assault, which, however, was delayed for a brief period owing to Isabella’s desire to save bloodshed; meantime the spectacle of the besiegers’ preparations, coupled with the terrible dearth of provisions within the town, convinced the defenders that there was no alternative to an acknowledgment of defeat. After a fruitless effort to extract lenient conditions from Ferdinand by a threat of massacring the five or six hundred Christian captives in the dungeons of Malaga, the inhabitants surrendered at discretion. Whether owing to the fact that the garrison was largely composed of African troops, or to some other cause, does not appear; but it is certain that the terms which Ferdinand imposed on the conquered town form a most disagreeable contrast to those granted to the places which he had captured before. The whole population was virtually condemned to slavery. One third was transported to North Africa to be exchanged for Christian maidens, seized in Spain during the previous seven centuries and despatched across the dreary wastes of Northern Africa to supply the harems of the Orient. The fall of Malaga rendered that of Granada ultimately inevitable. But Ferdinand and Isabella were resolved to take no chances, and in order to make assurance doubly sure, directed all their energies during the years 1488 and 1489 to the reduction of that eastern extremity of the Moorish territories which acknowledged the sway of El Zagal. In 1488 Ferdinand advanced along the coast to attack Almeria, only to be beaten off with heavy loss by his crafty opponent. In 1489 the Christians diverted their efforts on the siege of Baza with better success. The town finally surrendered, after prolonged resistance, at the very end of the year. As Boabdil did nothing to help his uncle, the latter recognized the necessity of admitting defeat.

Negotiations and a personal interview with Ferdinand followed, and finally ended in an arrangement by which the Moorish king surrendered to the Christians all the principal fortresses of the realm, including Guadix and Almeria, and received in return the sovereignty of the small district southwest of Malaga, to be held by him as a vassal of the king of Castile. But El Zagal was much too proud to be permanently satisfied with so shadowy a vestige of royalty. He soon disposed of his new dominions to the king and queen of Castile in return for a money indemnity, and passed over to Africa, where, stripped of everything by the savage Berbers, he ended his days in misery and solitude. He was by far the ablest figure on the Moorish side of this last great contest of Cross and Crescent in the peninsula, and assuredly deserved a better fate.

Meantime the unhappy Boabdil, whose treachery was only equaled by his ineptitude, seized the moment of his uncle’s defeat to renounce the obligations to the king and queen of Castile which he had contracted at the time of his capture, and hurled defiance at Ferdinand and Isabella. In the spring of 1490 the Christian armies camped on the broad vega beneath Granada. The troops were in splendid condition; everything combined to make them certain of victory, and yet they did not...
underestimate the difficulties of the crowning task. With a full realization that time was indispensable to success, and a permanent fortified base on the vega the best guarantee for the maintenance of a rigid blockade, they constructed, during the winter of 1490-91, a new town in the wide plain, six miles to the west of Granada, and significantly named it Santa Fe. It was laid out in the form of a Roman camp, with regular streets crossing each other at right angles—"the only city in Spain that has never been contaminated by the Moslem heresy"; it was destined to be the scene of the capitulation of Granada, and of the signing of the contract with Columbus which led to the discovery of a New World. The sight of such a formidable establishment was profoundly discouraging to the beleaguered Moors. It proved to them that their foes would never cease from their efforts until their object had been triumphantly accomplished; and in October, 1491, negotiations for the surrender of Granada were begun, Hernando de Zafra, the royal secretary, and Gonsalvo de Cordova being entrusted with the conduct of them on the Christian side. After long conferences the terms were finally settled on the twenty-fifth of the following November; they were exceedingly liberal—the sharpest possible contrast to the vengeance that had been visited upon Malaga. The city was to be surrendered within sixty days, and the artillery and fortifications given up. The Moors, however, were to be permitted to retain unmolested their customs, dress, property, laws, and religion; they were to continue to be ruled by their own local magistrates, under the supervision of a governor appointed by the Castilian crown. They were carefully guarded against extortionate taxes, and they were to be furnished transportation to North Africa in case they desired to emigrate. The conditions, indeed, were in general such as did high honor to the magnanimity and generosity of the victors, and rendered the subsequent violation of them the more shameful. The actual surrender took place with impressive ceremonies on January 2, 1492. Pradilla’s great painting accurately depicts the scene as the contemporary chroniclers have described it—the stately courtesy of Ferdinand and Isabella, the timorous hesitancy of the vanquished Boabdil.

“Here passed away the Koran; there in the Crow was home;
And here was heard the Christian bell; and there the Moorish horn”.

It was indeed a glorious victory, won at a critical moment, and stained by few acts of treachery and cruelty. It had evoked all that was best in the character of the Spaniard. It showed that under the inspiration of a Holy War, hallowed by nearly eight centuries of national tradition, he could rise superior to petty local aims and ambitions, and was capable of really great things. It served, as perhaps nothing else could have done, to win enthusiastic support for the throne of Ferdinand and Isabella, by identifying their rule at the very outset with the advancement of the Faith, and with the successful completion of the national task. But there is grave danger in regarding the conquest of Granada merely as marking the end of an epoch. In many ways it was not so much an end as a beginning. We have already observed that no sharp dividing line can be drawn between reconquest and conquest; the two merge into one another and form a continuous whole. Attempts had been made to secure a footing in North Africa for centuries before Granada fell; and a year after its surrender Ferdinand and Isabella despatched a certain Lorenzo de Padilla, governor of Alcalá, in disguise to the Barbary coast, to gather information which should be valuable to them in the event of their carrying their arms across the Strait. Clearly the Catholic Kings had already made up their minds to pursue the Crescent beyond the borders of Spain. Moreover, it so happened that in the midst of all these exciting events a very persistent Italian mariner, whom many men thought to be half mad, but whom the sovereigns believed in and supported, came back from a long voyage of discovery into the West, with marvellous tales of new lands to conquer beyond the seas. Everything combined to beckon the new monarchs forward and onward at this crucial stage in their career. Certainly it was no time for them to rest on their laurels.

But internal reforms of the most drastic and far reaching sort were the indispensable preliminary to foreign conquest. They had indeed been largely accomplished during the period of the Granadan war, and we must study them carefully before turning to the story of Spain’s new career of expansion beyond the seas.
CHAPTER XIV
ABSOLUTISM VERSUS SEPARATISM. UNITY OF FAITH AND RAGE

STRIKING similarities have often been noted in the internal development of the three great states of Western Europe during the fifteenth century. In each a period of unparalleled anarchy and confusion was followed by the erection of a strong central monarchical government, capable alike of defying the factions at home and of taking the lead in campaigns of aggression and conquest abroad. To the terrible strife of the Armagnacs and Burgundians in France, correspond the Wars of the Roses in England, and the wretched disorders which characterized the reigns of John II and Henry the Impotent of Castile. The efficient royal despotism which emerged in France under Charles VII and Louis XI has its English counterpart in the reign of the first king of the house of Tudor, and its Spanish in the rule of Ferdinand and Isabella. Of the three states, France was on the whole the first in point of time to achieve national consolidation; the Spanish realms came second, and England third. How far the last two profited from the experience of the first; how much actual institutional borrowing occurred between them, is a vastly interesting subject, about which little definitely proven; but we cannot enter into it here. All that it is important for us to remember in the present connection is that the great work of national unification which the Catholic Kings performed was thoroughly in harmony with the highest aims and aspirations of the most enlightened statesmen of their day and generation in other European lands. Royal despotism was the form of government best suited to the stage of development which had been attained in the fifteenth century. It offered the sole sure means of escape from the intolerable evils of baronial anarchy. Order had to be reestablished before constitutional liberties could be observed.

The foregoing paragraph will have made clear that many of the problems with which Ferdinand and Isabella were confronted, when at last they were able to call their thrones their own, were almost precisely identical with those which had already been dealt with by the kings of France, and were subsequently to be attacked by the kings of England. Such, for example, were the domination of the rebel baronage, the reestablishment of the royal finances, and the reorganization of the administration of justice; and in the solution of each of these problems we shall encounter many resemblances between the methods of the Catholic Kings and those of their French and English contemporaries. But there were at least two special questions with which Ferdinand and Isabella were obliged to deal, which were emphatically cosas de España—peculiar to the Iberian Peninsula and absolutely without parallel north of the Pyrenees; in answering these two special questions the Spanish kings had no foreign precedents to guide them. Both were of such fundamental importance for the future of the Iberian realms and of the Spanish Empire that no apology is needed for a thorough consideration of them at the outset. The first arose out of the fact that Christian Spain contained at least four separate states—Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia—each with an independent set of institutions, which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to weld into a single homogeneous whole, even though the dynasties that ruled over them had been united by a fortunate marriage. The second was the direct result of the large measure of racial and religious toleration which had pervaded the Iberian realms during the greater part of the Middle Ages, and which had revealed itself again in the very liberal terms of the capitulation of Granada in 1491—namely, the existence of numerous and important Jewish and Moorish communities within the realm, whose presence was a most emphatic negation of the fundamental principle of unity on which the rule of the Catholic Kings was to be built up.

One of the surest proofs of real statesmanship is the ability to distinguish what is possible to accomplish from what is not. A completely united Spain, ruled under a single set of institutions and a single crown, would doubtless have been more in consonance with the ideas of political centralization prevalent at the time, than the maintenance of the system of separate and autonomous kingdoms which had been inherited from the Middle Ages. But with all their enthusiasm for strong central government, it is by no means certain that Ferdinand and Isabella really desired to see the process of unification proceed as far as this. They themselves inherited the separatistic traditions of their race, and despite the fact that the current was flowing strongly in the opposite direction, they were not improbably anxious, in some degree at least, to maintain them. In any case, whatever their personal desires and predilections may have been, they must have realized from the very first that any complete fusion of Castile and the
realms of the Crown of Aragon was, for the time being, outside the sphere of practical politics. The largely fortuitous union of the thrones through their marriage was no indication that the institutions of their respective realms could be made to follow suit. Dualism, in fact, was inevitable from the very first. The only question was how to work out the details.

The principal source of information in regard to these is the marriage treaty, which was drawn up and signed by the high contracting parties in January, 1469, nine months before the celebration of their wedding. It is principally made up of a series of limitations imposed upon the authority of Ferdinand in Castile; there was no need under the circumstances to emphasize the corresponding restrictions of the rights of Isabella in the realms of the Crown of Aragon. Ferdinand promised to respect all the laws and customs of the western kingdom, both local and national; all the separate institutions of the different realms whose crowns were to be united were thus maintained in their pristine vigor. All appointments in Castile, whether political, ecclesiastical, or military, were to be made in accordance with the queen’s desires, and her consent was necessary for the preferment of any foreigner within the realm. No portion of the domain of the Crown of Castile was to be alienated unless Isabella gave her permission; no grant or favor was to be bestowed there save by her. In deference to the greater size and importance of the western kingdom, Ferdinand promised to fix his residence there, and not to depart thence without the queen’s consent. He also pledged himself to the prosecution of the national Castilian task, the reconquest of the entire peninsula from the Moors. As a final evidence of his acquiescence in these arrangements, and also, perhaps, of the completeness of the understanding between the royal pair in other matters as well, it was stipulated that all laws, ordinances, treaties, and other documents of a public character should bear the signatures of both.

Whether Ferdinand had ever intended loyally to abide by these arrangements may well be doubted. There is strong reason to believe that from the very beginning he had cherished hopes of quietly setting aside the terms of the marriage treaty, and of demanding independent authority for himself in the western kingdom. Certainly the words in which the herald proclaimed the accession of the new sovereigns in Segovia after the death of Henry IV in 1474 were highly displeasing to him: “Castile, Castile”, sounded the cry, “for King Don Ferdinand and his consort, Doña Isabella, Queen Propriettress of these realms”. With the idea of making one last effort to assert himself, Ferdinand now came forward with the claim that as great-grandson of John I of Castile he was in his own right lawful sovereign of that kingdom, and that females were excluded from the succession; but the law of the land was clearly against him here, and his attempt to override the provisions of the marriage treaty simply led to a reconfirmation of them.

All the terms of the previous instrument were reiterated, though perhaps in some instances less specifically than before; there were also added several new stipulations tending to emphasize the concurrence of both parties in the arrangements that had been made. Of these the most important were that justice should be administered jointly by both monarchs when they were residing in the same place, and by each one separately when they were apart; that the heads of both were to appear upon all coins; and that the united arms of Castile and Aragon (the former being given precedence) were to be borne on a common seal and carried on a common standard. The famous Tanto Monta (“One is as good as the other”) which the monarchs adopted as their motto, is another evidence to the same effect. But despite all these efforts to accentuate the indivisibility of the interests of the two sovereigns, the fundamental principle of the agreement of 1474-75, as in that of 1469, was the complete independence and autonomy of the realms whose crowns had been united. Save for the foreign policy, in which henceforth all the Spanish kingdoms would naturally move as one; save for the Inquisition, which was to be established in 1481 with a single organization for Castile and the realms of the Crown of Aragon; and save for the abolition in 1480 of the prohibition of the exportation and importation of certain commodities from one kingdom to another (the customs duties, however, being maintained), the union of the crowns made no difference in principle in the government of the states of Christian Spain. Though the fundamental object of the administration of the Catholic Kings had been to secure internal unity, the particularistic traditions of their native land forced them to restrict their efforts to the attainment of that end within each of the separate realms which composed their dominions; fusion or amalgamation into a single state was at present out of the question. The absolutism which their government produced was therefore an absolutism of an essentially decentralized nature; and the special problems and difficulties with which the builders of the Spanish Empire were subsequently confronted can never be adequately appreciated unless this fundamental characteristic is constantly borne in mind.

On the other hand, it is important to remember that the measure of decentralization and separatism which was insured by the regime above described was in practice considerably less than might at first sight appear. The principal reason for this was, of course, the fact that Castile comprised
methods that their practical importance was very slight. The Bourbons in the eighteenth century, they were so completely permeated by Castilian principles and kingdoms; and though the background. From the time of the union of the crowns, Castile overshadowed the other Spanish institutions by which the latter attempted to limit the royal prerogative, and of which Spanish separatism in Castile the greater part of the time, and before long it became necessary to appoint viceroys to represent the authority of the crown in each of the Aragonese kingdoms. Naturally this increased preponderance of the western realm was bound to have its effect upon the constitutional arrangements of the time. From the very first the Catholic Kings centred their reforming energies on Castile. This was partly, no doubt, because it was in much worse case than the eastern kingdoms, and because the royal absolutism which it was the sovereigns’ chief aim to set up would there be opposed by selfish barons with whom no true patriot could sympathize, rather than, as in Aragon, by a set of democratic institutions firmly grounded in national tradition and good will. But a much more important reason why Ferdinand and Isabella devoted their chief attention to the western kingdom was because they realized that if they gained their ends in Castile, their victory would be far more significant than if they won it in the realms of the Crown of Aragon. With Castile pacified and under control, they could well afford to ignore the probably more difficult and certainly less profitable task afforded by Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. They could make the former the real centre of their dominions, and permit the various institutions by which the latter attempted to limit the royal prerogative, and of which Spanish separatism refused to permit the abolition, gradually to wither and decay for lack of material to work upon. Queen Isabella is said to have once remarked to her husband, “Aragon is not ours, we must go and conquer it anew”; but the words, if they were ever actually spoken, cannot be taken to indicate any settled intention on the part of the Catholic Kings to make over the institutions of the eastern realms with anything like the same thoroughness with which they reformed the institutions of Castile. In our examination of the various constitutional changes which added lustre to their reign, we shall therefore be occupied almost exclusively with the western kingdom; occasionally the eastern realms are the scene of some reform of sufficient importance to deserve special mention, but for the most part they fall into the background. From the time of the union of the crowns, Castile overshadowed the other Spanish kingdoms; and though the latter’s separate constitutions were not wholly abrogated until the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth century, they were so completely permeated by Castilian principles and methods that their practical importance was very slight.

We pass to the topic of racial and religious divergence. Save for the latter part of the Visigothic period and the great wave of clerically stimulated fanaticism which swept through the Iberian realms in the second part of the fourteenth century, the Spanish tradition, as we have already seen, favored a large measure of liberality to differing creeds and foreign peoples. Intolerance was emphatically not an indigenous national trait. Yet the spectacle presented by the large number of Moors and Jews, converted and unconverted, who resided in their dominions, must have been gall and wormwood to Ferdinand and Isabella, with their ideas of absolute unity and the levelling of all distinctions under the throne. Particularly obnoxious were the Conversos, or nominally Christianized Jews, who were justly believed to be secretly loyal to the faith of their fathers. Differences in race alone no one as yet would have dreamed of attempting to obliterate, and frankly avowed and acknowledged differences in religion were not held at the time of the accession of the Catholic Kings to call for drastic action; but that there should be concealed disloyalty within the pale of Holy Church was a thought that the pious Isabella, at least, could not endure. Unity and purity of the Faith were the cornerstone of her policy, and, in her eyes, the first essentials to unity of the state. Open and traditional disbelievers could perhaps be regarded as beyond the scope of Christian inquiry, but those who had been once converted, even against their wills, must not under any circumstance be suffered to relapse. It was to deal with the Conversos, or false Christians as they were sometimes called, that Ferdinand and Isabella resolved to apply to Pope Sixtus IV for permission to introduce the Inquisition into the kingdom of Castile, where it had never been known before.

The desired permission was promptly granted in a bull bearing the date November 1, 1478, but it was not till more than two years later that the institution it created really got to work; the long interval
simply shows how difficult it was for the sovereigns to overcome the various forces which were hostile to their new departure* But when at last the new tribunal began to sit, its unique and original constitution, differing so sharply from that of the ancient mediaeval ecclesiastical Inquisition, gave it a “peculiar and terrible efficiency”. The essence of this was “its combination of the mysterious authority of the Church with the secular power of the crown. The old Inquisition was purely an ecclesiastical institution. In Spain, however, the Inquisition represented not only the pope but the king; it practically wielded the two swords—the spiritual and the temporal—and the combination produced a tyranny, similar in character, but far more minute and all-pervading, to that which England suffered during the closing years of Henry VIII as Supreme Head of the Church.”

The foundation for this invasion by the state of a realm hitherto exclusively reserved to the church was the initial demand of Ferdinand and Isabella, which Sixtus IV granted without realizing its true significance, that the appointment and dismissal of all the officials of the new institution, from the Inquisitor General down, should be made, or at least controlled, by the monarchs themselves. In common with the other kings of their day and generation, Ferdinand and Isabella were resolved to reduce to the lowest possible terms all papal interference in the management of ecclesiastical affairs within their realms. They had no intention of setting up within their own dominions any institution whose officers should be nominated from Rome. But the right of appointment and dismissal was by no means all. The crown supervised the ‘instructions’ issued by the inquisitors. It insisted that the Inquisition’s confiscations should be paid into the royal treasury. It controlled and regulated salaries. From interference with the spiritual side of the Inquisition’s activities, Ferdinand and Isabella for the most part abstained, but in matters temporal their authority was complete and unchallenged. What doubtless combined to fortify and establish the measure of their royal control was the fact that the first crucial years of the existence of the Inquisition in Castile coincided with the period when the most important political and constitutional reforms of the reign were carried into effect. Everything was being directed towards the centralization of authority in the hands of the crown at the very moment that the new institution first saw the light; small wonder that it yielded to the current of the times. A single example will suffice. One of the principal methods by which Ferdinand and Isabella established their royal power in political affairs was by the increase and development of the powers of the Consejo Real, and the creation of responsible offshoots of it to control the different branches of the government service. The major part of this work was accomplished by the famous Cortes of Toledo of 1480, of which anon; by 1483 the success of the experiment had been proved beyond the possibility of a doubt; and in that year a new council—Consejo de la Suprema y General Inquisición, popularly designated as the Suprema—was brought into being to secure and maintain the royal authority over the tribunal which had recently been called into existence.

Any detailed examination of the growth, powers, and procedure of the new institution lies entirely beyond the scope of the present work; moreover, it would be supererogatory, if not positively impertinent, to attempt to traverse again so soon the ground that was so thoroughly covered by one of America’s most distinguished historians only a decade ago. The Inquisition’s privileges and prerogatives gave it ‘supereminence’ over every other institution in the state from the time of its establishment; and this high position was on the whole maintained and strengthened, despite occasional setbacks, during the two succeeding centuries. Its permanent courts under the Crown of Castile (including the Canaries) reached the total of twelve, while those in the realms of the Crown of Aragon numbered four. It was extended, as we shall later see, to Sardinia, Sicily, and the American possessions; and numerous temporary tribunals were set up in the course of its development. We have already remarked that, save for the sovereigns themselves, the new institution was the only one common to the eastern and western kingdoms; except for the period 1507-18, when, owing to the death of Isabella and Ferdinand’s second marriage to Germaine de Foix, a new separation of Aragon and Castile seemed likely to occur, there was but a single Inquisitor General for all Spain and all the Spanish possessions, and a single organization which embraced them. In more ways than one, then, the Inquisition fostered and advanced all the projects of union and centralization on which the internal policy of the Catholic Kings was founded; and in so far as it accomplished this, it was certainly possible to defend it according to the political theories of that day.

Yet the price which Spain had to pay for this advantage—if advantage it may be called—in the fastening upon herself, beyond all hope of escape, of a detestable spirit of racial and religious intolerance to which she had hitherto been for the most part a stranger, was out of all proportion to what she had gained. At the period of its establishment, we find countless evidences, particularly in the eastern kingdoms, of the dread with which the Inquisition was regarded. Its erection was the worst kind of a blow to the aspirations for liberty which have always animated the Spaniards, and thinking men had already perceived that intolerance was ultimately certain to beget economic ruin. But as time
wore on, the signs of the Inquisition’s unpopularity gradually diminished, and the Spaniards were converted “from the most tolerant to the most intolerant nation in Europe”. Their passion for racial and religious unity had been fired at precisely the moment that they had at last attained the national consolidation for which patriots hitherto had so ardently but fruitlessly longed. It was thus natural that the two things should become inseparably connected in their minds, just as it was natural that the history of Prussia during the last two centuries should serve to imbue the normally peaceable German with the idea that militarism is the inseparable adjunct of imperial greatness and power. And the growth and development of the Inquisition was by no means the sole evidence of this alarming increase of the spirit of racial and religious intolerance.

The Holy Office, as we have already pointed out, had no jurisdiction over the avowed and professed Jews, who were generally held to be beyond the pale of Christian inquiry. The number of these had, of course, greatly diminished owing to the persecutions of the fourteenth century; in 1474 there were only about twelve thousand families of them left in Castile. Down to the foundation of the Inquisition, the wealth and prosperity of the Conversos had caused large numbers of orthodox Hebrews to follow their example, and come, nominally at least, within the bosom of the church; but when the Holy Office was finally established and got to work on the ‘false Christians’ the lot of the latter ceased to be enviable and became distinctly the reverse; everything now combined to cause the professed Jew to cling more steadfastly than ever to the faith of his fathers. There was no longer any hope of his conversion; if complete unity of the faith was to be attained in Spain, expulsion was the only possible method of securing it.

But the policy of expulsion was so utterly at variance with the traditions of mediaeval Spain, and the economic consequences of it were so obviously destined to be disastrous, that it was some years before Ferdinand and Isabella, with all their zeal and energy, were able to put it into practice. It appears that the queen made a move towards getting rid of the Andalusian Hebrews in 1480, at the time of the foundation of the Inquisition, but nothing came of it; twelve long years more of deliberate inculcation of racial intolerance and stimulation of anti-Semitic prejudice were necessary before the fatal step could be finally taken. The conquest of Granada furnished the desired opportunity. Some sort of recognition of God’s goodness and mercy in delivering over the last stronghold of the infidel in the peninsula was clearly due; and the fact that with the conclusion of the campaign there was no longer the same need of the Jewish contributions which had gone far towards supporting it was a practical consideration which may well have settled the matter. Despite the efforts of prominent Hebrews to bribe their Catholic Majesties to postpone or abandon it, the edict of expulsion was signed at Granada on March 30, 1492; it granted the professed Jews of all the Spanish realms four months—until July 31—either to accept baptism or else to leave the land. They were given no fair or adequate means of disposing of their property or of collecting the debts justly due them; the time was all too short, and the government took no effective measures to protect them from robbery and fraud; moreover, the laws forbidding the export of gold and silver made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to carry away the equivalent of such possessions as they were obliged to sell. The total number of the exiles, of the dead, and of those who submitted to baptism to escape expulsion was probably rather less than more than 200,000; but even if we accept Colmeiro’s doubtless exaggerated estimate of the population of Spain in that period as 10,000,000, we shall unquestionably conclude that the loss was far greater than she could afford. And “the sum of human misery” inflicted, as Lea has rightly said, “was incomputable.” Most of the exiles passed over to the Italian lands or to the Moorish states of North Africa, where tribulations of various kinds and degrees awaited them. Some of them fled to Portugal, where they were permitted to remain for a time on payment of a heavy impost to the crown. In 1497, however, as we shall see more fully in another connection, Ferdinand and Isabella insisted, as part of the price of the marriage of their daughter Isabella to Emmanuel the Portuguese king, that the latter should follow their example and expel the Jews from his dominions, which he accordingly did. Their most satisfactory place of refuge was unquestionably the domain of the Sultan of Turkey, who properly estimated their economic value and scoffed at the praises which the bulk of Western Christendom lavished on the mistaken policy of the Catholic Kings. And the horror and loathing of their native land, which the unfortunate Israelites carried with them wherever they went, was not the least ominous feature of the situation. The Jews were perhaps too small a portion of the population to have their enmity count for much; but when in years to come the Moors and the Protestants were added to the victims of Spanish intolerance and exclusiveness, the nation drew down upon itself the bitter hatred of some of its most powerful neighbors, so that the fabric of its empire was shaken to the very foundations.
Racial and religious animosity had certainly made great strides between 1480 and 1492, but the next decade saw it increase more rapidly still; and this time, as the Jews were gone, it was the Moors who bore the brunt of the attack. The terms of the capitulation of Granada, as already remarked, had granted the most generous possible conditions to the vanquished infidels. They were to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of their own property and customs, laws, and religion. All attempts forcibly to convert them were strictly forbidden, and they were guaranteed the favor and protection of the Castilian crown. For at least five years after the fall of Granada, the main provisions of the capitulation were loyally observed; indeed, in April, 1497, when the king of Portugal expelled all the Moors from his dominions, Ferdinand and Isabella specifically invited the exiles either to come and settle in Spain, or else to pass through it on their way to their final place of refuge. But in the immediately succeeding period there came a change. In 1492 Isabella determined to revive the high episcopal traditions which Granada had enjoyed in Roman and Visigothic times, to erect it into an archbishopric, and to confer it upon her confessor, the saintly Hernando de Talavera. Under his gentle influence numerous Moorish converts to Christianity were made; but the process did not advance with sufficient rapidity to suit their Catholic Majesties, who in November, 1499, took the decisive step of associating with Talavera a man of a very different stamp—the redoubtable Francisco Ximenes de Cisneros, archbishop of Toledo. Inflexible determination and fanatic zeal for the propagation of the Christian faith were the principal traits of this extraordinary prelate; from the moment of his arrival in Granada he dominated everything; the gentle Talavera was simply elbowed aside. Conversion by compulsion and terrorism supplanted conversion by persuasion and instruction; baptism \textit{en masse}—3000 at a time on one occasion—by the use of the \textit{aspergillum} or baptismal sprinkler, replaced the individual rite. When rebellions ensued as a result of these proceedings, Ximenes insisted that the Moors had thereby forfeited their lives and their property, and that they ought not to be pardoned unless they promised either to accept Christianity or else to leave the realm. The sovereigns lent a willing ear to these representations; and the Holy Office, which had been extended to Granada in the same year that Ximenes had been sent there, urged them still further along the path of persecution. Ferdinand was unquestionably less amenable to clerical argument than was Isabella. He recognized the high value of the Moorish portions of the population from the economic point of view, and often strove to check the ardor of his more fanatic spouse. But the queen was determined to rid Castile at all costs of the last remnant of its non-Christian population, and on the plea that it was impossible to prevent the avowed and confessed Moors from entering Granada, where they would infallibly contaminate those whom Ximenes had baptized, she finally issued, on February 12, 1502, an edict for their expulsion. This provided that all unconverted adult Moors, except a few slaves with whom it was impossible to interfere, should leave the realms of Leon and Castile before the end of the following April. As a matter of fact, however, the edict really amounted to a sentence of conversion or death, for the conditions under which it provided that the expatriation should be carried out were quite impossible of fulfillment. The prescribed places of embarkation were too remote to be reached within the allotted time, and resort to the adjacent Iberian and North African realms was prohibited. The edict was virtually an order for the forcible conversion of all the non-Christian inhabitants of Leon and Castile and the consequent bringing of them within the jurisdiction of the Holy Office.

The edict against the Moors in 1502, in contrast to that against the Jews of ten years before, did not for the present apply to the realms of the Crown of Aragon. Not until the reign of the Emperor Charles V was it extended to the eastern kingdoms. Isabella, as we have seen, was primarily responsible for it; indeed, after her death in 1504 her husband did what he could to mitigate the severity of its enforcement. Ferdinand’s whole career shows him to have been much less intolerant than the queen; in this respect at least his point of view was far more modern. But even his efforts to stem the tide of persecution were in the end totally fruitless; the movement begun by Isabella and her clerical allies and advisers was to continue practically unchecked until its force was broken by the scepticism of the eighteenth century. How far the effects of this baleful arousing of the demon of persecution and exclusiveness was responsible for the fall of Spain and her empire, it is profitable to inquire, provided we do not expect a definite answer. Certainly it was a cause, and, in all probability, a principal one; but to hold it solely or even almost solely responsible for the disasters that followed, is too much. The Spanish Empire of the sixteenth century was such a vast, unwieldy, and heterogeneous organization that it is idle to attempt to account for its rise or fall on the theory of any single explanation. Many exceedingly complex, and in large measure accidental, elements combined to effect its sudden growth and decay; and if the present work lays less than the usual emphasis on the errors of Spain’s racial and religious policy, it is because the writer feels that they were but one of a number of reasons that went to produce the final result.
CHAPTER XVI
INTERNAL REORGANIZATION

HAVING disposed of the two distinctively Spanish problems with which Ferdinand and Isabella were confronted, we can take up the story of their principal administrative reforms, which were inspired, one and all, by the idea of giving the nation peace, order, and union under the absolute authority of the crown. Before any positive work towards the upbuilding of a strong central government could be attempted, it was essential to clear the way for it by two negative measures of fundamental importance. An end must be put to the long course of unpunished crime and contempt for authority which made the name of Castile synonymous with anarchy even in that lawless age; and the rebel aristocracy, the principal foe to the omnipotence of the king, must be permanently reduced to subjection.

The quotation from Andrés Bernáldez, with which this volume opens, may well be supplemented by a description from the pen of another contemporary, in order to portray the full horrors of the period in which Ferdinand and Isabella began to reign. “So corrupt and abominable were the customs of these realms, that everyone was left free to follow his own devices without fear of reprehension or punishment; and so loosely were the conventions of civilized society observed, that men practically relapsed into savagely, in such fashion that the wise and prudent deemed it next to impossible to bring order out of such chaos, or regulation out of such confusion; for no justice was left in the land. The common people were exterminated, the crown property alienated, the royal revenues reduced to such slight value that it causes me shame to speak of it; whence it resulted that men were robbed not only in the open fields but in the cities and towns, that the regular clergy could not live in safety, and that the seculars were treated with no respect, that sanctuaries were violated, women raped, and all men had full liberty to sin as they pleased”.

In times of such agony the Hermandad had proved itself the sole effective remedy in the past, and in the reign of Henry the Impotent “the extension of the malady made the cure more urgent still”. A new Hermandad, far larger and more powerful than any that Castile had seen before, had therefore been inaugurated in 1465 and definitely constituted two years later. A set of laws and ordinances, which were drawn up for it at a general assembly of its representatives at Castronuño near Valladolid, exhibit the institution at the height of its independent development, and show that the municipalities, disrupted and shaken though they were by the anarchy of the times, were still centres of patriotism and national pride. These ordinances declare that a Hermandad, comprising the important towns of Leon, Castile, Asturias, and Galicia, is established for the execution of justice, and for the preservation of the wellbeing of the realm and its royal crown. They prescribe the forms of its organization, from the alcaldes in the towns, on whom fell the important duty of intervening to prevent crime and disturbance, through the eight deputies who headed each provincial subdivision of the institution, to the supreme general assembly or Junta General. They lay down the methods of recruiting and utilizing the military forces of the institution, the contribution due from each municipality for their support, the means of forcibly collecting it in case of a refusal, and also the difficult question of conflicts of jurisdiction with the ordinary authorities. They are, in fact, the constitution of a powerful “administrative, judicial, legislative, and military machine”, “a state within a state, or, more exactly, the sole state then existent in Castile”. The excessive praises of contemporary chroniclers must not lead us into thinking that it succeeded in fully accomplishing its purposes, or “that there was once more safety on the roads in such manner that men could travel anywhere without fear”. The evils of the day were far too deep seated for that; but had it not been for this Hermandad of 1465-67 they would probably have been much worse. In any case, the institution had demonstrated its value so signaly and so recently, that, in casting about for some means of restoring order at their accession, it was impossible that Ferdinand and Isabella should ignore it.

One of the most striking features of the administration of the Catholic Kings, and also one of the most convincing proofs of their statesmanship, was their careful avoidance of gratuitous innovations. If their purpose could be as well served by the remodelling of an ancient institution as by the creation of a new one, they unhesitatingly chose the former alternative, knowing full well that the permanence of their work would thus be more completely assured. The application of this principle to the Hermandad
was obvious and important. The institution was highly esteemed and enjoyed noble traditions. It had stood in the past for objects of which no true patriot could fail to approve. With crown support it would be able to accomplish its purpose far more effectively than ever before, while the monarchy itself would gain prestige from association with it. Finally, under royal control, it could never lend itself to enterprises hostile to the throne. Accordingly, after consultation with the principal personages in the most important cities of the realm, the sovereigns promulgated a plan for the reorganization of the ancient Hermandad under the auspices of the central government, at the Cortes of Madrigal, April 27, 1476. On the basis of this proclamation, a new constitution was drawn up by the representatives of the different municipalities in solemn conclave at Dueñas on July 25, and sanctioned by the sovereigns on August 13 following. Three features of this new constitution deserve special emphasis. First, in order to preserve the authority of the crown over the institution as a whole, a representative of the monarchy, the bishop of Cartagena, was installed as president of the Junta or council of the Hermandad, which was composed as formerly of provincial delegates. Before this body all questions of importance were ultimately certain to come, and the sovereigns were thus enabled to keep in touch with every phase of the institution’s activities. Second, in addition to preventing crime and maintaining order, the new Hermandad was given complete jurisdiction over certain classes of crimes, and full power to punish them. Among these may be mentioned robbery and arson in the open country, rape, and all acts of rebellion against the central government; and elaborate rules prevented the ordinary judicial authorities from interfering in such cases. Finally, the amounts of the contributions due from each town for the support of the new institution, the sources and means of collecting them, and the penalties for default were regulated more carefully than ever before, as were also the size and distribution of its military contingents throughout the realm. No rank or class of men, whether nobles or clergy, was exempt from the tribute which the maintenance of the Hermandad required, “for as it was equally useful to all, so it was but fair that all men should pay their share.” The new institution may thus be regarded as “the first attempt to establish a system of taxation to which everyone should contribute irrespective of his estate and condition, and therefore as the initial step towards the abolition of the ancient privileges” and the levelling of all distinctions under the throne.

The efficiency of this reorganized or Holy (Santa) Hermandad is the best possible justification of the wisdom of the sovereigns’ treatment of it. The pursuit of criminals was carried relentlessly forward, lap on lap, by the squadrons of archers which were maintained in each locality. When the limits of the territory of one company were reached, it relinquished the chase to a fresh one, which was always on hand to take it up. Death or mutilation were the regular punishments. Whenever possible the malefactor was brought back to the place where he had committed his crime to undergo them; and the death penalty was invariably inflicted by a discharge of arrows at the body of the victim, bound upright to a wooden post, which, as the ancient law significantly specified, “should never be permitted to have the form of a cross”. Yet despite the ruthlessness of its procedure, the new institution met with little resistance or complaint. The nobles alone, who realized that it was certain ultimately to curtail their excessive powers, were bitterly hostile, but since they were themselves the fundamental cause of the prevailing anarchy, we may well believe that Ferdinand and Isabella paid no attention to their remonstrances. The Hermandad was vigorously supported by the crown in all its proceedings and rendered splendid service in return. We have seen that, in addition to their regular duties, some of its contingents formed a useful nucleus for the Christian army in the Granadan war. A similar institution was established in Aragon in 1488 and endured until 1510. Long before the latter date, however, the more important Castilian Hermandad had accomplished the work which it had been reorganized to do. Crime and rebellion had been suppressed, peace and order established. That this happy consummation was largely due to other contemporary measures of the Catholic Kings, which we shall examine in their proper place, it would be idle to deny; and it is certain that the character and prestige of the monarchs themselves counted for much. Still the Hermandad must always be remembered as the entering wedge of the administration of the Catholic Kings. By the year 1498 there was no longer any need for its continued existence—at least not in the form in which it had been reconstituted in 1476. The taxes for its maintenance were already very high and steadily increasing, and Ferdinand and Isabella resolved radically to modify and restrict it. By an ordinance of July 29 of that year they suppressed the supreme council or Junta of the Hermandad, its salaried officers, and the imposts which its upkeep demanded. Appeals from its sentences to the ordinary courts of the realm were thenceforth specifically permitted, and the severity of its ancient punishments was moderated by the order that criminals should be hung before being shot. Its archers indeed were to be maintained -in the different localities to watch over the security of the roads; but this last was probably little more than a concession to popular conservatism. To all intents and purposes the Hermandad had finished its work and been discontinued.
At the same time that Ferdinand and Isabella were bringing the active agents of crime and rebellion to book, they took measures of repression against the Castilian aristocracy, in whom they rightly recognized the ultimate authors and fomenters of the manifold evils of the times. That many of these measures were ostensibly gentle and pacific must not blind us to their real effectiveness, or lead us to imagine that the sovereigns did not realize the deadly peril to their throne that lurked in the excessive powers of the baronage. It simply shows that they shrank from open collisions, whenever it was possible to avoid them and to attain their ends without provoking civil war. Moreover, it is important to notice that most of the steps they took to curb the rebel nobles were specifically sanctioned by the Cortes of Castile, and therefore, nominally at least, bore the stamp of the approval of the representatives of the entire realm. The national assembly furnished valuable aid to the Catholic Kings in the establishment of their absolutism against internal anarchy and baronial rebellion. After it had successfully accomplished that purpose and had itself begun in turn to constitute a menace to the omnipotence of the crown, it was destined, as we shall subsequently see, to be rather cavalierly cast aside.

Systematic destruction of a large number of baronial castles—strongholds of unlicensed tyranny and rebellion—was a distinguishing feature of the early years of the reign, and effectively supplemented the activities of the Hermandad. The nobles were also formally commanded to keep the peace among themselves, and heavy punishment was unsparingly meted out to those barons whose misdeeds rendered them subject to it; for rank and lineage were no longer to be permitted to shield any malefactor from the consequences of his crime. The Cortes of Madrigal in 1476 carried the good work considerably further. In addition to taking the first steps toward the reform of the royal councils and courts, which we shall examine in another place, they initiated a thorough reorganization of the royal household; by this the duties and powers of Chancellor, Mayor domo, Adelantado Mayor, and the other ancient dignitaries of the crown were so strictly limited and defined that the great lords and clerics who held these offices were virtually deprived of all influence in the government. But the hardest blows were dealt through the Cortes of Toledo in 1480, which a contemporary chronicler admiringly characterizes as “a God-given means of remedy and reformation for the past disorders”. Two petitions, ostensibly emanating from the procuradores, but in all probability inspired by the sovereigns to whom they were addressed, set the ball rolling in the right direction. The first demanded that the royal revenues be restored to their proper proportions, ‘since failure to do so would inevitably mean increased taxes’; the second required that the various alienations, whether of lands, cities, or funds, which had been made without sufficient cause during the preceding reign, should be promptly revoked. In pursuance of these requests a great Act of Resumption was passed, by which the nobles lost and the crown gained an annual revenue of 30,000,000 maravedis. The details were worked out by the queen’s confessor, Hernando de Talavera, whose high character insured him the confidence of all men, in consultation with the very nobles against whom the measure was aimed. The amount that each one should give up was settled according to the merits of his particular case; if he could prove that he had rendered services commensurate with the grant that he had received, he was permitted to retain it, but most of the beneficiaries lost the whole or a large part of what they had been given. There was some grumbling, of course; but the measure was almost a sine qua non of national financial salvation, and the fact that the queen in her final will and testament revoked some of the grants which had been allowed to stand in 1480, as well as certain others which she herself had made, shows that Talavera’s verdicts had not been unduly severe. That the nobles themselves had been invited to participate in every stage of the process by which they had been deprived, was the best possible answer to any complaints.

The annexation of the grand masterships of the three great orders of military knighthood really forms a part of the story of the sovereigns’ measures against the Castilian baronage; intrenched as these institutions were, behind privileges both aristocratic and clerical, it was doubly essential that they be made to bow before the majesty of the throne. The first move came in 1476 on the death of the grand master of Santiago. When the news reached Isabella at Valladolid she promptly took horse, and after three days’ hard riding, the last part of it in a pouring rain and at night, she appeared at the convent at Uclés, where the thirteen dignitaries of the order were discussing the selection of a successor. The magnates were amazed at her vigorous insistence that they suspend their proceedings; they were dumfounded by her announcement that she desired that the coveted office be conferred on her husband, and that she had written to Rome to ask for a bull of investiture from the Pope; but the charm and power of her personality overcame all resistance. The royal ambassador at the Vatican wrote that “the Pope and cardinals held it to be a most monstrous thing and contrary to all precedent that a woman should have any rights over the administration of orders”; but his urgency finally triumphed, and the desired provision of Ferdinand to the grand mastership of Santiago at the request of the queen was duly granted. It is true that Ferdinand, whose whole handling of this problem of the grand masterships was
marked with even more than his usual caution, did not at once avail himself of the permission that he had received. The candidate whom the dignitaries had intended to elect was permitted to assume the office and to hold it until his death in 1499. But in 1487 the Catholic King utilized the opportunity afforded by the death of the grand master of Calatrava to give effect to the papal bull and possess himself of that office; in 1494 he took over that of Alcântara in similar fashion; and when five years later the grand mastership of Santiago once more fell vacant, he repeated the process there. As these offices had only been conferred upon Ferdinand for his lifetime, the process of annexation was not complete until in 1523 a bull of Pope Adrian VI definitely incorporated all three military orders into the crown of Castile; but their ultimate fate was inevitable from the moment of Isabella’s first dramatic interference in 1476. What had been one of the principal sources of political anarchy and disruption during the two preceding centuries had now been converted into a source of added wealth and power to the monarchy.

A number of other measures, all of which aimed directly or indirectly at the depression of the Castilian baronage, may be briefly mentioned. The Cortes of Toledo of 1480, in addition to passing the great Act of Resumption already described, further indicated their compliance with the royal desires by numerous petitions for the restraint of aristocratic abuses and usurpations. These were for the most part accepted, and converted into laws prohibiting the use of phrases, dignities, or methods of address which were anciently prerogatives of royalty. The grandees, for example, were henceforth forbidden to place crowns above their coats of arms, or to have maces carried before them on state occasions. The erection of new castles—one of the most harmful of baronial privileges—and the practice of duelling were also explicitly prohibited. At the same time the nobles were one by one deprived of important political offices, save in those rare cases where their loyalty was certain and their ability unquestioned. The advancement to the most important posts in the realm of low-born, subservient, self-made men—preferably legists or clerics—is as notable a feature of the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella as of that of their contemporaries in France and England, and left scant room for the baronage. Yet the sovereigns were keenly alive to the danger that the aristocracy, if removed from the government service, where the monarchy could in a measure superintend them, might retire to their great landed estates and hatch plots against the throne. To guard against this peril they made every possible effort to induce the nobles to dance attendance upon themselves. This process of converting their proud hidalgos into servile courtiers was exceedingly difficult to accomplish. The independent traditions of the Castilian baronage made it almost impossible to change them over at short notice into king’s minions, and Ferdinand and Isabella scarcely did more than make a beginning. But their methods of operation were skilful and exceedingly interesting. They flattered the aristocracy by permitting them to retain most of the empty rights and honors to which they were traditionally entitled; even a few of the significant and important ones, which it might have been dangerous to attempt to abolish, were permitted to remain. Thus the highly prized privilege of keeping their hats on in the royal presence continued to be the distinguishing badge of the Castilian nobility; so much so, in fact, that a common form of announcing the grant of a title was a command from the king to the recipient, in the presence of the full court, to ‘be covered’. It was also judged wise not to meddle with the ancient aristocratic exemptions from torture, imprisonment for debt, or even from the payment of regular taxes—much as the sovereigns must have disliked them. A considerable increase in the number of titles and of titled persons, moreover, was apparently held to be good policy by the Catholic Kings: they doubtless hoped in that way to diminish the importance of the distinction. There were, for example, but seven dukes in Castile at the time of their accession; during their reign the number was raised to fifteen. Flattery and cajolery were thus judiciously mixed with vigorous measures of suppression, in the sovereigns’ treatment of their unruly magnates.

Such were the principal means by which Ferdinand and Isabella succeeded in vindicating the authority of the monarchy against the class which more than any other had contrived during the past two centuries to hold it in tutelage. By them the preponderance of actual power in the body politic, which hitherto had been unquestionably possessed by the aristocracy, was made to pass to the crown, where it equally unquestionably remained until the days of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte. That such a shifting of the centre of authority at home was the indispensable preliminary to the efficient upbuilding of an empire abroad must be evident to the most casual observer. And in order to understand the relentless persistency with which the Spanish kings attempted to safeguard and conserve every minutest particle of their royal authority in the New World, it is essential to keep in mind the tremendous exertions which they had been obliged to put forth to establish it, at the very moment when they entered into possession of their new dominions.
At the same time that Ferdinand and Isabella contrived to curb and dominate the enemies of strong central government throughout their dominions, they took effective positive measures to upbuild their own power. The first and by far the most important of these—indeed the source and mainspring of the entire administration of Spain and the Spanish Empire down to the very end of the old regime—was their reform and development of the Royal Council.

We have already examined the origin and growth during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries of this interesting institution, the various changes in its composition and powers, and finally its subjection in the reign of John II and Henry IV, along with most of the other organs of the central government, to the factional control of the baronage. Obviously, if it were ever again to perform the function for which it had been originally created—namely, to advise and aid the king in the management of the realm—its personnel would have to be completely altered, and it would have to be once more brought back into close and intimate contact with the monarchy. A good beginning was made toward the attainment of these two ends in the Cortes of Madrigal in 1476. In spite of the fact that the original summons to this assembly makes mention of a long list of prelates, nobles, and legists as members of the Royal Council, the third of its enactments specifically provides that that body should in future be composed of but one bishop, two barons, and six letrados, with six secretaries; and at another place the monarchs distinctly promise that no new person shall be added to the Council unless there is a vacancy, or without the consent of the existing members. The aristocracy and ecclesiastics were thus in large measure hunted out, and the preponderance was definitely handed over to the legists. Moreover, throughout the portion of the cuaderno of these Cortes which deals with the Consejo, there occur various phrases which indicate that the sovereigns and procuradores had made up their minds that all the members of that body ought to be in constant residence at the court, but that the facts did not correspond to their desires. No specific rule was laid down on this matter for the time being; but it is clear that Ferdinand and Isabella had discerned the dangers inherent in the chronic absenteeism of many of the members of the Council in the past, and had determined to put an end to it.

All the progress made at the Cortes of Madrigal in 1476 was consolidated and increased at those of Toledo in 1480. The first thirty-three sections of their cuaderno are almost exclusively occupied with the reform of the Royal Council: the first two and the thirty-second of these sections deal with its membership and place of meeting; the rest with its procedure and powers. Its composition was now definitely fixed at one prelate, three nobles, and eight or nine legists, all but the first of whom were named in the cuaderno. A sop was thrown to the humbled aristocracy by the permission to those magnates, both lay and clerical, whose dignities anciently entitled them to the position of crown counsellors, to attend the meetings of the Consejo whenever they chose; but as the right to vote and transact business was specifically restricted to the regular members, the privilege was largely illusory. All meetings of the Council were to be held in the royal dwelling, wherever the monarchs happened to be, “and if there was not room, then as near to it as possible”; no separation of the crown from its advisers was to be tolerated in future. It was clearly the intention of the sovereigns that the reorganized institution should work, and work hard, to earn the large salaries which were paid to its members. It was to sit every day except Sundays and holidays—from six to ten in the morning between Easter and mid-October, and from nine to twelve during the rest of the year: if the business on hand could not be finished within the appointed time, the sessions were prolonged. Every member was sworn to inviolable secrecy. Four councillors, of whom two must be legists, constituted a quorum. Elaborate regulations prescribed the methods by which business should be conducted. Speed, order, and efficiency were the watchwords at every turn. It is clear that written records were kept of all the most important proceedings. In that way the sovereigns could inform themselves concerning the doings of their Council much more accurately than through oral reports; and moreover an enormous body of valuable experience and administrative and judicial precedents was thus accumulated and preserved for the guidance of those to come after. Huge stacks of documents and copies of documents of every sort and description became in fact a distinguishing characteristic of Spanish administration from the days of the Catholic Kings.

The competence and powers of the reorganized Council were exceedingly extensive; in theory every phase of the government of Castile fell within its purview. It acted as an advisory body to the crown in appointments, grants, and the bestowal of the royal patronage, as well as in certain matters of policy; and in such cases the sovereigns alone signed the document announcing the decision, though some of the councillors might indorse it. But the Council also dealt independently with a number of administrative affairs on its own authority. It doubtless often consulted the sovereigns in such cases, if doubts arose as to the proper course to pursue, but the royal signature did not appear on the paper which announced the verdict; those of the councillors were held to suffice. It even went so far as to exercise one of the most distinctive prerogatives of royalty after the death of Queen Isabella, and summon on its
own authority the Cortes which all men demanded. It was also the supreme court of justice of the realm, to which appeal lay from the lower tribunals, to which all men without distinction of rank or lineage were unquestionably subject, and whose decision was absolutely final; it was thus the principal means of centralizing the administration of justice in the hands of the crown. “When the liberties of the nation had perished, it preserved the laws”. Fridays were set apart for the exercise of its judicial functions, and during the earlier part of the reign the sovereigns lent all the majesty of their presence to these occasions by presiding whenever possible in person. We shall revert to this phase of the Council’s activities in another place; for the present we need only remark that contemporaries were so deeply impressed with it that the old name of Consejo Real began to give way to that of Consejo de Justicia, Consejo de Castilla, however, ultimately became the regular designation of it, though all three titles continued to be used indiscriminately for the same body for many years to come. Finally, in conjunction with the monarch the Council possessed the right to issue orders and proclamations which had the force of laws; but its legislative powers through the so-called autos acordados were not fully developed until the days of the Hapsburgs. The ancient notion that valid laws could only be made in and by the consent of the

It will be readily understood that all the vast powers above enumerated could not possibly be exercised in full by a single body with a personnel so limited as that which we have just described. A large amount of work would have to be delegated to minor tribunals, and a passage in Pulgar in reference to the Cortes of 1480 has led many authors to conclude that four other councils, each with a separate function of its own, were already in existence and full working order at that date. “At the time of these Cortes”, says the chronicler, “there were five councils in five separate apartments in the royal palace where the king and queen were staying;” and he then goes on to a brief description of their duties and personnel. But to assume that all of these bodies were permanently established in their final form at this early period, is to antedate by over forty years the constitutional arrangements of the time of Charles V, and to ignore indisputable proofs of their subsequent organization. Of the four, outside the Consejo Real, only one, that of the Hermandad, can be regarded as having attained anything like its final form in this period; and it only lasted, as we have already seen, until 1498. The other three bodies which Pulgar describes were merely groups of the chiefs of certain special branches of the administration, nuclei out of which full-fledged councils were afterwards evolved. What the words of the chronicler do show is that there was already a certain set of men—and it was the only one in which the grandees were permitted to play a prominent role—in which Ferdinand confided with reference to foreign affairs; this was the origin of the Council of State, which emerged in its final form in 1526. “In another part of the palace”, continues the story, “were the Contadores Mayores and the officials who kept the accounts of the royal treasury and the crown domain”; from these was ultimately evolved the Consejo de la Hacienda, but it did not take definite shape till 1568. Finally, a number of nobles and legists resident at the court, but natives of the realms of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Sicily, and well versed in the laws and customs of those lands, were intrusted, according to Pulgar, with the administration of the affairs of those kingdoms; yet it was not till November 19, 1494, that the Consejo de Aragon, of which this body was the origin, was definitely constituted for that purpose. In its final form it was composed of five legists; and it is worth noting that two of them were also members at one time or another of the Consejo de Castilla, an arrangement which the continuous presence of both bodies at the royal court rendered possible. This cannot, however, be taken to indicate any effort towards the fusion of the two bodies or of the different realms over which they had jurisdiction. It is explained by the very high ability of the two men in question, Alfonso de Caballeria and Felipe Pons, which made them indispensable. The Councils of Castile and of Aragon continued to deal exclusively with the affairs of the realms to which they respectively belonged; neither one trespassed upon the territory of the other.

In addition to these different committees, there were two regular councils which took definite shape before the close of the reign. These were the Consejo de la Suprema, which we have already examined in connection with the Inquisition, and the Consejo de las Ordenes, which was certainly in existence in 1515. The Consejo de Indios, whose origin and early development may most conveniently be considered in another place, was apparently spoken of as such as early as 1509, though it was not finally established until 1524.

The measure of independent authority possessed by these different bodies, both before and after they emerged from the stage of amorphous committees to that of full-fledged councils, varied widely, as was natural, in every case; but the immense preponderance of the Council of Castile is in general the all-important fact to be borne in mind. It was spoken of by the sovereigns as Nuestro Consejo in the Ordenanzas Reales as if no other council existed; if others took their places beside it in the succeeding years, it certainly maintained its preeminence. The Contadores de Hacienda did little more than carry
out in detail the main lines of the financial policy, which were laid down by the superior body. The Councils of the Hermandad, the Suprema, and the Indies doubtless enjoyed a somewhat larger measure of autonomy, but it was impossible for them to initiate a course of action repugnant to the Council of Castile. In the Council of Aragon we have, in theory at least, rather a coordinate than a subordinate jurisdiction during this period; but the fact, already noticed, that two of its members had seats in the Council of Castile, was an excellent safeguard against the two bodies falling to loggerheads with one another; and in case of difference of opinion on any isolated point, there could be no question which would prevail. The Council of State, on the other hand, was a purely advisory body with no real authority at all. Though it was usually placed at the head of the list of all the consejos in official descriptions of the government of Spain, the precedence accorded it was merely a sop to the grandees who had seats there, and for practical purposes amounted to nothing. The Consejo de Castilla continued to vindicate its position at the head of the great conciliar system whose ramification is the salient feature of Spanish constitutional development during the next three centuries; under the king it was the supreme power in the Spanish Empire, of which, as time went by, Castile became more and more unquestionably the centre.

It is not easy to state what measure of authority was possessed by each of these different bodies apart from the sovereign. In this matter, as in the relation of the different councils to one another, the facts doubtless varied in every case. With the Hacienda, the Suprema, and the Hermandad, the sovereigns had probably little to do, save through the Council of Castile. With the Consejo de Indias they were doubtless somewhat closer in touch, and still more so with the Council of Aragon. The Council of State, on the other hand, was almost wholly dependent upon the presence of the crown, since foreign affairs, with which it dealt, were always directly guided from the throne. The powers of the all-important Council of Castile, as we have already seen, were partly exercised independently of the sovereigns, and partly in conjunction with them; but the tendency, as time wore on, was towards a marked increase of its own authority apart from the crown. During the early part of their reign, the monarchs were in constant attendance. They feared that in their absence it might get out of hand; and we have already seen that they made a special point of presiding in person on Fridays, when it dealt with judicial affairs. After the forces of anarchy and rebellion had been definitely overthrown, however, they felt safe in leaving it more and more to its own devices. This is doubtless the significance of the first definite emergence in 1489 of an office of which there had previously been only vague hints—that of the President of the Council of Castile, or, as he soon came to be called, the President of Castile. It was conferred in that year on Don Alvaro de Portugal—“a very upright and most prudent man”—and again ten years later on Juan Daza, bishop of Oviedo and later of Cartagena. Its occupant soon came to be by far the most important person in the realm after the monarch; but the days of its greatest independent power and prestige did not come until the seventeenth century, when lazy, pleasure-loving ‘picture kings’ succeeded to the throne of the indefatigable Ferdinand and Isabella. Their Catholic Majesties were far too active and omniscient to permit any subordinate person to usurp their functions.

Such were the foundations of that great system of councils which formed the framework of the administration of the Spanish Empire, and which we shall encounter again and again in our examination of the different branches of the service of the crown. Through them the sovereigns carried their absolutism into every department and subdivision of the conduct of the government. Every single member of each of these different councils was appointed by the monarchy and could be dismissed at its pleasure. We have already pointed out that the overwhelming majority of these appointees, save in the Council of State, were letrados, whose origin and training rendered them fit instruments for the erection of a system of royal despotism; yet it is important to observe that Ferdinand and Isabella, in sharp contrast to many of their Hapsburg successors, were glad to advance men of originality and independent power to these important posts. The kind of councillor that Charles V, and still more Philip II, preferred, was the man who would obediently, nay almost slavishly, follow orders and precedents and never strike out into a line of policy of his own; and this characteristic was not the least important of a number of elements that combined to paralyze the efficiency of Spanish administration in the end of the sixteenth century and give it that reputation for extreme slowness, heaviness, and inadaptability which has clung to it ever since. But these defects did not appear, or at least they are not at all prominent—save perhaps in connection with the government of remote colonies and dependencies—under the Catholic Kings. Partly no doubt because the Spanish Empire had not yet attained its ultimate unwieldy proportions, but also because the sovereigns were not afraid to trust the management of it to men of ability, provided their loyalty was beyond question, the government of Ferdinand and Isabella forms an agreeable contrast to that of their successors in the comparative speed and efficiency of its operations.
Next in importance after Ferdinand and Isabella’s reorganization of the Royal Council and its satellites come unquestionably their reforms in the administration of justice. To these the establishment of the Hermandad was an indispensable preliminary; for so terrible was the situation at the time of their accession that emergency measures were imperatively necessary before the ordinary courts of the realm could be expected to discharge their functions. At the same time, however, the sovereigns did their best to restore the badly shaken prestige of the regular tribunals; and they began, as we have already seen, at the top of the ladder by regularly lending the majesty of their presence to the Council of Castile on the days which it devoted to judicial affairs. The penalties meted out by that body in the early years of the reign were extremely severe. Villalobos, the medical adviser of Ferdinand and also of Charles V, characterizes the mutilations and beheadings that it inflicted as “terrifying and horrible vivisections”; but it is doubtful if any less drastic methods would have served the purpose. Certainly they enjoyed the warm approval of contemporaries, and Isabella in particular received, as was probably her due, the lion’s share of the credit for the restoration of respect for the law. Fernández de Oviedo, writing in 1556, describes the early years of the reign as “an age of gold and of justice, when he who was in the right obtained his due. Since God has taken away the saintly queen, it is far harder to get an audience of 1556, describes the early years of the reign as “an age of gold and of justice, when he who was in the right obtained his due. Since God has taken away the saintly queen, it is far harder to get an audience of

The reorganization of the Council of Castile and the emphasis laid upon its judicial functions effected all the reform that was necessary at the fountain head; the next problem was how to deal with the royal Audiencia or Cancillería below it. During the troublous times of the preceding reign the functions of this tribunal had been continually interrupted, and its place of abode constantly changed, despite the pragmatics of 1405 which had established it at Valladolid; in 1480 the sovereigns definitely ordered it back to that city, where it henceforth remained. This, however, was only a beginning. It soon became evident that there was far too much work on hand for a single royal court to perform—especially as Ferdinand and Isabella, with the growing security of their thrones and the increased complexity of their administration, tended more and more to hand over to it many of the cases hitherto reserved to the Council of Castile, in order to leave the latter body more time for the discharge of its governmental functions. They therefore set up a second tribunal, first at Ciudad Real in 1494, and subsequently at Granada in 1505, for the southern part of the realm; this body and that at Valladolid were always known after 1494 as Chancillerías, a name which emphasized their proximity to the throne. The Tagus marked the boundary between their jurisdictions. A subsidiary tribunal also made its appearance in Galicia in 1486, and others were created in subsequent reigns with the gradual extension of the dominions of the crown; these lesser bodies were all called Audiencias, and we shall later encounter that term, though with a somewhat different and extended significance, in the Spanish possessions in the New World. But the two original courts enjoyed for a long time by far the greatest measure of prestige. Especially was this true of that of Valladolid. The number of its judges steadily rose as the reign progressed, owing to the enormous accumulation of suits that were brought before it. The four oidores, mentioned in the Cortes of Toledo of 1480, were increased to eight and later to sixteen; so that at the end of the reign there were four salas de lo civil in place of one. The sala de lo criminal, composed of three alcaldes, remained unchanged, as did also the sala de los hifosaldo, but there was also added a special sala and juez for natives of the province of Vizcaya. One-year terms were prescribed for most of the judges. Apparently the sovereigns dreaded lest with a longer tenure they might be in danger of getting out of hand; and their fear of aristocratic intrusion is once more revealed by their stem prohibition of all such claims to “the enjoyment of any judicial or governmental office by virtue of any hereditary right or title” as had been made in the two previous reigns. The increase and development of the duties laid upon the procurador fiscal, or prosecutor on behalf of the crown, form one of the most striking features of Ferdinand and Isabella’s judicial reforms. He was constantly urged to display the greatest energy and activity in order that the prerogatives and revenues of the monarchs should in no wise be diminished or impaired. The sovereigns also zealously guarded the judicial rights and privileges of the poor. In the larger tribunals they maintained special counsel for those who could not afford to pay for it at their own expense; and in the minor ones they commanded that all the lawyers in attendance should give freely of their services to the destitute “without payment and for the love of God.” The audiencias, the cancellerías, and the Council of Castile were protected against petty and vexatious suits by the provision that no case of less than 3000 maravedis’ value could be brought before them; but various interesting precautions were taken to prevent the miscarriage of justice in the lower courts. One of these provided that cases which could not be appealed might be tried over again at the request of either of the parties, before the same judge with two or three other persons of known integrity associated with him. A number of other elaborate regulations prescribed the methods of procedure of the Castilian audiencias and the nature of the cases that could come before them? Such
The absolutist theories of Ferdinand and Isabella made them chafe under the restrictions of their royal authority which were imposed by the powers of the Castilian Cortes. At first, while their attention was centred on breaking the power of the baronage, they concealed their dread of the national assembly, and skilfully utilized it as an ally against the nobles. It will be remembered that the Cortes of Madrigal in 1476 and of Toledo in 1480 lent them valuable aid in this particular. But with the aristocracy reduced to impotence, the sovereigns’ fears of democratic opposition not unnaturally revived. They saw that the indispensable ally of the past might easily develop into the menacing rival of the future, unless it was carefully restrained; they therefore took pains to summon the national assembly as infrequently as possible, and, whenever they were obliged to have recourse to it for financial purposes, to make the most of those germs of decadence which had already begun to appear in its constitution and procedure. The result was that the history of the Castilian Cortes under the Catholic Kings shows a decline quite as marked as the development of the powers of the Council. The salutary victory of the monarchy over the aristocracy—an indispensable condition of continued national existence—was dearly bought by the stifling of those aspirations for liberty which formed the brightest feature of mediaeval Castilian life. At the most critical stage of its existence the realm was transformed from a turbulent oligarchy, whose lawlessness was partially redeemed by a somewhat undisciplined passion for freedom, into a monarchy so omnipotent that nothing, save the national tendency towards separatism, could hold out against it.

The chronology of the Castilian Cortes under the Catholic Kings forms a significant commentary on these developments. According to the official reckoning they were summoned sixteen times between the death of Henry IV (1474) and that of Ferdinand (1516): of these meetings four took place before 1483 and the other twelve after 1497. The explanation of this curious distribution is not far to seek. The first four sessions represent the period when the monarchs needed the alliance of the Cortes against the aristocracy. The gap between 1482 and 1498 indicates that the sovereigns had won their battle and
dismissed their ally; and the hiatus would inevitably have been prolonged, had it not been for the necessity of obtaining national recognition of new heirs to the throne, and still more of gaining extra funds for the prosecution of the Italian wars. Careful comparison of the dates of most of the last twelve meetings with the ebbs and flows of the foreign conflict will reveal close interrelation between them.

Besides their refusal to call the national assembly together, except when absolutely necessary, the sovereigns utilized every quiet and inconspicuous means to accelerate the deterioration of its powers. Most important was their omission to summon the two privileged orders. Both nobles and clergy came in 1476 and in 1480, but afterwards we hear little or nothing of them; and by the end of the reign the Castilian Cortes had become to all intents and purposes a meeting of thirty-six procuradores from eighteen cities—“a number” which, as has been well said, “was too large for a council, but not enough for a national assembly”. In strict legality there can be little doubt that the sovereigns were fully justified in leaving the privileged orders out, since their presence was entirely dependent on the will of the crown. On the other hand the tradition of their attendance was so strong that it is almost inconceivable that Ferdinand and Isabella could have succeeded in breaking it, if the persons concerned had made a stand for their rights. It is at their own door that the blame for the gradual elimination of the nobles and clergy from the national assembly is chiefly to be laid; but it is not difficult to see how they came to lose interest in the meetings of a body, whose functions, as time went on, came to be more and more exclusively restricted to the voting of taxes from which they were exempt.

At the same time that the two privileged orders ceased to attend, the independence and ability of the procuradores of the cities declined. The humble, indeed almost abject tone of their petitions to Ferdinand and Isabella forms a striking contrast to the haughty claims which their predecessors had addressed to previous sovereigns. The remodelling of the municipal constitutions and fueros, which we shall subsequently describe, placed their selection more than ever in the hands of the crown and of its representatives; and the degradation of the Cortes was still further accelerated by the initiation, in 1501, of the practice of voting salaries to their own members. Most of their various rights and powers, save the control over the servicio, rested rather on custom than on written law, and were exercised only in consonance with the wishes of the crown; all this made it the easier for Ferdinand and Isabella to override them. In legislation, for instance, the increased activity of the sovereigns and of the Consejo left the Cortes little to do. They continued, of course, to frame petitions on a wide variety of topics, but as they possessed no real hold over the crown, the monarchs could afford coolly to disregard such requests as were not to their liking. Even in financial affairs the powers of the Cortes were really very slight. The list of revenues which came to the crown independent of their vote was so long that in times of peace the government managed to subsist without their aid, as is shown by the long period from 1482 to 1498, in which the national assembly was not summoned once. Isabella, it is true, had grave misgivings as to whether the alcabala could be lawfully levied without the Cortes’ consent; but her dying request that the matter be carefully investigated was disregarded. Over the servicio the Cortes did retain undisputed control; but their extraordinarily ineffective procedure, and their failure to make the most of their authority in other respects, enabled the sovereigns in the long run almost invariably to extort what they wished from them. The baleful effect of this state of affairs on the financial development of a nation which possessed unusually little comprehension of economic principles, and the external demands of whose government increased by leaps and bounds in the succeeding period, requires no additional emphasis.

The Cortes of the realms of the Crown of Aragon were of course in far better condition to resist the invasion of their ancient prerogatives by the monarchy. Realizing the difficulties of the situation there, Ferdinand followed his usual policy of leaving them as far as possible alone. The Aragonese Cortes, the most obstinate of all, met but seven times during his reign, those of Valencia once, and those of Catalonia six times, while the General Cortes of the three realms were convoked only thrice. Money came far harder from the assemblies of the eastern kingdoms when they did meet than from those of Castile, with the natural result that a totally unfair proportion of the financial burden of the Spanish Empire was thrown upon the western kingdom.

All in all, the Catholic Kings had managed to drive the Cortes of their various realms a long way on the road to destruction; but with all their efforts they were unable entirely to exterminate the ancient Spanish love of freedom and democracy, as the revolt of the comuneros in the succeeding reign was to prove in dramatic fashion. The Emperor, who was considerably less hostile to popular assemblies than his predecessors, gave the Castilian Cortes one last and very advantageous opportunity to vindicate their
ancient position; but that body, when the chance came, showed itself lamentably unable to take advantage of it.

Consideration of the national assembly naturally leads on to that of the national finances, whose reestablishment was rendered doubly essential by Spain’s active foreign policy and brilliant imperial prospects. To this the great acts of retrenchment and resumption in the Cortes of Madrigal and Toledo were the indispensable preliminaries; and at the same time a solemn prohibition forbade the further levying of any extra or special imposts by individuals or corporations, in virtue of any grants or favors of the preceding reign. Vigorous efforts were also made to reduce to the smallest possible dimensions the measure of exemption from taxation enjoyed by the two privileged orders. Especially noteworthy is a law providing that when any church, university, or notable person enjoyed the right of extending such exemption to anyone else, it should be exercised only in favor of poorer men, and not in the case of the rich.

These early measures really give the keynote to the whole financial policy of the Catholic Kings, who with their usual conservatism strove rather to correct the defects and abuses of the system they had inherited, than to augment their income by inventing new sources of revenue. According to the figures usually given, the total annual yield of the Castilian imposts amounted to only 885,000 reals in 1474, while thirty years later it had increased to 26,283,334; but during this long period only two new types of revenue were added. The first of these was the product of the mines of the Indies, which we shall take up in another place; for the present we need only observe that the amount of it, during the early years of discovery and exploration, was not large. The second was the so-called Bula de la Cruzada, or system of indulgences conceded by the Pope, through which those who contributed to the Moorish wars could purchase immunity from the penalties of Purgatory. As actually administered, it was an intolerable exaction. It was continued after the expulsion of the infidel from Granada, and the revenues derived from it were used for all sorts of purposes which had never been intended; what had been originally granted temporarily and for a specific end, became in fact a regular and permanent crown revenue. Subsequently it was even collected in the American possessions. The Cortes of 1512 complained vigorously against these abuses. “The preachers of the Bull”, they protested, “keep men two and three days in the churches from morning to evening to listen to their sermons, and thus prevent them from earning their daily bread; and when they find that they cannot thus induce them to take the said Bull, they parade through the streets, asking every one they meet if they know their Pater Noster and Ave Maria; and if perchance they find anyone who does not, they force him to take the said Bull as a penance; and if any one does not take it they drag him around with them in shackles to hear their preachments, and thus force him at last by compulsion and intimidation to do their will”. Yet the sums derived from the Bull of Crusade formed, after all, an insignificant portion of the grand total; the bulk of the income of the Catholic Kings was obtained from the older sources. Of these, as we have already seen, there were a very large variety, in theory at least, over and above the servicio, but the disrupted state of the realm and the inefficiency and corruption of the royal tax gatherers prevented all but a very small portion of the sums that should have been collected from ever reaching the royal treasury. The first aim of the financial policy of the Catholic Kings was to secure some sort of an approximation between the amounts due to the crown and those which were actually received.

The group of men, or Council, as Pulgar somewhat prematurely describes it, which constantly resided at the court and busied itself with the royal revenues, was of course the head and center of the new system. It was composed, so the chronicler tells us, of “the contadores mayores and the officials of the books of the treasury and royal domain, who managed the king’s taxes and the salaries and grants that were paid by the crown, and settled everything that concerned the royal property and patrimony”. This body was divided, early in the reign, into two separate offices or Contadurías—one for the treasury itself (Contaduría de hacienda), and one for the royal accounts (Contaduría de cuentas): each was directed by two contadores mayores, who had at their disposal a large secretarial force. And the increased efficiency of the central financial council which resulted from this reorganization was equalled, if not surpassed, by that of the subordinate officials whom it sent out to do its bidding throughout the length and breadth of the realm. The royal tax gatherers seemed to be everywhere. The corregidores, whose activity, as we shall later see, was one of the most striking features of the administration of Ferdinand and Isabella, were always on hand to protect and support them in exacting the uttermost farthing. Backed up by the authority of the powerful monarchy, they could no longer be intimidated by local magnates into shirking their duty.

Under such a system as this the ancient revenues of the crown took on a new lease of life. The diezmos de aduanas mounted fast and high, partly no doubt because of the permission to deal with
A thoroughly reform and standardization of the value of the coinage accompanied these measures. Most of the work was carried through in 1497; and though the debased or ‘vellon’ currency was permitted to remain in circulation, its relation to the gold and silver money was more strictly defined than before, so that the confusion in values, though still extreme, was by no means so bad as in previous reigns.

None of these financial reforms, however, could have effected their ends had they not been accompanied by a general revival of the economic life of the realm as a whole. Had the wealth of the nation remained where it was in the reign of Henry IV, the government could have done nothing but ‘borrow from beggars’. The solicitude of Ferdinand and Isabella for the prosperity and wellbeing of their people in this respect is highly creditable. The economic progress of Castile under their administration is not one of their most conspicuous triumphs, and it is idle to deny that they made a number of serious mistakes. But when we consider that they inherited a people with little or no talent for affairs, and a traditional aversion to agricultural labor, and when we remember that their religious policy committed them to the expulsion of the portions of the population most valuable from an economic point of view, we shall certainly admit that their successes outweighed their failures. Their Hapsburg heirs did not do nearly so well in this respect, though it is fair to say that the problems with which they were confronted were harder. Indeed, if the Spanish empire in the New World had not been launched on the crest of a temporary wave of prosperity at home, it is doubtful whether it could have survived its earliest trials.

The inevitable clash of the agricultural and pastoral interests was one of the foremost subjects to engage the monarchs’ attention. At first sight their policy appears to indicate a willingness consistently to sacrifice the former to the latter. Certainly their favor and protection gave the Mesta at the end of their reign a far stronger position than it had occupied at the beginning. Yet on the other hand it is only fair to point out that they also strove to do their best by the proverbially thorny problem of Castilian agriculture. Though the labrador—or laborer in the fields—still remained a social outcast and a political nonentity, his estate and condition were ameliorated in a number of different ways. A pragmatics of 1480 granted the solariego the right to remove from one place of abode and settle in another, and permitted him to take with him such possessions as he desired, and to sell the rest, irrespective of distinctions of tierras de señorío, de abadengo, or de realengo, or behetria. This law was by no means rigidly observed, even by the monarchs themselves, but it marked a considerable advance over the conditions that had obtained before. It may in fact be justly regarded as dealing the death blow to serfdom in Castile. Earlier legislation forbidding the seizure for debt of cattle for the plough and of agricultural implements, and exempting one pair of oxen on each farm from taxation, was revived at the Cortes of Madrigal; and a new regulation was passed in 1496 commending laborers and their property to the special protection of the Hermandad. An important pragmática was also issued in the latter year at Burgos, insisting on the preservation of the forests, gardens, and vineyards of the cities. The sovereigns’ encouragement of great fairs at the chief centres of the realm naturally helped the circulation of agricultural products. On the other hand, the sale of grain was subject to heavy taxation down at least to the year 1504, when a series of bad harvests caused the impost to be suppressed. One gains the impression that in good years, such as came with gratifying frequency in the last decade of the fifteenth century, Castilian agriculture could just manage to hold its own; but that it was in no condition to resist bad ones, of which there was a long succession after 1503. Of course there was the greatest
difference in the situation in the different parts of the realm. Portions of Murcia and Andalusia were so fertile that they could take care of themselves in any season, while some of the barren stretches of the meseta defied the most favorable possible conjunction of climatic conditions and human effort.

In the realms of the crown of Aragon Ferdinand also strove to better the lot of the peasants and serfs, largely no doubt as a blow to the nobles and on broad humanitarian grounds, but partly in order to serve economic ends. In Aragon, indeed, where the condition of the rural poor was far worse than in Castile, he had to admit defeat, and permit the continuation of certain ancient abuses which he had hoped to eradicate. In Catalonia, however, where the payeses de remensa had risen in revolt under the turbulent rule of John II and continued their rebellion during the first years of his own reign, he finished the noble work which had been begun by his predecessors by definitely abolishing the six malos usos in the so-called Sentencia arbitral de Guadalupe in 1486. Various measures of precaution were naturally maintained to guard against any fresh outbreak, and some of the ancient financial exactions were suffered to continue, in order to satisfy the claims of the baronage; but the process of liberation had by this time advanced too far to be ever permanently checked; and an important rôle in the history of his native land was assured to the Catalan peasant in the succeeding generations.

Meantime the Castilian Mesta made rapid and consistent progress. It had a long start on its agricultural rivals in the western kingdom when the reign began, and a combination of court favor, and of the general prosperity which accompanied the restoration of internal order, placed it in an almost impregnable position before Ferdinand’s death. Hitherto the crown’s control over this great sheep owners’ guild—the dominant force in the principal national occupation—had been preserved by the king’s appointment of the alcalde entregador, or principal judicial protector of the Mesta, who kept open the cañadas and regulated the interminable quarrels arising out of the encroachments of the pastoral on the agricultural lands and vice versa. In 1454 this important office had been conferred on Pedro de Acuña, a member of the Royal Council, in order that the monarchy might be kept the closer in touch with the Mesta’s affairs. This, however, was not enough to suit the Catholic Kings, who were determined still further to strengthen their hold over the Castilian sheep owners, and to derive the largest possible revenue from their profits. In the year 1500, accordingly, they created a new position, the Presidency of the Mesta, to be held in perpetuo by the senior member of the Council of Castile, with the duty of supervising all the inferior officers of the institution, and of directing its internal organization and external relations. The President naturally superseded the alcalde entregador as the principal link between the Mesta and the crown; in 1568 the alcalde’s office was finally taken over by the Mesta itself for the sum of 750,000 maravedis. In 1492 and 1511, moreover, the Catholic Kings caused a new set of ordinances to be drawn up for the regulation of the Mesta’s internal constitution: the bulk of the work was done by Doctor Palacios Rubios, one of the letrados of the day, who was also prominent in the early history of the administration of the Indies.

But if the creation of the office of President of the Mesta and the promulgation of new laws for its observance brought the institution more closely than ever under crown control, they also insured to it a great increase of crown protection and support. The first part of the sixteenth century unquestionably witnessed the climax of its development. Its extraordinary power and prosperity in this period are the outward emblems of the victory of the pastoral over the agricultural interests in Castile, in a conflict which presents many interesting analogies to the contemporaneous English struggle over enclosures. The Mesta was now not only a highly organized and specially privileged corporation, securely entrenched behind the favor and protection of the crown and amply capable of defending itself against the hostility of municipal officers and local magnates. It was rapidly becoming a considerable political force, which could lend valuable aid to the monarchy in its struggle to dominate the Cortes, the municipalities, and the courts. It is needless to add that the crown took good care to secure to itself a liberal recompense for its patronage of the Mesta in money as well as in reciprocal political support. The revenues it derived from servicio y montazgo were multiplied many times over in the reign of the Catholic Kings; moreover the latter appointed special judges of their own—jueces pesquisidores—to hear suits between the Mesta and the local tax collectors, so that a good many of the imposts which had previously been levied by the municipal authorities gradually found their way into the royal hacienda. It was also in this reign that the Mesta began the practice of occasionally voting special contributions to the crown, over and above the taxes it ordinarily paid; under Charles V the sums yielded by this custom were substantially increased.

The industrial and commercial policy of the Catholic Kings was dictated, like that of their contemporaries in other European lands, by the strictest principles of state regulation and protection. Standardization of weights and measures, minute regulations concerning the manufacture and
production of different commodities, sumptuary laws of infinite variety and scope, and stern prohibition of the export of certain commodities and of the import of others occupied a large share of the attention of Ferdinand and Isabella. Much pains was spent on the revival of manufacturing, for which the sovereigns discerned the country’s exceptional advantages. Hitherto Castile had exported chiefly raw material and bought most of its manufactured commodities abroad. Now, with the idea of righting the balance in one of the most important staples of Castilian trade, the sovereigns ordained that no more than two thirds of the raw wool produced in the realm should be sent out of it, and forbade the importation of manufactured cloths. For the time being the result was highly gratifying. The woollen industries of Toledo and Seville became famous throughout Western Europe, while in the south the manufacture of silk, which had flourished so notably under the Moors, was maintained at such a point that in 1504 the factories of eight cities in Andalusia paid about 9,000,000 maravedis a year in taxes to the royal treasury. All the internal tolls and economic barriers which had been established within Castile with the connivance of Henry IV since 1464, and from which the nobles drew the greatest profit, were abolished; the sovereigns also showed the most persistent energy in improving the public roads and highways. Though the high tariffs at the custom houses on the frontiers of the realm were maintained, its foreign commerce flourished as never before. The list of consuls maintained in other countries to look after the interests of Castilian trade in this period reminds one of the palmier days of Barcelona. As in other lands, the export of gold and silver was strictly prohibited. A law was passed in the Cortes of Toledo to that effect, and elaborate precautions were adopted to give effect to it. When any Spaniard left the realm, he was to inform the corregidor of the place where he resided what sum of money he carried with him. At the frontier the same formalities had to be gone through before an alcalde de las sacas and three other witnesses. The destination and the probable length of the traveller’s stay had also to be revealed, and all the details were written down, so as to be available as testimony against him in case it was found that he had lied. Foreigners were forbidden, by a pragmatics of 1491, to take any money out of the realm; if they came as merchants they were obliged to exchange their goods for the products of the land. Of all the features of the monarchs’ commercial policy, that which bore most directly on the fortunes of the Spanish Empire was their zeal for the increase of shipping. The ramifications of the subject are very wide. Even the course of foreign affairs was at times affected by it; for rival navigation acts were one of the chief causes of the bickerings of Ferdinand and Henry VII of England, which formed such an unedifying feature of both monarchs’ declining years. But, whatever its results, the origin of the policy was primarily economic. The discovery, of America furnished the needed impetus, and in 1495 the sovereigns offered a large premium for the construction of ships of six hundred tons and upwards. In 1500 they forbade the loading of any foreign vessels in their harbors if a Castilian one was available. In 1501 a fresh pragmatics forbade the sale of any Spanish vessel in a foreign land without the express authorization of the crown. Such measures as these produced the desired results. In 1481 their Majesties were able to despatch but seventy ships to aid Ferrante of Naples in putting the Turks out of Otranto in 1496, before the full effects of their policy could have been felt, we are told that they sent 130 vessels, carrying 20,000 men, to convey their daughter to Flanders, at the same time that another squadron was blockading the coasts of Cerdagne and Roussillon. All in all, it is clear that the Catholic Kings succeeded in arousing the economic energies of Castile in a variety of directions, and to an extent previously unknown.

In Catalonia and in Majorca, on the other hand, the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella witnessed a marked economic decline. A number of causes contributed to this result. In the first place, the devastating civil wars and internal uprisings which occurred under the rule of John II dislocated the commercial activities of Barcelona and of Palma. In the second, the constitution of the former city was thoroughly remodelled by Ferdinand for the benefit of the monarchy in such a way as to sap the vitality of its ancient democratic institutions, and also seriously to injure its trade. The ancient practice of electing the members of the Concell and of the Concell de Cent was exchanged for a system of insaculación, and the representatives of the mercantile and artisan classes were gradually elbowed aside. Thirdly, it seems perfectly clear that the economic effect of the Inquisition and of the expulsion of the Jews was felt much more quickly and acutely in the eastern kingdoms than in Castile.

A larger proportion of their trade was managed by Hebrews, and the complaints of the citizens of both capitals to Ferdinand plainly show that, in their estimation at least, the evil results of religious intolerance were chiefly responsible for their misfortunes. The advance of the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean deprived both Catalonia and Majorca of some of their most valuable markets in the Levant, and at the same time the discovery of America diverted the economic energies of Spain as a whole in a new direction. Castile suddenly became the centre of interest, and the eastern kingdoms were eclipsed. Barcelona lost a fifth of its population during the last third of the fifteenth century; in the early part of the sixteenth it revived somewhat, owing probably to the Italian wars, which necessarily
focussed men’s attention on the Mediterranean shores; but it never regained its former prestige. In 1491 the consules of the Lonja memorialized Ferdinand in a truly pitiful strain. “The commerce of this your city”, they declared, “is entirely prostrated and abandoned ... and the workmen and the artisans, who can no longer gain a livelihood or ply their trades, depart and transfer themselves to other kingdoms”.

The principles of centralization and monarchical supremacy on which the internal policy of Ferdinand and Isabella was founded left scant room for the maintenance of the high traditions of municipal self-government which had been inherited from the days of the Reconquest. The decline of the Castilian cities had begun more than a century before the accession of the Catholic Kings. Many of the ancient fueros had been shamefully transgressed, and royal appointees had begun to supersede the locally elected officials under the earliest sovereigns of the house of Trastamara; but hitherto the effect of these changes had been rather to convert the municipalities into centres of corruption and violence, than to render them amenable to the control of the crown. The monarchy had not yet attained a position sufficiently strong to enable it to reap the benefit of the abrogation of the local liberties; it had not succeeded in acquiring for itself the powers of which the concejos had been deprived. Dissipation of authority, rather than its concentration in royal hands, had thus far resulted from the crown’s premature attempts at municipal regulation. The town of Caceres in Estremadura was a case in point. In the reign of Henry IV it was apparently divided into two hostile factions, which fought so bitterly over the possession of the city offices that “deaths and other improprieties,” as Pulgar significantly expresses it, were the usual result. But Ferdinand and Isabella did not propose to tolerate the continuance of such conditions as this. The queen visited Caceres in person, in the year 1477, and ordained that the municipal magistrates, who had hitherto been elected annually, should now be chosen by lot and hold office for the rest of their lives; but that when, through deaths, future vacancies should occur, she and her successors would appoint to the same in such manner as would best conduce to the service of the crown. “And this she established as the regular law and custom of this place, and all the inhabitants thereof rejoiced in it, because it put a stop to their quarrels and the evils that followed in their train, which had resulted from the elections of earlier days”. Apparently the cities were perfectly ready to renounce their ancient liberties, now that at last they had got a monarch sufficiently powerful to give them peace and order in return.

The prevalence of such sentiments as these afforded the Catholic Kings an admirable opportunity to subvert the foundations of local autonomy in Castile without the sacrifice of popularity which such a measure would naturally be supposed to entail; and Ferdinand and Isabella took full advantage of the situation to carry their absolutism into every comer of the land. A number of ordinances were put forth in the Cortes of Toledo of 1480 to strengthen their control over the municipal magistrates. Hereditary grants of offices were revoked, and deathbed resignations in favor of kinsmen or friends forbidden. If a regidor was found to have leased his position to some other person he was to forfeit it as penalty for his offence; though, on the other hand, the crown not seldom put up the local magistracies for sale. All cities which did not possess a casa de ayuntamiento or town hall were directed to build one within two years, in order that municipal affairs might be conducted with dignity and decorum; they were also commanded to keep written records of all their special laws and privileges. Certain local institutions were judged to be so dangerous that, instead of attempting to modify them, the Catholic Kings determined to abrogate them entirely.

Such was the case with the Hermandad de las Marismas, which, by a pragmatics of 1490, was forbidden to hold further meetings, save under the supervision of the corregidor of Vizcaya—a mortal blow to its independent existence. Still, for the most part, Ferdinand and Isabella proceeded cautiously in this as well as in the other phases of their internal policy. Indeed, many of the municipal reforms which they initiated seemed to be quite as much inspired with the idea of improving conditions in the cities as with that of augmenting their own power at the expense of the concejo or ayuntamiento.

Yet it was not on the remodelling of the city governments themselves, that Ferdinand and Isabella chiefly relied to effect their ends; but rather on a great increase of the authority of the representatives of the central government whom they sent out to inspect and override them. It was in this reign that the pesquisidores, veedores, and corregidores for the first time really came into their own. The first named continued as before to play a primarily judicial role; they were usually dispatched to settle cases which the municipal alcaldes could not manage by themselves, and to see that other royal officials did their duty. The second, as their name implies, were supposed to exercise general oversight of the public affairs of the locality to which they were assigned, and report to the crown. The corregidores were by far the most important of all. Beginning in the year 1480, they were sent, for the first time, to all the Castilian cities without exception, so that the institution was henceforth definitely
extended over the entire realm. At the same time, the sovereigns were careful to keep these important offices out of the hands of the aristocracy, and especially of the knights of the three military orders. In 1500 the corregidores had attained to such importance that an elaborate pragmática was put forth on June 9 at Seville, describing their functions and responsibilities. This pragmática remained valid throughout the sixteenth century, and gives the best existing description of the institution at the height of its power. As soon as he had been appointed, the corregidor, if present at the court, was obliged to take his oath of office before the Council of Castile, which delivered to him his special instructions. Arrived in his corregimiento, he must refrain from imposing any illegal taxes, from mingling in local factions, from the purchase of real property, or from building himself a house without the royal license, from selecting his subordinates from the inhabitants of the region over which he had been set, and from farming out any of the privileges or offices in his control. He was specially recommended to guard against any encroachments of ecclesiastical and seigniorial jurisdiction, to prevent the construction of castles or fortified houses in the cities, and to see to it that no new impost of any kind was established on any pretext whatsoever. He must learn the special laws and customs of his corregimiento, in order, if he deemed it expedient, that he might reform them in collaboration with the local regidor; he was to keep a close watch on the local finances, and inform himself in regard to the wealth and extent of the public lands of the municipality and the best methods of increasing their yield. Inspection and regulation of the relations of Moors and Christians, oversight of gambling houses and prevention of forbidden games, superintendence of local customs dues, general police and executive authority, and above all the securing of the impartial administration of justice to all men, both in civil and criminal affairs—these and many other things besides were included in his official functions. The ancient forms remained, though the animating spirit had fled. But without the corregidores it is certain that Ferdinand and Isabella would have been able to accomplish far less than they did. By them every man in the realm, no matter how obscure or remote, was brought into direct and immediate contact with the central power. They were as indispensable to the crown in local affairs as was the Council of Castile in national ones.

This vast accumulation of power in the hands of the corregidor explains why the Catholic Kings took such unlimited pains to get the best men in the realm for the office. Bovadilla describes, with interminable prolixity, the qualifications and characteristics of the ideal corregidor, and the way in which he should make use of the authority confided to him. Though his book was not published till 1597, it seems certain that the author was thinking, when he wrote, rather of the appointments of the Catholic Kings than of those of their successors, for the average was distinctly lower under the Hapsburgs. And it was not merely by exercising great care in their selection that Ferdinand and Isabella maintained the highest standard for their corregidores. At the close of their term of office these magistrates were subjected to a most searching test through the development in this reign of the institution of the residencia. We have already seen that it had come to be the practice in Castile, at least as early as the reign of John II, that the corregidores should remain at their posts for a period of fifty days after the expiration of their appointment, in order that any complaints against them might be heard and justice done accordingly; and we may remark in passing that this seems to dispose of the well-known statement of Herrera, that King Ferdinand imported the residencia from Aragon. On the other hand, it is quite possible that some of the fresh developments and improvements of the institution which marked this reign may have been suggested by the Catholic monarch. Of these the following are the most important. The length of the period of the residencia was shortened from fifty to thirty days; but evasion of it, which had not seldom occurred in the past, was henceforth prevented by an elaborate system of oaths and forfeits. Many new precautions, moreover, were taken to render the residencia fair and effective. Hitherto the hearing of the complaints against the outgoing official had apparently been a somewhat haphazard affair. Usually it had been intrusted to pesquisidores, who not seldom made dishonest use of their authority, in order to win for themselves the place of the man on whom they were sitting in judgment. To remedy these evils, the conduct of the affair was now turned over to a juez de residencia with elaborate instructions in regard to the performance of his duties. He was to be held during the period of the inquiry to the observance of all the rules which had been framed for the corregidor; he was to take care that the residencia be duly published and proclaimed, in order that the remotest portions of the corregimiento might be heard from; he was not, however, to be satisfied with general accusations, but was to get specific facts and spare no pains to learn the truth. He was to inform
himself concerning the conduct of the local officials and the general state of the corregimiento, and to report to the central government. There were, furthermore, numerous regulations defining the limits of his independent authority, and the matters to be referred to the Council of Castile, to which, when the residencia was completed, a full report of it in writing must always be rendered? All this shows that the institution was now regularly and permanently established as an integral part of the administrative system of Castile; moreover, it was utilized henceforth in connection with other officials than the corregidores. “Asistentes, Corregidores, Gobernadores, Alcades mayores y Tenientes, Alguaciles y Merinos y sus Tenientes” are described in laws of the first part of the next reign as magistrates whose residencias must be reported to the Royal Council; and besides, as we shall later see, the institution made its appearance in the Indies during the period of Ferdinand and Isabella. Whether it was primarily intended, as seemed to be the case, to secure the highest possible standard of honor and efficiency among the government appointees, or whether the crown was merely attempting, under the guise of preventing abuses, to gain for itself a further hold over the officials who represented it at a distance from the seat of the royal power, it is difficult to say; but it is probable that the first of these alternatives came nearer realization, in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, than it did under their successors. With all their enthusiasm for centralization, the Catholic Kings never forgot their zeal for the impartial administration of justice.

The ecclesiastical policy of the Catholic Kings, in so far as it is not concerned with the Inquisition and the expulsion of the Jews and the Moors, may be summed up in a single sentence. The sovereigns would gladly promise unswerving loyalty to Rome, and enthusiastic devotion to the advancement of the interests of the church in all their dominions; but in return they demanded from the Pope wellnigh complete control of the clergy of Spain and all her dependencies. The idea of national churches, independent of papal control, which had already manifested itself in England, France, and the Empire in a variety of different ways, was firmly upheld by the Catholic Kings. It tallied closely with their schemes of political centralization; and they put it in practice, as we have already seen, in connection with the foundation of the Inquisition, whose officials they insisted on nominating themselves. But the measure of the authority which they exercised over the regular ecclesiastical appointments of the realm at the time of their accession did not correspond at all to their desires. During the confusion of the preceding reigns papal provisions to the Spanish sees had increased apace, in defiance of more ancient precedents to the contrary; and they were the more obnoxious in that the nominees in such cases were almost invariably foreigners. A vacancy in the see of Cuenca in 1482 gave the sovereigns a chance to make a stand for their own prerogatives in this respect. After a vigorous dispute they elicited from Sixtus IV an acknowledgment of their right to ‘supplicate’ in favor of the worthiest candidate for any of the more important ecclesiastical offices of the realm; it was of course understood that in such cases their supplication would not be refused. Practical control of the smaller benefices, which the Pope had reserved for himself in the agreement of 1482, was also subsequently acquired by the sovereigns, through various indirect methods. Moreover, in the conquered realm of Granada, and in the Indies, they were given outright the privilege of appointment to all ecclesiastical posts, as a reward for the services which they had rendered to Christendom in these lands. In 1501 they were also granted all the tithes in the American possessions, to be used for the building and support of the churches there, so that their ecclesiastical authority in the New World was even more securely established and fortified than at home.

Doubtless the Popes were chiefly inspired by ulterior motives in making these concessions. They recognized the sovereigns’ power and prestige; they needed their alliance for political purposes; and they wisely determined to grant with a good grace what they were not strong enough to refuse. Indeed, they gave more than was demanded. At the close of the year 1494, Alexander VI formally conferred on the Spanish monarchs their proudest title, ‘the Catholic Kings’, ostensibly as a reward for their great services to the faith—really because he needed their help in expelling the forces of Charles VIII from Italy. And Ferdinand, in turn, took pleasure in exalting the authority of the papacy on a subsequent occasion, when he thought that its assertion might prove politically useful to him. The ancient claim of the Holy See to dispose of the temporal kingdoms of the earth was dramatically upheld by the Spanish monarch in 1515, when he justified his claim to the realm of Navarre before the Cortes of Burgos on the ground that it had been granted to him by Pope Julius II.

But though external political considerations were unquestionably the principal reason for the cordial relations of the papacy with the Spanish sovereigns, it would be grossly unjust to the latter to depreciate the immense services that they rendered to the church within their own domains. The monasteries were reformed and the vices of regulars and seculars punished. The scandalous immorality
of the clerics was checked. Their usurpations were restrained and absenteeism was sternly prohibited. Activity and zeal replaced idleness and corruption, for the time being at least, as the distinguishing marks of the Spanish priest. In all this beneficent work the monarchs’ right-hand man was Cardinal Ximenes, whose admirable devotion and fervor went far to palliate his unbinding intolerance. And no better comment on the position which he desired the church to occupy on earth could possibly be imagined than the memorable words in which he justified the arrangement of the text in the famous Complutensian Polyglot Bible—the fruit of his energy and enthusiasm, and perhaps the most notable triumph of scholarship in the Spain in which he lived. The Old Testament is printed in three parallel columns—the Septuagint on the left, the original Hebrew on the right, and the Vulgate in the centre. “Midway between the Greek of the Church of the East and the Hebrew of the synagogue”, runs the Cardinal’s sonorous preface, “we have placed Saint Jerome’s Latin translation of the Church of Rome, even as Christ was crucified between two thieves.”

The needs of the Spanish Empire demanded powerful military resources. One of the most important reforms of the Catholic Kings was their transformation of the scattered and undisciplined feudal levies which had effected the Reconquest, into a modern, organized, efficient, well equipped army, unquestionably superior to any other in Europe down to the time of Gustavus Adolphus.

We have already seen that the recruiting of the troops for the Granadan war was for the most part of the old-fashioned sort. The contingents of the Hermandad afforded a nucleus, it is true, but the bulk of the levies were furnished and commanded by the great nobles, who marshalled them under their own special standards. But at the same time traces of a different type of military organization began to appear. Pulgar speaks of a body of regular troops, paid by the crown, which was maintained in Galicia in the early part of the reign for the repression of disturbance there. In another place the chronicler tells us of a royal bodyguard of one thousand men (its numbers were soon to be trebled), all servants of the king and queen. He also waxes enthusiastic about the body of Swiss mercenaries which had been sent to the peninsula for the Granada campaign—“warlike men, who fight on foot and never turn their backs on their foes, and therefore wear all their defensive armor in front. They go to earn their livelihood in foreign lands and aid in wars which they consider just. They are good and devout Christians and hold it a great sin to take anything by force.” This very rosy description shows that Spain was keenly observant and appreciative of the military progress that was being made in other lands. The sovereigns had begun to hire foreign soldiers in order to learn from them new methods of waging war; they had thus shown that they realized the necessity of taking the control of military affairs out of the hands of the baronage. The results of their experience were evident in a pragmatics, dated February 22, 1496, at Valladolid, which announced that thenceforth the state would take one man out of every twelve between the ages of twenty and forty-five to serve in the royal armies. It was not intended that the soldiers thus recruited should be permanently under arms. They were mobilized only when there was an immediate prospect of war, but they were paid by the crown from the day on which they entered active service, and their employment may be justly regarded as a long step towards the formation of a standing army. The Italian wars showed that the measure was inadequate to the needs of Spain’s expanding power, and Cardinal Ximenes and Charles V were obliged to develop and augment it; but the days of the old feudal levies were gone forever. The new army was wholly controlled by the central government, and, as long as its pay was forthcoming, generally firm in its allegiance. If funds ran short its behavior was indeed unutterable, as countless episodes in the wars of the sixteenth century were abundantly to prove; the case could scarcely have been otherwise, in view of the fact that rascals and cutthroats as well as patriots and gentlemen found places in its ranks; but it was no worse than the other mercenary armies of the time, and was a vast improvement on the military system which it supplanted.

At the same time that the sovereigns altered the methods of recruitment, a brilliant young officer named Gonsalvo de Cordova, who had fought through the Granadan campaign and reflected on what he had learned there, began to introduce equally radical changes in armament and tactics. He was ably seconded in this important task by Gonzalo de Ayora, who had studied the art of war in Italy. The mediaeval Spanish infantryman, equipped for guerilla warfare in a mountainous country, was far too lightly armed to withstand the shock of contact with the powerful squadrons that had been developed north of the Pyrenees during the preceding hundred years; nor was he adequately protected against firearms or discharges of arrows. On the other hand, the speed and suppleness of the Spanish formation were precious assets which could not be lightly cast aside; the problem was to preserve them and gain needed stability at the same time. The ultimate solution was reached in two different ways. In the first place, the defensive arms of all the Spanish infantrymen were augmented by the addition of a light
The Granadan war we hear no more of his lieutenants or disappeared. The office of general. The ancient mediaeval hierarchy of military officers had in the meantime practically 1505 the entire Spanish army was divided into twenty accompanying each brigade (that is, two seems that Gonsalvo de Cordova set no great store by his artillery. The normal contingent the field was relatively new. Before the end of the reign, however, this had all been changed, though it value and importance, and their secretary and counselor, Francisco Ramirez, spent an infinity of time and pains in developing it. The guns were of all sorts, of different sizes and calibers, but the greatest difficulty was that of transportation; for hitherto cannon had been utilized almost entirely as stationary pieces for siege work, and the idea of carrying them about as an inseparable adjunct of an army in the field was relatively new. Before the end of the reign, however, this had all been changed, though it seems that Gonsalvo de Cordova set no great store by his artillery. The normal contingent accompanying each brigade (that is, two coronelias) was now sixty-four pieces of different types. In 1505 the entire Spanish army was divided into twenty coronelias under the command of a colonel-general. The ancient mediaeval hierarchy of military officers had in the meantime practically disappeared. The office of condestable was henceforth merely an honorary distinction, and after the Granadan war we hear no more of his lieutenants or mariscales.

The battle tactics of this renovated army made it the terror of Europe for a century to come. The pikemen and short-sword-and-javelin men were usually formed in squares, the latter in the center, and the pikemen, several rows deep, with their spears advanced, outside. The arquebusiers and artillery were separately disposed, where they could shoot to good advantage, and the cavalry was chiefly utilized for scouting and for the pursuit of fleeing foes. Few charges of hostile horsemen could make any impression on the phalanx of pikes, especially as their ranks were invariably thinned by the Spanish artillerymen and arquebusiers before they reached the point of contact. On those rare occasions when the outer lines of the square were broken, the light-armed troops in the centre were on hand to finish off such riders as had got through. When a phalanx of Landsknechts was encountered, the Spanish formation had two important advantages, besides its above-mentioned superiority in firearms. In the first place, the light-armed troops in the centre gave it greater flexibility, so that it was not broken by bad ground to the same extent as were its opponents. Second, when the front ranks closed in combat, and the opposing pikemen began thrusting at one another a spear’s length apart, the short-sword-and-javelin men would creep underneath and slash and stab indiscriminately at their opponents, who were too fully occupied in front to defend themselves. Time after time was this manoeuvre repeated with deadly effect, but no one was able to devise means of stopping it until the time of the Thirty Years’ War. When we consider the stupendous progress in military implements and science which has been accomplished during the last half century, we cannot help wondering that methods so rudimentary as these should have remained virtually unchallenged for so long.

The efforts of the Catholic Kings to increase the Castilian merchant marine, which have been already described in another place, served also to strengthen the Castilian navy. The line between ships of commerce and ships of war was not yet so clearly drawn but that practically all were available for both purposes, though Ferdinand made some effort to distinguish between them. The development of artillery furnished a splendid opportunity for improvement in efficiency, but was not utilized to the full; the ancient tactics of ramming and boarding were retained for a long time to come, and were one of the main causes of the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The almirante, like the condestable, lost most of his ancient authority; in 1479 a capitán mayor was given effective control of the national fleets.

The naval resources of Catalonia diminished, on the whole, in this period, as those of Castile increased. In this matter, as in so many others, the western kingdom asserted its preponderance.

The intellectual life of the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella gives evidence of the increased cosmopolitanism and contact with the outside world which form one of the principal features of the
reign. The Italian influence in art and letters, of which we observed the beginnings in the previous century, is now far more predominant than before; the rule of Alfonso the Magnanimous had made the eastern kingdoms more Italianate than ever, and their union with Castile transplanted the new tendencies to the west. The education of the royal Infantes was entrusted to Italians. Peter Martyr de Anghiera, humanist and historian of the New World, set up a school at the court, in which he taught Latin and history to the children of the greatest families in the land; in fact, if one encountered a learned man in Spain during the early part of the reign of the Catholic Kings, it was usually safe to assume either that he was a foreigner, or else that, if Spanish, he had received a prolonged Italian training. In later years there was a change. Spain saw that she could not afford to remain aloof from the great movement of the Renaissance and send abroad for all her knowledge; and the foundation of the University of Alcalá, through the efforts of Cardinal Ximenes, at once gave her a standing in the world of scholars which she had not enjoyed since the days of the caliphate of Cordoba. But for many years more, inspiration continued to come from without. Antonio del Ríncon, the sovereigns’ favorite painter, was a pupil of Domenico Ghirlandaio. In architecture and sculpture we encounter a strange jumble of ancient Moorish and modern Renaissance styles; profusion of elaborate detail was the result.

The only matter in which the sovereigns ventured to fly squarely in the face of popular opinion was in the establishment of racial and religious unity. When the interests of the Faith as they conceived them were at stake, they were restrained by no considerations of political expediency. The Spanish Inquisition was extended to Sicily in 1487 and to Sardinia in 1492; in spite of popular disaffection and complaint, and even bloody revolts, it was maintained without interruption to the close of the reign. In Sardinia, it is true, the tribunal was in a somewhat decadent condition at the time of the death of Ferdinand, owing chiefly to the exhaustion of the confiscable property of its victims, and strenuous efforts were necessary to revive it under Charles V; but in Sicily we have ample evidence that the institution was exceedingly active. The edict for the expulsion of the Jews was also extended to both islands in 1492. Sardinia there was apparently no great outcry against it; in Sicily, however, where the Hebrews had perhaps enjoyed greater privileges than anywhere else in Europe, there was considerable resentment, which was greatly increased by the cruel and unjust maimer of its enforcement by the viceroy, Ferdinand de Acuña. As elsewhere, its economic effects were disastrous, while politically it formed an admirable basis, as did the Inquisition, for a further introduction of the principles and practices of monarchical centralization at the expense of the national liberties.

In constitutional affairs one of the most important innovations introduced by the Catholic Bangs was the practice of conferring the office of viceroy on Castilians in place of Catalans and Aragonese. This evoked numerous complaints, and demands on the part of the local parliaments that only subjects of the realms of the Crown of Aragon be recognized as eligible for this dignity, but Ferdinand quietly ignored them, as an inspection of the lists of the successive representatives of the crown in both islands will plainly show. The powers of the viceroy were so great that the whole complex of the
administration varied with the character of the appointee. With men at the helm who had been trained in the now thoroughly monarchical atmosphere of Castile, Ferdinand could rest fairly confident that his Mediterranean domains would be kept well in hand; Castilians, moreover, were also appointed to some of the subordinate posts. In Sardinia the practice of placing legists, instead of soldiers, in the viceregal office was also occasionally adopted in the period; this, again, smacks strongly of the methods of the western kingdom. In 1496, we hear of the appointment there of the first abogado del fisco, to conduct financial suits on behalf of the crown, and lend aid in the management of the royal treasury.

The attitude of the sovereigns towards the parliaments of Sardinia and Sicily reflects the conditions which obtained in those islands. Certainly Ferdinand and Isabella rather favored than opposed their meetings. In Sardinia the national assembly was summoned in 1483 and in 1511, after an interruption which had lasted the entire length of the reign of John II. Whether the cause of its convocation was that Ferdinand saw in it the best means of breaking down the old barriers that had divided the island in ancient times, or that he needed the funds which it alone could grant, it is impossible to say; but we know that when it did meet, it used the opportunity to present numerous petitions to the crown. In general one gains the impression that Sardinia enjoyed, under the Catholic Kings, a measure of internal peace and tranquility to which she had hitherto been a stranger; and that such was her delight in the establishment of order that she raised little objection to such invasion of her autonomous privileges as accompanied it. In Sicily, there was much more vigorous opposition to monarchical encroachments. Nowhere else in the widely scattered dominions of the Spanish sovereigns was the passion for freedom more deeply implanted, and the national assembly was regarded as the emblem and personification of national liberty. Yet Ferdinand made no effort to prevent or curtail its sessions. This was chiefly, no doubt, because he recognized that he was not strong enough openly to defy it, and partly because of financial necessity. On the other hand, he consistently strove to sap its vitality in a number of indirect ways. He played off the two upper orders against the third estate, and refused to accede to a request that the barons and clergy be forbidden to send deputies to represent them in their absence—an abuse which had seriously weakened the efficiency of the Parliament as a whole. He strenuously defended the right of the viceroy to summon the assembly to whatever place he wished, and thus made it possible to hold its sessions in remote or unhealthy spots, where opponents would find it difficult to attend, and if present might easily be bullied into submission. By slight changes of phraseology he managed to extinguish the ancient contractual theory that the granting of the donativo was dependent on the royal assent to the petitions of the Parliament and the observance of the national privileges; he also invariably tried to get the financial business of each session concluded first, and to his own satisfaction, before the desires of the representatives were heard. The Sicilian Parliament was undoubtedly far weaker at the end of the reign than at the beginning.

Such were the main features of the great work of monarchical unification and consolidation accomplished by the Catholic Kings. When we consider that the chief aim of their policy ran counter to the most dominant of Spanish characteristics—separatism—and when we remember how widely scattered and differentiated were their various domains, we cannot fail to be deeply impressed with the importance of the results they achieved, even though we may not always sympathize with the ends they had in view. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of their work was the skill with which they adapted their methods to the widely varying problems with which they were confronted; it was their great versatility that enabled them to handle all sorts of different questions at one and the same time. Wisely recognizing the impossibility of welding all their dominions into a single state, they had concentrated their efforts on the principal one of them—Castile—with the aim of subjecting it completely to their control and making it the pivot of their empire. They had endeavored to imbue the lesser portions of their possessions with some of the principles of Castilian polity, but they did not deprive them of their native laws or institutions, or attempt to absorb them in the greater kingdom; and as new territories were successively acquired in later years, they were treated in similar fashion. The result was a congeries of separate states, differing from one another in race, in traditions, in language, and in government, and bound together solely by the fact that they possessed a common kingship—a loose-jointed, heterogeneous empire, the fundamental principle of whose administration was that of decentralized despotism.
BOOK IV
EXPANSION

CHAPTER XVI
THE CANARIES

We have already emphasized the continuity of the reconquest of Spain from the Moors, and her conquest of an imperial domain beyond the seas. We have seen that Castile had gained her first outpost in the Atlantic, and that Aragon had won an empire in the western Mediterranean, before Granada fell. The reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, during which the infidel was finally expelled from the peninsula, witnessed the completion of the winning of the Canaries, the discovery and earliest explorations of America, and the acquisition of several important cities on the North African coast; it also saw Spain gain new lands for herself in Europe, and take her place in the front rank among the nations of the earth. For the sake of clearness we shall take up the different phases of this mighty process of expansion one by one, beginning with the conquest of new lands across the water and closing with the relations of Spain to her European neighbors; but we must constantly bear in mind that they were all, roughly speaking, contemporaneous, and that at certain critical moments they exercised an important influence upon one another.

In the course of the war of succession between the Catholic Kings and Affonso the African, the difficult question of the respective rights of Castile and of Portugal in the Canary Islands and the adjacent coasts had kept constantly coming up. In November, 1476, eight months after the battle of Toro, Ferdinand and Isabella ordered an inquiry to be opened in regard to the possession of the island of Lanzarote and to the right of conquest of the rest of the Canaries; in 1477 a verdict was rendered favorable to the claims of Diego de Herrera and his wife Inez (Peraza), whose previous history has been related in another place. It will also be remembered that in October of that year the Herreras were confirmed in their tenure of the conquered islands of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, Ferro, and Gomera, but yielded to Ferdinand and Isabella all claims to the three remaining and larger ones in return for an indemnity of 5,000,000 maravedis. The Catholic Kings lost no time in attempting to substantiate their rights. An expedition of six hundred infantry and thirty horse set sail from Seville in the spring of 1478, under the leadership of an intrepid soldier named Juan Rejón, with instructions to avoid interference with the Herreras in the four islands that acknowledged their sway, but to effect a landing in the Grand Canary and to make preparations for its conquest. But the Portuguese had no idea of permitting Ferdinand and Isabella thus to establish unopposed their sovereignty over the archipelago. By way of serving notice that their own claims to the Canaries were not to be regarded as extinct, they dispatched seven caravels to attack Rejón and his men. This episode naturally led to a reopening of the old discussion between the two realms as to priority of occupation and conflicting rights in the islands and the opposite coasts, with the result that in one of the treaties signed in 1479, at the termination of the War of Succession, the Portuguese renounced all title to the Canaries, but received in return exclusive privileges of conquest and possession on the adjacent African shore, including the kingdom of Fez and the lands of Guinea, and also in the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape Verde Islands. Moreover the Castilian sovereigns promised that they would not permit their subjects to trade in the territories assigned to Portugal without the express permission of the Portuguese king. Probably the treaty was not regarded at that time as being any too favorable to the king of Castile. Possession of the Canaries was then held to be important chiefly as facilitating acquisitions in Africa, on which the eyes of both nations were at that time directed; and in the neighboring African territories the Portuguese were recognized as supreme. No one then realized that the greatest value of the archipelago was ultimately to be found in the fact that it furnished a most convenient stopping place and harbor of refuge on the way to the Spanish possessions in the New World.
Meantime Rejón and his followers had landed, on June 24, 1478, at the Grand Canary, and were received in friendly fashion by the natives. Serious difficulties, however, were soon to come. The Canarians were split into two factions, of which the first, under an upstart military chieftain called Doramas, was attempting to oust from power Thenesor Semidan, the brother of the late king, who had been appointed regent during the minority of his nephew. Doramas wished to fight the Spaniards, while Thenesor was for a policy of peace; but the mass of the islanders supported the former, and before the end of the summer two encounters occurred at Guiniguada, in which the Spaniards, despite their vastly inferior numbers, were brilliantly victorious. After these battles the Canarians retired inland, hoping that the invaders would remain content with the shores; but spasmodic Portuguese interference served to keep up the fighting spirit of the natives, and led in turn to constant raids and devastations by the troops of Rejón. Meantime the effectiveness of the Spanish operations was greatly lessened by a dissension of the characteristic sort between Rejón and Juan Bermúdez, dean of Rubicon, who had been associated with him for the purpose of converting the natives, but who was chiefly interested in prosecuting his own schemes. News of their quarrels finally reached the Spanish court, and in the summer of 1479 Ferdinand and Isabella sent out a juez pesquisidor named Pedro Fernández de Alcaba, and a certain Alfonso Fernandez de Lugo, a soldier of the Granadan war, to find the facts and render a verdict. Rejón was falsely accused, seized, and shipped off to Spain. There, however, he soon succeeded in rehabilitating himself, and was promptly sent back with fresh troops to continue the conquest. Meanwhile Alcaba had mismanaged everything in the Grand Canary. His attempt to win military prestige by a victory over the natives resulted in a disgraceful defeat; and the final upshot of the matter was that he was accused of treacherous dealings with the king of Portugal and executed, at Whitsuntide, 1480, by the order of the very man he had previously been sent out to report upon. Bermúdez had meanwhile been banished to the Herreras in Lanzarote, where he soon died of chagrin, and Rejón for the time being was left supreme. The whole story gives a startlingly accurate forecast of the adventures of many of the American conquistadores at a later date.

All these quarrels in the Canaries naturally retarded the progress of the conquest of the archipelago, and convinced Ferdinand and Isabella that other means must speedily be employed. The person whom they selected for the difficult task was Pedro de Vera, of ancient Castilian lineage, a renowned fighter in the Moorish wars, whose energy, ambition, and revengefulness made him an uncomfortable neighbor in Spain, but promised well for his success in the role of conquistador. His extensive possessions, which enabled him to fit out an expedition largely at his own expense, were of course an added recommendation. Vera was warmly received by Rejón on his arrival in the Canaries in August, 1480, and carefully made the most of the latter’s friendship until overwhelming reinforcements arrived to support him; then he lured Rejón on board ship, clapped him into irons, and sent him off a prisoner to the Spanish court to answer to the charge of unjustly executing Alcaba, whose widow was clamoring for vengeance. But Rejón had powerful relatives in high places, soon after his arrival in Spain he not only procured his release, but obtained command of new ships and forces; in June, 1481, he reappeared in the Canaries with two caravels and three hundred and twenty men. Meantime Vera had been guilty of dastardly treachery in his dealings with the natives. In order to entice a number of them on board ship, so that they might be sent off and sold as slaves in Spain, he swore to them before a Host, whose consecration by the priest he had secretly forestalled, that they were to be employed to conquer Teneriffe. Most of the islanders jumped off the boat when it touched at Lanzarote, and the complete execution of Vera’s plans was thereby prevented; but the impression made by the attempt was of the very worst, and it led to a number of conflicts with the natives, in one of which their gallant leader Doramas met his death. When Rejón finally arrived in the midst of all these exciting events he was not permitted to land. He accordingly weighed anchor, with the intention of passing over to Palma, but stress of weather forced him ashore at Gomera, which was one of the islands still controlled by the Herreras. Diego de Herrera’s son Ferdinand, who was usually called Peraza after his mother’s family, was in command there at the time; bearing no special good will to the representatives of the monarchs whom he regarded as usurpers of his family domains, he sent a force to capture Rejón on his arrival. In his attempt to resist it, Rejón was killed. His noble widow, Elvira de Sotomayor, departed for Spain in search of revenge, and finally succeeded in having Peraza sent home and tried for his offence. Peraza, however, escaped the penalty which the wife of his foe demanded by a marriage which won him the favor of the queen. King Ferdinand’s attentions to a fair maid of honor, by name Eleanor de Bobadilla, had recently aroused the jealousy of Isabella; as the easiest way out of the difficulty, a match was arranged between the lady and Peraza, which served to remove the former from the court, and secured pardon for the latter on his promise to return to the Canaries and bear aid to the king’s soldiers in conquering the Grand Canary, Palma, and Teneriffe. The personal note is distinctly dominant during this phase of Spanish progress toward the attainment of imperial domain.
Meantime in the Canaries the conquest was gradually progressing. With the death of Doramas, the natives’ spirit of resistance was temporarily broken, and in the early months of 1482 an expedition under Algba’s companion, Alfonso de Lugo, resulted in the capture of the Guanarteme or regent, Thenesor Semidan. The latter was by this time thoroughly reconciled to the prospect of Spanish domination, and his captors accordingly made haste to utilize him for that end. He was sent over to Spain, presented to the king and queen, and was apparently so immensely impressed by their majesty and power that he at once consented to receive baptism and return to his native land in order to bear aid in the completion of its conquest. So anxious were Ferdinand and Isabella to make the most of the favorable opportunity afforded by the submission of the Canarian chief, that they sent five shiploads of fresh soldiers among them some of the contingents of the Hermandad to accompany him on his homeward journey. But even with all these reinforcements (the Spanish soldiers in the islands cannot at this juncture have numbered much less than two thousand) the final subjugation of the Grand Canary was not destined to be accomplished without one more desperate struggle. A large portion of the natives still favored resistance, and elected the youthful Bentejuf, nephew of the converted Guanarteme, to lead them in a final war against the intruder. Vera at first attempted to utilize the Guanarteme to persuade them to surrender without fighting. Failing in this, he prepared in the spring of 1483 for a vigorous campaign in the mountains. Guerilla warfare was waged for some weeks with varying success. Finally a detachment of Spaniards was lured into a difficult rocky country, honeycombed with caverns and secret hiding places known only to their enemies, and there defeated with severe slaughter, chiefly owing to the great stones which were rolled down on them from above. This reverse at Ajddar (for so the place was then called) was by far the heaviest that the Spaniards had ever suffered in the Canaries, and it would have been worse still had not the Guanarteme been on hand to persuade the victors to spare the lives of many of their vanquished foes. But the invaders were by no means daunted. Vera reorganized and increased his forces and in April was again in the field. Moreover, profiting by his defeats, he avoided his previous mistakes. Instead of sending small detachments recklessly forward into places where they could be captured one by one, he cautiously drove the natives from one stronghold to another, until he had them virtually surrounded in their final place of refuge at Ansite. A brief parley with the Guanarteme, who accompanied Vera wherever he went, convinced the bulk of the natives of the futility of further resistance, and induced them to surrender on promise of good treatment; but the heroic Bentejuf and his most intimate friend refused to endure the humiliation of admitting themselves vanquished, and, after embracing each other on the brow of a high precipice, committed suicide by jumping over the brink. The formal capitulation took place on April 29, 1483, with appropriate ceremonies, which were afterwards repeated at the Spanish headquarters on the seashore, already known as Las Palmas. Acceptance of Christianity and of the sovereignty of the king of Castile were, for the time being, the only conditions imposed by the victors, and Vera made haste to report the successful termination of the conquest to the king and queen in Spain.

We must pass on rapidly now to the story of the conquest of Palma and Tenerife. For six years after effecting the subjugation of the Grand Canary, Vera was chiefly occupied in setting up the framework of the Spanish administration of the island. He was also called upon during this period, however, to bear aid in subjugating a revolt of the natives of Gomera, in which Ferdinand Peraza was killed (1487). In this affair, Vera showed such dastardly treachery and unmitigated cruelty towards the islanders that he drew down on himself the condemnation of the bishop of the Canaries, whose ancient see at Rubicon had been transferred on November 20, 1485, to Las Palmas. Finally, after a series of futile protests against Vera’s atrocities, the bishop went home to complain of him, with the result that Ferdinand and Isabella sent out Francisco Maldonado as juez pesquisidor to investigate. The charges were impossible to deny, and in December, 1489, Vera was sent back to Spain in irons. Thenceforth he disappears from the history of the Canaries. Maldonado, who succeeded him, inaugurated his term of office with a wretchedly unsuccessful attempt to take Tenerife; but his failure brought forward the man who was destined to carry the conquest of the archipelago to a triumphant conclusion. Alfonso de Lugo, Vera’s old companion in arms, had by this time enjoyed a wide experience of Canarian campaigns. That Palma and Tenerife remained unsubdued had long been a thorn in his side; and soon after Maldonado’s repulse, he returned to Spain to get aid from Ferdinand and Isabella for a final expedition against them. His reputation at the court stood high on account of his previous military successes; he had a large private fortune, which he had substantially increased by his careful management of his estates on the Grand Canary, and consequently was able to offer to fit out the expedition at his own expense. All he demanded was supreme military command for the time, and a promise of the office of adelantado and the political authority that went with it in the future; and these Ferdinand and Isabella were glad to grant him. They also apparently invested him with some measure of authority over the adjacent West African coast, despite the fact that by the treaty of 1479 that region had been handed over exclusively to the Portuguese. Armed with these offices and powers,
Lugo recruited his forces, and returned to the Canaries in the spring of 1491. On September 29 of that year he landed on the island of Palma. By gentle and conciliatory means, and by skillful utilization of tribal divisions, he managed to win the allegiance of the majority of the natives before the following spring. One clan only, under the chieftain Tanausu, defied him; the latter’s headquarters, established in a sort of mountain crater, were so strong that Lugo was unable to storm them. When force did not avail, however, the Spaniards were quite ready to use fraud. Tanausu and his followers were invited to a parley on May 3, 1492, and there treacherously set upon and most of them slaughtered; the chief himself was captured alive, but subsequently starved himself to death on board the vessel by which he was being sent to Spain. This barbarous affair marked the end of the natives’ resistance. In the summer of 1492, when Lugo sailed back to the Grand Canary, Palma had been virtually incorporated in the domains of the realm of Castile, though there were sporadic revolts by the islanders for many years to come.

Tenerife alone remained, but Tenerife was destined to give more trouble than all the rest. Lugo did not underestimate the difficulties of the task. When, in April, 1493, he finally set forth to conquer the island, he took with him no fewer than a thousand foot and one hundred and twenty horse—all picked men, whom his own fame and the cessation of the Granadan war had enabled him to collect. It was by far the largest single force that had yet appeared in the Canaries, and only slightly smaller than that which accompanied Columbus on his second American voyage. Lugo’s landing was unopposed, and he made haste to construct a fortified camp, the nucleus of the future city of Santa Cruz. Meanwhile an embassy, accompanied by the invaluable Guanarteme of the Grand Canary as interpreter, was dispatched into the interior to parley with the natives. The latter were, as usual, divided among themselves. Benchomo, the ablest and most powerful of the chieftains, aspired to lord it over the rest; but his ambitions roused the enmity of various rivals, who were inclined from the first to seek the alliance of the Spaniards against him, while Benchomo himself naturally became the representative of the principle of resistance to foreign encroachment. For a whole year after their arrival the Spaniards strove to utilize these discords of the Tenerifians for their own advantage, and with considerable success, for several of the most powerful of the local chieftains accepted baptism and the suzerainty of the king of Spain; but the mighty Benchomo, with five minor princes who had promised from the first to stand by him, determined to resist until the end. His first blow for the preservation of his country’s freedom was certainly highly successful. He drew a large detachment of Spaniards who had ventured to invade his territories into a deep mountain defile at Acentejo, and there suddenly fell upon them unawares. So terrific was the discharge of stones from above that both sides of the gorge seemed to roll down together upon the unfortunate invaders. The horrors of the ensuing rout were vastly increased by the panic among the great herds of cattle which the Spaniards had attempted to bring away with them. Six hundred of their number were slain, and three hundred more of their island auxiliaries. Even Lugo himself was wounded and beaten from his horse; and only a few escaped unhurt. Had Benchomo desired, he could easily have taken the life of every Spaniard in the island, but he was moderate and merciful in victory, and on receiving a promise from a number of the invaders who had fallen into his hands that they would not repeat the attempt, he caused them all to be escorted to the coast. Nevertheless the reverse was so serious that speedy recuperation was obviously impossible, and on June 8, 1494, Lugo left Tenerife with all his remaining men and returned to the Grand Canary to collect fresh forces.

The ensuing summer was filled with preparations for a fresh campaign. New detachments were brought from Spain and Lanzarote, and loyal Canarians were mustered into service. In November, 1494, Lugo was able to land another large force at Santa Cruz. Wisely refusing again to venture into the mountain regions, he finally enticed Benchomo down to a pitched battle in the plain at La Laguna in early December, and there defeated him with great slaughter. There seems to be some doubt as to whether Benchomo or his brother Tinguaro was slain in this fight, for the face of the corpse was so badly disfigured by sword cuts as to be virtually unrecognizable; the probabilities, however, point to Benchomo, though most of the authorities take the other view. In any case the battle of La Laguna was decisive. Though guerilla warfare continued until September, 1496, ultimate surrender to the invaders was inevitable. Famine and the ravages of the local fever, called the modorra, hastened the end. Numerous picturesque episodes and adventures occurred during the final stages of the conflict; of these the most notable was perhaps the love match between the captive Spanish officer, Fernando Garcia del Castillo, and Dazila, the fair daughter of one of the Tenerifian chiefs. But the final result of the struggle was never in doubt. On September 29, 1496, the last of the native rulers recognized the authority of Ferdinand and Isabella, and when Lugo finally returned to Spain in 1497, he carried a number of them with him; one, whom Zurita asserts to have been Benchomo, was subsequently exhibited in Venice. Lugo was of course the hero of the hour. Not only was the governorship of Palma
and Tenerife conferred upon him, but the title of adelantado of all the Canaries was made hereditary in his family, and his authority over the four smaller Herrera islands was further augmented, at least temporarily, by his marriage with Eleanor de Bobadilla, the fiery widow of Ferdinand Peraza. He even attempted to realize some measure of the rights over the adjacent West African coast, which Ferdinand and Isabella had conferred on him when he first embarked on the conquest of Palma, by the erection of a fort there which should dispute the exclusive claims of the Portuguese; but his efforts in this direction were not particularly successful, and they cost him the life of his favorite son. The rest of his days were chiefly spent in Tenerife, where he died and was buried early in the year 1525—one of the most interesting of the Spanish conquistadores, and one of the least known.

Thus by the opening of the sixteenth century the entire Canarian archipelago acknowledged the sovereignty of the crown of Castile. Of the seven islands that composed it, however, the four smaller ones which had been conquered first continued to be administered as family holdings by the descendants of the Herreras down to the end of the eighteenth century; only Grand Canary, Palma, and Tenerife were completely incorporated in the Castilian realm. The systems of government set up in the two portions of the archipelago naturally differed accordingly. In the lesser Herrera islands the different descendants of the original grantees maintained, each one in the district that fell to his share, a considerable measure of political power; but every possible opportunity was utilized to effect a gradual diminution of their authority, and to subject them more and more, as time went on, to the control of officers sent out by the crown. The transference of the episcopal see from Rubicon to Las Palmas deprived Lanzarote of many privileges, and Lugo’s office of adelantado gave him numerous opportunities to interfere, as the crown’s representative, in the lesser islands, particularly in Gomera and Ferro, where he acted for some time as regent for his wife’s children by her first husband, Ferdinand Peraza. Nevertheless, the political rights of the Herreras were by no means extinguished; and the útil dominio conferred on them by the arrangement of 1477 continued to be recognized, in theory at least, down to the period of the Napoleonic wars. In Grand Canary, Palma, and Tenerife, on the other hand, the regular machinery of Castilian government was gradually set up. The office of adelantado remained hereditary, as the original grant had provided, in the family of Lugo and the collateral lines, though it was stripped of all political authority as the result of a residencia in the year 1536-37, so that the administration of the three principal islands was thenceforth directly in the hands of representatives of the crown. But since it was during the earlier period, while the adelantados were still supreme, that the foundations of the permanent system of government were securely laid, the change effected by the above mentioned residencia was only a change in the source of authority; the crown of Castile had merely substituted itself for the local magnate who had previously represented it. Each island was organized as a municipality, the limits of the capital town being held in each case to extend to the shores. A fuero of the most liberal and democratic sort was granted by Ferdinand and Isabella on December 20, 1494, to Las Palmas in the Grand Canary, which soon became the recognized center of the archipelago; an ayuntamiento, whose membership was variously constituted, makes its appearance, together with alguaciles, alcaldes, almotacenes, and all the other familiar concomitants of Castilian municipal life. A number of special privileges, including notable exemptions from taxation and the coveted distinction of a coat of arms, were also conferred upon it. The islands of Palma and Tenerife were administered on similar lines. To give unity and cohesion to these three different organizations a supreme tribunal of appeal, or audiencia, was set up in the Grand Canary in 1526-27; it was largely owing to the reports which it sent home that the Emperor ten years later took away the political powers of the adelantado.

The treatment of the native Canarians by the Spaniards has been represented in various lights by different authors, and it is by no means easy to determine the facts. The propagation of the faith was of course a primary object of the conquest, and acceptance of Christianity consequently obligatory on the islanders from the very first. Dominicans and Franciscans established themselves in the archipelago with the first conquistadores and followed the Castilian banners wherever they went. Two of them, indeed, were hurled from a precipice by those whom they were attempting to convert; but the proselytizing energy of the government was not to be denied, and before long all the Canarians adopted the religion of their conquerors. Doubts naturally soon arose as to the genuineness of some of the conversions and furnished an excuse for the extension of the Inquisition to the archipelago in 1504; but officially the Canarians are to be regarded as Christians from the time of the completion of the Spanish conquest. There can be little doubt that it was the intention of the home government that the natives should be humanely and generously dealt with in other respects, and that they should not be deprived of their right to hold land; but it also seems equally clear that these intentions were not fully carried out in practice. An enormous number of those who had served in the conquering armies, or contributed to their support, had to be rewarded by extensive grants of land; the distribution of repartimientos, or
allotments of territory among their followers, was one of the most difficult duties of the early adelantados, and one in which much jealousy and ill will were unavoidably stirred up. Under a system such as this it was inevitable that the natives should suffer. Some few of them—especially those who had aided the Spaniards in the conquest—were permitted to retain small and generally undesirable portions of land. Others remained as tenants on the territories that had been handed over to the invaders. Marriages between the natives and their conquerors were also of frequent occurrence. But in general we may be certain that the lot of the indigenous Canarians grew steadily worse during the first two centuries of Spanish rule. More and more were they elbowed aside to make room for the newcomers. There were ample facilities for emigration, owing to the large number of ships that touched at the islands, and the population rapidly declined; it is, however, but fair to add that Canarians figure very prominently at certain stages of the conquest and colonization of the Americas, and also in Flanders and in Italy.

The question of slavery and the slave trade in the archipelago is perhaps the most difficult of all. During the first three-quarters of the fifteenth century there was certainly a great deal of both, attributable probably rather to the Portuguese than to the Spaniards; but after the completion of the conquest in the period of Ferdinand and Isabella efforts were unquestionably made to restrict them. The enslaving of the native Canarians, the Catholic Kings did their best to terminate entirely. It continued to be employed as the regular penalty for an insurrection, and occasionally Portuguese raiders succeeded in carrying off small groups of the islanders into captivity; but if Canarian slaves were brought over to Spain to be sold the crown usually gave orders that, they be granted their liberty. On the other hand, the practice of organizing elaborate slave hunts among the natives of the adjacent Barbary coast, across the so-called Mar Pequeña, had been popular in the Canaries for so many years that Ferdinand and Isabella wisely recognized the impossibility of putting an end to it. They therefore strove instead to regulate it in a way favorable to themselves, and to ameliorate the conditions under which it was carried on. Apparently the sovereigns were at first scrupulously careful to observe the arrangements, made in the treaty of 1479, giving the Portuguese exclusive rights on the African coast opposite the archipelago. In 1495 they forbade any expedition by any of their subjects into that region, unless the formal consent of the Portuguese monarch had been previously obtained. A few years later, however, they altered their policy in this respect, and became much more aggressive, probably as a result of the demands of their subjects in the Canaries, to whom the congenial occupation of slave hunting on the opposite coasts had become a principal means of livelihood. A prolonged dispute with the Portuguese authorities ensued, and finally ended, on September 18, 1509, with an agreement by which the latter acknowledged Castile as the lawful possessor of the Torre de Santa Cruz on the West African coast, and recognized the authority over it of the adelantado of the Canaries.

“A veritable halfway house between Europe, Africa, and America”—such are the words in which a recent historian of the Canaries significantly describes them. The Catholic Kings doubtless regarded their conquest as a logical sequel to the War of Succession with Portugal, an assertion that they did not propose to permit that state to monopolize the fascinating occupation of discovery and colonization in unknown lands. The importance of the archipelago was primarily evident in connection with Africa, where the Portuguese had already established themselves. It formed a Spanish outpost on the confines of the Dark Continent, occupying in relation to it a position closely analogous to that of Cyprus to the Holy Land in the days of the Crusades. But in the end the relation of the Canaries to the Spanish conquests in the Western Hemisphere was to prove more intimate and significant still. They became a regular stopping place for outgoing and returning ships. Columbus put in there on each of his four voyages; the Pinta was provisioned and repaired in the harbor of Las Palmas in the Grand Canary in the last three weeks of August, 1492; and the island of Gomera was the last bit of land in the Eastern Hemisphere which the great explorer trod before he first set foot in the West Indies. Still more striking were the effects of the conquering, colonizing, and proselytizing experiences of the Spaniards in the Canaries upon their conduct and policy in the New World. The archipelago furnished them with the material for their first colonial experiment, and their methods there were reproduced with remarkably few variations in the Indies. The Canaries in the sixteenth century may, in fact, be justly described as a microcosm of the Spanish dominions across the Atlantic. In some ways the Spanish policy in the archipelago was more liberal than in America. There were not, for instance, the same restrictions on immigration; some foreigners, especially Italians, were allowed to come, and until the establishment of the Inquisition in the archipelago in 1504 a number of Jews sought refuge there. Moreover, owing doubtless to the fact that they held all the islands, and consequently had no reason to fear, as in America, the acquisition of land by hostile powers in disagreeable proximity to themselves, the Spaniards welcomed traders and merchants from other countries, and did their best to establish relations with them. The mineral and agricultural products of the archipelago were both numerous and
valuable, and furnished plenty of commodities for commerce; and the government, which rigorously
exacted its fifth (*quinta*) on every cargo shipped in Canarian ports, did its utmost, though not always in
the wisest ways, to promote their material prosperity. Altogether, the archipelago may be said to have
occupied a pivotal position in the Spanish Empire from the end of the fifteenth century.
CHAPTER XVII
THE INDIES

The story of the discovery of America, like that of the conquest of the Canaries, is intimately bound up with the relations of Castile to Portugal. The latter had been active in foreign exploration and conquest long before the accession of the Catholic Kings. The efforts of Prince Henry the Navigator had made her a Mecca of fifteenth century mariners. Traditionally she had a far better right to the honor of finding the Western Hemisphere than had her eastern neighbor, and it was largely the result of accident, and possibly of the issue of the War of Succession, that Castile stepped in at the last moment to deprive her of it.

It was probably in the latter part of the year 1476 that Christopher Columbus first appeared in Portugal, and seven years later, towards the end of 1483, that he laid certain propositions for a voyage of discovery into the western ocean before King John II, the son and successor of Affonso the African. Whether these propositions contemplated merely the finding of a shorter and easier way to the eastern shores of Asia, or the discovery of new lands which the explorer had reason to believe lay hidden in the western ocean, or both, we are fortunately not called upon to decide; a group of scientists gave its verdict against the feasibility of his schemes, and in 1484 he left Portugal for Spain. After dispatching his brother Bartholomew to press his suit at the courts of England and of France, he took his own measures for furthering his projects in Castile. The Duke of Medina Sidonia, to whom he first applied, did nothing for him. The Count of Medina Celi, whom he visited next, was more encouraging, but powerless to help him alone; at the end of 1485 he sent Columbus on to the court of Ferdinand and Isabella at Cordova. In April and May of the following year their Catholic Majesties gave audience to the explorer, and charged Hernando de Talavera with the formation of a committee to examine the validity of his claims. This committee held its sittings at Salamanca, where Columbus in all probability appeared before it. With characteristic Spanish deliberation it failed to render its decision before 1490; and during the long interval the explorer, despite the protection of Ferdinand and Isabella, was often hard put to it to get a living. When the sentence of the commission was finally rendered, it was adverse, and the Catholic Kings bade Columbus a courteously worded adieu. Though profoundly discouraged, he soon determined to go and seek better fortune in France. On the way thither, after a visit to his former friend and patron, the Count of Medina Celi, he passed by the monastery of La Rabida, near Palos, where he greatly interested Fray Juan Perez, a former confessor of the queen, in his schemes of discovery and exploration. It also seems highly probable that he succeeded in obtaining at this critical juncture the effective support of the famous pilot Martin Pinzon, who was to be his right-hand man in his momentous voyage. In any case it is certain that Perez was able to make representations to Isabella concerning Columbus’s plans and prospects, which resulted in the explorer’s recall to the Castilian court before Granada in the summer of 1491, in order that he might be given another hearing. Conferences ensued, but the conditions which Columbus demanded, in respect both to the funds for his expedition and to the rights and dignities to be conferred upon himself, were such that all who were consulted regarded them as unacceptable, and in January, 1492, the explorer was again dismissed. He had no sooner departed, however, than a number of persons intervened to demand that he be brought back once more. Prominent among these was a wealthy member of the Royal Council, of Aragonese Jewish extraction, by name Luis de Santangel, and also Beatrice de Bobadilla, Marchioness de Moya, Isabella’s most intimate friend, and elder sister to the lady who figured so prominently in the history of the Canaries. The final result was that before Columbus, on his sorrowful journey northward, had reached the Puerta de Pinos, two leagues from Granada, he was overtaken by a royal alguacil with orders to return at once.

Three months more elapsed, however, before terms of agreement could be reached. The final arrangements were concluded on the seventeenth of April at Santa Fé. Columbus was granted the rank of Admiral, with all the dignities and privileges thereto pertaining, in such territories as he should discover, and the title was to pass on his death to his heirs. As admiral he was given the right to be sole judge of all cases arising in connection with the trade and commerce of the territories in question. He was to be viceroy and governor general in the lands he expected to find, and was to have the right of
presenting three candidates for any post of profit and emolument under him, from whom their Majesties should select one. He was to have one tenth of all the products drawn from the said lands, and the right, if he contributed one eighth to the cost of the expedition, to receive one eighth of the profits resulting from it. It used to be the fashion to represent Ferdinand as indifferent, or even positively hostile, to the whole enterprise, and to give all the credit of the affair to Isabella; but more recently strong reasons have been advanced for thinking that the king of Aragon bore an important part in the whole negotiation. That his signature is affixed to all the documents and capitulations relative to the expedition may not count for much, and the story that he employed the first gold brought to Spain from the Indies to gild his royal palace at Saragossa is not particularly significant, but the fact that his own officials found most of the necessary money for the voyage is an evidence of interest too substantial to controvert. The whole matter is of great importance as leading up to the question of how far the realms of the Crown of Aragon were subsequently permitted to take part in the conquest and colonization of the New World—a problem which goes down to the very foundation of the Spanish Empire. We shall return to this matter in another place. For the present we need only observe that though the privilege of emigration and settlement was with rare exceptions restricted to the inhabitants of the western kingdom from the time of the announcement of the discovery to the death of Queen Isabella in 1504, it was gradually thrown open to the inhabitants of the other Spanish kingdoms in the succeeding years, until, by the end of the sixteenth century, they enjoyed absolute equality in this respect.

The story of the preparations for the voyage and the equipment of the three caravels has been often told. So great was the prevalent distrust of the issue of the expedition, that it is more than doubtful whether, even with the backing of the crown, Columbus could have successfully organized it, without the precious aid of the pilot Martin Pinzon. The Catholic Kings were scrupulously careful not to permit the explorer to trespass on the Portuguese territories in Africa; he was specifically forbidden to go to the Guinea coast. The contemporary accounts vary widely as to the number of persons who went with him. Probably the total was rather less than more than one hundred and twenty, of whom ninety were sailors of one sort or another. The majority came from the towns of southwestern Andalusia, but there were apparently a Genoese and a Portuguese among their number, and possibly an Irishman. Strangely enough, no priest accompanied the expedition. The little fleet sailed at dawn on August 3, 1492, from Palos, put in six days later at the Canaries for repairs, and finally departed thence on September 6 for the unknown seas. Doubts, discouragements, and proposals to turn back, grumblings and mutinous threats from the crews were the daily accompaniments of the next five weeks, but the sublime faith of the Admiral triumphed, and at last, on the evening of October 11, a flickering light was perceived in the darkness ahead. The following morning revealed the low-lying shores of one of the Bahamas, which the majority of modern scholars have agreed in identifying as Watling’s Island, and which Columbus significantly named San Salvador. Whether we accept the older notion that the object of the Admiral’s expedition was to reach the east by way of the west, or follow M. Vignaud’s more recent argument that he had started out with the idea of finding new lands which he had reason to believe existed some seven hundred and fifty leagues west of the Canaries, it seems clear that Columbus, having already progressed some two hundred leagues farther than he had ever expected to go, was persuaded that he had reached the confines of the eastern world. At any rate he dubbed the natives he encountered ‘Indians’, a name which had hitherto had an exclusively Oriental connotation, though Ferdinand Columbus tells us that his father adopted it because it was suggestive of great riches; and as ‘Indians’ the aboriginal inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere have continued to be known until this day.

Of course the adventurers soon discovered that the land they had found was merely an outlying islet. They therefore continued their voyage westward to look for the larger territories which lay beyond. On October 28 they struck the northern shore of Cuba and explored it; and so sure was Columbus that he had reached the mainland, and that the realms of the Great Khan could not be far away, that he sent off two of his followers to seek for the court of that potentate and carry him the compliments of the sovereigns of Spain. From Cuba he sailed southeast to Haiti, in which he fancied he recognized both the island which he had expected to discover and the Cipango which Martin Pinzon believed had been reached; on account of its similarity, at first appearance, to Spain, he named it Española. Off the coast of this island his largest ship, the *Santa Maria*, ran aground on Christmas Day and was wrecked. Ready aid from the friendly Indians, however, made possible the saving of the cargo and provisions, and the Admiral finally became convinced “that God had permitted the disaster in order that the place might be chosen for a settlement”. Some forty of his followers agreed to remain and await his return; the construction of a stronghold to give them shelter was begun; every effort was made to urge upon them the importance of preserving the friendliest possible relations with the natives; finally, on January 4, 1493, after duly impressing the cacique with a sense of his power by a salvo from
his cannon, Columbus set sail for home. He took with him specimens of gold which his followers had collected, and also a few Indians; the number of these was increased during the first week of the homeward voyage when he touched at several other points on the northern shore of Española, and came for the first time into hostile collision with the natives. The return voyage was beset by gales. Columbus was obliged to stop at the Azores on the way, where the Portuguese governor apparently had some thought of apprehending him; moreover, when he finally landed at Lisbon and told his story to the Portuguese sovereign, there was talk of King John’s laying claim to the lands he had discovered, and even of provoking the explorer into a quarrel and compassing his death. Clearly the Portuguese were jealous of Columbus’s good fortune, and of the fact that Spaniards rather than themselves were to profit by it; and the remembrance that the explorer had originally applied to them for aid in his great enterprise, long before he had visited the Castilian court, must have added to the bitterness of their reflections. But Ferdinand and Isabella were now far stronger than they had been during the War of Succession. King John could not afford to quarrel with them, and he knew it; he therefore wisely determined to bide his time, and leave the substantiation of any claims he might have to a more favorable opportunity in the future. Columbus was accordingly permitted to depart with a splendid escort of knights; two days later he again embarked, and finally, on March 15, 1493, dropped anchor in the harbor of Palos, whence he had set sail over seven months before. The people received him with enthusiasm and thanksgivings, and he was speedily summoned to report to their Catholic Majesties at Barcelona.

Before pursuing further the fortunes of the explorer, we must examine the measures taken by the Catholic Kings to guarantee their possession of the lands he had discovered; for they did not wait to see Columbus before applying for papal confirmation of their right to the new territories. Dread of Portuguese competition was, of course, the explanation of their haste. The news of the Admiral’s adventures at Lisbon on his homeward voyage had brought the dangers of it forcibly to their minds, and there were also other memories of earlier days which strengthened their determination to guard themselves against it. Bulls of Martin V, Eugenius IV, Nicholas V, and Calixtus III had granted the Portuguese such lands as they might discover from Capes Nun and Bojador southward towards Guinea and beyond, and there was a general impression that their claims under these bulls extended as far as the Indies. In 1479-80 the Catholic Kings had specifically recognized by treaty the exclusive rights of Portugal to all lands she should discover in Guinea and off the coast of it, except the Canaries; and on June 21, 1481, Pope Sixtus IV had confirmed this treaty, and also the grants under his predecessors’ bulls. Since that time the Portuguese had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and followed up the east coast of Africa to a point beyond Algoa Bay; clearly, in view of the prevailing ignorance of geography and the doubts as to the exact location of the lands Columbus had found, it was essential that Rome be immediately notified of the Spanish pretensions. Ferdinand and Isabella had every reason to believe that their claims would not fare ill at the hands of the recently elected pontiff, Alexander VI, who, in addition to being of Valencian birth, was beholden to them in a variety of different ways. Their foresight was justified by the event; in all the ensuing negotiations the pontiff was less an arbiter, than an instrument in the hands of the Catholic Kings. In April, 1493, he put forth the first of the two famous bulls Inter caetera, granting to the Spanish sovereigns exclusive right and possession in all the lands and islands discovered in the West, towards the Indies, in the Ocean Sea, as well as in all others yet to be discovered in that region. On May 17 the bull was dispatched to the papal nuncio in Spain. It was doubtless Alexander’s hope that the very vague phraseology which had been employed would safeguard the rights already granted by his predecessors to Portugal “from Cape Bojador towards Guinea and beyond”, and at the same time satisfy the demands of Ferdinand and Isabella; but he was destined to be disappointed. By the time that the bull arrived in Spain, the sovereigns had had time to discuss the whole affair with Columbus, and to learn the full extent of his achievements and of his hopes. They had also opened negotiations with John II of Portugal, and had been informed of the counter-claims which that monarch had to urge. The wording of the first bull was clearly inadequate: it did not settle the question of the dominion of the Atlantic, particularly to the southward, which Spain was most desirous to secure. Columbus urged the advisability of a demarcation line; and the sovereigns, acting on his suggestion, again applied to Rome for an amplification and extension of the rights already conferred upon them. The result was the second bull Inter caetera, which was issued in June and reached Spain in the middle of July. It granted to their Catholic Majesties all lands found or to be found both to the west and to the south towards India and all other regions, provided they had not been occupied by any other Christian prince previously to Christmas, 1492; and it established a line to be drawn, north and south, a hundred leagues to the westward of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, beyond which no foreigner was to venture without a license from the Spanish sovereign. Furthermore, a supplementary bull Eximiae, issued in July, reiterated and emphasized the rights and privileges to be enjoyed by Ferdinand and Isabella in the territories in question; while a final one, dated September
26, provided—in flat contradiction to the earlier instrument—that previous occupation by other Christian potentates should not constitute a title, and annulled all grants “to kings, princes, infantes, or religious or military orders” in the regions assigned to the king and queen of Spain.

Clearly all these stipulations were aimed directly at the Portuguese; Alexander, who, on account of the political situation in Italy, was like wax in the hands of Ferdinand and Isabella, was being steadily led on to more and more open infringement of the rights of their rival. Naturally, under the circumstances, King John regarded the course of the negotiations between Spain and the Vatican with steadily increasing dissatisfaction. In addition to all their other advantages, the fact that the Catholic Kings were holding their court at Barcelona, whence they could reach Rome twice as quickly as could the Portuguese monarch, doubtless convinced the latter that little was to be gained by an attempt to outbid them there; his best hope was to deal directly with Ferdinand and Isabella themselves. He therefore instructed Ruy de Sande, his representative at the Spanish court, to lay his case before them; moreover he assembled a powerful fleet, probably with the idea of threatening a descent on Columbus’s discoveries if his protests should not be heard. The negotiations dragged slowly along far beyond the date of Columbus’s departure on his second voyage, but both parties were desirous to avoid a quarrel, and Ferdinand and Isabella saw no harm in yielding to the argument of King John that the original line—one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands—limited too closely Portugal’s opportunities for expansion in the Atlantic. On June 7, 1494, a treaty between the monarchs was accordingly signed at Tordesillas, by which the line of demarcation of their respective claims was drawn north and south at a point three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands—that is, about half way between them and the islands that Columbus had discovered; everything beyond that line was to fall to the Catholic Kings, everything to the east of it was to belong to the Portuguese. The line hits the north coast of South America just east of the mouth of the Amazon, and of course ultimately served to secure the Portuguese title to Brazil. On the other side of the globe it passes just west of New Guinea, but it was a long time before the facts were accurately determined, and in the meantime Spain made good her hold on the Philippines, which lie on the Portuguese side of it.

We now return to the career of Columbus, who was most graciously received by their Catholic Majesties at Barcelona; indeed, the months immediately succeeding his triumphal return from his first voyage were unquestionably the happiest in his life. But the sovereigns were even more concerned with the vigorous prosecution of the advantages already won than with rewarding the Admiral for his energy and faithfulness. On May 23, 1493, it was announced that a new and much larger expedition to the Indies would be sent out, and no less than sixteen royal orders were issued on that same day in regard to the preparations for it. Other cartas and cédulas on the same subject followed in large numbers during the next three months, and bear witness to the immense enthusiasm which the whole affair had roused. The principal object of them all seems to have been to secure over every phase of the enterprise the largest possible measure of royal control and supervision compatible with the privileges granted to Columbus in 1492. The name of Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, archdeacon of Seville, appears in the majority of these documents as a sort of superintendent of Indian affairs resident in Spain, and links this earliest period of discovery with the beginnings of the regular political and commercial organization of Spanish America in the next century. From 1493 until after the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, Fonseca was, in fact, the crown’s chief minister for colonial affairs. The duty of converting the Indians to Christianity was emphasized again and again, and a Catalan monk of the Benedictine order, named Boyl, was especially entrusted with it. The expedition numbered seventeen ships and some fifteen hundred men, among them soldiers, artisans, and laborers, and it carried all sorts of building and agricultural implements, seeds, and livestock. Clearly it was intended that a permanent colony should be founded. On the other hand the enterprise was regarded as so hazardous that it was deemed unwise that any women should accompany it; the lack of them goes far to account for the miserable broils of the colonists with the natives in the succeeding years.

The adventurers set sail from Cadiz on September 25, 1493. On November 3 they sighted one of the Lesser Antilles, which, as it was on a Sunday, they named Dominica; the inhabitants, however, were so hostile that they did not remain there long, but passed over in the latter part of the month to Española, where Columbus had left a portion of his company on his previous expedition. Much to his horror, not a trace of them was to be found. Throwing off all discipline after his departure, they had assaulted and maltreated the natives; a few of them had been massacred in return, and the rest had been driven off and perished in the wilderness. It was both an earnest of far worse difficulties of the same sort that were to come in the near future, and the beginning of immediate troubles for Columbus, which were to make his second expedition a very different affair from the first. In December the Spaniards passed along the north coast of Española to a more favorable site, and set about the construction of a permanent town, which they named Isabella. But the heavy labor in the strange climate played havoc with their
health. Columbus himself was prostrated for prolonged periods. Discipline broke down, and the punishments the Admiral inflicted kindled the resentment of his followers. Explorations into the interior brought back encouraging reports of gold, but not enough specimens to satisfy the sceptics. Worst of all were the relations of the Spaniards with the Indians. The disappearance of the first colony had raised dark suspicions and deep resentment in the hearts of the newcomers: even Fray Boyl had counselled measures of vengeance and terrorization. A few of the natives, who were believed to be cannibals, were taken prisoners and sent back to Spain in January, 1494, with a recommendation from the Admiral that they be Christianized and taught Spanish, in order to make them available as interpreters; and Columbus further advised that more of them be captured and sold as slaves to pay for the supplies of various kinds that the colonists so sorely needed. All this was glozed over by much discussion of the spiritual welfare of the Indians, but it marked a wide departure from the line of policy advocated by the sovereigns less than six months before, and the clash of conflicting views on this most difficult subject was to constitute one of the hardest problems of Spanish colonial administration. During the summer of 1494 the Admiral made a voyage of discovery to Jamaica and along the Cuban coast. After his return he was once more overtaken by a long and painful illness; and before his recovery was complete some of his followers, among them Fray Boyl, deserted and went back to Spain, where they roundly declared that the Indies were not worth retaining. The remaining colonists were in a sorry plight. Provisions ran short. Relations with the natives went steadily from bad to worse. It became necessary to raid the interior, and to terrorize the Indians into submission by the exaction of heavy tributes. In the spring of 1496 things were in such evil case that Columbus determined that he must go back to Spain to seek help and advice. Leaving his brother Bartholomew, who had come out in 1494, in command at Isabella in his absence, he set sail with two caravels, bearing about thirty Indians and upwards of two hundred homesick and discontented colonists, and reached Cadiz on June 11.

His detractors had not been idle in his absence. Instead of the triumphant welcome accorded him in 1493, he now had hard work to regain the badly shaken confidence of the Catholic Kings, and to secure the maintenance of his original rights and privileges. More serious still, the fascination of the Indies for the mass of the Spaniards seemed temporarily dead; the Admiral was reduced to the most desperate extremities to find colonists to accompany him on a third voyage; most of those who finally went were paid by the crown, and the rest were criminals and jailbirds, who were sentenced to transportation in lieu of prison or execution. An advance guard of two ships was despatched in January, 1498, Columbus himself following with six more in May; but half of these were sent straight to Españaola from the Canaries, while the Admiral with the rest took a more southerly course across the Atlantic. The first land he sighted was the island of Trinidad (July 31), and a little later he descried the continent of South America beyond it. At first he took it for another island, and named it Isla Santa, but a little later the enormous volume of fresh water pouring out of the mouths of the Orinoco convinced him that he had reached the mainland. Passing on up the coast to the northward and westward, he discovered the islands of Tobago, Granada, Margarita, and Cubagua, and finally arrived at the newly founded town of Santo Domingo on the southern shore of Españaola in the end of August, after an absence of nearly two years and a half, to find conditions even worse than he had feared. Difficulties with the natives were more threatening than ever: and far graver still, dissension and insubordination had broken out among the Spaniards themselves; some ninety of their number, led by a certain Francisco Roldan, had become so enraged at the strict discipline of Bartholomew Columbus that they had gone off into the interior of the country and abandoned themselves to a life of violence and debauchery. After long negotiations, the Admiral determined that it would be expedient to pardon these rebels and restore them to favor, and he finally did so; but long before this had occurred, he realized his powerlessness to set affairs permanently to rights in the colony without aid from home, and consequently sent back to Spain in the autumn of 1498 a full account of the insurrection, with vigorous demands for reinforcements, and for a letrado of experience, who should be capable of fulfilling the duties of a judge. But Columbus had enemies as well as friends on the returning ships, and also at court, who made the most of his absence to traduce him. He had also sent back a large cargo of Indians, with an assurance that the continuance of the practice of enslaving them was the best possible means to preserve the existence of the colony; and these arrived, most unfortunately for him, at a juncture when the proverbially sensitive conscience of the queen had been vigorously aroused on the ethical questions involved. The net result of this welter of conflicting circumstances, reports, and arguments was that the sovereigns in May, 1499, intrusted the government of the Indies to Francisco de Bobadilla, a knight of Calatrava and ancient servant of the crown, and sent him out there in January, 1500, armed with several alternative commissions, to be used according to his discretion. This was a gross infringement of Columbus’s rights and monopolies in the Indies, as defined in the grant of 1492, and can scarcely be justified on the ground of the request in his letter to the sovereigns for a letrado; but the Catholic Kings had already made up their minds that, whatever his services to them as an explorer, the Admiral had no
talent for ruling men. The appointment of Bobadilla marks, indeed, the beginning of the taking over of the administration of the Indies by the crown. It seems clear that the new governor was prejudiced against Columbus before he started, and his impressions were strengthened by what he found on his arrival. The Admiral was speedily clapped in irons and sent back to Spain; and though liberated and granted an interview by the sovereigns soon after he landed, he never regained anything approaching the position he had previously held. No more political authority of any kind was ever vouchsafed to him. His original rights and privileges were more and more shamefully invaded. From henceforth he was merely one (and by no means the most conspicuous) of a number of explorers of the Western Hemisphere. He made one last voyage to the Indies in 1502, on which, after being refused permission to land at Española, he followed down the east coast of Central America from Honduras to Panama; but so many others had reached other portions of the mainland before him that this final venture attracted but little attention. The very month of his return (November, 1504) saw the death of his best friend and patron Isabella; Ferdinand for the moment was far too much absorbed in his efforts to retain possession of the Castilian throne to pay any attention to him; and on Ascension Day, 1506, the great discoverer passed away at Valladolid, in an obscurity which, under all the circumstances, may well have been more grateful than the reverse.

We must now briefly run through the achievements of the other explorers in the New World down to the death of King Ferdinand in 1516. The first of these was a certain Alonso de Ojeda, who had distinguished himself by his bravery and resourcefulness on Columbus’s second voyage. He was in Spain at the time that the report arrived of the Admiral’s discovery of the mainland of South America in 1498, and being himself a favorite of Fonseca, boldly asked leave, in defiance of the exclusive rights of Columbus, to undertake a voyage into the west for his own profit and advantage. With an injunction to avoid all Portuguese possessions, and any lands discovered by Columbus previous to 1495, the desired permission was accorded him, and on May 20, 1499, Ojeda set sail. He struck the north shore of South America well to the east of the point reached by Columbus in the previous year—probably somewhere in the Guianas—and coasted along to the northward and westward as far as Cap de la Vela—thus covering wide strips on both sides of the coast previously traversed by the Admiral. In the Gulf of Maracaibo he found a native village built on piles, which so reminded him of Venice that he bestowed upon the region the name Venezuela, which it bears today. A visit to Española not unnaturally involved him in a vigorous dispute with Columbus, after which he returned to Spain, where he was warmly received and granted new privileges of exploration and conquest. But long before Ojeda could profit by this fresh patent, other explorers were in the field. Indeed, it seems probable that he was actually anticipated on the Venezuelan pearl coast by the pilot Alonso Niño, who left Cadiz with a single caravel in the early summer of 1499; though unimportant from the point of view of exploration, the expedition apparently brought back much treasure, and thus raised the badly shaken prestige of the Indies in Spain. In the late autumn of 1499 Vicente Yañez Pinzon, a brother of Columbus’s associate Martin, and, like him, a companion on his first voyage, sailed in a more southerly direction than any of his predecessors, struck the coast of Brazil, probably near its easternmost point, and followed the coast some two thousand miles north and west, discovering the Amazon (which he took to be the Ganges) by the way, and returning via Española to Spain. He was followed a few weeks later by a certain Diego de Lepe, who made the Brazilian shores still farther to the south, and got back to report before Pinzon. Finally, a Sevillan notary, by name Rodrigo Bastidas, sailed in October, 1500, explored the coast from Cap de la Vela to the Isthmus of Panama, and returned to Spain in 1502. The last voyage of Christopher Columbus along the Central American shore fell in the same year, so that the entire coast of the Western Hemisphere, from Honduras to beyond the eastern point of Brazil, had now been visited by the Spaniards.

Meantime, while all these Castilian adventurers had been flocking to the New World, the Portuguese, who had relapsed into temporary inactivity during the ten years following Bartholomew Diaz’s famous expedition of 1486, gave signs of reawakening interest in the acquisition of new and unknown lands. In 1495 King John had died and was succeeded by his energetic and enthusiastic cousin Emmanuel the Fortunate; in 1497 Vasco da Gama was dispatched on the memorable voyage which carried him to the Malabar coast of India. In 1500 another expedition was sent out by the king of Portugal under Pedro Alvares Cabral to follow up the advantage that da Gama had already gained. Probably on the advice of his predecessor, Cabral steered well out westward into the Atlantic after leaving the Cape Verde Islands, in order to avoid the calms of the Gulf of Guinea, and on April 21 sighted the east coast of Brazil, near Porto Seguro, some five hundred miles to the south of the point reached by Diego de Lepe a few weeks before. Of course no one knew at that time that the line of demarcation established by the treaty of Tordesillas fell far to the west of the landings of Lepe and Pinzon, but it was probably altogether fortunate for the later substantiation of the Portuguese rights to
For six years after Columbus’s departure on his last voyage in 1502 there is a curious lull in Spain’s exploring activities. Only one or two scattering expeditions were undertaken, and with practically no results. Ferdinand’s preoccupation with domestic troubles and European politics was doubtless the chief explanation, and the Archduke Philip died before he could carry out any of his American projects. In 1508, however, the work of discovery was actively taken up again, a large portion of the voyages for the next decade and more being directed toward the finding of a passage through the continent which would give the Spaniards access to still richer lands beyond. Cuba was circumnavigated in 1508 by Sebastian de Ocampo, and conquered and settled in the succeeding years by Diego Velasquez, Pánfilo de Narvaez, and others. In 1508-09 Vicente Yáñez Pinzon and Juan Diaz de Solis followed the American coast from Honduras down probably somewhat beyond the extreme eastern point of Brazil: those who maintain that they attained the fortieth parallel are confronted with the difficult problem of showing why they failed to discover the Rio de la Plata. In 1509 comes the first permanent effort of the Spaniards to settle on the mainland. The energetic and popular Ojeda, who seemed to bear a charmed life, and had never once been wounded in his many encounters with the Indians, was granted a strip of the coastline from Cap de la Vela to the Gulf of Darien, with the name of New Andalusia, while a rich planter of Española, called Diego de Nicuesa, received the stretch northward from the Isthmus to the eastern point of Honduras, with the title of Castilla del Oro. An attempt of Ojeda to make a settlement near the modern town of Cartagena was frustrated by the hostility of the Indians, who with their poisoned arrows slew some seventy of his followers; he therefore moved west to the extreme limit of the territory assigned to him and built there a fort, which he called San Sebastian, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Urabi. But the marvelous good luck which had hitherto accompanied him seemed to have turned at last. The Indian attacks continued, and Ojeda himself was struck by an arrow; only by cauterizing the wound with plates of white hot iron was he able to preserve his life. He had lost most of his followers, and the survivors had become restless and discouraged. Finally he determined to leave the settlement in charge of his friend and supporter, an attorney named Enciso, and himself to repair to Española for aid; but he failed to obtain the help he sought, and died some years later in poverty and wretchedness. Nicuesa had meantime striven valiantly to develop his section to the northward, and founded the town of Nombre de Dios just east of the present city of Colón; moreover he subsequently attempted to extend his authority over the remnant of Ojeda’s colony, which had by this time moved from San Sebastian across the Gulf of Darien into territory which fell within Nicuesa’s jurisdiction. But Ojeda’s men would have nothing to do with him; his own followers were decimated by disease; and finally the unhappy adventurer was forced to sail for Spain in an unseaworthy ship, and was never heard of again.

The dominant personality in the remnant of Ojeda’s little colony at Darien was a certain Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, who had escaped from his creditors in Española to the mainland, concealed in a cask, on a ship that bore Ojeda’s lawyer lieutenant Enciso to his destination. It was at his suggestion that the settlement had been removed from San Sebastian to Darien; having earned the gratitude of the company by proposing this wise change of abode, he refused obedience to Enciso, and finally shipped him off to Spain, with a letter to Ferdinand ringing with the scorn of the legist ‘who tries to do everything from his bed’. With the reins of authority securely in his own hands, Balboa made a vigorous attempt to secure provisions. This naturally brought him into conflict with some of the Indians, but he strengthened himself for any struggle that might ensue by a close alliance with one of the native chieftains, who even went so far as to give him his daughter. The intimate knowledge of the aborigines which resulted from these events brought to the Spaniards constant rumors of ‘regions flowing with gold’, and another great sea to the westward; and on September 1,1513, Balboa, with a picked company of one hundred and ninety of his followers and a number of Indian servants, started off through the tropical forests to substantiate them. So dense was the undergrowth that the explorers made on the average less than two miles a day; but on September 25 they were rewarded by coming out on a summit whence they could gaze upon “the other sea so long looked for and never seen before of any man coming out of our world”. Four days later Balboa waded into the waters of the Mar del Sur, or Southern Ocean, as he had already named it, holding aloft a banner and a sword, and solemnly took possession of the portentous Pacific and the adjacent lands in the name of his royal master, the king of Spain.

But it seemed to be for the most distinguished of the Spanish explorers that the cruellest of fates were reserved. Columbus had been cheated out of his rights and suffered to die in oblivion; Balboa, who next to the Admiral had perhaps rendered the most notable service, was to be rewarded for his achievements with death. In April, 1515, before the news of the discovery of the Pacific had
been reported in Spain, King Ferdinand, whose most recent information concerning the state of affairs at the Isthmus had been received through the report of the rancorous lawyer Enciso, sent out a stern and truculent official, Pedrarias Davila, as governor of the colony with full powers and a large military force, and special instructions to take the residencia of Balboa. On his arrival a trial was instituted, but the prestige which Balboa had won by his discoveries and his obvious popularity with his followers discouraged Pedrarias from pushing it to its conclusion; and his perplexities were increased in 1515 when news came from Spain that Ferdinand had at last received word of Balboa’s achievement, and had rewarded him with the title of adelantado de la Mar del Sur. But Pedrarias was profoundly jealous of the man he had been sent out to supplant and vowed his ruin. There was indeed an official reconciliation between them, and Balboa was sent off on a fresh exploring expedition; but a report from a treacherous subordinate that he entertained plans of regaining independent authority for himself gave his enemy an excuse for arresting him again. After a humiliating trial, he was beheaded, with four of his companions, sometime in the year 1517. Had his discovery of the Pacific been reported a little earlier in Spain, Pedrarias would in all probability never have been sent out, and Balboa might well have anticipated the work of Pizarro. It was a sad earnest of the tragic results which were bound to ensue from the extreme slowness and difficulty of communication between the now widely scattered portions of the Spanish Empire.

Two more expeditions, one to the north and one to the south, complete the tale of the exploring activities of Spain in the New World during the period at present under review. Rumors of an island called Bimini to the north of Española, which contained a spring or fount of eternal youth, so fascinated a certain Juan Ponce de Leon, who had come out in 1493 and since risen by his own energy and valor to the headship of the island of Porto Rico, that he applied for a patent to discover and colonize it; and this was granted him by the king at Burgos on February 23, 1512. The voyage he undertook in pursuance of this license brought him in April of the following year to the northern part of the eastern shore of the present state of Florida. He took the land he had found to be an island, and christened it with the name it bears today, probably because he had discovered it on Easter Sunday—the Spanish Pasqua de Flores—or possibly on account of the luxuriance of its vegetation. During the next two and one-half months he coasted down along the eastern shore, rounded the point, and followed the western side up possibly as far as Appalachee Bay. Thence he returned, still obsessed with the idea of discovering Bimini, for further exploration among the Bahamas, and finally got back to Porto Rico in September. He still cherished the delusion that Florida was an island, as is proved by the terms of the patent for its settlement which he secured in Spain in the following year (1514); but as he did not actually return thither until 1521, the remainder of his career must be reserved for another volume.

Meantime to the southward the news of Balboa’s discovery of the Pacific gave fresh impetus to the old quest for a strait; and on November 12, 1514, King Ferdinand commissioned Juan Diaz de Solis, the companion of Vicente Yañez Pinzon’s famous voyage of 1508, and now chief pilot of Spain, to explore the coasts of South America, to a distance of seventeen hundred leagues or more beyond the Isthmus of Panama, if possible, taking great care not to trespass on the territories of the king of Portugal. With three small ships and seventy followers, Solis left San Lucar on October 8, 1515, struck the Brazilian coast just north of Rio de Janeiro—well to the south, indeed, of the point reached by Cabral fifteen years before, but still east of the line of demarcation—and coasted along until in February, 1516, he reached the estuary of the Rio de la Plata. Surprised at the great volume of fresh water, but not suspecting at first that it could be the mouth of a river, he called it the Mar Dulce. On landing, the adventurers were suddenly assaulted by a great host of cannibal Indians, and Solis and some of his men were slain; the rest of the company, fearful that a similar fate would overtake them if they attempted to avenge the death of their comrades, sorrowfully departed, and after loading their vessels with Brazil wood, made the best of their way back to Spain.

Thus far did the exploration and settlement of the New World progress under the Catholic Kings; the first years of their imperial successor were to witness fresh strides in advance. To complete the picture of Spanish America at the death of King Ferdinand, we must now briefly sketch the growth of a system of administration of the new territories after the abolition of the monopolistic privileges of Columbus.

It is scarcely possible to overemphasize the obvious truth that the Spanish colonial system was an exceedingly gradual development. No one could have had any notion at the time of Ferdinand and Isabella of the immense importance of the place the Indies were ultimately destined to occupy in the Spanish Empire. The policies and institutions under which they were administered grew up little by little, pari passu with the extension of the domains of the Crown of Castile in the Western Hemisphere.
The methods adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella were no more than the earliest beginnings. They bear little resemblance to the full-fledged colonial system as it appears in the end of the sixteenth century.

Yet, on the other hand, there were certain dominant principles of colonial policy initiated by the Catholic Kings which lasted right down to the days of the Bourbons, though the methods of applying them changed greatly as the years went by. Some of them, indeed, go back to the heyday of the fortunes of Columbus. The motto subsequently added to the coat of arms granted to the Admiral in 1493 hints at one of the most essential of them:

A Castilla y a León
Nuevo mundo dió Colón;

and the same idea appears again and again in the Laws of the Indies and in the writings of contemporary historians and legists. The American possessions were not, strictly speaking, Spanish; in a sense they were Castilian, though even that statement can only be accepted with reservations; but with the realms of the Crown of Aragon they had nothing whatever to do. Down to the death of Queen Isabella, indeed, even the privilege of emigration was not granted to the inhabitants of the eastern kingdoms. There may be some ambiguity in the phraseology of the famous ordinance granting to ‘cualesquier personas’ liberty to go and settle in the Indies and to ‘cualesquier personas nuestros subditos e naturales’ the right to go and make discoveries there; but Herrera and Oviedo are perfectly definite in their statements that only Castilians were permitted to pass over to the Indies in these early years. After 1504, when Ferdinand obtained control of the western kingdom, it seems clear that the restrictions were considerably relaxed, at least in practice, by frequent utilization, for the benefit of the inhabitants of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, of the royal right to grant special exemptions from the operation of existing laws; but it was not till the year 1596 that all the inhabitants of Spain were legally given the same privileges of emigration to the New World. And in matters of government and administration the realms of the Crown of Aragon were much more completely and permanently shut off from participation in American affairs; the laws and institutions of the Indies continued throughout to be modelled on those of Castile. It is not difficult to see the reason. Geographical considerations doubtless counted for something; but a far more fundamental explanation of the unwillingness of the sovereigns to permit any of the political methods of the eastern kingdoms to percolate to the Indies was their dread lest the new territories should be contaminated by coming in contact with the ‘Aragonese liberties’ which they had not been able wholly to subvert. It was their ultimate object to maintain absolute control of their American possessions for themselves: therefore the government of those possessions was to be modelled on that of Castile, which had been reduced to a satisfactory condition. The system which these statements imply was not fully set up until Hapsburg days; but the idea of keeping the administration of the realms of the Crown of Aragon and their dependencies in Italy and the Mediterranean rigidly apart from that of the territories fact begun to make itself felt in the initial stages of the development of the Indies: the new empire that was opening up to the westward was not to be permitted to learn anything from that portion of Spain which had hitherto enjoyed by far the largest measure of imperial experience.

It must not, however, be inferred from the foregoing that the Indies in any sense belonged to Castile as a whole, or that any Castilian institution except the crown had the smallest vestige of authority there. Spanish colonial laws and institutions were to be brought into the closest alignment with those of Castile, in sharp contrast to their many divergences from those of Aragon, but save for the sovereign at the head of them all, they did not possess a single authority in common. The Castilian Cortes, councils, and audiencias were not to have an atom of power in America (save, possibly, in the very early days through an occasional appeal from the Casa de Contratación to the royal justices in Seville); the crown proposed to maintain exclusive control of the new possessions—to manage them as another hereditary domain, through a totally new set of institutions, without doubt closely similar to, and in fact modelled on, those of Castile, but entirely separate from them.

This determination of the crown to supervise every phase of the development of the American possessions manifests itself first of all in economic affairs, a fact which has been adduced by some authors to prove that the primary object of the sovereigns in the new territories was to derive revenue from them. The political authority conferred on the Admiral in the capitulations of 1492 was quite adequate to the needs of the first settlement in España, and he had not yet demonstrated his failings as a ruler of men; but the monarchs were much concerned that the revenues of the little colony should be developed to the full, and that only the right sort of men for that purpose should be permitted to emigrate. They therefore appointed Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca in 1493 to supervise the preparations for Columbus’s second voyage, as we have already seen, and to issue licenses to those who were to
accompanied him; furthermore, acting on a suggestion from the Admiral, they gave orders that all ships returning from the Indies should enter and unload at Cadiz alone. From the very beginning the entire trade of Spanish America was concentrated at a single port—for when Cadiz was abandoned in 1503, its place was immediately taken by Seville—in order to facilitate the rigid supervision which the crown was resolved to maintain. This system was, of course, most detrimental in its economic effects, both on the mother country and on the colonies—the more so because of the immense difficulties of communication in separatistic Spain—and there were petitions that other seaports might be permitted to share in the American trade. No attention, however, was paid to these requests. The government was definitely launched on its policy of strict supervision and monopolistic control, and all other considerations were to be sacrificed to the maintenance of it.

All this, however, was the merest preliminary. The early years of the sixteenth century were to witness a much further development of the machinery of royal control of American affairs. In the first place, Columbus’s rights and privileges had by this time been entirely abrogated, so that the crown had matters completely in its own hands. In the second, other explorers had been sent out, and new lands had been discovered, so that Fonseca, energetic man-of-all-work though he was, had become absolutely overwhelmed with the multifarious tasks that were imposed upon him. In 1503, accordingly, it was determined to relieve him of a large share of his economic responsibilities by the erection of a Casa de Contratación, or Board of Trade. This body, which was at first composed of a treasurer, a comptroller (contador), and a business manager (factor), was established in June, 1503, in the Alcazar Real at Seville, where it remained until the days of the Bourbons. Besides the three officials above named, a chief pilot made his appearance in 1508 (the office was first bestowed on Amerigo Vespucci) and the beginnings of a sort of a school of navigation took shape before the close of the reign; a postmaster-general (correo mayor) was also appointed in May, 1514; and as the business of the Casa increased, a number of secretaries and legal counsellors naturally had to be added. But the original division of the functions of the Casa into three main parts remained virtually undisturbed for over a hundred years. The tesorero, contador, and factor became each the head of a department in which subordinate officials found their places.

From the composition of the Casa de Contratación we pass to the more difficult and important subject of its functions. Our chief source of information concerning these is the ordinances of January 20, 1503, and of June 15, 1510, which have been preserved to us in full; and also that of 1504, of which we have an abridgment. At the outset the crown probably had some idea of retaining the American trade entirely within its own hands. Experience, however, soon proved that this was impracticable, so that the Casa fell heir to the exceedingly onerous task of supervising all the ships and merchants that carried goods and passengers to and from the Indies and seeing to it that all the laws and ordinances relative to navigation, emigration, and commerce with the new territories were fully and exactly carried out. It has been well described as “at once a Board of Trade, a commercial court, and a clearing house for the American traffic.” The chief duty of the treasurer was to receive and care for all the gold, silver, and precious stones which were due to the royal treasury from the American mines. These were regarded, in this period, as belonging to the crown, though the latter rarely exploited them on its own resources. The regular practice was to turn them over to private persons to operate, but to demand that a large share of the product (two thirds at first, though the proportion was gradually reduced until, in 1504, it reached one fifth) be paid over to the Hacienda Real for the privilege. To the factor fell the function of outfitting and provisioning ships, of purchasing supplies and armament of all kinds, and the care of all merchandise, except gold, silver, and precious stones, that was remitted from the Indies to the Crown. The contador, meantime, discharged the very difficult duty of registering all persons and commodities carried by outgoing or incoming ships. Every person wishing to emigrate, was obliged to obtain a license from the crown, which had to be duly authenticated. No infidels or heretics, or their descendants down to the fourth generation, were permitted to go, and it was the Contador’s business to see that they were kept out. The meticuous paternalism which characterized every phase of the Indian administration of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was indeed not fully developed in the period of the Catholic Kings; but an excellent foundation for it had unquestionably been already laid. The precision and detail with which it was expected that the different officials of the Casa should discharge the functions assigned to them can be best appreciated by careful perusal of the ordinance of 1510; that their task was no sinecure may be judged from the fact that they were expected to come together for consultation and joint action twice a day, morning and afternoon, every day in the year except holidays. In this connection it may also be observed that the Casa as a body attempted from the very beginning to exercise some measure of judicial authority over Indian affairs, and as a result soon found itself involved in quarrels with the municipal authorities of Seville. In September, 1511, a royal proclamation attempted to define the Casa’s jurisdiction as a court of law, and the nature of the
cases that should come before it; but interference by the local judiciary continued until the Casa’s powers were amplified and the Council of the Indies was definitely established in the reign of the Emperor Charles V. The collection of the _avería_, or toll for the convoy of the fleets, and of the _almozarifazgo_, or duty on commodities imported from the Indies, was also to form an important branch of the Casa’s activities; but as these impostes were not established till the succeeding reign, we do not need to consider them here.

From matters economic we pass to the political administration of the Indies. The original concessions to Columbus in 1492 gave him supreme authority over such territories as he should discover; then on his return in the following year Fonseca was appointed, as we have already seen, as the royal representative in Indian affairs resident in Spain; and the terms of the various commissions issued to him show that he was clothed with wide powers of government as well as of economic supervision. The gradual withdrawal of the privileges of the Admiral in the succeeding years, as well as the rapid progress of American exploration, naturally increased the burden of Fonseca’s responsibilities, and a number of subordinate persons were associated with him; a certain Gaspard de Gricio appears in 1501 as secretary for the affairs of the Indies, and was succeeded, on his death in 1507, by the Comendador Lope de Conchillos. At the same time the officials of the Casa de Contratación, which had been formally established four years before, were ordered to keep close in touch with these men, as was also Governor Ovando in Española; and in 1514 we learn that in affairs of great importance Doctors Zapata and Palacios Rubios, and the _licenciados_ Santiago and Sosa, all of them members of the Council of Castile, were called in by Fonseca and the secretary to give their advice. This group of men formed the germ of the future Council of the Indies, or supreme authority in the management of the Spanish possessions in the New World down to the end of the old regime; but since that body was not permanently organized until 1524, we may postpone further consideration of it until the succeeding reign. A number of orders and injunctions from Ferdinand relative to the Indies, some of them of an extremely minute and detailed character, plainly show that the king kept close watch over the administration of the American possessions; certainly this first amorphous committee on the Indies, from which the full-fledged _Consejo de Indias_ was subsequently evolved, enjoyed little independent authority apart from the crown. The king’s concession in 1507 of coats of arms to fourteen different ‘cities’ of Española is an interesting indication of the way in which the Spaniard carried his ancient love of emblems and dignities with him across the sea.

So much for the organs of Spanish American government which remained resident in Spain. We now turn to the representatives of the crown in the Indies themselves. In later days, after the Spanish American administration had got into full working order, these consisted of viceroyes, captains-general, audiencias, and their subordinates, but this was not until the time of Charles V and Philip II; for the present we are concerned merely with the methods in vogue during the period intermediate between the withdrawal of the privileges of Columbus and the end of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. Our chief source of information concerning these is the instructions issued to Francisco de Bobadilla, who was sent out to supersede Columbus in 1500, and subsequently to Nicolas de Ovando and Diego Columbus, who followed him in turn in 1501 and in 1509; the orders borne by Pedrarias Davila in 1514 to the colony at Darien also contain items of interest. Aside from their precepts for the treatment of the Indians, which is a matter of such importance as to demand separate consideration, the following features of these instructions are particularly worthy of attention. In the first place, the powers granted to the new governor in each case were practically all-inclusive: all subordinate officials were to take their orders from him, but he was beholden to no one, and was not compelled to take any one’s advice. A plan of controlling Pedrarias at Darien by forbidding him to act without the consent of certain important lay and ecclesiastical officials who were sent out with him was tried, indeed, but was soon abandoned as useless; and for a long time afterwards the governor was left to manage affairs alone. Only in the nascent municipal constitutions did any vestige of ancient Castilian democracy or self-government permanently survive; it is interesting to observe that the inhabitants of the settlement at Darien elected Balboa as their alcalde in 1510, and that we hear of procuradores chosen to inform the crown of the desires of the inhabitants of the cities of Española as early as 1508. All the royal orders laid great stress on the necessity of strict and impartial administration of justice; and the practice of taking the residencia of outgoing officiate became firmly planted in the Indies from the very beginning, with all its attendant benefits and disadvantages. It must be confessed, however, that the latter were considerably greater than the former under the system as it operated in the American territories; for so great was the dread in those distant regions of complaint by some malicious foe that the majority of the magistrates feared to deviate in the slightest degree from instructions composed, often quite ignorantly, in Spain; with the result that healthy initiative was checked, evils of which the home government knew little or nothing were perpetuated, and a sort of creeping paralysis ultimately
came to pervade the entire structure of the Spanish Empire in the New World. Finally, the instructions to the successive governors reveal plain traces of the crown’s burning desire to extract revenue from the American lands at any and every possible opportunity. In 1501, Ovando was ordered to try to levy a servicio voluntary on the inhabitants of Española to defray the expenses of the ‘wars against the Turks’; in 1509, we hear of the same thing again under the name of an empréstito, or loan. On the other hand, it is fair to say that one of the commonest privileges offered to induce men to go and settle in the New World was exemption for a more or less prolonged period from the alcabala.

Lastly we come to the difficult question of the treatment of the Indians, and the various attempts to reconcile the sovereigns’ firm determination to deal kindly with them, and ultimately to convert them to Christianity, with their desire to see the colonies self-supporting and, if possible, a source of profit. No one who has read the documents can doubt the sincerity of the good intentions of the Catholic Kings in their policy toward the natives, who were regarded from the outset as subjects of the crown of Castile, and not, as by the English colonists farther north, as independent tribes, hostile or friendly as the case might be. The major part of the instructions to practically every explorer and governor sent out from Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella is occupied with exhortations and commands to be kind and just to the Indians, and to bring them as soon as possible to the Christian faith. But the church itself was the means on which the sovereigns chiefly relied to accomplish their purposes in this respect. Their control over the ecclesiastical revenues and appointments in the Indies was even more complete, as we have already seen, than that which they exercised in Spain, and they utilized it with an eye to the welfare of the natives, as well as to that of the emigrant Spaniards. At least two bishoprics were set up in the islands in the course of the years 1512-13, and their occupants were chiefly concerned with the superintendence of the work of conversion; but an earlier and more active agency in this, and also in the protection of the Indians from maltreatment by the newcomers, was the contingent of monks which came out with almost every fresh party of settlers. Some of these, indeed, like the Benedictine Fray Boyl who accompanied Columbus’s second expedition, were quite unworthy of the high task that had been laid upon them; but the majority were of better stuff, and certainly, meant to do their duty, though their achievements did not always correspond to their intentions. The foremost champions of the rights, and also of the conversion of the Indians, were the Dominicans, whose zeal for the welfare of the natives ultimately obtained “such root in that brotherhood as almost to become one of the tenets of their faith”; unfortunately, however, the jealousies of the other orders, particularly of the Franciscans, were so aroused by their activities in this direction that the cause for which they labored not seldom suffered from having been permitted to become the subject of bitter monkish quarrels.

Nevertheless the actual facts of existence in the Indies were strangely at variance with the indubitably benevolent intentions of the home government. Columbus himself, who in 1492 was apparently imbued with the sovereigns’ humanitarian views, had become as early as 1494 at least temporarily a convert, as we have already seen, to the necessity of enrolling the Indians. The perilous condition and scanty resources of the colony at Española were of course the cause of the change. Gold had not been found in anything like the quantities that had been expected. If the settlement was to be maintained at all, means must speedily be devised to make life there profitable and attractive, and the method finally adopted was to parcel out the land and the enforced labor of the Indians resident upon it in so-called encomiendas, or repartimientos, among the Spaniards who went out to the New World. This system, which did not reach its full development until the time of Ovando, is said to have been suggested by a tribute which had been imposed on certain Indians in 1495 as penalty for a revolt, and which had been rendered by them in the form of manual labor; but certainly the idea of dividing up conquered territory into repartimientos between those who had won it goes back to a much earlier period of Spanish history, and was employed by James the Conqueror when he captured the Balearics and Valencia. Obviously, the character of this practice as ultimately developed in the Indies would depend primarily on whether the emphasis was laid on the allotment of the land, or on that of the compulsory services that went with it; and as time went on it was the latter that became the increasingly predominant factor. It is true that Ferdinand and Isabella strove to make the encomienda system actively promote their plans for the conversion of the natives to Christianity, for in all the patents the grant of their services was made conditional on the grantees’ teaching them “the matters of our holy Catholic Faith”. Indeed, one of the reasons for the establishment of the encomiendas was that the Indians had withdrawn into the interior to avoid, all contact with the Spaniards, and consequently were inaccessible to missionaries. The sovereigns were also careful to insist that the Indians on the encomiendas should be paid for their work at a reasonable rate, for in addition to their desire to Christianize them the monarchs were determined that the natives should not be enslaved. In 1501 they had even gone so far as to authorize the importation of negro slaves into the New World in order to spare the Indians, and though the license was temporarily revoked in the last years of the life of the
queen, it was renewed in 1505, and the practice it sanctioned gradually established itself in the succeeding years. Yet despite all these precautions to safeguard the welfare of the natives, the tendency of the settlers to exploit them for their own advantage, to the prejudice of their health and their instruction, proved too strong to be effectively resisted. The royal arm could not reach across the sea and bring the offenders quickly to justice. The period of labor in the fields, and still worse in the remote mines in the interior, was gradually lengthened; wages were not regularly paid; and the precepts of kind treatment and instruction were neglected. So cruelly were they abused, in fact, that the Indian inhabitants of the islands began to dwindle away; according to an admittedly partisan witness the existence of similar conditions throughout the world would soon cause the human race to die out.

A violent sermon delivered by the Dominican monk Fray Antonio de Montesinos to the inhabitants of Santo Domingo on the fourth Sunday of Advent, 1511, served to bring clearly into relief this wide discrepancy between the home government’s program for the Indians and the facts as they actually were. The preacher fiercely rebuked his auditors for their oppression and neglect of the natives, and when the colonists demanded that he retract what he had said, he repeated his discourse on the succeeding Sunday with redoubled emphasis and ended by announcing that the sacraments of the church would thenceforth be refused to those who did not amend their ways. The colonists replied by sending a Franciscan to Spain to complain of the Dominicans; and the latter naturally retorted by dispatching Montesinos to defend them. The Franciscan had every advantage over his adversary at the court, but the vivid horror of Montesinos’s recital led Ferdinand to appoint a commission of inquiry, whose labors finally resulted in the publication, on December 27, 1512, of a brief code—generally known as the Laws of Burgos, from the place in which it was put forth—which has justly been described as “the first public recognition of the rights of the Indians, and an attempt at least to amend their wrongs”. Limitation of the periods of the labor of the natives, regulations concerning their food and shelter, and a provision for the nomination of inspectors to see that the orders of the crown were actually carried out, are the principal feature of this theoretically admirable ordinance; but as the inspectors were themselves encomenderos, they had every inducement to neglect the discharge of their functions. We have here again, in fact, the selfsame difficulty which crops up in every phase of the Spanish administration of the New World to the very end. The regulations made by the home government were usually excellent, but distance and defective means of communication rendered it wellnigh impossible to carry them out. The best evidence of the nonobservance of the Laws of Burgos is the fact that less than three years after their passage a certain settler of Cuba, by name Bartholomew de las Casas, whose conscience had been aroused by the exhortations of the Dominicans, surrendered his encomienda and made his way back to Spain to plead for the Indians before the king. Powerful interests in the Casa were opposed to him, and Ferdinand died before this future apostle of the Indians could be fully heard, but the work which he had so nobly begun was to be carried much further in the succeeding reign. — All the fundamental difficulties of the Indian question had, in fact, been clearly recognized under the Catholic Kings, but practically no progress whatsoever had been made towards its solution. The circumstances of the reign of the Emperor Charles V were destined greatly to increase the complexity of the issues involved in the problem which his grandparents had bequeathed to him.

This is not the place to attempt any extended estimate of the position and significance of the Indies in the fabric of the Spanish Empire. Only the surface had as yet been scratched. The real wealth and extent of the new possessions remained hid for many years to come, and the system under which they were to be administered was still in its infancy. Yet one brief comment may be added here, if only to emphasize the tremendous importance of the achievement of Christopher Columbus. More than sixty years ago a shrewd and observant writer advanced the theory that the possession of the Indies was the determining cause of the ruin of Spain in the succeeding centuries, that it diverted her from her normal and traditional lines of development, caused her to neglect excellent chances nearer home, and forced her to bleed herself white in the effort to maintain her remote acquisitions in the New World. There is much to be said for this argument. The number, variety, and coincidence of Spain’s opportunities, as we have often remarked, was one of the most potent causes of her decline, and it was the American possessions which caused her to deviate the furthest from the paths she had trodden before. Had she kept out of the New World she would doubtless have led a more comfortable existence in the Old. She would not have been so easily induced to attempt impossible tasks. She would not have drawn down on herself the jealousy and hatred of neighboring states. She would probably have avoided the fatal trial of strength with England. She might well have been more powerful today. Yet when all is said and done, it was the Indies that account for her greatness during the brief period that it lasted. If they were a principal cause of her subsequent decay, they were also the primary source of her temporary
preeminence. Without them she would never have been able to retain the hegemony of Europe so long as she did; without them the Spanish Empire would scarcely have been worthy of the name. What seemed to contemporaries but a fortunate incident was really the great turning point in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. The day that Christopher Columbus set sail from Palos was the most fateful in the history of United Spain.
CHAPTER XVIII
NORTH AFRICA

The Spanish possessions in the New World did not so monopolize the attention of Ferdinand and Isabella as to prevent them from laying plans for the conquest of another region, whose destinies, from time immemorial, had been intimately connected with those of the Iberian Peninsula. The task of carrying the Christian arms across the Mediterranean into North Africa was the obvious and logical sequel to the capture of Granada; it was dictated by every consideration of sentiment and of expediency; in 1493, as we have already seen, the Catholic Kings had sent out a trusty official, Lorenzo de Padilla, in disguise to reconnoiter. The kingdom of Fez, directly across the Strait, was closed to him by virtue of the provision in the treaty of 1479 which had assigned it to Portugal. He therefore set his course farther eastward and finally penetrated to Tlemcen, whence he returned with much useful information. In the following year (1494), the Spanish ambassador at Rome reminded the Pope of the many historical ties that united Spain to Mauretania and demanded that his Holiness should concede to their Catholic Majesties the exclusive right of conquest of the North African coast. Portuguese representatives were, of course, on hand to insist on the priority of their rights in the western part of the territory in question, and on the Atlantic seaboard; they were finally brought to agree, however, that everything east of and including the town of Melilla should be assigned to Spain, though they took a mild revenge by challenging the Spanish claims to the possession of lands on the west coast opposite the Canaries. The Pope also handed over to the Spanish sovereigns and their heirs the tercias of Castile, Leon, and Granada in perpetuo, to aid them in the prosecution of the Holy War, and in 1496-97 the town of Melilla was seized by a representative of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who subsequently turned it over to the Catholic Kings. Yet despite all these early activities, it was almost ten years later before the Spanish conquest of North Africa can be said to have really begun. The chief cause of the delay was unquestionably the Italian wars, which absorbed all the available resources of the Catholic Kings during the decade following the memorable raid of Charles VIII on Naples. Not until the year after the final conquest of that kingdom by the troops of Gon-salvo de Cordova was it possible to launch the first regular expedition against the Barbary coast.

The real hero of the story of Spanish expansion in North Africa during the first ten years of the sixteenth century is neither King Ferdinand nor Queen Isabella, but Cardinal Francisco Ximenes de Cisneros. His fame as a churchman and as regent of Castile during the twenty months that elapsed between the death of Ferdinand and the arrival of his grandson Charles from the Netherlands will doubtless long outlive his reputation as a builder of the Spanish Empire; but it is in the latter capacity that we have to consider him here, and it is no reason to depreciate its significance that the cardinal accomplished still greater things in other directions. A well-established tradition, accepted by a contemporary biographer, pictures him on the southern slope of the Sierra Vermeja, in the year of the conquest of Granada, pointing out to an attendant monk the distant promontories of the opposite shore beyond the blue waves of the Mediterranean, and solemnly urging upon him the glorious duty of carrying the Christian faith into the country of its infidel foes. It was doubtless his enthusiasm that inspired the monarchs to take the first steps towards the realization of this project in the years that followed the conquest of Granada; and more important still, it was his insistence that prevented the whole matter from being quite forgotten in the whirl of European diplomacy which occupied the next decade. Isabella was certainly a far more ardent supporter of the cardinal’s plans than was her husband. Her attention was not centered, as was his, on the prosecution of the Italian campaigns; and it is one of the ironies of history that she died before the first expedition against Mers-el-Kebir was actually sent forth. “I beg my daughter and her husband”, so runs a memorable passage in her will, “that they will devote themselves unremittingly to the conquest of Africa and to the war for the faith against the Moors”; and her words may well have been an inspiration to Ximenes in the hard struggle to enlist the sympathies of the cautious Ferdinand in his crusading schemes, which he was henceforth left to carry on alone. It is perfectly clear that the North African enterprise did not commend itself to the King of Aragon on religious grounds alone, and also that he failed at first to perceive its political and economic advantages. The cardinal won his consent to it at last by pointing out that an attack on the Barbary coast was the best means of defending the Spanish ports from the ravages of Moorish pirates, which had increased in frequency since the fall of Granada; and still more by promising to advance to the royal
absorbed in his quarrels with his son-in-law, Philip, over the Castilian regency, and afterwards with his imagination as it had d
journey to Naples. Even Ximenes himself was obliged to neglect the Barbary conquests in this presidio for its capture had cost him practically nothing; but the North African enterprise had never fired his it was impossible to bring King Ferdinand to see this. He was glad that Mers-el-Kebir had been taken, and
were indispensable; advance was essential as the sole way to prevent retreat. For a long time, however, necessary to send over to them no less than 12,000 bushels of grain from Barcelona. If the captured Spaniards to maintain themselves on what they had already won; before June, 1506, it had been found
Most serious of all was the question of supplies. Cooped up in Mers-el-Kebir, it was impossible for the Christian territories round about, and which was so strongly fortified that a direct assault from the sea was foredoomed to failure. Only by land could Oran be attacked with any reasonable prospect of success, and a land attack necessitated a base at Mers-el-Kebir. Some 10,000 troops were accordingly collected at Malaga in August, 1505, under the lead of Diego Fernandez de Cordova, a distant kinsman of the great captain, and embarked on a fleet of 140 ships commanded by Ramón de Cardona. Passing up the coast to Cartagena to take on their pilots, they finally set sail on September 3, and after being driven about in the Mediterranean by bad weather, arrived eight days later off Cape Falcone, at the entrance to the Bay of Mers-el-Kebir. The disembarkation was effected through the heroism of 180 Spaniards, who made their way to shore in small boats and by swimming, and fell upon a vastly superior body of Moors with such fury that they soon cleared a space for others to follow them. The next step was the occupation and fortification of a hill dominating the city, and the repulse of a violent counterattack. A vigorous bombardment of the fortress itself was soon after begun, and preparations to storm it hurried forward. But a Moorish soldier who had fallen (perhaps not unintentionally) from the battlements of Mers-el-Kebir into the sea with the feeling that they were sent forth to fight for a sacred cause. There can be no question that the militant religious fervor which inspired these last crusades of the West went far deeper than that of the period of the Reconquest as a whole, and the influence of Cardinal Ximenes was one of the principal causes of the change.

On the advice of a Venetian merchant named Geronimo Vianelli, who had traded all along the North African coast, and also served under Gonsalvo de Cordova in the Italian wars, the cardinal selected the fort of Mers-el-Kebir as the point that it would be most profitable to attack. It lay just west of the far more important town of Oran, which was the key to all the country round about, and which
was menaced by the hold the Christians had already won, was moving heaven and earth to expel them. For a long time, however, an end in itself. For Ximenes and his most ardent supporters it
was merely a steppingstone, as we have already seen, to the capture of Oran. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that the plans of the cardinal had already begun to go much further than the mere control of the coast. “Africa, Africa for the king of Spain, our sovereign lord!” echoed the shouts of his troops as they entered the conquered fortress; and there are plenty of other indications in the contemporary historians that Ximenes was already contemplating the foundation of a Hispano-Mauretanian empire stretching southward to the confines of the Sahara. Moreover, it soon became evident that Mers-el-Kebir itself could not long be retained, unless the Christian territories round about it were enlarged. The Moors of Oran were constantly on the watch to cut off any foraging expeditions into the interior; and more important still, the king of Tlemcen, whose access to the coast was menaced by the hold the Christians had already won, was moving heaven and earth to expel them. Most serious of all was the question of supplies. Cooped up in Mers-el-Kebir, it was impossible for the
Spaniards to maintain themselves on what they had already won; before June, 1506, it had been found necessary to send over to them no less than 12,000 bushels of grain from Barcelona. If the captured presidio was to be made self-supporting, as it was clearly desirable that it should be, further conquests were indispensable; advance was essential as the sole way to prevent retreat. For a long time, however, it was impossible to bring King Ferdinand to see this. He was glad that Mers-el-Kebir had been taken, for its capture had cost him practically nothing; but the North African enterprise had never fired his imagination as it had the cardinal’s, and in the months that followed its initial success he was deeply absorbed in his quarrels with his son-in-law, Philip, over the Castilian regency, and afterwards with his journey to Naples. Even Ximenes himself was obliged to neglect the Barbary conquests in this
period, owing to the multitude of problems that claimed his attention in Spain. Throughout the year 1506 and the early part of 1507 the garrison of Mers-el-Kebir was shamefully neglected, despite urgent messages dispatched by the gallant Diego Fernandez de Cordova to beg for reinforcements. Finally, the news of a Moorish victory over a Christian detachment which had been sent out to seize provisions, coupled with a personal visit of the Spanish general to the Castilian court during the absence of Ferdinand in Italy, elicited from the cardinal a substantial body of troops; but the _razzia_ in which they were utilized soon after their arrival resulted in a terrible disaster. The Moors let them plunder at will, and then, as they were retiring to their base, led them into an ambush in the ravine of Fistel, where they slew or captured nearly all of them; Diego Fernandez de Cordova managed almost alone to escape by night to Mers-el-Kebir. Encouraged by this success, the Moors of Oran attacked the Spaniards in the fortress itself; though they were repulsed, the episode served to clinch the argument of the Spanish leader that unless more troops and munitions were speedily sent out from home, the loss of all that had been already gained was inevitable. Ferdinand had by this time returned from Italy. The European situation was temporarily quiet, and he was free to devote more of his attention to North African affairs. The last months of the year 1507 saw vigorous preparations for a renewal of the Barbary campaign on a much larger scale.

But when it came to settling the details of the arrangements for the new attack, all the old difficulties and divisions broke forth afresh. First, there was the inevitable question of funds. The royal treasury had been emptied by the Italian campaigns; and Ximenes, as previously, had to come forward with an independent offer. After long negotiations, it was finally agreed that he should pay the entire cost out of the revenues of his archiepiscopal see, and should receive in return supreme command, under the crown, of the forthcoming expedition, together with the royal promise that all conquests made should specially appertain to the diocese of Toledo. Then came the problem of finding a competent military leader. Diego Fernández de Cordova would have been the best possible choice on account of his previous experience, but the failure of his last raid had discredited him, and both king and cardinal were resolved to make a change. Ximenes wanted the Great Captain, but Ferdinand, suspicious of the latter’s schemes for personal aggrandizement, would have nothing to do with him, and insisted instead on nominating Pedro Navarro, renowned indeed as a soldier and engineer in the Italian wars, but altogether too untrustworthy and rapacious for leadership in an enterprise like this. Nay more, Navarro, from the moment of his appointment, lent himself obediently to the private schemes of Ferdinand, who, though ostensibly an enthusiastic convert to the plan of the cardinal, was still much of the time secretly working against him. Ximenes had powerful enemies about the Castilian court; and the king, who lived in perpetual terror of having his authority overshadowed by that of some subordinate, was easily led to believe that Ximenes was aiming at the conquest of an independent empire. Indeed, it is not impossible that it was chiefly with the idea of putting a spoke in the cardinal’s wheel, and of delaying the departure of the main enterprise against Oran, that Ferdinand sent off Navarro, in July 1508, on the pretext of a punitive raid against the Moorish pirates, to attack the island and town of Velez de la Gomera, far to the westward, in the regions which had been assigned to the Portuguese. The expedition was brilliantly successful. The island was captured, and the town on the opposite shore bombarded and destroyed. But the Portuguese at once complained of this invasion of their sphere of influence, as they had done in 1494 when the Spaniards laid claim to Melilla; and they were apparently further irritated, rather than grateful, when Navarro released the Portuguese garrison of the fortress of Arzila on the Atlantic coast, which was being besieged by the Emir of Fez. Long negotiations naturally ensued before the two nations could come to an agreement; and, as before, the Portuguese attempted to bring the Spanish rights on the mainland opposite the Canaries into the discussion, in the hope that if they lost at one point they would gain at another. Eventually they were defeated at both; for the boundary between the territories claimed by the two states in the Mediterranean was ultimately moved west to Velez, which remained in Spanish hands till recaptured by the Moors in 1522, while the Spanish possession of the Atlantic coast opposite the Canaries was confirmed, as we have already seen, in 1509. The chief immediate result of the whole episode, however, was a long postponement of the main enterprise against Oran. It was a striking instance of the way in which the whole North African policy of Spain in this and in the succeeding reigns was made to suffer as a result of jealousies and divided councils at home; certainly nothing short of the heroic determination of Ximenes could have set the expedition in motion at all. Not until May 16, 1509, were the last pretexts and excuses of his enemies exhausted, so that the great army, 14,000 to 20,000 strong, was enabled to embark for the Barbary coast, in a huge fleet of ninety great ships and several hundred transports.

The crossing this time was so speedily accomplished as to leave the Moors but little time for preparation. On the second night after its departure from Spain, the bulk of the army was landed on the shores of Mers-el-Kebir. The activities of certain Christian captives within the walls of Oran had
apparently won over some of the Moors inside the fortress from their allegiance, so that the Spaniards were measurably aided in their enterprise by treachery in the ranks of their foes; but all accounts agree that the really crucial factor in the conflict was the enthusiasm evoked by the dauntless bearing of Cardinal Ximenes. Despite his seventy-three years, his bodily infirmities, and the dubious loyalty of some of his subordinates, the cardinal insisted in sharing all the hardships of the expedition. Mounted on a mule, and preceded by the great silver cross of Toledo, he rode along the ranks exhorting the soldiers to do or die for the faith. Only the assurance that solicitude for his personal safety would divert his followers’ attention from the battle could dissuade him from taking active part in the attack, and it was his urgency that saved the less zealous Navarro from the fatal error of postponing it. The plan of the operation comprised two distinct parts. The first and most important was the assault and capture of the high ridge that separates Mers-el-Kebir from Oran and completely dominates the latter; the second was a bombardment of Oran itself from the ships in the bay, to be followed, if successful, by a landing of troops and a storming of the walls. The attack on the ridge, delivered late in the afternoon and with great desperation, finally attained its objective, owing largely to the cover which a thick mist afforded to the advancing troops, and to a battery of heavy guns which Navarro turned loose at a critical moment on the Moorish flank. The Spaniards reached the summit in time to gaze down upon the minarets of Oran flashing in the level rays of the dying sun. But in order to make the most of the advantage already gained it was essential to press on, and capture the town before its defenders could recover from their surprise. The fleet had meantime done its part, by drawing the fire of the cannon on the walls, and landing a large detachment on the shore at the foot of the ridge; it was by joining with this force in a sudden desperate attack that the troops on the summit could best hope to carry the city then and there. Down the eastern slopes, therefore, they rushed, and, uniting with the detachment at the base, went forward against the fortiﬁcations of Oran. The lack of storming ladders did not stop them. Thrusting their long pikes into the crevices of the rocks, they surged over the walls with an impetuosity that nothing could resist, and, led by the captain of the cardinal’s bodyguard, planted the cross and the arms of the primate on the ramparts. Leaping down on the inside, the soldiers soon overwhelmed the Moors at the gates, and a few moments later the entire Christian army poured through into the streets. The massacre and pillage which ensued form one of the darkest blots on the Spanish arms in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. Neither age nor sex exempted any one from the outrages of the brutal soldiery; the streets were filled with corpses, and thousands of Moors were captured to be sold as slaves; Navarro was totally unable to maintain discipline. A pleasanter feature of the conquest was the liberation of the three hundred Christian prisoners conﬁned in the Casbah, or citadel of the town; for Ximenes, who made a solemn entry into Oran two days after its capture, this ceremony was the culmination of the whole expedition. The booty taken was considerable. A large portion of it was devoted by the cardinal to the maintenance of his army, and the rest he turned over to the royal treasury. An army sent by the king of Tlemcen for the relief of Oran retreated in hot haste when it learned that the town had already been taken; the episode furnished the best possible vindication of the wisdom of Ximenes’s refusal to permit Navarro to postpone the attack.

The completion of the conquest of Oran brought once more to the fore all the old differences between the two leaders. In the eyes of the Cardinal, it was merely an entering wedge, like Mers-el-Kebir, for the foundation of a Spanish empire in North Africa. He wished to import colonists to settle it as a permanent Spanish outpost; and he desired to penetrate at once to Tlemcen. But Navarro, like Ferdinand, was very skeptical about the possibilities of a North African empire. Like most professional soldiers of his day, his immediate interest in the campaign he had undertaken was the prospect it offered of booty and reward. Having captured Oran, he wanted to move on and attack and plunder other rich ports to the eastward; and he showed no enthusiasm for the more difficult and permanent projects which fascinated Ximenes. These antagonisms came to a head in a violent scene between the two leaders, a day or two after the capture of Oran, over the limits of their respective jurisdictions. A proclamation of Navarro, in deﬁance of the conventions signed by Ximenes and Ferdinand, that the conquered city belonged to the crown, and was in no wise attached to the see of Toledo, caused the quarrel somewhat further, and the climax was reached when one of Ximenes’s servants laid before him an intercepted letter from the king to Navarro, in which the latter was urged to amuse the cardinal with various projects and detain him as long as possible in Africa, thus preventing his return to Spain, where his presence was not desired. Naturally the suspicions of Ximenes were at once aroused. He had always been rather the counsellor of Isabella than of her husband: what black treachery was Ferdinand meditating against him now? The only way to meet such treatment was to return at once and ascertain the facts, and this with characteristic promptitude the cardinal resolved to do. At a council of the ofﬁcers he designated Navarro as commander-in-chief, and urged him, with all the eloquence he could command, to continue the campaign; then, with many promises to watch over and provide for the needs of the expedition at home, he set sail on Wednesday, May 23, after a sojourn in North Africa of less than one
week. Disdaining an invitation to visit the king, he dispatched one of his subordinates to Ferdinand to report; and then, after occupying himself for a couple of weeks with the collection of supplies and equipment for the army that he had left behind, he retired on June 12 to his beloved university at Alcalá. A bitter quarrel, arising out of an odious attempt to deprive him of the rights over Oran which had been guaranteed to the see of Toledo in the original convention with Ferdinand, pursued him to his quiet retreat. The king made no pretense of keeping either to the letter or the spirit of his agreement in the matter; and the feud lasted without definite settlement beyond the limits of the cardinal’s life. It was another example, perhaps even more striking than those contemporaneously afforded in the Indies and in Italy, of the suspicion and distrust with which Ferdinand in his later years regarded any evidence of independence or initiative in the representatives of his authority in distant lands. Unfortunately these traits were inherited and magnified by his successors until they became a distinctive and ultimately ruinous feature of Spanish colonial and imperial policy.

After the withdrawal of Ximenes the whole aspect of the North African campaign changed. No one else had taken the possibilities of a Spanish empire in North Africa as seriously as he. Few but himself had cherished any thought of penetrating inland. Had he remained in command, an expedition against Tlemcen would almost infallibly have followed the capture of Oran, and there is every reason to think that it would have been successful, so thoroughly were the Moors demoralized by the losses they had already sustained. But with the cardinal in retirement the opposition had its innings. Ferdinand, and under him Navarro, were now the guiding minds. With the king the principal motive of the North African campaign had doubtless been the suppression of piracy; for Navarro, as we have already seen, the capture of booty was the main consideration; and both these ends could be far better attained by attacking other seaports than by advancing inland. In the autumn of 1509, therefore, it was decided that Navarro should attempt the capture of Bugia, just east of Algiers, leaving Oran in charge of Diego Fernández de Cordova, who was recommended for the purpose by the cardinal before his retirement, and invested with the imposing title of ‘Captain General of the town of Oran, the fortress of Mers-el-Kebir, and the kingdom of Tlemcen.’ In 1510 the ruler of the latter place recognized the sovereignty of Spain, and gave a solemn promise, which he shortly afterwards broke, to furnish aid to the Christians against their foes. Some of the neighboring tribes also made political and commercial treaties with the invaders in the succeeding years, but this and the emigration to Oran of six hundred Spanish families were all that the cardinal was able to accomplish towards the permanent foundation of the empire of which he had dreamed. For all practical purposes the control had passed into the hands of men who had much less ambitious ends in view.

The rest of the story of Spanish expansion in North Africa during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella may be briefly told. On January 1, 1510, Navarro set sail for Bugia with a large force, and a few days later dropped anchor in the bay before it. There is much discrepancy among the different accounts of the capture of the place. According to some authors the entire population fled at the sight of the Spanish fleet, and Navarro was able to take possession without striking a blow; it seems more probable, however, that the fugitives were merely the women and children, for there is good evidence that a vigorous resistance was made, under the lead of a Hafsid e prince named Abd-el-Aziz, before the invaders finally entered the place. Curiously enough, it was soon after, and as a direct result of their capture of Bugia, that the Spaniards first came in contact with the power which was ultimately to be their most effective foe in North Africa—the famous Barbarossa brothers. These two, whose names were Arudj and Khaireddin, were sons of a potter of the island of Mytilene, and after a stormy career as pirates in the Levant had transferred the scene of their operations to the western Mediterranean. It was soon after their arrival off the North African coast that the dispossessed ruler of Bugia applied for their aid in the recovery of his dominions. The elder lost no time in seizing the opportunity that chance had thrown in his way. With a thousand Turks he joined forces with Abd-el-Aziz, and, probably in 1512—the date is somewhat uncertain—assaulted the Spaniards in Bugia. The assailants were repulsed with great slaughter; Arudj had his arm shattered by an arquebus shot, and his younger brother had to remove him to Tunis to recuperate. But he was anxious to repeat the experiment, and in the following year (1513) was again in the field. This time he resolved to proceed more methodically. He began by establishing himself on the island of Gerba, where the Moors had remained in unchallenged possession since the expedition of Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1432, and where Barbarossa could effectively organize an expedition at his leisure. Next he assaulted and captured Jijeli, just east of Bugia, from the Genoese (1514), who in a fit of jealousy at the recent Spanish conquests on the Barbary coast had possessed themselves of it the year before. Having obtained this solid base on the mainland, he returned in 1515 to the attack of Bugia, with the aid of a host of plundering Berbers who rallied to his standard. The town was heroically defended by a small garrison under Don Ramón Carroz for three months, at the expiration of which time Christian reinforcements arrived in such numbers that Barbarossa deemed
it prudent to retire; but the Spaniards had by no means seen the last of him, as they were to learn to their cost in the succeeding reign.

Meantime the great majority of the adjacent Berber tribes were far too much terrified by Navarro’s victories to contemplate further resistance. They deemed it more prudent to acknowledge Spanish overlordship, at least for the present, than to fight for their independence under the aegis of a Turkish corsair. Algiers was convinced that submission was the sole way to avoid the fate of Bugia. On January 31, 1510, a capitulation was signed by envoys whom the town had dispatched to Navarro to sue for peace, promising the recognition of the sovereignty of Spain, friendship with her friends, enmity to her foes, payment of tribute, and liberation of all Christian captives. Furthermore, the Algerians made haste to confirm their surrender to Navarro by dispatching an embassy to Ferdinand in Spain to ratify what they had done, and to offer costly presents to their new master. But Navarro believed in making assurance doubly sure. He realized that as the submission of Algiers had been rather compulsory than voluntary it was more likely to be temporary than permanent; he therefore took measures which he hoped would serve to hold his new vassals permanently to their allegiance. He seized and fortified an islet—the famous Peñón d’Algel—in the harbor directly opposite the town, and left a strong garrison there, in the belief that it would keep the inhabitants in perpetual terror of the Spanish arms; but it was only six years afterwards that Arudj Barbarossa entered Algiers in the face of the Spanish guns, while in 1529 his brother captured the Peñón itself, and built the mole which connects it with the mainland today. Certainly the Barbary coast was not to be permanently held by any such devices as these. Systematic conquest and colonization of the interior were the only way; but the sole advocate of such a policy as this was now in retirement at Alcala, and for the time being Navarro’s methods seemed amply sufficient. Tenes and Delys made haste to follow the example of Algiers and send in their submission; and before the year 1510 was over Navarro was able to follow the injunctions of Ferdinand, and, discreetly avoiding the powerful fortifications of Tunis, to pass on to the conquest of Tripoli farther east. After a desperate resistance the town was captured. In deference to traditions inherited from Norman days, it was placed in the succeeding year under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Sicily and accounted thenceforth an integral part of that kingdom until its cession to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in 1528. It was the last conquest of the reign on the Barbary coast; moreover, it was almost immediately followed by a very serious reverse. Together with Garcia de Toledo, the father of the famous Duke of Alva, who had been sent over from Spain with seven thousand men for the purpose, Navarro attempted to capture the island of Gerba; but the expedition was most rashly launched, without adequate preparations or knowledge of the country, and was finally beaten off by inferior forces with a loss of several thousand men. The disaster was not retrieved in Ferdinand’s day. Navarro was called off to Italy by the war of the Holy League in the following year, and North African affairs were neglected during the rest of the reign.

The verdict which the student of history will pass on the whole North African enterprise under the Catholic Kings will depend primarily on the standpoint from which he regards it. Looked at as an isolated affair, or even as a phase of the development of the regions in question, it seems certain that the Spaniards would have done better to have followed the more ambitious program of Cardinal Ximenes and strive to establish a real Mauretanian Empire. The enterprise was hallowed by the most ancient of the national traditions: if the thing were worth doing at all, it certainly seems, when regarded as a separate problem, as if it would have been worth doing far better. But when we come to fit these North African campaigns into their proper setting in the general development of the Spanish Empire, we shall not be at a loss to find plenty of reasons, if not ample justification, for the somewhat halting method in which they were conducted. They formed, after all, only one, and perhaps on the whole the least important, of a vast number of problems that simultaneously claimed the attention of the Catholic Kings. Without even going into the question of internal affairs, it was inevitable that the responsibilities of maintaining and strengthening their political, territorial, and dynastic position in Europe, as well as the development of their newly discovered domains in the Western Hemisphere, should occupy a far larger share of the attention of the Spanish monarchs than the possibilities of further expansion on the Barbary coast. Had Oran or Mers-el-Kebir been captured before Columbus reached the Indies, or even before the beginning of the Italian wars, they might possibly have taken precedence; but as it was, these North African campaigns were started last of the long list of memorable enterprises which distinguish the reign of the Catholic Kings: under all the circumstances they were bound to be subordinated to the others. Indeed, the mere effort of retaining the few strongholds which had been won diverted energy and resources which were badly needed elsewhere. Superadded to the multitude of other cares and responsibilities which had so recently and so suddenly been saddled upon Spain, they constituted a burden which was ultimately to prove too heavy for her to bear. It was really a case of the last pound that breaks the camel’s back.
CHAPTER XIX
MARRIAGE ALLIANCES AND THE CONQUEST OF NAPLES

No plainer evidence of the rapid rise of Spain’s power and prestige in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella could be desired than the immense increase in the activity of her foreign policy. It has, perhaps, been the fashion somewhat to exaggerate the measure of the isolation of the mediaeval Spanish realms—to forget the conquests of Aragon in the Mediterranean and in Italy and to remember only the Moorish wars and the domestic troubles of Castile; but it is undeniable that the part played by the Iberian kingdoms in the general history of Europe down to the end of the fifteenth century was insignificant in comparison to that of England, France, or the Empire. Before the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, however, all this was radically changed. From comparative obscurity Spain leaped forward to a position of acknowledged prominence in the family of European states, and in the succeeding reigns she was, for a brief space, to attain primacy. On her relations with her neighbors the whole course of European history in the sixteenth century turned, and it was in the effort to prevent her from becoming omnipotent that the principle of the balance of power was gradually evolved. Her chief rival for the hegemony of Europe was France. England, at first her friend and ally, gradually became her foe, and finally dealt her the stroke which rendered ultimately inevitable the ruin of her dominion overseas. With the Empire she was accidentally brought into intimate dynastic relations which proved disastrous to both. Italy was the principal theatre of her continental wars. With Portugal, the most obvious menace to the even tenor of her imperial way, she consistently pursued a policy of friendship, and later of annexation by marriage, which was finally rewarded by temporary success in 1580-81. Against the Turk, after considerable hesitation, she declared the Holy War and announced herself the champion of Christendom. All, or nearly all, the issues involved in these momentous developments had proclaimed themselves before the end of the reign of the Catholic Kings; in fact most of the chief international problems of modern times were stated in the course of the first two decades of the sixteenth century, though the solution of them was reserved for later generations. And the man who set the stage for the great drama that was to unfold itself in Europe in the period when his country reached the highest pinnacle of her glory was King Ferdinand the Catholic. By him Spain was dragged forth from obscurity, and irrevocably committed to that immensely active foreign policy, which, under less sympathetic and skillful guidance, she followed unfaithfully for the next one hundred years. He took the lead in external affairs even more markedly than Isabella had done in domestic ones. The fortunes of the nation abroad could not, in the nature of things, be vigorously pressed until the great internal problems of the time had been solved. Then, when these necessary preliminaries had been cleared away, the queen became so absorbed in the affairs of the Indies and of North Africa that she left her husband a free hand to deal with his fellow potentates of Europe according to his own desires. Finally, after her death in 1504, that is, during the twelve last and most difficult years of the reign, Ferdinand had exclusive control of every phase of the policy of his native land. Thus the story which forms the subject of this and of the succeeding chapter begins inconspicuously, and for a long time is overshadowed by that of Spain’s activities at home and in the Western Hemisphere; but it gradually emerges from obscurity into prominence, until at the end it takes precedence of everything else; and it is dominated throughout by the figure of the Catholic King

It will be convenient to clear away the account of Spain’s relations with Portugal at the outset; for these constitute an episode by themselves, apart from the general current of European affairs, and almost unaffected by the history of Spain’s dealings with the larger states. Since Portugal had declared her independence in the twelfth century, Castile had often longed to win her back, and had several times taken steps, both peaceful and warlike, to attain that end. Castile’s weakness and ill fortune, however, had invariably caused these efforts to fail, and when, in the latter part of the fifteenth century, she suddenly turned her face to the eastward and united her destinies to those of Aragon, the opposition of Portugal had nearly succeeded in subverting the thrones of Ferdinand and Isabella. But after the final defeat of the projects of Affonso the African, it was natural that the more ancient traditions of intimate alliance, if not of unity, should be revived. The expansion of Portugal down the West African coast made her friendship more desirable than ever for Castile; while the triumphant union of the Spanish kingdoms rendered it hopeless for Portugal to oppose them in war. It may indeed seem strange that Ferdinand and Isabella did not anticipate by a century the work of their great-grandson, Philip II, and deliberately invade and overthrow their western neighbor by irresistible military force;
and their failure to do so is the more difficult to explain when we remember the rapidity with which the value of the reward increased before their eyes, through the immense expansion of the Portuguese empire overseas. Excess of responsibilities and opportunities in other directions, rather than any hesitancy on grounds of international morality, was doubtless the principal cause; but one cannot help wondering whether it would not have been sounder policy for Spain to have sacrificed the Italian program of the latter part of the reign to a more vigorous prosecution of her ends in Portugal; and whether indeed she would not have done so, had King Ferdinand happened to be a Castilian. Be that as it may, the sovereigns were certainly too busy at home, at the time of the repulse of Affonso the African’s last raid into Castile in 1479, to think of retaliating by a counter-invasion of Portugal. An honorable and secure peace was, for the time being, all that they cared to demand; and this, as we have already seen, they shortly afterwards obtained. At the same time it was arranged that their eldest child, Isabella, born October 1, 1470, should be married, when she had reached a suitable age, to Affonso, the grandson of Affonso the African, and the son of the future King John the Perfect. An intimate dynastic alliance, such as had frequently been made in early days, once more united the two realms; but whereas hitherto it had usually been the Castilian Infanta who had wedded the Portuguese princess, now, for the first time since the middle of the fourteenth century, a Portuguese Infante had found a wife in Castile. The primary cause of the change was unquestionably the fact that there was not at that time available any Portuguese princess of a suitable age for Ferdinand and Isabella’s only son John, who was born June 30, 1478; had a favorable opportunity offered they would doubtless have been glad to continue the policy of their predecessors. Yet in their readiness to marry Isabella to the Portuguese Infante, as well as in the fact that they subsequently arranged for their son John an alliance in a very different quarter of Europe, we have evidence that their chief object for the moment was rather to conciliate Portugal, and to win her friendship, than to prepare the way for reannexing her. It is also clear that in view of the great increase of strength which had resulted from the union of Aragon and Castile, they felt that they could face with equanimity the very slight risk that their daughter’s marriage might someday threaten the independence of Spain by giving her a Portuguese sovereign.

The wedding of Isabella and Affonso was finally celebrated in the autumn of 1490; but the bridegroom died a few months afterwards, and the Infanta returned to her native land, to forget her grief in works of charity and devotion. Her father-in-law, King John the Perfect, continued to reign in Portugal until his death on October 25, 1495, when he was succeeded by his cousin, Emmanuel the Fortunate, hitherto Duke of Bejar, and at that time twenty-six years of age. Emmanuel, it would appear, had become enamored of Isabella during her previous residence in Lisbon. Immediately after his accession he sent an embassy to the Castilian Court to ask for her hand and to offer a renewal of the ancient alliance. His overtures were finally rewarded by success, but not until the autumn of 1497; and the contemporary chroniclers assure us that the cause of the long delay was the reluctance of the Infanta to marry again, which was only overcome at the last by the earnest entreaties of her parents. It seems highly probable, however, that political considerations had much to do with the whole affair. The Portugal of 1495 was far stronger than that of 1479. In 1484 Diogo Cam had discovered the Congo; in 1486 Bartholomew Diaz had doubled the Cape of Good Hope. The new king was known to cherish most ambitious projects, and to be haunted by the idea that he might some day unite all the Iberian realms under his own scepter. In Spain, on the other hand, the dynastic situation was critical in the extreme. No other sons, except John, had been born to the royal pair, and as their youngest daughter, Catharine of Aragon, was by this time ten years old, they had little hope of further issue. If by any chance John should die childless, such offspring as Isabella might have by Emmanuel would inherit the Spanish thrones, and Portugal would become, theoretically at least, the head of a united Iberia. Such a prospect would of course be most unwelcome to the Catholic Kings, and it seems probable that they deliberately postponed the union of Isabella and Emmanuel until they should be sure of the marriage of John with Margaret, the daughter of the Hapsburg Emperor, Maximilian. This match, as we shall subsequently see, had been under consideration for several years past. It had been practically settled in the early part of 1495, but the vacillations of the Emperor had postponed the final ratification until the fifth of the following November; and the anxieties of the Catholic kings concerning it were not absolutely set at rest until the actual celebration of the marriage on April 3, 1497. Margaret’s pregnancy was announced in the course of the summer, so that Ferdinand and Isabella felt reasonably safe in going ahead with the Portuguese match; in September Isabella was finally wedded to Emmanuel at Val de Alcântara near the frontier. But the sovereigns were keenly alive to the possible dangers inherent in the alliance to which they had consented and were resolved to extort an important concession in return. Apparently on the plea that the marriage of Emmanuel and Isabella might some day result in the union of all the Iberian realms under a single scepter, and that conformity of action in racial and religious matters was therefore imperative, they demanded, and Emmanuel agreed, that all the
Then, like a bolt from the blue, came that truly terrible series of deaths which ruined all the carefully laid plans of Ferdinand and Isabella, and ultimately brought to pass a catastrophe far more serious than that which they had feared. The wedding ceremonies of Emmanuel and Isabella were clouded by the news of the dangerous illness of the Infante John: on October 4, 1497, he died.Shortly afterwards his widow, Margaret, was delivered of a stillborn child; and all the direct descendants of the Catholic Kings in the male line were thus wiped out. Isabella, the wife of Emmanuel, now became the legal heiress of her parents, and she and her husband were promptly summoned over from Portugal and solemnly recognized as the lawful successors to the Castilian throne by the Cortes, assembled at Toledo. An attempt to extort a similar acknowledgment from the more obstinate representatives of Aragon elicited vigorous opposition, owing to the doubts cast upon female rights of inheritance; but the discussion was closed in tragic fashion on August 23, 1498, by the death of Isabella in childbirth. Her baby, a boy, who was named Miguel, received the recognition that was denied to his mother, so that the crowns of Aragon, Castile, and Portugal were now, as Prescott says, “suspended over one head”; but the situation was not destined to endure, for on July 20, 1500, before he had completed his second year, the Infante followed his mother to the grave. This event terminated, of course, all danger of a Portuguese monarch’s falling heir to the Spanish throne, but it also, unfortunately, confronted the nation with a far more grievous peril—the succession of the foreign Hapsburg offspring of the marriage of the sovereign’s third, and oldest remaining child, Joanna, to the Archduke Philip the Handsome. In view, therefore, of the distressing prospect that the sovereignty of Spain might one day be carried across the Pyrenees, there was every reason why Ferdinand and Isabella should wish to draw near to Portugal, in order to make a united stand for the cause of Iberian freedom from the matrimonial entanglements of the house of Hapsburg. The fresh strides of Portugal’s territorial advance in distant lands since the marriage of Emmanuel to Isabella were an added argument for the renewal of the ancient bonds. Vasco da Gama had reached India in 1497; Pedro Alvares Cabral discovered Brazil, and Gaspar Cortereal, Labrador, in the spring and summer of 1500; for one brief moment it almost seemed as if the imperial prospects of the little western kingdom were destined to eclipse those of Spain itself. Consequently, when Emmanuel, still fascinated with the dream of possibly placing his descendants on the thrones of Castile and Aragon, approached their Catholic Majesties with a proposal to marry their fourth child, Maria, they did not hesitate to accept; and the wedding was celebrated in October, 1500.

From that time onward, until the end of the reign, the relations of Spain and Portugal call for no special remark. It was to the interest of both states to keep on the friendliest possible terms with one another. Both were exceedingly busy in extending their possessions in distant lands; neither had any time to spare for bickerings with its next-door neighbor. Even in their new dominions overseas they scrupulously avoided collisions in this period. There was a notable cessation of Portuguese raids on the Canaries, and the boundary between the Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence in North Africa was amicably settled, as we have already seen, in 1509. Emmanuel continued to the last to cherish the hope of ultimately winning the Spanish thrones for his descendants, and when his second wife, Maria, died in 1517, he immediately took steps to renew the tie that had been broken by marrying for the third time into the royal family of Spain. The bride that was selected for him on this last occasion was Eleanor, the niece of his first two wives, and elder sister of the Emperor Charles V, who was struggling for recognition as king by the Cortes of the different Spanish realms at the time that the marriage took place; but Emmanuel died in 1521, and was succeeded by John III, the offspring of his union with Maria. In the following reigns, as we shall later see, the policy of intermarriage between the two royal families was carried further still—so far indeed as ultimately to transgress the laws of nature; moreover, in the next generation the Spanish monarchs turned the tables on Emmanuel, and themselves reverted to the ideas of reannexation by dynastic unions that had animated the mediaeval Castilian kings. Charles V married the sister of John III; the first wife of his son Philip II was the Empress’s niece and the Portuguese king’s daughter; finally, when the ‘curse of the Jews’ had carried off all the other direct descendants of Emmanuel the Fortunate, the Spanish sovereign was able to realize the hopes and ambitions of a multitude of his predecessors, and seat himself at last upon the Portuguese throne.

When we contrast the Portuguese policy of the Catholic kings with that of their predecessors and successors, we note, in the first place, that they were obliged to abandon their aims of annexation by marriage for lack of opportunities to carry them out; but that on the other hand they saw that it was essential to terminate the ancient quarrels that had divided the two states in previous generations and to cultivate friendly relations. To attain this end they even risked the danger of Spain’s being united to Portugal, but they accomplished their object, and broke, for the time being, the miserable tradition of Jews in Portugal should promptly be expelled, as they had already been, five years before, from Aragon and Castile.
hostility that stretched back for so many years. When we recall the fact that the crucial lap in the race for imperial domain was being run by the two nations at the very moment that this happy change was being effected in their relations at home, we shall appreciate more fully the wisdom and importance of the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella in this regard. The treaty of Tordesillas would, in all probability, have been a scrap of paper before the reign was finished, if it had not been strengthened and supported by the consistent maintenance of cordial friendship between the high contracting parties in the Iberian Peninsula. That peace with Portugal was also absolutely essential to the effective handling of Spain’s different problems in other parts of Europe is too obvious to need further emphasis here.

The dealings of Spain with the various non-Iberian nations are so closely interrelated that it is useless to attempt to follow the course of the Catholic Kings’ policy toward any one state without keeping in touch with their contemporary dealings with all the rest. From first to last, however, the story revolves around their rivalry with France. There lay the gist of the whole matter, and Spain’s attitude towards the other countries was primarily governed by it.

We have already seen that Castile, the larger and dominant portion of Spain, had enjoyed an unusually long and uninterrupted tradition of amity with France during the later Middle Ages, but that in the third quarter of the fifteenth century the friendship between the two countries had been severely strained. The immediate reason for this was the various efforts of Louis XI, already described, directly or indirectly to prevent the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, and to frustrate the ends for which it stood. Another cause of a more general nature, yet certain to be exceedingly effective in the long run, was the fact that with the close of the Hundred Years’ War and the expulsion of the English from Gascony the two kingdoms became for the first time contiguous to one another at the western end of the Pyrenees. By the realms of the Crown of Aragon, on the other hand, France had been regarded for more than two centuries past almost in the light of an hereditary foe.

The princes of the house of Anjou had been the chief rivals of Aragon in Italy, and there was an even more ancient tradition of hostility with the French crown over the lands north of the Pyrenees which had been claimed at one time or another by the Aragonese kings. Furthermore, these enmities had all been accentuated and brought to a head by events of the latter part of the reign of John II and of the early years of that of Ferdinand. There was, in the first place, the bitter memory of the way in which Louis XI had tried to make capital for himself out of the Catalonian revolt in the reign of John II. Despite all the latter’s energy and skill, he had been obliged to endure the humiliation of leaving Cerdagne and Roussillon in French hands at the time of his death, and to hand on the task of reconquering them to his son; certainly the French king’s cooperation in John’s Navarrese policy had not been hearty enough to efface the remembrance of his treachery farther eastward. Then, in 1480-81, with the deaths of old King René and of his nephew Charles, the ancient line of the counts of Anjou had become extinct, and Louis XI fell heir to the Angevin lands in Provence and also to the Angevin pretensions to Naples. The Neapolitan question did not directly influence the course of Franco-Spanish relations for many years to come, but the effect of the acquisition of Provence was felt at once. It gave the French monarchs a long and valuable stretch of seacoast on the western basin of the Mediterranean—a coign of vantage from which they could deal deadly blows to the progress of the Aragonese Empire. Never before, in fact, had there been anywhere nearly so many opportunities for dissension between France and Spain as at the accession of the Catholic Kings; never had the interests of the two nations threatened to conflict at so many different points. It is true that the large majority of these causes of quarrel pertained only to the realms of the Crown of Aragon; but with Ferdinand in control of the foreign policy of united Spain it was inevitable that they should become the dominating factors in the situation. Under the circumstances, the ancient traditions of Franco-Castilian friendship and alliance were bound to be forgotten, and France and Spain to engage in a desperate struggle for supremacy.

It was a long time, however, before that struggle declared itself in open war. From 1480 to 1495 it was essentially a battle of secret diplomacy and intrigue, such as was dear to the heart of the crafty king of Aragon. On the Spanish side the cause of the long delay in appealing to arms is obvious at a glance—the imperative need of restoring order and strong government at home, and of expelling the Moors from Granada, before launching the united kingdoms on the perils of a foreign war. In France, also, the desire to attain internal unity accounted for much. The last three years of the life of Louis XI were chiefly occupied in reaping the rewards of his earlier efforts to ruin his feudal vassals; and his son Charles VIII, who succeeded him in August, 1483, devoted the first part of his reign to the termination of the independent existence of the duchy of Brittany. Indeed, the struggle over Brittany (1485-91) became for a time the storm centre of European politics during the period immediately previous to the
opening of the Italian wars. Spain, England, and the Hapsburgs were all intimately concerned in it, each striving to utilize the embarrassments of the king of France in such a way as to extort concessions valuable to themselves. It thus forms an admirable starting point for our examination of the foreign policy of Ferdinand and Isabella, and a glance at it will enable us to get a clear idea of the aims and relative positions of the different European powers on the eve of the famous raid of Charles VIII on Naples.

The first object of the Catholic Kings was to get back Cerdagne and Roussillon, whose recovery was regarded by Spain as almost equally important with the conquest of Granada. There had apparently been some talk of Charles VIII’s voluntarily restoring them at the beginning of the reign; but as nothing ever came of it, the episode merely had the effect of whetting the appetites of Ferdinand and Isabella. Then arose the struggle in Brittany, which offered the sovereigns a splendid opportunity to fish in troubled waters, to increase the difficulties of their rival the young king of France, and perhaps indirectly to accomplish the end which was nearest their hearts. They themselves were far too busy actively to interfere in such a remote region; but there were two other powers already involved in the contest, either one of which might conceivably be induced by a suitable reward to do for the Catholic Kings the work which they were at present unable to perform. The first of these two powers was Maximilian, the Hapsburg King of the Romans, the son of the Emperor Frederick III, and, through his marriage in 1477 with Mary the daughter of Charles the Bold, the heir to all the ancient Burgundian quarrels with the crown of France. His wife had died in 1482, leaving him as regent in the Netherlands for their son Philip; moreover, he had been in close relations with the duke of Brittany since 1486, and had even gone so far as to promise to marry the latter’s daughter Anne in order to cement their alliance against their common enemy Charles VIII. The other was Henry Tudor, king of England since 1485, who, though he was greatly indebted to the French monarch for timely aid in his final and successful attempt to win the English throne, had also spent no less than twelve of the earlier years of his exile in Brittany, where he had been most hospitably treated by the duke. Of the two sovereigns, Maximilian seemed at first to have more causes of quarrel with the French king than did Henry VII, and, consequently, to promise better for the purposes of Ferdinand and Isabella. In the spring of 1488, however, an unexpected event occurred which determined them to try to make use of the king of England instead.

This event was the arrival of proposals from the English court for a close political and commercial alliance between the two kingdoms and the marriage of Arthur, the eldest son of the English monarch, to Catharine, the youngest daughter of the Catholic Kings. No one realized more thoroughly than Ferdinand and Isabella that Henry came to them with these friendly overtures as a suppliant. The new Tudor dynasty was not yet firmly seated on the English throne. It was threatened by pretenders, and by the hostility of neighboring states. Moreover the realm had fallen so low during the anarchy of the Wars of the Roses that it had forfeited the respect of continental Europe, and desperate efforts were necessary to enable it to regain its badly shaken prestige. In an intimate alliance with the Spanish sovereigns, whose fame had already begun to spread beyond the boundaries of their realm, the English king saw the chance for which he had been waiting; in no other way could he so significantly assert his right to be treated as an equal by the other monarchs of the time. But upstarts have to pay heavily for recognition, and Ferdinand and Isabella did not propose to permit the case of Henry Tudor to prove an exception to the rule. They determined, as the price of the union for which the English king was so desirous, to demand that he break with Charles VIII, by whose help he had won his throne, enter the Breton war against him in alliance with the King of the Romans, against whom he bore a grudge—in fact that he so embarrass the king of France in the northwest of his dominions, that Ferdinand and Isabella should be able to gain with a minimum of effort the southern counties on which their hearts were set. Henry VII, in other words, was to win Cerdagne and Roussillon, for Spain, from France, in Brittany. Such was the real significance of the famous treaty signed at Medina del Campo, March 27, 1489, between the Catholic Kings and the English ambassadors, in which the latter finally agreed to the conditions imposed by the former in return for their alliance and the hand of their daughter.

The war in Brittany which ensued on the conclusion of this treaty was slackly conducted by all the participants, save possibly the king of France. Maximilian, blow hot, blow cold, at one moment deserted the allies, and at the next returned to the attack, thus convincing every one with whom he dealt of his absolute untrustworthiness. The Spaniards sent a bare thousand men into the duchy to besiege Redon, and also to keep watch on the conduct of their English allies, whom they expected to do most of the work. But Henry Tudor was no novice at the game of diplomacy. He was exceedingly loath to break with Charles VIII at all and made the most of every opportunity to delay the opening of the war which he had bound himself to wage. Not until 1492 did he seriously take the field. The fate of Brittany had
already been decided by that time. On December 6, 1491, the Duchess Anne had been married to Charles VIII, and the way had thus been paved for the union of the province to the domain of the Crown of France. But the international issues which had become involved in the struggle still remained unsettled, and there is no knowing when the solution would have been reached had not the young French king, in defiance of sound precedent and the advice of his wisest counsellors, abandoned the work of internal consolidation, which had been bequeathed to him by his father, and begun to prepare for his memorable raid on Naples. Peace with his neighbors was of course the obvious prerequisite to an expedition into distant lands, and as Charles was all on fire to depart, he naturally paid the price demanded by those with whom he dealt. To Henry of England, by the peace of Etaples (November 3, 1492), he promised 745,000 crowns of gold as reimbursement for the expenses of his campaign. To Ferdinand and Isabella, by the treaty of Barcelona (January 19, 1493), he restored Cerdagne and Roussillon without even demanding payment of the 300,000 crowns for which John of Aragon had pawned them to Louis XI. The sole compensation which Charles received for his surrender of the counties was a promise, soon to be broken, that the Catholic Kings would make no marriage alliances with the King of the Romans without his consent, and would consider themselves the enemies of all those, save the Pope, who should be at war with France. The definitive handing over to the Catholic Kings of the lands for which the Tudor sovereign, in order to get his marriage treaty, had entered the war, was thus postponed until two and a half months after the English monarch had withdrawn from it; but as the cession had been discussed between the representatives of France and Spain since the year 1491, Henry VII must have known, when he signed the treaty of Etaples, that with Charles’s attention riveted on Naples, the Catholic Kings would obtain what they desired. The result of the Italian projects of the young king of France was really a windfall for the sovereigns of both England and Spain. The latter got back the lands on which they had set their hearts far more easily and swiftly than they had any right to expect; the former obtained his marriage treaty without the serious military effort which, at one time, had seemed inevitable—indeed, without permanently imperiling his friendly relations with France. Finally, the treaty of Senlis (May 23, 1493), by which Charles VIII purchased peace with Maximilian before his departure for Italy, had an important bearing on the subsequent fortunes of Spain. By it Margaret, the daughter of Maximilian, who had been destined for Charles VIII, and had resided in Paris since 1483, was handed back to her father; and with her went the lands which were to have constituted her dowry. The way was thus opened for her subsequent marriage to the Infante John in 1497, and the continuation of the territorial jealousies of France and the Hapsburgs was insured for the future.

The Breton war had served in fact to place the pieces for the great game of international politics which was to be played during the critical period of the Italian wars. It gave renewed proof of the irreconcilability of the ambitions of Spain and France. The treaties with which it ended had no element of permanence. It had merely served to reveal to Ferdinand and Isabella the gross incompetence of the French king and was the prelude to a fresh outburst of hostilities in another place. Moreover the course of the struggle in Brittany had also shown the Catholic Kings where to look for allies in their forthcoming duel with the kings of France. They had been able to bring the English monarch into the war on their side and hoped to do so again. This hope was not invariably realized in the succeeding years; in fact, some of the most serious mistakes of Spanish diplomacy in the sixteenth century arose from deficient comprehension of the fact that the Tudors, save for a few temporary aberrations, had thrown over the mediaeval English tradition of enmity to France. Still, for the time being, it is no wonder that Spain thought she could gain many advantages by keeping the ancient animosities alive. From Maximilian also something might reasonably be expected. There was no question of his hostility to France; the danger was lest his versatility and ubiquitousness might destroy the value of his alliance for Spain. In any case, the plan of a marriage between the Archduke Philip, son and heir of the King of the Romans, and one of the daughters of Ferdinand and Isabella was under discussion at least as early as the autumn of 1491, and even spoken of as a settled matter in the following February. The origins of the most fateful dynastic union of the sixteenth century are thus to be traced back to the period of this Breton war. Finally, the years of this singular conflict saw Ferdinand and Isabella reach a satisfactory solution of their internal problems, and consequently set them free to devote a far larger share of their energies to foreign affairs. Hitherto they had been obliged to do most of their work through others. Henceforth they were able to enter the lists themselves, with all the power and prestige which their domestic triumphs had insured them. The preliminary period was in fact over, the main events were about to begin, and with the change the scene of interest shifts from northwestern France to southern Italy.
We left Italian affairs in 1458, at the death of Alfonso the Magnanimous, who had bequeathed Naples to his illegitimate son, Ferrante, while the rest of his domains were inherited by his brother John. For the next thirty years the two Aragonese courts in Spain and in Naples were united in most intimate friendship and alliance; they maintained a regular family compact. John was too busy at home to interfere actively with Italy, though he had numerous interests there; it was consequently essential for him to keep on the best of terms with his nephew, who could represent him on the spot. Ferrante needed the aid of his uncle against hostile Angevins and Turkish corsairs, and welcomed his advances. In all the ‘leagues for the preservation of Italian peace’ which succeeded one another in such bewildering confusion at this time, the name of John of Aragon is invariably found together with that of his nephew. In 1476 Ferrante married, as his second wife, Joanna, the daughter of his uncle, and a sister of Ferdinand the Catholic. The objects of this intimate alliance were defensive rather than offensive. Maintenance of the status quo was at that period all that either partner could reasonably expect. The alliance was founded, moreover, essentially on practical considerations, rather than on any real affection. John doubtless coveted Naples for himself, and would have been only too glad to expel Ferrante if he could. Ferrante, on his part, bore no love to his uncle and would willingly have thrown him over had he dared. But as a matter of fact neither sovereign was strong enough to do without the other; and on John’s death, in 1479, his son inherited the Neapolitan alliance.

Though Ferdinand the Catholic was no less busy in Spain during the early part of his reign than his father had been before him, he was obliged from the very beginning to take a somewhat more active part in Italian affairs. Every time he interfered there, however, in this first period, he did so on behalf of his Neapolitan kinsman; in fact the sole object of his Italian policy seemed to be to defend Ferrante against his various foes. When the Turks took Otranto in 1480, Ferdinand was the chief agent in forming the league of princes that expelled them in the following year; moreover he dispatched no fewer than seventy ships from Castile to aid the Christian forces. Still more significant was the action of the Spanish monarch in a small conflict of the characteristic Italian sort which broke out in the northern part of the peninsula in 1482. On May 2 of that year, Venice, land-hungry and insolent, and supported by Pope Sixtus IV, declared war on Ercole d’Este, duke of Ferrara; the Pope moreover solicited the aid of Louis XI, offering in return to help him to assert the French claims in Naples against the house of Aragon. Wide ramifications of the impending struggle were obviously possible; and Ferrante of Naples, who, besides being threatened in his own domains, was father-in-law to the duke of Ferrara, applied for the support of the Catholic Kings. The latter, totally unprepared at that juncture for any considerable military effort beyond the boundaries of their realm, were yet most unwilling to see their Neapolitan kinsman deprived of his dominions. Accordingly they strove at first to prevent the conflict by conciliatory means, and by reminding the Pope of his duty to maintain peace among Christian princes. Meantime they became convinced that Louis XI was so old and feeble that there was no danger of the French interference which they dreaded most of all. Consequently when the Venetians, scorning arbitration, invaded Ferrara in the course of the summer, the Spanish sovereigns adopted a more vigorous attitude, threatened commercial war with the republic, and spoke of armed intervention to the Pope. The latter was so impressed by these menaces that he promptly ratted to the side of Naples and Ferrara. By the end of the year 1482, Venice had not a single ally left among the Italian states, save Genoa; but she was still too proud to lay down her arms, and attempted to strengthen herself by begging for the intervention of France. The war, then, was by no means over, though the ultimate issue could not long remain in doubt. During the whole of the year 1483, the sovereigns, busy with the Granadan campaign, strove their hardest to put on others the work of bringing the republic to its senses. They even advised Ferrante of Naples to consider a league with the Turk against Venice, and gave him full power, in case it should be concluded, to enroll the realms of the Crown of Aragon among its members. But more vigorous measures than these were necessary on the part of the Spanish monarchs to bring the Ferrara war to a close. Early in 1484 they fulfilled their threat of a commercial campaign against the republic, and expelled all Venetians from their territories. In the following June they sent a fleet into Italian waters to cooperate with that of Naples. Finally, on August 7, they had the extreme satisfaction of compelling Venice to sign a treaty which granted all their demands and reestablished the status quo. The whole episode had demonstrated the vigor of the Spanish-Neapolitan alliance and greatly enhanced the prestige of Ferdinand and Isabella. They had asserted in dramatic fashion their right to be consulted in future settlements of Italian affairs.

Just ten years later the two ends of Spain’s foreign policy were most unexpectedly drawn together by the French king’s crossing the Alps at the head of a large army, intent on possessing himself of Naples as heir of the house of Anjou: fascinated, as Comines says, “with the smoke and glories of Italy.” The strength of the Spanish-Neapolitan alliance was now to be tested again. To all the old causes of Franco-Spanish hostility which had come to the surface in the struggle for the throne of Castile and
in the Breton war, another was now to be added—and in view of the memories it awakened, it was perhaps the most potent of them all. And now for the first time the Catholic Kings were able to give their chief attention to the direction of foreign affairs. The Granadan war was over. Their thrones were secure. Neither the Indies nor North Africa had yet begun to occupy a large share of their attention. They had a well-trained and efficient army and could back up their diplomacy by military force. Opportunity came in a way that no one could have anticipated, simultaneously with the ability to utilize it. The intensity of the struggle with France increased with the enlargement of its scope.

But though Spain was now far stronger than ever before, and though Ferdinand fully realized the rashness and incompetence of Charles VIII, his conduct at this crisis was marked with even more than his usual caution. He was the last man in the world to play carelessly when the game was in his own hands; and besides, might there not be a double stake to be won from the French king’s descent into Italy. Hitherto, as we have seen, the Neapolitan alliance had been almost a necessity for Spain; but now, with her internal problems solved, it might safely be thrown over—the more so, since the able though vicious Ferrante had been succeeded, in January 1494, by his much less valorous son Alfonso. Neither Ferdinand nor his father before him had given up hope of ultimately reuniting Naples to their own dominions; at the bottom of their hearts they had always regarded the illegitimate Neapolitan dynasty as usurpers; but they had both realized that to quarrel with it before they had set their own house in order would be madness. Now at last the chance had come. Coincident with the termination of the domestic difficulties of the Catholic Kings, their arch enemy, the king of France, was voluntarily setting out on an expedition directed against their ally of the past, whom they now were quite ready to cast aside. On the face of it, the situation gave the Spanish sovereigns every pretext for declaring war on Charles VIII, whom it was essential sooner or later to expel from Italy; but on the other hand, there was obviously much to be gained by delaying the opening of hostilities until the Valois monarch should have attacked and weakened for them the Neapolitan dynasty which they were now most desirous to displace. And the supreme cleverness of the Italian diplomacy of Ferdinand the Catholic during the next ten years consists in the fact that he timed the ebbs and flows of his policy in just such a way as most effectively to compass both these ends.

At first the Catholic Kings seemed anxious above all things to prevent the French king’s expedition. In the winter of 1493-94 they dispatched their ambassador Diego López de Haro to the Vatican to counterwork the envoys of Charles VIII, and to keep the new Pope, Alexander VI, on the side of the Neapolitan king. Six months later they sent a special envoy, Alfonso de Silva, to the French monarch at Vienne, to warn him to desist from his enterprise and to recommend that he devote all his forces to a war against the Turk. When Charles replied that by the peace of Barcelona Ferdinand had bound himself to treat the enemies of France as his own, Silva reminded him that since Naples was a fief of the Holy See, it was not affected by the provisions of that instrument. Yet, on the other hand, the Spanish sovereigns carefully avoided giving effect to their threat for many months to come. They had formally taken their stand against the French invasion; but they suffered Charles to cross the Alps unopposed in August, 1494, and to proceed as far as Rome before he heard from them again. Then at last, in January—February, 1495, just as the young monarch was about to enter the kingdom of Naples, the ultimatum came. Ferdinand’s envoys, Juan Albion and Antonio de Fonseca, gained access to the French king, roundly accused him of insulting their master and maltreating the Pope, warned him again to abandon the Neapolitan enterprise, and finally threatened, in case he persisted with it, to throw over the treaty of Barcelona: the older historians tell us that on receiving an angry reply from Charles, the ambassadors dramatically produced the original copy of that agreement and tore it in pieces before his eyes. Whatever the precise manner in which the interview ended, its purport could not possibly be misunderstood; it was nothing more nor less than a frank declaration of war. Yet it is important to notice that the climax had been postponed until the other aim of the Spanish monarch’s Italian policy had been at least partially accomplished. On January 23, while Charles was still at Rome, Alfonso of Naples had voluntarily abdicated the throne of that kingdom in favor of his son, Ferrante II, and retired to Sicily. Not until the Neapolitan dynasty had begun to totter was the challenge of Spain hurled at the king of France. Of course the extreme slowness of communication between Spain and Italy renders it impossible that Ferdinand should have planned the timing of the ultimate defiance of Charles to accord so exactly with his own desires. It was owing to good luck, rather than to foresight, that it occurred precisely when it did. Nevertheless, the fact that he had delayed it so long may reasonably be taken to indicate that he was not unwilling to see Charles temporarily attain the goal of his ambition. The ulterior objects of Ferdinand the Catholic in Naples, quite as much as the difficulties and delays of military preparation, were unquestionably responsible for the fact that the king of France had been allowed to get so far.
Ferdinand of Aragon was not the man to issue a challenge without being ready to fight. As in the Breton war, however, he determined, as far as possible, to put the work on others. Since the autumn of 1494 he had been planning the formation of a league against Charles VIII, in order to make sure of victory when the time for action should come. The question was where to look for allies; and among the Italian states he quickly decided that Venice, his enemy in the Ferrara war, was the most suitable for his purpose. The republic was probably the most powerful of all the states in the peninsula at the time, and political combinations shifted far too rapidly in the Italy of those days for her to cherish any lasting resentment against Spain for the quarrel of ten years before. She was out of the line of march of the French king, and consequently could make her preparations undisturbed. She was also, for the moment, on excellent terms with Lodovico il Moro, duke of Milan, whose sister, Hippolita, had married Alfonso of Naples. In the autumn of 1494, accordingly, Ferdinand despatched an ambassador, Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa, to Venice to propose to that power a league with the Pope against Charles VIII, and to promise the cooperation of a Spanish fleet and troops under Gonsalvo de Cordova. On January 5, 1495, Figueroa reached his destination and immediately set to work. In order fairly to estimate the situation with which he was confronted, we must leave him for a moment at Venice, and examine the ramifications of the policy of his wily master in other parts of Europe.

In the Breton war, it will be remembered, Ferdinand had been greatly aided in his efforts to embarrass the French monarch by Henry VII of England, and also by Maximilian, King of the Romans, who now, since the death of his father on August 19, 1493, was Holy Roman Emperor in all but name. It was therefore natural that in the present crisis he should turn to them again. From the former he was able to gain nothing of substantial value. The Tudor king was by this time far too firmly set upon his throne to be induced, as before, to break with France. He did, indeed, finally adhere to the league against Charles VIII which Ferdinand was striving to create, but not until September 1496, long after it had accomplished its purpose. With the versatile Maximilian, Ferdinand was much more successful. Even before Charles VIII had begun to think of his descent on Naples, there had been talk of a marriage between Maximilian’s son, the Archduke Philip, and one of the daughters of the Catholic Kings; and in 1492 embassies had been exchanged between the two powers for the purpose of settling the terms. No very rapid progress was made in these early stages, chiefly for the reason that Charles VIII had refused to give up Cerdagne and Roussillon until assured that Ferdinand would make no marriage alliances with the Hapsburgs without his consent: such, it will be remembered, was the stipulation in the treaty of Barcelona of January 19, 1493. But now, with the coveted territory safe within their grasp, the Spanish sovereigns were perfectly ready, in case any advantage could be gained by so doing, to tear up the agreement they had made. They consequently despatched another envoy, Francisco de Rojas, to the court of Maximilian in November, 1493, to bring the matrimonial negotiations to a conclusion.

The task was not an easy one. The plan of marrying the Infante John to the Archduchess Margaret had by this time taken shape and had to be considered in conjunction with that of the union of Joanna and Philip. Maximilian, as usual, changed his mind almost every day. Philip’s Francophile leanings made matters doubly complicated and led to constant bickerings with his father. Furthermore, Rojas was greatly embarrassed by the fact that down to the final denunciation of the treaty of Barcelona, in February, 1495, the Catholic Kings insisted on continuing the pretense of demanding the consent of Charles VIII. By the spring of 1494, however, the Spanish ambassador had successfully concluded his business, at least with the Hapsburgs. A letter of the Catholic Kings to their envoy, dated July 1, from Arevalo, indicates that the only thing lacking was the approbation of the king of France. Failure to obtain this was doubtless responsible for the postponement of the final ratifications until the time that Ferdinand was ready openly to break with Charles VIII; and the exciting events that followed further delayed matters until November 5, 1495, when the treaties were finally confirmed at Malines. But though the last formalities were not complete until after the French king had been driven out of Italy, the alliances were practically certain before he entered it, so that King Ferdinand had every reason to hope for the active support of Maximilian in his Italian schemes. Furthermore his new intimacy with the Emperor had a most important effect on his negotiations with Venice. We have already seen that the republic was in many respects admirably fitted to be the instrument of Ferdinand’s plans for opposing Charles VIII; but there had been one serious difficulty in the way. For years Venice had lived in terror of invasion by Maximilian, who had repeatedly announced his intention of conquering her; not until she was relieved of that menace could the republic devote her energies to making war on the king of France. Now, in November, 1494, she was most agreeably surprised to receive friendly overtures from the Emperor, which were gladly accepted by the Doge, and ripened in the following January into proposals for a regular alliance. Though we have no document to prove it, there seems every reason to believe that this change in the attitude of Maximilian, so convenient for the
It was almost three months later, however, before the confederates could be brought together in a formal treaty to attain their ends. Suarez de Figueroa labored for it with might and main, but there were still many difficulties to be overcome. Philippe de Comines had been posted in Venice by the king of France to watch developments and report, and it was by no means easy to hoodwink him into believing that all was well. Moreover both the Venetians and the duke of Milan, though they had been brought to good terms with Maximilian, showed a decided repugnance to having the armies of the Emperor cross the Alps. “If the Germans descend upon Italy”, said Lodovico il Moro, “they will be in no wise preferable to the French; instead of one fever we shall have two”. All this, coupled with Maximilian’s other responsibilities, prevented the arrival of the vanguard of the imperial army in Italy until the late summer of 1495, after Charles had got back into the north of the peninsula; it was not until 1496 that Maximilian himself was able to lead an expedition across the mountains, and when it did finally arrive, it turned out to be a miserable failure. Ferdinand in Spain was doubtless accurately informed of the Emperor’s numerous embarrassments, and realized from the first that little military assistance could be expected from him. All the more reason why he should hasten his own preparations. By December, 1494, he had got ready a large fleet and 3500 soldiers, to be dispatched, under Admiral Galceran de Requesens, to Sicily, to cooperate with the forces that were being mustered there. Meantime, on March 31, 1495, the League was formally signed at Venice between the Pope, the Emperor, Spain, the Venetians, and the duke of Milan, “for the peace and tranquility of Italy, the welfare of all Christendom, the defense of the honor and authority of the Holy See, and the rights of the Holy Roman Empire, ... and the protection of its members against the aggressions of other potentates at that time possessed of states in Italy, even if those potentates should lose those states in the duration of the League.” The news of it reached Ferdinand in Spain either late in April or early in May; it caused him at once to send off to Sicily another detachment of 2100 men under Gonsalvo de Cordova, to support the troops of Requesens, who was already on the spot, and to bear aid to young Ferrante II in the recovery of the kingdom of Naples. The force was so small as to justify the verdict of Prescott that it was Ferdinand’s intention “to assist his kinsman rather with his name, than with any great accession of numbers”; but when we remember what the ulterior objects of the Catholic King were, as well as the fact that he was holding another army in readiness for a diversion in Cerdagne and Roussillon, we cannot wonder that it was not larger. It reached Messina on May 24, and two days later was transferred to Calabria, where Ferrante had already begun operations.

The military events that followed can be recounted in short space. On May 20, four days before Gonsalvo reached Sicily, Charles VIII had quitted Naples, leaving the Count of Montpensier with some 10,000 men to defend the kingdom as best he could. His retreat to France occupied three months less than his descent into Italy. The two important events of it were the battle of Fornovo, on the Taro, where his army succeeded in cutting its way through the forces of his Italian foes assembled to oppose him, and the treaty of Vercelli on the ninth of the following October, by which he succeeded in detaching Lodovico il Moro from the League of Venice. Meantime, in the kingdom of Naples, Gonsalvo and Ferrante had come to blows with the French forces that had been left to defend it. The first encounter took place at Seminara, some twenty-five miles northeast of Reggio; owing to the impetuosity of the young Neapolitan monarch, who insisted on fighting against the advice of his more experienced ally, it resulted in a victory for the French. The latter, however, were unable to follow up their advantage. Gonsalvo managed to retreat in safety to Reggio, while Ferrante boldly transferred himself to the city of Naples by the ship of Admiral Requesens; and on July 11 he was able to effect an entrance into his capital. The rest of the year was occupied in ousting the French from the neighboring fortresses and in a fresh advance of Gonsalvo from southern Calabria. The Spanish commander was now seen at his very best. His army was still small, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Spain, but it was in perfect fighting trim; and the extraordinary rapidity of its movements rendered it impossible for the French to withstand him. One victory followed another in rapid succession; so that when at last, in the summer of 1496, Gonsalvo was called across to join Ferrante in besieging the town of Atelia, he was saluted on all sides as ‘the Great Captain’, the title by which he was thereafter best known. The capitulation of Atelia, on July 20, virtually marked the end of the resistance of the French. Gaeta surrendered on November 19, and Taranto on the eighteenth of the following January. A little later Gonsalvo, at the invitation of the Pope, passed over to the Patrimonium Petri, expelled a French garrison which Charles had left in Ostia, and was subsequently accorded a most magnificent reception in Rome; in August, 1498, he was back in Spain. A series of raids and forays into French territory north of the Pyrenees had meantime been carried out by another army, under command of Enrique Enriquez de Guzman. Much damage was done and booty taken; and though the
French retaliated by a counter-raid on Salsas, the enterprise demanded so many troops that were desperately needed elsewhere, that a truce soon terminated the struggle in that region.

The League of Venice, in fact, had thoroughly accomplished the work that it had been organized to do, and the interests of its members had begun once more to diverge. Milan, as we have seen, had deserted at the treaty of Vercelli. The ridiculous failure of Maximilian’s military demonstration in 1496 showed that nothing more was to be expected from him. Venice had forced Ferrante of Naples to deliver up to her some of the ports of Apulia in return for her aid against the French—an event which must have been most unwelcome to the king of Spain. Finally, on October 7, 1496, the brave and vigorous, though cruel, Ferrante II of Naples, the ally of Gonsalvo, died most unexpectedly at the very moment of the recovery of his realm, and was succeeded by his weak and yielding uncle, Frederic. The latter was the fifth monarch to occupy the fatal throne of Naples within three years, and obviously far less competent to defend it than any one of his predecessors. The significance of these events was not lost on Ferdinand the Catholic; they indicated that the time was ripe for a reversal of his policy. He had got rid of the French. He had no more use for his allies—indeed one of them, Venice, was actually in possession of a portion of the territory which he coveted for himself. The throne of Naples was at present occupied by a prince whom it promised to be easy to despoil. Now, if ever, was his chance to win the crown which Alfonso the Magnanimous had withheld from his father.

The first essential to the achievement of this purpose was to gain peace on the side of his quondam enemy, the king of France, and Ferdinand soon found that the latter was quite ready to meet him halfway. Despite the resentment which he must have cherished against the Spanish monarch for his expulsion from Italy, Charles realized that he was in no condition to seek vengeance. Moreover, his fears of the hostility of the Catholic Kings were considerably increased in the winter of 1496-97 by the conclusion of the two Spanish-Hapsburg marriages, whose dangers to his own realm he had thoroughly realized, and which he had hitherto moved heaven and earth to prevent. On October 20, 1496, the Infanta Joanna became the wife of the Archduke Philip at Lille; on April 3, 1497, the Archduchess Margaret wedded the Infante John at Burgos: so that the two most powerful neighbors and rivals of France were now united by a double tie. These same months also witnessed a revival of the negotiations for the marriage of the Infanta Catharine to Arthur, Prince of Wales, which had been almost abandoned after the conclusion of the Breton war. Encirclement, in fact, seemed to threaten the king of France, so that some sort of an understanding with his neighbors became almost a condition of existence. From Henry VII, as he well knew, he had little to fear. With Maximilian, as usual, negotiations dragged on for an interminable space without reaching any definite conclusion. But Charles’s dealings with Ferdinand the Catholic determined the whole course of international relations during the next five years and revealed for the first time to the world at large the schemes that had long lain hidden in the brain of the Spanish king.

Peace between the two sovereigns was simply and quickly attained. A suspension of hostilities was agreed to on February 25, 1497; on April 25, it was transformed into a seven months’ truce, which was again extended and considerably amplified, on November 24, at Alcalá de Henares. But an inquiry into the course of the negotiations that underlay these treaties shows that much more than a mere peace between the two kingdoms was under consideration. All through the year 1497 the ambassadors of Charles VIII, led by Guillaume de Potiers, Seigneur de Clerieux, kept journeying back and forth between the courts of France and Spain; and in the course of their interviews with Ferdinand and Isabella a proposition for the joint conquest and partition of the kingdom of Naples came up for discussion. Whether this proposal emanated ostensibly from the French or from the Spanish side, it is impossible to state. Comines tells us that it “was made by Ferdinand out of mere dissimulation to win time,” notwithstanding, he thought, that the Spaniards “wished with all their hearts the said reale of Naples to be their own, and sure [sic] they had better title to it than they that possessed it”. Zurita, on the other hand, maintains that the idea of a division of Naples was first broached by the French. They began, so he tells us, by asserting that the whole of that kingdom unquestionably belonged to their master, and that he was resolved to have it, though he might consent to give up the realm of Navarre in exchange. Subsequently, however, they modified their demands, and were finally brought to suggest a partition, based on the cession of Calabria to the Catholic kings. In view of what we know of the aims and ambitions of Ferdinand the Catholic, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that he was the real originator of the plan; but we may well believe that he also succeeded in gaining the very considerable diplomatic advantage of making the other side propose it first. At any rate, it seems clear that the agreement at Alcalá de Henares, signed November 24, 1497, was accompanied by an understanding of the sovereigns of France and Spain to the effect that they should jointly invade Naples when the opportunity should arise, and divide it between themselves—Calabria going to Spain, and the rest of the kingdom to France. It also appears that the French ambassadors on this occasion had various other

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The new king of France was quite as anxious to conquer Italy as his predecessor had been before him; but his first objective was the north rather than the south of the peninsula. From his grandmother, Valentina Visconti, Louis inherited a claim to the Milanese, which he was all on fire to vindicate against the Sforzas. At his accession to the French throne, he assumed the title of duke of Milan, and at once prepared to expel the usurper and set himself up in his place. For this enterprise, peace with his neighbors was, of course, indispensable; and he immediately took steps to assure himself of it in much the same way as Charles VIII had done on the eve of the raid of 1494, though not at so great a cost. In July he renewed the peace of Etaples with England. With Maximilian, who also had pretensions to Milan, he was unable to come to terms; but as the Emperor was deeply engaged at the moment in a war with the Swiss, his opposition did not promise to be serious, while his son, the Archduke Philip, was so amicably disposed that he actually did homage to the Chancellor of France for Flanders, Artois, and Charolais. Ferdinand the Catholic also finally accepted Louis’s friendly overtures, despite the fact that the Italian states, plainly foreseeing the intentions of the French king, urged the Spanish monarch to mediate between him and themselves. On July 31,1498, the two sovereigns made a treaty of peace and of mutual aid in case of attack. The business was transacted near Paris by Louis and certain Spanish ambassadors whom Ferdinand had dispatched for the purpose, and a secret interview was apparently held at the same time, in which it seems probable that the partition of Naples was again discussed, though it is impossible to be certain. At any rate, Frederic of Naples was so disturbed over the outlook, that he shortly afterwards sent an embassy to the Spanish court to ask for the hand of one of the Infantas for his son, the Duke of Calabria; the support and protection of the Catholic Kings were doubly indispensable to him now, because the Pope, together with the Venetians, was believed to be in league for his son, the Duke of Calabria; the support and protection of the Catholic Kings were doubly indispensable to him, wholly to any one side as long as it was possible also to maintain a foothold in the camp of the other. Nevertheless, he had gone far enough to give a plain hint of the main aim of his Italian policy in the immediately succeeding years, though the incompetent monarch with whom he was negotiating was totally unable to fathom its meaning. All the preparations for the game that Ferdinand was to play in Naples between 1500 and 1504, at first with the aid, and then at the expense, of Louis XII of France, were made before the death of Charles VIII, which occurred, as the result of an accident, on April 7, 1498. Indeed, had it not been for the various delays which the change of rulers inevitably caused, the climax of the Neapolitan drama would not, in all probability, have been postponed nearly so long as it was.

The war in northern Italy, during the years 1499-1500, saw fortune alternate rapidly between the combatants. Milan was taken, lost, and retaken by the French king and the Venetians within the space of seven months, but Ferdinand the Catholic kept out of the struggle there. For the time being his sole object seemed to be to lend aid to the Venetians against the Turks. He made ready a large army and a fleet for this purpose and appointed the Great Captain commander of it; and in the winter of 1500-01 the allies attacked and captured from the infidel, in a most gallant action, the fortress of St. George in Cephalonia. Gonsalvo, at the time of his departure on this expedition, was specially warned not to take sides in any of the struggles between Christian potentates which were at that time devastating Italy; but in view of what subsequently occurred, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Ferdinand entered the Turkish war largely as a means of getting his forces into convenient proximity to Naples, in order that they might be quite ready for action in that kingdom when the decisive moment should arrive. Meantime he vigorously pressed forward his secret negotiations with the king of France concerning the partition of the realm they both coveted. Frederic of Naples, foreseeing more plainly than ever the fate that was in store for him, again attempted without success to engage the Spanish monarch to protect him against his foes; then, when his overtures were refused, he rashly applied for aid to the Sultan, thus

proposals to make, all of them indicating that Charles VIII was still so infatuated with the idea of conquering Italy that he was willing to sacrifice everything else to the accomplishment of that end; these, however, Ferdinand declined, on the ground that they constituted an infringement of the rights of his allies in the League of Venice. As usual, the Catholic King distrusted everybody, and wisely refused to commit himself wholly to any one side as long as it was possible also to maintain a foothold in the camp of the other. Nevertheless, he had gone far enough to give a plain hint of the main aim of his Italian policy in the immediately succeeding years, though the incompetent monarch with whom he was negotiating was totally unable to fathom its meaning. All the preparations for the game that Ferdinand was to play in Naples between 1500 and 1504, at first with the aid, and then at the expense, of Louis XII of France, were made before the death of Charles VIII, which occurred, as the result of an accident, on April 7, 1498. Indeed, had it not been for the various delays which the change of rulers inevitably caused, the climax of the Neapolitan drama would not, in all probability, have been postponed nearly so long as it was.
The disparity of the forces of the allies and those of the king of Naples was such that an easy conquest was practically certain. The French troops, some 12,000 to 15,000 strong, under the lead of the Sieur d’Aubigny, left Milan June 1, 1501, and reached the Neapolitan frontier July 8. The French and Spanish ambassadors at Rome seized the moment when the invading armies were crossing the States of the Church to notify the Pope of the intentions of their masters, and to extort from him confirmation of their rights, and investiture in the territories to which they respectively laid claim. No serious resistance was experienced from the forces of King Frederic, save at Capua. The city of Naples was surrendered without a blow, and the unfortunate sovereign sent off to an honorable captivity in France, where he died in 1504. All the contemporary accounts of the conduct of the French soldiers, during these first months of the occupation of the kingdom, agree that it was atrocious. Murders and ravishings of the defenseless were the order of the day, and a legacy of hatred was laid up for the invaders of which the Spaniards were subsequently to reap the advantage. In the meantime, Ferdinand, having finally refused to King Frederic the protection which the latter had not ceased to hope for, ordered the Great Captain to land his forces in the southern part of the peninsula; thence they advanced northward and occupied within the space of a month the bulk of the regions assigned to the Spaniards. Taranto, commanded by Frederic’s son the Duke of Calabria, was the only place which defied them. It was apparently too strong to be taken by assault, so that Gonsalvo had to sit down to a siege. Only by transporting a number of Spanish ships on rollers across a tongue of land to the inner harbor directly under the walls of the town, was he finally able to capture it, on March 1, 1502. An ugly incident of the capitulation was the fate of the young Duke of Calabria. He had been solemnly promised his liberty by Gonsalvo before he surrendered, but as a result of a missive from Ferdinand, which arrived at the last moment, the agreement was violated, and he was sent a prisoner to Spain.

The joint conquest concluded, the inevitable disputes and quarrels between the allies were not long in breaking out. Blood had been spilled in Rome months before, in a fight between some of the soldiers of the French army as it passed through, and certain Spaniards who were resident there, over the question as to whether the French or the Spanish king had the better right to the Neapolitan realm. Now that the rivals were actually on the ground and in possession of the spoils, more serious trouble was bound to come. Ferdinand was of course amply prepared for it, though he urged Gonsalvo to postpone it as long as possible; and the accounts of the interviews of the Great Captain and the young French regent, the Duke of Nemours, concerning the limits of the possessions of their respective masters, read as though they also had become convinced that a breach was ultimately inevitable. The precise cause of the quarrel—the question of the Basilicate and the Capitanate, which had perhaps purposely been left untouched in the treaty of Granada—less interesting for us than the diplomacy by which the Catholic King sought to insure to himself the victory in the impending struggle. To Maximilian his ambassador represented that the conduct of the French, both in the north and south of Italy, indicated that they would be satisfied with nothing short of the control of the entire peninsula; and he urged the Emperor as lawful suzerain of Milan immediately to declare war upon them. Though Maximilian did not accede to his desires, he was at least kept practically neutral during the next few years; the treaty of friendship and alliance which it seemed probable that he would make with France in 1501 was postponed until 1504. With the Pope and the Venetians also Ferdinand labored hard and with good results. Alexander VI was not perfectly certain whether Spain or France was the safest repository of his political fortunes. He appeared at first to incline toward the latter, and his redoubtable son Caesar...
Borgia was hand in glove with Louis XII; but Spain had attractive proposals to offer in other directions, and at midsummer, 1502, it was believed in Venice that a rupture had been brought about between the Pope and the French. This was certainly an exaggeration; yet on the other hand the Borgias had been effectively prevented from breaking with Spain; and, lastly, the Venetians, who were becoming more and more alarmed every day by the preponderance of France in the north of the peninsula, maintained a neutrality which tended to be favorable to Ferdinand. If the Catholic King had not succeeded in winning allies for himself, he had at least made certain that they would not be secured by his foes.

Meantime in the kingdom of Naples the rivals had at last abandoned all attempts at conciliation and begun to fight. The war was at first of the old-fashioned sort—a war of sieges, raids, and deeds of individual valor, rather than of decisive pitched battles in the open. Most characteristic and dramatic of all was the famous combat of eleven French against eleven Spanish knights outside the walls of Trani, in the winter of 1502-03—the result of a formal challenge issued by the Sieur d’Urfé. It was witnessed, so we are told, by over 10,000 persons, and is described in glowing colors by all the contemporary historians. The foremost champion on the French side was the Chevalier Bayard, the knight ‘sans peur et sans reproche’; the most famous of the Spaniards—at least if his subsequent exploits be taken into account—was Diego Garcia de Paredes, “who never had his equal in strength and courage,” and lived on to the year 1533. The Spaniards gained the initial advantage by aiming their lances at the horses rather than at the persons of their foes; but when they attempted to ride down the dismounted Frenchmen and give them their coup de grâce, the most skillful of their adversaries leaped aside, and, catching the shafts of their spears as they rushed by, managed to disarm them. Night put an end to the fighting without conclusive results; the judges, who were Venetians, refused to give any verdict; before leaving the lists the combatants embraced one another, and all present agreed that it was a fair and equal feat of arms.

More conclusive, if less heroic than these proofs of valor by renowned champions, were the first real battles of the war, in which the French at the outset obtained a decided advantage. In December, 1502, d’Aubigny won a considerable victory at Terranova in Calabria against an army which had recently been sent over from Spain to reinforce Gonsalvo; and the latter was obliged to rest on the defensive. In the beginning of 1503 there seemed a prospect of peace through the instrumentality of the Archduke Philip, who proposed the eventual cession of Naples to his son, the future Emperor Charles V, and the marriage of the latter to Claude, the daughter of Louis XII; the negotiations, however, proved abortive, owing to the refusal of King Ferdinand to ratify the terms which had been made for him in France. Indeed, the whole affair served chiefly to gain for the Spaniards much valuable time, and to enable Gonsalvo to be heavily reinforced; while on the other hand it lulled the French, who really believed that peace would be concluded, into a false sense of security, and rendered them unprepared for a continuance of the war. When in the end of April, 1503, Gonsalvo issued from his retreat at Barletta, intent on regaining the laurels which he had temporarily lost, his foes were in no condition to withstand him. He defeated Nemours at Cerignola. One of his lieutenants routed d’Aubigny at Seminara. On May 14, 1503, the Great Captain entered Naples in triumph; Gaeta alone in the whole kingdom held out for the French. Then indeed King Louis roused himself to desperate efforts to retrieve his fortunes. An army was sent into Cerdagne and Roussillon, and kept Ferdinand and Isabella busily occupied there. The French fleet revictualled Gaeta, and obliged Gonsalvo to raise the siege. Finally, a large force under La Trémouille was sent to retake Naples. As Alexander VI died (August 12, 1503) at exactly the moment the French general reached Rome, the latter wasted three months there in a fruitless effort to influence the cardinals in favor of the election of George d’Amboise; and when, in October, he finally reached his destination, Gonsalvo was fully prepared to receive him. A series of desperate combats along the river Garigliano ensued in the next three months, and were marked by a number of deeds of extraordinary valor and courtesy by the heroes of both armies. At first the French succeeded in throwing some troops across the stream, but they totally failed to dislodge the Spaniards from their main position; then, in a night attack, December 28, 1503, Gonsalvo suddenly assumed the offensive, seized the bridge by which the French army had crossed, and drove it back in headlong flight on Gaeta. This action practically marked the end of the war. Gaeta surrendered on January 1, 1504, and two months later a formal treaty was concluded between Louis and the Catholic Kings, in which the French sovereign definitely recognized the Spaniards as lawful possessors of Naples.

Thus, after ten years of tortuous diplomacy and bloody war, the primary aim of the Italian policy of the Catholic King was at last triumphantly attained, and another rich territory added to the domains of the Spanish Empire. The Neapolitan contest in its different phases had exhibited Ferdinand at the very height of his powers. It was through it that Machiavelli became acquainted with his methods, which he described for the guidance of contemporary statesmen in The Prince. Into the
question of the morality of those methods it is happily unnecessary for us to enter here; of their effectiveness there cannot be a shadow of doubt. It would be idle to deny that Ferdinand possessed many advantages in the struggle on which he had launched himself both against his own cousins and against the French. Tradition, on the whole, was distinctly favorable to him; for the memories of the union of Naples and Sicily under the Normans and Hohenstaufen counted heavily against the claims of the French as heirs of the house of Anjou, and of Ferrante and his successors as descendants of Alfonso the Magnanimous. Sicily, moreover, was of immense practical value to him throughout the contest as a base and source of supplies. The French had nothing to correspond to it, and their admiral, Prégent de Bidoulx, was unable, despite the most strenuous efforts, to wrest from his Spanish adversary the all-important control of the sea. Lastly, in Gonsalvo de Cordova the Spanish monarch possessed a general whom his enemies could not possibly hope to match. Prudent, yet immensely aggressive when the moment for action arrived; never over-elated by success or despondent in failure; liberal to his soldiers, courteous to his foes: he seemed to endow the cause he fought for with a certain moral elevation which made men forget the treachery of his master and contributed no small element towards its ultimate success. His diplomatic triumphs moreover must not be forgotten; his victories on the field of battle were scarcely more valuable to the Spanish cause than his manipulation of the leading Neapolitan families, who were wavering between the rival factions. Yet after all, the conquest of Naples was primarily the work of Ferdinand the Catholic. It had been made possible chiefly because it had been planned for long before; it was largely the fruit of the Spanish monarch’s ability to look ahead and work quietly and effectively towards the attainment of a distant goal. Moreover, it meant far more than the mere winning of a kingdom. It was Ferdinand’s way of serving notice on his fellow sovereigns that united Spain intended to maintain and increase the Mediterranean empire which had been founded by Aragon, as well as to assume all the responsibilities that she had inherited from Castile. In addition to setting her own house in order and developing and enlarging her possessions overseas, she proposed henceforth to play a leading part in the international politics of Western Europe.

The new master of the conquered kingdom made some changes in the system of government which he inherited from his predecessors. In the days of Alfonso the Magnanimous, there had been no attempt to subordinate Naples to the realms of the Crown of Aragon; if anything, the reverse had been the case, for the first conqueror of the Italian kingdom preferred it to his native land, fixed his residence there, and made it the center of his dominions. Now, however, under Ferdinand the Catholic, Naples became a regular dependency of the Spanish monarchy, like Sicily and Sardinia before it; so that “a new Polity, new Magistrates and Laws agreeable to the Spanish Customs and Principles”, were “introduced into the Kingdom”. The occasion of the initiation of these reforms was a visit which Ferdinand made to Naples during the winter of 1506-07 in a fit of jealousy and distrust of the Great Captain, who had continued to reside there as the royal representative after the completion of the conquest three years before. The beginnings of the new regime were thus established under the supervision of the king himself.

The first evidence of the new order of things was that Naples “lost the Honor of being the Royal Seat”, and was thenceforth governed, like the other Mediterranean dependencies, by viceroys sent out from Spain. These were, as elsewhere, appointees of the crown, and their average term seems to have been about three years. Many of them, however, held office for shorter periods, while a few extended their tenure to more than four times that length; the case of Ramón de Cardona, whose term began under King Ferdinand in 1509, and continued until his death in 1522, is a case in point. The powers of these Neapolitan viceroys were considerably greater than those of the corresponding officers in the other Mediterranean dependencies. They were, from the first, the representatives of an absolute king; they did not reach back, as did the viceroys of Sicily and Sardinia, to the days of the more limited monarchy of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. Their authority, moreover, was not restricted to the same extent as in the other Mediterranean dependencies by the rights of the local assembly; for the meetings of the ancient Neapolitan parliament had by this time degenerated into a mere formality, while the more important Seggi of the city of Naples found themselves more and more completely in the control of the central power as the years went by. So conveniently were these constituted, indeed, for the purpose of enabling the viceroys to divide and weaken the forces of his opponents, that Tommaso Campanella, writing in the early seventeenth century, hints broadly that the king of Spain might do far worse than to establish a similar institution at home, as a means of protecting himself against baronial encroachments. The great crown officers of Angevin days, the High Steward, Grand Chamberlain, and the rest, who had been maintained by Alfonso the Magnanimous, were now either dismissed or shorn of all their important functions; certain others after the Spanish fashion were introduced to replace them,
but Ferdinand took good care, as he had already done in Castile, that the central authority should not be overshadowed. And finally, at the same time that he strove to weaken and divide all the forces from which opposition might be anticipated, Ferdinand took positive steps to fortify and Hispanicize the office of his representative in Naples. A special privy council, or consulta, of the viceroy, which soon came to be known as the Consiglio Collaterals, was instituted in 1507 at the time of the visit of the Catholic King, and at once took precedence of the Santa Chiara, the Sommaria, and all the other tribunals of the realm. Down to the end of the reign it was composed of two legists, a Sicilian and a Catalan, with a secretary or clerk, under the presidency of the viceroy. In later years a Neapolitan member was added, but the two senior councilors invariably came from outside the kingdom, and usually from Spain. The significance of these arrangements was perfectly obvious. Besides being Spanish himself, the viceroy was to be advised and guided at every turn by a body dominated by Spanish influence. The Neapolitans were to be practically excluded from any real participation in the government of their own country.

One result of this system of administration was that Naples was overburdened with taxation to a far greater extent than any of the other Mediterranean dependencies of Spain. The home government expected its overseas possessions to pay for themselves and yield revenue besides; and as the power of the Neapolitan viceroy was virtually absolute, there was practically no limit to the number of tributes which he could impose. There was, besides, a special reason why the inhabitants of Naples should be made to pay more heavily than the Sicilians or Sardinians; and that was the provision in the treaty of 1504, stipulating that the Angevin proprietors of the kingdom should be reestablished in the possession of the estates from which they had been evicted in the course of the war. This difficult task was performed by Ferdinand himself, during his visit in the winter of 1506-07; and though every advantage was taken of such flaws as the ingenuity of the lawyers could discover to impugn the validity of the Angevin titles and evade the terms of the peace, a large number of the territories had either to be bought up or given back, and those who were deprived of them compensated by a grant of funds. All this was naturally very expensive, and necessitated fresh levies on the people: for a time it was not a question of making the new kingdom an asset but rather of preventing it from becoming a liability. Moreover, when the work of restoration and transfer was completed, the new imposts which it had called into existence were suffered to remain. What had been adopted as a temporary expedient was converted into a permanency, and Naples was given a long start on the road to financial ruin which she travelled to the bitter end. Other and most burdensome levies were invented and set in operation in the succeeding years, without the slightest reference to correct economic principles, or to the convenience or prosperity of the people. The pills were sometimes gilded, indeed, and their true nature disguised by the use of an attractive label; for men would often grant donativos which differed in no essential respect from the tributes at which they boggled; but of any serious or effective attempt to ease the burden we hear nothing at all. Needless to say the material prosperity of the kingdom suffered terribly under such a system as this. The sums which the government annually wrung from its subjects were multiplied seven or eight-fold during the first hundred years of the Spanish administration, while agriculture, industry, and commerce dwindled away. It is, however, but fair to add that the blame for these unfortunate developments is to be laid less at the door of Ferdinand than at those of his Hapsburg successors. The Catholic King could plead the exigencies of the situation in Naples itself at the time of the conquest in partial justification for what he had done; but the sums derived from the far heavier exactions of the days of Charles V and the Philips were not utilized for the benefit of the Neapolitans, but were spent for the most part outside the realm, on the maintenance of other more remote and less subservient portions of the Spanish Empire.

The ecclesiastical situation in Naples was peculiar and difficult, because of the kingdom’s proximity to the States of the Church, the claims of the Pope to its feudal overlordship, and the papal tradition of alliance with the hostile Angevin elements in the realm. Roman ambitions and encroachments had made trouble there before for the illegitimate Aragonese dynasty; they were to do so again and in even more serious fashion in later years, particularly under Pope Paul IV. The strongest bulwark against these encroachments was the provision that no papal bull or other instrument could be promulgated in the realm without the special license or exequatur of the king or his representative; and no better proof could be desired of the firm resolution of the Spanish monarchs to eliminate Roman interference in the internal affairs of their dominions than the vigor of their resistance to any attempt to evade this regulation. In 1508 King Ferdinand gave orders to hang a papal messenger who carried a brief lacking the required indorsement of the king.

The most interesting phase of the ecclesiastical history of Naples in this period, however, is the attempt and failure of King Ferdinand to introduce the Spanish Inquisition there. In 1503, Gonsalvo de Cordova, who desired to conciliate the Neapolitans, had made a solemn engagement that it should never
be established in the kingdom; but in the following year the influx of *conversos* from the other Spanish possessions became so great that Ferdinand determined to ignore his general’s promise and to try to set up the Holy Office in his new dominions. Jealousy of the papal Inquisition, which had meantime been introduced into Naples by Julius II, further strengthened the king’s resolve; but the opposition of the Neapolitans was so outspoken that, fearing a revolution if he persisted, he postponed the fulfilment of his purpose until 1509. When at last, at the very end of that year, all the preparations had been made, and the Inquisitors who had been appointed arrived, there was a terrible uproar in the capital. The populace rushed to arms and surged in fury through the streets. The Catholic King had unquestionably been prepared for some resistance, but the political situation in northern Italy, where the Pope needed Gonsalvo’s veterans to fight his different foes, and was evidently prepared to make things extremely disagreeable for Ferdinand if he withdrew them to overawe the Neapolitans, convinced the Spanish monarch that, bitter as it was for him, he must yield again. To cover his retreat he put forth two pragmáticas ordering the expulsion from the realm of all professed Jews and *conversos* before March 1, 1511, and thus gave himself a plausible excuse for revoking the Inquisition on the ground that there would be no more work left for it to do. These pragmáticas, however, were not obeyed, as is proved by the records of the papal Inquisition, which in the meantime had continued its activities in Naples, and to which, it seems, the inhabitants did not seriously object. The whole situation must have been gall and wormwood to the Catholic King. The most recently acquired of his dominions was honeycombed with unbelief; yet he was prevented from using that means of arresting it which had proved so terribly effective in Spain. His dissatisfaction, moreover, must have been considerably enhanced by his jealousy of the rival papal institution, subordinated though it was to the authority of his viceroy. The whole affair showed that the Neapolitans still retained some measure of their pristine independence; and in this one matter at least, they made good their contention to the very end of the story, for the full-fledged Spanish Inquisition was never permanently established within the kingdom.
CHAPTER XX
THE HAPSBURG PERIL AND THE ANNEXATION OF NAVARRE

The foreign policy of the last twelve years of the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic was largely shaped by that long series of family bereavements, which, beginning with the death of his son-in-law, Affonso of Portugal, in 1491, continued almost without interruption till near the end. Every single one of his dynastic ventures was attended with the most persistent ill fortune.

The marriage of Catharine of Aragon to Arthur, Prince of Wales, which had been arranged by the treaty of Medina del Campo in 1489, was not actually celebrated until 1501. The tender years of the children were the obvious reason for the long delay. In the course of it the original agreement of 1489 was abandoned, and another was substituted for it in 1496. Constant bickerings and maneuverings for diplomatic advantage characterized the relations of Spain and England during this period and in the succeeding years. Ferdinand and Isabella angered the Tudor king by coolly throwing over the treaty of Medina del Campo after they had got back Cerdagne and Roussillon. They declared, on the shallowest of pretexts, that the marriage which it had provided for could not take place. They held out the prospect of a renewal of the negotiations for it, however, in order to induce Henry to join the League of Venice against France in 1495; and though the English king did not promptly accede to their desires, his position was so much stronger than it had previously been that the Catholic Kings felt it unwise to flout him again. A fresh marriage treaty, accordingly, was signed in October, 1496. The haggling over details continued up to the proxy wedding, which was celebrated in May, 1499, and even beyond it, until the arrival of the princess in England in the autumn of 1501. The negotiations were at one time involved with the career of the pretender Perkin Warbeck, and also with the commercial and shipping rivalries between the two realms; and their outcome was powerfully affected by the conduct of the Spanish representative at London, Rodrigo de Puebla, who, in revenge for the nonpayment of his salary by the Catholic Kings, labored rather in the interests of England than of Spain. Finally, however, the last difficulty was cleared away. On August 25, 1501, the princess sailed from Corunna, and, after having been driven back to Laredo by a storm, finally reached Plymouth, October 2. The wedding was celebrated at St. Paul’s on November 14, and one half the large dowry of 200,000 scudi which had been agreed upon was paid over at the same time.

Meanwhile the Catholic Kings had been cruelly stricken at home, as we have already seen, by the death of Prince John without heirs, October 4, 1497, six months after his union with Margaret of Austria, and again by the losses on August 23, 1498, and July 20, 1500, respectively, of the Princess Isabella and of her surviving child Prince Miguel. The heiress to the thrones of Spain and the Spanish Empire was now the Princess Joanna, third child and second daughter of the Catholic Kings, who had wedded the Archduke Philip the Handsome on October 20, 1496, at Lille, and had already given him two children, Eleanor, born November 16, 1498, and Charles, born February 24, 1500. The latter on his father’s side would inherit the Hapsburg domains in the Netherlands, Burgundy, Austria, and the Empire, and would probably be elected Emperor. If from his mother he received the Spanish thrones as well, the sovereignty of all the realms of Ferdinand and Isabella would be carried out of the peninsula to a foreign dynasty, which was already heavily loaded down with responsibilities in other parts of Europe and cared far less for Spanish aims and aspirations than for the increase of its family dominions. Such was the really terrible catastrophe—threatening to undermine the foundations of all their splendid work—which now stared the Catholic Kings in the face. They had taken every reasonable precaution to prevent it, by the alliances which they had arranged for their two eldest children, but the hand of death had defied them. The double Hapsburg marriage, from which they had hoped to gain so much, promised now to spell the end of Spain for the Spaniards. And the worst part of the situation was that it seemed impossible to find any remedy. The rights of Joanna and her children, under the law of the land, were clear. The sovereigns had no hope of further offspring themselves, and no issue of any other marriage or of any collateral line could have a valid title to the thrones of both Aragon and Castile. Moreover, even if Ferdinand and Isabella were prepared to override all law and hereditary right in the interests of national independence, they could not well afford to insult and defy the house of Hapsburg, especially when they themselves were on such bad terms with France. It was a wonderful stroke of good luck for the future Charles V, as a contemporary historian sagely observed,
that Prince Miguel, the sole remaining obstacle to his inheritance of the Spanish throne, should have died when the son of Philip and Joanna was but four months old; and his very dynastically minded grandfather, Maximilian, did not propose that the infant should be robbed of even the tiniest portion of the fruits of his good fortune. The Spanish monarchs must have felt unutterable things at the way that their marriage policy had worked out, but for the moment there was little for them to do but to sit still and trust that something would turn up.

Common prudence, however, pointed to the wisdom of maintaining all existing ties with other friendly states, in order to be perfectly ready for whatever the future might hold; and this consideration was doubtless uppermost in the minds of Ferdinand and Isabella when, in April, 1502, their attention was once more focused on England by the sudden and unexpected death of Arthur, Prince of Wales. The close bond that had united the two nations since his marriage with Catharine in the previous November was snapped; and it was essential for Spain that it should be promptly mended—the more so as she was obviously about to come to blows with France over the partition of Naples. The situation that had obtained at the time of the treaty of Medina del Campo was, in fact, almost precisely reversed: Spain, not England, was now in the position of suppliant, and Ferdinand and Isabella lost no time in dispatching to London a special ambassador, the Duke of Estrada, to ask for a renewal of the previous treaty and a second marriage for Catharine with Arthur’s younger brother, the future Henry VIII. The Tudor monarch was ready to negotiate, though he fully understood the strength of his own position, and gladly availed himself of it in later years to pay Ferdinand back for the humiliations which that monarch had previously inflicted on him. For the time being, however, all went smoothly. The new marriage treaty was drawn up, and ratified on June 23, 1503, providing for the celebration of the wedding in 1506, when young Henry should have completed his fifteenth year, and for the payment of the rest of Catharine’s dowry at the same time. Neither of these events, however, actually took place until after Henry VIII’s accession in 1509. Though it was generally understood that Catharine’s first marriage had never been more than a union in form, Ferdinand asked the Pope to grant the necessary bull of dispensation for her second, so phrased as to cover the case even if the previous one had been fully consummated, and the Pope acceded to his request. The final instrument, which arrived in England in the summer of 1505, did indeed introduce a faint element of uncertainty in the situation by speaking of Catharine’s first marriage as *forsan consummatum*, but since the brief or preliminary summary of it which was sent to Spain in the previous year to comfort the dying Isabella omitted the word *forsan*, there could be no reasonable doubt of the papal intentions. Both these documents were to play an important part twenty-five years later in the history of Henry VIII’s divorce; and it seems to indicate an almost prophetic insight that the Spanish monarch should have taken such pains at this early date to safeguard the validity of his daughter’s second marriage. Certainly the great energy and persistence displayed by Ferdinand in regard to the English match shows that he was greatly disturbed over the state of his relations with the continental powers. He was at war with France. The Hapsburg alliances, from which he had hoped so much, actually menaced the independence of Spain; and the Portuguese marriages, by which he had sought to forestall this last danger, had turned out fruitless. No wonder, in view of all the circumstances, that he clutched at England.

Meantime the sovereigns had been reminded of the imminence of the Hapsburg peril through a visit from Philip and Joanna, who, after having been sumptuously entertained by King Louis of France, arrived in Castile from the Netherlands, in January, 1502. The purpose of their coming was to receive the recognition of the Cortes as lawful heirs of the throne, and to enable the Archduke to become familiar with his future subjects. Ever since the death of Prince Miguel, Ferdinand and Isabella had begged them to come to Spain; they doubtless hoped that by approaching Philip while he was still young they might make him see things through their eyes, forget his Burgundian affiliations, become a true Spaniard and work primarily in Spanish interests. But it was to be a long half century more before any real Hispanicization of the Hapsburgs was possible; certainly Philip was never susceptible to the process, and Charles V did not succumb to it until the end of his life. In the latter case it was dynastic ambition that stood in the way; with the Archduke it was mere shallowness and want of character. It had never been possible, in fact, to make him take a serious interest in anything, or pursue any plan to its logical conclusion. He had already got into difficulties with his mercurial father Maximilian in the Netherlands; the sober energy and grandiose projects of the Spanish monarchs did not appeal to him at all. It is only too easy to see how utterly he disappointed the hopes of the Catholic Kings. The contemporary chroniclers give several instances to prove it, and one can read much more between the lines. The conduct of the Archduke’s Flemish attendants also elicited the most unfavorable comment. They had nothing in common with the Spaniards, and seemed solely intent on the acquisition of fat pensions for themselves. Moreover, Philip was most anxious to return as soon as possible to his native land. After his recognition, with his wife, by the Castilian Cortes at Toledo, and by those of
Aragon at Saragossa, he made his preparations to depart, despite the fact that his wife, on account of an approaching confinement, was unable to accompany him. As on his journey to Spain, the Archduke determined to travel by way of France, toward whose monarch he had manifested a disposition far too friendly to suit either his father or his father-in-law; however, in view of the course of the war in Naples and the uncertainties of the situation in other parts of Europe, Ferdinand decided that it would do no harm to take advantage of Philip’s offer to open negotiations for a peace. The result was the treaty of Lyons of April 5, 1503, which we have already noticed in connection with the Neapolitan war. Philip had so grossly exceeded his instructions in arranging it that Ferdinand was not without justification for his refusal to ratify; and the only practical result of it, as we have previously observed, was to afford the Great Captain a precious respite in southern Italy, which he knew how to utilize far more effectively than did his foe. But the whole episode showed what the diplomacy of the years 1504-11 was to demonstrate more clearly still, that in view of the possibility of trouble with the house of Austria Ferdinand was prepared, at least temporarily, to seek an adjustment of his difficulties with France.

The next and perhaps the most stunning blow of all—not only in itself but also in the tremendous consequences with which it was fraught—was the death of Queen Isabella at Medina del Campo on November 26, 1504. By it the tie that had united the Spanish kingdoms was once more broken; for Isabella’s will expressly provided that the thrones of Leon and Castile should descend to her daughter Joanna, as ‘queen proprietress’, and to her husband Philip as king consort. Only in case Joanna should be absent from the realm, or “being present should prove unwilling or unable to govern”, was her father to act as regent until the future Charles V should come of age; otherwise Ferdinand was henceforth to be nothing more than the king of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. It was a bathos almost inconceivable for a man who had been so powerful, and Ferdinand’s was not the sort of disposition that would submit to it without a struggle. Moreover, he was not in all respects unfavorably situated for a contest against his daughter and son-in-law for the retention of the throne of Castile. The law of the land was indeed clearly against him; but on the other hand the national detestation of subjectio to foreign authority would tell heavily in his favor. His war with France was over. Furthermore the Princess Joanna, who had given birth to her second son, the future Emperor Ferdinand, at Alcalá de Henares on March 10, 1502, had returned to the Netherlands in the spring of 1504, eight months before her mother’s death. It is quite possible that her departure was hastened by ill-treatment at the hands of Ferdinand. Certainly her absence from Spain at the time of Isabella’s demise afforded her father a legal opportunity to act as regent in Castile until her return, without transgressing the provisions of her mother’s will; it thus gave the Catholic King an enormous initial advantage over his children in the struggle for the throne of that realm. Finally, there were the very grave doubts raised by the phrase in Queen Isabella’s will about Joanna’s being “unwilling or unable to govern”. We know that the possibility indicated by these words had been contemplated at least two years before Isabella’s death and communicated to the Cortes; and the natural inference is that Joanna had already begun to show signs of the mental derangement which first became unquestioned and notorious after the death of her husband. There is, however, no documentary evidence to show that she was insane at this early date, though she was certainly neurotic and hysterical. What seems most probable is that at the time of Philip’s visit to Spain in 1502, Ferdinand and Isabella had made up their minds, if possible, to prevent her succession on account of the foreign rule which it would inevitably entail, and to utilize any signs of abnormality which the princess may have given as an excuse for setting her aside. At any rate the words in the queen’s will gave Ferdinand a powerful weapon for a struggle against the harsh fate which the tragic consequences of the Hapsburg marriages had brought upon him, and against the carrying of the sovereignty of Castile beyond the borders of Spain. If his conduct in the succeeding years seems deficient in parental solicitude, we must not forget that he was fighting for the cause of national independence as well as for his own hand.

There could be no question that Philip and Joanna intended to make all possible efforts to substantiate their claims to the Castilian throne. The Archduke assumed the title of king of Castile as soon as he had learned of his mother-in-law’s death. He did everything in his power through his agent, Juan Manuel, to stir up dissatisfaction against Ferdinand, particularly among the Castilian grandees. He wrote to his father-in-law to demand that he resign the Castilian regency and retire to his own domains. He even put forward claims to Naples on the ground that it had been conquered by the armies of Castile and was therefore a dependency of that realm and strove to win away the Great Captain from his allegiance. And at first King Ferdinand seemed to acquiesce in what he was powerless to prevent. He caused Philip and Joanna to be formally proclaimed as lawful sovereigns of Castile; he also summoned the Castilian Cortes to Toro on January 11, 1505, in order that the recognition might be confirmed. But Ferdinand, like his father before him, was never so dangerous as when apparently at the end of his resources. He took good care that these same Cortes at Toro should ratify his title to the regency during
the absence of his daughter; moreover he permitted the assembly openly to allude to Joanna’s mental infirmities, and to the steps to be taken in view of them. Still more important were his measures to strengthen his position abroad—his primary object being, of course, to gain for himself at the expense of his son-in-law the friendship and alliance of France. To accomplish this some sacrifice, immediate or prospective, of the Spanish conquests in Naples would inevitably be necessary, for Louis XII was still very sore over the defeats that he had sustained there; but Ferdinand was accustomed to rapid changes of front in that quarter, and was prepared to bid high for the prize he had set himself to win. The net result was a treaty, signed by the French king and Ferdinand’s representatives at Blois, on October 12, 1505, providing for the marriage of the Spanish monarch to Germaine de Foix, niece of Louis XII, and granddaughter of Ferdinand’s own half-sister Eleanor; this arrangement also incidentally strengthened the claims of the Catholic King to Navarre, which had been held by the senior branch of Germaine’s family until it passed by marriage to the Albrets in 1484. Louis XII at the same time resigned all his rights to Naples to Germaine, to descend after her death to her children; he carefully stipulated, however, that if she died without issue the French crown was to get back those portions of the realm which had been assigned to him by the treaty of Granada in 1500.

Prescott, who is very severe on the “disgraceful and most impolitic terms of this compact”, points out that if Germaine had had a son, he would have inherited all the realms of the Crown of Aragon, and thus nullified the best results of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella by once more severing the destinies of the Iberian kingdoms; if, on the other hand, she died childless, it was provided that a large share of Spain’s recent Neapolitan conquests should be surrendered. But if we fix our eyes on the immediate effects of the treaty, rather than on the distant contingencies that were contemplated in it, we shall probably conclude that this verdict is much too harsh. The all-important thing for Ferdinand, at the moment, was to secure French support and the prospect of an heir—both of them indispensable weapons in the impending contest for the Castilian throne and the cause of Spanish independence of foreign sovereignty; and with these the treaty provided him. The stipulation about the partition of Naples in case Germaine should die childless was far too remote to cause him serious hesitation. He had cheated Louis XII in that kingdom before, and openly boasted that he would do so again; and as a matter of fact, neither the French king nor his successors ever got back the coveted lands. If, on the other hand, his new queen had borne him a male child who had survived, there is every probability that he would have labored with might and main to set him on the Castilian throne to the prejudice of the Hapsburgs, and at least a fair chance that he would have succeeded. The treaty of Blois was not made merely “in order to secure the brief possession of a barren authority” or “to gratify some unworthy feelings of revenge”. It was a shrewd political move, virtually dictated by the needs of the moment, but also calculated better than any other to preserve the safety and independence of Spain at a serious crisis in her career.

The marriage of Ferdinand and Germaine took place on March 18, 1506, at Dueñas near Valladolid; and six weeks later Philip and Joanna, who had this time been refused permission to cross France, arrived by sea at Corunna. There had been much correspondence between the different parties during the previous year; in the course of it an arrangement had been evolved for the administration of Castile under the joint names of Ferdinand, Philip, and Joanna, and the handing over of one half the public revenues to the Catholic King. This was obviously, however, merely a temporary makeshift, designed to tide things over until Philip and Joanna should reach Castile; a new settlement was inevitable as soon as the persons concerned could meet and talk things over. The interview finally took place, in the month of June, in the little village of Villafafila in the Galician mountains. Ferdinand arrived at the appointed place with a few faithful attendants mounted on mules, “with love in his heart and peace in his hands”; while his gorgeous son-in-law appeared at the head of a powerful army, and obviously enjoyed, for the moment, the support of the Castilian grandees. And at first it seemed as if the cause of Philip and Joanna was to triumph all along the line; for Ferdinand signed an agreement in which he promised to retire to Aragon, and to surrender the government of Castile to his “most beloved children”. An additional treaty, however, robbed Joanna of her share in account of “her infirmities and sufferings, which for the sake of her honor are not specified”; Ferdinand and Philip bound themselves to use their united forces to prevent her from meddling in the government; the father betrayed his daughter and the husband his wife. Thus Philip thought to obtain the goal of his ambitions and to secure for himself undisputed control in Castile; but he little knew the man with whom he was dealing. On the afternoon of June 27, the very same day that the two treaties were signed, Ferdinand made a solemn protestation that he refused to recognize their validity, on the ground that they had been extorted from him under compulsion; and that he would never consent “that his daughter should be deprived of her liberty or of her rights as hereditary proprietress of this kingdom”. Prescott is at a loss “to reconcile this monstrous tissue of incongruity and dissimulation
with any motives of necessity or expediency”; but it is still more difficult to conceive of Ferdinand the Catholic as intriguing and deceiving without a definite purpose in view. The protestation was primarily valuable as a step toward disposing of his arch-enemy Philip; yet despite all its assertions that Joanna was lawful queen of Castile, it nowhere denied that she was mentally incapable of reigning, and consequently created no impediment to getting rid of her in case it should prove ultimately desirable to do so. Clearly Ferdinand wished to leave himself a free hand in Castile, in order that he might be able to act there in whatever way should seem most advantageous when the opportunity should arise; and the determining factor in the situation was the possibility of male issue by Queen Germaine. Prescott cannot seem to get rid of the idea that Ferdinand cared little or nothing for the cause of Spanish unity. He implies that the king’s desire for male issue by his new wife is explained by his wish to deprive the Hapsburgs of the Aragonese realms and their dependencies, and that in order to attain that end he was willing to set up the old lines of cleavage within the Iberian Peninsula. But it seems far more consistent with the character of Ferdinand as we know it, to conclude that if the son whom Queen Germaine finally bore him, May 3, 1509, had survived, the Catholic King would have strained every nerve to win for him the throne of Castile in defiance of the law of the land, and to hand down the united crowns to a Spaniard. The memory of his father’s treatment of Charles of Viana was still fresh in his mind; he had himself already been a party to one usurpation of the throne of the western kingdom in the interests of political expediency; why should he not have attempted it again? The question is not his mind; he had himself already been a party to one usurpation of the throne of the western kingdom in 1506. He had another affecting interview with Philip on July 5, during which the most perfect apparent harmony prevailed between them; and he wrote him a letter from Saragossa on the twenty-ninth, urging him to treat Joanna lovingly, and that they should live together as a good husband and wife ought to do. He not only fulfilled his promise to retire to Aragon; on September 4, 1506, he embarked at Barcelona for Genoa on the way to settle the affairs of his kingdom of Naples. But he had been only a few weeks on Italian soil when he was overtaken by the news of the sudden death of his son-in-law Philip at Burgos, on September 25. The event was so convenient for his purposes that the accusation of poison was inevitable, as was the case with so many of the enemies of his redoubtable father. The physicians, however, were unanimous in declaring that the Archduke’s death was due to natural causes, and they apparently convinced the contemporary historians, though some modern writers incline to take the other view. But whether or not King Ferdinand had any reason to expect that Philip would not long survive his departure for Italy, he certainly showed no impatience to return. Not until the late summer of 1507 was he back again in Castile. In the meantime he had settled the affairs of Naples, relieved the Great Captain, of whose popularity and independence he had become profoundly jealous, from his duties as viceroy there, and held his famous interview with Louis XII of France at Savona, to which we shall return in another place. Did the king deliberately stay away in order that suspicion and hostility might have a chance to cool down, and that the rebel barons might once more be brought into subjection for him by the iron hand of Cardinal Ximenes? Or was his absence prolonged in the belief that his daughter’s mental infirmities would increase the faster if she were left to bear her grief alone? There can be no doubt that Joanna became hopelessly insane immediately after her husband’s death, though it was not till February 14, 1509, that she finally withdrew to the gloomy fortress of Tordesillas, to live out in dreary solitude the remaining forty-six years of her existence. In the interim between her father’s return and her final retirement, she remained under the close supervision of Ferdinand. The latter had every reason to keep a strict watch upon her, for her hand was sought by various princes at the time, as a means of gaining title to the throne of Castile. But all these proposals were firmly refused, on the plea of Joanna’s insanity; and meantime her father left nothing undone which should serve to confirm his title to the administration of her kingdom. Some of the unruly barons, who had not forgotten how their ancestors had lorded it over the land during the periods of monarchical abasement, were inclined to raise their heads in revolt. Most of them, however, had been so thoroughly disciplined in the previous thirty years that they soon tired of anarchy and gave in their submission; and Ferdinand’s final triumph over the factions was confirmed by the Cortes at Madrid, in October, 1510, when he solemnly took the oath as administrator of the realm in his daughter’s name. For the rest of his life, at least, the Hapsburgs were to be kept out, and Spain preserved to the Spaniards.

From this time onward the dynastic question falls into the background. Ferdinand’s animosity to Philip transferred itself on the latter’s death to his eldest son and heir, the future Emperor Charles V, who remained in the Netherlands until 1517, and certainly gave few signs in his early years of the abilities which developed so rapidly when he became possessed of his great inheritance. But the
failure of male issue by Queen Germaine rendered it impossible for the Catholic King to turn his feelings to any practical account, and though the thought of the fate that awaited his kingdoms after his death must have embittered his declining years, he was absolutely powerless to avert it. In only one way did he give any outward evidence of the feelings that burned within his breast, and that was by lavishing every sort of care and affection on Charles’s younger brother, the future Emperor Ferdinand, who had been named for his maternal grandfather, and continued to reside in Spain until after the latter’s death. The old king took an intense interest in his education and made every effort to inculcate in him the Spanish point of view. He would doubtless have been delighted to put him in his brother’s place and may possibly have laid schemes to that effect. Some historians have even thought that the real key to the old king’s tortuous Italian diplomacy from 1509 to 1514 was his desire to create a new realm for his beloved youngest grandson out of Sicily, Naples, and any other states he might manage to acquire in the peninsula—the whole to be protected by the German, Austrian, and Spanish territories which would inevitably go to Charles. Of all this there is no proof, for the Catholic King was a past master of the art of covering his tracks, and our only means of estimating the policy of the last part of the reign is the one definite achievement that resulted from it, namely, the acquisition of Navarre. To the story of this final conquest we now turn, but our picture of the latter years of the old king will be the more accurate if we bear in mind the gloomy prospect with which he was perpetually confronted at home: the assurance, growing stronger and stronger as time went on, that the empire which he had been at such pains to build up was destined to be inherited by a foreign prince.

From 1506 to 1511 the external policy of Ferdinand the Catholic continued to be based on friendship with France; the Hapsburg danger remained far too pressing for several years after Philip’s death to admit of any other possibility. The Catholic King was constantly reminded of Maximilian’s jealousy and hatred during this period by the visits to Spain of secret agents from the Netherlands, who did their utmost to fan the smoldering flames of discontent among the Castilian grandees and to persuade them to rise in revolt against his regency. One of these envoys had to be imprisoned; another was shown out of the realm directly after his arrival at Laredo. Moreover, it was not merely a question of Ferdinand’s maintaining his position as administrator in Castile. There is reason to believe, as we have already seen, that until the disappointment of his hopes of male issue by Queen Germaine he contemplated assuming the aggressive and ousting the Hapsburgs entirely. Clearly it would be impossible to fight both Hapsburgs and Valois at once. He had already scored heavily against the latter in the Neapolitan war, and prudence now dictated the maintenance of cordial relations with them, in order to be perfectly certain of their neutrality, and if possible of their alliance, in case Spain should come to blows with the former. Consequently, we find the rapprochement which began at the treaty of Blois, in October, 1505, continued and solidified in the succeeding years. In June, 1507, after his departure from Naples, Ferdinand met Louis at Savona near Genoa, where the latter had gone to suppress a revolt. The interview there lasted four days. Beneath the attendant festivities and the notable honors accorded to the Great Captain, it is difficult to determine what serious business was transacted on this occasion. Probably those who have seen evidences in it of a Franco-Spanish alliance against the Hapsburgs, or even of negotiations preliminary to the league which was formed so shortly afterwards against the Venetians, have considerably exaggerated the importance of the whole affair. The only thing that the documents prove to have been definitely settled at Savona was the maintenance of the existing peace on the basis of the status quo for at least six months to come. This, however, was quite enough to show that Ferdinand and Louis both realized that for the present neither was strong enough to be able to dispense with the support of the other.

In the following year, when France made peace with the Emperor, and joined with him and with Pope Julius II in the famous League of Cambray against Venice, the Spanish monarch seized the first opportunity to get himself included in the alliance. To let Louis and Maximilian throw their united forces into Italy, while he stood completely aside, would mean danger to his new dominions in Naples; besides, if the king of France and the Emperor got a chance to lay their heads together while he was excluded from their deliberations, might it not result in the immediate sending of the Archduke Charles into Spain to claim the Castilian inheritance, the challenging of his regency there, and the upsetting of many other plans. There was also one positive advantage to be derived by Spain from entering the league against Venice, namely, the recovery of the Adriatic seaports of the kingdom of Naples, which had been intermittently in Venetian hands since 1495. All these considerations combined to make Ferdinand throw in his lot with the allies; but he did so with little enthusiasm, and with a firm resolve, doubtless strengthened by the fact that the Great Captain was in retirement, to shirk the military duties assigned to him. The only part of the campaign that really interested him, the recovery of the Neapolitan ports, he accomplished with almost no effort at all; for Venice, comprehending the necessity of concentrating against France, virtually surrendered them without attempting a defense. But the rest of
the war the Spanish monarch left to his confederates, content merely to keep close enough in touch with them to make sure that they mediated no treachery. He knew the nature of Italian politics well enough to realize how rapidly the combinations changed, and doubtless foresaw that if Louis were permitted to gather in most of the spoils of the campaign, he would infallibly be made to pay for it in the near future. As usual his judgment was correct. Even before the Venetians had been brought to their knees, the allies had become so jealous of the preponderance of the French in northern Italy that everything was ripe for a complete diplomatic revolution.

By this time, moreover—that is, in the winter of 1510-11—Ferdinand’s own attitude towards the foreign situation had undergone a change. His hopes of male issue by Queen Germaine were practically gone. The ultimate succession of the Hapsburgs to the Spanish throne was consequently inevitable. On the other hand, there was no immediate prospect that the Archduke Charles would be sent to Castile. It seemed likely that his own regency in the western kingdom, which Maximilian had formally recognized on December 12, 1509, would be permitted to continue unchallenged for many years to come. French aid, in other words, was no longer so indispensable for him in the dynastic problem, either for offensive or defensive purposes, as it had been before. And, finally, there was one more territorial conquest which he had ardently desired since his boyhood, and was determined, if possible, to carry through before he died—a necessity for the attainment of Spain’s natural boundaries on the north, yet scarcely to be accomplished without incurring the displeasure of France—the conquest of the little mountain kingdom of Navarre. When, therefore, the European powers, under the lead of Julius II, prepared to turn on Louis XII for the purpose of expelling him from Italy, Ferdinand was secretly rejoiced and promptly joined the confederates. He had no more use for the Valois now; and if they were completely isolated, he might well derive territorial advantage from the fact in a region on which he had long had his eye. Into the well-known story of the Italian campaigns of the Holy League we need not enter here, for though Gonsalvo’s veterans formed the backbone of its armies, and Ramón de Cardona, viceroy of Naples, was on the whole its most successful general, Spain reaped no direct reward from its victories in that quarter. We must rather concentrate our attention on what is usually regarded as a side issue of the war, and see how Ferdinand utilized for his own purposes in the Pyrenees the fact that most of the French forces were engaged beyond the Alps.

Since the failure of John II of Aragon to get it away from the children of his first marriage, we have had no occasion to follow the fortunes of Navarre. Eleanor, the sister of the unfortunate Prince of Viana, and heiress, after his death, of the little Pyrenean kingdom, had carried it, as a result of a marriage which had been arranged for her in 1434, into the possession of the powerful French house of Foix, whose principal domains, in Béarn and Bigorre, lay contiguous to Navarre on the northeast. Had she not had the good fortune to survive her treacherous father—though only for the short period of twenty-one days—her descendants would in all probability have been despoiled of their inheritance; but as it was, the kingdom passed, on her death in 1479, to her youthful grandson, Francis Phoebus, the eldest child of her eldest son Gaston, who had predeceased her. Francis Phoebus, however, also died in 1483, leaving no children, so that Navarre was inherited on his death by his younger sister, Catharine, and was by her in turn transferred, through her marriage in the following year, to Jean d’Albret, son and heir of Alain le Grand, the most eminent of the feudal nobles of the south of France. Navarre had thus been strengthened by dynastic unions with a number of adjacent states; but it had also been sadly shaken and disrupted by the frequent changes of its rulers; and, finally, it was seriously menaced by the jealousy of the neighboring powers. Ferdinand and Isabella had at one time planned to marry their son John to Catharine of Foix,² and never really forgave the Albrets who had forestalled them; moreover, the younger line of the house of Foix, represented at first by John, second son of Eleanor of Aragon, and, after his death in 1500, by his children, Germaine, the second wife of King Ferdinand, and Gaston, the hero of the battle of Ravenna, insisted on treating the Albret claims as a usurpation, and strove for a long time to win the succession for themselves.

Most important of all, however, was the effect on Navarre of the newborn hostility between France and Spain. These two states had now definitely entered upon a contest for the supremacy in Western Europe. Navarre held the keys to the passes of the western Pyrenees. Spain could not afford to let the destinies of the Albrets’ realm be exclusively guided by France, nor could France tolerate its permanent subjection to the influence of Spain. The little mountain kingdom, heretofore secluded and remote, became all at once the battleground of opposing policies. In this long struggle for the control of the Navarrese government, the Catholic Kings, despite the fact that the local dynasty was rather French than Spanish in its affiliations, were on the whole victorious. By a series of eight treaties, between 1476 and 1500, they succeeded in reducing the Navarrese sovereigns to the position of protégés of Spain. Their ultimate object was doubtless annexation, but for this the time was not yet ripe, and Ferdinand never did anything in a hurry. Besides, in the early years of the sixteenth century, a fresh complication...
arose, when the Hapsburgs, in anticipation of trouble with the Spanish monarchs, offered their alliance to the sovereigns of Navarre in return for their support in the successional quarrel in Castile. An understanding was reached between the houses of Austria and Albret, which continued to be a thorn in the side of Ferdinand the Catholic long after the death of Archduke Philip; it was also most displeasing to Louis XII. During the period immediately preceding the war of the Holy League, the Navarrese managed to play off the ambitions of these different foreign potentates against one another in such a way as to preserve their independence. Finally, at the opening of the conflict, they announced their intention of remaining strictly neutral, in the belief that the hostile powers would so exhaust themselves during the course of it, that their own position would ultimately become impregnable.

These hopes were destined to be disappointed. Navarre’s position between the two great rivals of the first half of the sixteenth century, coupled with the military value of the territory she possessed, rendered it inevitable that sooner or later she should fall a prey either to France or to Spain. It was during the spring of 1512 that her fate was decided. The crucial event in the story was the death in the battle of Ravenna, on April 11, of Gaston de Foix, the representative of the claims of the younger branch of his family against the Albrets, and the consequent passing of his title to his sister Germaine, the wife of Ferdinand the Catholic. Hitherto the French kings had tended to support the Foix line, as a means of bringing pressure on the existing dynasty; now it would be suicidal for them to continue to do so, since the representative of the Foix claims was the queen of Spain. The only thing for Louis XII to do was to draw near to the Albrets. On July 18, at Blois, he concluded with them a secret treaty of alliance; this treaty, however, he purposely caused to be worded in such ambiguous fashion as to deceive the Navarrese sovereigns themselves in regard to its true meaning. While they thought that they were only committing themselves to a defensive agreement—so loose as to be even consistent with the maintenance of their policy of neutrality—they really bound themselves to aid the king of France against attacks which he expected from the Spaniards and the English in the Pyrenees and in Guienne. Ferdinand, in the meantime, sat still and watched events. He realized that the death of Gaston de Foix was ultimately bound to throw France into the arms of the Albrets, and that therefore the time had come for him to stop negotiations and make ready to attack; but, as usual, he wanted to make success as nearly certain as possible before he took the field. Consequently, while secretly preparing an army of invasion, he continued to negotiate with the Navarrese. He also brought every conceivable argument to bear upon that very magnificent young gentleman, his son-in-law, King Henry VIII, to induce him to send an English force into Guienne. Ostensibly the English were to go to war for the recovery of their ancient continental possessions; in reality, as Ferdinand plainly saw, the sole practical result of their expedition would be to help him to win his own game? It must have given the old king great satisfaction to pull the wool over the eyes of the son of the one sovereign who had ever come near getting the better of him in the past; at one time he even had the effrontery to suggest that the only way for the English army to make certain of Guienne was to begin by attacking Navarre. And Ferdinand’s final act to justify the invasion which had been determined months before, was certainly one of the most extraordinary pieces of duplicity that history records. He knew nothing whatever of the terms of the treaty which the Albrets made with the Valois on July 18, at Blois, but he realized that their rapprochement boded no good to him. To accomplish his own ends it was essential for him to forestall the confederates, but at the same time he well knew that the most telling possible vindication of the assault which he was now fully prepared to deliver, would be to spread it abroad that the Navarrese and the French had made an agreement to attack him. He accordingly concocted an abstract of a treaty, which he falsely represented as having been signed by Louis XII and Jean d’Albret, and published it as such on July 17; it purported to provide for a joint attack by the French and Navarrese on Gipuzcoa and the adjacent Castilian lands, and the settlement of all the details of an intimate offensive alliance between them, primarily directed against Spain. However odious the deception, there can be no question of its effectiveness. The Spanish army of invasion, 17,000 strong, under the Duke of Alva, which crossed the Navarrese frontier from the westward on July 21, was persuaded that it was being employed for the purpose of national defense to anticipate a foreign attack, and not for aggression or spoliation; outsiders, too, were generally convinced of the justice of Ferdinand’s cause.

The Navarrese, it is almost unnecessary to add, were in no condition to resist. The fact that the Catholic King had continued to negotiate with them up to the very last moment, had lulled them into a false sense of security, so that no military preparations had been made; moreover, the English army, under the Marquis of Dorset, though it did not lend itself quite so obediently to Ferdinand’s purposes as that monarch had hoped, created a most valuable, diversion by threatening Guienne, and thus prevented the dispatch of French troops to the aid of the Navarrese. The Spanish invasion was, in fact, a triumphal procession. Jean d’Albret fled before it in early August into Béarn. Ten days later a subsidiary Aragonese army entered the southern part of the realm and besieged Tudela, which
surrendered on September 9. Meantime (August 28) the Duke of Alva summoned the inhabitants of Pamplona to recognize Ferdinand as their lawful sovereign. And the way in which the Catholic King defended his assumption of the crown of Navarre was certainly a fitting counterpart to the methods by which he had previously justified his invasion. Taking advantage of the fact that he was a member of the Holy League, he determined to make use of Pope Julius n to establish him in lawful possession of the territories he had won, just as he had previously utilized Alexander VI at the time of the discovery of America. On the plea that the Navarrese were heretics and schismatics, because they had adhered to the council which had been summoned to Pisa in the previous year at the instance of Louis XII, the Pope was induced to launch against them a bull of excommunication, dated July 21,1512, which was solemnly published by Ferdinand exactly one month later in the cathedral church of Calahorra. By it the Albrets were declared to be deprived of their sovereign rights and their subjects absolved from their allegiance; on it, over and above all the claims which he could put forward on other grounds, Ferdinand based his seizure of the crown of Navarre, “which he had won with the full authority of the church ... in a war for a just cause, as his Holiness had declared.”

Contemporary historians tell us that the usually unemotional Ferdinand actually wept for joy when he learned of the winning of Navarre. We need not wonder at the depth of the old king’s satisfaction. The conquest was not only the fulfillment of a duty bequeathed to him by his father, the realization of a dream that had haunted him from his youth; it rounded out his dominions on the north, just as the capture of Granada had done on the south, and was the sine qua non of national safety, whenever France and Spain should be at war. The military defense of his new frontiers was the problem which occupied Ferdinand’s chief attention in Navarre during the remaining years of his reign. The French and the Albrets made a series of desperate efforts to recover it, down to the year 1521, but none attained permanent success; for the Catholic King left no stone unturned to secure for himself undisputed control of the passes of the western Pyrenees. In the year 1514 he carried his conquests across the range and obtained the complete submission of the small region of French Navarre, or ‘Ultrapuertos’, as the Spaniards called it. Moreover he entirely refused to listen to the advice of the counsellors who urged him to abandon it on the ground that it was not worth keeping; the Catholic King had been more than fourteen years in his grave before it was voluntarily relinquished by Castile, and the boundary between the two realms established where it is today. Constitutionally Ferdinand followed the traditional Spanish practice of suffering the conquered realm to retain complete autonomy. The national laws and liberties were scrupulously respected. The different organs of the local government—Cortes, Council, Exchequer, and the rest—were left virtually undisturbed. Every possible concession was made to win the loyalty of the Navarrese: so much so, in fact, that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the only change brought about by the conquest was the incoming of a new dynasty, which was represented on the spot by a Castilian viceroy. On the other hand, the Catholic King did not propose to leave the realm which he had been at so much pains to conquer in any such state of independent isolation as would make it possible to tear it away from his successors. With the idea of committing the larger and more important portion of Spain to its protection and retention, he solemnly declared before the Cortes of Burgos, on July 7, 1515, that Navarre was united and incorporated with the kingdom of Castile. It may well have cost him a pang not to turn it over to Aragon, with which it had certainly more intimate historical ties. Zurita tells us that he hesitated a long time before settling the difficult question; but there can be little doubt that his final decision was the wisest. Certainly Castile would have been threatened far more seriously than Aragon by the presence of the enemy in Navarre. It was but fair that she should reap the benefits of its annexation and undertake the onerous duty of its defense.

While the conquest of Navarre was being completed, the war against the French continued to rage with unabated violence in Italy. At one moment, just after the battle of Ravenna, there was a unanimous demand that the Great Captain be called forth from the retirement to which Ferdinand, after his return from Naples, had ungenerously consigned him. By him alone, insisted the allies, could the fortunes of the Holy League be restored. The Catholic King finally gave his consent, the less reluctantly because he plainly saw that a further advance by the French would endanger his Neapolitan dominions; and so great was the enthusiasm for service under the banner of Gonsalvo that it seemed, for a short space, wrote Peter Martyr, that Spain was to be drained of all her noble and generous blood. But more favorable news was received from Italy before all the necessary preparations could be made. The Great Captain was ordered back into seclusion on his estates at Loja, and died at Granada on December 2, 1515, without having been able to render the last service which his country demanded. Other generals carried the work of the League to its triumphant conclusion. The French were soon expelled from Milan; peace was made before the end of 1514, and Louis XII died on the last night of the year. His brilliant young successor, Francis I, immediately returned into Italy, won ‘a battle of the giants’ at Marignano, reoccupied the Milanese, and before he had been a year on the throne regained all, and
more than, the prestige which his predecessor had lost; but Ferdinand, save for making a fresh alliance with Henry VIII of England, seems to have remained quite indifferent to the conquests of the French. The old king’s days were numbered, and he knew it; of his principal contemporaries, whom he had fought and outwitted, only one, the Emperor Maximilian, was still alive; a new generation had arisen; he had done his work and was probably not sorry to go. Death came to him at last, on January 23, 1516, in the little village of Madrigalejo in Estremadura; and Adrian of Utrecht, the envoy of the Hapsburg Charles, hovered about like a bird of evil omen all through his final illness, as if to remind him in his last moments of the detested Fleming, who was to reap the reward of his labors and to inherit his hard-won domains. Certainly it was the bitterest irony of fate that at the very moment when Spain’s national unity had been attained, her national independence should have been lost. Ferdinand and Isabella had earned the everlasting gratitude of their country by giving her the one, and by increasing, beyond the most ambitious dreams of their contemporaries, the wealth and extent of her dominions overseas. Yet their reign had also resulted in depriving her of the other, and in bequeathing her the almost insoluble problem of reconciling the national interests with the dynastic ambitions of a race of alien kings.
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THE EMPEROR
BOOK V
SPAIN IN THE OLD WORLD

CHAPTER XXI
FRESH RESPONSIBILITIES AND A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

The six years which followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic were in some respects the most critical in the history of the Spanish Empire. They saw the control of its destinies pass from native into alien hands. They witnessed fresh extensions of its responsibilities and power; all over the earth, and at a pace hitherto undreamed of, did its prestige and its burdens increase. While it was being linked with foreign kingdoms and Roman imperial traditions in the Old World, it conquered a mighty empire in the New. The voyage of Ferdinand Magellan was a symbol of the universality of the position it had won. And finally, these six years saw the beginning of a radical alteration in the attitude and aspirations of the Spanish people. In 1516 they were still primarily interested in internal affairs. Though unquestionably proud of the great conquests of the preceding reign, they continued to think rather in national than in imperial terms. They regarded with misgivings the foreign dynasty which fate had placed upon their thrones, and four years later, a large proportion of them were in full revolt against it. But in 1522, when their young sovereign came amongst them for a second time, a striking change had already taken place. Their rebellion had died down from lack of fuel to feed the flames. They had had an opportunity to perceive that the rule of the much-dreaded foreigner had its advantages as well as its drawbacks; if it meant outside burdens and distractions, it also brought riches, power, and renown. Little by little their earlier forebodings gave place to a conviction that under the leadership of the house of Hapsburg it was their destiny to rule the world. The significance of this great turning point can only be appreciated if we keep constantly before our eyes the picture of Spain’s acquisitions and achievements in every quarter of the globe. Clearness and convenience prescribe separate treatment of contemporary developments in the Old World and in the New; but a general conspectus of the events recorded in the first chapters of the two books comprised in the present volume is essential to the formation of an intelligent verdict on the meaning of these crucial years.

The bitter hostility of Ferdinand the Catholic toward his grandson, Charles of Burgundy, reveals itself in various utterances and stipulations in regard to the succession to the Spanish kingdoms. To disinherit the prince entirely was out of the question; but Ferdinand was resolved to do his utmost to delay the inevitable. For this, the absence of Charles in Flanders, the presence of his brother Ferdinand in Spain, and above all the condition of his unfortunate mother—immured in Tordesillas—furnished an admirable opportunity. Joanna was the legal heiress and had been recognized as such in a will drawn up by her father at Burgos on May 2, 1512; her unfitness to rule, however, was also openly acknowledged, and Charles was designated as regent. But until Charles should arrive, it was provided that his younger brother Ferdinand should take his place, and it was generally believed that their grandfather cherished hopes that the substitution might prove permanent. Certainly, he left no stone unturned to strengthen the hand of the ‘Infante’ against Charles; significant, in this connection, were his repeated efforts to win for his favorite grandson the hand of the Princess Renee, daughter of Louis XII, and thereby to forestall the match which had been arranged for her with Charles. Badoero, the Venetian ambassador, writing early in the year 1515, goes so far as to affirm that Ferdinand was very glad to see how much the grandees liked the Infante, who had been reared in Spain, and that he ardently hoped that they would make him king, in case Charles should come to Castile to take possession of his inheritance. Even after Ferdinand’s death, the impression prevailed in Spain that he had intended to set aside the lawful heir. As late as October, 1520, his cousin, the Admiral Fadrique Enriquez, assured the Junta of Tordesillas that the king, on his death bed, had nominated his namesake as ‘gobernador’ or regent for his mother, without reference to the claims of Charles.
Yet the facts of the case, though the admiral may not have been aware of them, were exactly the contrary of the statement he had made. For during the last months of Ferdinand’s life, the counsellors of the absent prince, who were accurately informed of the situation in Spain, made a determined effort to eradicate his grandfather’s prejudice with an unseemly quarrel between his hero Ferdinand and his patron Charles, vigorously denies that the former made any testamentary disposition whatever in favor of his namesake and gives in support of the denial a detailed account of a will which he represents the king to have drawn up on April 26, 1515. There is, however, no other evidence that such an instrument was ever framed, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the usually trustworthy cronista, in this particular instance, was deliberately distorting the facts against him, and to insure his own rights to the succession. For this purpose they dispatched Charles’s friend and tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, dean of Louvain, in October, 1515, to plead his cause at the Spanish court. The selection was altogether wise. Adrian was patient and tactful. He was capable of appreciating the Spanish point of view. It may have counted in his favor that he was not on the best of terms with Charles’s most intimate advisers in the Netherlands. To assume that Ferdinand was persuaded to forget his dislike of the Archduke would be absurd; but he was apparently brought to see that it was no longer practical politics to give vent to his hostility by attempting to deprive him of his inheritance. At any rate, an agreement was reached in early January, 1516, that Charles should come to Spain in the immediate future, not like his father before him, with armed forces, but only with his retinue as a prince; that he should be recognized as heir in all the Spanish kingdoms, without prejudice to the rights of his grandfather, so long as the latter should live; and finally that the same fleet which bore him to Spain should carry back his brother Ferdinand to the Netherlands, to take over the government there. Most of these arrangements were nullified by the old king’s death a few weeks later; but the principal point for which Adrian had contended—namely, the setting aside of the Infante’s claims to the regency in Spain—had been definitely and permanently won. The day before he died, Ferdinand called his most intimate counsellors together, and, after prolonged consultation, annulled his will of 1512, recognized the right of succession to the Spanish kingdoms of his daughter Joanna, and her legal heir, Prince Charles, and ordered that until the latter should arrive in Spain the regency of Castile should be entrusted to Cardinal Ximenes, and that of the realms of the Crown of Aragon to his natural son, the archbishop of Saragossa. Several places in the kingdom of Naples and an annual stipend of fifty thousand ducats were all that was left to the Infante.

The sentiments of the mass of the Spaniards on the question of the succession accurately reflected those of Ferdinand, and they knew little or nothing of the circumstances which had brought the king in his last days to bow to the inevitable, and cancel the previous dispositions made in favor of his namesake. So much has already been said concerning the prevalence of separatism of every sort in the Iberian Peninsula, that it is unnecessary to emphasize the danger of generalizations; still, if there was any one characteristic common to all ranks and classes of the Spain of that period, it was certainly dislike and distrust of foreigners. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Geographical facts and historical traditions furnished the background. A natural pride in glorious deeds done under the Catholic Fangs, and a consequent tendency to look down on others who had accomplished less, counted for much. All the contemporary accounts bear witness to it. Peter Martyr tells us that “among Spaniards no foreigner is accounted of importance. They boast that they know for themselves, and that is enough”. “They think they know more, and can accomplish more than any other people”, comments Corner in 1521. Guicciardini in his ‘relation’ of 1513 was even more explicit. “They are by nature proud, and believe that no other nation can be compared with their own. In their conversation they are constantly vaunting their own exploits; they have little use for strangers, and are exceedingly rude in their dealings with them”. And it was but natural that Charles should be regarded in Spain as a foreigner, and should come in for his share of this contempt. He had never left the Netherlands since the day of his birth, and he had been surrounded from the cradle by essentially non-Spanish influences. Spaniards had, or thought they had, a little inking of what this boded for them; for they cherished the bitterest memories of the wanton recklessness with which, ten years before, the Archduke Philip had impoverished Castile in the interests of his greedy Flemings. The only Spaniards who had got any good at all out of Philip’s brief rule in the Peninsula were the old self-seeking Castilian nobles, who, dreading the strong hand of the king of Aragon, had flocked to the court of the young Hapsburg in the hope that his wastefulness and incompetence would afford them a long looked for opportunity to retrieve their own shattered fortunes. The aristocracy’s gain was the loss of every other portion of the body politic; and if Philip had been unsatisfactory, there was every probability that Charles would be worse. The Infante, who had always lived among them, would have been much more acceptable to the mass of the Spaniards.

Discussion of the attitude of Spain towards Charles naturally leads to that of the attitude of Charles towards Spain. Much light is thrown on this matter by a confidential letter, written to Cardinal Ximenes shortly after Ferdinand’s death, by Alonso Manrique, bishop of Badajoz, who had resided in the
Netherlands since 1509, and knew whereof he spoke. Briefly summarized, his verdict was that Charles knew little of Spain and of the Spaniards, and that most of that was wrong. Under all the circumstances, it could scarcely have been otherwise. The prince had grown up under the tutelage of his Hapsburg aunt Margaret, and of his Francophile minister Chièvres. His dynastic interests and responsibilities, as future head of the house of Hapsburg, had been set before him; his obligations to revive the pristine splendors of the ancient dukes of Burgundy had been reiterated again and again; but the claims of his maternal inheritance had scarcely been insisted on at all. It is true that a number of Spanish representatives had been in attendance at his court since the death of his father, in 1506, but their attitude and conduct had probably rather alienated than attracted him. The majority were Castilian nationalists who hated the rule of King Ferdinand because he was Aragonese. They formed, in fact, the remnants of the party that had ranged itself on the side of the Archduke Philip in 1506; somewhat less self-seeking perhaps than the adherents of that ruler had been, they represented, for more patriotic reasons, essentially the same point of view. Their leader was that Juan Manuel who had ruled in the counsels of Charles’s father, and closely associated with him were the above-mentioned bishop of Badajoz, and Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, his successor in that see. They lost no opportunity to poison the young ruler’s mind against his maternal grandfather, and the latter responded by sending an Aragonese delegation to Charles’s court to present his side of the case. The rival partisans struggled and intrigued to gain the upper hand, and their strife became involved with various factional bickerings in Charles’s council; at one time Ferdinand’s supporters succeeded in persuading the Emperor Maximilian to order their archenemy, Juan Manuel, into confinement. We may well believe that the spectacle of all these plottings and recriminations both puzzled and disgusted Charles. He retained, to an unusual degree, throughout his youth, that love of calmness and regularity, that aversion to the unaccountable and inconsequent, which is a common characteristic of children. The real meaning and significance of the wrangles of his Spanish visitors were at present quite beyond him. He only knew that they were constantly at odds with one another for remote and insufficient cause. They disturbed the regular round of Hapsburg and Burgundian affairs, and were an unwelcome reminder of future responsibilities which he probably, at that moment, was by no means anxious to assume.

A few words in regard to Charles’s appearance and character at this early stage of his career will serve to emphasize the difficulties of the situation, and shed further light on the mutual repulsion between his future Spanish subjects and himself. At sixteen, he was far from prepossessing. Neither in aspect nor in conversation did he give any promise of the ability, ambition, or independence which he was afterwards shown to possess. The portraits that have come down to us give a far clearer idea of his appearance than the contradictory descriptions of contemporaries. He had a good body, thin, but well formed, and of medium height. His forehead was broad and clear, but his eyes bulged and stared; they looked, said the Venetian Pasqualigo, as if they were stuck on and did not really belong to him. His salient feature, however, so prominent that it really diverted attention from the upper part of his face, was his long protruding lower jaw, which caused his mouth not seldom to hang open, and sometimes gave him almost the air of an imbecile. Proper mastication was consequently impossible; and as the prince’s appetite was almost uncontrollable, digestive troubles affected him all his life. The unhealthy pallor, which was remarked upon by all observers, was doubtless attributable to the same cause. The unhealthy prince’s appetite was almost uncontrollable. French and Flemish were perhaps Charles’s natural languages; but he was never absolutely at home in the former, and he did not begin the latter until he was thirteen. His Latin was well learned, and was an unwelcome reminder of future responsibilities which he probably, at that moment, was by no means anxious to assume.

Of the character that lay behind this unattractive exterior, it was almost impossible to judge. Charles, at this stage of his career, was an enigma to his contemporaries. On one point only there was general agreement, and that was his preternatural gravity and reserve. All the joy and enthusiasm of youth seemed to have been denied him, and he gave the appearance of being always slightly tired. “Sexdecennis est, gravitate tamen senilis”, writes Peter Martyr; “molto meliconico”, reports Pasqualigo. This sedateness was, perhaps, not entirely unbecoming to a future sovereign, but it discouraged intimacy, and left observers of Charles’s character in the dark. Most of them jumped at the conclusion
that he was really a nonentity. Just before his departure for Spain a couple of Italians reported that, having been thrice in his presence, they had never heard him utter a single word, that he had no ability whatsoever, and was exclusively governed by others. His most intimate adviser was the Burgundian Chièvres, for whom he entertained affection and profound respect; and despite the harshness of the Spanish verdicts on this minister—perfectly explicable in view of subsequent events—it was really to Charles’s credit that he clung to him as he did. It showed a sense of duty, and even, paradoxical as it may seem, a certain sort of independence. Chièvres represented to Charles his responsibilities to his Netherlandish subjects—the only subjects he had ever known; the minister was the embodiment of immediate and evident obligations. That Charles refused to be diverted from these by the changeful and capricious demands of Maximilian and Margaret, and the even remoter claims of different Spanish delegations, is a point in his favor. It reveals conscientiousness, strength of character, and concentration. And Chièvres himself could have testified, had he wished, that the prince had a will of his own. When, in his eighteenth year, Charles found on the person of his sister Eleanor a letter, which proved that his old friend Frederick, Count Palatine, was making love to her without his knowledge and consent, he promptly banished the offender from his court; and all the pleadings and intercessions of Margaret, of the Prince of Orange, and of Chièvres himself availed nothing to mitigate the sentence. But of all this the average observer was still ignorant; the externals gave no inkling of it whatsoever, and the mass of mankind judges by externals. Certainly the Spaniards, who knew far less of the prince than any of his subjects, derived little encouragement from the prospect.

In one respect the death of King Ferdinand simplified the complicated diplomatic situation which had arisen through the rivalry of the different factions about the person of the prince; it put an end to the quarrel between the Castilian nationalists and the Aragonese representatives at the Burgundian court. For Charles was now practically sovereign in both portions of his Spanish inheritance, and under the guidance of Chièvres did his best to efface the memory of the jealousy between the eastern and western kingdoms. Almost all the leaders of both of the Spanish parties in the Netherlands were got rid of on one pretext or another in the course of the year 1516-17. Pedro de Urrea, one of the representatives of Ferdinand, was sent off to Rome. Another, Juan de Lanuza, was dismissed. Juan Manuel, the Castilian, was also kept away from Charles’s court, and finally reappeared as his ambassador to the Vatican in 1520. Their places were taken by Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, now bishop of Badajoz, who had not been so deeply involved in the preceding quarrels, and by Pedro Quintana, a nephew of the famous state secretary, Miguel Perez de Almazán, who was specially summoned by Charles from Spain. Both these men were cosmopolitan in training and point of view; their advent betokened the intention of the prince and his advisers to take up the Spanish problem as a whole, and not as an affair of Aragon or of Castile. In order to remove all doubts, and to preclude the dangers inherent in his mother’s infirmity and her legal position as sole heiress in the Spanish realms, Charles was proclaimed King Catholic jointly with her on March 14, 1516, at Brussels in the Cathedral Church of Saint Gudule. In the autumn of the same year it was determined to enlarge the famous Order of the Golden Fleece “in view of the increased power and prestige of the Burgundian House”, and to reserve ten places in it for distinguished Spaniards; this action is the more significant when contrasted with the previous failure of the Emperor Maximilian to have the Order extended to Austria. Clearly the Netherlands regarded the acquisition of the Spanish inheritance for their sovereign as a point of honor and felt that a union of both peoples under a single ruler would work to the advantage of both. There was something to be said for this point of view. So accustomed are we to think of the relations of Spain and the Low Countries as they were in the time of Philip II and William of Orange, that we forget the many traditions of cordial good feeling that lay behind. Particularly noteworthy was their interdependence in economic life. The wool trade was a sine qua non of commercial prosperity for both, and their joint fleets could probably have controlled the seas. Given good relations with France (and to attain and preserve such good relations had been the constant aim of Chièvres’s foreign policy), it was by no means impossible, at that period, that Spain and Burgundy, including Franche Comté, could have been successfully and advantageously united under a single rule.

But if the death of the king of Aragon simplified the Spanish problem, as it presented itself to the court of Brussels, it also rendered its immediate solution far more urgent than before. It was desirable from every point of view that Charles should go to Spain as soon as possible, and it was generally understood between his Flemish advisers and the regent Ximenes that nothing of importance should be permanently decided there until he should arrive; yet on the other hand there were many obstacles in the way of a speedy departure. There were pressing questions of internal politics to settle in the Netherlands. Wars had to be fought in Gelderland and Frisia. The opposition of the Emperor Maximilian, who was disgusted with the Francophile tendencies of Chièvres’s administration, had to be overcome. Most necessary of all was the assurance of good relations with France, without which the
whole Spanish enterprise would be hazardous in the extreme; and this was secured, August 13, 1516, by the treaty of Noyon, which settled, for the time being, all outstanding questions between the contracting parties, and sealed their reconciliation by the betrothal of Charles to Louise, the daughter of Francis I. That Chièvres was able to accomplish all these things in the twenty months that followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic was no mean achievement. Yet it is not difficult to see why the Spaniards, who were imperfectly informed about the situation in the Netherlands, chafed at the long delay. It confirmed their previous estimate of Charles as an essentially foreign prince, with outside responsibilities to which he gave precedence over his duties as a Spanish sovereign. Some of them decided to act on the principle that if the mountain would not come to Mohammed, Mohammed must go to the mountain. “They flock here in incredible numbers every day”, wrote Spinelly to Henry VIII from Brussels in May, 1516. No less than twenty-four commanders of the Order of Santiago were to be found in that city in the following July, enough to make possible a formal capitular meeting there. No doubt a chief cause of the coming of these people was their desire to advance their own private ends; but they all showed a firm determination to instill into their young ruler the Spanish point of view, and to ensure that he should not enter upon his new inheritance a total stranger to the traditions and aspirations of the Iberian Peninsula. Since a deathbed change of policy on the part of their late monarch had blasted all their hopes of the successor whom the vast majority of them would have preferred, they had wisely resolved to accept the inevitable, and do their utmost to turn the Flemish alien into a loyal Spaniard.

Meantime, in Castile, the iron hand of Cardinal Ximenes governed the realm, put down revolt, and maintained the prestige of the authority of the crown. So dominant was the personality of this extraordinary prelate that he overshadowed everyone associated with him in the government, and also his co-regent in the eastern kingdoms; the realms of the Crown of Aragon, under the less masterful rule of the archbishop of Saragossa, seemed to shrink into insignificance during the years 1516-17. The task that the cardinal inherited was beset with difficulties; and his loyalty and determination were subjected to the sternest tests. For all the malcontents in the realm seized the vacancy of the throne as their longed-for opportunity to gain their own selfish ends. The Castilian aristocracy raised its head in revolt and had to be suppressed by strong statesmanship and force of arms. The ambitions of Queen Germaine were a constant source of anxiety. The Infante Ferdinand was the hardest problem of all. His grandfather’s preference for him was a matter of common gossip. Being only thirteen years old, he would have made just the sort of ruler that the grandees would have delighted to see. Plots and intrigues continued to center about him, until finally Charles authorized the cardinal to separate him from his most intimate adherents. This vigorous action was rendered easier by the fact that it had been already agreed that Ferdinand should be sent off to the Netherlands to take Charles’s place, after the arrival of the latter in Castile; and in May, 1518, six months after Ximenes’s death, this arrangement was carried into effect. There was universal grief at the Infante’s departure. If the grandees regarded him merely as a means of restoring their own shattered fortunes, the people felt that he was the last symbol of Spanish, as opposed to foreign rule. “Woe unto thee, Castile, if thou sufferest the Infante Ferdinand to be carried away”, ran a writing that appeared on the doors of St. Francis of Valladolid; and there can be no doubt that these words represented the general feeling. Ximenes, however, had definitely accepted the new regime with all that it implied. Castilian to the core, he had followed the late king’s will, and cast in his lot with the absent Hapsburg.

The unrest in the realm and the need for stern repressive measures led the cardinal to try an experiment fully in consonance with his own inclinations and with the traditions of the previous reign. He had always delighted in military affairs; and the use of the troops of the Hermandad under the Catholic Kings, and the provisions of the royal ordinance of 1496, gave him excellent precedents for the creation of a standing army. He accordingly sought and obtained Charles’s permission to call on each of the different cities of Castile to raise, equip, and drill a military force proportional to its population, to be permanently ready for the service of the crown. The cost of this body was to be borne by the cities in time of peace, and by the central government in time of war; and in order to make the experiment popular, a number of privileges and immunities were offered to those who entered the ranks. Violent opposition, however, soon manifested itself on every hand. The nobles regarded the ‘alistamiento’, as the measure was called, in the light of a menace to their independence, and were naturally loudest in their complaints; but the cities were not far behind. The expense was heavy, and the scheme itself was an invasion of cherished municipal privileges. In some places the hostility remained latent; in others it manifested itself in riots, and in appeals over the head of the regent to the absent prince. Salamanca expelled the officers sent by Ximenes to organize the new army. In Valladolid the regent’s representative had to hide and then flee in disguise for his life; and when the cardinal announced his intention of punishing the inhabitants, they rushed to arms. The resistance of Valladolid was in fact the
rock on which the project was wrecked. Together with Burgos she protested to Charles, who, desirous above all things to avoid trouble while he was in Flanders, gave assurance that if peace were preserved the obnoxious order would be suspended. It was in vain that the cardinal warned his young master that such leniency was but playing into the hands of his worst enemies, the grandees. The court of Brussels was determined on conciliation, and the whole plan had to be given up. But the attempt, though it failed, brought the government all the unpopularity that might have been expected to ensue from its success. Everyone realized what the cardinal had intended to do, for Charles’s interference had come too late to cloud the issue. Nobles and burgesses alike were up in arms, and the way was paved for a temporary union between the aristocracy and the third estate against the crown, which, a few years later, nearly cost the king his throne.

The cardinal was as solicitous for the interest of the Spanish Empire as he was for the authority of the crown of Castile. His efforts for the progress and prosperity of the Spanish dominions across the Atlantic, and for the fair treatment of the American Indians, form an interesting and important episode in the history of Spanish civilization in the New World. Nearer home, he distinguished himself by repelling an expedition of Jean d’Albret for the recovery of the Spanish portion of Navarre. The invading forces were caught unprepared in the narrow valley of Roncal; they were overwhelmed there in March, 1516, by the sudden attack of the Spaniards under Colonel Cristobal Villalva, one of the ablest of the disciples of the Great Captain. Victory on the battlefield was followed by stern measures to prevent a repetition of the attempt. Many of the great fortresses of the realm, more likely to prove nuclei of revolt than strongholds of authority, were razed to the ground; only Estella, Viana, and Pamplona were suffered to remain. An imposing army of occupation was installed in the reconquered land; and a new viceroy, the Duke of Najera, whose vast wealth rendered him inaccessible to corruption, superintended the execution of the orders of his master. Certain constitutional and administrative reforms were also carried out; their tendency, needless to add, was to curtail the liberties and privileges of the Navarrese, who executed the cardinal in Spain, and his representatives on the spot. The harshness of these measures was subsequently softened by sundry modifying edicts of Charles, who saw and improved the obvious opportunity to win an easy popularity by a show of conciliation; but it is doubtful if the Spanish rule in Navarre could have survived the much more serious test to which it was to be subjected in 1521 had the cardinal been less pitiless in 1516.

In any history of the Spanish Empire the name of Cardinal Ximenes will always be chiefly remembered in connection with North Africa. The campaign against Oran, in 1509, and the other conquests which immediately followed after it, had been primarily rendered possible by his energy and enthusiasm. During the period of his regency he launched an expedition against Algiers, and despite the assertion of his biographer to the contrary, we may well believe that he was deeply cast down by its failure. According to some authorities the immediate occasion of this enterprise was one for which there had been many a precedent in the history of the relations of Spain and of North Africa—an appeal for Christian aid from local Berber potentates who had acknowledged themselves vassals of the king of Spain, in their dread of domination by a more powerful coreligionist. The suppliants this time were the rulers of Tenes and Mostaganem, and possibly one of the sons of the sheik of Algiers. The oppressor against whom they sought aid was the Turkish corsair, Arudj Barbarossa, who had just strangled the Algerian ruler with his own hands and proclaimed himself king of the realm in his stead. But it seems more probable that the principal cause of the expedition was the sorry state of the Spanish garrison of the Penon d’Algel. It was short of supplies and especially of water, which, owing to the vigilance with which the enemy guarded the wells on the mainland, had to be fetched from the distant Balearics. The letters of the commander of the garrison—a Catalan, Nicholas de Quint—give a vivid picture of the sufferings of his men; “No hermit,” avowed one of his subordinates, “has ever endured such pangs of hunger and thirst”. A powerful relief force was accordingly fitted out at Cartagena; when it finally sailed in the end of September 1516, it comprised some thirty-five ships and about 3000 men. Its command was entrusted to Diego de Vera, a favorite pupil of Gonsalvo de Cordova, and one of the famous ‘eleven’ who had fought the French at Trani in 1502; Peter Martyr assures us, however, in his laconic fashion, that he was far more talkative and boastful than energetic. Certainly he made a lamentable failure on this occasion, and his blunders are exposed in merciless fashion in the report of the commander whom he set out to relieve. He took no pains to time the arrival of his fleet so as to effect a surprise. He assaulted the city of Algiers without utilizing his artillery in preparation. He suffered Arudj to draw him forward into a trap where his troops were overwhelmed by a furious counterattack. Only the cannon of the Peñón saved his army from annihilation; and on his return voyage to Spain his best ships were driven ashore by a storm, and their crews either captured or slain. “Even Homer sometimes neds”, is Sandoval’s grim comment on this reverse, “and for our sins, it generally happens at the very time that it is most important for him to be awake.”
There was another portion of the Spanish Empire which was destined to give its youthful sovereign many an anxious moment during the two years which followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic—namely, the island of Sicily. Here Cardinal Ximenes had no jurisdiction and was consequently unable directly to intervene; his correspondence, however, shows that he was deeply concerned over the insurrection which broke out there, and the danger that it might spread to the neighboring kingdom of Naples.

The immediate cause of the uprising in Sicily was the unpopularity of the viceroy Hugo de Moncada, who had been sent thither by Ferdinand the Catholic in 1509. The earlier years of his tenure of office had been principally occupied in lending military aid to the North African campaigns, especially in 1511, after the capture of Tripoli; in all this he exhibited energy, dauntless courage, and remarkable capacity as a soldier. Unfortunately his internal administration was marked by avarice, cruelty, and arrogance. He appropriated the government resources for purposes of his own. He substituted his own will for the law of the land and utilized the Inquisition to terrorize people into submission. Everyone looked forward to the death of Ferdinand, by which the appointment of Moncada would be legally terminated, as the sole means of escape from intolerable conditions. But the viceroy was determined to retain his office. When the news of Ferdinand’s death arrived, he sought, at first, to keep it secret till he should be able to extort from the estates a recognition of his authority. Then when the opposition of the nobles and burgesses in the Sicilian parliament rendered it impossible to carry out this plan, he reversed his tactics, and sought, by openly proclaiming the accession of Charles and of Joanna, at once to win the confidence of his new sovereigns, and also to gain for himself the adherence of the masses. This maneuver, however, was even more unsuccessful than the first. Not only did it fail to produce the intended effect; it precipitated an uprising in Palermo against Moncada, which resulted in his expulsion and flight to Messina. The movement soon spread over all the rest of the island. The viceroy’s edicts were set aside; his friends and appointees were hunted out and killed. For a brief period the cities were delivered over to mob rule. Finally, however, a provisional government was set up by the aristocracy under the able leadership of the Count of Golisano, and succeeded after a brief struggle in gaining the adherence of the mass of the Sicilians. On the subject of Moncada it took a decided stand; it sent a messenger to the court of Brussels to demand that he be immediately recalled, and that the measures for which he had been responsible be promptly revoked. At the same time it protested that the island was entirely loyal to Charles and his mother, and that it would welcome the new dynasty, provided its laws and privileges were not infringed.

Charles took up the matter vigorously. Moncada and Golisano, with the latter’s principal adherents, were cited to appear before him in the autumn of 1516, and were confronted with one another at the royal court. The Sicilian representatives won an initial victory by preventing the return of the detested viceroy, but they failed to gain any profit from it for themselves. Golisano and his friends were forced to dance attendance at the royal court for over two years and a half; not until June 1519, were they suffered to return to their native land. Their provisional government was declared null and void, and most of the viceroy’s edicts and impositions were restored. Moreover the successor who was appointed in Moncada’s place was a Neapolitan nobleman, the Count of Monteleone, who was bound to be unpopular with the Sicilians as a foreigner, and who naturally reaped the fruits of all the errors of his predecessors. The new title with which he was invested—lieutenant-general of the realm—was an additional ground for suspicion and dislike. In July, 1517, within three months of his arrival, the island was again in the throes of a revolution.

This second uprising was more serious than the first. The populace and not the aristocracy furnished its leaders and its platform. The place of the Count of Golisano was taken by a burgess of Palermo, named Gian Luca Squarcialupo, whose aspirations reached much further than the redress of grievances, and contemplated the foundation of an independent republic. There were murders and riots in all the Sicilian cities except Messina. Monteleone was powerless to restore order, and Charles was so remote that the revolutionists felt it safe to ignore him. But the movement was not destined to last long; it contained within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. The nobles had flirted with it at the outset, when they thought that it promised to bring them some advantage; when they discovered that they were to have no share in its direction or its spoils, they shifted over into opposition, and revolution gave way to class war. Finally, on September 8, 1517, a group of them fell upon Squarcialupo and murdered him in the church of the Annunciation in Palermo. Deprived of its leader, the populace soon lost its enthusiasm for fighting; and when, six months later, a force of six thousand men was sent over from Spain to restore order, there was little left for it to do. Politically and administratively the movement was almost barren of results. Monteleone was maintained in office with the title of viceroy; some few concessions were made to the popular demands, but the only portion of the inhabitants who really
The whole affair must have made a painful impression on the mind of the young king. It gave him his first inkling of the difficulties inherent in the rule of the far-flung empire which he had inherited from his Spanish forebears. But it also demonstrated the important fact that an aristocracy, if properly manipulated, could be converted from a menace to the omnipotence of the crown into an invaluable bulwark against popular revolution. The history of Charles’s subsequent dealings with the revolt of the Castilian Comuneros shows that he took this lesson to heart.

At last the long awaited day arrived, and on September 9, 1517, Charles set sail from Flushing for Spain. The fleet that bore the young monarch to his new inheritance numbered some forty sail, and his following nearly five hundred souls. Among them were his sister Eleanor, his chief adviser, Chièvres, and a large number of Flemish magnates, the Castilian bishop, Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, and Sir Thomas Spinelly, the envoy of Henry VIII. Every effort had been made to fit out the expedition in such a manner as would be worthy of the gorgeous traditions of the Burgundian court and secure the favor and protection of Christ and the saints. In order that the king’s ship might be recognized by the rest in the daytime, it carried at its topmast two square banners, and on its sails many beautiful paintings and sacred scenes. On its mainsail was painted a picture of the crucifixion, between the figures of the Virgin Mary and St. John the Evangelist, the whole enframed between the two pillars of Hercules which appear on the royal arms, together with the king’s motto Plus oultre, written on a scroll twined around the said pillars. On the main topsail was painted a representation of the Holy Trinity, and at the mizen that of St. Nicholas. On the foresail was a picture of the Virgin with her Child, treading on the moon, and surrounded by the rays of the sun, with a crown with seven stars above her head; and over it all there was painted the figure of St. James, the lord and patron of Castile, slaying the infidels in battle; and on the jib was the picture of St. Christopher. All these figures were painted on both sides of the said sails, for the reason that they are saints frequently called upon by those who are in peril or danger from the sea. Other details were arranged on a scale correspondingly magnificent, and the contrast to the rude discomforts which awaited the young king during the first six months of his sojourn in Castile must have produced an ineffaceable impression.

For everything seemed to go wrong during the early days of that memorable visit. The pilots had intended to land in Biscay, and were deeply chagrined to discover when they first came in sight of the Spanish coasts that they were far to the westward, more than a hundred miles out of their course, off the little Asturian town of Villaviciosa. Naturally no preparations had been made to receive the king, and when the expedition neared the shore the inhabitants mistook it for a raid by French or Turkish pirates. They recoiled into the mountains, carrying with them their wives, children, and household goods; they armed and made ready for battle. Shouts of “Spain, it’s the king” from the royal followers were not enough to convince them of their error; not till one of them “approaching covertly through the bushes and hedgerows recognized the arms of Castile on the banners of the new arrivals” were their misgivings completely dissipated. When they learned the truth, they did their best to atone for their previous mistake, but their efforts in that direction failed to please. The men had no manners; the women were somewhat better in this respect, but their apparel scandals Flemings; few of them wore stockings, and their uncombed hair streamed down their backs. There were no proper buildings in which their distinguished guests could lodge. Most of the company had to sleep the first night on straw or open benches, and cook their first meals with their own hands. An impromptu bull fight, organized for their edification on the Monday morning, could not make them forget the difficulties of eating and sleeping. The whole neighborhood, moreover, was infested by the plague, and on Wednesday, the twenty-third, the king left Villaviciosa on his way southward. Till he reached Tordesillas, on November 4, he had a most dismal time. He was welcomed, with at least outward cordiality, at all the towns through which he passed; a bull fight invariably took place, and various delegations of the Castilian nobility arrived to pay their respects; but the lack of suitable quarters, of provisions, and, strangely enough, also of horses, made the occasion very different from the royal progresses to which Charles had been accustomed in the Netherlands. “For two hundred persons, lords, gentlemen, and gentlewomen”, wrote Spinelly, “there were not forty horses, nor could any be procured, because in that mountainous country the principals go afoot, and the chief places were infected with the sickness... The lack of victuals did compel the king to depart, and so the third day after his landing he took the journey toward Santander, and rode four days upon a hobby, the which I gave unto his Grace for fault of better. The most part of his company went afoot, and of the residue, the greater number rode upon pack horses; and as for the gentlewomen, many
of them in carrettes, with oxen. Nevertheless, considering the surety and sweetness of the land, every man suffered it joyously in patience.”

Charles’s object in going to Tordesillas was to visit his mother, whom he had not seen for twelve years. His faithful follower Laurent Vital sought to be present at the interview by smuggling himself into the room as a torch bearer; but his intention was defeated by the king, who informed him that he preferred to remain in darkness. Vital has left us, however, an elaborate account of the whole affair, as related to him by eyewitnesses; and one may read much more between the lines. Political ambition rather than filial affection was the dominant note. Chièvres glided in and out of the chamber and poured into the queen’s ear the most glowing accounts of the political capacities of her son. He assured her that Charles could safely be trusted with the government, and that she needed therefore concern herself about it no longer. In fact, “he virtuously acquitted himself of his duty to advance his young master; for by his tactful and truthful representations, the affair was conducted so well that it would have been impossible to do better in the interests of the king and his countries in that part of the world”. Clearly it was the plan that the queen should be gently set aside, and her condition at the time doubtless justified this course. But whether the Spaniards, ignorant of the facts and prejudiced against Charles, could be made to see matters in the same light, was another question.

While at Tordesillas Charles received word of the death of Cardinal Ximenes, on November 8, at Roa, east of Valladolid, whither he had recently transferred his residence in order to be near the king. The correspondence that has come down to us between the regent and the royal court does not entirely bear out the traditional view that Chièvres did his utmost to keep Charles and the cardinal apart; and it seems clear that the king’s “permission to retire”, which has been handed down as a classical example of royal ingratitude, never actually reached Ximenes’s hands. Whatever the facts in regard to the cardinal’s last days, it is no exaggeration to say that Charles owed him the preservation of his Spanish inheritance; no less devoted or less masterful a representative could have made possible the difficult transition from Trastámara to Hapsburg. Had the long looked for interview between king and regent ever actually taken place, the young monarch might well have been spared some of his gravest errors in the ensuing months. As it was, Charles met his first real test in the eyes of his Castilian subjects without any preparation or guidance except from his Flemish counsellors. It took place at Valladolid, which he entered on November 18 “in the midst of a most imposing cavalcade, and so richly accoutered that the burgesses confessed that no monarch so noble or so triumphant had ever entered there before.”

The first two months of the king’s stay in the old Castilian city were chiefly occupied with festivities, tournaments, and audiences to the principal grandees. Vital devotes many pages to a description of the ceremonies, descanting with evident pleasure upon the excellence of Charles’s horsemanship, and his chivalrous bearing in the lists. Outwardly, despite a few minor clashes, the impression he created was not unfavorable; but under the surface there were plenty of signs of approaching trouble. Amidst all the merrymaking a good deal of important business was being done, and much of it was of a nature to cause deep misgivings to those who knew the facts. There were numerous complaints that the king was inaccessible to his Spanish subjects, and that when he granted an audience he rarely uttered a word. For this Charles’s linguistic limitations were doubtless chiefly responsible, but that only made the matter worse; his inability to converse in Spanish was taken by most of the Castilian magnates as a deliberate insult. Meantime the greed of Charles’s Flemish followers aroused intense dissatisfaction. To the Spaniards it seemed as if it were their sole object to seize all the riches of the realm for purposes of their own. On the pretext that Ximenes “had done more damage in casting down the walls of the towns of Navarre than all his wealth amounted to”, the king appropriated to his own use the sum of 212,000 ducats of gold, which the cardinal had left “to be given to the churches and his servants”. An attempt was made, with the consent of the Pope, to extort a tenth from the Castilian clergy; though the latter declined to pay, on the ground of the inadequacy of the reasons alleged, the episode did no good to the royal cause. And it was not on money alone that the eyes of the foreigners were bent; political and ecclesiastical preferments were sought by them as well. Chièvres had himself made contador mayor of Castile, with a yearly salary of four thousand ducats. Adrian of Utrecht, who had joined the king soon after his arrival, was already bishop of Tortosa and cardinal. Worst of all, and most humiliating to Castilian pride, was the disposition of the primatial see of Toledo, “the crown of Spain and the light of the whole world, free from the time of the mighty Goths”; for it was conferred on Guillaume de Croy, a youth of sixteen, the nephew of Chièvres, who left Spain with Charles in the spring of 1520, but continued to enjoy the rich revenues of the archbishopric, until his death at Worms in the following January. And while these jovial, comfortable Flemings gayly plundered Castile, they commented with evident amazement on the wretchedness and misery of the people they were impoverishing. “It is indeed the very truth”, wrote Vital, “that I have seen several little children just born, who have been found, in the coldest winter season, lying on the ground, abandoned by their
In January 1518, the Castilian Cortes assembled at Valladolid, to swear allegiance to their new sovereign as lawful ruler of the kingdom. Besides the thirty-six delegates from the cities, the prelates and the nobles were also there; the representatives of the clergy numbered ten, while the aristocracy counted forty-eight. It was the procuradores, however, who proved themselves on this occasion to be the doughtiest champions of the privileges of the realm. At the preparatory session, which was presided over by the Burgundian chancellor Jean le Sauvage, they revealed the resentment which they had cherished for so long; through the mouth of Juan Zumel, one of the deputies of Burgos, they protested unanimously against the presence of foreigners at their deliberations as an invasion of their liberties and an insult to Castile. The session was hurriedly closed in order to prevent a violent scene, and on the following morning Zumel was sent for by the chancellor and threatened with death and confiscation of property as a stirrer up of sedition against the king. The deputy, however, was staunch. He insisted that he was legally justified in everything he had done, declared that Charles should not be recognized as king until he had sworn to observe all the laws of Castile, and protested against the impoverishment of the realm by favorites and by foreigners. Heated discussion of these different points ensued during the next few days; but Zumel showed an admirable obstinacy, and finally gained the substance if not the form of his contentions. In return for recognition by a majority of the procuradores, the king, by the mouth of the bishop of Badajoz, swore respect, in a general way, for all the laws and customs of the realm. On the subject of the foreigners—the tenderest point of all—he was, perhaps, less specific than was desired; but with this single exception, the popular party had, on the whole, prevailed. A significant episode was the exhibition of petty irritation by the Castilian grandees over the fact that the procuradores had been suffered to precede them in the ceremony of swearing allegiance. It showed that the old class jealousies still persisted in Spain, in a manner that boded ill for united action in any common cause. It is probable that Charles and his advisers learned a lesson from what they saw; for it was by dividing the forces of their opponents that they subsequently overcame the revolt of the Castilian Comuneros.

In accordance with immemorial custom, the procuradores at the closing session voted a servicio to the crown, and also presented a cuaderno of petitions. The subsidy on this occasion was six hundred thousand ducats, which was to be spread over a period of three years; the Catholic Kings, as Peter Martyr significantly remarks, were accustomed, when they demanded tribute, to be satisfied with two thirds of this sum. The petitions preferred by the procuradores numbered eighty-eight, and most of them had appeared in the cuadernos of the preceding reigns. Such were the requests that the residencias of alguaciles, alcaldes, and other officials be regularly enforced, that the exportation of gold, of silver, and of horses be prohibited, that justice be administered alike for all the inhabitants of the realm, and that there should be no alienation of the property of the crown. But intermingled with these familiar demands were certain others which, if not totally new, were at least endowed with a special significance by the unprecedented conditions which at that moment obtained. Such was the blunt request that no office of profit or emolument within the realm nor letter of naturalization be granted to foreigners, coupled with the plain hint that the will of the sainted Isabella had already been transgressed in this particular. The king was also asked to promise to send for the new archbishop of Toledo and to cause him to reside within the realm. He was moreover advised to marry at once in order to secure the succession in Castile; the Infante Ferdinand ought not to be suffered to leave the realm, pleaded the procuradores, until his Highness had had children. The king’s inability to speak Spanish was severely commented upon; and it is interesting to observe that the procuradores clung resolutely to ‘su Alteza’ as the old traditional Spanish designation of royal rank, despite the king’s obvious preference for ‘su Majestad’. On this point indeed Charles’s contentions were turned against himself, for the only time in the whole list of petitions that the procuradores made use of the title he desired was in referring, not to him, but to his mother Joanna. Clearly the condition and treatment of the unfortunate queen was a constant source of perplexity to the popular representatives. There is evidence of a general belief that she was being kept prisoner under false pretenses, as part of a black plot to deprive her of her royal rights. Was she really incapable of reigning herself, or was the tale of her insanity a sham in the interests of her unpopular son. The first of the eighty-eight petitions was a brave attempt to force the issue: “We beg your Highness at the outset”, so it ran, “that the queen, our sovereign lady, be granted the retinue and establishment which her Majesty of right ought to have, as the queen and the ruler of these kingdoms”. The royal reply was evasive; under the circumstances it could scarcely have been anything else, but the question was indubitably serious. In the course of the previous ceremony of
On March 22, the king bade goodbye to Valladolid and took his way to the eastward into the realms of the Crown of Aragon. On May 9 he made a solemn entry into Saragossa, where the Cortes were beginning to assemble. The difficulties that awaited him there proved even greater than those which he had left behind. He made an excellent beginning by solemnly swearing on the day of his arrival to observe all the laws and privileges of Aragon; but he was much disappointed to find that after all he had done, there was grave hesitation about recognizing him as king. The claims of the Infante Ferdinand and the rights of his mother were openly discussed; it was remembered that the archbishop of Saragossa had recently returned “foaming with rage” from Tordesillas, where he had been forbidden to interview his half-sister the queen; everyone was asking why Joanna was so carefully secluded. At the formal opening of the Aragonese Cortes an effort was made to impress the deputies with a sense of the greatness of Charles’s prospects and power. His grandfather, it was represented, was the Holy Roman Emperor, the kings of Denmark and of Hungary were his brothers-in-law, those of England and Portugal his uncles, and the Pope was most favorably inclined. The attempt, however, fell painfully flat; for the present, at least, Aragon was far more interested in the maintenance of her privileges than in all the royal relationships in the world. Charles was finally recognized, jointly with his mother, as lawful sovereign of the realm; a moderate subsidy of 200,000 ducats was also granted, but the atmosphere of Saragossa remained charged with discontent. A number of Castilians who had accompanied the king took serious offence at the attitude of the Aragonese; that anyone should resist the monarch that Castile had accepted was regarded by them as a deadly insult. A street fight ensued, in which Charles, after some difficulty, managed to reconcile the combatants. The episode was unquestionably instructive, like the quarrel over precedence between the nobles and burgesses at Valladolid; but it increased, rather than diminished, the difficulties of the immediate situation. Worst of all was the effect of the avarice of the Flemings. Peter Martyr reverts to it again and again. “Regis facilitas in dando,” “De avaritia Cancellarii,” “Quot ducatorum miserit in Flandriam,” “Collachrymatio super Rege devor a suis,” are typical phrases in his letters. A fresh cause for the financial drain had been recently superadded to the greed of Charles’s followers. Rumors of the approaching death of the Emperor Maximilian had already begun to fill the air; an imperial election was imminent in the near future, and if Charles was to be chosen, the electors must be bribed. Francis I, the rival candidate, was already in the field; even before Charles had reached Saragossa he had been obliged to send off a hundred thousand ducats into the empire to be used for the advancement of the interests of the house of Hapsburg. It is doubtful if the Aragonese knew how the money was being spent, for they were traditionally blind to affairs which did not directly concern them; the Flemings probably came in for more odium than they actually deserved. But the detestation of Charles’s foreign advisers reached a pitch in Saragossa which it had never attained in Valladolid; and it was doubtless a stroke of good fortune for the king when Sauvage, who was popularly regarded as the greediest of them all, was carried off, on June 7, by the pestilence. His successor in the chancellorship was Mercurino Gattinara, an able and cosmopolitan Piedmontese, who has been justly characterized as “a fit minister for a heterogeneous empire.”

The intractability of the Aragonese prolonged the king’s stay in Saragossa far beyond the period he had expected to spend there. He had summoned the Catalan Cortes to assemble in Barcelona, on October 2, 1518; but as he was unable to leave Aragon till the end of the following January, the meeting was necessarily postponed. When he finally reached the Catalan capital, the representatives of the three estates took the line that he could neither swear nor be sworn to as the lawful sovereign, so long as his mother was alive; being men of “flesh and blood”, however, they finally conceded the point at issue, and, on May 12, the required oath was given and received. The Catalans were also determined not to be fleeced by the Flemings; indeed, they succeeded in turning the tables in this respect, and treated the foreigners to a dose of their own medicine. Sandoval informs us that they put Chièvres in such difficulties that he wished himself well out of Spain; many of the ‘lesser Cerberuses’ also, convinced that the Catalans were more than a match for them, deserted the king and flocked back to the Netherlands. But outside of these inevitable quarrels over procedure and finance, the general attitude of the Catalans was considerably less unfavorable to the king than that of the Castilians or the Aragonese. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, we may assume that Charles had learned something from his previous experience and avoided repeating some of his earlier mistakes. He was much more of
a person than he had been when he landed in Castile; the retiring, inarticulate boy was becoming a man; he was no longer “spellbound under the ferule of Chièvres”. The traditional cosmopolitanism of the Catalans also counted for much. They may have insisted on the maintenance of their privileges, but they could appreciate an outside point of view. Moreover a piece of news had arrived while the king was on his way to Barcelona, which fixed every one’s eyes on foreign affairs—the long expected word of the death of the Emperor Maximilian, which left Charles head of the house of Hapsburg and the logical candidate for the imperial succession. Small wonder if the attention of the Catalans was diverted from their internal grievances by all these things. They already began to discern, what the mass of the Spaniards took much longer to realize, that the rule of this alien Fleming might have its glorious compensations; that if he failed to do his full duty by his different Spanish dominions, he might also conceivably give them a position of prominence and power which they never, under any other auspices, could have possibly attained. Here, in fact, were the first evidences of a gradual change of sentiment on the part of Spain towards Charles—the change which makes the early part of his reign so critical a period in the history of the Spanish Empire. It was many long years before it was complete. Charles’s reputation and popularity in the peninsula were destined to fall much lower before they were retrieved; but he never forgot the comparatively sympathetic attitude of the Catalans at this early crisis in his career, and repaid it by the most scrupulous respect for the laws and customs of the principality throughout the remainder of his reign.

It was not, however, by the territorial acquisitions of their youthful sovereign, but rather by his imperial prospects that the imagination of the Catalans was chiefly stirred. The former were perhaps still regarded as less of an asset than a liability, but there was every chance that the latter would prove a most desirable prize. The Hapsburg lands to which the king fell heir were Austria, and its dependencies in Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, and Tyrol, the family domains in northwestern Switzerland, and scattered territories along the upper Rhine. Spain had nothing in common with any of these different states—not even such economic ties as had kept her in touch with the Low Countries. Political association with them, through the possession of the same sovereign, was consequently undesirable from every point of view; it meant that they all would necessarily suffer from the evils of royal absenteeism, not that they would effectively cooperate for the attainment of a common end. But the prospect that their sovereign might soon be proclaimed the temporal head of Christendom was one which few Spaniards could contemplate without emotion. Doubtless the vast majority of them had the haziest notion of the real significance of the imperial title; but it appealed to their love of the grandiose and seemed a fitting consummation of their achievements during the preceding reign. For the Castilians, it awakened memories of Alfonso the Emperor and of Alfonso the Learned; for the Catalans and Aragonese, it revived the triumphs of Pedro the Great, and the glories that had been won by the monarchs of the house of Barcelona as heirs of the Hohenstaufen in their struggle with the popes. In view of the commanding position Spain had won under the Catholic Kings, the highest dignity in Christendom seemed no more than was her due. That Charles’s election would mean war with France must have been evident to all intelligent observers, but in view of the mediaeval traditions of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, and of the victories in Italy which had been won under the Catholic Kings, the Catalans were not likely to balk at that prospect. They had their grievances against their sovereign in 1519, and were still primarily interested in getting them redressed. They were alive to the danger that Charles’s territorial inheritance in Central Europe might divert him from his responsibilities in the Iberian Peninsula. But the imperial dignity had a fascination which they could not resist, and in general there can be little doubt that they hoped he would attain it. Certainly no part of Spain was more favorable to his aspirations than cosmopolitan Barcelona; he was fortunate to be there during the critical months of the electoral contest.

The election, however, could not be won without money; and when Charles asked for money, the Catalans drew back. Even the imminent danger of the war with France could not make them see the necessity of liberal giving. “I do not believe”, writes Peter Martyr, “that a single penny will ever reach the royal coffers” and until long after the election was over and announced this gloomy forecast was literally fulfilled. For the necessary bribery that was accomplished at Frankfort, Charles was obliged to depend chiefly on the financial magnates of the empire; Spain’s role in the whole contest was largely that of an interested spectator. Over and above the manipulation of the individual electors, of whom the archbishop of Mainz was at once the most influential and the most venal, the struggle hinged chiefly on the attitude of Leo X. At the outset the chief object of the papal policy was to prevent the election of the king of Spain, whose territorial inheritance gave him such unquestioned predominance as to threaten the independence of the see of Rome. As the most promising means of attaining this end, Leo began by supporting the candidacy of Francis I; in the middle of April he believed that he had accomplished his purpose, and that Charles’s failure was definitely assured. But that was by no means the whole of Leo’s
plan. He had made use of Francis to get rid of Charles, but he had no desire to see Francis elected. He was disturbed by the French king’s preponderance in Northern Italy, which had been the immediate consequence of the battle of Marignano; having got what he wanted out of the Eldest Son of the Church, he was now anxious to cast him aside. Naturally Francis resented such treatment as this; in May he was at sword’s points with his former ally; while Leo, on his part, had by this time become convinced that Charles stood a good chance of being elected after all—so good in fact that it might be unwise to oppose him. By the middle of June his change of front was complete; on the twenty-eighth the electors voted unanimously in Charles’s favor; on July 6 the result was announced in Barcelona. The sovereign of Spain was now also King of the Romans, and Holy Roman Emperor in everything but name; what is more, he had attained the coveted dignity with the open consent and approval of the papacy. Pope and Emperor, contrary to precedent, were now not at odds, but in alliance; and the new combination was to prove almost as significant for the development of the Spanish Empire as it was baleful to that of the German Reformation.

The moment the news of his election arrived, Charles was all impatience to depart for the Empire. The situation in Germany was very delicate. The coronation ceremony at Aix could not be indefinitely postponed. France was openly hostile. England’s friendship was not certain. Everything demanded that Charles should leave Spain as soon as possible. The same day that he heard of his election at Frankfort, rumor had it that he proposed to pass August in Valencia, thence proceed to Granada to hold his court, and that in March he would take ship for the Netherlands on his way to the Empire. Clearly his responsibilities as a Spanish monarch were relegated to the background; for the past two years they had absorbed all his energies; but now, in turn, they must give way to greater things. The Spaniards were naturally quite unable to enter into this point of view. Each one of the different Iberian kingdoms doubtless felt that it had the best right to occupy the center of the stage; but they were all united in resentment at Charles’s obvious intention to leave the peninsula at the earliest opportunity. However great his outside responsibilities, they felt that they had received less than their share of his attention. They had wanted him to win the Empire in order to increase the dignity of Spain, but they had no mind to have Spain become the tail to the imperial kite. Their standpoint, in other words, was the exact opposite of universal. Despite all the great events of the preceding reign, their interests were still primarily local and particularistic. If the king was to inherit the Empire, they insisted that it should be directed from Spain.

The way in which these sentiments found expression in Barcelona was well calculated to augment the impatience of the king. Taking advantage of all the elaborate technicalities of their system of parliamentary procedure, the Cortes continued to postpone their vote of funds. Charles could, of course, have sent them home at any moment after his formal recognition in the month of May, and was doubtless frequently tempted to do so; on the other hand, a dismissal without a grant would have created a precedent most undesirable for the crown. For six long months after the announcement of the election, the quarrel continued. Not until January, 1520, was the money voted, and even then it was but a beggarly 250,000 “pounds of Barcelona,” scarcely enough to defray the expenses of the king’s extended stay. Only the unexpected arrival in the previous December of a present of Mexican gold from Hernando Cortes had availed to save Charles from bankruptcy. It was the first real indication of the wealth of the Indies, a foretaste of the way in which the preponderance of the Hapsburgs in the Old World was to be supported by the resources which they could draw from the New. In the meantime a whole half-year had been wasted, and the foreign horizon had become increasingly dark. Charles’s immediate presence in the Empire was now more indispensable than ever; if he delayed longer, he risked the loss of his paternal inheritance. Under the circumstances, his projected visit to Valencia had to be abandoned. Even before the dismissal of the Catalan Cortes his decision had been made. It was announced that he would dispatch Adrian of Utrecht as his accredited representative to that kingdom, to swear to the observance of its laws and to receive the oath of allegiance of its representatives, while he took his way with all speed into Galicia to the nearest port of embarkation for the Netherlands and Germany.

The adventures of Adrian at Valencia form part of a new ramification of Spanish discontent, which may best be reserved for separate consideration; our principal interest is to follow the career of Charles. On January 23 he left Barcelona in hot haste for the westward; nineteen days later he once more trod Castilian soil at Calahorra, whence he dispatched summonses to the procuradores of the Castilian cities to assemble in Cortes at Santiago de Compostela on the twentieth of the following March. The moment that word of this action got abroad, a wave of furious indignation swept through the land. Castile had been primed for an explosion for many months. The mere fact that Charles had spent thrice as long in the realms of the Crown of Aragon as he had seen fit to accord to the western kingdom had been enough to maintain a smoldering discontent. That he now was returning only in order to depart again for the
Empire simply served to fan the flames. The central and southern parts of the kingdom still remained unvisited. Valladolid was the only important Castilian city that had ever seen its king. And the summons of the Castilian Cortes to far-off Santiago was the crowning insult of all. There was no precedent whatever for a meeting place so remote, in a province without a city which sent representatives to the national assembly; and no possible cause for its selection, as the shrewder ones must have plainly seen, save the facilities which its remoteness afforded for bullying the procuradores, and its convenience to the Emperor’s port of embarkation. Clearly the real object of calling the Cortes there was to get a fresh subsidy, despite the fact that the three years over which the preceding one was to be spread had not yet elapsed. The omission to send for the two upper orders proclaimed it, as did also, for that matter, the text of the summons to the procuradores; the anticipative use in that instrument of the title ‘Emperor Elect’ was also remarked on with profound dissatisfaction. And the climax was capped by an act of executive despotism well calculated to subvert one of the most cherished privileges of the realm. For centuries the Castilian cities had been accustomed to regard the poderes or instructions which they gave to their procuradores as the surest guarantee of the maintenance of their liberties. By these poderes they prescribed the conduct of their representatives, and the attitude they were to adopt on all measures proposed by the crown. But Charles had had enough of the limitations of parliamentary tradition, and was resolved not to be delayed as he had been in Barcelona. He therefore drew up and sent out to the Castilian cities a specimen of the poderes they were to give to their procuradores; and this specimen sanctioned compliance in the fullest possible manner with whatever it should please the monarch to propose. The manoeuvre promised to end all opposition; the king would have not only a docile assembly, but also every advantage in the unlikely event of resistance.

Throughout the long journey from Calahorra to Santiago Charles encountered constant evidences of the popular displeasure. An eight days’ stay at Burgos signally failed to conciliate the inhabitants, who were not nearly so gratified at the royal visit, as resentful at the fact that it had been so long postponed; there were the usual festivities and outward rejoicings, but there was also an undercurrent of deep discontent. It was at Valladolid, however, where the king spent the first four days of March, that the hostility of the people was most plainly manifest. An effort to elicit from the local magnates a formal approval of his intended departure was met with a courteous but decided refusal. The fact that it was through Chièvres that the appeal was made brought the financial side of the question prominently to the fore. Once more the cry went up that the realm was being impoverished by favorites and foreigners. Orators recalled the ruinous expense and inglorious ending of the imperial adventure of Alfonso the Learned. They demanded that the king be compelled to stay in Spain. Six thousand armed men collected in the streets. Chièvres and the Flemings were threatened with death. Serious violence, however, did not actually occur. The king got away in a pouring rain to Tordesillas, at the cost of a scuffle with some hot spirits who attempted to shut the city gates. After his departure the uprising evaporated in sullen grumbling, and prophecies that the lowering skies boded ill for the future of the realm. The arrival of envoys from imperial Toledo, with a plea for methodical and united action, also served to divert the popular energies into calmer channels. The Toledans bad already perceived what the mass of the Castilians were unable to comprehend, that no amount of local, uncoordinated uprisings could possibly effect anything; that riots were the enemy of orderly revolution. They were aiming, in fact, at the organization of a national revolt, fully realizing that anything short of this was predestined to fail. Had they not partially and temporarily succeeded in this endeavor, the movement in all probability would have ended in nothing. Had they wholly and permanently accomplished their purpose, it is doubtful if Charles could have retained his throne.

It was on March 26 that Charles finally arrived at Santiago; on the thirty-first the Cortes were formally opened in the monastery of San Francisco. A count of the procuradores revealed the fact that the representatives of Toledo were not in attendance, but had remained in the offing in order to organize the opposition; such was the method with which the imperial city elected to show its displeasure at Charles’s high-handedness in the matter of the poderes. Salamanca sent her procuradores to the assembly with their instructions made out in flat defiance of the royal mandate. The other cities outwardly complied with the king’s demand for blanket powers, but many of them secretly forbade their representatives to sanction any servicio unless they could extort concessions in return. Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, now bishop of Palencia, announced the reason for the summoning of the assembly. “Now is returned the ancient glory of Spain”, he declared, “as in the days when the old writers said of her that while other nations sent tributes to Rome it was her happy lot to send emperors. She sent Trajan, Hadrian, and Theodosius, and now the Empire has come to seek an Emperor in Spain, and by God’s grace our Spanish king is made King of the Romans and Emperor of the world”. Under the circumstances, he continued, it was imperative that Charles should depart at once; he was desperately in
need of money for his journey, for his coronation, and the defence of his realms; and the bishop demanded a new servicio equal to that which had been granted at Valladolid. The king then followed up the argument of his minister to the best of his ability, expressing his regret at being obliged to leave, promising to return within three years at the latest, and swearing to confer no more offices on foreigners. Doubtless both speeches were meant to be conciliatory, but the temper of the procuradores augured ill for the royal cause. The Salamanca had to be excluded from the meetings because of the uncompromising hostility of their attitude; the recalcitrant Toledans, after a collision with Chièvres, retired into the interior of Castile to spread trouble and raise troops. Meantime within the walls of the assembly everything centred on the vote of the servicio. Should it be granted without compensating guarantees, or should it be postponed until the king had made concessions. The latter course was warmly advocated by the deputies of Leon and Cordova, and the majority of the rest gradually rallied to their support. The king saw that the cards were going against him, but was more than ever resolved to get his grant before he sailed. As the easiest way of gaining time, and also of removing the procuradores one step further from their constituents, he announced, on April 4, that the Cortes would be transferred from Santiago to Corunna, his port of embarkation, and that they would assemble there on the twenty-second.

The king and his advisers made the most of the interval between the sessions to bring influence to bear on the individual procuradores. There was apparently no attempt at intimidation, but the resources of bribery were utilized to excellent effect. The procuradores of Cuenca were brought into line by a promise of 50,000 and 60,000 maravedis each, as a charge on the servicio to which they were asked to consent; one of the representatives of Valladolid was similarly won over by a gift outright of 300 ducats. When the Cortes reassembled, these favors were followed up by a speech from the new chancellor Gattinara, in which several important fresh concessions were announced. In deference to the request of the procuradores, he promised that the export of horses and of gold should cease, that no offices within the realm should be conferred on foreigners during Charles’s absence, and that a suitable representative, “of sufficient authority and dignity, and zealous for the service of God, of the king, and of these kingdoms”, should be left to carry on the government in his place. The effect of these maneuvers was not slow to make itself felt. The deputies were wearied of debate and had lost much of their earlier confidence. On April 24 the servicio was duly voted, to be spread over three years like that of 1518, with collections to begin in 1521, when the term of its predecessor had fully expired. Reassured on this essential point, Charles made the definite announcement, which had hitherto been discreetly withheld, that the person whom he had selected to govern in his absence was Adrian of Utrecht, his Flemish tutor and confidential adviser, who had been in Spain for more than four years, and who had recently been delegated as his master’s representative to receive the oaths of the kingdom of Valencia. Various limitations, it is true, were imposed upon Adrian’s powers with the idea of making him more acceptable to the mass of the Spaniards; but the general effect produced by his appointment was to destroy all the value of the concessions that had been granted before. It showed that the king’s word could not be trusted. It was a flagrant violation of his recent promise that no office should be conferred upon a foreigner during his absence. It was a parting shot with an incendiary shell. To the outraged feelings of his Spanish subjects, however, Charles and his advisers paid little heed. He had got his grant and was now all on fire to depart. Unfavorable winds delayed him until May 20, when, after confessing and hearing mass, he set sail with Gattinara, Chièvres, and the rest of the Flemings, and a handful of Spanish grandees. Revolution had already started before he was out of sight of land; but others were to bear the brunt of it and suppress it for him in his absence. Luis Hurtado de Mendoza summed up the situation admirably, when he remarked that the martyrdom of Adrian had begun.

Castile was not the only portion of Spain that was seething with discontent at the time of the king’s departure. Another uprising of wide ramifications was already under way in Valencia. The origin of this disturbance lay in the jealousy and hatred of the artisans and laboring classes of the capital of the kingdom towards the richer burgesses and lower nobility; it was not until much later that it was affected by the attitude of the crown. It arose in the spring of the year 1519, soon after Charles reached Barcelona, as a result of military preparations for defense against a squadron of Moorish pirates which had appeared off the Valencian coasts. Martial exercises and the possession of arms endowed the industrial classes of the capital with a spirit of aggressiveness and self-confidence, which was measurably increased by the withdrawal into the country of many of the more prominent citizens and lesser nobles on account of the ravages of the plague. The masses were temporarily left in control, and as the expected Turkish attack did not take place, they turned their energies to the assertion of their own power. In August, 1519, a clash occurred on the occasion of the public punishment of a number of sodomites, when the violent denunciations of the public preacher had stirred the popular feelings to the highest pitch of excitement. A cry was raised for the death in the flames of several culprits who had
been let off with lighter punishments. Men rushed for their arms and fell into ranks; and as the sole means of preventing a serious disturbance the royal governor insisted that the populace immediately disband, give up their weapons, and return to their homes. This demand evoked the most violent opposition. The Valencian masses regarded their right to drill and bear arms as an inalienable privilege. They formed themselves into a Germania or brotherhood for the purpose of maintaining it; and finally, as the obvious means of gaining legal justification for their acts, they appealed, over the head of the royal governor, to the king himself, for a formal confirmation of their military organization.

This appeal reached Charles in Catalonia at the very moment that he was coming to the decision that he could not afford time to visit Valencia in person; and it gave him an opportunity of which he promptly sought to take advantage. It was clear that the Valencian nobles would fight to the last ditch against any project to recognize the king, unless he were present in the flesh; the clergy were neutral on the question; everything depended on the attitude of the third estate. In exchange for a promise from the deputies of the Germania to do their utmost to influence the popular representatives to favor the recognition of Charles in his absence, the king, on November 4, yielded to their petitions for the confirmation of their military organization and reversed the decree of his representative on the ground. On their return to Valencia, the emissaries were naturally accorded a triumphal reception, and the popular party proceeded to clinch its victory by choosing a central committee of thirteen members, representing the principal gilds and handicrafts of the capital, to direct and coordinate the energies of the Germania, and exercise authority as its representative. It did not have to wait long for an opportunity to use its powers. It had, in fact, been scarcely elected before word was received that, owing to the representations of the royal governor, the king had changed his mind, and on January 4 had decreed that the popular party should disband its forces. The Germania was in no mood to put up with such tampering as this. Its members regarded themselves as the victims of aristocratic oppression, to which they were firmly resolved to put an end. At the instigation of the Thirteen, another deputation was sent to the king, to demand a reconfirmation of the popular organization, and permission to continue to drill and to bear arms. When it reached the court Charles was prepared to consent to anything, provided it would serve to accelerate his departure. He was irritated at the stiff-neckedness of the aristocracy and impressed by the importunities of the popular representatives. At Fraga, on January 31, 1520, on his way back to Castile, he once more altered his verdict, and granted the Germania the recognition it demanded.

The spectacle of royal vacillation which Charles had given reacted most unfavorably on Adrian of Utrecht, who had been dispatched as his representative to the Valencian estates on the eve of the king’s departure from Barcelona. Adrian’s instructions were, at all costs, to gain recognition for his master by the Valencian Cortes, and if possible to extort a subsidy; but the attitude he was to take on the question of the hour—that of the recognition of the Germania—had been left undefined. In the presence of the three estates of the realm, he cut a sorry figure. The attitude of the assembly was frankly hostile; and Adrian increased rather than diminished his difficulties by solemnly producing a copy of the Scriptures, on which Charles had sworn to observe the laws of Valencia and exhibiting to the Cortes the page which the king had touched when he pronounced the oath. Instead of creating an impression, the episode evoked shouts of laughter. “Does the prince think we are such poor Christians that we have no Bible in the realm?” called out one of the deputies. “He should not hold us in such low esteem!” After such a scene as this, it was painfully evident that Adrian’s mission was bound to fail; the recognition which Charles had sent him to gain was flatly refused. Meantime, outside the walls of the assembly, the Germania for the time being dominated the situation. The nobility and the wealthier citizens were violently hostile, but in view of Charles’s edict of January 31, it was impossible for Adrian consistently to oppose it; moreover his irritation against the aristocracy, who had been chiefly responsible for his failure in the Cortes, tended to make him favor the popular party. On February 21, the gilds, 8000 strong, paraded before him with banners and music, in significant celebration of the victory they had won. Three months later, by the revival of an ancient ordinance of the reign of Pedro the Great, which had been revoked after a life of only five years, they managed to possess themselves of two of the six places on the municipal council of the capital of the kingdom. News of the situation, however, had reached Charles long before this latest triumph of the Germania, and showed him that vigorous measures were indispensable to the maintenance of authority and order. The regular royal governor in Valencia was a nonentity. The king’s special agent, Adrian of Utrecht, had failed, and was, moreover, badly needed in Castile. Clearly another representative of different qualifications must be sent out at once. On April 10, the king’s choice was announced. It fell on Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Melito, a valiant soldier and comrade of the Great Captain, with a magnificent record in the Italian wars. His instructions were to avoid, if possible, an open conflict; yet it was evident that Charles had again turned against the Germania, and that if it proved impracticable to deal with it peacefully, the
Charles certainly left Spain in 1520 more unpopular than when he entered it in 1517. His first visit to the peninsula had increased and not allayed the many misgivings which had been aroused among the Spaniards by his early life and paternal inheritance. It had convinced them of what they had only suspected before that he was essentially a foreigner in outlook, aspirations, and policy. Such enthusiasm as had been aroused by the fact that a Spanish king had been chosen to succeed to the throne of the Caesars had been obliterated by the course of events which followed Charles’s departure from Barcelona. Imperial glories were all very well, but the maintenance of the national privileges and liberties took the precedence of them. Charles’s inability to speak Spanish, his unimpressive aspect, and his apparent subserviency to the greedy Flemings were doubtless chiefly responsible for the prevalent hostility; but on the other hand, it could plausibly be argued that Spanish narrowness and provincialism were also much to blame, and that if the Spaniards could be induced to adopt the larger point of view, which was indicated by their achievements under the Catholic Kings, they would soon come to a better understanding and appreciation of their new monarch. Such, at least, was the opinion of one of Charles’s fellow travelers from Corunna to the Netherlands in the spring of 1520, and he whiled away the weary hours of the voyage northward in an attempt to set forth his views in writing for the benefit of the Spanish people. A few words about this author and the arguments he produced will not be out of place.

His name was Georg Sauermann; he was born in Breslau, probably in 1492, the scion of a family of substance and of education. He studied in Wittenberg, Leipzig, and finally in Bologna, where he devoted himself chiefly to jurisprudence and the humanities and was famous for the excellence of his Latin style. In 1517 he was made rector of the University there—an unusual honor for a man only twenty-five years of age—and distinguished himself by his prompt suppression of a violent quarrel between the German and North Italian students; in the course of this affair he became acquainted with Ulrich von Hutten, who was the spokesman of the Teutonic faction. During the next year his reputation as a Latinist mounted so high that he found a welcome at the court of Pope Leo X. In the meantime his political views, which had always been most favorable to the house of Hapsburg and its imperialistic pretensions, reached full development. The spectacle of Italy, parcelled out among petty tyrants and foreign potentates, was most painful to him. He was fully alive to the Turkish peril. Some approach to a universal monarchy under Hapsburg leadership seemed to him to be the only solution of these and other problems of the day. He rejoiced in the succession and election of Charles, because they made Spain and her vast dominions a part of the combination for whose triumph he so ardently longed; and Leo, who knew his opinions and was now hand and glove with the young Emperor, sent him over to Spain with the highest recommendations, as a desirable addition to the royal and imperial court.

We do not know the exact date of Sauermann’s arrival in Spain, but we may be certain that he had ample opportunities to become acquainted with the state of feeling in the country before his departure with Charles from Corunna, in May, 1520. He saw that the views of the mass of the Spaniards were such as would effectively prevent them from fitting into the great schemes of a universal Hapsburg monarchy on which his hopes were centered. He realized, in fact, that Charles would be fortunate if a revolution did not speedily break out in his Iberian dominions. Nothing short of a radical change of opinion in Spain would serve to avert the catastrophe which seemed imminent, and it was in the hope of contributing to such a change that Sauermann, on his northward voyage across the bay of Biscay, set himself to the composition of a brief treatise which he called the Hispaniae Consolatio. This treatise, which was published in the following August at Louvain in the Netherlands, is dedicated to the imperial councilor, Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, and is addressed to the Spanish people. It warns them to desist from their grumblings and complaints over local grievances, and seeks to prove that Charles’s journey to the Empire was for the best interests of Spain as well as of all his other kingdoms and indeed of all Christendom. He was not leaving the peninsula for his own amusement, it insisted—but in order to assume the imperial title, to which he proposed to give a deeper meaning and significance than it had possessed for generations, tie was going in order to create a universal monarchy through which he, as kings of kings, would put an end to war between Christian states, and unite them all in a victorious onslaught upon the infidel. Sauermann pictured, in fact, a sort of super-state under Hispano-German
leadership, and demanded that the Spaniards should rouse themselves to an appreciation of the glorious future which had so suddenly and providentially been placed within their reach.

The whole argument of the *Hispaniae Consolatio* rested on the doctrine of a higher internationalism and an all embracing empire. Spain was not asked to let her king go for the sake of Germany, but rather for the welfare of Christendom; the universal rather than the specifically Teutonic attributes of the exalted position which Charles had been called to assume were emphasized throughout the entire treatise. And it must be remembered that this conception had many ardent supporters in the first half of the sixteenth century. Despite the recent development of strong independent states, the mediaeval ideal of a world empire still possessed a tremendous hold on men's imaginations. Charles himself, at that stage of his development, unquestionably believed in it. Doubtless the motives that inspired this belief were primarily dynastic. The principles of nationalism were essentially opposed to the enormous preponderance which fortunate marriages had given to his house; only by turning men's thoughts in anti-nationalistic directions could that position of preponderance possibly be maintained. But it was quite unjust to assume, as the average Spaniard did in 1520, that Charles's departure meant that he preferred Germany to Spain. If they could have seen some of the complaints subsequently addressed to him by his Teutonic subjects that he was ruling the Empire in the interests of Spaniards, they might have been brought to a realization of their mistake. Charles regarded the imperial dignity not as something primarily German, but rather as a token of his leadership of the Christian world. Of all the states over which he held sway he really felt himself at home in only one—in the Low Countries, where he had been born and bred. Outside of that, he had for the present no preference at all; and in later years, when his schemes of universal monarchy met with insuperable opposition, it was from Spain that he derived the most effective support; it was to Spain that he finally retired to die. But the road to that great reconciliation was long and full of turnings. Spain had to make one more bid to maintain the old ways before she was prepared to adopt the new; and Charles had to give more tangible proofs than the diatribe of Sauermann that his journey into the Empire would redound to the advantage of Spain. The next two years saw the beginning of the fulfilment of both these conditions. While revolution broke out and was suppressed in the peninsula, Charles vindicated his claims to the leadership of Christendom in a manner which obliterated most of the bitter memories of his first visit, and evoked warm sympathy and admiration from the hearts of his Spanish subjects.
CHAPTER XXII
THE COMUNEROS AND THE GERMANIA

“The Communes of Castile begin their revolt, but after a good start had a bad ending, and exalted, beyond what it had previously been, the power of the King whom they desired to abase. They rose in revolt because the King was leaving the realm, because of the servicio, because of the foreign Regent, because of the large amounts of money which were being taken out of the realm, and because the chief office of the treasury had been given to Chièvres, the archbishopric of Toledo to Guillaume de Croy, and knighthoods of the Military Orders to foreigners.” Such are the words in which a contemporary historian portrays the great insurrection which forms the principal subject of the present chapter. It would be impossible to construct a better summary in equal space; not a word is wasted, and no essential element is left out. To complete the picture it only remains to develop the ideas which are there put forward, and to fill in the more important details.

Hatred of the foreigner and of the foreign ways and customs Charles brought with him was unquestionably the dominant cause of the outbreak of revolution in Castile. Even the various demands for reform in the national administration which were to appear in the memorial of the Junta of Avila, and in which some subsequent historians have thought they discerned evidences of aspirations for a democratic regime, were primarily due to the popular conviction that the national liberties were endangered by the rule of a non-Spanish king. And this is the chief reason why, in its earlier stages, the revolt was joined by all classes of Castilians—why so many nobles and clergy ranged themselves beside the commons under the banner of the revolution. Social distinctions were for the moment forgotten in a common detestation of the alien Hapsburg. It was not, indeed, in the nature of things that such a condition should long endure; the ancient forces of Spanish separatism—social as well as geographical—were ultimately bound to assert themselves, and the clever utilization of their recrudescence by the absent sovereign was the principal reason why he was able to keep his throne. At the outset, however, the grievances of Castile were felt by high and low. Save for Adrian and his immediate supporters, and the small body of troops they were able to command, there was almost no one in the realm who would fight for the absentee king.

The six weeks after Charles’s departure saw the revolution spread like wildfire. The procuradores who had been bribery or bullied by the king into sanctioning the servicio at the Cortes of Santiago-Corunna were, not unnaturally, the first victims of the popular wrath. Rodrigo de Tordesillas, procurador for Segovia, was rash enough to disregard the warnings of his friends, return to his constituency, and appear, richly clad, at its ayuntamiento. Despite all the efforts of the local clergy, who strove to protect him, with the sacrament in their hands, a rope was thrown around his neck by the furious mob, he was dragged through the streets and hung up by the feet at the public gibbet. At Zamora, the procuradores were more prudent, and took refuge in a monastery nearby; but the populace dragged their effigies through the streets and burned them in the Plaza Mayor. At Burgos the mob vented its anger by destroying the house and property of the city’s principal delegate to the national assembly, and by hanging a rich French merchant, widely known as a friend and protégé of Chièvres. In Valladolid, the seat of the Real Cancillería, there was at first no open revolt; and Adrian of Utrecht, after summoning Inigo de Velasco, the constable of Castile, to his side, prudently took refuge there on Corpus Christi day. So charged with discontent, however, did the atmosphere seem to be, that he maintained a discreet silence on the course of events at the Cortes of Santiago-Corunna.

More serious, if less dramatic, than these various acts of violence, were the evidences of a nascent organization in the ranks of the popular party. In the movement to secure this end, the city of Toledo led the way. She had sent her envoys to the other towns of Castile in the early days of March to plead for united action in defense of the liberties of the realm; and though her appeals to her neighbors went unheeded for the time, she was able to set them an example in effective organization. More than a month before Charles set sail from Corunna, she had risen, under the lead of her municipal magistrates, expelled the corregidor, and set up the forms of a popular government, “in the name of the king and of the queen, and of the Comunidad”. The conservatism of the formula is noteworthy. It implied loyalty to
Charles if only he would dismiss the Flemings and remain in Spain. It showed that the movement was as yet neither democratic nor anti-monarchical, but simply national in its aims. The leaders of the revolt in Toledo were of the ancient Castilian aristocracy. Pedro Laso de La Vega, who was afterwards to preside at the Junta of Avila, was the brother of the poet, Garcilaso de la Vega, and related to the great house of Guzman. Juan de Padilla, who stood beside him, was also of noble lineage, and his wife, Maria Pacheco, “the real man of the pair”, who urged her husband forward, and was a “veritable flame of fire for the whole realm”, was the daughter of the second Count of Tendilla, and the sister of the great Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, and of Antonio de Mendoza who was to be viceroy of New Spain. The Toledan clergy, also, at the outset, supported the revolution to a man.

The example of Toledo was followed, in the weeks that succeeded the Emperor’s departure, by most of the cities of Old Castile. One by one they expelled the royal officials and proclaimed the ‘Comunidad’. Clerical and aristocratic participation, in greater or less degree, is likewise everywhere evident. At Zamora the movement was headed by the bishop, Antonio de Acuna, whose fate was destined to be the strangest in all the ranks of the Comuneros. Only a handful of scattering and unimportant towns, like Simancas and Truxillo, remained loyal to Charles. In the South, on the other hand, the revolution made little progress. Murcia and Mula, it is true, raised the standard of revolt; but improbably on account of their proximity to the rebellion in Valencia; and Don Pedro de Giron, who coveted the duchy of Medina Sidonia, sought to stir up the rural districts for purposes of his own; but Cordova and Granada held completely aloof, and later formed a loyal union to raise forces for the cause of the king. In Estremadura, too, the rebellion gained little headway; while in Navarre, it was overlaid by local factional feuds of ancient standing and involved in the international issues between France and Spain. What significance is to be attached to these geographical details; it were difficult to determine. Was it natural slackness and apathy that kept the Andalusians and Estremadurans from joining forces with the rebels. Or was it the greater distances between the southern and eastern towns that prevented the spread of the revolutionary fever to these regions? It is possible to argue from the data that we have at our disposal that those portions of the realm which had not come into actual contact with Charles were far less ill disposed towards him than those which had; it was the outlying, unvisited parts that failed to respond to the call to arms. If this argument holds, it offers additional proof of the sorry figure of a gawky, incompetent stripling, dominated by his greedy Flemish followers; but only those who had seen with their own eyes could realize to what depths of degradation the throne of the saintly Isabella had fallen. Others were not convinced of the necessity for revolt.

Union and cooperation between those cities which had committed themselves to the uprising were clearly indispensable to its success. Toledo, which had taken the lead in establishing a ‘Comunidad’, came forward once more to plead for joint action by the revolutionists. On July 18, she dispatched a letter to “all the cities” suggesting that they send representatives to a common council to be held at Avila on the 29th to devise remedies for the evils with which the realm was afflicted. The invitation was promptly accepted. The delegates assembled at the appointed time and place, and lost no time in electing the Toledans, Laso de la Vega and Padilla, president of their Santa Junta and captain of its forces. The effect of this action was virtually to create a rival government to that of the regent; it was a challenge to the authority of Adrian, which it was impossible to leave unanswered.

Adrian was by nature a conciliator and shrank from violent action. His letters to the Emperor about the progress of the revolt are filled with recommendations for compromises and redress of grievances; and his first instinct, on hearing of the establishment of the Santa Junta of Avila, was to have it transferred to Valladolid, where he could prevent it from getting beyond control. On the other hand, the royal authority had been so openly flouted in the various local uprisings that had taken place, that some form of military retaliation was indispensable. Segovia, the first to revolt, was selected for chastisement; and, in late July, the alcalde Ronquillo, with a thousand royal troops, most of whom had but recently returned from campaigning in North Africa and were consequently uncontaminated by the revolutionary spirit, was accordingly sent against it. The Segovians, however, were quite equal to the occasion. Aided by reinforcements from Toledo and Avila, they repulsed the army of the crown. Ronquillo drew off in disorder, and called on Adrian for more troops. These were at once dispatched under the command of the king’s chief military leader, Antonio de Fonseca, who determined to make assurance doubly sure by first possessing himself of a park of royal cannon at Medina del Campo. The inhabitants of that town, who had thus far held aloof from the revolt, regarded themselves as custodians of the king’s artillery, and fiercely resented all attempts to deprive them of it. Furious street fighting ensued. Some houses were fired; the city was swept by flames, and over 450 buildings, most of them filled with valuable merchandise, were burnt to the ground. Medina del Campo was the principal market town for all the region round about; its fairs were great events in the life of Old Castile, and the losses it had sustained
affected the agricultural and commercial classes of all the neighboring region. It would be difficult to
conceive of any other event more calculated to increase and spread the unpopularity of the king’s
government, than this apparently wanton destruction of the economic nerve center of the realm.

The burning of Medina del Campo occurred on August 21. Its first result was a rising in hitherto
passive Valladolid, where the news was reported on the very day of its occurrence. An angry mob
appeared in the street and demanded the disbanding of the forces of Fonseca; he and Ronquillo fled to
Portugal for their lives. Adrian was suffered—almost contemptuously—to remain at liberty; but all his
hopes of coming to terms with the Santa Junta vanished in smoke, and thenceforth, as Sandoval
significantly puts it: “those of the Comunidad called those of the Council tyrants, and those of the
Council called those of the Comunidad traitors”. But while the regent was powerless to give effect to his
words, the Junta vindicated its authority in dramatic fashion. All that it needed was a legal pretext for
assuming full control of the government. If only it could secure the adherence of the captive Joanna, it
would be formally justified in any step that it might choose to take. Possession of the queen’s person
was the first essential to the accomplishment of its desires; and the news that Adrian’s adherents had
attempted, though unsuccessfully, to get her signature for certain documents confirming their authority,
convinced the leaders of the Junta that there was no time to lose. On Wednesday, August 29, the very
day of the uprising at Valladolid, Padilla, with the full force of the insurrectionary army, appeared
before Tordesillas. They found the poor queen, closely guarded by the Marquis of Denia, whom she
detested, whiling away the weary hours in the company of her youngest daughter, Catharine. A faint
realization of the state of the realm, which had apparently been afforded her by her previous interview
with the adherents of Adrian of Utrecht, combined with her mental infirmities to render her more than
usually suspicious and sad. Padilla, dropping on one knee before her, strove to make her comprehend
the reason for his coming, specially emphasizing his resolution to protect her from all injury, and to
prevent her enemies from separating her from her daughter. The queen seemed pleased and thanked
him; and then Padilla added: “Since certain cities of these your realms have united for your service and
defence, and have sent their representatives here for that purpose, we beg you to declare how we may
best accomplish these ends, and whether it be your pleasure that we remain here at your service”. “Yes,
yes,” replied Joanna, “remain here and serve me. Tell me everything that is happening and punish the
evil doers, and I shall be most grateful”. Padilla thanked her in turn, and assured her that everything
should be done in accordance with her desires, and then, justifying his action by the words which the
queen had spoken, he summoned the Junta from Avila to Tordesillas. The Marquis of Denia was
speedily induced to depart. The revolutionists took possession of the castle and its royal inmate.

Only one step more needed to be taken to complete the triumph of the rebellion. Verbal
encouragement and sanction from the queen were all very well, but her signature to documents must be
procured before Castile could be induced to recognize the legality of the popular cause. On Wednesday,
September 24, twelve deputies of the rebel communes resolved to put it to the test; it was the critical
moment in the history of the revolt and perhaps, indeed, of Charles’s rule in Castile. Joanna received
them in solemn audience. She listened with deep attention while two of them explained the condition of
the realm, and protested that they were ready to serve her and recognize her as their leader and queen.
She replied at length, with melancholy references to her family bereavements, to the lies that had been
told her by the Marquis of Denia and to the cruel maltreatment to which she had been subjected. She
thanked the deputies for their good intentions and expressed willingness to help them. But when it came
to giving effect to her words, she suddenly drew back. Nothing would induce her to name the members
of a delegation which she had asked the Junta to create to keep her informed of its proceedings.
A request from Padilla that she sign the Junta’s resolutions as if they emanated from her Council, elicited
a stubborn refusal. Was it merely a madwoman’s whim, or did she faintly realize the gravity of the point
at issue? The question has never been definitely answered and probably never will be; but it is certain
that this failure to obtain the queen’s signature marked the passing of the zenith of the revolution.
Padilla and the rest did their utmost to conceal the defeat they had sustained, and outwardly their
prestige continued to increase. It was generally believed that Joanna had recovered her reason and that
she sympathized heartily with the revolutionists; and “as the voice of the Junta was most persuasive in
its reiteration of the sweet name of liberty and of exemption from unjust taxation and evil rule”, there
were many who rose and joined its banners. But this accretion in numbers was more than
counterbalanced by the indecision of the leaders, whose half-measures at this critical moment plainly
showed that they realized that the queen’s refusal to give them some tangible evidence of her adherence
had cut the ground from beneath their feet.

On September 28, Padilla, with 1100 men, entered Valladolid and dispersed the regent’s Council;
Adrian himself, however, was suffered to escape, on October 15, to Medina del Rio Seco, and his
personal belongings were courteously sent after him. A zealous friar was dispatched by the Junta to stir
the flames of revolt in Palencia; his eloquence apparently was of considerable effect; nevertheless the loyalists in the town were suffered to seize and garrote him, “which”, as Sandoval adds, “is the sort of thing that friars deserve and get, when they attempt to mix into secular affairs”. Meantime, in Andalusia, the few foci of revolutionary ardor were almost neglected. There had been outbursts of varying intensity, at Jaen, at Baeza, at Ronda, and at Seville. Skillfully utilized and combined they might well have carried the whole South for the popular cause; but the Junta was blind to its opportunity. The loyalty of Granada and Cordova prevailed. A line of demarcation was permitted to establish itself, which restricted the revolution to the older portions of Castile; and in February, 1521, the Andaluzians united in the powerful royalist confederation of La Rambla.

More significant even than the apathy of the Comuneros in taking practical measures to consolidate the position they had won, was their activity in constitutional theorizing and in the writing of notes. On September 25, their representatives swore to unite for the redress of the evils with which the realm was afflicted; they spoke of themselves as a regular assembly of the Cortes of Castile. Possession of the person of the queen led them on, moreover, to the assumption of executive powers. They got hold of the royal seals and appended them to their decrees. They ordered the members of the Chancillería Real to repair to Tordesillas for instructions. They asserted their claim to receive the royal revenues. But instead of seeing, themselves, to the execution of these decrees, they sent messengers to Charles to request his approval. Counsels of caution prevailed at the very moment when a little recklessness was indispensable to success. Preservation of the fiction of loyalty to the throne was preferred to the seizure of the realities of authority. The instrument in which the Junta’s demands to the Emperor were contained was dispatched from Tordesillas on October 20. It took the form of a sort of cuaderno of petitions, coupled with a most comprehensive ordinance for reform. Conservatism, however, is the dominant note throughout. The evils of the times are almost invariably attributed to the foreign Flemings and the innovations and extravagances they brought with them. Remedies are to be found in the fulfilment of the royal promises at the Cortes of Valladolid and Santiago, and still more in a return to the good customs of the Catholic Kings. There are certain proposals for the limitation of the power of the crown, for the increase of that of the Cortes, and for rendering that body and the Royal Council more truly representative of the people of the realm; but save for the request that the national assembly should meet at stated intervals, independent of any summons from the king, there is scarcely anything for which some precedent cannot be found in the pages of the history of mediaeval Castile. The document concludes with an elaborate demand for the king’s sanction and pardon for everything that the revolutionists had done without him and against him in his absence; in fact, the whole tone of the instrument reveals a palpable lack of self-confidence. To send it at all was a capital error; to phrase it so moderately was to invite a rebuff from the monarch to whom it was addressed.

Meantime, while rebellion was overrunning Castile, King Charles, after a brief visit to his uncle, Henry VIII, landed at Flushing on June 1, 1520, and trod once more the soil of his native land. Save for another brief interview with the English monarch at Calais, he remained in the Netherlands until the end of October, when he departed into the Empire to meet Martin Luther at Worms. Foreign affairs, especially the prospects of war with France, were his principal anxiety at this period, but he was kept constantly informed about the progress of the Castilian uprising by Flemish merchants, and by a series of piteous appeals for help from Adrian of Utrecht. For many a long week the young king did not reply, at least to the regent, who bitterly complained, in a more than usually gloomy letter, dated at Valladolid on September 12, that he had heard nothing from his royal master since his departure, save a rumor, which had arrived by a Flemish ship, that he had landed safely in England. The king’s silence with reference to the Castilian outbreak is the more striking when contrasted with the multitude of letters and orders which he wrote in this period in connection with the realms of the crown of Aragon and their Italian dependencies, but there is no reason to believe that he underestimated the seriousness of the crisis; he was merely waiting for more information, before making up his mind what course to pursue. Sandoval tells us that he called Germans, Flemings, Italians, Aragonese, and Castilians into council, and that “their opinions were as divergent as their nationalities. The Germans said that he must go to the Empire, the Italians that he should visit Italy; the Flemings begged him to remain where he was; the Aragonese drew attention to the rising in Valencia; and the Castilians desired him to return to Castile. But in the end the decision was made by a few, as is the custom of great sovereigns when difficult questions are to be settled, and it was resolved that he should proceed to the Empire for his coronation, and that he should thoroughly settle the affairs of Germany, so that he would not have to go back there every day. And it was also decided that the Emperor should write friendly letters to all the cities and towns of Castile, commanding some to return to their allegiance and thanking others for their loyalty, and urging and enjoining the aristocracy to support the members of the Royal Council, and promising all, on his royal word, that he would be back as soon as possible in Castile. For it was the feeling among
the common people that the Emperor would never return to Spain, that led them to dare so much and attempt such follies’”. The Emperor and his counsellors also decided, as a sop to the popular feelings, to suspend the collection of the servicio voted at the Cortes of Santiago-Corunna, to confer no more offices within the realm on foreigners, and finally, as a bid for the support of the nobles, to associate Don Fadrique Enríquez and Don Inigo de Velasco, Admiral and Constable of Castile, with Adrian of Utrecht in the conduct of the regency.

The meeting at which these decisions were reached was probably held in the first days of September; at any rate the appointment of the Admiral and the Constable as coregents with Adrian was announced to the city of Cordova by the Emperor in a letter dated on the fifth of that month at Brussels. This letter is apparently the first communication from the absent king on the subject of the revolt that has come down to us, and there is every reason to think that other epistles of a similar tenor were simultaneously dispatched by him to the other cities of Castile. There followed a few days later a letter of instructions to Adrian (which crossed his of September 12 to Charles) laying down a number of limitations to the authority of the regents. In the succeeding weeks Charles learned of the capture of Tordesillas and its results, and consequently was apprised of the extreme seriousness of the crisis; he made no change, however, in the policy he had adopted. It was a wise decision. His concessions were a proof that he did not ignore the Spanish point of view, yet they mitigated little if at all against the authority of the crown. His appeals to the loyalty of the Castilian aristocracy caused most of the grandees to rally to the regent, and ultimately served to turn what had started as a national revolt into a mere war of classes. And, finally, Charles was supremely fortunate in the moment at which these measures had been adopted. The revolutionary forces had already reached the zenith of their power. As there was no longer any serious opposition for them to overcome within the realm, the need for unity was in a large measure removed, and various lines of cleavage revealed themselves within their ranks. “The victory had been so easy, so complete, that they knew not how to use it”. It was at this critical juncture that the Emperor’s instructions were received; from that time onward the fortunes of the monarchy rapidly revived.

The first of the Emperor’s measures to show its effect was his appeal to the loyalty of the Admiral and the Constable. The former, who cared more for the preservation of his own estates than for the maintenance of the royal authority, and who hoped for a solution of the existing difficulties without an appeal to arms, held aloof from the scene of operations, in Aragon, and contented himself with writing letters to Valladolid to protest against the action of the revolutionists went unheeded, but they at least served to show that he was gravitating towards the crown. The Constable in the meantime was far more active. Established at Burgos at the outbreak of the revolt, he had been obliged, by the uprising of the citizens, to take refuge in Briviesca, where he received, in late September, the Emperor’s letter appointing him co-regent with Adrian. All his loyalty was aroused by the imperial message, and, convinced that the uprising could not be suppressed except by force, he set vigorously to work in the interests of the crown. He sent letters to the Admiral to beg for his assistance. He got in touch with the municipal aristocracy of Burgos, and with their aid, and by dint of some concessions, he succeeded in winning back the old Castilian capital to its allegiance. On November 1, he was able to return there and set up his headquarters. He summoned all the local nobility to rally to his standard, and collected funds and munitions from every available source. He was active in getting loans from Emmanuel of Portugal, and countered all the efforts of the revolutionists to obtain assistance from that quarter. Such energy was not without effect upon the more hesitant Admiral. His policy of negotiation had by this time broken down. The Comuneros were so confident of success that they refused to make any concessions, and by mid-November it was clear that war was inevitable. The regents’ council reunited at Medina del Rio Seco, and the Admiral came in and took his place beside the cardinal, though he continued his attempts to negotiate with the Comuneros for many weeks to come and did not accept the title of co-regent until January 3, 1521. The Constable’s son, the Count of Haro, was placed in command of the forces of the crown.

The growing power of the royalists soon manifested itself upon the field of battle. On November 30, the Count of Haro arrived at Medina del Rio Seco with upwards of 3000 men; after some deliberation, it was decided to launch them at once in a surprise attack on Tordesillas. Bickerings among the leaders of the Comuneros facilitated the attempt. Padilla, in high dudgeon at the promotion of Pedro Giron to the command of the revolutionary forces, had drawn off to Toledo with a large body of his adherents; and Giron, who was left behind, did not utilize his men to the best advantage. Haro reached the walls of Tordesillas without opposition and almost unperceived. In a five-hour combat the walls were breached and the city entered. The defenders fled, the town was sacked, and the queen-mother fell once more into the hands of the royalists. The importance of her capture was doubtless primarily negative; she welcomed the grandees with stately courtesy and appeared to rejoice at their
return; nothing, however, would induce her to sign a document, any more than when she was in the hands of the Comuneros. She remained, as before, essentially a passive spectator of the combat, whose issues she was quite unable to comprehend. Yet the fact that her person was no longer in the hands of the revolutionists counted for much. It deprived them of their last hope of clothing their actions with a semblance of legality. From henceforth, they fell permanently back to the position of rebels against the authority of the crown.

While the royalists were gaining in power and unity, dissension became rife in the ranks of the Comuneros. The leaders of the Santa Junta after the storming of Tordesillas transferred themselves to Valladolid, which henceforth became the headquarters of the insurrection. But the Junta’s authority was by no means so complete as heretofore. It found two other bodies holding their sessions at Valladolid, on its arrival—the Junta de la Comunidad, or municipal committee, which had seized power in the city at the time of Adrian’s departure, and the ultra-democratic Junta de las Cuadrillas or local military council, elected by the different sections of the city and its suburbs, which had come into existence in the dark days of November. Both these bodies were radical and aggressive; and they saw in the waning prestige of the Santa Junta an opportunity for them to extend their authority from municipal to national affairs. Particularly was this the case with the Junta de las Cuadrillas, whose military attributes gave it special prominence in the existing crisis; and it concentrated its efforts on an attempt to recall the popular hero, Juan de Padilla, to the supreme command of the revolutionary forces, from which the recent promotion of Giron had ousted him. The latter, summoned by the Santa Junta to the defence of Valladolid, was so unpopular with the masses that he was openly insulted and denounced as a traitor; he had never been enthusiastic in the revolutionary cause, and finally, on December 16, he deserted to the royalists. After his defection, the Santa Junta strove to place its president, Pedro Laso de la Vega, in the chief command; the Junta de las Cuadrillas, however, managed to carry the day for Padilla, who reached Valladolid with 2000 men on the last day of the year, “amid such a tumult of rejoicing as if God had come down from heaven”. Laso, like Giron, was unable to endure humiliation by the populace. He figured no more on the revolutionary side, but after striving for some weeks, from a midway position, to bring about the restoration of peace, he finally went over (March, 1521) to the adherents of the crown.

The early months of 1521 were memorable for the activities of that most picturesque of the figures in the ranks of the revolutionists, Antonio de Acuña, the fighting bishop of Zamora. Partisan from the outset of the cause of the Comuneros, and animated apparently by the most radical ideas, he had hitherto wrought furiously, in most unclerical fashion, but with indifferent success, in the interests of the revolution in the country near his see. He now appeared at Valladolid at the moment of the defection of Giron, took his place in the war council of the Comuneros, reanimated the drooping spirits of his comrades, armed hundreds of priests as soldiers, and led a series of raids into the surrounding country. The deeds of this ‘devil of a bishop’ described in a series of increasingly horrified letters from Adrian of Utrecht, were duly reported to Leo X by the Spanish ambassador at the Vatican; the Pope declared that he was a second Luther and promised forthwith to depose him. But Acuña recked nothing of papal displeasure; if deprived of Zamora, he proposed to conquer Toledo. The opportunity for this perilous venture was certainly very tempting. The death, at Worms, on January 6, of the absentee archbishop, Guillaume de Croy, had left the primacy vacant; all Castile breathed a sigh of relief when the news was known. Designation of a successor by the Emperor was for the moment out of the question; and the French envoy at Rome actually urged the candidacy of the ‘second Luther’ on Leo as a means of embarrassing Charles. But Acuña had more faith in immediate action than regard for decisions by Emperor or Pope, and there were many factors in the situation in Castile which urged him to strike a blow in his own behalf. He was too uncomfortable a colleague to cooperate effectively with the other revolutionary leaders at Valladolid; and he was especially irritated with Padilla, whose valorous wife, Maria de Pacheco, had been left virtually in command at Toledo when her husband had returned to the North. Under all the circumstances, Acuña was convinced that he could most effectively serve the cause of the Comuneros in the very spot to which his personal ambitions were driving him apace. One night, in the last week of February, with his bodyguard of fighting priests and a few hundred soldiers, he secretly left Valladolid. His forces increased as his destination became known; but he suffered a discouraging repulse, in which he himself was twice wounded, at the hands of a contingent collected to oppose him by the Prior of San Juan; finally, on Good Friday, he entered Toledo fully armed and on horseback, with only two attendants. A crowd collected about him when his identity was revealed; he was borne aloft into the cathedral, seated on the throne, and solemnly proclaimed archbishop. Further than this, however, Acuña found it impossible to go. The clergy of Toledo refused to be bullied into giving him the sanction of canonical election, and the more sober spirits were thoroughly shocked by his unprecedented defiance of lay and ecclesiastical authority. The whole episode produced a profound sensation throughout Castile, and the ultimate effects of it weakened the cause of the revolution.
The Comuneros, however, had not yet been decisively beaten in the field; nay more, they had been encouraged by a brief return of fortune, at the time of Acuña’s departure from Valladolid. War had by this time been formally declared by the opposing parties—by the royalists in the form of an imperial decree, dated at Worms on December 17 and published at Burgos two months later, proclaiming the Comuneros guilty of high treason, and specially designating the names of two hundred and forty-nine of their leaders—by the rebels in a reply from the Junta at Valladolid, denouncing the Constable, the Admiral, their counsellors and adherents. It was the psychological moment for Padilla to strike a blow, and he delivered it in the last days of February by storming and capturing the town and fortress of Torrelobaton, in the domains of the Admiral, about equidistant from Valladolid and Tordesillas. The Comuneros greeted the news of this success with the wildest enthusiasm, but they knew not how to reap the benefit of it. Instead of utilizing the demoralization of their foes to drive home another blow, they suffered their own forces to scatter before Torrelobaton and finally, on March 3, arranged with the diplomacy-loving Admiral for an eight days’ truce. Though not strictly observed by either party, it redounded rather to the advantage of the royalists than of the Comuneros. It gave them time to collect their forces for a decisive blow, while their enemies continued to waste their resources in further attempts to secure peace by negotiation, and in bickerings between the rival Juntas in Valladolid.

The two chief difficulties of the royalists were lack of effective military leadership and deficiency in artillery. The fall of Torrelobaton had been almost entirely due to the incapacity of the Count of Haro, and no cannon had been obtainable for the government since the burning of Medina del Campo. But the energy and ability of the Constable were to rescue the royalists in their hour of need. Since November he had been obliged to remain at Burgos, chiefly to oppose a threatened invasion from Navarre, but partly in order to deal with the rebel Count of Salvatierra, who had espoused the cause of the Comuneros for his own selfish purposes, and had to be beaten and put to flight before the North was safe. Now at last, on April 8, the Constable was free to march southward and join his son. He had meantime collected a considerable train of artillery from Fontarabia; so that when the two divisions of the royalist armies united at Peñaflor on the twenty-first, they were by no means destitute of heavy guns, though still inferior in this respect to their opponents. In all other particulars, however, the crown forces were in far better shape. In numbers they were distinctly superior—some 9000 in all, against 7000, if the contemporary chronicler may be trusted; their cavalry counted six times that of their foes; their morale was excellent, and they looked forward eagerly to the fray. There were several preliminary skirmishes, generally favorable to the royalists; and the final combat took place on April 23 in the ploughed fields of Villalar, outside Toro. Like the battle of Muhlberg, which twenty-six years later was to settle the fate of the Schmalkaldic League, it was rather a rout than a battle. Drenching rains had converted the ground into mud, in which the heavy artillery of the Comuneros stuck fast; a few shots from the lighter cannon of the royalists, together with a charge of their well-armed and disciplined cavalry, threw the rebels into confusion. They offered no resistance worthy of the name. Many of them tore off the red crosses which they wore—the badge of the revolution—and replaced them with the white emblem of the grandees; the rest scattered, panic-stricken, to the four winds of heaven. Only Padilla and a few other leaders stood their ground, and were captured, fighting valiantly against overwhelming numbers; to Don Alonso de la Cueva fell the honor of taking Padilla, who was badly wounded in the leg. Mexia puts the losses of the Comuneros at “five hundred and a few more wounded”. Seldom has a victory been more complete; nor, from the point of view of the absent Emperor, could it have come at a better time. Six days before it, he had been solemnly challenged by Martin Luther at the diet of Worms; three days after it, the Saxon monk had departed, under the protection of a safe conduct, to raise the standard of revolt against mediaeval church and Empire. Authority had been reestablished in one portion of Charles’s far flung dominions at the very moment that defiance had been hurled at it in the other.

Villalar was a death blow to the revolution in the North. Padilla and two of his companions met death, with heroic courage, at the hands of the public executioner on the morning after their defeat, but there for the moment vengeance ceased. Valladolid at once sent an emissary to sue for peace, who was favorably received; the other cities in the neighborhood speedily followed her example. A few of the revolutionary chiefs were excepted from the general amnesty which the government granted, but even against these the regents showed no inclination to proceed at once; retribution was postponed, by common consent, to the day of the Emperor’s return. Only in Toledo, where the ‘devil of a bishop’ and the widow of Padilla disputed the control, did the flames of revolt continue to burn. Thither converged some of the fugitives of Villalar; and they were inspired to continue the fight by the eloquence of Acuña, who, temporarily forgetting his grudge against Dona Maria, strove manfully to cooperate with her in organizing resistance. Provisions and munitions, however, were sadly deficient; the cathedral’s
ultimately adopted; but so far as the immediate crisis went, there was not the slightest cause for alarm.

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Their dealings with Portugal may be very briefly dismissed. These began, it would seem, on October 24, 1520, with a letter from the Santa Junta in which the Comuneros gave a full statement of their side of the question at issue, protested that they were entirely loyal to their lawful sovereign, provided he would dismiss his foreign advisers, rectify crying abuses, and come to live in Spain, and finally begged King Emmanuel to write to the Emperor and acquaint him with their point of view. What reply was vouchsafed to this request does not appear; but it is obvious from repeated statements in the letters of Adrian to Charles that the Portuguese monarch had no sympathy with the revolution. A month before the Comuneros had appealed to him, he had offered his help to Adrian at Valladolid; nine days afterward he had promised him a loan of fifty thousand ducats. “I know not...” wrote Adrian to the Emperor on November 13, “how your Majesty can adequately thank the king of Portugal for the paternal and intimate affection which he continually displays in the affairs of your Highness, both in regard to the Comuneros and to others of this kingdom, who certainly, if they should note in him any wavering or lack of love to your Majesty, would be far bolder to carry out their evil designs. But his loyalty checks and restrains them. It would be well that your Majesty should write to him most warmly, to give him thanks for what he has done, and to beg for its continuance”. The regent did not exaggerate the importance of Emmanuel’s good will; he must, indeed, have been immensely relieved at the turn things had taken. Two months earlier, when it was far from certain that Portugal would stand by him, the Constable had gone so far as to suggest to Charles that he should marry Emmanuel’s daughter in order to secure the support of the king during the trouble in Castile. It was sound advice, and was ultimately adopted; but so far as the immediate crisis went, there was not the slightest cause for alarm.

Portugal’s loyalty to the royalist cause steadily increased as the months went by; and if we accept the statement of the Portuguese chronicler, Osorio, that the Comuneros finally threw caution to the winds and actually offered the crown of Spain to Emmanuel in return for his support, we may be sure that the proposal was rejected in no uncertain terms.

The story of the attitude of France towards the revolt calls for more extended comment. It had its roots in the diplomatic rivalry between Charles and Francis in the years immediately following the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, and was closely linked with the thorny question of Navarre.

The Albrets had never recognized the validity of the conquest of their kingdom by Ferdinand the Catholic; and the kings of France, whenever the international situation threatened war with the Spanish monarchs, put pressure on the Navarrese sovereigns to recover their heritage by force of arms. It was Francis I who stirred up Henri d’Albret to launch the expedition which was defeated at Roncal; and though he was careful not to lend it any active support, he was deeply chagrined at its failure. In the next few years, however, matters took a more peaceful turn. The Francophile tendencies of Charles’s Burgundian counsellors made possible the treaty of Noyon (August 13, 1516) with the French court, in which was inserted a special clause relative to the question of Navarre. By it Charles promised that as soon as he reached Spain he would receive ambassadors from the Albrets, and, after having learned
what claims they could lawfully advance to the realm from which his grandfather had expelled them, that he would give them satisfaction “according to reason and in such manner that they ought reasonably to be content”. For over a year after the treaty of Noyon, things remained, despite much negotiation, essentially in statu quo, save that the death of the queen-mother, Catharine of Navarre (February 12, 1517), deprived her youthful son, Henri, of her high hearted and courageous support.

Whether Charles or his counsellors were in earnest in their promise at the treaty of Noyon may well be doubted; but it is certain that in making it they had been characteristically oblivious of the Spanish point of view. On this the young king was to be speedily enlightened soon after his arrival in Castile. The sixty-fourth petition of the cuaderno of the Cortes of Valladolid (February, 1518) left no room for doubt upon this point. “Your Highness is already aware”, so it ran, “that the realm of Navarre has been united to the Crown of Castile since the Cortes of Burgos in 1515. The bishop of Badajoz has told us that your Highness is firmly resolved to keep it. We beg your Highness to guard it, as your Highness’ predecessors have done. If, in order to defend this conquest, it is necessary to risk our lives and our fortunes, we are ready to do so, since that realm is the principal key to this kingdom.” Under the circumstances, Charles had no alternative but to yield. “We have always been firmly resolved to keep the said realm”, so ran the royal response, “in view of our rights to it and of its importance to these realms of Castile. ... We thank you for your offers of service in this regard ... but we are certain that we shall not be obliged to make use of them, for our rights to Navarre are so clear that no one would dare to dispute our possession.”

Charles was indeed between the devil and the deep sea. The Navarrese delegates, agreeably to the provisions of the treaty of Noyon, were already on the ground, and were effectively supported by the French ambassador, La Rochebeaucourt; the young king must have had much difficulty in keeping secret from them what had occurred in the sessions of the Cortes. During the next six months the matter hung fire, but the Navarrese delegates found it impossible to obtain any real satisfaction for their demands for the execution of the treaty of Noyon. A proposal for solving the existing difficulties by a marriage between young Henri d’Albret and one of Charles’s sisters was skillfully evaded. The Navarrese ambassadors followed the king into Aragon, but without result, and finally departed, angry and discouraged, in August. They would have been more disheartened still had they known of an event, occurring on the twenty-second of that month, which plainly showed how the king’s mind was working on the question at issue. This was the secret cession by Germaine de Foix, the widow of Ferdinand the Catholic, to Charles, at his request, of all her rights and claims to the realm of Navarre. These rights had already been recognized by France. It was obvious that Charles, who now possessed them, was resolved not to abide by the treaty of Noyon, though he might continue indefinitely to negotiate in order to avoid the responsibility for breaking it. On this, as on many other questions, the young monarch was coming around to the Spanish point of view.

Everything now depended on the attitude of France. Hitherto, though she had counselled much and promised more, she had carefully avoided anything that savored of aggression on behalf of the Albrets. Charles, on his part, had every reason to wish to avoid a rupture with Francis I; and so far the French monarch had seemed willing to keep the peace. The result was the initiation of a new series of conferences on the Navarrese matter between French and Spanish delegates, at Montpellier; but delays and procrastinations on both sides prevented the plenipotentiaries from meeting until May 3, 1519, and the temper of both parties, when the sessions began, precluded any real hope of agreement. The French were by this time thoroughly convinced that the Spaniards did not really intend to restore Navarre; the Spaniards were certain that the French were supporting the Albrets in order to make trouble for their sovereign; and the rivalry of Charles and Francis over the control of the Empire was daily assuming a more threatening aspect. It was also at this juncture that Charles married Germaine de Foix to the Margrave John of Brandenburg, thereby preventing a union which had been projected for that much-sought heiress with the famous French soldier, Lautrec. No common ground was left to the rival claimants, and on May 10 the conference broke up. Clearly the question at issue could not be settled by diplomacy, and war was the only way out.

The result of the imperial election (June 28, 1519) served at once to hasten the combat and to enlarge its scope; in Italy, in Germany, in Burgundy, as well as in the Pyrenees, the young Emperor found himself at odds with the king of France. It was in Navarre, however, that the fighting first began. In February 1520, Francis deliberately challenged his rival by solemnly calling upon him to fulfil his obligations under the treaty of Noyon, and when Charles attempted to put him off with an evasive reply, he began to prepare for war. The opportunity was in all respects favorable. The first grumblings of the coming rebellion in Castile were already making themselves heard; the Emperor could not remain to suppress it; in Navarre, where the Spanish viceroy, the Duke of Najera, was bitterly unpopular, the
majority of the inhabitants yearned for the return of the Albrets. There was talk of a new dismemberment of the Spanish realms, of undoing the work of the Catholic Kings, and even of placing Castile under the suzerainty of Navarre. But Francis was unaccountably slow in collecting soldiers and guns. The return of Charles to the Netherlands had drawn off his attention to that quarter, and he spent most of the autumn of 1520 vainly trying to secure the alliance of Henry VIII of England. Not till the end of December, after the revolt of the Comuneros had passed its zenith, did the French king give definite orders for the levying of troops in Gascony. Henri d’Albret, in the meantime, was much more active; and though he could not think of invading Castile without the support of the king of France, he certainly succeeded in making trouble for the Duke of Najera in Navarre. At the very moment that the viceroy was most in need of reinforcements in order to make head against the threatened peril, he was called on to send men and guns to the Constable at Burgos, for the suppression of the revolt of the Comuneros. “If it be expedient”, wrote Charles on October 24, “to take care for the preservation of Navarre, it is even more so to bear aid in the pacification of Castile.” A series of bitter letters passed between the viceroy and the regents over this thorny question of the disposal of his military resources; but the urgency of Adrian and the Constable, supported by the injunctions of the Emperor, carried the day. Navarre was denuded of defenders, and the guns and men were sent southward.

On the subject of the direct relations between the king of France and the Comuneros, there is disappointingly little information, a fact which is probably explained by the pains that were taken to keep them secret. The French monarch was not blind to the opportunity afforded him by the revolt to strike a fresh blow for the recovery of the Albret realm. In the late summer of 1520, he sent ‘suitable persons’ into Castile, to effect the liberation of the Marshal of Navarre, who had led the unsuccessful invasion of 1516, and had been imprisoned ever since in the castle of Simancas. Among these was Count Pedro Navarro, of North African fame, who, after leading the Spanish infantry in the battle of Ravenna, had gone over into the service of France, and was charged with the mission of determining whether Simancas could be mined. These envoys were also instructed to discover whether it would be possible to cause “greater commotion” in Castile than at present existed; and letters were written to various grandees, among them the Constable, to see if they could not be won away from their allegiance. But Charles and Adrian were well informed of these proceedings, and nothing seems to have come of them; while the Comuneros, on their side, kept demanding that the French king send an army. Writing from Toledo, in November, 1520, Peter Martyr assures us that great efforts were being made in that city to bring about a French invasion of Navarre. But Francis dared not face the risk when the decisive moment came, and a golden opportunity was allowed to slip away. Instead of sending a large force, adequately equipped, and at once, he dispatched an envoy to the Junta at Valladolid in January, 1521, to offer a diversion by 800 lances in the Albret lands, provided he was promised “that no hindrance would be placed in the way of their entrance by that route”! It is perhaps not surprising that the French king was so hesitant. He well knew how dangerous it was for any monarch to aid and abet rebellion in the land of his neighbor; his attention at this juncture was chiefly directed to the north; and he had been obviously impressed by the firm determination which Castile had already shown not to permit the retrocession of Navarre. Yet it is clear that such dallying was fatal to his own plans; indeed it is probable that it saved Charles’s throne. Had he struck, with all his might, at the time when the rebellion was at its climax, it would have been impossible to resist him. Attacking as he finally did, almost a month after Villalar, he was speedily and decisively beaten.

The invading army was ready at last, on May 10, 1521; it was commanded by André de Foix, sieur de l’Esparrre, and it numbered 12,000 infantry (half of them Gascons), 800 lances, and twenty-nine pieces of artillery. At first it carried all before it, for the regents had not yet been willing to dispatch reinforcements to the viceroy. The first fortresses fell almost without a blow. While Najera went south to beg for help from Valladolid, the powerful Francophile faction of the Agramonts joined the invaders, and their rivals, the Beaumonts, dared offer no resistance. On May 19, Pamplona capitulated to l’Esparrre, and ten days later Tudela followed suit. Less than three weeks had enabled the French to overrun the entire kingdom; and when the news was brought to the Emperor at Brussels, he was so cast down that he could not eat but left the table for a conference with the Duke of Alva.

But if the invaders found it easy to conquer Navarre, they were entirely unable to retain it. They reaped the reward of the tardiness of their masters, for Castile was now at peace and could muster forces to expel them. L’Esparrre, moreover, did not use his victory to the best advantage. By refusing the petition of the Navarrese to bring the young king to Pamplona, he lent color to the report that the Valois sovereign had undertaken to conquer the realm, not for the sake of the Albrets, but for his own. He assumed all the powers and prerogatives of a reigning monarch, and irritated the Navarrese by his severity and exactions. Furthermore, he neglected to consolidate his conquests. So confident was he in the position that he had won, that he not only sent home some of his Gascon troops, but even ventured
to cross the Ebro with the rest, to lay siege to the town of Logroño. Ignoring the defeat of the rebels at Villalar, he imagined that by shouting for the ‘Communes of Castile’ he could win for himself a cordial welcome from the inhabitants. As a matter of fact, he did precisely the reverse. Najera had had time to put 4000 men into Logroño; the pride of the Castilian aristocracy, assembled within the walls, flamed out against the allies of the Comuneros whom they had overthrown. The invaders encountered a desperate resistance, and as rumors came in of overwhelming reinforcements, sent on by the Constable from the Castilian cities, l’Esparre began to realize that the tide had turned. News also arrived from Aragon to complete his discomfiture. The Cortes at Saragossa had promised aid to the Castilians; indeed an Aragonese detachment had already got in behind l’Esparre at Sanguesa, and threatened to cut off his retreat. Under the circumstances there was nothing for it but to retire as rapidly as possible. On June 11, he broke camp before Logroño, and began to withdraw into Navarre.

Step by step, for the next nineteen days, the retreat continued. The pursuing Castilians, ably led by the Constable, steadily gained in spirit and increased in numbers; by the middle of June they counted almost 30,000 men. L’Esparre neglected to concentrate his available troops but took up what he believed to be an impregnable position, with the forces that he had, in the valley of the Ebro backed by the Sierra del Perdón. Realizing the futility of a frontal attack there, the Constable marched around behind him into the valley of Pamplona, and there, on June 30, between the villages of Noain and Esquiros, forced his foe to accept an unequal battle. For a time the skillful handling of the French artillery, coupled with the splendid dash of their infantry charges, gave l’Esparre the advantage; but a furious assault of the Castilian cavalry, which the Constable delivered in the nick of time, reestablished the Spanish front, enabled their hard-pressed infantry to reform, and finally made possible the capture of the enemy’s cannon, which were promptly turned against them. From that moment, the battle became a rout. The French left 6000 dead on the field; all their guns and a great number of prisoners were taken, among them l’Esparre, who had been temporarily blinded by a lance thrust in the visor of his helmet. In a few days more, the whole of Navarre was again in Spanish hands, and no serious effort to reconquer it was ever made again. Nine years later the little corner of Ultrapuertos, north of the Pyrenees, was voluntarily ceded by Charles V to the Albrets on account of the great expense of maintaining it; in 1589 it was united to France with the accession of Henry of Navarre. But the rest of the realm, which was incorporated into Castile, became gradually Hispanicized in the succeeding years. Charles had the wisdom to follow the precedents of Spanish history, and the example of Ferdinand the Catholic, and suffer it to retain a large measure of institutional autonomy. He was lenient in his dealings with those who had fought against him, and Najera was replaced by a more popular viceroy, the Count of Miranda. In one sense the Navarrese annalist Aleson was correct in characterizing the battle of Noain as “the definitive sentence which blotted Navarre from the roll of nations”, but in view of her past history and traditions and of the measure of local liberty which she was permitted to retain, one inclines to prefer the verdict of a more modern writer, that “the victory of the Spaniards was not that of one nation over another. Its sole result was the expulsion of a race of princes who were more French than Spanish. Nothing was changed in Navarre, save the advent of one more dynasty.”

For the student of the development of the Spanish Empire, however, the struggle which has just been described for the possession of the little Pyrenean realm has a much deeper significance than the mere acquisition of a kingdom. It contributed, more perhaps than anything else, to the education of Charles’s Castilian subjects in the policy to which their new sovereign’s vast inheritance had now unavoidably committed them. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as we have already seen, there had been a long and almost uninterrupted tradition of friendship between France and Castile. This had been broken, it is true, to a certain extent during the latter part of the rule of the Catholic Kings; still the wars with the French for the possession of Naples had been regarded hitherto by the mass of the Castilians as a cosa de Aragon—an affair of the eastern kingdoms. They had joined in them, perfide, because their queen was the wife of the Aragonese king; but down to the conquest and annexation of Navarre in 1512 and 1515, their interests were primarily elsewhere, at home, in North Africa, and in the Indies. Now, since the incorporation of Navarre with Castile, they had acquired a vital interest in the struggle with France which would be necessary to retain it. The request of the Cortes of Valladolid in 1518 gave dramatic evidence of this, as did the readiness with which the Castilians flocked to defend Navarre when the crisis came in 1521. Through Navarre they were brought to approve and support, with a measure of willingness which they would not otherwise have shown, the wars with France which violated their national traditions, but which the position and inheritance of the new sovereign rendered inevitable. It is true that for many years to come, they continued to show reluctance to go abroad to seek the foe. The union with Aragon was still too recent, and their tradition of isolation from the rest of Western Europe still too strong, for them to be reconciled at once to a policy of conquest beyond the Pyrenees. Nevertheless the struggle over Navarre in 1521 marks an important stage in the imperial
education of Castile. Henceforth, she was convinced that it was her destiny to fight France, in order to retain the realm that she had won. It was not a long step further to persuade her to acquiesce in the extension of that process to foreign battlefields, in order to make fresh conquests in other parts of Western Europe. She would henceforth take the place which destiny had prepared for her as the chief instrument of her foreign ruler in the accomplishment of his imperial task.

One trivial incident of the war in Navarre was destined to have results more important than the winning of a kingdom—more lasting, in fact, than the Spanish Empire itself. Among the handful of cavaliers who vainly essayed to check l’Esparre’s mad rush southward, at Pamplona, was a high born youth from Loyola in Guipuzcoa, by name Inigo Lopez de Recalde; youngest of a family of thirteen, he had hitherto led the gay life of a soldier from a noble house, and had once been a page of Ferdinand the Catholic. Struck by a cannon-ball on the battlements of Pamplona, he fell unconscious into the moat between the walls. One of his legs was shattered and the other badly hurt, and the military career to which he had ardently looked forward was thenceforth closed to him forever. But the prospect of a life of enforced idleness was unendurable to him; if he could not fight under the banners of Castile, there were other noble causes which he deeply longed to serve. His French captors treated him kindly, and after two weeks sent him home in a litter to Loyola. During his convalescence there, he read with increasing emotion in the lives of Christ and of the saints. Finally he became convinced that it was his duty to choose a new calling, and to devote himself henceforth to the advancement of the church. Of the consequences of that high resolve was born the Society of Jesus.

We have already noted the trouble that was brewing at Valencia at the time of the king’s departure for the Empire: —the hatreds between the classes and the masses in which it originated, the vacillation of the departing monarch in his attitude towards the uprising, and finally his dispatching, on April 10, 1520, of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Melito, with instructions to put it down—peacefully, if possible, if not, by force of arms. The way in which this revolt was further developed and finally suppressed, as well as the results which ultimately ensued from it, furnish an excellent illustration of the diversity of the problems with which the young Emperor was constantly confronted, in the far scattered portions of his vast dominions.

Mendoza reached Valencia on May 21. Any hopes which he may have entertained that his authority would be recognized by the masses were rudely dispelled by the reception which awaited him. He was not even permitted to proceed to the cathedral by the route which he had selected, but was obliged to follow one suggested to him by a weaver, who spoke in the name of the Germania. Two weeks of this sort of treatment convinced the viceroy that there was no use in remaining in the capital. On June 6, he fled from Valencia in disguise, and after some days of aimless wandering betook himself finally to Játiva. At the time of his arrival he had reason to expect a cordial reception. A number of the aristocracy had gathered there, and the municipal representatives had invited him to come. Mendoza, however, was soon to learn that the power of the Germania was by no means confined to the capital. The Thirteen brought pressure on the artisans of Játiva the moment they learned where Mendoza was. A series of clashes between his adherents and the mob convinced him that there was nothing to be gained by remaining in his new abode; and after a stay of a few weeks he took refuge in Denia, where he summoned all loyal men to rally to his standard. He now gave out that he proposed to abandon negotiation and proceed against the rebellion by force of arms, but the rapid series of changes of base, to which he had been involuntarily subjected ever since his arrival, did not augur well for his success on the field of battle.

On the other hand, the policy of the Germania was pitifully deficient in opportunism and statesmanship. Save for a few of the northerly districts on the Catalan frontier, it had the entire kingdom virtually in its control. Under the circumstances it should have made every effort to extend the revolt into Aragon and Catalonia, and above all to make common cause with the rebellion in Castile. But this, despite an unusually favorable opportunity, it signal failed to accomplish. The city of Murcia, though on Castilian soil, was economically in far closer touch with the Valencian towns than with the cities of the North. An informal sort of a Germania had sprung into being there before the revolt of the Comuneros had fairly begun, and the movement extended itself to Lorca and Cartagena. Adrian dispatched a Castilian alcalde to deal with this uprising; but his forces were wholly inadequate, and he was soon obliged to take refuge in ignominious flight. Foreseeing that a fresh punitive expedition would in all probability follow, Murcia sent messengers to Valencia to ask for aid; they were welcomed with enthusiasm, but nothing effective was accomplished to secure the cooperation desired. The result was
that Murcia, whose rising had been opposed by the Castilian authorities, shifted over into an alliance with the Comuneros, who were threatened from the same source. For a time she sent her delegates to the Santa Junta, but she was one of the first to return to her allegiance; indeed her inhabitants were to lend useful aid in the suppression of the Germania in the following year. In Aragon and in Catalonia the movement found even less support. An embassy from Valencia to Saragossa was informed that the Aragonese recognized but one authority, namely, the rule of the Emperor Charles; and Barcelona, though socially and industrially she had so much in common with Valencia, would give no aid to the rising in the South. Only in the Balearics did the Germania succeed in producing a sympathetic insurrection, but distance and the intervening waters prevented effective cooperation between them. Spanish separatism had been the bane of many a monarch in the past, but on the present occasion it saved Charles’s throne. Cleavages, social and national, were the ruin of all these revolts. Had all ranks of the population, in any portion of his dominions, stood loyally shoulder to shoulder until the end, or had the same class of malcontents in the different parts of the Iberian Peninsula united their forces, the royal authority could scarcely have been maintained.

It was some time before Mendoza could put an army in the field. His conviction that the existing difficulties could only be settled by force of arms was not yet shared by his absent master, who continued through the autumn of 1520 and the early spring of 1521 to send special representatives to the heads of the Germania, to see if it might not be possible to find a peaceful way out. Not until the latter part of April was it evident that these negotiations could not succeed. The royal terms were not ungenerous; but the self-confidence of the Germania had by this time mounted so high that it was increasingly deaf to reasonable appeals, and the situation was not improved by sundry sporadic outbreaks of violence in Valencia. The long delays which these peace proceedings imposed were highly unfavorable to Mendoza’s military preparations. The Valencian royalists lost confidence in his leadership, and were slow to respond to his repeated calls for troops. The Germania, in the meantime, sent an army against him. On July 14 it captured Jativa; with the death of its leader before the walls, the chief command fell to a cloth seller called Vicente Peris, who challenged the royalist forces by marching straight on their headquarters at Gandía. Mendoza wished to retire without a battle, but his followers would hear of no retreat. In the combat that ensued on July 25 the royalists were soundly beaten. Their army was dispersed. Their leaders were at odds. Denia managed to hold out against the rebels, but Mendoza was unwilling to remain there. Against the wishes of the inhabitants and of his own adherents, he took ship and sailed for Peñíscola in the northern part of the realm, there to await reinforcements which would enable him to resume the offensive.

In the North the king’s cause had better fortune: for the excesses of the revolutionists had alienated the local aristocracy, who rallied unitedly to the support of the crown. A small detachment which the rebels had sent against Murviedro was badly beaten at Oropesa (June 30) by the Duke of Segorbe; and a rescuing party met the same fate at Almenara on July 18. The adherents of the Germania did not make good soldiers. Discipline was woefully lacking, and of tactics and strategy they were ignorant. Meantime in the capital the aspect of affairs had greatly changed. The departure of the military forces of the Germania had weakened the radical party there. The magistrates whom they had left in office were anxious for peace, and their efforts in this direction were ably seconded by the viceroy’s elder brother, Rodrigo, Marquis of Zenete, who had labored for reconciliation since the outbreak of the struggle. These efforts soon bore fruit in an invitation to the Marquis to come to Valencia, to assume the chief authority there pending the restoration of law and order. After consulting with his brother, Zenete accepted (July 4), and such were his popularity and skill in his new office that he soon succeeded in obtaining the voluntary resignation of the Council of Thirteen, which the Emperor had demanded as the price of peace. Mendoza was much encouraged by these favorable signs, and he strengthened his brother’s hand in the capital by arranging for the return thither of the Infante Don Enrique, the natural son of Ferdinand the Catholic, who had an official residence in Valencia, and could be regarded as a quasi-representative of the royal family. On the other hand, the viceroy neglected no precautions to strengthen his military forces, for he rightly conjectured that battles were still to be fought.

While these events were occurring at the capital, the rebel army under Vicente Peris had moved northwest into the interior. It was in this portion of the kingdom that the estates of the nobility were chiefly concentrated, and these estates were largely cultivated by a Moorish rural population. It will be remembered that the edict of 1502, which provided for the conversion of all Moors remaining in Castile, had not yet been extended to the eastern kingdoms, where they were still permitted to continue in the enjoyment of their own customs and religion. But they were deeply detested by the population of Valencia, partly on account of their faith, and still more on account of jealousy of their economic prosperity and happiness. This animosity had been carefully nurtured by the leaders of the Germania, with the result that when Peris’s army arrived in the interior, it committed all sorts of outrages against
the Moorish population. Many were murdered in cold blood. Others were robbed and forcibly baptized.

Naturally, those that escaped flocked eagerly to the standards of the nobility for protection and revenge, and the nobles themselves, who had lost so much good labor, became more hostile than ever to the revolutionary forces. Now, if ever, the Germania should have proceeded cautiously, but Peris was not the man to read the signs of the times. On hearing that the example of his soldiers had been followed in Valencia, and that an outburst against the Moors there had resulted in the forcible conversion of the local mosque into a Christian church, he rashly betook himself to the capital in hopes of regaining it for the Germania. He received a vociferous welcome from the gilds, and succeeded in collecting some men and artillery, but on October 11 he was defeated by the Marquis of Zenete outside the walls and forced to seek refuge in Játiva. This episode marked the end of the Germania in the capital. Zenete soon severed it from the other centers of the revolution. He relentlessly punished all who resisted him, and the rest were only too glad to come to terms. The municipal elections gave an overwhelming verdict in favor of the return of the lawful authorities, and on November 9 Mendoza reentered Valencia in triumph.

The rebellion was now limited to Jativa and Alcira. Mendoza besieged these towns for a few weeks without success; then, yielding to a popular demand that an attempt be made to secure their submission by negotiation, he dispatched his brother to confer with the representatives of the Germania. Peris, however, had no faith in diplomacy. On the day of Zenete’s arrival he managed to stir up a revolt in Játiva which resulted in the Marquis being temporarily made prisoner, while the others who had accompanied him were ordered out of the city. But Peris’s triumph was very brief. Those who favored negotiation resented his interference. They were persuaded that the imprisonment of Zenete was a stain on their honor, and on February 9, 1522, the Marquis was permitted to return to his brother. Peris’s prestige was destroyed by this blow. He left Jativa and reappeared in Valencia, where the power of his personality caused the populace to rush to arms. Overconfident in his ability to maintain a resistance, he refused a last offer to negotiate with Zenete, with the result that on March 3 the royalist troops attacked his dwelling. The house was fired, and Peris was caught. On the morrow he and two of his chief adherents were quartered, while nine others of his followers were hanged. Outside the capital the resistance continued until the winter of 1523; a mysterious personality—El Rey Encubierto—succeeded Peris as the leader of the rebels, and swore to avenge the death of his predecessor. But the mass of the population was weary of fighting. sporadic outbreaks took place, but they became fewer and weaker as the months rolled by. At last the royalists could concentrate against Játiva and Alcira, and forced them, after a brief struggle, to lay down their arms.

The course of the revolt in Majorca presents certain interesting peculiarities. It started, as we have already noted, in response to representations from the rebels of Valencia; but it also had deep roots in the previous history of the Balearics. The devastating strife which had been waged there, under John II, between the large landholders and the mass of the population had engendered the bitterest feelings between the different classes of society; and though the war had ceased under the Catholic Kings, its legacy of hatred had remained undiminished. From the beginning of the rising, therefore, which started in Majorca in February 1521, class lines were drawn far more definitely than in Castile or in Valencia. The workmen, artisans, and peasants were all intensely sympathetic with the movement; the nobility, officials, and richer burgesses united their forces to put it down. The rebels were unusually well furnished with arms, with which the Balearics in their exposed position were always kept plentifully supplied. And, lastly, even more than the Comuneros of Castile they had an excellent opportunity to secure aid from France. The Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria, who at this period commanded the French fleet, was continually cruizing about in the waters near the island; but owing to lack of energy and foresight on one or both sides, he did not drop anchor in the bay of Majorca until July, 1522, after the revolt was well on the way to its decline. To the tardiness of the rebels in combining with the foreigner, both here and in Castile, a large share of the responsibility for the failure of both insurrections is unquestionably to be ascribed.

The main lines of the Majorcan revolt are not difficult to trace. When the first news of it was brought to Don Miguel de Gurrea—the Aragonese nobleman who represented the crown—he gave orders for the arrest of several of the ringleaders; but so impressive was the demonstration of popular wrath, that on the following day he was obliged to release them. The masses organized themselves with extraordinary rapidity. They chose as their leader, with the title of instador, one of Gurrea’s intended victims, a cloth merchant called Juan Crespi. A small council was associated with him for advisory purposes, while a larger one of twenty-six members maintained relations with the masses and the gilds. Emissaries were dispatched to the other towns of the island, to secure their cooperation; finally, on March 16, 1521, they demanded and compelled Gurrea’s resignation. In his place they selected a local nobleman, Don Pedro de Pachs, and dragged him in triumph from his country seat to the capital; but
when Pachs, to show his disapproval of their conduct, withdrew at the first opportunity to the shelter of his domain, they pursued him relentlessly, besieged him in his castle, and finally, on July 29, murdered him there, with all the rest of the aristocracy of the neighborhood, who had flocked to him for protection. This episode unchained the worst passions of the populace. The aristocracy were obliged to flee for their lives, the viceroy seeking safety in the island of Iviza; even there he found it not altogether easy to maintain himself, though the insurrection was nowhere so powerful as in Majorca. When the revolution was at its height, it was master of that entire island save the town of Alcudia, whose natural defenses, high walls, and ability to communicate by water with comparatively loyal Minorca, made it the principal refuge of nobles, officials, and the municipal aristocracy.

It was in fact before the walls of Alcudia that the power of the Balearic Germanía wore itself out. Throughout the winter of 1521-22, the town was regularly besieged by the rebel army; but the assaults upon the fortress were not successful, while the sorties by the defenders wrought havoc in the camp of their foes. The siege gradually degenerated into a sort of land blockade, and the blockade in turn into a guard so lax that the defenders of the city were able to go out unharmed and reap their crops. But it was not till after Charles’s return to Spain, in the summer of 1522, that the aristocracy and the constituted authorities ventured to assume the offensive. Four galleys and 800 men were dispatched by the Emperor to Gurrea in Iviza, to serve as a nucleus for his adherents to rally around; with these Gurrea crossed over to Alcudia, and thence, in October, began to reconquer Majorca. After two months of costly guerrilla warfare against the small isolated bands into which the revolutionists had broken up, the siege of Palma was started in December. It was accompanied by many horrors, and lasted three full months, before the efforts of the bishop of the see were successful in arranging terms. It was doubtless owing to this clerical intervention that the conditions of surrender were not much harsher; for the aristocracy had suffered much and burned for revenge. Only the ringleaders and notorious criminals were tortured before being put to death, and the regular executions did not exceed twenty-five. The tale of the victims, as established from authentic sources, falls far below that given in the contemporary chronicles.

On July 16, 1522, after an absence of more than two years, Charles landed at Santander, and trod once more the soil of Spain. A brief summary of his experiences since his departure is essential to a comprehension of the situation at his return.

Of the twenty-six months that had elapsed since he left Castile, Charles had spent more than sixteen in the Netherlands, nearly seven and a half in the Empire, and the rest in England and on the sea. On October 23, 1520, he had been crowned King of the Romans at Aix-la-Chapelle, and on the following day he had assumed the title of Roman Emperor Elect. His war with Francis I—the product of inherited rivalries in Burgundy and in Italy, and inevitable since his election to the Empire—had begun in earnest in the summer of 1521; in Flanders, on the Pyrenees, and in Lombardy the two great rivals had already come to blows. The days of the treaty of Noyon and of the Francophile counsellors of Charles’s early years were now gone for ever. Chivères himself had died at Worms on May 28, 1521, and his influence had steadily waned in the preceding months. In the diplomatic contest for allies, moreover, which had accompanied the outbreak of the war with France, Charles had on the whole come out victorious. Leo X was supporting the Imperialists in Italy when death overtook him on December 1. On January 9, 1522, Adrian of Utrecht was elected as his successor. England also was strongly anti-French. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (June, 1520) was a diplomatic fiasco, while Charles’s two visits to England (May 26-29, 1520, May 26-July 6, 1522) and the intervening conferences at Calais and Bruges laid apparently firm foundations for an Anglo-Imperial alliance. And finally, on April 17, 1521, Charles had solemnly declared against Martin Luther at the ever-memorable diet of Worms. On the twenty-sixth of the following May he had ordered the publication of the ban of the Empire against the Saxon monk and all his adherents.

The feelings with which the Spaniards regarded these great events were doubtless mixed; but there can be little doubt that satisfaction was predominant. They intensely disliked their monarch’s absence, and they must have foreseen that it was bound to be repeated. As to the war with France their attitude has already been described. On the Pyrenees they supported it heart and soul, but in Italy and the Netherlands they tended to draw back; their imperial education was still too incomplete, and the Castilians were unquestionably more reluctant than the Aragonese. But the glory of having an Emperor for their sovereign was a telling argument to convince the grumblers. Charles had been crowned, and Charles had come back to them. Spain was the home of the King of Kings and the seat of the highest authority in the Christian world; the Hispaniae Consolatio had actually come true. And the condemnation of Luther was the climax of it all. Spain had not failed to let Charles know her wishes in this matter. On April 12, 1521, Adrian of Utrecht, the Admiral of Castile, and a number of the lords and
Emperor proceeded without leave from Rome and ordered the immediate execution of Acuña. He escaped the same fate, and Acuña had almost got away when he was finally retaken. This time the Emperor proceeded with him in his cell, and murdered him there before help could be summoned; another guard narrowly escaped the same fate, and Acuña had almost got away when he was finally retaken. This time the Emperor proceeded with him in his cell, and murdered him there before help could be summoned; another guard narrowly escaped the same fate, and Acuña had almost got away when he was finally retaken. This time the Emperor proceeded with him in his cell, and murdered him there before help could be summoned; another guard narrowly escaped the same fate, and Acuña had almost got away when he was finally retaken.

Himself, he was no longer a puppet in the hands of the Emperor, but a full-grown man, with a mind of his own, and a will to translate his thoughts into deeds. "His Majesty", wrote the ambassador of his brother Ferdinand from Valladolid on November 1, 1522, "is very well, and hard at work as a result of the recent events. He takes much pleasure in jousting, to the delight of his court, and goes every afternoon to the tilting field. It is said that he expects to reorganize his Council and his household. He has rendered justice on all hands, and those who were most guilty during the late troubles are being condemned every day." A pleasing change, unquestionably, from the gawky stripling of five years before; moreover, Charles had made a heroic effort to satisfy his Iberian subjects on another tender point; he had actually succeeded in learning a little Spanish. On the other hand, it was evident that the returning monarch did not propose to tolerate insubordination. The attacks of the French in the Pyrenees and the dispatch of a large detachment of Spanish troops to guard the Netherlands gave him two pretexts for bringing with him into Castile 3000 German landsknechts, with an impressive train of seventy-four pieces of artillery. Foreign soldiers and foreign cannon were henceforth often to be employed by Charles V to forestall and put down rebellion in his different dominions. Here was a sign which all Spaniards could read; their sovereign had returned with prestige and renown; he had shown an appreciation of the Spanish point of view; but he was also indisputably master of the situation.

Altogether Spain was far better disposed to think well of her young monarch when he returned in 1522, than when he first arrived in 1517. This favorable impression was also enhanced by the personal appearance of the king and his entourage. Chièvres was dead, and the hated Flemings had not returned; the king’s chief adviser was now the Piedmontese Gattinara, with a vigorous anti-French policy in Italy, which the Spaniards, though they might not wholeheartedly approve of it, could at least understand. They would of course have liked it better had he been one of themselves. They would have preferred it had he been interested less in Milan and more in Navarre; still the contrast to his predecessor was so agreeable that they were not disposed to complain. But what doubtless pleased them most was the change that they could observe in the king himself. He was no longer a puppet in the hands of his entourage, but a full-grown man, with a mind of his own, and a will to translate his thoughts into deeds.

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Charles was not disposed to be merciful to the leaders of the recent revolts. Adrian and the Admiral wanted him to issue a general pardon, but the Emperor was determined that the worst offenders must be punished. But he did not propose to share the odium incident to the executions. He had been fortunate in that the Comuneros had been put down during his absence and made the most of it by remaining in the North, at Palencia, until after the bulk of the death penalties had been inflicted. November 1 at Valladolid, at an imposing ceremony at which the course and termination of the rebellion were formally proclaimed; of the 293 persons excepted from the pardon there announced, most of those not already executed were either banished or suffered confiscation of property in varying degrees. The cause célèbre was that of the fighting bishop of Zamora, who awaited his sentence in the castle of Simancas. His clerical status rendered him immune from torture or the death penalty. Adrian at Rome even spoke of absolving him, and though Clement VII was more willing to take Charles’s point of view in the case, there were long delays, and for a time nothing was done. But Acuña was not the man to await the pleasure of emperors or popes. His age—some sixty-five years—had by no means deprived him of physical vigor, and in February, 1526, he determined to make a bold dash for liberty. With a heavy stone and a knife which he had concealed about his person, he fell upon his jailer, who was conversing with him in his cell, and murdered him there before help could be summoned; another guard narrowly escaped the same fate, and Acuña had almost got away when he was finally retaken. This time the Emperor proceeded without leave from Rome and ordered the immediate execution of Acuña by the garrote; but he was careful to seek papal absolution for what he had done and abstained from the communion until after it had been accorded to him.

The main grievances against the king which had produced the revolt were his impending departure, his foreign advisers and the favors which he had shown them in Castile, and, finally, his heavy taxation. The position in which these three matters of divergence were left after the triumphant suppression of the rebellion may be gathered from a study of the text of the proceedings of a meeting of the Castilian Cortes which Charles summoned to Valladolid in July 1523.
The mere fact that the king had returned was a partial answer to the complaints of his departure, and it was clinched by an elaborate harangue from the royal representative, in which the causes and results of Charles’s journey into the Empire were fully set forth and the reasons for the war with France described in detail. The procuradores were made to feel that the king’s absence had been unavoidable; they were flattered by the assurance that he regarded “these realms as the head of all the rest” and that he was using their resources “not only to sustain the others which God had given him, but also to gain new ones and carry his pillars plus ultra for the advancement of the holy Catholic faith.” They continued to express their regrets in future years whenever the situation rendered it imperative that he should leave them: “Your Majesty’s protracted absence from your Spanish kingdoms,” wrote the Admiral of Castile in 1531, “though indispensable perhaps for the safety of threatened Christendom, and the furtherance of your own political views, is a thing to which your Spanish subjects can hardly reconcile themselves”. But as the years rolled by they gradually accepted what they were unable to prevent, and centered their efforts upon obtaining a suitable regent. “The remedy for all things, after God”, run the words of a paper on the good government of Spain during a period when the Emperor was expected to be away, “since it is impossible for your Majesty to be continually in these kingdoms, is that you should leave in your place that person who may most worthily represent you.”

As to the foreign advisers, Charles certainly met his subjects halfway. They were reassured by observing that he was no longer surrounded by Flemings. When they begged him to employ only Spaniards in his household, he answered that he had reserved for them a large number of places, when he had reorganized his suite on his departure from the Netherlands. So crying had been the abuse on the occasion of Charles’s first visit that it was many a long year before Castile was satisfied on this point. There was a small riot in Valladolid just before the opening of the Cortes, when some veterans, returning from the war in Valencia, “went through the street like men who had taken a town, crying ‘Spagna, Spagna and death to all the Flemings’; and the cuadernos of the Cortes and the various state papers advert to the matter until the very end of the reign. But these later remonstrances were scarcely justified by the facts. Charles employed his Spanish subjects increasingly, both at home and abroad; indeed, at the close, the picture was reversed, for it was by Spaniards that he governed his other dominions. “Since it would be wrong”, replied the Emperor to the Cortes of 1523, “to separate the members which God has joined together in one body, we intend, as is reasonable, to be served conjointly by all the nations of our realms and dominions, preserving to each of them its laws and its customs.” On one subsidiary point Castile got no real satisfaction during the Emperor’s lifetime; Burgundian magnificence replaced the time-honored simplicity of the court of Ferdinand and Isabella.

“Although your Majesty holds the Empire and is lord of many great realms and seigniories”, runs the petition of the procuradores of 1523, “we beg your Majesty to diminish your royal household in Castile and the pensions which are given therein, which are immense, so that the money which is thereby saved may be available for more necessary expenses and for the service of God and your Majesty”. The Emperor promised improvement, but nothing was done; the gorgeous display on the occasion of his son Philip’s first visit to the Netherlands in 1548-49, and the bitter complaint about it from the Duke of Alva and the other Spaniards, show that the evil continued till the end of his reign. Its effect on the economic condition of the kingdom was exceedingly unfortunate. The court was constantly moving from place to place, and wherever it went, prices rose by leaps and bounds. “The country is so expensive”, wrote Richard Sampson, “that I cannot live on twenty shillings a day ... and if the Emperor goes where he intends ... the expenses will be double.”

“Nervus belli est pecunia, which he will not have without Spain”, wrote Sir Thomas Spinelly of the Emperor in August 1520; and now the war had come in earnest. The Cortes of 1523 had been summoned to vote a servicio, exactly like those of 1518 and 1520; that was the main thing; all else was subsidiary. The Emperor was strong in the prestige of his recent victory, but the procuradores did not intend to give in without a struggle. Juan Rodriguez, representing Granada, arose to explain the attitude of his colleagues. After protesting the depth of his loyalty and love, he roundly declared that the late rebellion had been caused by the way in which the servicio had been voted at Corunna. “And we venture to say”, he boldly continued, “that it would be well for your Majesty to summon us solely to deliberate and confer about the service of your Highness, and the welfare of your kingdoms, without making any mention of the servicio... Every one knows that the principal intention of your Majesty is to provide for and do good to your kingdoms, and that the replenishment of your treasury, for urgent necessities, is but secondary... And we do not think that your Majesty can refuse this request on the ground that it is an innovation, for the laws are subject to the will of kings who can make or unmake them. Your Majesty is the living law who, under new circumstances, can make a new law or custom, or, on occasion, suspend an existing one without prejudice to your royal preeminence”. Charles was prompt with his reply. He would gladly have refrained from demanding the servicio, he said, had not his
necessities, born of the late uprising, rendered it imperative. “Yesterday”, he continued, “I asked you for funds; today I want your advice. Which seems to you better, that you should grant me the servicio at once, on my promise not to dismiss you until I have replied to and provided for everything that you justly ask me, and that I should do so of my own free will; or that I should first reply to the petition which you bring me, and have it said that I do so in order to get the servicio? You know that the custom has been to grant this first; thus it was done under my royal predecessors. Why try to establish an innovation with me? And since many evils have brought me to this necessity, you, like good and loyal subjects, will remedy them by doing your duty as I expect you to do”. For several days more the dispute continued; but the Emperor was not to be denied. In the end the procuradores voted an extraordinary subsidy of 400,000 ducats, payable in three years.

It was a notable victory for Charles, and a great blow at the liberties of Castile. Had the constitutional precedents been the other way, the outcome might well have been different. From that moment onward Spain was definitely established in the place which Spinelly had attributed to her in 1520—she was to be the source of supply for the Hapsburg Empire. How far she could flatter herself that that Empire was Spanish was a point on which men have disputed ever since. Certainly it was more nearly so at the end of Charles’s reign than at the beginning, but in the meantime the peninsula had been drained dry for many causes in which it cannot be said to have been vitally concerned. The revolt of the Comuneros had not been absolutely fruitless. Charles learned to respect his Spanish subjects as he had not done before. He listened henceforth to their wishes and gratified them when he could. On the whole it may be fairly said that he used his victory with moderation. Politically and financially, however, it had left him so much the master of the situation that the destinies of the Spanish people, at this most critical stage of their development, were placed almost without let or hindrance in the royal hands. In the eyes of the student of constitutional liberties, this was unquestionably a great misfortune, and goes far to explain the sufferings of the succeeding centuries; but those who are chiefly interested in Spain’s imperial development may well question whether she would have been capable of taking full advantage of her opportunities, had the power not been wholly in the Emperor’s hands. With all his faults and the foreign burdens which he imposed, he gave Spain a larger vision of her possibilities than she had ever been able previously to obtain.

The punishment and final consequences of the Valencian Germania present certain interesting contrasts with those of the Comuneros. Even more than in the case of the Castilian insurrection, Charles was resolved to deal with the problem from a distance; it will be remembered that he had not had time to visit Valencia at all during his first visit to the peninsula; and after his return he kept away till 1528, when he went there to be sworn to as king by the estates of the realm. More than four years before this the rebels had felt the weight of his displeasure; even the fact that Charles had at one stage encouraged the masses to revolt against the aristocracy did not avail to mitigate the severity of the sentences. His representative on the spot in the work of retribution was Germaine de Foix, who was appointed viceroy of Valencia on October 20, 1523. On January 19, 1524, the chiefs of the Agermanados were arrested in their beds, and a large number of the guiltiest of them were quartered. More permanently important were the fines and confiscations. Since the revolt had been rather in the nature of a social war than of a political rebellion against the royal authority, the government preferred rather to mulct than to slay; and the great wealth of the Valencian cities doubtless served as another inducement in the same direction. So overwhelming, however, were the king’s financial exactions, and so ignorant were the authorities of the simplest economic laws, that the result was the impoverishment of one of the fairest of the Spanish realms. And the effect of the royal demands was all the more disastrous because they were made at the very moment when Valencian agriculture—the chief source of the prosperity of the kingdom—was temporarily and most unexpectedly paralyzed by an unforeseen consequence of the late rebellion.

We have seen that the Moorish inhabitants of Valencia—for the most part agricultural laborers on the great estates—had almost without exception opposed the revolt; that a number of them were slain, and others forcibly baptized, wherever the Germania got the upper hand. When the pressure was removed, these unwilling converts naturally returned to the faith of their fathers; and a situation was thus created for which there had been many precedents in Spanish history, a situation of which the Inquisition was prompt to take advantage. Baptism, whether compulsory or not, was indelible. The enforced converts were at last within the pale of Christian authority. A new field of activity was thus opened to the Holy Office, which, if skillfully cultivated, might be ultimately made to result in an extension of the edict of 1502 from Castile to the Eastern Kingdoms.

Some years elapsed, however, before the Inquisition was able to carry this ambitious program into effect. The institution had not been in a flourishing condition since the death of Queen Isabella in 1504.
The Archduke Philip had been notoriously lax in his attitude towards unbelievers. Ferdinand was certainly no enthusiast for persecution. Charles and Adrian had been very moderate. The Holy Office was not incited to activity from high quarters, and there was a palpable lack of fuel to feed the flames. Even in Valencia there promised to be many difficulties. The traditions of that region were averse to intolerance; the nobles, needing the labor of their Moorish tenants, were certain to oppose; even the Valencian clergy were not unanimous in their support. Everything really depended on the attitude of Charles. Fanatic by nature he emphatically was not; moreover in 1518 he had solemnly sworn to abide by the promise of Ferdinand the Catholic not to extend to the Eastern Kingdoms the edict of 1502. On the other hand, he was profoundly conscious of his responsibilities as temporal head of Christendom; he had openly declared against heresy at Worms and had sanctioned the burning of Lutherans in the Netherlands. In the year 1524 he applied to Pope Clement VII for license to transgress his oath of six years before; and the desired permission was immediately granted, though it was not until he heard of the great victory of Pavia that Charles decided to avail himself of it. Some signal act of faith was obviously demanded of him as an evidence of his gratitude to God for this ‘crowning mercy’; and it was by the ‘purification’ of the realms of the Crown of Aragon that the Emperor elected to perform it. On November 3, 1525, all the Moors of those kingdoms were given the naked alternative of accepting Christianity or being exiled; and they were discouraged from making the latter choice, by the usual regulation that they must depart from some distant port, and by the granting of a wholly inadequate time in which to reach it. As was the case with Castile in 1502, the edict was virtually a sentence of conversion or death.

It is no wonder that the edict encountered resistance. The more vigorous of the Moors retired into the mountains, where they kept up a continuous guerrilla warfare for some months; whether owing to lack of skill or reluctance to fight, the local Spanish troops were unable to put them down, and the work had finally to be accomplished by Charles’s German landsknechts. The suppression of the revolt kept Valencia in an uproar; after it was over there was no one left to till the fields, and agriculture for the time being was brought to a standstill. Foreign trade had also suffered cruelly of late, owing to the results of the discovery of the New World; the wealth of the cities was being seized by insatiable crown agents, and the mass of the Valencians were hard put to it to find a living. Bitter indeed must have been the thoughts of the old men, who could look back to the days of splendor and prosperity in the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous. If Charles realized the situation, he took little pains to remedy it. No part of his Iberian dominions had such grounds for complaint of him as Valencia; not improbably for that very reason it was the one that he elected to ignore. It is not without significance that after his recognition by the Valencian Cortes of 1528, he visited the kingdom only once in his whole life—in the month of December 1542.

The rising of the Valencian Moriscos, like all the other rebellions which we have examined; had its connection with the activities of Charles’s foreign foes, and therefore a direct bearing on the development of the Spanish Empire. Hitherto Charles had not been able to give much attention to the Turkish peril, owing to the pressure of his other affairs. The war with France and his responsibilities in Spain, in Germany, and in the Netherlands had demanded all his time. He had delegated the defense of Hungary to his brother Ferdinand, and, despite the reiterated protests of his Iberian subjects, he had taken but little pains with the fortification of the Spanish coasts. Barbarossa, on the other hand, had become increasingly active. He was constantly improving his position in North Africa; and in response to the prayers of the Valencian Moriscos that he aid them to escape to the Barbary coasts, he launched numerous expeditions against the southern shores of Spain. The climax of these raids came in 1529, and was enough to show Charles that the growth of the power of the infidel in the Mediterranean constituted a problem which he could no longer afford to ignore. It was but another instance of the Emperor’s being brought round to an appreciation of the Iberian point of view.
CHAPTER XXIII
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

The internal history of Spain under the Emperor Charles V is curiously barren of dramatic events, after the suppression of the two great rebellions at the beginning of the reign. The constitutional and economic aspects of the period, on the other hand, are of far-reaching importance. They illustrate from beginning to end the difficulties of reconciling Charles’s duties as Emperor and head of the house of Hapsburg with his responsibilities as monarch of the Spanish kingdoms, as most of his Iberian subjects originally conceived of them. That another open conflict was avoided, and that the complaints grew fewer as the reign went on, are a tribute to the Emperor’s sagacity and tact. The position he had inherited was beset with difficulties. It was a marvel that he managed as well as he did. But the same facts also go to prove that Spain’s imperial education was steadily progressing. More and more did she feel the thrill of world power; wider and wider grew the horizons of her ambition. Her role in the whole matter was doubtless predominantly passive. She was not asked to share the responsibility, so much as to vote the necessary funds. Her greatness was rather thrust upon her than deliberately striven for and attained. Nevertheless she gloried in it, accepting it as her high destiny with characteristic fatalism, seeking now no longer to limit and restrain her sovereign, but only to Hispanicize his originally Hapsburg point of view. And in this final endeavor she met with a fair measure of success. The full fruits of her efforts were not gathered until the succeeding reign, but the Emperor grew steadily closer to his Spanish subjects, and finally retired to the peninsula to die.

Charles took every opportunity to cultivate and strengthen these imperial aspirations. His subjects had seen only the darker side of his rule on the occasion of his first visit to the peninsula; he now proposed that they should realize its glories. The contemporary authors describe in glowing terms “the exceedingly imposing court and assembly of magnates” which he held at Toledo in the summer of 1525, on the occasion of the meeting of the Cortes of Castile, just before King Francis was brought a prisoner to Madrid. Thither came ambassadors from France “to treat of the liberation of their King”, from England, from Portugal, from Russia, and the Italian states; there were the papal legate and the Grand Master of Rhodes with forty knights commanders; there were representatives of the Moorish kingdoms of North Africa and even legates from the distant Shah of Persia, “in such wise that the Court of the Emperor was one of the most notable that was ever held by Prince of Spain.” Spectacles such as this could not fail to impress the mass of the people. Their longings for a return to the simple ways of the Catholic Kings were temporarily forgotten in their pride at such a display of imperial power. Had they realized what was happening at the same time in another quarter of the globe, their enthusiasm would have been greater still. It was in the preceding November that Francisco Pizarro set sail on the voyage of discovery which was to lead to the conquest of the great empire of Peru; the wealth of the Incas was soon to be available, to support the position of Spain in Western Europe. In many ways the year 1525 saw Charles’s power at the pinnacle of its greatness.

In one respect the Emperor’s views of his position and policy had now veered around into full accord with the desires of Spain. From the time of his first visit in 1517, he had been constantly besought to marry in the peninsula; and the Cortes of 1525 ventured to express the hope that his bride would be his cousin Isabella, the sister of the king of Portugal. Hitherto Charles had responded noncommittally to these requests. Indeed, under the circumstances he could hardly have done otherwise, for he had been almost continuously betrothed to one princess or another, since the days of his infancy in the Netherlands. First it had been Mary Tudor, who afterwards wedded Louis XII; afterwards Claude and later Louise of France; then, with the English alliance of 1522-23, it was Mary, the daughter of Henry VIII, who was later to marry the Emperor’s son Philip, and reign for five sorrowful years in England. But the English alliance had grown much weaker of late. Henry VIII had been tardy and inefficient in the war; he and Wolsey were plainly disturbed by the completeness of the Emperor’s triumph at Pavia; in midsummer of 1525 it became clear that the marriage of Charles and Mary would have to be given up. The whole course of events had shown Charles the danger of any permanent entanglement with either France or England. Whichever was neglected would be sure to bear a grudge; the political situation shifted almost every day; clearly it was the part of wisdom to keep his hands free. On the other side, the advantages of a Portuguese marriage were daily becoming more obvious. Besides
satisfying the desires of the Spaniards, whom he wished to please, it would be the logical continuation of the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella. It would be another step on the road to that Pan-Iberian unity which, despite all the bickerings and hostilities of the past, the mass of his subjects had not ceased to desire. Moreover, it would be most advantageous from a financial point of view. The Portugal of John III was far richer than that of Emmanuel the Fortunate. The treasures of the Orient poured incessantly into Lisbon; and when the marriage of Isabella and the Emperor was finally arranged, the bride’s dowry was fixed at 900,000 ducats. The wedding took place at Seville on March 10, 1526; and the inscriptions on the seven triumphal arches which were erected for the occasion reflect Spain’s high hopes of the lasting benefits that it was expected to confer.

The spring, summer, and autumn months which followed his marriage were probably the happiest of Charles’s whole life. His union with Isabella had been dictated by policy, not affection; in fact, he wrote to his brother Ferdinand that he wedded her to get her dowry and an acceptable representative when he had to be away. But the Emperor was to be more fortunate in his marriage than he knew; for besides the financial and political advantages, he had the additional satisfaction of falling in love with his wife. His nature was not romantic. The cares of state weighed ceaselessly upon him and left scant space for the development of his affections. But he yearned for sympathy, loyalty, and devotion, and these Isabella afforded him in full measure. Though slight and pale, she bore herself like an Empress; her head and her heart were both in the right place; she was, as a contemporary justly observed, “of the sort that men say ought to be married”. Certainly she was an ideal companion for Charles. Though he had married her in part to get a regent in his absence, he was to find it unexpectedly difficult to bring himself to leave her side. Most of their honeymoon was spent at Granada, where they took refuge from the great heats of the valley of the Guadalquivir. It was the first time that Charles had visited Andalusia, and he gazed with wonder and delight on what he saw. The news from France was increasingly disquieting, and finally in December he had to return to the North, but he never forgot those happy days on the Alhambra hill, “so that though he was well satisfied with all the cities of his kingdom, it was Granada that gave him the most pleasure of all.”

It was but natural that the reign of Charles should bring with it extensive changes in the administration of the Spanish dominions. In the first place, he personified the union of the crowns as Ferdinand and Isabella had never been able to do. He was neither primarily Castilian nor Aragonese. If his visits to the western kingdom were more prolonged, those that he paid to the realms of the crown of Aragon were more frequent. It was from them that he received the most sympathetic support in the many difficult problems which confronted him in Italy and the Mediterranean, just as it was to the Castilians that he turned for the affairs of the Indies. He regarded Spain as a whole in a way that his predecessors had never done. He did not contemplate a fusion of the different kingdoms that composed it; but there is plenty of evidence that he sought to diminish the dissimilarities, and to improve one realm in the light of the others.

Not only was it natural that the idea of Spanish unity should be measurably advanced by the reign of Charles V; it was also inevitable that the new sovereign should regard all his Spanish dominions as forming a part of a still larger whole—the far flung possessions of the house of Hapsburg. But he did not attempt to give effect to that conception until the very last—till he was flushed with his triumph over the Lutherans in the Empire. He saw that his possessions naturally fell into two different groups, a Northern and a Southern, a German and a Spanish; and after his first hard lesson in 1517-20, he comprehended the difficulties and the dangers of combining them. For more than a quarter of a century after his return in 1522, one is conscious that he felt constrained to keep them apart; the emphasis falls first on the South and then on the North, according to the demands of the political situation; but the perilous experiment of a closer combination was not repeated till 1548, when Prince Philip was called to Germany for the succession in the Empire, and his cousin Maximilian went as regent into Spain. One observes the same thing in Charles’s political appointments, though here there is a slight preponderance in favor of the Spaniards. His representatives in the Empire and the Netherlands—his brother Ferdinand, his aunt Margaret, and his sister Mary—had all lived in the peninsula and been subjected to its influence; while his Italian and Mediterranean possessions were kept exclusively in Spanish hands. Separate administration for the two great groups into which his dominions were divided, with alternating emphasis, but a tendency to favor Spain, seems to have been the keynote of Charles’s policy down to 1548. A closer examination of the methods and details of his government will furnish numerous illustrations of this underlying principle.

It was during the period of Charles’s second visit to the peninsula that Spain first came to occupy the center of the stage. Everything combined in these years to give her the predominance. It was the
period of Charles’s longest stay in the peninsula, the period of his marriage and the birth of his son, the period of monarchical triumph after the suppression of two dangerous rebellions. The focus of political interest was the war with France, which was being fought, in some measure, by Spanish veterans; and the scene of the greatest battles and of the Emperor’s most notable triumph was in that Italy where the Spanish power was gradually attaining the upper hand. The Emperor’s chief adviser was the Piedmontese Gattinara, whose hatred of the French made him favorable to Spain, and who also took a lively interest in problems of internal government, as is proved by his famous “Instruction” of 1523. The growing menace of the sea power of Barbarossa was another factor to keep Charles’s attention in the South, while the startling revelations of the wealth of the Indies afforded a fresh demonstration of the importance of his Iberian dominions. By the time that he departed in August, 1529, for his coronation at Bologna by Pope Clement VII, the bitter memories of his first visit to Spain must have been wellnigh obliterated. Spain had given proof of her loyalty and power. She had served and supported him far more effectively than his Northern dominions.

In 1530, however, there came a change. Gattinara died in June of that year, and his successor as chief minister was the Burgundian Nicolas Perrenot de Granvelle, who was primarily interested in the affairs of Central Europe, and is even said to have striven to make Charles live in the North. During the next twenty years, in which Granvelle’s influence steadily increased, the Emperor was most of the time absent from Spain. The center of political interest had shifted to the North, to the campaigns against the Turk on the Danube, and France in the Netherlands, and still more to the struggle against the Lutherans in the Empire. It was therefore almost inevitable that Spanish affairs should fall into the background, but Charles took great pains to see that they were not neglected. Moreover he was resolved to have Spanish advice, and obtained it from his secretary, Francisco de los Cobos, who enjoyed his fullest confidence throughout most of his reign. To all intents and purposes, he was as powerful as Granvelle. “The Emperor has two principal counsellors, and in fact only two, who transact all the business of all his states, Cobos and Granvelle”, wrote the Venetian Navagiero in 1546; “Cobos is the guardian of your Majesty’s honor and secrets and knows how to accomplish what your Majesty leaves undone”, declared the Emperor’s confessor in 1530. “All the affairs of Italy, the Indies, and Spain passed under his hand for many years,” wrote another contemporary who knew him well. None of Charles’s other secretaries attained such influence as Cobos; we are specifically told that he overrode the Fleming, John Lallemant, who personified Burgundian influence at the Emperor’s court; and his ascendency is good evidence of the importance Charles attached to the Spanish point of view. One very unambiguous characteristic which Cobos shared with Granvelle was his extraordinary venality. “Neither of them is of very noble birth,” wrote the vigilant Navagiero, “but both have been nourished and made great by their master, in such wise that with their greatness they have acquired wealth; Cobos has an income of perhaps 70,000 ducats”. “He took presents right and left, whereby he became excessively rich,” wrote Gomara, in a characterization at the time of his death; “he even took away offices and benefices and pensions from those to whom the Emperor wished to give them, in order to bestow them on those whom he himself appointed ... and at last even the Emperor got wind of it”. He did not accompany Charles on his last journey into the Empire, but died at Ubeda, his birthplace, in 1547.

Since Charles’s position and responsibilities were primarily international, it is natural to inquire how far the great system of councils, which had been established in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, was given any influence in non-Spanish affairs. The councilors were naturally anxious to offer their opinions, and the Emperor did not discourage this tendency; he was even willing to delude them on occasions with the semblance of an authority which he had no intention they should actually possess. For this purpose he made use of the body of grandees—highest in rank but by no means in importance—which came to be known as the Council of State. Under Ferdinand and Isabella it had been amorphous and irregular, but in 1526 Charles gave it definite existence, “to discuss the most important matters concerning the government of Spain and of Germany”; its members at this time were Alonso de Fonseca, archbishop of Toledo, the Chancellor Gattinara, Count Henry of Nassau, the Dukes of Alva and Bejar, and the bishops of Osma and Jaen. That a body so composed should be asked to treat of German affairs seems extraordinary. It is barely possible that Charles really wanted to try the experiment, but far more probable that he was merely seeking to flatter the magnates; at any rate when he found that the new body only served to arouse the jealousy of those who were not included, he promptly dismissed it, five months later, at Valladolid. The Council, however, did not go out of existence; it is even said that Charles subsequently referred to it as “the knowledge, power, and understanding, the eyes, hands, and feet of the monarch, since it aims to preserve the obedience of the Holy Catholic Roman Church and of the Pope who presides over it, the observance of religion and of the Catholic Faith and the defense of the one and of the other, universal justice and order, the maintenance of the peace and tranquility of kingdoms; sometimes making war, when it is expedient, by attacking the foe, or
if occasion demands by repelling his assaults, and at others by concluding peace”. But the attribution of such extensive powers cannot fail to arouse suspicion of their genuineness. In the conduct of war the Council was not without influence; the Consejo de Guerra, to which contemporaries refer, was probably at this stage simply the Consejo de Estado, sitting in a military capacity, or else a committee of some of its members, reinforced, on occasion, by the addition of certain generals. But in other respects the Council was largely a sham. It was a means of conferring a social distinction, for its members could boast that they were in constant attendance upon the monarch and accompanied him on his journeys into Italy and the Empire; but it was utterly lacking in political authority. The men who composed it were far too narrow in their outlook to be useful as advisers in international affairs; non tali auxilio was Hapsburg supremacy to be maintained in Western Europe. The decisions were made by the Emperor and his chief ministers; if the Council of State was consulted at all, it was merely asked to ratify what the monarch had already done.

With the Council of Castile or Consejo Real, on the other hand, we have an entirely different situation. It inherited from the Catholic Kings a reputation of high authority and great efficiency; it had dealt with every phase of the government of the Western Kingdom. In the reign of the Emperor, it might have been expected to rise higher still, for Charles’s frequent absences gave it an unusual chance to gain independence of the crown. That it proved incapable of taking full advantage of this opportunity was due to Charles’s determination to keep the power in his own hands, and to the lack of initiative of the councilors whom he appointed.

The question of its composition was obviously of the first importance; in fact the Comuneros, at the height of their power, recognizing the nature and extent of its authority, essayed to transform it into a semi-representative institution. They planned that it should contain one member from each of the thirty-two bishoprics of Castile, each member being appointed for life by the king from a list of three elected in the diocese; each member was to be a letrado of proved ability and character, and at least forty years of age. But these far-reaching schemes naturally failed of realization, and the Council survived on its ancient footing. The Emperor on his return sought information concerning its membership, and obtained it from his confidant, the chronicler Carvajal, in a document which has been preserved. The Council at that period numbered no less than sixteen—a president, the archbishop of Granada; fourteen councilors; and a fiscal—three more than were prescribed by the Cortes of 1480. The aristocratic element was even smaller than before. Save for the archbishop, who was of the Rojas and Manriques, only one—Alonso de Castilla—belonged to the higher nobility; a few of the rest were hidalgos, but most of them were of much lower origin; the letrado and man of affairs were in general predominant. Illegitimate birth was no disqualification for membership, but lack of limpieza was a serious drawback; the ancient prejudices in regard to this latter point persisted, undiminished, throughout the sixteenth century. Carvajal gives us precious details concerning the personalities of the different councilors. Two of them in his opinion were too old for their jobs; two others were of such character that he felt they should be gotten rid of; in regard to the rest his comments were generally favorable.

The Emperor diminished the number of members of the Council; it is impossible to follow the process in detail, but at the end of the reign it was scarcely half as large as at the beginning. The Cortes of 1551 registered a vigorous protest. “The councilors are so aged and infirm at the time of their appointment”, runs the initial petition of the Cortes of 1551, “that they cannot perform the work that is laid before them. And, moreover, your Majesty takes two of them with you when you are absent from these realms, so that with these absences and indispositions there are usually present but six or seven”. During the whole of Charles’s reign, the presidency remained in the hands of ecclesiastics. Juan de Tavera, archbishop of Santiago, followed Antonio de Rojas, archbishop of Granada, in 1524; fifteen years later he was succeeded by Hernando Valdes, archbishop of Seville, who in turn gave way to Antonio de Fonseca, bishop of Pamplona: not till the hitter’s death in 1557 was the office again conferred upon a layman, Juan de Vega, Señor de Grajal, who had already won distinction as ambassador to the Vatican, and later as viceroy of Sicily. All of these were thoroughly reliable men, but none had any great ability or initiative. They would conscientiously fulfil any order they received, but they were entirely incapable of striking out a line of their own. The sum total of these details is extremely significant. The Emperor did not propose to have any rival to his authority, especially when he was obliged to be absent from Castile. At all costs the Council must be kept subordinate to the monarchy; docility was preferable to originality or leadership. It was a principle that Charles applied in all sorts of different places; most unfortunately it was to be inherited and intensified by his successors, and the effect upon the Spanish Empire was little short of disastrous. It deprived the nation of experience of imperial responsibility; it imposed duties on the king which should have been delegated to others; it goes far to explain why Spain so easily went to pieces when pitted against rivals of freer development.
If Charles guarded the crown against the independence of the Council, he took no pains to protect the other organs of the body politic from conciliar encroachments. The Council was, after all, far closer to the monarchy than any other institution in Castile; and the Emperor tended, if anything, to increase its responsibilities so long as the royal authority remained unchallenged over all. The Council had always far more work than it could do, as is abundantly proved by the petitions of the Cortes. “We beg your Majesty,” runs the cuaderno of 1528, “that the Consejo restrict itself to the administration of justice and the government of these realms, because its preoccupation with other matters renders it incapable of appreciating the afflictions of the republic.” The accumulation of untried suits was the worst grievance of all. It had for a long time been the established custom that in civil cases of the highest importance, an appeal could be carried from the audiencias to the Consejo, if the appellant would deposit 1500 ducats, to be forfeited in case the former verdict was confirmed. But the Council had apparently taken cognizance of many other suits besides—far more in fact than it had opportunity to hear—and the Cortes complained again and again. “We beseech your Majesty to command the Consejo not to deal in the future with ordinary suits but to send them on to the audiencia,” so runs the request, which in one form or another incessantly reappears. The Emperor’s replies were generally favorable but insufficiently specific, and the arrears of business continued to pile up. There was also much criticism of the character and industry of the councilors. Charles was asked to see that there were on hand during the hours of business; to forbid them to hold any other salaried office, or to marry their daughters to those who brought suits before them; and to invalidate all decisions bearing less than four signatures.

As a foreigner, Charles found it specially necessary to get advice on the assignment of crown pensions, the distribution of the royal patronage, and the exercise of the pardoning power. All these matters would ordinarily have been settled by the monarch in consultation with his most intimate advisers; but Charles, on his first arrival, knew Castile far too little for this; so he naturally sought guidance from the Consejo Real. Since it was obviously unnecessary to consult all the members, it soon became the practice to hand over all such questions to a committee composed of the president and three or four other councilors; such was the origin of the Camara Real de Castilla. Ordinances of 1518, 1523, and 1528 define its functions. It was, in effect, nothing more than a section of the Council of Castile, occupying a position in relation to it similar to that of the Consejo de Guerra in relation to the Consejo de Estado. It referred all contentious points to the Council of Castile, and in case of an appeal against any of its decisions, the matter in question remained in suspense till the parent body had pronounced final judgment.

A document is preserved in the National Library at Madrid which sheds valuable light on the activities of the Consejo Real, and the attitude of Spain towards the policy of Charles. It is entitled “Advice which the Consejo at different times has given on general affairs”; it covers the years 1528-49—a period when the Emperor was often away. Most of it is concerned with internal matters—delays of justice, clerical abuses, excessive pensions, taxation, loans, inflation of prices, reforms of the coinage, local fueros, hunting rights, and the breed of horses. The old dread of the foreigner continually crops out; it manifests itself chiefly in ecclesiastical affairs and is involved with the national relations to the Pope and his nuncios. “We have seen the letter,” writes the Council in 1541, “which the Marquis of Aguilar, your ambassador at the court of Rome, has written to your Majesty in regard to the proposal of his Holiness in Consistory, concerning the laws and pragmáticas of these realms, providing that foreigners shall hold no benefices or pensions, and concerning the bulls of Sixtus and of other illustrious pontiffs in favor of those born in these kingdoms; and that his Holiness proposes to issue a bull of general revocation, on the plea that other Christian princes have done prejudice to the authority of the see apostolic, in the matter of provision to benefices ... We are truly amazed that such things can be for it can be truthfully averred that nowhere in Christendom is there such a respect for the Holy See as in these kingdoms ... and it would be well that his Holiness should be plainly and immediately informed, that no such injustice should be permitted to take place in this most fortunate period of the reign of your Majesty, whom God has made greater than any of your predecessors, and so faithful a defender of the Holy See”. “We have examined”, runs the advice of 1546, “his Holiness’s declaration of the fourth of May of the present year in regard to the power of the nuncios who are sent here, and it seems to us most injurious. The enforcing of it will cause many suits and vexations for the subjects of your Majesty who have been provided with benefices, and have spent their money for the sending of the bulls and the graces.... Your Majesty would do well to write to his Holiness, that this declaration should be void and of no effect.”

The Council’s attitude towards the Cortes is also noteworthy. It evidently regarded them solely as a means of obtaining money and recognized the nullity of their political power. On April 6, 1532, Charles wrote to the Council to ask its advice about summoning the national assembly to provide funds for the war against the Turks. “We have considered at length your Majesty’s proposal,” came back the cautious
reply, “and we well know your Majesty’s zeal for the service of God and the defense of the Christian faith, but in the calling of the Cortes there are certain inconveniences of which your Majesty is well advised.” Thirteen years later, when the Emperor repeated his request, the Council was more specific. “Since the remedy and aid which are afforded to your Majesty by the Cortes is simply through the servicio, which falls on the working man and tax-payer, and since ... we are poor by reason of these lean years and the heavy floods and the ordinary and extraordinary servicios which we must pay till 1548 ... all this seems a just cause for not asking for another, which it will be impossible to pay ...; and therefore it seems best to the Council to postpone the summoning of the Cortes until your Majesty’s return.”

But the Council did not restrict its advice to matters within the realm; it not seldom expressed its mind about foreign affairs. It gave its opinion about the plan that Charles should settle his differences with the king of France by a personal encounter; it was certain that the “Emperor had responded to the challenge in such wise as to satisfy the honor and state of his royal and imperial person, and as a gentleman of noble lineage was bound to do”; and that the king of France had failed to do likewise, “since he was plainly and openly seen to refuse to fight”. It took a lively interest in the relations with Portugal in the regions of the Canaries and the West African coast, and in the maintenance of the navigation acts of the realm against Holland and Zeeland. It expressed its disapproval of a request of the “books from Germany ... be not brought and sold in these realms, and that the documents the Council is commanded to restrict its activities to the administration of justice, and is April 20, 1522, at Brussels, confirmed the organization, which his grandfather had set up. In both

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desire and Catholic piety that inspire his royal heart,” and hopes that he may be the means of

learned persons examine such as are already here in the hands of the printers and booksellers.” The Council, in the same year, seeks to dissuade Charles from visiting the Barbary coast; “to trade with the infidel is a disservice to God, and many Christians have been taken and imprisoned thereby; since your subjects in this realm have been forbidden to go thither, it seems just that the same should be done in this case.”

The dread of Lutheran contamination is extraordinary. The Emperor is begged in 1531 to command that “books from Germany ... be not brought and sold in these realms, and that the corregridores and other learned persons examine such as are already here in the hands of the printers and booksellers.” The Council, in the same year, seeks to dissuade Charles from visiting the Empire; it recognizes “the holy desire and Catholic piety that inspire his royal heart,” and hopes that he may be the means of confounding the authors of “such poisonous innovations, opinions, and heresies, with devilish and damnable purposes,” but it holds his plan of going into Germany to be “most perilous and doubtful, and very uncertain in the events that it may bring forth”; it confidently asserts that “these realms are your Majesty’s principal home, your safest seat, and surest abode, which can render your Majesty better and more powerful aid than any other part of the world in the accomplishment of your high designs.” It was horrified at the thought of any compromise with heretics, such as was not seldom proposed in the middle of the reign. “We beg your Majesty not to admit them to the faith, under any condition or pretext whatsoever, nor in any way to dissimulate or indirectly to give them countenance.”

Much less can be learned of the Council of Aragon, which in theory performed for the Eastern Kingdoms the same functions that the Council of Castile fulfilled in the Western. It had been instituted, it will be remembered, by Ferdinand the Catholic on November 19, 1494; and Charles, in a decree dated April 20, 1522, at Brussels, confirmed the organization, which his grandfather had set up. In both documents the Council is commanded to restrict its activities to the administration of justice, and is forbidden, in general terms, to deal with other matters without the express permission of the crown; the sovereign obviously regarded it as a court of highest appeal for the regions concerned, while the Council sought to extend its authority into political affairs. How far Charles succeeded in checking this last tendency, it were difficult to determine; certainly while the cosmopolitan Gattinara was at the head of the Council of Aragon, it is hard to believe that it can have limited itself entirely to the administration of justice. A kindred problem, on which there is also little light, is that of the territories which came under its jurisdiction. There is no direct evidence in the pragmáticas of 1494 or of 1522 that its authority reached into the tierras de allà mar; yet on the other hand Sicily had been incorporated with the realms of the crown of Aragon since 1460; and there is a passage in Pulgar which leads one to believe that Sicilians took part in the Council’s deliberations. There was also apparently an Italian—one Jacopo da Bologna—among its members in 1522; and it will furthermore be observed that it was not till the year 1555 that a ‘Council of Italy’ was formally set up “and definitely separated from that of Aragon.” The sum total of all these details would seem to indicate that the Council of Aragon exercised a somewhat wider influence during the Emperor’s reign, both in the nature and the territorial extent of its authority, than would be deduced from a strict interpretation of the pragmáticas of 1494 and 1522; with the material, which is at present at our disposal, it is unfortunately impossible to be more specific. In contrast to the Council of Castile, it was not always resident in Spain, but accompanied the Emperor on his different journeys, a fact which bears out the theory that its functions were more cosmopolitan than would at first appear.

There is occasional reference in the documents of the period to the Emperor’s Consejo Privado—or Privy Council—and a manuscript in the National Library at Madrid explains what it was and why it was so called. This document is a translation, made after the Emperor’s death, of two ordinances drawn
up by him, the first at Middleburg in the Netherlands, January 23, 1517, appointing his aunt Margaret as regent of the Low Countries, and establishing a Council to help and advise her; the second at Brussels, October 1, 1531, proclaiming the selection of his sister Mary as her successor and giving further instructions in regard to the said Council. Its composition was almost exclusively Flemish; and it was thus natural that it should come to be called ‘privy’ by the Spaniards, since none of them was aware of what was transacted therein. As it was resident in the Netherlands, they knew little or nothing about it, but since it referred all doubtful matters directly to the Emperor, he generally kept certain Netherlanders in attendance upon him, to get the benefit of their advice when the situation demanded it; and it would appear that the name of Consejo de Flandes did not emerge till after the Emperor had abdicated and Philip had assumed control; its advent was the signal for the beginning of a new policy, and the placing of the Low Countries under Spanish administration.

The history of the Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms, particularly those of Castile, in the reign of Charles V, has been the subject of much recent discussion among historians. The Castilian Cortes met at least fifteen times during the reign; the General Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon six times at Monzón; those of the county of Catalonia twice; and those of Aragon and Valencia once each. The Emperor’s pressing financial needs, for the support of his wars on land and on sea, were doubtless the chief reason for the frequency of these meetings, and gave the popular representatives an opportunity of expressing their views, which it is probable that Charles would otherwise have been unwilling to accord them. Yet it is only fair to add that the Emperor strove to make the best of the situation with which he was confronted. He realized that there was much good other than financial, to be derived by an absolute sovereign from the meetings of a representative body; this is clearly demonstrated by the history of his government in the Netherlands, where he used the States General “as a symbol and practicable basis for common action” by the united provinces. In Spain he could improve one assembly in the light of another, and bring the heterogeneous institutions of the peninsula into some sort of alignment. Above all he could rearrange the collection of the subsidies, in such wise as to make the national representatives share the odium of the taxation which he was forced to impose. A parallel may be drawn here to the parliamentary history of the reign of his contemporary Henry VIII, who, having found after twenty years’ experience that he could not get on without the national assembly, kept it almost constantly in session from 1529 to 1547, and thus committed the English nation to the great changes of those momentous years. Where the parallel fails is in the ultimate results. While the Parliament in England took advantage of the situation to fortify its authority beyond the possibility of overthrow, the Cortes had been so enfeebled by the developments of the previous half century, and were so generally deficient in political sagacity, that the end of the reign found them far weaker than the beginning.

In the realms of the crown of Aragon, one is struck with the frequency of the sessions of the General Cortes of all three kingdoms, and the rarity of those of the estates of each of the component parts. The former met just twice as many times as in the preceding reign; the latter less than one-third as often. The obvious explanation of this is that Charles was too busy to visit all three capitals, and saved time by summoning the representatives of the three realms to their traditional meeting place at Monzón. But it is also natural to suppose that he hoped to find in the General Cortes of the three Eastern Kingdoms, just as in the States General of the Netherlands, a useful means of combating separatism. It will be remembered, moreover, that the General Cortes were general only in name—a juxtaposition, but not a fusion of the three separate assemblies—and that one of them not seldom refused what the other two were willing to accord, so that the Emperor had to deal, to all intents and purposes, with three different bodies. Like many of his predecessors, he was to find it wellnigh impossible to make headway against the accumulated weight of long centuries of Spanish tradition.

In dealing with the Cortes of these Eastern Kingdoms and attempting to induce them to vote him funds, Charles was forced to observe all the elaborate regulations by which their rights and privileges were traditionally safeguarded, and their liberties protected against the encroachment of the crown. Nowhere else in all his dominions did he encounter the same measure of constitutional opposition; but he made no serious effort to overthrow or evade it, though his patience was often severely tried. As an offset to this difficulty, he had reason to expect that the position, traditions, and commercial leanings of the Eastern Kingdoms—more especially, of course, of the principality of Catalonia—would render them more alive to the necessities of his foreign policy than could be expected of proverbially self-centered Castile. It was primarily through the realms of the crown of Aragon that Charles had fallen heir to his Mediterranean responsibilities. They were near the seat of the Italian wars. Catalonia and Valencia were exposed to Turkish raids. But the Emperor was to discover that these cosmopolitan influences were of
little consequence when weighed in the balance against the preservation of the national privileges. The sums that he could extract from the General Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon were never large, and one-third of the amount voted was almost invariably set aside for internal purposes. In 1528 the Aragonese voted him 200,000 pounds of Barcelona, the Valencians 100,000 pounds, and the Catalans, who felt that their privileges had been infringed, nothing at all. In 1533 the sum total was about 550,000 ducats, and there seems no evidence that the subsequent sessions made larger grants. And in order to obtain even these comparatively modest amounts, the Emperor was forced to subject himself to conditions which most of his fellow sovereigns would have regarded as intolerable: long continued sojournings in unattractive spots, sanctioning of much legislation of which he wholeheartedly disapproved, incessant repetitions of promises to respect the fueros. The constitutional arrangements of the Eastern Kingdoms were in fact a glaring anachronism in the monarchical atmosphere of the sixteenth century. That Charles took such pains to avoid collisions with them is at once a proof of his need for funds, and a tribute to his tact and to his respect for tradition.

And yet despite all such vexations and delays, the Emperor was fully alive to the strong points of his East Spanish subjects; in fact it is impossible to resist the conviction that he found them, in some respects, more congenial than the Castilians. They had not revolted against him in his absence in any way comparable to the rising of the Comuneros; their cosmopolitan traditions gave them a far wider outlook; Charles felt that they might be brought to a sympathetic comprehension of his policy, in a way that was impossible for the representatives of the Western Kingdom. Even out of the constitutional prerogatives of the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon, Charles recognized that it might be possible for him to derive advantages. Claims to control connoted the assumption of responsibility, and the burden of raising and collecting the taxes was a responsibility of which the Emperor was heartily tired. In the Eastern Kingdoms the Diputados de las Cortes relieved him of a large share of this onerous function; and the provision that one-third of the sums regularly granted should be devoted to the purposes of internal government, and consequently be left in the hands of the Cortes, suggested the introduction of certain changes in Castile. It is needless to add that he had not the slightest intention of giving to the representatives of the Western Kingdom any such measure of control over the granting of subsidies as had been inherited by the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon. In Castile he had virtually the right of arbitrary taxation; and realizing what an enormous advantage this was to the crown, he was by no means minded to part with it. But if, by the adoption of a few of the arrangements with which he had become acquainted in the Eastern Kingdoms, he could modify the methods of collecting the funds, he might both educate and gratify his Castilian subjects, and at the same time improve his own financial condition. He would rid himself of a host of dishonest tax-farmers, whose extortions and peculations were a disgrace to the realm. He would comply with some of the most oft repeated requests which had been addressed to him, since his accession, by the Cortes of the Western Kingdom. He might even hope to win popularity for himself and sympathetic comprehension of his financial and political needs.

It was with the Cortes of Toledo in the year 1525 that Charles determined to try such an experiment. The relations between sovereign and assembly were unusually cordial. Both were naturally elated by the great victory of Pavia. The Emperor was soon to relieve the anxieties of his subjects by marrying the Infanta Isabella of Portugal, and the procuradores, to show their gratitude, voted Charles an extraordinary grant of 150,000,000 maravedis. The time was ripe for an attempt to get into closer touch with the representatives of the realm, to devise new means to promote the common welfare; and Charles essayed to accomplish these ends in two different ways. In the first place he gave permission to the procuradores to elect two of their number as a Comisión Permanente, on the model of Aragon, to remain at his court and watch over the fulfilment of his promises to the Cortes; and 200,000 maravedis were voted by the procuradores to defray the expenses of this new body. In the second he offered to abandon the alcabala, or tax on sales—whose blighting effect had been recognized for years past and whose yield had been regularly sold to the tax-farmers—and also the tercias, or clerical contribution, in return for a so-called encabezamiento, or general tax on individuals, to be collected by the different cities of the realm, which in turn were to pay definite sums to the crown. He placed the amount of these sums so high that the Cortes for the time being declined his proposal; but most of the cities made separate contracts with the government, so that the arrangement went into immediate effect for the greater part of the realm. Charles had shown his willingness to meet the representatives of the nation halfway, but he did not intend to have his revenues diminished; in fact, in the form in which his offer was first made, he expected that it would result in substantially increasing them.

Further light upon the Emperor’s policy and aims in regard to the national assembly of the Western Kingdom is afforded by the history of the Cortes of 1527. These were summoned to Valladolid for February 12; and this time Charles invited the representatives of the nobles and the clergy to take their
places beside the procuradores of the cities. This had not occurred, save on formal occasions, since 1480; Charles obviously desired to see if the two upper orders could be induced to bear their share in contributing to his needs, but the specific purpose for which he asked support awoke no response in the hearts of the assembly. It was primarily for a Turkish war that Charles desired funds; but it was also plainly obvious that his attention was directed rather to the Danube valley and the Hungarian plains than to the waters of the Mediterranean and the shores of North Africa. His brother-in-law, King Louis, had been slain at Mohacs; his brother, Ferdinand, was at the end of his resources; it looked as if the Sultan would advance, without let or hindrance, to Vienna. But all this was too remote to be of interest to Castile. It was in vain that Charles insisted that it was identically the same enemy that threatened the Iberian shores and the North African presidios—a menace to Christendom and the traditional foe of Spain. No one of the assembled estates could be made to see it in that light. The nobles asserted that if the Emperor went in person to the war, their lives and their property were at the service of his Majesty, but they would not consent to be taxed like pecheros. The attitude of the clergy was only slightly more encouraging. The Order of St. Benedict offered 12,000 doblones, and the Military Orders one-fifth of their encomiendas. The bishops said that Charles could take the church plate if he would, but that if he did so, he would be taking it from God and not from them. The municipal representatives were the worst of all. They pointed to the poverty of the land, and to the extraordinary subsidies which they had granted in 1525, as proofs of their inability to contribute. They reverted to their numerous unsatisfied grievances; and finally the Emperor “sent them home to spend Easter”, without having received a single penny or giving them an opportunity to draw up a cuaderno. It was a bitter disappointment, from which he did not recover for many a day. Castile was not yet so loyal to the new dynasty as to be willing to bear aid to the non-Spanish part of his dominions. The upper orders stood out firmly for their privileges, and Charles did not repeat the experiment of summoning them until eleven years later, when the situation had entirely changed.

In the interval, however, he made some progress in the matter of improving the methods of Castilian taxation. It was naturally in the yield that he was primarily interested; but he was quite willing to accede to any reasonable demand which would serve to distribute the burden more fairly and give the nation an appreciation of his needs. The root of the difficulty, as he plainly perceived, lay in the enjoyment enjoyed by the nobles and the clergy. He knew, however, that it would be impossible to abolish it by compulsion, and his experience with the Cortes of 1527 showed that the privileged orders were for the present unwilling voluntarily to relinquish it; he was, therefore, thrown back upon the subsidiary problem of the alcabala. The Cortes of 1528, 1532, and 1534 had done fairly well by him in the matter of servicios—200, 184, and 204 cuentos respectively—all of the money to be paid in before the end of 1537, and on the last of these occasions the question of the encabezamiento was once more taken up. To the usual petition that it should be generally established, Charles responded favorably. He offered to permit the realm to collect by encabezamiento the equivalent of the tercias and the alcabala for ten years to come, and also to give back annually the sum of 20,000 ducats, in consideration of the way in which his revenues had increased, and of the amounts which under the old system had been appropriated by the tax-farmers. It was not until more than two years later that this proposal was finally accepted and went into effect. Long negotiations were necessary before the contracting parties could be brought to an agreement; and the arrangement did not become operative until the beginning of 1537, though it was thereafter prolonged until 1556 and 1561. The royal revenues did not suffer by the change. It was calculated when the new plan was proposed in 1534 that the crown would derive from it 300 cuentos a year; and at the end of the reign it yielded about 334. On the other hand, Charles had shown his readiness to rectify a national grievance; he had done something to restrict the extortions of the tax farmers, and he had handed over to the municipalities the problem of getting the funds.

The proceedings of the Cortes of 1537 are in no sense notable. The procuradores granted a servicio of 204 cuentos, and drew up a cuaderno of 151 petitions, of which 53 were definitely granted and thus became the law of the land. But there is a significant sentence in the speech from the throne which struck the keynote of the program which Charles was to try to put through in the succeeding year—a final attempt against the exemption of the privileged orders. The dangers to which the realm was exposed from France and from the Turk—so the Emperor pointed out—were common dangers which could only be put aside by common efforts; it is clear that he meant—even if he did not directly say so—that the pecheros alone could not possibly bear the burden, and that the nobles and the ecclesiastics ought also to contribute. In 1538 he put this idea to the proof, and summoned the whole body of the higher clergy of the realm, and ninety-five representatives of the Castilian aristocracy, to be present with the procuradores at a meeting of the Cortes at Toledo in October. It was made perfectly clear that the occasion was unusual; the corregidores were even ordered to see to it that the poderes borne by the municipal representatives were unlimited, “because the present business is very different from that
which has been treated in other Cortes, since it has to do with the remedying of the affairs of these realms and of our service in general.”

The proposiciones, or speeches from the throne, which were read to the estates by the royal representatives, deal only in general terms with the necessities of the government; but much more can be gleaned from the records of the subsequent proceedings. The total annual revenues of the realm were more than a million ducats, twice as much as was necessary to defray the regular expenses. But apparently the royal treasury was so drained by special demands and the alienation of the Patrimonio Real that not only was the balance exhausted, but a considerable deficit created as well; besides, the Emperor had contracted floating debts which amounted to more than the annual revenues of Castile. These conditions could not be permitted to continue if the government’s credit was to be saved. Consequently Charles proposed that the two upper orders should sacrifice their privileges and join with the procuradores in voting him a sisa, which should bring him in 800,000 ducats a year. This sisa was a tax on articles of food. It had been already used in the cities as a means of collecting revenue, but this time it was Charles’s intention that all men should contribute to it, irrespective of their condition. He promised that he had no intention of levying it permanently, but merely as a means of relieving his present necessities; in view, however, of the past history of Castilian finance, this assurance was regarded by the Cortes with justifiable distrust.

We know nothing of the debates on the royal proposal in the estates of the clergy or the commons; but the diary of one of the nobles, who took an active part in the deliberations of the aristocracy, has fortunately been preserved to us. There was never the slightest chance of their consenting to the sisa in the form which Charles had proposed it; on that point they were unanimous from beginning to end; but they apparently nominated a committee of ten of their own number to draw up a statement of their views and convey it to the Emperor. One of these ten, the Duke of Bejar, who was also a member of the royal Hacienda and therefore alive to the Emperor’s needs, ventured to suggest that a tax on exports be levied to redeem the alienations of the Patrimonio Real, that the floating debt be officially repudiated by a law of the realm, and that the Pope be asked to excommunicate in future any one who should traffic in liens on the national resources. But only a trifling minority supported this proposal; the mass of the nobles were solely interested in killing the sisa; and as soon as the Emperor had assured himself of this, he dismissed them in no very gracious terms on February 1. The clergy in the meantime had shown themselves more complaisant. They had voted before Christmas to satisfy Charles’s demands, only stipulating that papal consent would be necessary to give validity to their decision; but as the procuradores followed the example of the aristocracy and emphatically refused to sanction the sisa, the Emperor saw that the plan must be given up. The traditional privileges of the nobility had nullified all his efforts; without aristocratic support the clerical offers would not avail, and neither of the two upper orders was ever summoned to the Cortes again.

The procuradores, however, still remained; and Charles was resolved to make one more trial there before acknowledging that he had suffered defeat. Even though his scheme of taxing the two upper orders had perforce been abandoned, he realized that a great improvement could be effected by a change in the imposts that were paid by the third estate; he hoped as usual both to increase the royal revenues and to simplify his own problem by leaving a larger share of the collection and administration of the finances in the hands of the national representatives. He therefore proposed that the regular servicio—of 100 cuentos a year—he handed over to the realm, which in return should shoulder the burden of the regular national expenses, including the navy and Doria’s fleet, the household, courts, and councils, the army and the garrisons on the frontier and in North Africa; while he promised with the aid of the rest of the royal revenues from Castile and the Indies to pay his debts and meet all extraordinary demands. From the Emperor’s point of view this plan was most advantageous. The regular expenses which the nation was asked to assume were wellnigh thrice as great as the amount of the servicio, and he hoped that his offer to permit the nation to manage its own financial affairs would so gild the pill that the procuradores would swallow it; but the latter were on their guard, and stoutly refused. After consulting with their constituents, they voted, over and above the servicio ordinario of 100 cuentos, an extraordinario of 450 more, 250 of the total to be paid in at once and the rest before the end of 1542; further than this, however, they would not go. Moreover, in order even to secure this grant, Charles had to promise that the encabezamiento should be prolonged for ten years more (1547-56) after its first term had expired, and to agree not to alienate any more of the royal domain. Altogether it had been a discouraging experience. The reestablishment of the encabezamiento had been indeed a solid gain; it had benefited the royal treasury and also pleased the nation; but that after all was but a small result for fifteen years of constant effort. The other five Cortes of the reign—at Valladolid in 1542, 1544, 1548, and 1555, and at Madrid in 1551—voted 450 cuentos each, the regulation form of the grant being 100 cuentos of servicio ordinario for three years and 150 of extraordinario, which was usually to be paid in
at once; moreover an extra four cuentos were generally granted for the procuradores and “gastos de las Cortes”. The larger amount voted in 1538 is doubtless accounted for by the fact that the Cortes, having defeated the Emperor’s two main contentions, were not unwilling to hand him some sort of a consolation prize.

We have hitherto considered the Castilian Cortes solely in their tax-voting capacity. It was primarily in this light that the Emperor and the Consejo regarded them, and by the latter part of the reign the procuradores themselves had come around to the same point of view. Their request, in 1544, not to be summoned oftener than once every three years, “on account of the great costs and expense,” was a virtual abdication of their traditional place in the body politic. Their right to petition for the enactment of legislation should not, however, be wholly ignored. It was not, assuredly, of great practical importance, for if their requests were displeasing to the monarch, he was not obliged to accept them, nor, if he did so, to put them into execution. The number of times the same petition reappears is perhaps the most striking of all the features of the proceedings of the Cortes, and bears witness to the futility of their claims to legislation. The fact that they asked that the autos acordados of the Consejo Real and the other tribunals be printed and made generally available is an indication that they realized that the legislative authority was passing out of their hands; moreover, they were soon to lose even the precious right which they had inherited from earlier times, that no law or ordinance which had been enacted in the Cortes could be formally revoked without their consent. And yet it is instructive to glance at the cuadernos as a record of the national aspirations and desires; in fact it is probable that they give a far truer picture than could be drawn from the proceedings of a national assembly today. The procuradores were innocent of parliamentary tactics; they made no effort to compromise or circumvent; since the royal replies were but “yes” or “no,” there was nothing to be gained by concealing their real feelings. They said just what they thought of the policy of the foreign dynasty which fate had placed upon the Castilian throne. Their words are an accurate reflection of the national attitude.

It is not to be expected that the Castilian Cortes should have occupied themselves to any great extent with the course of foreign affairs. Such matters were invariably left in the hands of the monarch in all the countries of Western Europe at this period; the national assemblies were far too ignorant to deal with them. The attitude of the procuradores, like that of their constituents, towards all the great world developments with which they had so suddenly been thrown into contact, was in the main passive. God had sent Spain an Emperor—the temporal head of Christendom—for her king; it was obviously His intention to make her the chief instrument of His will; it was merely her duty to accept this high mission, and to see to it that the preeminence which He had granted her was maintained. That Charles had a host of non-Spanish possessions mattered nothing in their eyes; these possessions were remote, disturbed, and honeycombed with heresy, a debir rather than a credit item in the general account; it was Spain, save for the very first, that wholeheartedly supported the Emperor; it was Spain—and in particular Castile—that paid his bills. It is consequently no matter for surprise that the first petitions of the cuadernos of 1537, 1538, 1542, 1544, and 1548, a period when Charles was most of the time absent, demand that he should reside continually in the peninsula, and make his Spanish realms the centre of his dominions. It is the same request as in the days of the Comuneros, but the language in which it is couched is very different. Jealousy and suspicion were the keynote in the early days; now it is rather fear lest his “royal and imperial person be placed in difficulty, danger, and peril” in these distant journeys, and desire “that he should remain and repose in these realms which so ardently love and long for him, and imitate the ways of his glorious ancestors the Catholic Kings”; or assurance that “his Majesty possesses in these realms many subjects that can abundantly satisfy any necessities which may arise in other lands” and “good captains such as there have ever been in Spain … who have done mighty and memorable deeds in similar circumstances in the service of their king.” Charles’s response in every case is evasively affirmative. He protests that “the necessities of Christendom have been the sole cause of his absences, and that his Majesty desires nothing so much as to remain and repose in these kingdoms.”

It is also evident that the procuradores were far more interested in Charles's wars against the Turks and the Lutherans than in those against the king of France. On the Pyrenees, indeed, they were ever ready to fight, as witness their solicitude for the fortifications of Fontarabia; but they apparently recked little of the course of the struggle in Italy or on the frontier of the Netherlands, and in 1544 and 1548 they bluntly asked Charles to condescend to make peace with Christian kings. Against Barbarossa, on the other hand, the procuradores were continually urging him on. There are incessant demands for the fortification of the southern coasts, and, down to the Tunis campaign of 1535, constant requests for vigorous action in North Africa. “We beg your Majesty,” runs the fifth petition of the cuaderno of 1523,
“to labor by all possible means to make peace with all Christian kings and war with the Infidel.” The forty-fourth petition of the cuaderno of 1525 is still more specific. “We ask that your Majesty keep up the fortifications of North Africa,” so it reads, “and see that the garrisons are well paid, for this will redound to the service of God, and do great hurt to the unbeliever.” The naval and commercial sides of the Turkish struggle naturally command a large share of the procuradores’ attention, for Barbarossa’s piracies rendered it almost impossible to trade in the Western Mediterranean during the early part of the reign; moreover he constantly raided the Spanish ports and carried off captives and booty. There is an interesting request in 1528 that Spanish ships be better furnished with cannon, “since it has been often observed that though there are more men in the ships of Spain than in those of her foes... the Spaniards have to surrender because the others have more artillery and ammunition... the which does not happen to the ships of Portugal or of other nations.” All these different items may be adduced to prove that the Castilians were still chiefly interested in such matters as traditionally or geographically lay close to their doors. Charles found it difficult to induce them to support the Turkish campaigns on the Danube, and there is nothing in the cuadernos about the Schmalkaldic wars; but there are many instances of a provinciality equally striking among the enlightened nations of today, when the means of communication have been so tremendously improved that the Antipodes are far less remote than was Germany from Castile. And there are plenty of evidences scattered through the cuadernos that the outlook of the Castilian was broader than before. In 1532 Charles was asked to diminish the number of suits before the courts by adopting the law “which is in force in certain seignories of Italy and elsewhere, that cases between relatives within the fourth degree be settled and compromised by arbitrators por una via de derecho.” Six years later he is asked to “forbid entirely the game of cards and dice, as has been done in the kingdom of Portugal”; and, in 1548, to seek the advice of the experts in irrigation, “who are to be found in Aragon and in Valencia and in part of Navarre and in other places.” Such requests would hardly have been heard in the days of the Catholic Kings. The Castilians were beginning to get ideas from abroad.

The cuadernos, however, are of course primarily valuable for the light they shed on internal affairs; more than nine-tenths of the petitions they contain concern themselves with matters within the realm. The three principal subjects of complaint—which occupy far more space than all the rest put together—are the defects and delays in the administration of justice, clerical abuses and the giving of benefices to foreigners, and the impoverishment of the realm through the economic policy of the crown. Each of these topics will be subsequently taken up by itself; it therefore remains to consider in the present section a number of minor details which cannot be classified under any one head.

One of the commonest demands is that the legislation of the realm be codified and printed “in one volume so that there shall be nothing superfluous and no contradiction.” There was apparently much ignorance about the laws of the land, not only among the people at large but also on the bench and in the bar; “those ordinances which were selected by Dr. Montalvo were faulty and ill chosen, and for this reason the judges give various and divergent sentences, and do not know the laws under which all cases must be tried,” so runs petition 56 of the cuaderno of 1523. A subsequent paragraph asks that the Partidas be republished, with corrections and additions to bring them up to date. There are also several requests that the “ancient chronicles and histories of this realm be collected and printed,” since it is “profitable and pleasant” to know of “the great deeds done by the kings of Castile, of glorious memory, both in war and in peace... so that they will not be forgotten.” The procuradores begged for a pension of 400 ducats for Florian de Ocampo, who “of his own natural inclination has written for twenty-eight years on the history of Spain... which is one of the most principal provinces of the world, whose inhabitants have wrought mighty deeds, not only in the wars of the Carthaginians, Romans, and Goths, but also since the coming of the Moors and in the recovery of the same by the Christians, from the time of King Pelayo to that of the final restoration by the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella, who are in glory; and since for lack of authors these things are no longer remembered”. But there were other works of which the procuradores wholly disapproved. In the very same cuaderno in which they commended Ocampo they drew attention to “the great harm that has been done in these kingdoms to men, boys, young girls, and others through the reading of books of lies and vanities like Amadis [de Gaula] and all the works that have been patterned thereon... for the youths and the young women spend their idleness over these... and the more they give themselves up to those vanities, the more they draw away from the true and holy Christian doctrines and remain fascinated with that affected manner of speech.” They therefore demand that no such books be printed in the future, and that those copies already in existence be collected and burned.

The Cortes gave much attention to educational problems. They were insistent on the desirability alike of admitting to colleges and seminaries of learning such candidates as could prove Christian descent for four generations back, and of excluding those who could not; and they begged Charles to
see to it that the line was fairly drawn. They desired that occupants of the professorial chairs at Salamanca and Valladolid “be given but a temporary tenure, as in Italy and elsewhere, and not elected for life, since life tenure is a cause of many evils ... for those who have got the chairs take no interest in study or the care of their students,” whereas a temporary appointment “would cause them to work for the increase of their salaries and larger classes ... to write and to see to it that their students should hold disputations and otherwise exercise themselves in letters.” They ask that the degrees of Toledo, Seville, and Granada and of the other universities of the realm be given the same status as those of Salamanca, Valladolid, and Bologna; that the curriculum at Alcalá be brought up to a similar standard, and that the expenses of the higher education be reduced. After hinting broadly that many lettrados had obtained degrees by easy methods in foreign universities, and at those recently established within the realm, and were claiming exemption from taxation on that ground, they demand that such exemption be henceforth granted only to those who have graduated after “rigorous examination” from Salamanca, Valladolid, and Bologna. The students also gave food for anxious thought. The Cortes were concerned at the way in which they contracted debts, and the national assembly strove to protect them and their parents from legal action by their creditors. “Since fathers and mothers send their sons to the universities, and carefully provide them with food and clothes and books, and the students, on the pretext that they need to purchase these things, seek to get money by loans or by pawning their books and effects and then gamble it away or spend it for other evil purposes and are thereby distracted from their studies,” the procuradores beg that it be forbidden “to imprison students for such debts, or to take their clothes, their rooms, or their books” and that “their parents be not held for the payment of their indebtedness.” Most serious of all was the state of medical knowledge; the realm was apparently infested with quacks.

Charles was assured that many of the doctors then practicing were “untaught idiots”, and that the apothecaries are seldom present in their shops but leave behind them incompetent persons “who mix up the drugs and make other mistakes, from which great harm results for those who take the said medicines.” He is asked to see to it that no one be permitted to practice without a thorough examination and the degree of bachelor of arts, and that that degree be not given save at a university where the recipient has studied medicine for the full four years; to oblige surgeons and doctors to prescribe in Spanish “clearly and with the avoidance of the evils which arise from lack of such information.”

The procuradores were also greatly concerned over the march of luxury and reckless expenditure. They felt that the royal court was the seat of these evils; they resented its establishment “after the Burgundian fashion ... at great cost and excessive waste sufficient to conquer a kingdom,” and were constantly demanding a return to the custom of Castile, “which is suitable, very ancient, and less expensive.” There are numerous outrages against the abuses of purveyance and forced entertainment.

“We have often begged your Majesty to give orders,” runs the cuaderno of 1542, “that your courtiers pay a reasonable price for their lodgings ... for in this wise your Majesty’s court will be better satisfied, and the householders will receive it willingly”; “it often happens to a poor woman who has nothing but a place in a doorway and a bed of cloths, which she has collected as a dowry for her daughter, that the guests who are imposed on her ruin her bed and destroy it.” Gay clothes and carriages were another fertile source of complaint. “We have seldom observed”, declared the procuradores in 1555, “that men follow the good customs which are brought to these realms from abroad, but that they immediately adopt the bad ones, as for example is the case with the coaches and litters which have lately appeared ... and daily so increase in luxury and expense that a whole fortune is needed for their upkeep; and when people of dignity and importance adopt these fashions, experience shows that everyone wants to follow their example; and such is the insolence with which they bear themselves, that coaches and litters and all their following have been seen to pass by the Holy Sacrament in the streets without a single obeisance; moreover, there have occurred countless terrible accidents through people’s rushing and confusion, through the frightening of horses and mules, and the falls of their riders.” Charles is besought to forbid these coaches and litters, and thereby “to do a service to God, from which these realms will derive profit, contentment, and pleasure.”

Other scattering petitions throw an interesting light on the national customs. The right to bear arms was the subject of much discussion. Apparently the royal officials were constantly interfering with this privilege in the most arbitrary manner; it was probably their intention merely to increase the safety of the streets at night, but their actions affronted the pride of Castile. Both swords and daggers were permitted by law—the former to be of a standard size—as late as 1551; four years afterwards, however, the procuradores apparently recognized that daggers were very dangerous, “since they are a weapon which the upper classes can scarcely handle without killing, and the lower classes, when they have them, will slay if they are insulted, whereas, if they lacked them, they would let the insult pass”; the procuradores therefore requested that they be henceforth forbidden, and likewise pistols (arcabuzes
pequeños) “with which men do murder secretly”. Efforts to mitigate, the harsh penalties of earlier days were occasionally made. “Since those who are condemned by the Hermandad to be shot with arrows are shot alive, without first being strangled, and this seems to be inhuman, and sometimes causes a lingering death, we beg your Majesty to give orders that no one shall be shot with arrows without first being strangled, since this is the custom with heretics”. The procuradores were also much disturbed about the gypsies. They were forbidden by law to reside in the realm; but apparently, they obtained special licenses to remain “and rob the fields and destroy property and wound and slay anyone who hinders them; and injure and deceive all those who traffic with them; and have no other means of making a living.” Gambling was also rife throughout the realm. There are constant requests’ in the early part of the reign to enforce the pragmáticas against cards and dice, and to increase the penalties on those who infringed them. But one also infers that false accusations of gambling were not seldom preferred against innocent persons, for in 1542 and in 1551 Charles is asked to give orders that the authorities shall only take cognizance of cases where the gamblers are caught in the act, or where the loser prefers a specific complaint. It was likewise requested that there should be no penalty on games for stakes of less than two reals, “for it is the poor people who pay, and the rich are never fined or punished.” The reign, moreover, witnessed at least one of the innumerable vain attempts in Spanish history to stop the bull fight. “Since it is notorious that bull fighting often causes men’s deaths and other misfortunes”, runs the petition of the procuradores in 1555, “we beg your Majesty to give orders that this pastime be stopped, or else to change it so as to make it less dangerous”. The royal reply was a refusal to make any innovation. By this time the Emperor had come to know his Spanish subjects even better than they knew themselves.

The records of the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon are not yet available in such form as to make any thorough analysis possible; but much may be inferred from the contemporary chroniclers and from the summaries of the different sessions in later books. Since the claims of these assemblies to a real share in the legislative power were considerably more firmly established than those of the Cortes of Castile, their meetings were at once more businesslike and less interesting to the historian. They did not waste so much time in hit-or-miss petitions about any sort of grievance that might come into their heads, but concentrated on those whose redress they were able to compel. Despite the comparative cosmopolitanism of these eastern kingdoms—especially the county of Catalonia—they are curiously reticent on the subject of Charles’s foreign policy; only when the war was brought to their very doors did they seem to take any interest—as at the time of the French attack on Perpignan in 1542, or of the Moorish raids on the Valencian coasts. There was a great outburst against the conferring of ecclesiastical benefices upon foreigners. It reached its climax in 1533 when Charles presented Cardinal Doria for the archbishopric of Tarragona; from the royal reply, the lists of incumbents, and the fact that similar complaints almost never reappear, one infers that the national representatives succeeded in making their point. The Catalans were naturally much concerned about their commerce; in fact, their enthusiasm for the suppression of the Moorish pirates is probably chiefly attributable to their desire to avail themselves of the right which had been granted them by Ferdinand the Catholic to traffic in certain commodities with the North African ports; in 1519, 1533, and 1537 they demanded and apparently obtained confirmation of this privilege. It is also interesting to observe that they requested Charles to continue to prohibit the importation of foreign cloths into Naples and Sicily, save at a duty of twenty per cent. Apparently they regarded themselves as competent—at least in economic affairs—to legislate for the tierras de allá mar. But by far the greater part of their activities were exclusively concerned with internal matters; the same thing holds true of the Cortes of Valencia, and to an even greater extent of the Cortes of Aragon. Administration of justice, infraction of the fueros, salaries of officials, and the preservation of economic resources are the principal topics which interested the procuradores, and the constitutional arrangements which they had inherited from the Middle Ages made it usually possible for them to enforce their views. The results of their absorption in these things were unfortunate. The realms of the crown of Aragon occupied, after all, a small portion of the Iberian Peninsula, and it was only by developing their Mediterranean activities that they could hope to withstand the preponderance of Castile. Charles made many an effort to turn them in this direction, but without any really permanent success. At the end of the reign they were left with the forms of their constitutional liberties and little else besides; under Philip even these were in large measure to be abrogated, and the Castilianization of the peninsula was virtually complete.

It is doubtful if any feature of the Emperor’s government was more unsatisfactory to his Spanish subjects than the administration of justice. The cuadernos are filled with criticisms and complaints of it; in all the judicial hierarchy, there was apparently not a single court which was successfully discharging its functions. Yet the Emperor had the loftiest conceptions of his duties as the highest judge in the land.
He made no important changes in the system which he had inherited from the Catholic Kings, and which had been justly regarded as one of the greatest glories of their reign. He constantly sent his royal agents to visit the different tribunals of the realm, to report on their activities, and to suggest reforms. The fundamental difficulty was really twofold. In the first place, the Emperor’s numerous absences rendered it impossible for him to administer justice in person with the regularity which had become customary in the previous reign, and had taught all men to respect the law. The judges lacked the constant inspiration of the royal example, which had accomplished so much under the Catholic Kings. In the second, the very accessibility of the tribunals, coupled with the increase in population and the complications incident to the rule of the new dynasty, produced an accumulation of suits which the courts could not possibly handle, so that at the end of the reign there was confusion from top to bottom.

Since it was impossible to remedy the first of these difficulties, the Spaniards concentrated on the rectification of the second. It was in Castile that the evil was chiefly felt; the judicial arrangements of the realms of the crown of Aragon were, relatively speaking, adequate to meet the changed conditions. The trouble began, as we have already occasion to notice, at the top of the ladder, in the Consejo Real. In 1532 the procuradores begged for the establishment therein of a separate chamber to hear ecclesiastical cases and civil suits of the highest importance: pleitos de mil y quinientos, as they were commonly called. Charles responded favorably, but the recurrence of the same petition in 1548 and in 1555 shows that the promise was not fulfilled; the Sala de Mil y Quinientos was not set up until a later day. There were also unfulfilled requests for a special sala to have charge of residencias. The Cancellarias, next below the Consejo, were similarly inadequate to their tasks. The two principal tribunals, at Valladolid and Granada, and the subsidiary one in Galicia which had been set up in 1486, were by no means sufficient for the purpose. In 1544 and in 1551 the procuradores demanded that another be established at Toledo, “since there are many who cannot leave their homes in winter and have no one to send to represent them ... and since Valladolid and Granada are so far off, and the first named is so cold in the wintertime that men abandon their cases, or else, if they pursue them, spend more than the value of the suit.” The royal replies were evasive, but the petition was so obviously justifiable, that in January 1556, a new Cancilleria was actually set up; the residence that was finally selected for it was, however, not at Toledo but at Seville. The procuradores also strove to increase the personnel of the tribunals already in existence. In 1528 they begged the Emperor to add another sala de oidores to each Cancillería Real, “since there are now so few judges that suits cannot be heard without great delays, and there are some cases which have been waiting these fifteen and twenty years ... and since such delays, even if good sentences are finally given, are even more harmful and prejudicial than if bad ones were given and it were done promptly.” Things must indeed have come to a pretty pass to bring Spaniards to prefer such a petition as this. The Emperor responded with the perennial formula—that he would consult with the Consejo and see what it was best to do—but the additional sala was not created. Indeed from the fact that ordinances had to be issued in 1532, 1537, and 1542, confirming the organization of each Cancillería in four salas, with four oidores in each, which had been set up by the Catholic Kings, one would infer that the Emperor had some difficulty in even maintaining the arrangements which he had inherited from his predecessors.

There is more material on the lower stages of the judicial hierarchy than on the upper. The Actas de Cortes are particularly rich, for the doings of the corregidores and alcaldes came under the immediate observation of the procuradores. The corregidores reached the height of their power in this and in the succeeding reign, but the municipalities were not always satisfied with the character and ability of the men who were appointed, or with the manner in which they discharged their functions. In 1525 Charles was assured that “one of the chief causes for the recent rebellion had been the defects of the corregidores and their assistants, who had got their jobs at the solicitation of individuals.” He is accordingly begged “to provide rather for offices than for persons, and to command that the said corregidores be lawfully graduated letrados who have studied the prescribed ten years, and that they remain continuously at their posts.” The precedents for a short tenure, inherited from the Catholic Kings, were apparently disregarded. In the higher tribunals, many of the magistrates held office for life; if the term for the corregidores was theoretically limited, they were not seldom reappointed, a practice which evoked bitter complaint. The residencias also failed to work satisfactorily. The pesquisidores, who had charge of them, “took as much time about their business as if they were corregidores”; Charles was begged to command them “to be brief and not to exceed three months, since the cities have need of their corregidores, who are gentlemen.” Most of the complaints about these local officials are concentrated in the early part of the reign, when Charles was much of the time resident in Castile. Whether conditions improved as the years went by, or whether, during the later periods of the Emperor’s absence, the procuradores desisted from preferring petitions whose futility they recognized, it is impossible to say; but it seems probable that matters grew worse rather than better. Charles’s
responsibilities were so great that some things had to be ignored, and since his preoccupations were primarily international, it was local affairs that were bound to suffer. Moreover, the financial temptations to appoint unworthy men were doubtless so strong that he was unable to resist them.

Several special details deserve passing notice. It was the custom in criminal cases to oblige the delinquent to testify under oath; this naturally often resulted in perjury, and the Cortes begged Charles to abolish the practice, but the Emperor refused to sanction any innovation. Another request, that the servants of alguaciles be not admitted as witnesses, received a similar response. False accusations by malicious persons were also not infrequent; in 1537 the Emperor was requested to give orders that anyone who entered a complaint should pay the costs of the ensuing trial, unless the accused should be proved guilty. He was also asked to forbid the judges to appropriate any part of the fines they imposed to their own use. There were numerous conflicts of jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical tribunals, whose influence was gradually waning; the concentration of authority in the hands of the crown served to fortify the independence of the secular courts. But the Spaniards were too loyal and respectful to the church to follow as far along this road as their monarch wished to lead them, and they showed it by their defense of the right of asylum. They begged Charles to command his judicial officers to respect the churches and sanctuaries, to forbid them to break in or take any one out, and to force them to pay out of their own pockets for any damage which should arise from such causes in the future. The Emperor promised amendment, but the recurrence of the same request in 1563 would indicate that matters remained exactly as they were.

In the realms of the crown of Aragon Charles did little to alter the existing judicial arrangements. His authority was so much more restricted there than in Castile that he had little temptation to initiate reforms. Outward modifications were consequently very slight; on the other hand, the pristine vitality ebbed rapidly away, owing to the shift of the center of interest into Castile; institutionally speaking, the Eastern Kingdoms were gradually turning into an old curiosity shop. Even the Justicia succumbed to the general trend; the resignation, in 1547, of Lorenzo Fernandez de Heredia, in favor of the royalist favorite Ferrer de la Nuza—permitted by the Cortes in defiance of the law—was ominously significant of approaching ruin. Several changes which were made in the Justiciars advisers seem to indicate that the institution was not working satisfactory. The council of five legists appointed by the crown, which had been imposed upon the Justicia by Ferdinand the Catholic, was increased to seven in 1518, and then, ten years later, abolished; while the number of the Justiciars lieutenants was raised to five, to be selected by the king from a list of sixteen, who were chosen by the Cortes. There were also frequent appeals from the Justicia’s court to the royal audiencia—a practice by no means pleasing to the representatives of the nation, who strove to facilitate the reappeal of some cases from the audiencia to the Justicia on the plea of contrafuero. The Cortes, in fact, labored heroically throughout the reign to observe the forms of all the ancient liberties, but the revival of institutional energy was a task beyond their powers. The kingdoms that they represented were falling steadily into the background; Charles respected the great traditions which they had inherited from the Middle Ages, but he knew that Castile was the real source of his power. The diminishing significance of the realms of the crown of Aragon in the fabric of the Spanish Empire is naturally reflected in the history of their internal development; and it was to prove increasingly difficult to maintain institutions whose practical importance had become so slight.

The financial and economic history of Spain under the Emperor is an exceptionally difficult topic, on which much has been recently written, though the last word is very far from having been said. New material is rapidly accumulating, and the conclusions of the older writers are being constantly upset. Efforts have been made, by the Emperor’s admirers, to show that Spain was strengthened rather than weakened, at home as well as abroad, by his administration, that he introduced no disastrous financial innovation, and that his reign coincided with the period of Spain’s greatest economic prosperity; they place the beginning of her decline, in those respects, in the time of Philip II. But their arguments have been pretty conclusively refuted by those who have taken the other side. After all, the common sense of the situation would imply that it was impossible that Spain should be subjected to the terrible drain which Charles’s foreign responsibilities and increasing wars inevitably caused, without showing the effects of it. Sandoval tells a story which will bear repetition in this connection. The Emperor, it appears, got lost while out hunting in the woods near Toledo, and finally, meeting a peasant who failed to recognize him, fell into conversation. The peasant said that he had lived to see five kings in Castile, and when asked which of them he considered the best and which the worst, replied that Ferdinand the Catholic was unquestionably the one, and the present sovereign the other. Pressed to give his reasons for his disapproval of the Emperor, he answered that Charles had abandoned his wife and children to go...
off to Italy, Flanders, and the Empire, that he had carried off with him all his revenues and the silver and gold of the Indies, and, not content with these, that he was ruining the poor farmers by his taxation.

The first problem that presents itself in connection with the economic history of the reign is naturally that of the organization of the central financial body of the kingdom of Castile. In the early part of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, as we have already seen, the collection and administration of the royal revenues had been placed in the hands of two Contadores Mayores and two Contadores Mayores de Cuentas; and as their duties became increasingly arduous as time went on, there were added to them, before the Emperor’s accession, a number of other officials, with special functions of their own. Among these was the Relator, a sort of general bookkeeper and accountant, two, and later three Porteros, who drew up the agenda for each Contaduría every day, a special officer to look after the revenues from the silk manufacture of Granada, and, most important of all, five Veedores, who saw to the payment of the troops. In view of all the new questions and complications which arose with the accession of Charles, it was obvious that this organization needed centralization and development; and when the Emperor returned to Castile after the defeat of the Comuneros, he at once gave his attention to the problem of reform. By a cedula of January 1, 1523, at Valladolid, he gave to a committee of six persons, of whom the Count of Nassau was first, the task of superintending and systematizing the work of the Contadurías, and of the functionaries associated with them. This committee was to meet every day in the royal palace, and go over every detail of the royal revenues; it was to bring the Contadurías, which hitherto had been almost autonomous, and exceedingly jealous of any interference by the Consejo Real, into close subordination to the crown. It has been maintained that this body was merely a temporary and exceptional means of centralization and superintendence, made necessary by the confusion which resulted from the revolt of the Comuneros, and that it did not essentially alter the system of the Contadurías inherited from the preceding reign; it has been asserted that the name of Consejo de la Hacienda cannot properly be given it during the lifetime of Charles V; and it is fair to add that that title does not officially appear in the laws of the realm until the time of Philip II. On the other hand, it was constantly referred to by the Emperor himself under that name, from the very date of its inception; it continued its sittings and gained steadily in authority and prestige; and it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion of a more recent writer that its advent marked a great change in the financial system of Castile. It certainly brought the collection and administration of the revenues far more closely than before under the eye of the crown, and paved the way for measures at which Spaniards, if left to themselves, might well have balked. The appointment of the Count of Nassau as president is highly significant, though he only held office for two years. He had been ‘Chef et Surintendant des Finances’ in the Netherlands, and Charles obviously preferred him to any native magnate. In this matter, at least, his Hispanicization was incomplete.

Under the direction of this reorganized Exchequer, the royal revenues were enormously increased. It is, in fact, generally admitted that Charles drew at least three times as much from Spain at the end of his reign as at the beginning. By far the larger portion of the burden fell on Castile; the sums derived from the Eastern Kingdoms were doubtless somewhat greater in 1555 than in 1520, but in general it was Charles’s policy, financially as well as otherwise, to let them alone. Of the different sources of the increase in Castile, the first, and one of the most important, namely, the servicios voted by the procuradores, has already been mentioned; we have also followed the establishment of the encabezamiento in lieu of the tercias and the alcabala. The revenues from the Indies, which first began to assume large proportions in the late forties and the fifties, will be taken up in detail in another place. It remains for us to consider briefly here certain other sources from which the royal treasury derived its increased funds.

I. Revenues from the Orders of Military Knighthood. The process of annexation which had been begun by the Catholic Kings was completed early in the Emperor’s reign, when Pope Adrian VI, by a bull of May 4, 1523, declared that they were forever united with the Crown. The annual yield of the three Orders has been estimated at about 75 cuentos; but the Emperor was soon after obliged to hand over their administration, and the revenues derived from it, as well as that of the quicksilver mines of Almaden, which belonged to the Order of Calatrava, to the great Augsburg banking house of the Fuggers, partly as a repayment of loans for the bribing of the imperial electors in 1519, partly as security for a further advance.

II. Revenues from the church. When, in 1519, Leo X granted Charles a tenth of the clerical income, there was a terrible outcry; but in 1532 the proportion was raised to a quarter. In 1539, after it had become obvious that Charles’s plan for the establishment of a sisa could not succeed, the clergy voted him one-half their income, the so-called medios frutos, for the years 1540-42; and this proportion
was continued until the very end of the reign, sometimes with the approval, and sometimes against the positive command of the Pope.

III. A general increase of the rates of taxation on Spanish industries and raw material, and on the movement of cattle and of commodities from one part of the realm to another. The revenues from \textit{servicio y montazgo} rose, as did those from salt pits and from the silk manufactures at Granada; and in general it may be fairly said that the dues were imposed primarily with the idea of filling the royal coffers, and not seldom in such fashion as to do the greatest possible harm to the economic welfare of the nation as a whole. The difficulty of collecting these revenues caused the government to farm them out to financial agents whenever possible.

IV. The sale of all sorts of rights, privileges, and offices. Such sales had not been unknown in the previous history of the realm, but they certainly had never before reached the proportions which they now attained. Patents of nobility, legitimations of natural children, sinecure posts of influence and authority, were constantly granted in return for funds. More significant still was the recent development of the system of so-called \textit{juros}. These were originally royal grants of annuities out of the state revenues, conferred by the monarch as a mark of favor. But under the Catholic Kings the custom had arisen of using them as a means of obtaining money. \textit{Juros} were sold for lump sums of from ten to fifteen times the annual yield; the purchaser, in return, receiving the right to get his interest, at a high rate, directly from the tax collector, before the sums received were turned over to the royal treasury. This not altogether admirable system of mortgaging the future attained enormous proportions during Charles's reign; what was even worse, the necessities of the government not seldom obliged it to forbid the payment of the interest; the national credit consequently declined, and there was much gambling and speculation in bad \textit{juros}. Everyone recognized the evil, and various plans were proposed for bringing it to an end, but the necessities of the government preserved and increased it. In 1504 the Crown's outstanding debts to the holders of \textit{juros} (the so-called \textit{juros al quitar}) amounted to eighteen cientos. In the following year they had risen to nineteen and a half. In 1539 they had reached ninety-nine. After that date it is almost impossible to distinguish the \textit{juros al quitar} from other financial obligations of the crown of Castile, but there is every reason to believe that the amount of them continued to increase even more rapidly than before.

The way in which the system of \textit{juros} developed during the Emperor's reign is indicative of the increasingly precarious state of the royal finances. But the sums for which, under this system of \textit{juros}, he became indebted to his Spanish subjects, were trifling in comparison with those which he came to owe to foreign bankers. Large sums were advanced to him by the great financial houses of Florence and Genoa; larger still were the sums which he borrowed from the Fuggers and Welsers of Southern Germany. His relations with the Welsers were largely concerned with the affairs of the Indies, and may therefore be more conveniently considered in the second part of the present volume; but the Fuggers appear at almost every stage of his financial career, and at the time of his abdication they had acquired a strangle hold on the revenues of Castile. They had established themselves in Lisbon during the first decade of the sixteenth century and plied a thriving trade there; one of their representatives accompanied Charles on his first visit to Spain in 1517, and in all probability remained there when the king returned to the Netherlands; in 1519, as we have already seen, they advanced him large sums for the purposes of the imperial election. From that moment onward Charles's dependence on them steadily increased. For every new loan, they managed to possess themselves of one after another of the sources of royal revenue; on the heels of the grandmasterships followed greater or lesser portions of the \textit{alcabala}, the \textit{servicio}, the \textit{cruzada}, and the revenues of the Indies. The rate of interest they demanded steadily rose, in proportion, as the royal credit became less and less secure; in 1540 it was ordinarily fourteen per cent; moreover the Fuggers were not ashamed to force the government to antedate by several months the contracts that they made, so that the amounts they received were substantially increased. The Cortes, of course, were loud in their complaints, as soon as they realized what was taking place. To their natural dislike for the procedure in question was added their traditional detestation of foreigners, and their conviction that the revenues of their native land were being carried outside the realm. But no attention was paid to these remonstrances as long as the Emperor remained upon the throne. His son was indeed to make a heroic effort in that direction in June, 1557, when his father was in retirement at Yuste; but Castilian credit was unquestionably at a far lower ebb at the time of Charles's abdication than it had been since the days of Henry the Impotent. The amount owed the Fuggers by the government in Spain alone, quite apart from the obligations to them which Charles had incurred in other lands, was probably well over 2,000,000 ducats, and the sums which it owed to other similar houses at least 5,000,000 more.
It was indeed a sorry ending. In a well-known “Memorial de las finanzas de España en los años 1560 y 1561,” Philip II affirmed that all the state revenues were alienated and that their redemption would cost 20,000,000 ducats; while a seventeenth-century historian, Matias de Novoa, asserts that the Emperor’s debts at his abdication amounted to no less than 60,000,000 escudos. At the other extreme, an ardent defender of Charles’s financial policy, basing his conclusions on an account of the state of the Hacienda in 1554, and the estimated expenses for the next three years, reduces the total of the national indebtedness to 4,329,435 ducats; but the methods by which he arrives at his conclusions do not serve to inspire confidence. And finally we have another financial report of uncertain date from the reign of Philip II, stating that whereas at the time of writing no less than 40,000,000 ducats were needed for the discharge of the royal obligations, the deficit in 1560 was but 13,000,000; from which the writer deduces the incompetence of those who had administered the royal finances in the interval. Among such widely scattered alternatives it is perhaps rather futile to try to make a choice, but in general there is good reason to believe that the estimates of Philip and of the contador who referred back to the situation as it existed in 1560 are the most nearly correct; that the deficit, in other words, at the end of the Emperor’s reign was between 13,000,000 and 20,000,000 ducats. There can be no question that the debt accumulated with terrible rapidity in the latter years of the reign, when Charles was constantly absent and occupied about other affairs. That he had seen grave financial trouble ahead in 1543 and in 1548 is made clear by passages in his instructions to Philip. But those were the days of his triumphs and renown; when the tide turned against him in the early fifties, his credit inevitably suffered, and the condition of the Hacienda became infinitely worse. And, finally, we cannot doubt that the damage was primarily due to the expenses of Charles’s foreign wars and to the outside responsibilities which Spain had been forced to assume as a result of the Hapsburg inheritance. We have seen that the Emperor was probably getting from Spain, at the end of his reign, about three times as much money as he derived from her in the beginning, and yet there is little evidence that his purely Spanish expenses had been substantially increased. Petitions for raises in the salaries of state and court officials were constantly refused; the royal guards received 80 cuegos (or 213,333 ducats) in 1504; in 1560 Philip estimates their pay at “over 200,000 ducats.” Doria’s fleet did not come into the reckoning until after 1528, and the North African presidios were relatively unimportant until after 1530; yet it is interesting to observe that while 339,000 ducats are set aside for these purposes in 1543, the corresponding estimate seventeen years later is only 21,000 more—an almost negligible increase. And yet, with all his larger loans and taxation, the Emperor found it impossible to meet his obligations. The tale of his inability to pay his troops is highly significant, a sad harbinger of the even worse conditions which were to obtain under his son. Not once did the soldiers get their money on time. At the end of 1535 Charles was one whole year in arrears. In 1543 he agreed to pay his troops one-half of what he owed them; and it was not until 1550 that they received what was due them for the last half of 1547.

Admirers of the Emperor have maintained that the real source of his financial difficulties was the rise of prices which was such a noteworthy feature of the sixteenth century; one of them has even gone so far as to pretend that the increase of taxes during his reign was more than counterbalanced by the contemporaneous fall in the value of money, and that Charles should consequently be regarded as having rather diminished than augmented the burdens of Spain. But this contention can be easily refuted. In the first place, it has not yet been positively proved that there was any general rise of prices in Spain until the decade following 1540, when the gold and silver of the Indies first became available in considerable quantities. It is in the year 1548 that the change begins to evoke universal comment and complaint. Now Charles’s financial difficulties, though they did not reach their maximum until the end of the reign, began at a much earlier date. In 1523, the year when the royal accounts were first carefully examined, it was evident that to pay outstanding bills it would be necessary to draw upon the revenues of 1524, and that to meet any sudden or exceptional demand the royal patrimony would have to be mortgaged or sold. In 1536 no less than 80 cuegos had to be borrowed on the next year’s account. The chief definite evidence now available of a rise in prices during this earlier period is that which resulted from the occasional presence, in the different cities of the realm, of Charles’s spendthrift Burgundian court. The complaints on this subject, as we have already seen, were loud and constant; they reached their climax in the period just after the war of the Comuneros, when the resulting devastation, and the concentration of large bodies of troops for the war in Navarre, rendered the situation particularly bad in the north-central portion of the realm. The grumblings of the ambassadors of Henry VIII of England, who sent back to their monarch the most appalling accounts of the difficulties in the way of gaining adequate subsistence with the salaries they received, might also make the casual reader believe that the ‘price revolution’ had already arrived. But large allowance must be made for ambassadorial exaggerations, and for the notorious miserliness of the Tudor monarch’s payments; above all, it must be remembered that the conditions described were local rather than national in their scope. The court to which the ambassadors were attached, and which was the primary cause of the conditions of which they
complained, was ambulatory; and the character of the country was so highly diversified, that it is impossible to draw any general conclusions from the situation that obtained wherever the court happened to be. There can be no doubt that the rise of prices served materially to enhance the Emperor’s difficulties during the last ten or fifteen years of his reign. It was certainly one of the chief reasons why conditions grew so much worse, so very rapidly, at the close; but it cannot be advanced as an adequate excuse for his increased demands, or even regarded as a primary factor in causing the debacle; that responsibility must be borne by the Emperor’s foreign wars and dynastic inheritance. Even the Burgundian court, which was the chief cause of such rise in prices as occurred during the early part of the reign, was the direct result of Charles’s non-Spanish traditions.

A few words may be added at this point in regard to the general economic conditions in Spain under Charles V. The Emperor’s measures in this respect have been vigorously defended, and the theory advanced that his reign marked the most prosperous period in the country’s development; naturally the advocates of this view have been driven to the conclusion that the whole blame for the terrible decline which was evident to all observers by the end of the sixteenth century should properly be made to fall on the shoulders of Philip II. But a more critical examination of the available evidence makes it clear that a large share of the responsibility should be attributed to Charles. His main object throughout was to derive revenue from Spain, and a large proportion of his edicts on matters economic were chiefly put forth in order to serve that end. Occasionally he would attempt to salve his conscience by following the suggestions which were offered by the procuradores for the amelioration of the conditions for which his exactions were in large measure responsible; but in general these suggestions were so ignorant and so self-contradictory that their adoption did more harm than good. The Spanish economic problem was unusually difficult, and Spanish economic knowledge distinctly below the average; when one couples these facts with a ruler whose viewpoint, in such matters at least, remained rather dynastic than national till the very end, one ceases to wonder that the country suffered.

In matters of agriculture and pasturage, the Emperor followed the example of the Catholic Kings, who, while by no means neglecting the interests of the tiller of the soil, tended on the whole to favor the grazier and the herdsman at his expense. This policy had yielded good results in the preceding reign; but under Charles, after the devastations of the revolt of the Comuneros, the effects on Castilian agriculture were little short of disastrous. Many of the peasants were unable to get their land under cultivation again, and the crops were inadequate and of inferior quality. The Cortes of the succeeding years were loud in their complaints, to which the government partially and occasionally paid heed; but it is abundantly clear that no real remedy was found. In 1541, Damianus a Goes, a notable enthusiast for Spain and the Spaniards, asserts that for twenty-five years past there had been unceasing importation of foreign grain into Northern Castile. The natural result of this was a rapid rise in the cost of foodstuffs, which Charles in 1539 attempted to check by fixing the maximum price of a bushel of wheat at 240 maravedis. But when he found that this and similar measures threatened to cut down his own income, he promptly drew back. In 1548 he commanded the tax-farmers to turn over one-half the corn which they derived from the lands of the Military Orders to the municipal storehouses at cost price; but two years later, when it was pointed out to him that the enforcement of this ordinance would inevitably result in less advantageous contracts with his banking friends, he reluctantly permitted it to fall into desuetude.

The Mesta, on the other hand, continued to receive the most powerful protection from the Crown. The eighty years from 1476 to 1556 mark the very climax of its prestige, and it was stronger, on the whole, at the end of that period than at the beginning. The main reason for this was doubtless Charles’s financial needs. He had discovered, early in his reign, that the Mesta could be made to contribute funds far more quickly and in greater quantities than the tillers of the soil; in fact, he had levied a special subsidy on it in 1519, for the purposes of the imperial election. The lesson thus learned he never forgot; and he cherished the Mesta to the end of his days as one of the most reliable sources of royal revenue.

The legislation of the reign in regard to horses and mules is interesting and significant. An ancient law of the Partidas decreed that Caballeros should ride on horseback, as “honor and tradition demanded”; but of recent years the use of mules had become increasingly popular. The Catholic Kings had vainly tried to check the new tendency, which seems to have increased with the incoming of Burgundian fashions, and in 1534 the Cortes took up the subject vigorously. It was felt that the nation was growing effeminate; there was a terrible shortage of mules for labor in the fields; and the upshot of the matter was that the Emperor put forth an elaborate pragmática, obliging caballeros to observe the law of the Partidas, threatening them with the death of their mules if they continued to ride them, and forbidding the export of horses from Castile. It seems clear that at first this pragmática was pretty strictly observed (we are even told that “certain mules paid the penalty in Valladolid and in other towns
for justice’ sake”); but so many horses were lost in the disastrous expedition against Algiers in 1541 that in the following year the Emperor granted numerous exemptions from the law. These exemptions multiplied in the succeeding years; they were sold by the Crown at the profitable price of fifty ducats apiece; and finally, the Cortes of 1548 asked Charles to annul the pragmática of fourteen years before, since it accomplished little good and was productive of much evil. The Emperor’s reply was to extend the exemption already granted, but not to abolish the law; the increased use of coaches and litters also operated to diminish horseback riding, and fifty years afterwards Sandoval complained that “the men of the realm had become like feeble women, and that it was to be feared that the day of judgment which God had threatened was near at hand, when the chiefs of the nation should become feminized, as it had been in the last days of the mighty Goths, when Spain was lost to the infidels”.

On the side of industry and manufacturing there is a different tale to tell, but one even more unfortunate for the economic development of Spain. Here the policy of Charles is in sharp contrast with that of his predecessors, who had striven, with considerable success, to protect and foster the national industries, by forbidding the importation of goods produced abroad. In so far as it is possible to ascribe any general trade policy to the Emperor (the oscillations between extremes are so numerous throughout that it is exceedingly difficult to discern any general trend), it is that of encouragement of foreign manufactures, provided they paid the duties imposed. Whether this was done with the idea of gaining more revenue from his customs houses, or with some vague idea of binding the different portions of his scattered Hapsburg dominions more closely together by stimulating the commercial intercourse between them, it is impossible to say; certainly it is difficult to agree with those who have seen in his measures any evidence of a nascent appreciation of the beauties of free trade. It is only too evident that Spanish industry suffered as a result of his rule. Ferdinando and Isabella, discerning that the large quantity and excellent quality of Spanish wool offered exceptional opportunities for the manufacture of cloths, had done their utmost to protect that industry from foreign competition,1 and with such success that in 1513 Guicciardini, who spoke in the most derogatory terms of Spanish industry in general, was obliged to confess that there had recently been a marked improvement in that particular line. But by the middle of the Emperor’s reign there are evidences of a change for the worse. In 1537, in 1542, in 1548, and in 1552 the Cortes complained that the quality of Spanish cloths had deteriorated; and at the same time we learn that the importations from Flanders were increasing; in 1545 Bruges alone took 500,000 ducats out of Spain in return for the woolen goods which she sent there. And when, owing to the rise in prices in the latter part of the reign, the poor people complained that they could not afford to buy the finer quality of cloths, in the production of which Spain excelled, Charles commanded that only the cheaper sorts be manufactured in the future, thus dealing a heavy blow to the industry in Spain, which was incapable of competing, in fabrics of inferior grade, with the cloth industries of foreign lands. With the silk industry of Granada, which had been taken over from the Moors in 1492, and favored and encouraged by the Catholic Kings, the situation was even worse. Not only did Charles permit the importation of foreign silks, against the expressed desires of the Cortes, but in 1546 he rearranged and increased the tariffs on the exportation of raw silk and manufactured goods from Granada into Castile and into foreign countries in such fashion that the raw material could actually be obtained more cheaply by Genoese traders than by the Spaniards themselves. In 1557 we learn from the Venetian ambassador that Granada is crowded with foreign merchants who are making large fortunes out of the silk trade; in the following year Luis Ortiz, in a report to Philip II, declares that Toledo has lost the greater part of her silk manufacturing establishments.

In other branches of economic life there are evidences of a similar state of affairs. In 1537 the Cortes complain of the bad quality of shoes, and of the evil results of the export of iron ore to France. In 1548 they declare that foreign merchants are buying up all the wool, silk, iron, steel, and other commodities in Spain, so that the home industries are completely ruined, and all the profits are carried off to other lands; Spain is significantly described as having become an “Indies for foreigners”; and ten years later it is asserted that owing to her poverty “other nations regard her inhabitants as barbarians and treat them even worse than Indians.” Making due allowance for inevitable exaggerations, these statements cannot be taken to indicate anything but an economic decline. The blame is increasingly laid, as the reign progresses, on the foreign merchants and bankers, and the facilities that had been granted them for gaining control of the national resources. The ‘big business’ interests which they represented were able to accommodate themselves to, and even derive profit from, the rise in prices and consequent fall in the value of money; but for the unorganized mass of the population of Spain the development in question was little short of disastrous. Despite all the silver and gold that streamed in from the Indies, there was a notable lack of currency in Castile. Prohibition of the export of the precious metals was of no avail; as early as 1524, before the American revenues were available in any considerable quantity, it was complained that the king of France paid a large share of the expenses of the armies with which he
was fighting Spain with the gold which he managed to derive from Spanish lands. Yet after all it would have been surprising if the result had been very different. Castile was the only one of the Emperor’s possessions where his power was sufficiently firmly entrenched to enable him to levy imposts without serious opposition, and to regulate trade in such fashion as best suited his own financial needs; it was inevitable that it should be the first one to be called upon to pay the cost of Hapsburg imperialism. Its own economic past had been so checkered and uneven that the Emperor felt neither the support nor the restraint of any firmly established traditions. In return for his steadily growing approximation to the Spanish point of view in matters religious and political, he probably felt that, in economic affairs, he had the right to utilize the country for his dynastic ends.

The sixteenth century is the greatest period in the history of the Spanish army. The reforms and reorganization initiated by Gonsalvo de Cordova had reached full fruition by the time of the accession of Charles V; and the Emperor also had the great advantage of being able to build upon the principles of national military service first enunciated in the pragmática of 1496, and subsequently developed by Cardinal Ximenes in the alistamiento of 1516. At the same time every effort was made to surround the profession of arms with a halo of glory, and to make it seem a privilege rather than a burden to embrace it; to preserve mediaeval ideals while adopting modern organization. But unfortunately this latter aim proved impossible of realization, at least in the lower ranks, save possibly in those bodies of troops which were retained in Spain for purposes of defense; for the greater part of his foreign wars the Emperor was obliged to rely upon mercenaries, recruited in the ordinary fashion, and characterized by the same merits and defects that have always been displayed by that class. His problem was greatly complicated by the fact that so many German and Italian troops were enrolled in his armies. They were separately organized and led, and as far as possible kept apart from the Spaniards, whom they disliked; but their presence gave the imperial forces a certain aspect of heterogeneity, which Charles, with all his efforts, was never quite able to overcome. Yet it cannot be doubted that constant and intimate contact with soldiers of other lands was a most important element in the broadening of Spain’s outlook which is so marked a feature of the Emperor’s reign; militarily as well as politically, economically, and intellectually, the tradition of her isolation was being rapidly broken down.

Military tactics and strategy underwent no important modification during Charles’s day. Save for certain notable improvements in the arts of entrenchment and fortification, which were made during the reign of Philip II, the methods of Gonsalvo de Cordova maintained their supremacy until the time of Gustavus Adolphus. A change in the matter of military organization, however, is to be noted, with the appearance of the so-called tercios in the year 1534. These were new divisions of the Spanish infantry, so named, it is said, because at the outset they numbered 3000 men, each one of them composed of twelve companies, each of which in turn was 250 strong. The tercios make their first appearance in Italy, where they were named after the region in which they were quartered—as, e.g., the tercios of Lombardy and of Naples; but no foreigner was ever admitted under any circumstances to their ranks, a fact which goes far to account for the pride with which the Spaniards regarded them.

The reign of the Emperor is the last great age of the Spanish military hero of the old traditional type, the dauntless warrior whose feats of individual prowess were discussed throughout the land, like those of the popular toreador of today. Some of them had the good fortune to be advanced to the highest positions, and to leave large fortunes behind them, like Antonio de Leyva and Fernando de Alarcon, who guarded Francis I; but the popular favorites were those who never attained the most exalted ranks, and were distinguished rather because of their physical strength and unflinching courage, than on account of their abilities as strategists or tacticians. Of these probably the most famous were Juan de Urbina and Diego Garcia de Paredes, both of whom had won laurels in the armies of the Great Captain, but lived on, respectively, to 1529 and 1533. Men loved to tell how Urbina, when Lautrec was besieging Milan with the army of the League, happened to pass, quite alone, by a spot where a fellow countryman was being assaulted by five Italians, and called on him for help; how Urbina went to his rescue, and how “the five Italians turned their faces to him after having knocked over the Spaniard, and at first pressed him very hard, but soon afterwards two of them left him to return to the fallen man, who was getting up, and then Juan de Urbina slew two of the three who remained to fight with him, and with the partisan of one of them put to flight the others, who were killing the soldier and were in fear of being slain also. He gathered up their arms as a proof of his victory, and returned to Milan, wounded in the breast by a stroke of a partisan, and with a knife-thrust in the cheek, and another small cut in the sword-hand, and so covered with blood that he was unrecognizable.” Paredes, it would appear, was even more remarkable. He fought “eleven duels in closed lists and won them all, which no other man has done in our day and generation.” ... “When the Emperor was going to Piacenza from Genoa he threatened the
Count of Nassau, who, at the command of the Emperor, was drawing up the troops, and had wanted to put him out of the squadron of the knights because he was not properly armed. The Count complained, but his Majesty told him that that was Diego Garcia de Paredes, who was worth more without arms than another man would be with them. In Soria he broke a pimp’s head with a bench, and threw another into the fire, and two women afterwards, so that one of them died; also two low fellows who were laughing at him and asking for the food his servants had cooked for a gentleman. On one occasion, when he was in a tavern on his return from the Turkish war near Vienna, a number of others attempted to eject him from it, but he defended the inn against them, and wounded and even slew some of his opponents.” “On many occasions,” as the contemporary chronicler naively confesses, “he completely lost control of himself, a fact which explains his failure to attain to greater dignities,” but his irregularities doubtless served to increase rather than diminish his popularity with the masses.

In naval affairs the period of Charles V witnesses a number of significant changes, most of them in the matter of the construction of ships. In the first place, the necessity of carrying cannon, and various demands of transatlantic navigation, served materially to increase the size of the vessels. The heavy galley, propelled by oars, which in the fifteenth century had on the whole tended to lose ground in favor of lighter ships, recovered its ancient preeminence, and was built on larger lines than before; the still heavier galleon or galley, destined primarily for voyages to the Indies, and depending solely on sails for its propulsion, also began to make its appearance. The foremost figure of the Spanish navy of the time was probably the elder Alvaro de Bazan, whose fame was subsequently to be overshadowed by that of his still greater son and namesake. He it was who most clearly foresaw that the ships of the future were destined to depend on sails, and who first rightly estimated the effects that the discovery of the New World was bound to have on the maritime development of his native land. But Alvaro de Bazan by no means stands alone. Side by side with him are a host of naval architects and inventors, of whom the most prominent was perhaps Blasco de Garay. In 1539 this man sent a memorial to the Emperor, outlining eight different naval inventions, of which the first and most significant was a plan for the propulsion of ships by paddle wheels turned by human agency. It appears that this experiment was actually tried, and it was found that in calm weather a vessel of 350 tons could be made to cover one league per hour in this fashion, and that it could turn around in half the time that was required by a regular galley. We also hear of schemes for armor plate, for floating batteries, for diving bells, and even for marine camouflage, all highly rudimentary, no doubt, but indicative of keen interest in naval affairs, as is also the large and diversified outpouring of naval literature during the period. One accompanying development, due primarily to the increasing importance of the Indies, and secondarily to the reliance which the Emperor placed on Andrea Doria for warfare in the Mediterranean, was the rapid decline of the naval importance of Barcelona and Valencia, and the corresponding increase of that of the cities of the Atlantic coast. Not only do the maritime energies of Seville and Cadiz expand apace; the ports of Cantabria, Asturias, and Galicia follow suit; they furnish the fleets to transport the Spanish armies to the Netherlands and to the Empire, and revive the pristine glories of this earliest of all the homes of the Spanish navy. It was only one of a number of auguries of the beginning of the transference of the center of Spanish imperial power from Aragon to Castile, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, from the Old World to the New.

The Emperor’s reign sees a further development in the broadening of Spain’s literary and artistic horizon which had begun in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was from Italy that most of the new impulses came, but German and Flemish influences are also discernible, and the relationships between the courts of Spain and England served to make each country better acquainted with the other’s intellectual life. Very notable is the change in the attitude of other European nations towards the capabilities of the Spaniards in these directions. Boccaccio had called the Castilians “semi-barbari et effrater homines,” and Lorenzo Valla had spoken of the Aragonese as “a studiis humanitatis abhorrentes,” but now in the sixteenth century the attitude is completely changed, and Spanish scholars are universally held in higher esteem. Juan Luis Vives, the Valencian philosopher, was called to the University of Louvain as professor of belles-lettres before he was thirty years of age; he was invited to England by Henry VIII, made tutor to the Princess Mary, and later elected a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Four years afterwards his opposition to the divorce of Catharine of Aragon deprived him of the royal favor, and in 1528 he retired to Bruges, where he lived most of the time till his death in 1540. He, Bude, and Erasmus, were called the triumvirs of the republic of letters in the sixteenth century; and it was said that while the other two surpassed him in wit and in learning, Vives excelled them both in the soundness of his judgment.
The period has been described as characterized by a mania for founding institutions of higher education. Cardinal Ximenes’s great university at Alcalá had pointed the way, and its two leading lights, Antonio de Lebrija and Lucius Marineus Siculus, spread the enthusiasm for learning throughout the length and breadth of the land. Sometimes the new foundation was attached to one of the older universities—as, for instance, Alonso de Fonseca’s Colegio Mayor in Salamanca; more often it was set up independently, in some new place, so as ultimately to draw down upon itself the jealousy and bitter hatred of the older institutions, which could not bear to see their classes suffer as a result of the increased resort to colleges of more recent origin. The Society of Jesus signalized itself by its zeal in the cause of education before the end of the reign, the first Jesuit college in Spain being founded by St. Francis Borgia, who subsequently became the third general of the order, at Gandia, his birthplace, in 1546. Modern subjects and humanistic methods came in on all sides, to the prejudice of the scholastic ones, and the Emperor was glad to encourage the new tendencies. Intellectual Spain was now thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the Renaissance.

It is in the realm of literature that the Italian influence is most conspicuous. Andrea Navagero, the Venetian ambassador at Charles’s court, became acquainted, in 1526, with the Barcelonese poet, Juan Boscan (d. 1542), introduced him to the new school of Italian poetry, and encouraged him to work for its adoption in Spain. As Boscan’s native tongue was Catalan and not Castilian, he would have found this a difficult task to accomplish unaided; but fortunately his intimate friend, the poet, Garcilaso de la Vega, brother of the popular hero in the revolt of the Comuneros, had also become a convert to the new style of writing, and loyally seconded the efforts of Boscan. The verses of both poets were published, in a single volume, in the year 1544, and from that date onward the triumph of the fashions of the Italian Renaissance was definitely assured. On the side of the drama the works of Juan de Encina, Bartolome de Torres Navarro, and Gil Vicente mark the transition period between the older ecclesiastical plays and the ‘comedias de capa y espada’ in which the Spaniards were soon after to attain their greatest fame. Since Torres Navarro lived most of his life in Naples, and since Gil Vicente was a Portuguese who preferred to write in Spanish, it is easy to account for the foreign influences which so greatly accelerated the change; but after the new ideas had once taken root, Spanish dramatic talent and originality convincingly asserted themselves, and laid the foundations for a national dramatic style which constitutes one of the glories of the peninsula. The Sevillan, Lope de Rueda (1510?-65), is the foremost figure in the movement; he has been justly described as the father of the Spanish theatre. The astounding success of the Lazarrillo de Tormes which was first published at Antwerp in 1553, marks the corresponding victory of the modern novel of real life over the mediaeval romance of chivalry.

The development of historical writing during the reign is perhaps, for the student of political affairs, the most interesting of all. Italian models were doubtless carefully studied, as is abundantly proved by the life and works of the imperial biographer, Alfonso de Ullor; but what chiefly inspired the Spaniards to write so much more and so much better history than they had ever done before was the consciousness of the greatness to which they themselves had attained, and the desire to perpetuate the memory of it for the benefit of posterity. The increasing importance of the office of royal chronicler in Castile (which had existed since the end of the fifteenth century, if not before), and the foundation of corresponding positions for Aragon and the Indies, bear witness to the Emperor’s zeal for the encouragement of historical writing; and his ability to draw the line between the literal truth and the flattering eulogies from which most of his appointees were unable to turn aside, is attested by his ironical remark on the commentaries of Luis de Avila, that though Alexander’s achievement surpassed his own, he was less fortunate in his chronicler. The list of historical writers whose names add luster to the reign is far too long to enumerate here; some of the most eminent of them did not attain the coveted position of royal chronicler at all; but the progress of history, as well as that of poetry, prose, and the drama during the period, is amply sufficient to justify the statement that the first half of the sixteenth century marks the beginning of a new era in the development of Spanish literature.

In painting and sculpture the reign of the Emperor in Spain has few products of exceptional value to boast of; though many Spanish artists crossed over to Italy and studied under the direction of the great masters there. But in architecture there is another tale to tell; the age of Charles V witnesses the final evolution, out of the long conflict between ‘Mudejar,’ Italian, and German Gothic influences which had raged during the preceding century, of a distinctively Spanish style, the plateresque, so called because the fineness of its ornamentation recalls the work of the platero, or silversmith. Its first great name is that of Enrique de Egas, a good specimen of whose art is the Hospital de Santa Cruz at Toledo, and close beside him stands his son-in-law Alonso de Covarrubias, who is seen at his best in the monuments at Alcalá. The fondness for elaborate decoration increased as the reign advanced: it was by Alonso Gonzalez de Berruguete (1486-1561) and Diego de Siloe (1500-1563)—the former really rather a sculptor than an architect, and the latter the son of a sculptor—that the fashions begun by Egas were
developed. The Emperor’s own interest in building is attested by the architectural monuments with which his name is connected in almost every Spanish city where he remained for any length of time. The magnificent though unfinished palace on the Alhambra hill is perhaps the most famous case in point, though its style is much more distinctively Italian than that of most of the great edifices of the reign. At Cordova, in the year 1523, the cathedral chapter, in spite of the opposition of the town council, secured permission from Charles, who had not then visited the spot, to construct a Christian church, in the plateresque style, in the very center of the great mosque of the Abd ar-Rahmans, thereby necessitating the removal of sixty-three of the beautiful columns that upheld the roof, and the destruction of a large portion of the elaborately carved and painted ceiling which formed the chief glory of the building. But when the Emperor, for whose praises the chapter ardently longed, finally came to see the result of its handiwork in 1526, he was visibly taken aback, and exclaimed: “You have built what you or others might have built anywhere; but you have destroyed something that was unique in the world.” Whatever else Charles V may or may not have been, he was unquestionably reverent of the past.
CHAPTER XXIV

WARS WITH FRANCE AND ASCENDANCY IN ITALY

The main interest, as well as the chief difficulty, in studying the foreign policy of Spain under the Emperor Charles V, is to determine precisely how the nation was affected by the almost enforced expansion of her influence and responsibilities which resulted from her being merged in the inheritance of the Hapsburgs. As the richest and most powerful of Charles’s far flung dominions, it was inevitable that she should be called upon to shoulder the heaviest part of the burden of their maintenance; and whenever the foe was a heretic or an infidel, her ancient traditions served as an added reason for placing her in the forefront of the conflict. Whether she gained or lost in the process is a problem over which men have disputed ever since. The verdict depends in the first place on the degree to which one believes that the Emperor’s point of view, dynastic at the outset, became His panicized in the course of his reign. It will be determined, in the last analysis, by the measure of outside responsibilities which Spain, at that stage of her development, is thought to have been capable of advantageously assuming. Increased external prestige is obvious on every hand; but the constant use of Spanish soldiers and Spanish resources for objects not primarily Spanish is equally apparent, while the attitude of the contemporaneous Spaniards in regard to these outside enterprises varies between ungrudging approval and reluctant and compulsory acquiescence.

Throughout his life, Charles was confronted with three different enemies—France, the Turk, and the German Protestants and it was largely with Spanish troops and Spanish treasure that he fought them all. The wars with France occupy the forefront of the picture and will therefore be considered in the present chapter.

There were four main causes for Charles’s hostilities with the contemporary French kings. First came the ancient rivalry over the inheritance of Charles the Bold—the Burgundian lands which had been divided between the Valois and the Hapsburgs. Next there was the bitterness of feeling over the result of the imperial election of 1519; Francis I, when he learned of his defeat, took the news calmly, but obviously realized that war was inevitable. Thirdly, there was the contest for the hegemony of Italy—the contest that had begun with the raid of Charles VIII on Naples in 1494—the contest in which France had hitherto been opposed by Spain under Ferdinand the Catholic. And lastly, there was the quarrel for the possession of Navarre—torn from the Albrets in 1512, and incorporated into Castile despite the protests of Louis XII and Francis I. Over and above these four immediate reasons there was also the fact that the realm of France divided Charles’s dominions into two separate halves—a geographical fact bound to make for trouble.

Now, of these different causes of the wars with France, only two—the contest for supremacy in Italy and the quarrel over Navarre—can fairly be called in any sense really Spanish. With Burgundian and imperial affairs Spain had only become recently and artificially connected, through the accident of the Hapsburg inheritance; she could not reasonably be expected to take a very lively interest in them. Moreover, even the Italian rivalry, as it presented itself to the mind of contemporaries, must have seemed not so much Spanish as Aragonese. The mediaeval traditions of Castile were, as we have several times pointed out, emphatically Francophile; the union of the crowns had been too recent, and the tie that it had created too loose, to permit the western kingdom as yet to forget its inherited friendships in any very enthusiastic support of projects for the aggrandizement of the Aragonese portion of the Spanish Empire. The Navarrese quarrel was indeed exclusively a cosa de España: both parts of the peninsula had an inherited interest in it, more especially Castile, owing to the events of the preceding decade. When the war was carried to that frontier, all Spaniards were ready, almost eager, to fight. Castile took the lead, and Aragon supported her; witness the story of the repulse of the invasion which followed on the heels of the revolt of the Comuneros. But the conflict of 1521 marked the last serious flare-up of the struggle in that quarter. The subsequent efforts of the French to recover Fontarabia were but trifling episodes. The real scene of the war had shifted to Lombardy, which to most of Charles’s Iberian subjects still seemed very remote. On January 11, 1530, the Emperor wrote to his brother Ferdinand from Bologna, that in Spain they detested every expenditure that he had made from that kingdom for the sake of Italy.

The war opened, moreover, in such a manner as to emphasize those phases of the struggle which were outside the Spanish horizon. Charles had left Spain in May, 1520, ostensibly to be crowned at Aix-
la-Chapelle, but really to make certain of the alliance of Henry VIII of England, indispensable for success against France on the Flemish frontier. That he had gone at all was a bitter grievance to his Spanish subjects; that he had gone for a purpose in which they were really not concerned served to irritate them still more. Their discontent, moreover, was by no means alleviated by the course of events after the fighting began. Hostilities opened in the spring of 1521 with a raid on Luxemburg by Robert de la Marek, who, after wavering for several years between the rival camps, had decided, for the time being, in favor of the Valois; the French king was not entirely averse to having such an unstable ally, for it was easier, when it should prove convenient, to disavow him. The aggressions of de la Marek provoked counterattacks from the imperialists under the Count of Nassau and Franz von Sickingen, who sought vainly to wrest Mézières from the guard of the heroic Bayard. In June Charles left the Diet of Worms and took the field in person; a little later Francis also collected his forces and relieved Mézières; with the rival sovereigns in battle array the war had now begun in earnest. Charles concentrated his efforts on Tournai, which for centuries had eluded the grasp of Burgundian dukes and Flemish counts; and though his attention was distracted by the necessity of going off, in August, to Bruges, to negotiate with Wolsey about the details of the English alliance, his generals in the end proved equal to the task. The place was exceedingly strong; Francis advanced, with a superior force, only to throw away, through an excess of caution, an admirable opportunity to crush the army of his rival under the walls of Valenciennes. Finally, on December 3, Tournai capitulated to the imperialists and was permanently annexed, though as a separate province, to the rest of Charles’s domains in the Netherlands. Hapsburg dynastic interests had certainly been advanced, but Spain apparently had been temporarily forgotten.

Yet if the Spaniards had been able to see into the mind of their young sovereign, they would have learned that the Netherlands were less remote from them than they seemed. The capture of Tournai was shortly followed by the first of a long series of events which were ultimately destined to bring the Iberian and Burgundian portions of Charles’s inheritance into the closest contact, to the lasting misfortune of both. On February 7, 1522, at Brussels, Charles signed a convention by which he handed over to his brother Ferdinand the Austrian domains of the house of Hapsburg. It was the first note of warning, so to speak, of the division of his vast inheritance which he was finally to consummate at the time of his abdication; the first evidence of his intention “to draw the Netherlands into the orbit of Spain” and of the Spanish Empire. The imperial suzerainty over the Burgundian lands lasted on, in theory at least, until 1648, 1678, and the wars of the French Revolution; but for all practical purposes it grew steadily weaker after 1522. It was henceforth clearly Charles’s aim to transfer the Netherlands into an outpost of the Spanish power in Northern Europe. Nor is it difficult to see why he acted as he did. The Burgundian and the Spanish portions of his inheritance were the only ones that he had yet really seen and got to know. They were, moreover, the only ones in which the government was really in his own hands. It was but natural that he should wish to bring them into a closer and more effective union, just as it was natural that, in the midst of so many conflicting duties and responsibilities, he should desire to hand over the remoter Austrian lands to someone else. And the war with France, on which all his energies were now concentrated, served as a final and compelling reason for the step which he had taken. With Spain and the Netherlands in intimate and effective cooperation, he could catch his enemy between two fires. Thus was the power of the Spanish Empire given its first foothold in a region where it was ultimately to suffer one of its most disastrous and significant defeats.

Meantime, the imperial diplomacy had been proceeding with marvelous success, and in a manner which insured the continuation and expansion of the area of the conflict. The alliance with Henry VIII of England, considered at the time of Charles’s visit to that monarch in May 1520, was virtually concluded at the time of the deceitful conference of Calais in August, 1521. The terms were arranged in a manner favorable to Charles, who, though disappointed at the various delays which Wolsey managed to impose, got a definite promise of an English invasion of France. With the papacy also, Charles’s envoys were equally fortunate. Ever since the imperial election of 1519, when Leo X had discovered the futility of attempting to prevent the election of the Hapsburg by supporting the candidacy of Francis I, the Pope had been gravitating towards an alliance with Charles. On May 8, 1521, a secret treaty for a joint offensive had been concluded between them, and on the fourth of the following June Leo had specifically granted Charles the right—indispensable in view of his Aragonese inheritance—to transgress the ancient papal constitution forbidding the union of Naples and the Empire in a single hand. The event had been hastened by the misgovernment of France in the Milanese, where everyone united in desiring her expulsion; the smaller states to the south of it were also eager to lend a hand. In the summer of 1521 a force of over 20,000 men was collected under Prospero Colonna; most of them were Italians and Germans, but there were 2000 Spaniards sent on from Naples, and Hernando de Avalos, Marquis of Pescara, and Antonio de Leyva held minor commands. By the middle of November the French had been virtually driven out of Lombardy; only the citadel of Milan, and a few other strong
places, remained in their hands. The war had blazed forth again on the ancient battleground. Italy once more was the centre of the stage, and with the influence of Gattinara increasing every day, it was destined to remain so for some time to come. Spain, and especially Castile, was certainly not enthusiastic about the Italian war; still it was less alien to her traditions and her interests than the struggle in Picardy and on the confines of the Netherlands.

Less than two months after the French had been expelled from the Milanese, Leo X died, and the choice of his successor became the question of the hour. In the ensuing conclave the more prominent candidates were one after another excluded, and the choice finally fell, to the horror of the Roman populace, on Charles’s ‘barbarian’ tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, regent of Spain, the only Dutchman that was ever Pope. It was not Charles’s influence that elected him, for the Emperor could not have known of Leo’s death in time to exert any pressure upon the cardinals; it was rather weariness on the part of the electors, skillfully utilized by Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, and a lurking feeling that in view of the history of the preceding half century, it would be well to choose a Pope for his piety and exalted character, and above all, for his freedom from local political bias or entanglement. Adrian accepted his election with great diffidence and real regret, as a duty imposed upon him by the inscrutable wisdom of God; but at the beginning of his pontificate he showed firmness on the question of the hour. Personally friendly to Charles, he refused to promise him immediate support against the king of France. Neutrality between the two great rivals was apparently to be his policy, and France was encouraged to attempt recovery of the Milanese.

A new expedition was dispatched into Lombardy, under the Marechal de Lautrec; but it was inadequately supported in the matter of funds, and suffered defeat at the hands of Prospero Colonna at Bicocca in the end of April. This time the results were even more decisive than before. The French retreated in confusion; the Sforzas were reestablished in Milan; Genoa also was captured by Colonna and pillaged by the Spaniards, and the imperialist Adorno was elected Doge. Charles, moreover, was by this time back in Spain, gathering in the fruits of the victory over the Comuneros. The diplomacy of the preceding years had already begun to bear fruit. Henry VIII promised to invade Picardy in the summer of 1523; in June of the same year, the Venetians, who had hitherto half-heartedly supported France, went over, for the time being, to the imperialists; and in August the new Pope, finding that his earlier policy of neutrality had failed to produce the results he desired, succumbed to the general trend and joined the coalition against the French. Most important of all, the allies were encouraged by the news of the treason of Charles, Duke of Bourbon, Constable of France, his desertion of his liege lord, the king of France, and his reception into the ranks of the imperialists. This great noble, whose domains covered a large portion of South Central France, had been so irritated by various injuries at the hands of his master that a promise of marriage into the royal house of Spain, together with a large dowry, induced him to place himself at the disposal of Charles V. The circle of Francis’s foes seemed absolutely complete; and this time their avowed object was not merely the expulsion of the French from Italy, but the invasion and dismemberment of France herself.

But the allies were destined to experience that rare defensive strength of France, which, demonstrated again and again in the centuries to come, has recently proved the strong bulwark of western civilization. The English invasion of Picardy, under the Duke of Suffolk, was little more than a raid. The imperialist contingent soon deserted, and in December the English retired to Calais, discouraged and resentful. An attack which Charles had promised to deliver in person in the region of Narbonne and Perpignan was shifted at the last moment to the frontiers of Navarre, doubtless because Castile, on which the Emperor had to rely for men and supplies, was less averse to fighting in that quarter. But even with this advantage Charles was unable to accomplish much. Spain complained that the expedition was “for the benefit of England.” “Whereas [the Emperor] believed,” wrote Sampson, the English envoy, from Pamplona, on November 12, “to have now here in a readiness over ten or twelve thousand Castilian footmen, at the most he hath scarcely found five thousand... and, Sir, when this army shall be in any readiness, God knoweth”. The town of Bayonne was the Emperor’s original objective, but the winter snows blocked the passes, and he had to content himself with recapturing Fontarabia, which had been in the hands of the French since 1521. “I make no doubt,” he wrote to his brother Ferdinand in March, 1524—and the tone of the letter sounds as if he were boasting to keep up his courage—“that you will be glad to hear of the recovery of this place ... for it is a great advantage to me to have in my control such a powerful city, so necessary to my realms of Castile and Navarre, and so advantageous for doing harm to our enemies in Guiene.” In the meantime the Duke of Bourbon had barely escaped to Genoa, while his accomplices had been arrested and his lands seized by the crown of France. If anything, the realm had been strengthened by his treachery. Its treasury and its territorial integrity had benefited by the ensuing confiscations; the national feeling was deeply stirred; and men rallied around their king, who was certainly not deficient in personal courage and charm, and could still
Francis, however, was, for the moment, more intent on the recovery of the Milanese than on the preservation of his own realm. Always a lover of show and ostentation, he hoped to distinguish himself by another Marignano. At the time of Bourbon’s treason, he had been about to lead another army into Lombardy. The bulk of it, in fact, was already there, and he ordered its leader, the Admiral Bonnivet, at once to win back the territory which had been lost. His forces were probably larger than those of the imperialists, and at first he met with some measure of success. The tide, however, soon turned against him. The death of Adrian of Utrecht (September 14, 1523) had been followed, in December, by the election of Giulio de’ Medici, who took the name of Clement VII; as he owed his choice in some measure to the influence of Charles V, he was obliged, for the time being, not to break with the imperialists. Charles’s military forces, at the same time, were strengthened and their leaders changed. Prospero Colonna had died in the end of December and was replaced by Lannoy, vicerey of Naples, who came up from the south with over 4000 Spanish troops; the Duke of Bourbon was made lieutenant-general with the supreme command. Under them the Marquis of Pescara, and his nephew, the Marquis del Vasto, were steadily gaining in ability and prominence; they were not always the most docile subordinates, but Bourbon knew how to get the best out of them, and the Spaniards whom they commanded, though probably never more than one-third of the imperialist armies, were the decisive element in the victories of the ensuing months. Against these forces Bonnivet could make no headway. In the spring of 1524 he was obliged to retire once more into Provence, the imperialists, under Bourbon, following hot on his heels. The Chevalier de Bayard, *sans peur et sans reproche*, who had fought in the famous combat at Trani in the winter of 1502-03, and had knighted Francis I on the field of Marignano, lost his life in protecting the rear guard of the French.

Again France was placed on the defensive, and again the invader was destined to be repulsed. In August Bourbon advanced to the siege of Marseilles and wrote urgently to Henry VIII and Charles V to support him by simultaneous invasions in the North and across the Pyrenees. But the Tudor monarch, irritated by what he was pleased to regard as the treachery of his ally, refused to budge; and meantime the expedition which the Emperor had prepared on the frontiers of Roussillon was so slow in getting under way that he finally countermanded it and offered Bourbon a subsidy instead. Marseilles, moreover, resisted stoutly; it was plentifully supplied; its defenses were in excellent repair, and its garrison was full of ardor and enthusiasm. A vigorous cannonade made a breach in the outer walls, but the inner fortifications were so strong that the German, Spanish, and Italian portions of Bourbon’s army successively refused to deliver an assault; finally, on September 29, the imperialist general broke camp and retreated, slowly and in good order, through the pass of Susa into Lombardy.

But the period of see-sawing was nearing its end. A climax of most dramatic nature was rapidly approaching. The eyes of the French king were still on Milan; he had even assured the Pope that he would invade it again, at the moment that Bourbon was advancing on Marseilles. When the imperialists withdrew, he kept his word; in October, 1524, he led his army across the Alps. At first, fortune seemed to smile upon him as it had done in his great campaign of 1515. The skies were clear for his crossing the mountains. The imperialists retreated before him when he reached the plains below. He was able to occupy Milan without opposition. Meantime, the bulk of Bourbon’s forces retired to Lodi, twenty-two miles to the southeast, while a detachment of some 6000 men, mostly Germans, under the Spanish general, Antonio de Leyva, occupied Pavia, fifteen miles farther west. This town is situated on the left bank of the Ticino, flanked on the east by a swift-running brook, and protected on the north by the enclosed park of Mirabello; its walls were strong and high and in good condition. On October 28 Francis began to besiege it, but his first attack was a miserable failure, and he soon sat down to starve it out. November, December, and most of January were passed in disastrous inaction—an army of over 30,000 immobilized by a garrison of less than 6000—while the bulk of the imperialists at Lodi, discouraged by lack of pay, and by rumors of the defection of their Venetian and papal allies, were given time to recover their badly shattered morale.

By the latter part of January, Bourbon, Lannoy, and Pescara decided to move on Pavia and force the French to raise the siege; in early February the two armies had established contact. The French were drawn up in the park of Mirabello, in such fashion as to derive the greatest amount of protection from the walls that enclosed it. For three long weeks the imperialists sought to distract their attention by a series of petty skirmishes, and succeeded so well that de Leyva, under cover of a false attack from Pavia itself, was able to replenish his supply of munitions and to send out one of his captains to consult with the imperialist generals. The numbers of the two armies were by this time probably nearly equal, for the French had been weakened by the recall of several thousand Swiss, and by the departure of a con-
siderable force which had been dispatched to make a feint on Naples; they probably numbered rather less than 25,000. The imperialists at Lodi were reckoned at 23,000 men and 800 ‘lances’ but were certainly less numerous by the time they reached Pavia. In cavalry and in artillery the French were unquestionably superior.

On February 23 the imperialists decided to risk a battle. On the night of the 24th-25th, they sent forward a few detachments to breach the walls of the park of Mirabello in three different places; the soldiers wore white shirts in order to be able to recognize one another in the dark. They did their work effectively and in perfect order. At dawn the entire army began to enter the park. The French artillery tore great holes in the advancing ranks; but the imperialists, thanks to their excellent discipline, were soon drawn up in battle array inside the walls. At that moment the French king, foolishly abandoning the intrenchment which he had constructed with so much care, led forward his men at arms to the charge; by so doing he masked the fire of his own artillery, thus depriving himself of the chief advantage he possessed. So precipitate, moreover, had been his attack that many of his heavy-armed troops were unable to follow, and he soon found himself almost alone in the midst of his foes. Pescara showed himself a worthy disciple, of Gonsalvo de Cordova by the skill with which he mingled his horsemen with his arquebusiers. At the critical moment de Leyva made a sortie from Pavia and attacked the French camp. In a few hours the battle had virtually ended and given place to individual combats, of which the most important and dramatic raged around the person of the king of France. Wounded in one arm, and surrounded by his foes, he fought valiantly on, refusing to surrender to one of the followers of the Duke of Bourbon, who had recognized him and begged him to yield; in the end he gave his sword to Lannoy, who arrived on the scene just in time to save his life. Over 6000 of his army had been left dead upon the field, among them many of the noblest names of France. The king wrote to his mother from his prison in Pizzighetone that “naught was left him save his honor and his life.”

In some respects the battle of Pavia marks the climax of the career of Charles V. Certainly it was by far the most dramatic of his victories. It had been won on his twenty-fifth birthday, against an army which had been generally expected to be victorious. It had ended by leaving his most powerful enemy a helpless prisoner in the hands of the imperialist generals, and France undefended against the Emperor and his allies. Moreover, things had worked out in such fashion that Spain came in for the lion’s share of the glory,—possibly for a somewhat larger share than she actually deserved. The Spanish detachment in the imperial forces formed less than one-third of the entire army, and had been recruited entirely from Naples and Sicily; Charles had not yet been able to send a single man across from Spain. The Spaniards themselves took little interest in the Italian campaign. More concerned with the defense of the Pyrenean frontier, they blamed the insistence of the Piedmontese Chancellors Gattinara for the fact that most of the fighting was being done in Lombardy. They naturally asked themselves what advantage they could hope to derive from the struggle there, rightly anticipating that even if Charles were victorious, he could not ignore the claims of the Sforzas. Yet, on the other hand, it is not difficult to see why the battle was generally regarded as a victory for Spain rather than for any of the other countries over which Charles ruled. It had been fought in a war whose origins were in large measure Franco-Spanish; in the Italy over which the two nations had struggled intermittently for more than thirty years. The Spanish contingent in the imperialist army, though small, had done the most effective fighting of the day, and Pescara was unquestionably the most brilliant of its leaders. And, finally, the monarch whose generals had been victorious was residing in Spain when the battle was won; it had come in the most Spanish period of his reign, when the rest of his vast responsibilities had been suffered to fall into the background. Once more Spain had been singled out as the child of fate; greatness, at every turn, was being literally thrust upon her. Foreign lands, and an imperial title, had already fallen into her lap, almost without her having to strike a blow for them; and now came the glory of having gained the greatest military victory of the age, when she had, if anything, disapproved of the campaign in which it was won.

Spain received the news of the victory with the utmost calmness. There was almost no outward evidence of joy or exultation. This was doubtless largely due to the example of the young king, whose demeanor in his hour of triumph excited the admiration of the English ambassador. The news reached him at Madrid on March 10, but “there was no semblance in him of arrogance or change of manner to joy effusively ...” but he referred everything to God. With this, Sir,” continues Sampson, “and divers other good words in so great a thing to have such singular moderation, I think myself more to have learned, and much better at all times to have moderation present and in good remembrance, than be all the letters, words, or books that ever I have or shall read.” But there were other reasons than Charles’s “accustomed gravity” to explain the way he took the news. He was keen enough to see that the moment of his great victory was really one of imminent danger, and that the completeness of his triumph had roused the jealousy of the rest of Europe. The waverings of the Pope and the Venetians before Pavia had given him his first warning; though both of them ostensibly fell into line again shortly afterwards, it was
only too easy to see that they did so from motives of fear rather than of loyalty. The other Italian states were also up in arms. After Pavia they had most of them been forced by Charles’s victorious generals to recognize a sort of imperial protectorate, and what was worse, to contribute funds. In Milan itself, Girolamo Morone, Sforza’s chancellor, concocted a plot to free the duchy from the presence of foreign troops. He counted on having the support of Pescara, who, not underestimating the extent of his own services, was exceedingly jealous of the honors heaped on Lannoy; but the Spaniard, after having learned the extent of his designs, reported the plot, arrested the chancellor, and shut up the duke himself in the citadel of Milan.

But the most ominous cloud on the horizon was England. Henry VIII, despite various experiences of being left in the lurch by continental allies, still professed himself anxious for a joint invasion and partitioning of France. But Wolsey had always striven to restrain the king’s martial ardor, and to make him alive to the dangers of imperial preponderance. Even during the months before Pavia, he had managed to keep in close touch with the French government. The secret agent and go-between was a Genoese merchant, Passano—or John Joachim, as he was generally called; but de Praedt, the imperial ambassador, suspected what he was about, and lost no time in reporting to Charles. When the news of the Emperor’s victory arrived, the cardinal was naturally more than ever alarmed. Before any reversal of England’s foreign policy could be possible, it would be necessary for him to convince the king of the error of his ways. This, however, was not so difficult as it had been before. Correspondence between the two sovereigns in regard to a joint invasion of France had quickly revealed the divergences of their points of view. Both advanced extravagant proposals, while each began to accuse the other of seeking to avoid all the trouble and expense, and at the same time to monopolize all the glory and advantage. In May it became clear that Charles had abandoned all thought of marrying the Princess Mary, and was resolved to seek the hand of the Infanta of Portugal. The keystone of the alliance of 1522 was thus removed. There was, indeed, no formal breach, and each side continued to give the other fair words; but it was only too obvious that all cordiality had departed. Meantime, Wolsey drew close to Francis’s mother, Louise of Savoy, who was acting as regent in the absence of her son, and cleverly utilized the situation for his own advantage. The transference in June of the captive king from Italy to Spain increased the cardinal’s anxiety to come to terms. Might not the Emperor be planning to extort from his prisoner the promise of an alliance to be directed against England? By the month of August, Wolsey had gained his point. A defensive treaty was signed between England and France, in which Henry VIII promised to do his utmost to effect the prompt deliverance, on reasonable conditions, of the ‘Most Christian King’ from his captivity at Madrid.

The system of alliances which the Emperor had built up two years before had, in fact, broken down, and Charles was fully alive to the dangers of his position. Everything now depended on the outcome of his dealings with his royal prisoner, who, after prolonged delays and an unusually eventful journey, finally reached Madrid on August 14. That he must be speedily released and sent home was obvious from the outset. Europe would never permit him to remain a prisoner for long; even in Spain his gracious and gallant manners had won him an admiration and popularity “more, perhaps”, as the Venetian ambassador significantly reported, “than some people would wish.” The only question was how severe should be the conditions of his restoration to liberty. For five long months the Emperor deliberated, while every day news poured in of the ominous condition of foreign affairs, the restlessness of Italy, the hostility of the Turk, the progress of the German Lutherans, and of the Anglo-French entente; of the marvelous way in which France had gathered herself together under the regent, Louise of Savoy, in spite of the defeat and imprisonment of her king. Meanwhile, Charles’s treatment of his royal captive excited the wonder of all men; certainly, the like had never been seen before. Francis cherished the illusion that he was to be entertained as a royal guest but was speedily undeceived; he was confined in the great tower of the castle in Madrid. Disappointed that Charles did not immediately respond to his request that he pay him a visit, he fell dangerously ill; and the Emperor was persuaded to grant permission to Marguerite d’Angouleme to come and comfort her brother in his captivity. “Being young and a widow,” reported the English ambassador, somewhat maliciously, “she comes, as Ovid says of women going to see a play, to see and to be seen, that, perhaps, the Emperor may like her, and also to woo the Queen Dowager of Portugal for her brother, which no one else dares do without the Emperor’s knowledge. Then, as they are both young widows, she shall find good commodity in cackling with her to advance her brother’s matter; and if she finds her inclined thereto, they will help each other.” Two months later, the king’s illness had advanced so fast that on September 18 he was thought to be dying, and Charles was sent for in hot haste from Toledo. In an affecting interview he assured Francis that he was ‘his good friend and brother and hoped that he would continue to be so.’ The same strange mixture of kindliness and severity was maintained till the very end. The two monarchs “had oftentimes alone in secret very long discourses. They went together in one coach to a castle half a day’s journey from
thence, where was queen Eleanor, whom the King contracted. And yet, notwithstanding all these great signs of peace and amity, he was no less straitly guarded than before, without having any more liberty; so that at one and the same time he was embraced as a brother, and guarded as a prisoner.”

The conditions of the king’s liberation were not finally settled until January 14, 1526. They had been the product, on Charles’s side at least, of much anxious thought, and the subject of prolonged negotiation with the different representatives of Francis. The knottiest point was Charles’s territorial demands; for, despite all the clouds on the political horizon, the Emperor was resolved not to let his captive go without requiring the cession of the duchy of Burgundy. That he should have insisted upon this has often provoked surprise. He must have known how deeply the Burgundians were attached to France, and how unlikely it was that a stipulation of this sort, extorted from a captive monarch, would ever be observed after he had regained his freedom. On the other hand, he could not bring himself to forego all territorial reward for the great victory that he had won, and there was certainly no other place in Western Europe where he could claim it with a greater show of merely asserting his traditional rights. As a Netherlander, he had never ceased to regard the duchy as the lawful property of the house of Hapsburg, and as Spain and the Netherlands were henceforth to go hand in hand, its acquisition would be most valuable from the Iberian point of view. To the union of his captive with his widowed sister, Eleanor, he could not openly consent without breaking his pledge to Bourbon, who had been allured out of France only by hope of that marriage, and had recently arrived at Madrid to assert his rights; but when the Duke had had the Emperor’s necessities explained to him, “he at last said with his tongue, he was content;—whether he was in his heart or not.” The other stipulations—the abandonment by the French king of all his claims to Italy, and of his overlordship of Flanders and Artois, his assumption of the Emperor’s debts to Henry VIII, and his cession of his two sons as a pledge of the fulfilment of the treaty—made comparatively little difficulty, and on March 17 Francis was conveyed to the banks of the Bidassoa. In midstream a large boat lay at anchor, and to it the French king was rowed out, with six Spaniards; while his sons, with six Frenchmen, simultaneously approached it from the other bank. Apparently not a word was spoken while the exchange was being effected, but the moment that Francis trod the soil of his own realm, the Spanish ambassador, acting on instructions, approached and demanded the ratification of the cession of Burgundy. The king, however, possibly dreading recapture, was in mad haste to be gone. Waving the ambassador aside, he mounted a horse and rode off to St. Jean-de-Luz, and then to Bayonne. When the Emperor heard of it, he speedily sent orders that Eleanor, who had expected to follow Francis within a few days, should be detained until further notice at Vitoria.

The scene on the Bidassoa portended much. It was plain that Francis did not intend to observe the treaty of Madrid; nor does it appear that anyone expected him to do so. Charles had, on the whole, made a not excessive use of his victory; but moderate though it was, it had been far too much for the rest of Europe, now thoroughly alarmed at the overwhelming preponderance of the house of Hapsburg. Through the early months of 1526 the French king temporized. On the ground of a secret protestation that without the consent of the local estates he had no right to alienate a French province, made in the presence of witnesses on the day before he signed the treaty, he continued to postpone the cession of Burgundy. On May 16 Lannoy wrote to the Emperor that he did not believe that it would ever be given up. In the meantime, the attitude of the foreign powers grew steadily more favorable to the king of France. His relations with Henry VIII became more cordial every day. The Italians longed to be rid of the imperial soldiers. The Pope, at those rare moments when he had the courage to speak his mind, poured forth furious invectives against the ambition of Charles V. Finally, on May 22, at Cognac in Angouleme, a treaty was made between Francis, Clement, and the Italian states, “to put an end to the wars which were devastating Christendom”—or, in other words, to liberate Italy from the tutelage of Charles V, and reestablish the balance of power in Western Europe. Each of the high contracting parties promised its contingent, and it was expected that the king of England would take the title of Protector and Preserver of the League. As far as this, however, Henry was not yet prepared to go. Wolsey still desired to preserve the appearance of amity with the Emperor, and had certainly no wish to be actively involved in another continental war. On the other hand, it was obvious that the new combination had the cordial good wishes of the English government; for the position of the Emperor was still far too strong to suit either the cardinal or the king.

In December Charles returned from his honeymoon at Granada to a very different sort of task from that which he had anticipated six months before. He had hoped, after the treaty with Francis, to go over to Italy and be crowned by the Pope; to pass on to Germany and deal with the Lutherans; and, finally, to concentrate his forces against the Turk. Instead, all these weighty matters had to be indefinitely postponed, and he was obliged to take up the sword for the retention of what he had already won. His anger was particularly violent against the Pope, whose utter untrustworthiness was now fully revealed. He realized, moreover, that Clement was the weakest link in the chain of his foes. No one of the other
The news of these preparations frightened Clement. Every day came in alarming reports of the concentration of the imperialist forces under Bourbon at Milan. The Pope’s allies, moreover, were absolutely useless. Francis promised much, but accomplished nothing. Henry VIII remained true to his policy of abstention. The Duke of Urbino, who led the Italian levies, was so hopelessly lacking in energy and courage that the classic dictum of Julius Caesar was modified to suit his case; “Veni, vidi, fugi” was a just description of his activities. In late February Bourbon and Frundsberg joined forces at Piacenza—12,000 German mercenaries, 4000 Spaniards, 2000 Italian volunteers, and 5000 lances—and slowly began to move toward Rome. There were constant mutinies for lack of pay, and the advance was signaled by every sort of violence and crime. On March 16, the Pope, in abject terms, signed a humiliating truce with the imperial representative; but the news of it failed to halt the onrushing tide. “Furious as lions” the invaders swept down upon the Eternal City, their numbers swelled by a host of renegades, who, foreseeing untold opportunities for plunder and rapine, were only too glad to be absorbed into the ranks. On Saturday, May 4, the army was in front of Rome; on the sixth, in a murky fog, it delivered the assault. Bourbon was slain in an attempt to scale the walls, but his death never halted the progress of the attack; indeed it only served to render the results of it the more horrible by eliminating the few vestiges of discipline that remained. For more than a week, the city of the Caesars was given over to horrors far more awful than those of barbarian days. Lust, drunkenness, greed of spoil, and, in some cases, religious fanaticism, combined in truly hellish fashion to produce the worst outburst of savagery in the annals of the period. “They strewed on the ground the sacred body of Christ, took away the cup, and trod under foot the relics of the saints to spoil their ornaments. No church nor monastery was spared. They violated nuns, amid the cries of their mothers, burnt the most magnificent buildings, turned churches into stables, made use of crucifixes and other images as marks for their harquebusses. It is no longer Rome, but Rome’s grave. They dressed the old wooden crucifix, revered by all nations, which stood on one of the seven altars of St. Peter’s, in the uniform of a lanzknecht. St. Peter and St. Paul, who have lain so many years buried under the altar of St. Peter’s, never suffered such indignities, even from those who made them martyrs.” The Pope found a precarious refuge in the Castle of St. Angelo, and later in Orvieto, but he did not regain liberty of action for many months to come.

The inevitable war of words at once burst forth—it has not entirely ceased today—as to how far Charles was responsible for this crowning outrage. All Western Europe made haste to express its horror, and the Emperor was prompt to absolve himself of all blame. His information was at best from two to three weeks late, and he could not possibly have foreseen the lengths to which his soldiers would go; on the other hand, one cannot doubt that he intended to teach Clement a lesson, and in view of the character and composition of his army, he must have been perfectly well aware that it was bound to be severe. There seems to be no evidence of any wavering of Spain’s loyalty to her young master because of what had occurred. The news was kept quiet as long as possible, and men generally put the responsibility on Bourbon and Frundsberg. After Pavia, Spain had not been permitted to exult; after Rome, if she was horrified, she made no sign. She was still almost a passive spectator of the deeds of her young Caesar.

The course of the war during the next two years was neither particularly interesting nor decisive. In the spring of 1527, the lines of the alliance of France and England were again more closely drawn, and on January 22, 1528, the heralds of Francis and of Henry VIII presented themselves before the Emperor at Burgos and bade him defiance. Thereafter ensued that solemn farce—the proposal that Charles and Francis should settle their differences by mortal combat. Each one accused the other of cowardice and broken faith. There were interminable exchanges of cartels and defis; but neither was so Quixotic as to enter the lists. Charles, on the whole, had the best of the argument. It was impossible to answer his
repeated assertion that his rival had broken the treaty of Madrid; and he showed how thoroughly he believed in his case by the efforts that he made to have the correspondence generally known. There is a curious touch of modernity in the advice which he received from the Duke of Infantado, whom he had consulted as to the line of conduct most expedient for him to pursue: “Such differences ought not to be left to be decided by the fortune of arms; they depend solely on the existence and authenticity of treaties, and on the verdicts of men of honor and knowledge, consulted on the points at issue. It is certainly clear that a sane judgment is sufficient to terminate this dispute; which a duel could never do”. Ordeal by battle was a thing of the past; even the Spanish aristocracy was willing to acknowledge it.

Meantime, the king of France had dispatched a fresh army into Italy under Lautrec, who at first carried all before him. He reconquered the Milanese, reestablished the authority of France in Genoa, and then, passing down the Adriatic coast, entered the kingdom of Naples. In a few weeks all the smaller cities of the realm had opened their gates to him; and in April, 1528, he sat down to besiege the capital, blockaded from the sea by Filipino Doria, who at the same time won fresh laurels for himself and his family by defeating and slaying Don Hugo de Moncada in a spirited action off Capo d’Orso between Amalfi and Salerno. But in July, just as the city was about to surrender, the blockading squadron was suddenly called off, and the fleet that was sent on from France to replace it was utterly inadequate to continue its work. Lautrec’s army was wasted by plague; its leader succumbed to it on August 15, and his incompetent successor, the Marquis of Saluzzo, was overwhelmed by the imperialists at Aversa on August 28. In the following year, a fresh expedition, under the Count of St. Pol, failed even more conclusively than its predecessor; it got, in fact, only as far as Landriano, in the Milanese, where it was utterly defeated on June 21. It was clear that the imperialists were still masters of the peninsula. The League of Cognac had proved too feeble to resist them, and Francis began to think seriously of peace.

Two incidents of the struggle that was drawing to a close were of greater significance in the history of the Spanish Empire than the actual course of the war itself. The first was the winning over of Andrea Doria, and explains why Naples had been preserved to the imperialists. The great Genoese admiral had alternately fought, in his early days, for Naples, for Rome, and for his native land, but since 1512 he had been in the service of the French. He had not, however, been altogether happy in the employ of Francis I. He had been irregularly and inadequately paid, and treated with disdain by French generals and statesmen; there had also been a bitter quarrel over the town of Savona, where the French were installed to the prejudice of the Genoese. Doria can scarcely be called an ardent patriot; rather did he long for honor and authority for himself, and aspire to the naval domination of the entire Mediterranean; and these he was now firmly convinced he should never obtain at the hands of the king of France. Charles, who was in desperate need of ships, approached the admiral at the opportune moment. In July, 1528, Andrea Doria passed over to the imperial service. He got generous terms for his change of sides. The supreme command of the fleets of Spain, and of all other vessels that fought in conjunction with them; rights and privileges for his native Genoa, whose freedom was recognized under imperial protection; financial concessions and other rewards, were granted in the treaty which he made with the Emperor. But there is no question that he was worth the price. In the first place, his desertion served to relieve Naples; for he lost no time in summoning his nephew, Filipino, who commanded the blockading squadron there, to abandon the siege and come to meet him at Gaeta. In the second, it made communication between Spain and Italy far safer and easier than it had ever been before. The transfer of troops, hitherto almost impossible, became from henceforth comparatively simple and frequent; and Genoa, which was now, for the most part, subjected to Spanish influence, proved an asset to Charles of the most vital importance. It furnished him a port in the north of Italy, the lack of which had hitherto seriously hampered his operations in Lombardy. And, finally, the fact that Doria had gone over to the Emperor had an important effect on the contemporary struggle against Barbarossa and the Turks. The admiral remained loyal to the Emperor and his successor to the day of his death in 1560; and it was largely through his assistance that the infidel was held in check. The command of the Mediterranean trembled in the balance down to the battle of Lepanto in 1571; but if Doria had remained on the side of the king of France, Spain would, have had to surrender it before the struggle had fairly begun.

If the winning of Andrea Doria served to give Spain a navy, an event was simultaneously preparing in a very different quarter of Europe, whose ultimate results were, some sixty years later, to deprive her of it. Charles had watched with growing anxiety the steadily increasing intimacy of Henry VIII and Francis I; and in the summer of 1527 he found out that there was a special reason for it over and above the dictates of political expediency. The failure of Catharine of Aragon to produce a male heir caused the Tudor monarch grave misgivings about the future of his dynasty. The charms of Anne Boleyn had attracted his attention; before long it became evident that he intended to get a divorce. As a divorce could not legally be secured save from Rome, and as the Pope was virtually a prisoner of the Emperor,
who would be bound to resent any maltreatment of his aunt, it was clear that Henry must find means to exert strong pressure upon Clement to grant his desires; and the obvious way was to draw near to Francis, who was also anxious to effect the Pope’s release. It is probable that the rapprochement of France and England had worried the Emperor much less than the “great matter” which had given rise to it; for the war was being fought in Italy and the Mediterranean, where the Tudor monarch could not effectively intervene. But the divorce project was of ominous portent; it added one more to the already long list of Charles’s cares and responsibilities in foreign lands. He was in honor bound to stand by his aunt, who was determined to fight her cause tooth and nail. He knew, on the other hand, that the king would not retreat. How momentous were to be the ultimate consequences, no one could then have dreamed; but it was already clear that friction and distrust must ensue in a quarter where, six years before, Charles had had amity and alliance—that a cordial friendship was to be replaced by a smoldering quarrel. And so the sordid matter pursued its unedifying course. The arguments of the king for the annulment of his marriage were based on the flimsy plea that the bull of dispensation for it, granted by Julius II, had not specifically mentioned the consummation of Catharine’s first marriage with his brother Arthur; but this plea was effectively met by the queen, who was able to prove that the brief of the bull in question had dealt with the matter at issue in no uncertain terms. The Emperor, committed to the cause of his aunt, did all that was humanly possible to aid and protect her. The Pope procrastinated, owing to the political situation; he dared come to no decision till he could be certain of the issue of the war. By the late spring of 1529 this was no longer in doubt. The imperialists were triumphant in Naples and in Milan; despite all the importunities of the Tudor monarch, Clement dared not offend the victorious Emperor. The legate Campeggio was instructed to adjourn his court at Blackfriars; the trial of the case was ‘advoked’ to Rome; and in August the cup of Henry’s bitterness was filled to overflowing by the news that Francis, from whom he had hoped so much, had settled his differences and made a treaty with Charles V.

Peace on the Continent had, in fact, been inevitable, since the desertion of Doria and the defeats of the French at Aversa and Landriano. The French king was weary of war. The Emperor’s presence was essential in Germany, not only to deal with the Lutheran problem, but also to repel the advance of the Turks. Charles paved the way for an understanding with Francis by coming to terms with Clement VII. In June, 1529, a treaty was signed at Barcelona, in which Emperor and pontiff agreed to unite for the pacification of Italy and the repulse of the infidel. Clement regranted to Charles the investiture of Naples; Charles promised to restore the Medici in Florence. In the meantime, negotiations were opened with France, the conduct of them being entrusted to Louise of Savoy and Margaret of Austria, who met at Cambray to carry them to a conclusion. Agreement was facilitated by the fact that Charles now recognized that his demand for Burgundy was impossible of fulfilment. His concessions in that quarter made the French more willing to abandon their claims to the North of Italy. Francis assumed Charles’s debts to Henry VIII and paid an enormous ransom for the delivery of his two sons. They were handed over in the following year, as their father had been in 1526, on the Bidassoa, amid precautions reminiscent of those of four years before, plainly showing that distrust had not vanished even though a treaty had been signed. Finally, the French king married his rival’s sister, Eleanor of Portugal, who was welcomed in her new realm as one of the authors of the peace and the pledge of its preservation.

Surprise has sometimes been expressed that the brilliant French historian, Mignet, ended his great work on the Rivalry of Francis I and Charles V with the peace of Cambray, instead of carrying it to the death of the French monarch. But the more one studies the period in question, the more one is convinced that he was entirely right in cutting off the story in 1529. The peace of that year marks the end of an epoch in the relations of the two monarchs; the struggle that followed was of an entirely different nature from that which had gone before. Moreover, this impression is certain to be accentuated if one envisages the period from the standpoint of Charles as king of Spain. Sandoval tells us that just before he embarked for Italy at Barcelona, he cut his hair, which, in deference to ancient Spanish custom, he had hitherto worn long, despite the fact that in the rest of Western Europe men had generally begun to clip it close; and that his followers, out of loyalty, felt bound to imitate his example, though they were so grieved at the necessity for it that many of them wept. The episode may be regarded as indicative of greater things. Since 1522 Charles had been continuously resident in the peninsula. His attention had been focused on his Iberian dominions and the extension of Spanish power in the West of Europe. One thinks of him first and foremost as king of Spain. After 1529 his attention is distracted by his duties and responsibilities in Germany and elsewhere; he appears in the role of Emperor rather than in that of an Iberian monarch, and all sorts of other elements come into play.

The period preceding the peace of Cambray is also differentiated in another important respect from that which follows. It has been well said that after 1529 the territorial unity of France was no longer threatened, or at least was threatened to an infinitely less degree than it had been before. We have seen
that after 1522 it was the Emperor’s intention that Spain and the Netherlands should march hand in hand. The obstacle to this project was the intervening realm of France, and down to 1529 the Emperor never entirely abandoned the idea of shortening the land route between his two sets of dominions by territorial acquisitions at the expense of his rival. It crops out in the extravagant proposals which he exchanged with Henry VIII for a joint invasion and partitioning of France. It was in the back of his mind when he negotiated with Bourbon. It is revealed, most plainly of all, in his demand for the duchy of Burgundy in the treaty of 1526. The eagerness of Gattinara to win Milan, and the fact that the war was almost wholly waged in Italy, should not blind us to this other most important phase of the Emperor’s ambitions. By 1529, however, it was abundantly clear that, for the time being, at least, there was no possibility of its realization. France had been solidified by the acquisition of the Bourbon lands. The divorce project threatened to turn England’s friendship into hostility; and when the Emperor dropped his demand for the duchy of Burgundy, it was tantamount to an admission that he had ceased to hope to win French soil. Henceforth, if he was to have territorial reward for his victories over his rival, he would take it in Italy and not in France.

One final reflection on the results of the war down to 1529 must occur at this point to all students of the Spanish Empire. Apparently Charles had started out with an immense preponderance. He had enjoyed the alliance of England and of the Pope, and acquired soon afterwards that of the greatest of the French feudal lords. He could draw on the military resources of the Empire and the Netherlands, as well as those of Spain and of Naples; the Mexican silver mines were beginning to yield him revenue. Moreover, he had won the majority of the victories. He had met his only repulses when invading French soil; at Bicocca, at Aversa, at Landriano, his generals had been successful; while at Pavia they had gained an overwhelming triumph, whose dramatic effect had been enhanced by the capture and imprisonment of his rival. And yet what had he to show for it at the end? Practically no territorial gains, only a few trifling financial and political concessions. More ominous still, the whole edifice of alliances, which he had been at such pains to build up in the early twenties, had by this time crumbled and fallen to the ground. With the papacy he was still ostensibly on good terms, but that was only the result of political necessity; he knew well that he could not count on the continuance of Clement’s friendship if the situation should make it advisable for the pontiff to draw close to France. Bourbon was dead; the result of his treason had ultimately redounded to the benefit of the French king, whose domains had been increased by the ensuing confiscations. Worst of all was the right-about-face on the part of the king of England. In a measure, that catastrophe had been the result of the divorce—a bolt from the blue which no one could have foreseen; but Charles realized that under the guidance of Cardinal Wolsey England had been preparing to desert him at least as early as 1525—long before the situation was complicated by Henry’s matrimonial woes. So threatening was the Emperor’s preponderance in the eyes of the greatest and most modern of all the statesmen of the age that he violated a political tradition of centuries’ duration, and sought to come to terms with England’s hereditary foe, for fear of being overwhelmed by the power of the house of Hapsburg. In the face of all these developments, the Emperor had made peace—not, as he once hoped, as a victor dictating terms, but rather on a basis of uti possidetis; for it was not, after all, much better than an even split.

What has been said of the Emperor applies equally to Spain. Though the Spaniards had not been enthusiastic over all phases of the war with France, Charles’s long residence among them had identified them with it in men’s minds, and its issue was popularly laid at their door. Spain had fallen heir to the glories of Pavia, but she also fell heir to the jealousy and suspicion which the Emperor’s victories aroused. Half a century earlier she had counted for almost nothing in international relations. She had been regarded as outside the current of European affairs, shut off behind the Pyrenees, with a life of her own sharply differentiated from that of her neighbors. Then suddenly, under the Catholic Kings, she had become a first-class power, able to speak on even terms with England and with France. And now, even more suddenly still, as a result of the position and inheritance of her young sovereign, she actually threatened the independence of her neighbors, and seemed destined to become the center of an empire more mighty than that of Charlemagne. The rapidity of the transformation rendered it all the more alarming. Would it not be necessary for all other governments to combine against her, in order to preserve the national individuality of the states of Western Europe? The need for the maintenance of a balance of power, as a corollary of the preservation of the separate existence of the different states, was, of course, not as yet at all generally understood Cardinal Wolsey was really an exponent of it before its day. But Europe was clear that Spain threatened to become too powerful; that any further extension of her dominions would constitute a great danger; indeed, it is probable that she exaggerated the peril, for the maintenance of such an empire was a task beyond Spain’s powers. Be that as it may, Europe’s fears had been aroused and were not to be completely allayed for a century to come,—not, in fact, until long after the Spanish Empire had become a ghost of its former self. Charles was doubtless aware of the
feeling that had been stirred up, but the position he had inherited and was determined to maintain rendered it impossible that he should waver in his course; and Spain, as the chief instrument of Hapsburg imperialism, was obliged to pay the price of her young master’s resolve.

We can pass on more rapidly now. The period from 1529 to 1547—from the peace of Cambray to the death of Francis I—is all that need claim our attention for the present; for the struggles of Charles V with Henry II may be more conveniently considered in a subsequent chapter. Of those eighteen years there were less than five of actual warfare—a much smaller proportion than in the period before Cambray; moreover, a large portion of such fighting as did occur took place on the frontiers between France and the Netherlands; the conflict was rather European than Spanish in its implications. And yet, though the nature and scene of the struggle were more remote, the use of Spanish gold and Spanish soldiers increased as the reign progressed. Never before had so much money been sent out of the realm. Had not Charles had a series of fresh windfalls during this period, as a result of the conquest of the Empire of the Incas, his treasury could not possibly have stood the strain. The Emperor took 8000 Spanish soldiers to Italy in 1529; he had at least 11,000 in the force with which he invaded Provence in 1536; between 6000 and 8000 of them served in the armies which he launched against Picardy from the Netherlands in 1543 and 1544. Spanish troops formed the backbone of the forces which accompanied him on the Danube campaign of 1532; it was largely with Spaniards that he won the battle of Mühlenberg in 1547. It was in this period that the Spanish pikeman became a familiar figure all over the West of Europe, and the tactics of the Great Captain gained the fame they so richly deserved.

On the other hand, though the interests of Spain were often frankly sacrificed, during these years, to the advancement of the house of Hapsburg in its various non-Spanish capacities, one cannot help feeling that the Emperor had taken to heart the oft expressed desire of his Spanish subjects for ‘peace with Christian Kings. He fought far less and negotiated far more than in the period before the peace of Cambray; indeed, it is not too much to say that, whenever it was possible honorably to do so, he strove to avoid an appeal to arms. He frankly recognized the impossibility of realizing the ambition which had animated him in his earlier years,—territorial aggrandizement at the expense of France; never before in his entire career had his aims appeared to be so completely defensive. Even in Italy he would have gladly renounced the acquisition of more land, had it been possible in return to maintain the peace he so much desired. That he failed to do this was due to Francis I, “always obsessed with the desire to recapture Milan”, and to a series of unfortunate deaths which brought to naught Charles’s schemes for solving by a compromise the great question of its disposal; but the Emperor’s own attitude was far less aggressive than it had been. Though resident in Spain less continuously than before 1529, he seems after that date to have become even more sympathetic to the Spanish viewpoint. In foreign affairs the Hispanicization of his outlook begins really to manifest itself after he had left the peninsula.

The Milanese question was not the only one that presented itself when Charles crossed over from Barcelona to Genoa in early August, 1529. The details of the treaty with Clement in the previous June remained to be worked out, and the advance of the Turks in Hungary made it essential that Emperor and Pope remain on friendly terms. The negotiations with Venice, Ferrara, and Mantua, the expeditions against Perugia and Florence, and the imperial coronation at Bologna (February 24, 1530), were all carried out in a manner which showed that, though there was no love lost between them, both Clement and Charles realized that they could not afford to quarrel. As to Milan, “the fountain head of the troubles of Italy,” the treaty of Barcelona had not been at all definite; and it was obvious that at first Charles wished to avoid the necessity of giving the investiture of it to Francesco Sforza. He could not forget the past faithlessness of the duke, nor the way in which he had made common cause with the king of France. The Emperor was doubtless sorely tempted to keep Milan in Spanish hands; and the gouty veteran, Antonio de Leyva, who had held it for him, despite the gravest difficulties, during the critical period of the war, was clamoring to be rewarded for his services with a title which would have made him Charles’s permanent representative there. But the establishment of a Spanish ruler in Lombardy, however valuable as a bulwark to Naples and Sicily, would infallibly have put all Italy up in arms, and definitely invited a new French intervention; it would have been a contradiction of the principle of “peace with Christian kings”, to which Charles, at all costs, was at present resolved to adhere. At one time the Emperor thought of giving the duchy to Alessandro de’ Medici, who was later to marry his natural daughter, Margaret, and thus placing upon the family of his new ally the responsibility for its defense; but the objections of Clement rendered this solution impossible, and Charles was finally brought to see that the investiture of Sforza was inevitable. Having made up his mind, he accepted the unwelcome solution with good grace. Francesco, who had not been officially included in the general peace, was trembling in his shoes when the Emperor sent for him to Bologna, and must have been much relieved by the kindly reception that awaited him. Save for the growlings of old de Leyva, everything passed off very pleasantly. On December 23, Sforza was formally invested with the duchy, at the price
of 300,000 ducats; and he further agreed to pay Charles 500,000 more in annual installments during the next ten years. Thus peace had been preserved and Spanish troops and treasure saved, but only, as it proved, for a time.

During the next few years the relations of Charles and Francis fall into the background. The Emperor was chiefly occupied during this period with the Lutheran problem, and with fighting the infidel on the Danube and at Tunis. The attitude of England, where the divorce was finally put through, in the teeth of the censures of Clement, also claimed a large share of his attention. But the differences between Hapsburg and Valois were too deep seated to be forgotten; their enmity might slumber, but it did not sleep. Italy, as before, was the chief bone of contention. While Charles was busy in the Empire and in Spain, Francis strove to recreate for himself an Italian clientele. He maintained a garrison at Mirandola and negotiated with petty princes and Genoese exiles. He sought to win the services of the most famous condottieri. Most important of all, in the year 1533 he succeeded in regaining the alliance of the Pope. Clement was still in terror of the preponderance of Charles and longed to enhance the reputation of his house by making a royal marriage for his niece, Catharine. Francis fully shared the Pope’s dread of the Hapsburgs and was the more willing to offer one of his sons as a candidate for Catharine’s hand, because Charles wished to marry her to Francesco Sforza and thus bind the Medici to support him in Milan. In October, Clement and the French king had an interview at Marseilles. The marriage of Catharine de’ Medici and the future Henry II was celebrated there on the twenty-eighth, and a common policy laid down with regard to the North Italian states.

Less than a year later (September 25, 1534) Clement died, and his successor, the Farnese, Paul III, stoutly refused to take sides in the Hapsburg-Valois conflict. For ten long years he succeeded in maintaining strict neutrality. Francis was deprived of most of the advantage that he had won in 1533, but he continued his intrigues with the different Italian states. He induced the rulers of Monaco and Saluzzo to place themselves under his protection. He strove to induce the Venetians to declare themselves against Charles V. Clearly he had determined to pick up the Italian quarrel once more, whenever he could hope to do so with any reasonable prospect of success. The Emperor saw the danger and prepared to meet it. The crux of the situation was, as always, Milan; and Charles took fresh measures to bind Francesco Sforza to the house of Hapsburg. He paid him a state visit in March, 1533, and arranged for the duke’s marriage with his niece, Christina of Denmark; the wedding was celebrated in May, 1534. But at the same time he continued to use every effort to avoid a renewal of the war. In August, 1534, he sent the Count of Nassau as ambassador extraordinary to the king of France to seek a peaceful solution of the difficulties that confronted them. But Francis was in no mood for compromise. He insisted on his rights to Genoa, Asti, and Milan. The utmost that he would do was to consent to the postponement of the enforcement of the last named until Francesco Sforza should die.

Under all the circumstances, the death of the duke, which occurred quite unexpectedly on November 1, 1535, inevitably meant the renewal of the war. The last descendant of the native dynasty was gone, and Milan reverted to Charles as an imperial fief; but the king of France was resolved not to permit him to enjoy it or to settle the succession on any candidate of his own. Charles was in Sicily, on his way back from the capture of Tunis, when the event occurred, but he had already crossed over into the kingdom of Naples before he heard the news. It must have been exceedingly unwelcome to him, for he cherished designs of repeating his recent success against the infidel on a much larger scale in the ensuing years, and even of leading an expedition against Constantinople. But the state of affairs which he found on his arrival in Italy made impossible the realization of this “great ideal of his life”. Much to his regret, he was forced once more to take up the sword against his Christian rival. Francis had begun to prepare for war the minute he heard of Sforza’s death. His envoys at Rome strove to work on the Pope’s fears of a Spanish supremacy in the Italian peninsula and win Paul III to the support of France; it was only by a wise mixture of firmness and conciliation that the Emperor was able to checkmate these designs. In February, 1536, the French king invaded Piedmont and Savoy, which was virtually the equivalent of declaring war on Charles; for Savoy was, in theory, at least, a fief of the Empire, its duke was an ally and connection of the Hapsburgs, and besides, the conquest of his territories would bring the French king once more within striking distance of Milan.

Meantime the Emperor continued to labor for the now hopeless cause of peace. A “Discours sur la Disposition de l’Estat de Milan”, drawn up by Granvelle after the death of Sforza, indicates the concessions which he was prepared to make. He had every right, and many inducements, so Granvelle points out, to keep it for himself, but “for the good of Christendom, and to prove the truth of his reiterated assertion that he did not want any more land, no, not even in Italy”, he was willing to consider a plan of handing it over to some one else, and even, under certain conditions, to one of the sons of his rival. Henry, Duke of Orleans, the candidate of Francis I, who was to become Dauphin through the
death of his older brother on August 10, 1536, was certainly inadmissible from the Hapsburg point of view. He was the husband of Catharine de’ Medici and had claims on Florence which would be the “ladder and bridge that would enable him to pass into Naples”; but his younger brother, Charles, Duke of Angoulême, if married to the widow of Francesco Sforza, or even to the Emperor’s natural daughter, Margaret, might be considered, provided his father would give fresh assurances for the maintenance of peace. But Francis was unwilling to accept this suggestion. By the time that Charles reached Rome (April 5, 1536) the French troops were already in Turin. So the Emperor, as a last resort, and a final attempt to avoid a war, reverted to the expedient that had been proposed in 1528. Vindicating his conduct in a long speech which he delivered in Spanish on April 17, in the presence of the Pope, the cardinals, and the ambassadors of the states of Western Europe, he offered to settle his differences with Francis in single combat, the stakes of the duel to be Burgundy against Milan.

The French king, however, saw no reason to accept this challenge. His armies had been two months in the field at the time he received it; he had got the initiative and believed that he could win the war. Charles was now convinced that it was no longer possible to avoid an appeal to arms; and if, despite all his efforts, a conflict was to be inevitable, he was resolved to teach his rival a lesson not easy to forget. The Emperor planned a quintuple attack upon the country of his foe. The principal assault was to be delivered against Provence. The Emperor and Antonio de Leyva were to lead it, with an army of over 20,000 men. Henry of Nassau was to invade from the Netherlands with a Burgundian force of similar proportions. A Spanish army in Catalonia was to threaten Narbonne; Ferdinand promised a diversion in Champagne; and Andrea Doria was to ravage the Mediterranean coasts.

But the result of these preparations fell far short of expectations. The French army, declining an engagement in the field, retreated before the Emperor’s invading forces, systematically devastating the country through which it passed. The Emperor got as far as Aix, where death deprived him of the services of de Leyva. Discouragement, lack of provisions, and reports of a hostile attack on Genoa convinced him, by the middle of September, of the necessity for retreat. Nassau, in the meantime, had been repulsed before Peronne; the German princes kept Ferdinand from collecting the army that he had promised; the Spaniards in Catalonia failed to accomplish anything; and Doria’s raiding operations were generally ineffective. In November the Emperor crossed from Genoa to Barcelona, discouraged and worn out. The campaign of the ensuing year was even more inconclusive. There was a series of sieges and skirmishes in Piedmont. A French invasion of the Netherlands was defeated. Instead of Doria’s ravaging Provence, Barbarossa raided Apulia as the ally of the king of France. It is probable that this last operation indirectly contributed to bring the war to a close. It revived all Charles’s enthusiasm for a campaign against the Turks; and was a chief cause of the triple alliance of the Pope, the Emperor, and the Venetians against the infidel, which was concluded in the middle of September.

The struggle with France was to all intents and purposes over, before the league against the Turk was actually signed. If it was evident that it was impossible for Charles and Francis to remain at peace, it was equally plain that they were incapable of waging any war that would lead to any definite result. A truce signed at Bomy (July 30, 1537) put an end to hostilities on the Netherlands frontier; another, at Monzón (November 16, 1537), stopped the fighting in Italy and the South of France; both provided for the maintenance of the status quo pending the settlement of terms of peace. But the arrangement of such terms proved almost impossible. Conferences held at Leucate (December, 1537-January, 1538) served only to produce a prolongation of the truce. The famous triple interview of the two sovereigns and the Pope, which occurred at Nice in the following June, resulted in temporarily despoiling the duke of Savoy, two-thirds of whose states were occupied by Francis, and almost all of the rest by the Emperor; the truce was also prolonged for ten years; but the fundamental problem of Milan remained untouched. One month later the two rivals met again at Aigues-Mortes; they exhausted themselves in protestations of affection; they dined and wined together, and even shared the same bedroom. Outwardly, moreover, these marks of friendship continued for two years to come. In the autumn of 1539 Charles was invited to cross France on his way to suppress the insurrection at Ghent, and was entertained at Paris with every mark of cordiality and respect. But all this time the Milanese question remained unsettled; and as long as that sore spot was unhealed, the peace lacked the first requisite of permanence.

Ever since the truces of Bomy and Monzón, the disposition of the duchy had been under discussion. Many solutions had been proposed, but none had proved acceptable. In the spring of 1540, after the Emperor had left Paris, he made a final effort to arrive at a settlement, by offering his daughter, Mary, to the French king’s youngest son, Charles, with Milan as a dowry, on condition that the duchy should never revert to the crown of France. But the influences surrounding the French king were strongly anti-imperialist. Montmorency, the sole advocate of peace with the Hapsburgs, was tottering on the verge of disgrace. By June it was clear that Charles’s proposal could not succeed; and on October 11 the
Emperor finally recognized it by conferring Milan on his Spanish son Philip, to hold as a fief of the Holy Roman Empire. The outcome may well have caused surprise both to friends and to foes. It was certainly a violation of the traditions of the duchy, whose affiliations were Austrian and imperial, not Iberian. It was to Ferdinand, not Philip, that it would have been natural to give it; but the exigencies of the immediate situation demanded that it should be handed over to Spain. The reservation of the imperial overlordship served to disguise the suddenness of the change; it gave Charles a chance to assert his own authority in Milan until Philip should be old enough to assume the government himself; but with these exceptions it meant almost nothing at all. Spain had a vital interest in the fate of the duchy, because of her territories in Sicily and in Naples. Spain alone had the necessary men and money for its defense. It was consequently to Spain that Charles resolved that it should go. Both in the North and South of Italy she was now firmly established; and the destinies of the peninsula were almost completely in her hands.

Renewal of the war with France was henceforth inevitable, and the French king was furnished with a fresh pretext for declaring it by the murder, in July, 1541, of his agents, Fregoso and Rincon, as they were descending the Po on their way to Venice and Constantinople. The Marquis del Vasto, who represented Charles in Milan, knew the nature of their errand and was determined to arrest them. Whether he authorized his soldiers to kill them is more difficult to determine. Charles officially denied all responsibility for the deed, but took pains to add that if Rincon, who was Spanish born and a traitor to his country, had fallen into his own hands, he would certainly have been punished according to his deserts. The war that ensued during the next two years was in some respects reminiscent of the struggle of the early twenties. Henry VIII, for the last time, abandoned his neutrality, and furnished a diversion of great value to the Emperor by crossing the Channel and besieging Boulogne. Francis was once more in alliance with the Scots. Not only was there fighting on the Netherland and Italian frontiers; the struggle flared up again in the region of Roussillon. But the war had another feature which was entirely of its own. Both its immediate cause and its subsequent course served to give it, from first to last, a distinctly Turkish complexion. The alliance of the king of France with the infidel was now in full swing. Barbarossa cooperated with the Duke d’Enghien in besieging Nice, which still held out for the duke of Savoy. The Turkish fleet passed the winter at Toulon, and departed in the following spring with a huge cargo of Christian slaves, and the French accepted full responsibility for their allies’ misdeeds.

From a strictly military standpoint, the French carried off most of the honors in this final trial of strength between Charles V and Francis I. The Emperor was turned back at Landrecies (November, 1543), in an attempt to reach Paris by marching down the Oise. The victory of the Duke d’Enghien over the Marquis del Vasto at Cerisoles (April 14, 1544) was hailed throughout France as a second Marignano. But this triumph failed to yield any tangible result. The French were unable to penetrate the Milanese, and meantime the political situation developed favorably for the Emperor. The duke of Cleves, who was the principal ally of the French king in the Empire, had his lands overrun, and was forced to sue for peace (September, 1543). The Anglo-Scottish war, from which Francis had hoped so much, degenerated into a series of Border raids. The attention of the Turk was distracted from the West by difficulties at home and by the prospect of a new campaign against the Shah. Despite all his victories, the French king was even further from the attainment of his ends in the summer of 1544 than when the war began, and Charles, whose chief desire for the moment was to have his hands free to fight the Lutherans, seized the first favorable opportunity to terminate the conflict. On September 18, 1544, he signed peace at Crespy. Francis gave up his claims to the Netherlands and Naples, and promised to abandon the Turkish alliance. Both sides agreed to restore all territory occupied since the truce of Nice.

On the vital question of the disposition of Milan, Charles showed once again his willingness to compromise. Despite the fact that he had conferred it on Philip, he now reverted to a modified form of the proposal that he had made to Francis in 1540. He agreed that the French king’s youngest son, now Duke of Orleans, should either marry one of his nieces, the daughters of his brother Ferdinand, and take Milan; or else his own daughter Mary, and be given Franche Comté. But the choice between these interesting alternatives was never to be made; for on September 8, 1545, the Duke of Orleans died. “Though the Emperor was sorry for it”, as a contemporary chronicler sagely remarked, it “was no bad thing for him.”

Once more the hand of fate had intervened to solve a question which war and diplomacy had been unable to answer; after 1545 there was no longer any doubt that Milan would go to Spain. The majority of Spaniards were not enthusiastic for its acquisition, and Charles had recently shown that he appreciated their point of view; destiny, however, it was impossible to defy. The fag end of the war with Henry VIII kept Francis fully occupied until the summer of 1546; and death overtook him in the following March, before he could revert to his Italian designs. Under his son and successor the scene of interest shifted to the Netherlands and the Empire, and Lombardy was undisturbed by attacks from the
French. We have therefore to study the beginnings of the system of government that the Emperor set up in the territory which fate had united to the Spanish Empire.

The problem presented by the acquisition of Milan was unlike those which had arisen from the annexation of Sicily and Naples. The inherited traditions were entirely different; and the military side of the question, which, in the southern dependencies, was not necessarily always prominent, assumed from the outset the first importance in the Milanese.

When the Spaniards entered into possession of the duchy, they found the political power divided among various claimants. Since the days when the Visconti had established their rule, the prestige of the ducal authority had stood exceedingly high; Milan was the typical Italian tyranny. Down to the end of the fifteenth century, two advisory bodies—the Secret Council and the Council of Justice—had assisted the duke in the performance of his functions; but when the French gained possession in 1499, Louis XII had united these two councils into a so-called Senate, which he invested—on the model of the Parlement of Paris—with the authority of rejecting or confirming the ducal laws, and thus erected into a bulwark of popular liberty. The more absolutist principles of the government of Francis I served temporarily to push this Senate into the background, but its authority was by no means dead when the Spaniards came in, and Charles was to make good use of it. The spirit of communal independence and liberty, inherited from the great days of Legnano and the Lombard League, had not utterly departed in the sixteenth century; but the municipal councils, through which it had made itself felt, were by this time mere shadows of their former selves; reduced in numbers, and dominated by the aristocracy, their practical importance was slight. Another ancient tradition—that of the authority of the archbishop—had also been suffered temporarily to fall into desuetude; of the four prelates who held that office between the years 1520 and 1560, only one—Arcimboldo, from 1550 to 1555—ever entered his see! In the days of Carlo Borromeo there was, indeed, another tale to tell, but that saintly prelate did not take up his office until the Emperor had been for two years in his grave.

Charles was obliged, by the political situation, to intervene in the government of Milan long before it was formally turned over to his son. After Pavia, his generals and soldiers were, in fact, in control there, the investment of Francesco Sforza being postponed until December, 1529. During the intervening years the military aspect of the whole affair came naturally to the fore. Leyva, Pescara, and Bourbon were the heroes of the hour; the last named, in 1526, was made lieutenant-general of the Emperor in Italy, and, in his capacity as head of the imperial troops, found himself practically supreme over the civil authorities in Milan. When Sforza was invested with the duchy in 1529, Leyva remained there as head of the troops, and was doubtless, for all practical purposes, more powerful than the duke; when Sforza died in 1535, his authority was complete. After Leyva’s death in the following year, a double system of authority was once more set up, the Cardinal Marino Caracciolo being invested with the civil, and the Marquis del Vasto, the nephew of Pescara, with the military power; the former, however, was but a tool in the hands of his colleague, and when he died, in January, 1538, the military and civil authority were once more reunited in the hands of Vasto, who was given the title of imperial governor, and remained in Milan till his death in 1546. After a brief interim appointment, he was succeeded in the same year by Ferrante Gonzaga, who had already proved his loyalty as viceroy of Sicily, and he, nine years later, by the Duke of Alva. The names of these appointees are enough to prove how all-important the military qualifications of the governor of Milan were held to be. Leyva, Vasto, and Alva were all first-class soldiers; Gonzaga was perhaps not quite their equal in this respect, but his appointment is explained, in part on the ground of the Emperor’s personal fondness for him, and in part by the advisability of choosing an Italian in order to conciliate local feeling during the early years of the Spanish regime.

There are many other evidences of the importance of the military element in the administration of the Milanese. By an ordinance of the year 1536 it was made the headquarters of one of the four great tercios or divisions of the Spanish military machine; the army of “alta Italia” was the name it soon came to bear. In contrast to the garrisons at Naples and other strongholds in Italy, the infantry was entirely composed of picked Spanish troops, and the Italian foot-soldier was rigidly excluded; only in the cavalry, which was comparatively unimportant, were the Lombards represented. In 1560 an ordinance of Philip II reduced the infantry to 3000 men, which may be regarded as its normal strength in time of peace; during the troublous times that had gone before its numbers were naturally very much larger. Moreover, all the governors spent large sums in fortifications. The capital was the chief object of their care, and the walls and bastions with which Gonzaga surrounded it evoked the admiration of the representative of Ferrara. But the other cities of the duchy were not neglected. Como, Cremona, Lodi, Tortona, Novara, and Alexandria had their defenses strengthened and their garrisons increased. Whether
attacked by France, by the Swiss, or by the neighboring Italian states, whether threatened by local uprising or invasion from abroad, Milan henceforth could effectively defend itself.

When one turns from the military to the civil side, one is confronted with a great variety of conflicting testimony. The average Italian historian is loud in his denunciations of the entire Spanish regime. He holds it almost exclusively responsible for the decline of civic virtue, and exhausts himself in lurid descriptions of the cruelties of the Spanish troops and the hard-heartedness of the Spanish governors. But if one examines the whole problem from the Emperor’s point of view; if one studies his correspondence; and, above all, if one separates the period of Charles V from those of his immediate predecessors and successors, one is certain to conclude that this verdict is much too harsh. The change from the rule of the French and the Sforzas to that of Spain could not, in the nature of the case, be effected without stern measures, and it was inevitable that a certain amount of misery should ensue. On the other hand, there is not the slightest evidence that Charles or his representatives took delight in wanton cruelty or adopted any repressive measure that was not dictated by considerations of safety. If we bear in mind that Charles did not wish to take Milan, and that he would have greatly preferred to dispose of it by a compromise, we shall approach the problem in a much saner frame of mind. When at last it became evident that the fates were against him, he accepted the duchy and the responsibility of maintaining it, but he did not enter upon his new inheritance in any spirit of wantonness or revenge.

The sources for the study of Charles’s policy in Milan are the Nuove Costituzioni which he promulgated by a decree of August 27, 1541, during a visit to the duchy, and, still more important, the Ordini di Vormattia in regard to the Milanese Senate and magistrates, which he issued at Worms on August 6, 1545. Certainly one looks in vain, in these documents, or elsewhere, for any evidence of a desire on the part of the Emperor to abrogate any of the ancient liberties or privileges. On the contrary, he seemed to be most anxious to confirm them. When the Duke of Bourbon was his representative in Milan, he was ordered to renew the prerogatives of the Senate, which had been so scandalously abrogated by Francis I. In 1545 Charles enjoined the members of the Senate to take special pains to see that nothing, not even a royal edict or a governor’s command, should prevent them from strictly observing the letter of the law, even though the matter touched the royal treasury; and there are plenty of proofs that these precepts were lived up to in practice. It is true that he kept the appointment of the senators in his own hands, and insisted that three of them should be Spaniards, but as the senators were irremovable, he lost all control over them the moment they entered office. Moreover, when his representatives in the Milanese got involved in disputes with the Senate, or attempted to exercise illegal influence over its members, he vigorously upheld the latter’s rights. “If the governor represented the supreme authority, the Senate was to stand for equity and justice.” Vasto and Gonzaga were both favorites of Charles, but the complaints of the Senate led to the removal of both. Sindicatores, sent over by the Emperor to examine into the rights and wrongs of each case, dealt with Vasto so harshly that it is said that he died of shame; while Gonzaga was deprived of all his offices.

These last facts may suggest that the action of Charles’s, representatives in the Milanese did not measure up to the good intentions of the Emperor who sent them out. The temptations were indubitably severe; the military atmosphere led naturally to arbitrariness; and the long time that it took to communicate with Spain often made it necessary for the governors to act on their own initiative. And yet, when compared with the French administration which immediately preceded it, and with that of Philip II by which it was followed, the period of the Emperor was not unfortunate for the Milanese. Its worst feature was unquestionably its financial exactions. Special and illegal imposts were levied on the plea of military necessity. The regular sources of the state revenues were sold. The towns, in default of anything like a national assembly, were obliged to make large contributions, which averaged perhaps 300,000 ducats a year. Measured by modern standards, all this was doubtless exceedingly bad; but whether it was any worse than the average contemporaneous condition elsewhere, is more than doubtful. Certainly the Milanese were not the sort of people to understand or cooperate with a policy of sound finance. Their wastefulness is attested by the accounts of the farewell dinners and ceremonies accorded to Ferrante Gonzaga by his friends and adherents on the occasion of his final departure from the duchy. Ranke rightly points out that the contribution from the Lombard communes indirectly served to keep alive the embers of their ancient independence; for, in theory, at least, they had the right to refuse it, and the consciousness that they possessed that power prevented the loss of their self-respect. Last of all, one must never forget, in estimating the early years of the Spanish occupation of Milan, that no territory could possibly change hands, as the duchy had done, at least five times since the beginning of the century, without suffering violence to its social and constitutional structure. The new regime did not have a chance to get fairly started in the days of Charles V. Many of its worst faults were inevitable for the time being, and ought to have been eliminated in the calmer years that were to follow.
A detailed description of the various wars of the petty Italian states in which Charles, during the last twenty-five years of his reign, was, in one way or another, involved, has no place in a history of the Spanish Empire. Yet it may not be amiss to indicate briefly some of the principal stages of their progress, and, above all, to summarize the situation which obtained at the time of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. The story shows, if nothing else, how completely the imperial overlordship of Italy was a thing of the past, and how the peninsula, at the time that Charles gave way to Philip, had become, to all intents and purposes, a dependency of Spain.

The important question of the title to Florence was suddenly raised in January, 1537, by the murder of the first duke, the Emperor’s son-in-law, the wretched and tyrannical Alessandro de’ Medici. Charles might perhaps justifiably have appropriated it for the Hapsburgs, for Alessandro had left no near relative to succeed him; but, anxious as ever to show “that he did not want any more land, no, not even in Italy”, the Emperor settled it on Cosimo delle Bande Nere, a distant cousin of the murdered duke. The choice was unpopular, and Cosimo had to fight for his throne against the representatives of the older Medicean line and the Strozzi. But his own relentless energy and severity, and a detachment of imperial troops which was placed at his disposal, enabled him to win the victory over all his enemies. His gratitude to the Emperor bound him firmly to the Hapsburg cause, and the tie was further strengthened by his marriage, in 1538, to the daughter of the Neapolitan viceroy, Pedro de Toledo, one of the ablest and most trusted of Charles’s representatives in Italy. In 1545 the center of interest shifted to the North, where the Pope, on a pretext of more than doubtful validity, had invested his bastard, Pier Luigi Farnese, with Parma and Piacenza. The Emperor at the moment was too busy with the German Protestants to retaliate vigorously against this high-handed proceeding; but when Pier Luigi began to intrigue with the French, and lent aid to the conspiracy of the Fieschi in Genoa, he saw that it was no longer possible to hold his hand. In September 1547, Pier Luigi was murdered in a rising of the Piacenzan nobles, which had been stirred up by Ferrante Gonzaga, with the Emperor’s full consent. Charles’s stipulation that the tyrant should not suffer any personal injury can scarcely be regarded as absolving him from blame, for he must have known that passions were too strained to permit a revolt without the shedding of blood. He was prompt to take advantage of what had occurred. Piacenza was annexed to the duchy of Milan, and was not restored in the Emperor’s day; while Parma was finally conferred on the Pope’s grandson, Ottavio, whom Charles had sought to bind to the Hapsburgs nine years before by giving him his illegitimate daughter, Margaret, the widow of Alessandro de’ Medici, in marriage. In Italy, as well as in the rest of Europe, the Emperor lived up to the matrimonial policy on which had been founded the greatness of his house.

In 1552 there was an uprising in Siena. French intrigues, fear of annexation by Florence, misconduct of the Spanish garrison, and the requirements of Charles’s representatives at Rome, combined to produce a serious revolt. The viceroy of Naples was commanded to restore order, but death overtook him before he could accomplish his purpose, and Cosimo de’ Medici was called upon to take his place. Cosimo accepted the task the more eagerly, because of his desire to get Siena for himself. A ruthless and devastating struggle began, and continued until April, 1555, when Siena was starved out. Doubtless the Florentine hoped to be at once invested with the conquered lands; but in this, for the time being, he was doomed to disappointment. The Emperor granted Siena to his son, Philip, and Philip did not turn it over to Cosimo till 1557, when he needed help in his war against Paul IV. Even then Philip retained in his own hands the coast towns of Orbitello, Porto Ercole, Monte Argentaro, Porto San Stefano, and Talamone—the Stato dei Presidii, or Presidios, as they were called—each of them garrisoned by Spanish troops, whose commanders were appointed by the viceroy of Naples. These seaports were of course doubly valuable to Spain, as long as there was any possible doubt of the loyalty of Genoa. Cosimo was given the rest of the Sienese territory, with the addition of Porto Ferrajo, to hold as a fief of Spain, and on condition of bearing military aid to his Spanish overlord, whenever the Presidios should be attacked. The net result of the Sienese war was thus enormously to strengthen Spain’s hold on Italy.

It has been well said that the Emperor’s ideal for the administration of Italy was “a loose federation of viceroyes and princes,” but Spanish overlordship was to be the keynote of it all. Considering all the difficulties, he had succeeded pretty well. In Sicily, Naples, and Milan, Spain’s power was supreme; in Tuscany and most of the smaller states, her influence was unrivalled. Venice, of course, needed constant watching; Savoy was a source of anxiety until Emanuel Philibert was restored; and the Patrimonium Petri could be a thorn in Spain’s side, as the war of 1556-58 between Paul IV and Philip was abundantly to prove. But these states were so situated that, even under the worst conceivable circumstances, it was virtually impossible for them effectively to combine. So strongly, indeed, were the Spaniards intrenched, that they felt they could afford to leave the French in Mirandola, which remained, for years to come, their sole outpost in the Italian peninsula. Some other small places they
preferred to maintain in complete independence, as possible checks on their own viceroy and allies. Florence, for instance, was not permitted to annex Lucca for fear of undue extension of the power of the Medici. Altogether, Charles’s reign had served, almost without his having intended it, to Hispanicize Italy. The acquisition of Milan had rendered Sicily and Naples safe. The winning of Doria and the annexation of the Presidios made communication with Spain easier and surer than ever before. Military preponderance and marriage alliances cemented the whole structure from Cape Passaro to the Alps.

One of the chief reasons why Charles had been so successful in Italy is to be found in the unusual abilities of the men who represented him there. He could give only a small portion of his time to Italian affairs, and was obliged, from first to last, to depend, in large measure, upon others. On the whole he was fortunate in the selections that he made. In the early years of his reign he chose his men primarily for their military qualifications’. Moncada ‘the Unlucky’, viceroy of Sicily and Naples, Leyva, Pescara, and Alarcon, the heroes of Pavia, were first and foremost soldiers; their contemporaries, Cardona and Lannoy, “stern and reserved, not only for a Fleming, but even for a Spaniard, if he had been one,” were able to give a good account of themselves on the battlefield. But even in this first period, we are constantly encountering examples of another type, the keen, enterprising, resident diplomatist, who unearths important secrets, and sends home precious information; such was Fernando Marin, abbot of Najera, “a man of great abilities and unusual veracity, whose numerous reports are a model of prudence and discretion”; such was Aloysius de Cordova, Duke of Sessa, who represented the Emperor at the court of Clement VII during the period of the formation of the League of Cognac. The latter part of the reign is the age of the administrator and statesman. Pedro de Toledo, who was viceroy of Naples from 1532 to 1553, was by far the ablest man that ever held that post; “a gambler, a heavy eater, and very arrogant,” he “brought to Naples the high Spanish ideal of justice and police,” “exercised his powers to the utmost, and so fulfilled his duties well.” Neither Vasto nor Gonzaga in Milan was his equal; in the latter case one cannot help feeling that personal affection was the chief cause of the appointment. More competent by far was the Duke of Alva, who succeeded Gonzaga in Milan for a brief period in 1555-56, and was subsequently given the viceroyalty of Naples. Though his name was to become a byword for tyranny and oppression in the Low Countries, whither he was sent, under Philip II, to execute a predetermined policy, he showed, in his earlier years, both in Italy and in the Empire, that he was capable of caution, conservatism, and conciliation; he was, moreover, an excellent soldier. Perhaps the greatest of them all, and certainly one of the most notable men of genius of the Spain of the sixteenth century, was Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, whose fame as a man of letters was ultimately to eclipse his reputation as a soldier and diplomatist. Born in 1503, of the ancient Castilian aristocracy, he fought at Pavia and Tunis, and in 1537 was sent to England to try to negotiate a marriage between Henry VIII and the widowed Duchess of Milan. After a year in the Netherlands, he became the resident ambassador of the Emperor at Venice, and subsequently represented him at Trent and at Rome. Contemporaries held him largely responsible for the outbreak of the Sienese war, and in 1554 he was recalled to Spain, where the accession of Philip II put an end to his diplomatic career. But in the earlier period, when his influence was at its height, he was “really a sort of Spanish viceroy of Italy”; masterful, haughty, and dominant, the personification of the qualities for which Spanish diplomacy was becoming famous.

The best of these names are an interesting evidence that this hitherto Aragonese portion of the Spanish Empire was gradually beginning to become Castilianized; and the process was to be carried further in the succeeding reign. It was an unlooked-for outcome. Down to 1529, when most of the fighting had been done, Castile had hung back from the Italian campaigns; and in the later years, when there was less war and more diplomacy, the Emperor constantly showed that he had begun to share the reluctance of his Castilian subjects to assume any fresh responsibilities in Italy. But before the close of the reign, Castile had attained a position which forced her to shoulder most of the burden of maintaining Spain’s Italian possessions. The influx of American gold and silver was the outstanding factor in the situation. Spinelly’s famous phrase of 1520 could now be modified into “Nervus imperii est pecunia, which he cannot have without Castile.” It was a significant example of the way in which the different parts of the Spanish Empire affected one another. The wealth of the Indies committed the defense of Italy to that portion of Spain which had least interest in retaining it.
CHAPTER XXV
WAR WITH THE INFIDEL

One of the most notable features of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries is the constant outcropping of belated enthusiasm for a revival of the crusades. Historians, for the most part, have been inclined to belittle the genuineness of these outbursts. They point out, with justice, that they furnished a most convenient pretext for the raising of funds and the collection of armies, to be employed for very different purposes, and much nearer at home. They also make it clear that, in fighting the infidel, it was now no longer a question of the recovery of the Holy Sepulcher, but rather of protecting the states of Western Europe; the advance of the Turks had converted the struggle from a war of aggression, inspired by a holy purpose, into a measure of defense, dictated chiefly by political necessity. Yet it would be unfair to maintain that the spirit of Peter the Hermit and of St. Louis had utterly departed. In France, it is true, one seeks for it in vain; for the political interests of the ‘eldest sons of the Church’ dictated friendship rather than enmity with the Moslem world, and in the first half of the sixteenth century political considerations took the precedence of religious ones. But in other countries, where the conditions were different, the mediaeval ideals were by no means wholly forgotten. Real crusading was often contemplated, if only very remotely, by many of the sovereigns of Western Christendom.

Of all the monarchs of Europe, Charles had the liveliest interest in a vigorous revival of the ancient traditions. As Holy Roman Emperor he was designated as the leader of Christendom against Islam. Moreover, in sharp contrast to his rival, the king of France, his political and dynastic interests coincided, instead of colliding, with his duties as the leader of the armies of the Cross. The infidel threatened his family domains in the Danube valley; the task of actually defending them might be delegated, for the most part, to his brother Ferdinand, but the Emperor was always closely in touch with the struggle in that region, and he once intervened there, most effectively, in person. And, finally, as Spanish monarch, he ruled over a country whose whole mediaeval history had been one long crusade—a land which had not rested with the expulsion of the infidel from its own borders, but had carried the Cross to the shores of North Africa. In each one of his different capacities, and in each of his far scattered dominions, Charles was bound to be looked to as the leader against Islam.

It will readily be believed that of all the countries over which he held sway, Spain was by far the most enthusiastic for the waging of the Holy War. There is not a trace of complaint in any of the records, either of the Cortes or of the Council, about the burdens imposed by the conflict against Islam; in fact, Spain was constantly urging Charles to increase his efforts in that direction, and to abandon the contemporary struggle against the king of France. Spanish troops formed the backbone of the two chief expeditions which he led against the North African coast; Spanish galleys did most of the work of their transportation. Nor did Spain restrict her efforts to the maintenance of the conflict in those portions of Europe where it would redound to her own advantage. More than 6000 of her best troops accompanied the Emperor in the Danube campaign of 1532; and Spanish soldiers continued to serve in the armies which Ferdinand maintained in that region during the next thirty years. One cannot for one moment leave the Danube campaigns out of one’s calculations, even when writing only of the Emperor in his capacity as king of Spain. The Spaniards took the liveliest interest in the ebbs and flows of the struggle in that quarter, and there was often close correlation between the naval war in the Mediterranean and the military campaigns on the Hungarian plains.

A few words as to the condition and extent of the Ottoman Empire at this period may not be amiss; for one must never forget in studying Charles V that his reign coincided with the most brilliant epoch in the annals of the Turks. Under Selim the Terrible (1512-20) they had conquered Egypt, and were thus brought much nearer than before to the Spanish Mauretanian lands. Under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66) they were to advance much farther still. The new sultan signalized his advent to power by two important victories. In 1521 he took Belgrade, and was thus brought within striking distance of the Hapsburgs in Austria. In the following year he captured Rhodes, which had been occupied for over two centuries by the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and had prevented the Turks from controlling the Aegean; the Eastern Mediterranean was now open to his fleets. And Suleiman followed up both these triumphs with energy and persistence. Despite the fact that his attention was often distracted by his Persian campaigns, he continued to lead his armies up the Danube until the day of his death. In the Mediterranean, he was of necessity obliged to rely on others, and the man whom he ultimately found to
represent him in that quarter was Kheireddin Barbarossa, the younger brother of that Arudj who had established himself in North Africa in the time of Ferdinand the Catholic. From the moment that Barbarossa was taken over into the Sultan’s service, the Spanish campaigns in North Africa and in the Mediterranean were necessarily given a new significance. They were no longer mere isolated ventures in a region comparatively unknown and remote, or desultory defensive operations to protect the Spanish coasts. They became part and parcel of a larger struggle, and had their bearing on the Emperor’s policy all over Europe.

But it was not merely through his adoption of Barbarossa that Suleiman made himself felt in the West. He also found a most unexpected ally in one whom every tradition should have made his bitterest foe. So threatening, in 1525, was the preponderance of the house of Hapsburg that the Most Christian King of France made overtures for help to the Ottoman Turk. The story of the development of the ensuing alliance lies obviously beyond the scope of this volume, and can only be touched on when it most directly affects the fortunes of Spain. Yet it is clear that its existence not only served to embarrass Charles V, but also forced him to take the Turkish problem more seriously than before. In the first part of his reign he had been obliged to set aside that problem to make way for the more immediate necessity of fighting the king of France. Later it became obvious that the two things were so closely connected that it was no longer possible to treat them independently, and that war against the infidel, which Spain had been ceaselessly demanding, was also practically dictated by the state of affairs in Western Christendom.

It was scarcely to be expected that Charles should take the Spanish point of view about the conflict of the Cross and the Crescent, in any of its different phases, at the time of his first visit to the peninsula. He was absorbed in getting recognized as king of his different Iberian realms, and in his prospects in the imperial election. He was under the influence of Burgundian counsellors, who cared nothing for North Africa or for the naval control of the Mediterranean. Yet the precepts and example of Cardinal Ximenes could not be utterly ignored; the defeat of Vera before Algiers called loudly for revenge, and when the Marquis of Comares, who commanded at Oran, came over to Spain in 1517 to pay homage to his new lord, and report on the North African situation, it was impossible for Charles to refuse him a hearing. The opportunity was favorable for a Spanish attack, for the archenemy, Arudj Barbarossa, after making himself master of Tenes and Delys, had by this time penetrated to Tlemcen, where he had murdered some seventy members of the local dynasty, and was now almost totally isolated in a region that panted for revenge. So Charles finally granted Comares liberal reinforcements, which he utilized, to good effect, in the spring of 1518. The outposts of Tlemcen were carried one by one. The city itself stood a six months’ siege, and was only taken at the last through the treachery of the inhabitants. Arudj temporarily escaped, with a handful of his followers, scattering gold and jewels behind them as they went, in the hope of diminishing the ardor of the pursuit; finally, however, he was overtaken and slain, after a desperate encounter, in which he fought like a lion at bay. A representative of the local dynasty was set up at Tlemcen, and paid to the Spanish governor at Oran, in recognition of his suzerainty, an annual tribute of “12,000 gold ducats, 12 horses, and 6 female falcons”.

It was an excellent beginning, but the sequel was a grievous disappointment. In the first place, the infidels were ultimately strengthened by their defeat; for the mantle of Arudj fell on the shoulders of his brother, Kheireddin, his equal in resolution and his superior in political sagacity. Furthermore, the new leader at once took the step which was dictated by the perils of his situation in North Africa, and hastened to Constantinople to declare himself the vassal of the Sultan; he now had behind him, in theory, at least, all the might and prestige of the Ottoman Empire. On the Christian side, in the meantime, the outlook became more and more discouraging. Charles’s differences with his Spanish subjects, his return to the Netherlands, and the simultaneous outbreak of the revolt of the Comuneros prevented the sending of reinforcements to North Africa for a long time to come. The only attack of any importance that was launched against the infidel from any of the Spanish dominions during the next ten years was a disastrous expedition, in 1519, led by Hugo de Moncada from Sicily against Algiers. He had 40 ships and 5000 good troops, and, despite lack of expected support from the local chieftains, won a commanding position, close to the city, after four or five days of desperate fighting. But the hesitation of his officers prevented his utilizing this success by an immediate attack upon the town; and Kheireddin, by a clever stratagem, induced him to leave his intrenchments, and put his whole force at the mercy of his foes. Like a flock of frightened sheep they were driven back to their boats, large numbers of them being slain before they could embark; a violent gale completed their discomfiture, twenty-six of their ships being blown ashore, their cargoes seized, and their crews massacred. In the following year Moncada sought to wipe out the memory of his defeat by an attack on the island of Gerba (or, as the Spaniards called it, Los Gelves), in which he was successful, but he failed effectually to rehabilitate his prestige.
It was certainly unfortunate that Spain desisted from her aggressions in North Africa in the immediately succeeding period; for Kheirreddin was so much weakened by the hostility of his Berber neighbors that in 1520 he had temporarily to abandon Algiers. Such was the confusion that reigned at that moment that a force of 7000 to 8000, marching eastward from Oran, could easily have gained the submission of the entire region. But Charles was unable to take advantage of the situation. His attention of necessity was centered on other things, and a golden opportunity was irretrievably lost. From 1520 to 1529 the offensive was entirely in the hands of the infidels. On the Danube they won at Mohács in 1526, and three years later seriously threatened Vienna. In North Africa Barbarossa took Velez de la Gomera from the Spaniards in 1522, and an attempt to recover it, three years later, was disastrously defeated. In 1524 the neighboring cherifs captured Santa Cruz de Mar Pequena, opposite the Canaries, thus depriving Spain of the only post that she held on the African Atlantic coast. A little later, by a series of negotiations which finally terminated in the spring of 1530, Charles established at Malta, Gozzo, and Tripoli the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, who had been driven from Rhodes in 1522.

The action was doubtless largely due to the Emperor’s desire to find a home for the Knights, but it is obvious that it was also dictated, at least in part, by his anxiety to shift to other shoulders the burden of maintaining possessions difficult to defend. Most significant of all, and most humiliating to Spanish pride, was the loss of the Peñón d’Algel in May, 1529. The maintenance of that fortress in Christian hands had been a serious annoyance to Barbarossa. It really neutralized the effect of his possession of Algiers, for his ships could pass neither in nor out of the port without exposing themselves to bombardment; even the city itself was occasionally cannoned. But in the spring of 1529 the defenders of the Peñón ran short of ammunition; the Emperor, to whom they applied for help, was too busy with European complications to pay any heed to them; and Barbarossa saw that his chance had come. Foreseeing that a siege would cost him many lives, he offered the garrison free transportation to Spain, provided it would surrender without resistance; the proposal, however, was scornfully refused, and the pirate replied by an overwhelming assault. The islet was surrounded by a fleet of forty-five ships, every one of them crammed full of soldiers and arms. The defenders, only 150 strong, were most of them killed. On May 21, Barbarossa entered the fortress in triumph, and caused the twenty-five survivors of the garrison whom he found there to be either tortured or put to death.

At the same time that these defeats were being suffered in North Africa, events were occurring off the Spanish coast which served to force the infidel problem even more directly on the Emperor’s attention. We have seen that the edict of expulsion of 1525 had put the Moriscos of Valencia up in arms, that the rebels, very naturally, looked for aid from North Africa, and that the result was an orgy of piratical raids. Barbarossa had sixty vessels and a swarm of hardy sea rovers at his command; and he launched them at the most unexpected moments, upon unprotected points. The Cortes were loud in their complaints of the inadequacy of the coast defenses, and in the year 1529, just as Charles was crossing from Barcelona to Italy, their remonstrances received a crowning justification. Taking advantage of the fact that the best of Spain’s navy were escorting the Emperor to Genoa, the most daring of Barbarossa’s sea captains, the famous Caccia Diabolo, suddenly appeared, with fifteen ships, off Cape St. Martin in Valencia. He landed, rained the surrounding country, and rounded up and carried off a large number of Moors and Christians, the former to freedom, and the latter to captivity. The news of this incursion reached Charles at Genoa, and caused him to dispatch his admiral, Rodrigo de Portuondo, with eight galleys, to intercept the raiders on their return to Algiers; the two fleets encountered one another, on October 25, off the island of Formentera, in an action which is described by a contemporary chronicler as “the greatest defeat ever suffered by Spain in a combat with galleys”. Portuondo was killed, six of his eight ships were brought back to Algiers or burnt by Caccia Diabolo as useless; the other two escaped with great difficulty to carry the sad news of the disaster to Iviza.

The report of this defeat, which made a profound impression in Spain, served to give the Emperor a final and conclusive proof of the urgent necessity for vigorous measures against North Africa. It was no longer merely a question of preserving the Spanish foothold in Mauretania; Barbarossa must be attacked as a means of defending Spain. Moreover, for the first time in his career, Charles was in a position to deal an effective blow against the pirate. The peace of Barcelona and Cambray had set his hands free in Western Europe. The winning of Andrea Doria had furnished him with an adequate naval force. Accordingly, in the spring of 1530, just as he was about to leave Italy for the Empire, Charles ordered the admiral to attack Cherchell, a pirates’ nest on the North African coast, about fifty miles to the west of Algiers. The expedition, which was launched in the following July, took the enemy by surprise, and at first succeeded well. Doria took the town and liberated many Christian captives; he was also able either to take or destroy, almost without firing a shot, the infidel ships that lay in the bay. But subsequently his followers dispersed to plunder, and finally their foes drove them back with great slaughter to the shore. Certainly the expedition could not be regarded as an unqualified success from the
Christian point of view. The following year, however, saw a renewal of Spanish aggressiveness, the attack on this occasion being led by Alvaro de Bazán, and directed against the port of Honeine (or One), just west of Oran, from which Tlemcen drew its provisions. The town was taken, and a Spanish garrison established there; 6000 Moors are said to have been slain, and 1000 more made prisoners. Barbarossa, in 1532, attempted to reply to these attacks by launching Caccia Diabolo against the coast of Sardinia; his particular desire was to obtain Christian captives for his galleys, and his special objective a famous shrine where the faithful were assembled for the feast of Saint Antiochus. But the expedition was a total failure. A tempest arose and drove the raiders on the rocks. Instead of replenishing his supply of ships, Barbarossa lost 1200 from the benches of his own shipwrecked galleys.

These clashes, however, were but petty affairs. They proved that the Emperor had at last recognized the necessity for vigorous action in North Africa and on the Spanish coasts, but in the immediately succeeding years the scene of interest was to be shifted farther eastward. It was known that Suleiman had been in the Empire since April, 1530, and was proposing to lead an army of Spaniards and Italians against the Sultan. A diversion in the Mediterranean, in the shape of a naval raid on the coasts of Greece, seemed an obvious way of embarrassing the Turk. In the spring of 1532 Andrea Doria passed through the Strait of Messina with a fleet of forty-four galleys (of which seventeen were Spanish) and a number of lesser ships, carrying from 10,000 to 12,000 German, Spanish, and Italian soldiers. A Venetian fleet of sixty sail, off Zante, refused to accompany him; it even sent word of his advance to the Turk. On September 12 he seized Coron, on the southwestern promontory of the Peloponnesus, and left 2500 Spanish soldiers to guard it under Jeronimo de Mendoza. Immediately afterward he took Patras, and also the two castles that guarded the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth; the Turks were forced to seek refuge under the guns of Lepanto. In the end of November he got back to Genoa, with 60,000 ducats' worth of cannon. It was a great coup and spread terror in the East. The news of it was doubtless one of the things that led the Sultan to retreat from Guns. In the following May Suleiman sent an army and a fleet to retake Coron, but Doria had solemnly promised Mendoza to send succor in case of need. With a fleet of thirty sail, of which twelve were new Spanish galleys under Alvaro de Bazán, and 2500 Spanish troops, he issued out into the Ionian Sea. One of his best galleys was sent ahead to apprise Mendoza of the arrival of help, and to take 10,000 escudos for the pay of his troops. It crept inshore under the lee of Mendoza's guns, and accomplished its errand; and on August 2, Doria, with his fleet, broke through the Turkish ships and scattered them. Had Doria not been overcautious, he might have reaped greater rewards from the victory he had won; for the Turkish vessels were quite unable to defend themselves and he should never have allowed them to escape unscathed; however, he had at least fulfilled his promise to Mendoza. But Coron did not remain much longer in Christian hands. Like the territories of the Catalan Grand Company two centuries before, it was too remote to be of real value. On April 1, 1534, it was abandoned, the garrison being permitted to march out with all their equipment, and any Christian Turks who wanted to come with them.

It was not only on the military and naval sides that the Emperor revealed his increasing interest in the struggle against Islam; he began to bestir himself diplomatically as well. To this he was doubtless in large measure incited by the rumors which reached him of the relations between Suleiman and Francis I; and it is unfortunate that we have not more definite information as to the origin of these relations, and the period and manner in which Charles first came to know of them. It seems certain that the first regular envoy of Francis to Suleiman was not dispatched until the spring of 1525, just after the battle of Pavia; but there is some reason to think that the French monarch had at least considered the possibility of making use of the infidel as early as three years before. There is a letter of the Emperor to one of his counsellors, written on August 25, 1522, in which he discusses the siege of Rhodes, and uses language which is susceptible of being interpreted to mean that he believed that there was already some sort of an understanding between the Sultan and the king of France. This notion, if Charles actually entertained it, was probably in advance of the fact; for though Francis failed to send the Knights the aid that he had promised them, there is no evidence that he was as yet in relations with the Porte; he may well have looked forward to such relations in the near future, but it does not seem likely that they had actually begun. On the other hand, we may well believe that Charles’s fears had been sufficiently aroused to make him desirous of finding himself some ally in the East with whom, if occasion served, he could cooperate against Suleiman; and the obvious place to look for such an ally was in Persia.

It would appear that the notion of an alliance between the Shah of Persia and the powers of Western Christendom against the Turk originated with the counsellors of the boy King Louis of Hungary, who had been betrothed, May 20, 1515; to Mary, the sister of the Emperor, and was thus brought into close relations with the house of Hapsburg. A Maronite of Lebanon, called Brother Peter, arrived from Hungary at the court of the Shah Ismail with letters pointing out the advantages of such an alliance,
probably as early as 1518; and it was probably in October of that year that Ismail sent him back to
Charles to indicate his willingness to follow the matter up. Nearly six years, however, elapsed before
Brother Peter found the Emperor; the envoy from ‘the Sophia’, whose arrival at the imperial court at
Burgos on July 1, 1524, was reported by the English ambassador, Sampson, can scarcely have been any
other than he. At first Charles seemed in no hurry to enter into so distant an undertaking. There were
apparently grave doubts as to whether the Maronite was a ‘counterfeit messenger’, or a genuine one,
and the Emperor’s hands were full of other things. After suffering more than a year to elapse without
doing anything at all, he wrote to the Shah, on August 25, 1525 (Ismail had been succeeded by his son
Thamasp in 1523), expressing general willingness to cooperate with the Persian ruler, but carefully
avoiding any promise of definite action. He had not yet felt the weight of the Turkish peril to the same
extent as had his kinsmen in the Danube valley, and it is not surprising that he was so cautious at first.
But four years later there came a change. The peace of Cambray, though not signed till August, was
virtually inevitable from the beginning of 1529. The Turk had proved his mettle both in the Danube
valley and on the Mediterranean, and his relations with the king of France, whether the Emperor knew it
or not, were considerably closer than they had been in 1522. On February 18, 1529, therefore, Charles
dispatched a certain Jean de Balby to the court of the Shah, to inform him how matters stood in Western
Europe and to ask for an anti-Turkish diversion in Asia Minor.

Nothing came, however, of this interesting experiment. Balby arrived in ‘Babylon’ in May, 1530,
to find a situation most unfavorable to his master’s plans. The Shah was off on a campaign against the
Usbegs of Khorasan; in order to be able to concentrate all his forces against this new foe, he had
temporarily come to an amicable understanding with the Sultan, and there was no chance of inducing
him to alter his plans. The scheme of a Persian alliance was apparently put forward again in the year
1537 by one of Charles’s German councilors, Frederick of the Palatinate, but the Emperor did not
choose to adopt it. The whole affair doubtless seemed to him too remote; moreover, at precisely that
very moment, as we shall later see, he was actually negotiating for a treaty with Barbarossa. Yet the fact
that he sought the alliance of the Shah in 1529 proves how seriously he was then alarmed at the extent
of the Turkish peril; had his ambassador had the good fortune to arrive at a more opportune moment, it
is altogether probable that a treaty might have been signed. The horizon of the Spanish Empire was
certainly being enlarged.

In the meantime, Charles had become much more fully apprised of the extent of the relations
between Francis and Suleiman. At the time of his interview with the Pope at Marseilles, in 1533, the
French king had made a clean breast of his understanding with the Porte, and Clement betrayed the
secret to the Emperor. “Not only”, reported the pontiff, “will the king of France not prevent the coming
of the Sultan against Christendom; he will advance it”. Fuller and more specific information came to
hand before the year was out. Charles sent a special envoy, the Count of Nogarolles, to accompany the
ambassadors charged by his brother Ferdinand with the duty of arranging a peace in the Danube valley.
Nogarolles found Rincon, the representative of Francis, in close intimacy with the grand vizier, Ibrahim.
He learned all the details of what had passed between them, and was further privately informed by a
renegade Christian of certain preposterous lies which the ambassador had told the Sultan in regard to
the captivity and the release of the king of France, with the object of inciting Suleiman’s anger against
the Emperor. It would appear that Charles had an ulterior object in sending Nogarolles; namely, to see if
it might not be possible to arrange a peace with the Sultan for himself; for, despite all his strictures on
the conduct of the king of France, he was not above making a treaty with the infidel on his own account,
provided he could hope to do so with advantage; indeed, the sequel will show that he continued to seek
for such a treaty in the future. But the Turk was unwilling to meet him half way. Peace was made, for
the time being, on the Danube, in the three cornered strife between Suleiman, Ferdinand, and Zapolya;
but on the Mediterranean the Sultan was anxious to continue the fight. The principal reason why he
made a treaty in Hungary was doubtless in order that he might be free to attack Persia; but he was also
strongly influenced in the same direction by his desire for more resources to use against Andrea Doria.

Ever since the great Genoese sailor had gone over to the Emperor, the Sultan had realized that he
was in danger on the sea. The capture of Coron had confirmed all his fears, and determined him to draw
closer to the one man who was capable of coping with Doria. Ever since 1518, when Kheireddin
Barbarossa had gone to the Porte to declare himself the Sultan’s vassal, Suleiman had been keeping
close watch on the doings of the pirate; and in the summer of 1533 he ordered him once more to repair
to Constantinople. Traditional policies and present jealousies at first prevented the Sultan from giving
Barbarossa the supreme naval command. The pirate, who was then in his sixty-seventh or sixty-eighth
year, had to journey overland, in December, into distant Syria, in order to interview the grand vizier
Ibrahim, without whose approval the Sultan refused to act. But Ibrahim was quick to recognize the man
that was needed. Barbarossa returned to Constantinople to find all his difficulties vanished. In June,
1534, he put to sea as pasha and grand admiral of the Turkish fleet, with over 100 ships, and 10,000 Turkish soldiers. During the next few weeks he treated the coasts of Italy to such a ravaging as they had seldom experienced before. From Reggio north to Fundi he burnt, he sacked, he made prisoners; but the prize that he most ardently desired escaped him. The story goes that he had hoped to carry off as a present to his master, and a proof of his own valor, the famous Julia Gonzaga, accounted the most beautiful woman in the Italy of that day; the lady, however, was warned of his intentions, and escaped with the utmost difficulty, almost naked, in the dead of night.

Clearly the time had arrived for a decisive trial of strength, and Barbarossa’s next move, after his ravagings of the Italian coast, settled the spot where it should take place. For years his attention had been directed to Tunis, where the tottering Hafsid rulers maintained themselves with difficulty, and only because they were willing to call for Christian help. Full possession of the place would be invaluable to the Sultan, for it would establish him in dangerous proximity to Sicily, and limit the operations of his foe to the western basin of the Mediterranean. The inevitable pretext—defense of the rights of a fugitive claimant—was eagerly seized upon. In August, 1534, Barbarossa landed his janizaries at Bizerta. The terror which his name inspired was certainly not less among his coreligionists than among the Christians; the Hafside ruler did not even wait to receive him, but gathered up his family and his treasures, and retired to the interior. Kheireddin entered the city without striking a blow. The union of the whole naval force of the Ottoman Empire with the dominant power in Moorish North Africa was now officially proclaimed to the world. The establishment of its daring leader in his new headquarters, so close to Sicily, and so advantageous for sudden attacks, roused all the lands of the Emperor and his allies to a keen realization of the imminence of the new peril.

Measures of defense were promptly taken in Spain, Sardinia, Naples, and Sicily. The coast towns were fortified; fresh galleys were prepared; Andrea Doria and Alvaro de Bazan were kept constantly informed of everything Barbarossa did, and were ordered to be ready to sail at a moment’s notice. But Charles was not content with mere measures of defense. He wished to carry the war into the enemy’s country, and drive his foe out of the coign of vantage he had seized. A swift, decisive blow, delivered on the instant, might possibly serve to shatter the new combination of his opponents before it had fairly got into working order. Nor was the moment in all respects unfavorable for the organization of a great offensive against the Turks. The situation in Western Europe was temporarily quiet. The Cortes were anxious to contribute funds. The new Pope, Paul III, wanted to revive the Crusades; and Portugal, the Netherlands, and the Empire promised to send contingents. The king of France, of course, held off; but in view of all that was known of the state of his relations with Suleiman, the Emperor can scarcely have been surprised. He and the Pope continued to work for the loan of thirty galleys which the French king had assembled in Marseilles, though probably not as much with the idea of actually obtaining them, as of making capital out of the refusal which they expected and received. But even in this they were doomed to disappointment. The facts of the situation were no longer a secret, but Europe was in no mood to be easily shocked.

The Emperor himself, it must frankly be confessed, was not absolutely guiltless of similar designs. While as temporal head of Christendom he was calling for a crusade, he was plotting to deal with the situation in North Africa in such fashion as would relieve him from the necessity of waging war. In the autumn of 1534, he dispatched to Tunis, disguised as a merchant, a certain Genoese called Luis de Presenda, who had lived in Fez and knew the language and customs of the Moors. Presenda’s first task was to spy out the land, ingratiate himself with Barbarossa, learn his intentions, and report every two weeks. He was also to get into touch with the dethroned ruler, Muley Hassan, and try, with his aid, to stir up such a revolt as would effect the expulsion of Barbarossa from his new dominions. But if this should not prove feasible, Presenda was empowered, at his own discretion, to embark upon a new and different line of conduct. He was given leave to approach the pirate himself, as the Emperor’s accredited ambassador, and to endeavor to win him away from the Sultan by offering him, as a bribe, the lordship of North Africa. And there was lastly a third alternative, which he was authorized to adopt, if the circumstances were favorable and the means could be found; and this was nothing less than Barbarossa’s assassination. Poison or throat cutting were the methods approved; there would be a good chance to apply them when the pirate was drunk—a contingency, it would appear, of no infrequent occurrence. None of these interesting projects was destined to succeed; for Presenda’s mission was soon discovered by Barbarossa, and Presenda himself was arrested and put to death; but the fact that the Emperor gave his consent to the employment of such methods is significant of his attitude toward the entire Turkish problem. That he did not shrink from assassination should cause us no surprise. Few rulers of his time were too proud to adopt it, if the need was sufficient and occasion served, nor is it entirely unfamiliar today; it but emphasizes the importance that Charles attached to Barbarossa. That he strove to outbid the Sultan for the pirate’s allegiance shows that the political side of the struggle against
the infidel was emphatically, for the moment, uppermost in his mind. He possessed his share of crusading enthusiasm and was only too glad to make use of that of others; but in crises like that with which he was for the moment confronted, he was perfectly ready, if he could do so with advantage, to sacrifice religious consistency to the advantage of the house of Hapsburg, and the safety of the territories over which it held sway. Whether he would have dabbled in such schemes if the king of France had not set him the example, is a question over which one can argue indefinitely; but the fact remains that his instructions to Presenda prove that for the moment, at least, he was no more scrupulous than his Most Christian rival.

Charles had not sufficient faith in the success of Presenda’s mission to abate his military preparations. The Spanish and Portuguese concentrated at Barcelona, where Andrea Doria subsequently joined them with an imposing fleet which he had gathered at Genoa. The Germans, the papal levies, and the Spaniards in Naples and Sicily had their original rendezvous at different points on the western coast of Italy. Late in the spring of 1535, under the Marquis del Vasto, they united their forces at Cagliari, in Sardinia, where they were joined by the Maltese contingent of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. On June 10 the Emperor and Andrea Doria arrived from Barcelona, and the Christian forces for the first time were united in one place. In all there were probably about 400 sail, of which only about a quarter, at the most, could be regarded as ships of war, and upwards of 30,000 troops. The Spaniards formed the largest contingent, and probably constituted over half of the entire expedition; 10,000 is a fair estimate of those that came from Spain, and 6000 for those from the Spanish dependencies in Italy; the Germans numbered about 7000, and the Italian levies between 4000 and 5000. Doria was given supreme command of the fleet, and the Marquis del Vasto of the land forces. On Monday, June 14, the expedition set sail, and, with favorable winds, covered the distance to North Africa in about twenty-four hours, arriving off Porto Farina early in the morning of the 15th. Passing slowly on to the south and east, the fleet came to anchor off the ruins of the ancient town of Carthage, and on the 17th and 18th the troops were landed, in excellent order, at a point previously agreed upon, between Carthage and the fortress of La Goletta. The enemy made a few feeble efforts to hamper the disembarkation, but the excellent order and close formation of the Spanish veterans prevented them from doing any serious damage.

The city of Tunis stands at the western, or most inland, end of a shallow saltwater lake or marsh, about six miles across, and connected with the sea by a strait some 300 yards long and 100 feet wide. A channel was kept open through this strait, and down the center of the lake to the walls of Tunis itself, to admit of the passage of Barbarossa’s largest galleys; in fact, the greater part of the pirate’s fleet was anchored in the lake at the time of the Emperor’s arrival. On the very end of the narrow neck of land which formed the north shore of the strait was erected the strong fortress of La Goletta, a rectangular tower with thick walls and strong bastions, protected on the land side by several well fortified walls, which ran clear across the isthmus on which it stood. La Goletta was, in fact, the key to Tunis: it got its name from the fact that it “held Tunis by the throat”. It controlled absolutely the approach by sea; it commanded the lake and the ships that lay therein. Barbarossa had been quick to realize its importance, and the moment that he learned of the Emperor’s expedition, he concentrated all his energies on strengthening its defenses. He had no time to spare for those of Tunis itself; but he rightly judged that Charles would never venture to advance unprotected overland against the city as long as its chief bulwark remained, untaken, in his rear. The foresight of the pirate was justified by the event. The Emperor immediately decided to attack La Goletta; it was there that the fate of the expedition was to be decided.

The siege of the fortress lasted three weeks and a half, from June 20 to July 14. La Goletta was defended by a garrison of about 5000 Turks and an indefinite number of Moors, commanded by the famous corsair, Sinan ‘the Jew’; upwards of 300 cannon were mounted on its walls. The besiegers were obliged to dig trenches and parallels to protect their advance toward their final objective. But what made their task particularly difficult was the sudden attacks to which they were subjected by light-armed Moorish troops concealed in the olive groves nearby. Barbarossa, whose headquarters were in Tunis itself, organized these diversions with consummate skill. Small bodies of Christians were being constantly cut off; not until the last days of the siege did they learn how to defend themselves. Sorties from La Goletta itself were of frequent occurrence, and usually timed so as to coincide with the attacks from the olive groves; Barbarossa kept in touch with his commanders inside the fortress by means of light boats on the shallow waters of the lake. The Christians suffered throughout the siege from lack of proper drinking water, and from consequent overindulgence in fruits and in wine; dysentery and intoxication made difficulty from beginning to end. Jealousies between the different nationalities of which Charles’s army was composed were another fertile source of trouble. The Spaniards and the Italians held one another in contempt, and often failed to cooperate in attack and defense. The Germans

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were insolent and insubordinate, and shocked the decorous Spaniards by their lack of respect for the person of Charles. One of them actually pointed his gun at the Emperor, and, though apparently drunk, was executed forthwith. Charles himself showed great personal bravery throughout the siege, and proved, on the day of the final assault, that he was by no means devoid of skill as a tactician. It was, in fact, his baptism of fire, and he came out of the ordeal with high credit. The eulogies of the standard Spanish authorities are doubtless overdrawn, but it is evident that the vague doubts, expressed ever since Charles’s first appearance in Spain, as to whether he would prove a worthy inheritor of the warlike traditions of his Iberian forebears, were henceforth definitely and permanently set at rest.

During the course of the siege the Emperor established connection with the dethroned ruler, Muley Hassan, who had promised to come to his aid, at the moment of his arrival, with several thousand Arab and Berber troops. The ex-king, when the critical moment came, proved totally unable to make good his word. He did not reach the Emperor’s camp till June 29, and when he did finally arrive, brought with him a bare 300 men; what was even more serious, he failed to furnish any supplies, which the Emperor needed far more than he did soldiers. But despite all these disappointments, Muley Hassan was cordially received. Though his military value for the moment might be small, he was likely, in case the Emperor should be successful, to prove subsequently indispensable as his local representative; moreover, the information that he could furnish in regard to the country around about was of great help to the invaders. So Charles, after warning him not to attempt any treachery, turned him over to the care of his generals, who saw to it that he was properly impressed with the irresistible power of the Christian arms.

The day for the grand assault on La Goletta was fixed for July 14. Sunrise was the signal for a tremendous bombardment, which was directed against the fortress from all four sides at once. Spanish batteries fired from the north and east—that is, from farther up the isthmus, and on the sea side; there were twenty-one guns in the latter detachment, which was stationed at a point 400 paces distant from the fortress. It devoted its attention to the main tower of La Goletta, and the gunners were encouraged by the presence of the Emperor in their midst. On the west side, near the lagoon, the Italians took charge of the bombardment; their batteries also were established only 400 paces away from their objective. But perhaps the most effective cannonading of the day was delivered from the fleet itself against the sea walls and southern towers; over 70 ships participated in it. They were divided into three squadrons, to facilitate maneuvering; they advanced, ship by ship, in regular alternation, and having delivered their fire, returned to reload. Particularly valuable were the great guns of the larger carracks. They shook the towers of La Goletta until one of them tumbled and fell, spreading consternation throughout the fortress. About midday orders were given to cease firing, in order that the besiegers might note the effect of their bombardment, which was decidedly the most marked on the eastern and southern sides; it therefore devolved upon the Spaniards, on land, and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, who were gathered, for the most part, in the ships of the fleet, to lead in the grand assault, for which every preparation had been made. The Spaniards were commanded by Alvaro de Bazán; and the Knights, who were rowed toward the shore in small boats and finally completed the distance by wading, pressed forward most gallantly behind their standard-bearer. Ladders were on hand, and the walls were scaled; after some furious fighting, the Turks gave way; many of them were killed and wounded, while the rest escaped to Tunis. The booty captured in La Goletta was large and rich; significant among the trophies were the fleurs-de-lis of France, stamped on several of the cannon and cannon balls. But by far the most valuable prize that fell into the Emperor’s hands was neither the fortress itself nor the spoils it contained, but the pirate fleet on the waters of the lake, comprising all the ships under Barbarossa’s command, save for fifteen galleys which he had held in reserve at Bona. According to the Emperor himself, it numbered eighty-two sail. Why it had failed to cooperate in the defense of La Goletta will always remain one of the mysteries of the siege; but as soon as the Christians had got possession of the fortress, there was no possible alternative for it save immediate surrender.

Apparently some of the Emperor’s counsellors felt that he ought to rest satisfied with the capture of La Goletta, and urged him to retire to Europe without attacking Tunis. But Charles plainly saw that his prestige would infallibly suffer if he came back with, the goal he had announced unattained, and he wisely insisted that Tunis must be taken. Whether it would not have been even wiser still to make sure, in the first place, of the capture of the galleys at Bona is another matter. Barbarossa, rather than Tunis, was the Emperor’s real objective; it was more than doubtful if the pirate could be captured, but if he could have been deprived of the sole remaining portion of his fleet, he would at least have been immobilized for some time to come. But Charles’s heart was set on the taking of Tunis. He listened, as usual, to the objections of his councilors, but none of them served to divert him from his purpose.

On July 20 the Christian army began to advance along the northern shore of the lake; as horses were lacking, the cannon had to be dragged along the sandy roads by the soldiers themselves. The heat
and drought were terrific; every soldier had been ordered to carry enough water to last him three or four days, but many of them had failed to do so, and in consequence soon began to suffer agonies of thirst. The Emperor accordingly directed his march toward some wells of sweet water of which Hassan had informed him, and which lay about three miles to the northeast of the city walls. Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of this movement on the part of his foe and determined to take advantage of it. When Charles arrived within sight of his objective, he found the infidel army drawn up in the form of a crescent, with its flanks resting on the lagoon and on the olive groves, so placed as to make it impossible for the Christians to reach the wells without a battle. But the pangs of thirst made Charles’s army desperate, and the issue of the ensuing conflict was soon decided in its favor. The Spaniards bore the brunt of the fighting, and the Emperor himself was in the thick of it. His horse was shot under him, a page was killed by his side, and he saved the life of one of his followers. The poet, Garcilaso de la Vega, was also wounded in the course of the day. By evening Barbarossa had withdrawn his army to the shelter of the walls of Tunis; the Christians were established in possession of the wells.

Charles had doubtless expected more battles on the morrow, but events occurred during the intervening night which spared him the necessity of further fighting. Within the walls of Tunis were several thousand Christian captives, who might easily break out of confinement and bear aid to the invaders; it was Barbarossa’s plan to forestall this possibility by ordering a wholesale massacre. His subordinates, however, objected strongly, not so much, in all probability, out of humanitarian motives, as because they did not wish to have their own property destroyed; and finally the pirate consented to a postponement. This decision proved fatal to his hopes of retaining Tunis. The prisoners were informed of the advance of the Christian army, and finally certain renegades, who desired to make their peace with the prospective victors, furnished them with the means of regaining their liberty. Under the lead of a Knight of Malta, they burst into the arsenal, armed themselves with pikes, muskets, and cutlasses, and poured forth to attack the Turks and Moors. By the morning of July 21, the city was no longer in a condition to defend itself, and when the Emperor, advancing from his camp, was apprised of the state of affairs within the walls, he entered Tunis without serious opposition. The Moors in the city implored him to spare them the horrors of a sack and sought to curry favor with him by the warmth of their welcome to Muley Hassan. The Emperor, however, had promised his soldiers that they should enjoy the ordinary three days of plunder; and, after considering the question in council with his generals, he felt obliged to keep his word. The outrages that occurred in the allotted time were rarely exceeded in the sixteenth century and stand out in distressing contrast to the clemency shown by Suleiman the Magnificent at the time of his capture of Bagdad in the previous December. On the other hand, it is fair to recall that the Christians, and especially the Spaniards, were but recouping themselves for losses which they had sustained, for many years past as a result of corsair raids, and that they could scarcely be expected to regard Barbarossa in the light of an ordinary foe.

If the postponement of the massacre of his Christian captives was the immediate cause of Barbarossa’s loss of Tunis, the permission to plunder which Charles granted to his soldiers was the principal reason why he failed to capture Barbarossa. Taking advantage of the confusion which reigned in the city, the pirate gathered a few thousand Turks and Moors about him, and retired in safety to Bona, where, it will be remembered, he had kept fifteen of his best galleys in reserve. Andrea Doria, who had remained in La Goletta, had failed to obey Charles’s order to occupy Bona; nay more, when subsequently commanded to send a sufficient number of galleys thither to cut off Barbarossa’s escape by sea, he only dispatched a squadron of fifteen, a force quite inadequate to accomplish its purpose. The pirate, after giving his men two days of much needed rest, was able to sail away without molestation; and though Bona itself was soon after occupied by a Spanish garrison, the continuance of the struggle was nevertheless inevitable. Had the Emperor, with all his forces, laid siege to Algiers, whither it was soon learned that Barbarossa had retired, it is possible that he might have effected his purpose then and there, and broken the connection between the Turkish Empire and North Africa. But the lateness of the season, the state of his army, and, above all, the imperative need of his presence in Europe, combined to convince Charles that that enterprise must be postponed. It was a disastrous mistake, as the sequel was abundantly to prove.

Before departing for Sicily, Charles signed a treaty with Muley Hassan, by which that ruler was set up in Tunis as a vassal of the Emperor, on condition that he should give no aid to any of Charles’s enemies, whether Christian Frenchmen, Turkish corsairs, or disaffected Moors. A strong Spanish garrison was left in La Goletta, whence it could dominate the entire situation, and give prompt notice of the approach of any danger. During the second and third weeks of August, the last squadrons of the Christian fleet set sail for their respective destinations, the Emperor accompanying the Italian division to Trapani, and subsequently to Messina and Naples. Ostensibly, at least, he had scored an important success; the capture of Tunis unquestionably marks the apogee of the Spanish power in North Africa.
But his failure to capture Barbarossa himself served almost to render nugatory the victory which he had won. While still in Sicily, Charles received a most surprising and discouraging piece of news—a striking proof of the irrepressibility of the pirate, and an evidence that the recent campaign had, after all, been comparatively futile.

Barbarossa had resumed the offensive in dramatic fashion. He had passed on from Bona to Algiers, where he increased his fleet to more than thirty sail; then, foreseeing that the Spanish dominions would be absorbed in getting ready to welcome the returning expedition of the victorious Emperor, and consequently more than usually unperturbed for a hostile attack, he flew the flag of Spain from his masthead, disguised his crews and soldiers as Christians, and sailed boldly forth to the Balearics. His daring was rewarded with astounding success. He was received with every kind of rejoicing and with ringing of bells. According to one account, the inhabitants were engaged, at the very moment of his arrival, in desecrating the corpse of an executed prisoner, which the authorities had disguised in such fashion as to make men believe that it was Barbarossa himself. Certainly no surprise was ever more complete. The pirate concentrated his forces against Port Mahon, in Minorca; he captured a Portuguese caravel in the harbor and carried off most of the inhabitants of the city, to serve as slaves and rowers in his galleys. On his way back he visited Oropesa, on the Valencian coast, fought off the inhabitants of the adjacent towns who had hurried to the rescue, and finally sailed away with 6000 ducats, which he consented to accept as ransom for captives.

At this point the story of the relations of the Emperor and his infidel foes enters on a completely new phase. Several causes combined to produce the change. In the first place, the reopening of the war with Francis I distracted Charles’s attention once more from the Turkish and North African problems; his admiral, Andrea Doria, also, was necessarily much preoccupied with the naval side of the conflict with France, and had consequently less time to devote to Barbarossa. Secondly, the situation in North Africa developed, in the years succeeding the conquest of Tunis, in such fashion that the Emperor felt justified in temporarily leaving it alone. Barbarossa, after his raid on the Balearics, had been summoned to Constantinople, so that the archenemy was gone. He left an able representative in Algiers; but everywhere else on the Barbary coast the Spaniards and their Moorish vassals had distinctly the upper hand; even the king of Tlemcen was so impressed by their power that he thought, for one moment, of recognizing Charles’s overlordship. And finally, the departure of Barbarossa for Constantinople, and the new naval program of Suleiman the Magnificent, served to transfer the chief scene of interest to the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, and ultimately brought the republic of Venice into the struggle against the Turks. The net result of these different factors was to diminish the immediate interest of Spain and the Emperor in the struggle, and to shift, for the time being, the chief burden of what fighting was to be done to the shoulders of another power. The activities of Charles during this phase of the conflict are, on the whole, less military and naval than diplomatic.

By the month of August 1536, it became generally known that the Sultan was preparing a great naval expedition against Italy for the following year. His agreement with Francis I was in full running order now, and the allies were timing their movements to coincide. In July 1537, a Turkish fleet of a hundred ships appeared in Italian waters, with Barbarossa in supreme command, and the famous Lufti Pasha, seraskier of Rumelia, as his principal subordinate. The infidels ravaged the coasts of Apulia. They effected a landing at Otranto, laid waste the surrounding country, and carried off numerous captives. Andrea Doria was far too weak to resist them, and retired with the few ships at his command into the harbor of Messina. Never had the Turkish naval power seemed so menacing before.

Yet, curiously enough, it was at this very moment of imminent peril that the Emperor was offered an opportunity to detach Barbarossa from the service of the Sultan and to win him as a vassal and an ally of Spain. In April of the same year, 1537, there had appeared at the court of Ferrante Gonzaga, the viceroy of Sicily, a Spanish gentleman called Alonso de Alarcon, who had been for five years a prisoner of the pirate, and bore a strange message from him to the Emperor. Apparently Barbarossa was anxious to change sides. It was clear that he was profoundly jealous of Lufti Pasha; and the recent fate of the grand vizier Ibrahim was a warning to all servants of Suleiman the Magnificent. By dint of liberal concessions, Charles might be able to win over the pirate and the fleet that he commanded; possibly an offer of Tunis would turn the trick. Gonzaga, of course, was alive to the possibility that these proposals were being made with treacherous intent, with the idea of lulling Charles into a false sense of security, in order to render more certain the triumph of the Turk. Nevertheless, he determined to communicate them to the viceroy of Naples, the Spanish ambassadors at Rome, and Andrea Doria; and he despatched Alarcon himself in a swift brigantine to Barcelona, to deliver his story in person to the Emperor.
The next six months saw a general gathering of the Christian forces, at the exhortation of Paul III, for a campaign against the infidel on a really large scale. The truces of Bony and Monzón had halted the fighting between Charles and Francis, and seemed to make possible an effective crusade. The failure of the French king to appear in Italy caused the Turks to withdraw from Apulia and concentrate against Corfu; after suffering a repulse at the hands of its heroic garrison, they again transferred the scene of their activities to the eastward and raided the islands in the Aegean Sea. These operations naturally aroused the ire of Venice, whose Aegean and Ionian possessions bore the brunt of the Turkish attack, and determined the republic, after long wavering, to join with the Emperor and the Pope against the infidel. In early February 1538, a new ‘Holy League’ was formed between the three allies for offensive and defensive war against the Turk. The quota which each one should furnish was determined in advance, as was the division of the spoils in the event of victory. But it was plain from the outset that the interests of Charles and of Venice were so divergent that they were highly unlikely to cooperate effectively; and the situation was further complicated by the attitude of the king of France. The Pope journeyed to Nice in the month of May, in the hope of arranging a permanent peace between the Emperor and his principal rival, and thus ensuring the success of the crusade. But his efforts were only partially successful. A ten years’ truce was the most he could accomplish; moreover, the whole atmosphere was so charged with suspicion that it was obvious that Charles could not possibly give his undivided attention to the Turkish war. He insisted on conducting the struggle on defensive lines during the rest of the year 1538, while the Venetians wished to carry the war into the enemy’s country. His eyes were fixed on the situation in the western basin of the, Mediterranean, and on the maintenance of the Spanish power in North Africa; theirs were directed to the Adriatic and the Aegean. The results of these divergences were to be only too plainly evident when the time for decisive action came.

The rendezvous for the different contingents of the Christian fleet was fixed at Corfu. The first to arrive were the Venetians, with fifty-five galleys, under Vincenzo Capello. Next, on June 17, came the twenty-seven that were furnished by the Pope; they were commanded by Marco Grimani. Both these leaders wanted to get started at once, and seek out the enemy in the Aegean Sea; but the viceroy of Sicily, who was commander-in-chief, insisted on waiting for the arrival of Doria, who was occupied till the latter part of July with the various goings and comings of the Emperor in connection with the interviews at Nice and Aigues-Mortes, and did not finally reach Corfu until September 7. He brought with him forty-nine galleys, thus carrying the Christian total to over 130; on September 22 a large contingent of ‘naos gruesas de combate,’ sent on by the Emperor, also arrived, and there was the usual swarm of minor transports. The fleet carried 16,000 land troops, and 2500 cannon. In the meantime, Barbarossa, with a somewhat smaller number of ships, had been able to take up a position just inside the entrance to the Gulf of Prevesa, under the shelter of the guns of the fortress, close to the site of the battle of Actium. His inferiority in numbers was very largely compensated by the excellence of his crews and the skill of his captains. All the most famous of his corsairs accompanied him; especially the terrible Torghoud, or Dragut, who was to be a thorn in the side of the Christians for many years to come.

But before the rival fleets got into contact, a strange scene was enacted at the town of Parga, on the shore opposite Corfu. Alonso de Alarcon unexpectedly appeared there, on the night of September 20, as the messenger of Barbarossa, and held a secret interview with Andrea Doria and the viceroy of Sicily, who were empowered to treat with him in the name of the Emperor. Negotiations had made much progress since the previous year; it now looked as if there were a real prospect of inducing the pirate to change sides. On two vital points, however, no agreement could be reached. Barbarossa would be satisfied with nothing short of Tunis, where the Emperor was determined to maintain Muley Hassan. Charles wanted the pirate to burn such portions of the Turkish fleet as he could not bring over with him into the service of Spain, a proposal which failed to appeal to Barbarossa. As Alarcon was only acting in the capacity of a messenger, he could not settle these questions without referring to the pirate, and the ensuing delay spoiled all chances of an immediate understanding. Doria and Gonzaga went back to their fleet to prepare for battle, but in view of the negotiation in which they had just taken part, it was inevitable that they should enter the conflict with somewhat mingled feelings.

As soon as he had returned from his secret interview with Alarcon, Doria led the Christian fleet out of Corfu in the direction of Prevesa. It at once became evident that Barbarossa could not be easily tempted to abandon his strong position inside the gulf and risk a battle in the open sea; and at a council on board the Christian fleet a plan was advanced of landing the troops, capturing the castle, and blocking up the infidel fleet within the gulf by sinking a ship at the narrowest point of the entrance. It seems that Gonzaga originated this scheme, and Doria at first appeared to approve of it; but when the
moment for action came, he entirely refused to carry it out. Unfavorable weather conditions, lack of deep water close in shore, and unwillingness to denude his fleet of fighting men, have all been put forward as reasons to explain his conduct. There is also a strong possibility that his action may have been determined by secret intrigues with the foe. At any rate, the landing operation was not attempted; the Christian ships kept out in the open sea; and finally Barbarossa was persuaded by his pugnacious subordinates to issue out of his retreat and go forth to seek the foe. The Turkish formation was that of a huge crescent; it was divided into several groups, with Dragut and a squadron of his fastest ships in the center and vanguard.

The engagement, which ensued on September 27, is usually known as the battle of Prevesa, and has been a fertile source of discussion ever since. What is perfectly clear is that Doria and his Venetian and papal allies failed to cooperate effectively; they were cut off from one another and followed different plans of action. United, it is probable that they might have secured a decisive victory; as it was, the day passed off without any serious fighting. There was a certain amount of long-range cannonading; a few of the Christian ships were captured, burnt, or sent to the bottom; some of the smaller ones were sunk in a gale which blew up, apparently, in the course of the afternoon; at night the allies retired to Corfu, crippled, the only heroes of the entire conflict, long after their companions had given them up for lost. Biscayans were able seamen, and kept the ship afloat. They beat off several savage attacks, and entirely in the shelter of the Gulf of Arta. The Spaniards drew some consolation for the inglorious issue from the conduct of one Martin de Munguia and a company of 200 Biscayan arquebusiers whom he commanded. The ship in which they were placed had borne the brunt of such fighting as had occurred; it had been almost shot to pieces; its crew had fled; and at the end of the day, it had been given up for lost. But the Biscayans were able seamen, and kept the ship afloat. They beat off several savage attacks, and entirely refused to haul down their flag. Finally, five days after the fight, they managed to reach Corfu, battered, crippled, the only heroes of the entire conflict, long after their companions had given them up for lost.

Doria was anxious to deliver before the end of the year some blow which would serve to neutralize the effect of Prevesa; and the allies finally agreed to attack the strong fortress of Castelnuovo at the entrance to the Gulf of Cattaro. On October 27 the place was taken; but its capture only served to bring the old divergences between Doria and the Venetians more sharply than ever to the fore. The Venetians claimed the right to occupy and hold it, under the terms of the League; but Gonzaga and Doria insisted that it be garrisoned by Spaniards, 4000 of whom were finally left there under command of Francesco Sarmiento. They were not to remain long. In the summer of 1539 Barbarossa reappeared with a large army and a fleet of 200 ships to retake the fortress. The garrison performed prodigies of valor in its defense, which was prolonged from July 12 to August 7, and cost the besiegers many lives; but Doria failed to come to its rescue, and it was finally obliged to capitulate. Only 800 of the garrison, counting women and children, survived. One of the prisoners was Martin de Munguia, of Prevesa fame. Barbarossa complimented him on his past performance and promised him his favor if he would change sides; but on receiving a point blank refusal, he made haste to have him executed.

The dispute between Doria and the Venetians over the possession of Castelnuovo foreshadowed the dissolution of the Holy League; it was the beginning of the end of that chapter of Charles’s Turkish wars. From the Spanish point of view, that phase had been most unfortunate. It had served to distract attention from North Africa; and the Venetian alliance, which had formed the keynote of it, had been productive of nothing save misunderstanding and defeat. Soon after the dispute about the occupation of Castelnuovo, the Doge made overtures for peace with the Turks; though these were not finally successful until October, 1540, it is clear that the Venetians pinned their faith on them from the very outset, for when the Emperor offered to put them in possession of the fortress that they had coveted, they hesitatingly refused him. They doubtless had their own suspicions of double dealing on the part of Charles and Doria, and justifiably; for secret negotiations with Barbarossa continued, as we shall later see, for many months to come. In any case, it was obvious that Spain and Venice could no longer effectively combine; geographically, politically, and commercially, their aims and ideas diverged; and the sole result of the league that had been arranged between them had been to raise the Turkish navy to a position of recognized supremacy in the Mediterranean from which it was not to be displaced till the battle of Lepanto. We may well believe that the lesson was not lost on Charles; and the result of it was to bring the purely Spanish side of the war against the infidel, which he had rather neglected ever since the capture of Tunis, again prominently to the fore. Henceforth the North African situation, and the repression of pirate raids, became once more his chief preoccupations; and the scene of interest shifts back from the Adriatic and Ionian seas to the western basin of the Mediterranean.

The summer and early autumn of the year 1540 witnessed three events, all of which reflected the new tendency of affairs. The first was the capture, in the middle of June, of the corsair Dragut, by
Giannetino Doria, a nephew of the admiral, and Berenguer de Requesens, commanding the galleys of Sicily. There had been a good deal of indiscriminate chasing of this pirate, whose ability and boldness were by this time generally recognized, in the months succeeding the surrender of Castelnuovo; the chief scene of operations was the waters near Sicily, where Dragut had effected a number of daring raids. Neither there, nor off Sardinia, had it been possible to find him, but at last his pursuers had the good fortune to run him down in the inlet of La Giralata, between Calvi and Bastia, on the northern shore of the island of Corsica. So utterly desolate and unfrequented was the place that the infidels had neglected to keep any lookout for the foe. Most of them fled inland when the Christian fleet appeared. Dragut, with a few followers, attempted to put to sea, but was captured, with eleven galleys, two of which had been lost by the Venetians at Prevesa. The corsair was carried off to Genoa, and chained with the other galley slaves to a rowers’ bench, until, four years later, he was ransomed by Barbarossa.

The inevitable reply to this Christian victory took the form of a raid on the fortress of Gibraltar in the early part of the following September. It was organized in Algiers, at the instigation of Barbarossa. It was led by a Sardinian renegade, who called himself Ali Hamet; and a certain Caramani, who had been a galley slave under Alvaro de Bazán, was placed in command of the accompanying troops. The expedition consisted of 16 vessels, rowed by about 1000 Spanish captives, and carrying over 2000 soldiers, mostly Turks, with a sprinkling of Valencian Moriscos. It left Algiers on August 24, and turned its course westward in order to avoid the Spanish galleys, which were concentrated at that moment off the Balearics. On September 9 the infidels arrived off Gibraltar, and, concealing their identity by hoisting Spanish flags, landed upwards of 1000 troops before they were discovered. The fortress just managed to hold out against them, but they gutted the town at the base of the Rock, slew twenty of its defenders, took seventy-three prisoners and a lot of booty, played havoc with the smaller vessels that lay at anchor in the harbor, and got away, unscathed, to their own galleys. For three days more they hung about the Rock, haggling over the amount of ransom that should be paid them for their prisoners. At last, fearing that the Spaniards were inventing delays in order to bring up overwhelming soldiers, mostly Turks, with a sprinkling of Valencian Moriscos. It left Algiers on August 24, and turned its course westward in order to avoid the Spanish galleys, which were concentrated at that moment off the Balearics. On September 9 the infidels arrived off Gibraltar, and, concealing their identity by hoisting Spanish flags, landed upwards of 1000 troops before they were discovered. The fortress just managed to hold out against them, but they gutted the town at the base of the Rock, slew twenty of its defenders, took seventy-three prisoners and a lot of booty, played havoc with the smaller vessels that lay at anchor in the harbor, and got away, unscathed, to their own galleys. For three days more they hung about the Rock, haggling over the amount of ransom that should be paid them for their prisoners. At last, fearing that the Spaniards were inventing delays in order to bring up overwhelming reinforcements, they departed, on September 12, for the Barbary Coast, and cast anchor in the harbor of Velez de la Gomera. Seven thousand ducats were sent after them from Spain, and after prolonged negotiations, the prisoners were given up.

At the time of the attack on Gibraltar, the Spanish galleys were moving westward from the Balearics, in the hope of getting news of the movements of the infidel fleet. They were commanded, at the time, by Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who had recently taken the place of Alvaro de Bazán. At Cartagena, on September 18, he learned of the raid on Gibraltar, and though his ships were somewhat less numerous than those of the enemy, he at once started out to find the foe. Finally, on October 1, off the little island of Alborán, 125 miles due east from the strait, the rival fleets came into contact. The combat that ensued was fierce in the extreme; both sides were confident of victory and anxious to fight to a finish. Many deeds of heroism were performed on both sides, but after an hour, victory declared itself for the Spaniards. Ten of the enemy’s ships were captured and one was sunk; the five others managed to escape. Most of the infidel captains were slain, among them Caramani; upwards of 700 others were killed or wounded; Ali Hamet and more than 400 of his men were taken prisoners, and over 700 Christian captives were set free. On the side of the Spaniards, the loss in killed and wounded was scarcely less heavy than that of their foes; but the moral effects of the victory were so great, and the lesson which it had taught to the pirates had been so severe, that the return of the fleet to Malaga was celebrated with salvos of artillery and triumphal processions.

If the results of the Prevesa campaign had cured the Emperor of all desire to make war in alliance with the Venetians against the Turk in the Eastern Mediterranean, they had not caused him to abandon his plans of attempting to win Barbarossa away from the service of the Sultan. The encounters which we have just been describing had all occurred while Charles was absent in the Low Countries. They were due to the activity of the Spanish commanders on the spot, and do not prove that the Emperor had yet made up his mind to trust the solution of the whole naval problem in the Mediterranean to the arbitrament of war. On the contrary, there were many considerations which urged him to continue the crooked diplomacy of 1537 and 1538. A new war with France was highly probable, and with Barbarossa in supreme command of the entire Turkish navy, the Franco-Turkish alliance would be more menacing than ever. The Emperor’s resources were exceedingly low; and the need of chastising the Lutherans in Germany promised in the near future to drain them to the dregs. The ransom of the survivors of the garrison of Castelnuovo gave a pretext for renewing the negotiations that had been broken off on the eve of the battle of Prevesa, and in the autumn of 1539 we find Andrea Doria and the viceroy of Sicily, with the approval of Charles, once more making overtures to Kheireddin Barbarossa. The name of Alarcon no longer appears; the principal agents on this occasion were the contador Juan Gallego, Captain Juan de Vergara, and a certain Doctor Romero, all of whom were in Constantinople in
the spring of 1540. So important did Charles consider the pirate’s adherence, that he authorized his representatives to offer more for it than before. He would abandon Muley Hassan and give up Tunis; he might even consent to the dismantling of Tripoli and La Goletta. Barbarossa apparently had professed himself satisfied with the terms which the proposed agreement called on him to perform. He even went so far as to promise Charles to help him in an offensive war against Venice, and to come to his aid if he were attacked by the king of France. Everything seemed, in the early part of 1540, to point to a successful termination of this singular intrigue, when suddenly, at a moment’s notice, the whole affair was dropped. According to a letter of Cobos to the Emperor, it would seem that the French representative at Constantinople, the argus-eyed Rincon, got wind of the negotiations and told them to Suleiman; but one of Charles’s agents at the Porte was convinced that Barbarossa, “more Mussulman than Mahomet”, had really been duping the Emperor from first to last; that he had never had any intention of deserting the Sultan, but had entered into negotiations with Charles solely in order to learn his designs, and report them to headquarters. “His treachery is worse”, so the agent concludes, “than that of Count Julian or the Bishop Oppas”. Whatever the methods by which it was brought about, it is certain that Charles’s projects were terminated for the time being, and they were not to be renewed until 1545.

The failure of his plots made the Emperor ready to fight; in fact, he was most anxious to get in a hard blow before his attention was distracted by the now inevitable war with France. There was little or no question as to where it could be most effectively delivered. The desires of Spain, her traditions in North Africa, and the safety of navigation in the western basin of the Mediterranean, all dictated an assault on the town of Algiers. It had been the chief headquarters of pirate fleets ever since its capture by Arudj Barbarossa in 1516, and the main starting point of the terrible raids of which the Spaniards were constantly complaining. It stood out unsubdued in a region which, for the most part, had been forced to acknowledge the overlordship of Spain; it was a bar to the development of her Mauretanian Empire. A vigorous attack on it might also divert the attention of Suleiman from the Hungarian campaign on which he had started in January, 1541. Indeed, it is highly probable that the Sultan’s withdrawal to Constantinople, in the autumn of that year, at the instance of Barbarossa, was caused by his fears of what Charles might accomplish in the West.

Algiers was at that moment commanded by a henchman of Barbarossa named Hassan Aga. Born in Sardinia, he had been captured in a pirate raid and converted to Islam; and though apparently a eunuch, he had already signalized himself by desperate courage on the field of battle. The garrison he commanded, however, was not large—probably not over 1500 Turks and 5000 or 6000 Andalusian Moors—and it occurred to the Spanish governor of Oran, the Count of Alcaudete, that he might be detached from the service of his Turkish masters, and induced, by the offer of a suitable reward, to deliver up Algiers without attempting a defence. We are not very fully informed in regard to this affair, but it is interesting to observe that it began in the autumn of 1540, or, in other words, at the very moment when it had become obvious that Charles’s plan for winning over Barbarossa could not possibly succeed; apparently the habit of secret negotiation with the foe had by this time become so strong in these Turkish wars that it was no sooner checked in one direction than it broke out in another. On this occasion it seems probable that Hassan Aga was really persuaded seriously to consider the surrender of Algiers, but demanded, for appearance’s sake, that the Emperor should attack him with forces sufficiently overwhelming to give him an adequate excuse for so doing. Such, at least, seems to be the most obvious explanation of the way in which Charles insisted on undertaking the enterprise so late in the year, at the very stormiest season, and against the advice of all his councilors, of his brother Ferdinand, and even of the Pope. It is not inconsistent with the insolent refusal with which Hassan Aga replied to Charles’s demand that he give up Algiers before he was attacked—a refusal which has been explained in so many different ways by Spanish and Moorish historians. In any case, the project ultimately failed. Whether Hassan was merely playing with the Spaniards, or whether, at the critical moment, the protests of his subordinates held him loyal to Barbarossa, it is certain that he defended his post with courage and success, and that a subsequent renewal of negotiations, after the failure of Charles’s attack, was unable to win him away from his allegiance.

The Emperor spent the summer and early autumn of 1541 in Bavaria and Lombardy. He had begun his preparations for attacking Algiers long beforehand, but apparently had succeeded in keeping them secret, for we learn that Hassan Aga was not apprised of them until just before the expedition sailed. The rendezvous for the different detachments had been fixed at the Balearics, where the Emperor arrived, with the galleys of Andrea Doria, on October 13, to find Ferrante Gonzaga with 8000 Spanish troops from Naples and Sicily, 6000 Germans, and 6000 Italians awaiting him; but the force from Spain, under Bernardino de Mendoza and the Duke of Alva, was so slow in getting started that the Emperor subsequently sent word for it to proceed directly to the North African coast, where he finally united with it on October 21. All told, the expedition numbered 65 galleys and 450 other ships, with 12,000
sailors and 24,000 troops. Almost all the greatest soldiers of Spain accompanied it, among them Hernando Cortes, the conqueror of Mexico, who had returned from the Indies in the preceding year. On Sunday, the twenty-third, the troops were landed at the head of the bay, near the mouth of the Harrach, southeast of Algiers; while the fleet was left scattered along the shores, completely at the mercy of any storm that might blow up.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth, the march on the city began: the Spaniards, under Gonzaga, in the lead, the Emperor, with the Germans, in the center, and the Italians in the rear. The army was much hampered in its advance by a series of sudden attacks from light armed Berber troops. To avoid this embarrassment, it was decided to carry the heights of Koudiat-es-Saboun, whose deep ravines promised to afford much needed shelter. This feat was promptly performed by two Spanish regiments; the Emperor at once transferred his headquarters to the new position, and by nightfall the whole army was safely entrenched from the shores of the bay to the crest of the heights, whence it could sweep the city with a devastating fire. Inside Algiers there was terror and confusion. It is said that in the evening a Moor stole out and was brought before the Emperor, and begged him, when he assaulted on the morrow, to leave one of the gates of the city unguarded in order that the inhabitants might have a means of escape. Everything combined, on the evening of the 24th, to convince the Emperor that he was certain of his game.

But shortly before midnight rain began to fall, and rapidly increased in violence; a wind also blew up from the northwest, and before many hours had become a howling gale. The Christians were unable to find adequate shelter from the elements, and the defenders, perceiving their situation, determined to profit by it. In the small hours of the morning of the 25th, they directed a sortie in force against the Italians, who broke and fled before them. The heroism and devotion of a small detachment of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem served to check the retreat before it became a rout, and ultimately drove the assailants back within the walls; the Emperor also showed courage and presence of mind, and rallied his Germans for an attack on the foe. But the rain had rendered the muskets and cannon of the besiegers well-nigh useless, while the Moors shot their crossbows from the walls with deadly effect; and the discouragement of the Christians reached the point of demoralization when they looked out on the bay and saw what the storm had done to their fleet. No less than 140 vessels had been driven, utterly helpless, upon the shore. It was necessary to send off company after company to protect the shipwrecked crews from Moorish attacks. Worst of all, it soon became evident that Andrea Doria did not dare to risk the rest of his fleet by remaining where he was; and he finally dispatched a swimmer to the shore to beg the Emperor to abandon the enterprise, and to inform him that he would await him in the more sheltered waters off Cape Matifou. When the soldiers saw the admiral weigh anchor, they gave up in despair. They were tired, wet, and desperately hungry, and obviously in no condition to fight. On the morning of the 26th, to the amazement of the Algerians, Charles began to withdraw his forces to the eastward. Three days later, they reached Cape Matifou. At a council of war the preponderant opinion was in favor of retirement. It was in vain that Hernando Cortes, who had been confronted with far more difficult situations in the war against the Aztecs, assured the Emperor that if he were allowed to remain with a small portion of the army, he felt perfectly certain he could conquer Algiers; the more cautious advice of Doria prevailed, and on November 1 the army began to embark. The ships were in bad condition and terribly overcrowded. The bad weather persisted throughout the month. There were several wrecks, and Charles, who was the last to set sail, was forced to put into the port of Bugia to refit; he did not reach Majorca till November 26, nor Cartagena till December 2. The total losses are almost impossible to ascertain; but it does not seem likely that they were less than 150 ships and 12,000 men, not to speak of large quantities of cannon and supplies; in Spain it was believed that Charles himself had been killed, and his return was consequently celebrated with rejoicings. The moral effects of the defeat were of course immense. It was the first serious reverse that the Emperor had ever sustained. It weakened his confidence in his own good fortune, while it encouraged the infidels to greater activity than ever. Hassan Aga was loaded with presents by Suleiman and given the title of Pasha. Algiers was henceforth regarded as impregnable; while the raids of the Barbary corsairs and pirates became an even worse menace to Western Christendom than before.

From the failure before Algiers to the end of the reign, the war against the infidel rather falls into the background. Charles himself took no further active part in it. He was busy with Continental politics and the suppression of the Lutherans; he was only too glad to leave his Turkish and Moorish enemies alone, provided they would consent to do the same by him; indeed his chief contribution to the struggle after 1541 was another attempt to gain peace with his foes. The story of that attempt we must now briefly relate, and then pass to the remaining conflicts on the Mediterranean and in North Africa.
The Franco-Turkish alliance caused Charles more annoyance than ever during the Hapsburg-Valois war of 1542-44. Andrea Doria was unable to deal effectively with the joint fleets of his foes, and at the end Barbarossa was permitted to ransom Dragut. In 1545 the Emperor wished to concentrate against the Lutherans; and accordingly dispatched a secret envoy, one Gerard Veltwyck, to Constantinople, in the hope of getting peace with Suleiman on the Danube, and with Barbarossa as well in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Veltwyck’s instructions and correspondence are complicated and very interesting. He was apparently commanded to carry on his negotiations ostensibly in accord with the French ambassador, and for the purpose of obtaining a joint peace; but he was also given private orders of his own. He was urged to try to bring Venice into the discussion in such a way as would render the Emperor safe in that quarter, and to checkmate any possible efforts of the Lutherans to get help at the Porte. On the Danube Charles’s emissary soon accomplished his purpose. An eighteen months’ truce there was arranged on November 10, 1545, to be converted in June 1547, into a permanent peace; the rumblings of a war with Persia which broke out in 1548 were doubtless a strong factor in causing Suleiman to agree to a suspension of hostilities in the West. As for Barbarossa, it was plain that Charles was in mortal terror lest he should attack Tunis; and Veltwyck was therefore charged to inform him that if he would refrain, the Emperor would make no effort to oust him from Algiers and the other North African ports of which he illegally held possession. This singularly one-sided proposal was naturally not accepted; but the Emperor was relieved of the worst of his anxieties in that direction by the death of the old pirate on July 4, 1546, at the age of at least eighty; he was certainly one of the most picturesque figures in the whole history of naval warfare. But if Barbarossa was gone, Dragut still remained, as Charles and Spain were to learn to their cost. In the year 1550 the Mediterranean was ablaze once more.

Dragut’s four years as a galley slave in the service of Doria made him burn for revenge on his Christian captors. After his ransom by Barbarossa in 1544, he devoted all his energies to the collection of a fleet, which should enable him to dominate the Western Mediterranean. He carried neither the banner of the Sultan, nor of any of the North African, states, but flew a red and white flag with a blue crescent on it, emblematic of his freedom from all overlordship, and of his resolve to maintain complete independence. Partly by treachery, and partly by force, he managed, in the early months of 1550, to establish himself at Monastir and El Mehedia, to the southeast of Tunis; thence he organized ravaging expeditions against the Sicilian, Neapolitan, and Spanish coasts. By midsummer of that year, the situation had become intolerable, and Charles, who was busy in the Netherlands and the Empire, sent orders to Andrea Doria and Juan de Vega, the viceroy of Sicily, to oust the pirate from his new headquarters. The expedition had the good fortune to arrive at its destination while Dragut was absent on a piratical raid. Monastir surrendered without attempting a defense; the troops and artillery were promptly landed; and, most important of all, Doria was able to place his ships in such fashion as to cut off Dragut, on his return, from bearing aid to El Mehedia. The siege of that fortress was long and very difficult. Incredible amounts of ammunition were shot away before it was possible to breach the walls, and many gallant lives were lost in the ensuing assault, but finally, on September 10, the place was entered, the defenders were overpowered, and those who were not killed, reduced to slavery. A strong Spanish garrison was installed, and on September 25 the victors sailed away to receive the plaudits of all the Hapsburg lands; but the sequel soon showed that these rejoicings were premature.

Dragut, infuriated at the loss of El Mehedia, retired temporarily to the island of Gerba, where Doria went to seek him out in the spring of 1551. The admiral caught the pirate fleet in an inlet from which escape without a conflict seemed absolutely impossible and contented himself with guarding the entrance to it. But Dragut was more than equal to the occasion. While he distracted Doria’s attention by a heavy artillery fire from the shore, he caused all his ships to be dragged overland on greased ways to the other side of the island of Gerba, where he launched them and got away without his opponents being any the wiser. Such energy did not long remain unnoticed by the Sultan; the next time that Dragut was heard from, he bore an official title and commanded Suleiman’s galleys. Aided by a still larger fleet under the terrible Sinan ‘the Jew’, he attacked the strongholds of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. At Malta, their principal fortress, he was repulsed: but he had no difficulty in capturing the neighboring island of Gozzo; and finally on August 16, 1551, he took Tripoli, where the Order had been established since 1528. El Mehedia itself was in grave danger of sharing the same fate, more especially as its garrison was discontented and mutinous; and so, after the Tripolitan Knights had been offered and refused an opportunity to establish themselves there, it was abandoned and dismantled in 1554. All the fruits of its capture in 1550 had been thrown away; and the reign ended with the Turk in the ascendant on the sea.

The land operations of the Spaniards against the infidel in North Africa during the closing years of the Emperor’s reign were even more unfortunate than their ventures on the Mediterranean. Their failure, several times noted heretofore, to make any serious effort to penetrate inland, or to establish their
authority elsewhere than on the coast, had caused deep dissatisfaction to the more enthusiastic of the expansionists. When, in the spring of 1535, Martin de Cordova y Velasco, the brave but imperious Count of Alcaudete, arrived at Oran with the title of captain-general, he determined to do his utmost to atone for this defect; but the remedy he applied proved worse than the disease.

The goal of his efforts was the kingdom of Tlemcen, whose capital was the chief center of the commerce of the western part of North Africa. The puppet sovereign set up there by the Marquis of Comares in 1518 had recently found difficulty in maintaining himself against rivals supported by Barbarossa, whose predominance in the seaports of Tenes and Mostaganem enabled him to influence the course of Tlemcen’s trade; and Alcaudete’s first act, on arriving at Oran, was to dispatch a strong force to reestablish the Spanish protégé. But the expedition, after having been on the point of scoring a notable success, was forced to retire with its mission unaccomplished. Indeed, had it not been for the effect of the contemporaneous success of the Emperor at Tunis, the last vestige of Spanish authority at Tlemcen would have been shattered then and there. As it was, the different claimants continued to quarrel for the control until after the defeat of Charles at Algiers, when Alcaudete, convinced of the necessity of striking some vigorous blow in order to rehabilitate Spain’s badly shaken prestige, offered to fit out a fresh expedition for the conquest of the kingdom. This time he had better success than before. He won two bloody battles over superior forces on February 3 and 5, 1543; on February 6 he entered the city of Tlemcen at the head of his troops. But instead of installing a strong Spanish garrison—the sole possible way to secure what he had won—he entrusted his conquest to the same local vassal who had previously given his allegiance to the Emperor, with the result that shortly afterwards the Turkish protégé regained control. In 1547 Alcaudete returned to the charge once more, entered Tlemcen and again set up a puppet ruler; but by this time his Turkish rivals had learned what the Spaniards were apparently never able to comprehend, namely, the futility of all efforts to maintain control through vassal kings. In the spring of 1552 the redoubtable Hassan Corso, sent in from Algiers, conquered Tlemcen and established a Turkish governor and garrison, and therewith all Alcaudete’s hopes of recapturing it were gone. Henceforth the scene of the conflict transfers itself to the presidios on the coast, where the Spaniards during the remaining years of the reign continued to fight a losing contest.

In September, 1555, they were forced to surrender Bugia, which capitulated to Salah Reis, the new and energetic viceroy of Algiers, after twelve days of hopeless resistance. The generous terms which the Spanish commander, Alonso de Peralta, demanded and obtained at the time of the surrender were afterwards shamefully violated by the victors. The majority of the garrison was enslaved; Peralta and the rest were cast adrift on the Mediterranean and only reached Alicante by a miracle. Bugia had been uninterrupted in Spanish hands for a period of forty-five years, and so deeply was the nation cast down by the news of its loss that Peralta was executed in the public square at Valladolid, a really innocent victim of the popular wrath. In the following year the death of Salah Reis necessitated the abandonment of a Turkish project to besiege Oran, and Alcaudete, taking advantage of the ensuing demoralization of his foes, began collecting a large force to besiege Mostaganem. But there were as usual interminable delays. Not until August, 1558, was the expedition able to start, and the Turks had been given their opportunity to prepare. An assault, delivered under hopeless conditions, suffered a disastrous repulse. A retreat ensued and soon became a rout. Alcaudete was slain in an attempt to rally the fugitives, and only a handful got back to Oran. The Emperor was on his death bed when the sad news reached Castile; and it was decided not to darken his last hours by telling him what had occurred.

Taken as a whole, Charles’s reign had witnessed a radical alteration of the aspect of the conflict between Spain and the infidel. He had inherited from his predecessors merely a desultory struggle for supremacy in North Africa, which had been constantly relegated to the background by the pressure of other affairs. In the period of his rule, new elements had come into play, which had served to create fresh ramifications of the contest, and invest it with a new and far wider significance. Practically all of these new elements had been the result, directly or indirectly, of the advance of the Turks in the Danube valley and in the Mediterranean. The task of defending the Austrian lands was never absent from the Emperor’s mind, and Spanish gold and Spanish soldiers were being constantly requisitioned to enable him to accomplish it. The rise of the Barbarossas not only brought the Ottoman power into rivalry with Spain for the control of North Africa. It subjected the coasts of the peninsula and its dependencies to merciless raids, of which the inhabitants were constantly complaining. It imperiled the whole structure of Spain’s Mediterranean empire by menacing communication between the different parts of it, and thus forced Charles into naval warfare upon a large scale. What had been but a side issue of the latter part of
The reign of the Catholic Kings was now thrust prominently into the foreground. In one or another of its various phases, the war with the infidel was one of the Emperor’s most unceasing cares.

It must be confessed that the story as a whole is rather a record of failure than of success. On the Danube the Turk, in 1558, was perhaps less of a menace than in 1529 or in 1532, but he was certainly far more dangerous than in 1516. In the Mediterranean the situation was very much worse. Navigation in the western basin of it had hitherto been generally safe; but at the time of Charles’s death, there was no area between Gibraltar and Constantinople which was not likely to be visited by infidel corsairs; while the verdict of Prevesa, in 1538, had established, at least for the time being, the primacy of the Ottoman fleet. In North Africa the Spaniards were distinctly weaker at the end of the reign than at the beginning; and it is with good reason that the most recent Mohammedan history of the region calls the period beginning with Charles’s accession, that of “the revival of Islam”. Since the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, Spain had lost Algiers and Tripoli, Bugia, Tenes, Delys, and Velez de la Gomera. She took El Mehedia in 1550 only to abandon it in 1554; she had gained the overlordship of Tlemcen only to lose it again, and had been forced to give up all hopes of penetrating into the interior. Moreover her one great conquest, the capture of Tunis and La Goletta, had proved, before the end of the reign, to be largely illusory. Her vassal, Muley Hassan, was unable to maintain authority there. In 1542, he was dethroned, imprisoned, and blinded by his son Ahmed, who ruled till 1569 in no friendly spirit to the Spaniards; even the commander of the Spanish garrison at La Goletta adopted the customs and costume of Islam. The prestige of Spain, as a conqueror of the infidel, was lower at the end of Charles’s reign than at the beginning.

As far as the situation in North Africa was concerned, the cause of Spain’s ill success was fundamentally the same as that which had explained her halting progress there under the Catholic Kings. The whole matter had been treated as a side issue. There was no systematic or continuous policy for the permanent establishment of Spanish power. No consistent efforts were made to penetrate the interior, or even effectively to colonize the regions already won. The garrisons in the coast towns were inadequate and ill-furnished. The fortifications were allowed to fall into disrepair. Above all, there was a constant tendency to rely on puppet vassal kings—Moorish chieftains whose loyalty to Spain was measured solely by their dread of Turkish domination or their fear of dethronement by some local rival. We have remarked that Charles had been obliged to take the infidel problem as a whole more seriously than his grandparents had done before him, at least after the fall of Granada in 1492; but the portions of it that claimed his most urgent attention were the struggle for naval supremacy and the wars on the Danube. The essentially Spanish side of the problem—the consolidation of the North African conquests—was relegated to the background quite as emphatically as before. It was all an interesting example of the way in which Spain’s mounting power and prestige under Charles were counterbalanced by her enforced assumption of new duties and responsibilities. She was mighty, indeed, as she had never been before, but, on the other hand, she had never before had anywhere nearly so much to do. A French historian has said of the Emperor, “[Sa] force a toujours ete exactement egale & sa faiblesse”, and the generalization is especially true of his rule in his Iberian dominions. Spain’s increased resources had to be almost exclusively applied to what her monarch regarded as his most serious responsibility—the wars against different enemies for the maintenance of Hapsburg supremacy in Western Europe. North Africa from the outset had been subsidiary to these, and though the experience of Charles’s reign had served to show him that it was far more important than he had originally thought, he was never able to afford sufficient time, money, or men to establish the Spanish power there with any measure of permanence.
If Spain was anxious to have Charles make peace with Christian kings in order to save time and strength to fight the infidel, she was even more desirous to have him utilize the resources which could be husbanded by the cessation of the wars with France for the purpose of putting down the Lutherans in the Empire. In her eyes the suppression of heresy was the most important task of all; even her chronic complaints about the Emperor’s prolonged absences could be silenced by the plea that he was departing to attack the Protestants. Doubtless the Spanish monarch had been obliged by the political situation to postpone that work much longer than he desired. The development of Lutheranism since 1521 showed that it was far more than the mere monkish quarrel which Leo X had thought. Every year it became plainer that Charles could not hope to overthrow it until all his other responsibilities had been cleared away. This was not accomplished till the winter of 1544-45, when the Emperor's last war with Francis I had been closed by the peace of Crespy, and a truce with the Turk on the Danube, though not actually signed until the following November, was clearly in prospect. Then, and not till then, were Charles’s hands free.

Yet never, in all his career, were the Emperor’s caution and foresight more plainly manifest than at the moment when he resolved to open his long delayed campaign against his Lutheran foes. His recent successes, more especially his triumph over the rebel duke of Cleves, had convinced him, so he tells us in his memoirs, that it would not be impossible “to restrain such presumption by force; indeed it appeared quite an easy task if undertaken with adequate means, and under favorable circumstances”; but he was determined to render those means so adequate and those circumstances so favorable as to make assurance doubly sure. His army needed strengthening after the strain of the recent war with France; particularly was he in want of Spanish soldiers, whose orthodoxy would make them willing fighters in a war for the suppression of heresy, and whose efficiency was already the terror of Western Europe. Even more essential was it for him to justify his cause before the world, to prove that he had no idea of unrighteous conquest, and that his sole object was to preserve the unity of the church, as a Holy Roman Emperor was in honor bound to do. Finally, it was of the utmost importance that he make sure of the attitude of the papacy, for whose benefit, in one sense, he was proposing to wage war, and whose hearty cooperation was indispensable to success. And as the easiest means of effecting these ends, Charles called on the Pope in the autumn of 1544 to summon the general council of Christendom, which had been so often demanded ever since the beginning of Paul’s pontificate, but which, for one reason or another, had never been able to meet for effective business. If such a council were summoned, the Lutherans would have no excuse for refusing to attend it. If they did so refuse, Charles would be absolved from all his promises to leave them in peace; if they did not, they would be certain to be outvoted by the Catholics, and the Emperor would gain their submission without a war. As for the Pope, the council would be a means of holding him in leash, as similar councils had been for his fifteenth-century predecessors; Charles could test the genuineness of his enthusiasm for ecclesiastical reform. The choice of the meeting place, which must have been foreseen—at Trent in Tyrol—was deeply significant. Nominally German, it was really Italian in sentiment and affiliation, and close to many important Italian sees. A council meeting there would not be “free, Christian, and general”, as the Lutherans desired; it would infallibly be dominated by Spanish and Italian bishops; and yet it would formally comply with the expressed wish of the Protestants that it should meet on German soil. As Charles had doubtless foreseen would be the case, the Lutherans declined to fall into the trap. They refused to recognize the validity of the council or be bound by its decisions; when it finally opened on December 13, 1545, not a single one of them was found to be in attendance.

From that moment war was inevitable, and the Emperor began to prepare for it in earnest. The complicated tale of his diplomatic negotiations with the different German princes does not concern us here, but the military side of the story is of great interest, for Spanish soldiers played an important part in the ensuing campaigns, and the reputation and dread of the Spanish arms were thereby much enhanced. Charles passed the year 1545 and the early part of 1546 in the Netherlands and on the Rhine. In April 1546, he moved across to Ratisbon, partly to hold a Diet, at which his secret agreements with the different princes he had won over to support him were concluded, and still more to take up an
advantageous position for the union of the various bodies of troops which began to pour in on him from south, east, and west. Among the first to arrive was Don Alvaro de Sande with his tercio of 2800 Spaniards from Hungary; another Spanish contingent, 3000 strong, came on from Lombardy; and scattering German levies streamed in from the different states of the Empire. On August 12, at Landshut, Charles effected a junction with the 12,000 Italian troops under Ottavio Farnese, which the Pope, by a treaty of alliance of the previous June, had promised to furnish him. He now had an army of nearly 40,000 men. It seems probable, however, that he was still numerically inferior to his Lutheran foes, who had concentrated their forces near Ingolstadt to the west of him, in the hope of preventing his union with the only large contingent which he still expected—some 15,000 to 20,000 troops from the Netherlands, under Maximilian of Egmont, Count of Buren. Charles’s forces, as usual, were heterogeneous to the last degree, and the Duke of Alva, who was his constant adviser throughout the campaign, urged him to avoid a pitched battle until he was more certain to win.

There are few instances in history of a military inefficiency more glaring than that displayed by the Schmalkaldic forces in the summer of 1546. Whatever the relative size of the two armies after the arrival of the papal levies in August, it is certain that until that time the Lutherans were enormously superior; had they struck at once, after Charles arrived at Ratisbon, they would have had the game in their own hands. Divided leadership, and excessive respect for the counsels of Martin Luther to avoid aggressive warfare, and “let the word of God take care of itself”, were doubtless chiefly responsible for their mistakes; in any case it is certain that the Emperor took advantage of them in masterly fashion. It was on August 28 that the opposing forces first came into contact, on the plain before Ingolstadt; but the ensuing engagement was limited to a half-hearted cannonade; the Lutherans did not venture a vigorous attack. During the following week they had recourse to abusive letters. On the thirtieth they declared that “the Antichrist at Rome... had issued a decree that all the wells, fountains, and other bodies of stagnant water in Germany should be poisoned, in order that by the joint malice of Emperor, Pope, and Devil, the slaughter of man and beast may be accomplished”. On September 2, they wrote Charles that “under pretense of obedience to God’s word, and the Christian religion, he had forgotten his vows made to God, his Lord and Creator, at his baptism, and violated his oath to the whole German nation”; this letter, says the Lutheran, Sastrow, “was not written by man, but by Lucifer himself, with the characters of hell; it cost the German nation tons of gold, the lives of many thousands of its citizens, and the shame and dishonor of multitudes of women and girls, all of which might have been avoided had the letter remained unwritten; they challenged the Emperor’s authority with it and then ran away”. It was on September 4 that the Lutheran retreat began. Its object, in so far as it had any at all, was to cut off Buren’s detachment, which was advancing from the west, but even in this it was unsuccessful. On September 15 the Netherlands arrived safely at the Emperor’s camp before Ingolstadt and brought the total of the Imperial forces to more than 60,000 men. But not even yet did Charles venture to take the offensive. Alva’s policy of inactivity had more than justified itself in the past. The season was getting late. If the enemy did not force him to a pitched battle, he was only too glad to let things remain in statu quo. And so the next two weeks were spent in doing nothing, on the upper Danube, between Ulm and Giengen; there was not even a skirmish between the hostile forces. The cold German autumn played havoc with Charles’s Italian levies; there was much disease, and many desertions. The Spaniards were better off, but made trouble about their pay. The case of the Lutherans was even worse. Their treasury was empty; subsidies that had been promised from France and the South German towns did not arrive; and when, in early November, news came that Charles’s brother Ferdinand and Duke Maurice of Albertine Saxony had entered upon the conquest of the Ernestine lands (which had been formally transferred to the latter by the Emperor on October 27), it was the signal for the scattering of the Schmalkaldic forces to the four winds of heaven. The municipal levies departed one by one; Philip, the landgrave of Hesse, retired “to his two wives”; and the Elector, John Frederick of Saxony, too late to recover his territories before winter set in, consoled himself by plundering the defenseless dependencies of the Empire.

In the following spring all eyes were turned on Saxony, for John Frederick had managed to collect a considerable force during the winter months, and obviously proposed to use it for the recovery of the electoral lands. The Emperor had not originally intended to take the field himself but had sent to Maurice a reinforcement of 7000 men, under Albert Alcibiades of Brandenburg-Culmbach. These troops, however, were surprised and defeated by the elector on March 2 at Rochlitz, and it soon became clear that Charles would have to come in person to save the situation. His forces were now much smaller than they had been in the previous year. The papal levies had been recalled. Many of the Germans and Netherlands had gone home. When, on April 13, Charles crossed the Saxon frontier with Ferdinand and Maurice, his army numbered only about 25,000 men. Alva was chief in command under the Emperor, and the proportion of Spanish troops was much larger than before. In the early
morning of April 24 the imperialist forces reached the Elbe opposite Mühlberg, where John Frederick, after listening to a sermon, was eating a lazy breakfast. He had carefully destroyed the bridge across the river and felt sure that it would be impossible for the Emperor to attack him. But Charles and Alva knew how to force the fighting at the proper time, as well as how to rest, when expedient, upon the defensive. Descrying a bridge of boats which was attached to the opposite bank, they ordered a dozen Spanish soldiers to swim across the river with their swords in their mouths, cut down the guard, capture the bridge, and set it in place; and this was done. The discovery of a ford made the operation of crossing even simpler, and the corpulent elector’s unaccountable failure to defend his strong position on the higher bank showed Charles and Alva that victory was within their grasp. The ensuing battle degenerated into a sort of running skirmish, in which the imperialists lost only about 50 men, and the enemy over 2500, with the whole of his artillery and baggage train. John Frederick himself fought bravely, but was finally captured, and brought before the Emperor with his face streaming blood from a sword-cut in his cheek. Charles characterized his victory in the apposite words, “I came, I saw, God conquered.”

The story of the use Charles made of his triumphs in the Empire lies for the most part outside the scope of the present volume; its main lines, moreover, are well known, and need not be repeated here. Titian’s two greatest portraits of him give a pretty clear inkling of what was passing through his mind at the time; the pale, set face, furrowed with care, and plainly revealing the beginnings of decaying health, expresses a stern resolve to keep the mastery of Western Europe in the hands of the house of Hapsburg. His treatment of the captive elector and landgrave was ungenerous, if not positively dishonorable. The constitutional reforms which he sought to put through in the Diet which met at Augsburg on September 1, 1547, ran counter to all the main tendencies of German history for the previous three centuries, and afford convincing proof of his incorrigible lack of sympathy with his Teutonic subjects. As for his provisional settlement of the religious question—the Interim, which, on June 30, 1548, became a law of the Empire by a recess of the Diet—it was a Catholic settlement with certain notable concessions to Protestantism, made inevitable, on the one hand, by Charles’s zeal for the faith, and, on the other, by the fact that despite the treaty of June, 1546, he was now once more at odds with Paul III. To a brief account of the origin and progress of that quarrel we must now devote ourselves. Its ramifications are very wide, and they ultimately led Charles to put forward an entirely new dynastic plan, which threatened powerfully to affect the development of the Spanish Empire.

Profound distrust is plainly evident in every communication between Emperor and pontiff, from the middle of the summer of 1546. Charles had many grounds for suspicion of the Pope. Paul had been far too neutral to suit his taste during his recent war with the king of France; moreover, the Emperor had grave doubts about the papal attitude on the question of ecclesiastical reform. Paul, on his part, feared to see Charles too strong. Might he not use his victory over the Lutherans, not so much for the benefit of Rome, as for the further extension of the power of the house of Hapsburg? Might he not win for himself such a position as would reduce the papal authority to a cipher? The first open evidences of the approaching breach were the order (January, 1547) withdrawing the papal contingents which had reached Germany in the previous August, and the stormy scene in which Verallo, the papal nuncio, announced their recall to Charles. The next was the decision of the Council of Trent, in the following March, against the Emperor’s wish, to transfer its sittings to Bologna. This transference was made possible by the votes of the Italian prelates, who were of course in the majority; and Charles was not slow to attribute their attitude to the influence of the Pope, who desired to have the council more closely under his own supervision, and further removed from possible interference by the Emperor. But fourteen Spanish and Sicilian bishops, at Charles’s command, continued their sittings at Trent, and refused to recognize the validity of the sessions at Bologna; apparently the Spanish church was national and loyal to its king, rather than Roman and obedient to the Pope. The episode may well have had its effect on Charles, and reminded him, in the midst of all his German and imperial preoccupations, how largely, for his real power, he was dependent upon Spain.

Meantime grave news was coming in from Italy, also plainly foreshadowing a papal-imperial quarrel. The death of the Duke of Orleans (September 8, 1545) destroyed the last hope that Charles’s enemies may have cherished of keeping Milan out of Spanish hands; and the appointment, in the following April, of Ferrante Gonzaga as viceroy there showed that Spanish interests in Lombardy were not only to be vigorously pressed, but pressed, if need be, in opposition to those of the Pope; for Gonzaga was a bitter enemy of the Farnese, and was known to have cast longing eyes on Parma and Piacenza. Clearly the Spanish supremacy weighed more heavily on Italy than ever before, and Paul, as head of the church, and also as an Italian potentate, felt himself hemmed in on every side. A series of
revolts against Charles’s allies and representatives in Italy broke out during the years 1545-47, and though positive proof is not in every case forthcoming, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that they were all, directly or indirectly, inspired by the Pope. First came a rising in Siena against the imperial commissioner Juan de Luna. The rebels put themselves under the protection of the Pope; the Spanish garrison was expelled, and the intervention of Cosimo de’ Medici and of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza was necessary before it was readmitted and order restored. In January, 1547, occurred the famous attempt of the Fieschi against the Dorias in Genoa. A slipping plank was the conspirators’ undoing, but the fact that they had been permitted to purchase four papal galleys to aid them in their attempt showed plainly enough what the pontiff’s attitude was. Had the plot succeeded, it would have been a terrible blow to Charles. Hot on the heels of this (May, 1547) came news of a rebellion in Naples, which it took all the skill and courage of the vicerey to put down. The ostensible cause of the revolt was the appearance of a papal commissary with a brief, which opened an old sore by hinting at the establishment of the Inquisition in the kingdom; but it was generally believed that Paul had taken this measure merely as a means of stirring up trouble for the Emperor, and that his real object was to tie the hands of the Hapsburg. Charles, urged on by Gonzaga, was in no mood to tolerate such machinations as these; and in September, 1547, he showed his real feelings by tacitly consenting to the murder, through the instrumentality of Gonzaga, of the papal bastard, Pier Luigi Farnese, and by the subsequent annexation of Parma to the duchy of Milan.

Both in Germany and in Italy, then, both in religion and politics, the opening months of the year 1548 found the temporal and spiritual heads of Western Christendom in deepest jealousy and suspicion of one another. Charles knew that Paul was eagerly seeking for allies in his schemes for retaining his rival within bounds. Fear of Hapsburg power might keep them from immediately declaring themselves, but it was evident that the Emperor was surrounded by potential foes. Some means of concentrating his resources and solidifying his authority must clearly be found. Had he been a less devoted Catholic, had it not even been, perhaps, for his maternal inheritance, he might have sought to find the way out of his difficulties along the lines which Napoleon Bonaparte, two and a half centuries later, declared he should have followed; he might have turned Protestant, defied the Pope, and sought to conquer Europe at the head of a unified Germany. But under the circumstances as they actually existed, such a policy would have been impracticable. Even if we assume, what is by no means certain, that there was sufficient popular enthusiasm for Lutheranism in the Empire to have made it possible for Charles, as its champion, to overcome the established forces of particularism and disunion; even if we leave out of account his own religious inheritance; it was impossible for a Spanish king to be a heretic. Spain, as he was learning more and more surely every day, was, far more than Germany, the real source of his power. Spain, ever since the revolt of the Comuneros, had stood loyalty by him, in fair weather and foul. Spanish soldiers and Spanish gold had been in large measure responsible for his victory over the Lutherans. Spanish bishops had stayed on at Trent, and in spite of their orthodoxy had supported him against the Pope. If a conflict with Rome was to be fought, it would be far better, from every point of view, to lean on the support of that part of his dominions which was “plus catholique que le pape”, than to imperil his reputation and tempt Providence by making common cause with a lot of German heretics. Everything that had happened since the peace of Crespy had served to make Charles yearn for Spain and for Spanish help; it was to Spain that he was to turn in the present crisis.

His son Philip was by this time twenty-one years old. In May, 1543, he had married his first cousin, the Infanta Maria of Portugal, partly as a means of continuing the traditional Castilian policy of strengthening all ties with the Lusitanian kingdom, partly because the Emperor was in desperate need of funds, and Portuguese dowries were gratefullyly large; but in July, 1545, the princess died in giving birth to a son, the unfortunate Don Carlos, so that Philip was left a widower at the age of eighteen. The prince had already had some experience in ruling; for Charles had entrusted him with the regency of his Spanish realms, when he departed for the Empire and the Netherlands in 1543. Philip had unbounded respect for his father; their correspondence is full of expressions of confidence and affection; the Emperor knew that he had a son after his own heart. During all the difficulties and vicissitudes of the next few years he longed increasingly for Philip’s companionship; and it may well have been the situation which developed in Milan after the death of the Duke of Orleans in September, 1545, that first suggested to Charles the idea of trying to win for Philip the succession in the Empire. Though Philip had been nominally duke of Milan since October, 1540, the duchy was still reckoned as a fief of the Empire, and all its traditions were imperial, not Spanish. Philip’s hold on it would be immensely strengthened if he could win the imperial crown, and the scattered territories of the house of Hapsburg would be bound together more closely than ever before. But what would be the attitude towards this scheme of Charles’s brother and German representative, Ferdinand? In 1531 Ferdinand had been permitted to assume the title of King of the Romans, together with the claims to the imperial succession which that dignity
implied; since that time it had been generally understood that Ferdinand would follow Charles, and that Ferdinand’s son Maximilian would be elected to succeed him. Could Ferdinand be expected to acquiesce in any change in these arrangements?

It seems clear that the two brothers discussed the question at Ratisbon in the summer of 1546, in connection with a proposal of Charles to render the Empire hereditary in the House of Hapsburg. Ferdinand was of opinion that the most that would be possible would be to bind the electors for two or three elections to come, and then let things go back to the old established footing. For the time being the matter was dropped, but the events of the next twelve months made the Emperor more anxious than ever to put the project through, and at the Diet of Augsburg in the summer of 1548 it was taken up again. This time it was agreed that Philip should leave Spain and come to meet his father in the Empire; while his cousin Maximilian, Ferdinand’s son, who was soon to go to Spain to marry the Emperor’s daughter Mary, should remain there with his bride as regent in the Iberian kingdoms. It is worth noting that in the famous paper of instructions which the Emperor dispatched to Philip from Augsburg on January 18, 1548, there is not the slightest hint of the project under discussion. It is by no means certain that Charles had yet definitely decided to carry it out; in any case he was keeping his plan to himself.

In October, 1548, the Infante sailed from Rosas, for Genoa, and proceeded, in leisurely fashion, via Milan, Tyrol, Munich, and Heidelberg, to Brussels, where he joined his father in April, 1549. He made every attempt to please his future subjects in each of the different countries through which he passed, and during the tour of inspection on which he was sent in the Low Countries. Contemporaries differ widely in their estimates of the measure of success that attended these efforts; but in general it seems probable that the well-known formula, that he pleased the Italians little, displeased the Flemings, and made the Germans hate him, is not far from the truth. Linguistic limitations were the beginning of his difficulties. He would speak nothing but Spanish; it was a curious reversal of the situation that had obtained when his father had made his first journey into Spain. His haughtiness and reserve were another fertile source of trouble, at least with the Flemings and the Germans. If he consented to drink beer with them, he always made a very face over it, and nothing whatever would induce him to get drunk. There was also a very general impression that he lacked manliness and courage; there are different stories of the way in which he handled himself in tournaments, but most men were convinced that he had no stomach for a fight. Certainly his hosts were by no means pleasing to him; nothing but his sense of duty and respect for his father kept him from taking the first ship back to Spain. Probably the only really happy hours of that period of his life were those which he daily spent in the company of those he had left at court, and from which he derived such complete satisfaction that he had no wish to see indefinitely perpetuated the situation that had existed under the Emperor.

In June, 1550, Charles and Philip left the Netherlands for Germany. On July 8, accompanied by the King of the Romans, they entered Augsburg, where the Diet had been summoned to meet them. The complex of affairs had been considerably altered since Charles’s last sojourn in Germany, chiefly owing to the death (November 10, 1549) of Pope Paul III, and the election in the following February of the much more complaisant Julius III; the arch-disturber of the Emperor’s plans was gone. Charles, however, had now proceeded too far with his scheme of altering the succession in the Empire to be willing to draw back from it; the papal policy might, and indeed in all probability would, soon veer around again; and so, in the autumn, a Hapsburg family council was called to consider the question.

Mary of Hungary was summoned from the Netherlands; she had been won over to support the views of Charles, who counted on her well-known ability to influence her brother Ferdinand. Ferdinand, in turn, insisted that Maximilian should also be sent for from Spain; and though Charles had no wish for him to be present, the demand was so clearly just that it was impossible for him to refuse. The family deliberations were often interrupted by the Emperor’s gout, by the business of the Diet, by the disturbances in the Empire, by the news of the Turkish war, and by the tension in the Netherlands over the introduction of the Spanish Inquisition—Mary of Hungary had to return thither on this account less than three weeks after her arrival in Augsburg, and did not get back until the following January—but finally, in November, the question of the succession was vigorously taken up. The relations of Charles and Ferdinand had grown less and less cordial during the preceding months. To the natural distrust engendered by Charles’s plans for putting Philip on the imperial throne were now added other grievances. There were violent quarrels over the use of the funds which had been granted by the Diet. Ferdinand wanted to employ them for the defense of his Danubian lands against the Turk, whilst Charles insisted that they be spent on the reduction of Magdeburg. Ferdinand even went so far as to declare that he was bound rather to his honor than to Charles, and that he demanded his money for the defense of Hungary with the clearer conscience because Charles had stirred up the Sultan to wrath by
the capture of Monastir and El Mehedia; never had men seen the two brothers so angry with each other before. Only the influence of their sister Mary prevented an open breach, and it did not seem as if even that could bring them to any sort of an agreement when, on February 14, 1551, the Diet was formally closed. In the next few weeks, however, the situation cleared up. Almost no details of the discussions have been preserved to us, but finally, on March 9, a formal agreement was signed between Ferdinand and Philip to the effect that as soon as Ferdinand, after Charles’s death, should be crowned Holy Roman Emperor, he would see to it that Philip was elected King of the Romans, and that Philip, in his turn, would do likewise for Maximilian. A number of other minor stipulations provided for the most intimate cooperation between the two branches of the house of Hapsburg, and especially for the hearty support of Ferdinand to the Spanish hegemony in Italy; ostensibly, at least, the Emperor had gained his point, and yet preserved peace with his brother. In May Maximilian accompanied Philip back to Spain, where the latter once more assumed the regency; while the former, who was quite as unsympathetic with things Iberian as his cousin was with things Teutonic, made haste to gather up his wife and children and bring them back into the Empire.

Surprise has often been expressed that the Emperor should have been so blind to the dangers with which he was surrounded in the summer and autumn of 1551, that he made no adequate preparations to meet the catastrophe that was to overwhelm him in the following year. For the first and only time in his life he was guilty of overconfidence. The most probable explanation of his mistake is the fact that he had been so absorbed, ever since the peace of Crespy, in German and in papal affairs that his grasp of international conditions had temporarily deserted him. In the Empire and at Rome, the outlook was far brighter than it had been after his victory at Muhlenberg four years before. He had rammed the Interim down the throats of the Lutherans; there was, of course, still grumbling and resistance, but Charles had successfully encountered that sort of thing before, and was confident of his ability to do so again. He had succeeded in winning his brother’s consent to an arrangement which he believed would secure a larger measure of cooperation between the German and Spanish branches of his dynasty than he had previously dared to hope for; the power and prestige, both military and financial, of his Iberian dominions would thenceforth be available to support the house of Hapsburg in the Empire. The papacy was far less ominous. Julius III was neither so able nor so cantankerous as his predecessor; and in May the fathers had reassembled at Trent. The real source of danger was France. Henry II had made peace with England. He was in league with Dragut. He was supporting Charles’s enemies in Parma, and on September 26, 1551, he actually declared war. But the season was so far advanced that he was not able to accomplish much. Charles was assured by his sister Mary that in the Netherlands she would be able to take care of herself. It was in Germany, as she repeatedly warned him, with the possibilities of an alliance between Henry and the Protestant princes, that the real peril lay. But Charles refused to listen to her. He knew that the French king was a far more ardent Catholic than his father had been before him. He could not believe that he would combine with heretics. A little more forcing the pace, he was now convinced, would settle the fate of the remnant of the rebels. When he was finished with them, it would be time to turn on the French. The sequel was to show that his calculations were wrong; but it is not altogether surprising that he made the mistake.

His treatment of the captive elector and landgrave evoked much hostile comment. Men felt that such honorable foes should have been restored to liberty; and that their continued detention was an insult to the German nation. His enforcement of the Interim made him many enemies; he stopped at no measures, however brutal, that would enable him to accomplish his end. But if he had used German methods and German soldiers to effect these objects, it is not impossible that he might have weathered the storm. The fundamental cause of the revolt that overthrew him was the growing conviction that he was sacrificing German liberties in the interests of Spain. His Spanish veterans were an eyesore to all men; they were not very numerous, but they were scattered through the country in such fashion that they seemed to be everywhere, and created the impression that Germany was a conquered land. Certain contemporary remarks deserve quotation in this connection. “Germans have become so tame”, remarked an imperial councilor, “that they will all yet learn Spanish”. “Spanish troops”, declared another, “shall teach the German cities the Catholic truth”. “Spaniards”, wrote Roger Ascham from the imperial court, “had now in their hands the seal of the Empire, and in their swing the doing of all things, and at their commandment all such men’s voices as were to be called the imperial diets; compelling the Germans in their own country to use strange tongues for their private suits, wherein they could say nothing at all, or nothing to the purpose; using camera imperialist at Spires for a common key to open all men’s coffers when they listed”. The younger Granvelle, who had succeeded his father in the autumn of 1550, showed a true appreciation of the real state of affairs when he told Charles, on September 1, 1551, that he “could not remain safely in Germany after the Spaniards had gone,” and the Emperor enclosed this opinion in a letter to his sister Mary, written two and a half weeks later, in which
he pointed out the difficulty of deciding whither he should go next. And if the presence and conduct of
the Spanish soldiers was a sign which everyone could read, there were other even more ominous
portents for those who were in a position to know all the facts. The electors were furious when they
heard of the family compact. When Ferdinand asked for their support of it, they indignantly refused to
let the Spaniards “lead them like cattle by the nose”. The Diet accepted, but certainly disliked, the new
arrangement which Charles, in 1548, for purposes purely dynastic, had made for the Low Countries.
They were erected into a circle of the Empire simply and solely that they might enjoy imperial
protection in case of war. Of German control they were made completely independent; they became a
hereditary dominion of the house of Hapsburg, transmissible even to female heirs. It was only too
evident that they were destined for Spain and for Philip; the Hispanicizing of their government, which
had begun in 1522, was now rapidly approaching completion. On every hand it was the same story.
Charles’s growing dislike of Germans and things German, and his increasing affection for Spain and for
Philip, were leading him on to a rearrangement of his family possessions which promised ultimately to
merge the Holy Roman in the Spanish Empire.

The blow that was to hurl the Emperor from his high place fell like a thunderbolt in the spring of
1552. Maurice of Saxony was the king-pin of the combination that delivered it; Charles had been
warned of his machinations as early as November, 1550, but refused until too late to pay any heed. The
Princes’ League, on whose support Maurice depended, was gradually and securely formed in late 1550
and in 1551; but the success of the rebels was by no means assured until their acquisition, by the treaties
of Chambord and Friedewald, in September, 1551, and January, 1552, of the support of the king of
France. It was the first real test of the policy of alliances with foreign Protestants for the preservation of
the balance of power, which in all the important international crises of the next hundred years was to
prove the salvation of France, and the undoing of the house of Hapsburg; it was the policy of Richelieu
and of Mazarin in the Thirty Years’ War. Charles was at Innsbruck when his foes, who had massed their
forces in Lorraine and in Franconia, were finally in a position to strike. For a moment the Emperor
thought of escaping to the Netherlands, but the way was barred; in the latter half of May, as the sole
means of eluding the troops of Maurice, he fled over the Brenner, in a storm of sleet and snow, and
found safety at last in the little Carinthian town of Villach. All the work that he had accomplished since
the battle of Muhlberg was now undone. His plans for winning the imperial crown for Philip were
shattered forever; and though, with characteristic obstinacy, he refused to recognize it, there was no
longer the remotest chance of reestablishing Roman Catholicism as the sole religion in the Empire.
Lutheranism, from thenceforth, was bound to receive some form of legal recognition.

Bitter indeed must have been Charles’s thoughts during those weeks of retreat in the Tyrolese
mountains. He had been just on the verge of an overwhelming triumph; then fortune had deserted him,
and he had been reduced to impotence. Doubtless he was sorely tempted to get rid of Germany at once;
never had it seemed so inhospitable and unattractive; never had Charles so longed for Philip and for
Spain. Yet it was contrary to his nature to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune without a
return blow. To Ferdinand, under suitable guidance, he left the temporary settlement of internal affairs
at the conference of Passau; but as soon as the treaty signed there had set him free, the Emperor hurried
back across Southern Germany to seek satisfaction at the hands of the French, in whom he now
recognized the chief source of his misfortunes. The news of the doings of Henry II in Italy1 may well
have stimulated his desire for revenge; the blow that had fallen on the Hapsburgs in the Empire must
not be suffered to be followed by another against their dominions across the Alps. “Necessity”, so he
wrote to his sister Mary on November 13, “knows no law”, by way of justification of his unholy
alliance with the wild marauder, Albert Alciabides, who joined him with 18,000 good troops in return
for the imperial ratification of his plunderings of the bishoprics of Wurzburg and Bamberg. The
Emperor’s objective was the city of Metz, which the French had occupied and fortified six months
before. In the end of October he sat down before it with what a contempo-
rary calls “the biggest army he ever collected at his own expense”, possibly as many as 75,000 men. For two long months the siege
continued. Never in his whole career had the Emperor shown more dogged persistence. Despite his deep
discouragement, and bodily ills; despite horrible weather, and the more than usually bitter quarrels
between the different elements of which his motley forces were composed, he kept his soldiers steadily
at their task. But Alva was fatally hesitant at the critical moments. The German commanders were
openly scornful of his generalship. The duke of Guise met every move of the attacking forces with
consummate skill, and finally, on the first day of the year 1553, the Emperor raised the siege and
departed for the Netherlands. Had he been successful at Metz, he might well have returned to the
Empire and made one last desperate effort to regain all that he had lost in 1552. The fires of ambition—
at least of dynastic ambition—were not yet quenched within him, though his physical condition made
all activity a torture. But his failure in the great siege, on which the eyes of all Europe were directed,
that kingdom, as well out of natural feeling as because of the advantages mentioned by your Majesty.

Philip's answer, dated August 22, reached Brussels on September 11. "The Portuguese busi

plot against the Princess [Mary] and feels confident that he will prevail

"He spent long hours sunk in thought and then wept like a child; no one dared offer him any consolation.

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John Scheyfve, the very mediocre imperial ambassador in London, was slow to realize the true state of affairs. Not till June 11 did he report to the Emperor that "the Duke has formed some mighty plot against the Princess [Mary] and feels confident that he will prevail". During the early months of the year Charles's mental and physical state had been so bad that his ordinary activities were suspended. "He spent long hours sunk in thought and then wept like a child; no one dared offer him any consolation or had enough authority to dispel his dark imaginings so injurious to his health." To ambassadors he gave audiences "that lasted about as long as it takes one to recite the creed"; his single care and occupation, day and night, was "to set his clocks and keep them going together; he has many, and they are his chief thought, with another new sort of clock he has invented and ordered to be set up in the frame of a window. As he cannot sleep by night, he often summons his servants, assistants, and others, and orders them to light torches and help him to take some of his clocks to pieces and set them together again." But the news of the prospective disinheri

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Henceforth he would devote all his energies to strengthening and consolidating them, and to seeking for some means of compensating his beloved Philip for the failure of his plan of getting him the succession in the Empire.

Under the circumstances it was natural that the Emperor's attention, during the spring and summer of 1553, should be chiefly directed to the state of affairs in England. The 'good duke' of Somerset had perished on Tower Hill on January 22, 1552; the next twelve months had seen the triumph of the policy of the odious Northumberland; ultra-Protestant reforms, spoliation of the church, truckling to France, were the order of the day. But the health of the boy king Edward was beginning to fail. In the spring he had been attacked by measles and small pox; in January, 1553, he developed a chill, and shortly afterwards showed signs of consumption. Northumberland did not realize the true state of affairs until the end of March; but as soon as it had become evident to him that the king could not survive, he bent all his energies to altering the order of succession established by the will of Henry VIII, depriving the princesses Mary and Elizabeth of their just rights, and ultimately transferring the crown of England from the Tudors to the Dudleys, by the marriage of his son Guildford to the ill-fated Lady Jane Grey. The ceremony was performed on Whitsunday, May 21; precisely one month later, the instrument altering the succession received its final signatures.

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where France and the Low Countries are concerned. It is certain that if she suggested a match between herself and your Majesty, and your Majesty was disposed, it would be the very best thing possible. But as your Majesty feels as you say about the question, and if you wish to arrange the match for me, you know that I am so obedient a son that I have no will other than yours, especially in a matter of such high import. Therefore I think best to leave it all to your Majesty, to dispose as shall seem most fitting."

The phraseology of these letters is particularly significant as an indication of the fact that it was more even of the Low Countries than of Spain itself that the Emperor was thinking at the time that he first broached the question of the marriage of Philip and Mary. He was one of the first statesmen to appreciate how closely the political as well as the commercial interests of England and the Netherlands were interwoven, and how indispensable was each to the safety of the other. His reasoning was the counterpart of that of Lord Burleigh when he averred, under Queen Elizabeth, that "the Netherlands were England’s strongest bulwark"; it had its echo in the action of the British government when Germany invaded Belgium in 1914. Charles had already resolved to leave the Netherlands to his son, and definitely to incorporate them into the Spanish Empire; but the recent evidences of the hostility of Henry II had shown him how infinitely difficult it was going to be for Philip to retain them in the face of the opposition of France. Even two years before, when his prospects had been far brighter, it had been the prevailing opinion that the Low Countries could not be regarded as really safe unless an important English seaport could somehow be acquired, so as to protect the sea route between Flanders and Spain. There had even been talk at the time of sending an expeditionary force against England for that purpose. But now Charles had been defeated in the Empire; moreover, the French king, after the raising of the siege of Metz, had shifted the scene of operations to the Netherlands frontier. So immediate, in fact, was the danger, that in April Charles had written Philip that unless he could soon arrive in Flanders with plenty of funds to save the situation, there was a serious chance of the Low Countries being lost. The Spanish domination there was obviously unpopular. Men spoke longingly of the cheerful and jovial disposition, affable demeanor, and linguistic talents of Ferdinand’s son Maximilian, and compared them with the sinister and taciturn ways of the Spanish ruler, who knew “neither Latin, French, nor Flemish, the native languages of the States.” Clearly the maintenance of Spain and the Netherlands in a single hand was going to prove even harder than Charles had originally thought, and the Emperor knew, if any one did, the difficulties inherent in the possession of scattered states. Then suddenly came the possibility of solving these thorny problems by a single stroke—not the difficult acquisition of a mere channel port by the hazards of war, but the absorption of nothing less than the whole of England, by the easy and traditional Hapsburg method of marriage. The intimate commercial ties that bound England and the Low Countries were but an added argument in favor of the new plan; in the reign of Henry VIII an imperial ambassador is said to have calculated that no less than half the population of England depended, directly or indirectly, for subsistence, upon the wool market of the Netherlands. It was an entrancing prospect that had suddenly opened; enough to atone for the miseries of 1552, enough to awaken the old Emperor from his lethargy, and make him announce to Philip that “God be praised, I am well.” He even allowed himself, in the latter part of November, some fleeting thoughts as to ultimate results. If children should be born to Philip and Mary, “it would be possible to give them England and the Low Countries, leaving the Spanish dominions, the Italian states, and the adjacent islands, to the son of the first marriage [i.e. Don Carlos]. This would protect both countries and drive the French from the Ocean, which would be the best possible means of encouraging commerce, the foundation of the Low Countries' prosperity, and hold the French perpetually in check ... Even if there were no children, the marriage would serve, as long as it lasted, to enable the Low Countries to send through England to Spain for help as often as need might arise. It would bridle the French, and it might be possible not only to hold out against them, but also to use the alliance to make them see reason.” It is interesting to see how the Emperor’s dynastic ambitions leaped into flame at a crisis like this. Not even his love for Spain was proof against them. If his dearest hopes were realized and the English marriage was put through and proved fruitful, he would abandon his original plan of giving the Low Countries to Spain, in favor of the creation of a ring of Hapsburg states that would ultimately encircle and paralyze the hereditary enemy, France. His dream, at the moment, was rather of Hapsburg supremacy than of Spanish Empire.

There remained the all-important question as to how Mary and England would regard Charles’s schemes for a Spanish marriage. In view of the violent oscillations of English history since the death of Henry VIII, the Emperor was quite alive to the importance of going slowly. On July 29, when Renard and his colleagues had their first audience with the new queen, the conversation turned chiefly on the question of religion and the advisability of extreme caution in restoring the ancient faith. The question of Mary’s marriage was in everybody’s mind; but when it was broached, in general terms, the queen declared that she never thought of wedding before she came to the throne, that “as a private individual
she would never have desired the Emperor to propose the match to the principal lords and the quotation is taken from a paper members of the Council of State.” “A Proposal to be made by it, but preferred to end her days in chastity”, and that the Emperor would remember that she was thirty-seven years of age”. She realized, however, that now that she occupied a public position, the situation had changed, and she would submit herself to the Emperor’s decision as to her marriage and all other matters, since he was willing to take the trouble to advise her’. During the next three months there was much talk and correspondence, but no definite decision. Renard had to get rid of his colleagues, whose jealousy had made them a hindrance to his plans; the question of rival candidates—both English and foreign—for the queen’s hand, had to be disposed of; the opposition of certain prominent councilors, and the intrigues of the French ambassador, Antoine de Noailles, had to be met and overcome. But the candidacy of Philip loomed larger every day, and in mid-September Renard received from Granvelle the definite news that the prince had given his consent. Finally, on Sunday evening, October 29, the queen sent for the imperial ambassador. After having invoked the holy sacrament, as her protector, guide, and counsellor, she knelt and with her visitor and her lady in waiting repeated the Veni creator Spiritus. She then gave Renard her promise to marry his Highness ... and her mind, once made up, would never change, but she would love him perfectly and never give him cause to be jealous ... Sire, continues the ambassador’s report, the joy this declaration gave me was such as your Majesty may imagine, and if she had invoked the Holy Ghost, I had invoked the Trinity to inspire her with the desired answer”.

That simple scene portended much. It showed what the events of the succeeding years were conclusively to prove, that though Charles and Mary had agreed upon the course to be pursued, they had been impelled to their decision by very different motives. Political and dynastic reasons, as we have already seen, had led the Emperor to propose the match. He wanted to protect his native land, and ardently longed to be avenged upon the French. That the marriage would also redound to the advantage of Catholicism was all to the good, but that was distinctly a secondary consideration; his advice to Mary about her religious policy is conclusive proof of this. For the queen, on the other hand, religious considerations were of primary importance. Her whole soul longed to bring England back to the Roman fold; and the real reason why she accepted Philip was because she doubted her ability to do it without the aid and support of Spain. She has rightly been characterized as the “most honest of Tudor rulers”; when she told Renard that as a private individual she had not desired matrimony, she spoke the literal truth. It was “conscience, not inclination, that impelled her to wed”. With the Emperor’s dynastic plans she was certainly sympathetic, but chiefly as a means to her own most desired ends. This divergence of objects was ominous for the future; as matters ultimately developed, it was to prove fatal. And the situation was still further complicated by the attitude of the English nation. Despite the enthusiasm with which Mary’s accession had been hailed, it is not certain that the majority of Englishmen approved of the restoration of Catholicism, even as it had been at the end of the reign of Henry VIII; as for the possible bringing back of the Roman jurisdiction, the Venetian ambassador, Barbara, had reported in 1551, that the detestation of the Pope was now so confirmed that no one, either of the old or new religion, could bear to hear him mentioned, and there is no reason to believe that the situation was very different in 1553. To the Spanish marriage, and the Spanish domination which it would necessarily imply, there could be no question that the nation was bitterly opposed; and when men discovered the purposes for which Philip intended to use them, their opposition was to become more bitter still. The Tudors had inspired England with their enthusiasm for independence—for the elimination of foreign interference in national affairs; the idea of being dragged at the tail of the Hapsburg kite was intolerable.

Not only, then, were the objects of the two parties in the Spanish marriage divergent; but England, without whose support neither one could be attained, was fundamentally hostile to both. As in Germany, Charles’s projects were confronted with the bitterest national opposition.

But the Emperor once more had the bit in his teeth and did not care. Military successes against his French foes—the captures in June and in July of Thérouanne and Hesdin, and the successful defense in September of Cambray—had further encouraged him; if he could only put through this English marriage, he felt that he could retire and end his days in peace. “At all costs”, so he wrote to Renard on November 28, “it is our desire ... that England and the Netherlands be paired off together, in order to afford one another mutual aid against their enemies”; if concessions to English policy were necessary to accomplish this end, they were to be made without the slightest hesitation. And so it came about that the marriage treaty, which was practically settled in the month of December, was arranged in such fashion as to relieve the worst of English fears. The sturdy patriotism of Stephen Gardiner, who conducted the negotiations in London, doubtless counted for much, but it was the Emperor’s complaisance that made possible the final issue. Philip was to be rather a prince consort than a king. He was strictly to observe the rights and privileges of all classes, and foreigners were to be excluded from office. He was to have no claims on English ships, guns, or treasure for his foreign wars, and to do his best to maintain peace
between England and France. If Mary should die childless, his connection with England should be at an end. If there were issue of the marriage, that issue should inherit, as the Emperor had planned, the Low Countries and Franche Comté, as well as England, while the rest of the Spanish dominions should go to Don Carlos. In case Don Carlos should die without heirs, the child of Philip and Mary should inherit the Spanish Empire. Small wonder that the Spaniards murmured loudly against the alliance, and protested that it amounted to disinherit ing the Infante. Whether all these stipulations would have been rigidly carried out if Mary had borne Philip the much desired heir may well be doubted; but the fact that the Emperor consented to their insertion shows how important he deemed it to make certain of the English alliance in view of the situation in 1553.

It was over six months more, however, before the wedding could take place. In the latter part of January, 1554, several weeks after the Count of Egmont and other gentlemen had arrived in London to do the formal wooing, a striking demonstration of the unpopularity of the queen’s policy was afforded by the famous rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyatt. It was aided and abetted by the French ambassador Noailles, and narrowly missed complete success. Even after it had been put down, and the ensuing executions had duly taken place, the people manifested their detestation of Spain and of Catholicism in no uncertain terms. “A dead cat, having a cloth like a vestment of the priest at Mass, with a cross on it afore and another behind put on it; the crown of the cat shorn, a piece of paper like a singing cake put between the forefeet of the said cat, bound together, ... was hanged on the post of the gallows in Cheap, beyond the Cross, in the parish of St. Matthews, and a bottle hanged by it ... The Lord Mayor and his brethren, the aldermen of the city of London, caused a proclamation to be made that afternoon, that whosoever could utter or show the author of the said fact should have £6, 13 sh. 4 d. for his pains, and a better reward with hearty thanks. But at that time after much enquiry and search made, it could not be known, but divers persons were had to prison for suspicions of it.” 1 Small wonder if Philip hesitated to come to England as long as men’s minds were in such an excited state. He found, moreover, much, in Spain to delay him. There was the difficult question of providing for a regency, which it was finally decided to entrust to his sister Joanna; but the death of her husband, the prince of Portugal, and the birth of her son, the ill-starred Sebastian, made it impossible for her to reach Valladolid till after Philip left it. Not till the fourth of May did the prince at last start northward. At Compostela, where he stopped to pay homage to Santiago, he signed the marriage contract, brought on from England by the Earl of Bedford. On Thursday, July 12, he embarked at Corunna. On the twentieth he landed at Southampton. On Monday, the twenty-third, he met his bride at Winchester, and there, two days later, they were married. The Emperor had a very interesting wedding present in readiness. In order that Philip might have the title of king, and possibly as an earnest of his own future intentions, he had conferred on Philip the investiture of the kingdom of Naples and Jerusalem.

Philip had been amply warned, before he left Spain, of the necessity of accommodating himself to foreign customs which he loathed; and he had prepared himself to undergo a martyrdom similar to that which six years before he had endured in the Netherlands and in the Empire. He kept only four Flemings and six Spaniards with him when he landed; he recommended them “to live in all respects which six years before he had endured in the Netherlands and in the Empire. Small wonder that the Spaniards murmured loudly against the alliance, and protested that it amounted to disinherit ing the Infante. Whether all these stipulations would have been rigidly carried out if Mary had borne Philip the much desired heir may well be doubted; but the fact that the Emperor consented to their insertion shows how important he deemed it to make certain of the English alliance in view of the situation in 1553.

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More serious still were the first evidences of the trouble that was bound to arise out of the divergency between the aims of the two parties to the marriage. Mary, who had accepted it chiefly as a means to enable her to bring back the Roman jurisdiction in England, had hitherto followed the Emperor’s advice and rested content with the restoration of religion to the state that it was in at the death of Henry VIII: now that she was married, she was eager to proceed with the work of reconciliation with Rome, and to admit to the realm the papal legate, her beloved Reginald Pole. With England safely entangled in the Hapsburg net, the Emperor did not feel that he had the right to interpose further delays, though he dreaded the effect of the possible restoration of the abbey lands. Assured, however, that the Pope would not insist upon this, he withdrew his last objections, and on November 20 Pole once more trod the soil of his native land. Philip, an even better Catholic than his father, bade the legate welcome; a resolution favorable to reunion was extracted from Parliament, and on November 30, the feast of St. Andrew, England was solemnly restored to the communion of the see of Rome. But the
great act with which Parliament legalized the restoration in the following December bore an ominous title: “An Act repealing all statutes, articles, and provisions against the See Apostolic of Rome since the twentieth year of King Henry the Eighth, and also for the establishment of all spiritual and ecclesiastical possessions and hereditaments conveyed to the laity.” Only on condition that they were allowed to keep the ecclesiastical spoils, would Englishmen consent to return to the Roman fold. Let the pliant Julius III be succeeded by a Pope who would not consent to that concession, and the whole fabric which Mary had reared with such pains would fall to the ground.

Meantime the development of the political and dynastic side of the marriage was such as to arouse the gravest misgivings. In September, 1554, only two months after his arrival and wedding, it was evident that Philip desired to leave England and go to help his father in the war against France. He even hoped, under the pretext of an escort, and in defiance of the marriage treaty, to be able to take with him a few thousand English troops. Renard, with a true appreciation of the ticklish state of affairs, prevailed on him, for the time being, to remain; day by day it became increasingly evident that everything depended on whether or not the queen was to have a child. Mary herself was certain that she would be confined in the latter part of April, 1555. So confident was she of the approaching event that circular letters were drawn up to announce it—the day and the month only being left blank; it was even decided that the child was to be a boy. But the appointed time passed by without result; and soon it began to be whispered that the queen had never been pregnant at all. Mary alone refused for some months longer to give up hope, and assured her attendants that she felt the child; but it gradually became more and more obvious to her physicians that she was the victim of a tragic delusion. And if no child was to be born, the major part of what Charles had hoped to gain from the English marriage would be lost. His scheme of permanently uniting the Netherlands and England, and thus gaining lasting control of both sides of the Channel, would fall to the ground. The advantages of the match, both to Spain and to the Low Countries, would last only as long as Mary’s own life; as soon as she died, the connection would be broken. A significant proof of the international effect of the news that Mary’s hopes had been disappointed was afforded in May, 1555. The war on the Netherlands frontier, which had gone well for France in the early months of the preceding year, had once more turned in favor of the imperialists; Charles himself had taken the field for the last time. Namur was successfully defended. There was an indecisive engagement at Renty, and then the French retired. If the expected child arrived, it was evident that England would be bound more closely than ever to the house of Hapsburg. The French saw the handwriting on the wall and thought it might be well to end the war while they could do so with honor; in the latter part of 1554 the Constable Montmorency asked for the mediation of England. A peace conference was accordingly opened at Marcq, in the Calais Pale, on May 23, under the presidency of Cardinal Pole; but as soon as it was known that Mary’s hopes were to be disappointed, the backs of the French plenipotentiaries stiffened. They demanded impossible terms, and before the end of July the conference broke up, having accomplished nothing.

Another heavy blow, from a most unexpected quarter, fell on the Hapsburg projects on the very day of the opening of the conference at Marcq. On March 24, Julius III, whose easy-going complaisance had proved infinitely helpful to the Emperor at all critical moments during the previous six years, had died; his successor, Marcellus II, had a pontificate of but twenty-two days; on May 23, Giovanni Pietro Caraffa was elected, at the age of seventy-nine, to the chair of St. Peter, and took the title of Paul IV. The new Pope was not only a fanatic zealot; he was also, most unfortunately for Charles, the bitterest enemy of the house of Hapsburg; and his accession was the signal, all over Europe, for the downfall of nearly everything that the Emperor, in the past two years, had striven so hard to erect. Paul was plainly going to lend his heartiest support to the French, particularly in Italy, where he was hemmed in by Hapsburg foes; the Spanish domination there was in greater danger than ever. In England, too, his influence was immediately felt. He detested Cardinal Pole, and would not tolerate for one moment the retention by the laity of the spoils of the church, the one condition on which Parliament had been willing to consent to the restoration of the Roman jurisdiction. Ecclesiastically as well as politically the major part of what Charles and Mary had hoped to set up when the queen’s marriage was arranged in 1553 seemed now destined to fall; and Philip, whose impatience to leave England and go to the aid of his father had only been restrained by the importunities of Renard, felt that it was no longer possible to postpone his departure. On August 28 he bade good-by to his sorrowful queen, who had now abandoned her last hopes of an heir; on September 8 he met the Emperor at Brussels. His sole remaining hope of getting any real good out of the English alliance lay in persuading Mary, in violation of the terms of the marriage treaty, to invest him with real authority as king, and he corresponded with her for that purpose in the weeks after his arrival in the Netherlands. Mary herself would have been only too glad to comply, but she dared not fly in the face of Parliament, Council, and the nation. And so argument and persuasion soon gave way to recrimination; Philip ordered the removal of his personal attendants, in order “to
agitate the Queen”, and threatened never to return. The mass of the people openly rejoiced; they had come to detest the very sight of a Spaniard.

In justice to Philip it is only fair to add that dissatisfaction with England, and desire to help fight the French, were not the sole, or even the most important reasons, that led him to desert the queen. His father had summoned him to the Netherlands for a very special purpose. The Emperor’s resolve to abdicate and go into retirement, of which there had been many a hint during the previous three years, was now practically ready to be put into effect, and the presence of his son was necessary for the ceremony. The death of Charles’s mother, the unfortunate Joanna, which had occurred on the thirteenth of the previous April at Tordesillas, probably helped to confirm, if not to hasten, his decision; it also doubtless served to turn his thoughts once more to Spain, from which they had been temporarily diverted in recent years by his desire to unite the Netherlands and England. Mary’s childlessness had knocked that project on the head; Spain and the Low Countries were henceforth to be permanently joined, not only under Philip, but also under his successors. The best that Charles could hope for as far as England was concerned was that Spanish influence would be sufficiently perpetuated there to enable him to count on her aid in keeping the sea route open—a hope which was destined to be cruelly disappointed in the succeeding years. The accession of Paul IV was an added reason why his attention should be once more attracted to his Spanish dominions. A war for the maintenance of Spanish supremacy in Italy was clearly inevitable; Charles himself was too weary to fight it; his Spanish son must take the reins. The dynastic ambitions, which had flared up so strongly in 1553, now fell into the background once more; it was plain that Europe would not tolerate their realization. Spain, ‘the inexpugnable’, and his Spanish son Philip occupied all Charles’s thoughts once more; if he could not have all Europe under the heel of the house of Hapsburg, he could at least contribute notably to the aggrandizement of the Spanish Empire. Yet in and by the very act by which he was to give it the largest territorial addition which it acquired in Europe in the course of his reign—his Burgundian inheritance, the Netherlands and Franche Comté—he was really paving the way for its ultimate downfall. Without the support of England, which Spain was soon to lose, it was to prove impossible for her to retain the Low Countries, in the teeth of Protestant opposition and the hostility of France; indeed, it was her attempt to so which was to prove the most important factor in bringing her into the conflict with England which lost her the sovereignty of the seas. That Charles realized the danger is shown by his anxiety to obtain the English alliance in 1553, and by the provisions of the marriage treaty; that Philip also realized it, in a measure, was to be shown by his offer of marriage to Queen Elizabeth after the death of Mary in November, 1558; but neither of them could be induced to take the sole and truly heroic measure that could certainly avert it—namely, to separate the destinies of Spain and the Low Countries, and to leave the latter, where they belonged, with the inheritance of Ferdinand. Never had the Spanish Empire been so top heavy before; never had it acquired such an incongruous addition.

But Charles was not gifted with the vision of a prophet. The English alliance was tottering in 1555, but it was by no means as yet irretrievably lost and it was entirely possible that it might be completely reconstituted. And so the preparations for the abdication were pushed rapidly forward. On September 26 the States General, and the chief officers of the Low Countries, were sent orders to convene, on October 14, at Brussels. Ferdinand was also invited to come, in order to lend added solemnity to the occasion, and sent his second son to represent him. The heavy rains, and bad state of the roads, made it necessary to postpone the assemblage until October 25; on that day the Emperor, mounted on a mule, and accompanied by Philip and a few personal attendants, left the little house in the park where he had taken up his residence, and rode to the palace in Brussels. At four o’clock in the afternoon he entered the great hall, where the members of the States General, the provincial governors and principal magnates, and Knights of the Golden Fleece, were assembled to meet him; it is said that as many as one thousand were present. The Emperor was conducted to a raised dais, whereon were seats for himself, his sister, and his son. One of his councilors made a formal address to the estates, to apprise them of the purpose for which they had been convoked; then Charles, seated, with his spectacles on, and a little paper in his hand to refresh his memory, began to speak. He recalled the events which had made him the heir of such great and such scattered dominions. He reminded his hearers of the endless journeyings which his many responsibilities had entailed: nine times to Germany, six times to Spain, seven to Italy, ten to the Low Countries, four into France, twice each to England and North Africa, eight crossings of the Mediterranean, three voyages on the ocean. He spoke of his failures and successes, in peace and in war, and frankly confessed his incapacities and his faults; he begged forgiveness for what he had done amiss, and assured his hearers that it was not vaulting ambition, but sense of duty, that had been his constant motive. He continually harped on his love for his native land and grieved that it was impossible for him to leave it at peace. The time, however, had now arrived for him to give effect to the decision which he had made long before—to go into retirement and hand over his responsibilities to his beloved son, who
The story of the Emperor’s life at Yuste has been so often and so fully told that it is almost impossible to add anything more. It was studied in the utmost detail three centuries after his death, during the decade between 1850 and 1860, by five different authors, who completely dispelled the persistent delusion that he lost touch with outside affairs during the period of his retreat. They showed that...
he received many visitors, that he was accurately informed of the progress of war and diplomacy all over Europe, that he sent Philip advice on the conduct of a campaign, and that he used his influence to help raise money and troops for his son. At one time there was even a rumor that he expected to leave the convert, and lead an army for the defence of Navarre. But if Charles ever said anything to encourage this last idea, “it must have been”, as Quijada reported, “from mere policy”. His activities were rigidly confined to what he could accomplish from his place of retreat; the power and authority were now in Philip’s hands. The course of events after the spring of 1556 must consequently be reserved for another volume; all that remains to be considered here is the general effect of Charles’s character and reign upon the development of the Spanish Empire.

Territorially he had considerably increased it. The enormous extension of the Spanish lands in the New World will be taken up in another place; in Italy, Charles had added Milan and the Presidios by conquest; while the Netherlands and Franche-Comté had been united to Spain by the manner in which he had divided his inheritance. In North Africa, it is true, Spain had lost more than she had gained. The advent of the Turks, the pirate raids, Charles’s failure before Algiers, and the various defeats of the Count of Alcaudete, more than neutralized the effects of the conquest of Tunis. In Europe, however, which was far more important, it is clear that the lands which acknowledged the rule of the Spanish crown were both more extensive and more widely scattered in 1556 than in 1516.

But the mere possession of territory is an unsafe criterion of greatness; it is time that we looked for other indications of the effect of Charles’s reign on the development of the Spanish Empire. Certainly his rule caused Spain’s name and fame to be carried much farther through Western Europe than ever before. The last remnants of her mediaeval isolation were gone. The Italian peninsula had now become almost completely Hispanicized. At the north as well as at the south of it, Spanish authority was securely established; Spain also really controlled the destinies of the intervening petty states; only the Pope and the Venetians maintained a precarious independence. Moreover, for the first time in recorded history, the Northern, Teutonic, as well as the Latin, Mediterranean countries had seen and felt the Spanish power. The Spanish soldier was now a familiar figure in the Netherlands, in the Empire, and in the Danubian lands; a Spanish king-consort sat on the throne of England. It is an open question, as we have often pointed out, whether this enormous extension of power and prestige ought properly to be regarded as Spanish or as Hapsburg; but the men of the sixteenth century thought rather in national than in dynastic terms, and in view of the progressive Hispanicization of Charles’s character and policy, it is small wonder that they not only attributed his triumphs to Spain but regarded them as redounding almost exclusively to her benefit. When the Emperor divided his inheritance in 1555 and 1556, there was no longer any room for doubt. All the adjacent and immediately important acquisitions had been adjudged to Philip—the economic nerve centers in the Netherlands, which were traditionally associated with the Empire, the Italy over which men had fought and bled for the previous sixty years. To Ferdinand was left only the nebulous authority of the Holy Roman Empire; the Hapsburg lands in the Rhine and Danube valleys had already been his since a much earlier date. Already one can discern the dread of Spanish preponderance—a dread which the succeeding years were enormously to intensify, a dread which outlasted its reason for existence, and endured until long after the Spanish Empire had become a ghost of its former self.

The development of Charles’s religious policy, also, had a powerful effect upon the destinies of Spain. He was irrevocably committed, by his traditions and inheritance, to the cause of Rome. Both as Holy Roman Emperor and as king of Spain, it was inevitable that he should be a Catholic, and do his utmost to advance Catholicism. He might temporize with Lutherans, and even quarrel with Popes, in order to gain political and dynastic ends; but of his fundamental loyalty to the ancient faith there could not be for one moment any serious doubt. Of heresy, to the very last, he kept his Spanish and Italian dominions clear. In the Netherlands, where his authority was firmly intrenched, he persecuted the Lutherans with the utmost vigor; the very first martyrs to the Protestant cause were burnt in the public square at Brussels on July 1, 1523. In the Empire alone the Reformation had beaten him, and won a precarious right to coexistence with the ancient faith; but as the Empire had now been turned over to Ferdinand, it no longer formed a part of the Spanish picture. In all the lands that he left to Philip, Roman Catholicism had virtually been maintained to the exclusion of everything else. At the time of his abdication, no other country in Western Europe, save Portugal, was so free from the taint of heresy as were the different scattered states that composed the Spanish Empire. And the inevitable result of this was that the cause of Spain and that of Catholicism came to be synonymous in men’s minds. Spain was henceforth saddled with the role of championing the Old Faith against the New, just as hitherto she had been saddled with that of upholding the Cross against the Crescent, and of carrying the Christian faith to the New World. That the Emperor had bequeathed to his son a bitter quarrel with the papacy served if anything to make the matter worse. It was apparently Catholicism according to Spanish, not papal
definition, that Spain was attempting to foist on Europe. Small wonder that men took alarm at such tremendous pretensions. Was it to be the aim of Iberia to dictate the religious as well as the political future of the rest of Western Christendom? All these developments are usually associated with the reign of Philip II; but the foundations for them were laid during the reign of his father. Both politically and religiously, Spain had inherited a burden far too heavy for her to bear, a task that her resources could not enable her to perform.

But that was by no means all. Not only was the burden too heavy and the task too hard, but the path that Spain was obliged to travel in order to carry them was mediaeval rather than modern,—the path of reaction rather than of progress, of darkness rather than of light. Against the modern political principle of national independence and individuality she was already committed; she was forced to combat it in order to maintain her own inherited preponderance. Against the still more modern principle of balance of power, which was to be gradually evolved as the most obvious method of preserving national independence, she was equally inevitably arrayed indeed, the first great victories of that principle were won in defending the liberties of Europe from the perils of Hapsburg and Spanish supremacy. Religiously, too, the tale was much the same. Whether Protestantism or Catholicism is the better faith is a matter on which men have continued to dispute ever since the Reformation; but there can be no question that religious toleration is one of the greatest blessings which the progress of the last four centuries has conferred upon mankind. That Protestantism does not mean toleration, the history of those four centuries has abundantly proved; but it was at least through the persistency of Protestantism’s efforts to win for itself the right to exist, that men first came to realize the horrors and the futility of religious persecution. And Spain’s inherited religious role—her most sacred duty, as she conceived it to be—committed her in advance to that very policy of persecution and intolerance which the more fortunate and enlightened nations to the north of her were gradually to abandon in the succeeding years. She was landed in a sort of strait-jacket of unbending mediaevalism, from which honorable escape seemed utterly impossible; she was almost obliged to be an anachronism. Against freedom, both national and ecclesiastical, she had been forced to take her stand. Verily, she was the child of fate.

How far Charles realized the nature of the position in which he had left Spain, and the impossibility of the task he had bequeathed to Philip, how accurately he was able to forecast the future, is a problem which must constantly recur to all students of the sixteenth century. In the matter of religion there can be little doubt that, whatever the dangers and difficulties he foresaw, he ardently believed that his was not only the right but also ultimately the winning side. Heretics had threatened and had been put down before, ever since the days of Constantine. The peace of Augsburg, it had to be confessed, was the greatest rent that had ever been made in “the seamless garment of Christ”; but surely, with the forces of militant Catholicism rallying to the standard on every hand, it was going to be possible to mend it soon. The very ambiguity of the phraseology of the instrument was an indication that neither party expected it to be permanent. And this reasoning was doubtless intensified by the development of the Emperor’s own character during the latter years of his life. Ever since his defeat in the Empire, he had become increasingly religious. The evidences of his personal piety multiplied apace. He was more zealous than ever for the persecution of heretics, less willing to sacrifice the interests of the faith to political and dynastic considerations. Religiously, then, he had no misgivings for the future. He was convinced that the cause of Catholicism was bound to triumph in the end.

In matters political, however, it was a somewhat different story. There is reason to think that Charles was not entirely free from doubts and forebodings as to the prospects of Philip’s reign in Spain and in the Spanish Empire. The significance of the fact that the Emperor had been willing to abandon his claims to Burgundy in 1529 has been already commented on. It showed that he realized that men regarded the integrity of France as the symbol of European escape from the perils of Hapsburg preponderance, and that the literal fulfilment of the treaty of Madrid would serve to unite all Western Christendom against him. The nature of his defeat in Germany in 1552 emphasized the same lesson in another way. His victories in the preceding years had made him too great for the general welfare; all the outside powers, and even some of his own vassals, desired to have him checked. And so at his abdication he had divided his inheritance,—in itself a confession that his life had stood for an ideal no longer realizable; the union of Spain and Germany in one hand had proved a dream that could not possibly come true. But now there remained the further question: was not the Spanish part—Philip’s inheritance alone, disburthened of the Empire and the Austrian lands—too great to be regarded with equanimity by the rest of Europe? Without the Netherlands and Franche-Comté, it would probably not have been so. The Spanish authority in Italy had been so long established that no one save France—the hereditary foe there was greatly disturbed by its recent extension through the addition of Milan; and the American possessions were still too remote seriously to affect the course of European politics. But the acquisition and retention of the Burgundian lands altered the whole situation. It planted the Spanish
power in a region where it had never been before, where it had no tradition or precedent, and where, most important of all, it continued to threaten France with the old bugbear of encirclement and would therefore inevitably arouse her hatred. Certainly the Emperor had realized the danger here. His anxiety for the English alliance in 1553, and the provisions that he made for the inheritance of the issue of Philip and Mary, are sufficient proof of this. But the grandchild he so ardently longed for was never born, and the sovereignty of the Netherlands remained in Spain; nay more, the most important result of the English alliance was to estrange instead of unite the parties to it, and ultimately to convert the island realm into the most effective and unrelenting of Philip’s foes. All this it was impossible for Charles to foresee; but the events of the first part of the year 1558—the loss of Calais, the increasing estrangement of Mary and Philip, the queen’s despondency and her tragic sense of failure—must have given him cause for the gravest fears. The Burgundian inheritance, with all that it implied, was full of evil portent for the future of the Spanish Empire.

If much can be deduced from the Emperor’s actions in regard to his views on the events of the day, something may also be gleaned from his different writings. Of these the best known is his Commentaries or Memoirs, which he dictated for the most part as he voyaged up the Rhine, from Cologne to Mainz, in June, 1550, and finished at Augsburg in the latter part of the year. These, however, are little more than a bare narrative of events and campaigns; moreover, they only carry the story to the month of August, 1548, and consequently shed no light at all on what was passing through the Emperor’s mind during the years when he finally settled the disposal of his vast inheritance. More enlightening by far are the various ‘Poderes’ and ‘Instrucciones’ which he drew up for the guidance of those to whom he entrusted the regency in Spain during the periods of his various absences from the peninsula, and finally his so-called political testament of October 25, 1555. Many of the less important of the ‘Poderes e Instrucciones’ remain, still unpublished, in the archives at Simancas and Madrid; the best known of them, however, especially those to Philip in 1539, 1543, and 1548, have been printed more than once, and afford rich material for the student who desires insight into the underlying principles of the Emperor’s government. Over the genuineness of the ‘testament’ of 1555 there has recently raged a vigorous controversy. It was first published in a French translation of one of the Italian texts in which it was first discovered, by Antoine Teissier, the councilor and historiographer of the Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg, in 1699, at Berlin, for the instruction of the elector’s son. Neither Teissier, nor any of the various writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who subsequently mentioned it, cast any doubts whatever upon its authenticity; but in 1919, it was declared to be an absolute forgery, and nothing more nor less than an Italian essay on the theory of statecraft; while the most recent authority inclines to the view that while the basis of it is genuine, many of its statements were modified and changed by the Italian compilers of the best known of the available texts. Whatever the final conclusion in the matter of the ‘Testament’ (and it certainly seems clear that it is not entirely apocryphal), there is enough material in the various ‘Poderes’ and ‘Instrucciones’ to enable us to form a basis for important deductions in regard to the Emperor’s political theories and expectations for the future.

We have no space to go into details; in view of the careful analyses that have already been made, it would be but a task of supererogation to do so. There is, however, one fundamental idea which may be discerned in almost every line that the Emperor wrote, which it were wellnigh impossible to exaggerate or overemphasize. It is perhaps best expressed in a single phrase in the Instruction to Philip of 1543: “por no dexaros menos de la herencia que herede.” A sturdy defensiveness, not aggression, in other words, was the keynote of Charles’s policy, and the line of action that he commended to his son. Maintenance of the status quo was the utmost that he could hope for; the Spanish Empire was already so great that any attempt to enlarge it further would be certain to meet disaster. Charles realized that his own vast inheritance had been the result of a dynastic accident, and that Europe, more sensitive than ever before to the principles of nationalism, would never permit its like to occur again; he had divided his dominions, as we have already seen, as a concession to the sentiment of his day and generation. Yet nothing would induce him to surrender one foot of what he had inherited and won, or suffer it to pass out of the orbit of Hapsburg control; and he was most anxious that Philip should be guided by the same idea. Acceptance of the enormous possessions and responsibilities with which it had pleased God in His infinite wisdom to invest him was the principle which he sought to inculcate at every turn. To attempt to increase them further would be manifestly unwise; to shun or shirk them would be cowardly. The details of the various ‘Instrucciones’ which Charles left to his son were chiefly designed to help him in carrying out this fundamental principle.

Illustrations of this spirit of ‘sturdy defensiveness’ may be found on almost every page that the Emperor wrote. The duchy of Burgundy, so he told his son, was unquestionably the lawful patrimony of the house of Hapsburg, and its claim to that territory must never be abandoned; so essential, however,
was the maintenance of peace, especially in view of the exhaustion of his treasury, that it would be better to leave the matter in suspense than to engage, for the sake of it, in an unnecessary war. The French had wickedly despoiled the Emperor’s kinsman and faithful ally, the duke of Savoy, of a large part of his estates, in the hope of opening a road for themselves into Italy; yet Philip was advised to let the injury pass without revenge, and to concentrate his efforts on the defense of the remaining possessions of the Savoyard. The papacy, also, had given the Emperor much cause for complaint; Paul III had deserted him after his victory over the Schmalkaldic League, and had constantly sought to thwart him in Italy, while Paul IV had made trouble for the house of Hapsburg in every corner of Christendom. Yet Philip was urged to treat the successor of St. Peter with reverence and respect; to wait until the refractory pontiff was removed by the hand of death, and then to use every lawful means to compass the election of a more amenable successor. Even against the infidel the Emperor emphasized the danger of offensive warfare. The passage in which he discusses this subject is curiously involved, but certainly his counsels did not breathe the spirit of the Crusades. The Turk, he insisted, could be more advantageously met with craft than with force. No war against him should be undertaken at all unless it could be justified in the eyes of the world as being of a strictly defensive character. If Philip should be so fortunate as to capture any place from him, he was to direct all his energies to fortifying and retaining it, rather than endanger his army by attempting further conquests.

The same essentially negative spirit which animates the Emperor’s advice on the conduct of foreign affairs is made evident in a somewhat different fashion in his remarks on internal government. The famous passage in the instruction of 1543, in which Charles gives his views of the characters of his principal counsellors, affords an admirable illustration of this. No one of them, he repeatedly insists, was so good or so wise as to be given unquestioned precedence over the rest or even permitted to seem to monopolize Philip; it was in order to prevent this that the Emperor had filled the most important posts with the heads of opposing factions. The Duke of Alva was the best soldier in Spain, well versed in foreign affairs, and should always be consulted in matters military and diplomatic; but he was also of the ancient Castilian aristocracy—a grandee of grandees—who had not ceased to aspire to rule the realm. It would therefore be dangerous to admit him to the inner circle of the government. Cobos and Zuniga were financiers and administrators, whose value was perhaps all the greater because they belonged to opposite parties and would consequently emphasize both sides of every question. On the other hand, they were both avaricious, and Philip was cautioned not to reward either of them so liberally as to give the other just cause for complaint. And so on through the entire list; never a word of praise without the corresponding apportionment of blame; perpetual balancing of good and evil. It was a notable proof of Charles’s shrewdness and insight, a monument to the keenness of his judgment of men; and yet, when one comes to consider it as a whole, its net effect was to paralyze initiative. So evenly weighted were the pros and cons that Philip must often have been at a loss which way to turn. One sees the reason for the fatal hesitation which was to be the source of so many of his subsequent defeats. A modern nation, with a cabinet in which all parties were given equal representation, would certainly find it difficult to follow any definite or consistent policy; the probable result would be to make it stand stock still. The system of government which Charles commended to Philip was bound to arrest the progress of the Spanish Empire.

It was doubtless the vast size and unwieldiness of his Spanish inheritance—more obvious than ever when coupled with his Austrian and imperial one—that first convinced Charles that he must be content to rest on the defensive; and the lesson that Spain had taught him sank deep into its teacher’s heart. The Spanish ideal was henceforward the preservation of the status quo; Spain is conservative, not progressive; she looks backward, not forward. She seems overwhelmed by the tremendous load that God has given her to bear, oppressed by a fatalistic feeling that the future depends solely on His will, and is out of her power to mold or control. There is the sharpest possible contrast between the eagerness and enthusiasm with which Pedro of Aragon went forth to win the crown of Sicily, and the almost reluctant acquiescence with which Charles V finally accepted the inheritance of Milan; and the attitude of both rulers is accurately reflected in that of the peoples over whom they held sway. The Spain of the middle of the sixteenth century gives the impression of being strangely tired. The fire and energy which characterized every action of the heroes of the Reconquest and of the early builders of the mediaeval Aragonese Empire are no longer there. She was conscious, in other words, that she had reached her zenith. There was no longer any possibility of her rising any higher; the only question was whether she could prevent a decline. A spirit of grandiose somberness seems henceforth to pervade her. She was proud of the mighty deeds that she had wrought in the past; for the future she must trust in the omnipotence of God.

Never before had Spain and Charles of Burgundy been so close to one another’s hearts as during the last few months of the Emperor’s life at Yuste. The long and difficult process of reconciling their
originally divergent viewpoints had now attained its final stage. The news that poured in from abroad was mostly sad, yet nothing of necessarily fatal significance was reported; nation and retired ruler were calm and undismayed. In February, 1558, Charles got word of the death at Talavera of his sister Eleanor, the widow of Francis I, who had bidden him good-by only two short months before; but the Emperor himself, in the following summer, seemed in excellent condition; in July he was described as “well and fat, with a better color than for many a day”. On August 31, however, there was a sudden turn for the worse; while sitting on a covered terrace by the western side of his apartment, he was attacked by chills and a fever, and retired to his room, which he was never more to leave. In the early hours of the morning of September 21, it was evident that the end had come. Rousing himself from his lethargy he grasped, for one brief instant, the crucifix which had been held in death by the Empress Isabella; then, calling loudly on the name of Jesus, he sank back upon the pillows and expired. Twenty-six years later his remains were removed from Yuste to the Escorial, where they lie today, under the altar of the great monastic church, amid surroundings symbolic of the union of the vast empire which he bequeathed to his successor, with the spirit of the ancient faith in which, at the last, he found enduring peace.
BOOK VI
SPAIN IN THE NEW WORLD

CHAPTER XXVII
THE CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF THE GLOBE AND THE ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC

The progress of Spanish discovery and colonization was much influenced under Charles V, as it had been under the Catholic Kings, by the long-standing rivalries between Portugal and Castile. It was early in March, 1518, at Valladolid, when he had been in his Iberian dominions for less than five months, that the new monarch received an application, of far reaching consequences, from a Portuguese adventurer who had but recently taken up his residence in Spain.

Ferdinand of Magellan, to call him at the outset by the Anglicized version of his name, was born of noble parentage, probably in the city of Oporto, about the year 1472 or 1473. Transplanted at an early age to the capital for his education, as was the custom with the scions of the aristocracy, he grew up a page in the household of Queen Eleanor, and thence passed, in 1495, into the service of Emmanuel the Fortunate. Fired by his sovereign’s enthusiasm for exploration, an eyewitness of the triumphant return of those memorable expeditions to the Far East and to the New World which succeeded the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope, he enlisted as a volunteer in the great armada which Francisco de Almeida, the first viceroy of India, led out to the Orient in the spring of 1505. After distinguishing himself by many acts of skill and gallantry on the East African coast and the western shores of India, he passed from the service of Almeida to that of Albuquerque, and in the autumn of 1510 joined the famous expedition which captured Malacca in the following summer. Whether or not he sailed in the fleet which Albuquerque dispatched to the Moluccas, we cannot surely tell; but we know that he was on most friendly terms with Francisco Serrao, one of its principal commanders, and that he later exchanged letters with him about the wealth of the new lands. In 1512 we find him back again in Portugal, and in the following year taking part in an expedition against the Moors of Azamor; but it was his experience in the Far East that had sunk most deeply into his heart, and was destined to give birth to the project which won for him immortal fame.

An interview with King Emmanuel, on his return from the Moroccan campaign, proved to be the critical moment in Magellan’s career. We know that the explorer asked for an increase of his moradia, or annual court stipend, and was refused. It is also natural to infer—though there is no documentary evidence to prove it—that Magellan broached to the king a plan of reaching the Spice Islands by the western route, but failed to elicit any encouragement from his master. At any rate, it is certain that the rebuff that he received determined him, like Columbus in 1484, to try for a more favorable reception for his projects in Spain. Discussion with his friend, the learned cosmographer, Ruy Faleiro, convinced him that the idea of reaching the Spice Islands by the west was perfectly feasible; and if he were determined to try to realize it, there would be obvious advantages in entering the service of the king of Spain, within whose demarcation, under the treaty of Tordesillas, lay most of the water he would be obliged to traverse. In October 1517 he crossed over to Seville, and took out his naturalization papers as a subject of King Charles.

Shortly afterwards he applied to the officials of the Casa de Contratación for aid in carrying out his great project. He told them that the Spice Islands belonged to Spain by virtue of the demarcation line; he promised to prove it before all the doctors who might contradict him, and would pledge his head for it. Furthermore, when the officials replied that it was impossible to go thither without trespassing within the demarcation of Emmanuel the Fortunate, he replied that if they would give him ships and men, he would show them “navigation to those parts without touching any sea or land of the King of Portugal”. Most of the officials were unconvinced, but one of them—Juan de Aranda—made up his mind that Magellan knew whereof he spoke; he questioned him more closely, and also catechized Faleiro, who had arrived in Seville in the month of December. Faleiro found it difficult to get on with Aranda. He
was furious when he discovered that the official wanted a share in the profits of the expedition, if it should be possible to arrange it. However, on realizing that Aranda was the only possible open sesame to an audience with Charles, he swallowed his bile, and the three men journeyed northward to Valladolid. Aranda got his companions into touch with Chièvres, Adrian of Utrecht, the Chancellor Sauvage, and the rest of the Flemings; he enlisted the support of Juan Rodrigo de Fonseca, head of the Casa de Contratación, and now bishop of Burgos also; in fact, he did everything for his associates that could contribute to their success. Even the unforgiving Faleiro was forced to recognize the importance of his services. In February 1518, at Valladolid, he and Magellan signed a formal agreement, in which they promised to give Aranda an eighth portion of such profits as they should derive from their expedition.

One month later, on March 22, Charles gave his consent to the capitulation y asiento, defining the terms under which Magellan and Faleiro were to sail for the Spice Islands. He promised to furnish them with five ships, provisioned and equipped for two years, and carrying crews to the total of 234 men. He agreed that for ten years to come no other explorer should be sent out on the same quest. Magellan and Faleiro were to receive one-twentieth of all profits arising from the expedition; and a subsidiary document gave them the rank and pay of captains, with all the dignities and powers thereto pertaining. The rights of the king of Portugal were carefully safeguarded. Nothing was to be done, no discovery to be undertaken inside the limits of his line of demarcation. This last stipulation, however, was by no means sufficient to mollify the wrath of Emmanuel the Fortunate, who was apprised of all that had happened since Magellan and Faleiro had left his dominions, and was furious at the prospect that Castile would reap the profits of an opportunity which he had suffered to escape him. An excellent occasion for making trouble was afforded by the fact that negotiations for his marriage with Charles’s sister Eleanor were at that moment pending, and that his ambassador, Alvaro da Costa, was resident at Charles’s court, charged with the duty of bringing them to a conclusion. Da Costa tried to persuade Magellan to abandon his intended enterprise. He sought to bribe him. There was even talk of his assassination. The Portuguese ambassador also approached the Flemings, and he finally remonstrated with Charles himself; the matter continued after the removal of the court to Saragossa, whither the explorers accompanied the young monarch in May; it was reopened after Charles reached Barcelona. But da Costa’s efforts were in vain. In such matters Charles relied, at this stage, on the advice of Fonseca, who gave enthusiastic support to Magellan’s cause. The crying need for funds, and the strong probability that an expedition to the Spice Islands would help to supply them, were other considerations which doubtless carried weight. Charles stood loyally behind the leader of the expedition; and he further indicated his enthusiasm for the explorers by decorating them with the Cross of the Order of Santiago. Nay more, when, after Magellan and Faleiro had gone to Seville to fit out, a Portuguese agent started a riot among their crews, Charles expressed himself so vigorously that no more difficulty was experienced for some time. The hostility of King Emmanuel, however, was only held in leash; and he continued to show it by sending out expeditions to intercept Magellan after he had set sail.

The opposition of Portugal was not the only hindrance that Magellan was compelled to overcome before he was able to depart. The officials of the Casa de Contratación interposed delays, and a sharp letter from the Emperor was necessary to bring them into line. Faleiro, too, made trouble. Whether it was through jealousy or madness, it is not possible to say; but the fact remains that from a colleague and friend he was rapidly becoming converted into a troublemaker and foe, until finally a royal cedula of July 26, 1519, effected his removal, by ordering him to remain in Seville after Magellan’s departure, to superintend the fitting out of a second expedition. From that moment he drops out of the picture, and Magellan was left in supreme command. Faleiro’s elimination at this stage of the proceedings was probably not an unmixed evil; indeed, it is quite possible to regard it as a blessing in disguise. His scientific accomplishments and knowledge of navigation had certainly been a priceless asset to Magellan in launching his project and in obtaining the indispensable support of the crown. Without them the whole plan might well have been nipped in the bud. But Faleiro’s temper was far too uncertain to enable him to stand the strain of a long and arduous voyage. He was utterly deficient in practical common sense and ability to get on with his fellow men. He had made his contribution, and it was time for him to give place to others.

In the meantime, the preparations for the voyage were pressed forward as rapidly as these various difficulties would permit. The funds which the Casa de Contratación was able to furnish proved inadequate, but the merchants of Seville advanced the rest, so that the entire cost—over 8,000,000 maravedis—was finally defrayed. The five ships that composed the expedition—the San Antonio (120 tons), the Trinidad, in which Magellan sailed (110 tons), the Concepcion (90 tons), the Victoria (85 tons), and the Santiago (75 tons)—were provided for defense with high castellated structures fore and aft. The total number of persons who finally embarked was probably upwards of 265. They were a cosmopolitan lot. Most of them were Spaniards, but there were also many Portuguese—far more, in
fact, than Charles desired—besides Italians, Frenchmen, Flemings, Germans, Greeks, and Moors, one Englishman, and Magellan’s Malaccan slave. The ships were plentifully supplied with cannon, powder and ball, and provisions of all sorts. On August 10, 1519, the fleet left the quays at Seville, and dropped down the Guadalquivir to San Lucar. On the twenty-fourth Magellan made his last will and testament. On September 10 the expedition weighed anchor, and sailed boldly forth on its memorable voyage.

Among the supernumeraries (sobresalientes) who sought and obtained passage with the explorers was a native of the town of Vicenza in Lombardy named Antonio Pigafetta, who had come to Spain with the papal nuncio Chieregato in 1519. He tells us that he was possessed with a desire to see and experience “the great things of the Ocean”, and that through the favor of Charles V he was able to attach himself to the expedition. He sailed in the Trinidad as a servant or criado of Magellan. It was most fortunate for posterity that he was able to do so; for his account of the expedition is by far the best that has come down to us, and, in fact, one of the most precious narratives of travel in the history of the world.

Favorable winds accompanied the explorers during the first few weeks of the voyage. They put in more antiquo at the Canaries, and then ran down along the West African coast inside the Cape Verde Islands. As they approached the Line, the weather became much worse. There were harassing alternations of flat calms and heavy gales; and before they got across to the eastern point of Brazil, a large number of the crew were sullen and discontented, while Juan de Cartagena, the captain of the San Antonio, showed such open insubordination that it was necessary to put him in irons. But the hardships of the voyage were by no means the only cause of trouble. Many of Magellan’s companions had been pledged to rise against him long before the expedition set sail from San Lucar. The Portuguese, as will be readily surmised, were at the back of these conspiracies. There are hints of a prearranged mutiny in letters of King Emmanuel’s agents in Castile to their master. Not long after his departure, Magellan received definite warning “that his captains had told their friends and relations that if they had any trouble with him they would kill him”. The great explorer, then, was not unprepared for emergencies; and when, in the end of March, 1520, suffering from cold and short of provisions, the little fleet anchored, to spend the Antarctic winter in the harbor of Port St. Julian, in southern Patagonia, the blow fell.

On Easter Sunday (April 8) Magellan commanded that all hands should go ashore and attend mass, and that afterwards the captains of the different ships should come to dine with him. Both orders were but partially and halfheartedly obeyed, and on the following morning Magellan awoke to discover that a band of armed men from the Concepcion had boarded the San Antonio, overpowered the officers, and assumed control. The mutineers were led by Gaspar de Quesada, the captain of the Concepcion, which had already been gained for the rebel cause; and the Victoria, whose captain, Mendoza, was notoriously hostile to Magellan, was also quick to give its adherence. Juan de Cartagena likewise took sweet revenge for his previous punishment by lending his support; and Juan Sebastian del Cano, who was later to win immortal fame by completing Magellan’s great work, was numbered, at this juncture, in the ranks of the sublevados. The situation was such as would have daunted any but the stoutest heart; but Magellan was fully equal to the occasion. It was clearly a case of win all or lose all; unless the mutiny was completely and immediately suppressed, his hopes were blasted and his career ruined. Numbers were apparently against him; he must therefore try the effect of a surprise. So he sent a handful of men to the Victoria, many of whose crew, despite the treachery of Mendoza, he knew to be loyal to himself. The captain was held for a moment in parley, and then suddenly cut down; while at the same instant the Victoria was boarded by fifteen men from another boat which had been kept in readiness for the crucial moment. There was practically no resistance. Magellan’s ensign was hoisted, and the Victoria, together with the Santiago, which had been loyal from the first, was moved alongside the Trinidad, so as to block the mouth of the harbor and prevent the possible escape of the Concepcion and the San Antonio. The odds were now three to two in favor of authority, and the morale of the mutineers had been broken by the swiftness and success of Magellan’s onset.

A delay of twenty-four hours and a bloodless contest between the Trinidad and the San Antonio were sufficient to induce the rest of the rebels to surrender; and an inquiry was promptly held to determine their fate. ‘Politic mercy’ was clearly the line for Magellan to take with the rank and file—the more so as he could not dispense with their services for the remainder of the voyage; but of the ringleaders it was equally obvious there was every reason to make an example. The body of Mendoza, slain on the Victoria, was accordingly drawn and quartered, as was the immemorial custom with traitors; Quesada was taken ashore and beheaded on the Saturday after the mutiny, and his body, after execution, subjected to the same treatment as that of Mendoza; while Juan de Cartagena, and the priest, Pedro Sanchez de Reina, who had been caught in the act of attempting to stir up a second revolt after
the failure of the first, were marooned. More than thirty-five others were found guilty by the court of inquiry, and sentenced to death, but Magellan pardoned them. Having shown enough decision and severity to make it certain that his authority would thenceforth be unquestioned, he could afford to be generous to the rest of his vanquished foes. The mutiny, though passed over in silence or else accorded only bare mention by the four historians of the expedition who actually accompanied it, was really the turning point of the whole adventure.

The expedition remained in the bay of St. Julian until August 24, 1520. Much time was spent in careening and caulking the ships. In the end of April a reconnaissance to the southward was undertaken by Magellan’s loyal follower, Joao Serrao, with thirty-seven men in the Santiago. But a gale blew up after they had gone some sixty miles. The Santiago was driven ashore and went to pieces. The captain and crew, with the exception of Serrao’s negro slave, were fortunate to escape alive, but they were destined to endure terrible hardships before they got back to their comrades. A river three miles wide barred their passage northward along the shore; finally a raft was constructed on which two of them fought their way across and managed, after terrible privations, to bring the news of the disaster to Port St. Julian; a relief party was organized, and the rest of the survivors were finally rescued. Efforts were also made to learn something of the interior of the country and its inhabitants, six of whom were brought to Magellan’s ship and given food enough to satisfy twenty men, “but the six ate it all, since they were so big that the smallest was bigger and taller than the tallest man in Castile.” Two of the gigantes were later somewhat treacherously enticed on board, and manacled, to be taken home as a present to the Emperor, but they both died before the expedition had begun to cross the Pacific. This last episode naturally aroused hostility between the natives and the explorers during the closing weeks of their stay at Port St. Julian, and made the prospects of the two marooned culprits—Juan de Cartagena and Pedro Sanchez de Reina—even darker than they had been before.

It was on the twenty-first of October, 1520, that the adventurers, in the four ships that remained to them, reached the Cabo de las Virgenes and the opening of the strait that bears Magellan’s name. The next thirty-eight days were spent in threading its devious windings. The farther the explorers went the more difficult their enterprise seemed to be. The low-lying pampas at the eastern extremity of the strait gave way as they passed westward to the bleak precipices of the Southern Andes. The waters beneath them were apparently fathomless. New and strange forms of life appeared on sea and shore. Even the dauntless spirit of Magellan was appalled. At least one council was held to discuss the expediency of turning back, but when it came to the question of abandoning the search to which he had dedicated his life, the courage of the great captain revived, and the doubts and objections of the more timid were set aside. Desertion, however, Magellan could not prevent, the more so as the necessity of sending out constant reconnoitering expeditions gave every opportunity for it; and before the expedition had reached the Pacific, the San Antonio was seized by a party of mutineers, under the pilot Estevan Gomez, and taken back to Spain. It was a dastardly act, and it was rendered even more heinous by the lies that the deserters told about their leader when they got home. But nothing could induce Magellan to swerve from his purpose. Finally, in the end of November, a well-equipped boat, which had been sent ahead to explore, returned, after three days’ absence, with the news that it had found “the cape of the other sea .... The captain-general wept for joy”, continues Pigafetta, “and called that cape, Cape Deseado, for we had been desiring it for a long time.” “The other sea” proving blessedly free from the terrible gales that had recently beset their course, they called it the Pacific, a name which finally prevailed over that of the Mar del Sur first given to the same ocean by Vasco Nunez de Balboa, when he saw it, seven years before, from a “peak in Darien.”

For nearly three weeks the explorers worked their way northward along the Chilean coast; then, on December 16, when they were near the fiftieth parallel of latitude, they struck out boldly, in a northwesterly direction, across an apparently unlimited waste of water. After thirty-nine days they sighted a small island covered with trees (probably Puka-Puka, in the Tuamotu Archipelago); it proved to be uninhabited, and they passed on. Eleven days more brought them again within sight of land (probably Flint Island, in the Manihiki group), but it was likewise uninhabited and desolate, “and they called these islets the Unfortunate, since they found there neither people, nor consolation, nor any kind of food.” For thirty more days they struggled on, again without sight of land, their only encouragement being a favorable wind. Never had the pangs of hunger been so sharp. Rations were reduced to the lowest possible limits, and consisted, says Pigafetta, “of biscuit which was no longer biscuit, but powder of biscuits swarming with worms, for they had eaten the good. It stank strongly of the urine of rats. We drank yellow water that had been putrid for many days ... and ate some ox hides that covered the top of the mainyard,” after they had been softened in sea water for four or five days. “Rats were sold for one-half ducado apiece, and even then we could not get them.” Scurvy broke out, and several died; more sickened, and all were utterly discouraged, when at last, on March 6, 1521, they sighted an island...
(almost certainly Guam) which proved to be inhabited, and the worst of their troubles were over for the time being.

The thievish propensities of the natives impressed the explorers so vividly that they gave the archipelago that they had reached the name of the Ladrones or Robber Islands. “The inhabitants entered the ships,” declares Pigafetta, “and stole whatever they could lay their hands on,” including “the small boat that was fastened to the poop of the flagship. Thereupon, the captain-general in wrath went ashore with forty armed men, who burned some forty or fifty houses together with many boats, and killed seven men.” Fresh, fruit and vegetables, however, were obtained, and on March 9 the explorers departed on a southwesterly course which brought them, on the 16th, to Samar in the Philippines. Two days later they landed at the neighboring island of Humunu (Malhou or Homonbon), and were visited there by a prau with nine men in it. These people soon proved to be friendly, hospitable, and anxious to trade, and in a short time “they became very familiar with us.” The sick recovered rapidly with the good food that was now easily available. Troubles and complaints began to vanish as the wonders of unknown lands continued to unfold themselves. Finally, on March 28, after they had passed over to the little island which is now called Limasaua, the adventurers encountered some natives who were able to comprehend the language of Magellan’s Malaccan slave, and thus knew definitely for the first time that their great quest had been successful, and that they had reached, by sailing westward, the outer confines of the Asiatic world.

For the next few weeks fortune continued to smile. On Good Friday, March 29, Pigafetta and another man were sent ashore to visit the local king and see the country; and such was the hospitality with which they were treated that Pigafetta was forced “to eat meat on holy Friday, for I could not help myself,” while his companion “became intoxicated as a consequence of so much drinking and eating.” Easter Sunday, the 31st, was the first anniversary of the mutiny at Port St. Julian, and therefore doubly appropriate for remembering God’s mercies. Mass was accordingly celebrated on shore with the utmost solemnity, and Magellan was deeply gratified by the participation of two of the local chieftains in the service. “They went forward to kiss the Cross as we did,” writes Pigafetta, “and when the body of our Lord was elevated, they remained on their knees and worshipped Him with clasped hands.” But the greatest triumph of all occurred two weeks later, when the expedition had passed on to Cebu. After some hesitation, the king of that island agreed to a treaty giving Spaniards the exclusive privilege of trading in his dominions, and a little later he accepted the Christian faith. On Sunday, April 14, the ceremony of baptism was performed with appropriate rites. The king of Cebu was called Don Carlos, in honor of the Emperor, and the queen was given the name Joanna, in honor of the Emperor’s mother. As the news spread, the people came in from the countryside and the neighboring islands to follow the royal example; within a few weeks over two thousand had been baptized. Apparently, however, the natives did not show sufficient alacrity to suit Magellan in fulfilling their promises to destroy their ancient idols, and on one occasion they were reproved by the captain for their slackness in this respect. Thereupon they replied that they were preserving the idols “not for themselves but for a sick man who had not spoken now for four days, so that the idols might give him health. He was the prince’s brother, and the bravest and wisest man in the island. The captain told them to burn their idols and to believe in Christ, and that if the sick man were baptized, he would quickly recover; and if that did not so happen they could behead him [i.e., the captain] then and there. Thereupon, the king replied that he would do it, for he truly believed in Christ. We made a procession from the square to the house of the sick man with as much pomp as possible. There we found him in such condition that he could neither speak nor move. We baptized him and his two wives, and ten girls. Then the captain had him asked how he felt. He spoke immediately, and said that by the grace of our Lord he felt very well. That was a most manifest miracle in our times. When the captain heard him speak, he thanked God fervently.” After this episode, iconoclasm apparently proceeded at a more satisfactory rate, “and the people themselves cried out, ‘Castiglia! Castiglia!’ as they destroyed their idols.

But alas, that the triumph so gallantly won should have been destined by fate to be so cruelly short-lived! Some of the petty rulers of the territories near Cebu had become restive under the suzerainty of the king of that island, and Magellan, naturally wishing to strengthen the authority of his friend and convert, gladly offered aid in effecting their subjugation. One of the most troublesome of these petty rulers was the rajah of Matan, an island just across the harbor of Cebu, and when one of the rajah’s minor chieftains promised the Spaniards his support in subduing his overlord, Magellan thought the opportunity too good to let slip. Against the advice of his old friend and comrade, Joao Serrao, he embarked at midnight on Friday, April 26, with fifty-nine of his followers, in three boats. The king of Cebu and upwards of a thousand natives accompanied them in war canoes. But when the armament reached Matan, these auxiliaries were requested by Magellan to remain where they were, and “watch the Spaniards fight”; while the captain, with forty-eight of his men, waded ashore and advanced,
The death of Magellan changed the whole face of affairs. His successors in the supreme command were by no means his equals; still worse, the fact that it had been possible to kill him and to defeat the expedition which he had led against Matan undermined the prestige of his followers with the natives. Their ally, the king of Cebu, turned against them; a group of twenty-nine were enticed ashore, and, save for two who scented danger and made their escape in the nick of time, were surrounded and slaughtered. It is scarcely necessary to add that the Christianity which the natives had so recently adopted was not proof against the shock to which this additional demonstration of the mortal character of its propagators subjected it; and as the survivors sailed away, they saw the inhabitants tearing down all the emblems of the faith, save the great cross, which, as Herrera assures us, they were unable to bring to the ground while the ships of the Spaniards remained in sight. Desertion and death had by this time reduced the numbers of the participants in the expedition by more than half. Since there were not enough left to man the three ships that still remained, it was decided to abandon the Concepcion, which was no longer in a seaworthy condition, and to transfer her cargo and crew to the Trinidad and the Victoria. This was done, off the island of Bohol, just opposite Cebu, and thereupon the expedition bore away to the southwest. This course took the explorers away from land, and provisions were again beginning to run short, when they finally arrived at the island of Palawan, where they were fortunate in finding the inhabitants friendly and plenty of food of every kind. They were also able to seize native pilots, whom they forced to conduct them to the town of Brunei, on the northwest coast of Borneo, of whose wonders many rumors had reached them; and there they arrived in the middle of June.

A royal welcome and opportunities to trade encouraged the travelers to plan for a long stay. They were, moreover, fascinated by the sights that met their eyes; the city of twenty-five thousand houses built all on piles in the salt water, “except the houses of the king and certain chiefs”; the graceful praus with gold and silver ornaments; the elephants; the fat king, with whom “no one was allowed to communicate save through a speaking tube”; and “the three hundred foot soldiers with naked rapiers at their thighs to guard him.” But rumors of treachery soon began to fill the air. Several members of the expedition were seized and detained by the king. Two large junks and a fleet of over two hundred praus attempted a naval demonstration against the Trinidad and the Victoria, and had to be fought off with cannon. The capture, on July 30, of another junk with a number of notables on board did not serve to make the Spaniards sure of their position. In early August, accordingly, they sailed away to the northeast, taking with them sixteen men and three women whom they had captured on the junk, and not
stopping till they reached an islet off Banguey, where they landed to caulk and refit their badly damaged ships. Setting sail once more on September 27, they altered their course to the southeast. Learning from the crews of captured junks that the Spice Islands which they had set out to find were not far off, they continued their voyage until November 8, 1521, when they cast anchor off the shore of Tidore in the Moluccas.

It was but natural, now that the explorers had reached their goal, that the hostility of Portugal, which had pursued them so relentlessly at the time of their departure from Spain, should give unwelcome evidence that it was still alive. Ternate, a neighboring island, had already been occupied by the subjects of King Emmanuel; in fact, the explorers soon found out that Magellan’s old friend, Francisco Serrao, had been made captain-general of the forces of the king of Ternate, and had been poisoned eight or nine months before their arrival, through the instrumentality of the king of Tidore, against whom he had been leading the troops of his master. On November 14 they were visited by a renegade Portuguese from Ternate, one Pedro Affonso de Lorama, who not only brought them much valuable information in regard to conditions in the Moluccas, but also was able to give them news of events that had occurred in Spain after their departure, and of the various efforts of the Portuguese king to intercept them. Clearly, in view of the enmity of their ancient rivals, it behooved them to take all possible precautions; and as the Portuguese had already established themselves in Ternate, it was evidently the part of wisdom for them to do likewise in Tidore. A treaty was accordingly signed with the local ruler, who had received them with the utmost kindness, and assured them that astrologers had been prophesying their arrival for a long time. He listened with deep attention to the explorers’ accounts of the greatness of the Emperor and assured them that he wished to live at peace with him. He gladly accepted all their proposals for trade and promised them that if his island would not afford them enough spices to fill their ships, he would personally undertake to see that they were obtained elsewhere.

For the next six weeks trading went merrily forward. Cloves and spices were brought in from every side, and the explorers “bartered for them with might and main”, knives, caps, hatchets, scissors, clothes, glassware, and Bornean gongs being given in exchange. Relations with the king of Tidore became more cordial every day, and the rulers of many of the neighboring islands came in and signed treaties of peace with the representatives of the king of Spain; some of the nobles of Ternate, also, dissatisfied with their experiences at the hands of the Portuguese, crossed over to Tidore and offered their allegiance. Altogether it would seem that the Spaniards made a considerably more favorable impression in the Moluccas than their predecessors had done before them; and when their ships were filled and the time came for them to leave, they were unfeignedly sorry to depart.

The adventures of the explorers were not yet at an end. On Wednesday, December 11, all was ready, and the Victoria stood out to sea; but when it came the turn of the Trinidad to weigh anchor, it was discovered that she had sprung so bad a leak that there was not the remotest possibility of her being able to set sail. The Victoria accordingly returned; a council of war was held, and it was finally determined that the Trinidad should discharge her cargo, receive a thorough overhauling, and sail for Panama after the change of the monsoon; while the Victoria, after being lightened of some of her burden, which was believed to be dangerously heavy, as well as of a part of her crew who preferred to remain in the Moluccas, should take advantage of the east winds then prevailing and sail direct for Spain via the Cape of Good Hope. Juan Sebastian del Cano was placed in command of her; although involved in the mutiny at Port St. Julian, he had since that time given high proofs of loyalty, skill, and efficiency as a navigator. Fifty-nine others accompanied him, of whom thirteen were natives and forty-six Europeans (among them, Pigafetta); while fifty-three others remained behind with Gonzalo Gomez de Espinosa, who was left in command of the Trinidad. Thus only 101 were still remaining of the 265 or more who had set forth with Magellan; and most of the members of the two parties into which the expedition was now divided were destined never to see each other again.

Idle story of the subsequent adventures of the Victoria and of the Trinidad and their crews is full of thrilling details; here it can only be indicated in outline. The Victoria, steering a southwest course, reached the island of Timor on January 25, 1522, remained there for barter and provisions for nearly two weeks, and on February 13 started southwest across the Indian Ocean for the Cape of Good Hope. The ship’s condition gave constant cause for alarm. The food and water it carried became more and more unfit for use. Disease broke out, and many died; “when we cast them into the sea” writes Pigafetta, who almost alone of that whole ship’s company had succeeded in keeping always well, “the Christians went to the bottom face upward, while the Indians always went face downward.” So great were their sufferings that “some of our men wished to go to the Portuguese settlements at Mozambique,” but the rest, “more desirous of their honor than of their own life, determined to get to Spain, living or dead. Finally, by God’s help, we doubled the Cape [of Good Hope] on May 6, at a
distance of five leagues.” On July 9 they reached the Cape Verde Islands, where they were obliged to put in for provisions and refitting. Fearing a hostile reception from the Portuguese if their identity should become known, they attempted at first to conceal it; but the truth soon leaked out, and thirteen of their number were detained. With eighteen Europeans and four natives left on board, they completed the last stage of their journey. Finally, on Monday, September 8, as Pigafetta relates it, “we cast anchor near the quay of Seville and discharged all our artillery. Tuesday, we all went in shirts and barefoot, each holding a candle, to visit the shrine of Santa Maria de la Victoria, and that of Santa Maria de l’Antigua.”

Heavy as had been the sufferings of the crew of the Victoria, they were exceeded by those of the men who accompanied Gonzalo Gomez de Espinosa on the Trinidad. After a thorough overhauling, she set sail for America on April 6, but she was not destined to get far. Disease, shortage of provisions, and head winds forced the adventurers, after a few weeks, to turn back; and the cup of their bitterness was filled to overflowing when they found, on reaching the Moluccas, that the Portuguese had regained control. A fleet of seven ships, with more than three hundred men, under Antonio de Brito, had arrived there a short time after the departure of the Trinidad, possessed themselves of the warehouse which the Spaniards had built, and captured the scanty garrison which they had left to guard it; and when Espinosa and his men returned, they also were obliged to surrender. The Trinidad shortly afterwards went to pieces in a heavy squall, and the survivors of the expedition, of whom there were now but twenty-three, were left at the mercy of their captors. De Brito maltreated them in every possible way. He insulted and abused them in the presence of the natives, in order to undermine the prestige of Spain; and then sent them via Banda and Java to Malacca and Cochín. Vasco da Gama, who was viceroy there at the time that they arrived, refused to give orders for their release; but his successor, Enrique de Menezes, who replaced him in the year 1524, proved more compassionate, and commanded that they be sent back to Portugal. But their numbers had by this time been again sadly diminished. Death had claimed the majority of them; two had been detained in the Moluccas; one had escaped and got back as a stowaway to Lisbon. Five only—Espinosa and four others—of the fifty-four who had stayed with the Trinidad when she parted company with the Victoria in December, 1521, ever saw Europe again, and Espinosa was the only one of these to get recognition and reward.

Del Cano, the captain of the Victoria, had better luck; indeed, from all we know of his character and actions, the recompense he received was far greater than he deserved. He returned to Spain at a fortunate moment for himself, for Charles had only just got back from the Empire, and everything combined to invest del Cano in the popular mind with the credit that in reality was due to his leader. Charles sent for him to Valladolid the moment he arrived. He and his companions were presented at court; he was given an annual pension of five hundred ducats and a coat of arms. There was good reason for the Emperor’s satisfaction, over and above the reflected glory which the successful accomplishment of the circumnavigation cast upon him; for the cargo of spices which the Victoria brought home was worth considerably more than it had cost him to send the expedition forth. Charles’s perennial need was money; if a hazardous preliminary exploration of uncharted seas could succeed, in spite of almost every conceivable misfortune, in sending home survivors with a cargo that could be disposed of at a profit, it was clear that the experiment was well worth repetition.

But after all, for the student of the history of the Spanish Empire, at least, the most important result of the voyage of Magellan was neither economic, nor even scientific, but rather what may perhaps be best called psychological. It occurred, not only at the beginning of Charles’s reign, but also at the most critical moment of his fortunes. His election as Holy Roman Emperor took place two months before Magellan’s departure. His authority was challenged, almost overthrown, and finally reestablished in Spain, during the months covered by the voyage. The Diet of Worms, the beginning of the wars against the king of France, and the first foreshadowings of the struggle against the Turks, all fall in the same period, and the Emperor got back to Spain just fifty-three days before del Cano arrived. The news that the first circumnavigation of the globe had been accomplished—accomplished from Spain, by men whom he had sent forth, and in the teeth of the most violent opposition from the king of Portugal—strengthened Charles in the belief that it was his destiny to rule the world. Austriae est imperare orbi universo had already been the motto of the house of Hapsburg for many years past, but hitherto the interpretation of it had been limited to Europe. Now Charles had not only inherited the American lands which had been won under the rule of the Catholic Kings, but he had himself sent forth the first expedition to put a girdle around the globe. And moreover, with the idea that his empire was to be indeed and in truth a world empire, came the added conviction that, for all practical purposes, his Iberian dominions were destined to be the center of it. Traditionally his imperial title was of preeminently German origin, but the power that was to enable him to make that title a reality, to an extent that few of his predecessors had done, was brought to him, it was equally obvious, through his
Spanish inheritance. He had just got back from the Germany where Martin Luther had raised the standard of revolt, to the Spain where revolt had been crushed. He could take advantage of the victory that had been won for him in his absence. Small wonder if all things combined as markedly to draw him closer to his Iberian dominions as, on the occasion of his first visit to the peninsula, they had combined to do the reverse; small wonder if the immediately succeeding years were preeminently the Spanish period of his rule. Through Spain could the destinies of the house of Hapsburg be actually realized; through her could the program of *Plus Oultra* be accomplished, until his family dominions encircled the earth.

If profit was to be derived from the circumnavigation of the globe, it was essential to reassert and fortify Spain’s claims to the Moluccas, by far the most valuable source of revenue that had been found. That claim was bound to be resisted by the Portuguese, and thus to perpetuate the hard feeling between the two nations over the limits of their colonial empires,—a feeling which dated back to the days of Columbus.

It was evident, in the first place, that Magellan’s expedition must be promptly followed up, and before the end of the year 1522, Charles had issued a series of thirty-three ‘privileges’ to any of his subjects who would undertake to fit out ships to go to the Moluccas. But it was not until 1525 that a voyage was actually begun; and in the meantime Charles turned his attention to negotiations with the king of Portugal. On February 4, 1523, he dispatched two ambassadors to his cousin to propose that the limits of their respective jurisdictions on the other side of the globe be determined in accordance with a continuation of the Tordesillas line, but at the same time asserted that the Moluccas clearly belonged to Spain; King John, however, was totally disinclined to concur in this. Clearly the next step was to arrange for a conference of expert scientists and lawyers to discuss the matter; and on April 11, 1524, this conference met at the bridge over the Caya, which forms the boundary between Spain and Portugal. It has gone down into history as the Junta of Badajoz, since its meetings were alternately held in that city and in Yelves. It continued its sessions until May 31. Among the Spanish representatives were Ferdinand Columbus, Juan Sebastian del Cano, Sebastian Cabot, and Juan, the nephew of Amerigo Vespucci. But the conference broke up without reaching any decision. The Spaniards pushed their case aggressively, and even asserted that Sumatra, as well as the Moluccas, clearly fell within their line of demarcation. The Portuguese, on the other hand, played for obstruction and delay. They were, without doubt, in a serious quandary, for if the line should have to be pushed eastward in order to give them the Moluccas, they would inevitably, by the same process, be deprived of Brazil. Under the circumstances, it was impossible to arrive at an agreement, and so Charles turned his attention once more to the sending out of a fresh expedition to assert his claims.

The commander of this new expedition was Garcia Jofre de Loaysa, a native of Ciudad Real, a knight commander of the order of St. John, and a kinsman of the archbishop of Seville (1539-46) of the same name. The armada was to consist of seven vessels, and was fitted out and dispatched from Corunna, whose advantages for the purpose were pointed out to the Emperor in an interesting memorial which has fortunately been preserved to us. Sebastian del Cano was Loaysa’s first lieutenant, and there was the usual galaxy of detailed and provoking instructions as to the course to be steered, the precautions to be observed, the discoveries to be made, the barter to be effected, and the policy to be pursued in regard to the Portuguese. The fleet left Corunna July 24, 1525, and reached the southern part of Patagonia in December, where it encountered storms so violent that the ships were separated and several of them lost; when Loaysa entered the Pacific on May 26,1526, he had only three vessels left. Two months later, on July 30, 1526, Loaysa himself died and was buried at sea; and he was followed, five days after, by Sebastian del Cano, who had succeeded him in command of the armada. When the survivors, on the first day of the year 1527, finally arrived in the Moluccas, it is clear that discipline had utterly broken down; and they soon began to engage in fighting the Portuguese, who were in no mood to be ousted from the position they had won, and returned their hostility with interest.

Meantime, at home, Charles continued to contemplate the sending out of fresh expeditions. A group of Sevillans, fired by the prospects of gain through the spice trade, engaged Sebastian Cabot to pilot a fleet to the Moluccas. The Emperor, hearing of the project, put himself in touch with its originators, gave them the ships that they needed, and, in an agreement of March 4, 1525, fixed the conditions of his concurrence. Cabot was not only to visit the Moluccas, but to pass on to “Tarshish, Ophir, East Cathay, and Cipango”; he was to bring home all the precious stones that he could find; according to Herrera, he was to go by the route that Magellan had followed, but there was also, apparently, high hope in Spain that he would be successful in finding a much shorter way, for the belief in the existence of a strait near the middle of the Western Hemisphere continued to persist, in spite of all discouragements. The expedition was to have set sail in August 1525, but a serious disagreement
between Cabot and the merchants who employed him postponed its departure until the following April. The subsequent development of this lamentable affair, which was to divert the expedition from its original objective and convert it into an exploration of the southeast coast of South America and the estuary of the La Plata, will be taken up in another place; for the present it suffices to observe that it put an end to Charles’s first project for following up the expedition of Loaysa and Cabot.

Other things had meantime occurred to modify the Emperor’s outlook on the whole problem of the Spice Islands. On March 10, 1526, a month before Cabot’s departure, Charles had married his cousin, Isabella of Portugal; peace and amity were proclaimed afresh between Spain and her western neighbor. Under these circumstances it did not seem wise to dispatch another expedition to the Moluccas direct from Spain, for such action could only be construed in hostile fashion by the Portuguese; on the other hand, the Emperor could not persuade himself to abandon the claim which Magellan had established, and which Loaysa and Cabot had been sent out to reinforce. The best solution of the dilemma seemed to lie in the Western Hemisphere where Hernando Cortes and others had by this time established the Spanish power; for America was still regarded as a Spanish outpost on the way to the Spice Islands, quite as much as a new dominion great and valuable in itself. An armada could be sent out from its Pacific coast without fear of arousing the hostility of Portugal, which would not, in all probability, be apprised of its dispatch; and there would be the additional advantage of a much shorter journey. On January 20, 1526, accordingly, Charles sent from Granada, where he was spending his honeymoon, a royal decree to Hernandez Cortes, ordering him to dispatch ships from the west coast of Mexico to the Moluccas, to discover what had become of the ship Trinidad, and of the subsequent expeditions of Loaysa and Cabot.

The story of the ensuing enterprise can be very briefly told. Command of it was given to Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron; it consisted of two ships and a brig; it carried a letter, explaining its objects, from Hernando Cortes to the king of Cebu; it set sail on the last day of October 1527, from the port of Zacatula, at the mouth of the Rio de las Balsas. On December 29, it reached the Ladrones; shortly afterwards it came into contact with natives who had known Castilians, and a little later with survivors of the expeditions of Magellan and Loaysa. There the adventurers became involved, like their predecessors, in negotiations with the natives, and in fighting with the Portuguese. In the course of the next few years they became scattered, many of them finding their way home to Europe by way of India and the Cape of Good Hope. Saavedra Ceron apparently died at sea, in the month of December, 1529, in the course of a futile effort to get back to New Spain; and the ship in which he sailed returned to the “port of Zamafo” in the island of Gilolo, which seems to have temporarily become the principal center of Spanish influence in the East Indies. Altogether, the different expeditions by which Charles had attempted to enforce his claim to the Moluccas had signally failed to accomplish their purpose. The Portuguese, constantly reinforced from India and from Malacca, had maintained the upper hand.

The news of all these events made the Emperor less and less anxious to prolong a struggle in which ultimate success seemed increasingly remote. His affection for his wife was doubtless another element to influence him in the same direction, while the pressure of the war against Francis I, and the need of his presence in Italy, constituted conclusive arguments in favor of a settlement, provided it should prove possible to reach one on reasonable terms. Finance was, as usual, his most urgent problem; and so, finally, on April 23, 1529, at Lerida, on his way to Barcelona and Italy, he put his signature to an agreement which had been reached by his representatives and those of the king of Portugal during the preceding weeks at Saragossa; the treaty of Saragossa is the name it bears today. It provided that in view of the prevailing uncertainty in regard to distance, position, and latitude, and the impossibility of accurately measuring them, the line of demarcation between the possessions of Spain and Portugal on the other side of the globe should be drawn from pole to pole nineteen degrees or 297° 5' leagues east of the Moluccas; that the Emperor should neither claim, trade, nor sail beyond it; and that, in return for this renunciation, the king of Portugal should pay him in instalments the sum of 350,000 ducats. Neither of the contracting parties, as Herrera sagely remarks, had any real idea of what he was buying or selling, and the treaty consequently stipulated that if a subsequent scientific investigation should accurately determine the exact position of the original line of demarcation according to the treaty of Tordesillas, the present agreement should be void and of no effect. This investigation, however, was never made. The line laid down by the treaty of Saragossa continued to be valid, in theory at least, and so far as the Moluccas themselves were concerned, in practice also. They remained in Portuguese hands until, in 1581, Portugal and her colonies were annexed to Spain; twenty-four years later, in 1605, they were seized by the Dutch.

But with the archipelago of St. Lazarus—such was the name that Magellan had given to the group of islands where he had met his death—there was a different tale to tell. As these islands lie in a
northwesterly direction from the Moluccas, they were unquestionably in Portuguese waters; but the Portuguese had done practically nothing to assert their claims to them, and Charles was not the man to let unclaimed territory remain indefinitely without a master. In the years 1538-41 we find him making formal asientos or agreements for the discovery, conquest, and settlement of the “islands in the Southern Sea toward the westward” with Pedro de Alvarado, the adelantado of Guatemala, and with Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy of New Spain. Whether the phrase “islands in the Southern Sea toward the westward” was a definite reference to the archipelago of St. Lazarus, it is impossible to say; but it seems clear that the question of trespassing within the Portuguese demarcation must have been squarely faced, and a decision reached to break the treaty of 1529. Spain and Portugal were now far less friendly than they had then been. The death of the Empress had severed the strongest bond of union between them, and Prince Philip was not yet betrothed to the Portuguese Infanta. On the other hand, the old notion that Spain’s possessions in the New World were in some measure an outpost on the way to the Far East had not yet entirely died out. In the end of the year 1542, accordingly, an expedition was prepared, and set sail (November 1) from Navidad, on the west coast of Mexico, Command of it was given to one Ruy Lopez de Villalobos, a native of Malaga and brother-in-law of the Viceroy Mendoza; it was composed of six vessels, carrying upwards of three hundred and seventy men. After a three months’ voyage, during which numerous minor islands were discovered, the explorers reached Mindanao on February 2, 1543, and christened it Caesárea Karoli—“because it was so great, and gave evidence that the majesty of the name was suited to it.” This appellation, however, did not last; but the name which Villalobos, a few months later, gave the group to which Mindanao belongs—“the Philippines, after our most fortunate Prince”—has endured unchanged until this day.

The christening of the Philippines was the most permanently important thing accomplished by Villalobos. The rest of his stay in the “islands toward the westward” was one long chronicle of struggles with the Portuguese, to whom he was finally obliged to surrender himself; and he died of a fever at Amboina on Good Friday, 1546, receiving the last rites of the church at the hands of St. Francis Xavier. Had he not labelled the islands with a Spanish name, it seems probable that the work he had started would not have been continued, and that the Portuguese would have been left undisturbed within their line of demarcation, as provided in the treaty of 1529. As it was, his renaming of the archipelago of St. Lazarus paved the way for its permanent occupation by Legazpi in the succeeding reign. It was the last expedition to the “islands toward the westward” during the Emperor’s life, and taken by itself, it was assuredly neither creditable nor successful. It was sent out on a quest which no interpretation of the treaty of Saragossa could possible justify. It failed to effect any permanent Spanish settlement in the islands which it visited. Yet it managed to prevent the extinction of the name and fame of Spain in that part of the world. It preserved the memory of Magellan’s great exploit. It was a challenge to the conquistadors of the reign of the Prudent King to carry further the great work that had been begun under his father. Whether that challenge and its subsequent acceptance by Legazpi was an advantage or the reverse to the Spanish Empire as a whole is a difficult question. The subsequent development of the American possessions proceeded at such a pace in the ensuing years that the Moluccas and the adjacent islands were soon relegated to the background; moreover, Spain’s battle line, at the Emperor’s death, was so far flung that she emphatically needed rather to contract than to expand it. On the other hand, her final acquisition of the Philippines in 1571 was to make her empire a world empire to a degree that it could not otherwise have been. Together with her contemporaneous victory over the Turks at Lepanto, and her subsequent annexation of Portugal and its dependencies, it placed the capstone upon the edifice of her preponderance throughout the globe.
“I AM the man who has given your Majesty more provinces than your ancestors left you cities”. Such was the haughty reply which the Emperor is said to have received, when he angrily demanded the name of a gray-haired Spaniard, who had ventured to push himself through the jostling crowd and mount the steps of the imperial carriage in a desperate effort to attract Charles's attention. The picture that the story conjures up—of a daring, devoted, and incredibly effective servant of the crown, whose successes had aroused the jealousy of his master, and who was consequently suffered to die in obscurity—was already a familiar one in the history of Spain, and destined to become still more so as the years rolled on. The boast, on this occasion, may not have been literally substantiated by the facts, but the man who made it was unquestionably the chief founder of the Spanish power in the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.

His name was Hernando Cortes, and he was born in the year 1485, at the little town of Medellin, on the Guadiana—the scion of parents of gentle though not distinguished ancestry, without much property or political influence. Destined by his father for the law, he was sent at fourteen to the University of Salamanca to study that profession; but his career there was less notable for his academic attainments than for his fondness for brawling and amorous adventures. After two years it became evident that he was best fitted for a military calling; and after wandering for some time between Italy and the Indies as the most favorable scene upon which to begin, he finally decided in favor of the latter, and sailed in a trading vessel for Española in 1504. His character at that time, though not yet fully developed, gave clear promise of what it was to be. Calculated audacity formed the basis of it, and, coupled with a truly Napoleonic ability to seize opportunities and to estimate men, furnishes the key to his brilliant successes. Zealous, like all true Spaniards, for the advancement of the faith, determined to effect the subjugation of the Indians, and get possession of their treasures, he shrank from no means to accomplish these ends; yet there are few instances in his whole career in which he was cruel or bloodthirsty without a purpose. In his care for his person and dress, in his passion for gambling, and in the looseness of his relations with women, he was typical of the Spaniard of his day and generation; but he kept business and pleasure rigidly separate, and when he recognized the moment for decisive action, drove forward with a power that refused to be denied. His followers could not resist the magic of his appeal. Under his leadership they attempted and achieved the impossible.

For the first six years after reaching the New World, he found little opportunity to exercise his particular talents. He announced, on arrival, that he had come to seek for gold, and not to till the soil; but save for distinguishing himself in sundry encounters with rebel Indians, he lived for the most part on his repartimiento at Daiguao. In 1511, however, a new field was opened to him. One of the first acts of Diego Columbus, who had succeeded Ovando as Governor of Española in 1509, was to fit out an expedition for the conquest of Cuba. Command of it was given to Diego Velasques, who had already risen to wealth and fame in the Indies, and Cortes was among the earliest to volunteer. The invaders easily accomplished their object. The unwarlike natives could make no effective resistance, and were slaughtered wholesale; by the summer of 1514 the Spaniards were virtually in control of the entire island; a year later they had founded seven towns, of which the most important was that of Santiago.

Cortes showed valor and skill in the conquest of Cuba; he won a high place in the esteem of his comrades, and also, at first, of the Governor Velasquez. But the relations of the two men soon changed for the worse. According to Cortes’s chaplain and apologist—the chronicler, Francisco Lopez de Gomara—the trouble originated in Cortes’s refusal to fulfil his promise to marry a lady whom he had persuaded to become his mistress; the Governor took the matter up, there were a trial, two imprisonments, and subsequently miraculous escapes. In the history of Las Casas, who was at that time in Cuba, and an eyewitness of the scenes he describes, the source of the difficulty is reported as a plot, in which Cortes was deeply involved, to lodge complaints against Velasquez before the royal judges at Española, in order to get him removed from his post. There is better reason to accept this story than the first. Injuries to women were too frequent in Spanish America to enlist the intervention of the constituted authorities, and the story of Las Casas fits in well with what we know of Cortes’s character and ambitions. Whatever the facts about the origin of their quarrel, it would appear that outwardly some sort of a reconciliation was patched up between the two men; Cortés married the lady he had wronged;
Velasquez conferred on him the office of alcalde, and actually stood godfather to one of his children. But smoldering jealousy and distrust still remained. Each man had formed his estimate of the other, and longed to sweep him from his path. Both might be forced to dissemble for a time, but an opportunity to give vent to their real feelings was ultimately bound to come.

Cuba was at that time an improvement on Española from the point of view of the Spaniard who had come out to seek his fortune; yet its supply of gold and potential slaves was by no means inexhaustible. Schemes for an expedition to Tierra Firme, further westward, began to take shape, and in 1517 a certain Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba, with the help of Velasquez, got together a fleet of three vessels, and set sail. After a passage of twenty-one days, they reached Cape Catoche, on the northwest point of Yucatan. The natives gave them a hostile reception. Forty-eight of their number were killed, two captured, and the rest wounded, including Cordoba, who died of his injuries a few days after his return to Cuba; on the other hand, the survivors took two of the Indians prisoners, and brought back glowing reports of the gold that they had seen, at which “we felt well content, for at that time Peru was unknown.” It seemed worthwhile to follow up the expedition, and accordingly Velasquez sent out a larger armada in May, 1518, under the command of his kinsman, Juan de Grijalba, with instructions to continue the discoveries of Cordoba, and establish, if possible, trading relations with the natives. Grijalba reached the island of Cozumel after a short and pleasant voyage, coasted around the end of Yucatan, and came down along the shores of the Gulf of Campeachy, past the mouth of the Tabasco, which he named for himself, to an island off the harbor of what was subsequently to be Vera Cruz, where he reported finding recent proofs of cannibalism and human sacrifices. Thence he passed over to a smaller island close at hand, which he christened, through a misunderstanding of a native word, by the name of San Juan de Ulua. There he became convinced of the necessity for further help and formal authorization to begin to colonize. He accordingly dispatched one of his followers—Pedro de Alvarado, with whom he was not on good terms—to the Governor Velasquez, in Cuba, to seek for what he desired.

The governor, in the meantime, having become very impatient at not receiving any news from Grijalba, sent out another adventurer—Cristobal de Olid—to look for him. But Olid, soon after reaching Cozumel, encountered heavy weather and was obliged to return with his mission unaccomplished. Soon after Olid got back, Alvarado also arrived, and the news and the specimens of gold that he brought with him determined Velasquez to send out a still larger fleet. The reasons that led him to give command of it to Hernando Cortes, in view of the difficulties that had arisen between them in the past, have been variously estimated by different historians, and there is no possibility of obtaining certainty on the point. The whole of the Indian administration at that time was so honeycombed with official jealousy and suspicion that men like Velasquez were constantly reversing their policies; the enemy of one day was often the friend of the next, and cause and effect are difficult to trace. The appointment of Cortes is usually attributed to the influence of two favorites of the governor. They are said to have formed a partnership with the future conqueror for a share of all spoils that his expedition might obtain. It is also not impossible that something may have been due to the influence of Alvarado, in view of what we know of his subsequent career, and of the fact that he was already at odds with Grijalba. At any rate, when Grijalba finally got back to Cuba, in the midst of the preparations for the new expedition, we know that he was coldly received by Velasquez, who was obviously determined to have a fresh deal all around. Meantime, the governor took pains to look out for his own interests, and sent back to Spain for a formal authorization to conquer, settle, and trade with the lands that had been so recently discovered.

Cortes saw in the appointment he had received the chance for which he had been waiting ever since he came out to the Indies. It was the opportunity of a lifetime to make a fortune and win renown. A gambler by nature, he resolved to stake everything on the venture before him. The accounts vary as to the proportions of the cost borne by him and by Velasquez, but it is clear that Cortes put into it every ducat that he could raise. The feverish energy of his preparations threw the town of Santiago into a whirlwind of excitement. The inevitable jealousy was aroused, and communicated itself to the governor, who finally decided to revoke Cortes’s appointment. Cortes, however, was warned in time to forestall Velasquez’s intentions by a characteristic stroke. By superhuman exertions, he rushed his men and supplies on board the ships on the very day that he received the news (Las Casas tells us that he bought up the whole meat supply of Santiago and paid for it with the gold chain that hung around his neck); and after taking leave of the governor, stood down the bay. Whether, as Bernal Diaz del Castillo asserts, that leave taking was public, outwardly friendly, and in presence “of all the most distinguished citizens of the town,” so as to shame Velasquez into desisting from his purpose; or whether, as Las Casas would have us believe”, the departure of Cortes resembled a flight, with futile and undignified recrimination at the water’s edge, it is clear that the two men parted foes. In addition to the memory of their ancient quarrel, their interests in the present venture were diametrically opposed. Unless Cortes were ousted
Cortés left Santiago on November 18, 1518, and for the next three months, as he himself long afterwards described it, played the “gentle corsair” along the Cuban shores. Neither his army nor his stores were yet adequate for his purposes; and as he slowly proceeded westward, he steadily increased them, by either seizing or purchasing what he wanted from the settlements where he landed, or from the ships that he chanced to meet. Velasquez sent constant orders to displace or imprison him, but it was observed that those who bore them never ventured to carry them out, and invariably ended by joining with Cortés himself. Never had the magnetism of the great conqueror been so evident before; it was like a triumphal procession. When, on February 10, 1519, he finally left the shores of Cuba for Yucatan, his armada consisted of eleven vessels, one of one hundred tons, three of from seventy to eighty, and the rest caravels and open brigantines. They carried upwards of 600 soldiers, including a certain number of Cuban Indians, the two natives of Yucatan who had been captured by Cordoba two years before and were indispensable as interpreters, and 100 mariners. Olid, Alvarado, and other well-known cavaliers were among them, and also, fortunately for posterity, that sturdy soldier historian, Bernal Díaz del Castillo. Ten brass cannon, and some smaller pieces called falconets, together with a plentiful supply of ammunition, formed an essential part of their equipment; the adventurers also brought with them sixteen horses, and the supreme importance that was attached to their presence is attested by the great difficulties involved in their transportation, and by the care with which the old chronicler describes them one by one. Altogether it was an imposing armament; but after all, the expedition’s best prospect of success rested on the fact that its indomitable leader had burned all his bridges behind him; that retreat, in the face of the enmity of Velasquez, was impossible; that he had to go forward because he could not go back. Had he known of the terrific difficulties which he was soon to encounter, and had honorable retirement been an open alternative, it is possible that even his stout heart would have quailed. It was the absence of all chance of retracing his steps that explains the astounding success of his memorable adventure.

Another result of the fact that Cortés had set sail in defiance of the constituted authority of the governor of Cuba was that he was scrupulously careful to act, in every particular, after his departure, in the strictest possible accordance with the principles of law and justice. Sooner or later, if he proved to be successful, he would have to gain the sanction of the Emperor in Spain, over the head of his enemy, Velasquez; and the surest way to do this would be to show himself worthy of the imperial confidence. Discipline was enforced with the utmost rigidity. Maltreatment or robbery of the natives was severely punished, for Cortés’s announced policy at the outset was to respect the persons and property of the Indians, provided they accepted the Christian religion and the sovereignty of Spain. A certain formality was even observed in the process of demanding this acceptance. A requerimiento or summons, containing a most unhistorical account of the origin of the primacy of Roman Christianity, was invariably pronounced whenever a new district was reached, regardless of whether or not any Indians were near enough to hear it, or able to understand it if they were. The bull of Alexander VI was also read to prove the title of the king of Spain. Such a proceeding was obviously a hollow mockery in fact. In theory, however, it salved the conscience of the legalist, and it also had a good effect upon the soldiery.

A few words must be inserted at this point in regard to the origin and civilization of the native peoples with whom Cortés was to come into contact; for the Indians of Yucatan and Mexico were infinitely further advanced than those whom the Spaniards had already encountered in the islands. The earliest race, of which we have any real knowledge, to inhabit the southeastern part of Mexico, and the northern half of what is now Central America, is known as the Mayas. This people exhibited in their ancient native culture what is probably on the whole the highest aboriginal development that has yet been found to have existed in the Western Hemisphere. There are clear traces of centralized governments and legal systems. Trade and agriculture were highly developed. Architectural ruins and hieroglyphic inscriptions have furnished the material for the most interesting and valuable archaeological discoveries of the last two decades. The accuracy of the scientific observations of the Mayas is illustrated by the excellence of the calendar they invented; and the enduring qualities of their native language are attested by the fact that it has not only held its own against the Spanish, but in certain cases actually supplanted it; for there are families of pure white blood in Yucatan today who know no other speech than the Mayan.

Into the regions immediately northwest of the Mayan territory, there had been a series of migrations, from at least as early as the eighth century of our era, by tribes who came down from farther northward still; and these migrations reached their culmination in the year 1325, with the arrival of the
The dominant characteristic of these Aztec invaders was their passion for fighting: indeed it is doubtful if a more warlike race (save possibly a few of the African tribes) has ever existed on the face of the globe. Everything combined to magnify and exalt the profession of arms; religion, education, and public life were alike directed to the promotion of it. The Aztec priesthood held the whole people in a grip of iron, and directed its chief attention to the worship of the god of war; their principal religious festivals were bloody sacrifices of the most distinguished of their war captives, whose bodies were afterwards often served up in a solemn ceremonial banquet for their captors. Their discipline in action evoked the admiration of the Spaniards; the surest road to honor and advancement was to win distinction on the field of battle; cowardice or desertion was punishable by death. In other respects the Aztec civilization presented strange contrasts between enlightenment and barbarism. Their systems of government and taxation were orderly and secure. Justice was administered by regular tribunals, and the rights of private property were respected and recognized. Their public couriers were more rapid and efficient than those of Europe. They had accomplished notable things in architecture and engineering. Their picture writing had reached, a high stage of perfection. They were extraordinarily skillful in many trades and arts. They had made great strides in astronomy and in medicine; and homes for the aged were provided at the public expense. Yet they possessed no beasts of burden nor milk-producing animals; they had no coinage; iron, tin, and lead were unknown to them, as was also every kind of cereal except maize. Above all, the dark authority of the sacerdotal order, and the terrible rites of their polytheistic faith—the repulsive images and revolting sacrifices—served to oppress the vast mass of the people with a sense of superstitious awe, and opposed an insurmountable barrier to the attainment of the higher culture which their gentler Mayan neighbors to the south had already won.

The boundaries of the region that acknowledged the Aztec overlordship at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards are impossible accurately to determine; but it seems clear that it stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, covering the bulk of the southern portion of the present republic of Mexico, and also a small part of that of Guatemala, with isolated colonies stretching down to Panama. The center of it was the island city of Tenochtitlan, or Mexico, connected with the shores of Lake Texcoco by three giant causeways, each of them several miles in length and wide enough to permit ten horsemen to ride abreast. It numbered, apparently, at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, about sixty thousand families, and save for the royal palaces, and the great solid pyramidal teocalli or temple, was probably chiefly composed of adobe huts. It was the chief residence of the Aztec ruler, Montezuma, who had occupied the throne since the year 1502. He had begun his career as a soldier, but subsequently passed into the priesthood; and it was this curious mixture in the training that he had received that chiefly accounts for his fatal hesitations in dealing with the Spaniards. Personally brave, he was also grossly superstitious; and when once convinced that the invaders were the supernatural beings whose coming had been predicted by the Aztec oracles, the spirit of resistance died within him, and he tamely submitted to their most outrageous demands.

The Spaniards reached the island of Cozumel on February 18, where they were received by the natives in such friendly fashion that Cortés promptly tried to instruct them in the mysteries of the Christian faith. To judge from his own account of the affair, his efforts were most successful; but a more probable explanation of the apparent readiness of the Indians to be converted is the fact that the cross which they were asked to adore happened also to be the symbol of their own god of rain. It was at this time also that Cortés had the incredible good fortune to pick up a Spaniard, Jeronimo de Aguilar, who had once been settled in the colony at Darién, but had subsequently been shipwrecked on the shores of Yucatan, while trying to cross over from Tierra Firme to Espanola. Since that time he had become thoroughly Indianized; he had learned to speak Mayan and had married a Mayan wife, and was invaluable as an interpreter in Yucatan. But that was by no means all. When the Spaniards passed on to the mouth of the Tabasco River, they were fiercely attacked by the natives, whom they defeated with great slaughter at Cintla on March 25. This battle was of much value to the invaders in more ways than one. It gave them experience in the native methods of warfare, and confidence in their own ability to defeat them. It resulted in the submission of the entire region to their authority, and the formal acceptance by the inhabitants of the Christian faith. And, finally, it caused the local cacique to hand over to Cortés, as a pledge of his obedience, a present of twenty female slaves, of whom one, a Mexican
woman who was rechristened Marina, was to be his chief means of communication with the Aztecs in the succeeding months. But it was solely through Aguilar that Marina, who had known Mayan in her youth, was able in turn to communicate with Cortés; each one of these precious discoveries supplemented the other, and the good luck by which the Spanish leader had been able to secure them seems still more striking when we read that the best of the Indian interpreters who had been brought over from Cuba had already succeeded in deserting to the foe. On Palm Sunday the Spaniards sailed away from Tabasco, which they renamed, before their departure, Santa María de la Victoria; at midday on Holy Thursday, April 21, they cast anchor at the island of San Juan de Ulúa. On the morrow, Good Friday, they set foot on the mainland, on the site of the modern town of Vera Cruz.

The four months (April 22-August 16, 1519) that elapsed between the landing of the Spaniards and the beginning of their march inland are remarkable, on the one hand, for a complete change in the official status of the expedition, and, on the other, for the development of relations with the natives. These two processes went on simultaneously and exercised an important influence upon each other. For the sake of clearness, however, it will be better to examine them separately.

Despite the fascination of Cortés’s personality, there still remained a considerable faction of the Spaniards which was convinced that the supreme authority of Velasquez should be maintained, and felt that it was the first duty of the expedition to follow implicitly the instructions he had given it. These instructions—to preach the Gospel, establish trading relations, and obtain treasure—had now, these men argued, been practically fulfilled; it was consequently time to go back and report. These arguments were reinforced by the hardships and sufferings the expedition had undergone. The camp had been pitched in a most unsanitary spot; before the end of May, some thirty men had died. A party was sent north along the coast to discover a more favorable place, which was finally found, some dozen leagues away; and Cortés gave orders that the camp be transplanted thither. This command was the signal for a vigorous remonstrance by the Velasquez faction, and for a definite demand that the whole expedition return to Cuba; and greatly were the grumblers amazed when Cortés, instead of refusing, showed himself disposed to comply. But they little realized the craft, the ambition, or the prescience of their leader. Cortés had plainly foreseen what was coming, and had already prepared to meet it. He had made sure of the support of some of the ablest of his followers. He had learned much of the internal conditions of the Aztec empire. He was now quite convinced that it would be possible to overthrow it, and to win glory and treasure unlimited thereby; and his adherents had circulated the news among the soldiers and successfully appealed to their cupidity and ambition. When it was known that he had acceded to the request for a return to Cuba, there was an outburst of disappointment. Not only did the Velasquez faction find itself outnumbered; a counter demand was now made that a colony forthwith be founded, subject only to the authority of the Spanish crown, and entirely independent of that of Velasquez; and before long it became evident that this was to be the way out.

There only remained the question of methods, and here it was Cortés’s far-sighted resolve to observe the forms of law that ultimately gave the solution. The mediaeval traditions of Castilian municipal independence were pressed into service. Cortés nominated all the officers of the first ayuntamiento of the Villa Rica de Vera Cruz—alcaldes, regidores, alcaldes, and the rest; into the hands of the body thus formed he resigned his commission; by it, in turn, he was unanimously appointed, in the name of the Emperor, captain general and chief justice of the newly founded colony. The supreme authority under the Spanish crown was now in his hands, and he straightway proceeded to fortify it in such fashion as to preclude the possibility of its overthrow. On July 16 he dispatched a ship with two envoys direct to Spain, bearing letters to the Emperor, telling him exactly what had occurred, and begging him to confirm all that had been done; the whole of the treasure which had already been collected was sent back at the same time as a present to his Majesty. And the grand culmination of his carefully laid plans was the scuttling of the remaining ships which had brought him to Mexico, as they rode at anchor off the shores of Vera Cruz, thus cutting off all possibility of retreat for the faint hearted, and making death the sole alternative to absolute success in the stupendous venture against the mighty Aztec empire, upon which he had now resolved to stake his entire fortune.

Meantime, while establishing his own ascendancy and authority over his followers, Cortés skillfully prepared the way for the work of conquest that lay before him. An embassy from Montezuma appeared at the Spanish camp on Easter Sunday, two days after the landing; from it and its successors Cortés got much valuable information. Montezuma, it was clear, had no wish to receive the Spaniards, and at first flatly refused Cortés’s request for an interview; on the other hand, it soon became equally evident that he was very much afraid of them, and inclined to believe that they were really gods. More important still, Cortés soon became apprised of the fact that the rule of Montezuma was by no means universally acceptable to all his subjects. There was an ambitious pretender who aspired to dethrone
him. There were various regions, most of them recently conquered, which longed to rise in revolt. One
of these regions was the town and district of Cempoala, which Cortés and his followers visited on their
way northward to the new site which had been selected farther up the coast. It was ruled by a cacique so
fat that Bernal Díaz decided to “call him by this name”, and it was so well built and amply provisioned
that the Spaniards compared it to Seville and Villaviciosa. One day was enough to enable Cortés and his
men to persuade the cacique to defy Montezuma and transfer his allegiance to the king of Spain; nay
more, the cacique followed the Spaniards on to the next town, Quiahuitzlan, to make certain that its
ruler imitated his example, and that the Spaniards did not repent of their decision to protect him. While
the Spaniards were at Quiahuitzlan, an event occurred which Cortés utilized to his own advantage with
even more than his usual adroitness. Five tax gatherers from Montezuma arrived to collect tribute, and
to demand the surrender of twenty sacrificial victims, in punishment for violating Montezuma’s orders
not to receive the dreaded Spaniards, whom they openly flouted as they passed them. Cortés thereupon
ordered the local cacique to refuse to yield the tribute or the victims, and to imprison the tax gatherers,
thus definitely committing the cacique to open rebellion. Then suddenly reversing his policy, he took
the five tax-gatherers out of the hands of their jailers, and, after assuring them that he had thereby saved
them from death, sent two of them back to Montezuma, to prove his good will and the friendliness of
his intentions. Thus with one and the same stroke, he had won valuable allies, and allayed the hostility
of the power he had resolved to conquer. Meantime he strengthened his hold on Cempoala and
Quiahuitzlan by spreading the notion that he and his followers were demi-gods, certain to bring victory
to any cause they espoused; while the building of the new town of Vera Cruz in the immediate
neighborhood gave him a coign of vantage from which to detect the slightest sign of disloyalty. Finally,
he demolished the local idols, and demanded and obtained the acceptance of Christianity. Dread of the
loss of the precious alliance of the divine strangers proved an effectual deterrent to any serious
resistance.

The march to Mexico began on August 16, 1519. The expedition numbered between three and four
hundred foot soldiers, fifteen or sixteen horsemen, and six pieces of artillery. Forty native chiefs
accompanied it as counsellors and guides, and there was a considerable force of Indian soldiers and
porters. The route for several days lay steadily upward; the luxuriant vegetation of the tierra caliente
gave way to the pine clad slopes of the Sierra Madre; the snowy summit of Orizaba shone out on the
left. After six days the Spaniards entered a high and fertile valley, and, crossing it, arrived at the town of
Xocotla, whose chief, doubtless instructed beforehand by Montezuma, sought to dissuade them from
continuing their march to Mexico. Finding, however, that they were resolved to proceed, he advised
them to pass through the city of Cholula, and leave the independent republic of Tlascala on one side.
But the Cempoalan chiefs assured Cortes that this was a ruse; the Cholulans, they declared, were
notoriously treacherous, and on the friendliest possible terms with Montezuma. The Tlascalans, on the
other hand, were enemies of the Aztecs and therefore more likely to be favorable to the Spaniards.
Toward Tlascala Cortes accordingly directed his force, sending on ahead “a letter to the Tlascalans,
although we knew that they could not read it, and also a red fluffy Flemish hat, such as was then worn.”

The Tlascalans found it difficult to decide how to receive their mysterious visitors, but finally
elected to lure them on by the appearance of friendship, and then suddenly to fall upon them unawares.
The Spaniards were suffered to pass unmolested through the opening in the great wall which served as
the frontier of the republic, and to advance some dozen miles beyond it; but Cortés was keenly on the
watch to prevent a surprise, and kept his force in constant readiness to do battle. It was fortunate that he
did so, for on September 2, two days after passing the great wall, the Spaniards found themselves
suddenly surrounded by a vast host of hostile Indians, which Cortés estimates at no less than one
hundred thousand men. Any such figure as that is ridiculously inadmissible; yet there can be no
reasonable doubt that the Spaniards were outnumbered, in this, and in many succeeding battles, in the
proportions of ten to twenty to one, and even more; and some explanation is consequently necessary to
account for the regularity with which they emerged victorious. The comparative ineffectiveness of the
natives' weapons, and their massed formations, on which the Spanish artillery and smaller arms did
such deadly execution, their natural amazement at the guns and the horses, and their superstitious
conviction that the invaders were demi-gods, have all been held partially responsible for what actually
occurred; but the capitaly important element in the case was the fact that the Indians were invariably
less anxious to kill their enemies than to capture them alive to be sacrificed to their war god. None of
the contemporary chroniclers states this in so many words; but the more one reads, the more inevitable
seems the conclusion. It explains the way in which they crowded around single Spaniards, and used
their darts and spiked clubs to wound rather than to kill. It certainly went a long way towards account-
The eighteen days which elapsed between this second battle and the entrance of the Spaniards into the Tlascalan capital on the twenty-third show Cortés at the height of his powers as a diplomat and a master of men. Of military operations they were virtually empty, save for one abortive night attack by the Tlascalans on the Spanish camp, and an expedition of Cortés to destroy some neighboring villages. Politically, however, they were crucial in the extreme. From Cortés’s viewpoint, they opened darkly; for the sufferings and hardships the Spaniards had undergone had sapped the courage of the fainthearted; the old Velasquez faction raised its head, and had to be cajoled and bullied back into obedience. But the Tlascalans had clearly had enough of fighting, and before long an embassy from them appeared at the Spanish camp to sue for peace. This embassy, however, had been preceded by one from Montezuma, which came to congratulate the Spaniards on their victories, to offer them rich gifts, and to bribe them not to advance farther. Montezuma even promised to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Spanish king, and pay him any tribute in token of it that he should desire, provided Cortés would renounce his intention of visiting the Aztec capital. It was a fresh revelation of Mexican wealth, and of the weakness and vacillation of the Mexican ruler; and it came in the nick of time for the purposes of Cortés, for the spectacle of the humiliation of their Tlascalan foes enhanced the respect of the Aztecs for the Spaniards. Cortés graciously accepted the gifts of Montezuma, but refused to bind himself not to advance; moreover, he kept all but two of the envoys as his guests, for they served as hostages for the good behavior of the Aztec emperor, who forthwith sent on another embassy, with even richer presents than before, to express his solicitude for the safety of the Spaniards, and to warn them against the perfidy of their Tlascalan hosts; while the latter, needless to add, replied in kind. The Spanish leader had, in fact, attained a position where he was simultaneously courted by both the rival powers; but it was evidently the part of wisdom to hold fast to the Tlascalans. Peace and alliance were duly concluded. The Spaniards made a solemn entrance into the capital, where they were received with every mark of friendliness and respect. There was the usual exposition of the Christian faith and demand that it be accepted and the idols cast down. At this, however, the Tlascalans demurred. The most they would do was to admit the Christian God to a parity with their own; “they would not leave off making sacrifices even if they were killed for it”; and, at the advice of his chaplain, Cortés reluctantly accepted this compromise. Meantime the Spanish commander got much precious information out of his hosts, especially in regard to conditions in Mexico, and its hostile relations with Tlascal in the past.

The submission of the Tlascalans had its effect on Montezuma. He now abandoned his attempts to induce the Spaniards to turn back and sent an embassy to invite them to visit him in Mexico. He furthermore advised them to travel by way of the town of Cholula, some twenty miles to the southwest of Tlascal, assuring them that the inhabitants were his vassals and friends, and would give his guests a most cordial welcome. The Tlascalans warned Cortés that Cholula would prove a trap, and that Montezuma planned to use it to effect their destruction. They told him that the Cholulans had dug pitfalls in the streets, and gathered stones upon the housetops with which to kill their guests. They besought him on no account to go there. But Cortés was convinced that to show weakness would be fatal. He sent the Cholulans the regular message, demanding that they submit to his authority, and accept the Christian faith, and on October 12 started to march toward their city, taking a large force of Tlascalans with him to help his Spanish followers. Outside the city he was welcomed by the inhabitants with every appearance of friendliness. On entering it he was conducted to a spacious dwelling place, while his men were encamped in the sacred square enclosure where the temple stood; but there were also signs that treachery was in the wind. Ambassadors from Montezuma came and went. There were traces of the pitfalls of which the Tlascalans had spoken. Finally, Marina obtained from a Cholulan woman the information that there was a plot for a wholesale massacre of the Spaniards; Montezuma, it seemed, was the originator of it, for he had been told by his oracles that Cholula was to be the grave of strangers. Clearly the only means of safety was to forestall the plotters, and with characteristic promptness, Cortés adopted it. The chief caciques and a host of their followers were enticed inside the enclosure where the Spaniards were, and where every preparation had been made for their destruction. The caciques were taken aside and taxed with their treachery. When they attempted to lay the blame on Montezuma, Cortés pretended to be infuriated by such defamation of his friend and ally. A musket shot was fired, as a preconcerted signal, “and”, as Cortés grimly describes it, “we did such execution that in two hours more than three thousand persons had perished.”

The report of the massacre, when carried to Mexico, threw Montezuma into such a panic of fear and of doubt as to render him incapable of decisive action. The Spaniards stayed on at Cholula until the beginning of November, and in the meantime received a stream of conflicting messages from the Aztec ruler. At first they tried to dissuade them from coming; then he sent them a large present of gold, and
assured them that he longed to receive them and do them honor. It was also during this period that Cortés sent ten of his followers to make the ascent of Popocatapetl, which with its twin sister, Ixtaccihuatl, guards the sides of the high pass over which the Spaniards would have to go on their way to Mexico. As the mountain, at that time, was in active eruption, the adventurers were unable to reach the summit; they got nearly to the top, however, “and so high was it, that, when they were up there, the smoke began to come out, and they say it came with such an impetuosity and noise as if the entire mountain was about to sink; so they descended, and brought with them a considerable quantity of snow and icicles, which seemed a strange thing to see in these parts, for according to the opinion of the pilots, they belong to the tropics.” On their way up Popocatapetl, the Spaniards got a look into the great valley of Lake Texcoco, with the city of Mexico seeming to rest upon its surface; they also discovered an excellent road to it, and God knows,” as Cortés wrote to the Emperor, “how happy I was about it.”

The first seven days of the month of November were occupied by a leisurely advance from Cholula to Iztapalapa, on the end of a promontory jutting out into Lake Texcoco. Cortés’s forces now probably consisted of about three hundred and fifty Spaniards and a few thousand Tlascalans, for most of the Cempoalans had turned back at Cholula, and some losses had been sustained in the different battles that had taken place. As the invaders advanced, they became more and more encouraged. Gifts and prayers from Montezuma showed how completely he had been cowed, and the territory through which they passed proved to be restive under the Aztec yoke. Their admiration, too, was aroused by the great beauties of the scene spread out before their eyes—the grandeur of the mountains, the charm of the floating gardens, the gorgeous flowers and well built houses; and their cupidity was likewise stimulated by the unmistakable evidences of wealth and treasure that met their gaze. On Tuesday, November 8, the climax came, when the Aztec emperor, accompanied by two hundred chiefs, appeared at the north end of the great southern causeway to welcome formally the representative of Charles V. Never before had the civilizations of the Old and the New Worlds been confronted with one another in such dramatic fashion. The interview that followed is described in detail in Cortés’s second letter: —

“When I approached”, wrote the Conqueror, “to speak to Montezuma, I took off a collar of pearls and glass diamonds, that I wore, and put it on his neck, and, after we had gone through some of the streets, one of his servants came with two collars, wrapped in a cloth, which were made of coloured shells. These they esteem very much; and from each of the collars hung eight golden shrimps executed with great perfection and a span long. When he received them, he turned towards me, and put them on my neck, and again went on through the streets, as I have already indicated, until we came to a large and handsome house, which he had prepared for our reception. There he took me by the hand, and led me into a spacious room, in front of the court where we had entered, where he made me sit on a very rich platform, which had been ordered to be made for me, and told me to wait there; and then he went away. After a little while, when all the people of my company were distributed to their quarters, he returned with many valuables of gold and silver work, and five or six thousand pieces of rich cotton stuffs, woven, and embroidered in divers ways. After he had given them to me, he sat down on another platform, which they immediately prepared near the one where I was seated, and being seated”, he made Cortés a long speech in which he virtually conceded everything, acknowledging his vassalage to the Conqueror’s distant sovereign, and placing himself and all that he had at the disposal of the king of Spain. “And then,” continues Bernal Diaz del Castillo, “he went to his palaces, which were not far away, and we divided our lodgings by companies, and placed the artillery pointing in a convenient direction, and the order which we had to keep was clearly explained to us, and that we were to be much on the alert, both the cavalry and all of our soldiers. A sumptuous dinner was provided for us, according to their use and custom, and we ate it at once.... Thanks to our Lord Jesus Christ for it all.”

The events of the next six days served to convince the Spaniards that, however reckless they had been in entering the Aztec capital, they would have to be more reckless still if they desired to remain there in safety. The inevitable differences of opinion at once arose with Montezuma as to whether or not the Aztecs should embrace Christianity and abandon their own gods. This Cortés demanded when he formally returned the Aztec emperor’s visit the day after his arrival, and again, more insistently, four days later, when he had been taken to look at the great teocalli and saw signs of the horrors that had recently been enacted there. But Montezuma courteously and firmly declined to do more than permit the invaders to worship their own God in their own way. The Aztec gods, he assured them, were also very good, and he begged his guests to say nothing more to their dishonor. Clearly the Spaniards could not submit to a rebuff like this without serious loss of prestige; moreover, as they surveyed the city from the heights of the teocalli, another ominous thought occurred. Would it be possible for them to get out of Mexico alive, if the friendship of their hosts should be exchanged for hostility? Let the drawbridges on the various causeways be raised, and they would be absolutely cut off in the midst of their enemies, who, if they could not overwhelm them by force of numbers, would certainly be able to kill them by
starvation. The only road to safety lay in anticipating their potential foe, and the method by which it was finally resolved to do so was as characteristic of Cortés as was his anticipation of Velasquez at the time of his departure from Cuba. The sole way to cow the Mexicans was to seize the person of Montezuma, thus demonstrating, in dramatic fashion, the superiority of the power and authority of the Spaniards. A pretext was found in the murder, by one of Montezuma’s local representatives named Quauhpopoca, who ruled over the region near the present town of Tuxpan, of a couple of Spaniards who had been sent to escort him to Vera Cruz, in order that he might acknowledge the suzerainty of the king of Spain. The facts of the case were by no means clear, but Cortés chose to pretend that Quauhpopoca had acted throughout on Montezuma’s orders, and that he even had been commanded to destroy the Spanish garrison that had been left behind at Vera Cruz. On Monday, November 14, Cortés visited Montezuma and confronted him with this tale. He further requested that the Aztec emperor have the conduct of his lieutenant forthwith investigated. Finally he insisted, as a pledge of his sincerity and determination to have justice done, that Montezuma should at once take up his residence at the Spanish headquarters. At first the Aztec emperor seemed horrified at this demand; but on being assured by Marina that he would be well treated if he came quietly, but killed on the spot if he resisted, he finally gave his consent. As the imperial litter passed through the streets, borne by the attendants, and guarded by the Spaniards, signs of commotion were apparent, but Montezuma ordered it stopped, and “thus all was as completely quiet as though nothing had happened ... And I, and those of my company,” as Cortés naively adds, “did everything we could to please him.”

The next six months were spent by the Spaniards in utilizing the consequences of this daring coup d’état. Quauhpopoca, his son, and fifteen of his followers were caught, sent to Mexico, interrogated, and promptly burned alive in front of Montezuma’s quarters, and, “so that there could be no obstruction while they were being burned, Cortés ordered shackles to be put on Montezuma himself ... and if before this he was scared, he was then much more so”. After the burning, the fetters were removed, and a long and outwardly friendly conversation between the Aztec emperor and his captor took place; its chief result was to show how utterly all Montezuma’s power of resistance had been sapped. In the meantime, small parties of Spaniards were sent out to explore the surrounding country, to estimate its treasures and mineral wealth, and above all, to make certain of the attitude of the rulers of the various adjacent states which formed the loose confederation acknowledging Montezuma’s overlordship. Every advantage was taken of local jealousies and quarrels to secure recognition of the supremacy of Spain; finally Montezuma summoned “all the lords of the city and the neighboring countries”, and in a voice choked with sobs, solemnly commanded them one and all henceforth to regard and obey the Spanish monarch as their rightful sovereign, and to pay to him all the tribute and services that they had hitherto paid to the Aztec emperor. It took a long time to collect the wealth—to the value of over six hundred thousand pesos—which, in consequence of this ceremony, began to pour into Mexico. There was much quarrelling over its distribution, after the royal quinto had been set aside. To pacify the malcontents, Cortés voluntarily gave up much of what fell to him, and caused it to be secretly divided among the poorer soldiers.

There remained, finally, the great question of the overthrow of the Aztec religion, which Cortés, with all his energy, had been unable to accomplish during the early months of his stay at Mexico. The more he learned of the local cult—the grinning idols, with necklaces of human hearts and skulls, and the horrible butcheries on the tops of the teocallis—the more his Christian soul revolted; and at last, after a violent scene with Montezuma and the priests, he started to cast down the images with his own hand “and I swear to God”, writes Andres de Tapia, “that he looked supernatural as he did so”. Altars were erected, mass was said, “and the Aztecs came to ask the new gods for rain, since the old ones had been done away with; and they went to the service in full sunshine, but when they came away, it was so wet that their feet were covered with water, whereat the Indians marveled greatly.” All this, however, by no means awoke the horror which the desecration had aroused among the mass of the people. The priesthood was furious, and strove in every way to stir up the Mexicans to expel the hated strangers. Montezuma himself began to fear for their safety, and plainly told them so; and their danger was enhanced by the fact that the godlike attributes with which they had originally been credited had begun to wear off as the Aztecs came to know them better. Even their horses no longer inspired fear.

At this moment an ominous cloud appeared on another part of the horizon. One day in early May, 1520, Cortés was suddenly confronted with news of the arrival of eighteen ships off the shore near Vera Cruz.

In order to understand the fresh danger with which Cortés was now threatened, we must briefly revert to his relations with Velasquez. His solemn defiance of the authority of the Cuban governor on
the shores of Vera Cruz, and his dispatching of two envoys to Spain to state his case before the Emperor, had both been daring plays whose value remained to be proved; and Cortés was to have further experience of the jealousy of his ancient enemy before he succeeded in getting the full support of the Spanish government. His envoys, on reaching Spain, found that Velasquez had forestalled them, and had turned Fonseca and most of the other Indian officials against their master. Indeed, when the emissaries of Cortés finally got an audience from Charles, in March, 1520, at Tordesillas, on his way to Corunna, they found the young monarch so prejudiced against them, and so preoccupied with his journey into the Empire, that they entirely failed to enlist his sympathies. Meantime, in Cuba, Velasquez had received from Spain the authorization for which he had asked, giving him the right to trade and to found settlements, and also a commission, naming him adelantado. Strengthened by these, he prepared a force to be sent to the Mexican coast, to assert his authority there and to punish the rebellious Cortés. The command was entrusted to a daring but careless and arrogant conquistador, Pánfilo de Narvaez. The fleet numbered eighteen vessels, carrying nine hundred Spaniards and one thousand Indians, eighty horses, and a large assortment of arms. Before it could set sail, a rumor of its departure reached the audiencia of Santo Domingo, the most important civil and judicial body resident in Spanish America at that time; and the audiencia, perceiving that great scandal would result from open strife between two prominent conquistadores, sent one of its members, Lucas Vasquez de Ayllón, to warn Velasquez to desist. But Velasquez was by this time too far committed to draw back. Narvaez set sail in early March, 1520, and took with him Ayllón, who apparently preferred to accompany the expedition which he had been unable to prevent rather than return to Santo Domingo with a report of failure. His importunities, however, so wearied Narvaez that, soon after the expedition had reached the coast of Mexico, he was unceremoniously packed off by ship to Cuba, whence he made his way back, after many hardships, to Santo Domingo, to announce to the audiencia the flouting of its authority.

Narvaez arrived at San Juan de Ulua on April 23, and soon was informed of what Cortés had accomplished, and the state of affairs at the Mexican capital. To Montezuma he sent word that Cortés was a rebel whom he had been commissioned to chastise; and at the same time he insisted that Gonzalo de Sandoval, who was in command at Vera Cruz, should submit to his authority and that of Velasquez. But Sandoval was staunch. Not only did he ignore the demands of Narvaez; he promptly dispatched the messengers who had borne them, bound hand and foot on the backs of Indian porters, to carry to Cortés the news of what had happened. The Conqueror saw that with affairs in such a ticklish state in the city of Mexico, a quarrel with the newcomers should, if possible, be avoided. He therefore released the messengers on their arrival, extorted from them priceless information in regard to Narvaez, won them over to his own service by flattery and blandishments, and finally sent them back to the sea coast bearing the friendliest of letters to the recent arrivals, and expressing his regret that he could not have been there to welcome them in person. But, in the meantime, Narvaez had established his headquarters at Cempoala, and made it evident that he intended to fight. His attitude toward Sandoval was so hostile that the latter had to retire to the mountains to avoid a pitched battle, and the Indians on the sea coast, plainly reading the signs of the times, began to refuse to work on the fortifications of Vera Cruz, or to bring food and provisions to its garrison.

Under all the circumstances, it was essential to assume the offensive before the situation grew worse. In the end of May, therefore, with the unanimous approval of his officers, Cortés left Mexico for the coast to deal with Narvaez, taking eighty or ninety of his followers with him; Alvarado, with the rest, remained behind to guard the capital. Various messages were exchanged between the hostile camps, as the Conqueror and his tiny army proceeded eastward; the chief result being to reveal Narvaez as both arrogant and weak, and to convince Cortés that it would be possible to defeat him. Cortés had meantime been joined by sixty Spaniards under Sandoval, and a number of Indians, so that his total forces numbered two hundred and sixty-six; and he had secured a large supply of copper-tipped lances from a neighboring tribe, with which to withstand the dreaded cavalry of his foe. Still Cortés did not propose to have a pitched battle if he could help it. All through the march to the coast he kept up the fiction that he had gone forth merely to effect the arrest of a rebel, and not to oppose an honorable foe; and such were the slackness and ineptitude of Narvaez that the Conqueror succeeded in effecting his purpose “with no more loss than two men”. On the night of May 28-29 he surprised the teocalli in Cempoala, where his enemy had established his headquarters. The plan of the attack had been carefully rehearsed, and each of his men discharged to perfection his allotted task. Narvaez was captured; his plans were exposed; his followers, undeceived, made haste to abandon him and enroll themselves in the service of the victor; and all “rejoiced very greatly that God should have ordained and provided such an ending. For I assure your Majesty,” continues Cortés, “that, if God had not mysteriously intervened, and had Narvaez been victorious, it would have been the greatest injury which for a long-time past Spaniards had done to one another.”
Cortés had triumphed again; but, as before, he was not permitted to rest long on his laurels. Three days after the capture of Narvaez, two Tlascalans Indians arrived at Cempoala, with the alarming news that the city of Mexico had risen against the Spaniards. A revolt had been brewing for some time. Conditions in the city, as we have already seen, were unstable at the moment of Cortés’s departure to fight Narvaez, but the outbreak was accelerated by the stupid brutality of Alvarado. Trouble arose over an attempt of the Aztecs to replace some of their idols. The Spaniards replied by falling upon an unarmed mob on the occasion of a great religious festival. A ruthless massacre of the Mexicans ensued, and drove those who escaped it to desperation. Alvarado and his men were hemmed in on every side; several of them were killed, and two, who managed to escape and carry to Cortés (about June 10) a confirmation of the report brought by the Tlascalans, assured him that the Mexicans had resolved to rid themselves forever of their hated guests, and exterminate them in whatever way should prove most feasible, before the Conqueror had an opportunity to march to their relief. However much Cortés may have been irritated by the blundering of Alvarado, he had to rescue his lieutenant; for if the garrison in Mexico were permitted to succumb, the prestige of the Spaniards would be gone. Leaving Narvaez himself, and one of his subordinates, to be kept as prisoners of war at Vera Cruz, Cortés accordingly set out for Mexico, with all the forces he could muster. Counting his own followers and those of Narvaez, he had upwards of 1000 Spaniards and nearly 100 horses, and as he passed through Tlascala he was joined by 2000 native soldiers of the republic. On June 24, at midday, he reentered Mexico, at the head of this formidable array. The inhabitants made no attempt to prevent him, but they showed by their averted faces how their attitude toward the Spaniards had changed.

Alvarado and most of his men were still alive; for the Mexicans had decided to leave them to be taken off by the slow processes of starvation. But the arrival of Cortés resulted, as usual, in greatly increasing the pace of events. His peremptory demand for provisions so kindled the fury of the Mexicans that they forlornly resolved to attack the Spanish quarters. On the day after Cortés’s return, the whole city rose in arms. The drawbridges on the causeways were raised so as to cut off retreat. Flaming arrows rained upon the thatched roofs of the houses where the Spaniards lodged. The streets were packed with soldiers, and when the Spanish firearms ploughed furrows in their serried ranks, fresh men instantly took the places of the fallen. Hard fighting continued all that day and the next, without decisive result. On the twenty-seventh the Spaniards remained behind their defenses, and busied themselves with the construction of three movable towers, or burros, as they called them, to be pulled through the streets on rollers with ropes, and afford protection for a sally. On this same day the Spaniards induced Montezuma to address his subjects from the roof of his prison, in the hope of persuading them to desist from the attack, but the speech was so feebly delivered that it produced no effect; nay more, a shower of stones and other missiles was discharged, and the captive emperor was hit on the head. On the twenty-eighth the burros were tried in action, but they did not prove so effective as had been hoped. That evening Cortés held a council of war, in which it was recognized that there was no hope of permanent victory for the Spaniards as long as they remained where they were, and that they must needs devote all their efforts to getting out of Mexico alive. The first step to this end was to gain possession of one of the causeways, and fill up the breaches caused by the removal of the drawbridges. The shortest, western (or Tacuba) one was selected for the purpose, and the twenty-ninth and thirtieth saw desperate fighting to clear the way. Some time during these two days the captive Montezuma died. Whether it was as a result of the wound that he had received on the twenty-seventh, and of his subsequent refusal to take food and have his hurts dressed or whether he was murdered by the order of Cortés on the eve of the Spaniards’ departure, it will probably never be possible to determine. At any rate he was no longer of any value to his captors. His authority with his own subjects had vanished; he was therefore quite useless as a political pawn.

At midnight on June 30 all was in readiness, and the Spaniards and their Tlascalans allies filed silently out into the rainy streets. They brought with them a portable bridge to enable them to cross the gaps in the causeway; a less useful load was the treasure in gold and jewels which most of them insisted on trying to carry off. If they had hoped to get away without alarming their foes, they were doomed to disappointment. The Aztecs were keenly on the watch, and the moment the Spaniards appeared, the whole city was aroused. The horrors of the ensuing hours are impossible to describe; they have gained for the occasion the name of the Noche Triste. The crisis came when the Spaniards reached the breaks in the causeway and tried to make use of their portable bridge. Jammed together in the narrow passage, they were attacked from behind, and shot at on all sides from war canoes in the lake. The portable bridge soon became unfit for further use. The gaps in the causeway were quickly choked with guns, ammunition, baggage, and treasure, and the struggling bodies of horses and men; it was by setting his long lance in the wreckage at the second cut that Alvarado is said to have accomplished the famous
resumption of the campaign against Mexico. Not only was the morale of his forces restored; their lot with the great Conquistador.

The cargo furnished Cortés some of the things he needed events that were taking place on Tierra Firme, decided that Vera Cruz promised better than the islands, followed suit; and finally, the captain of a supply ship from the Old World, hearing rumors of the great colonize the region known as Panuco, farther up the coast, found the task too difficult and soon.

Tlascala. In the spring, thirteen vessels were carried, piece by piece, on the shoulders of porters, all the numbers, drawn up to intercept their retreat. Death was thus the only alternative to victory in the ensuing battle, and the thought inspired the Spaniards to the most desperate efforts. Through the morning hours fortune wavered between the combatants. Toward midday the Spaniards showed signs of giving way; then finally, just as everything seemed irretrievably lost, the Aztec general took up a prominent position in front of his troops, with his gold and silver plumes and his banner displayed. There was only one possible way in which to save the day, and that was to kill him, and then make the most of the ensuing disorganization; and Cortés, with six of his followers, accomplished this object. In a trice, defeat was converted into victory. The Aztecs fled in every direction. A demoralized remnant of retreating Spaniards had turned and routed their savage foes.

The republic of Tlascala stood loyally by its Spanish allies in their hour of need. It refused a pressing invitation from the Aztecs to desert them, and for twenty precious days afforded them rest and refuge and an opportunity to bind up their wounds. But Cortés chafed at every moment’s delay. His whole soul was set on the recovery of the empire he had lost, and despite all the murmurings of the Tlascalans and of his own followers, he promptly set about his preparations to that end. His first task was to restore the prestige of the Spanish arms, fallen as a result of the flight from Mexico; and the simplest way to accomplish this seemed to be to attack and subjugate some of the neighboring tribes. That of the Tepeacans, to the southeast of Tlascala, seemed the best to begin with, and an occasion for hostilities was afforded by the fact that they had murdered a dozen of Cortes’s followers a short time before. In the early part of August, accordingly, an expedition was prepared, and succeeded, after two engagements, in overwhelming the Tepeacans; a number of them were enslaved and distributed among their conquerors. Other attacks, for similar purposes, were launched against other tribes in the next three months, and were uniformly successful. When Cortes got back to Tlascala in December, he found that all but a few of his followers had forgotten their grievances, and were once more enthusiastic for the resumption of the campaign against Mexico. Not only was the morale of his forces restored; their numbers were also increased. Two ships sent by Velasquez, with supplies and reinforcements for Narvaez, were seized on arrival at Vera Cruz, and the men they carried were persuaded to enroll themselves under the banners of Cortés. The members of an expedition sent out from Jamaica to colonize the region known as Panuco, farther up the coast, found the task too difficult and soon followed suit; and finally, the captain of a supply ship from the Old World, hearing rumors of the great events that were taking place on Tierra Firme, decided that Vera Cruz promised better than the islands, as a place in which to dispose of his wares. The cargo furnished Cortés some of the things he needed most; and the crew, catching the thrill of adventure in the air, marched off into the interior to throw in their lot with the great Conquistador.

On December 28, 1520, Cortés left Tlascala at the head of a force of nearly six hundred Spaniards, and set up his headquarters at the town of Texcoco, half a league to the east of the lake whose name it bears. For the next four months all his energies were directed towards preparations for the siege of Mexico. The bulk of these preparations consisted in a series of military and reconnoitring expeditions around the shores of the lake; their principal object was to isolate the Mexicans and cut off the possibility of their being aided by their neighbors. Iztapalapa and Tacuba, which commanded respectively the land ends of the southern and western causeways, were captured in turn; as was also Cuernavaca across the sierras to the southward. But it was not merely by conquering adjacent towns that Cortés had planned to make sure of his game. His previous experience had firmly convinced him that Mexico could not be captured without a fleet of brigantines on the lake; and with characteristic energy he prepared to have these built. Sails, rigging, and iron work were brought on from Vera Cruz; timber and pitch were obtained from the adjacent forests, and the work of construction was pressed forward at Tlascala. In the spring, thirteen vessels were carried, piece by piece, on the shoulders of porters, all the fifty miles from Tlascala to Texcoco, whence a short canal was dug to launch them on the lake. Reinforcements had meanwhile arrived in Vera Cruz, despatched, in all probability, by the authorities of Española, in response to the requests which Cortés had previously sent; they comprised upwards of two hundred and fifty infantry, a number of horsemen, and a plentiful supply of gunpowder, which was sorely needed. At the same time, a conspiracy, hatched in the army at Texcoco, to murder Cortés and a
number of his subordinates, was betrayed and defeated in the nick of time; and the ringleader was hanged from the window of his lodgings.

On Sunday, April 28, 1521, the brigantines were launched on the lake with impressive ceremonies, and a review of the troops—eight hundred and eighteen foot and eighty-seven horse—was held at Texcoco. Ammunition was now plentiful once more. The Indian auxiliaries were numerous, and for the most part keen to fight. Never before had Cortés disposed of such a formidable array. The month of May was chiefly occupied in reviewing his forces and distributing them in the most effective manner for the accomplishment of his purpose. Alvarado, with thirty cavalry, one hundred and sixty-eight foot, and twenty-five thousand Tlascalans, was stationed at Tacuba. Sandoval and Olid, with slightly larger detachments, were placed where they could command respectively the land ends of the eastern and western branches of the great southern causeway. Cortés himself took command of the brigantines, which he justly characterized as “the key to the whole war,” and retained about three hundred Spaniards to man them. Each of the brigantines was furnished with oars and with sails, and each of them carried a single piece of artillery.

The first event of the siege itself was the cutting of the aqueduct which brought water to Mexico from the springs of Chapultepec; this was accomplished by Alvarado and Olid on Sunday, May 26. Five days later, the fortress of Acachinanco or Xoloc, at the junction of the eastern and western branches of the great southern causeway, was seized by the besieging forces, and Cortés enabled to set up his headquarters there; this operation was carried out both by land and by water, and furnished the first practical demonstration of the value of the fleet of brigantines, which beat off and wellnigh destroyed some fifteen hundred native war canoes which attempted to dispute its passage. With Alvarado in control of the western or Tacuba causeway, the city of Mexico was now completely invested, save for the long dike which connected it with the north shore of the lake; and this, in turn, was soon occupied by Sandoval. The next two months saw desperate and bloody fighting. In the third week of June, the Spaniards made rapid progress, and by the twenty-second they appear to have held possession of most of the city. Then for the next eight days the tide turned, and on the thirtieth (the anniversary of the Noche Triste) they suffered a bloody repulse, in which more than fifty of their number were captured alive and subsequently sacrificed, in plain sight of their friends, on the summit of the teocalli of the Mexican war god. The first three weeks of July witnessed a general slackening of the siege, largely because, after having witnessed their recent reverse, many of the Indian allies of the Spaniards began to desert them, and vigorous efforts were necessary to bring them back to their allegiance. By the twentieth there was a resumption of active operations, in which the Spaniards followed the policy of consolidating their advance by a systematic destruction of temples and buildings. Slowly but surely their progress continued, from south to north; finally the carnage became so frightful that Cortés made various attempts to induce the new Aztec emperor, Guatemoc, to yield to the inevitable, so as to avoid further slaughter. None of these efforts, however, was successful; indeed, the last of them, which occurred on August 9, resulted in the killing and sacrificing of the messenger who bore the proposal, and was the prelude to the last attack of the Mexicans on the Spaniards. But flesh and blood could endure no more. On the twelfth the Aztecs yielded, and requested Guatemoc to meet Cortés in the market place to discuss terms; and it was the failure of the Mexican emperor to appear at the rendezvous that gave the Spanish commander the pretext for a final assault. This time there was practically no effective resistance. The half starved Mexicans were butchered in droves, and Guatemoc was captured while trying to escape in a canoe. On August 13 the proud capital of the mighty Aztec empire bowed its head in submission to the authority of Charles V.

One grievous disappointment awaited the conquerors. They had kept up their courage during the trying days of the siege by telling each other wonderful stories of the immense treasure they were certain to gain; and deep was their chagrin when the spoil was collected, and found, after all, to be scanty indeed. Convinced that much more was hidden away, they put the ex-emperor Guatemoc to inhuman tortures in the hope of making him reveal the place where it was secreted. All that they were able to extract from him, however, was a confession that much gold had been thrown into the lake; and yet the divers who were sent after it found almost nothing. On the other hand, such treasure as Cortes was able to send home, coupled with his account of the siege and the efforts of his friends in Spain, sufficed, after long delays, to turn the scale in his favor in the settlement of the long outstanding question as to whether his acts and authority should be repudiated or confirmed. His enemy, Velasquez, had done his utmost to ruin him, and in April, 1521, when the revolt of the Comuneros was at its height, had succeeded, with the support of the bishop of Burgos, in extorting from the regent, Adrian of Utrecht, an order for an official visitation of the conquests of Cortés, an inquiry into his conduct, and the seizure of his person. But the officer entrusted with this task proved alike incompetent and untrustworthy; he was bribed by Cortés to abandon his object, and returned ingloriously to Castile.
Shortly afterwards (July, 1522) the Emperor got back to Spain. He at once perceived the importance of the new conquests, and of settling all questions that had arisen in connection with them. A board of inquiry was accordingly appointed, composed impartially of the friends of both sides. After patient deliberation, it rendered its verdict in favor of Cortés, and forbade Fonseca and Velasquez to interfere any further in his affairs. The judgment of the board was ratified by the Emperor, and a commission appointing him governor, captain-general, and chief justice of New Spain, with all the powers pertaining to these titles, was dispatched to Cortés from Valladolid, October 15, 1522. Thus the conqueror of Mexico, who through all the hardships and perils of the expedition had never known how he stood with the government in Spain, was at last confirmed in the supreme authority under the crown over the lands that had been won by his foresight and daring.

In Mexico the work of reconstruction was begun at once. A cathedral, dedicated to St. Francis, arose on the site of the teocalli of the Aztec war god. A palace of hewn stone, which was subsequently appropriated as a residence for the viceroys, was erected for Cortés on the corner of the great square; and a strong fortress was built to protect the Spanish quarters. “Your Sacred Majesty may believe”, wrote Cortes to the Emperor in October, 1524, “that within five years this will be the most nobly populated city which exists in all the civilized world, and will have the finest buildings.”

On the seacoast, moreover, new cities were begun; while fresh attempts by Francisco de Garay to settle in the Panuco region were frustrated, and the territory in question brought under Cortés’s control. At the same time, an expedition was sent through to the Pacific, where it founded the town of Zacatula, near the mouth of the Rio de las Balsas; a dockyard was speedily constructed there, and active preparations made for the building of a small fleet of four vessels with which to explore the adjacent shores. These ships, unfortunately, were destroyed by a fire as they were approaching completion; but the energy and zeal which were shown in their construction reveal how deeply the exploring enthusiasm of the conquerors had been stirred. The key to it all, as is evident from the letters of Cortés to Charles V, was the conviction that the continent was pierced by a strait, which would enormously shorten the voyage to the Spice Islands. The Conqueror planned to send the Zacatula fleet southward along the Pacific coast as far as the Strait of Magellan to search for it; while he urged on the Emperor the importance of exploring the shores of the Atlantic for the same purpose from Vera Cruz to Florida, and thence northward, if need be, to the Bacallaos, or ‘codfish waters’ off Newfoundland, which had already been visited by John Cabot and Cortereal. “If the strait exists”, he roundly declared, “it cannot escape both those who go by the South Sea and those who go by the North... As I am informed of your Majesty’s desire to discover this strait, and of the greater service your Royal Crown would thereby receive, I ignore all other profits and interests to follow this other expedition.” This belief in the existence of a strait through the Western Continent continued for many years before it was finally disproved; on the other hand, schemes for the construction of an interoceanic canal were definitely broached before the end of the Emperor’s reign.

In spite of his assurances to his imperial master that the search for a strait occupied his exclusive attention, Cortés did not neglect the extension of the Spanish power on land in the years immediately succeeding the conquest of Mexico. Especially was his attention directed toward the region to the south, alike by reports of its riches and by a natural fear that if he did not occupy it at once he might be forestalled by others of his countrymen advancing northward from Darien. In November, 1523, accordingly, he sent Pedro de Alvarado, with more than 300 men, into the territories beyond the rich valley of Oaxaca. There, after a series of bloody battles with the natives, Alvarado founded (July, 1524) the city of Santiago de los Caballeros, which subsequently was given the name of Guatemala. After a ravaging expedition into the region of Salvador he returned in 1526 to Mexico, and shortly afterwards to Spain, where he was accused on various grounds before the Council of the Indies. Finally released, he was sent back to the lands he had won; we shall hear of him again in connection with the conquest of Peru.

More important in its influence upon the fortunes of Cortés was an expedition led by Cristobal de Olid in January, 1524, to Honduras. Olid made the journey by sea; touching at Cuba, he fell under the influence of the enemies of Cortés, and was persuaded by them to renounce his allegiance. When the news was reported in Mexico, Cortés despatched one Francisco de Las Casas to recall the rebel to obedience; and though Las Casas was wrecked on the coast of Honduras, and subsequently taken and imprisoned by Olid, he was afterwards able to raise an insurrection against his captor, with the final result that Olid was beheaded. A little later, Las Casas started back for Mexico; but before he could
arrive there, Cortés, who had become greatly alarmed at getting no news from Honduras, determined to go thither and investigate in person. He started in October, 1524, taking with him about 150 Spaniards, over half of them cavalry, a large force of Indians, and the ex-emperor Guatemoc. His route lay overland, through Yucatan, across difficult country, intersected by rivers and swamps, and covered by dense underbrush. In the course of the journey a rumor reached Cortés of a plot of his Indian followers to massacre his Spaniards, and the report served as a pretext for the execution of Guatemoc, who was hanged from a ceiba tree, with seven minor Aztec potentates who had accompanied him; “this death, which they suffered very unjustly,” as Bernal Diaz asserts, “was considered wrong by all those who were with us”. Another episode of the expedition sheds light on the results of the Spanish efforts to spread the Christian faith. Wherever they went they demanded its acceptance; and they apparently found an unusually willing convert in the Indian ruler of the island city that rises from the waters of Lake Peten. On his departure thence, Cortés left one of his precious horses, which had recently gone lame, in charge of his hosts, who fed the beast on flowers and chickens, so that he incontinently died. But so indiscriminately had the necessity of caring for this horse and of accepting the Christian God been mingled in the instructions which the Spaniards left behind them, that the Indians, not unnaturally, got the two things confused. When two Franciscan friars visited the place, nearly a century afterwards, they found the inhabitants worshipping an image of Cortés’s charger, and believing that it controlled the thunder and the lightning.

In the spring of 1525, Cortés and his men came out on the so-called Golfo Dulce at the head of the Bay of Honduras. There he soon learned of the execution of Olid and of the subsequent return of his followers to their allegiance. There also he found another party of some sixty Spaniards who had formed a portion of an expedition led by Gil Gonzalez Davila from Panama for the purpose of exploring the region of Nicaragua. The repentant rebels and the followers of Gil Gonzalez were all in wretched condition—sick, half starved, and in fear of the Indians—so that Cortés, instead of having to fight, found himself welcomed on all sides as a savior and guardian angel. The main settlement was moved eastward to Puerto Caballo, on the seacoast; the chief wants of the colonists were gradually supplied; exploring expeditions were dispatched into the interior, and plans were made for the establishment of new towns. Never had Cortés been seen in a better light; his energy and cheerfulness were an inspiration to all. Any jealousy which the followers of Gil Gonzalez may have felt was forgotten in the enthusiasm which his leadership evoked. But from these arduous and fruitful labors the Conqueror was recalled by ominous tidings from Mexico. Word came that the government there had gone to pieces and that the city was rent by dissenion and misrule; that a false report of his own death was being circulated and believed, and that the sole remedy for the situation was his immediate return. In the spring of 1526, accordingly, he set sail for Vera Cruz, and, after a stormy voyage, reached San Juan de Ulua on May 24, and the city of Mexico on June 19.

The source of the trouble that brought Cortés back to Mexico was, first and foremost, the removal of his own strong hand, and secondly, the envies and jealousies which had been aroused by his successes. We have already had several occasions to observe that the Spanish colonial administration was honeycombed with quarrelling and jealousy; the system itself seemed to foster them, and the bigger the man the surer he was to make enemies. So badly had things gone in Mexico since the Conqueror’s departure that on his return he was welcomed by the mass of the people with delight. They regarded him as the sole means of restoring law and order. But unfortunately the reins of government were no longer in Cortés’s hands, for those whom he had left in authority had utilized the period of his absence to work his overthrow. Charge after charge had been preferred against him before the home government. He was accused of poisoning his wife, who had died three months after her arrival in Mexico; of appropriating a larger share of the treasure than was his due; of plotting, finally, to defy the imperial authority and to set up an independent kingdom of his own. Whether guilty or not, it was evident to the Emperor that the Conqueror of Mexico was becoming dangerously powerful. On November 4, 1525, accordingly, Charles had written him a letter informing him that he had decided to send out an officer—Luis Ponce de Leon—to take his residencia. This letter reached Cortés in Mexico on June 24, 1526, just five days after his return from Honduras; and it was but eight days after that—on July 2—that Ponce de Leon himself arrived.

He was welcomed by the Conqueror with courtesy and outward friendliness, and the preliminaries of the residencia were instituted at once. During the first seventeen days, so Cortés tells us, no person appeared to enter a complaint against him, and shortly afterwards Ponce de Leon fell ill and died. On his deathbed he delegated his functions to an elderly and infirm licentiate, Marcos de Aguilar, who speedily followed his predecessor to the grave, thus giving the enemies of Cortés the opportunity to
circulate a report that they been removed by poison, and otherwise to “defame him with their viperous tongues.” The air had, in fact, become so charged with suspicion that the Conqueror soon saw that nothing was to be gained by remaining on the spot. The best chance of vindicating himself was to return to Spain and lay his case before the Emperor in person, and this he determined to do. In the spring of 1528 he set sail from Vera Cruz, where he was saddened by the news of the death of his father. In May he arrived at Palos, to be stricken again by the death of Gonzalo de Sandoval, the most loyal and trusted of all his followers. After various delays he was received by the Emperor, who was holding his court at that time in Toledo.

Outwardly the reception that was accorded him left nothing to be desired. Charles knew how to discount the calumnies of his foes, and realized the immensity of his debt to the Conqueror. The title of Marquis of the Valley of Oaxaca and a huge grant of lands were conferred upon him. He was given full power to continue his explorations. He was confirmed in the office of captain-general of New Spain. He was raised to the knightly Order of Santiago, and visited in person by the Emperor when ill. These marks of royal favor were reflected in the attitude of the grandees. The Conqueror was lionized wherever he went and strengthened his social position by marrying the niece of the Duke of Bejar. There was, however, one possible recognition of services rendered, more important, if less conspicuous, than any of the rest, which the Emperor was resolved that Cortés should not be given, and that was reinstatement in the civil government of his conquests. Whatever the greatness of the work he had done, whatever the baselessness of the accusations of his foes, the combination of civil and military authority would make him too powerful to suit the views of such a master as Charles. The process of withdrawing his political authority had in fact begun before he reached the court, with the appointment, on December 13, 1527, of a royal commission of five persons—the first "audiencia of New Spain”—to take over the government of the recent conquests; and the new policy was to be carried still further while Cortés was in Castile. The doings of this first audiencia brought a flood of complaints. Its president, the notorious Nuño de Guzman, proved an unscrupulous tyrant; and a joint meeting of the Councils of Castile, of the Indies, and of Finance, which was called to consider the situation, gave its opinion, on November 9, 1529, that the true solution of the existing difficulties lay in the appointment of a royal representative in New Spain with the fullest powers. This recommendation resulted in the selection ten days later of Antonio de Mendoza as the first of the Spanish viceroys on the American continent, and also in the sending out of a second audiencia to tide over the interim—it was nearly six years—before Mendoza could get his instructions and reach his post. Cortés, by these means, was entirely ousted from the government of Mexico; and the measure of his impotence may be gauged by the fact that on his return thither in 1530 he was formally forbidden to enter the capital, and the clergy were reproved for praying for him in church.

The career of the great conquistador had in fact long passed its zenith at the time he returned to the lands he had won. Even the military authority he had been allowed to retain was rendered nugatory by the concurrent jurisdiction of the audiencia, which sent back constant complaints of his claims and pretensions. Before long he retired to his estates at Cuernavaca to busy himself with agriculture, sheep raising, and the establishment of new industries. But his restless spirit could not long be satisfied with such sedentary pursuits; and soon afterwards he embarked on a series of explorations of the Pacific coast, “in which”, as the old chronicler sadly declares, “he had no luck at all, for everything turned to thorns”. The expedition of Saavedra Ceron in 1527, which has been recounted in the previous chapter, had turned his attention once more to the shores of the Pacific; and his imagination was further roused in the succeeding years by the news that reached him of the riches of Peru. In May, 1532, he accordingly fitted out two ships in the port of Acapulco, “to explore the shore and search for islands and new lands”; but the commander was incompetent, the crews mutinied, one of the vessels was lost at sea, and the other was driven ashore near Jalisco. Undismayed by this misfortune, Cortés, in October, 1533, sent out two more ships from the port of Tehuantepec. One of these reached the coasts of Lower California. The other, having lost most of its officers and crew, was obliged to land at the port of Chiametla, within territory claimed by Guzman, the odious president of the first audiencia and the mortal enemy of Cortes; needless to add, he appropriated the ship. Once more the great Conqueror resolved to try his fortune; in 1535 he took command in person of a large expedition, which carried the previous explorations to the north somewhat farther, and even sought to establish a colony at the tip of the California peninsula. But the prosecution of his magnificent schemes demanded resources far greater than the authorities were willing to grant. The new viceroy, Mendoza, who had by this time reached his post, threw every obstacle in the way of Cortés’s plans; and finally the Conqueror, despairing of fair treatment, left Mexico for the last time in the spring of 1540, and returned, worn out and broken hearted, to Spain. His attempt to retrieve his fortunes by participation in the Algerian campaign was a dismal failure. His star had now set, and others had risen to replace him. He had done
The arrival in Mexico, in October 1535, of Antonio de Mendoza, the first viceroy of New Spain, marks an epoch in the history of the Spanish dominions in the New World. It initiated a new system of government and administration, which lasted, with certain important modifications, down to the revolutions of the nineteenth century. But as the present chapter is devoted to conquest and discovery, we can afford to postpone the consideration of these things. Our task, for the moment, is to complete the story of the exploration and conquest of the various territories which were ultimately to compose the viceroyalty of New Spain; and we can begin to the best advantage with those which were discovered and occupied by expeditions sent out from Mexico.

The majority of these expeditions were directed toward the northwest. Most of them were by land, but a few were by sea, and as the latter naturally connect themselves with the last ventures of Cortes which have just been described, it will be well, even at the sacrifice of chronological sequence, to dispose of them at once. In 1539, before leaving for Spain, the Conqueror dispatched Francisco de Ulloa to explore farther north in the Gulf of California; and this expedition, after ascertaining that, contrary to the general belief, the peninsula of Lower California was not an island, followed up its western coast to a point about the latitude of 28° or 29°. From there one of the ships was sent back to report, while Ulloa continued northward: whether or not he ever returned is uncertain, but there is reason to believe that he did. There is also evidence that another expedition led by Captain Francisco de Bolanos made further explorations of the California peninsula in the latter part of 1541 or early the following year, and that an account of his voyage was in the hands of Rodriguez Cabrillo, a Portuguese mariner in the service of Spain, who was sent out in 1542 by the viceroy Mendoza, largely in the old hope of finding a strait through the Western Hemisphere. On February 3, 1543, when, this expedition had reached the southern part of the coast of the present state of California, its leader died; but his pilot, Bartolome Ferrelo, took his place, and conducted the exploration considerably farther northward: some say to the neighborhood of Cape Mendocino, others to the latitude of the southern boundary of the state of Oregon. Heavy weather was encountered, and the two ships of which the expedition was composed were separated for a period of three weeks, but they got back at last, on April 14, 1543, to the port of Navidad, from which they had set forth. If they had not discovered the strait they had set out to find, they at least had explored many hundreds of miles of unknown coast.

Meantime even greater progress was being made in the exploration of the interior. Rumors began to reach Mexico in the year 1529 of wealthy Indian tribes some hundreds of miles to the northwest, and especially of seven cities of unusual size and riches, which soon came to be known as the Seven Cities of Cibola. It was Nuno de Guzman who first determined to test the truth of these stories; in the winter of 1529-30 he led a large expedition into the region of Culiacan. He failed to find the treasures that he sought; yet he dared not return unsuccessful to Mexico in view of the changes that had taken place there since he left; so he finally retired to the neighborhood of the present town of Guadalajara, where he busied himself in forming the settlements that were to become the kernel of New Galicia. In 1536 the tales of the wonders of the regions to the northwest were revived by the arrival in Mexico of Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, who had passed through them on his long journey from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and this time the new viceroy, Mendoza, resolved to follow the matter up. He entered into correspondence with a certain Francisco de Coronado, who had come out with him to Mexico in 1535, and had recently been appointed to the governorship of New Galicia, with the result that in March, 1539, Fray Marcos de Nizza and another monk, with a negro guide called Stephen, who had accompanied Cabeza de Vaca, were sent on a reconnoitering trip into the regions in question. In September Fray Marcos returned, to report that he had seen from afar a city larger than Mexico, and that he had been assured that it abounded in gold and precious stones. Preparations accordingly were begun for the conquest of the new lands. A force of some three hundred Spaniards and a large body of Indians was collected at Compostella, the capital of New Galicia. Coronado was given command of the expedition, and on February 23, 1540, it started northward.

The tale of the ensuing venture forms one of the most remarkable chapters in the early history of the New World. Hernando de Alarcon, who had been sent up the Gulf of California with two ships to carry provisions, found the mouth of the Colorado in the month of August, and subsequently ascended it in boats, possibly as far as the lower end of the Grand Canon. Coronado had meantime marched overland, dividing his forces as he went. With the advance guard he proceeded to Cibola, where he was
forced to fight a bloody contest with the Indians before he could effect an entrance, only to discover the falseness of Fray Marcos’s reports; “and such,” declares the contemporary account, “were the curses that some hurled at the Friar, that I pray God may protect him from them.” A little later another detachment crossed over the Colorado and penetrated to the westward; while de Cardenas with twelve companions tried to explore the Grand Canon. They spent three days on the bank, “looking for a passage down to the river, which looked from above as if the water was six feet across, although the Indians said it was half a league wide. It was impossible to descend, for after these three days Captain Melgosa and one Juan Galeras and another companion, who were the three lightest and most agile men, made an attempt to go down at the least difficult place, and went down until those who were above were unable to keep sight of them. They returned about four o’clock in the afternoon, not having succeeded in reaching the bottom on account of the great difficulties which they found, because what seemed to be easy from above was not so, but instead very hard and difficult. They said that they had been down about a third of the way, and that the river seemed very large from the place which they reached, and that from what they saw they thought the Indians had given the width correctly. Those who stayed above had estimated that some huge rocks on the sides of the cliffis seemed to be about as tall as a man, but those who went down swore that when they reached these rocks they were bigger than the great tower of Seville.”

The bulk of the expedition passed the winter of 1540-41 on the Rio Grande, at what is now nearly the center of New Mexico; and in the spring Coronado started off to the northeast, in search of a town called Quivira, of which marvelous tales had been told him by the Indians. The country he had thus far traversed had been barren and desolate, though no worse than many places in the plains of Old Castile; but as he proceeded it grew more fertile; “humpbacked cattle”, or buffaloes, were seen, and “there was not one of the horses that did not take flight when he saw them first, for they have a narrow, short face, the brow two palms across from eye to eye, the eyes sticking out at the side, so that, when they are running, they can see who is following them. They have very long beards, like goats, and when they are running they throw their heads back with the beard dragging on the ground. There is a sort of girdle around the middle of the body. The hair is very woolly, like a sheep’s, very fine, and in front of the girdle the hair is very long and rough like a lion’s. They have a great hump, larger than a camel’s. The horns are short and thick, so that they are not seen much above the hair. In May they change the hair in the middle of the body for a down, which makes perfect lions of them. They rub against the small trees in the little ravines to shed their hair, and they continue this until only the down is left, as a snake changes his skin. They have a short tail, with a bunch of hair at the end. When they run, they carry it erect like a scorpion. It is worth noticing that the little calves are red and just like ours, but they change their color and appearance with time and age.” After advancing for over a month, Coronado left his main force, and went on with thirty horsemen—still in quest of Quivira. A ride of about six weeks due north by the compass finally brought him to it—a plain Indian village in the northeastern part of the present state of Kansas, and more, if anything, of a disappointment than Cibola; thence he returned in the autumn to his previous winter quarters. The spring of 1542 found him back again in Mexico, “very sad, and very weary, completely worn out and shamefaced”, and not very graciously received by the disappointed viceroy, who had entertained such high hopes of the treasure he would bring home. He was reinstated in the governorship of New Galicia, but shortly afterwards was accused of neglect and malfeasance: his residencia was taken, and in September 1544, he was found guilty and deprived of his office. After a brief confinement in his own house, he was released on bond, and retired to Mexico to live out the rest of his days. Like many another of the Spanish conquistadores, he could do great deeds when great opportunities came; but when the special incentive to high effort was removed, the effects of the reaction were little short of disastrous.

The story of the expeditions sent out from Mexico to the northwest needs to be supplemented, at this point, by a few paragraphs on the discovery and first settlement of the regions to the southeast, now comprised in the republics of Central America. These territories, as we have already seen, had been coveted by Cortes, who had sent Alvarado into Guatemala and Salvador, and Olid to Honduras; and it was their ultimate fate to become a part of the viceroyalty of New Spain. The larger part of them, however, was first occupied from Panama, and the dominant figure in their early history is that of the savage Pedrarias Davila.

It will be remembered that this official—over seventy years old at the time—had been sent out from Spain as governor to Darien in the year 1514. From the first he seemed determined to sweep all rivals from his path, and win for himself all the favors of the crown. He executed Balboa, with four of his companions. He founded the town of Panama, on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, and moved the seat
of the government thither in 1519. He sent out expeditions and raids against the natives of the surrounding regions. Such vigorous proceedings roused the inevitable complaints at home; a new official—Lope de Sosa—was sent out from Spain to take his residencia; and simultaneously a fresh expedition was prepared under Gil Gonzalez Davila, to carry further the explorations he had begun. In undertaking this enterprise, Gil Gonzalez had banked on the friendship of de Sosa, whom he had expected to convict and supersede Pedrarias; but Lope de Sosa died almost immediately after his arrival at Panama (May 1520), with the result that Pedrarias remained in power, and naturally threw every obstacle in the way of Gil Gonzalez. But the latter was not to be swerved from his purpose. With infinite difficulty he constructed four small vessels, and in January, 1522, sent them off on an expedition, which explored the Pacific coasts of the territories to the northwest, as far as the boundaries of the present state of Honduras; he himself, in the meantime, followed on, overland, discovering the Lake of Nicaragua on his way, and making numerous, if temporary, converts among the Indians; in June, 1523, he was back at Panama. Convinced that he had found a most valuable bit of territory, and that Pedrarias would hinder rather than help him in developing it, he promptly got away to Espanola, where he was received with approval by the authorities, and urged to continue the work of exploration.

In the spring of 1524, accordingly, he reembarked for Tierra Firme; but this time, in order to avoid Pedrarias, he directed his course to the shores of Honduras, whence he proceeded by land to the regions he had found.

In the meantime, Pedrarias, profoundly jealous of the good fortune of Gil Gonzalez, determined to make an effort to get hold of Nicaragua for himself, and dispatched his lieutenant, Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba, to occupy it in his behalf. The situation was further complicated by the arrival from Mexico of Olid and Las Casas in Honduras, and finally, in 1525, of Hernando Cortes; and the ensuing confusion became worse confused still when Cordoba, thinking that he saw in the number of rival claimants an opportunity to strike a blow in his own behalf, threw off his allegiance to Pedrarias, and announced his intention of seizing Nicaragua for himself. This last source of trouble was indeed speedily removed, for the hoary-headed Pedrarias, coming up from the south, surprised and executed his rebellious subordinate. At this juncture the home government intervened, and deprived Pedrarias of his authority at Panama; but he richly indemnified himself, in the course of the next few months, by securing the appointment to the governorship of Nicaragua. The quarrels of the various claimants to that region showed the need of a stern rule, which it was universally known that Pedrarias would provide: there was, moreover, no one else who seemed capable of withstanding the efforts of Lope de Salcedo, the new governor of Honduras, to extend his power over the Nicaraguan lands. The end of the year 1528 saw the veteran firmly established in control of the territory for which he had longed, with the full approval of the constituted authorities. It had been thought out a contest of rogue against rogue; but in that kind of encounter none could equal Pedrarias. On Monday, March 6, 1531, the old man died, at the age of ninety: one of the ablest but most repellent figures in the ranks of the conquistadores; proud, selfish, treacherous, and revengeful.

The whole story of the occupation of the Central American lands—it has only been recounted here in the barest outline—is, in fact, one of the most miserable chapters in the history of the Spanish Empire. It contains no outstanding achievements; it is but a chronicle of jealousy and self-seeking, of sordid scrambling for territory and gold. None of the characters, save possibly Gil Gonzalez, is really attractive; and the inability of the Emperor and of the audiencia in Santo Domingo effectively to adjudicate their various quarrels, is a sad commentary on the inherent evils of government from afar. Yet no picture of the Spaniards in America would be adequate without it; the infamy of Pedrarias, his rivals and associates, makes the greatness of Cortes stand forth in clearer light. The ranks of the conquistadores contained bad men and good. Courage and persistence were their commonest virtues; brutality and self-seeking their outstanding faults. Sometimes the good qualities so prevailed over the bad ones as to make possible achievements at which the world has not yet ceased to wonder. Sometimes, when the scales were tipped the other way, we marvel that anything was accomplished at all.

We now pass for a few moments to another region, which the Spaniards had explored before Cortes conquered Mexico, but which was ultimately to form part of the viceroyalty of New Spain—the Florida where Ponce de Leon had first landed in 1513. This part of the story is almost exclusively a record of exploration, for none of the efforts at settlement and colonization in the eastern part of the North American continent attained anything more than evanescent success.

Ponce de Leon’s voyage of discovery up the west coast of Florida was followed in the next few years by several others in the same waters, the most important being that of Alonzo de Pineda in 1519, which came to the mouth of a river of great size; earlier writers used to identify it as the Mississippi, but
it seems on the whole more probable that it was Mobile Bay. Two years later Ponce de Leon arrived again, with all the material and apparatus of colonization, to exercise his rights under the patent of 1514, and started a settlement in the neighborhood of Tampa Bay. The venture was unlucky from the first. The natives proved hostile, and soon compelled him to return to Cuba with all his followers; and Ponce de Leon himself succumbed shortly afterwards to the effects of a wound from an Indian arrow. “Not yet,” comments Oviedo on the failure of this enterprise, “had the time come for the conversion of that land to our holy Catholic faith; for the Devil was still permitted to deceive and possess those Indians, and the population of Hell to be augmented by their souls.”

Meantime, on the Atlantic coasts other projects for exploration were pushed vigorously forward, one of the dominant motives being the old desire to find a transcontinental strait. In 1521 Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon—the man who had vainly attempted to prevent the expedition of Narvaez to Mexico in the previous year—sent out a caravel, under Francisco de Gordillo, which reached the neighborhood of the present city of Georgetown, South Carolina, captured many Indians, and got back in safety. Two years later Ayllon got a patent in Spain, giving him the right to colonize and govern 800 leagues of shore, and in 1526 he set forth to substantiate his claim. With three ships and some 600 followers he coasted along toward the northeast, finally establishing a settlement in a marshy and unhealthy spot which some have identified with Jamestown. Indian hostility and swamp fevers, however, condemned the colony to a short life. Ayllon died on October 18, and only a quarter of his company got back to Santo Domingo.

But if schemes of colonization languished, the zeal for exploration continued; the conviction of the existence of a strait remained; and the man who was to write the next chapter of the great quest was that Portuguese sea captain, Estevan Gomez, who had deserted Magellan with the good ship San Antonio. He had never wavered in his belief in the existence of a passage to the northwest, and in 1524-25 he set out from Corunna to find it, in a ship furnished by the Emperor for the purpose. It is impossible to state with any definiteness where he went, though it seems probable that he made the American shore in the neighborhood of Nova Scotia, and then coasted southwest to the region of Virginia. Needless to add, he found no strait, nor the cargo of spices for which the Emperor had hoped; but he loaded his vessel with Indians for the voyage back, and the similarity of the two words clavos (spices) and esclavos (slaves), and the natural credulity of mankind, led many to believe, for some time to come, that he had actually discovered the passage he had sought. In any case, the reports of the lands he had seen were sufficiently interesting to cause the Emperor to make a vigorous protest, when, more than ten years later, reports began to come back of the explorations of Jacques Cartier in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In Charles’s eyes the Frenchman was a common trespasser on lands that were undoubtedly Spanish under the bull of Alexander VI and the treaty of Tordesillas; and when King Francis gave signs of following up his discoveries, the Emperor ordered the preparation of a fleet to prevent him. In the summer of 1541 two caravels were sent out to find Cartier; but they returned unsuccessful in the following winter. For the next two years the matter hung fire, the situation being much influenced by the course of the war in Europe; finally, in 1545, in his instructions to his son, Charles laid stress on the necessity of keeping an eye on the French, so as to prevent them from sending a fleet to the Indies. “In their previous attempts, however,” he continues, “it has been noticeable that they have exhibited little pertinacity; and if a vigorous opposition is maintained, they immediately give way and withdraw.”

We return to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and to that Pánfilo de Narvaez who had attempted in 1520 to oust Cortés from Mexico. After his fiasco at Cempoala, Narvaez had been imprisoned for a space at Vera Cruz; but he was finally liberated on orders from the home government, and shortly afterwards went back to Spain. His experience had apparently not wearied him of adventure; for he promptly applied to the Emperor for a new grant, and was authorized, in December, 1526, to conquer the country from the peninsula of Florida to the Rio de las Palmas. In the following June he set sail from San Lucar, with five ships and about 600 colonists; and after being delayed in the West Indies by exceptionally heavy weather, he landed near Tampa Bay in April, 1528. But the Indians proved inhospitable and dangerous. There were the usual tales of fabulous treasures to be obtained further westward, and Narvaez accordingly soon decided to move on. Contrary to the advice of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, the treasurer and historian of the expedition, he divided his forces; and retaining 300 of his men to march along the coast under his own leadership, he dispatched the rest with the ships to meet him further west. But the rendezvous that was arranged proved too indefinite to be of any practical value. The two parts of the expedition never saw each other again, and though those who had gone by sea finally managed to effect a safe return, only four of those who had accompanied Narvaez ever got back to tell their tale. The story of their awful sufferings in the summer of 1528—the dismal swamps, the Indian attacks, the efforts to construct ships with inadequate materials, the westward struggle, and the death of Narvaez—need not be repeated here. We will pass on instead to the late autumn of the
same year, when the remnants of the expedition, about eighty men in all, finally gathered themselves around Cabeza de Vaca on an island off the coast of Texas.

Escape was sought on every hand, but proved at first quite impossible to find. Hunger and exposure further reduced the company; small parties wandered off and were never heard of more. Meantime the survivors won great fame, without wishing it, as traders and medicine men among the surrounding Indians. They were utilized by the natives for all sorts of purposes. They became, in fact, too valuable to be let go. “I was in this country nearly six years”, wrote Cabeza de Vaca, “alone among the Indians and naked like them”. Finally, however, in 1534, he got away, and with two other Spaniards and a negro, all of them survivors of the original expedition, started westward across the plains. The progress of the party was exceedingly slow. Their reputation as miracle workers preceded them as they went. Often they were obliged to remain for weeks in one spot; and frequently they were accompanied by three or four thousand persons, “and as we had to breathe upon and sanctify the food and drink for each ... it may be seen how great was the annoyance”. But at last one of the adventurers happened to see “the buckle of a sword belt on the neck of an Indian, and stitched to it the nail of a horseshoe. He took them, and we asked the native what they were; he answered that they came from Heaven. We questioned him further, as to who had brought them thence; they all responded that certain men who wore beards like us had come from Heaven and arrived at the river, bringing horses, lances, and swords... For this we gave many thanks to God our Lord. We had before despaired of ever hearing more of Christians.” Some days afterwards Cabeza de Vaca came upon “four Christians on horseback,” who, seeing him in such strange attire, and in company with Indians, were greatly startled; “they stood staring at me a length of time, so confounded that they neither hailed me, nor drew near to make an inquiry.” A few weeks later the wanderers were at Compostella, telling their story to Nuno de Guzman, who received them cordially, and gave them clothes; but “for some time,” so their leader assures us, “I could not wear any, nor could we sleep anywhere else but on the ground.” Finally, on July 24, 1536, they reached Mexico. They had crossed the continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and the stories they brought back of the regions they had traversed led directly, as we have already seen, to further explorations. It was the negro whom Cabeza de Vaca had brought with him across the plains that accompanied Fray Marcos in 1539.

One more great adventure—in some respects the most remarkable of them all—completes the list of expeditions which issued, directly or indirectly, from Florida. Hernando de Soto, who with “nothing more than blade and buckler” had already won distinction in the conquest of Peru, returned early to Spain a comparatively rich man, and in 1537 was formally authorized by the Emperor to conquer, pacify, and people the region now comprised in the southeastern quarter of the United States. In April, 1538, he left Seville with a gallant company of 600 men, which included a number of Portuguese. Eight weeks afterwards he reached Cuba, where he remained for nearly a year, collecting material for his adventure. In the spring of 1539 he set sail for Florida, and landed at Tampa Bay on May 30. Shortly after his arrival there, he had a piece of good luck, reminiscent of the encounter of Cortés with Jeronimo de Aguilar more than twenty years before. A survivor of Narvaez’s unfortunate expedition, a Sevillian by the name of Juan Ortiz, who had lived in misery among the Indians for over eleven years, was picked up by some scouts who had been sent out to seek for him, and proved invaluable as a guide and interpreter during the ensuing months.

For some time the expedition busied itself with local explorations in West Florida; it passed the first winter near Appalachese Bay. In March, 1540, de Soto broke camp and started off in a northeasterly direction across what is now the state of Georgia. In late April he was on the Savannah, not far from the site of the present city of Augusta; thence he turned northwest and followed up the river almost as far as the southern boundary of North Carolina. No gold or other riches had thus far been found; but the dauntless leader, though he saw that it was imperative to get back to within reach of the coast, resolved at least to return by a different route. Striking off, accordingly, towards the southwest, he reached, in mid-October, the head of Mobile Bay. There he fought the bloodiest of his various encounters with the Indians; 2500 is the lowest of the contemporary estimates of the natives that were slain, while of the Christians “there fell eighteen... and of the living, one hundred and fifty Christians had received seven hundred wounds from the arrow, and God was pleased that they should be healed in little time of very dangerous injuries.” Not yet, however, could de Soto bring himself to turn back, or even to send “news of himself, until he should have discovered a rich country”; so, after a month’s rest, he started off once more to the northwest, until, on May 8, 1541, he struck the Mississippi, to the south of the present city of Memphis. Barges were built and a crossing effected, and during the ensuing summer the expedition roamed over the eastern part of Arkansas. A few hundred miles to the northwest, Coronado and his thirty horsemen were simultaneously seeking Quivira. Indeed, an Indian woman who had escaped from one of Coronado’s companions fell into the hands of de Soto’s men nine days later, “and told them that she had run away from other men like them ... and gave them the names of some captains.”
The end, however, was near at hand. In the spring of 1542 de Soto started down the Mississippi; not, indeed, with the idea of going home, but rather of reaching a point whence he could communicate with Cuba in the hope of obtaining reinforcements. But the strain and the sufferings which he had endured for the past three years had at last begun to break down his health. Fever overtook him, and on May 21 he died, and his body was sunk in the waters of the ‘Great River’. After vainly seeking to get to Mexico overland, the survivors built boats, floated down to the mouth of the Mississippi, and then coasted along to the southwest, until, on September 10, 1543, 311 members of the original company finally succeeded in reaching Panuco. From the point of view of the seeker for gold and precious stones, the expedition had been absolutely sterile, and de Soto, whose notions on the subject of treasure-hunting had been formed in the school of Pizarro and his companions, was utterly discouraged when he died. From the humanitarian standpoint, moreover, the entire expedition had been nothing short of atrocious. Oviedo describes de Soto himself as “very fond of the sport of killing Indians,” and there are numerous passages in the contemporary accounts recording acts of cold-blooded cruelty unsurpassed in all the annals of Spain in the New World. Yet one cannot forbear to pay tribute to the indomitable will and magnificent courage which led the Spaniards to persist in their undertaking in the face of all the hardships and perils they were called upon to endure. Their venture has rightly been designated as “the most remarkable exploring expedition in the history of North America”; for endurance and heroism, it is in some respects unique; and the chief share of the glory belongs to its gallant leader, who chose death in preference to returning unsuccessful.

In order to complete our survey of the process of discovery and acquisition of the various territories that were ultimately to compose the viceroyalty of New Spain, it remains for us to examine the history of the early attempts to settle and colonize the northern part of South America—the region now comprised in the republic of Venezuela.

The chief attraction of this territory was the opportunities it offered for slave-hunting. The natives were easier to capture than the better organized and more warlike tribes of North America; moreover, being accustomed to a tropical climate, they fared far better and could do more work when transported to the islands. A subsidiary inducement was the pearl fishing, whose center was the island of Cubagua, just off the Venezuelan coast; down to about 1535, when the oyster beds began to get exhausted, it was one of the most important scenes of Spanish activity in the New World. Many of the slaves that were captured on the mainland were used in the fisheries, and Las Casas assures us that the tyranny which the Spaniards exercised over them in this occupation was “one of the cruellest things that is in the world”, and that “there is no hell in this life, nor other desperate state in this world, that may be compared unto it.”

The eastern part of the region in question, namely, from Cape Maracapana around to the Gulf of Paria, was, during the first half of the Emperor’s reign, alternately the scene of the most brutal kind of slave hunting, and of misguided and unlucky efforts on the part of the Dominican monks to protect the natives from the ravages of their countrymen. It seemed to be the fate of the Dominicans to be punished for the very outrages they had gone forth to prevent; for the Indians did not distinguish between the different types of Spaniards, or the different objects by which they were animated, and not seldom destroyed monasteries under the impression that they were capturing forts. The great names of the story are those of the ‘Apostle’ Las Casas, whose schemes for the founding of a model colony at Cumana were shattered almost before they had got started; the ferocious Gonzalo de Ocampo, whose slave hunts counteracted all the efforts of the monks; Antonio de Sedeño, who tried, without much success, to occupy Trinidad in 1530, and Diego de Ordaz, who attempted, also fruitlessly, to explore the Orinoco in the immediately succeeding years. Over and above the fundamental differences between the Dominicans and the conquistadores about the treatment of the natives and the development of the territory, there were even more than the usual number of petty complaints and recriminations between the individual adventurers before the audiencia at Santo Domingo, with the net result that by 1540 the greater part of the region was virtually abandoned as unprofitable, and no further attempt was made to develop it during the Emperor’s reign.

Somewhat different was the fate of the regions farther westward—the territory between Cape Maracapana and Lake Maracaibo. For more than a quarter of a century after Ojeda’s first visit to these shores, they were left virtually alone by the Spaniards, save for occasional raids by slave hunters and pirates. It was to put an end to these depredations, and to answer the various complaints which were constantly pouring in about the scandalous treatment of the natives of these parts, that the audiencia of Santo Domingo, in the year 1527, sent thither Juan de Ampues, who had already won an enviable reputation by the kindness of his dealings with the Indians in the islands. The chief results of the
mission of Ampues were the founding of the city of Santa Ana de Coro, in the northwestern part of the region that had been assigned to him, and the initiation of a policy of friendly relations with the natives, which promised to produce the most gratifying results. But Ampues had scarcely got started on his colonization scheme when he was ordered to give way to settlers of a very different sort, sent thither under the auspices of a famous German banking house.

The older historians are almost unanimous in stating that the grant by the Emperor of the region of Western Venezuela to the Weiser Company was made as a security for pecuniary indebtedness. More recently it has been urged that this was not the case, but that the whole affair was merely one—the most conspicuous and dramatic—of a large series of money-making enterprises in the New World, on which the great house of Weiser, with the imperial approval, had already embarked, before ever it was established on the VenezueLAN shores. Making due allowance for the intensity of German colonial enthusiasm at the time that this theory was first put forth, and the obvious desire of its chief proponent to find historical precedents for his country’s expansion, there is much to be said for the view that he advances. Charles realized that the Spaniards were rather conquerors than colonizers; he also knew something of the economic efficiency of the great German banking houses. If the Indies were to be made to yield the highest possible profit, it would be necessary to supplement the efforts of the conquistadores with those of settlers who would utilize and develop the new territories to the best advantage. The Welsers had had a business agent in Santo Domingo since 1525; when Charles learned how badly things were going on the northern coasts of South America—from the point of view both of the humanitarian and of the economist—it was natural enough that he should turn to them for help.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon a story which has recently been told with such a wealth of detail. The Welser occupation began with a series of capitulaciones y asientos issued by the Emperor in the year 1528; the first party of settlers reached Coro in February, 1529; some months later they succeeded in ousting Ampues. For the next sixteen years the Welsers remained in full possession; but their administration gave rise to such universal dissatisfaction that it was evident that sooner or later they would be obliged to withdraw. They treated the Indians even more abominably than had the Spaniards before them. Never had the good intentions of the home government in respect to the natives been more shamefully disregarded. The region around Coro was virtually depopulated, and Coro itself was converted into a great slave market. The Welsers were also constantly in trouble with the audiencia of Santo Domingo, whose efforts to exert authority over them they regarded in the light of an unwarrantable infringement of their patent. The home government was inundated with charges and counter-charges. The only bright spot in the picture is the achievements of the Welsers in exploring the valley of the Orinoco and the regions farther westward; for they penetrated into territory which has not even today been thoroughly opened up. The chief hero of these explorations—indeed, the most interesting figure in the whole Weiser episode—was a hard-hitting Swabian, named Nikolaus Federmann. In the year 1530 he led an expedition into the back country, whose itinerary it has never been possible definitely to trace. In the autumn of 1536 he started out on an even more remarkable adventure farther westward, which finally brought him to the high plateau of Bogota, to meet there with Quesada and Sebastian de Belalcázar. But these achievements were of slight consequence when weighed against the miseries of the colony as a whole. In 1546 the Welsers’ grant was formally rescinded, and after ten years more of complicated litigation, through which the Germans sought to reassert their title, the judgment against them was confirmed by the Council of the Indies, and their last claim to Venezuela was thus finally and definitely abrogated.

Such in brief outline is the story of the discovery, conquest, and settlement of the territories which came to be known as the viceroyalty of New Spain. It certainly seems at this distance to have been a most heterogeneous and ill-assorted agglomeration; all the worst and most characteristic faults of Spanish political administration in the Old World seem to have been reproduced, if not accentuated, in the New. Yet if one looks at the situation from a contemporaneous point of view, one will not be at a loss to find a reason, at least, if not a justification, for the gathering together under a single viceroy of such different and scattered lands. That reason is that all these separate regions had been discovered and colonized by expeditions sent out from the islands of the West Indies. They were linked together, from the earliest days, by the fact that they all recognized, in theory, at least, the supremacy, under the crown, of the authority of the audiencia of Santo Domingo; and when, with the establishment of the viceroyalty in 1535, the seat of that authority was transferred to Mexico, the link had become so strongly forged that it seemed undesirable to try to break it. New Spain, in other words, was distinctly Atlantic in its connotation and traditions; while the region of New Castile, to which we turn in the succeeding chapter, was equally essentially bound up with the Pacific.
CHAPTER XXIX

THE CONQUEST OF NEW CASTILE

The founder of Spanish power in South America was a far less attractive personality than the Conqueror of Mexico. His name was Francisco Pizarro, and he was born sometime in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century in the city of Truxillo in Estremadura, the illegitimate son of a colonel of infantry who later served in Italy in the armies of the Great Captain. It is said that he was abandoned by his parents shortly after his birth, and was left at the door of the church at Truxillo, where he was suckled by a sow. He certainly had neither education nor upbringing. He drifted for a time into the occupation of swineherd; but finding little to attract him in such a sedentary pursuit, he resolved to try his fortune in the New World. There is apparently no record of the time and occasion of his crossing the Atlantic: but we know that he accompanied the expedition of Ojeda for the settlement of New Andalusia in 1509; that he crossed the Isthmus of Panama with Balboa in 1513; and that he subsequently shifted his allegiance to Pedrarias. These incidents of his early career give an indication of his character. The key to it was insatiable ambition and lust for gold, and willingness to sacrifice everything thereto. He was restrained by no fear or scruple. Religious enthusiasm, which for Cortés was a beacon light, was for Pizarro little more than a means to an end. He was, in fact, a gambler for the highest stakes. Having risen from nothing, he had nothing to lose; and as each succeeding venture left him better off than when he entered upon it, he gradually acquired a confidence in his destiny which rendered him invincible at the crisis of his career, but was also a potent cause of his tragic and unhonored end.

Balboa’s discovery of the Pacific in 1513, together with the general ill-success of the various efforts to develop the Atlantic coasts in the neighborhood of Darien, gave rise to the view that it might be the part of wisdom to transfer the Spanish settlement to the southern side of the isthmus. This idea did not actually bear fruit till the founding of the town of Panama in the year 1519; but before that time a number of expeditions were sent out to explore the Pacific coast, and in these Pizarro played a prominent part. Most of them were directed to the northwest, and yielded no gold: but in 1522 Pascual de Andagoya, sailing southward, returned after a summer voyage with a tale to stir men’s blood. On his arrival in the region called Chochama, just south of the Gulf of San Miguel, he was begged by the inhabitants to help them against their enemies of the neighboring district of Biru, who came in canoes to assail them at every full moon. Having obtained reinforcements from Panama, Andagoya set forth with his friends of Chochama, and after a journey of six days reached Biru, attacked its principal stronghold, and received the submission of its chieftains. There he heard rumors of a still greater power—that of the Incas—farther southward, and he started out in a small vessel to investigate them. But an attack of fever soon compelled him to turn back: and a few weeks later he was once more in Panama, reporting his discoveries to the local authorities. Evidently the affair was well worth following up, though Andagoya himself was too ill to do so; and so Pedrarias finally persuaded him to hand over the conduct of the whole matter to Francisco Pizarro, who was eagerly on the watch for just such a chance, and had enlisted the support of two other residents of Panama. The first of these was one Diego de Almagro, a foundling of origin more obscure if possible that Pizarro’s, and like him unable to read or write. The second was Hernando de Luque, then a vicar at Panama, who had previously been a schoolmaster in the settlement at Darien.

The misfortunes that accompanied the efforts of the three associates would have daunted any but the stoutest hearts. Luque had a hard time in collecting money and supplies. When Pizarro left Panama on November 14, 1524, he had only one ship, carrying about one hundred men; while Almagro, who followed shortly afterwards with another vessel, had the utmost difficulty in finding his partner. Both adventurers encountered bad weather and hostile natives, and suffered heavy losses of men; but they got as far south as the Rio de San Juan, and both succeeded in bringing back gold. When they returned to Panama to refit, it was even harder than before to obtain funds; but the indefatigable Luque finally persuaded a local functionary named Espinosa to advance 20,000 pesos; and a fresh start was made in 1526. This time there were two ships and about 160 men; a few horses also were purchased and brought along. Pizarro was landed with the troops at the southernmost point that had been reached before, one of the wettest and most unhealthy spots on the entire coast; thence one of the vessels was sent still farther south to explore, while Almagro in the other went back to Panama for fresh recruits. When the two ships returned from their respective missions, they found the followers of Pizarro deeply discouraged.
They had made arduous expeditions into the interior to no purpose. They were stricken with swamp fever, and many of them were anxious to return. But the reports of the explorers and the specimens of native gold work which they brought back with them revived the drooping spirits of Pizarro’s men. The new recruits whom Almagro had brought from Panama were full of enthusiasm for further adventure. It was accordingly decided to resume the advance southward; and they all coasted along together as far as Atacames in the northern part of the present republic of Ecuador.

Evidences of a civilization far superior to anything they had yet encountered met the gaze of the explorers as they proceeded on their way. Broad areas were under cultivation; towns of several thousand inhabitants were seen; the natives wore ornaments of gold and precious stones. Here at last was a region well worth conquering; the ambition and avarice of the Spaniards flamed up at what they saw. But conquest would obviously be difficult in the extreme. The natives were numerous, well equipped, and warlike. Clearly the adventurers could do nothing without reinforcements, and a council was called to determine their course. Almagro wished to leave Pizarro with the troops, as he had done before, and himself go back for help to Panama; while Pizarro not unnaturally protested at being constantly assigned the harder and more perilous part. Hot words would have been followed by blows had not the cooler members of the company intervened. The quarrel was temporarily patched up, but neither of the participants forgave or forgot. Meanwhile Almagro’s plan was adopted. Pizarro and his followers were transferred to the little island of Gallo, farther north, where they were comparatively safe from native attacks. Almagro returned to the Isthmus for more men and supplies. There was grumbling among the troops when the decision was announced; and treacherous attempts were made to have the expedition recalled. Indeed, Pizarro found it advisable to send back to Panama the one ship that had been left him by Almagro, on the pretense of having it repaired, but really as a means of getting rid of the more mutinous of his men.1

The next phase of the story reveals the truly desperate resolution that animated Pizarro. When Almagro got back to Panama he found the authorities prepared to oppose the further prosecution of his schemes. Pedrarias, who had stood behind the three associates in the early days of their partnership, had been superseded by Pedro de los Rios, whose ears had been reached by the complaints of the faint-hearted. Not only did the new governor refuse further support to the enterprise: he promptly dispatched to Gallo a certain Cordován, Pedro Tafur, with two ships, and orders to bring back to Panama every Spaniard on the island. At the moment that these vessels arrived at their destination, Pizarro and his companions were in the depths of despair. Provisions had run out, and nothing save a few shellfish was to be found in Gallo. Their clothing was in rags; they had no adequate shelter; and the island was swept by drenching rains. Under the circumstances the arrival of Tafur seemed like a deliverance from a prison house; but Pizarro was resolved not to withdraw from the enterprise until he had given his luck another chance to turn. He was encouraged, moreover, by letters from his associates, urging him to hold fast, and promising to stand by him. There remained the great question of how to deal with his followers. Prayers and remonstrances could effect nothing; if the faint-hearted were resolved to return, it was better to let them go. But there were certain of his men, Pizarro was convinced, who were like-minded with himself. He therefore determined to give them an opportunity to show their mettle by staging a scene which would appeal to their Castilian pride. In the sand of the shore he drew a line with his sword, from east to west, and then addressed his men: “Friends and comrades! on that side are toil, hunger, nakedness, the drenching storm, desertion, and death; on this side, ease and pleasure. There lies Peru with its riches; here, Panama and its poverty. Choose, each man, what best becomes a brave Castilian. For my part, I go to the south Peru with its riches; here, Panama and its poverty. Choose, each man, what best becomes a brave Castilian.” So saying, he stepped across to the southern side of the line; and sixteen others followed after him, one by one. Tafur regarded the whole proceeding as an act of madness. He refused to countenance it in any way, or even to leave one of his ships for the use of the desperate men who had flouted his authority. Only with difficulty was he persuaded to give them a few supplies. But the scene on the sands of Gallo really marked the crisis of Pizarro’s fortunes. It committed him to success, because he had renounced the possibility of failure. It was like Cortés’s scuttling his ships off the shore of Vera Cruz.

The little band needed all its resolution to support it through the trials of the ensuing weeks. With infinite trouble the men constructed a raft, and ferried themselves across to the neighboring island of Gorgona, where they found rabbits and pheasants, and a plentiful supply of excellent water. Day after day they scanned the northern horizon for the arrival of the succors which Pizarro’s associates had promised, and after seven months had elapsed their patience was rewarded. Almagro and Luque had been true to their word, and had finally induced the authorities to consent to the sending out of a vessel and supplies, bearing positive instructions to Pizarro to return to Panama within six months and report. Pizarro was bitterly disappointed that the ship had brought him no reinforcements; but at least he was now possessed of the means of further exploration: and the time limit set by the governor for his return

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was sufficient to permit him to undertake them. The adventurers accordingly made haste to depart from the “Hell” where they had suffered so much. Guided by certain friendly Indians, picked up in the previous explorations, they coasted southward for twenty days, and finally cast anchor in the Gulf of Guayaquil.

If Pizarro had been gratified by what he had already seen on his previous voyage to Atacames, he was astounded and overjoyed by his experiences in the next few weeks. The natives on the shore were full of wonder and apparently friendly. Some of them came on board, with presents of delicious food. One was induced to remain and dine and was told the regulation story of why the Spaniards had come—the omnipotence of the Emperor, and the supremacy of the Christian faith. On the two succeeding days the visit was returned by Spanish cavaliers, who, after impressing their hosts by discharging their arquebuses, were taken to see the marvels of the land. The fruitful fields, the system of irrigation, the marvelous roads, and the great temple of the Sun in the city of Tumbez, with its walls literally tapestried with plates of silver and gold—all were duly noted and reported to Pizarro. Here at last was El Dorado; here was an inexhaustible reservoir of the precious metal which had been the chief magnet to draw the Spaniards to the New World. Further exploration of the coast to the southward—the adventurers reached a point about nine degrees south of the Equator—brought additional confirmation of the riches of the land, and also of the power of the mighty emperor who ruled over it. Pizarro was convinced that he had at last found an opportunity to win wealth and fame more remarkable, even, than that of the Conqueror of Mexico. But it was clear that he could do nothing with the puny forces which he now commanded. He must return and collect a larger armament. The winter of 1527-28 found him back again at Panama.

Pizarro had good ground for exultation; for he had come in contact with what was in some respects the most remarkable civilization that the Western Hemisphere had yet produced. The empire of the Incas, whose confines he had reached, extended along the Pacific coast, from the River Ancasmayu on the north to the River Maule on the south; it included the present republics of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, northern Chile, and northwestern Argentina. The story of its origin is exceedingly obscure, particularly in the matter of chronology; but it apparently centers around a hill with caves in it, called Tampu-Tocco or the Tavern of Windows; from these caves issued certain people led by four brothers, claiming descent from the Sun; of these, the eldest, Manco, founded the town of Cuzco and gained the leadership over the adjacent tribes. There followed a period of uncertain duration, empty on the whole of decisive events, but with the accession of the Inca Rocca, who flourished in the early part of the fourteenth century, we emerge upon firmer ground. From that time expansion was more rapid. The capital at Cuzco was enlarged and improved. Wars of conquest were undertaken and carried out, first to the south, west, and east, finally to the north in the region of Ecuador; that last territory, in fact, had been brought under the Inca rule only a few years before the arrival of the Spaniards. Huayna Capac, under whose reign this achievement had taken place, lived to learn of the first expedition of Pizarro and Almagro, and was apparently convinced that it boded ill for his dynasty. On his deathbed, in defiance of the established usage of the Incas, he divided the Empire, leaving the older provinces to the southward to his eldest son, Huascar, the child of his sister and lawful wife; while the recent conquests to the north were assigned to Atahuallpa, the progeny of a concubine said to be descended from the rulers of Quito. On the eve of the Spanish conquest, the two half-brothers had quarreled. Finally Atahuallpa marched on Cuzco, conquered and imprisoned Huascar, and possessed himself of the entire inheritance.
possible substitutes for writing. When a community was believed to be dangerously near revolt, it was leavened by the compulsory importation of colonists of whose loyalty there could be no fear. If a region threatened to become overcrowded, it was relieved by the transportation of a part of its inhabitants to territories whose resources had not been developed. An even distribution of the population and an even rate of economic progress were the ideal. No one was to be overworked; no one permitted to remain idle. Probably never in the world has a communistic experiment, on a large scale, attained a greater measure of success, and it is reasonably certain that it never will again. For there obtained in the Inca Empire three conditions which seem essential concomitants of any socialistic system, and which it now seems impossible ever to reproduce. These are (1) an absolute despotism; (2) a very uniform level of knowledge and culture (save for the Amauta, or men of learning, whose attainments were placed exclusively at the disposal of the government); and (3) no foreign relations. The resemblances to the state of affairs portrayed in Sir Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) are in some respects very striking.

The conditions of life, and the occupations and achievements of these early Peruvians, reveal a state of affairs far happier and more serene than existed in the grim empire of the Mexican Aztecs. Their Sun worship was never disfigured by such revolting slaughters as drenched the teocalli of Huitzilopochtli with blood. Human sacrifices there probably were—the inheritance of an earlier civilization—though the Incas did their best to suppress them; but it is certain they were limited to occasions of the highest importance, and that the methods of execution were comparatively humane. The elaborate ceremonies that accompanied burials reveal an unshaken belief in a life after death. The Peruvian love songs and hymns to the Sun, and most of all their dramatic poems, handed down by prodigious feats of memory from generation to generation, attest the existence of a literature among a people who knew no writing. They had taught themselves something of surveying and astronomy, and had evolved and reformed a very accurate calendar. Their architecture, characterized by “simplicity, symmetry, and solidity”, has stood the test of time in a region frequently visited by earthquakes, even better, on the whole, than that of the Spaniards who conquered them. Their roads, their aqueducts, their suspension bridges of osier rope, spanning chasms two hundred feet broad, with roaring torrents beneath, excited the liveliest admiration of Pizarro and his men. Their sense of beauty is attested by their notable achievements in the textile arts, by their pottery, their stone carving, and the ornaments they made out of silver and gold. But the greatest of all their accomplishments was their knowledge of agriculture; they “surpassed every other American race in their dominion over the earth”. The land was by no means universally favorable to husbandry. The bottoms of the higher valleys were fertile indeed; but the slopes were too steep to be cultivated without terracing; water was unevenly distributed and had often to be brought from afar; and the soil needed to be enriched from the guano deposits on the coast. Over all these natural difficulties the Peruvians, aided and directed by the benevolent despotism of the Incas, gained decisive triumphs. The Spaniards, who knew something of the hard lot of the farmer in such arid lands as the plains of Old Castile, were tremendously impressed by what they saw.

The Peruvian army, with which the Spaniards were so soon to come into contact, was considerably less formidable than that of the Aztecs. Its organization and discipline were admirable; and it was plentifully supplied from a series of large magazines, scattered over the country at strategic points. But it was not possessed of that desperate zeal for slaughter and combat which animated the Mexican hosts. It had no ‘religion of war’; and seemed desirous of accomplishing its ends with as little misery and inconvenience as possible to both its enemies and itself. Occasionally the Peruvian soldier could be ferocious, when his wrath was provoked by the senseless resistance of a beaten foe, and some of the Incas displayed lust for conquest; but the Peruvians were not primarily a fighting people, in the sense in which that term can be applied to the Mexicans. Their arms and equipment were generally similar to those of the other native tribes of the Western Hemisphere, who knew neither iron nor gunpowder. They consisted of bows and arrows, slings, swords, battle axes, and spears and darts tipped with copper or bone; and, for defense, of quilted tunics and shields.

When Pizarro got back to Panama to report, he found the authorities as unwilling as ever to furnish him with the means of following up his great discoveries. The tale he had to tell was marvelous enough, and he had brought back some llamas and a few specimens of Inca art to corroborate it, but the governor had been too much irritated at the flouting of his authority to consent to give support to the enterprise on which the adventurer had set his heart. Under the circumstances there was no alternative but to apply to the Castilian crown; and to Spain accordingly Pizarro betook himself, in the early months of 1528. It was characteristic of the ups and downs of his checkered career that on arrival at Seville he was straightway cast into prison at the complaint of the lawyer Enciso, on the ground of an ancient debt; but he was soon rescued from this disagreeable predicament by an order from the Emperor, who had heard
rumors of his achievements, and sent for him to come to Toledo to tell his tale. His manner of recounting it was simple and impressive, and the llamas and the golden Inca ornaments aroused the keenest interest. Before the Emperor departed for Aragon (March 8, 1529) he commended Pizarro to the friendly consideration of the Council of the Indies.

It was not until July 26, 1529, at Toledo, when Charles was about to leave Barcelona for Italy, that the capitulación, for which the adventurer had so ardently longed, was finally executed; the Empress Isabella signed it in the place of her absent spouse. It granted to Pizarro and his two associates a stretch of two hundred leagues along the coast of the Pacific, southward from the neighborhood of the Gulf of Guayaquil, to settle and conquer. The name of New Castile does not appear in the instrument, but it seems to have been generally applied, from that time forward, to the region in question and the adjacent lands. Pizarro was to have the titles of governor and captain-general of the whole territory, together with those of adelantado and alguacil mayor; he was in fact virtually endowed with viceregal authority, and he was to have an annual salary of 750,000 maravedis. There were the usual inducements to prospective colonists—such as partial and temporary exemption from taxation; and Pizarro was enjoined to see to it that good government was maintained, and that the natives were protected from exploitation and ill usage. His associates, though not forgotten, were less generously treated than he. Almagro was given command of the fortress of Tumbez, with an annual salary of 300,000 maravedis; while Luque was appointed to the bishopric there, and granted the title of Protector of the Indians, with a yearly stipend of 2000 ducats. The uneven distribution of these emoluments excited, when it was reported to him, the jealousy of Almagro, and sufficed to keep alive the ancient grudge which he had cherished against Pizarro since their quarrel of three years before. The measure of Pizarro’s responsibility for it is not, however, altogether easy to ascertain.

Before sailing for America, Pizarro visited his birthplace, where he gathered a number of followers to share his fortunes. Among these were his legitimate half-brother, Hernando, whose arrogance and unscrupulousness exceeded his own; his two brothers, illegitimate like himself, named Gonzalo and Juan; and Francisco Martín de Alcantara, a son of his mother by a different father. His young cousin, Pedro Pizarro, who was subsequently to win fame as a chronicler, accompanied him as a page; and a fanatical Dominican, Fray Vicente de Valverde, was enlisted as chaplain. On January 19, 1530, he set sail from San Lucar—hurrying off at the last moment with the utmost precipitation, to escape an investigation by the Council of the Indies, which felt that he had failed to fulfil all the obligations imposed on him by the capitulation of the previous year, and attempted to place obstacles in the way of his departure. At Panama, he found difficulty in enlisting recruits, but at last he mustered a company of about 180 men and twenty-seven horses. With this force—small, indeed, for the conquest of an empire—he set sail in January, 1531, on his third and final venture to Peru. Almagro, as on previous occasions, was left to follow with reinforcements.

Heavy weather forced the adventurers to abandon their original project of steering direct for the city of Tumbez, and to land much farther north, at the Bay of San Mateo. An arduous march along the shore ensued, enlivened by the capture of a large booty of gold and emeralds from the fleeing natives of the village of Coaque. From this point the ships were sent back to Panama to bring on the reinforcements; but before the adventurers reached the Gulf of Guayaquil, they were overtaken by other vessels with recruits and supplies, and the officers appointed by the crown to attend them. Shortly afterwards they were visited by the chiefs of the inhabitants of the island of Puna, which lies in the center of the Gulf, just opposite Tumbez. The islanders came over with a large fleet of balsas or rafts, and invited the Spaniards to return with them. Despite the warnings of his Indian interpreters, who assured Pizarro that the islanders meditated treachery, the Spanish commander considered the opportunity too good to lose; here seemed to be a place where he could establish his headquarters with perfect safety, in convenient proximity to the territory he hoped to win. The Spaniards accordingly were ferried across. Whatever the original plans of the islanders may have been, a visit to their guests from the Indians of Tumbez was amply sufficient to incite them to arms. Bitter hostility had existed for a long time between the inhabitants of Puna and their neighbors on the shore. Each party told evil tales of the other to the newcomers, until at last Pizarro captured some of the islanders, and handed them over to be massacred by their foes. This outrage was the signal for the outbreak of a devastating war between the Puná Indians and the Spaniards. The latter, of course, were victorious whenever they could induce their enemies to meet them in pitched battle; but night attacks, and sudden forays, they were unable to check. They were consequently much relieved by the arrival of reinforcements under Hernando de Soto, the future discoverer of the Mississippi, together with a fresh supply of horses for the cavalry. With these, Pizarro felt strong enough to set out for the mainland. Leaving Puna, accordingly, with little regret, the Spaniards crossed over to the shores of Tumbez.
While they were at Puná, and after they had reached the mainland, the Spaniards collected much precious information in regard to the divided state of the Inca Empire. They learned of the defeat and imprisonment of Huascar; of the victory of Atahualpa and of the way in which he had determined to utilize it. All this news was exceedingly welcome; it promised the Spaniards a rare opportunity for the achievement of their objects. Pizarro, accordingly, remained some months in the neighborhood of Tumbez, reconnoitering the country, and waiting for the situation to develop in the interior. To the south of Tumbez, he founded the city of San Miguel, the first European settlement within the limits of the Inca Empire. He also sent out de Soto to obtain intelligence concerning the nearest of the Inca’s garrisons among the hills. After an absence of some days de Soto returned, bringing with him an Indian envoy from Atahualpa himself. This emissary, as Pizarro well knew, had been dispatched rather to collect information than to bid welcome to the invaders; but it was the Spanish policy for the time being to preserve, at all costs, the appearance of friendship. The Indian, accordingly, was treated with the utmost courtesy. He was sent back to his master with a few presents of glass and cloth, and a message that the Spaniards would soon visit the Inca at Cajamarca across the mountains, in order to pay their respects to so great a prince.

In the autumn of 1532, Pizarro started eastward across the Andes, at the head of a force of 62 horsemen and 102 foot soldiers. Their upward march was attended with many difficulties and dangers. The tropical heat of the lowlands gave way to a piercing cold; the luxuriant vegetation to stunted mountain growths; and the gayly feathered birds of the tierra caliente to the lonely condor, circling high above the clouds. The path they followed, winding in and out among the cliffs, was so narrow and so steep that the cavalry often had to dismount. Forts were found as they advanced, so placed as to enable the garrisons to overwhelm them, but every one proved to be untenanted; clearly there was no thought of interfering with the Spaniards’ march. Embassies from Atahualpa came and went, but no definite information as to his intentions could be obtained. The Inca apparently was observing a fast in his encampment outside the city of Cajamarca, and could on no account be disturbed, until the season that had been appointed for it had expired. The dread of treachery, never absent from the Spaniards’ minds, was greatly increased, when, after crossing the range, they began the descent, and saw the fertile valley of Cajamarca spread out before them to the eastward. The ground was dotted with thousands of tents; at night the watchfires blazed forth in such myriads that “it looked like nothing so much as the starriest of skies.” Clearly the Inca had an army of overwhelming strength, ready to do battle; what if he was planning to lure the Spaniards to their destruction, into the heart of his empire and beyond the possibility of retreat. That fear, though it was probably groundless, is the sole possible excuse—and an utterly inadequate one—for the outrages that were to be perpetrated by the invaders in the ensuing months.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1532, the Spaniards entered the city of Cajamarca. The place was apparently quite deserted; and Pizarro reluctantly consented to send his brother Hernando, and de Soto, with five or six horsemen, to the Inca’s headquarters a few miles distant to announce the arrival of the Spaniards and learn how the land lay. The envoys found “the tyrant” at the door of his lodging “sitting on a low stool, with many Indians before him and women at his feet, who almost surrounded him”; but the expression of his face gave no indication of his feelings; his mind seemed to be wholly occupied with the keeping of his fast, and it was only with great difficulty that he was induced even to speak to his guests. Finally, after an exchange of boasts with the envoys as to the respective merits of the Peruvian and Spanish forces, he dismissed his visitors with the assurance that on the morrow, when his fast was ended, he would come himself to Cajamarca to interview the leader of “the Christians.”

When the envoys got back to Pizarro to report, he called a council of his officers, and unfolded to them the plan of action which he had resolved to carry out. It was so plainly reminiscent of Cortes’s arrest of Montezuma that there is every probability that it was inspired thereby, for the Conqueror of Mexico and the Conqueror of Peru had had an excellent opportunity for conference and discussion during their sojourn at Toledo in 1528. The project was nothing less than to seize the Inca in the presence of his own army; and Pizarro justified it on the grounds that thus alone could the possibility of Peruvian treachery be surely anticipated, and the natives terrorized into submission to the Spaniards. The motives of religion were also urged, to salve the consciences of the more scrupulous, and steel their hearts to desperate deeds. Mass was said, and the friars promised eternal salvation to all who should perish in the attempt to advance the faith. On the morrow, November 16, the deed was done. Towards evening the Inca arrived, borne aloft by his attendants in an open litter, adorned with the richest decorations. He was accompanied by some five or six thousand natives, and was permitted to enter and traverse the great square before a single Spaniard made his appearance. At his query, “Where are they?” Fray Vicente presented himself; gave the standard exposition, probably somewhat amplified for the occasion, of the Christian faith, and concluded with the demand that Atahualpa accept it, and
acknowledge himself a vassal of the Emperor Charles V. The Inca naturally demurred and asked the friar to tell him by what authority he spoke. A copy of the Bible was given him by way of reply, but Atahualpa, after looking at it, threw it angrily upon the ground. Scandalized, the friar hurried off to Pizarro. He demanded vengeance for the insult and promised abjuration. The signal was given, and the Spaniards, who had lain concealed in the adjacent buildings, poured out into the great square. Overwhelmed by the suddenness of the assault, blinded by the smoke, and stupefied by the discharge of firearms, the Peruvians, incapable of resistance, were butchered where they stood. The estimates of the victims vary between two and ten thousand; but all the accounts agree that the Spaniards escaped with a single wound. That wound was received by Pizarro himself, and from one of his own men. It was inflicted while he was protecting the person of the Inca, whom a Spaniard, despite explicit orders to the contrary, strove vainly to slay as a grand culmination of the bloody work.

Atahualpa, then, was preserved alive, at least for the time; but he was kept a prisoner of the Spaniards at Cajamarca. His liberty was curtailed as little as was consistent with his security; he was even invited to dinner with Pizarro and taught to amuse himself with cards and with chess. The doctrines of Christianity were frequently expounded to him; and he was visibly impressed by the fact that the new Deity whom he was asked to adore had been able to give the Spaniards a victory against overwhelming odds, while the Sun had been impotent to save him in his hour of need. But he was naturally most anxious to regain his freedom, and as his subjects were too cowed to try to liberate him by force, it occurred to him to appeal to the cupidity of his captors. He had been shrewd enough to detect their overpowering lust for gold, and he finally offered them, as the price of his liberty, a whole roomful of the precious metal—twenty-two feet long, seventeen feet broad, and nine feet high. To this astounding proposal Pizarro assented, and allowed the Inca two months in which to collect the treasure. But before the process of collection had got fairly under way, Atahualpa gave orders for the perpetration of an act whose ultimate results proved disastrous to himself. Fearing lest his captive brother, Huascar, should take advantage of his own imprisonment to regain his liberty and the scarlet fringe of the Incas, and dreading equally the effects of a scheme of Pizarro’s to sit in judgment on their respective claims to the throne, he determined to lose no time in sweeping his rival from his path. By his orders Huascar was accordingly put to death, being drowned—according to the common report—in the river Andamarcas.

During the early months of 1533 the Inca’s ransom began to pour into Cajamarca. It consisted of golden goblets, pitchers, and plates, tiles from the roofs and the walls of the temples, and curious specimens of Inca art. Two Spaniards were dispatched to Cuzco to hurry its collection, while Hernando Pizarro was sent off with a small body of horse and foot to the town of Pachacamac on the seacoast, to demolish the local idol and plunder the rich ‘mezquita’ there. In the midst of these events Almagro arrived from Panama, with a welcome reinforcement; so overjoyed was Pizarro at their coming that the ancient grudges between the two associates seemed entirely forgotten. By the middle of June all the treasure had arrived. It fell somewhat short of the promised amount; but Pizarro professed himself entirely satisfied, and apparently signed a document to that effect. Atahualpa thereupon demanded his freedom. But at that moment the air was filled with rumors of a rising of the natives. How they originated it is impossible to say, but there is no reason to believe that they were based upon fact; it is natural to lay much of the blame on the interpreter Felipillo, who had angered the Inca by his attentions to one of the imperial concubines, and could most easily revenge himself by circulating false reports. Demands were soon heard for the death of Atahualpa, especially among the followers of Almagro, who desired to push onward and get more gold, and regarded the fallen ruler as an encumbrance to their plans. Finally a solemn trial was held, in which the Inca was accused of usurping the throne and murdering Huascar, of seeking to stir up a revolt against the Spaniards, and of adulterous and idolatrous practices at variance with the Christian faith. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the farcical nature of the charges or the false interpretations, by the rancorous Felipillo, of the testimony of the witnesses that were summoned for the defense. It was, as Prescott says, “a question of expediency,” and the Spaniards had determined that it was expedient that Atahualpa should die. He was condemned to be burnt alive in the great square of Cajamarca, on the evening of the very day (August 29, 1533) that the sentence was pronounced. In consideration of the fact that, as the fagots were being piled up around him, he accepted Christianity and consented to receive baptism, he was let off with the milder penalty of death by the garrote. No plea, however, can be offered in extenuation of this judicial murder, which the greatest historian of the Conquest has rightly characterized “as having left a stain, never to be effaced, on the Spanish arms in the New World.”

The character of the rank and file of the men who had accompanied Pizarro was revealed by the unseemly fashion in which they quarreled over the division of the Inca’s ransom. The sum total was reckoned, three-quarters of a century ago, as equivalent to over fifteen million dollars; but subsequent calculations have reduced that estimate by more than two-thirds. The royal quinto was duly deducted
and sent to Spain under care of Hernando Pizarro; valuable as his services had been to the expedition, they were equaled or outweighed by his insolence to Almagro, and his brother gladly availed himself of the opportunity to get rid of him. The rest of the treasure was distributed unevenly. Almagro and his men had to be content with a smaller portion, because of the fact that they had faced fewer perils than the rest; and the cavalry in general got more than the infantry. Gambling for high stakes was the natural result of the distribution. Whole fortunes were won and lost, while the prices of every sort of commodity soared to levels hitherto unknown. Discipline broke down and Pizarro soon perceived that the sole remedy for the situation was to order a fresh advance. Cuzco, the Inca capital, was clearly the next objective; and thither, in September, the Spaniards directed their march. Pizarro judged it wise, for the time being, to keep up the pretense of maintaining the Inca authority. He accordingly selected a younger brother of Atahualpa, presented him to the natives as their lawful sovereign, and took him along with his Spaniards to Cuzco.

The march to the Peruvian capital proved more difficult than that from Tumbez to Cajamarca. The road was narrow and traversed by foaming torrents, and signs began to multiply that the natives intended to dispute the Spaniards’ passage. The first serious encounter took place beyond the town of Xauxa, where Pizarro had halted with the main body of his troops to make a settlement, and whence he had sent forward de Soto with a company of sixty horsemen to reconnoiter. This advanced guard was suddenly overwhelmed in the rocky defiles by an assault of the Peruvians in vastly superior numbers. Had not Pizarro learned of the attack in time to send out reinforcements under Almagro, de Soto and his companions must have perished to a man. The affair had a tragic sequel in the Spanish camp; for it led to the burning alive of a captive chieftain named Challcuchima, whom Pizarro had brought along with him, and whom he suspected of complicity with the natives who had delivered the assault; and “all the people of the country”, so the notary Sancho assures us, “rejoiced infinitely at his death, because he was very much abhorred by all who knew what a cruel man he was”. The puppet Inca whom Pizarro had set up also died during the march. He was, however, immediately replaced by the young prince Manco, a brother of Huascar, who arrived at the camp of the Spaniards, opportunely for their purpose, in order to apply for their protection. He accompanied the conquerors to the Peruvian capital, which they reached on November 15, 1533, the first anniversary of their arrival at Cajamarca.

The Spaniards were delighted and amazed by the greatness and beauty of Cuzco. The architecture of the great fortress on the hill, and of the Temple of the Sun, commanded special admiration; “the walls,” declared one of them, “are made of stones as large as chunks of mountains…” and those “who see them say that neither the bridge of Segovia nor any other of the edifices which Hercules or the Romans made is so worthy of being seen”. The treasure that the conquerors gathered was also immense. Whether it was greater or less than the ransom of Atahualpa it is impossible to determine; but it is certain that its collection and division among the troops were succeeded by gaming, and by lavishness in expenditure, fully equal to anything that had taken place at Cajamarca. Meantime Pizarro did not neglect the more serious responsibilities of his position. Manco was crowned Inca, with appropriate solemnities, and the farce of preserving native rule was thus continued. But a truer indication of the real source of authority in Peru was given on the twenty-fourth of the following March by the erection of Cuzco as a Spanish municipality with all the time-honored offices and ceremonies thereto pertaining, and by the taking of the regular preliminary measures for the propagation of the Christian faith. Though the mass of the natives were incapable of realizing it, the supremacy of their ancient civilization had been shattered beyond repair.

Yet the conquest which had been accomplished with such extraordinary ease was not destined to be acquiesced in without further native challenge. It had been accepted chiefly because the Peruvians had failed at first to comprehend its real nature; but when they realized the true state of affairs, they longed to throw off the yoke. In the autumn of 1534, Pizarro left Cuzco for the neighborhood of the coast, where he founded, on the eighteenth of the following January, the city of Lima, the future capital of New Castile. His departure from the Inca metropolis was the signal for a native attack. Manco Inca effected his escape from Cuzco, hotly pursued by Juan Pizarro. A bloody battle was fought in the mountains, from which the Spaniards, as usual, emerged victorious. But they were confronted on the morrow by their foes in such overwhelming numbers that they decided it would be the part of wisdom to retreat to Cuzco; and this resolution was confirmed by a message from Hernando Pizarro, who had recently got back from Spain, to say that he was being besieged in the Inca capital. A series of desperate engagements ensued outside Cuzco. There was a furious sally of the Spaniards, in which the natives were slaughtered in droves. The climax came when an assault was ordered on the great fortress of Sacasahuaman, outside the city, which the Peruvians had managed to occupy; and this assault, though successful, cost the life of the heroic Juan Pizarro, who was hit on the head by a stone hurled down from above. Thereafter the struggle degenerated into an attempt on the part of the natives to starve the
Spaniards out; this lasted until August, 1536, when, the season for planting having arrived, the Inca was obliged to raise the siege. It was the last serious effort of the Peruvians to reassert their power, though Manco Inca continued to be a thorn in the side of the conquerors until his death in 1544. Henceforth the main interest of the story lies not in the struggle of the Spaniards and the natives, but rather in the bloody feuds of the different factions of the invaders over the partition of the rich territory which had been won by their unscrupulousness and valor.

The tale of the development of the conquests of Pizarro during the quarter century that elapsed between the capture of Cuzco and the death of Charles V is not one of the more inspiring chapters in the history of the Spanish Empire. It contains indeed a number of stirring passages, but it is primarily a chronicle of self-seeking and avarice. There is much in it that is reminiscent of the early days of the Reconquista, especially in its numerous illustrations of the inability of the Spaniard to sink individual differences in the prosecution of a common aim. The quarrels of the Pizarras, the Almagros, the conquerors of Quito, and the royal representatives remind one irresistibly of the bickerings of the early kings of Leon, of Castile, of Aragon, and of Navarre. Lack of any outstanding personality, such as that of Cortes in Mexico, was doubtless the underlying cause; the talents and abilities of the different personalities in New Castile were so evenly matched that leadership was very difficult. That the conquest progressed at all is under the circumstances remarkable. Certainly it was the fruit of individual initiative and not of cooperation.

Another factor, which greatly increased the difficulty of maintaining a united and orderly government in the newly discovered lands, was the reports that got abroad of their fabulous wealth. Mexico had been somewhat of a disappointment to the seeker for precious metals, but here in Peru they were apparently to be had for the asking; small wonder if adventurers of every sort and kind fell over one another in their eagerness to reach El Dorado. One of the first to be drawn thither was Pedro de Alvarado, the hero of the famous ‘leap’ on the Mexican causeway, who had been experiencing grave difficulties with his government in Guatemala. Learning of the wealth that had been found at Cajamarca and at Cuzco, and drawing the natural conclusion that Quito, the capital of Atahualpa, which had as yet been left untouched, would prove equally lucrative, he determined to ignore the fact that it fell within the jurisdiction of Pizarro, and get possession of it for himself. He easily collected 500 followers, landed in March, 1534, at Puerto Viejo, and started, without a moment’s delay, on his way eastward across the mountains. The obstacles he encountered are almost impossible to describe. The cold was intense. Cotopaxi was in eruption, and the air was so full of cinders that the men could scarcely breathe. And after all the suffering that had been endured the expedition proved absolutely sterile. Quito was an empty shell, without gold or precious stones; moreover, Alvarado had been preceded there by the followers of the man he was attempting to dispossess. Pizarro, who had become alarmed for the safety of the ‘northern province,’ had detailed Sebastian de Belalcazar to guard it; and Diego de Almagro, inspired by the same idea, had joined forces with Belalcazar before Alvarado could arrive. A battle seemed imminent, but it was finally decided to negotiate. Alvarado was bought off for 100,000 Castellanos, and gave up his troops, his fleet, and his stores. He subsequently had an interview with Pizarro at Pachacamac, and finally departed in friendship and satisfaction. The episode was but an introduction to the more serious quarrels that were to come.

The source of most of these was the ill-feeling between Pizarro and Almagro that had smoldered since the early days of their partnership. When Hernando Pizarro went back to Spain in 1534 to report to the Emperor, Almagro had taken care that an agent of his own should also be on hand, in order to make sure that his own services should not go unrewarded; with the result that while Pizarro’s jurisdiction along the Pacific coast had been extended to a point seventy leagues farther southward than that which it had reached before, his associate had been empowered to conquer and occupy a strip extending two hundred leagues to the south of that. But this arrangement, instead of quieting the jealousy between the two conquerors, actually served to foment it; for, because of the lack of any adequate means of measuring distances, it proved impossible to settle the crucial question whether Cuzco, the capital and principal source of wealth, fell within the jurisdiction of Pizarro or of Almagro. The inevitable dispute at once arose; bloodshed was threatened, and was only avoided through the intervention of friends. Finally the appearance of amity was restored, June 12, 1535, by a singular compact, sworn to by both parties under a most solemn oath, in which each promised neither to malign nor to injure the other; but the vital issue of the possession of Cuzco remained unsolved. Shortly afterwards, Almagro, with a force of 500 Spaniards, and a large body of native carriers, determined to go south to substantiate his claim to the territory that had been allotted to him by the grant of the preceding year. False reports of its great riches had been given him by the Peruvians, who were desirous of ridding their country of as many Spaniards as possible, in order that they might more easily throw off
the conquerors’ yoke. Almagro put every penny he could raise into the expedition, and departed with high hopes in midsummer, 1535.

Seldom have great expectations been more grievously disappointed. The route of the explorers lay inland, through difficult mountains and sandy wastes; hunger, cold, and snow-blindness dogged their footsteps. The Spaniards burnt and pillaged as they advanced. They treated the natives with the utmost brutality, and the natives replied by killing them whenever they could. Worst of all, no gold was to be found; an advance guard, which penetrated, in all probability, to within 100 leagues of the river Maule, returned with the most unpromising reports. Cries began to be heard among the troops for a return to Cuzco, which they now asserted to be clearly Almagro’s; and Almagro’s tenderness for his young son Diego, to whom he longed to bequeath a great fortune and a famous name, finally induced him to listen to their demands. By the end of the year 1536 the expedition started to retrace its steps; in the spring of 1537 it had reached Arica. After an engagement with the troops of Manco Inca, who had raised the siege of Cuzco only a few months before, Almagro sent a message to Hernando Pizarro, who was in command at the capital, to demand that the city admit him and recognize his authority. On receiving in reply a request for delay, on the ground that it was not yet possible to determine definitely within whose jurisdiction Cuzco lay, Almagro became convinced that Pizarro was gathering troops to attack him, and resolved to anticipate his rival. On the night of April 8, 1537, he entered Cuzco unopposed, arrested Hernando Pizarro and his brother, Gonzalo, and obtained the recognition of the municipal authorities. “Had not this deliverance come when it did,” wrote the young Alonso de Guzman, who was weary of the tyranny of the Pizarros, “I should certainly have had no other alternative than to join with the Inca, even though he had been a toad.”

Rumors of Almagro’s return had meantime reached Francisco Pizarro at Lima, and he dispatched to the relief of his kinsmen a force of 500 men, under Alonso de Alvarado. When they reached the banks of the Abancay, some twenty leagues west of Cuzco, they were met by an embassy of six Spaniards from Almagro, who assured them that the object they had been sent to attain was no longer possible of achievement, but that they were willing, if they wished, to stay and help fight the natives. To this Alvarado replied by open defiance, and by casting the emissaries into a stone prison, which he caused the Indians who accompanied him to construct for the purpose. Under the circumstances a battle was inevitable; and it took place, July 12, 1537, on the banks of the Abancay, whither Almagro, with 450 men, marched out to meet his foe. The tactics of the Almagrists were exceedingly skillful. Alvarado, caught napping, surrendered after a struggle in which “only three or four were killed”. He himself was placed under arrest; his army was taken over into the forges of his conqueror, and his prisoners “joyfully returned to Cuzco with the victorious party.”

The news of the defeat of his lieutenant reached Francisco Pizarro at Lima. No longer strong enough to oppose Almagro by force, he prepared once more to negotiate. It was no easy matter to bring Almagro to another conference. His followers urged him to execute Hernando and Gonzalo Pizarro, and boldly assume the offensive against his old associate; and though Almagro’s good nature shrank from this extremity, he was determined to hold on to Cuzco, and to fortify his claim to it by gaining for himself a port and an open line of communication with the sea. But his effort to carry out this last project brought him into proximity to his craftier partner, and led to the initiation of the very conference which Pizarro had sought to bring about. This took place in November, 1537, at Mala, on the seacoast, some fifty miles to the south of Lima; and as the two rivals were so bitter that they could not discuss the issue between them without losing their tempers, it resulted in leaving the decision in the hands of a friar named Francisco de Bobadilla, “for the devil always seeks for suitable men to do his will in affairs of importance”. The friar gave judgment that, pending an accurate determination of the limits of their respective jurisdictions, Pizarro and Almagro should both retire into territory unquestionably their own; that they should refrain from all hostilities, and that Almagro should release his prisoners within six days, and give up Cuzco to Pizarro within thirty. Enriquez de Guzman assures us that “the Friar and Don Francisco Pizarro behaved with duplicity, and concealed a large body of men to seize and kill us, if we should not agree to what they desired.”

Pizarro violated the terms of the decision of Mala at the first moment that there was any prospect of his doing so with advantage. The release of his brother Hernando provided him with a capable general; his forces increased and were once more eager to fight. Almagro, who had returned to Cuzco, was rudely apprised that the treaty was at an end. Too ill to take command in person of his forces, he handed them over to his able lieutenant, Orgoñez, who sallied forth to meet the advancing army of Hernando Pizarro. The rival hosts encountered one another at Las Salinas, two miles outside of Cuzco. Orgoñez had about 600 men; Pizarro, 800; and the surrounding heights were thronged with natives eager to witness the slaughter of their detested conquerors. It was a Saturday, April 6, 1538. The desperate valor
of Ordonez proved no match for the more skillful dispositions of his foe; he was overpowered by numbers, and slain in cold blood after having given up his sword; his followers fell into confusion, and finally broke and fled. In less than two hours the fight was over, and the victors were pursuing the vanquished into Cuzco. Some time elapsed before any semblance of order could be restored; but Hernando Pizarro did not propose that the rising fortunes of his family should ever again be threatened by the ambition of the Almagros. The young Diego was sent away to Lima, where Francisco Pizarro received him in kindly fashion; for the present he was regarded as harmless, but it was deemed wise to remove him from the neighborhood of his father, whose fate had been already settled by the battle of Las Salinas. After a mockery of a trial, in which he was accused of levying war against the crown, and entering into treacherous conspiracy with the Inca, the old man was secretly garroted in his prison, in July, 1538. His good nature and his unfortunate readiness to mix war and diplomacy made it inevitable that he should be the victim of the more unscrupulous Pizarros, whose cause for the time being had triumphed all along the line. Such at least was the conclusion of the prudent Alonso Enríquez de Guzman, who had recently been the most ardent partisan of Almagro. “At this time,” so he assures us, “Hernando Pizarro and I had become friends, because he was alive, and the governor was dead, and it is very disastrous to have any intercourse with the dead.”

The events just recounted form only the beginning of the “chronicle of the civil wars of Peru”; but before we carry that sordid tale to its conclusion, we must pause to relate the pleasanter story of the explorations and achievements of other Spanish conquistadores in the regions to the north, east, and south of the territory that had been won by the Pizarros.

It will be remembered that in the year 1534, at the time of the intervention of Pedro de Alvarado, Pizarro had sent one of his ablest lieutenants, Sebastian de Belalcazar, to hold Quito and the adjacent territory in his name, and to guard it from possible occupation by any other conquistador. After the claims of Alvarado had been duly disposed of, Belalcazar established himself at Quito, and soon after received from the crown a definite appointment as governor there. But his restless spirit was not satisfied to remain in a subordinate position. He was eager to carve out a domain for himself, and, with this idea in mind, advanced farther north until he reached the high plateau which forms the southern part of the present republic of Colombia. There, in the year 1536, he founded the town of Popayan, and thence he raided the upper valleys of the Cauca and the Magdalena, slaughtering the natives and devastating their land. One of these forays brought him, in the year 1538, to the lofty tableland of Santa Fe de Bogota, where he met with two other conquistadores who had reached the same place from very different starting points. One of them was Nikolaus Federmann, whose expedition from Venezuela has been mentioned in the preceding chapter. The other was a fellow Spaniard whose notable achievements require more careful consideration.

Gonzalo Ximenes de Quesada was born, either in Cordova or Granada, in the early years of the sixteenth century, and received an excellent training in the profession of the law. But he aspired to win fame and wealth in the Indies, and when he was about thirty years old his chance came. In the year 1535, Pedro Fernandez de Lugo, the son of that Alfonso de Lugo who had completed the conquest of the Canaries under the Catholic Kings, and the holder of the post of adelantado there, was granted the office of governor and captain-general of the town and province of Santa Marta, between the river Magdalena on the westward and the Weiser territory in Venezuela on the east. This region, which Rodrigo de Bastidas had first attempted to settle in 1525, had had a checked history during the succeeding ten years, furnishing the usual chronicle of maltreatment of the natives and bitter rivalries between the different conquistadores. The audiencia of Santo Domingo was at a loss how to deal with it. But the territory contained gold, of that there could be no doubt; and Lugo solved the perplexities of the authorities by indicating his willingness to take charge: He offered the post of chief judge of the new settlement to Quesada, who made haste to accept it. In December, 1535, the two adventurers arrived, with a well equipped expedition, off the harbor of Santa Marta.

It soon became evident that nothing was to be gained by remaining in the town itself. The place was a pesthole, without nearly enough houses to accommodate the newcomers, while the country for miles around had been laid waste. An expedition into the interior seemed under the circumstances to be the only alternative to withdrawal, and finally Lugo started south into the wilderness with nearly 1000 men. But misfortune dogged the footsteps of the explorers from the first. The Indians were hostile; large numbers of the Spaniards were wounded or slain; and to cap the climax the governor’s son, Luis Alonso, escaped to Spain with all the gold that had been found, leaving his father in a pitiable plight. But Lugo was not to be easily diverted from his enterprise. A new expedition into the interior was speedily organized. It was to be composed of 800 men, provisioned and assisted by a flotilla of five
large boats on the Magdalena, whose valley was to be the route which the explorers were to follow. Command was given to Ximenez de Quesada, in whom, despite the fact that he had hitherto had no experience save as a lawyer, Lugo had already recognized all the essential qualities of a captain.

The expedition departed on April 6, 1536. Quesada, with most of his men, started southwest across country, planning to strike the Magdalena some 150 miles above its mouth, and there to unite with the flotilla, which had gone around by sea. When he arrived at the rendezvous the boats were nowhere to be seen. One of them had been wrecked at the mouth of the river; two more had deserted and sailed west to Cartagena; the two others were weeks late when they finally reached their destination. The following months were occupied in a joint advance up the Magdalena. The hardships encountered defy description. Those in the boats were harassed by native war canoes, and in constant danger of being devoured by alligators. Those on shore had to cut their way through the densest of tropical jungles; they were bitten by insects and poisonous snakes, and jaguars attacked them in their hammocks at night. But evidences of a far higher civilization in the country that lay beyond them appeared with increasing frequency as they fought their way southward, and enabled Quesada, after the expedition had been gone eight months, to persuade his officers, who wanted to return to Santa Marta, that honor and self-interest demanded that they continue their advance. All at once the ground began to rise before them. The air became cooler and the vegetation less dense. The river grew so swift that it was impossible to navigate it, and the boats had to be sent back. But Quesada and his followers regained their strength in the higher altitudes. They clambered on up ravines and rocky defiles, and finally their courageous leader was rewarded by emerging on a broad cultivated plateau, nearly 7000 feet above the sea, dotted with villages, and traversed by laughing brooks. He had only 166 men and 59 horses left. All the rest had perished on the way or been sent back with the boats.

The explorers had every reason to be gratified at what they saw; for the Chibchas, whose domains were about to invade, had attained a state of civilization fully comparable to that of the Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas, and unapproached by that of any other of the indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere. At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards they numbered, in all probability, somewhat more than a million souls, spread over an area of about 6000 square miles. Like the Incas to the south, they were primarily sun-worshippers; but they also adored other objects of nature, such as mountains, lakes, and waterfalls. They also believed in a life after death. Their government was in theory an absolute despotism; the zipa, or monarch, made and executed all the laws. The country, at the time of the Spaniards’ arrival, was apparently divided into a number of independent sovereignties; but it would seem that the zipa of Bogota, the latest of them to attain that rank, was rapidly extending his authority over the rest. The general state of culture which prevailed among the Chibchas on the eve of the Spanish conquest presents the same sort of contrasts between civilization and barbarism which we have already encountered among the Incas and Aztecs. Human sacrifices were still offered to the sun, though the custom was gradually dying out. There was no system of handwriting or substitute therefor. Beasts of burden were unknown. Yet there was a well-developed language, a calendar, a system of numeration, and a rudimentary coinage; agriculture, gold work, weaving and spinning, and commerce had reached a high stage of perfection. By a system of regular fairs the Chibchas exchanged the products of the high plateau which they inhabited for those of the tierra caliente below them, and were thus able to avail themselves of many of the commodities of the tropical as well as of the temperate zone.

The Spaniards were in no hurry to begin hostilities against the Chibchas, when the odds were so overwhelmingly against them. Quesada ordered his men to treat the natives in friendly fashion; and the natives, overawed by the appearance of the newcomers, and still more by their horses, refrained for some time from attacking them. But it was not to be expected that they should permanently submit to the program of plunder on which the invaders were plainly intent; an assault was soon delivered on the villages, and traversed by laughing brooks. He had only 166 men and 59 horses left. All the rest had perished on the way or been sent back with the boats.

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extorted from him in the extremity of his sufferings; indeed, it is probable that he had distributed all his
wealth among his chiefs before he fell into the hands of the Spaniards. As the outlines of the mountains
around the great plain where he was reminded Quesada of the summits of the Sierra Nevada, below
which he had passed his boyhood years, he called the conquered region New Granada; and christened
the city which he founded there in the summer of 1538 with the stirring name of Santa Fé (de Bogotá).
The conquistadores lost few opportunities to remind themselves that the progress of the vast empire
which they were winning in the New World was in some of its aspects but a prolongation of the
Crusades.

Probably the last thing that Quesada had expected when he left Santa Marta was that he should
meet with Europeans in the course of his explorations; and yet, shortly after the founding of Santa Fe de
Bogotá, Belalcazar, as we have seen, arrived from Popayan, while Federmann at the same time
appeared out of the northeast. Each of the explorers had a considerable following, and none of them was
in the mood to abandon what he believed to be his own; for a short time there were good prospects of a
fight. Yet there were certain considerations which served to draw them together, particularly the fact
that they were all more or less at variance with the authorities who had sent them out: Belalcazar with
Pizarro, Federmann with the Welsers, and Quesada with Lugo, of whom he now desired to make
himself independent in the new territory he had found. Peace and amity were further facilitated by the
fact that Belalcazar announced that he would be satisfied with the recognition of his title as governor of
Popayan. Quesada and Federmann signed two separate agreements, on March 17 and April 29, 1539,
and finally the three adventurers departed together for Spain, to lay their problem before the Emperor;
Hernan Perez, the brother of Quesada, being left, with most of the soldiers, in charge at Bogotá. In
Spain Belalcazar was confirmed in his governorship of Popayan; but Federmann and Quesada were less
fortunate. The former, on his return, was accused by the Welsers, and died in February, 1542, without
establishing his innocence; while the latter was obliged to give up all his pretensions to the lands he had
found, in favor of that Luis Alonso de Lugo, the son of Quesada’s old associate, who had run off to
Spain with all the treasure that his father had collected in his first expedition after reaching Santa Marta.

The elder Lugo had died in October, 1536, and from the purely legal point of view the young man’s
claims to the disputed territory were strong. Moreover Charles, who was absent in France and the
Netherlands at the time of Quesada’s arrival, had small opportunity to learn what all Spain knew:
namely, that Quesada was a good man, and Lugo an unmitigated scoundrel. Lugo left for New Granada
immediately after receiving his appointment, and misconducted himself so outrageously there in the
next two years, that when orders to take his residencia were issued in 1544, he did not dare to face the
test, but departed for Europe, joined the Spanish forces in Italy, and ultimately died either in Flanders or
in Milan. Quesada temporarily went into retirement, and occupied himself in travel and literary pursuits
not till 1550 was he permitted to revisit his conquests in the New World.

The history of New Granada during the years immediately succeeding the departure of Quesada is a
weary chronicle of confusion and self-seeking. Further complications, over and above those already
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in January, 1533, by one Pedro de Heredia, at Cartagena, and extending along the coast of the modern
republic of Colombia from the mouth of the Magdalena to the Gulf of Uraba. Heredia began by
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especially from an expedition which he led in 1534 to the famous graves of Zenu; but his conduct drew
down on him the jealousy of his associates, and in 1537 he was arrested and sent back to Spain. His
successors devoted themselves to the exploration of the interior; they penetrated to the upper waters of
the Cauca and the Magdalena, and there came into hostile contact with Hernan Perez de Quesada, and
also Belalcazar; and the confusion already existing became worse confounded still, when Pedrarias’
old associate Andagoya, who had got a grant along the Pacific coast from the Gulf of San Miguel to the
river San Juan, succeeded in invading the same territory from the west. So bitter became the rivalries of
the different claimants, that the Council of the Indies was at last obliged to take the matter in hand. In
1546 it sent out a commissioner, Miguel Diaz de Armendariz, to take the residencia of the different
regions; but he was aggrieved by the jealousy of his associates, and in 1548 he was sent back to Spain.

The result of his findings, and of the protests they elicited from the conquistadores on the
matter, was the establishment in 1549 of a royal audiencia at Santa Fé de Bogotá, which thenceforth
became the capital of New Granada. The new tribunal was given jurisdiction over all the different
settlements—Santa Marta, Cartagena, Popayan, and the rest—whose chiefs had quarreled over the
control of the rich plateau. Its erection marks the first step in the setting apart of the region which is
known today as the republic of Colombia. The fates of the two greatest of the conquistadores who had
won it were characteristic of the ups and downs of those tremendous times. Belalcazar, who had stained
the close of a brilliant career by the judicial murder of one of his rivals, died at Cartagena in 1550, on
his way back to Spain to appeal against the penalty of death that had been awarded him. Quesada, who had been restored to favor and sent out again as marshal to Bogotá with the judges of the audiencia in 1550, passed away, full of years and honors, at Mariquita in 1579.

In Peru, after the execution of Almagro in 1539, the Pizarras made haste to gather in the fruits of their victory, and also to protect themselves against the complaints of their surviving foes. To accomplish this latter purpose, Hernando was sent off to Spain, with a magnificent present of gold for the Emperor; his enemies, however, had contrived to forestall him, and he was cast into the dungeons of Medina del Campo, where he remained a close prisoner until the reign of Philip II. Meantime, in New Castile Francisco had distributed the lands and property of his late associate among his own relatives and adherents. He was especially liberal to his brother Gonzalo, who, after conducting a successful expedition against the natives of Charcas, was rewarded with rich territories in the neighborhood of Potosí, and finally invested with the government of Quito, which Belalcazar was held to have forfeited through insubordination. Gonzalo made haste to establish himself in his new domain, which he prized for its own sake, but still more for the opportunities which it gave him to investigate the territory immediately to the east of it, which was reported by a previous explorer to be prolific in cinnamon.

On Christmas Day, 1539, Gonzalo started across the Andes from Quito, at the head of a force of 340 Spaniards. He took with him 4000 natives as porters, and a large flock of llamas; a huge drove of swine was also brought along, as the easiest method of providing food. But the hardships endured in the early weeks of their march caused the improvident Spaniards to abandon most of their supplies. There were Indian attacks. They experienced an earthquake. Worst of all, the icy cold of the peaks of the cordillera made them long to reach the warmer lands below; they were sure they could obtain provisions from the natives of those parts; at all costs they must hurry on. But when they arrived at their destination they were grievously disappointed. A certain amount of cinnamon was found, but under the circumstances in which they were it profited them nothing. The forests were so dense that they could make only a few miles a day. The Indians, naked and destitute, could give them no food. In a few weeks they were suffering from the pangs of starvation. Before long they came to the banks of the river Coca—one of the confluents of the Napo, the roaring of whose mighty cataract could be heard for miles around—and following it down for a distance of forty or fifty leagues, they came to a place where it dashed through a narrow gorge which Garcilaso de la Vega declares to have been two hundred feet deep and but twenty feet wide. Convinced that the country on the other side of the stream would prove more attractive than that in which they were, and doubting whether they would again find such a good opportunity to reach it, they felled trees across the chasm, and then constructed a bridge on which all but one of their company succeeded in passing over. After enduring more hardships, they reached the broader waters below, and then, seeing that some means of conveyance for the weaker members of their number had become essential, they set to work on the construction of a boat, using “nails made from the shoes of horses which had been killed as food for the sick,” and which “they now found more valuable than gold.”

When the boat was finished, they placed their sick and their valuables on board, and continued, keeping pace with it, to march down the banks of the river. After much suffering, they reached a spot where the natives informed them that ten days farther on they would get to a point where the river emptied into a still larger stream; and that there they would find plenty of provisions and gold. As the company was utterly exhausted, Gonzalo Pizarro determined to send forward his lieutenant, Francisco de Orellana, with fifty men in the boat, to get the promised supplies and return with them. In three days Orellana made no less than eighty leagues, but he found no food, and, doubting his ability to work his way back against the current, it occurred to him to continue his voyage down the river, discover new country on his own account, and then get back to Spain. It was the rankest kind of desertion, and he had great difficulty in persuading his followers to countenance it. One of them, indeed, named Sanchez de Vargas, was so firm in his refusal that Orellana at last turned him loose in the jungle, where he was found months later by Pizarro and his men. They, despairing of the return of Orellana, had finally started overland to find him; on learning what he had done, they undertook and accomplished the truly Herculean task of fighting their way back to Quito. It took them till the summer of 1542 to complete that terrible journey; and only the inspiring words and conduct of their heroic leader kept them from abandoning the enterprise in despair.

Meantime Orellana and his companions continued their voyage. For a long time it seemed likely that they would perish of starvation; but supplies became gradually more plentiful as they sailed on, and for a time the natives they encountered were friendly. As their first boat was manifestly inadequate for use on the sea, which they expected to reach many months before they did, they constructed a larger one
with infinite labor; the nails for it had to be forged in a charcoal fire, and “they made bellows of their leather buskins.” Farther down, beyond the mouth of the Napo, the Indians became more numerous, and also very hostile. Surrounding the adventurers in war canoes, they shot at them with poisoned arrows; and Orellana was so impressed with the valor of the women that he called them Amazons, an appellation which finally prevailed over that of the discoverer himself as the name of the great river whose entire length he was the first to sail. In August, 1541, the explorers reached the sea; and following along the coast to the northwest, they finally arrived at the island of Cubagua on September 11. According to the reckoning of the priest who accompanied them, they had sailed “for one thousand eight hundred leagues, including the windings of the river,” and the estimate is not far from correct. Shortly afterwards Orellana departed for Spain to report his discoveries and get authority to conquer and colonize them. This he easily obtained, and, having collected 500 followers, set sail for the New World; but he died on the way thither, and the expedition which he led was dispersed with nothing accomplished.

It is an interesting fact that the mouth of the Amazon lies just to the west of the Tordesillas Line, so that all of Orellana’s memorable voyage fell clearly within the Spanish demarcation; but it is more than doubtful if this was known at the time. The ‘second discovery’ of the great river, by the Jesuit, Cristobal de Acuña, did not take place until nearly a century later, in 1639, when Portugal acknowledged the sovereignty of a Spanish king.

One result of the execution of Almagro was that Pizarro at once resolved to gain possession for himself of the territory of his old associate—the two hundred leagues to the southward of his own dominion. His first efforts to accomplish this purpose were not particularly successful, chiefly because of the difficulty of crossing the great desert to the south of Lake Titicaca—the very nitrate beds over which, more than three centuries later, the Chilean and Peruvian republics were to wage bitter war. But the tide of enthusiasm for arduous enterprises was running high among the best of the Spanish in those days; and finally Pizarro found the man that he wanted in Pedro de Valdivia, an old soldier of the Italian wars, who had come out to Peru in 1536: a daring adventurer, always keen to press forward while others held back. Under him there took service, though not till after the expedition had got started, another veteran of the Italian campaigns named Francisco de Aguirre, as distinctly a born administrator as Valdivia was a typical conquistador; the two men complemented one another at every point. But there were also elements of discord in the ranks of the invaders, the chief rock of offence being one Pedro Sancho de Hoz, who had been sent out from Spain with a commission to conquer Chile; and it was only with difficulty that Pizarro induced him to make common cause with Valdivia, by arranging that the two men should divide the command.

The expedition left Cuzco in early January, 1540; it numbered at the time of its departure about 150 Spaniards and 1000 natives. It had not gone far before Sancho de Hoz was detected in a conspiracy to assassinate Valdivia and gain for himself the leadership of the invading forces. The fortunate result was his own arrest, and his renunciation, as the price of being set at liberty, of all his rights to the Chilean lands and of his share in the command. Before the party crossed the desert Aguirre arrived with a reinforcement of twenty-five men and an ample supply of provisions. It was largely owing to his ability and foresight that the perilous passage of the next 500 miles was accomplished without the loss of a single man. After a three months’ rest in the valley of the Copiapo, where the country was solemnly taken possession of in the name of the king of Spain, the invaders pressed on to the site of the present city of Santiago de Chile, which was founded on February 12, 1541. The earliest actas of its cabildo have been preserved to us, and bear witness to the indispensable services of Aguirre as an organizer during this critical stage of the newly founded colony.

The years 1541 to 1546 were occupied with the establishment and extension of the settlement already made. Valdivia had himself elected governor and captain-general by the cabildo of Santiago, very much as Cortés had been by that of Vera Cruz, thereby making himself independent of Pizarro, and directly subject to the home government in Spain. He was crafty enough to pretend that he did not desire the post; but there is little doubt that he saw that the acquisition of it was indispensable to the maintenance of his authority, and that he had secretly maneuvered to obtain it from the first. As it was, there were several revolts against his government, culminating, in the year 1547, after Valdivia had departed for Peru, in a conspiracy of Sancho de Hoz against the governor’s lieutenant, Francisco de Villaigrant; it was, however, discovered and nipped in the bud, and the chief rebel paid for his temerity with his head. In 1541 there was a general uprising of the natives against the invaders. Santiago was attacked and burned; the assailants were repulsed after a bloody struggle, but the work of reconstruction was long and arduous, and had it not been for the timely arrival of a boat with reinforcements from
Peru, it is quite possible that the infant colony might have perished. The experience made it evident that the tribes to the north of Santiago must be brought into subjection in order to prevent the isolation of the settlement; and this task, which was begun in 1543, was finally accomplished in 1549. In 1545 Valdivia led an exploring expedition to the south as far as the mouth of the river Biobio, and there came into hostile contact for the first time with the Araucanians, who advanced in solid masses “like Germans” and fought with a ferocity far surpassing that of any of the other South American tribes. The Spaniards were obliged to return without founding a new city as they had originally planned; clearly the conquest could not be pushed farther in that direction until their numbers and resources had been greatly increased. Meantime, in the neighborhood of Santiago, a regular system of encomiendas had been established, and a tradition of good order and strong government set up, which went far to lay the foundations for the large measure of happiness and prosperity which Chile was to enjoy in the succeeding centuries.

In 1546 news arrived from Peru which caused Valdivia to leave his new colony and return to the north. In order to appreciate the significance of this news, we must revert to the history of Pizarro’s own dominion, which we left at the time of the execution of Almagro in 1538. Thereafter we can carry on the story of the development of Peru and Chile jointly to the end of the reign of the Emperor Charles V.

The arrogance exhibited by Francisco Pizarro in gathering in the spoils of his victory over his old associate made it inevitable that the remnants of the Almagro faction should lust for revenge. ‘The men of Chile,’ as they were popularly called, were scattered through the country after the death of their leader; but the house of the younger Almagro at Lima furnished a convenient meeting place for the hatching of plots, and as the months wore on without the arrival of the official from Spain whom they had looked for to do them justice, they finally resolved to take matters into their own hands. They formed the desperate resolution of assassinating Pizarro, and fixed on Sunday, June 26, 1541, for the accomplishment of their purpose. Pizarro had ample warning of the fate that was in store for him, but affected to treat the reports of it with indifference; he was, however, finally persuaded to remain away from church on the appointed day, so that the conspirators were obliged to betake themselves to his house. It was shortly after noon, and Pizarro was just finishing dinner. His attendants made a futile effort to hold the assailants in parley; but the latter soon forced their way in, cut down Pizarro’s half-brother, Martín de Alcantara, and then overwhelmed the governor himself, before he had had time to put on his armor. He fought like a lion at bay, and succeeded in accounting for several of his foes; but he was quickly borne down by sheer force of numbers, and sank lifeless to the ground in a welter of blood.

The ‘men of Chile’ made haste to proclaim the younger Almagro, in whose name they had perpetrated this terrible deed, to be governor of Peru. But their summons to obey him was by no means universally respected. Cuzco remained loyal to the cause of the Pizarros; and their old companion in arms, Alonso de Alvarado, sent a message to Vaca de Castro, the crown’s representative, who was known to be on his way to New Castile, apprising him of what had occurred, and urging him to make haste. The fact that the Pizarros were the first to get into touch with the emissary of the home government goes far to explain why he took sides against their foes; and the rash and defiant attitude of the Almagrists confirmed him in his decision. He journeyed overland from the Isthmus to Peru; at Quito he displayed his commission, empowering him to assume the government, and dispatched messengers to the cities farther south demanding that they forthwith recognize his authority. Had the Almagrists struck at once, before Vaca de Castro had had time to establish himself, it might have fared ill with the emissary of the home government. But their young leader was not the man to make the most of his opportunity. His first act was to seize Cuzco, to which he believed that he possessed unquestioned claims. He then wasted his time in futile negotiations, and thus gave Vaca de Castro the chance to occupy Lima. So confident was the latter of winning the victory in the trial of strength which he now saw to be inevitable, that he even refused the proffered assistance of Gonzalo Pizarro, who had but recently returned from the ‘Land of Cinnamon’. The decisive battle began in the late afternoon of September 16, 1542, on the plains of Chupas, between Lima and Cuzco. It was a bloody contest, but the numbers and the generalship of the royalists were superior, and when night descended on the battlefield the Almagrists broke and fled. A few days later the young Almagro was executed at Cuzco. One cannot refrain from pitying him in his hard fate. He was generous and brave, but born to be the tool of others.

A clean sweep had now been made of all the original conquerors of Peru, with one exception, Gonzalo Pizarro; and he, ostensibly at least, was in full accord with the representative of the crown. The government was in the hands of a man of unusual wisdom and ripe experience; for the moment it seemed as if the era of civil war was at an end. But at precisely this juncture the tranquility of affairs in Peru was destined to be disturbed once more, from a most unexpected source. This was the publication
of a code, commonly known as the ‘New Laws’, which was chiefly the fruit of the labors of the ‘Apostle’ Las Casas in behalf of the rights of the American Indians. It received the Emperor’s signature at Barcelona on November 20, 1542, and the news of it threw the inhabitants of Peru into a perfect ferment of excitement, because it threatened, if rigorously enforced, to deprive them of a large share of the compulsory services of the natives on the encomiendas, the chief basis of the large fortunes which every one of them had hoped to make. In Mexico, where a comparatively efficient form of government had been in operation since the arrival of the Viceroy Mendoza in 1535, the protests of the settlers against the ‘New Laws’ received such strong support from the royal officials on the ground, that the most burdensome parts of the code were soon suspended. But in Peru the situation was very different. It had been the Mecca of rough customers since its wealth had first become known; and the wrongs which Las Casas was attempting to right were generally believed to be particularly prevalent there. The struggles of the crown representatives and the conquistadores were not yet over; there was need for reforms and for a strong hand to administer them. One of the provisions of the new code had commanded the abolition of the old audiencia at Panama, and the creation of a viceroy and an audiencia to reside at Lima. The Emperor conferred the viceregal office on Blasco Nuñez Vela, a knight of Avila, and an ancient servant of the crown; and on May 17, 1544, the royal representative entered the Peruvian capital. He at once made it evident that he intended to enforce the new code with vigor, and that he expected prompt and implicit obedience on every hand.

But he reckoned with little knowledge of the sort of men who had conquered Peru. Vaca de Castro, interrupted in the midst of his task of restoring order, behaved, it is true, with tact and moderation. He made haste to get in touch with the viceroy on his arrival. He assured him of his loyalty, and warned him of the danger of high-handed measures; and it was entirely characteristic of Blasco Nuñez’s suspicious, nature that he should have rewarded his predecessor’s confidence by confining him on a ship in the harbor. But Gonzalo Pizarro took a very different course. He was the last of the brood that had conquered New Castile, and had no mind to surrender all the claims he had inherited to the unpopular representative of an ungrateful sovereign. With Vaca de Castro he had preserved the appearance of friendship,—the time was not then ripe for the revolt he had long been planning; but now, with all his old associates up in arms against the ‘New Laws’ and looking to him to deliver them from the tyranny of the new viceroy, he saw that his chance had come. He collected a large band of enthusiastic followers at Cuzco, and started to march on Lima; there was every prospect that a battle would be fought. But the viceroy was unable even to muster forces to oppose Pizarro. His imperiousness had alienated every one with whom he came in contact. Worst of all, the members of the new audiencia, who had followed him from Panama, refused to sanction a single one of his acts; and when he showed signs of resisting them, they had him imprisoned and declared him deposed. Yet when they attempted to assert their own authority, they found that every man’s hand was against them. Gonzalo Pizarro was the hero of the hour, and when he demanded that the audiencia invest him with the government, the members of that body did not ventute to refuse. On October 28, 1544, he entered Lima amid universal rejoicing. The authority of the last of the conquistadores was restored.

Gonzalo Pizarro made every effort to establish himself securely in the perilous position he had won, but the prestige of the crown and its representatives in the New World was too high to permit him to do so unopposed. Before his arrival at Lima the audiencia had shipped off the viceroy to Spain in the custody of one of their own members; but the latter’s heart soon failed him at the prospect of having to explain to the Emperor the imprisonment of his representative, with the result that Blasco Nuñez, at his own request, was set on shore again at Tumbez. At San Miguel he collected an army of several hundred men; and when Pizarro marched against him with superior forces he retreated to the north, and there got reinforcements from Belalcazar at Popayan. There were long months of marching and countermarching in the mountains, in which Pizarro vainly sought to bring his enemy into action; but finally by feigning a retirement to the south he accomplished his purpose. The crucial battle was fought at Anaquito (just outside Quito), on January 18, 1546. The viceroy’s troops were decisively defeated; Blasco Nuñez himself was unhorsed by a blow from a battle-axe, and his head stricken off by a black slave, as he lay wounded on the ground. He had been loyal and constant in his efforts to perform an impossible task, but he was lacking in every other qualification for the difficult mission with which he had been entrusted.

Meantime the news of Gonzalo Pizarro’s successful defiance of the royal authority had been received with the utmost consternation in Spain. The Emperor was absent in Germany preparing to suppress the Lutherans, just as he had been at the time of the revolt of the Comuneros, with which the uprising in Peru was popularly compared. Much correspondence and delay were consequently inevitable before the proper policy to pursue could be finally determined; but at last it was decided to send out to Peru an experienced cleric, named Pedro de la Gasca, who had already given ample proofs of his ability to serve the crown. Like Ximenes, he was quite as much of an administrator as a
the foe. The last of the conquistadores endured the terrible mortification of being obliged to surrender without a fight.

serried ranks of Gasca. But the president did not propose to fight until he was certain of victory. He spent the rebellion in Peru, after his departure, that of Francisco Giron, who, dissatisfied with his share of the encouragement he derived from it led him to return to Cuzco, and risk everything on the issue of a battle against him, and who now seized the chance to raise his standard for Gasca. The military genius of his own, under Diego Centeno, one of the few who had previously supported the royal representative was to retire into Chile; but the way was barred on the shores of Lake Titicaca by an army twice the size of his own, under Diego Centeno, one of the few who had previously supported the royal representative against him, and who now seized the chance to raise his standard for Gasca. The military genius of his octogenarian captain, Francisco de Carbajal, gave Pizarro an unexpected victory in the engagement that followed, October 26, on the plains of Huarina, the bloodiest that had yet been fought in Peru; and the encouragement he derived from it led him to return to Cuzco, and risk everything on the issue of a battle with Gasca. But the president did not propose to fight until he was certain of victory. He spent the winter in collecting reinforcements, so that by the time that he advanced to the final encounter he commanded the largest, best equipped, and best disciplined European army that had ever trod the soil of New Castile—utterly different from the reckless adventurers of which his enemy’s forces were principally composed. The issue was decided in the vale of Xaquixaguana, some fifteen miles west of Cuzco, on Monday, April 9, 1548. There was no battle. The followers of Pizarro, after a glance at the principally composed. The issue was decided in the vale of Xaquixaguana, some fifteen miles west of Cuzco, on Monday, April 9, 1548. There was no battle. The followers of Pizarro, after a glance at the

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But the president’s arguments were wasted on the man whom of all others they were intended to persuade. Gonzalo Pizarro did not venture on the one hand to follow the advice of those who urged him to carry his revolt to its logical conclusion—to defy the Emperor and to proclaim himself king, as the Infante Alfonso had done at Avila in 1465; on the other, he refused to listen to Gasca. He was puffed up with pride by the victories he had won, and by the adulation that had been lavished upon him. He was slow to see that the army on which he depended was already honeycombed with disaffection as a result of Gasca’s proclamations; and when the president finally landed at Tumbez, in June, 1547, with a well equipped force, he found to his deep chagrin that he was incapable of opposing him. His first thought was to retire into Chile; but the way was barred on the shores of Lake Titicaca by an army twice the size of his own, under Diego Centeno, one of the few who had previously supported the royal representative against him, and who now seized the chance to raise his standard for Gasca. The military genius of his octogenarian captain, Francisco de Carbajal, gave Pizarro an unexpected victory in the engagement that followed, October 26, on the plains of Huarina, the bloodiest that had yet been fought in Peru; and the encouragement he derived from it led him to return to Cuzco, and risk everything on the issue of a battle with Gasca. But the president did not propose to fight until he was certain of victory. He spent the winter in collecting reinforcements, so that by the time that he advanced to the final encounter he commanded the largest, best equipped, and best disciplined European army that had ever trod the soil of New Castile—utterly different from the reckless adventurers of which his enemy’s forces were principally composed. The issue was decided in the vale of Xaquixaguana, some fifteen miles west of Cuzco, on Monday, April 9, 1548. There was no battle. The followers of Pizarro, after a glance at the

The judgments on the way in which Gasca utilized his victory vary widely according to the viewpoints of those who have pronounced them. For some he is the faithful, benevolent, effective servant of the crown, stern only because the situation in which he found himself demanded it; for others he is but an ignoble and revengeful cleric, who, beginning with insincere professions of pardon and conciliation, left behind him a trail of blood, and departed with his pockets full and the chief administrative problems of the country unsolved. But if we approach the problem from the sixteenth-century standpoint, we shall infallibly conclude that this latter verdict is too harsh. It was not an age of mercy, least of all to the authors of revolts against the crown. It was a foregone conclusion that the chief rebel and his principal officers should be condemned to death. One cannot refrain from pitying the last of the Pizarros, the only one of them who had survived the entire sixteen years of the conquest. He had many admirable qualities, and was in the prime of life when he was sent to execution; but under the circumstances it was impossible that he should have been allowed to live. Nor is it fair to blame Gasca for returning to Spain without fully settling the government. He had been sent out with exceptional powers for a specific purpose, the putting down of the insurrection; having accomplished it, and initiated reforms which were essential for the prevention of its recurrence, he went back in 1550 to report to the crown, was rewarded with a bishopric, and died in 1567. There was one more small rebellion in Peru, after his departure, that of Francisco Giron, who, dissatisfied with his share of the
spoils of the victory over Pizarro, raised the standard of revolt at Cuzco; but it was put down without much difficulty in 1554, and would have been suppressed even sooner than it was, had it not occurred in the interim between the administrations of two viceroyos, when the forces of the government were without a leader. The real credit for ending the regime of the conquistadores in Peru, and of establishing the authority of the crown in its place, is principally due to Pedro de la Gasca.

We must now pass on rapidly. After Gasca’s departure the chief authority in Peru was exercised by the members of the audiencia for more than a year, until the arrival of a new viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, sent down, in September, 1551, after a long experience in Mexico. Ten months later he died, to be succeeded, after an interval of nearly four years, by his distant cousin, Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Cañete, who continued to hold office till 1561. These officials were chiefly busied with problems of administration which do not concern us here; but the period of their rule witnessed a further extension of the Spanish territories to the south, and thus rounds out the story of the conquest of Chile. Valdivia, as before, was the principal hero of it. On his return to Peru in the winter of 1547-48, he promptly joined the forces of la Gasca, and lent invaluable aid in the ensuing campaign that ended at Xaquixaguana. La Gasca rewarded him with his heart’s desire, the office of governor of Chile in the name of the king; and after issuing triumphantly victorious from an investigation of his conduct which was demanded by his enemies, he returned to Santiago in the summer of 1549. The chief thing that occupied him thenceforth was the prosecution of the war against the Araucanians. In 1550-51 he led armies into the south of Chile, and founded the cities of Concepcion, Valdivia, and Villarrica. In 1552-53 he penetrated still farther into the territory of the foe, and left small garrisons. But Valdivia had forgotten that the natives of southern Chile were of sterner stuff than the Incas or the Chibchas, and he was to pay for his error with his life. A tremendous uprising of the Araucanians ensued. The principal stronghold of the Spaniards was taken, and Valdivia was called south to suppress the revolt. In the battle that followed, on New Year’s Day 1554, at Tucapel, near the mouth of the river Lebu, he was overwhelmingly defeated and made prisoner; and subsequently tortured to death by his captors, who cut off his arms, roasted them, and devoured them before his eyes.

The death of Valdivia threw the affairs of Chile into confusion. There were a number of claimants for his vacant office, of whom the most prominent were Aguirre and Villagran. But Aguirre had been invested in 1552 with the government of the rich mining region of Tucuman to the northeast, where by striving to render himself independent of all superiors save the home government he had become an object of suspicion to the local authorities; while Villagran had been severely defeated in an effort to retrieve the disaster of Tucapel, and was, in addition, so jealous of Aguirre, that the viceroy, who claimed the decision of the matter, was unwilling to grant him the prize that he desired. The final outcome was the appointment, on January 29, 1557, of the viceroy’s son, Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, to the governorship of Chile—two rival veterans of the conquest being thus obliged to cede their claims to an inexperienced youth, not yet twenty-two years of age. The results of the discontent that this arrangement produced must be reserved for consideration in a later volume; for the present we are only concerned with the new government’s conquests. Some of these were made in Aguirre’s old dominion to the south of Tucuman, where the city of Mendoza, named in honor of the viceroy, was founded in March, 1562; but most of them were effected at the expense of the Araucanians. The natives were defeated in three battles, on November 30, 1557, and on January 20 and December 14, 1558; their leader Caupolican was captured, and cruelly put to death; and exploring expeditions by land and sea penetrated as far as the Strait of Magellan. But the power of the Araucanians was not yet broken, as the history of the succeeding years was to prove; and the heroism of their resistance was immortalized by a young soldier in the Spanish forces named Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga, in an epic poem which has been held worthy of comparison with the masterpieces of Homer and of Torquato Tasso.

In order to round out the history of the conquest of New Castile under Charles V, we must briefly recount the explorations of the Spaniards in the region of the Rio de la Plata, first discovered by Juan Diaz de Solis in 1516. The story of these events is closely interwoven with the careers of at least two of the conquistadores whose acquaintance we have already made in other parts of the New World.

It will be remembered that in the spring of 1526 the Emperor and a group of Seville merchants cooperated in the sending out of a fleet under Sebastian Cabot, to follow up the explorations of Magellan and Loaysa, and, if possible, to find a strait through the Western Continent. But the aims and ambitions of the commander and his subordinates were widely at variance. Disaffection broke out shortly after the departure of the fleet, which Cabot directed to the shores of Brazil; the leaders of the malcontents were arrested and then released; the flagship was lost and everything thrown into confusion. At this juncture reports were received of large quantities of gold and silver that were to be
found in the basin of La Plata. There was always the bare possibility that the estuary might prove to be the longed for strait; and as the expedition was in no fit state to face the perils of the Pacific, it was decided to ascend the great river of the Argentine. Three dissentients were marooned on the island of Los Patos; and in the spring of 1527, Cabot started to follow up the explorations of de Solis. He went up the Parana beyond its junction with the Paraguay, which he subsequently also ascended, probably as far as its confluence with the Pilcomayo. He founded a small settlement, which he called San Espiritu, on the lower reaches of the Parana. But his followers were decimated by disease and by Indian attacks; the promised gold and silver were not found; there were rumors of Portuguese hostility; and in 1528 Cabot started back to Spain, to report to the Emperor and demand reinforcements. On his way down the river he met with an expedition led by a rival explorer—one Diego García de Moguer—under a royal capitulación not very different from his own; but as the outlook was so discouraging, and the priority of Cabot’s claims seemed clearly established, the newcomer soon decided to retire. Both men reached Spain in the summer of 1530, but neither of them got authority to continue their explorations; and the colony at San Espiritu was abandoned two years afterwards.

Yet their venture was soon to be repeated by others on a larger scale. Clearly La Plata was not the entrance to the strait which all men longed to find; on the other hand it might well be the opening of a shorter and more convenient route to Peru, whose vast riches were rapidly getting to be the talk of all Spain. It was chiefly with this idea that Pedro de Mendoza, a native of Guadix and a soldier in the Italian wars, applied for and obtained from the Emperor in the year 1533 a license to colonize the new region at his own expense, with the titles of adelantado and governor of the settlement he proposed to found. Over 2000 Castilians accompanied him, some of them already distinguished; and there were also a considerable number of Germans. Many of these were sent out through the instrumentality of the great house of Weiser, which had but recently established itself on the shores of Venezuela and was striving to strengthen its foothold in the New World, while others enlisted in a military capacity; among them was Ulrich Schmidel of Straubing, who wrote the earliest account of the colonization of La Plata. The expedition left Spain on August 24, 1535; there were violent disputes as to the route to be followed, which led to the murder, at Mendoza’s command, of his principal lieutenant, Juan de Osorio; but in January, 1536, the fleet reached the mouth of La Plata, and in the middle of the following March a settlement was established, on the site of the present capital of the Argentine Republic, and given the name of ‘Nuestra Señora de Buen Ayre. But misfortunes followed thick and fast. Lack of provisions and Indian attacks played havoc with the colony at Buenos Aires; it ultimately had to be abandoned, and the remnants of it moved up the river to the mouth of the Pilcomayo, where the town of Asuncion had been founded in 1537. An expedition into the northwest in search of Peru perished miserably in the wilderness; and finally Mendoza, worn out and discouraged, started back to Spain; but “when he was come nearly half way, the hand of the Almighty so smote him that he died miserably.”

The survivors who had been left behind gathered together at Asuncion, and elected Martinez de Irala to be their governor. The Indians of that region proved more friendly than the rest; “they were so scrupulous in the observance of the treaties they made with the invaders, that they exceeded the terms of the obligations imposed,” and a period of peace and prosperity ensued. Since no gold or silver was anywhere to be found, the Spaniards naturally settled down to a life of ease; their principal occupation was to find themselves wives. The Guaraní women were apparently most attractive to them, and polygamy and concubinage became open and avowed. Irala married all seven daughters of the principal cacique, and desired in his will that the children whom they bore him should be considered and treated as Spaniards. It was perhaps the first large-scale experiment in the history of Latin America in the practice of indiscriminate mingling of the two races—a practice which was to increase apace in the succeeding years, and is the key to many of the most fundamental differences that exist today between the United States and its neighbors to the south.

But Irala and his associates were not left undisturbed by the home government in the happy seclusion of the forests of Paraguay. As soon as Charles learned from Mendoza’s companions of the death of the adelantado and the misfortunes of his colony, he determined to send out reinforcements to the survivors, together with a new governor appointed by the crown. In looking about for a fit man for this arduous office, his eye fell on our old acquaintance Cabeza de Vaca, who, after his perilous journey from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, had returned to Spain and settled at Seville. But the veteran explorer found European city life dull after his adventures in the wilderness. His interest and imagination were constantly stirred by the stories from the ships that cast anchor in the Guadalquivir, and he eagerly seized the opportunity that was offered him to take out reinforcements to the colony at La Plata, and assume command of the settlement on his arrival. In the end of 1540 he set sail from San Lucar with 400 men and forty-six horses; after a tempestuous voyage, and a series of adventures on the Brazilian coast and the lower waters of the Parana, he reached Asuncion on March 11, 1542. He had no
mind to continue the policy of Irala, who, on his arrival, was necessarily relegated to second place. He led vigorous campaigns against the more hostile of the Indian tribes, sent fresh exploring expeditions into the interior, and in general roused the colony to a far greater degree of activity than it had ever known before. But it was inevitable that he should make numerous enemies. The older settlers were hostile to his ideas, and profoundly jealous of the new comers he had brought with him; they longed for a return to the more patriarchal regime of Irala. In the course of an expedition which he had led up the river, the governor had contracted an inflammation of the eyes, and the malcontents took advantage of it to effect his removal. In 1544 he was arrested without warning in his house at Asuncion, hurried on board a boat, and packed off to Spain, with a long list of charges against him, on which he was tried shortly after his arrival. The verdict was not rendered till 1551, when he was condemned to an exile of three years in Africa; whether or not the sentence was actually enforced is uncertain, but it seems clear that he was ultimately restored to the favor of the court, and given a judicial office in the city of Seville.¹ On his departure from Asuncion, Irala was re-elected to the governorship of the colony, and was subsequently confirmed in that position by the home government. He was given the title of adelantado, and continued to rule the settlement till his death in 1556.

This brief concluding account of the early exploration and settlement of the basin of La Plata, and the enormous importance and prosperity which that region was subsequently to attain, must not make us forget that the centre of gravity of New Castile remained in Peru until well on into the eighteenth century. We have seen that one of the chief inducements that led the Spaniards to explore the valley of the great river was the hope that it would afford them a shorter route to the richer territories farther west; and though that hope was not realized in such fashion as to be of much practical value in colonial times, it did not cease to inspire the early settlers of the Argentine. To put it in other, and still more familiar words, the conquistadores were primarily in search of the precious metals; and they neglected to develop regions which did not afford these, though they were easier to reach, and often pleasanter to live in. Many of the gravest errors of the Spaniards in the New World are directly traceable to their failure to realize that agriculture is the stabiler source of a new country’s material prosperity; and the economic history of Latin America since the revolutions has served to emphasize the seriousness of their mistake. The grain country of La Plata, regarded by the Hapsburg sovereigns as a comparatively unimportant outpost, was ultimately to become the greatest of all centres of South American wealth.
CHAPTER XXX
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIES

The growth of the American territories of Spain proceeded at such a rapid pace during the reign of Charles V that the system of administration which he had inherited from his grandparents became manifestly inadequate before he had been many years upon the throne. At his accession he had probably regarded the American continent, in so far as he had any conception of it at all, chiefly in the light of a vexatious barrier, impeding his access to the Spice Islands beyond. At his abdication he realized that it was his principal source of wealth, the financial foundation on which the power of the house of Austria reposed; that his territories there were vastly more extensive than all the rest of his Empire put together; and that the Christianization and civilization of the Indians who inhabited them constituted a problem and a duty far more difficult than he had originally supposed. Small wonder if his reign witnessed an enormous development and ramification of the colonial system of the Catholic Kings.

Yet it is important to observe that all the fundamental principles that underlay the American policy of Ferdinand and Isabella were preserved virtually unaltered by their successor. The crown kept the exclusive control of the new dominions in its own hands. It created and maintained a separate set of institutions to aid in their administration, which was thus totally distinct from that of any of its European possessions. It kept a close watch on its representatives in the Indies; and it imposed such manifold limitations upon them that they were constantly under the necessity of referring to the home government. It rigidly supervised immigration to the New World, which, save in special cases, was theoretically restricted to the inhabitants of Castile; and trade was subjected to the same close surveillance. It persisted in regarding all the natives as subjects of the Castilian crown, and put forth edicts and laws to regulate their existence. All the development of the administration of the Indies under Charles V was accomplished in full consonance with these basic ideas. The changes consisted in the manner of their application to a vastly larger field.

Let us start with an investigation of those organs of the government of the Indies which resided in Spain, and there aided the Emperor in his efforts to perform the wellnigh impossible task of dictating, executing, and interpreting the laws for his overseas dominions at a distance of more than three thousand miles. These were the Council of the Indies and the Casa de Contratación.

The Council of the Indies was given its first definite and legal existence by the Emperor in August, 1524. Until that time, as we have already seen, its functions had been discharged by Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, and a number of subordinates associated with him; but there was increasing discontent with Fonseca’s management, and his death in March, 1524, gave Charles a welcome opportunity to reorganize his work. As constituted at the close of the Emperor’s reign, the Council was composed of a president, the grand chancellor of the Indies; eight councilors; a fiscal, or prosecutor on behalf of the crown; and two secretaries, one for New Spain and the other for New Castile. A number of minor officials were also attached to it, among them a professor of mathematics and a cosmographer-chronicler (cosmografo-cronista) this last post was to be held by Antonio de Herrera under Philip II and Philip III. The Council was to reside continuously at the royal court, so as to be constantly in touch with the sovereign whom it served; the Emperor might preside over it in person at any time. Its competence in regard to the affairs of the Indies was literally all-inclusive, exactly like that of the Council of Castile in the home government; and all other officials and tribunals in the realm were solemnly forbidden to meddle in its affairs.

Most of the laws that have come down to us in regard to the methods in which the Council of the Indies was to exercise its manifold functions are from the reigns of Philip II and his successors, when the system which the Emperor evolved was confirmed and established; but many of the provisions then enacted were actually operative before the end of Charles’s lifetime. In its legislative capacity the Council prepared all the laws and ordinances regulating the government of the new domains; but its activity in this respect must not be regarded as primarily original, for its chief function was to give legal form to the principles and ideas which emanated from the crown, and to see that they were duly communicated to the officials who administered them. Only in matters of detail was it granted a free
hand. It was in the execution of these laws that its chief responsibility really lay, for the Emperor had no time to devote to this arduous task, and could only approve or disapprove what his advisers proposed. It was the Council that corresponded with the adelantados, vicerroys, and audiencias, watched over their conduct, and made arrangements for their residencias. It was the Council that proposed candidates for every vacant office in the Indies whether temporal or spiritual; for the administration of ecclesiastical affairs also fell within its jurisdiction. It was the Council that devised the limits of the different territorial divisions of the New World. It was the Council that was entrusted with the supervision of the treatment of the Indians. And finally the Council acted as a superior court of appeal in suits arising in the Spanish dominions in the Indies, one year being always allowed for bringing the matter across the seas; and it gave judgment in first instance in certain cases of the highest importance. For the exercise of their exalted functions its members were granted all the privileges and exemptions that were enjoyed by other advisers of the crown. It took conspicuous rank in that great hierarchy of councils and juntas which formed the backbone of the government of the Spanish Empire.

Its personnel under Charles V deserves passing attention. Its first president, in fact the real successor of Fonseca, was Francisco Garcia de Loaysa, the Emperor’s confessor, and head of the order of the Dominicans in Spain—a fact which bears eloquent testimony to the genuineness of Charles’s zeal the propagation of the faith, and for his determination to Christianize the inhabitants of the New World. When Loaysa went to Rome in 1530 to receive a cardinal’s hat at the hands of Clement VII, his place at the head of the Council of the Indies was temporarily taken by Garcia Manrique, Count of Osorio, and assistente or chief justice of Seville. The responsibilities of the office were, however, really borne during that period by Francisco de los Cobos, who in addition to his other multifarious duties was most active in American affairs; indeed Cobos’s interest and influence in the administration of the Indies continued long after Loaysa’s return. On Loaysa’s death in 1546 the presidency of the Council went to Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Mondejar, who held it till he was called by Philip II, on December 22, 1559, to be the president of the Council of Castile. He is described as having rendered particularly valuable services in connection with the differences that had arisen between Spain and Portugal over the demarcation of their respective conquests in the New World; and he was the brother of Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy of New Spain and of New Castile. This relationship was naturally most helpful to him as president of the Council of the Indies. The worst of the many difficulties which that body had to contend with was its dense ignorance of conditions in the New World; and it was still too early to apply the obvious remedy, namely, the selection of a considerable number of its members from ex-magistrates who had seen service in the Indies. The evil, however, might be mitigated if a measure of cooperation between the officials on both sides of the water could be insured through family ties; and this consideration was doubtless uppermost in Charles’s mind when he appointed Mendoza to his important post. The names of all the minor members of the Council have not come down to us; but it appears that in 1542—an important year in the history of the administration of the Indies—the Council underwent a rigid inspection and reorganization, “as a result of which two of the four Oidores who were in it were put out.”

The Emperor’s reign likewise witnessed a notable growth of the organization, powers, and personnel of the Casa de Contratación—first established at Seville by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1503, with a treasurer, a comptroller, and a business manager as its chief officials. Ordinances of the years 1534, 1536, 1539, and 1543 formed the basis of the new development; most of these laws, which were first collected and published in 1552, are comprised in book IX of the Leyes de las Indias. But the fundamental purpose of the institution, the maintenance of strict government control over all trade and travel to and from the New World, remained unaltered; the only changes were those which were rendered necessary by the enormous growth of the work that it was created to do.

The Casa continued to reside at Seville, the sole port for American ships at the Emperor’s accession. Its office hours, however, were henceforth much longer; and each of its three original chief officials—jueces oficiales, as they now were called—had the services of a number of secretaries and clerks, so that each one became, in effect, the head of a department in a government ministry. It now had a private chapel and chaplain, a prison, and a jailer, whose principal functions were those of a man of all work. Its offshoots—the chief pilot’s bureau, the post office, and the School of Navigation—were also all developed and enlarged; the latter evoked the admiration of visitors from other lands, especially of Englishmen. In the early part of the Emperor’s reign a cosmografo mayor de la casa de Sevilla makes his appearance; by the year 1536, when the office was conferred on Alonso de Santa Cruz, the title had been changed to that of cosmografo, or cosmografo mayor de la casa de Sevilla.

The period is also marked by the creation of two new institutions, both primarily designed by Charles to lighten the burdens of the Casa, and to meet various complaints of the delays that it caused,
though the first of them was not entirely successful in attaining these ends. This was the so-called *Juezgado de Indias*, established in response to ceaseless grumblings from sailors and merchants about the difficulties and dangers of the bar of San Lucar, and the necessity of crossing it in order to get up the Guadalquivir to Seville. Various half-way measures to solve the difficulty having been attempted in vain, it was finally decided, in the year 1535, to set up a *juez oficial* in the city of Cadiz, to act in conjunction with the officials of the Casa, and to permit the loading and unloading of ships for the New World to take place at that port under his immediate supervision. The *juez oficial* was a nominee of the crown, and the Casa at first was expected to appoint deputies to assist him; but such was its jealousy of the functionary at Cadiz that it not seldom failed to do so, with the final result that in 1556 the new official was commanded to perform his duties alone. In reality the authority of the Casa was in no wise infringed by the establishment of the *juez* at Cadiz, for all of his acts had to be fully reported and sanctioned at Seville; and the fact that the Casa persisted in regarding him rather in the light of a rival than of a helper is a sad commentary on the characteristics of the officialdom of the time.—The other new body which took shape under Charles V was the Consulado of Seville, erected in 1543. Such consulados or gilds of merchants were already in existence in other Spanish cities, and when the Sevillans interested in the American trade petitioned the Emperor for a license to create one, he readily acceded. He hoped thereby, as he had hoped by the Juzgado, to diminish the work and the responsibilities of the Casa; and in this case he was not disappointed. The Consulado was represented by a prior and two consuls, elected annually by the indirect vote of the merchants of Seville engaged in the American trade. Its principal functions were to settle all civil suits between members of the body it represented, to see to it that their common interests did not suffer from the greed of any one of their number, and to frame rules and regulations for its own procedure, which was far simpler and more expeditious than that of the ordinary law courts. It held its sittings at the Alcazar, in close touch with the Casa, which was generally grateful for the relief it afforded, and showed it none of the hostility that it had exhibited toward the Juzgado.

Meantime the judicial authority and functions of the Casa itself, of which traces were already discernible in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, were placed on a firm footing by Charles’s ordinance of the year 1539. It was granted criminal jurisdiction over those who infringed its own regulations, or committed misdeeds on the voyage to or from the New World. It was also given cognizance of all civil suits which in any way affected the revenues of the crown, or involved the violation of the laws for the American trade, with an appeal, if the case was particularly important, to the Council of the Indies. The erection of the Consulado, in 1543, relieved the Casa, as we have already seen, of civil cases between different merchants; but even in spite of this its judicial activities increased so rapidly that a separate court, composed of two oidores, had to be added to the other departments in 1583.

The subject of trade and navigation naturally follows that of the Casa which regulated them, and forms a convenient bridge between the organs of the Indian administration which were resident in Spain and those which were established in the new dominions. Certain phases of this part of the story reflect great credit on the Emperor’s judgment, and mark off his Indian policy in agreeable contrast to that of his grandparents and that of his son.

Under Ferdinand and Isabella, as we have already seen, the American trade was wholly concentrated in a single port, at Cadiz till 1503, and afterwards at Seville; and the same was the case during most of the reign of Philip II. But Charles, whose more cosmopolitan experience gave him a truer vision of the opportunities involved, showed a disposition to extend to other Castilian seaports the privilege of engaging in commerce with the Indies. It seems fair to assume that it was the Flemish advisers of the early years of his reign, who turned his thoughts in this direction; and that they urged the advantages of the Biscayan ports, which were so conveniently situated for their own interests. A petition of the Cortes of 1520 serves to show that the idea of moving the *Casa de Contratación* away from Seville was very much to the fore at the time; and shortly afterwards the Emperor was presented with the ‘memorial’ referred to in a previous chapter, pointing out the advantages of Corunna as a center of trade and navigation. It seems clear from the language of the ‘memorial’ that the Casa de Contratación whose establishment at Corunna it recommended was for the purpose of the Moluccan and not the American trade; and we know that on December 22, 1522, Charles gave orders for the setting up there of a Casa de Contratación “para armamento de flotas y comercio con el Maluco”. But a passage in Herrera would indicate that nothing was actually done about the matter, on account of the objections of Seville, until at least as late as 1525, nor does there seem to be any definite evidence of the existence of a Casa at Corunna even afterwards: moreover if such a body was ever actually established it must necessarily have been abandoned in 1529, when the Moluccas were sold to Portugal. On the other hand
the discussion of the project of setting up a ‘Casa de la Especeria’ at Corunna had served to draw so much attention to the advantages of the chief Biscayan ports, that Charles resolved that they should be given a chance to participate in the American trade. In the same year, 1529, he gave orders that Corunna, Bayona, Aviles, Laredo, Bilbao, and San Sebastian; Malaga and Cartagena on the Mediterranean; and Cadiz on the Atlantic were henceforth to share the privilege of sending ships direct to the Indies. All ships so sent must indeed return to the Guadalquivir and there be received by the Juzgado and the Casa—doubtless for fear that otherwise the royal quinto might be lost; it is, moreover, a significant fact that the traditions of the time of the Catholic Kings were too firmly established to permit the Emperor to extend similar privileges to any of the seaports of the realms of the crown of Aragon; the profits of the Indies were to be restricted to Castilians. But what is far more remarkable than the limitations to the Emperor’s concessions is the fact that little or no advantage was taken of the privileges that he did concede; the license he granted “remained for the most part a dead letter.” There were certain obvious excuses for the failure of these favored seaports to seize their opportunity—inadequate appreciation of the importance of the Indies, complaints by the Sevillans of the infringement of their monopoly, and most of all the activities of the French and Turkish corsairs; the Biscayan ports offered golden opportunities to the one, and Malaga and Cartagena to the other, while Seville was far harder for both of them to reach. The traditions of the preceding reign may also be made to account for something. At any rate the fact remains that, save for the temporary outburst of enthusiasm on the part of Corunna in the early years of the reign, there is practically no evidence that any of the ports to which the decree of 1529 applied showed any real interest in availing themselves of its provisions. Charles must have been much discouraged at the failure of his honest efforts to throw open the American trade to the other ports of Castile; but Philip, who personified the Spanish point of view, finally revoked his father’s concession in 1573.

The Emperor’s distrust of the economic capacities of his Spanish subjects also led him, in the year 1526, to abrogate the restrictions which excluded all others than Castilians from the privileges of trade and emigration to the New World. The principal beneficiaries of the Emperor’s liberality in this respect were not, as in the time of Ferdinand, the inhabitants of the realms of the crown of Aragon, but rather the Italians, and still more the Germans, in whom Charles discerned large capabilities for the development of the Indies. The great banking houses, to which the Emperor was under heavy pecuniary obligations, were naturally the first to avail themselves of the new privilege. In 1525 the Welsers established themselves in Seville and in Santo Domingo, and began to take a leading part in the American trade. Three years later, in conjunction with the Ehingers of Constance, they made contracts with Charles for the importation of negro slaves and German miners, to aid and instruct the Spaniards in the development of their new domains. It was also at this juncture that they were granted Venezuela, and they participated in Mendoza’s attempt to colonize La Plata in 1534. Their rivals, the Fuggers, were not far behind. In 1530 they were granted a license to colonize and develop the Pacific coast, from the southern limits of Pizarro’s jurisdiction to the Strait of Magellan. They were to be ready to embark on this arduous undertaking not later than the first of January, 1533, but for some unknown reason the enterprise was given up. The high-water mark of German activity in the Indies was passed, in fact, before the middle of Charles’s reign. The Welsers were forced to retire from Venezuela before his death, and their other undertakings were abandoned one by one. Spanish hostility was undoubtedly the chief explanation. The Council and the Cortes made incessant complaints of the presence of the detested foreigners in the new domains, and though he never formally abandoned his policy of admitting them, Charles found it convenient, in the latter years of his reign, to give secret instructions to the Casa to find excuses for their exclusion. It was but another instance of the progressive Hispanicization of his point of view; and his son, at his accession, lost no time in reverting to the principles of earlier days, and legally restricted emigration to Castilians.

In other respects the Emperor’s policy in regard to those who wished to settle in the New World was entirely in accordance with that of his grandparents. Never had the provision excluding infidels, heretics, and their descendants been more rigidly enforced, nor limpieza de sangre been more rigidly insisted on. The early part of Charles’s reign also witnessed a number of wise, though unsuccessful, attempts to prevent the neglect of agriculture for the search for gold, and the consequently nearly universal tendency to abandon the islands for the mainland. Various attractive privileges were offered to prospective colonists who were willing to till the soil; and in 1526 all migration from the Antilles to the continent was forbidden, under pain of confiscation and death. But the tendency the other way proved too strong to be resisted. The edict of 1526 was first modified and then ignored, and the search for the precious metals so overshadowed all other occupations that the colonies were temporarily converted into a “mining speculation on a gigantic scale.”
It was during Charles’s reign that the practice of communicating with the New World by two annual treasure fleets—the ‘galleons’ and the ‘flota’—was gradually built up, though the system was not finally established till the time of Philip II. At first the ships sailed either singly, or in small companies; but before long the activities of French corsairs made it evident that some sort of armed protection would be necessary, and that, for the convenience of affording it, there would be certain advantages in having the vessels grouped in larger squadrons. As the wealth of Mexico and Peru was gradually revealed the danger increased apace; for the pirates would take desperate risks for a chance to capture the rich cargoes of gold, particularly whenever France and Spain were at war. In 1537, accordingly, a large armada was sent out under Blasco Nuñez Vela, to collect the gold and silver of New Spain and New Castile, and convoy it in safety to Seville; in 1543, and again in 1552, the same experiment was repeated on a larger scale. In the year 1543 we have the first hint of the later practice of definitely prescribing the routes and dates of sailing of the different squadrons—a policy which ultimately facilitated the very piracy it was intended to prevent; but at the same time there is evidence of a tendency to adopt the wiser plan of obliging each merchantman to be sufficiently large and well armed to enable it to beat off the corsairs without assistance, and of permitting each vessel to depart and return alone. It is unnecessary to follow the ebbs and flows of the conflict between these rival policies during the later years of the Emperor’s reign. Suffice it to say that the system of large fleets, with convoys to protect them, and regular routes and dates of departure, was the one which finally prevailed; we shall later study it full fledged under Philip II. Since the practice of having regular convoys was not definitely established in the Emperor’s reign, it is natural to find that the status of the so-called averla, or tax on imports and exports, to defray the costs of the protection of the merchantmen, was likewise unsettled during this period. The rate, at the outset, was probably about 1 per cent; but later there are instances of 5 and 6 per cent being charged; a fair average for the reign would probably be from 2 to 2½ per cent. The manner of collecting it was also undecided, and caused endless discussions between the Casa and the Consulado.

A document in the Archivo de Indias gives the number of registered outgoing vessels from Spain to the Indies during the forty years of Charles’s reign as 2421; the figures for those returning as 1748. The highest outgoing number in any one year is 101 (for 1549), the lowest 3 (for 1554); the highest returning is 84 (for 1551), the lowest 10 (for 1516 and 1524). Additional lists tell us that four outgoing vessels were lost in 1549 and 1550, and no less than fifty-four returning ones between 1549 and 1555. This last figure was doubtless chiefly due to the activities of the corsairs.

A few words may not be amiss in regard to the ways and means of local traffic in the Antilles and on the mainland, supplementary to what has been said about the transoceanic voyages. The principal centers of it on the Atlantic side were Havana, Vera Cruz, and Nombre de Dios; on the Pacific, Panama and Callao. Havana, which gradually replaced Santo Domingo as the chief port in the islands, was primarily important as the point of reunion of all ships for the eastward voyage; indeed, until the discovery of the agricultural wealth of Cuba in the succeeding centuries, it drew most of its life and prosperity from the sojourn of the vessels in its harbor. Vera Cruz was the gateway to Mexico and the territories of the audiencia of New Galicia. But Nombre de Dios was the most important of all; for it was there that all the passengers and cargoes to and from New Castile were landed and embarked. It corresponded to Panama on the other side of the Isthmus. The town, which had been temporarily established by Diego de Nicuesa in the reign of the Catholic Kings, was refounded in 1519 by order of Pedrarias, at the same time that the capital of the colony was moved across to Panama from Darien. The problem of determining the most convenient route across the Isthmus was ardently debated during the Emperor’s reign. At first there was only a rough mule path, eighteen leagues in length, connecting Nombre de Dios with Panama; but as the riches of Peru were gradually revealed, the possibility of utilizing the lower reaches of the river Chagres for part of the distance was vigorously taken up. This stream, whose channel was to be of such great help in the construction of the Panama Canal, empties into the Atlantic just west of Nombre de Dios. In 1536, a station called Venta Cruz was established at the head of navigation thereon; and thenceforth, save in the dry season, the easiest and cheapest way across the Isthmus was eighteen leagues on the river from the Atlantic to Venta Cruz, and five leagues overland from Venta Cruz to Panama. The so-called Armada of the Southern Sea, or Pacific fleet, carried passengers and goods between Panama and Callao (the seaport of Lima), touching at Payta and Truxillo on the way, and collected and distributed throughout the viceroyalty of New Castile.

There were also many subsidiary ports on the shores and islands of the Caribbean—notably Cartagena on the north coast of South America—which had to be kept in touch with Spain; and the consequent dispersal of the great fleets on their arrival in western waters gave the corsairs an opportunity which they utilized to the full. So accustomed are we to regard the sacking of Spanish towns and the capture of Spanish treasure fleets as the work of Englishmen, that we tend to forget that the example
which they were to follow with such astounding success in the time of Queen Elizabeth was originally set them by the French. The waters off these minor ports were the pirates’ favorite hunting ground. They would lie in wait, outside the harbors, for incoming and outgoing ships; then, when they were sure that the coast was clear, and that the inhabitants had not the aid of the crews of transient vessels to help them in defending themselves, they would swoop down on the unsuspecting settlers, pillage homes, carry off valuables, and not seldom extend their depredations into the interior. The inhabitants constantly complained to the Emperor of the inadequacy of their defenses, in terms strikingly reminiscent of those used by the Mediterranean towns when suffering from the ravages of the fleets of the Barbarossas; but there is little to show that these appeals were heard. How far the French corsairs were operating on their own initiative, and how far their activities were connived at by the French government, it is impossible to determine; but it is fair to say that the worst of their depredations synchronized with the periods when France and Spain were at war.

Spain is also commonly thought of as a country of many customs dues and internal tolls; and many of our readers may consequently be surprised to learn that, until the latter part of the Emperor’s reign, practically no duties at all were imposed at Seville on imports from, or exports to, the colonies in the New World. The only exception was on luxuries sent out from Spain to the Indies, and the quantity of these was so small as to be practically negligible. At the other end, an import tax or almojarifazgo of 7½ per cent had been charged from the very outset, the rate representing the ordinary import duty of 5 per cent plus the 2½ per cent of export duty which had been remitted at Seville; but the receipts therefrom had been exclusively applied to colonial uses, and exports to Spain had been totally free; the treasury of the mother country had thus far profited nothing from imposts on the American trade. But a change came in 1543, a fruitful year in colonial legislation. The war with Francis I was at its height, and it is natural to infer that the need of getting funds for it was the principal reason for the adoption of a new policy. In that year it was decreed that an export duty of 2½ per cent should be collected at Seville on all commodities shipped to the New World, the rate of the almojarifazgo at the other end being simultaneously reduced to 5 per cent. The effect of this measure was simply to transfer one-third of the proceeds of this revenue from the colonies to Spain; the amount collected remaining the same. On goods entering Seville a new almojarifazgo of 5 per cent was simultaneously imposed, and also a 10 per cent alcazaba, to be paid at once to the officers of the Casa, irrespective of whether the commodity in question was subsequently sold or not; in other words, what practically amounted to an import duty of 15 per cent was levied at Seville after 1543, so that everything brought back to Spain from the colonies paid charges at double the rate of exports to the Indies. Needless to add, all the proceeds of this import duty—and, in fact, seven-ninths of the total customs revenues both ways—were henceforth turned over to the crown, which was free to utilize them in any way it saw fit; only the 5 per cent almojarifazgo which was collected in the Indies was specifically devoted to colonial purposes. Needless also to add, the rate rapidly rose in the succeeding reigns; and the business of imposing and collecting the new duties added another to the long list of the responsibilities of the Casa.

The problem of estimating the amount of gold and silver that was drawn from the Indies in the Emperor’s reign has proved very attractive to most of the historians of the New World from the sixteenth century until today. As the present writer has been unable to make any original investigation of this topic, he cannot do better than repeat the conclusions of the most recent and scientific authority on the subject, who has carefully scrutinized and compared the works of his predecessors. His estimates, in most cases, have effected substantial reductions of theirs; he gives the grand total, down to 1560, as 139,720,000 pesos of 8 reals, or 101,345,0.00 ducats. Some 10,000,000 pesos need to be deducted from this sum for the products of the islands and coast settlements on the Caribbean under the Catholic Kings; and perhaps 20,000,000 more for the income of the years after the Emperor’s abdication. Thus 110,000,000 pesos would probably be a fair estimate for the forty years that Charles was on the throne, and of this the quinto would give the government 22,000,000. Until 1545 the yield of gold and silver was probably about even, the preponderance of the latter in Mexico balancing that of the former in Peru; but with the opening in that year of the famous silver mines of Potosi to the southeast of Lake Titicaca, the production of the white metal speedily forged ahead. The amounts increased apace as the result of the conquest and development of New Castile. Probably at least three-quarters of the total that was yielded by the New World while Charles was on the Spanish throne was drawn from it during the last quarter of his reign.

The evolution of the political institutions of Spanish America which resided in the colonies themselves presents certain interesting analogies to the mediaeval constitutional development of the different Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula, as the territory was slowly recovered from the
Moors. In both cases the first outpost of the conquistadores was the municipality, with all its inherited traditions of self-government; in both it was gradually superseded and overshadowed by the more extensive and despotic authority of the central power and its representatives.

In the foregoing pages many instances have been given of the Spanish practice of founding a municipality directly on the occupation of any new piece of land, and the list of such cases might be indefinitely extended. It has been well said that whereas “in the English colonies of America the town grew up to meet the needs of the inhabitants of the country, in the Spanish colonies the population of the country grew to meet the needs of the towns.” All this was fully in accordance with the best Iberian traditions, and the revival of the time-honored practice not unnaturally reawakened all the corresponding aspirations for municipal self-government. When Cortes wanted to shake off the authority of Velasquez, and get for himself the supreme command, under the crown, over his followers in the expedition against Mexico, he sought and obtained it from the ayuntamiento of Vera Cruz, to which, by that act, he assigned sovereign power in the new colony. When Armendariz was sent out in the year 1546 to take the residencias of the different claimants to New Granada, his first step was to get formal recognition of his authority by the local cabildos in order to preclude the possibility of encountering resistance in the name of the adelantado. In fact, throughout the whole of the Emperor’s reign, the colonial municipalities enjoyed extensive powers. They generally elected the majority of their own magistrates. They were regarded as possessing a considerable, if indefinite, authority over the regions where they were. They claimed and frequently exercised the right to send representatives to Spain—like procuradores to the national assembly—to see to it that their desires were made known to the crown; and it seems reasonable to assume, from the language of some of the Laws of the Indies, that the Emperor cherished plans for the meeting of colonial Cortes, on the model of those of Castile. Altogether it looked as if the finest Spanish traditions of urban democracy were destined to be revived and implanted in the New World. In later years the tide turned back. The centralizing tendencies ultimately proved too strong. Appointment by the crown representatives and hereditary tenure began to replace the free election of the city magistrates. The powers of the cabildos gradually declined; in fact, the same process that had taken place in the mother country in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was subsequently reproduced with but little variation in the colonies. But these later developments should not blind us to the strong foundation for municipal authority and self-government that was laid in the colonies during the period of Charles V; and the memory of it was to prove potent in the New World, as well as in the Old, at the time of the revolutions of the nineteenth century.

The more permanent heirs to the authority of the early conquistadores in the Spanish dominions across the Atlantic were the audiencias and the viceroyals. It was through these two institutions that the crown and the Council of the Indies sought to have executed, in the colonies, the policy and laws that were devised for them in Spain.

We have hitherto encountered the term audiencia only in its original meaning of a tribunal or court of law; and such was its primary significance in the Spanish colonies. But the circumstances in which these institutions found themselves in the New World, and, particularly at the outset, the deliberate policy of the crown of Castile, served to thrust upon the colonial audiencias a large number of functions other than judicial. Their presidents—in those of Mexico and Lima this post was held by the viceroy himself—were the principal executive officers in the regions committed to their charge; and the audiencias, acting in conjunction with them as councils, were entrusted with “all matters with which governmental authority might properly deal”. A fuller account of the range of their powers, and the way in which they executed them, will be given a few pages later, after examination of the manner in which they were established; at this point we only hope to have made it clear that the colonial audiencias possessed political as well as judicial authority.

A tribunal of three royal judges had been set up at Santo Domingo by a decree of October 5, 1511, to act as a check on the governor of Espanola. We have already encountered it in connection with the early history of the conquest of Mexico, when it had taken a hand in the quarrels of Cortes and Velasquez; it apparently exercised all the powers of a regular colonial audiencia and was also proleptically referred to as such; it served in fact as a precedent for the full-fledged institution there, which was formally established by imperial edict of September 14, 1526. The next one to follow was that of Mexico, first erected by a decree of the Emperor at Burgos, on December 13, 1527; it was subsequently to become the chief judicial and political body of the viceroyalty of New Spain, and the viceroy himself was to be its president. The third was that of Panama, created on February 3, 1535; it was abolished by the ‘New Laws’ of November 20, 1542, but was reestablished in 1563-64. The audiencia of Lima was set up by the ‘New Laws’, simultaneously with the suppression of that of Panama; it was
to occupy in the viceroyalty of New Castile a position analogous to that of the audiencia of Mexico in New Spain. The next on the list was the audiencia of Santiago de Guatemala, also provided for by the ‘New Laws’, and formally established by decree of September 13, 1543; that of New Galicia (later Guadalajara) followed, on February 13, 1548; and the last of the seven to be created by the Emperor was that of Santa Fe de Bogota, July 17, 1549.

It is not easy to determine precisely how these different bodies were composed in the period of Charles V. The standard edition of the Laws of the Indies gives their membership as it was in the days of Philip IV and Charles II, but it is by no means safe to assume, as many historians have done, that they were constituted in the same way at the time that they were set up. We know that the viceregal audiencia of Mexico, as established by the Emperor’s decree of December 13, 1527, was composed of a president and four oidores, a number which death soon reduced to two, while that of Lima, as established by the New Laws, consisted of a president and four oidores letrados; whereas in the Recopilacion, the composition of both bodies is given as eight oidores, four alcaldes del crimen, two fiscales (or crown prosecutors), and subsidiary officers—more than twice as many as in the time of Charles V. The five lesser audiencias were also originally much smaller than they were to be in the seventeenth century. That of Santo Domingo was composed, two years after it was set up, of a president and two oidores; but it is clear that its membership was sometimes larger and more often smaller than this, during the rest of the reign; its composition really varied from year to year, according to the exigencies of the immediate situation. The audiencia of Guatemala, as established by the New Laws, was made up of four oidores letrados, of whom one was to be president, and that of New Galicia, which followed in 1548, was originally composed of at least three oidores. Of the first composition of the temporary (1535-42) audiencia of Panama, it seems impossible, at the moment, to obtain authentic information; but we know that in 1550 the audiencia of Santa Fe de Bogota possessed two oidores. A fair average for these lesser institutions, then, would be three or four oidores, of whom one was usually president; and there seems to be no evidence of the regular presence of a ‘fiscal.’ In general these bodies, at the time they were set up, were about half as large as they subsequently became.

Each of these audiencias was given jurisdiction over a definite region—as definite at least as Spanish ignorance of American geography would permit—and an investigation of their boundaries will give us a good general idea of the chief political divisions of Spanish America as they existed at the end of the Emperor’s reign. The audiencia of Santo Domingo held sway over all the islands of the Caribbean Sea, save those immediately adjacent to the coasts of Mexico and Central America, and over the northern coast of South America from the Rio de la Hacha eastward to the Guianas; all of what is now Venezuela, and the northeastern corner of the present republic of Colombia, consequently fell within its jurisdiction. That of Mexico bore rule over the southern and eastern parts of the present republic of Mexico, save Tabasco, Chiapas, and Yucatan, and over the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico around to the tip of Florida. Its boundaries on the north were the terra incognita of what is now the United States; on the west, the domains of the audiencia of New Galicia, which stretched away to the northwest of a line running about north-northeast from the neighborhood of Zacatula; and on the south, the Pacific, and the regions that belonged to the audiencia of Guatemala, which in turn included everything between the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the Isthmus of Panama. The lands of these four audiencias thus comprised everything contained in the viceroyalty of New Spain. Of the other three, all of which fell within the, limits of the viceroyalty of New Castile, that of Panama, as we have already seen, was temporarily in abeyance at the time of the Emperor’s death, so that in 1558 the territories of the audiencia of Lima included the Isthmus and everything which the Spaniards had conquered to the south of it, save the lands which fell within the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Santo Domingo, and those which had been assigned to the audiencia of Santa Fe de Bogota. These last comprised the bulk of the present republic of Colombia, as far east as the Rio de la Hacha, westward to the Pacific, and southward to include Popayan.

In theory, all these seven audiencias enjoyed the same power and prestige before their common superior, the Council of the Indies; but for practical purposes the two viceregal ones of Mexico and Lima were by far the most important. The viceroy had the right to send to the lesser audiencias within their viceregalities orders which they were bound to execute and obey; the audiencias were also supposed to keep the viceroy informed of the state of affairs within their respective districts; so that though each one was regarded as sovereign in its own territory under the Council of the Indies, they were likewise generally subordinate to the viceregal administration. It is also worth noting that the regions under the jurisdiction of the different audiencias were generally coterminous with the so-called captaincies-general, or military districts, into which Spanish America was divided, and that the
president of each of the lesser audiencias, who was virtually the governor of the region over which it held sway, generally occupied the post of captain-general as well. In the absence of any superior officer the audiencia itself was generally entrusted with the direction of military affairs.

It will have been made clear by the foregoing pages that the functions of these bodies were exceedingly extensive. In their judicial capacity they acted as the supreme tribunals, under the Council of the Indies, in the regions committed to their charge. They heard and decided appeals from the minor local courts of the corregimientos, alcaldías mayores, and other districts into which their jurisdictions were divided, and in all such cases their verdicts were final; only in suits where the value at stake was 10,000 pesos or more, could an appeal be made from the audiencias to the home government. They had the right to sit in judgment on the acts of their own viceroys and presidents, when appealed to by anyone who felt himself aggrieved thereby; in such cases the official concerned was obliged to be absent from their sittings. They took an important part in the conduct of local residencias and visitas, chiefly by revising the decisions of the officials appointed to conduct them, and in case they were found just, by taking measures to enforce them. And they were specially instructed to conduct the preliminary investigation of all matters arising under the famous law of Malines, put forth by the Emperor in that city on October 20, 1545, in regard to suits about encomiendas or the Indians thereon. The final decision in such cases was rendered by the Council of the Indies in Spain, and it was the primary duty of the audiencias to collect the evidence, and dispatch it, sealed, to the home tribunal within a period of six months. As time went on, however, and the accumulation of such suits became intolerable, the audiencias were empowered to do their utmost to diminish them, by preventing on the spot the occurrence of gross injustice. “Two days every week, and also Saturdays when there were no pleytos de pobres”, were to be devoted to “suits between Indians, and between Indians and Spaniards.”

Politically the audiencias were supposed to act as advisory councils to the executives who presided over them. Their sessions, when devoted to this purpose, were known as acuerdos; and the decisions there reached, when duly promulgated, as autos acordados. It was through the development of these acuerdos that the colonial audiencias gradually became possessed of legislative and administrative powers such as their Spanish prototypes had never enjoyed; on this side of their functions they were to their respective districts more nearly what the Consejo Real was to Castile. The very early period, before the first viceroys arrived (as in Mexico, from 1528 to 1535), was naturally that in which the audiencias possessed the largest measure of independent authority of this sort; and some historians have even thought that it was the Emperor’s original intention that they should continue to exercise it alone. Experience was soon to show that any such idea as this, if it were ever entertained, would be impossible to carry out; but the hold on legislation and administration which the first audiencias had acquired in these early years proved too strong to be shaken. They really associated themselves with their respective executives in the discharge of all their functions, and in the interims between the death or removal of one governor and the arrival of his successor they assumed all the authority of the absent official. Thus in 1550 it was decreed that in case of a vacancy in the office of viceroy of Peru, the audiencia of Lima should succeed to the government of all the provinces and districts of New Castile, and that the subordinate audiencias thereof should obey its commands “without excuse, difficulty, or delay.”

It will readily be understood from the foregoing account that conflicts of jurisdiction between executive and audiencia were by no means infrequent, especially in the viceregal jurisdictions of Mexico and Peru. Most of these quarrels took place in later reigns; for under the Emperor the emphasis was so decidedly on conquest that institutional differences had little chance to come to the fore. Yet, at the close of Charles’s life, things were sufficiently normal to justify one generalization in regard to these conflicts, which holds doubly good for the years to come. As law courts—their primary and original function—the audiencias maintained their unquestioned supremacy; and the viceroys were repeatedly forbidden to interfere with them in any way. But in executive and administrative affairs the shoe was on the other foot. The viceroy was the king’s representative; he had the support of the home government; and his wide powers of appointment served to consolidate his position. The audiencias “may advise, they may remonstrate; but, in the event of a direct collision between their opinion and the will of the viceroy, what he determines must be carried into execution; and nothing remains for them, but to lay the matter before the king and the Council of the Indies.”

The events that led up to the appointment of the first viceroys have been fully narrated in the preceding chapters. They had demonstrated on the one hand that the original conquistadores—Cortes and the Pizarrors—had grown too powerful and too independent to be controlled by the home government; and on the other that no audiencia alone, unsupported by an executive with independent
authority, was capable of establishing the dominance of the Spanish crown. Some sort of a royal representative on the spot, with the fullest powers, was an obvious necessity; yet the utmost care must be taken to make sure that the new official did not follow the same course as the conquistadores, and defy the authority of the monarch that sent him out. The Hapsburgs did not, as a rule, take kindly to subordinates of the brilliant or inventive sort, who wanted to strike out lines of their own. The official whom they preferred was the hardworking, competent, but obedient type, who would faithfully discharge the duties laid upon him, and send back for fresh instructions in any case of doubt. In the Indies the problem of finding the right man was particularly difficult. The distance from Spain, the slowness of communications, the new conditions of which Europe was necessarily in the densest ignorance, all rendered supervision from home exceedingly difficult, and offered the greatest temptation to independent action; it was therefore doubly essential that the crown be certain of the men that it placed there. The first viceroy of New Spain was chosen by the Empress and her principal advisers in November, 1529, while Charles was negotiating with Pope Clement at Bologna; and the Emperor never had reason to regret the selection that had been made for him by his representatives in his absence.

Antonio de Mendoza, who was given the post, was a scion of one of the most distinguished of the families of Castile. His father, the first Marquis of Mondéjar, had done brilliant service in the Granadan war, and subsequently in the administration of the conquered kingdom; his whole family had enjoyed wide experience in the ‘problems of the frontier’. Antonio’s brothers were also making names for themselves. The eldest was to be President of the Councils of the Indies and of Castile, another captain of the galleys in the Mediterranean, a third—Don Diego Hurtado—one of the greatest political and literary figures of sixteenth century Spain; while his sister, Maria Pacheco, had been the heroine of the Comuneros. Of Antonio’s early career we know very little, but even that is enough to show that at the time that he was chosen to be viceroy of New Spain he was already highly esteemed and trusted by the crown. He had borne a share in the suppression of the revolt of the Comuneros. He had been employed in missions to Flanders and Hungary. Three months after his selection for the viceregal office he was present at the imperial coronation at Bologna. What delayed his final appointment and dispatch to the New World for more than five years after he had been chosen for the post, it is difficult to determine. We know that Mendoza was involved in various lawsuits which had to be cleared up before he could depart; the fact that Charles did not get back to Castile until 1534, and had been busy in the interval with so many other things, may also explain something. Mendoza’s character was by this time fully developed. Loyalty to the crown and devotion to the church formed the basis of it; firmness and resolution stand out in everything he did. Like the Emperor he made it a rule to listen to the advice of many different counsellors, but to reserve to himself the final decision, and he showed his Spanish training and traditions when he told his successor that the secret of good ruling was to do little, and to do that slowly, since most matters lend themselves to that kind of treatment, and in that way alone can one escape from being deceived. Nor were the gentler virtues lacking; there are countless instances of his generosity, liberality, and boundless hospitality. Such was the splendid equipment of the first of Spain’s proconsuls in the New World.

We have spent some time on the personality of Mendoza, because it was he that really laid down the lines on which the viceregal office was to develop in the Indies. During the reign of the Emperor, the history of the institution is the history of its first incumbent. Everything was still in the experimental stage; and the terms of Mendoza’s commission and instructions tell us more about the office that he held than do the Laws of the Indies. The viceroy was to be the immediate representative of the Spanish monarchy in his vicereignty. He was to be welcomed, wherever he went, with royal pomp and circumstance; his progress, on arrival, from Vera Cruz to Mexico was the occasion of a display of unparalleled magnificence. His appointment was at first during the good pleasure of the king, and Mendoza remained in New Spain from 1535 to 1550; in 1555, however, the normal term of the viceregal office was fixed by law at three years, though the sequel was to show that this provision was not rigorously observed. With the office of viceroy was coupled that of president of the viceregal audiencia, and the sum total of the regular emoluments of both posts was upwards of 8000 ducats annually; there were also a host of perquisites.

One of the most significant features of Mendoza’s instructions is the emphasis they lay on his ecclesiastical and economic duties. He was commanded to provide for the building of an adequate number of churches, to delimit the boundaries of the various bishoprics, and to take special care for the instruction of the natives. He became, in fact, the chief ecclesiastical as well as political representative of the Spanish monarch in America, and exercised in his name the extensive rights of patronage which the crown enjoyed. He was directed to set out, after a brief stay at the capital, on a tour of inspection of the different towns of the viceregency. He was to learn of local conditions on the encomiendas; above all he was to have his eye out for every opportunity to make money for the crown. He was constantly to be
on the watch for hidden treasure; he was to consider whether it was not high time to withdraw the privilege of exemption from the payment of the alcabala; he was to investigate the feasibility of government operation and control of the Mexican mines; the welfare of the royal treasury was in fact to be the object of his most unremitting care. Evidently, under the Emperor, the Christianization of the natives and the acquisition of revenue were still the principal keynotes. The one was in fact the quid pro quo of the other; and the viceroy, as the king’s chief representative, was primarily responsible for the progress of both.

The more strictly political side of the viceregal functions is defined in a law put forth by Charles at Barcelona on November 20, 1542, in the following terms: “The viscountys of Peru and of New Spain are to be governors of the provinces under their charge, and in our name are to rule them: they are to make such gifts and grants as seem meet to them, and to fill such offices of government and justice as are customary, and not forbidden by our laws and ordinances; and the subsidiary audiencias, judges, and justices, and all our subjects and vassals are to recognize and obey them as rulers, and permit them freely to exercise their offices; and give them, and cause to be given them, all the aid they desire and need”. This is certainly an inclusive statement; but when we come to examine the actual results, we find not only that the viceroy was considerably less omnipotent than the words of the law would imply, but also that the home government was determined to have a check on him. The story of the development of his relationship to the more anciently established authority of the audiencia, to which reference has been made in the preceding pages, furnishes an admirable instance of this. The viceroy was henceforth to issue and execute all royal mandates, and the oidores were forbidden to interfere with him in that capacity; the settlement of lines of policy was to rest exclusively in his hands, though he was directed to consult the audiencia in all important affairs. But when the audiencia sat as a court he was forbidden to vote; his sole function in such cases was to sign the decisions that the audiencia reached alone, and thereby lend to it the majesty of his support. The judicial supremacy which was the brightest jewel of the Spanish crown was thus specifically denied to its representative across the seas. So fearful was the home government of a revolt against its authority that it dared not permanently concentrate all the power in a single hand. The result was the erection of a system of checks and balances, subsequently to be fortified by an elaborate series of residencias and visitas, fatal to efficiency at critical moments, and ultimately productive of appalling slowness. The effects of this system were not to be fully evident until the succeeding reign; but the groundwork for it was laid during the period of Charles V.

We have no space to recount the events of the fifteen years of Mendoza’s tenure of the viceroyalty of New Spain. Indian wars, the discovery of new lands, the opening up of economic resources, and the situation brought about by the promulgation of the ‘New Laws’ constituted the most difficult problems which he had to face. The instructions that he left to his successor are a proof he regarded his work in Mexico as incomplete; but the eminence of his services is demonstrated by the fact that the home government finally turned to him, in 1549, as the only man capable of finishing the labors of Gasca in Peru. His last official order in Mexico was given on October 4, 1550; his successor arrived on November 25; Mendoza reached Lima on September 23, 1551; and died there after ten months’ more service on July 21, 1552. Both north and south of the Isthmus of Panama he had worthily initiated the traditions of a great office.

Those familiar with the relations of the Emperor with the contemporary popes will readily believe that Charles vigorously insisted on the maintenance of all those special powers and privileges over the church in the New World which had been conferred upon the Spanish crown in the preceding reign. These included the exclusive right to found bishoprics, churches, and other ecclesiastical establishments in the Indies; to appoint all the clergy and exercise full jurisdiction over them, and also to collect and appropriate the tithes; indeed practically all the points over which the temporal and spiritual powers of Western Christendom had fought throughout the Middle Ages were here decided at the outset in favor of the temporal. The Pope could really do nothing in the Spanish American colonies without the consent and cooperation of the Spanish crown; it was a situation without precedent “either in law or ecclesiastical usages or customs.”

Charles’s zeal for the purity of the faith in his new domains is revealed by his various measures for the exclusion of infidels and heretics, and his enthusiasm for its propagation, by the number and character of the clergy he sent out. The tale of the bishoprics in the Indies was increased during his lifetime to twenty-two, not counting Mexico and Lima, which were made archbishoprics in 1546; a number of smaller churches and monasteries were also established. The duties and powers of the clergy who ministered to them are prescribed in detail in the Laws of the Indies; the presence of such legislation in a primarily civil code is the best proof of the way in which the spiritual authority was
subordinated to the temporal. One of the most important of the functions delegated to the colonial bishops was that of acting as inquisitors. The Holy Office was not formally extended to the New World until 1569; but all its machinery was in active operation under episcopal superintendence during the Emperor’s reign. Jeronimo de Loayza, the first archbishop of Lima, held autos-da-fe at Lima, at Cuzco, and at Charcas. In the first of these, which was celebrated in 1548, a Flemish Protestant, Jan Millar, was burnt alive.

But the most distinctive of the duties of the colonial clergy was that of converting, instructing, and protecting the Indians. Charles inherited all his grandmother’s zeal for the good treatment of his new subjects, and charged all his officers, lay and clerical, in the New World, to see that his commands in this matter were faithfully carried out; but it was on the clergy that he chiefly relied. His failure to accomplish his full desires in this respect was due to the fact that his ideas were far in advance of the prevailing theories of his day and generation, to the inherent weaknesses of “government from across the sea”, and most of all to the ambitions of the large majority of the colonists, whose chief object was to derive revenue from the New World, and who regarded the natives as a means to help them in the attainment of that end. The story of the interaction of these conflicting elements is complicated and difficult, and the easiest way to trace its main outlines is to follow the vicissitudes of the career of that impassioned advocate of the rights of the Indians, the ‘Apostle’ Las Casas, whose acquaintance we made in the preceding reign, but the greater part of whose life’s work was done under Charles V.

Las Casas had but one audience with Ferdinand the Catholic on the subject of the wrongs to which the natives were subjected. It promised well; but his hopes were soon dashed; for exactly one month later the old king died. Ximenes, to whom he next applied, was horrified at the tales he had to tell. The ‘Apostle’ was charged to elaborate a plan for the relief of the Indians, of which the abolition of the encomiendas was the fundamental idea, and was sent back to America to help put it in operation; but the holders of the encomiendas succeeded in thwarting it, and in the summer of 1517 Las Casas returned to Spain. Charles and the Flemings had by this time arrived, and the ‘Apostle’ got the ear of the Chancellor Sauvage; but Fonseca and the Casa were active in opposition, and, despite the fact that the young monarch was favorable to him, the friend of the Indians could accomplish nothing. Indeed, the sole practical result of this phase of Las Casas’s career was to confirm and establish the practice, already begun, of importing negro slaves into the New World. Charles had asked him to draw up a plan for ameliorating the condition of the natives of the New World; as Las Casas knew nothing of the evils of the African slave trade, it was but natural that he should grasp at it as an obvious means of relief, particularly as it promised to satisfy his enemies in the Casa and in the colonies. The king’s Flemish majordomo, Laurent de Gouvenot (or Gorrevod), was accordingly given a license to export to the islands 4000 negroes. The number was fixed by the officials of the Casa; it was really the first of the famous asientos, and de Gouvenot, and some Genoese speculators to whom he promptly sold it, realized a handsome profit thereon. From that time forward the practice rapidly grew. Las Casas tells us that some 100,000 blacks had been sent to the Indies before the end of the reign; and when he realized too late that the effects of his plan had been to increase rather than diminish the sufferings he was attempting to alleviate, he bitterly repented, and doubted if God would forgive him. He was certainly not the first to propose it, nor would he have countenanced it for one moment had he been better informed; but the legend that he originated the idea of bringing negro slaves into America as a means to relieve the native Indians became so firmly implanted in the years to come that modern scholarship has not completely eradicated it yet.

The next phase of the story is Las Casas’s attempt to establish a ‘model colony’ on the northern coast of South America: a settlement from which he promised that the king should derive large revenues, but in which no native was to be maltreated or exploited. He got the necessary grant from Charles at Corunna, on May 19, 1520; he collected a company of hard-working emigrants, and trinkets with which to win the confidence of the Indians; on the eleventh of the following November he set sail from San Lucar. But unfortunately the pearl fishers of Cubagua had got ahead of him; they had raided the mainland in search of slaves; and when Las Casas arrived on the scene of his prospective labors, he found the natives so hostile that nothing could be done. He sailed over to the islands in the hope of getting help, and asserting his rights under his capitulacion with the crown; but the colonists, who regarded him much as a modern banker would a Bolshevist, opposed him even more violently than the Casa had done at home. One day, as he was taking his siesta under a tree, he was awakened by a party of travelers with the news that the Indians had looted all the stores that he had landed at Cumaná, and murdered the few followers whom he had left behind to guard them. It was a stunning blow—a catastrophe which the Apostle was at first inclined to interpret as a proof that God had found him unworthy to be the instrument of His will; and, feeling the need of rest and reflection, he took the vows of a Dominican monk in 1523. For the next six years he remained in seclusion, studying theology, and
composing his famous Historia Apologetica—one of the earliest and most valuable of the descriptions of the New World. But he never wavered in his faith in the justice of his cause; and he was soon to reenter the lists as its active champion.

The main interest of the period of Las Casas’s retirement is that it shows that the favorable attitude of the Emperor with regard to the Indians was not solely dependent on the pleadings of the Apostle. Laws of 1523 and 1526 strictly forbade all maltreatment or enslaving of the natives, and exhorted all colonial officials to insist on their strict observance. Charles also seemed convinced that the system of encomiendas was not working satisfactorily; for he repeated to Cortes in 1523 an injunction which he had given to the governor of Cuba five years before, forbidding any further grants. Moreover, with the death of Fonseca in 1524, the bitterest of Las Casas’s enemies in Spain was removed; as far as the intentions of the home government went, everything was now proceeding in accordance with the Apostle’s desires. But when it came to translating these intentions into practice, there was another, and far less satisfactory, tale to tell. Obedezca pero no se cumpla—let it be obeyed, but not enforced—was the formula for the colonists’ reception of unpopular decrees from Spain; and the intervening distance made it impossible for the Emperor to enforce the laws. The compulsory labor of the natives on the encomiendas had by this time become an established system, which could not be changed without revolutionizing the whole economic life of the Indies. Admit it, and the way was wide open to all the cruelties and abuses of which Las Casas complained, particularly in a community where “getting rich quick” was the primary objective. Yet the colonists were determined that the system should be maintained, and the edicts of the Emperor were tacitly ignored.

It was this state of affairs, the glaring contrast between the will of the king and the situation as it actually existed in the colonies, that aroused Las Casas to renewed activity in 1529. In 1530 he was once more pleading his cause in Spain; two years later we find him in Peru; and then after four more years of fruitless effort in the islands, he scored the sole victory of his long career in the colonies. The province of Tuzulutlan, in Northern Guatemala, had hitherto defied every attempt of the Spaniards to conquer it; the difficult nature of the country and the warlike character of its inhabitants had thus far combined to render it impregnable. The authorities of Guatemala challenged Las Casas to subdue it by the peaceful methods he had consistently advocated, and promised that for five years he should be absolutely undisturbed. The Apostle promptly accepted the opportunity, and was making rapid progress towards the accomplishment of his undertaking, when he was called away in 1538, by a summons from his Dominican superior at Guatemala; in the following year he was sent back to Spain to collect more clergy for the conversion of the Indians. But the work that he had started in Tuzulutlan survived him. He revisited the region in 1545, to be joyfully welcomed by happy throngs of Christian Indians, and two years later the name of the province, which had hitherto been known as the ‘Tierra de Guerra’ was officially changed to Vera Paz.

The five years from 1539 to 1544, which Las Casas spent in Spain, were chiefly notable for his successful efforts to secure the enactment of the so-called ‘New Laws’, to which reference has been made in the preceding chapter. Though the encomiendas, which Las Casas roundly declared to be the root of all the evil, were not abolished, all further granting of them was forbidden, and those already in existence were to lapse on the death of the holders; moreover, all enslavement or enforced personal service of the Indians was henceforth prohibited in the most specific terms. When, on November 20, 1542, the code received the imperial signature at Barcelona, Las Casas thought that his life’s work had been successfully accomplished. He had yet to learn the futility of all laws made in Spain in defiance of the wishes of the colonists in America, when the means of enforcing them were so lamentably deficient. The furious opposition which the ‘New Laws’ aroused in Peru has already been described. In Mexico, as we have also seen, it would probably have been even greater, had not the official charged with their promulgation been prudent enough to give directions to suspend them. When, in 1545, the Apostle reappeared in New Spain, where he had accepted an appointment as bishop of Chiapa, he found not only that the ‘New Laws’ were a dead letter, but that he himself, as their originator, was the most unpopular man in the colonies. For two years more he fought manfully in his new see, against overwhelming odds, for the triumph of the cause to which he had dedicated his life; but in 1547 he returned, utterly disheartened, to Spain for the last time, and three years later he resigned his bishopric. He was by this time seventy-six years old, and unable to do any more active work on behalf of the oppressed natives, though he continued to defend them by written and spoken words until his death in 1566 at the age of ninety-two. Yet he recognized, at the end, the futility of all his efforts; for he admitted, in a letter of the year 1562 to the Dominicans of Guatemala, that the evils which he had labored so heroically to mitigate had gone on steadily increasing throughout the period of his active life.
His noble career left a curious and rather tragic legacy behind it. Like most ardent advocates, Las Casas generally overstated his case; but things so fell out, in the years after his death, when the power of Spain was the nightmare of Europe, that the various tracts, in which the Apostle had exaggerated the sufferings of the Indians for the purpose of securing their alleviation, were greedily seized upon by Spain’s numerous enemies as affording a true picture of conditions in the Spanish colonies. They made excellent propaganda, and were utilized to the limit of their possibilities. Thus the most permanent result of the work of the Apostle was not the accomplishment of the end he had in view, but rather the perpetuation of the ‘legend of Spanish cruelty’. The facts as they actually existed were doubtless bad enough, but no reasonable person would rely solely on the testimony of Las Casas in regard to them, any more than he would take John Foxe’s description as his only authority for the sufferings of the Marian martyrs.

The rank and file of the colonial clergy, though none of them approached the record of Las Casas, were generally active on the Indians’ behalf. The worst of them, indeed, took sides with the encomenderos, and tacitly countenanced their most outrageous oppressions, and the jealousies and rivalries of the Franciscans and the Dominicans often neutralized the good intentions of those who worked hardest for the Indian cause; but for the most part the weight of the church was thrown on the right side. It was in the matter of conversion and education that it was able to accomplish most, for the encomenderos rather welcomed what would serve to keep the Indians harmlessly occupied during off hours, provided the periods of their labor were undisturbed. Elementary principles were inculcated in the doctrinas on the encomiendas, and schools and colleges were provided in the different cities for those who showed themselves capable of advancing beyond the elementary stages. The first of these institutions was the Colegio de Santa Cruz, established, at the instance of the first bishop of Mexico, in the Indian quarter of that city in 1535. It gave instruction in Latin, philosophy, and music, and in Mexican languages and medicine. In its faculty appear the names of Bernardino de Sahagun, “the founder of American anthropology”, and of Juan de Torquemada, the author of the Monarquía Indiana; and some of its graduates rose to fill municipal offices in the Indian towns.

Nor was the education of the conquistadores and their descendants forgotten. Charles was resolved that Spain’s culture, as well as her religion and institutions, should be transplanted and established in his new dominions across the seas; and he looked principally to the colonial clergy for the execution of his will. The first steps towards the founding of schools in America for the education of the children of Spanish parents were taken as early as 1536; and the imperial decree for the establishment of the universities of Mexico and Lima bears the date of September 21, 1551. It declares them to be established “for the service of God, and the public welfare of our kingdom” and “because we desire to protect the inhabitants of our Indies from the darkness of ignorance.” They were Harvard’s “elder sisters on the American continent” by a period of no less than eighty-five years. The high level of their scholarship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is attested by the names and achievements of their professors and graduates; indeed “it is not too much to say that in number, range of studies, and standard of attainments by their officers, they surpassed anything existing in English America until the nineteenth century.”

The end of Charles’s life is in many respects an unsatisfactory point at which to interrupt an account of the administration of the Indies. By far the greatest thing which was accomplished in the Western Hemisphere during his reign was the extension of the Spanish dominion from the islands to Tierra Firme, and the conquest of the Aztec and Inca Empires; the emphasis, in other words, is on discoveries and on feats of arms. The institutional side of the story had scarcely begun—particularly in New Castile; and the state of affairs that we have attempted to portray in the foregoing pages was not really established until the time of Philip II. Yet the Emperor deserves the credit for laying the foundations of the system of administration under which the Spanish American colonies continued to be governed for the succeeding two centuries and a half. There were modifications and amplifications; there were readjustments and improvements, particularly in Bourbon times; but the underlying principles, and the chief institutions that were charged with the duty of carrying them out remained, with little change, down to the era of the Revolutions.

Of all these principles by far the most important, in fact the one on which everything else in a measure depended, was that of the maintenance in the new dominions of the absolute power and control of the Spanish crown. It is not a principle which appeals to us today, and it was undoubtedly the primary cause of those unfortunate characteristics for which the Spanish colonial system became notorious in later years: its meticulous paternalism, its unwieldiness, its appalling slowness. Yet it is hard to see how the Emperor could have adopted any other. In the first place he had inherited it from Ferdinand and
Isabella; it was also the very essence of the political atmosphere of his own day and generation. Moreover, the special circumstances in which Charles was placed seemed to render its maintenance particularly imperative. In the eyes of the economist of that time it was the sole way to insure to the Spanish government its fair share of the revenues of the Indies; and it was to Spain that the Hapsburgs invariably looked to pay the expenses of their foreign wars. Political events also seemed to point to the same conclusion. Royal control was not only deemed essential to the repulse of hostile corsairs and the exclusion of foreign trespassers; it also appeared to be the sole practical method of keeping the Spaniards themselves under proper discipline. Had the greatest of the conquistadores, such as Cortes and the Pizarros, been men of a less daring type, it might have been judged safe to entrust them and their successors with a larger measure of independent authority, to the lasting benefit of the system as a whole. But Charles did not venture to take this risk, especially in view of the remoteness of the new domains. He could not permanently collaborate with such men, any more than a bridge-player, whose methods are conservative, can be happy with a partner who is perpetually taking risks. It was almost always the policy of the Spanish Hapsburgs to play safe; they had everything to lose and nothing to win. The conquistadores, on the other hand, took the most desperate chances; they had everything to win, and nothing to lose. The Emperor did not even permit them permanently to retain those powers with which they were originally invested. When they had done their great work, they were ruthlessly cast aside, to make way for a system of monarchical control from afar, under which men of their type were virtually relegated to impotence.

We can scarcely be surprised, then, at the principles by which Charles was guided in establishing the foundations of the Spanish colonial system; in this, as in so many other phases of his multifarious activities, he was, more than most men, the child of fate. Indeed the wonder is that in view of the position in which he found himself, he should have given so many proofs of liberality and enlightenment. Of the excellence of his intentions in regard to the natives, it is impossible to entertain a doubt; though most of the regulations he made for them proved impossible of fulfilment, they were inspired by the highest sense of duty. His attempted relaxation of the strict system of the Seville monopoly, and of the exclusion of non-Castilians which he had inherited from the Catholic Kings, shows an economic vision far in advance of his day and generation. Had his policy in this respect been continued by his successors, the later chapters of the story might well have made less dismal reading. His open-mindedness on the subject of local government in the Indies is revealed by his measures in regard to the colonial municipalities, and by the powers and privileges he conceded to the cabildos; in fact, his friendly tolerance of democracy is quite as well illustrated in the Indies and in the Netherlands as in his dealings with the representatives of the cities of Castile. Altogether Charles’s methods of administering his American dominions furnish one of the best arguments that is afforded in his entire reign for the case of those who seek to show that he aimed rather to raise his Spanish subjects to higher levels, than to utilize them, regardless of their own interests, for the benefit of the house of Hapsburg. Fate, on the whole, was against him throughout. His acquisitions in the Western Hemisphere so enormously increased the preponderance of his dynasty, that it became, more than ever, an object of suspicion and dread; and it was Spain, under Philip II, that had to pay the price. But it was impossible for Charles to see how the future would develop; and, as the careworn Emperor surveyed his life’s work from the solitude of Yuste, the achievement that may well have afforded him the greatest satisfaction was the establishment of the supremacy of Spain in the New World.
VOLUME IV
PHILIP THE PRUDENT
BOOK VII

THE SPANISH EMPIRE AT ITS GREATEST TERRITORIAL EXTENT

CHAPTER XXXI

A SPANISH SOVEREIGN, CHAMPION OF THE CHURCH

The transition in Spanish history from Charles V to Philip II forms the antithesis to that from the Catholic Kings to the Emperor. In 1516 the destinies of the Spanish Empire had passed from native to alien hands; Spanish interests had been suddenly subordinated to those of the house of Hapsburg. Forty years later the reaction is complete; a process whose beginnings we have already noted in the Emperor's closing years has now attained its final stage; the outlook of the Spanish monarchy is once more thoroughly Hispanicized. The second of these transitions was more gradual than the first, but when it was completed it was much more permanent and far-reaching. Philip the Prudent will go down in history, both within the Iberian Peninsula and without it, as the typical Spanish sovereign of all time.

There can be no doubt that the heart's desire of the new king, when on January 16, 1556, the huge burden of governing the Spanish Empire had at last fully devolved upon his shoulders, was to make peace with his enemies and get home to Spain. The first sixteen years of his life had been spent wholly in the Iberian Peninsula, and had satisfied him of its immeasurable superiority to every other part of the world. His many disagreeable experiences during the ensuing Wanderjahre had but served to emphasize this conviction, and to implant in him a deep aversion to everything north of the Pyrenees. His political education, the precepts and example of his imperial father, were but added arguments in support of the same conclusion. Charles had preached peace and defensiveness to him with increasing fervor in his later years. He had also publicly confessed at the last, by his abdication and the division of his inheritance, that his own life had stood for an unrealizable ideal, that the great task he had undertaken entailed an impossible amount of travelling, and that a single sovereign could not continue to rule both the northern and the southern halves of the Hapsburg inheritance. And if it had been impossible to combine them under the Emperor, it was certainly even more so now, because, to the vast number of preexistent incompatibilities, there had recently been superadded that of religion. On October 3, 1555, only twenty-two days before Charles's abdication of the rule of the Low Countries, there was signed the peace of Augsburg, giving Lutheranism, under certain restrictions, legal right to coexistence with Catholicism in the Empire. Heresy, in other words, had at last been formally recognized, in a fashion which Philip could neither tolerate nor comprehend. Unswerving zeal for unity of the faith was the lesson from his Spanish education that he had taken most deeply to heart; it must have seemed to him almost the result of divine intervention that he should have been relieved of the responsibility of ruling Germans at the very moment of their adoption of a modus vivendi so abhorrent to him. From every point of view—personal, political, and religious—he deeply longed to return to his native land.

At first there seemed good prospect that he would soon be able to satisfy this desire. An honorable peace with his French foes was the indispensable preliminary to his departure, and that was furnished him, apparently at least, by the truce of Vaucelles, on February 5, 1556, just twenty days after he had become the official ruler of Spain and of the Spanish dominions. In the three other possible centers of disturbance for him, outside the Iberian peninsula, the situation, during the first half of this same year, 1556, while not entirely satisfactory, might well have been far worse. In England there was little open indication of disloyalty to the Spanish alliance. The conspiracy of Sir Henry Dudley was easily detected and foiled, and the government seemed principally occupied with the burning of the Protestant martyrs. In the Low Countries, destined to become a few years later the worst sore spot of all, the discontent for the time being was also latent. Philip had been amply warned against the dangers of any rapid Hispanicization of the administration there. For the present he seemed chiefly bent on preserving intact all the measures and policies of his beloved father, and his appointment to the
government generalship of Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, though really dictated by considerations of foreign policy and the military ability of the nominee, was taken by the Netherlanders as a pledge of respect for their liberties. In Italy, indeed, Paul IV had virtually declared war; but he seemed—at least until July—to be quite incapable of waging it. The truce of Vaucelles had deprived him of French support; the cardinals, though they dared not openly oppose, silently disapproved; and meantime the Duke of Alva, now viceroy of Naples, was getting his tercios into an admirable state of readiness. In midsummer, 1556, it really looked as if Philip would soon get home to his beloved Spain; indeed, there seemed an even chance that he would get home without a fight.

But six months later the situation had entirely changed. So complicated were the cross currents, so self-contradictory the combinations of international politics, during these critical years when Charles was giving way to Philip, that it was impossible to foretell from day to day whether it was to be friendship or enmity, peace or war. The decision was likely to remain with the most strong-minded of the powers concerned, and in 1556 there can be no question that that distinction belonged to the octogenarian pontiff. For the moment, at least, his hatred of the house of Hapsburg took the precedence of his devotion to the church; blind to the disastrous effect on Catholicism, not only in the Hapsburg lands on the continent, but also in England, of a war between the see of Rome and the king of Spain, he offered such provocation to the representatives of his enemy in the summer months of 1556 that in September the Duke of Alva invaded the Patrimonium Petri from Naples with an army of 12,000 men. The papal levies were quite unable to resist him. Though he waged war with the utmost scrupulousness, as befitted a Spaniard who was attacking the States of the Church, his advance on Rome was methodical and rapid, and the 18th of November saw the Spaniards established in Ostia, where their leader offered an armistice to the Pope. But the lion-hearted Paul was not yet prepared to surrender; he still cherished the hope that he would be rescued at the last moment by France. Everything, in fact, depended on whether or not Henry II could be induced to break the truce of Vaucelles. Such a breach had seemed inevitable to the Argus-eyed Simon Renard in London as early as May, 1556, only three months after the truce had been signed, and the events of the following autumn proved the accuracy of his foresight. The urgency of Carlo Caraffa and of the cardinal of Lorraine prevailed over the more cautious policy of Anne de Montmorency. In the end of December the Duke of Guise was permitted to cross the Alps with an army of 13,000 men to go to the rescue of the Pope; in the first week of January the Admiral Gaspard de Coligny made an ineffectual attempt to surprise Douai. A state of war between France and the Hapsburgs had existed in fact, both in the Low Countries and in Italy, for more than a month before Henry II actually declared it, on the last day of January, 1557.

Though deeply discouraged by his failure to preserve peace, Philip entered the ensuing struggle with the better courage because it had not been of his seeking; he could honestly say that he was waging a defensive war of the type which his father had approved. Moreover the fact that he had not been the aggressor did not prevent him from acting vigorously when the crisis came; himself proverbially incapable of taking the initiative, he at least on this occasion permitted his representatives to seize it for him. During the first nine months of the year 1557 the course of the conflict was wholly favorable to Spain.

There was throughout the closest interdependence between the events in both theatres of the war, widely separated though they were. The Spaniards planned to force the fighting on the northeastern frontier of France, so as to win a decisive victory there before the Duke of Guise could get back from Italy; the French strategy was to rest on the defensive in Artois and Picardy in order to enable Guise not only to rescue the Pope, but also to rehabilitate all possible anti-Spanish combinations among the lesser Italian states. The fact that the French leader was given so many different things to do was probably the chief reason for his initial ill success; it led to sharp differences of opinion among the leaders of the Franco-papal forces, and prevented them from concentrating in any one direction. When the Duke finally reached Rome (March 2, 1557), he found the pontiff most anxious to resume the offensive against the Spaniards. Paul had been greatly encouraged by the recent recapture of Ostia through the efforts of his generalissimo, Pietro Strozzi; he had visions of driving “this mixture of Jews, Marrani, and Luthers”—such was his characterization of Alva’s army—not only out of Naples but out of the rest of Italy as well. But his French and Italian allies did not snare his aggressiveness. In May the French king commanded Guise to turn his attention to Lombardy and Tuscany; not till two months later was he persuaded to countermand his order, and allow the army to remain in the States of the Church. And then, just as everything was at last in readiness for a vigorous offensive against the Duke of Alva, there arrived the stunning news of the great defeat which the French had sustained at St. Quentin in the North, followed the next day by an urgent message from Henry II recalling Guise and his troops for the defense of Paris. This, of course, meant the ruin of Paul’s hopes of chastising the Spaniards; the only question now was whether he could save Rome from a repetition of the great sack which had so horrified all
Europe just thirty years before. But fortunately the Duke of Alva was not minded to follow the example of the leaders of the imperial armies in 1527. He was himself far too scrupulous a Catholic. He knew, moreover, that his master wanted peace, and the papal defenses were not entirely negligible. On August 25, he advanced to the outskirts of Rome as if to demonstrate the fact that the game was in his own hands, and just two weeks later the Pope admitted it, by sending out to him three cardinals to discuss terms of peace. On September 12, a treaty was arranged, whereby Alva was to make solemn submission to the Holy See in the name of his sovereign, to restore to the Patrimonium Petri all cities and territories which he had captured in the preceding months, and to receive in return the Pope’s forgiveness and his promise thenceforth to remain neutral in the war between Spain and France. The moderation of the Spanish leader had been well rewarded. He had restored the status quo ante bellum in Italy, which was all that Philip could have asked for. Henceforth Paul IV was to devote himself exclusively to his spiritual duties, and ceased to breed trouble for Spain and the house of Hapsburg.

Meantime in the North the struggle had begun more successfully still. In the spring a large army was assembled at Brussels under the leadership of the duke of Savoy. Its ultimate object was to strike directly at Paris, and on March 18 Philip crossed over from Calais to Dover, in order to enlist the support of his wife. From the standpoint of Englishmen his visit was entirely disastrous. To all the old difficulties of 1554-55 was now added the fact that Philip’s hostility to the Pope made it impossible for him whole-heartedly to support the great work of reconciliation on which Mary’s heart was set; never before had it been so obvious that he proposed to utilize the resources of the island kingdom simply and solely in the interests of Spain. But the queen’s loyalty to him never faltered. Her hopes of the heir whose advent would solve so many puzzling questions were renewed once more; with that happy prospect before her, there was no sacrifice she was not prepared to make. In June she sent a herald to Henry II to carry him the English declaration of war on France; before July 6, when Philip left her for the last time, she had sold crown property to the annual value of over 10,000 pounds for the support of his campaign, and had raised upwards of 5000 troops for the service of Emanuel Philibert. By the beginning of August everything was in readiness, and an army of over 50,000 men was launched at St. Quentin on the Somme. The fortifications of the place were almost in ruins. Coligny, who was in command, had a mere handful of soldiers; on learning of the approach of the Spanish army he sent word to his uncle Anne de Montmorency, who was at La Fère with about 18,000 troops, that unless he was speedily reenforced he could only hold out a few days. Montmorency came to his rescue on the morning of August 10, but his tactics were so faulty that he suffered a crushing disaster outside the walls of the town. Over 3000 of his men were killed; 7000 were captured, among them the constable himself; the rest only saved themselves by ignominious flight.

It was a notable defeat for France and a glorious victory for Spain: the most glorious, perhaps, ever won by the armies of the Prudent King over any of his Christian foes. But so incapable was Philip of utilizing his opportunity that the battle remained almost barren of advantage to the Spaniards. Indeed, it may justly be said of it, as of Malplaquet a century and a half later, that its chief importance was that it marked the turn of the tide against the would-be invaders of France. When the news of it reached the Emperor at Yuste, he eagerly demanded whether his son had clinched his victory by marching on Paris, and was deeply cast down when word came that he had failed to do so. Philip, indeed, had not even been present at the battle. He was writing letters at the time, a few miles distant, at Cambrai; and on reaching the scene of the victory that had been won for him, he gave orders to besiege and capture St. Quentin before entering any farther into the enemy’s territory. But the town was heroically defended by Coligny with 700 men; every day that Philip could be made to waste before its walls would bring nearer the winter season and the return of the Duke of Guise. Not till August 27 was it finally taken and subjected to an unusually horrible sack; by the time that Philip’s troops had recovered from their orgies, the autumn rains had already begun, and further advance was regretfully abandoned. The most that Philip could do was to take Le Catelet, Ham, and Chauny, and retire to Brussels to put his army into winter quarters. Shortly afterwards came the counterstroke, not indeed against Philip and the Spaniards, but against his English allies, the subjects of his sorrowful queen. When the Duke of Guise got back from Italy he found to his intense relief that Paris was safe. Discerning that what France needed above all things was a restoration of her morale, he determined to effect it by the capture of Calais. Concealing his real object with masterly cunning, he arrived before the town on January 2, 1558; eighteen days later he had taken it, together with its various outposts, before Philip had been able to send a man to its defense. The last remnant of the conquests of the Hundred Years’ War had been torn from the grasp of England as the result of her sacrifice in the interests of a foreign power; the queen and the nation were cast into the depths of despair. It was a final and overwhelming demonstration of the error of the Spanish alliance.
The remaining operations of the war were unimportant. The strategy of both sides aimed at avoiding decisive battles. Philip’s financial resources were completely exhausted; the majority of Frenchmen were obviously war-weary; peace in the near future was the inevitable conclusion. Conferences were opened in October, 1558, at the abbey of Cercamp in Cambrésis, the principal Spanish representatives being the Duke of Alva, the prince of Orange, Ruy Gomez da Silva, and Granvelle. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of the ensuing negotiations, which were interrupted several times between the end of November, 1558, and the beginning of March, 1559, on account of the death of Mary Tudor and the proposal of Philip to marry her successor Elizabeth. So many and so weighty were the issues that hung on the acceptance or failure of that proposal that nothing else could be definitely determined until the question was permanently settled in the negative. Finally on April 2 and 3, 1559, the different articles of the treaty were signed in the little village of Cateau-Cambrésis. In the North, France kept Calais, and there were mutual restorations of conquests between the belligerents on France’s eastern frontier. All the territories of which the duke of Savoy had been despoiled by Francis I in 1536 were duly returned to him, and the settlement of the outstanding questions in Italy was such as connoted the abandonment by France of further schemes of aggrandizement in the peninsula. As was suitable at the close of a long dynastic war, the treaty ended with a marriage. Since Philip had been unable to win the hand of Elizabeth of England, he was given, in her stead, Elizabeth of Valois, the eldest daughter of the king of France. The proxy marriage was celebrated in Paris on the 22d of the following June, the bridegroom being represented by the Duke of Alva. In January, 1560, the new queen arrived in Spain.

The treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis put an end to that long series of wars between the French and the Spaniards which began with the raid of Charles VIII on Naples in 1494. Though the prize for which the contestants were striving was originally Italy, the struggle later ramified in such fashion as to affect most of the rest of Western Europe, so that the peace which concluded it was of universal significance; it was, in fact, the international settlement to which men perpetually referred back, as establishing the normal state of the relations of the European powers, down to the treaties of Westphalia in 1648. In France it was generally regarded by contemporaries as disastrous, as “a great misfortune to the king and to his whole kingdom”; and though some subsequent historians have judged it more leniently, the most recent authority confirms the earlier verdict. He censures Henry II for having granted such favorable terms to an adversary so exhausted that he could not have continued to fight, and finds the explanation of the French king’s error in his zeal for the extirpation of heresy. If this estimate be just, the treaty must, ipso facto, be regarded as a notable victory for Philip II. In Italy, the original cause and theatre of the strife, there can be no question that Spain had come out on top. Her power was now securely established, and it was a factor in forcing her into a struggle to maintain it, which lost her not only the Netherlands but also the sovereignty of the seas.

All this, however, was an affair of the future; for the present there could be no doubt that Philip had emerged victorious. He had got the peace for which his whole soul longed, and the opportunity which it offered him to return to his beloved Spain; he had got it, moreover, on ostensibly triumphant terms. “During the spring of 1559 his court at Brussels was the political capital of Catholic Europe”. Thither flocked the political representatives of the petty Italian states to pay grateful homage to their protector and master, “the greatest monarch”, so the Florentine ambassador described him, “that Italy has known since the day of the Romans.” Thither also came the princes of France to congratulate their conqueror on the victories that he had won; they begged him to come to Paris for his wedding, and were visibly cast down when he refused; “The custom of the kings of Spain”, he haughtily replied, “is not to go and fetch their brides, but to have them brought to them in their own country and their own house”. Philip, indeed, was wholly bent on getting home; and the sole reason why he delayed his departure was to give himself time to make arrangements in the North which would relieve him of the necessity of ever leaving home again. In view of the role that he was to play in the immediately ensuing years, it is worth remarking that for the moment he seemed more preoccupied with political than with religious cares. His quondam rival, Henry II of France, was apparently far more anxious to extirpate heresy than.
he. Philip refused to collaborate in an expedition against the Calvinists of Geneva, which the Most Christian King was desirous to undertake. He was also totally unwilling to take any measures for the subversion of English or Scottish Protestantism; indeed, for the time being, he appeared to regard the British heretics rather as a chief bulwark for the defence of the island kingdoms against the designs of the Valois and the Guises. When, on July 9, the lance-thrust of Montgomery put a sudden end to the life of the king of France, Philip’s fears in regard to these matters were naturally much relieved. If France and Scotland were to be brought closer than ever through the fact that their respective sovereigns were now husband and wife, the youth and weakness of the new Valois monarch gave adequate assurance that Spanish interests in Northern Europe were at least temporarily safe; and Philip prepared to depart. His date of sailing, fixed originally for August 18, was delayed till the twenty-third because of the advice of his astrologer, Nostradamus, who “with his threats of tempests and shipwrecks ... did put the sailors in great fear”; on September 8 he landed at Laredo.

If Philip before his departure from the Netherlands had devoted himself rather to the regulation of political than of religious affairs, his return to the peninsula gave the signal for the emphasis to be reversed. His journey to Spain is, in fact, the real dividing line, as far as he was concerned, between the era of the Hapsburg-Valois wars and that of the Counter-Reformation. During the next twenty years, at least, his principal interest was to be the advancement of the faith. Now that he had got home he could follow undisturbed the path that was indicated to him by the traditions of his native land. Arrangements had been made there, even before his arrival, for a public demonstration of his detestation of infidelity and heresy, and of his solemn determination to extirpate them, and this demonstration took the form of a most imposing auto-da-fe. It was held, directly in front of the great church of St. Francis, at Valladolid, on Sunday, October 8, 1559. At six o’clock in the morning the officials of the Inquisition took their places on a magnificent dais at one end of the square. Close by was the royal gallery, occupied by the king, the Prince of Asturias, a number of privileged grandees, and the ambassadors of foreign powers; directly opposite was the scaffold. Then the bells began to toll, and the sad procession of guards, clerics, familiars, and convicts—the latter all duly attired in corozas and sanbenitos—filed slowly out of the gates of the Inquisition prison and into the great square. Spectators to the number of 200,000 are said to have followed. The ceremonies began with the “sermon of the faith”, which was preached on this occasion by Doctor Juan Manuel. Then Hernando de Valdes, the inquisitor-general, rose and faced the king, who also rose and bared his sword as a sign that he would champion the cause of the Holy Office; whereupon Valdes addressed to him the following solemn demand: “Since the apostolic decrees and the sacred canons have ordained that sovereigns must swear to favor the Holy Catholic Faith and the Christian religion, does your Majesty swear by the Holy Cross to give all necessary support to the Holy Office of the Inquisition and its ministers, against heretics and apostates and against those who help and favor them, and against all who directly or indirectly shall hinder the activities of the Holy Office; and to force all your Majesty’s subjects and the inhabitants of your Majesty’s realms to give obedience to the constitutions and decrees which are published for the defence of the Holy Catholic Faith against heretics and against all who believe, receive, or support them?” The king replied, “I swear it.” Then followed the interminable reading of the sentences of the condemned, the separation of those to be ‘reconciled’ from those to be ‘relaxed’ to the secular arm, and the subsequent subdivision of those in the latter category into a larger group who elected by confession at the last moment to purchase the privilege of the milder form of death by the garrote, and a small minority—only two on this occasion—who preferred to undergo all the horrors of the quemadero. One of these was a Florentine noble, Carlo de Sesa, a godson of Charles V, who had once stood high in the imperial favor. As he passed by the king, he haughtily demanded of him how he could suffer such things to be. And Philip replied, “If my son were as evil as you are, I myself would fetch the wood wherewith to burn him.”

So Spain at last got back her king. The wish, so often expressed by the Cortes of Charles V, that the Spanish monarch would stop his travelling, had now been fulfilled with the advent of his son. In all the thirty-nine years of life that remained to him Philip never once set foot outside the peninsula; and his constant presence there during so long a period, and in such a monarchical age, made its administration the faithful mirror of his own policy and ideals. Seldom in history has it been given to any sovereign to stamp the impress of his personality so deeply upon the lives of his subjects. If one would learn the destinies of the vast dominions over which he bore sway, one must begin with a careful study of his character and mentality; and these in turn cannot be adequately understood without remembering the Spanish origin and background out of which they were evolved. If Spain and the Spanish Empire were represented in Philip, so Philip was a typical product of Spain and the Spanish Empire.
His ancestry, of course, was predominantly Iberian. His father was half Spanish, his mother half Spanish and half Portuguese; and she doubtless impressed him in his boyhood years with the idea that it was Portugal’s destiny to be ultimately reunited with Spain, the idea which her own marriage with the Emperor had represented, and which Philip was subsequently, if only temporarily, to carry out. The influence of the Empress was also a potent cause of Philip’s proverbial respect for the clergy. She was very devout and spent many hours in prayer; from his infancy the prince was surrounded by clerics and subjected to ecclesiastical influences. The other two chief things that stand out, as one reads the story of his early years, are the joylessness of his life and the deficiencies of his linguistic equipment. He was never allowed to have a playmate worthy of the name; the Portuguese Ruy Gomez da Silva, who afterwards became his chief councilor, was perhaps the nearest to it, but Ruy Gomez was Philip’s senior by no less than five years. The Empress insisted that the prince be treated with the respect due to “the son of the greatest emperor that the Christian world had ever seen”; his every movement was regulated by an etiquette so strict that it was scarcely possible for him to laugh. Everything combined to make him cold and reserved, to train him to conceal his real feelings, to enhance the characteristics of gravity and melancholy which he had inherited from his father. The latter, though absent from Spain during the greater part of his son’s early life, had given much thought to the question of the prince’s studies, and had provided him with the best tutors that could be had. Philip made good progress in science and in art; he read much history and gave promise at an early age of possessing unusually sound political judgment. But for languages he showed even less aptitude than the Emperor; indeed it was well said of him that from his childhood days he preferred to communicate by writing rather than by word of mouth. Even in his native Castilian he always spoke slowly, though with great precision, and he seemed to have much difficulty in choosing his words. He could write and speak his Latin reasonably well. He could understand a little French and Italian, and speak a little French; but to converse readily in these or any other foreign tongues was utterly beyond him. Small wonder that he was so uncosmopolitan. He had no means of free communication with any one beyond the Pyrenees.

Numerous contemporaneous accounts of his physical traits have come down to us; those of the Venetian ambassadors are on the whole the most valuable, though we have Spanish, French, and English testimony besides. Philip was of less than medium stature, but finely proportioned, and of a carriage “so straight and upright as he loseth no inch in height”; the grace and dignity of his presence were further enhanced by the care, restraint, and elegance with which he dressed. His eyes were blue and his hair and beard light, so that he seemed at first sight to be rather a Fleming than a Spaniard. His large protruding under-jaw and lip, though considerably less prominent than those of his father, were yet sufficiently noticeable to betray the Hapsburg ancestry. In early manhood he wore his beard “short and pointed, after the Spanish fashion”; later in life he permitted it to increase in length and breadth until it approached the style customary in the Netherlands. The pallor of his complexion was also remarked on by all observers, and most of them drew the proper conclusion, namely, that it indicated a weak stomach and lack of exercise. Reddened eyes were a penalty of his excessive devotion to the written word both day and night. He ate slowly, sparingly, and usually alone, restricting himself to meats and the “most nutritious foods”; almost all the accounts of him emphasize his avoidance of fruits and of fish. He also suffered from asthma, stone, and gout; and though his doctors recommended him to go hunting and get out into the open air “as the best means of strengthening his body and distracting his mind from melancholy reflections”, he paid little or no attention to them; apparently, too, he was haunted by the fear lest he should die as the result of an accident, and kept constantly before his mind the experience of the king of France. He was totally deficient in that capacity for sudden and almost superhuman physical exertion which, in the case of some of Spain’s greatest empire builders, alternated so strikingly with long periods of doing nothing at all: “Ohne Hast, aber ohne Rast” is an accurate description of him, if one remembers that his activities were not those of the body, but of the mind. He was ever a great sleeper, and the tendency increased with advancing years. In the later part of his life he seldom rose before half past nine, and always took a long nap after his midday meal; sometimes, it is true, he would work till midnight, but more often he retired early in the evening to read for a couple of hours before he closed his eyes; indeed it was well said of him when he was an old man that his only recreation was repose. The effect of these habits on his policy and methods of government was foreseen with striking clarity by the Venetian ambassador in 1559. “From them it results”, so remarks the report, “that though he is at the age of youthful appetites and insatiable desire to rule, nevertheless all the actions of his Majesty are invariably directed, not to the aggrandizement of his kingdoms by war, but rather to their conservation through peace”. The counsels of the Emperor to avoid aggressive action and rest on the defensive had certainly been hoard by willing ears. What his father had acquired with the sword, Philip proposed to preserve with the pen. From first to last he was the ‘Prudent King’.
Reading and writing occupied the major portion of Philip’s day; indeed he not seldom continued to read and to write while taking a drive in his carriage. We have already alluded to his preference for written over oral communications; add to this his firm determination to keep in touch with everything that was going on, even in the remotest corner of his vast dominions, and his own persistent unwillingness to leave the center of Castile, and it furnishes the key to his methods of government. He had the highest possible sense of his royal prerogatives and duties; he had taken deeply to heart his father’s injunction to direct everything himself, and never to give his full confidence even to the most faithful of his ministers, and the natural result was that his time was completely occupied with receiving and answering reports and letters. Most of these were concerned with immediate affairs of state, and their number mounted so fast that in 1566 Philip took the first measures for their conservation in the ancient castle of Simancas, which soon became a national archive. Others—like the famous Relaciones Topográficas—were elaborate answers to royal requests for information in regard to existing conditions from all the cities of the realm. “They are sent to him,” writes the Venetian ambassador Morosini, “from all sorts and conditions of men and treat of every sort and kind of subject, both great and small, in such fashion that it may be said that the number of them is infinite; indeed, having so many subjects and trusting no one, and insisting that everything pass under his own hand and eye, he is so perpetually preoccupied with this business, with so great labor and toil, that I have heard many people say that they would not for the world be the ruler of so many states as is his Majesty, if it meant living the kind of life he lives”. Reports, reports, and ever more reports; Philip was literally submerged with them in his later years, and moreover he did not stop at reading them; he annotated them, as he went along, with comments on matters as absurdly trifling as the spelling and style of the men who had written them—all in that strange, sprawling hand of his, one of the most illegible hands of an age more than usually replete with chirographical difficulties. A story of somewhat uncertain origin which has come down to us, in regard to the results of a night’s work of this sort, is perhaps worth quoting in this connection; it is primarily a proof of Philip’s unlimited patience and self-control, but it also reveals his great kindness to his servants, an excellent test of a gentleman. Apparently the king had sat up unusually late, covering sheet after sheet with handwriting and annotations; when at last he had finished, he called his attendant to throw sand over the papers in order to dry the ink. The attendant, however, was so confused and appalled by the responsibility placed on his shoulders that instead of the sand box, he took up the ink pot and emptied its contents over his Majesty’s labors; but Philip forbore to reproach him. “This is the sand, that is the ink”; was his only comment on the damage that had been done. If we can visualize Philip niggling over these innumerable reports, we are furnished with the explanation of much else besides. He possessed a tenacious memory, and was resolved to superintend everything himself; “bien es myrar a todo” is a phrase frequently found in his writings. But he was curiously unable to separate the essentials from the details, or to persuade himself ever to ‘delegate’ the latter to subordinates; he was like the historian who has-vastly more material than he can possibly hope to handle. And the obvious result was that under his rule the administration of the Spanish Empire became more notorious than ever for its slowness. It had been bad enough under the Emperor, but it was to be infinitely worse under his son. So poor were the means of communication in those days, so vast and so widely scattered were the dominions over which Philip ruled, that the only possible method of governing them successfully was to invest the king’s local representatives with a large measure of independence. But this was just what Philip could never bring himself to do; and he was the more convinced that his own way was the only right one because it tallied so closely with the precepts of his imperial father. It was centralization carried to the breaking point, pushed so far that it paralyzed efficiency. While Philip was deciding how the sailors on the Armada could best be kept from swearing, Sir Francis Drake raided the Spanish coast. His viceroy and ambassadors, who were constantly kept waiting for orders, and for subsidies to enable them to carry them out, frequently expressed the hope that death would come to them by way of Spain, for thus they would be certain to live to a ripe old age. Prescott prints part of a letter addressed to Philip by Luis Manrique, the grand almoner, telling him in vigorous terms of the discontent of his subjects because of his manner of doing business, “sitting forever over your papers, from your desire, as they intimate, to seclude yourself from the world, and from a want of confidence in your ministers. Hence such interminable delays as fill the soul of every suitor with despair ... God did not send your Majesty and all the other kings, his viceroys on earth, to waste their time in reading or writing, nor yet in meditation and prayer”. The Cortes also pointedly advised him to relieve himself of the details of administration and entrust them to the councils and tribunals to which they belonged, so that business might be transacted more speedily and his time be free for weighty affairs of state and war. And the tragedy of it all was that these disastrous mistakes were really brought about chiefly as a result of one of Philip’s, finest qualities, his exalted idea of the duties of kingship. Certainly his worst enemies cannot justly accuse him of being a roi fainéant.
Two other outstanding virtues of Philip call for special comment; they were both of them salient characteristics of his great-grandmother, Isabella the Catholic, and in both he showed notable improvement over the ways of his father. The first was his love of justice and determination to see it done throughout his dominions. “Justice is his favorite interest”, writes the Venetian ambassador in 1563; “and in so far as its administration concerns him, he does his duty well”. “He is by nature the justest of rulers,” writes another in 1584, “and his justice extends so far that were it not regulated by the greatest prudence and experience in the affairs of the world, it would pass into severity.” The good old custom of the Catholic Kings—that of hearing the pleas of their subjects on Fridays—had by this time fallen into desuetude, and Philip made no effort to revive it; in this matter at least—and it would seem to be the exception that proves the rule—the king consented to delegate to others; and it should be added that the judges whom he selected were famed for their probity and competence. Nevertheless, Philip was by no means entirely inaccessible, much as he loved solitude and detested the fatigue of audiences. We are assured that on the way to and from divine service, “he accepted all the supplications that were handed to him, and that if any one desired to speak with him, he stopped courteously to listen but Philip never showed, either by expression or gesture, how he proposed to deal with such requests; if favorably the signature of the king was necessary before final establishment was fully as magnificent as ever it had been in the days of his father; it numbered no less than 1500 persons, of whom nine-tenths were Spaniards, and the rest Flemings, Burgundians, Englishmen, Italians, and Germans; there are, moreover, countless testimonies to the excessive liberality of his grants and pensions, especially to Spaniards. But Philip himself was by nature frugal; the lavish cost of his household at the beginning of his reign represents rather the system which he had inherited from his father than what he would have chosen for himself; and as the years went on, with his resources growing gradually smaller and smaller, with Spanish influence increasing and Burgundian growing correspondingly less, and with his own fondness for solitude becoming steadily more marked, his natural frugality began to assert itself. In the middle of his reign we have numerous evidences that the expenses of the royal household diminished year by year; at Madrid only barely enough pomp and circumstance were maintained to suffice for the preservation of the dignity of a king. And at the end, we find Philip living and dying in a little cell in the Escorial, only twelve feet square, unadorned and austere; it has been well said that the humblest monk of San Lorenzo “had a better room and better furnished than did the king of Spain.” And the contrast, striking as it is with the ways of his father, is even more obvious with those of his son. The gorgeousness of the courts of Philip III and Philip IV was furnished than did the king o

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Yet it would be a grave error to think of Philip as being naturally dead to all the pleasanter sides of life, and an even graver one to conceive of him as deficient in affection or incapable of friendship. The joylessness of his early years, to which we have already alluded, was but the inevitable consequence of the way in which he had been brought up; that he so loved to be alone during his later life was chiefly the result of circumstances and of a long series of family bereavements. Though he detested physical exercise of every sort, he got recreation in other ways. To the end of his life he took much pleasure in the jokes of professional buffoons—a peculiarly Spanish trait; we also get a glimpse of him playing piquet after dinner. Still more notable were his knowledge and enthusiasm for art. He loved music and could play the guitar; he was a patron of artists and a real connoisseur of painting and tapestry, sculpture, and architecture; we shall return to this phase of his activities in more detail in connection with the building of the Escorial. And there can be no doubt that in his earlier years he had various mistresses. The Venetian ambassadors and others frequently advert to his incontinence, but save for his liaison with the Princess of Eboli, about which there are so many divergent opinions, his amours do not seem to have had the slightest influence on his policy or methods of government. But it was not, after all, in the company of his mistresses that Philip found his principal relaxation from the cares of state; indeed his ill health gives good reason for believing that he was rather less than more amorous
than the average man. It was in the bosom of his own family that the king hoped to find the affection and companionship for which he hungered, and it was perhaps the deepest tragedy of his whole life that that hope, save for a few brief intervals, was destined to be disappointed.

His mother had died when he was but twelve years old; his first wife, Maria of Portugal, when he was eighteen, in bearing him the Infante Don Carlos. He wedded Mary Tudor at twenty-seven, but of the four years and four months during which he was married to her he passed less than one-third in England with the queen; the union had been dictated solely by political expediency; no child was born of it, and it was profoundly distasteful to Philip. Until the time of his return to Spain in 1559 he had scarcely tasted of the joys of a happy family life. Thereafter followed the brightest period of his whole existence. His third spouse, Elizabeth of Valois, reached Spain in the following January; her advent was the occasion of festivals and rejoicing, for it was regarded as the sign and seal of permanent reconciliation with France, and the new queen was popularly known as the Reina de la paz. Soon after her arrival she was stricken with small pox; it was a light case, and she soon recovered, but it is interesting to read of the worries of her mother Catharine de’ Medici, lest the disease should so disfigure her that she would lose her influence on her husband and imperil the safety of the Franco-Spanish understanding. Much depended indeed on whether or not the new queen should bear a child, and that question was not answered in the affirmative till six years after her arrival. On August 12, 1566, she was delivered of a daughter; the birth of the child was believed by the queen to have been due to the beneficent influence of the Spanish Saint Eugenius, whose remains the king, after interminable correspondence, had recently succeeded in having transferred to Toledo from their former resting place at St. Denis, and the Infanta was accordingly named Isabella Clara Eugenia. This daughter and her younger sister Catharine, born October 9, 1567, were the joy of their father’s heart; and his affection for them increased with the death, on October 3, 1569, of their mother, who was mourned by the Spaniards as “the best queen that they had ever had or could have”. That year, 1568, which also witnessed the death of Don Carlos, was unquestionably one of the saddest in Philip’s whole life. But the necessity for a male heir took the precedence over everything else; in November, 1570, Philip married his fourth and last wife, Anne of Austria, the daughter of his cousin, the Emperor Maximilian II. She bore him four sons and one daughter, and died October 25, 1580, but of her children only one, who was to succeed his father as Philip III, lived to be more than eight years old. The Escorial was scarcely finished before it was filled with coffins. Philip had laid no less than seventeen members of his own family to rest there before he had completed his sixtieth year.

This terrible series of family bereavements is an element too often forgotten by those who have attempted to portray the life and character of Philip II. One chief reason why it has been so much neglected is doubtless the king’s own extraordinary self-control. It was one of his fundamental principles that a sovereign should never, under any circumstances, exhibit his inmost feelings. “He is an adept at concealing his affections,” writes Morosini in 1581. “No display of sorrow,” was his order at the time of the death of the Infante Don Ferdinand, in October 1578; “nothing but processions and public prayer, returning thanks to God and humbly supplicating that he mitigate his wrath.” Certainly it would be unfair to judge Philip by externals. But there has fortunately been preserved to us one glimpse of the man, as he really was in the bosom of his own family, one rift in the clouds of his impenetrable reserve; and that is a series of letters exchanged between him and his daughters Isabella and Catharine when he was absent on the campaign for the annexation of Portugal. These letters were discovered by Gachard in the archives of Turin, and published by him at Paris in 1884; they prove, beyond the possibility of doubt, that whatever the crimes and barbarities of which Philip may have been guilty in his capacity of Spanish monarch, he was a most loving and tender father, who longed, in his self-imposed isolation, for the sympathy and love which only a family can afford. Their contents are well known and need not be repeated here: the evidences of his solicitude for his daughters’ spiritual and physical welfare, his interest in the most intimate details of their daily life, his desire to know if they had begun to make use of the new Gregorian calendar, which went into effect during the period of the correspondence, his descriptions of the storms, the birds, the flowers, and of the local customs of his new kingdom, of everything, in fact, that would interest and amuse them. These letters also afford additional evidence of the king’s friendly relations with his servants; his kindly tolerance of the cranky eccentricities of Madalena, the old nurse of the Infantas, forms the most amazing contrast to the cold, stern lord of the Spanish Empire, as portrayed by his official visitors. And yet it was the real man that these letters reveal—the man whom Philip was irrevocably determined that the outer world should never know.

It is not impossible that this contrast between the real and the official Philip, coupled with his firm resolve that the feelings of the former should never interfere with the duties of the latter, may point the way to the most reasonable solution of the mysteries that still surround the life and death of the son.
of his first marriage, the Infante Don Carlos, born July 8, 1545. For over three centuries and a half it has been a favorite theme of historians, novelists, and playwrights. All sorts of different theories have been offered in the explanation of it, but none of them has as yet been accorded any general acceptance. The legend which forms the basis of Schiller’s famous tragedy, namely, that the Infante was sacrificed because of his love for his step-mother, Elizabeth of Valois, is devoid of any solid historical foundation; the tales that the sources of the trouble were his fondness for the Protestants, intrigues in the Netherlands, or deep-laid conspiracies against the royal authority in Spain, seem also, on the whole, to be unworthy of credence. On the other hand it would appear reasonably certain, despite the arguments of a recent authority to the contrary, that Don Carlos, from his earliest years, showed himself physically and mentally quite unfit for the vast responsibilities that would devolve upon him should he ever be permitted to succeed his father as the ruler of the Spanish Empire. His excesses in eating and in drinking, his passion for swallowing things and making others swallow them, his whimsical cruelties all tell the same tale; his picture by Sanchez Coello confirms it, as do the reports of the different ambassadors at the court of Madrid. These bad symptoms, sufficiently alarming during his boyhood, became rapidly worse when, at the age of sixteen, he “fell down a pair of stairs, broke his head and had two fits of an ague”. It seems probable that his life was only saved on this occasion through the efforts of the learned Vesalius, who performed the operation of trepanning; and the measure of Philip’s superstition and ignorance is revealed by the fact that he insisted on attributing his son’s survival to the miraculous healing powers of the corpse of the cook of a Franciscan convent, long since dead, which was placed in bed beside the fever-stricken body of the Infante. In any case the evidences that Don Carlos would make an absolutely undearable sovereign multiplied apace after his recovery from this accident. When his father, in the hope that the possession of authority might rouse him to some sense of his duties and responsibilities, tried the experiment of placing him in the Council of State, the Infante upset everything. He insulted and even assaulted his fellow councilors as no sane man would have done, and seemed to take a malicious pleasure in revealing the most important state secrets with which he had been entrusted. Irritated by the strictness of the surveillance to which he was subjected, he laid plans to flee to Italy or Germany and make trouble for his father abroad. Whether he had thoughts of murdering Philip seems much more doubtful. The difficulty, in this case, is not the lack of evidence, for there is an abundance of it, but rather to know how much to believe.

How to deal with the situation was a truly terrible problem, one of the most agonizing with which a royal father has ever been confronted; but early in the year 1568, Philip came to a decision. He was convinced that a strong monarchy was essential to the welfare of Spain. The experience of his predecessors had inspired him with a deep dread of the grandees, who had always seized the government when the kingship was weak; only a century before, under Henry the Impotent, there had been a striking demonstration of it, and Philip knew his Spanish history. Don Carlos promised to be far worse than Henry the Impotent had ever been; was it not obvious, then, that Philip’s duty to the state, of which he had the very highest conception, demanded that he should spare his realms from the perils of the rule of a madman? To imagine that he could answer this question in the affirmative without a pang is to ignore the evidence we have already adduced to prove that Philip had an intense family feeling and a deep affection for his own offspring; moreover there were some risks in setting the Infante aside, for the king, in that moment, had no other son. It must have been a heart-rending decision to make, but finally, on the night of January 18, 1568, Philip summoned to his palace at Madrid Ruy Gomez, Luis de Quijada, and the Prior Antonio, and, “speaking as no man had ever spoken before”, apprised them of the resolution he had taken. Then, with his helmet on his head and his sword in his hand, he led the way silently along the dark corridors of the palace to the apartments of the Infante. Everything had been carefully arranged beforehand. The bolts had been removed, and the door was opened without the least difficulty; before Don Carlos had waked up, the loaded pistols which he always kept by his bedside were taken away. The brief agonized queries of the Infante as to the meaning of it all were answered coldly and noncommittally by the king. The doors and windows were swiftly nailed up, Philip superintending the whole process with the utmost care. When all was finished he committed his son to the guard of the Duke of Feria, commanded that no one should be permitted to speak to him or bring him letters, and went out without speaking a word to the Infante. He was never to see him again.

Six months later, on July 24, the world learned that Don Carlos was no longer living, and stories were circulated for more than a century afterwards to the effect that the king had given orders that in one way or another he should be put to death. Some maintained that he was beheaded, and two of the various post-mortem examinations of the body (the last in 1812) appear to support this conclusion; but the evidences to the contrary are stronger and more reliable. The reports that he was strangled by slaves or suffocated in bed are totally lacking in solid historical foundation; while the tale that he was poisoned rests principally on the testimony of Antonio Perez, who, at the time that he wrote his account, was bent
on vilifying the name of Philip II. No one of the countless stories of the Infante’s being made away with at the royal command can be definitely substantiated; that being the case, the king should be given the benefit of the doubt, if any continues to exist. Perhaps the best of all reasons for believing Philip to be innocent of the crime with which, before the days of critical historical scholarship, he was so often charged, is that it was unnecessary to the attainment of his ends; for he must have foreseen that Don Carlos’s physical excesses in solitary confinement would be ultimately certain to cause his death. Philip’s object was to remove his son from the possibility of any active participation in the life of the world, and he effected that end by imprisoning him. That the Infante’s death, six months after his arrest, relieved the king from a most painful and embarrassing predicament is indubitable, but there is no adequate ground for believing that Philip was guilty of accelerating it.

The most recent authority on this tragic affair regards it simply as “a matter between father and son.” He rejects the hypotheses of treasonable or heretical conspiracies on the part of the Infante, but fully admits his unfitness to rule; on the other hand he is very harsh in his verdict on the king. Philip’s refusal to visit his son during his imprisonment seems to him utterly heartless. He cannot understand why the king failed to reward the improvement in Don Carlos’s disposition toward him, which apparently took place after the Infante had been permitted to receive the communion at Easter, with any relaxation of the rigor of his confinement; he even blames Philip for his unwillingness to take part in the prince’s funeral, which the king watched, with his accustomed calmness, from a window in the palace. But these strictures seem to reveal a very imperfect comprehension of the true character of Philip II. If the king was notoriously slow in making up his mind, he was equally firm in adhering to a course of action, once he had embarked upon it; to reverse the line of conduct which it had cost him such sorrow to adopt was unthinkable. Moreover, is not Philip’s refusal to visit his son in his prison and to participate in his funeral quite as explainable on the hypothesis that he could not stand the strain upon his own affections as on that of heartless cruelty? We have seen that it was a cardinal principle of the Prudent King never to reveal his inmost feelings. How can we be sure that his heart was not filled with mortal anguish all the time—an anguish which he dreaded every moment to find himself unable to control?

The parallel between Philip II of Spain and his great-grandson, Louis XIV of France, has been often drawn by historians. It was first attempted over two centuries ago by the French Protestant, Jean Jacques Quesnot de la Chesnée, who held strong views on the dangers of universal monarchy. He shows how the liberties of Europe had been threatened, first by the house of Austria, “which attained its preponderance through the two most unstable things in the world, namely, women and the sea,” and then by the Bourbons under the Roi Soleil; he points out that “whenever a Holofernes has threatened to seize the sovereignty of the world,” a “Judith has been supplied by England,” in the persons of Queen Elizabeth and Queen Anne, to curb his insatiable ambitions. He compares the political and economic results of the expulsion of the Moriscos with those of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes; he is convinced that both Philip and Louis were led astray by evil counsellors, and envies the kings of China, “who have ministers of incorruptible probity.” He stoutly maintains that “all men are by nature equal,” that “Princes derive their authority from the consent of those they govern,” and that “those who do not regard their subjects as their sovereigns are no better than tyrants.” He violently assails the theories of absolutism and of monarchy by right divine, on which the governments of the Prudent King and of his great-grandson were both built up. But there are other points of resemblance than these. Quesnot was primarily a political theorist of Anglophile ideas, and he used the similarities between Philip and Louis in order to point a moral. Had he been an historian, desirous of describing what actually existed, he would have found that there was even more to his ‘Parallele’ than he had thought. Both monarchs had the same high conception of their kingly duties and prerogatives, both the same haughtiness and reserve, both the same willingness to work constantly and hard for what they conceived to be the welfare of their subjects and the glory of their kingdoms. Both were unwilling to give full confidence to any of their ministers; both were methodical rather than brilliant in their conduct of affairs; there is the same dead-weight impression about both of their reigns. Both of them, finally, built themselves residences in the country, not far from their respective capitals. But the nature of these residences, and the motives that led to their erection, were widely divergent. Louis hated Paris, which had been full of disagreeable associations for him since the days of the Fronde in the period of his minority; he therefore constructed for himself, at enormous expense, a luxurious palace in the forest of Versailles, and permanently transferred thither both his court and his government on May 6, 1682; there they were to remain till the time of the French Revolution. Philip, on the contrary, was fond of Madrid; in fact he made it, for the first time, the capital of Spain, and formally established his court there in the spring of 1561; but his desire to find repose from his regular duties, his love for clerics and fondness for religious contemplation,
combined with certain special episodes of his own early career to bring into existence on the spurs of the Guadarramas a dwelling which bears no resemblance whatever to the palace at Versailles, the famous monument known as the Escorial.

The word ‘monument’ has been purposely used to characterize it, because it emphasizes the fact, which is too often forgotten, that the Escorial was in a large measure designed as a mausoleum for the remains of Charles V, who had directed in his will that his bones should remain at Yuste until his son should have provided them with a permanent resting place. The story, often denied and as often reasserted, that the building owes its origin to a vow made by Philip at the battle of St. Quentin, does not seem likely to be true, at least in the form in which it is usually told, for the reason that Philip was not present at the fray; we may, however, well believe that the fact that that great victory had been won on St. Lawrence’s day, together with the tradition that the saint was born in Spain, was of decisive influence in determining the form which the structure permanently took. Finally, there can be little doubt that the retirement of the Emperor, after his abdication, to Yuste, strengthened Philip in his natural inclination to build himself a residence in combination with a monastery and church. Whichever of these various motives is to be regarded as dominant, we can be pretty certain that when Philip came back to Spain in 1559 the plan of the building had already taken shape in his mind. Soon after the royal capital had been established at Madrid, a site was selected some twenty miles to the northwest. The first stone of the great edifice, styled by the Spaniards the ‘eighth wonder of the world’ was laid on April 22, 1563, the last on September 13, 1584.

To describe the Escorial is wellnigh impossible: if it is to be understood or appreciated it must be seen. Yet it is essential to try to give some idea of it, for it sums up the Spanish Empire in the period of Philip II more perfectly than any book can possibly hope to do. Its plan is that of a gridiron, in commemoration of the instrument on which St. Lawrence was tortured to death; the church, the courtyard, and the cells of the monks form the lines of the bars; the royal apartments, the handle. The main rectangle is of gigantic proportions, 675 feet long by 530 feet wide, and it took twenty-one years to complete it; its style, though unique, is distinctly reminiscent of that of the Italian school of the second half of the sixteenth century, as illustrated by the Gesù at Rome and the Granvelle palace at Besançon. Its material was the gray stone obtained from the quarries nearby; perhaps the most remarkable feature of it, as one views it from a distance, is the way in which it fits into the surrounding landscape, the somber colors of the lonely hills, the wild inhospitality of the frowning crags. Philip superintended the planning of it with that meticulous care for which his name has become a byword, and his ideas were faithfully carried out by its principal designer, Juan Bautista Castillo de Toledo, and also by his successor, Juan de Herrera, who completed the work. The king constantly visited it while it was in the process of construction, and urged on the workmen with an energy such as he seldom displayed in anything else. He shared with the ascetic Hieronymite monks whom he had determined to establish there the rude habitation in which they were temporarily installed; he watched the rising of the great walls for hours on end from the Silla del Rey, a rocky nook on one of the mountain spurs a mile and a half distant from the edifice itself. The whole scene is an epitome of the stern and lonelier aspects of his character. Philip can be studied in that landscape perhaps even better than in the books and manuscripts of the great monastic library.

But if the prevailing impression of the Escorial as seen from without is one of somber simplicity and gloom, the gorgeousness of its interior furnishes a most notable contrast. There is no trace of this, indeed, in the royal apartments, which accurately reflect the asceticism of their inmate; but the church, the galleries, the library, and its collections remain as a permanent memorial to Philip as a patron of art. The king wished the Escorial to contain samples of the best products of all his dominions. Jasper was fetched from Burgo de Osma, and marble from the quarries of the Sierra Nevada. The iron work was principally contributed by Toledo, which had been renowned, since the days of the Goths, for its preeminence in that art. Milan furnished fine specimens of its workmanship in silver, gold, and precious stones, the Low Countries their most exquisite tapestries; and the colonies in the New World sent their curiously tinted woods. Philip’s determination to get the best paintings is more notable still. Like his father before him, he was a great patron of Titian and Tintoretto, who are both splendidly represented in Madrid, though much less adequately at the Escorial; another of his early favorites was the Fleming Antonio Mor, who first came to Spain in 1552 and enjoyed Philip’s special good will for a number of years, only to lose it in a trice by committing the unpardonable error of presuming too far on the royal good-nature. The Cretan Dominico Teotocopuli, better known as El Greco, crossed over to Spain in the middle seventies; though the altar piece which he was commanded to paint for the Escorial failed to please, he lived on at Toledo till his death in 1614, doing work whose true greatness has only been appreciated in very recent years. More satisfactory to the royal taste was the Italian Federigo Zuccaro, who was summoned to Spain about 1585 for the special purpose of decorating the Escorial, and who
brought the two Carducci brothers with him when he came. But this long list of foreigners must not lead one to suppose that Philip had no faith in Spanish talent; quite the contrary, he was firmly convinced that in painting, as in everything else, it was the destiny of his native land to emerge supreme, and his faith was gloriously rewarded in the age of his grandson. In his own day he showed special favor, particularly when it came to the painting of portraits, to the Spanish-born Portuguese Alonso Sanchez Coello (1531-90) and to his pupil, Juan Pantoja de la Cruz (1551-1609). These two, and, in the early years, Antonio Mor, painted pictures of almost every member of the royal family, as well as of the prominent courtiers, secretaries, and generals of the day. It is worth noting that Sanchez Coello got only fifteen ducats apiece for his portraits executed from life, and twelve for copies; for determined though he was that nothing should be lacking for the decoration of the Escorial, Philip was constantly anxious to save expense. Raphael’s famous ‘Lo Spasimo di Sicilia’ was obtained without cost to the king by a really scandalous piece of corruption; and Arias Montano, his representative in the Netherlands, drove the hardest of bargains in the purchase of books and of manuscripts.

No part of the Escorial was more precious to the king than its library. His fondness for reading was one of his most prominent characteristics; he was also a real connoisseur of rare books and precious manuscripts. He gave constant employment to Fray Andres de Leon, one of the greatest masters of the art of illumination then living; he spared no pains to furnish the monks of the Escorial with the most magnificent copies of the liturgy and the Scriptures. Into the library itself there poured a steadily increasing stream of volumes and codices, both ancient and modern, in manuscript and type, some donated from the royal collections, but most of them acquired through the Argus-eyed agents whom Philip employed all over Europe. The treasures in the Greek and Oriental languages were probably the most precious of all; indeed a complete history of the library of the Escorial would be practically that of the renaissance of classical literature in Spain. The richness of the decorations rivalled that of the content of the collections, and is described in glowing terms by the first librarian, Jose de Siguenza; and the books, which are placed on the shelves with the backs inward, and the titles stamped on the edges of the pages, furnish the walls of the rooms in which they are stored with a mellow background of old gold.

But it was not merely books and manuscripts that Philip was determined to gather in. He was also resolved that the Escorial should be a great repository of precious relics and bones of the saints. His zeal for amassing these was well-known all over Europe; one of the surest ways to win his favor was to send a gift to his collections. In them were to be found the remains of St. Justus and of St. Pastor, an arm of St. Lawrence for whom the monastery was named, “a head of St. Undelina who was queen of Sicily and suffered martyrdom together with the 11,000 virgins, and another head of one of the 11,000 virgins, and another head of one of the companions of St. Maurice the martyr, and another bone of one of the companions of St. Gereon the martyr, and a bone of the same St. Gereon, and another bone of one of the Holy Maccabees; and two bones together of the blessed apostles St. Philip and St. James, and another bone of the blessed apostle St. Bartholomew.” Such an assemblage of pious relics “out of those good old centuries when there was so much faith and so little money” not unnaturally produced the most gratifying results in the shape of miracles, and miraculous visions by the Hieronymite monks. ‘At four o’clock in the morning of the day after the delivery of the remains of St. Justus and St. Pastor, the prior was awakened by two young people who urged him to say mass. He made haste to obey and to run to the altar, for the holy friar fully understood that those two young people were indeed St. Justus and St. Pastor.’

This brief description will at least have served to make it clear that Versailles and the Escorial are quite as incomparable as are the motives of the two monarchs that led to their construction. Versailles symbolizes the splendor of the age of Louis XIV; it became the center of French society and the seat of the French government. The Escorial was a place of retirement for Philip II. He brought his court there, it is true, for a brief period during the summer, and is said to have been able to accomplish four times as much work there as in Madrid; but it never became the capital of Spain. The real reason why the Spanish monarch was so deeply attached to it was that it gave him a chance to live in the atmosphere of a monastery and contemplate the glory of God. In order to complete the picture of Philip which we have drawn, it remains to say something of the nature of his religious life.

Castilian tradition for eight centuries past furnished the background for it. Philip was a typical product of a country whose national existence and imperial expansion had been inseparably bound up with the advance of the Christian faith, whose greatest victories had been won hand in hand with the church. No sooner had Spain driven the infidel from her dominions than she began to carry the Cross to the inhabitants of the New World, and to make herself the bulwark of Roman Catholicism against the
forces of the Reformation. The natural consequence of this historical development was that she had come to regard her welfare as necessarily identical with that of the ancient faith and even with that of Almighty God; and this conviction was personified in Philip the Prudent. But that was by no means all. The conditions which obtained, both within the peninsula and without it, at the time of the king’s return there in 1559, were such as must intensify all his inherited zeal for the Roman Catholic cause. As Charles V got his opportunity in the Hapsburg-Valois wars, so Philip was given his by the era of the Counter-Reformation.

The blows that had been struck during the previous forty years by the Protestants in their different branches against the authority and supremacy of the Roman church had been sufficient to convince its leaders that they constituted the most serious threat that it had ever been called upon to face. On all hands there went up a cry, spontaneous and enthusiastic, for the revival of the morals, discipline, and zeal of the Catholic clergy and laity. The movement it elicited gathered headway with miraculous speed; it was led by devoted priests and bishops, theologians and scholars, saints and mystics, who, though widely scattered over the face of Western Europe, were united by the inspiration of service in a common cause. Spain contributed more than her share to this galaxy of splendid figures. We have no space to enumerate them all, but must restrict ourselves instead to a few words about the greatest of them, the noble Santa Teresa of Avila.

She was forty-seven years of age when first it was revealed to her that her mission in life was to effect a permanent reform of the life of the Spanish clergy. It was indeed a stupendous task. The position of the clerical estate had become so unassailable, and its authority so unquestioned, that its members had come to neglect their spiritual functions; many of them were notoriously corrupt, and the multitude of the hangers-on who participated in their privileges and immunities was a public scandal. But Teresa was nothing daunted; in the year 1562 she founded the order of the barefoot Carmelites in the convent of San José, to serve as a model of her conception of what monastic life should be. The rigor of the discipline to which she subjected her followers almost passes belief; her own deepest grief, so she once confessed, was the necessity of eating, especially when it meant the interruption of her prayers; when she died in 1582, at the age of sixty-seven, she left a reputation so spotless that forty years afterwards she was canonized. She was not wholly successful in effecting the reforms to which she had dedicated her life; the evils against which she fought were too firmly intrenched, and her own ideals were so exalted as to be practically unattainable. But it is certain that the veneration which her own career evoked among the Spaniards tended to emphasize their already strong tendency towards the mystical and emotional phases of religious observance, possibly even somewhat to the detriment of their zeal for the rectification of abuses and other practical demonstrations of their loyalty to the faith.

Philip himself was profoundly influenced by all these things. There seems to be some reason for believing that he received Santa Teresa at the Escorial either in December, 1577, or in May, 1578; even if he did not, it is certain that the training that he had received in his early years rendered him particularly susceptible to the examples and precepts of such a person as she, and that his religious life, particularly at the close, was marked by the intensity of its devotional manifestations. This was evident not only in the frequency of his attendance at mass, in the strictness of his observance of ecclesiastical ceremonies, and in the fervor of his prayers; it was discernible also in his musical and artistic predilections, and he could give it fullest play when living with the monks in the gloomy solitudes of the Escorial. In it he found his only consolation for the defeats and bereavements of his later years; by it he persuaded himself that however patent the ruin and decay which were going on around him, his cause was the cause of God and must, therefore, triumph in the end. But it was not only in his own dominions and by seconding the efforts of such enthusiasts as Teresa of Avila that he proposed to play his part; he was also convinced that it was his most sacred duty to champion and protect the cause of Catholicism all over the face of the globe. And by the time that he got back to Spain in 1559, the reform movement within the church had progressed so far and become organized to such an extent as to give him precisely the opportunity he desired.

Clearly, unless the Protestants should voluntarily come back within the fold, that reform movement was ultimately bound to mean religious war; its connotations were essentially militant. In the Emperor’s day the political and dynastic issues had predominated—witness Charles’s constant postponement of the war against the Lutherans, and the French king’s alliance with the Turk; Europe had been divided on the basis of Hapsburg against Valois rather than on that of Catholicism against Protestantism. But now that was no longer the case. The Catholic church bade fair to be reestablished on a firmer foundation. Long steps had been taken toward the elimination of those abuses which had given point and justification to the complaints of the Protestants. Rome felt she had a right to reclaim their allegiance, and if it was refused, to compel it. More and more did she convince men that her cause was
more worth fighting for than the worldly ambitions of rival sovereigns, that earthly triumphs were as nothing compared to salvation in the world to come. And what rendered the impending religious conflict even more bitter and more certain was the fact that almost at the very moment that the church of Rome had purged itself for the fray, the hegemony of the Protestants passed from the Lutherans to the Calvinists, and therewith from passive to aggressive hands. The Saxon reformer had always maintained that “the word of God would take care of itself”, the Genevan was equally convinced that it needed vigorous human effort to support it, and he preached the duty of fighting for its active advancement as ardently as the Catholic leaders sounded the call to arms on the other side. Under the circumstances religious war, on a scale hitherto unprecedented, was inevitable. Dynastic and national lines of cleavage were bound to fall into abeyance; and Europe for some time to come would be divided, irrespective of political allegiances, into Catholic and Protestant camps. It is also interesting to observe that at the same moment and in some measure for the same reasons that the issues which disrupted Europe changed from a predominantly political to a predominantly religious character, the scene of the conflict shifted too. In the days of Charles V and Martin Luther, the centers of interest were in Germany and Italy; henceforth, they were to move westward to the Low Countries, to France, and to England.

But we must not wander too far afield. Our interest lies solely in those phases of the European situation which vitally affected Philip II and the Spanish Empire; it is, therefore, on the Roman Catholic side of the drama that we must focus our attention. Obviously the success of the Counter-Reformation would depend, in large measure, on the effectiveness of its organization. It had got started, indeed, on a great wave of spiritual enthusiasm; it had been borne forward on the shoulders of devoted men and women who had dedicated their lives to the task; but their efforts might well have proved unavailing, particularly in the impending struggle against heresy, without a correlation of its energies and a marshalling of its hosts. Clerical leadership was furnished by what a Protestant historian has characterized as the ‘rechristianized’ papacy. Certainly popes like Pius IV, Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Sixtus V, whose joint pontificates cover the years 1559 to 1590, were men who would put their ecclesiastical duties first of all, and not sacrifice them, as had some of their predecessors in the Emperor’s day, to the patronage of scholars and artists, and to the aggrandizement of their relatives and bastards. Even Paul IV deserves a place in the roll of these reforming Popes. Certainly his zeal for the church was unbounded, though the effectiveness of his efforts on its behalf was impaired by his undying hatred of the house of Hapsburg; his pontificate forms a fit transition from the age of the Emperor to that of his son. And at the same time that reinvigorated Catholicism had once more got a leader worthy of the name, it was supplied with a militant platform by the decrees of the Council of Trent. That assembly, during whose earlier sessions there had been some faint hope of compromise with Protestantism, was summoned for its final and decisive meeting on January 18, 1562; and it promptly proceeded to render irreparable the breach between the two faiths. All the doctrines and principles to which no Protestant could possibly subscribe, transubstantiation, the necessity of good works for justification, clerical celibacy, and the rest, were unequivocally sanctioned and upheld; all the heretical ones were equally unequivocally condemned. No loyal Catholic could henceforth have any doubts about the tenets he was expected to maintain.

There still remained the important question of the instruments of which the ‘rechristianized’ papacy could avail itself in order to carry the Tridentine decrees into effect. A number of primarily ecclesiastical ones were already in hand. Some of the mediaeval religious orders, such as the Franciscans and the Carmelites, had already been thoroughly reformed and placed at the service of the church of Rome; other new ones, like the Theatines and the Jesuits, had recently sprung into being and were animated by the same purpose. The Roman Inquisition had been reorganized for the great conflict on lines reminiscent of the sister institution in Spain, and the first Index Librorum Prohibitorum was drawn up in 1557. But all these, efficient though they indubitably were, would avail but little by themselves, without the support of the lay powers. It still remained for the religious leaders of the Counter-Reformation to find some great sovereign who would marshal his armies in the interests of the church, extirpate heresy in Western Europe, repel the infidel in the Mediterranean and in the Danube valley, and carry the Cross to the heathen. Rome found such a champion in Philip the Prudent, to the lasting misfortune of both.

Of course it was evident from the outset that it must be he. In the first place there was the conclusive negative argument that there was no other possible candidate for the place. Ferdinand, in the Empire, was too weak and too lukewarm; the last scions of the house of Valois were unworthy; the king of Poland was not to be thought of, and Elizabeth of England had gone over to the foe. There were also positive reasons in abundance. The Spanish Empire had been the product of a great crusade; the peninsula was the only portion of Western Europe that was virtually untainted by heresy, and Charles V had taken stern measures against the Protestants in the Low Countries. The Spanish monarch was also
master of the New World. If the Western Hemisphere was to be preserved for Rome, his cooperation was absolutely essential. Finally, there was the decisive factor of Philip’s own personality. Of his zeal for the faith there could not be the least possible doubt; his character, his training, and the precepts of his father combined to make that certain. He ardently longed for the great task that awaited him. He instinctively felt that he was the man of the hour, specially fitted and summoned by Divine Providence to win the great battle for which Rome was girding her loins.

Yet the situation was not, after all, quite so simple as at first sight it would appear. Ardent though he was in his loyalty to the church, Philip was not the man to give without getting something in return. Abundantly conscious of the importance of his own support, he would be tempted to ask, as the reward of it, for favors of a nature that the papacy might be unwilling to grant. There could be little doubt as to what those favors would be, namely, such a share in the control of the policy of the Holy See as would ultimately make Madrid and the Escorial, rather than Rome, the real center of Catholic authority. In other words, if the battle was to be won, and won with Spain’s support, the church of the future was to conform to Spanish interests and principles; that was Philip’s idea of his share in the spoils. It was not difficult to foresee the vast implications of this demand. Religiously they foreshadowed a Pope in Spanish leading-strings, but politically their import was wider still. We have already seen that Philip had openly renounced all schemes of further territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the Valois and his other Christian foes. Following his father’s advice, he had proclaimed his intention of remaining henceforth politically on the-defensive; he had retired to Spain after the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, ostensibly to busy himself with internal problems. But now, as the lay leader of the militant forces of Catholicism, he was reentering the international arena by another door. If his conception of his relation to the church should prevail, the power of Spain, would inevitably be increased by every victory that he won for Rome; under cover of advancing the faith, he would be adding to the already intolerable preponderance of his native land. It is doubtful if this conception had taken definite shape in his mind at the time of his return to the peninsula in 1559; but as the century wore on, and the political lines of cleavage began gradually to reassert themselves, it became increasingly obvious whither he was tending. Perhaps the earliest of all the powers to appreciate the true state of affairs was the papacy itself, the head of the church whose lay champion he had become. On the closeness of the cooperation of the two allies in the great cause much depended, far more, in fact, than could have been evident to contemporaries during the early years of Philip’s reign. It is high time, therefore, that we should give some attention to the story of the relations of the Prudent King to the successive occupants of the Holy See during the forty-two years in which he wore the crowns of the Iberian realms.

The age-long tradition of Spanish loyalty to the church must not blind us to the fact that the more recent history of the relations between Spain and the papacy had not been entirely happy. Europe had not forgotten the terrible sack of Rome in the days of Clement VII. Charles V had openly quarreled with Paul III. The war between Paul IV and Philip was still fresh in men’s minds. With the advent of the Medici Pius IV in 1559, there was indeed much reason to expect a marked change for the better. Political complications, the chief cause of the Emperor’s quarrels with the different pontiffs of his day, had been at least temporarily ended by the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Philip was back in Spain, apparently using all his influence to secure the prompt election of a good Pope, and Pius was far gentler and more complaisant than his predecessor. But all these favorable circumstances were insufficient to prevent clashes between Philip’s Caesarsopapismus and the determination of Pius to maintain the dignity of the Holy See. Trouble arose in the first place over the status of the Spanish Inquisition, whose autonomy and ‘supereminence’ Philip regarded as the brightest jewels of his crown. The story of the king’s persecution of Bartolome Carranza, archbishop of Toledo, who was unjustly suspected of Protestant leanings, and the papacy’s interference therein is the most obvious case in point; it will be narrated more fully in a subsequent chapter. For the present it will suffice to remark that there is no reason to think that the Prudent King cherished any personal antagonism to the archbishop; it was simply a case of asserting the authority of his own favorite tribunal as against that of Rome, and possibly also of getting a chance to seize for the crown the archiepiscopal revenues during the vacancy of the see.

Whether financial considerations had any bearing on the Carranza case, it is certain that they were a constant source of friction between Philip and his papal contemporaries. In 1556, the distinguished theologian Melchior Cano boldly advised the king to reform the administration of the Spanish church in such a way that it should be able to enjoy its own revenues instead of having them drained away to Rome; as things stood, he maintained, Spain had to go on her knees to the papacy in order to get the clerical subsidy, which was paid her in funds that were really her own. As far as this Philip did not venture to go; on the other hand he made it plain at the outset that he did not propose to fight the infidel unless he was adequately reimbursed. Not only did he demand the continuance of the
The period of Pius V ended without an open breach. The pontiff praised Philip’s conduct in the matter of Don Carlos; above all, the king and the Pope were drawn together again in 1571 by their common interest in the campaign, of Lepanto. The outstanding fact still remained that, despite perpetual quarrels, they were mutually indispensable.

Under Gregory XIII (May, 1572 - April, 1585), the situation went from bad to worse; and during the years 1579-81, matters came nearer to a formal break than they had been since the time of Paul IV. Political difficulties were in large measure responsible; as Gregory complained of Philip’s slackness in fighting the infidel, so Philip insisted that Gregory’s unwillingness to proceed vigorously against the heretics in the Netherlands was due to his desire to see the Low Countries lost to Spain. The Pope’s attitude on the annexation of Portugal was also displeasing to the Spanish king. It was evident that Gregory dreaded the extension of Spanish power which would inevitably result from it, and for some time he strove to remain neutral between the different claimants; indeed his final recognition of Philip II’s lawful Portuguese monarch was largely due to the fact that the latter, who, on this occasion, for once in his life was on time, was able to present him with the accomplished fact before he had had a chance to lay plans for anything else. These matters will be taken up more fully in another connection; for the present we must confine ourselves to topics ecclesiastical, and point out that under the new Pope another source of friction with the Spanish monarch came prominently to the fore in the widely divergent attitudes of the two powers in regard to the Society of Jesus. Some of the previous pontiffs had taken a rather negative attitude in regard to the Jesuits, but Gregory supported them heart and soul;
he showered privilege after privilege upon them; indeed, the order was generally admitted to be his favorite. Under the generalship of Claudio Aquaviva (elected February 7, 1581), it had entered upon one of the really great periods of its career; it gave countless proofs of its growing influence and power; it won notable victories over many of its bitterest enemies. Among these enemies, not the least considerable was Philip the Prudent. It may seem strange that an order which had such a distinctly Spanish origin should have found itself opposed by the lord of the Spanish Empire; the explanation lies in the king’s dread lest the Society, like his counsellors and generals, might become so powerful as to get beyond his control. So useful had the Jesuits proved themselves in advancing the cause of Catholicism all over the world, that it is doubtful if Philip would have ventured to proceed directly against them, had not the way been prepared for him by other foes of the Society. It so happened, however, that, some years before his accession, they had aroused the lasting jealousy of the Dominicans, who always regarded themselves as the preeminently Spanish order; in 1549 they had been bitterly attacked as precursors of Antichrist by Melchior Cano; the archbishops of Toledo and Saragossa were also openly hostile. In the early part of Philip’s reign the quarrel slumbered, though the new king’s ardent support of the Inquisition, in which Dominican influence had always been very strong, made it evident that an open breach could not be long delayed; not until the year 1580 did the Spanish monarch get the opportunity which he so ardently desired. At that time a few malcontents within the order started a movement for the purpose of diminishing the authority of the general at Rome, so as to render the different provinces of the Society more independent of his control. The plea for this change was that in no other way could the Spanish Jesuits remain free from the contamination of heresy; the effect of it, of course, would be to give Philip just the opportunity to control them for which he longed, and which he could not possibly acquire as long as they were ruled from outside the realm; he therefore supported the malcontents in every possible way, while the Pope, for the same reason, did his utmost to put them down. During Gregory’s pontificate, Philip accomplished nothing. When in 1587 he applied to Sixtus V for a revision of the constitution of the order, he found that the new pontiff, though far less well disposed to the Jesuits than his predecessor, had no intention of changing its rules in accordance with the interests of Spain, but rather cherished schemes of modifying them to suit his own views. From that time on the quarrel continued, with fluctuations according to the attitude of the successive Popes toward the order, till the end of the reign and beyond; but Philip’s enmity to it never ceased till the end of his days.

Under Sixtus V, and finally under Clement VIII, the ecclesiastical phases of the quarrel between the see of Rome and the Spanish monarch were again largely obscured by the political. Sixtus, who had been elected against the will of Philip, was a fiery, impetuous soul, not unlike Julius II—just the sort of a person that could not possibly understand or cooperate with the slow-moving Spanish king; and the haughty Spanish representatives at the Vatican, the Count of Olivares and the Duke of Sessa, grew more and more unpopular there as the years went by. The Pope’s relations with the non-Spanish Italian states, particularly his intimacy with Venice, were also highly displeasing to Philip II, and the refusal of Sixtus in 1589 to contribute to the sending of a strong Armada against England was an even greater source of complaint. But it was with regard to the situation in France that the most serious divergence occurred. The death of Catharine de’ Medici and the assassination of Henry III in 1589 eliminated the middle party in the civil wars there; Henry of Navarre and the League were left to fight it out for the mastery and the throne of the realm. Philip, who had many other grounds besides religious ones for detesting the Bourbon claimant, ardently supported the cause of the League, for its triumph would enable him to keep France in leading-strings and prevent her from becoming a rival of Spain. The papacy, on the other hand, desired a France loyally Catholic indeed, but independent and strong, to use as a counter-weight to the preponderance of Spain. The all-important question, then, was whether Henry of Navarre could be induced to abandon the religion of his fathers and accept the Roman faith. For four long years, covering the last twelve months of Sixtus, the three brief pontificates that followed, and the first year and a half of Clement VIII, that question remained undecided; when finally, in July, 1593, it was answered in the affirmative, not only did Philip lose all hope of controlling the destinies of France, but also a large measure of his influence with the see of Rome. He was no longer indispensable to it, for there was at last a possible alternative to his support. Yet it was thoroughly characteristic of him that he refused, to the very last, to abate one jot or one tittle of his earlier pretensions, but heroically brazened it out to the bitter end, and so successfully, moreover, that despite the altered situation, Clement VIII continued to the very end of his life to show marked reluctance to adopt any measures that might tend to bring about a breach with Spain. Filippo Sega, the papal nuncio at Madrid during the pontificate of Gregory XIII, summed up the story of the whole period admirably when he compared Philip and the Pope to two merchants, each of whom was firmly convinced that the other had wronged him in countless different ways, but who nevertheless could not afford to stop doing business with one another.
One final phase of the relations of Philip to the papacy remains to be mentioned: namely, the attitude and conduct of the Spanish king and his representatives at Rome with regard to the different conclaves. It has been made the subject of a most painstaking investigation by a competent German scholar; and his general conclusion furnishes a significant confirmation of the tendency, noticed in the immediately preceding pages, of political issues to regain, in the last two decades of the century, that predominance over religious ones which they had enjoyed in the time of Charles V, but had temporarily lost during the first part of the rule of his son. Down to, and including, the election of Sixtus V, Philip had really interfered comparatively little with the choice of the successive pontiffs for the purpose of advancing the interests of Spain. The most that he did was occasionally to insist on the exclusion from candidacy of persons whom he knew to be avowedly hostile to his own political ends; his chief interest seemed to be—as he was never tired of reiterating—the choice of a good Pope for Christendom. But during the pontificate of Sixtus there was a great change. The close bond between Spain and the papacy, which had made possible the Counter-Reformation, had done its work; the old political lines of cleavage were struggling to regain the mastery; indeed, the Pope’s own attitude towards the various projects of the Spanish king was a powerful factor in bringing this to pass. When Philip realized the new state of affairs, his policy towards the succeeding conclaves altered accordingly. More vigorous measures were clearly necessary in order to keep the papacy in line with the interests of Spain; and the obvious method of accomplishing this end was to take a more positive attitude with regard to the papal elections. In the four conclaves which succeeded one another with such extraordinary rapidity in the eighteen months following the death of Sixtus V, the Spanish monarch came boldly forward and indicated the names of the candidates whom he wished to have chosen; the policy of merely excluding undesirables was thus exchanged for the much more far-reaching one of putting through the election of favorites. “The least we can demand at this time”, so wrote Philip to his representative at Rome in November, 1591, “is that the victorious candidate should cooperate with me.”

For the time being the new policy seemed outwardly to attain its end. Despite the defeat of the Armada and the ensuing reverses in the Low Countries and in France, Philip was still both respected and dreaded at Rome; and the four successors of Sixtus V were all, at least at the time of their respective elections, among the candidates recognized as ‘agreeable’ to the representatives of the Spanish king. Yet one of Philip’s keenest henchmen at Rome, Francisco de Peña, auditor of the Rota, was not without his apprehensions in regard to the ultimate effects of the new attitude that had been assumed. Very serious consequences, he insisted, might result from the naming of persons whom his Majesty wished to have made Pope; “certainly it is not good policy to do so openly; it would be far less dangerous to rest content with the exclusion of undesirables. The latter gains us merely the ill will of a certain number, who feel that they have been wronged; the former makes us hated by the entire Sacred College; for there is not a single cardinal who does not daily conceive of the possibility that through some particular merit, capacity, or means, he may himself be chosen Pope.” But if Philip shared the auditor’s fears, he could not be induced to alter his policy. While all the world was changing around him, he remained at heart the same; he continued to cherish his original ideal of a universally triumphant Roman Catholic church which should be guided and controlled from Spain. The more dominant attitude towards the see of Rome, which circumstances had compelled him to adopt after the death of Sixtus V, turned out ultimately to be a powerful factor in forcing the two powers apart; it had results, in other words, precisely opposite to those which he had intended. The era which made Philip, and which he in turn contributed so much to make, was the era of the Counter-Reformation at its height, the era in which he began his reign. When Europe began to regulate its life along other lines, he was never quite able to accommodate himself to the change, and Spain and the Spanish Empire paid the penalty for his failure.
BEFORE Philip could undertake the great task of marshalling the hosts of regenerate Catholicism against the infidel and the Protestant outside the limits of the Iberian peninsula, it was essential to make certain that Spain itself was as nearly as possible untainted by any suspicion of heresy or unbelief. One of the principal reasons why he had been so anxious to get home was that he might give personal supervision to such work as should prove necessary to the accomplishment of this end; and the history of the early years of his reign is largely the record of his efforts to attain it.

As far as Protestantism was concerned, the task was comparatively simple. So far removed was Spain from the centers of the Reformation, and so powerful and all-pervading was the machinery of the Inquisition, that the doctrines of Luther and Calvin never really got a chance to establish themselves there. It used, indeed, to be thought that the Spanish Protestants were so numerous and well organized that considerable efforts were necessary to suppress them; but thirty years ago, it was conclusively proved that this was a gross exaggeration, that the number of native Spanish Protestants tried by the Inquisition, exclusive of the congregations of Valladolid and Seville, was probably not over four hundred in all, and that of those who preferred death in the flames to recantation there were perhaps hardly more than a score, though a much larger number perished by the garrote. The greater part of the work of extirpating them, moreover, was finished at the very beginning of the reign. In 1557, while Philip was still in the Netherlands, two small Protestant conventicles were discovered, one at Valladolid and one at Seville; it would also appear that many of the heretics in the latter city were of Jewish origin, and thus had a tradition of nonconformity behind them. The Holy Office made haste to pounce on them. It had been in a somewhat decadent condition during the latter years of the reign of Charles V, for lack—the metaphor is particularly apt—of fuel to feed the flames, and it now eagerly seized upon the opportunity for renewed activity, exaggerating the peril and posing as the savior of society in averting it. Indeed, it is largely through the rumors and reports which it circulated that contemporary and modern historians were misled into thinking that the danger was much greater than was actually the case. Most of the suspects were disposed of in two autos- da-fe at Valladolid, on May 21 and October 8, 1559; the latter was considerably the more important, and Philip, as we have already seen, graced the occasion with his presence. After this, the process of extirpation continued in much less wholesale fashion, and the culprits were increasingly few. After the middle seventies they were mostly foreigners, who naturally claimed immunity from the jurisdiction of the Holy Office, and the problems which arose in connection with their cases played their part in the formation of the then nascent science of international law. One of the most bitterly contested points was whether or not the ambassador of the queen of England should be permitted to have the Anglican service performed in his own house. Dr. John Man, who was sent to Madrid in the spring of 1566, insisted on this privilege, and apparently was given reason to believe that it would be accorded to him; but the king was obdurate, and required him to ‘sequester himself’ from the capital at the little village of Barajas, where it was impossible for him to perform the duties of his office. Man forthwith demanded his recall, which was immediately granted him; and it is significant of the intensity of Philip’s dread of Protestant contamination that he would not even permit the envoy to return to Madrid to make provision for his journey.

But Protestantism in the full sense of the word was not the only form of heresy against which Philip waged relentless war. The slightest deviation from the laws of the church, as upheld by the lay and ecclesiastical authorities of Spain, was almost certain to be detected and mercilessly punished. It might be failure to observe a fast, or to conform to the established rules of the service of the church of Rome; it might be the possession of forbidden books, or any one of a multitude of other derelictions; the agents of the Inquisition were sure to be on the watch and to receive Philip’s enthusiastic support in their demands for investigation and judgment. The Holy Office was also much concerned in this period with the suppression of another form of heresy, that of the Alumbrados or Illuminati, which, though its origin is usually associated with the Bavarian Adam Weishaupt in 1776, really arose for the first time nearly three centuries earlier, in the Spain of the Catholic Kings. As it appeared in the Iberian Peninsula it was essentially a form of mysticism, whose adherents recognized the supremacy of the internal light, and consequently regarded themselves as released from the obligation of obedience to the regular
ecclesiastical authorities. It often vented itself in hallucinations and in sexual aberrations and was utterly abhorrent to the officials of the Suprema. There had been processes against the Alumbrados in the Emperor’s reign; on the other hand, the edict formally declaring their faith to be heresy was not published till the time of Philip IV; but it was under Philip II that the problem of extirpating them was first seriously and systematically taken up, so that thenceforth the ultimate issue could not reasonably be in doubt.

It was indeed the heyday of the Holy Office. Never had its supereminence been so far-reaching and complete. For the king it was not only the emblem and instrument of his own conception of the purity of the faith, but also of the dominance of that conception throughout the Roman Catholic world. He kept full control of it in his own hands. He appointed and dismissed the inquisitors at will; he kept them all under the closest surveillance; he gave them definite orders for the discharge of their functions. In the dread and impenetrable secrecy which shrouded all its operations, it seemed to be the very mirror of himself. He used it not only to keep his own subjects, both lay and ecclesiastical, in strict conformity to the lines he laid down, but also to fortify his own position with regard to the see of Rome. It made trouble for the Spanish poet, Fray Luis de Leon, the glory of the order of the Augustinian Friars, and even attempted to do the same for Santa Teresa; that her persecution did not proceed further than certain rather humiliating interrogations was less due to the attitude of the king, to whom she applied for protection, than to her own high character and saintly presence, and to the support of the Society of Jesus. The hostility of the Inquisition to the members of that order, though latent, was absolutely consistent throughout the reign, and had the widest ramifications. The Jesuits upheld the authority of the Holy See almost as vigorously as did the Inquisition the supremacy of the king; and the struggle between the two institutions, from the time of the accusation of Carranza to the very end of the reign, is a useful barometer of the mutual jealousies between Rome and Spain. The tale of Philip’s repeated efforts and ultimate failure to introduce the Holy Office into the Spanish possessions in Naples and Milan forms another significant chapter of the same story. Its establishment was, for him, an inseparable adjunct and sine qua non of the solidification of his own authority in his Italian dominions; but the intensity of the local detestation of it, and the hostility of the Council of Trent and of the successive Popes, were finally successful in keeping it out. But it would be a great mistake to think of the power and influence of the Holy Office as restricted solely to Spain and her relations to the see of Rome. It was also of profound importance in Philip’s political dealings with the other realms of Western Europe; for church and state were, in his eyes at least, so closely fused that it was impossible to interfere in the one without affecting the other as well. We have already alluded to the trouble that arose with Elizabeth of England over the question of a Protestant service at the house of her ambassador. It is also worth noting that in 1578, when the Spanish customs officials showed themselves incapable of preventing the exportation of horses to France, the king, on the pretense that these animals were intended for the forces of the Huguenots, handed the whole matter over to the jurisdiction of the Holy Office, with the result that a Saragossan horse dealer, who had broken the regulations, was punished with two hundred lashes, a fine of a hundred ducats, and five years in the galleys. There were countless other instances of Philip’s utilization of the Inquisition for his political ends; the most significant of them all will be discussed in a later chapter in connection with the ‘troubles’ of the kingdom of Aragon. But enough has already been said to indicate how all-pervasive was its power and how completely it fulfilled the ideas of the King.

Philip’s firm resolve to make himself the unquestioned leader of the forces of militant Catholicism, his determination to extirpate Protestantism, and the measures which he adopted to attain these ends, were thus potent factors in shaping the course of Spain’s relations to the other states of Western Europe. But there was another very serious matter—as essentially and traditionally a cosa de España as Philip’s attitude towards heresy was international in its implications—which demanded his attention before he could embark on any crusade. This was the treatment by the Spanish government of the remnants of the Moorish population of the peninsula, which had been suffered to remain, under increasingly rigid restrictions, since the conquest of Granada by the Catholic Kings.

One result of the Germania of Valencia, as has already been indicated in the preceding volume, was to extend in 1525 to the realms of the crown of Aragon the edict in regard to the Moriscos which had been in operation in Castile since 1502; for thirty-one years before Philip succeeded his father all the Moorish inhabitants of Spain had, in theory at least, accepted the Christian faith. But there had naturally arisen grave doubts as to the genuineness of this enforced conversion. Under the Emperor, who was so much of the time absent from Spain, the policy adopted in regard to the Moriscos had been chiefly remarkable for its fluctuations. It must have been obvious that a certain amount of instruction in the tenets of the faith they were now compelled by law to adopt would be the indispensable preliminary
to their loyal acceptance of it; but the efforts in this direction were spasmodic, untautful, and constantly beset with almost insurmountable linguistic difficulties; and the Inquisition, to put it mildly, was not helpful. Another method, to which the Holy Office was likewise uncordial, was to facilitate intercourse between the Moriscos and Old Christians in every possible way. The walls which marked off the barrios, or Moorish quarters, in the different cities were occasionally pulled down; there were a few edicts to the effect that Old and New Christians should occupy alternate houses; and marriage between the two races was sometimes encouraged by providing that the dowry which a Morisco bride should bring to her Christian husband should never be subject to confiscation. But the tradition of intolerance and persecution was a potent influence against the permanent adoption of any of these wise policies. The wealth of the Moriscos, which was great, and was probably supposed to be even greater than it was, made a constant temptation to subject them to penalties which would involve confiscation; nowhere is the avarice of the officials of the Holy Office revealed in a more odious light than in its grasping after the property of relapsed conversos. The ability of the Moriscos to pay, moreover, often resulted in flagrant disregard of the government’s solemn promises that, upon their conversion, they should in all respects be treated like Christians, and regarded as entitled to the possession of Christian privileges. It suited the purpose of their quoniam masters, especially on the great Valencian estates, to retain them in semi-serfdom and not to set them free; it has been well said of them that they virtually remained taillables et corvéables a merci. And those who knew the character and ideals of Philip the Prudent must have realized that when he succeeded his father and returned to Spain, it was the less enlightened side of the government’s Morisco policy that was ultimately bound to prevail. One thing, in any case, was absolutely certain; there would be no toleration of the slightest indication of a relapse to the religion or customs of Islam.

Yet it would be unfair to the new monarch to assume that he at once gave full adherence to a policy of persecution, without making any efforts to attain his ends by gentler means. While he was still in Flanders, he had been approached by envoys of the Moriscos, and though nothing definite came of it at the time, it is evident that he realized that there were two sides to the case. In 1564, we have a record that he strove to mitigate the severity of the Inquisition against the Moriscos of Valencia, where it had recently been particularly active, owing, apparently, to letters which it had received from Paul IV. In the same year he also made an effort to improve and extend the instruction vouchsafed to the conversos; he even ordered that those who were entrusted with it should possess, whenever possible, the obvious qualification of knowing Arabic. One of his archbishops sanctioned the profanation of having the catechism printed in that language; but unfortunately the vast majority of Philip’s henchmen, and particularly the officials of the Holy Office, were far less anxious to make the most of their master’s fleeting enthusiasm for a more liberal policy, and the experiment did not yield the fruits that were expected of it. In the year 1566, more sinister forces were brought into play. Diego de Espinosa, who, though Philip once declared him to have been the best minister he ever had, was in reality the king’s evil genius, had been recently rising into prominence. He had just been made president of the Council of Castile, and was shortly to become inquisitor-general; and he and his agent, Pedro Deza, prevailed on Philip to permit the full reenactment for the Moriscos of Granada of a series of restrictions, generally known as the Edict of 1526, which a similar set of influences had extracted from the Emperor, but which, in the succeeding years, had been suffered to fall into desuetude. This edict was one of the most vexatious and unwise in the whole history of Spanish legislation. It forbade the use of Arabic, and required the education of all Moriscos in Castilian. Moorish names, dress, and ornaments were subjected to the ban; Moorish baths were strictly prohibited; and disarmament was to be strictly enforced. All births were to be attended by Christian midwives, so as to make sure that no Moorish ceremonies were secretly performed; and all the doors of the houses of Moriscos were to be kept wide open on feast days, fast days, and special occasions, so that anyone could look in and satisfy himself as to the conditions inside. And the reenactment of the edict, at this particular time and under these circumstances, was vastly more irritating to the Moriscos than the original had been to their ancestors. There was no excuse for it, as there possibly may have been before, in the state of Spanish foreign affairs. Its long period of suspension, though largely the result of a bribe which the Emperor, unlike his son, had been unscrupulous enough to accept, had naturally given its victims the notion that the Spanish government was not really in earnest in its policy of persecution; and it came as a great shock to them to learn that they were wrong. Finally, the reenactment, in itself, was far harsher than its original; though it aimed at the same end, its methods were much more severe. The Moriscos were now flatly ordered to learn Castilian, within three years, though no provision whatsoever was made for their instruction. All contracts in Arabic were pronounced invalid. Not only were the Moorish baths no longer to be used; they were to be formally destroyed—both the public and private ones. The government, in fact, seemed bent on blotting out every trace of the existence of the ancient Moorish civilization.
If the edict itself was inspired by principles which contradicted all the dictates of humanity and statesmanship, the way in which it was published showed an equally criminal lack of foresight. Iñigo Lopez de Mendoza, Count of Tendilla and third Marquis of Mondéjar, was captain general at Granada at the time. He had the benefit of a long family tradition, besides thirty years’ personal experience in that high office, and was generally respected and trusted by Morisco and Christian alike. It would, therefore, have seemed indispensable to consult him in regard to the violent change of policy that was proposed. This, however, was not done, although he was actually at the court at the time; indeed, the first intimation of it that he received was an order to go back to his post, and be ready when the edict should be published. He not unnaturally remonstrated at being treated in such fashion; he vigorously represented the probability of a Morisco rising, and the inadequacy of the garrison, munitions, and state of defenses at Granada, and he was heartily supported by the Consejo de Guerra. But the government chose to pay no attention to his advice. It was the priests, and not the soldiers, that for the moment held the upper hand, and Mondéjar was commanded to stop complaining and mind his own affairs. He had every right to be bitter about it. It had already become, as he plainly foresaw, and as Cabrera de Córdoba afterwards wrote, a case not for friars’ caps but for steel helmets.

It was on January 1, 1567, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the capture of Granada, that the new edict was formally published with appropriate ceremonies; and as an earnest of the government’s intention rigorously to enforce it, the destruction of the Morisco baths was immediately begun. That the answering insurrection was postponed for nearly two years was due, in the main, to the fact that it had been arranged that some of the more vexatious provisions of the edict should not go into immediate operation; and, to a lesser extent, to the representations which even Espinosa’s minions at Granada were now induced to make to the government, in regard to the evident danger of the policy they had been commanded to carry out. But the postponement only served to make the outbreak the more serious when it occurred; for the Moriscos had had time to muster their own resources, as well as to become acquainted with the weaknesses of their oppressors. Their fighting blood grew hotter as the different provisions of the edict were successively enforced; and the failure of their various deputations to procure its relaxation served to drive them to despair. They began secretly to accumulate munitions and stores, and to prepare strong places in the sierras to which they could retire. They sent messages to ask for aid from their coreligionists in North Africa; and some of them dressed themselves after the Turkish fashion, in order to make the Spaniards believe that they were receiving aid from Constantinople. They encouraged each other by reciting ancient prophecies of the reconquest of Spain by Islam; and they found a leader in one Aben Humeya, who had already made a name for himself by shedding Christian blood, and who boasted descent from the Omayyads. Appreciating the obvious advantages of striking their first blow on the day of a Christian festival, when their oppressors would be off their guard, they planned their initial rising for Holy Thursday April 15, 1568, but the Spaniards on this occasion were better prepared than they had supposed, and the rebels were obliged to abandon the attempt. At Christmas time, however, they struck again, this time with better results. Excess of caution at the critical moment prevented them, indeed, from capturing the Christian garrison of the Albaycin, or Moorish quarter of the town, which at the time numbered only twenty-three men; but in all the country about Granada the Moriscos rose in arms, robbing, spoiling, and desecrating churches, and torturing and murdering their Christian foes.

Having brought on, by its intolerance and ineptitude, the very uprising which the wiser heads had foreseen, the government turned to Mondéjar to put it down. So violent were the jealousies between the different factions at Granada that he was given practically no support; indeed, it would appear that Deza actually put obstacles in his path. But Mondéjar was equal to the occasion. The Andalusian cities were called on to send in their contingents, and on January 3, 1569, he was able to set forth from Granada with a force of about 2000 men. The critical point was the bridge over the deep gorge of Tablate, which commanded the approach to the sierras. Though the Moors had so dismantled the bridge that only a single soldier could cross it at a time, Mondéjar managed to drive away the force that guarded its further end, and so possess himself of the key to the country beyond. From that moment the first phase of the rebellion was over. Mondéjar was relentless in following up the advantage that he had gained. Town after town surrendered at discretion. By the beginning of February the revolt was practically put down. In case of useless resistance the victor was very stern, and there is at least one instance of his commanding a general massacre; but when submission, as was usually the case, was absolute and complete, he promised the vanquished that they should not be permitted to suffer harm. His sole object, so he repeatedly assured them, was to bring about a permanent pacification of the land. Such a plan, however, did not suit the views of the vast majority of the soldiers who composed his forces; their main object was to gorge themselves with booty. Nowhere in the annals of sixteenth-century warfare is there a blacker record in this respect; “There were even men who stole cats, caldrons, turnspits, kneading
troughs, reels, cow bells, and other worthless things, all simply because they would not give up the right to plunder. I mention no names,” adds the soldier who wrote the account, “for in this campaign we were all thieves together, and myself the first of them.” With all his efforts, Mondéjar found it impossible to restrain these outrages; this, in turn, convinced the Moriscos that he had no intention of observing the fair promises he had made them, and consequently encouraged them to continue their revolt. A few weeks after he had reported to Philip that the rebellion was at an end, the evidences began to multiply that it was about to burst forth afresh. Aben Humeya, who just previously had been a fugitive in hiding, was now reported to have an army of at least 4000 men.

But if the weary work of suppression was to be done all over again, the government was resolved that it should not be done by Mondéjar. Deza’s hatred of him had been increased by the success of his campaign, and by the high regard in which he was held by Christian and Moslem alike; and he assured Philip and Espinosa that things would never go the way they wished until the Marquis was removed. Deza’s representations, fortified by the soldiers’ complaints of the way in which it had been attempted to put a term to their pillagings, finally produced the desired effect; in March, Mondéjar was ordered to relinquish the supreme command to the king’s half-brother, Don John of Austria, the bastard of Charles V and Barbara Blomberg. This prince, who was born at Ratisbon on February 24, 1547, had been kept in concealment during the Emperor’s day, and even Philip did not learn of his existence until after his father’s death. The news may very likely have been unwelcome, but the king determined to make the best of it. He gave his newly discovered kinsman the name by which he was afterwards to be known, and commanded that he be furnished with a large household and many servants. There was, perhaps, a certain measure of sound policy in placing this royal bastard in a position far above the grandees, so as to accentuate the vast difference that separated them from the throne. Don John was certainly, in all outward respects, a most agreeable contrast to Philip. Good-looking, affable, and courteous, without any of that air of suspicion and taciturnity which no one could help remarking about the king, he seemed to contemporaries as one entrusted with a divine mission, prepared, nay, almost predestined to play a hero’s part. The task of putting down the insurrection at Granada was to be his first public appearance, so to speak, and Philip was determined that he should be equipped for it in such fashion as would secure complete success. He was given many times more troops than Mondéjar had been able to command (a whole tercio was brought over from Naples for the purpose); a detachment of Spanish galleys cruised up and down the coast so as to prevent all possibility of aid from without; and Don John had a war council of experienced captains. But there was also a whole series of restraints and inhibitions, such as was inevitable in any enterprise in which Philip was concerned. Don John’s youthful pride was galled by being commanded to remain at Granada to issue orders, and on no account to take a personal part in the campaign; his war council was rent with conflicting opinions; everything had to be referred to Madrid. Nine whole months went by with practically nothing done, save to encourage the Moors to continue their new resistance. Many of those places which, in the spring, had unconditionally submitted to Mondéjar now renounced their allegiance and made common cause with the rebels, whose forays reached right up to the gates of Granada. The town was virtually isolated in the midst of a hostile land.

Finally, on October 19, 1569, Philip issued an edict proclaiming a war of fire and blood—hitherto it had been only the suppression of a revolt—against the Moors of Granada, giving the soldiers leave to plunder at will and keep all they could get, and considerably increasing their pay. At the same time he yielded to the entreaties of Don John, and gave him leave to take the field in person. On January 19, the prince was able to sit down before the stronghold of Galera with an army of at least 12,000 men. Despite the fact that the garrison was scarcely one-fourth as large as the besieging force and pitifully lacking in arms and munitions, it was over three weeks before the place could be captured; one of the Spanish assaults was disastrously repulsed; Don John himself was wounded, and the Moors got the better of such hand-to-hand fighting as occurred. When Galera was taken, all the survivors were put to the sword without distinction of age or sex; and the ensuing orgies so demoralized the victors that, at the next stronghold which they attacked, they were speedily put to flight by the sorties of a handful of their foes; “I would never have believed,” wrote Don John to the king, “that such a panic as I have witnessed could possibly have taken place.” It is needless to follow the campaign in detail. There were a few bright spots in it, particularly the duels of certain doughty champions reminiscent of the heroic days of the wars of the Catholic Kings; but for the most part it was the sort of struggle that it is not pleasant to dwell upon. Despite all their burgling and barbarity the Spaniards were not to be denied. The overwhelming preponderance of their numbers and resources finally decided the day, and though the last embers of resistance were not stamped out till the first weeks of 1571, when the Moorish leader, Aben Aboo, successor to Aben Humeya, was treacherously murdered by an outlaw in Spanish pay, the end was plainly inevitable at least a year before. It had become evident to the more intelligent of the Moriscos that they must accept whatever terms the victors should please to impose.
There could be little question what the nature of those terms would be. In the eyes of the government, the concentration of so large a portion of the Morisco population of the Peninsula in the neighborhood of Granada was the fundamental cause of all the difficulties of the past. The Moriscos were, therefore, to be deported inland and arbitrarily distributed throughout the country. Orders for the execution of this measure were issued to Don John as early as February, 1570, long before the successful termination of his campaign. The peaceable Moriscos of each place that he conquered were successively to be collected and sent inland, in batches, under guard. They were allowed to take with them their women and children, to carry with them such movables as they could, and to sell the rest; but it is difficult to believe that they ever got fair prices, and there is abundant evidence that they were often robbed. The Venetian envoy, Donato, writing in 1573, calculates that the king got an annual revenue of 125,000 crowns from the dues on their confiscated lands and from their goods which had fallen to the crown since their rebellion. On October 6, 1572, an elaborate pragmática was drawn up, regulating the conditions under which they were to be permitted to live. They were to be kept under the perpetual surveillance of a series of different functionaries, who were encouraged to spy upon them in every way. They were forbidden to change the residences that had been assigned to them without a royal license, or to return to within ten leagues of the kingdom of Granada under pain of death; all the restrictions of the detestable edict of 1566 were declared to be fully in force. That the Moriscos were unwelcome guests in the communities where they were quartered is evident from all the contemporary records; and the archives of the Inquisition furnish ample proof that their enforced conversion to Christianity was but nominal. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of the whole affair was the success with which the exiles, in spite of all limitations and persecutions, found means to make good livings. In 1582 an official report declared that their numbers were fast increasing, because they were not “wasted by war or religion”, and that they were so industrious that, though they came to Castile ten years before without a scrap of land, they were becoming well-to-do, and even rich; and that there was good prospect that in twenty years more the natives would become their servants.

It must have been pretty obvious by the death of Philip II what the end was to be, though the final act of the tragedy was to be reserved till the reign of his son. Dispersion and persecution were not enough; Spain would never be satisfied short of absolute expulsion. Dread of religious contamination was the fundamental cause; but it is also worth noting that the government welcomed every other kind of complaint, whether political, social, or economic, that was addressed to it, for all contributed to exculpate the final action. It was in 1609 that the blow at last fell. By a series of edicts all the Moriscos in the different Spanish kingdoms were forced to depart from the peninsula, by routes or from ports that were designated to them in advance. No adequate time or opportunity was given them in which to dispose of such property as they could not carry with them; sales at forced prices and robberies were the order of the day. Yet there was surprisingly little resistance. Despite the deep sorrow that it must have caused them to abandon their last hold on a land where their ancestors had reigned supreme, the majority of the Moriscos were by this time so thoroughly convinced of the horror of all things Christian that they seemed, for the most part, to be glad to go, and even competed for the first places on the transports that had been provided. Most of them sought the Barbary coasts; but there were also a considerable number who made their way into France, where they found themselves far less welcome than they had been given reason to expect, and whence most of them ultimately embarked for North Africa. A trifling number attempted to remain hidden in Spain, and had to be hunted down in the succeeding years by commissioners specially appointed for the purpose; and some of the exiles were so ill treated in Barbary, that they elected to return to Spain and be consigned to the galleys. A fair estimate of the total number of those deported would be probably not far from half a million—about one-sixteenth, that is, of the population of Spain. That such a small proportion of the inhabitants of the peninsula should have been regarded by the government as constituting a serious menace, furnishes a final and conclusive proof of the intensity of the passion that animated Spain’s rulers for sacrificing everything on the altar of unity of the faith.

The government’s treatment of the Moriscos, and the rebellion which it evoked, belong primarily, as we have already remarked, with the internal history of Philip’s reign; but it would be an error to assume that they were entirely without effect on the course of Spain’s foreign affairs. For the dream of a reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula by Islam had never wholly lost its place in the visions of the Moslem prophets, nor had it ceased to be contemplated as a possibility by the Christians; and the rising of 1568 certainly furnished a better opportunity for the realization of it than had ever been presented since the days of the Catholic Kings. That more advantage was not taken of it is one of the most curious facts in the history of the period. The coasts of Andalusia were virtually unguarded, and there was considerable correspondence between the Morisco leaders and the Moorish kings of North Africa; the rebels even circulated stories that these sovereigns had landed in Spain with overwhelming
forces, in order to encourage one another to persist in their uprising. But beyond the sending of messages and the spreading of false reports, the North African monarchs did little to avail themselves of a really golden opportunity, and the same was the case with the Turks farther eastward. Writing in 1573, the Venetian envoy, Donato, declares that if the Sultan, instead of breaking with the signory, had sent a few galleys and troops to the south coasts of Spain at the time of the insurrection, he could have kindled a flame which would not even then have died out; and that he had heard on the best authority that it had often been feared in the Council of Castile that the Granadan rising might be the means of encouraging the Huguenots to pour across the Pyrenees. The Franco-Turkish alliance, which had been such a thorn in the side of the Emperor Charles V, was no longer, indeed, in full working order; but there was considerable fear of its resuscitation, and that fear continued to persist after the suppression of the Granadan insurrection. A plot, real or pretended, for an attack on Mers-el-Kebir by the rulers of Tlemcen and Algiers, to be aided by a rising of the Valencian Moriscos, by a possible invasion of Spain from France, and even by promises of support from Constantinople, was unearthed in 1573 and again in 1577. Another similar plan was said to be afoot in 1583, and incriminating correspondence was reported to have been intercepted; and the danger apparently recurred again in later years. All these episodes, however, were little more than aftermaths. The great chance had passed in 1570, before Philip’s foreign enemies could combine to utilize it, and it never was to present itself in such favorable form again. But the fact that the Spanish government took the peril so seriously shows that the Granadan revolt had the possibility of the widest ramifications, and it will thus serve as a connecting link between the events we have already described and the great naval campaign against the Turks on the Mediterranean, to which we devote the remainder of the present chapter.

However much the advice of the Emperor and Philip’s own inclinations may have dictated a policy of peace with Christian sovereigns during the first part of the new reign, there were abundant reasons why the Prudent King should adopt a more aggressive attitude in his relations with the infidel. In the first place, over and above the age-long tradition of the Spanish monarchy, Philip’s conception of himself as the true head of Christendom demanded some striking demonstration of his worthiness to champion the cause of the Cross. In the second, the opportunity was unusually favorable. The peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, in addition to ending the strife with France which had absorbed such a large proportion of Spain’s energy during the preceding reign, had naturally served to loosen the bonds of the Franco-Turkish alliance. The infidel was unsupported in the Western Mediterranean, as he had not been since 1535; furthermore, his own attention was now constantly distracted by revolts at home and by the pressure of his wars with the Shah of Persia. And lastly, there were a long series of defeats and affronts which called aloud for revenge. We have already alluded to the tragic tale of reverses in North Africa which had saddened the last years of the Emperor’s reign; but that was by no means all. Never had the ravages of the infidel corsairs, of whom by far the most terrible was the ubiquitous Dragut, attained such shocking proportions. Not only did they harry the Mediterranean shores of Spain, swooping down like vultures on commercial vessels and fishermen, seizing their cargoes, and sending their crews away to terms of dreadful servitude in the Orient; they now also ventured out into the broad Atlantic, and played havoc with the Indian galleons outside Cadiz and Seville. Even worse than the lot of Spain was that of the Italian states; and of these it was the Spanish realms of Sicily and Naples that suffered most of all. Defenseless towns and villages were sacked, and their inhabitants carried off to slavery, never to be seen again in Western Europe, save in the exceptional cases where a chance victory over an isolated Turkish galley served to deliver individuals from the rowers’ benches. It has been well said that one of the chief reasons why the Turks were so dangerous to Europe was because they were so successful in employing Europeans against her. Every one of their recent victories may be regarded, in other words, as possessing a double significance; not only did it strengthen them and weaken their foes; it almost invariably furnished them with the material for repeating it.

Clearly then, at the time of the return of Philip II to the peninsula, there were both ample justification and an exceptional opportunity for Spain to launch a vigorous attack against her traditional foe. If the Prudent King had come boldly forward and himself assumed the leadership of the different forces that demanded that a campaign be forthwith begun, it would probably have taken the form of another assault on Algiers, one of the recognized centers of the Turkish power in North Africa, or at least on some one of the infidel ports on the western part of the North African coast, where a victory would have chiefly redounded to the benefit of Spain. But Philip, as usual, failed to seize the initiative, with the result that the early stages of a game which really mattered more to the Spaniards than to anyone else were chiefly played by others, and in regions comparatively remote. It was Jean de La Valette, grandmaster at Malta, and Juan de la Cerda, Duke of Medina Celi and viceroy of Sicily, who planned the blow and decided where it should be planted; and it was consequently the Central and not
the Western Mediterranean that became the scene of action. The grand-master longed to recover Tripoli, whence the Knights had been expelled in 1551. The viceroy had had an unusual number of pirate raids to avenge; he adopted the grand-master’s proposals with an enthusiasm to which his criminal dilatoriness in action forms a shocking contrast and was duly appointed general-in-chief. He also got the approval of Philip—but not much more. Despite the urgency of the viceroy, the Prudent King gave him little active support; he did not wish to imperil his ships in an enterprise so remote; he proposed to participate in the expedition to just such an extent as would enable him to claim some credit and derive some advantage if it should succeed, but not enough to run grave risks in case of defeat. The composition of the expeditionary forces is highly significant. The fleet, of fifty-four ships of war and thirty-six transports, was exclusively composed of Italian vessels, and was commanded by Gian Andrea Doria, twenty-one years old, the grandnephew and successor of the Emperor’s great admiral; the Spanish naval leader, Juan de Mendoza, who was at Naples with a number of Spanish galleys at the time the fleet was being collected, entirely refused to cooperate, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that his refusal was dictated by the king. The army which the fleet carried, between 11,000 and 12,000 strong, was only a little more than half composed of Spanish troops, and all of these were taken from the tercios of Lombardy, Naples, and Sicily; their general-in-chief, Alvaro de Sande, was a Spaniard commanding at Naples; the expedition was in no sense truly Iberian, either in its origin, composition, or purpose. And it is reasonable to suppose that Philip’s failure to take a more active interest in it was chiefly responsible for the long delays and lack of cooperation which characterized the enterprise from the very start. By no means all the contingents reached Messina, the original rendezvous, at the appointed time. There was a month’s wait at Syracuse to permit the laggards to join. Not till February 10, 1560, did the expedition finally set sail from Malta.

These delays wore of evil augury for the success of the enterprise, and the events of the ensuing weeks made its failure inevitable. Lack of drinking water compelled the fleet to touch at Rocchetta, on the east coast of the island of Gerba, on the way; though it replenished its stock at the cost of a trifling encounter with the inhabitants, it gained no information in regard to the plans or resources of Dragut, who commanded at Tripoli. Failure to inquire about the enemy’s position and plans was, throughout, one of the worst mistakes of the crusaders. Their next landing was effected on the North African coast at a point some seventy-five miles to the west of their ultimate objective; but the place was unhealthy, the water bad, and Dragut, who knew every inch of the country, within disagreeable proximity; and so, after interminable disputes as to the proper course to take, it was decided to return to Gerba, where they felt they could be safe and prepare at leisure; on March 7, accordingly, the expedition finally disembarked at the northwest corner of the island. The inhabitants at first made no effort to prevent them. They belonged to a different tribe (Sof) from the men of Rocchetta, whose resistance three weeks before had been inspired by Dragut; they professed the deepest hatred of the pirate, and permitted the Christians to occupy the castle of Gerba without making any serious difficulty. But when they saw signs that the new comers intended to establish themselves permanently, their suspicions were aroused. Their original hope, that the Christians would rid them of Dragut and then depart, now seemed illusory. Before long they began to make overtures to their neighbors to the southeastward for a joint assault upon the crusaders, to be delivered at the first favorable opportunity.

While the evidences that the Spaniards proposed to remain at Gerba were converting its inhabitants from potential allies into formidable foes, the ubiquitous Dragut made active preparations to expel them. The excellence of his information in regard to the movements of his Christian enemies stands out in sharp contrast to their ignorance of his; and the hesitation of the crusaders had given him a chance not only to repair the defenses of Tripoli, but also to send for naval aid to Constantinople. On May 10, while the viceroy was in the midst of his leisurely arrangements, a galley arrived from Malta with the stunning news that a Turkish fleet of eighty-five sail, under the dreaded Piali Pasha, had been sighted off Gozzo and was making straight for Gerba. A scene of terrible confusion ensued. Doria wished to take flight at once and save his galleys. The viceroy, whose sense of honor was far higher than his military skill, insisted that it would be an outrage to abandon his men, who were too scattered and too distant to make it possible to embark them all. The point was finally settled in Doria’s favor; there was a wild scramble for the ships, and a certain number finally managed to get on board. On the morning of May 11, the admiral gave the order to put to sea; but before even his best ships could gain the open water, the Turkish fleet appeared on the northern horizon, bearing down on them before a favorable breeze. A panic seized the Christian forces, who were so anxious to escape as to be totally unable to fight, and the result was a foregone conclusion. The Turkish admiral, almost without striking a blow, captured twenty-seven Christian galleys and one galliot, and killed or took prisoners some 5000 men. Doria and the viceroy succeeded in effecting their escape, but Alvaro de Sande and about 6000 soldiers were left, without adequate supplies, in the castle of Gerba, virtually sentenced to death or
capture before succor from Europe could possibly arrive. The news of the disaster came as an awful shock to Spain, to the Italian states, and to the Knights of Malta, and perhaps most of all to old Andrea Doria, the admiral of Charles V; indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that it hastened his death, which occurred on Monday, the 25th of the following November, at the age of five days less than ninety-four years.

There were many brave resolves, both in Italy and in Spain, that help should be forthwith dispatched to Alvaro de Sande and his men who had been left behind; but there were, as usual, interminable delays when it came to the point of execution. Philip showed energy in forwarding the necessary preparations, but refused to let the expedition set sail. It seems evident that, for the time being, he favored a dispersal of Spain’s naval resources rather than their concentration as a united fleet, and that his worries over the maintenance of the Spanish hold on Tunis prevented him from giving his undivided attention to the problem of the moment. Meantime, Piali Pasha summoned Dragut out of Tripoli to aid him in the capture of the fortress of Gerba, which he planned, not to assault, but to surround and starve out, rightly judging that its scanty supplies and lack of water would compel it to capitulate before reinforcements could arrive. On May 26, he sat down before it, with some 8000 men and about twenty pieces of artillery, and occupied the next five days in cutting off all possibility of access by the garrison to the various wells in the neighborhood. Don Alvaro, who had failed to seize several excellent opportunities for a vigorous attack before the investment was completed, tried sorties, too late, on June 2 and on July 28. The first, which had some chance of success, was inadequately supported and finally driven back; while the second, which was attempted after the troops had lost their morale, had no other result than the capture of Don Alvaro. On July 31, the castle surrendered. All of its 6000 defenders who were not already dead were taken prisoners. The fortifications were razed to the ground. The victors returned in triumph to Tripoli, where Dragut was now established beyond possibility of overthrow; and Piali Pasha, after ravaging the eastern shores of Sicily, got back safely in the end of September to Constantinople, to receive the plaudits of the multitude and the thanks of Suleiman the Magnificent.

This reverse was by far the most serious that had been suffered in North Africa since the defeat of Charles V before Algiers. The object of the expedition had been to regain, through the reestablishment of the Knights of St. John at Tripoli, the control of the central part of the Mediterranean for the Christians; and its failure naturally encouraged their enemies to believe that it would be possible completely to expel them from it. In the following year Dragut asked the Sultan to grant him an army to recapture La Goletta from the Spaniards; the idea, in other words, which bore fruit in 1574, was first conceived just after the Gerba campaign. Moreover, the Turkish attack which was to be delivered against Malta in 1565 should be logically considered as the counterthrust to the Christian attempt on Tripoli in 1560; since the Knights had so signaly failed to win back their African home, was it not reasonable to suppose that it would be possible to oust them from their stronghold on the island? But most important of all for the student of the Spanish Empire was the effect of the disaster at Gerba on the situation farther west. Philip’s slackness in supporting the expedition against Tripoli is to be chiefly explained, as we have already remarked, by his conviction that the blow was to be planted in a region so remote as to be of comparatively little consequence to the maintenance of Spanish power in North Africa; now he was to learn that the encouragement which his enemies had derived from their victory was to carry the contest to his very doors. In the spring of 1561 the Turkish fleet suddenly appeared before Soller in Majorca and proceeded to attack it. The inhabitants, fortunately, were both brave and resourceful, and the assault was repulsed on May 11; but the expedition was of sufficient magnitude to show that the enemy meant to force the fighting. Vague rumors also poured in of an infidel attack to be launched against Oran, the most important Spanish stronghold still remaining on the Mauretanian coast; everything pointed to the necessity of more vigorous action on the part of the Prudent King. The next chapter of the story was to be staged in the western basin of the Mediterranean, on the Barbary coasts, with the infidels at the outset taking the role of aggressors, and Spanish soldiers and sailors resisting them; but the ultimate result of it was to restore the prestige of the Christian arms.

In the beginning, the weather took a hand in the game and played it, as was usually the case in these Mediterranean wars, in a manner adverse to the interests of Spain. In response to the petition of the Cortes of Toledo of 1559, Philip had taken measures to enlarge his navy; he ordered a number of new galleys to be built, and sent for others from Genoa to guard the coasts of Spain; in October, 1562, a large squadron was collected off Malaga, ready at need to defend either Valencia or Oran. Fearing the east winds which raged at that season, the Spanish admiral, Juan de Mendoza, who had been brought up on shipboard by the side of his famous father, Bernardino, sought refuge forty miles eastward in the anchorage of La Herradura, which was admirably adapted for protection against the Levanters; but no sooner had he arrived than the storm shifted to the south, whence it soon began to blow with the
violence of a tempest. A good defense against the east winds, La Herradura was worse than useless against such a gale as this. Some of the galleys began to drag their anchors. Others cut their cables and were dashed in pieces on the rocks, and most of those that were able to hold their moorings were sunk. No less than twenty-five of the twenty-eight vessels that composed the squadron were lost, together with at least 4000 lives, among them that of Juan de Mendoza, who assuredly deserved a better fate.

The news of this disaster, which was promptly reported at Constantinople, naturally caused the Sultan to hasten the plans, which he had been maturing since the disaster at Gerba, for an attack against Oran. The execution of this project was entrusted to Hassan, the son of Kheireddin Barbarossa, who was now Suleiman’s representative at Algiers; he had a small fleet at his disposal to carry his cannon and supplies, and an army of over 25,000 men. In April, 1563, he arrived before Oran, and at once made preparations for a vigorous attack. The place was defended by Alonso de Cordova y Velasco, son and heir of the Count of Alcaudete who had been slain there in 1558, and the neighboring fortress of Mers-el-Kebir, which was the key to it, by his younger brother, Martin; the combined garrisons cannot have numbered much more than 1000 men.

To maintain themselves indifferently was clearly impossible; everything really depended on whether or not they could hold out until the arrival of help from Spain. During late April and early May, they delayed the besiegers before two subsidiary outside forts; not until May 8 were they driven back into Mers-el-Kebir. There for a month more they continued to defend themselves; they repulsed one assault after another, and refused to haul down their flag. Reports occasionally reached them that the Spanish fleet was on its way, and finally, in the middle of June, their endurance was rewarded. By superhuman efforts Philip had collected thirty-four galleys, some of them from the Italian states, and the rest brand new, off the dockyards of Barcelona, and dispatched them, under Francisco de Mendoza, to the relief of his hard-pressed subjects. They reached Oran in the nick of time. Hassan had learned that their coming was imminent, and was preparing to launch the decisive blow which should forestall them; but Mendoza arrived just at the very moment that the attack was beginning, and threw the besiegers into confusion. Twenty of their ships succeeded in escaping to the eastward, but five others were captured, and also four large French vessels which formed a part of the infidel fleet. Hassan’s land forces, it is needless to add, made haste to raise the siege and seek safety in flight; they left behind them a large quantity of munitions and supplies, and also sixteen pieces of artillery. Altogether, the defense of Mers-el-Kebir was the most successful operation which the Spaniards had conducted on the shores of North Africa since the capture of Tunis twenty-eight years before. Both the Alcaudetes were worthily rewarded: the elder by the viceroyalty of the kingdom of Navarre, the younger by a grant of 6000 ducats.

If full advantage was to be reaped from the victory before Oran, it was indispensable to follow it up with a vigorous counter-offensive. There could be little doubt where Philip would elect to strike the blow. The disaster at Gerba had but strengthened his aversion to operations in the Central Mediterranean; Algiers was still too strong; but there was another pirates’ nest farther westward, two-thirds of the way from Oran to Tangiers, which had been in Spanish hands from 1508 to 1522, and which he was eager to recover from its infidel possessors. This was the town of Velez de la Gomera, commonly known at the time as the Peñón de Velez from the rocky islet which guarded the approach to it from the sea. Soon after the victorious fleet had got back from Oran, orders were received from the king to attack it. As Mendoza, who had captured the galleys on the previous expedition, was suffering from a fever at the time, the command devolved on Sancho de Leyva, who, captured at Gerba, but subsequently released, was now general of the galleys of Naples. On July 23, 1563, he put to sea with some fifty ships in the hope of surprising the Peñón by night, but the defenders were keenly on the watch, and at daybreak de Leyva retired. His next move was to disembark his troops, to the number of some four or five thousand, at a point six miles distant from the fortress, in the hope that a land attack would make him master of the town, but this enterprise failed even more signally than the first. The infidels knew every inch of the ground and used their knowledge well; at one moment de Leyva was in terror lest he should be surrounded and cut off. Turkish galleys, moreover, soon appeared on the horizon and eluded all the efforts of the Christians to capture them. A council of war was finally held, and despite the vigorous protests of Alvaro de Bazán, who insisted that the Peñón should and must be taken, de Leyva abandoned the enterprise. On August 2 the expedition returned to Malaga, after having suffered some damage from a storm.

The effect of this miserable fiasco was in turn to encourage the infidels, who not only seized the opportunity to strengthen the Peñón and raid the Spanish coasts, but even carried their depredations to the Canaries. Rumors also came in of the preparation of a huge fleet at Constantinople for operations on an unprecedented scale in the following spring. Other maritime rivals of Spain likewise took heart.
Eight English vessels which were lying off Gibraltar attacked a French ship which came up and anchored near them; they were finally captured by Alvaro de Bazán, and long correspondence ensued before the prisoners were released, but the boldness of the attempt was highly significant. It was obvious that strong measures must be taken for a fresh rehabilitation of Spain’s prestige, and that the first of them would be to find a leader more capable than de Leyva; as Mendoza, in the meantime, had died as a result of his illness, the choice finally fell on Garcia de Toledo, a cousin of the Duke of Alva and the son of the viceroy of Naples, who had seen service on the sea for a full quarter of a century before. He was not in all respects an attractive personality, but he had proved, during his tenure of the viceroyalty of Catalonia, that he possessed great talent as an organizer. It was characteristic both of his own abilities and of those of his subordinates, that, just as the expedition which he headed was about to start, he discovered that all the gunpowder had been left behind. His mission, of course, was to renew the attack on the Peñón; Philip’s persistence would not tolerate the abandonment of the enterprise, and every effort was made to ensure its success. The whole winter of 1563-64 was spent in preparation. Galleys were contributed by Portugal, by Savoy, by the Knights of Malta, and by the Italian states. When Don Garcia set sail from Malaga on August 29, 1564, he had a fleet of at least 150 ships, in addition to the transports, and land forces of over 16,000 men. The prompt success of this second expedition more than atoned for the failure of the first. The defenders of Velez were terrified and amazed when they saw Toledo’s imposing armament appearing over the horizon. Most of them gathered up their belongings and fled to the interior, so that the Christians were able to land and possess themselves of the ancient castle of Alcala and then of Velez itself, almost without striking a blow. The Peñón gave promise of more serious resistance; a few companies of Turks shut themselves up within its walls with the obvious intention of holding out until the last. But Toledo set up his heaviest batteries in a favorable position on the shore, and speedily opened a breach in the walls; shortly afterwards the defenders began to make their escape, and when the Spanish leader entered the place on September 8, he found it practically deserted. He installed a strong garrison under Alvaro de Bazán, with instructions to repair and improve the defenses, and got back to Malaga by the middle of the month; he had captured, with the loss of only thirty men, a place which was certainly one of the most dangerous of pirate nests, and which many contemporaries had regarded as impregnable. In the following spring, the good work was continued by Alvaro de Bazán, who sank several transports, laden with stones, in the mouth of the River Tetuan (now the Oued-Martine), thus temporarily immobilizing a dozen infidel vessels which lay at anchor farther up the stream, and preventing its utilization as a corsairs’ refuge for many months to come.

In the Western Mediterranean, then, the tide had apparently turned. Philip had shown vigor and persistence in his efforts to maintain control of the waters near his own shores; he had scored two considerable victories on the coasts of North Africa; the memory of the defeats of his father’s closing years and of the disaster at Gerba had been at least partially wiped out. But the next trial of strength was to come farther eastward, in a region for whose safety the Spanish monarch was far less solicitous; he was afraid of dissipating his energies, and failed to envisage the Mediterranean as a single whole. The issue of the new conflict was to be favorable to the Christian arms; but only a very small part of the credit for it can be given to the too Prudent King. The only real hero of the ensuing campaign, at least as far as Spain’s participation in it was concerned, was Garcia de Toledo, now promoted, as a reward for his success against the Peñón de Velez, to the difficult office of viceroy of Sicily.

Rumors of a great naval expedition that was being prepared at Constantinople became increasingly definite and alarming in the early months of 1565; and it was an open secret that its objective was to be the island of Malta. It was the sole remaining stronghold of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, whom Suleiman had already expelled from Rhodes and from Tripoli. Its capture would be the culmination of his achievements in the Mediterranean; it would open for him a road to Sicily and Naples and perhaps into the western basin of the inland sea. The Sultan collected a fleet of 200 sail, of which 130 were galleys fit for combat; they carried ample supplies of artillery and munitions and land forces to the number of 30,000 men. The latter were commanded by Mustapha, a veteran of the Danube wars, and the fleet by Piali Pasha; and most of the more famous of the Turkish corsairs, among them Dragut, and Hassan of Algiers, joined in with their special contingents. On May 18 a cannon-shot from the castle of St. Elmo announced the arrival of this formidable armament, a full month before the Christians had expected it, in the waters surrounding the island fortress of the Knights.

The grand-master, Jean de La Valette, had realized for many months the peril of his position and had been making superhuman efforts to get ready to avert it. He strengthened his defenses, he besought the aid of the European powers, he recalled his absent knights, he mustered his auxiliaries, and armed
the inhabitants of the island. In all he disposed of some 8500 men, of whom possibly 700 were members of the Order; but unfortunately St. Elmo, the key to the entire position, against which it was obvious that the enemy would launch his first attack, was only able to contain 600. Failing help from outside, that fortress was doomed; and virtually the sole possible source of such outside help was Garcia de Toledo, the new viceroy of Sicily.

Toledo had shown feverish energy from the moment of his arrival in his new domain. He saw the coming danger quite as clearly as the grand-master; not only did he muster all the military and naval resources of his own realm, he also visited both Naples and La Goletta, in order personally to assure himself that they were in an adequate state of defense. La Valette began to correspond with him at once; a few weeks before the Turks arrived he sent for him to come to Malta to inspect the fortifications, which Toledo found in a satisfactory state, though inadequately provided with soldiers to man them. The viceroy himself did everything he possibly could; he loaned the grand-master several companies of his Spanish regiments; he shipped him grain and money, and did his utmost to persuade the king to do still more. But Philip, with the disaster of Gerba still fresh in his mind, could not be brought to see the importance of a peril so far to the eastward; the most that Toledo could induce him to do was to order the assembling of 4000 men in Corsica, and to command the viceroy of Naples to send troops into Sicily; food and money were all that Philip would permit to be dispatched direct to Malta from Spain. It will readily be believed that the Turks made the most of these delays. On May 19, they began to land their troops, without any opposition on the part of the grand-master; and after a dispute of four days’ duration as to whether to start in with an attack on Il Burgo, the principal fortress of the island, or on the outer castle of St. Elmo, they decided in favor of the latter; on the 24th they opened their trenches within 600 yards of their objective. Thereupon there ensued a furious bombardment both by land and sea. It lasted for no less than twenty-three days, and under cover of it the besiegers were able to advance their parallels of approach so close to St. Elmo that on June 16 they could launch their first assault. Every day La Valette reenforced the little garrison in the confident expectation that succor would soon arrive; he redoubled his demands for help in his extremity, but all without avail. The heroism of the besieged was beyond all praise. They slew some 6000 of their assailants, among them Dragut, and wounded Piali Pasha; but it was impossible permanently to resist the overwhelming superiority of the Turkish forces. On June 23, the walls were so badly breached that the enemy was able to enter the castle, where they found only nine of the defenders alive. And having taken St. Elmo, they at once made preparations to attack Il Burgo and the other forts.

Garcia de Toledo in Sicily was at his wits’ end. On May 31, while the cannonade was at its hottest, he wrote another despairing letter to Philip, beseeching him to act vigorously and without delay. “If Malta is not succored”, he declared, “I hold it to be lost”. He even suggested that if Philip feared the loss of his Spanish galleys, he might borrow those of France, not knowing that Catharine de’ Medici at that very moment was sending a special emissary to Constantinople to assure the Porte of her friendship. But the king of Spain still hesitated. He continued to prepare, but would not give the word to start. Even the news of the fall of St. Elmo did not avail to persuade him to risk his precious navy in a sea fight; the most he would do was to sanction the landing of troops, “provided it could be accomplished without evident peril of the loss of the galleys”. A month earlier Don Garcia had demonstrated that the thing could be done. Taking full advantage of every atom of autonomy that Philip had permitted him, he had managed, after two failures, to introduce, on June 29, a reinforcement of some 600 soldiers, mostly Spanish, into Il Burgo, where the grand-master was so overjoyed at their arrival that he rushed amongst them in tears and embraced them. But this, after all, was but a handful; moreover, the numbers of the garrison dwindled rapidly under the pressure of the Turkish assaults. Every day the blockade became stricter and stricter; even the best of the grand-master’s divers found it almost impossible to get through with his desperate appeals. Every letter that Toledo received from Malta seemed certain to be the last; a note from the governor, Pedro de Amezqueta, dated August 22, contained the significant message: “Four hundred men still alive... don’t lose an hour”.

Had there been other causes of delay than the hesitations of the king, Malta must assuredly have fallen. But fortunately when, about August 20, Philip’s consent to a landing operation had at last been received, all the men and material were ready for the enterprise. This was chiefly due to the energy of Garcia de Toledo; but a share of the credit also belongs to Alvaro de Bazán, who was at that moment in command of the galleys of Seville and charged with the defense of Gibraltar. In May he had been ordered to take reinforcements from Malaga to Oran; subsequently he got leave to pass on to Cartagena, Barcelona, and Genoa, where he added to his fleet and picked up the tercio of Lombardy, which Philip had at last allowed to be sent to Sicily. At Civitavecchia he was further reinforced by a detachment of papal galleys, and at Naples he took on more troops. Finally, in early August, after his forces had joined Toledo’s, there was united at Messina an armament of some ninety galleys, forty transports, and over
11,000 men. All that was now lacking was the consent of the king, which finally arrived after a delay of three more weeks; it only sanctioned, as we have already seen, the landing of soldiers for a battle on the shore; to imperil the Spanish fleet against the obviously superior forces of the Turks was still to Philip’s cautious nature unthinkable. This inhibition, however, had been foreseen. During the weeks of waiting for the royal missive, the various leaders of the Christian armament had been discussing the best methods of carrying out the only operation to which Philip would consent, and they finally agreed on the adoption of a scheme suggested by Alvaro de Bazan. This was, in brief, to choose the best sixty of the Christian galleys, place 150 soldiers on each, and make a dash for the shore of Malta at a point some distance from the fortress, trusting that the main body of the Turkish fleet would be so occupied with the bombardment, and the rest of it so widely dispersed, that a naval action could either be avoided, or if it occurred, would be fought against so small a detachment of the enemy’s vessels that there would be no doubt that the Christians would be able to account for them.

The weather was at its very worst when the time came to put this plan into effect. The ships left Messina on August 26 in a “tempest the like of which few sailors had ever seen before”; it continued to rage for the next two weeks, and the fleet was cruelly buffeted about; its first attempt to make a landing was unsuccessful, and it had to return to Sicily for fresh water and supplies. Finally, however, on September 7, Toledo was able to report to the king that 9600 men had been safely set ashore on the island of Malta without the loss of a single oar; on his return for reinforcements, moreover, the viceroy passed contemptuously within sight of the main body of the Turkish fleet, firing a salute as he sailed by as a tribute to the besieged, and a confirmation of the great news that the longed for succor had at last arrived. The infidels were dismayed when they realized what had happened. If the little band of the original defenders had been able to detain them for so long, what could they hope to accomplish against a large force of the dreaded Spanish infantry, whose superiority to all other soldiers of the period was quite as fully recognized in the East as in the West? For a moment Piali Pasha had a thought of attacking the Christian fleet, but he abandoned it when he reflected that the loss of the support of his galleys would expose the Turkish land forces to inevitable destruction; one final attack on the relieving forces was attempted and repulsed, and on the following day the infidels began to retire. On September 12, the last of their sails had disappeared over the horizon: Hassan toward Algiers, Piali Pasha and the rest to the eastward. The second lot of reinforcements which the viceroy was bringing over from Sicily reached Malta at the very moment of the departure of the Turks, and was not even landed, and Toledo spent the rest of the month in removing from Malta the now unnecessary original detachment, and in pursuing the enemy to the coasts of Greece.

It was a glorious deliverance, and was fittingly celebrated both in Spain and in Rome. Coupled with the death of Suleiman the Magnificent, which occurred in the following year, it marked the passing of the climax of the Turkish peril, both on sea and on land. But though the credit for it, as we have already remarked, belongs largely to Garcia de Toledo, and in a lesser degree to Alvaro de Bazan, Spain as a whole got little or nothing of the glory, because of the hesitations of her king. Indeed, it is scarcely too much to say that she lost rather than gained in reputation from the—whole affair. It had been the first occasion since his return to the peninsula in which Philip had been concerned in an enterprise which interested the whole of Europe. He was, for a moment, the cynosure of all eyes, and men satisfied—theirselves for the first time of his slowness and vacillation. “The King has lost a great deal of reputation by not succoring Malta”, reported the English special agent at Madrid on September 3, 1565, and there is every reason to think that other foreign envoys sent similar opinions to their governments. In some respects the verdicts were probably harsher than Philip really deserved; the fact of the matter was that he had never been quite whole-hearted in his desire to have Malta saved. The enterprise lay beyond the Spanish horizon, at least as he conceived of it, and his interests, at that period of his rule, were strictly limited to Spain. He was intent on the preservation of the safety of his own shores and of his control of the adjacent seas. And he could never quite forget that the large majority of the Knights were Frenchmen and commanded by a French grand-master; why, then, should he bestir himself to give aid to subjects of a state, which, though friendly at the moment, had a long anti-Spanish and pro-Turkish tradition behind it, and might subsequently revert to its former hostile attitude- He had certainly shown himself considerably more energetic when it was a question of purely Spanish enterprise, such as, for instance, the defense of Oran. Yet, even allowing for all this, there can be little doubt that Philip’s conduct in connection with the relief of Malta had an adverse effect on his position in Western Europe. It showed his fellow sovereigns that he was not to be the factor of ubiquitous and universal importance which his father had been before him; it confirmed many disagreeable suspicions in regard to his fitness to champion the interests of the faith. And if Philip’s hesitations diminished his prestige, and increased the jealousy and distrust of his neighbors, they may also have begun to reveal, at least to the keener minds, the methods whereby it would ultimately be possible to defeat him.
The years immediately succeeding the attack on Malta saw a temporary lull in the activities of the Turks in the Mediterranean. It was expected that Suleiman would seek vengeance for his defeat in 1566, and Philip ordered the construction of eighty galleys to meet the threatened peril; but the Sultan’s anger vented itself principally in a last campaign against Hungary, in which he met his death; and Piali Pasha, who had begun to ravage the coasts of Apulia, was prompt to retire when Garcia de Toledo’s fleet drew near. But this same year 1566, though in itself comparatively quiet, witnessed the advent on the scene of a new personality, the incarnation of the crusading ardor of the Counter Reformation, who was to arouse and unite the Christians for a holy war against the infidel with an enthusiasm which they had rarely shown before, and to carry the combat into the waters of the foe. Eight months before Suleiman the Magnificent gave way to Selim the Sot, the papal tiara had passed from Pius IV to the far abler and more energetic Pius V.

From the moment of his accession the new pontiff was inspired with the idea of the creation of a Holy League: not the sort of Holy League which the sixteenth century had already occasionally produced, in which religious pretexts were put forward to cover the most selfish of political ambitions, but a genuine alliance for the purpose announced, the defeat and humiliation of the infidel Turk. The death of Suleiman, with the prospect which it opened of plots and revolts before the recognition of his successor, seemed to furnish an unusual opportunity for decisive action, and the depredations of Piali Pasha, to justify it. In the winter of 1566-67 the Pope sent messages to all the Catholic powers of Western Europe to urge them to take arms and unite for a crusade. From France, as was to be expected in view of her recent policy, he obtained nothing, and he was also quite unable to move the Emperor Maximilian II; before long it became obvious that the sole possible sources of help were Venice and Spain. But the tradition of Venice was to maintain peace with the Turk, particularly for commercial purposes; furthermore, she feared that a war would mean the loss of her colonial possessions in the Levant, and especially of the island of Cyprus, which she had held since 1489; she therefore refused, for the time being, to consider the papal proposals. Philip also, at first, held aloof, though for somewhat different reasons. He had great respect for the character of the new pontiff; moreover, it seems probable that the narrow escape of Malta had given him some inkling of the fact that the Mediterranean situation must be considered as a whole, and that the western basin could not be really safe as long as the infidel was in control of the eastern. The principal consideration which caused him to hold back was the threatening state of affairs in the Netherlands, where rebellion was plainly beginning to raise its head. Dissipation of his forces in a crusade against the Turks would be certain to increase his difficulties in that quarter; it might even conceivably encourage the Protestant states of the Empire to move against him. Like his father before him, Philip was beginning to discover that the size and extent of his scattered dominions exposed him to peril from many different directions at once.

Pius, however, was not discouraged; despite his first rebuff, he refused to abandon his crusading projects, and in 1570 his persistence was rewarded. The primary cause of the change in his fortunes was the rashness and stupidity of the new Sultan, which drove the Venetians, who really desired to keep the peace, into the reluctant necessity of declaring war. The island of Cyprus was the chief bone of contention. It lay “in the vitals of the Turkish Empire”; in Venetian hands it imperiled the infidel control of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean; it menaced the coasts of Syria and Palestine, and was a bar to maritime communication between Constantinople and Egypt. The Sultan, moreover, was firmly convinced that he would never have a better opportunity to wrest it from Venice; a bad harvest in 1569 had deprived her of supplies, and the explosion of a powder magazine was reported to have destroyed a large number of her galleys. In March, 1570, accordingly, an ambassador from Selim appeared in Venice with a curt demand for the cession and evacuation of the island. There was still a strong faction in the councils of the republic, to be heard from again and again in the succeeding years, which held that peace with the infidel must at all costs be preserved; but the Turkish demand was so uncompromising and so insolent that the majority felt that compliance was impossible. Selim’s envoy was accordingly sent back to his master without even being permitted to make formal statement of his errand, and war was therewith practically declared between Venice and the Porte. No one realized better than the republic that she was incapable of waging it alone. The only possible course was to apply to the Pope and through him to the other Catholic powers of Western Europe for the formation of the very Holy League in which three years before Venice had refused to participate. Her own crusading ardor was no whit stronger than it had been then, but she was only too glad to utilize that of others, provided it could avail for the preservation of her colonial empire.

The Pope had no illusions about the attitude and objects of the republic. He knew that her motives were exclusively selfish, and that the welfare of Christendom did not appeal to her at all; but
the chance was too good to lose. He also realized that nothing of importance could really be accomplished unless he secured the cooperation of Spain. France and the Empire were clearly of no avail; his own military and naval resources were scanty; the independent Italian states would only follow a Spanish lead. To Philip, accordingly, Pius once more applied, and sent over to Spain in the spring of 1570 a Malagan cleric, Luis de Torres, who had resided for years at the papal court, to ask for the support of the Prudent King. The envoy had his first interview with the Spanish monarch at Cordova in April. Fortunately for the success of the Pope’s proposals, the situation in Spain, as well as in Venice, had altered in such fashion as to make them much more acceptable on the present occasion than they had been three years before. The rebels in the Low Countries, now confronted by the terrible Alva, were far less of a menace than they had been in 1567. The infidel corsair, Aluch Ali, had recently captured the city of Tunis, and expelled the local Hafside ruler, who was still, in theory at least, a vassal of the Prudent King; a subsequent assault on La Goletta had been repulsed, but it had at least served as a reminder that Spain was still menaced by a Turkish peril. The high character and reputation of Pope Pius himself doubtless counted for something. But the consideration which unquestionably had the greatest weight of all was the fact that the Morisco rebellion in Granada, if not yet completely suppressed, was doomed to inevitable failure: its back had by this time been thoroughly broken. That revolt and the manner of its suppression had done much to undermine the prestige of the Prudent King. That it should have been permitted to occur at all was an evidence that he was not master in his own dominions; that such overwhelming force and such cruelty had been necessary to put it down, had but strengthened the bad impression at the different courts of Western Europe. The Spanish tercios which had been called on to do the bloody work longed to win back their good name in a war that concerned all Christendom; their leader, Don John of Austria, was the most insistent of all. Finally, there had been just enough danger that the rebellion might be aided by infidel cooperation from without to make adherence to the League which the papacy was proposing the logical sequel to what had already been accomplished at home. And whatever remaining doubts the king may have entertained, on the ground of the perennial emptiness of his exchequer, were cleared up by the papal offers, conveyed through Luis de Torres, of wellhigh unlimited concessions in the matter, of clerical subsidies.

By the middle of May, then, in the year 1570, Philip had determined to join the League; but it is scarcely too much to say that the Venetians deplored rather than welcomed the news that he had decided to become their ally. Much as they feared the Turk, they dreaded yet more lest they should become the cat’s-paw of Spain; and they were determined that the League should be constituted in such fashion as to prevent its being directed in Spanish interests. From the outset the republic desired a merely temporary agreement, from which she could withdraw when it suited her own convenience; she would have nothing to do with the more permanent and binding treaties which were advocated by Philip and the Pope. She also proposed to keep the control of the naval campaign as far as possible out of Spanish hands, by the creation of a pontifical fleet to which all the allies should contribute their contingents, and which was to be commanded by the papal general, Marcantonio Colonna; this appointment had the additional advantage in Venetian eyes that it was certain to be resented by Gian Andrea Doria, who had been placed in command of the galleys of Spain. Philip could not be blind to the meaning of these arrangements, and was naturally slow to acquiesce in them. The different contingents took a long time to mobilize and longer still to combine; not till the last day of August did they unite off the shores of Crete. The Venetians wished to rescue Cyprus, which was already besieged by the Turks, but Doria and Colonna did not believe that this would be feasible; and in the midst of the ensuing discussions there arrived, on September 21, the stunning news that the Turks, twelve days before, had captured Nicosia, and therewith become masters of all of Cyprus save Famagosta. This disaster and the advent of the Spanish lead, accordingly for the arrangement of them had met at Rome in June. By this time it also became evident that Philip was determined to enter upon the undertaking with all his might. Whether it was that he had caught the spark of the Pope’s crusading ardor, or because of the unusually favorable state of Spain’s foreign and domestic affairs, it is hard to say; in any case he
seemed more anxious to fight than he had ever been before. But if Philip was resolved to give whole-hearted support to the League, and was prepared to shoulder the principal burden of the work that it was to be called upon to do, he was equally determined to have the principal voice in the control of it, and to have its constitution so drawn up that Spain should derive due benefit from its activities. The representatives whom he sent from Madrid were given ample instructions to this effect, and at Rome they were powerfully aided by the efforts of Cardinal Granvelle, who was accused of being more Spanish than the Spaniards themselves. As the principal means of attaining their end, they insisted that the chief command of the forces of the allies should be conferred on Philip’s half-brother, Don John of Austria, who had been fighting the infidel in Granada for nearly two years past. Don John himself had applied for the position on November 19, 1570, and though the appointment elicited some objections from the other allies, it was thenceforth recognized as inevitable. He was at that time nearly twenty-four years old, in the fresh vigor of his early manhood, graceful, gallant, courteous, and well fitted by his inheritance and by his personal attractions to arouse men’s enthusiasm. There is no reason to believe that he possessed any great knowledge of naval affairs, despite the fact that since the spring of 1568 he had been commander-in-chief of the fleets of Spain; in matters of strategy he had to be guided by the counsels of older seamen like Gian Andrea Doria and Alvaro de Bazán. But such an arrangement was not uncommon at the time; and it seemed particularly desirable on the present occasion, when charm and personality were so obviously indispensable for the holding together of mutually distrustful allies. And it was not solely in the matter of the command that Spain manifested her resolve that the operations of the League should redound to her own advantage. She insisted that its objects should be both offensive and defensive, and, as a guarantee against desertion by her colleagues, that it should last for at least twelve years. She also demanded that Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli should be included in the sphere of its activities as well as the territories of the Eastern Mediterranean, and succeeded, with some reservations, in carrying her point. The question of relative costs made less trouble than usual in such cases. Spain was quite ready to pay for the preponderant position which she had elected to assume, and promised not only to meet half the total expense on her own account, but also to be responsible for such portion of the share allotted to the see of Rome as the papal exchequer might be unable to contribute. It was, after all, but the retort courteous for the financial concessions, of Pius, of which Philip had taken special pains to make doubly sure beforehand.

The Holy League was solemnly concluded on May 26, and on the following day it was published to the world in the basilica of St. Peter. In view of the history of previous Holy Leagues it did not seem superfluous to proclaim at the outset that it was formed “for the destruction and ruin of the Turk,” including his subject states of “Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli of Barbary”; and that there was to be no limit to the period of its duration. Spain was to furnish one-half of the funds, troops, ships, and munitions of war, Venice one-third, and the Pope one-sixth. Don John was invested with all the powers of commander-in-chief, and in his absence Marcantonio Colonna was to fill his place, but the authority of the generalissimo was limited by the provision that he was not to be permitted to take any decisive action without the consent of the general of each of the forces of the allies; this stipulation originated with the Venetians, who thus hoped to prevent the Spaniards from directing the League to suit themselves. It was recognized that the chief interests of Venice lay in the Adriatic and in the Levant, and those of Philip in North Africa; and it was provided that in years when no common enterprise should be undertaken each of the two powers should have the right to engage in ventures of its own, and to call upon its ally for support and assistance, save when the territories of that ally were actually in danger from the Turk. The Emperor and the kings of France and Portugal were invited to join the League, under conditions to be agreed upon; but no one can have been surprised at their determination to hold aloof. In France the belief was openly expressed that the differences between Spain and Venice were too deep-rooted to make it possible for them to accomplish anything in alliance; nay more, such was France’s jealousy of the power of the Spanish king that her government actually tried to thwart the purposes of the League by offering every facility to the Venetians for a separate peace with the Porte. Still less welcome was the news in England, in the Netherlands, and in the Protestant states of the Empire, all of which felt themselves menaced directly or indirectly by the power of the king of Spain. In their eyes the League could not fail to be a fresh means of enhancing the already dangerous preponderance of the ‘Demon of the South.’

News of the conclusion of the League reached Madrid on June 6; that very day Don John left for Barcelona on the way to Messina, the appointed rendezvous of the allied fleets. He was himself in a fever of impatience to reach the scene of action. If there was to be a real campaign before the coming of the autumn winds, there was not a moment to be lost. It was indispensable, moreover, to reassure the Venetians, who were clamoring for the rescue of Cyprus before Famagosta should fall, and who suspected the Spaniards of trying to delay matters in order to divert the expedition to North Africa. But
Despite the fact that all the leaders professed to be in such haste, it was not until September 2 that the entire armament could be united at the appointed place. The Spanish galleys had been scattered up and down the coasts and in the harbors of the Balearics, and it took a long time to collect and repair them. Though Venice had been so anxious for the Spaniards to make haste, her own preparations were the most tardy of all; and it was typical of her jealous and distrustful attitude that the last of all the allied squadrons to reach Messina was a detachment of sixty ships of the republic which had wintered at Crete. At the council of war, which was held immediately afterwards to determine the course of the ensuing campaign, the Venetians soon learned that Don John was fully as anxious as they were themselves that a vigorous blow be immediately struck; and as the news of the fall of Famagosta, on August 1, and the dastardly massacre of its defenders in the ensuing weeks, made it evident that an operation against Cyprus was no longer to be thought of, it was resolved to seek out the infidel fleet and give it battle wheresoever it should be found. It was a daring decision: one which the Emperor at the height of his power had never boon able to bring himself to make, and one which the sages of the time universally condemned as utterly contrary to the dictates of common sense. The enemy was known to be more numerous, both in ships and in men, and his janizaries were still the terror of much of Western Europe. A Christian defeat in eastern waters, where there would be practically no chance of escape for surviving galleys, would give the Turks unquestioned mastery of the Mediterranean. Spain in many ways was taking a much greater risk than the Venetians; she had far less to gain and infinitely more to lose. For the republic, immediate and drastic action was imperative; without it, she would be deprived of all her colonies in the Levant. For Spain, on the other hand, the status quo was at least tolerable. With her navy at its existing strength, the Turks might venture to raid the Western Mediterranean, but could scarcely hope to control it. If, on the other hand, all her galleys should be lost, her hold on North Africa would infallibly be broken, and the enemy permanently established within striking distance of her own coasts. When we join with these considerations the caution and hesitancy which usually characterized Philip II, and the difficulties born of the distrust between the allies, we shall be the better able to appreciate the meaning of the leadership of Don John. He seemed to personify the crusading ardor of the Pope. His inspiring presence swept men off their feet, and made them temporarily forget their own selfish aims in an overwhelming enthusiasm for the common cause. He seemed the incarnation of the spirit of 1095. Never had the Counter-Reformation given evidence so dramatic of the power of its creed.

When finally assembled in the port of Messina, the entire Christian fleet numbered six heavy galleasses, floating forts carrying 44 cannon apiece, which were contributed by the Venetians; 208 galleys, of which the republic furnished 106, Spain 90, and the papacy 12; and about 100 smaller vessels and transports, of which three-quarters were either Spanish or in Spanish pay; and there were in all some 50,000 sailors and rowers on board. The fleet carried about 31,000 soldiers, of whom 19,000 were either Spaniards, or Italians and Germans enlisted in the Spanish tercios, 2000 volunteers, fitted and equipped at their own cost but credited to Spain, 8000 Venetians, and 2000 troops furnished by the Pope. The Venetians galleys were by no means the equal of the Spanish ones, and the surplus number of them in excess of the proportion that had been allotted to the republic was further compensated by a corresponding surplus of the troops and equipment that were furnished by Spain. This arrangement, which had been tentatively agreed upon at the time of the formation of the League, was clearly to the advantage of all concerned, and was a tribute to the recognized superiority of the Spanish veterans. The forthcoming action, as had been plainly foreseen, was to be a contest at close range, of ramming and boarding, between vessels which relied chiefly for their propulsion on oars: a transference, one might almost say, to the decks of ships, of a land battle of the type in which the Spaniards excelled. Sailing ability and skill at long-range cannonading would consequently count for comparatively little, and the troops which the galleys transported would be quite as important as the galleys themselves.

On September 16 the great fleet streamed out of the port of Messina and headed across the Ionian Sea for Corfu, each galley being separately blessed by the papal nuncio as it passed. Once at sea, it assumed the formation which it was to retain, with a few trifling changes, when it encountered the foe. There was a vanguard of eight swift galleys under Juan de Cardona; behind it, in the center, a squadron of sixty-six galleys under Don John; on the left, the main body of the Venetians, to the number of fifty-four, under Agostino Barbarigo on the right, another detachment of equal size under Gian Andrea Doria; in the rear, a reserve of thirty-one, under Alvaro de Bazán. On September 27, the Christians arrived at Corfu, where they received the first news of their foe. The Turks had been plundering Corfu shortly before; from prisoners exchanged at their departure it was learned that the enemy had a fleet fully equal to that of the Christians, that its chiefs were in two minds whether or not to offer battle, and that when last seen, it was steering for the Gulf of Lepanto. Whether the forces of the infidel had remained united, or had subsequently split into two detachments, it was impossible
The Turkish fleet was, in fact, all collected at the time in the inner harbor of the Gulf of Lepanto, doubly secure in the protection of the fortresses that guarded its narrow mouth. The contemporary estimates vary widely in regard to its size. It seems probable that the total number of its ships was approximately equal to that of the Christians, but that a larger proportion—perhaps as many as 230—were galleys. There is also reason to believe that it carried a somewhat larger number of troops. It was now commanded by Ali Pasha, substituted for Piali at the order of Selim, who had been displeased at the manner in which the latter had permitted aid to be brought to the garrison of Famagosta in the preceding year. Ali Pasha was young, vigorous, anxious to distinguish himself, and probably somewhat over-confident as a result of his recent promotion; he also believed the Christian forces to be considerably smaller than they actually were and wished to sally forth and give battle in the open. But many voices in the Turkish war council were raised against this plan as too audacious: among them those of Pertau Pasha, the general of the Turkish infantry, and of Aluch Ali, the viceroy of Algiers, a renegade Calabrian fisherman who had become a Moslem, and had crowded a multitude of adventures into the fifty-two years of his existence; he was to be a thorn in the side of the Christians for many years to come. These men, who could scarcely be accused of timidity, had their own information in regard to the Christian fleet, and stoutly maintained that Ali Pasha underestimated both its quality and its size. They knew that their own crews were largely composed of Christiancaptives, who would naturally desert them at the first favorable opportunity. They therefore favored a policy of avoiding decisive action, and of awaiting their enemies under the protection of the fortress of Lepanto, where they would have every advantage, and a safe place of retreat; they were confident, moreover, that the coming of the autumn winds would soon oblige the Christians to disperse. But Ali Pasha rejected these opinions as derogatory to the honor of the Turkish Empire. He pointed out that there were many other fortresses to the south of Lepanto to which his fleet could retire in case of need; and his views were confirmed at the last moment by a peremptory order from the Sultan, commanding him to go forth at once and seek the foe. On October 6, accordingly, he weighed anchor and moved slowly west out of the inner harbor of Lepanto, in the direction of Cephalonia; one hour after daybreak, on the morning of the 7th, he sighted the Christian armament in battle array, moving slowly down out of the northwest. The moment which both commanders so ardently desired had at last arrived. A decisive battle was inevitable.

The spectacle presented by the two fleets as they approached one another is described in glowing terms in all the contemporary accounts. The day was a Sunday; a gentle westerly breeze was blowing, and the Christians advanced before it with their sails unfurled; and “it was a sight of marvelous beauty to see the sea covered with so many galleys with their banners and standards of different colors, in all their magnificence.” When everything was ready, Don John, clad in shining armor, transferred himself to a fast galley and ran along in front of the Christian line, exhorting and encouraging each of the different contingents in the words best suited to arouse its fighting ardor; and such was the enthusiasm which his eloquence inspired that even the Venetians forgot their distrusts and grievances. As the Turks drew near, they rent the air with taunting shouts and screams; they blew their trumpets, clashed their cymbals, and shot off their musketry to frighten the foe; the Christians, on the contrary, preserved complete silence. At the last moment, however, a signal gun was fired, and a crucifix was raised aloft on every vessel in the line. Don John, standing in a prominent place on the prow of his flagship, knelt to

definitely to determine; but in any case Don John was resolved to pursue them, and he soon succeeded in persuading the war council to agree.
adore the sacred symbol, and his example was followed by every soldier and sailor in the fleet. The decks were bright with the gleaming arms of kneeling men, while friars, erect and conspicuous in their robes of black and brown, promised absolution to all who should loyally fight the battle of the Cross. Never before, in the whole course of the sixteenth century, had there been so striking a demonstration, of the power of religious enthusiasm as a motive force in a fight.

On the Christian left, where the Venetians were stationed, the combat began with the utmost fury. The two galleasses in advance of the main line did yeoman service with their artillery in breaking the force of the initial Turkish attack; but most of the infidel ships finally got past them, and sought safety from their fire by laying themselves alongside the Christian galleys. Some few of the Turkish vessels contrived to get around the Christian flank, despite all the efforts of Barbarigo to prevent it, so that for a time the Venetians found themselves between two fires. There were murderous discharges of cannon, musketry, and arrows, and Barbarigo received a wound in the eye which three days later proved mortal; no quarter was asked or given, and the slaughter was very great. But fortune finally declared itself for the Venetians, who were as much encouraged as their adversaries were disheartened by the course that the conflict was taking in the center. By the middle of the afternoon large numbers of the enemy’s galleys had been either captured or sunk. A few ran ashore, and their crews sought safety by jumping overboard and swimming for land, where they were pursued and mostly slain by their relentless foes.

It was principally on the result of the combat in the center that the fate of the entire engagement depended; and as soon as the hostile fleets had closed for the encounter, it became evident that each of the rival commanders was making directly for the flagship of his foe. Within half an hour of the opening of the fight the two galleys had grappled one another, and the soldiers that they carried were engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict—the pick of Selim’s janizaries against the flower of the tercio of Don Lope de Figueroa. Both of the rival flagship were supported by their best galleys, from which reinforcements swarmed forward on ladders as fast as they were needed; and for two long hours the issue remained in doubt. Owing largely to the removal of the expolones, the cannon fire of the Christians was superior from the first; but this advantage was neutralized by the Turkish arrows, which did deadly execution on the troops who were attempting to board; Don John himself was slightly wounded. Twice the Spaniards got a footing on the decks of Ali’s flagship, only to be driven back again with terrible loss. A third attempt carried them forward beyond the mast, and then, as he was leading on his janizaries to repel them, the Turkish commander fell dead with an arquebus shot in the forehead. A Malagan soldier pounced upon the body and brought it to Don John. The head was cut off and swiftly raised on the point of a lance, where it was plain to be seen by friend and foe. This incident determined the issue of the day. One final rush was sufficient to take the Turkish flagship. Its standard was hauled down and transferred to the galley of Don John. The banner of the Cross was hoisted in its place, and the air was rent with Christian cheers. One last desperate effort of the infidels to retrieve their loss was frustrated by the ready aid of Bazán and his reserves. By three o’clock in the afternoon the battle in the center had been decisively won.

Not so conclusive, however, was the victory of the Christians on the right, where Doria was opposed by the crafty Aluch Ali and the swiftest vessels of the Turkish fleet. The contest there began somewhat later than it had in the center and on the left, owing chiefly to the masterly maneuvering of the Turkish leader. Perceiving the damage that had been done by the fire of the heavy galleasses to the other parts of the infidel line, he skilfully eluded the pair in the vanguard of Doria, and after baffling the chief galleys behind them by wheeling first to one side and then to the other, he finally bore away to the southwest as if to outflank his adversary’s right. In intercepting this maneuver, Doria suffered the main body of his contingent to be drawn away from the rest of the Christian fleet; a large hole was thus opened between his left and Don John’s right; and Aluch Ali, seizing his chance, suddenly changed his course and made with all possible speed for the gap in the Christian line. So rapid were his movements that he succeeded in getting through it, with the most of his ships, to the rear of Doria and Don John; once there, he found himself close to a small group of galleys of the Knights of St. John of Malta, for whom he cherished rancor and profound contempt. In a trice he succeeded in overpowering them. He captured their banner and took their prior’s ship in tow. Then, seeing that the fight on the other wing and in the center was irretrievably lost, he started to escape to the open sea. But at the same moment the Christian reserve, under Alvaro de Bazán, bore down on him at full speed. To engage so formidable an antagonist was under the circumstances impossible, and the Turk had the wisdom to realize it. He cut his prize adrift, and plied his oars with might and main in one last desperate effort to get away. By the merest hair’s breadth he succeeded, with upwards of fifteen of his best galleys, despite all efforts to prevent him on the part of Bazán, who realized that the victory could never be complete as long as this dangerous enemy was at large. The escape of the pirate was indeed a serious matter, far more serious in
fact, as the sequel was to show, than any of the Christian leaders could have foretold. For the moment, however, it seemed but a trivial misfortune; the victors were all convinced that they had gained, as a contemporary put it, “the greatest triumph that had been won in a thousand years.” Cervantes, who was present and severely wounded in the fray, has rightly characterized it as “the disillusionment of the world and of all the nations who believed that the Turks were invincible upon the sea.” Of the 300 or more infidel vessels which had entered the fight, a bare 50 had got away; 117 had been captured by the Christians, together with about 450 pieces of artillery. Some 30,000 Turks had been slain, and at least one-fourth of that number had been taken prisoners; and 15,000 Christian slaves had been libered from captivity. On the Christian side there had been between 7000 and 8000 killed, and about 15,000 wounded; the loss of ships was insignificant—15 or 20 at the most—and most of them were Venetians.

Great were the rejoicings in Italy and in Spain when the glorious news of the victory arrived; in both peninsulas the ensuing month was virtually given over to processions, Te Deums, and ovaitions to the returning heroes. Titian, then in his ninety-fifth year, did an allegorical painting of it for the king of Spain, which is now in the gallery at Madrid; two pictures of it by Tintoretto have perished, while two by Veronese are still to be seen in Venice. The glad tidings reached Philip at San Lorenzo on the afternoon of November 8, while he was at vespers; and it was characteristic of him that he suffered no outward evidence of his joy to escape him, but ordered that the service be continued without interruption to the very end, when he commanded that a solemn Te Deum be sung. Very different was the ecstatic welcome which the news received at the Vatican from the Pope, the real creator of the Holy League. Ever since the fleet had left Messina, Pius had been inspired with the belief that it was destined to return victorious. He longed to give the lie to the taunts of the sceptics, who had reminded him of the fate of the Holy Leagues of the Emperor’s day. When his sublime faith was at last rewarded, he is said to have burst out, in his gratitude to the victor, with the words of the Evangelist, “There was a man sent from God, whose name was John.” The phrase, if it was ever really used, was doubtless but a momentary effusion of ardent thankfulness and joy; but it has a deeper and more permanent significance as well. Whether the disposition of the different units of the Christian fleet, the excellence of its cannon, or the superiority of the tercios to the janizaries, offers the best technical explanation of the victory, is for the naval and military experts to determine; the outstanding fact remains, that had it not been for the inspiration of Don John’s leadership, and the help of the Venetians, there would not have been any campaign at all. The latter of these two essential elements was temporary, uncertain, and, one might almost say, accidental; it had been the product of the rage of the republic over the loss of Cyprus, and could not be expected to last, for the interests of the Venetians and the Spaniards were too radically divergent to make it possible for them to be loyal allies for long. But Spain’s crusading enthusiasm, personified by Don John, was a factor of much deeper and more permanent significance. That enthusiasm had, indeed, been somewhat dissipated and obscured in recent years by the multiplicity of Spain’s other interests, by her differences with the papacy, and by numerous other minor considerations; but it had behind it an age-long tradition, and it flamed out like a beacon at the hour of need. It was in just recognition of Spain’s major part in the splendid triumph that had been so gloriously won, that the Sandjak, or grand standard of the Turks, was handed over for safe-keeping to the monks of the Escorial. Not even in the Vatican could it have found so fit a resting place.

Seldom, if ever, in the history of modern times have the fruits of a fine victory been more shamefully wasted. “Now we must take Jerusalem,” was the cry of Garcia de Toledo, when the first news of Lepanto had come in. A combined attack on Constantinople was also mooted; but before long it was decided that the season was already too far advanced for further offensive operations, and the first golden opportunity had been suffered to slip by. During the ensuing winter, the old differences and jealousies between the allies broke forth afresh. Spain and Venice could not agree as to where the next blow should be planted; while Pope Pius was attempting to bring them together, he was overtaken, on May 1, 1572, by death; and though his successor, Gregory XIII, seemed at first almost to surpass him in his enthusiasm for crusading, he was unable to command the same confidence on the part of the members of the League. Philip II, especially, seized every opportunity for delay; he was much worried by the evidences of the hostility of France and of a possible recrudescence of the ancient Franco-Turkish alliance. He was also beginning to be suspicious of Don John, who now threatened to become too prominent and popular to suit his taste. It is also significant that we find him, at this very juncture, reverting to a project which had been initiated two years before, of bribing Aluch Ali to desert the Sultan; had not Selim given the corsair the supreme command of his fleet, which he succeeded, by the spring of 1572, in raising to the number of some 135 galleys, it is not impossible that Philip’s plots might have succeeded. All this naturally reacted most unfavorably on the attitude of the Pope and the Venetians, who continued to urge active operations in the Levant. Gregory was outspoken in his con-
demnation of the Spanish monarch, while the republic began seriously to consider the advisability of making a separate peace with the infidel behind the backs of her allies, and of utilizing the offers of France to facilitate this end. But the energy and enthusiasm of Don John would not suffer the forces of the League to disperse without one more effort. He finally secured the reluctant permission of Philip for the mobilization of the Spanish squadrons. There was a tardy reunion of the allies in August at Corfu, and a series of inconclusive minor operations against Aluch Ali and the Turkish fleet up and down the western shores of Greece. The nearest to a decisive battle that occurred during the campaign took place on the anniversary of Lepanto off the harbor of Navarino; but the Turk refused to risk his ships in a prolonged engagement against superior forces, and prudently retired, when the enemy bore down upon him, under the protection of the guns of the fortress of Modon. A whole year had been lost, and nothing accomplished; the magnificent outburst of crusading ardor which had made possible the great victory of 1571 had been succeeded by the revival of the old suspicions and distrusts; and in the meantime the infidel had once more become formidable.

If the wasting of the year 1572 was primarily due to the procrastinations of Philip, the dissolution of the League, which was to follow in 1573, must be charged first of all to the treachery of the Venetians. The issue of the campaign of 1572 had convinced the republic that the Spanish monarch would bear no share in any active offensive operations in the Levant, where all her interests lay. She had also observed that Don John had his eye fixed on Tunis, which did not concern her in the least. Throughout the winter months there were rumors and suspicions of her meditated treachery, both at Rome and at Madrid. They were strengthened by the refusal of the republic to arm as many galleys as heretofore for the coming campaign. The Pope was so much alarmed that he urged Philip to come in person to Italy as the sole possible way of saving the situation; and though the Prudent King could not bring himself to do this, he certainly showed far more energy and interest in the affairs of the League than he had exhibited in the preceding year. But it was all in vain. The conviction of the republic that she could not derive any further advantage from continued adherence to her allies had made her abandonment of them practically certain in November, 1572; and French influence and help facilitated her defection. On March 7, 1573, she signed peace with the Porte, on such terms as might have been expected to be made had the verdict of Lepanto been reversed; she tamely gave up Cyprus, whose retention had been the chief inducement that had caused her to join the League, and paid in addition an annual indemnity of 100,000 ducats for three years to come. Gregory was furious when the news reached him a month later, and the different Spanish representatives in Italy scarcely less so; for a moment there was even talk of chastising the republic for her treachery. But the wiser heads soon realized that vengeance was, for the present, quite outside the sphere of practical politics, especially in view of the state of affairs in France and the Low Countries; and Philip, when he learned the facts, did not utter a word of reproach against the deserters. He could not afford to quarrel with them, and he knew it; and even Gregory, before many months had passed, came reluctantly to the same conclusion. It remained to be seen what the Pope and the Spaniards could accomplish against the infidel without the aid of the republic.

If the defection of the Venetians made it manifestly impossible to attempt any extensive operations in the Levant, it also removed the principal objection to Don John’s directing his efforts to some purpose more immediately advantageous to Spain. Late in the summer it was decided that the victor of Lepanto should be permitted to attack the city of Tunis, now occupied by the Turkish garrison installed there in 1569 by Aluch Ali, though the Spaniards still held on at La Goletta. Don John left Sicily on October 1 for this purpose, with an armament of over 100 galleys, and some 20,000 troops; a week later he arrived off La Goletta, where he was welcomed like a conqueror. The Turks at Tunis, reading the signs, made haste to evacuate. Three days later the Spaniards entered the city almost without striking a blow, and set up the old sham Hafside dynasty there again in the person of Muley Mohammed, son of Muley Hassan, the protégé of Charles V. But the fruits of this easy triumph were speedily lost through the failure of the victors to consolidate their gains. The usual story is that Philip had only consented to the expedition on condition that, after the expulsion of the Turks, the walls both of Tunis and of La Goletta should be completely destroyed, and the place evacuated; that he was unwilling to spend money on an outpost so remote; and that he was in mortal terror lest Don John, of whom he was becoming more jealous every day, should establish himself there as a semi-independent prince. Others reject these allegations as groundless, and insist that Philip wished Tunis to be preserved. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the point at issue, it is certain that Don John received no real support in his efforts to maintain what he had won. After the capture of Tunis, he gave orders for the preservation of the existing fortresses, and for the erection of a new one; on his departure for Sicily, two weeks later, he left an experienced officer in charge of the work, together with a garrison of 8000 men; and on his return to Sicily he besought Philip to send over yet more troops and supplies. But he was
everywhere met with the most exasperating excuses and refusals, not only from the king himself, but also from the royal representatives in Italy. Despite all his efforts, the place remained unfit to stand a siege; and the Argus-eyed Aluch Ali, who, ever since his flight from Lepanto, had burned for revenge, was ready to seize his chance.

Fresh rumors began to reach Western Europe in the early spring of 1574 of the preparation of another large fleet in Constantinople, of which Aluch Ali was to have command; and there could be no reasonable doubt what its destination was to be. Don John saw the approaching peril and did his utmost to avert it. He elicited orders from Philip—needless to add, too late—for the preparation of 100 sail at Messina, and sent off some twenty galleys with men and munitions to reenforce the garrison of La Goletta. But the enemy was too prompt and too powerful to permit him to do more. On July 13, Aluch Ali appeared before Tunis with a fleet of 230 galleys and a host of smaller ships. There were apparently as many as 70,000 troops on board under command of Sinan Pasha, the son-in-law of the Sultan. The pasha of Tripoli and the inland tribes also furnished their contingents, so as to blockade the fortress on the land side; in all, the infidel armies numbered nearly 100,000 men. Against such overwhelming forces, the Christian garrisons in La Goletta and the unfinished new fortress—still a ‘cowpen’ to use the picturesque language of the soldiers, rather than a fort—were naturally insufficient, and the Turks began operations too swiftly to permit the larger reinforcements which Don John was painfully preparing in Sicily to arrive in time. On August 23, La Goletta was taken, and the garrison massacred, save for two or three hundred men, among them the commander, Portocarrero, who were enslaved; and the new fortress, after a heroic resistance, succumbed on September 15. The new fortifications were promptly blown up; a Turkish pasha was installed, with an adequate garrison, to organize the conquest after the infidel fashion; and in October Aluch Ali was back in Constantinople, bringing with him, in token of his triumph, some 300 Christian cannon, a number of distinguished captives, and finally Muley Mohammed, the last of the Hafsides. The greatest of the Emperor’s North African victories had been reversed, and the defeat of Lepanto at least partially avenged.

From 1574 onward, Philip lost all interest in fighting the hereditary foe. The papacy made several efforts to revive his crusading ardor, but in vain. The loss of Tunis convinced the Spanish monarch that it was bad policy to spend money on the maintenance of remote outposts; the verdict of Lepanto had been at least sufficiently decisive to deter the infidel from annoying him by raids into the western basin of the Mediterranean on any such scale as had been customary in the days of his father; above all, the pressure of his multifarious projects and responsibilities in Western Europe was sufficient, during the remaining years of his rule, to occupy all his time. One of these projects, the annexation of Portugal, was indeed, as we shall later see, to bring him temporarily into relations with the rulers of Morocco; but that was a minor affair, quite apart from the main problem of his attitude toward the Turks, and his handling of it was such as to demonstrate beyond any doubt that he had lost all enthusiasm for North African campaigning. Oran and Mers-el-Kebir he continued to hold, despite the opinion of many of his counsellors that their maintenance cost more than it was worth; and their successive commanders continued to wage the same series of petty and fruitless wars with the neighboring tribes which had meant so much labor and pain to their predecessors. It was entirely characteristic of the Spanish king that here, as in so many other of his affairs, he should have insisted on the policy of a rigid maintenance of the status quo. And it is interesting to observe that Philip’s resolve to retain these two places prevented him, for several years, from obtaining the definite peace with the Porte which, despite all the threats and censures of the papacy, he had determined to seek since at least as early as 1575, when secret Spanish agents began to appear in Constantinople. By 1577, his efforts in this direction became more vigorous and definite; a certain Milanese called John of Marigiliano and an Albanian named Bruti were charged with the difficult task, only to be told that a treaty was impossible as long as the Spaniards kept Oran. For three years more the matter hung fire. A report which reached Rome, in advance of the fact, in February, 1579, to the effect that peace had been actually concluded, elicited a final protest from Gregory XIII; but Philip went steadily on his course, and on March 21, 1580, he at last attained his end. A revolt of the local Berber tribes against the Turkish representative in Algiers apparently convinced Sultan Murad III that he could ill afford to remain at enmity with Spain, whether she continued to occupy Oran or not, and he finally granted the Spanish representative a truce to last till January, 1581; after that it was twice renewed till 1585, when further serious fighting had ceased to be practically possible. The whole negotiation was conducted in most extraordinary fashion. The Spanish representatives at Constantinople were treated rather as prisoners than as ambassadors, and they were constantly impeded by the counter-plots of the French and English; but the enhancement of the power and territories of their master, through the annexation of Portugal and her colonies in the East and West, furnished an argument in their favor which the Turks found increasingly potent. Save for
motives of religion, far less powerful than heretofore, Spain and the infidel had really little left to fight about. Each entertained a somewhat excessive respect for the power of the other. Both were exceedingly busy about other things. And the natural result was that though they were far from becoming friends, they ceased to be active foes.

Such was the rather sorry termination of a conflict which had gone on intermittently for over eight centuries, and in which the most ancient and permanent traditions of the Spanish Empire were intimately bound up. The fact is worth emphasizing that the end came simultaneously with, and in some measure because of, the expansion of the Spanish Empire in other directions, an expansion which was to carry it to its greatest territorial extent. From the eighth to the thirteenth century Spain had made practically all her conquests at the expense of the infidel; from the thirteenth to the latter part of the sixteenth, she had advanced at the cost of infidel and Christian alike, and also of the aborigines of the Western Hemisphere; after 1580, the infidel really drops out of the picture; he is virtually forgotten in the pressure of other things. But what perhaps in the long run is even more significant than the coincidence of the cessation of war against the Turk with the annexation of Portugal and her dominions overseas, is the fact that the ensuing era of peace with the infidel is also that of the beginning of Spain’s decline; when bereft of the ancient inspiration of crusading, she ceased to go forward and began to go back. She had more than done her part during the preceding century in maintaining the great struggle of the Cross against the Crescent. She had surpassed all other European nations in the carrying of the Gospel to the natives of the New World. But when it came to the assertion of her supremacy over her Christian neighbors to the north of her—the task which was to occupy her in the succeeding decades—she was destined to experience a series of bitter defeats; for her adversaries had attuned their lives to modernity, while she, in large measure, was still living in the past. It has often been pointed out that Spain’s reverses in Western Europe were at least one reason why she ceased to carry on the struggle against Islam; and the observation is entirely justified by the facts. But it is also quite possible to turn the statement around the other way, and to maintain that the fact that Spain had ceased to fight the infidel was in itself a contributing cause of the disintegration of her mighty empire, in that it deprived her of the most powerful of all the incentives which had made possible her greatest triumphs in the ages that had gone before.
CHAPTER XXXIII
AMERICA AND THE PHILIPPINES

The story of Spain in the New World is far less interesting during the reign of Philip II than under Charles V. The age of the greatest explorers and conquistadores is past; there are no adventures comparable to those of de Soto or Orellana, no feats of arms like those of Cortes and the Pizarros. The novelty of it all had begun to wear off, and the mother country was no longer fascinated by the Indies in the way that it had been in the Emperor’s day. Yet if measured by a less exalted standard, the progress of the Spanish rule in America under the Prudent King is by no means unimportant. There were, at least, several ‘Phoenixes of the conquistadores’; such was Francisco de Ibarra, who first brought effectively under Spanish control the regions comprised in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, roughly corresponding to the four northwestern states of the present republic of Mexico; such were Fray Agustin Rodriguez, Antonio de Espejo, and Juan de Onate, who penetrated and began to colonize the southwestern portion of what is now the United States; such was also Sebastian Viscaino, who explored the Gulf of California, and later (after Philip’s death) followed up the Pacific coast as far as Cape Blanco in Oregon; by these, and others like them, the area of the Spanish dominions in America was greatly enlarged. But it would be foolhardy to attempt to chronicle all these achievements in a work of the present size; we will therefore select three principal lines of development, each one of them typical of the Spanish method of dealing with a different problem of imperial domain and try to portray them in some detail. These are, first, the settlement of Florida and conflicts with the French (1559-68), which indicate the attitude of the Spaniard toward the foreign infringer of his colonial monopoly; secondly, the Araucanian war, which shows how he fought the native Indian who refused to acknowledge the authority of the king of Spain; and thirdly, the refounding of Buenos Aires and the opening up of La Plata, an early stage of the long process of the transference of the economic center of gravity of South America from the Pacific to the Atlantic coast.

The Spaniards, on the whole, had been grievously disappointed by the results of the expeditions that had hitherto been sent out to explore and subject the region which they called Florida. The legend that it contained the fountain of eternal youth was not yet, indeed, wholly extinct, and Cabeza de Vaca, despite all the terrible privations that he had undergone there between 1528 and 1536, described it in his narrative as the “richest country in the world”; but as no tangible proof of these wonders had been forthcoming, men had generally gravitated to the verdict of Castaneda in 1543 that it was actually “full of bogs and poisonous fruits, barren, and the very worst country that is warmed by the sun.” Save for shipwrecks and certain sporadic and generally unsuccessful missionary endeavors, the Spaniards left the whole region virtually untouched during the ensuing seventeen years.

At the time that the Emperor was giving place to his son Philip, there were signs of a great recrudescence of interest. The missionary appeal was always sure of a favorable audience at the court of the Prudent King; the second viceroy of Mexico, Luis de Velasco, who had succeeded Mendoza in 1550, sent home pressing demands for the occupation of Florida; and Philip was the more inclined to listen to them because of his fear that if its settlement was not speedily effected there was grave danger of his being forestalled by the French. Ever since the expedition of Jacques Cartier to the ‘codfish waters’ in 1534-35, the dread of French competition in the New World had been felt very seriously at the Spanish court. The Emperor had laid stress upon it in his instructions to his son, and it had been reemphasized in dramatic fashion, not only by the establishment in 1558 in the bay of Rio de Janeiro of the short-lived settlement of Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon, known as ‘La France Antarctique’, but also, much closer at hand, by a series of daring French raids on the Spanish settlements on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and the islands of the Caribbean Sea. Porto Bello, Cartagena, and Havana were perhaps the favorite points of attack, and much booty was taken. It was noted, moreover, that these raids occurred not only at times when France and Spain were at war in Europe, but also in years when they were officially at peace; in other words, a brood of French corsairs and adventurers was apparently growing up which the home government was unable to control, and it was impossible to tell when or
where they would next strike. Let them change their aims from piracy to colonization, and the scene of
their activities from the region of the Gulf of Mexico to the hitherto unoccupied mainland farther north,
and they might easily found a settlement which would imperil the Spanish monopoly of the New World.
It may possibly be a slight exaggeration to speak of Philip as developing “the policy ... of carrying
expansion into the heart of the continent as a means of repelling the aggressions of his European rivals”; 
but there can be no doubt that the desire to anticipate the French was one of the principal motives that
caused him, in December, 1557, to listen to the urgent pleas of Velasco, and order him, despite previous
prohibitions, to “send out ... to make new discoveries and settlements in Florida.” Velasco gave the post
of governor of the prospective colony (October 30, 1558) to Tristan de Luna y Arellano, who had been
resident in New Spain for some thirty years and was highly esteemed for his uprightness and efficiency.
Preparations to fit out an adequate expedition were pushed rapidly forward in the winter of 1558-59; in
June, 1559, a fleet of thirteen vessels carrying some 1500 persons—men, women, and children,
Spaniards, renegade Florida Indians, negro slaves, and Dominican friars—, 240 horses, and an
abundance of ammunition and supplies, set sail with high hopes from Vera Cruz for the northeast.

The expedition, however, was unlucky from the very first, and the result was to add one more to
the already long list of disastrous experiences of the Spaniards in Florida. The adventurers made their
first landing at what is now Mobile Bay; but, in the belief that a better place could be found farther
eastward, they moved on some twenty leagues to Pensacola, where they finally established their base.
This was most unfortunate. Had they remained in Mobile Bay they could have ascended the Alabama
River in boats and made settlements in the rich lands along its banks within easy reach of the sea; as it
was, the exploring expeditions which they sent out from Pensacola struck the comparatively poor pine
lands farther south and eastward. Some of the native Indians proved friendly and others hostile, and
some of the adventurers became involved in the warfare of the local tribes. Provisions ran short; dis-
content became rife, and de Luna found it almost impossible to maintain discipline; after a year in
Florida almost everyone in the expedition was clamoring to return to Mexico. It was in the early months
of 1561 that the miseries of the colonists reached their climax; on Palm Sunday a mutiny was narrowly
averted through the devotion of the Dominican friars; and then two days later the long-awaited succor
arrived from Mexico with supplies sufficient to relieve present needs. The relief expedition brought
also, however, a new governor, Angel de Villafañe, commissioned by the viceroy to supersede de Luna,
of whose leadership unfavorable reports had been received. As Villafañe had orders to occupy Cape
Santa Elena and trace the Atlantic coast, and as no one was anxious to remain at Pensacola, the
settlement there was virtually abandoned. De Luna departed for Havana and then for Spain, in a vain
attempt to reimburse himself for the expenses which he had personally incurred; and most of the rest of
his company that remained accompanied Villafañe on his mission to Cape Santa Elena. On May 27,
1561, he reached it by sea, after touching at Havana on the way; he ascended a neighboring river some
fourteen miles, and formally took possession in the king’s name; and in the next two weeks he
reconnoitered the Atlantic coast northward as far as Cape Hatteras. But he found no country suitable for
permanent occupation; his small fleet was in grave peril from storms; and finally, on July 9, he got back
to Hispaniola. He had totally failed to establish a settlement, but he had also convinced himself that
there was no danger that any other power would make the attempt. Moreover, he appears to have
succeeded in persuading Philip that the region was safe from foreign intrusion, for on September 23 the
king ordered the abandonment of all attempts to colonize the Atlantic coast. The very next year was to
prove that these calculations were entirely wrong.

The story of the first expedition of the French Protestant, Jean Bibaut, to the shores of Florida
has been so often told that it is not necessary here to do more than repeat it in outline. The adventurers
were sent out through the efforts of the Admiral Gaspard de Coligny; they had two large ships and three
small ones, carrying in all some 150 men, most of them ardent Calvinists; they sailed from Havre on
February 16, 1562, and landed on May 1 at the mouth of the St. John’s River. There Ribaut erected a
stone column with the arms of France engraved on it; then he coasted northward, finally landing again
at a point which most historians have now agreed in identifying as Port Royal Sound, South Carolina.
There he built a small blockhouse which he named Charlesfort, in honor of his king, and then, leaving
twenty-eight of his most devoted followers to form the nucleus of a colony, he hurried back to France to
get reinforcements. But what is of greater interest for our present purpose is the accuracy of the
information furnished to Philip in regard to this enterprise. His ambassador at the French court, Perrenot
de Chantonnay, had got wind of the project long before Ribaut sailed, and sent home full details, laying
horrified emphasis on the fact that those engaged in it were heretics and pirates, and had no official
sanction from the government of France; Philip could only regard them as corsarios Luteranos. This
impression, moreover, was materially strengthened by the course of events after Ribaut’s return. Civil
war was raging in France at the time; and as Ribaut was consequently unable to get the help he desired,
he crossed the Channel in hopes of better fortune in England. He had no success there; in fact, his activities landed him temporarily in prison; but his doings were reported to Madrid by Quadra quite as fully as they had previously been by Chantonnay, and Philip’s jealousy and resentment were fanned to a white heat. The whole matter was frankly unintelligible to his meticulous and legalistic mind. That his exclusive right to the New World should be challenged by any one was hard enough to understand; but that his neighbors, with whom he was honestly striving to maintain amicable relations at the time, should permit rebels and heretics to trespass there, was utterly incomprehensible. Efforts to get satisfaction from Catharine and Elizabeth proved unavailing, and so finally, in May, 1564, a small expedition was sent out at Philip’s order by the governor of Cuba, under Hernando Manrique de Rojas, to find and obliterate all traces of the French occupation of the Florida coast. It proved an unexpectedly easy task; for the remnants of the little colony which Ribaut had left at Charlesfort, rent by internal dissension and discouraged by loneliness and privations, had by this time deserted their post and gone home. On June 15 Manrique left the shores of the continent for Cuba, convinced that his enemies had departed for good. It was just seven days after he had gone that a second and far more formidable French expedition arrived.

The newcomers, some 300 strong, had been sent out, like their predecessors, through the instrumentality of Coligny. Since Ribaut was still imprisoned in England, they were commanded by René de Laudonnière, one of Ribaut’s companions on his first voyage. They established themselves at the mouth of the St. John’s River at the point where Ribaut had planted the column with the arms of France; there they built a redoubt which they called Fort Caroline. But they were singularly unsuccessful both as colonists and as explorers. Within two months of their arrival insubordination became rife. On September 20 thirteen of their number took one of the ships and started off on a piratical cruise against the Spaniards in the West Indies; after seizing a shipload of gold and silver, they were themselves captured and taken to Havana, where they were forced to give information about the colony from which they had come. Other similar incidents, on a somewhat larger scale, followed in the succeeding months. To the French they made it evident that Laudonnière was not strong enough to control his followers, and that if the colony was to be saved he must be superseded by a better man; to the Spaniards they furnished convincing proof that the insolence of the corsarios Luteranos had reached greater heights than ever and that they must consequently be vigorously chastised. The events of the year 1565, both in Europe and in America, were to bring the opposing theories of right and title to the New World into dramatic conflict with one another.

On March 20, at Madrid, Philip put his signature to an asiento creating Pedro Menendez de Aviles adelantado of Florida, and appointing him captain-general of a fleet which was to carry 500 colonists to settle it. Menendez, who was at that time forty-six years old, was an Asturian of distinguished ancestry, who had already given high proof of exceptional valor, ability, and loyalty by the services he had rendered his master both in the Old World and in the New. It was characteristic of him that he staked all his private fortune on the success of the venture, and that he succeeded, before it set sail, in trebling its size. News of counter-preparations in France emphasized the wisdom of this course, and the expedition, when it finally departed from Cadiz on June 29, consisted of ten ships carrying 1500 souls. Seven weeks previously Jean Ribaut, released from prison, had embarked at Dieppe with a fleet of seven ships and a large number of followers, to supersede Laudonnière and reinforce his colony. Coligny, as before, was the moving spirit in the enterprise, but the queen-mother was also cognizant of it, and though she was informed of the preparations of Menendez, and knew that his destination was identical with that of Ribaut, she was fully prepared to justify the latter’s expedition on the ground that it was directed to the Terre des Bretons, which had been claimed by France since the time of Verrazzano, and whose southern boundary was of course just as indeterminate as was the northern limit of New Spain. Ribaut’s fleet was long delayed by adverse winds. Not until August 28 did the adventurers reach the mouth of the St. John’s, where they found the last remnant of Laudonnière’s colony, utterly disheartened and actually on the point of setting sail to return to France; had Ribaut arrived a day later he would infallibly have found it gone. As it was, he had little difficulty in inducing his countrymen to remain. Laudonnière accepted his demotion with dignity, and preparations were at once begun to refound and extend the settlement, when suddenly, on September 4, just one week after Ribaut’s arrival, another large fleet was descried on the southern horizon. It was the advance guard of the expedition of Menendez, which had also experienced bad weather in crossing the Atlantic, and had been obliged to put in at the West Indies for repairs. He had landed at last on the Florida coast, some twelve leagues to the southward of the Frenchmen, on the very day (August 28) that Ribaut had reached the St. John’s, and had established a base which he called St. Augustine, in honor of the saint whose festival it was. He was now coasting northward in search of his foes.
The story of the next six weeks is a sad chronicle of bloodshed. Menendez immediately attacked four of Ribaut’s ships which were lying outside the harbor and dispersed them. Two days later he was back at St. Augustine, where he landed his troops and munitions in preparation for a land attack on Fort Caroline. That attack was delivered in a pouring rain, in the small hours of the morning of September 20, and was completely successful. Ribaut, with the flower of the garrison, had gone off in chase of the Spanish fleet, so that the defenders, most of whom were in their beds, were in no condition to resist. One hundred and thirty-two were killed outright; fifty women and children and half a dozen drummers and trumpeters were taken prisoners; the rest escaped into the forests or swam out to the ships that remained in the harbor, and Menendez rechristened the place San Mateo. Eight days later, after he had returned to St. Augustine, he got word from some Indians that about 140 of Ribaut’s men, the remnants of the crews of two of his ships which had been wrecked in the storm, were stranded on a marshy island to the south of him. Taking some sixty men with him, he advanced to a point on the mainland where he could be seen; whereupon one of the Frenchmen swam over and asked for a safe conduct to Fort Caroline. Menendez in his reply stated plainly that he was there as Philip’s adelantado, commissioned to purge his Majesty’s dominions of all heretics. He bluntly refused to give the Frenchmen the safe conduct they asked for and furnished convincing proof that Fort Caroline was already in his hands. When they came back with the request for a ship and sailors to take them back to France, he refused again, demanding that they all of them give up their arms and place themselves at his mercy, “in order that he might do with them as the Lord commanded him”; finally, he indignantly rejected a ransom of 5000 ducats that was proffered if he would spare their lives. The Frenchmen, then, had no valid reason for expecting anything but death at his hands; but their situation was so desperate that they had no alternative save to place themselves at his mercy. All their arms were sent across to the mainland in a boat; then they themselves were ferried over in groups of ten; once on the shore, their hands were tied behind their backs, on the plea that otherwise they might overpower their less numerous captors. Ten of them, who were found to be Catholics, were sent by boat to St. Augustine; the rest, who confessed themselves Protestants, were given food and drink and were then started out on their march north to the Spanish camp four leagues away. After proceeding a few hundred yards they came to a line in the sand which Menendez had drawn with his spear; at that point they were set upon by the Spaniards and butchered to a man. Two weeks later, on October 12, the selfsame tragedy was reenacted, in the selfsame manner, and on the selfsame spot, the victims this time being Jean Ribaut himself and some seventy of his men, who found themselves in exactly the same predicament as their predecessors, and elected rather to throw themselves on the mercy of Menendez than to face the certainty of death by starvation. In early November, when the Spanish commander learned that the remnant of his enemies had gathered near Cape Canaveral, where they had built a fort and were constructing a ship to return to France, he advanced against them, and this time promised them their lives if they would surrender. All but five accepted the proffered terms, and Menendez loyally kept his word.

Before attempting to pass judgment on these events, it will be interesting to examine the story of the reception of the news in Europe. The Spanish king had learned about the preparations for Ribaut’s second expedition in late March or early April, only a short time, if at all, before he had signed the asiento with Menendez, and Coligny, and also, in all probability, the queen-mother, knew all about the proposed voyage of Menendez before Ribaut set sail. But neither Philip nor Catharine gave the other any official notification of what had happened for many weeks to come. It was natural that the queen-mother should not do so. Since Ribaut had departed without her official sanction, she would do nothing to make it difficult for her to disavow him. Philip’s motives for delay were somewhat different. The conference at Bayonne was to take place in early June, and nothing must be suffered to mar the harmony of that reunion. Moreover, by the time that the conference had actually opened, Ribaut had already left, and Philip saw that the question would have to be solved rather by fighting in the New World than by diplomacy in the Old. He commanded Alava, Chantonnay’s successor, not to say a word to Catharine about Menendez until the latter had been gone so long that it would be impossible to recall or overtake him; as a matter of fact the Spanish ambassador did not notify the French court until November 23, probably at least a month after Philip had learned of the arrival of Menendez in Florida, and six full weeks after Ribaut and his companions had been massacred. On that occasion Alava bluntly demanded that the French withdraw; but Catharine skillfully avoided the issue by protesting that she had no intention of trespassing on Spanish soil, and was only seeking to colonize the Terre des Bretons. With the turn of the year, however, the news of the massacres and of the Spanish triumph had reached both Paris and Madrid, and there was no longer any point in further evasion or pretense; Philip’s sole object now was to utilize the matter to discredit the cause of the French Huguenots. In mid-February at Madrid the whole story was retailed with brutal frankness to the French ambassador by the Duke of Alva, who justified the conduct of Menéndez at every point, and laid the whole blame for the tragedy on Coligny; on March 16, at Moulins, Alava staged a similar performance for the benefit of Catharine de’
Medici. The queen-mother had learned all the facts long before the Spanish ambassador related them to her, and was therefore the better prepared to hold her own in the interview; but though she fought “like an enraged lioness” in debate, and protested that “neither Turks nor Moors would have been guilty of so great a cruelty as the Spaniards had practiced on the subjects of her son”, she knew that for the present she was powerless to get redress. She could not afford to quarrel with Philip, and she realized it. Revenge, as the sequel was to prove, was to be obtained by a private adventurer.

More significant still was the reception of the news in Spain. Menendez wrote a full account of his doings to the king, omitting nothing and palliating nothing, and Philip conveyed to him his full approval of the massacre; “as for the judgment you have executed upon the Lutheran corsairs,” so his letter runs, “we believe that you have acted with entire justification and prudence, and we hold that we have been well served”. The whole Spanish court was delighted at the news, “more gladdened”, said Fourquevaux, “than if it had been a victory over the Turk”. Clearly in the eyes of his compatriots Menendez had every reason to be proud, and none whatever to be ashamed, of what he had done; and if the line of reasoning on which his actions were based fails to appeal to us today, we must remember that it would scarcely have been possible for him to have followed any other. His master’s claim to the whole of the Western Hemisphere except Brazil, by the bull of Alexander VI and the Tordesillas Line, as well as by right of priority in discovery and colonization, must have been in his eyes unimpeachable.

The French were but common trespassers and pirates; that they were not officially supported by their government proclaimed as much, and the fact that most of them were Protestants made the matter even worse. He had treated them, indeed, with relentless severity; but the fact that his prisoners were more numerous than their captors gave his conduct the sanction of prudence, if not of humanity, and there is not the slightest reasonable evidence that he ever broke his word. The massacres he ordered have stained his reputation with a blot that it will never be possible to efface; but if he had been given a happier task, and a more favorable opportunity in which to display his talents, he might well have been numbered among the foremost of the great conquistadores who planted the banners of Spain in the New World.

The rest of the story of the Spanish settlements in Florida during the period of Philip II is not lacking in dramatic interest; but its practical importance for our purposes is comparatively slight, and we cannot do more than summarize it briefly here. After disposing of the French, Menendez planned to devote his energies to exploring the interior, and also the Atlantic coast to the northward as far as Chesapeake Bay, where he believed he would find the longed-for strait leading to the Pacific; he also made persistent efforts to convert the Indians. Ill fortune, however, attended his efforts. The natives were generally treacherous and hostile; the garrisons at St. Augustine and San Mateo were discontented and mutinous, and in May, 1567, Menendez went back to Spain, where he successfully vindicated himself against the reports of his detractors, received high honors and rewards at the hands of his king, but failed to get the prompt and effective assistance for his colony which he desired most of all. And in the interim between his departure from Florida and his return thither in 1568-69, the French took their revenge for the massacres of 1565. Rumors had reached France, through Fourquevaux, of the wretched state of the Florida colony. Such a favorable opportunity to attack it might never come again, and since the Valois government was in no condition to give official sanction to such an enterprise, it was undertaken, instead, on his own initiative, by a restless patriot called Dominique de Gourgues, who, though in all probability a Catholic, was determined to right the wrongs of his fellow-countrymen, and whose enthusiasm for fighting Spaniards had been fired by the maltreatment to which he had been subjected when a prisoner aboard their galleys. On August 2, 1567, he set sail from Bordeaux with three ships and 180 men. He concealed the real object of his expedition even from his own followers, under the pretense that it was intended for a slave raid in North Africa; but on reaching the West Indies, he revealed to them its true purpose, and in April, 1568, he accomplished it. He was greatly aided by the Florida Indians, who detested the Spaniards. A surprise attack, delivered while the defenders were “still picking their teeth” after their midday meal, was completely successful. San Mateo and its two subsidiary forts were captured, most of the garrison being killed in the assaults; all of the rest, save a few who escaped, were hanged on the adjacent trees, under an inscription which read: “I do this not as to Spaniards, nor as to Marranos, but as to traitors, robbers, and murderers.” With this signal act of vengeance de Gourgues elected to rest content. St. Augustine, now keenly on the watch, he decided to leave alone, and on Monday, May 3, he set sail for France. When he learned of the event, Philip was prompt to demand satisfaction from Catharine, which he naturally failed to get; but as the French showed no intention of following up their vengeance with renewed attempts to colonize, the matter was allowed to drop.

The history of the Florida colony during the rest of Philip’s reign is a dreary chronicle of discouragement and destitution. Menendez, the only person who had its interest really at heart, visited it
for the last time in 1571, but death claimed him in 1574 before he could accomplish anything in its behalf. Six years later St. Augustine was raided by Sir Francis Drake. The natives, despite persistent attempts to civilize and convert them, continued to be both treacherous and hostile; no gold was found, and provisions were perpetually running short. At the time of Philip’s death, it is probable that the total number of Spaniards in the colony did not exceed 300; and there is every reason to believe that they would have deserted their post, had it not been for the home government’s unwillingness to leave it unoccupied, and for the zeal of the missionaries for the conversion of the Indians.

The contrast between the conditions which obtained in Southern Chile during the reign of Philip II and those that we have outlined on the coasts of Florida furnishes a significant illustration of the variety of the different problems with which the Spaniards were confronted in their efforts to establish their title to the New World. In Chile the *corsarios Luteranos*, who had been their chief rivals in Florida, counted for almost nothing. Sir Francis Drake, it is true, passed through the Strait of Magellan in August, 1578, ravaged the Chilean shores, got a rich booty at Valparaiso, was repulsed at La Serena, and continued on up the coast. His fellow countryman, Thomas Cavendish, followed after him in 1587, neglected to relieve the starving remnants of a small Spanish colony which had been planted a few years previously in the Strait, landed at Quinteros, was defeated in a skirmish with the inhabitants there, and sailed north to Peru. Finally, seven years later, Sir Richard Hawkins, who had inherited all his father’s enthusiasm for plundering the Spaniards, put Philip’s subjects up in arms all the way from Valparaiso northward to Atacames in Ecuador, where he was finally assailed by an overwhelming force and captured. But these were merely incidents, pirate raids of the sort from which all of Philip’s colonies suffered with increasing frequency in the latter years of the reign, and they only occasionally disturbed the Chilean Spaniards in their efforts to accomplish what may be regarded as their principal task. That task was the conquest and subjection of the Araucanian Indians.

We have seen that the war against the Araucanians had begun in the Emperor’s day, and that the Spaniards had already had sufficient experience of it to learn that their foes were vastly more warlike than most of the American Indians, and that they had no desire to be converted or civilized, but were bent on maintaining their independence. The home government, however, had failed to learn that continuity of administration and personnel was essential to the successful prosecution of such an arduous struggle. Philip’s perpetual jealousy of his subordinates, his haunting dread that they might somehow get out of hand and attempt to embark on enterprises of their own, manifested itself most clearly of all in the case of his remoter possessions; he dared not leave them undisturbed for any length of time, and his constant replacements of the governors of Chile caused disastrous interruptions of the campaign against the Araucanians. We have already seen that in 1557 Villagran and Aguirre, the two rival veterans of the early days of the conquest, had been displaced, at the order of Andres Hurtado de Mendoza, viceroy of Peru, by Mendoza’s son, Garcia Hurtado, and that the young man had won splendid victories over the Araucanians in the course of the next two years. But Philip could not bear to see so much power concentrated in the hands of a single family; so in 1563 he recalled both the viceroy and his son, and quite characteristically permitted the latter to be superseded by his ancient rival, Villagran. The veteran, however, was much less successful against the Indians than the man he replaced; he suffered a series of disastrous defeats, and when he died in office, in June, 1563, his cousin and successor, Pedro de Villagran, was equally luckless. The latter’s place was taken by Rodrigo de Quiroga, an adherent of the Mendozas, who signalized his advent to power by a brilliant victory over the Araucanians. Yet Philip, despite the good reports of Quiroga which he received, continued to be distrustful. His next step was to confide the government of Chile to an audiencia of four *oidores*, which arrived and took office in 1567; but it was even more unfortunate than the Villagrans in its conduct of the war, and it was consequently suppressed in January, 1575, when Quiroga came back to power at the mandate of the crown, and did his best to retrieve the disasters of the preceding years. So it went on to the end of the chapter; the royal dread of the too successful conquistador being the only permanent element in the situation. No real continuity in office was allowed, and precious experience was thus suffered to go to waste. News of a victory over the Indians was gratefully received at home, but it also constituted a strong reason for suspecting the victor; local jealousies were kept alive, nay even fostered, in order to prevent any faction from becoming dangerously predominant. Small wonder, under all these circumstances, if the Araucanian war continued throughout the reign, without any decisive result.

It is not worthwhile to follow the ups and downs of the struggle. At the time of Philip’s accession, the theatre of war was limited to a small tract between the Biobio and the Tirna, and that portion of it was usually known as the *guerra vieja* because it dated from the Emperor’s time; under Quiroga, the natives near Valdivia, Villarrica, and Osorno rose in arms, and the campaigns against them
came to be called the guerra nueva. But the struggle was no nearer termination at the end of the reign than at the beginning. Indeed, the decade covering the last five years of Philip’s life and the first five of that of his successor saw the Araucanians seize the offensive under one of their greatest chieftains, Paillamachu, and to such good effect that in 1603 the Spaniards had been practically ousted from all of the country south of the Biobío. The Spaniards had been obliged greatly to increase their forces during Philip’s reign. Whereas Valdivia had made war with companies of a hundred men, his successors, forty years later, were commanding five times that number. But they could never get it into their heads that the Araucanians, unlike the majority of the South American natives, were not to be frightened into submission by a single defeat, and that after it had been inflicted on them, a series of desultory raids would be quite insufficient to keep them down; they consequently were often overwhelmed by the unexpected offensives of their foes. And if the Araucanians were slightly less numerous at the end of the reign than at the beginning, they had enormously increased the efficiency of their fighting machine. They learned from the Spaniards the value of defensive armor, of intrenchments, and of feigned retreats; they possessed horses, which they used to the best possible effect; moreover, they showed signs of appreciating the desirability of diminishing the horrors of warfare. Though they had not abandoned cannibalism at the end of the sixteenth century, they had begun to see that it was better to exchange their prisoners than to execute them. Altogether it is small wonder that in presence of foes so relentless, who were rapidly perfecting themselves in the methods of European warfare, the Spaniards returned battered and disheartened from the terrible privations and sufferings of the successive campaigns.

The halting progress of the Araucanian war had its inevitable reaction on the life of the Chilean colony. Besides being in large measure responsible for the frequent changes of administration, it made the whole settlement a debit rather than a credit item in the royal accounts. Instead of receiving gold and silver from it, Philip had to be constantly sending money thither to pay his troops. That his Spanish soldiers could not terminate the struggle victoriously and at once was something that passed his comprehension, and deeply galled his pride; it also served to arouse fresh suspicions, and confirmed his conviction that his representatives in Chile were somehow playing him false. In the colony itself the results were scarcely less lamentable. At the outset there had been much enthusiasm for the war, which was expected to end in a triumphal procession down to the Strait. Men served in it without pay, in the hope of being rewarded with encomiendas; in 1546 there had even been fears lest Santiago be depopulated. Fifty years later all this was changed. It was almost impossible to get soldiers to fight. Desertion was frequent; nothing but high pay in cash would induce men to enlist, for there was little or no chance of obtaining booty in the war, and nobody cared any longer to possess landed estates which were certain to be raided by the Indians. Mining activities, also, came almost to a standstill; agriculture and pasturage, though the climate was highly favorable to them, were neglected; and the Spanish population, at the end of the reign, did not reach 3000 souls.

Altogether, the condition of the colony gave cause for much anxiety and dissatisfaction, both in Spain and in America, at the time of Philip’s death. Perhaps the most notable thing that was achieved during his reign on what is now Chilean territory was the exploration of the Strait of Magellan; and that was undertaken, not through the efforts of the local Spanish authorities, but at the behest of the viceroy of New Castile. The voyage of Drake in 1578 furnished the impetus for it, and the task was entrusted to Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, a Galician sailor of considerable repute. He returned to Spain, visited Philip during the progress of the Portuguese campaign, and was commanded by him to erect fortifications in the narrows; but vile weather and the rivalries of his captains prevented him from accomplishing all that had been hoped, and the two small settlements which he established in the strait perished wretchedly a few years later from starvation.

While the Chileans were in the throes of the Araucanian war, their more fortunate neighbors to the north of them were able to make at least two fresh contributions to the westward march of the Spanish Empire in the Pacific. The first was the expedition which left Callao on November 19, 1567, under command of Alvaro de Mendaña, discovered the Solomon Islands in the following February, and, after several encounters with the cannibal natives, got back to New Spain in March, 1569. Mendaña’s failure to bring home gold made it difficult for him to get the government interested in the project of colonizing the archipelago, on which he had set his heart; but his indomitable resolution triumphed over every obstacle, and in April, 1595, more than a quarter of a century after his return from his first expedition, he set sail again, with four ships and 368 emigrants. This time, however, he was diverted from his original course by discovering the Marquesas group on the way, with the final result that he established his colony not on the Solomon Islands but in the New Hebrides. But the settlement was not destined to endure. Mendaña died within two months of his arrival; his followers were decimated by dissension and disease, and the survivors were only too thankful to find a refuge at Manila in 1596.
In November, 1574, the Spanish pilot, Juan Fernandez, in search of a means of shortening the voyage from Callao to Valparaiso by avoiding the adverse winds and currents that hugged the coast, discovered the three small islands, some 350 miles to the westward, which ever since that day have borne his name. There seems no good reason to give credence to the legend that on a subsequent voyage he reached out much farther into the west and possibly struck the shores of Australia or New Zealand, or even to believe the story that he established himself in the islands that he had found; for we know that he continued to direct navigation between Chile and Peru until at least as late as 1593, and that there was no trace of any European occupation of the archipelago of Juan Fernandez when it became, between 1704 and 1709, the home of Alexander Selkirk, the prototype of Robinson Crusoe.

It will be remembered that with the dispersal in 1537-39 of the little settlement which Pedro de Mendoza had established at the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, the town of Asuncion, far up the river in Paraguay, had become the chief nucleus of Spanish activity in the southeastern portion of South America. Buenos Aires, however, was to be refounded, this time permanently, during the reign of Philip II, and the vast economic possibilities of the country of which it is now the capital began for the first, time to be dimly foreseen.

The death, on October 3, 1556, of the patriarch Martinez de Irala, was a harbinger of stormy days for the little colony at Asuncion. He had provided in his will that he should be succeeded by his son-in-law, Gonzalo de Mendoza, who was accordingly proclaimed adelantado without any opposition; but Mendoza died in the early summer of 1558, before he had had a fair chance to get his administration started or to nominate his successor, with the result that the inhabitants of Asuncion, taking advantage of a privilege which had been granted by the crown to the settlers of the Rio de la Plata in 1537, elected as their governor another son-in-law of Irala named Francisco Ortiz de Vergara. The latter was a kindly soul, but totally deficient in talent for ruling men. The first years of his administration were marked by Indian risings which he was quite unable to suppress, and by discontent and insubordination on the part of his own followers, who resolved to prevent his obtaining the confirmation from the king or his viceroy which would be necessary to give him permanent possession of the office of governor. But it was chiefly as a result of the expeditions that were sent out from Asuncion during the period of his governorship, for purposes of exploration and settlement, that a crisis in his fortunes and in those of his colony was finally brought to pass.

We recall that the first hope of the early discoverers and explorers of La Plata had been that it would prove the entrance to a strait leading through to the Pacific; and that when that illusion had been dissipated, they continued to lay plans for the utilization of the great river as a means of shortening the route to Peru. During the period of Irala, this idea rather fell into the background. He did little or nothing to establish connections with the regions to the westward, and Mendoza and Ortiz de Vergara were similarly neglectful. Many of their followers, however, had larger vision. They longed to gain access to the mineral wealth of the Andes. They wished to follow up the Pilcomayo and ultimately get over the mountains to Cuzco. The most dominant and ambitious figure among them was a certain Nuño de Chaves, a conquistador after the pattern of Cortes and Pizarro, who, in 1561, signalized himself by pushing through and founding the town of Santa Cruz de la Sierra some sixty leagues to the west of the modern Bolivian city which bears that name today. The forces with whose aid he accomplished this object had been intended by the governor at Asuncion for another purpose, so that his action was tantamount to a declaration of revolt against Ortiz de Vergara. There were, moreover, rival claimants from Peru to the region where he proposed to establish himself; in fact he had been obliged, in 1560, to make a trip to Lima in order to get confirmation of his title from the viceroy. By 1564, however, lie felt strong enough to return to Asuncion to pick up his family and belongings and face the wrath of the governor; for he was fully aware of the unpopularity of Ortiz de Vergara, and was convinced that if he offered the inhabitants a chance to return with him to the Andes, the majority would gladly accept it. And thus indeed it proved; in October, 1564, occurred the so-called ‘exodus to Peru’. Almost all the vecinos of Asuncion cast in their lot with Chaves. Ortiz de Vergara himself came along, probably because he felt that it was the only way to preserve such measure of authority as was left to him; he had hopes, moreover, of getting confirmation in his office from the viceroy. In the course of their progress into the northwest, the inevitable occurred. Ortiz de Vergara was gradually elbowed aside and Chaves assumed his place; finally, when the expedition reached Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Vergara was informed that he could be permitted to go no farther. Chaves and the new ideas which he represented were fully in control.

In the meantime certain constitutional changes had also been carried through, which served to focus attention on the territories to the east of the Andes, and lessen the measure of their previous
isolation. On the ground that the lands under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Lima were too extensive to permit of adequate administration of justice, the Council of the Indies, on April 20, 1551, had recommended to the crown the establishment of a new audiencia at the “villa de la plata que es en las charcas cerca de las minas de Potossí”—the city which today is called Sucre and is the capital of the Bolivian republic. The suggestion had to be several times repeated before any attention was paid to it; but finally, on September 4, 1559, at Valladolid, directly after his return to Spain, Philip gave orders that the new tribunal be set up, and on September 7, 1561, it was formally installed. It at once became popularly known as the audiencia of Charcas, and it was composed at the outset of a regente and four oidores, who were to be presided over, in theory, by the viceroy of New Castile, and were restricted, in his absence, to functions exclusively judicial; but when it was found, after two years’ experience, that the viceroy was never able to attend, Philip provided, on August 16, 1563, for the creation of the office of a president, to be held by a resident member of the audiencia. The territories that fell within its jurisdiction extended originally only for a distance of 100 leagues around the city of La Plata in which the audiencia sat; but they were progressively enlarged in the immediately succeeding years, until they finally stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and comprised what is today Bolivia and Paraguay, a good slice of the northern part of Argentina, a portion of Uruguay, and the Peruvian department of Puno. The fact that the region committed to its charge had been carved out of territory hitherto under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Lima must not be taken as an evidence that the viceroys had lost interest in the lands cast of the Andes. Quite the contrary, it was the sole means by which they could hope to exercise any real control there and prevent the inhabitants of the lower reaches of La Plata from becoming wholly autonomous; it was inspired by the principle of divide et impera. While apparently separating the destinies of the lands on the east from those on the west of the Cordilleras, it was really intended to hold them together; it was aimed, from a totally different angle, at the attainment of an end very similar to that which had inspired Nuño de Chaves. And certainly the new audiencia Chaves an important service by ridding him of his enemy Vergara, who was summoned to appear before it in the year 1566. After a long trial he was declared guiltless of the charges which had been brought against him, and was even temporarily restored to the headship of the settlement at Asuncion, pending the arrival of a new governor who had meantime been appointed, subject to the royal approval, by the viceroy. He professed himself, however, to be dissatisfied with this verdict, and went back to Spain to plead his cause before the Council of the Indies—needless to add, without success. From that time onward he subsides into insignificance; and when he came back to Asuncion in 1573 it was in a subordinate office in the government of his successor. Five years earlier his successful rival Chaves had met his death, the victim of a blow from an Indian porra, or war club, delivered from behind, by a member of a hostile tribe. He was a remarkable man, with qualities better suited to the age of the Emperor than to that of his son. Though cut off in the midst of his labors with his own objects only partially attained, his restless activity had at least been instrumental in reopening the whole problem of Peru and the La Plata basin.

The man whom the viceroy had meantime selected to take over the government of Paraguay was a certain Ortiz de Zarate, who had come out with Blasco Nuñez Vela in 1544, and remained there ever since. He had not been in any way involved in the various quarrels by which the settlement at Asuncion had been rent and could consequently enter upon his new duties without favor or prejudice. He promised, moreover, to spend 20,000 ducats of his own in fitting out the expedition which he was to lead into his new domain, and to bring with him 400 or 500 soldiers, 4000 cows, and as many sheep and goats; apparently, both he and the viceroy had at least some faint conception of the pastoral possibilities of the basin of La Plata. As the royal confirmation was necessary for his new office, he departed for Spain via Panama to obtain it. It therefore became necessary to send someone direct from Peru to Asuncion to represent him there during his absence. The choice for this difficult office fell on one Felipe de Caceres, who had been active in Paraguayan affairs ever since the days of Cabeza de Vaca; in the end of 1568 he arrived at Asuncion. The four years of his rule there were chiefly remarkable for a violent struggle for supremacy between himself and the bishop of the diocese of La Plata, who finally got him shipped off to Spain to answer before the Inquisition to a charge of atheism and blasphemy. But Caceres also succeeded during the period of his governorship in leading two reconnaissances down the Parana to the estuary of La Plata; he was firmly convinced that a new settlement should be made on the lower reaches of the river. As Caceres himself was sent off to Spain directly after his return from the second of these expeditions, he was unable to carry his project into effect, but the work that he had initiated was to be continued by one of his subordinates. This was a certain Juan de Garay, a nephew of Ortiz de Zarate, then in his early fourties, who had come out to Peru with his uncle in 1541, and had profited by “a long and active acclimatization” in South America. He had gone down to Asuncion in 1568 as a sort of lieutenant to Caceres, and accompanied him on both his trips to the lower regions of the Parana. He surpassed his chief in his enthusiasm for starting a settlement in these regions; and his
ardor was still further quickened by the fear that if he did not act at once he ran grave risk of being forestalled by the Spaniards of Tucuman, who had founded the town of Cordoba on July 6, 1563, and were now straining every nerve to gain an outlet to the Atlantic. The result was that he immediately sought and obtained permission from the authorities at Asuncion to equip at his own expense a new expedition down the river, with the aid of which he founded the town of Santa Fe, near the junction of the Parana and the Rio Salado, on November 15, 1573. It was there that in the following February he received word, through an Indian scout whom he had dispatched for the purpose, of the arrival of his uncle, Ortiz de Zarate, at the estuary of La Plata.

Zarate had done well for himself during his sojourn in Spain. By a capitulation agreed upon between himself and the king on July 10,1569, the terms of his tentative appointment by the viceroy had not only been confirmed but enlarged. He was to be permitted to import African slaves into his new domain, and it is highly significant that it was stipulated that of the 500 Spaniards whom he brought with him, at least 100 should be workmen, artisans, and agricultural laborers. Moreover, in addition to the post of governor and captain-general, with an annual salary of 4000 ducats, he was given the title of adelantado for himself and for his descendant; he was vested, in other words, with a measure of hereditary authority in the territory which he proposed to colonize. It took him over three years to collect his followers and his armament. Not until September, 1572, was he able to set sail, and the delays and mishaps of the voyage were so numerous that he did not reach the mouth of La Plata till November 26, 1573. There, on the little island of San Gabriel, off the Uruguay coast, and directly across from the modern city of Buenos Aires, he found a cross with a gourd hanging on it; in the gourd were letters telling of what had already been accomplished by Cáceres and by Garay. Communication was speedily established with the latter, and there was fierce fighting with the natives on the north bank of the river. Zarate, who had promised the king to establish a settlement at its mouth, attempted to fulfil his obligation by founding a small outpost called San Salvador on the Uruguay coast, which was destined to endure but a short three years. Finally he passed on up the river, and, leaving his nephew at Santa Fe, reached Asuncion on February 5, 1575. For nearly a year he devoted himself to the difficult task of restoring order after the internal quarrels and revolts by which the settlement had been rent, but death overtook him in the midst of his labors on January 26, 1576.

Unutterable confusion ensued during the next three years. The heiress of Zarate was his daughter Juana, who was then residing at Charcas. Her representative at Asuncion was her cousin, Diego de Mendieta, a fatuous youth of some twenty years of age, who soon earned the contempt of all the inhabitants, and in 1577 was turned loose to perish in the wilderness. In the meantime, at the Ciudad de la Plata there ensued an unseemly rivalry between three ambitious men to secure the hand of Juana and the inheritance which went with it; but the viceroy and the audiencia prevented the finally successful candidate from assuming the government, and soon after landed him in prison at Lima. The sole permanently important development of these miserable years was the steady growth of the power and prestige of Juan de Garay. In April, 1578, he was appointed legal representative of the government at Asuncion, and during the following year occupied himself chiefly with the difficult work of restoring order and fighting the neighboring Indians. When tranquility was restored, in December, 1579, he prepared to carry through the unfulfilled task which was nearest his heart, the reestablishment of a permanent settlement at the mouth of La Plata. This, indeed, was obligatory on him, as Zarate’s successor, under the terms of the latter’s capitulation with the king. In March, 1580, Garay left Asuncion at the head of an expedition of some sixty enthusiastic followers. Dropping down the river past Santa Fe, he finally selected a site on the south side of the estuary, sufficiently far from the shore to be safe from the danger of inundation, and three or four miles distant from the spot where, forty-four years before, Pedro de Mendoza had planted his temporary outpost; the center of it is today the Plaza 25 de Mayo in the city of Buenos Aires. The formal ceremony of establishing the municipality took place on Saturday, June 11, 1580, and in view of the fact that the next day was Trinity Sunday, it was called La Trinidad; but the older name of Buenos Aires continued to be used to designate the port, and ultimately was to prevail as that of the city itself. The details of the story make interesting reading, particularly the fertility and extent of the surrounding estancias with which Garay rewarded his faithful followers. They gave happy promise of a future prosperity of which few Europeans could then have conceived. At any rate the settlement was now permanently established, never again to be abandoned, and Garay thus became the real founder of the future capital of the Argentine. The last three years of his life were chiefly spent in the less congenial tasks of maintaining authority at Santa Fe and Asuncion; and in the course of his journeyings to and fro between these places, he met his death in March, 1583, at the hands of hostile natives, while resting in the forest. He was the noblest figure in the early history of the Argentine, vigorous, far-sighted, upright, and fearless, explorer, conqueror, and master of men.
The death of Garay ushered in a new period of disorder in the government of the settlements on the Rio de la Plata. Juan Torres de Vera y Aragon, the husband of Juana Ortiz de Zarate, and lawful heir, through her, of her uncle’s office of adelantado, had by this time got out of prison, but was still prevented, by the hostility of the viceroy and the audiencia of Charcas, from entering his domains till the summer of 1587, and was only permitted to remain there till 1590. The sole event of importance which took place during his brief tenure of power was the founding (April 5, 1588) of the city of Corrientes. Discouraged by the opposition which he everywhere encountered, he retired to Spain and resigned his position in 1593; and from that moment the hereditary office of adelantado of the Rio de la Plata, which had been established in 1569 for Ortiz de Zarate and his successors, though it continued to exist in theory down to the year 1658, became for practical purposes extinct, and the rule of that territory passed into the hands of a series of gobernadores appointed by the viceroy at Lima and confirmed by the crown. Of these the most eminent was Hernando Arias de Saavedra, born of Spanish parents at Asuncion in 1561, and married to a younger daughter of Garay; he was the first creole to hold public office in the Argentine, and has even been called the first Argentine patriot. He was really the foremost figure in the colony from the early part of 1592, when he was chosen by popular vote as the representative of the absent governor. Five years later he was raised to that office in his own right, and held it with intermissions down to the year 1617, when, largely as a result of his representations to the home government, the territories of the province of the Rio de la Plata were divided, and Paraguay was definitely separated from Buenos Aires. His rule was not only marked by firmness and wisdom in matters political and administrative; still more was it notable for educational progress, and above all for the development of commerce. The enormous natural economic advantages of Buenos Aires began for the first time to be properly utilized, so that it speedily came to overshadow Asuncion; moreover, by the end of his life the old route across the isthmus of Panama had ceased to be the sole means of access to Peru, and traffic had been started from La Plata up the Parana and over the Andes.

Other evidences of nascent realization of the possibilities of the Argentine had begun to multiply before the death of Philip II. Corsarios Ingleses thought the settlements there well worth the harrying, and in the winter of 1582 Edward Fenton, after establishing himself on the island of Santa Catalina off the Brazilian coast, made an effort to raid Buenos Aires. The attempt, however, proved a miserable fiasco, and the captain and crew of one of the ships that had been entrusted with it were obliged, as the only alternative to being killed by the Indians, to seek safety at the gates of the very town that they had expected to sack. The period is also noteworthy for the activities of the missionaries. A few frailes had accompanied the earlier expeditions to the basin of La Plata from the time of Mendoza onward, but their efforts had at first been almost completely restricted to the settlements, and no serious attempts had been made to convert the natives. After the refounding of Buenos Aires in 1580, and partly as a result of it, the work of converting the Indians was vigorously taken up. A body of eighteen Franciscans who reached the estuary of La Plata in January, 1583, deserve, perhaps, to be regarded as the pioneers; but their activities were soon destined to be overshadowed by those of the Jesuits, who, arriving in 1588, so successfully extended their system of missions in Paraguay in the course of the next thirty or forty years that they converted the vast majority of the Guaranis, and obtained virtually exclusive control of the whole region about Asuncion during the following century and a half. Though they never got actual possession of the government there, their influence remained dominant in the colony until their expulsion in 1769. Perhaps most significant of all was the persistency of the efforts of the new settlements on the eastern slopes of the Andes, which had been founded by expeditions sent out from Chile and Peru, to break the ties that bound them to the audiencia of Lima, and unite their political and economic destinies with those of Buenos Aires. Tucuman, first exploited by Francisco de Aguirre in the Emperor’s day, succeeded in getting itself declared independent of Chile by a royal cedula of August 29, 1563, and placed under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Charcas; between 1593 and 1595 it was even temporarily united with the government of the Rio de la Plata. Economically speaking, its whole history during this period resolved itself into a series of efforts to obtain a direct outlet for its rich products via Buenos Aires to the Atlantic and to Spain. The story of the town of Mendoza farther south is much the same. Like Tucuman, it was founded in the early sixties by an expedition sent out from Chile; like Tucuman, it at once made every effort to get an outlet on the Atlantic and link its destinies with those of Buenos Aires. In matters commercial it attained its object, and before the reign of Philip II had closed, it succeeded in establishing connection with the future capital of the Argentine. Politically, however, it failed to gain its end, despite all the efforts to help it on the part of Tucuman, for it continued officially to belong to Chile down to the year 1776, when the natural frontier on the ridge of the Cordillera was finally and definitely established. The old idea, that the political and economic center of gravity of the Spanish domination in South America must necessarily reside in the mining regions on the Pacific slope, died hard; but even before the end of the reign of the Prudent King there were signs, if
only those in authority had been able to read them, that the original emphasis was destined ultimately to be reversed.

The principles on which Philip guided the administration of the Indies throughout his reign are a faithful reflection of his own character and ideals, and of the precepts which his father had passed on to him. From first to last he played safe. His object was rather to make sure of what he had already inherited, and of the maintenance therein of the Spanish monopoly and of the absolute power of the crown, than to increase the extent of his transatlantic possessions. The conquistador is therefore relegated to second place; he is largely supplanted by the hardworking, reliable crown official, whose pole star was the establishment of the royal authority. There are, consequently, few innovations. Such changes as were made were really only the logical consequences of the ramifications and development of the system which had been founded by the Emperor; they solidified, but did not alter it. The absence of new ideas was ominous for the future; it was another proof of the completeness with which Spain was wedded to the old ways, while her neighbors to the north of her were launching out into modern ones. It showed an inability to go forward which was prophetic of going back.

The supereminence, under the crown, of the Council of the Indies, was fortified by a series of Ordenanzas Reales para el Consejo de las Indias which Philip issued on September 24, 1571, and which formed the basis for practically everything that followed down to the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth century. By these ordinances the Council was given unlimited authority, under the king, in the territories committed to its charge; legislatively, executively, and judicially, it was made the counterpart, for the Indies, of the Consejo de Castilla for Castile. As in the Emperor’s day, it resided continually at the court, and met every day save on regular holidays, three hours in the morning, and two more in the afternoon. No business was to be transacted until at least three members were present, and not till then were the three hours of the morning session to be regarded as having begun to elapse.

The membership, which had been fixed by the Emperor in 1542 at eight, over and above the president, the attorney-general, two secretaries, and other minor functionaries, was now confirmed, twenty-nine years later, at the same figure by his son, but it does not seem always to have been actually filled up; if we may trust the statement of Cabrera de Cordoba, there were but six regular councilors at the time of the king’s death in 1598. On the other hand, it would appear that the duties and responsibilities of the Consejo multiplied so rapidly in the latter part of Philip’s reign that it became necessary, shortly after his death, to create two offshoots of it with special functions of their own. These were the Consejo de Cámara de las Indias, a committee of the Council itself, first created in the year 1600 to advise the king about all appointments to secular and ecclesiastical office, the distribution of pensions, and the exercise of the pardoning power in the New World; and the so-called Junta de Guerra y Armadas de Indias, also set up in 1600, and composed of members of the Council of the Indies and of the Consejo de Guerra; its special function was to oversee the arming and dispatch of the American fleets and to confirm nominations sent up to it by the Casa de Contratación for the various posts and offices involved. It thus served incidentally as an additional means of keeping the doings of the Casa at Seville under the supervision of the crown.

A few significant facts may be noted in regard to the presidents of the Consejo de las Indias during the reign of the Prudent King. There were eight of them in all, beginning with Francisco Tello de Sandoval, who replaced Luis Hurtado de Mendoza on December 2, 1559, when the latter was called to the presidency of the Council of Castile; the average term, in other words, was a little less than five years, a considerably longer period than the law prescribed. Of the eight, no less than seven were licenciados, men of technical training in theology or law, and all of them had had previous experience in one or more of the great departments of state. Only the first two of them, however, had been members of the Council of the Indies before they were elevated to the presidency of it, and of this pair only one had ever been in America, namely, Francisco Tello de Sandoval, who had gone out to Mexico as visitador, and published the New Laws there in 1544. The only other one of the eight presidents who had visited the New World was Pedro de Moya y Contreras, who had been sent out to set up the Inquisition in New Spain in 1570, became archbishop of Mexico in 1573, and served temporarily as viceroy there in 1584-85. There seemed, in other words, to be little disposition on the part of the king to profit by the experience of those who had actually been on the ground. Philip was apparently more anxious to have the Council of the Indies act in consonance with his own preconceived notions of what was for the best interest of his subjects in the New World than to permit it to be too well informed as to the actual facts. It is also clear that he proposed that the administration of his transatlantic domains should be kept closely in touch with the Inquisition. In addition to Pedro de Moya, three others of the eight presidents of the Council of the Indies during Philip’s reign, the fourth, sixth, and last, had
previously been members of the *Consejo de la Suprema*. The elimination of heresy was to be the government’s first duty not only in the Old World but in the New.

In the year 1596 the ban which had hitherto officially excluded non-Castilian Spaniards from the Indies was formally lifted by a *pragmática* removing the inhabitants of the realms of the crown of Aragon and Navarre from the category of *extranjeros*, and therefore conferring on them, by implication, if not directly, the privileges of emigration to the New World. It seems natural to attribute this gratifying change to the remodeling of the constitution of the eastern kingdoms in 1592, which brought them much more closely than ever before under the control of the crown; Philip had no longer any reason to fear lest his transatlantic possessions might be contaminated by Aragonese ‘liberties’. But it is doubtful if the *pragmática* of 1596 actually brought about any great change in the situation as it was. The royal right of granting special exemptions from the operation of existing laws had been so frequently utilized in the past for the benefit of desirable inhabitants of the eastern realms, that large numbers of them had already found their way across the Atlantic; and there was also the imperial decree of 1526, of which mention has been made in the preceding volume. It is worth noting that the law of 1596 failed to take the Portuguese out of the category of *extranjeros*; indeed, a clause which was added thereto in 1614 specifically declared them to be in it; they continued, in other words, to be debarred from Spanish America, though naturally not from Brazil. Even after the annexation of Portugal and its colonies in 1581, Philip did not regard their inhabitants as quite in the same category with Spaniards.

While the personnel of the Council of the Indies remained practically unchanged during the period of Philip II, that of the *Casa de Contratación* at Seville was considerably altered and enlarged. The first and obvious reason for this expansion was the enormous increase of the business that the Casa had to do; a second and subsidiary one, which really began to make itself seriously felt only in the latter half of the reign, was Philip’s characteristic determination to extend the royal supervision down to the most insignificant details of the commerce of the New World, as well as of its government. Finally, the creation of new offices was not without its value as a financial expedient, for it is impossible to deny that, in Philip’s later years, the minor positions went more often to the highest bidders than to those who best deserved them.

There is every reason to suppose that the old inherited organization, under three officials, the treasurer, factor, and contador, with coordinate powers, had demonstrated its inadequacy before the death of Charles V. It must have been overwhelmed by the sudden increase of the work that it had to perform during the last fifteen years of the Emperor’s reign; in fact, it seems probable that Charles’s absence from Spain and his preoccupation about other matters were the chief reasons why some remedy for the situation had not been found. In any case we know that on October 7, 1557, some twenty-one months after Philip had taken the reins of government, a president was appointed for the Casa de Contratación. The first incumbent, Juan Suarez de Carvajal, only served a little more than a year, and the office thereafter remained vacant till 1579, when it was conferred on the licentiate Diego de Salazar. After that, the succession remained unbroken down to the suppression of the Casa in 1790, and it is worth noting that all four of the remaining presidents under the Prudent King were, like their predecessors, *licenciados*, while the first three of the next reign were *caballeros de capa y espada*; the Prudent King could not get over his innate preference for the scholar over the man of action. On the other hand, it is fair to add that during his reign, though not invariably under his successors, the rule requiring all presidents of the Casa to have had previous experience in the Council of the Indies was faithfully observed.

The first duty of the president was to keep the *Casa* as a whole, and every department of it, in the closest possible touch with the Council of the Indies; for since it was resident at Seville, there was always the danger that it might strive to attain some measure of independence. In order to accomplish this end, he was expected to supervise and coordinate the activities of the three offices into which the Casa from its inception had been divided; to preside over the tribunal of the Consulado; and to attend, and, if he was a *letrado*, to cast a vote in, the so-called *Sala de Justicia de la Casa de Contratación*, created in 1583 to deal with the steadily increasing amount of litigation which the activities of the Casa rendered inevitable. This body, when it was first set up, was composed of only two *oidores*, but thirteen years later it became necessary to add a third. Its form and procedure were closely assimilated to those of the higher courts of the realm; and the president, as ex officio member thereof, became, ipso facto, the indispensable connecting link between it and the older established administrative offices of the Casa. It was characteristic of Philip’s fondness for courts and his determination to have justice done down to the minutest detail that this *Sala* should have been created and given such prominence by him; and he doubtless felt that the right to participate in its proceedings was the greatest privilege that the president possessed. Nevertheless the administrative side of the work of the Casa increased, during his
lifetime, even faster than the judicial; we must therefore turn our attention to the expansion of the responsibilities of the offices of the treasurer and factor, and its results.

The work of the treasurer’s department was more than doubled during the reign of the Prudent King, and its staff was in consequence greatly increased. Not only did it have to handle much larger amounts of money from the New World than in the Emperor’s day; it was made receiver of the proceeds of the rich silver mine of Guadalcanal, which had been discovered in 1555 on the border of Estremadura, and also, in 1579, of all the almojarifazgos and alcabalas of Andalusia. What inference is to be drawn from the assignment of the collection of these purely Spanish revenues to a body whose functions were theoretically restricted to amounts received from the Indies, it was difficult to determine. Probably the arrangement was made because, whatever the defects of the Casa, it was decidedly more efficient than the regular authorities of the Hacienda. Possibly it may also be taken to indicate a dawning realization of the necessity of reducing the excessive number of government officials, though this theory is sharply contradicted by the facts as they existed in other departments. In any event, the revenues received by the Casa from sources purely Spanish were but an exceedingly small fraction of the total sum it had to handle; it was chiefly through the increase of the amounts which arrived from the Indies that its responsibilities were enlarged.

The revenues which Philip derived from the New World mounted steadily during the course of the reign. All the expenses of the king’s government in the Indies were paid out of these revenues before they left America; the sums received by the Casa de Contratación were thus only the surplus available for the use of his Majesty at home. In 1554 they reached 223’5 cuentos; in 1566, 252; in 1577, 445; in 1585, 700, and in 1598, 945. The principal sources of them were the royal quinto (often more and sometimes less than one-fifth) of the yield of the American mines; sundry special tributos de Indios y de Negros; the proceeds of the alcabala, which was extended by law to the Indies in 1558, and established there in fact at the rate of two per cent in 1574-76; certain crown monopolies such as that of playing cards; the cruzado; and the almojarifazgos de los puertos on both sides of the Atlantic; and the amounts derived from every one of these items increased between 1555 and 1598. The rate of the various imposts and taxes was steadily raised, and the gold, silver, and quicksilver mines of the New World yielded the crown between three and four times as much at the end of the reign as at the beginning. In addition to the royal revenue from the New World, the Casa had also to handle the sums derived from the Indies by individual Spaniards. The latter averaged about two and one-half times as much as the former in the period under review.

These totals are certainly impressive, and the rate of their increase during the reign is even more so. But what is far more noteworthy still is their relative smallness compared with the sums which Philip drew from European sources. According to the budget of 1554 the income derivable from the Indies was reckoned at less than 11% of the total amount due to the royal treasury; in 1566 at a little over 7%; in 1577 at 10%. In 1585 it rises to a little more than 25%, and in 1598 it only falls back to 22%, but even at the very end of the reign it is obvious that the American revenues did not constitute anywhere nearly so large a portion of Philip’s income as has been popularly supposed. They did not even equal some of the more important single items in the list of the Spanish king’s European resources. During the first half of the reign they averaged less than three-fourths of the sums derived from the ecclesiastical revenues in Europe (the tercias, cruzada, subsidio, excusado, and maestrazgos); only after 1580 did they begin to exceed them. In 1554 they were only about two-thirds of the proceeds of the encabezamiento in Spain, in 1566 only a little better than one-half, in 1577 a little more than one-third. At the end of the reign, indeed, the current begins to flow the other way; the Indies yield 945 cuentos and the encabezamiento only 1035. But it is evident that the legend that America constituted an inexhaustible treasure house for Philip cannot possibly be substantiated by the facts.

It was in the years 1564-66 that the organization of the sailings to and from America in two annual fleets was definitely and permanently set up. There had been foreshadowings of it, as we have seen, in the Emperor’s day; henceforth it was formally established, to last to the advent of the Bourbons. On October 18, 1564, a set of ordinances was put forth providing for the annual dispatch of two convoyed fleets, one for New Spain, the other for the Isthmus of Panama and New Castile; they subsequently became known as the Flota and the Galeons, and they averaged, in the latter years of Philip’s reign, some seventy ships each. The first was to sail in April for the Greater Antilles and the ports on the Gulf of Mexico; the second was to leave in August for the northern coast of South America and Nombre de Dios. Both were to winter in the Indies, and to repair to Havana in March; they were to leave for Europe not earlier than the tenth of that month, and were generally expected to sail home separately. The details of these regulations were not invariably observed. The prescribed times of sailing were not rigidly adhered to; occasionally a year was skipped, and it was only rarely that either of
the fleets arrived anywhere at the appointed times. But the routes and schedules were at least sufficiently regular to enable the pirates to swoop down on the fleets at the most awkward possible moments, that is, to facilitate the very thing that the Flota and the Galleons had been established to prevent, with the result that increasing attention and expense had to be devoted to convoy and armament. At first it had been the custom to rely on a few cannon and a handful of soldiers, borne by each of the larger merchantmen of the fleet, but the ships were so crowded with passengers and goods as to be virtually useless when any fighting was to be done; so in 1565 it was provided that the flagship of each fleet was to be a galleon of at least 300 tons, with thirty-six cannon and 200 men, and it was never to encumber itself with merchandise of any kind, save when it rescued the cargoes of wrecks. The number of warships assigned for this purpose gradually increased as the reign wore on, and their efforts were supplemented by those of the so-called Armada de la Carrera de las Indias, which patrolled the waters off the Spanish coasts, and occasionally escorted the fleets across the sea. To us the system seems cumbersome and ineffective, a faithful reflection of Philip’s excessive confidence in the power of combination and weight, and of his inability to see the value of maneuvering and speed. But it seems probable that it actually worked out, under the conditions prevalent at the time, rather better than the modern student would have reason to suppose. Despite all their foreknowledge of the dates and routes of the Spanish sailings, none of Philip’s maritime enemies was ever able to capture an entire treasure-fleet. They had to content themselves with the cutting off of isolated vessels and minor squadrons. The Flota and the Galleons continued to maintain their sailings.

It will readily be seen from the foregoing paragraph that the provisioning, arming, and outfitting of the American fleets had become, under Philip II, a task far too heavy to be performed by the factor alone, who had had charge of it in the Emperor’s day. The natural result was a large increase in his staff and the gradual distribution of his duties among a number of officials. Of these by far the most important was the purveyor-general of the armadas and fleets of the Indies, who was first appointed in 1588. It was his duty to make sure that the ships themselves were in fit condition for the sea, and that they were fully supplied with provisions for the voyage; and he was expected to buy such commodities and to employ such labor as were necessary for these purposes. The matter of armament, however, still remained under the jurisdiction of the factor, who was aided, during the last twenty-five years of the reign, by an artillero mayor. The Junta de Guerra y Armadas de Indias, as we have already remarked, was not created until 1600.

On the other side of the Atlantic the consolidation and development of the system of viceregal administration inaugurated by the Emperor is by far the most significant fact of the period. Long lines of successors to Antonio de Mendoza were established under Philip II, both at Mexico and at Lima, and continued, with occasional interruptions, down to the era of the Revolutions.

Strictly speaking, there were but eight viceroyals of New Spain between the departure of Antonio de Mendoza for New Castile in 1550 and the death of Philip II in 1598, and the same number in New Castile between Mendoza’s death at Lima (July 21, 1552) and the end of the reign. In other words, the law of 1555, prescribing a three-year term, was practically in abeyance. There were, moreover, three interregna in New Spain, during which the government was carried on by the audiencia, and three of a similar nature in New Castile; the second of this latter trio, which lasted from 1564 to 1569, amounted in fact to a suspension of the viceregal regime, for the home government was so disturbed by the succession of calamities by which so many of the early viceroys of Peru had been taken off, that it determined to try the experiment of having the viceroyalty governed by the audiencia, under the able presidency of the licentiate Lope Garcia de Castro, who had been a member of the Council of the Indies. The longest term served by any viceroy in Philip’s time was that of Velasco, ‘the Emancipator’, the successor of Antonio de Mendoza in Mexico, from 1550 to 1564; the next, that of Martin Enríquez de Almansa, who ruled New Spain from 1568 to 1580, and then was transferred to New Castile from 1581 to 1583; and there are at least four cases of terms shorter than two years. Save for Enríquez de Almansa, the second Velasco, who governed New Spain from 1590 to 1595, was the only Mexican viceroy to be promoted during this period to the more dignified viceroyalty of Lima.

In general it is fair to say that under Philip the viceroys were carefully selected from men who in various ways had given proof of efficiency in the service of the crown. There is no evidence of any tendency, such as appeared in the seventeenth century, to lay special emphasis on military qualifications; if anything, Philip preferred the trained administrator to the soldier, and on one occasion he appointed a cleric. Most of his happiest choices, in both viceroyalties, were made from the great families of the Mendozas and the Velascos. Of the former there were three, one in New Spain and two in New Castile, the last pair father and son, and all of them of kin to the great Antonio de Mendoza of
the Emperor’s day; of the latter there were two, father and son, in New Spain, and the son, as we have already seen, was promoted to New Castile. But of all the viceroys appointed by the Prudent King, the greatest by far was Francisco Alvarez de Toledo, who was sent out to New Castile in 1569, when it was in utter confusion and disorder, and brought it back to peace and prosperity in the ensuing twelve years. A brief summary of his career there will serve to give some slight idea of the conditions prevalent in Philip’s American possessions in the middle years of his reign, and of the policies that were pursued in dealing with them.

Toledo had proved his value both as a diplomat and as a soldier before he was sent out to the New World, but Philip had no idea of leaving him a free hand in his new office. His duties and responsibilities were specifically defined in an elaborate set of instructions given him on his departure. Perhaps the most important of all these instructions was that ordering him to make a tour of inspection of his viceroyalty, in order that he might become personally informed of its conditions and needs, and report them to the crown. He began to make that tour of inspection in October, 1570, taking with him as counsellors a Jesuit priest, a judge, and a licentiate. It covered in all over 5000 miles, and occupied him for more than five years, and its results were far-reaching and beneficent. The two problems to which he gave his chief attention were the traditional ones: first, how to increase the output of the mines, and, secondly, how to better the conditions of the Indians. Past experience had tended to show that neither could be solved save at the expense of the other; but Toledo was convinced that it would be possible to deal with them separately and satisfactorily, and succeeded in proving that he was right. New methods were established for the extraction of the silver from the ore by the use of mercury, which had been discovered at Huancavelica. A wise code of mining laws and regulations was drawn up and enforced; and a mint to stabilize the currency was established at Potosi. These measures, and others, which Toledo adopted, were no small element in bringing about the gratifying increase, beginning about 1580, in the revenue which Spain was able to derive from the New World. At the same time the viceroy labored manfully to put an end to the maltreatment and exploitation of the loyal Indians. The chief means which he took to effect this end was to establish in the larger towns of his viceroyalty a system of corregidores and corregimientos modelled on that of Castile, and in the smaller ones, which were almost exclusively populated by natives, lesser officers called corregidores de Indios. Authority was thus gradually withdrawn from the encomendero, who had generally misused it, and placed in the hands of responsible officials, on whom the duty of caring for the welfare of the natives had been specifically laid, and who knew that they were likely to lose their positions if they neglected it. The Indians were no longer victimized by the greedy lawyers and judges who had hitherto reaped rich harvests out of their ignorance; and special codes with special officers to administer them were provided to regulate their affairs. A scale of wages was established for them, and a census of their population was taken, so that the tribute due from them could be justly apportioned.

But though Toledo was a sturdy champion of the rights of the loyal native, he would not tolerate any refusal to recognize the sovereignty of the Spanish crown. Tupac Amaru, the youngest son of Manco Inca of the days of the Pizarros, maintained an independent court in the mountains to the east of Ayacucho; it was a place of refuge for all sorts of undesirables, a potent potential center of disturbance and rebellion. On his arrival at Lima, Toledo strove by peaceful means to induce the Inca to abandon this last vestige of the independence of his race; but Tupac refused to listen to him, and the viceroy reluctantly determined that it would be necessary to use force. An army was sent against the youthful Inca; he was captured, brought back to Cuzco, tried, found guilty on testimony the greater part of which was false, and, despite the passionate protests of almost all the inhabitants, both lay and clerical, of the city, suffered death at the hands of the public executioner in December, 1571. The act has left a dark stain on the record of the viceroy. It has been characterized as a ‘judicial murder’ and it gave Philip an excuse for cruelly turning against Toledo, when ten years later he became convinced that he was in danger of becoming too powerful. But it was essential for the king’s representative to make it evident, at the outset of his regime, that he had the power to enforce his will, and the rulers of the sixteenth century were not wont to be merciful to rebels.

Toledo was also much concerned with ecclesiastical affairs. The state of the clergy at the time of his arrival in New Castile cried aloud for reform. Churchmen, like laymen, had flocked across the Atlantic, primarily with the idea of enriching themselves. They neglected the principal duty which had been assigned to them, that of educating the Indians in the principles of the Christian faith; only a few of them, in fact, had even taken the trouble to learn the native languages, and most of them were both immoral and corrupt. There was every prospect, moreover, that these evils would be perpetuated, for the higher clergy in the New World had begun to usurp the royal right of patronage, and doled out the most lucrative posts to the highest bidders. One of the principal duties that had been given Toledo was that of reestablishing the powers of the crown in this regard, and he lost no time in doing so. The king, in 1574,
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viceregal succession by the government of an audiencia, both in New Spain and New Castile, during the

The viceroy also rendered priceless service to New Castile and the Spanish Empire in a
multitude of other ways; he seemed literally indefatigable and omniscient, and richly deserves the title
of the ‘Peruvian Solón’. He built roads, and aqueducts and canals to convey drinking water to the
principal cities of the viceroyalty. He established inns and hospitals, and set up regular military outposts
at strategic points, so that it was safe, for the first time, for merchants and travelers to journey by the
principal highways of his domains. He fostered the lucrative culture of the cocoa leaf in the low hot
valleys of the interior; yet he took great pains, at the same time, to put an end to the shocking mal-
treatment of the Indians who worked on the plantations. The welfare of the native was never absent
from his mind; moreover, he realized that there were many features of the ancient institutions of the
days of the Incas which could profitably be utilized and preserved; some of his most happy regulations
were inspired by a fusion of Spanish and native ideas. The “Memorial” which he left for the instruction
of his successors at his departure was regarded by them as an “authoritative textbook,” and one of them
declared that “all future rulers of Peru were but his disciples.” And yet this greatest of all Philip’s
colonial administrators was deprived of his office without warning or reward. Though he had frequently
asked to be relieved of his post, his requests had been invariably refused; but the very fact that he had
been so successful had at last aroused the jealousy of his distant master, and in 1581 the viceroy of
Mexico was suddenly sent down to Lima to supersede him. When Toledo got back to Spain, the king
would not consent to receive him. He was accused and found guilty of having derived unlawful profit
from his term of office, and in 1584 he died in his native town of Oropesa, broken hearted and worn out.
Similar tragedies were to be frequently reenacted, with Philip’s most notable European representatives
as their principal victims, in the closing years of the reign of the Prudent King.

The sad story of Toledo’s dismissal will serve as a salutary reminder of the all-important fact
that Philip was quite as determined to keep all independent authority out of the hands of his
subordinates in America as in Europe. In theory, the viceregal powers were fully as extensive during the
reign of the Prudent King as ever they had been in the days of his father; nay more, the viceroys were
given by Philip, either temporarily or permanently, certain rights and duties which had not been
accorded them in the New Laws. Such were the extraordinary powers with which they were invested in
cases of rebellion, the authority to make treaties of peace with the native tribes, and the duty of
maintaining the royal supremacy over the tribunals of the Inquisition. Yet it would probably be a safe
generalization to say that the viceroys of the latter part of the reign were not actually so strong in their
independent authority as the earlier ones. Jealous though the Emperor had been of the aspirations for
autonomy of his representatives across the sea, his son was vastly more so. Moreover, by the end of the
century the Spanish colonial system was working sufficiently well to enable the Spanish monarch to
give his jealousy effect. Long as was the journey from the mother country to Mexico or to Peru in the
latter years of the Prudent King, and likely as it was to be intercepted by the attacks of hostile corsairs,
it was shorter, more regular, and more frequently made than it had been in the Emperor’s day. There
was, in fact, what might be charitably described as a ‘service,’ and the king could consequently keep in
touch with his representatives in the New World as his father had never been able to do. More and more
meticulous were the instructions he sent out; less and less were the viceroys permitted to settle matters
on their own authority; more and more were they commanded to send home information and wait for
the royal orders as to how to deal with the existing facts. The six interruptions, already noted, of the
viceregal succession by the government of an audiencia, both in New Spain and New Castile, during the
reign of the Prudent King, though each one of them had its immediate origin in specific events and conditions, may, perhaps, taken together, be interpreted as an evidence that Philip was not sorry to seize every opportunity to demonstrate that he could, if need be, govern his transatlantic dominions without the aid of viceroys.

By far the most characteristic of all the methods employed by the Prudent King to keep watch on the doings of his representatives across the sea was the development during his reign of the residencia and visita. For the present purposes it will suffice to describe the former, that is, the obligation incident on every official, from the viceroy down to the municipal corregidor, to continue to reside, for a specified period after the expiration of his term of office, at the place where he had exercised jurisdiction, in order that all those who considered themselves to have been aggrieved by any of his acts or decisions might prefer their complaints before the person or persons appointed to receive them. The visita was essentially only a residencia taken without notice at any time during the incumbency of the residenciado, and generally implying that things were not believed to be in good case. Philip, one of whose best qualities was a firm determination to see justice done to each and every one of his subjects, attached great weight to the residencia, “since experience had shown it to be most necessary as a means of repressing the arrogance of ministers”; more than one-third of the laws on the subject in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias are from his reign. They bear eloquent testimony to the excellence of his intentions, particularly in regard to the treatment of the Indians, who were to be given every chance to get their grievances heard. They reveal his willingness to work hard and long, and to take infinite pains in order to secure his ends, and his desire and expectation that his subordinates do likewise. But as the system actually worked in the New World, it probably produced more harm than good. Dread of the oncoming test caused the magistrates to become timid, to act negatively rather than positively, to seek at every turn rather to avoid giving offence than to take vigorous measures for the public good. Whether or no the dictum of Solorzano that good judges ran more risk than bad ones can actually be substantiated, it is certain that the system tended to paralyze initiative, a defect which Philip would have been the last to appreciate. Even worse was the waste of energy, money, and above all of time involved. The number of officials employed in the taking of residencias was enormous, and their written reports filled scores of bulky tomes. The period occupied by the taking of the test evoked universal complaint, but nevertheless constantly tended to increase; even Philip was obliged to admit the evil, and in 1582 he put forth a law that the duration of the residencias of all lesser officials should not exceed sixty days. In the case of residencias of viceroys, however, he remained obdurate; nothing would induce him to set any time limit for them at all, with the result that a viceregal residencia became a synonym for eternity. “In the year 1589” writes Solorzano, “the visita of the Marquis of Villa Manrique, viceroy of Mexico, was committed to the bishop of Tlascala, and never ended at all; and in the margin of the cédula or commission of the same, there was written a note to the effect that this had happened because no time limit had been set, and that therefore it would be well to set one”. But it was not until seventy-eight years later that this advice was taken; the law limiting the period of a viceregal residencia to six months was not put forth till the reign of Charles II in 1667.

The residencia was indeed the quintessence of Philip’s conception of good government. He saw only its virtues, and its virtues under ideal conditions; he refused to admit its faults as things actually worked out. There is evidence that his successors were far less enthusiastic for it than he. Philip IV was fully aware of its defects, and wished to substitute some other method of attaining the desired end; and Solorzano, whose great book was issued in 1629, dilates on the evil effect of the appalling slowness of the residencias. “It is better,” he declares, “to omit to ascertain and punish some things than to retard everything. A sovereign will never cure his republic with such medicine, if it brings with it greater ills and evils than those which it was intended to remedy.” And even earlier than this, in the reign of Philip III, the Marquis of Montesclaros, who was viceroy of Peru from 1607 to 1615, drew his famous parallel between “these visitas and the little whirlwinds which commonly blow up in the squares and the streets, with no other result than to raise the dirt, filth, and other refuse there, and let it fall down again on the heads of the people.”

It would be quite futile, in a book which attempts to cover as vast a field as does this, to describe all the other institutions in Spanish America at the close of the reign of the Prudent King. It must be remembered, moreover, that even the most important of them were but ephemeral; they were all to be swept away during the era of the Revolutions. If one bears this fact in mind, one is likely to conclude that the most notable achievement of the Spaniards in the New World was the conversion and civilization of the American Indians; and it was really in the reign of Philip II that this work was effectively begun. The foundations for it had indeed been laid by the Catholic Kings and the Emperor; but the Spaniards of those days had been so much occupied with exploration and fighting that they had little time to spare for the gentler sides of their task. Under Philip, on the other hand, the Spanish
It will be remembered that the group of islands in the Pacific in which the explorer Magellan had met his death, though situated well to the westward of the line of demarcation established by the treaty of Saragossa in 1529, had been virtually neglected by the Portuguese within whose waters they admittedly lay; but that in 1542 the Emperor had sent out an expedition from Mexico, which had further explored them, and had christened them the Philippines, in honor of the heir to the throne. This expedition, however, had made no attempt to conquer or to colonize; it had merely asserted a legally invalid Spanish title by labelling the islands with a Spanish name. The first serious effort to bring the archipelago under the dominion of the Spanish crown was not made until twenty-two years later, in 1564.

The change of rulers and the pressure of affairs in Europe are perhaps adequate to explain this long delay; but when Philip got back to Spain after the conclusion of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, he at once took up the problem of Spain’s possessions in the Pacific. It seems natural to assume that the chief consideration which impelled him to do so was the prospect that he might some day be able to realize the dream of his ancestors by reannexing the kingdom of Portugal, and thus acquire its dominions across the seas. Obviously the time was not yet ripe; for the title of King Sebastian could not be impugned, and Philip was not the man to act without legal justification. On the other hand, the Portuguese monarch had already given evidence of an instability which augured ill for a long duration of his reign; there was no prospect of a lineal heir, and if the opportunity to act should suddenly arise, it would be of inestimable advantage to the Prudent King to have an established base in close proximity to the Portuguese dominions in the Orient. At any rate, on September 24, 1559, Philip sent orders to Luis de Velasco, the viceroy of New Spain, to organize and send out an expedition for the discovery of the islands of the West, “hacia las Molucas,” but enjoined him to be particularly careful not to trespass on Portuguese territory. On the same day the king also wrote to a certain Augustinian then resident in Mexico, named Andres de Urdaneta, desiring him to accompany the expedition in the capacity of chief navigator. The reason for this choice was the fact that Urdaneta had made a reputation for himself as a mathematician and cosmographer before he turned monk, and had accompanied Loaysa’s expedition to the Moluccas in 1525 and remained in the Orient till 1536. Urdaneta accepted in an interesting letter of May 28, 1560; moreover, it seems to have been largely in order to please him that the supreme command of the expedition was given by Velasco to Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the scion of an ancient family of Guipuzcoa, who had lived in Mexico since 1532: a wise and generous man, who apparently sold most of his own property in order to help defray the costs of the enterprise. His armada consisted of two galleons and two pataches, “the best that had been launched on the Southern Sea, and the stoutest and best equipped”; they carried upwards of 350 persons, comprising soldiers, sailors, four Augustinians who accompanied Urdaneta in order to convert the heathen, and also a few servants. The expedition was practically ready in the end of 1563, and lay at Navidad awaiting orders to sail; but the illness of the viceroy, and a number of other delays of the typical Spanish brand, postponed its departure till November 21, 1564.
Good fortune accompanied the adventurers on the voyage out. They touched at the Marshall and Ladrones groups, and solemnly took possession of them in the name of Spain. When they reached the Philippines they were generally received by the natives in friendly fashion, as soon as they made it clear that they were not Portuguese. On April 27-30, 1565, they landed at Cebu, where Magellan had been given an amicable reception; there, in the center of the archipelago, Legazpi determined to establish his headquarters for the time being, and the discovery by one of his followers of an image of the Saviour, doubtless left there by the expedition of Magellan, was taken by all hands to be a highly favorable omen. In fact, the only serious misfortune which the adventurers had thus far encountered had been the desertion during the voyage out, on November 30, 1564, of Captain Alonso de Arellano with the patache San Lucas. He had hurried on ahead of the rest to the Philippines, where he took aboard a cargo of cinnamon. He had then hastened back to Mexico, in the hope of gaining for himself all the credit for the undertaking; and it was doubtless partly with the idea of checkmating his designs, as well as in compliance with the orders which had been given him at his departure, that Legazpi, on June 1, sent back his flagship, with Fray Urdaneta on board, to report what had already been accomplished. Urdaneta and Arellano finally encountered one another at court in Spain, where the former succeeded in establishing his case, while the latter was remanded to Mexico to be put on trial for his desertion. Soon afterwards Urdaneta also returned to Mexico, and died there, at the age of seventy, on June 3, 1568. He was one of the noblest and most efficient clerics in the annals of the Spanish Empire beyond the seas, and deserves a large share of the credit for the enterprise which led to the conquest of the Philippines.

Meantime in the archipelago Legazpi and his followers were wrestling with the usual problems incident to the occupation and settlement of newly acquired lands. He had some difficulty in maintaining discipline among his own men; the example of Arellano had made many of them subordinate; and severe punishments were necessary to hold them to their allegiance. There was also, curiously enough, great scarcity of provisions, and expeditions to the neighboring islands had to be organized to obtain them; but for the most part the natives showed themselves friendly and willing to supply the newcomers’ needs. Ships passed back and forth several times in the course of the next three years between the archipelago and New Spain, and Legazpi was particularly rejoiced when, on August 30, 1568, two galleons appeared from Acapulco with troops, munitions, and supplies. They arrived, indeed, in the nick of time; for in the very next month a Portuguese squadron came across from the Moluccas with the purpose of forcing the Spaniards to withdraw. After trying unsuccessfully to effect their ends by persuasion, they had recourse to arms, attempting to blockade the port of Cebu and destroying the villages of those natives who had befriended the Spaniards. Nothing, however, was accomplished by these means, and after three months the intruders retired. The Spaniards were also much occupied with the repulse of piratical attacks from the native corsairs of Borneo and Jolo. At the same time they made steady progress with the exploration and conquest of the larger islands of the archipelago. Two expeditions were sent south to Mindanao, rather for the purpose of obtaining cinnamon than of making a settlement; and Panay, where the natives were generally friendly and willing to be instructed in the Christian faith, was brought under Spanish domination in 1569.

Much more serious, however, proved the problem of gaining possession of the northern island of Luzon. Until it should be definitely in Spanish hands, the conquest of the archipelago could not be regarded as complete; and in the spring of 1570 a party of 120 Spaniards and a few native auxiliaries commanded by Martin de Goiti, Legazpi’s camp-master, was sent out to reconnoiter. Legazpi’s grandson, Juan de Salcedo, who had come out from Mexico in 1567, at the age of eighteen, and whose gallantry was afterwards to give him the name of ‘Cortés of the Philippines’, also accompanied the expedition. Guided by a Moslem pilot, they reached Manila Bay, and at once perceived its advantages for the founding of a city; they were also received at first with great friendliness by the two local rulers, Soliman and Lacandola. The first named, however, proved treacherous. As soon as the newcomers were lulled into a sense of security he attacked them unawares, but fortunately the Spaniards were able to beat him off, and afterwards, assuming the offensive, to capture a fort which he had erected nearby. In the course of these operations evidence was found that the natives had been aided in their resistance by the Portuguese. Since it was obvious that the task of conquering Luzon would demand large reinforcements, the Spaniards after some further reconnoitering returned to Cebu. During their absence a letter had been received from Spain, bringing the royal confirmation of Legazpi’s title of governor and captain-general, and establishing his authority in his new domain. He was occupied at the moment with the founding of a city at Cebu, and with the conversion of the natives there; but the conquest of Luzon was of still greater importance, and so an expedition, under Legazpi’s command, consisting of twenty-seven vessels, large and small, carrying 230 arquebusiers, was speedily organized, and left for the north on Easter Monday, April 16, 1571. After touching at Masbate and Mindoro on the way, Legazpi reached Manila on May 16. When the natives knew that the governor had come with his entire force to
settle the land, they burnt their villages and took flight; but Legazpi soon succeeded in getting in touch with them, and on discovering that he proposed to treat them well if they would recognize his authority, the majority soon decided to give him their allegiance. The rajah Soliman, indeed, continued to stir up trouble, but Goiti and Salcedo put down every insurrection. Meantime, on June 3, Legazpi “gave the title of city to this colony of Manila”, whose name he left unchanged; and on the twenty-fourth he formally erected it into a municipality after the traditional Spanish pattern with cabildo, alcaldes, alguaciles, and regidores; moreover he announced that in accordance with his Majesty’s desire, he would give lands and repartimientos to those who wished to settle there. In the course of the next year, Goiti and Salcedo brought most of the rest of the island under subjection. The Augustinians labored hard at the task of converting the natives, while Legazpi was chiefly occupied with the important matter of establishing and regulating commercial relations with the Chinese, whom he had found in large numbers on his arrival, and whose trade he was most anxious to get away from the Portuguese. He died on August 20, 1572, universally respected both by the natives and by his own people, one of the most attractive of Spanish empire builders, whose preference for peaceful rather than warlike methods stands out in agreeable contrast to the policies of most of the conquistadores in the New World.

On the death of Legazpi the government of the Philippines devolved upon his faithful lieutenant and camp-master, Guido de Lavezares, who had first visited the archipelago with Villalobos twenty-nine years before, and who had been acting as governor of Cebu while Legazpi was conquering Luzon. Further progress was made in the conquest of the small islands during the three years of his rule, but the most notable events of that period occurred in connection with his dealings with the Chinese. The Spaniards were convinced that China possessed fabulous wealth; they therefore strove their hardest to facilitate their own trade with it, to the prejudice of the Portuguese, who naturally did their utmost to prevent them. In an account of the Philippines which Lavezares sent back to Philip from Manila on June 29, 1573, he writes that “last year Chinese vessels came to this city to trade, and told us how the Portuguese had asked them not to trade with us, because we were robbers and came to steal and commit other depredations, so that these people wonder not a little if this be true. As the treatment accorded to the Chinese neutralizes these reports, more vessels came this year than last, and each year more will come.” Even more important than the governor’s direct efforts to encourage commercial relations between the Philippines and the Celestial Empire were the services which he rendered to both by his defeat of the famous pirate Li-Ma-Hong. This savage corsair, who had made so much trouble for the Chinese Emperor that he no longer felt safe on the shores of Asia, had determined to found an empire of his own in the Philippines, and in November, 1574, he appeared off Manila with a huge fleet and an army of soldiers and prospective colonists. Salcedo, by far the best soldier that the Spaniards had, was absent at the time, with a large force, on an expedition farther north against Vigan, and the pirate’s first assaults on Manila were only repulsed with great difficulty. But before Li-Ma-Hong could return to the attack with larger forces, Salcedo got back, and with his aid Lavezares defeated the invader, this time decisively, so that Li-Ma-Hong, abandoning his efforts against Manila, sailed away to the northward, in the hope of establishing a base for himself in Pangasinan. Salcedo, however, pursued him with a fleet, besieged him in the fortification that he had erected on the shore, and finally (August 3, 1575) completely routed his forces, so that the pirate, after murdering most of his men that remained alive, took flight, half famished, in a small canoe, and never ventured to molest the Spaniards again. It was a notable triumph, which greatly enhanced the reputation of Spain in the Orient, and a fitting culmination of the career of Juan de Salcedo, to whom the victory was chiefly due. He died March 11, 1576, of a fever, on his encomienda in Luzon, at the early age of twenty-seven, a striking exception to that decline of the fighting prowess of the individual Spaniard which is generally observable in the period of Philip II, and was of such ominous portent for the future of the Spanish Empire.

In August, 1575, Lavezares resigned his functions to Francisco de Sande, alcalde of the audiencia of Mexico, who had been sent out by the crown as governor of the Philippines, and six other royal representatives succeeded him in turn in that office before the death of Philip II. We have no space to go into the individual achievements of each of these men, but a few general remarks may not be out of place. Their tenure of office was usually quite short, on the average less than four years, considerably less than the actual, if not the legal term of the viceroyos of New Spain and of New Castile; and its shortness is but one more of the innumerable evidences of Philip’s perpetual fear lest his representatives in dominions so remote would tend, if allowed to remain long at their posts, to get out of hand, and strike out along lines of their own. There is also a significant alternation of the man of action and the constitutional administrator, of the soldier and the letrado, which may be taken as an evidence that Philip now regarded the conquest as virtually complete, and that consequently, in the Philippines as in the New World, he was tending to replace the conquistadores with men of less daring and greater dependence on himself. The fact that he became sovereign of Portugal and her dominions in 1530
relieved him from the fear of attack from his original rivals in the Orient. Save for the peril from English and Dutch adventurers, which did not become serious until after his death, he and his representatives were henceforth free to devote themselves wholly to the problem of dealing with the natives, and with their neighbors in the adjacent islands and in China and Japan. Another noteworthy evidence, likewise paralleled in the New World, that the era of conquest was regarded as past, and that of assimilation to the Spanish Empire begun, was the establishment, in May, 1583, of the first royal audiencia of Manila. It was set up as a result of advice to Philip from Gonzalo Ronquillo, who had been sent out as governor to replace Sande in 1580, and died in the Philippines in March, 1583; it was composed of a president, three oidores, and an attorney-general, but it led a very chequered existence in its early years. In May, 1590, Gomez Perez Dasmarias, one of the most notable governors the Philippines ever had, brought out with him a decree for its suppression, but after his murder in 1593 it was set up again, and continued, without interruption, till 1898. A letter from the archbishop of Manila, written in 1624, assures us that the reason for its reestablishment was the king’s fear “lest in regions so remote the governors might become too absolute”, and there can be little doubt that he told the truth. The ups and downs of the early history of the audiencia at Manila were also closely connected with the development of the relationship between the Philippines and the viceroyalty of New Spain. The authorities at Mexico never ceased to look upon the archipelago as forming a part of their own domain, and resented any measure which tended to give it independence. The audiencia at Manila, considered itself the symbol of such independence and coequal in all respects with that of New Spain, so that the two bodies regarded one another with hostility from the very first.

On the side of exploration and relations with the adjacent Oriental powers, the last twenty-five years of the reign of the Prudent King witnessed numerous proofs of the mounting prestige of Spain in the Far East. In the Philippines themselves the most significant event of these years was the attempt to conquer and subdue the Moros of Mindanao, who had not yet acknowledged the authority of the Spanish crown. This task was undertaken in 1596 by a captain named Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, as a private enterprise at his own expense; the king in return gave him the title of governor, and full possession of the island for two lifetimes, provided he could accomplish his purpose. He left Iloilo in April with a force of 214 men, and landed at Ilaliana Bay, where he was generally well received by the natives; but on attempting to penetrate inland, he fell into an ambush and was slain. As his camp-master, Juan de Jara, was unable to carry through the conquest without reinforcements, the government at Manila sent out Juan de Ronquillo with a force of 400 men to help him. Meantime the Moros made every preparation to resist and sought aid from the small island of Ternate farther south, whose inhabitants had been hostile to the Spaniards since the days of Magellan. But Ronquillo defeated the ships that were bringing over the enemy contingent, and was well on his way to the subjugation of Mindanao, when he unaccountably lost heart, and, availing himself of an authorization received from Manila before the government there had been fully apprised of the victories he had won, abandoned his post and withdrew with all his troops. Though he was officially acquitted by a court martial on his return, the consequences of his conduct were lamentable in the extreme. It encouraged the Moros and also the natives of the adjacent island of Jolo, all of whom were on the point of submitting to Spain, to persist in their struggle to maintain independence, and necessitated a number of subsequent expeditions and the loss of many lives, to complete the conquest of Mindanao during the ensuing years.

More impressive were the demonstrations of Spanish power in the lands and islands beyond the limits of the archipelago. Many of these were made possible by embassies from native rulers to beg support against hated rivals, the same sort of situation as the Spaniards often utilized to their own advantage in North Africa and in the New World. Thus an appeal from the king of Borneo for aid against a brother who had dethroned him led, in 1578, to a Spanish expedition to that island, and the recognition of Spanish authority by the ruler whom it restored to power. Requests for support from the king of Cambodia against his enemy, the king of Siam, brought Spanish troops to the mainland in 1596, and again in 1598; but though they greatly impressed the natives by their valor, they gained no permanent advantage. Constant efforts were also made to subjugate the Moluccas and gain full control of the spice trade. These began with a large expedition sent out at Philip’s command in 1582; but the climate, the consistent opposition of the inhabitants of Ternate, and the tradition of Portuguese hostility, which was kept alive till long after the annexation and evinced itself in native conspiracies and plots stirred up by Portuguese agency, prevented the full realization of these projects in Philip’s day, and caused the deaths of many gallant men; moreover the reign was hardly over before the Dutch appeared to challenge the Spanish claims.

With Japan there was an inconclusive and somewhat ridiculous exchange of communications. The Japanese emperor demanded that the Spaniards in the Philippines unreservedly acknowledge themselves to be his vassals and was with difficulty persuaded that they had no intention of so doing.
The Spaniards at Manila were equally determined to bring Christianity to Japan, and despatched a number of Franciscan friars for that purpose; but as both sides were resolved to maintain trade relations with one another, their political and religious divergencies did not lead to any fighting. All these items go to prove that the Philippines had now become a solid outpost of the power of Spain in the Pacific. Her ability to hold them was no longer in any doubt. They were henceforth to be a base whence further expeditions could be sent forth, and whither all Spaniards in the Orient could repair for aid.

During all the period of conquest and colonization the work of converting the natives went steadily forward. Indeed, it would probably be safe to say that the missionary activities of the early Spaniards in the Philippines were even more vigorous and extensive than those of their compatriots in the New World. The Augustinians, as we have seen, were the first in the field, and down to 1577 had it all to themselves. In that year the first Franciscans arrived; in 1581 the first Jesuits; and six years later, the first party of Dominicans.\(^3\) There was naturally keen rivalry among the different orders for the glory of making the largest number of converts, not only in the Philippines and in the adjacent islands, but also in China, which was visited by the Augustinians in 1575 and by the Dominicans in 1590; but the Jesuits resented the arrival of these newcomers as an invasion of their own domain, and in 1595 succeeded in putting a stop to it. They also managed to limit the monastic rivalries in the Philippines by having each of the different regions in the archipelago allotted to a separate order; moreover, they persuaded their general, Aquaviva, to erect the Philippines into a ‘vice-province’ and to place one of the ablest of their leaders, Antonio Sedeño, at the head of it. In the Philippines the society might be seen at its very best. Its members showed none of the unscrupulousness that gained them an evil name in Europe; they devoted themselves effectively and whole-heartedly to the accomplishment of a noble task. They were not satisfied with merely eliciting from the natives formal acceptance of a faith which they did not comprehend. They sought to instruct them not only to understand the tenets of the Christian religion, but also to live cleaner and better lives, and to practice the arts of a higher civilization.

The progress of the archipelago during the last two decades of the sixteenth century was also steady and rapid from the economic point of view. The era of restrictions such as had fettered Spanish-American commerce since the time of the Catholic Kings did not become fully operative in the Philippines until the seventeenth century, though the direct trade of the archipelago with South America was apparently forbidden before 1590, while three years later that with Mexico was limited to two ships a year, neither to exceed 300 tons burden, a foretaste of what was to come. Corsarios Luteranos, the ubiquitous pest of the Spaniards in America, were mostly out of the picture here. A richly laden Manila galleon was captured, indeed, off the western coast of Mexico, in November, 1587, by Thomas Cavendish, who, after disposing of his booty and burning his prize, continued calmly on across the Pacific, through the Philippines, and eluded all attempts to intercept him; but with this notable exception, the archipelago in this period was practically undisturbed by European sea-rovers. The colonists, moreover, were determined to prevent their happy lot from being ruined by royal exactions. In 1589 they persuaded the king to consent that a tenth, instead of the accustomed fifth, of the gold collected in the Philippines be appropriated by the crown, and that the natives be exempt from all payment. They were also desirous of uprooting the Portuguese tradition of enslaving the Filipinos, and their representations procured a royal order that no one be permitted to make new slaves, that the children of all existing slaves be born free, and that any slave should be allowed to purchase his freedom at a price to be fixed by the governor and the bishop.

Altogether one derives the impression that at the end of the reign of the Prudent King the Philippines were both prosperous and happy. There had been none of the revolting slaughter at the time of the conquest which stained the institution of Spanish rule in Mexico and Peru. The advance of commerce and civilization had been easier and more rapid. Natives and colonists were generally content, and as yet virtually undisturbed by the advent of European rivals. The archipelago had been acquired with far less effort than the American lands, and it appeared that correspondingly little work would be necessary to hold it and to raise it to the standards of European civilization. It exemplifies the contrast between the slacker, easier existence of the Orient, and the more strenuous life of the America of today and makes a pleasing exception to the generally far less fortunate conditions which obtained in the rest of the Spanish Empire at the time of Philip’s death.
CHAPTER XXXIV
SPAIN IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1559-78

The story of Spain’s foreign policy during the first two decades of the reign of Philip II revolves chiefly around the development of her relations with England and with France, while the course of her dealings with these two nations is at all times powerfully affected by the fluctuations of the struggle for the maintenance of Spanish authority in the Netherlands. The Low Countries, as has already been observed, were the focal point of Western Europe during the second half of the sixteenth century; and though no part of them attained recognized independence till long after the period covered by the present chapter, it will be clearer to treat of them in connection with Spain’s foreign affairs than to consider them, where they perhaps more logically belong, as a part of the internal problems of the Spanish Empire.

Taking the period in question as a whole—that is, the twenty years that elapsed between the return of Philip to Spain in 1559, and the assumption by Cardinal Granvelle of the post of chief minister in 1579—it is fair to say that if the dominant principle of the Spanish monarch’s foreign policy was to avoid aggressive action, and to preserve the status quo; politically speaking, he was content to maintain that attitude of ‘sturdy defensiveness’ which had been recommended to him by his father. In matters of religion, there was indeed a somewhat different tale to tell. So deep was the king’s detestation of heresy that whenever he was offered an opportunity to suppress it, he found it next to impossible to hold his hand; and so close was the fusion of religion and politics in the period under review, that a blow for the faith was often difficult to distinguish from a move for the aggrandizement of Spain. But on the whole, during the first half of his reign, Philip did not play the aggressor. He asked nothing better than to leave his French and English neighbors alone, provided they would forbear to breed trouble for him and to imperil Catholicism by concessions to heretics. Certainly he contemplated no further conquests at their expense.

There were of course many ebbs and flows. It is interesting to observe, as the panorama gradually unfolds itself, how closely those ebbs and flows corresponded with the character of the successive administrations of the Low Countries. When Philip’s representatives there were conciliatory, Spain’s relations with England and France, if not cordial, were at least tolerable; whenever the Netherlanders were up in arms, there were echoes of the conflict both in London and in Paris. We shall therefore do well to begin our investigation of this complicated period with an examination of the state in which Philip left his Burgundian dominions when he departed for Spain in 1559.

Two preliminary observations are indispensable in order to enable the modern reader to envisage the problem of these Burgundian territories as it presented itself to the Spanish king; and the first is concerned with their geographical extent. So largely is the interest of the period concentrated in the Low Countries, that one is likely to forget that the lands which Philip had inherited from his Burgundian forbears included not only the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands, corresponding roughly to modern Belgium and Holland, but also the Free County of Burgundy to the southward. The two blocks of territory were separated by many miles, and a journey between their respective capitals, in the sixteenth century, occupied an average of fourteen or fifteen days. The administrations of the two holdings had drifted steadily apart under the Emperor, and were now, for all practical purposes, separate. It is true that the Spanish monarch’s representative in the Low Countries was also in theory chief ruler under the crown of Franche Comté; but as that representative continued to reside in Brussels and never visited Besançon or Dole, his practical importance in the county was almost nil, and his functions passed to the royal agents on the ground. On the other hand, one cannot afford to lose all sight of the southern holding while one studies the more dramatic events in the Netherlands. If administratively speaking they had now, for all practical purposes, fallen apart, they had their roots in a common past. Many of the great houses whose scions were to play prominent roles in the approaching struggle in the Low Countries traced their origins back to Franche Comté. The Granvelles came from Besançon, and William the Silent inherited the name of Orange from that of the foremost family in the county, whose last direct descendant was his elder cousin, René, slain before St. Dizier in 1544. More-
over, Franche Comté was an indispensable link, a military route for the passage of Spanish troops to the seat of trouble in the Netherlands; and it was, finally, a reservoir from which Philip was able to draw both funds and supplies wherewith to put down the rebellion in the North. Though we shall hear of it infrequently in the succeeding pages, we cannot afford to forget its existence.

In the second place it is essential that the reader be reminded that the only picture of a Spanish dependency in Europe which was available as a model and guide for Philip II at the time that he took over the reins of government from his father was the picture of the Spanish dependencies in the Mediterranean and in Italy. The only overseas possessions which Spain had thus far held in Europe were the Balearics, Sicily, Sardinia, Naples, and Milan, the first three of which had been acquired by the realms of the crown of Aragon before the days of their union with Castile, the fourth at least partially so, while the fifth had fallen in during the period of Charles V. The methods by which they had been administered varied somewhat, of course, in detail, according to local conditions and traditions; but, mutatis mutandis, one may safely say that the guiding principle had been increasingly, throughout the list, that of the establishment and increase of monarchical authority, at the expense of every local custom or institution which ran counter to it. The application of that principle, moreover, had been considerably intensified since the union of the crowns. It was an integral part of the process of Castilianizing Italy to which reference has already been made. It was the essence of the political atmosphere in which Philip’s life was lived; and it is difficult to see how, in dealing with his Burgundian dominions, he could possibly have been expected to follow any other. The experience of the next century was conclusively to prove that the Netherlander would not submit to what the Italians had been willing to put up with, that the geographical position of the Low Countries made them far harder to handle than any of the Mediterranean dependencies, and, above all, that the power of Protestantism in the North destroyed every remaining ground for regarding them as parallel cases. But when we consider the task which the Emperor had bequeathed to Philip and the nature of the instructions which he had left behind, we can scarcely be surprised that the Spanish monarch at the moment of his accession was practically blind to the first two of these considerations; as for the third, that is, the increasing power of heresy in the Low Countries, it but constituted in his eyes another and most cogent reason for following the traditional policy of absolutism and suppression. There can be no reasonable doubt that the image of Spain’s Mediterranean and Italian dependencies, particularly Naples and Milan, in the state in which they had been handed over to him by his father, exercised a powerful influence in the determination of Philip’s policy and methods in regard to the Netherlands; and that consideration should serve at least to mitigate the severity of the judgments we pass upon him, when we look back upon the tragic history of Spain in the Low Countries from the vantage ground of the knowledge and experience of the twentieth century.

On his departure for Spain, Philip confided the regency of his Burgundian dominions, which Mary of Hungary had laid down in 1555, to his half-sister, Margaret of Parma, then in her thirty-eighth year. She was the illegitimate child of the Emperor Charles V by the daughter of a clothweaver of Flanders, and the first eleven years of her life had been spent in the Low Countries; but in 1533 she had been sent to Italy to be married, first (February 29, 1536) to Alessandro de’ Medici, and then, after his assassination a few months later, to Ottavio Farnese, the grandson of Pope Paul III. By these two unions she had become deeply involved in Italian politics, and particularly in the interminable questions arising out of the conflicting claims to Parma and Piacenza. Her husband had allied himself with France in the recent war in order to enforce what he regarded as his rights there, and though officially reconciled with the Hapsburgs in 1556, was still by no means satisfied indeed one of the reasons why Philip had selected Margaret as his regent in the Low Countries was his belief that her desire to obtain full realization of her husband’s territorial ambitions in Italy would induce her to place herself unreservedly at the disposal of the government at Madrid. At the time that she took office there her point of view was no longer native but foreign. She had even forgotten how to write French. She was, in fact, a living and present reminder of many of the characteristics of which the inhabitants complained in the king. Her intellectual and administrative gifts were by no means remarkable. Hard-working and methodical, but neither attractive nor brilliant, she was not comparable for one moment with either of her two great predecessors.

But the power was by no means exclusively in the regent’s hands. Officially, indeed, she was invested with all the authority inherent in the king himself; but secret instructions obliged her, in all matters of importance, to take the advice of a committee of three persons, of whom by far the most important was Granvelle; the Spanish name, the Consulta, by which this special committee soon came to be known, is at once indicative of the work which it was expected to perform and a significant
comment on Philip’s way of doing things. The trio that composed it were all members of the old Council of State, which still remained, in theory at least, the official advisory body of the regent; outwardly nothing had been changed. But practically the Consulta usurped all the functions of the Council, whose other three members, Egmont, Orange, and Glajon, were simply elbowed aside, until they became, by the force of events, the leaders of the national opposition. Philip’s plan, in other words, was to Hispanicize the government of the Low Countries by stealth, in order, if possible, to avoid revolution. He was determined to subvert their most cherished liberties, both political and religious, to reduce them to a state of subjection to the home government comparable to that of the Spanish dependencies in Italy; but he desired, if possible, to achieve his end without a fight. He hoped to conceal the true meaning of his policy from the watchful eyes of the Netherlanders themselves, by leaving the outward fabric of their ancient form of government untouched and accomplish his own ends by working under ground.

It was an impossible program, as the sequel was to show. The differences between Philip and his subjects were far too deep seated, at least in those portions of his Burgundian dominions where religious grievances were superadded to political, to be settled otherwise than by the arbitrament of war; but revolution did not really break out during the regency of Margaret of Parma. The period of her rule was that of indispensable preparation for the scenes of bloodshed that were to follow; but the outstanding fact of it, when viewed by itself, is that the government succeeded in preserving peace. A large measure of this success was attributable to the fact that Philip, at Margaret’s advice, made certain reluctant concessions to the popular demands. He had no intention of permanently abiding by them; but as it immediately became evident that the Netherlanders could not be hoodwinked into passive acquiescence in his policy of Hispanicization, there was no other alternative if he was not prepared to fight. The first of these concessions was the sanctioning of the departure of the last detachment of the detested Spanish tercios (January 10, 1561); another was his decision, three years later, to recall Granvelle, whom the opposition regarded as the source of all their woes; without his support, the Netherlanders were convinced that the much more pliant Margaret could be induced to grant them their desires. That Philip was willing to grant as much as this is an evidence of the predominance at the time of Ruy Gomez and the peace party in the Royal Council at Madrid; but there were other points on which the king showed himself less complaisant, and it is significant that it was in matters religious that his hostility to compromise was most manifest. Not only did the ‘placards’, or edicts, against all forms of heresy, a legacy from the days of his father, increase in severity and scope; there were also ominous innovations. In May, 1559, before his departure for Spain, he had obtained from Pope Paul IV a bull erecting fourteen new bishoprics in the Netherlands over and above the six existing ones. The right of appointment to these bishoprics was vested in the king, who would obviously nominate with a view to his own ends, and regardless of the claims of the Burgundian nobles; moreover the measure had an important bearing upon the political situation, for the new prelates would all have seats in the States-General, and constitute the nucleus of a monarchical party there. Mission after mission was dispatched to Madrid to protest against this new departure, and, above all, to demand the removal of Granvelle, who was popularly supposed to be responsible for it; but though Philip in 1564 permitted the Cardinal to retire the new bishoprics continued without change.

The bitterness caused by Philip’s religious policy was much increased by the fact that at the very time that he succeeded his father the guidance of the heretical party in the Netherlands passed from Lutheran to Calvinist hands. The doctrines of the Genevan reformer had made their first appearance in the Low Countries during the closing decades of the Emperor’s reign. They slipped in at first almost unperceived; but once they had got a foothold, they gained ground with astonishing rapidity. They were eagerly seized upon by the urban capitalistic centers, to which the implications of Calvin’s economic teachings were particularly welcome; the progress of the French Huguenots was another element in their favor; before long the more passive Lutherans were simply elbowed aside, and the program of the heretics in the Netherlands became aggressively militant. In October, 1561, there was an heretical outbreak in the town of Valenciennes, which required the use of regular troops to put it down; and from that time onward the discontent, though sometimes latent, grew steadily stronger until the day (April 5, 1566) of the famous interview with the regent when the petitioners were given the name of ‘Beggars,’ which was to be their rallying cry for years to come. Margaret, on this occasion, showed that she appreciated the seriousness of the crisis and the need of compromise. She promised to present to the king the requests of his subjects, and to moderate, pending his reply, the severity of the ‘placards’. For a moment it seemed possible that Philip would also yield; but the prospect of royal concessions, instead of allaying the excitement in the Netherlands, served only to augment it. Preachers harangued excited congregations and lashed them into paroxysms of rage against the existing regime. There were outbursts of iconoclasm and desecrations of churches. Before long it became evident that some of the
revolutions would not be content with liberty to exercise their own faith, but were even intent on the
destruction of Catholicism. Such a program as this was, of course, totally inadmissible, even to the
somewhat temporizing nature of the regent; at the first news of the revolt of the iconoclasts she
nominated the Count of Mansfeld as governor of Brussels, placed herself under his protection, and soon
succeeded, with his help, in collecting several regiments of soldiers in the Empire. There was fighting,
in the first three months of 1567, outside Antwerp and Valenciennes, and the government was every-
where victorious. Margaret was alive to the danger of pushing her triumph too far. She fully realized
that the rebels were too much in earnest to be permanently discouraged by a few trifling reverses; and
she wrote to Philip urging him to seize the moment of his victory as the psychological opportunity to be
generous to the defeated foe. But Philip had no intention of taking her advice. His previous concessions
had been but temporary and reluctant; he was resolved that the liberties of the Netherlands should be
crushed under the heel of Spain, and above all that every vestige of heresy should be obliterated. The
events of the first seven years of Margaret’s regency had convinced him that these ends could not be
attained by subterfuge and deceit, as he had originally hoped, and that, much as he deplored it, strong
measures were indispensable. He had, in fact, taken the first of these measures in the autumn of 1566,
when he ordered the Duke of Alva to repair to Lombardy and conduct to the Low Countries the Spanish
troops which were concentrating there. On the 9th of the following August the vanguard of his tercios
arrived in Brussels, and four months later the regent departed for Italy, leaving the terrible Duke as her
successor in title as well as in fact.

When contrasted with the regencies of the Emperor’s day, the rule of Margaret of Parma seems a
troublesome period, and it certainly saw the sowing of the seeds of future miseries; but compared with that
of the Duke of Alva which followed, it appears as a time of tranquility and peace. Such at least was the
light in which contemporaries regarded it. Save for the few who knew the whole story, the dominant
fact of the situation was that, though Philip had been offered grievous provocation, he had not yet really
shown his teeth. It served to strengthen the impression, already prevalent among his fellow sovereigns,
that, if possible, the Spanish monarch was determined to avoid war.

The course of the relations between Spain and France during these same years (1559-67) is
difficult to characterize in brief space. So complicated were the issues involved, so bewildering the
interaction of religious and political motives, so numerous the dramatis personae, and so quick the
shifts of scene, that consistency in the following out of any logical policy was practically out of the
question for either of the two courts. The situation, in other words, was such as offered Philip an
admirable opportunity for the exercise of his talents for concealment and intrigue. Renewal of the
Hapsburg-Valois conflict as it had been in the Emperor’s day was now out of the question; the disrupted
state of France rendered it impossible for her to wage it, and unnecessary for Spain to undertake it. The
real question in the eyes of the Spanish government was how much profit could be made, by diplomacy
and craft, out of the civil and religious struggle on the soil of its ancient foe.

As befitted long-standing enemies who had but recently made peace, the rulers of France and
Spain were deeply distrustful of one another. Each was determined to be precisely informed about the
ongoings at the other’s court, and anxious, if possible, to exert influence in the other’s councils. The
method used by Philip to attain these ends in France was a far-reaching system of political espionage,
first installed by the Duke of Alva when he repaired to Paris, after the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, to
represent his master at his marriage to Elizabeth of Valois, and later developed and perfected by
Thomas Perrenot de Chantonnay, the younger brother of Cardinal Granvelle, who was the ambassador
of the Prudent King at Paris from August, 1559, to February, 1564. On the other side, the queen-mother,
Catharine de’ Medici, who, after the death of Henry II in July, 1559, gave the French government such
measure of continuity as it was to possess for thirty years to come, expected that her daughter Elizabeth,
who was finally sent south to her Spanish husband in the winter of 1559-60, would soon have his full
confidence, and send home all she learned; it was also hoped that she would be able to influence him in
a way favorable to France. The princess, on her departure, was furnished with a magnificent wardrobe
and all manner of appliances for increasing her charms and rendering her attractive to Philip; but all
these carefully laid plans of the queen-mother were brought to naught by the attack of smallpox which
Elizabeth suffered shortly after her arrival, and which rendered it impossible for her husband to have
anything to do with her for several months to come. When at last Elizabeth got well, and was able to
take up her duties as queen of Spain, it was made clear to her that she was expected to forget the land of
her birth and become solely devoted to that of her adoption. Such a shift of allegiance cost her many a
pang, and rendered her mother furious; but under the circumstances in which she found herself, there
was no possible escape. At the outset, then, everything seemed to promise that the power which Philip
would be able to exercise in France would far outweigh any influence which the French government might be able to exert in Spain. Only in the Low Countries was the Spanish power really vulnerable, and the possibilities of that region were as yet unrevealed.

During the brief reign of Francis II (July, 1559-December, 1560) the queen-mother was temporarily in the background, and the government was controlled by the two uncles of the king’s wife, Mary queen of Scots—Francis, Duke of Guise, and the cardinal of Lorraine. In matters religious their policy was wholly in accord with the views of Philip II; but he cherished a grudge against them because of their achievements in the recent war, and he was in mortal terror lest they should manage to effect a permanent union of France and Scotland. He did not venture to express his views openly, for opposition to the Guises would mean dalliance with heretics; but there can be no doubt that during the year which succeeded the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis there were several occasions on which he secretly hoped for the success of John Knox, the Lords of the Congregation, and of those who supported them in England, and it is certain that he was greatly relieved by the news of the conclusion of the treaty of Edinburgh (July 5, 1560), whose object was to prevent the annexation of Scotland to France. Six months later, however, the whole situation was suddenly changed by the death (December 5, 1560) of Francis II, the consequent elimination of the Guises from the government, and the return thither of Catharine de’ Medici as regent for Charles IX. Philip’s fears for Scotland were now entirely allayed; but the peril of Protestantism, to which the queen-mother showed herself alarmingly tolerant, loomed larger than ever before. And it was not merely by the danger that heresy might become definitely established and recognized in France, intolerable though that would be, that Philip’s fears were roused. There was also every prospect that the contagion would infect his own dominions in the Netherlands and threaten the subversion of his own authority there. As early as August 9, 1560, while the Guises and their policy of peace were still in the saddle, Granvelle had written Gonzalo Perez that with things in the state in which they were in France, it was a miracle that matters were no worse in the Low Countries; what then was to be expected with Catharine de’ Medici in power? Obviously at all costs the Reformation must be put down, and from the beginning of the year of 1561 Philip bent all his efforts to that end.

These efforts, however, took the form of a vast campaign of bribery and intrigue; on no account did Philip propose to be dragged into open war. At the outset he attempted to turn against Catharine de’ Medici a project which she had once favored for the purpose of embarrassing him: namely, a plan to prevail upon him to give up to Anthony of Bourbon the Spanish portion of Navarre. There had been, as we have already seen, some doubts as to the legitimacy of the methods by which Spain had acquired that territory in the days of Ferdinand the Catholic; the emperor’s ‘instructions’ and ‘political testament’ contained passages which might be interpreted to indicate that he had conscientious scruples about retaining it; there was a possibility that Philip might take the same view. Bourbon’s case was, at least, sufficiently strong to put the Spanish king in a very embarrassing position if he refused to give it consideration; and it was in the hope of causing him such embarrassment that Catharine supported it. But Philip utilized the situation to his own advantage. He knew that Bourbon was both vacillating and imprudent, and that his Protestantism was no proof against his desire for personal aggrandizement; and for the next two years he negotiated with him, tantalizing him with offers, not indeed of Navarre, but of Sardinia, of Tunis, and even of the Balearics in lieu of it, in the hope of inducing him to take vigorous measures for the defense of Catholicism in France. These projects were all suddenly terminated by Bourbon’s death, October 26, 1563, as a result of wounds received at the siege of Rouen; but the fact that before March, 1562, he had consented to ‘receive instruction’ in the Roman Catholic faith, from a teacher recommended to him by Jesuits, and that in the following May he had published a proclamation expelling all Huguenots from Paris, gives reason for believing that if the unworthy sovereign of French Navarre had continued to live, he might well have become a pensioner of the king of Spain.

Another affair, which began in 1562, and continued for several years to come, though it ultimately effected little save to augment the suspicion and distrust of Catharine de’ Medici toward the Spanish government, is too characteristic of the methods of Philip II to be entirely omitted. This was the attempt of the Prudent King to take advantage, for his own purposes and for the advancement of Catholicism, of the vanity and sensitiveness of Blaise de Monluc. That gallant but unmanageable old soldier, “the real creator of the French infantry,” had been deeply aggrieved by the inadequate fashion in which his services to the French crown had been rewarded. He was also convinced—or at least pretended to be—that the position of the church was gravely imperiled by the policy of toleration of heresy on which the queen-mother had embarked. In October, 1562, the rumor was current that he was planning to deliver the whole of Guienne into the hands of the king of Spain. The person who was doubtless responsible for turning his thoughts in this direction was a certain Captain Felipe de Bardaxi, who had been condemned as a heretic by the Spanish Inquisition in 1558, but had escaped to France and got employment in the army of Monluc. His valor and skill won him the confidence of his new chief,
with whose character and cupidity he soon became acquainted, and it occurred to him to make use of
the situation in which he found himself for the advantage of Spain, and as a means to the rehabilitation
of his own fortunes. Philip was prompt to profit by the opportunity, for this was just the kind of
undertaking that appealed to him. Its conduct was placed in the hands of Bardaxi’s cousin, Juan, one of
the army of secret spies which the Prudent King maintained in France; and it is characteristic of Philip’s
methods of procedure that his regular ambassador at Paris, Chantonnay, was kept totally in the dark in
regard to the whole affair. Though no document has been found to prove it, there can be little doubt that
Monluc became a pensionary of the Spanish monarch from the very moment that his attitude was
known. He had a secret interview with Juan de Bardaxi at Toulouse in February, 1564. He sent Philip a
long memorial dilating on the many advantages that would ensue from Spanish intervention in
Southwestern France, and Philip replied with an elaborate letter in which he begged Monluc to continue
to inform him, and to see if Damville, the new governor of Languedoc, could not possibly be induced to
participate in a Catholic uprising. At this juncture proceedings were suddenly interrupted by a summons
to Monluc to return to Paris to face accusations of treasonable correspondence, put forward by the secret
agents of Catharine de’ Medici. Quite characteristically, he flatly denied all the charges that had been
made, nay, even demanded that his traducers be punished, and Catharine, who had many reasons for
wishing to avoid a public scandal, thought it wiser, under all the circumstances, to accept his word. She
even consented to go through the motions of a trial of the chief of his accusers. Meantime Monluc
shamelessly continued his correspondence with Philip and Bardaxi, and in a letter to the last named,
written October 27, 1564, put forward the plan of a meeting between the Spanish monarch and
Catharine for the discussion of a joint program for the suppression of heresy in France. Such was the
first suggestion of the famous interview which was to take place, June 14-July 4, 1565, at Bayonne.

The idea of such an interview had been cherished by the queen-mother ever since her daughter
Elizabeth had been sent south to marry Philip II. If she could induce the Spanish monarch to pay her a
formal visit on French soil, it would proclaim to the world that her authority was firmly established, and
that she was regarded as a real bulwark of the Roman Catholic church. It was doubtless these very same
considerations that determined Philip not to go, and his resolve was confirmed at the last moment by a
report that reached him of a threatened renewal of the ancient alliance between the government of
France and the infidel Turk. On the other hand, the queen-mother’s invitation offered him an
opportunity, which he could ill afford to neglect, to extend his own influence in French affairs; he there-
fore sent his wife Elizabeth and the Duke of Alva to represent him at the interview which Catharine had
proposed. It was a strong combination. The queen-mother’s passionate devotion to her children would
induce her to do everything possible to please her daughter Elizabeth, who had now become so
completely Hispanicized that there was no danger that she would be too compliant. Alva had already
proved himself equally competent at bullying and intrigue, and knew well which method to select in
order to attain his ends. The instructions they received dealt almost exclusively with the affairs of
religion. They were to propose a ‘holy alliance’ of the two governments against their heretical subjects
and the elimination of all ministers and counsellors who would not do their utmost to advance the faith.

Catharine, on her side, came to Bayonne with objects primarily political and dynastic. Her only
real interest was the preservation of her own authority, and that of her children who should succeed her;
and one of the most obvious methods of attaining this end was to strengthen the family ties between the
Valois and the Spanish Hapsburgs. She wished to marry her daughter Margaret to Don Carlos, and her
son, the future Henry III, to Philip’s younger sister Dona Juana, the widow of Prince John of Portugal.
But neither of these schemes appealed to Philip II. The state of Don Carlos’s health was a sufficient
reason for refusing, at that juncture, to consider any marriage for him; in case he should get well there
were other princesses who would make far better matches for him than Margaret de Valois. There were
also numerous objections, particularly in the matter of the dowry, to the union which the queen-mother
proposed between Henry of Anjou and Dona Juana; and, finally, Philip was convinced that his own
position was so strong, and that of Catharine, comparatively speaking, so weak, that he could well
afford to insist on the ‘Holy League’ which he had so closely at heart, without making any concessions
whatever in return. The Prudent King, moreover, had by this time completed all his arrangements for
keeping secret watch on Catharine and checking the results. Monluc was at Bayonne, and in close touch
with Alva; so also was the new Spanish ambassador, Francisco de Alava, who had replaced Chantonnay
in February, 1564, and had by this time perfected the system of spies and underground information
which had been initiated by his predecessor. But Catharine was both wily and obstinate. She pretended
to be amazed that Philip should be so disturbed by the state of religion in France; she was profuse in her
promises to take vigorous measures against heresy as soon as it could be demonstrated that such
measures were needed; but it was impossible to pin her down to any definite engagement to act at a
specifed time. Whenever Alva sought to bring the conversation to this point, she skillfully shifted it

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over to her own dynastic projects. Two weeks of diplomatic thrust and parry had no other result than to convince each party that the other was not to be trusted. There were, indeed, a number of affecting interviews, and suitable exchanges of courtesies and honors; and these outward evidences of cordiality, coupled with a series of violent edicts, in the ensuing weeks, against the printers of Protestant books, made such an impression upon the uninformed mass of the Huguenots, that a legend arose, which has not been wholly eradicated today, that the project which bore fruit seven years later on St. Bartholomew’s day originated at Bayonne. But the principals at the conference were not deceived. Philip and Catharine were really further apart at the end of the interview from which so much had been hoped, than they had been when it began.

Two events which took place in the succeeding months, neither of them, apparently, in any way connected with the conference at Bayonne, are significant indications of the way in which the wind was blowing. The first, which has been already described in detail, need only be mentioned here, namely, the massacre, by Pedro Menendez de Aviles, in September, 1565, of the French Protestant colony on the shores of Florida. The patent or asiento authorizing Menendez to undertake the expedition which produced this tragic result was dated March 20, 1565, and the first rumor of it which reached France is to be found in a letter written just two weeks later to Charles IX by Saint-Sulpice, his ambassador at Madrid, to tell him that it had been decided to send Menendez to the shores of Florida with a good fleet and 600 men to fight the French and put them to death. It is true that the fleet did not actually set sail until June 29, when the conference at Bayonne was practically over; but the plan of sending it had been devised before the meeting had even been arranged; and though Spanish slowness delayed Menendez’s departure until the meeting had been in session for a fortnight, the two events are to be regarded as entirely separate. There were justifications for the massacre, in Spanish eyes at least, other than the mere fact that Ribaut and his companions were heretics; for the Frenchmen were also trespassers on land that was indubitably Spanish under the bull of Alexander VI and the treaty of Tordesillas; but naturally this line of reasoning found no adherents among the Huguenots, who clamored loudly for revenge when the news was known. Catharine protested and demanded reparation; but Philip’s position was too strong to make it possible for her, officially at least, to translate her words into deeds. If vengeance was to be obtained it would have to be through private means.

Vengeance for the slaughter of Ribaut’s colony naturally suggests the name of Dominique de Gourgues, who sailed on his own responsibility from Bordeaux on August 2, 1567, accomplished his end, and was back in France on the sixth of the following June; the story of that enterprise has already been fully told. For the present we are chiefly concerned with another expedition, which departed from the same port almost exactly one year earlier, and is generally understood to have been a retort to the Florida massacre; this was the famous seizure of the Portuguese island of Madeira by Captain Peyrot de Monluc. This restless fighter, the second son of Blaise de Monluc, found life empty and tiresome in France after the termination of the First Civil War by the Pacification of Amboise (March, 1563). He longed to distinguish himself by some notable feat of arms, and cherished plans for a descent on the Portuguese in Africa; there was even talk of his going as far as Madagascar. Coligny, in his capacity of admiral of France, gave him hearty support, in spite of Peyrot’s sturdy Catholicism; but the king and the queen-mother were far more cautious, and it was not until the news of the Florida massacre had been received that Peyrot stood any real chance of being allowed to put to sea. It seems doubtful, in fact, if he had any definite idea of where he was going before April, 1566; but his plans took shape rapidly in the succeeding weeks, possibly as a result of the representations of two members of a family named Menine, well known in Guienne, one of whom had suffered on the sea at the hands of the Portuguese, while the other had been taken prisoner by the Spaniards in Florida, and brought back by them to Madrid, where he told his tale to the French ambassador, Fourquevaux. It would seem natural to trace the connection which indubitably existed between the Florida massacre and the expedition of Peyrot to the activities of these Menine. At any rate, Peyrot’s plans were sufficiently well known, in the weeks before he set sail, to elicit vigorous protests from the Portuguese and Spanish ambassadors. It would appear that he had made private arrangements to be joined, directly after he left Bordeaux, by a squadron of sixteen English vessels, which, together with the seven that he furnished himself, brought his armament up to twenty-three. Cruising southward, the expedition encountered violent storms; when it came in sight of Madeira it was short of water and supplies; solely with the idea of replenishing its stock it put into the port. But the inhabitants, doubtless because of the rumors of the expedition which had been circulated for months before, were convinced that it was Peyrot’s intention to conquer the island. Without the slightest warning they launched a furious attack, and though Peyrot had, apparently, promised the French government before his departure that he would never play the aggressor, he felt amply justified in defending himself. On the water the combat was speedily terminated in favor of the invaders; the land fighting which ensued took somewhat longer, but ended with the same result. There
was much bloodshed and wantonness, and Peyrot himself was numbered among the slain, but the close of the day found his comrades who survived him in undisputed possession of the island of Madeira. They did not, however, remain there long. As Peyrot had kept his ultimate objective secret, there were naturally all sorts of different opinions as to what should be done next. Many desired to attempt conquest and piracy on a large scale, but feared the displeasure of the home government. Those who preferred to remain at Madeira were in terror of the vengeance of the king of Portugal; and the final result was that after a few weeks the invaders evacuated the island and returned to Europe.

The whole affair had been utterly haphazard, and typical of the maritime enterprises of that day and generation. There was a terrible explosion of wrath at Lisbon when the first news of Peyrot’s conquest came in. The government prepared to take summary vengeance, and the lives of the French and English residents in the Portuguese capital were in grave danger. But Catharine was prompt to disavow Peyrot; the news that his expedition had voluntarily departed from Madeira helped to mollify the Portuguese; before the end of the year all the excitement had blown over. What is of most interest for our purpose is the attitude of Philip towards the whole affair. Officially it was none of his business. The harm had been actually done to Portugal and not to Spain; moreover, there was every reason to believe that Peyrot’s ultimate objective had been in Portuguese and not in Spanish waters, and yet Philip took the matter up with the French government just as vigorously as if he himself had been the injured one. In so far as Peyrot’s expedition could be regarded as an act of vengeance for the Florida massacre—and it is fair to add that the numbers and cruelty of Menendez’s Portuguese followers on that occasion lent color to such a view—the king of Spain was perhaps warranted in resenting it. It may be further added that a Madeira in French and English hands would have constituted a menace to his treasure fleets which Philip could not have been expected to ignore. Yet is it not also reasonable to regard the vigor with which the Prudent King espoused the quarrel of his western neighbor as an earnest of the project, already half formed in his mind, to extend his influence over the destinies of the Portuguese empire, as a foreshadowing, in fact, of the events of 1578-81.

So the year 1566 passed off without an open rupture between France and Spain. In view of the number and bitterness of the issues between them, it is really remarkable that it should have been avoided, and a tribute to the firmness of the determination of both Philip and Catharine to keep the peace. And now new causes of irritation appeared to complicate a situation already difficult enough. The new Spanish ambassador Alava was most offensive to the queen mother; so perfect was the network of spies at his command that she felt herself caught like a bird in the fowler’s snare. His insolence in demanding apology and reparation for piracies which she had not sanctioned became more intolerable from day to day; worst of all, he was obviously drawing closer to the Guises, and laying the foundations of the League which a decade later was to disrupt France. When it became known that the Duke of Alva was to be dispatched to the Netherlands, the Huguenots demanded that war be declared. The Calvinist alliance which Philip feared so much seemed about to be established; 6000 Swiss troops were raised for the defense of France. But despite all these provocations and inducements, Catharine could not bring herself to the point of fighting. The fate of the Protestant rebels in the Low Countries was a matter of profound indifference to her, provided her own authority could be firmly maintained in France, and for the moment she was persuaded that this end could be best secured by keeping peace with Spain; indeed she actually furnished provisions for Alva’s tercios as they passed north, just beyond her eastern frontiers, in the summer of 1567. It was a bad mistake, as the sequel was to show. Catharine’s difficulties and complications, already great, were to become vastly greater as soon as the new regime was definitely established in the Low Countries.

The relations of Philip II and Queen Elizabeth of England, during the period we have just been considering, present striking points, both of similarity and difference, to his contemporaneous dealings with Catharine de’ Medici. In both cases there is a long and varied list of mutual gravamina, both political and religious, and at the same time a firm determination on the part of both sovereigns—though for very different reasons—that peace must at all costs be preserved. In both cases the course of events is intimately bound up with the development of the revolt in the Low Countries. In both cases Philip had to do with rulers who were far more ready than he to sacrifice religion to politics. On the other hand, the fact that England had now officially gone over to Protestantism, and that she was for the most part internally at peace and united, constituted difficulties for the Spanish monarch in his dealings with Queen Elizabeth which did not obtain in his relations with Catharine de’ Medici. There was no longer any marriage tie to unite the Tudors and the Hapsburgs. Philip’s spy system could not work so effectively across the Channel as it did in France. And finally, though Philip was slow to discover it, the lapse of time was conclusively to prove that the queen of England, though capable of the most tortuous
diplomacy to secure her immediate ends, had a policy and a program far more patriotic and consistent than the dynastic strivings of the queen-mother of France, that she was, in fact, by far the abler woman, who was destined in the end to be Spain’s most dangerous foe.

At the outset the prospects for friendly relations between England and Spain could scarcely have been worse. Not only had the new queen insulted Philip by refusing his proffer of marriage; she had Scandalized him by daring to abandon Rome and

“mold new mode of old Christianity”
from the bottom of his heart he longed to have her punished. Yet on the other hand, it was obvious that he could not undertake her chastisement himself. His mind, for the time being, was set, as we have already seen, on keeping the peace, and getting back to Spain; clearly under all the circumstances it was a case for temporizing. So in the spring of 1559, before he left the Low Countries for the last time, Philip installed in London a new ambassador, Alvaro della Quadra, bishop of Aquila, bold, skillful, and unscrupulous, with instructions to watch events and report frequently. His first letter, May 10, 1559, to the Duke of Alva, closes with the following significant sentence: “Religion here now is simply a question of policy, and in a hundred thousand ways they let us see that they neither love nor fear us.”

Philip’s determination to proceed cautiously in England, and to make sure of his ground before taking any definite steps to punish the enormities of the queen, received ample justification in the following July. The sudden death of King Henry II brought his son Francis II to the throne of France, and Francis was married to Mary queen of Scots. France and Scotland were thus united more closely than ever before; but that was by no means all. In addition to being queen of Scotland and of France, Mary was also, in case Elizabeth should die without issue, the lawful heiress of the throne of England; nay more, in the eyes of all true Catholics, she was actually the rightful queen of England at that very moment, for it was a motto of the Counter-Reformation that no heretic should be allowed to reign. All these circumstances powerfully affected the position of Philip II. If, as the lay champion of the Counter-Reformation, he supported Mary and Francis in an attempt to dethrone Elizabeth, he would be contributing enormously to the political aggrandizement of the Valois monarchy, of which, though he had just made peace with it, he continued to be deeply jealous and distrustful. Much as he was offended by the conduct of the English queen, he could not afford to give vent to his indignation. Rather it might even be a case of his being obliged to lend covert support to that detestable heretic, in order to ward off the political peril of the absorption of the whole of Great Britain by France.

This complexity of circumstances furnishes the key to the story of the relations of Philip to Elizabeth down to the month of December, 1560, when the death of Francis II broke up the Franco-Scottish alliance and liberated England from a truly deadly peril. Throughout those crucial eighteen months the policy of Elizabeth was that of masterly inaction. She played the Hapsburgs off against the Valois, and vice versa; she coquetted with the Scottish Protestants; she committed herself to no one, and grew steadily stronger through the rivalries of her various foes. Philip, during the same period, was also inactive, but to far less good purpose than was the queen of England; he never got the lead out of her hand. He sought to bind her to the house of Hapsburg by proposing that she should marry one of his cousins, the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles of Austria. He flirted with a scheme of sending a Spanish force into Scotland on the plea of the necessity of suppressing heresy there, but really, of course, to keep watch on the French, and then, after the French were disposed of, to aid and abet a rising of the English Catholics. But nothing would induce him to listen to the pleas of Quadra that he interfere boldly and vigorously in England, or to his assurances that so good a chance would never come again. Doubtless the Spanish ambassador overstated his case. Until the Valois peril was removed by the death of Francis II, Philip was, of necessity, practically immobilized. The really extraordinary thing is that when that danger was passed in midsummer, 1561, with the return of the queen of Scots, widowed but independent, to her native land, the habit of inaction had become so fixed with the Spanish king that he could not avail himself of the fact that his hands were no longer tied. Once more Quadra urged him to strike, to grant vigorous support to Marv Stuart, since she was no longer bound to France, and to stir up a Catholic rising in England. He even ventured to tell Philip that the English Romanists had “lost all hope, and complain bitterly that through their placing all their confidence in your Majesty and trusting to you entirely, they have failed to avail themselves of the friendship of the French.” But it was all in vain. Nothing would induce the Prudent King to risk a fight; the most he would do was to play with a project for definitely binding the queen of Scots to the Hapsburgs by arranging a marriage between her and Don Carlos. Whether, in view of the state of the prince’s health, Philip had any real intention of carrying through this project may well be doubted; but Quadra flung himself into the negotiations for it with such feverish energy that the strain they entailed proved too much for his constitution, and in August, 1563, he died.
There is no point in following the course of Philip’s policy with respect to the internal affairs of England during the next few years; it is a tale of promises and projects unfulfilled, of endless procrastination, and complete ineffectiveness. More than ever he was convinced that, no matter what provocation was offered him, he could not under any circumstances afford to appeal to arms; and the character and instructions of his next ambassador, Diego Guzman de Silva, who was sent to replace Quadra at London after an interval of six months, are the best possible evidence of it. The new Spanish representative was a far gentler person than his two predecessors; it has been well said of him, moreover, that he came not to impose a policy, but to ask for a redress of grievances. Some of these were standard topics of complaint which had to do with the internal situation, such as, for instance, the matter of the very mild disabilities of the English Catholics, and are of little interest for us here; but there were two others of much wider import which powerfully affected the development of the Spanish Empire, and therefore demand at least passing consideration. The first of these was the embargo which England had laid on the products of the Low Countries; the second was the menace of the Elizabethan pirates.

The distrust between England and Philip’s government in the Netherlands, and the sympathy of the English Protestants for the cause of the rebels there, had already begun to manifest itself in a series of restrictive enactments and counter-enactments which had practically brought to a standstill the anciently established and mutually indispensable commercial relations of the two countries. The Netherlanders were unquestionably the side that suffered most, for without English wool their manufactures were ruined, whereas England had various alternative outlets for her raw material and goods; moreover, many of the Flemings had already taken refuge across the Channel, and had been liberally aided by Elizabeth in setting up their industries in England. Hitherto Philip had answered every one of Elizabeth’s prohibitions with some kind of retaliatory act; but now he was convinced that he was getting the worst of the argument, and he ordered Guzman to arrange “for the conference to settle the whole question ... in the friendly spirit anciently existing between the two countries and their rulers.” But the queen was in no hurry to accept the suggestion. Difficult though the situation was, she was far less worried by it than was Philip; and she knew enough of the character of the Spanish king to realize that a conference was bound to be useless unless she was prepared to grant more than she gained. To ruin the commerce of the Low Countries was, after all, one of the most effective ways of holding the Spanish power in check there; and she had already plainly perceived that unless it was held in check the safety of England would be endangered. And so Guzman was put off with excuses, and the situation went from bad to worse.

If Philip was powerless to remedy the conditions that had arisen with regard to the commercial relations of the Netherlands and England, lie was somewhat better prepared to oppose the activities of the English sea-rovers. The naval enthusiasm of Tudor England, carefully nurtured by Henry VII and Henry VIII, was now beginning to reach its full fruition; and in view of the strained relations, political, commercial, and religious, between the English and Spanish governments, it naturally manifested itself at the expense of the subjects of the Prudent King. Piratical seizures in the Channel were no longer the exception but the rule. Single galleons plying between Antwerp and Cadiz were an easy prey. Elizabeth gave no official sanction to these outrages, but on the other hand she carefully avoided putting a stop to them. The rovers, moreover, were now venturing out into more distant waters. In June, 1563, Hugh Tipton, an Englishman resident at Seville, reported to Sir Thomas Chaloner, Queen Elizabeth's ambassador at Madrid, a characteristic occurrence. A Spanish vessel, homeward bound from Porto Rico, met with two small ships, whose crews “killed two or three of her men, and hurt divers, and robbed them of 3000 pieces of money, ten chests of sugar, 200 great hides, and all their ordnance, cables, and anchors... They carried away the pilot of the Spanish ship”. Tipton was confident that “if they do more hurt, all the English goods here will be embargoed”, and assured his Spanish friends “that they were Scots and Frenchmen, and some Englishmen among them, a sort of thieves gathered together to go a robbing”. Scores of other similar instances are recorded in the correspondence of the time. And that was by no means all. It was in October, 1562, that Sir John Hawkins made his first voyage to the West African coast in search of negro slaves, of whom, after plundering a number of Portuguese vessels, he obtained a goodly number, together with rich merchandise. With this booty he crossed over to the West Indies, where he exchanged it for hides, ginger, sugar, and pearls. With the greater part of this treasure he himself returned to England, but two of his vessels he dispatched to Seville to dispose of their cargoes there. Naturally Philip did not relish this daring infringement of his monopoly of the trade of the New World; the ships which Hawkins had sent to Seville were seized and their cargoes confiscated, and their crews only escaped imprisonment by flight. Hawkins’s efforts to recover his property were unavailing; and the episode led directly on to his much more famous expedition in the year 1565, in West Africa and the Caribbean, but also the French colony on the shores of Florida, and...
the coast of Newfoundland on his way home. His relations to the Spaniards, uncordial, to put it mildly, during his first venture, became openly and avowedly hostile during his second.

Such escapades as these were quite undreamed of in the philosophy of Philip II. Their irregularity, their utter lawlessness, the evident delight which they afforded their perpetrators, were utterly abhorrent to his formal, slow-moving mind. But he was not without his means of retaliation. Boycotts and embargoes, indeed, would obviously avail him nothing, but in the Inquisition he possessed a weapon of defense as characteristically Spanish as the piracies of the sea-rovers were English. In the latter part of the Emperor’s reign, the Holy Office had been instructed to use special vigilance at the seaports, doubtless in order to prevent heretics and heretical books from seeping into the realm. Its minions were fully informed in regard to the arrival and departure of every foreign ship, and they utilized the ‘supereminence’ of the institution which they served to invoke the aid of all the local authorities in the accomplishment of their allotted task. The result was that, from the very beginning of the reign, a goodly number of Englishmen found their way into Spanish prisons, where they were not seldom so cruelly treated that they died. The fate of the crews of certain English ships captured in the harbor of Gibraltar in November, 1563, may be cited as an example. Two hundred and forty men had been incarcerated on that occasion, and when the studiously deliberate investigation of the whole affair had been concluded, there were but eighty left alive to be sent home. The situation, of course, was made vastly worse in the exaggerated reports that found their way back to London, but it certainly was such as befitted less a state of formal peace than one of war. When, in January, 1564, the climax was reached with a definite order from Philip for the arrest of every English ship in Spanish harhors, together with their crews and owners, it was really remarkable that hostilities were not openly declared. But, as usual, both sovereigns preferred to play safe. Both of them had their hands full of other things, and could ill afford to risk a fight; and so the settlement of outstanding disputes was placed in the hands of a commission of plenipotentiaries which met at Bruges in the early part of 1566, but totally failed to accomplish its purpose. One year later, in the summer of 1567, just as the period under review was drawing to a close, an event occurred in Plymouth Harbor, far more indicative of the way the wind was really blowing than any effort to settle existing Anglo-Spanish difficulties at a council table—a foreshadowing, in fact, of what was to occur in that self-same harbor in the summer of 1588. Sir John Hawkins was there, getting ready for a new expedition to the Indies, in reckless defiance of the protests of Philip’s ambassador, when seven Spanish ships, flying the flag of Castile, entered the port. There was no reason to think that they had come with any hostile intent, though their failure to salute the queen’s ships was certainly discourteous; but Hawkins promptly fired into them, forced them to lower their colors, and refused to listen to their commander’s subsequent expostulations. However much Philip and Elizabeth were determined to avoid war, it was impossible to quench the spirit that was ultimately to force their hands.

The stage is now set and the chief characters placed for the great drama that was to be enacted in Western Europe in the ensuing thirty years. Peace had been kept, chiefly because Philip was resolved that it should be kept; but there was more than enough incendiary material in the Netherlands, in France, and in England, to feed a tremendous conflagration. In the next act of the play the Spanish monarch becomes somewhat more aggressive; the flames of war burst forth in the Low Countries; and the relations of Spain with France and with England proceed from bad to worse.

This next act lasts from 1567 to 1573, and is epitomized in the name of Philip’s new regent in the Netherlands during those years: Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, better known as the Duke of Alva. His appointment itself was adequate evidence, for those who knew the facts, that Philip was done with making concessions there. The king, as was his habit, tried his best to conceal his hand, and to make men think that the policy of the days of Margaret of Parma was to continue unchanged; but no one familiar with Alva’s character and past record could have had any real doubts that he was being sent to the Netherlands for the purpose of hispanizing them, both politically and religiously, to an extent that had never been contemplated before: of erecting them, in fact, into a regular presidio, whence the Spanish monarchy, undisturbed by further revolt, could assert its predominance over England, France, and the Empire. Moreover, there could be no real question that the methods by which this result was to be attained were to be primarily those of repression and violence. That Alva had made his reputation as a soldier proclaimed as much, as did also the fact that he was the first of the Hapsburg representatives in the Low Countries who was not related by blood to the royal family. And, finally, his own character and antecedents were directly the opposite to those of the people over whom he was sent to rule. He was the typical Castilian grandee, proud, intolerant, and disdainful; they were the scions of traders and artisans, hard-working, democratic, and boisterous. He had not forgotten how at the age of twelve he had seen
his own country insulted and impoverished by the Flemings in the train of Chièvres; he had waited for
years for an opportunity for revenge. Waiting and remembering were in fact two of his strongest points.
They made him a fit instrument of the policy of Philip II.

For a full month after his arrival in the Low Countries the new regent held his hand. It may have
been in compliance with the royal instructions; more likely it was in order to make absolutely sure of
ultimate success; certain it is that during the interval the whole population was oppressed with the
conviction that some terrible and mysterious catastrophe was impending. Then suddenly, beginning on
September 9, 1567, the blows began to fall. On that day the two chief rebel leaders, Egmont and Hoorn,
were arrested at Brussels. Twelve days later, when the news had reached Spain, their representative
there, the Baron de Montigny, who had been lulled into security by the false promises of Philip, was
likewise seized and confined in the alcazar of Segovia. At the same time there was set up in the
Netherlands the famous Council of Troubles—better known as the Council of Blood—a body of seven,
dominated by three Spaniards, whose function it was to prepare the sentences of those whom the
government had decided to have punished. It superseded all other courts and jurisdictions; it overrode
all privileges and liberties, both personal and national; like the Revolutionary Tribunal of 1793, it
sacrificed everything on the altar of raison d’état. On January 4, 1568, 84 persons were executed, on
February 20-21, 108, on March 20, 55. All the property of the victims was forfeited to the crown; it was
intended that the new policy of blood should more than justify itself as a financial measure. On June 5,
1568, the climax was reached with the execution of Egmont and Hoorn in the public square in Brussels.
Though their countrymen were too terrified, too dumfounded to protest at the time, the event had the
merit of making the issue clear. After that there could be no doubt that the day of compromises and
palliations was passed, that two irreconcilable systems were confronting one another, and that one or the
other must ultimately succumb.

Meantime William of Orange, more cautious than Egmont and Hoorn, had escaped the clutches
of Alva, and was organizing an army of resistance in the Northeast. The Lutherans of the Empire gave
him considerable support. French and English Calvinists rallied to his standard. It was evident that there
was plenty of sympathy for his cause in the neighboring lands, even though the policies of their
governments might not permit formal expression of it. But Orange on the battlefield was far inferior to
Orange at the council table. His forces, led by his heroic brother, Louis, count of Nassau, were
successively defeated by Alva’s veterans at Dahlen (April, 1568) and Jemgum (July 21); by November
the rebel army had been virtually dispersed, and Orange himself had taken refuge in Picardy. Then Alva
was convinced that he had triumphantly and permanently finished the work he had been sent to do. The
people, so he assured the king, were the easiest to govern in the world, if one only knew how to treat
them. He had statues of himself erected at Antwerp and at Brussels. He even ventured to send 1500
horsemen into France to aid Catharine de’ Medici against the Huguenots, and to reply to the piracies of
the English in the Channel by arresting all the subjects of Elizabeth in the Low Countries. It looked as if
the dream of Philip was about to come true; instead of constituting a danger point to Spain and a
vantage ground to her foes, the Netherlands promised soon to become a mighty fortress from which he
could overawe the entire North of Europe. The king indeed was less fully convinced than was his
representative of the advantage of indefinite prolongation of the policy of severity. Since February,
1569, he had been in favor of granting a general pardon, but it was not until seventeen months later that
Alva could be brought to consent to it; moreover, when the pardon was finally issued, it was so full of
exceptions, both general and specific, that it virtually amounted to a fresh proscription. One example of
its operation will suffice: it was precisely three months after the day on which it was put forth that
Montigny, who had languished in his Spanish prison since September, 1567, was secretly strangled in
the castle of Simancas.

But Alva’s conception of his task in the Netherlands was not solely one of torture and massacres.
He proposed to prevent the recurrence of troubles in the future by a radical alteration of the constitution
of the Low Countries, which should convert them into a docile dependency of the Spanish crown after
the pattern of Naples and Milan. Absolute extirpation of heresy was, of course, the indispensable pre-
liminary to this. The new bishoprics, provided in 1559, were now fully organized and set up, and their
occupants charged with the duty of hunting out Lutherans and Calvinists. Alva was delighted to have
them employed in this fashion, for it tallied with his conception of the duty of the church to lend its full
support to the state. At the same time every effort was made to Hispanicize the government, and to
abrogate or nullify local privileges and liberties. Alva proposed to bring everything to the feet of his
master. It was observed that when a vacancy occurred in any of the councils he did not hurry to fill it.
His plan, as he explained in a letter to the king, was to let the unoccupied places accumulate until, by
providing for a large number of them at once, he could Hispanicize the personnel of the administration
en bloc; “under the system of successive nominations,” so he wrote to Philip, “those who remain,
corrupt those who come in, just as happens when one throws a flask of good wine into a cask of vinegar." Most fundamental of all, however, was his financial policy. To have the Spanish monarchy in any sense dependent for its revenues, as it still was in the Low Countries, on the vote of the national assembly, was to Alva’s mind intolerable. With Philip’s full approval, he now proposed to remedy this defect in characteristic Spanish fashion by forcing the Estates to sanction the permanent establishment in the Netherlands of an alcabala or tax on sales, at the rate of five per cent on real and ten per cent on personal property. There was also to be a single impost, at the rate of one per cent, levied once and for all on all property in the land. The Estates were summoned to Brussels on March 21,1569, to consent to these exactions, and all the resources of treachery and intimidation were brought into play in order to bend them to the royal will. The levy of the hundredth penny, after many protests, was finally sanctioned and at once put into operation; by February, 1571, it had yielded 3,300,000 florins. To the alcabala, on the other hand, the deputies were resolved not to submit. Not only would its establishment mean the subversion of their most cherished liberties; they also clearly perceived, what Philip and Alva were unable to comprehend, that it ultimately spelt economic ruin, that the measure which the king and his adviser had adopted as the shortest way to replenish the royal exchequer was really only killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. They finally succeeded in inducing Alva to accept for a period of two years (August 13, 1569-August 13, 1571) a lump sum of 2,000,000 florins per annum in lieu of the alcabala, which they dreaded most of all. When that period had expired, the Duke refused to consider the prolongation of it, and within a few weeks the alcabala was in full swing. Thereupon ensued a scene of wild confusion. The business world was paralyzed. Merchants left the country in swarms. Contracts were cancelled right and left. Rents fell to one-sixth of their former value. The textile industry was so disrupted by civil and religious strife, a prey to factions, without any consistent policy either at home or abroad. But when we come to consider the situation as it presented itself to the Spanish monarch, we shall not be at a loss for reasons to explain why he continued so long to underestimate England and to endure the idea of having a heretic on his flank. England, on the other hand, seemed much more remote, and principally occupied with its own affairs. It had, moreover, been recently Spain’s ally against France; Philip had even cherished hopes of bringing it permanently under Hapsburg control. So rapid had been the oscillations of its religious policy during the previous half-century that its complete re-Catholicization did not seem by any means out of the question. Spain had not “yet learned the lesson of war.” The exploits of the English sea-rovers were regarded by the Spaniards more in the light of the irritating pranks of an extremely naughty boy than as the first evidences of the upcoming of the greatest naval power of modern times. Before 1568, when the attention of Queen Elizabeth’s government was primarily focused on the affairs of Scotland, there had been, perhaps, some real basis for this point of view; but with the defeat and flight to England of Mary queen of Scots, the situation had entirely changed. Elizabeth began to consider the problem presented by the Netherlands far, more seriously than ever before. New voices, like that of Sir Francis Walsingham, were beginning to make themselves heard in her councils, and

Before we take up the course of the revolution which Alva’s brutality and ineptitude unchained in the Netherlands in the spring of 1572, it is essential to consider the effect of his presence in the Low Countries on the relations of Spain to France and to England.

It is easy enough to see, after the lapse of three centuries and a half, that one of Philip’s gravest errors was his failure to realize that the England Queen Elizabeth constituted a far more serious menace to the integrity of the Spanish Empire than did the France of the last three Valois kings. We think of the former as passing through one of the most notable periods of its history, united at home under one of the greatest sovereigns of all time, reaching out to lay the foundations of a far-flung colonial and commercial empire, inevitably destined, for reasons political, religious, and economic, to come into violent collision with Spain, both in the Old World and in the New. We think of the latter as internally disrupted by civil and religious strife, a prey to factions, without any consistent policy either at home or abroad. But when we come to consider the situation as it presented itself to the Spanish monarch, we shall not be at a loss for reasons to explain why he continued so long to underestimate England and to exaggerate the danger from France. The latter, in the first place, was the hereditary foe, the constant enemy, for over sixty years past, not only in the Old World but also in the New. Secondly, it intervened between Spain and the Low Countries, and constituted an annoying barrier to communication between them. Thirdly, its recent tendency towards Protestantism, though less marked than that of England, was probably even more alarming to Philip; for it was perilously close to his own borders, and he could not endure the idea of having a heretic on his flank. England, on the other hand, seemed much more remote, and principally occupied with its own affairs. It had, moreover, been recently Spain’s ally against France; Philip had even cherished hopes of bringing it permanently under Hapsburg control. So rapid had been the oscillations of its religious policy during the previous half-century that its complete re-Catholicization did not seem by any means out of the question. Spain had not “yet learned the lesson of war.” The exploits of the English sea-rovers were regarded by the Spaniards more in the light of the irritating pranks of an extremely naughty boy than as the first evidences of the upcoming of the greatest naval power of modern times. Before 1568, when the attention of Queen Elizabeth’s government was primarily focused on the affairs of Scotland, there had been, perhaps, some real basis for this point of view; but with the defeat and flight to England of Mary queen of Scots, the situation had entirely changed. Elizabeth began to consider the problem presented by the Netherlands far, more seriously than ever before. New voices, like that of Sir Francis Walsingham, were beginning to make themselves heard in her councils, and
causing her to consider the probable consequences of Alva’s obvious intention to erect them into a Spanish presidio. We discern the first faint glimmerings of the dawn of a new era in English foreign policy, which was ultimately to bear fruit in the defeat of the Spanish Armada.

But Philip was still determined to adhere, if possible, to the policy of ‘sturdy defensiveness’ in his foreign relations which had been commended to him by his father. If the Tudor and Valois monarchs would only leave Alva to carry out undisturbed in the Netherlands the new program which he had been sent there to initiate, he had as yet no intention of making trouble for them. But the Duke soon became aware that his doings in the Low Countries were arousing deep hostility on both sides of the Channel. Moreover, like his master in Madrid, he was at first inclined to believe that he was in considerably more danger from France than from England. William of Orange and his brother Louis were in close touch with the leaders of the French Huguenots. There were rumors that Conde had made the peace of Longjumeau (March 23, 1568), which had terminated so unexpectedly the so-called Second Civil War, in order to be free to interfere in the Low Countries; and it was only five months later that William signed a secret treaty with Conde and Coligny in which they promised each other mutual assistance, offensive and defensive, until they should have gained their ends. The Third Civil War in France broke out, it is true, directly afterwards, and the Catholics won impressive victories at Jarnac (March 13, 1569) and at Moncontour (October 3, 1569); but their Protestant foes refused to be discouraged, and at the peace of St. Germain-en-Laye (August 8, 1570) obtained important concessions for their faith. Still more alarming to the Duke of Alva was the palpably anti-Spanish attitude of Charles IX, who, after having remained for ten years a puppet in his mother’s hands, was now beginning to demand a share in the direction of affairs. Louis of Nassau had two conferences with him in July, 1571, in which he besought him to intervene to deliver the Low Countries from their Spanish oppressors, and the king gave him most encouraging replies. Even Catharine for the moment seemed to have succumbed to the anti-Spanish trend. She had been much irritated by Philip’s refusal, after the death (October 3, 1568) of Elizabeth of Valois, to wed as his fourth wife the latter’s younger sister, Margaret. She was at present planning to marry Margaret to Henry of Navarre, and her son, Henry of Anjou, was seeking the hand of the queen of England. Finally, there were mysterious activities in the harbors of Nantes and Bordeaux. Ships were being prepared. No one seemed to know exactly what was to be done with them, but Alva was persuaded that they were destined for some enterprise which boded ill for his master. Even the prospect of English hostility, on the other hand, he affected, at first, to regard as far less serious. He realized that Elizabeth, like his own master, loved to temporize. He recognized her natural reluctance to countenance any revolt against monarchical authority, even though the monarch in question might be her bitterest foe. He knew that she was well aware that the maintenance of the wool trade between England and the Low Countries was wellnigh indispensable to both. He was glad to learn that she had assured the Spanish ambassador, in August, 1568, that she was delighted at the news of his victory over the rebels. There were, of course, a host of other bits of evidence which pointed in the opposite direction. In October, 1567, only two months after Alva had reached Brussels, Hawkins had set sail on another freebooting expedition into American waters, which was destined to eclipse all his previous impertinences. We have already described the treatment accorded to Dr. John Man, the English ambassador at Madrid, because of his demand that he be permitted to have the Anglican service performed at his house without fear of interference by the Holy Inquisition; never again was Elizabeth to have an official resident representative at the court of the Prudent King. Then, in December, 1568, had ensued the seizure by the English government of a fleet of Spanish treasure ships bound for the Low Countries, which had sought refuge in Plymouth and Southampton from the pirates of the Channel. Alva was prompt to retort with the counter-seizure of all English property in the Netherlands, and the arrest of the English residents there; and Elizabeth in turn retaliated by imprisoning in his house the new and very aggressive Spanish ambassador to London, Guerau de Spes, whom Philip had dispatched in the previous August to replace the more complaisant Guzman de Silva. By midsummer, 1569, however, the tension had slackened again; and, as an evidence of her hope and belief that peace could be preserved, Elizabeth restored the Spanish ambassador to liberty. There appeared, in other words, to be no sequence or system to her aggressions; most of them might even have been gratuitously construed rather than the acts of lawless individuals than of the English government. To Alva’s formal mind they were, for that very reason, doubly abhorrent, but as yet they did not seem to him to indicate the existence of any settled policy of war. Without question they merited condign punishment; but it seemed likely that such punishment could be administered quite as effectively and much more cheaply by conspiracy and intrigue than by hostilities open and avowed.
The consequence was that the next two years of English history (November, 1569, to December, 1571) witness a series of Catholic plots against the Queen and the government, of all of which Philip and Alva were cognizant and to some of which they lent active encouragement. The situation in England was highly favorable to such attempts. The Romanists were discontented owing to the enforcement of the penal laws. The captive Scottish queen furnished an excellent rallying cry. Gueraud de Spes was in London to pull the wires. But even with all these advantages, and also the conviction that they were fully justified in any means that they might use to effect the deposition of an heretical queen, Philip and Alva acted neither effectively nor in unison; and their slackness was a grievous disappointment both to Gueraud de Spes and to the English Catholics. The king throughout was apparently more anxious for vigorous action than was the Duke. The latter was primarily interested in the recovery of his treasure ships by negotiation, and did not wish to risk it by getting involved with aristocratic conspiracies in which he had little faith. Not until the Northern Earls should prove their mettle by liberating Mary queen of Scots from captivity would he consent to send them support; and as they were unable to accomplish this, an opportunity which, if vigorously seized at the outset, might have yielded good results, was suffered to slip by unimproved. On February 25, 1570, Pope Pius V launched a bull of excommunication against Elizabeth, and strove to induce Philip and Alva to undertake the execution of it. De Spes and the English Catholics were fully convinced that, with aid from across the Channel, their success was assured; but both the king and his representative in the Low Countries continued to hang back. They complained, with some justice, that they had not been consulted before-hand in regard to the bull, or even notified that it was to be put forth; nothing would induce them to follow it up with a vigorous attack. In the winter of 1570-71 a third opportunity—in some respects the most favorable that had yet occurred—was presented by the machinations of the Duke of Norfolk and of the papal agent Ridolfi; de Spes and the English Catholics were more urgent than ever; the captive Mary “committed her cause to Spain.” This time Philip was persuaded that the moment had come to strike. On Saturday, July 7, 1571, there was held in Madrid a famous meeting of the Consejo, in which it was decided that Elizabeth must be assassinated, and ways and means were discussed. Orders also were dispatched to Alva to have a fleet and an army in readiness, that he might be able to invade at the critical juncture. But the Duke was more cautious than ever with regard to England at the very moment that his master had grown more bold. He was worried by rumors that reached him of the intimacy of certain malcontents of the maritime provinces of the Netherlands with the English privateers; he was impressed with the ease with which the government of Elizabeth had weathered the previous storms. If the assassination of the queen could be actually accomplished, he agreed that an invasion should be attempted forthwith; until that event, he insisted, it would be perilous to move, and his hesitation made a profound impression on the mind of the king. Neither the resolutions of the Spanish war council nor the pleadings of Spes could induce Philip to give the word for an invasion; he placed the conduct of his policy with regard to England entirely, for the moment, in Alva’s hands. And so the year 1571 ended with nothing accomplished. Elizabeth was not assassinated; and England remained uninvaded.

From their comfortable conviction that the Netherlanders would never venture to revolt, and from their hesitant machinations against the governments of England and of France, Philip and Alva were suddenly aroused by the astonishing news that on April 1, 1572, the town of Brill, at the mouth of the Meuse, had been seized and occupied by the famous ‘Beggars of the Sea’.

Broadly speaking, this disaster was in large measure due to the same error of judgment that had given the keynote to the foreign policy of Philip during the five preceding years: namely, his tendency to overestimate the danger from France and to underestimate that from England. So preoccupied had been the Duke with the perils of invasion from the southwest that he failed to keep track of what had been happening in the ports of Holland and Zeeland. The inhabitants of these seacoast towns were among the bitterest of his enemies. His character and his program, political, economic, and religious, were utterly detestable to them. Their own native independence and disregard for authority were stimulated by the example of the English privateers, with whom, ever since 1568, they had been increasingly closely in touch; even Queen Elizabeth had been induced to grant them covert encouragement and support, and they possessed what amounted to a base at Dover. At the outset the Duke had practically ignored them. Later on, in 1571, as we have already seen, he began to take the matter somewhat more seriously; he entered into negotiations with Elizabeth on the subject, at the very moment that he was plotting for her assassination, with the result that in the end of February, 1572, the chief of the Dutch pirates, William de La Marck, sometimes known as the Sire de Lumey, was ordered to leave the realm. The news of his expulsion relieved Alva’s worst fears for the moment; he felt confident that such danger as there had been from England was now at least temporarily past; he reverted once more to the problem presented by the situation in France. But the future was to prove that
his calculations were entirely wrong. Precisely how far the government of Elizabeth was implicated in
the events that followed the expulsion of La Mark will probably never be known; but the available
documents make possible the hypothesis that she so timed her official compliance with Alva’s request
as to convert it into the first effective blow against his government in the Netherlands. At any rate, La
Mark had no sooner quitte d Dover than he swooped down on a convoy of Spanish traders which was
approaching the narrows of the Channel, seized two of the largest vessels, and flung their crews
overboard. A few days later he appeared off Brill, which he captured, as we have seen, with the utmost
eease. And the capture of Brill was only a beginning merely the signal for the unchaining of the forces of
revolution. During the next ten days four other seaport towns rose in sympathetic revolt against the
Spanish authorities; particularly important was the accession of Flushing to the ranks of the insurgents,
for it controlled the mouth of the Scheldt, and was therefore the key to Antwerp. So horrible were the
excesses committed by the rebels that at first William of Orange hesitated to recognize them; but his
hand was ultimately forced by the march of events, and by the urgency of his counselors, one of whom
even ventured to issue, without showing it to him, a manifesto in his name, in which William assumed
the title of stadholder or representative of his Majesty in Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, and Utrecht, and
called on all men to bear aid in the revolution. Louis of Nassau and his Huguenot allies were prompt to
utilize the situation for their own advantage; in the latter part of May they seized Mons and
Valenciennes. Alva at Brussels was at his wit’s end which way to turn; but, still believing that the most
serious danger was that from France, he turned his face to the southwest, and in the latter part of July sat
down before Mons, while his son, Don Fadrique, defeated and cut to pieces a force of 4000 men which
had been dispatched to its relief. Needless to add, the rapidity of the progress of the Northern revolt,
already spectacular, was now still further increased; one town after another declared for the insurgents.
In Zealand only Middleburg held out for the Spaniards; in Holland, only Amsterdam and Schoonhoven.
The revolution even penetrated into Friesland and Gelderland.

Then suddenly, in the twinkling of an eye, the entire situation changed. On September 5, while
he was still in front of Mons, Alva received sure news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew twelve days
before. Catharine had reversed her policy once more. She had made away with Coligny and most of the
rest of the Protestant chiefs, together with several thousands of their adherents. All the long-laid plans
of Orange and his brother for securing the support of the Huguenots for their cause were knocked on the
head, at least for the time being. Alva had been saved in his extremity by what had happened in the very
country whence he and his master had apprehended their gravest peril.

The report of the massacre naturally spread consternation among the Protestant states of Europe.
Philip is reported to have laughed when he heard the news, which was celebrated at Rome with
processions and rejoicings. The defensive league which had been created between the governments of
Elizabeth and Charles IX by the treaty of Blois in the previous April was now succeeded in England by
preparations for war; never had the Counter-Reformation seemed so menacing before. But the panic
was excessive, as the sequel was to show. The massacre was not an indication of any settled policy on
the part of Catharine de’ Medici; it was but a crowning demonstration, if such were needed, that she
could not be trusted to follow one. Disem barrassed of Coligny, whose ascendency she could not abide,
she made peace offerings to his coreligionists, both at home and abroad. As was natural under the
circumstances, these peace offerings were either flatly rejected or else treated with justifiable distrust,
with the consequence that for some months to come France was practically eliminated as an
international force. None of her neighbors was in a condition to attack her, and none of them would
venture to accept her alliance.

For Alva, of course, the massacre meant that his southwestern frontier was temporarily safe.
Mons capitulated on September 21, and the Duke was free once more to return into the North, and deal
with the revolt that was gathering headway there. But before letting loose the full flood of his
vengeance on the rebels, he determined, with characteristic caution, to deprive them of their last hope of
the continuance of the English aid which had proved so indispensable to them in the past; here again he
gave tardy proof of his dawning realization of the latent perils of the hostility of Britain. Outwardly he
seemed to have ample justification and also an excellent opportunity for casting down the gauntlet
before the government of Queen Elizabeth. Ten months before she had mortally offended Philip by
ordering his ambassador, Guerau de Spes, to take his departure within four days. She had secretly
supported the rebels in the Low Countries. And now her loss of the French alliance made her
presumably less able to resist a Spanish attack. If the massacre of St. Bartholomew could only be
completed by the subversion of English Protestantism, it seemed that the triumph of the Counter-
Reformation would be achieved. Yet, just at the very moment that men expected him to declare war, the
Duke of Alva moved heaven and earth to obtain a treaty of peace. His first duty and desire was to crush the Sea Beggars; and the surest way to do that was to cut off the help they got from England. Certainly it was no time to undertake a crusade; better, far better, take advantage of Englishmen’s horror of the massacre of St. Bartholomew to impress them with the superior moderation of Spain. And so, with the reluctant approval of his master, Alva went to work to secure a settlement of all outstanding difficulties with the English government, and obtained it at last on March 15, 1573, by the so-called Convention of Nimwegen, providing for the reestablishment of commercial intercourse between England and the Low Countries for a period of two years, for the abandonment by each of the rebels against the government of the other, and for the repression of the pirates in the Channel. At last the Duke was free to wreak his vengeance on the Beggars without fear of interference from without.

There is no need to recount the story of that vengeance here: the sack of Mechlin, the massacre at Zutphen, the heroic resistance of Haarlem, and the comparatively lenient terms, whose good effect was wrought by the first of those mutinies of Philip’s unpaid soldiery which were destined to play havoc with the Spaniards in the Low Countries. On this occasion the Netherlands were goaded into a last desperate resistance by the outrages committed by their conquerors, and they were encouraged to persist in it by the fact that the discipline of Alva’s tercios had utterly broken down. The town of Alkmaar defied all the efforts of Don Fadrique to take it. The Spanish fleet suffered a significant defeat in the Zuyder Zee, and the Spanish garrison barely succeeded in maintaining itself in Middleburg, the last outpost in Zealand that remained in Alva’s hands. As long as the Duke had continued to be victorious, Philip was determined to maintain him in office, despite Alva’s repeated requests for recall. Now, however, that it seemed to have been demonstrated that no amount of bloodshed or expense could avail to quell the revolt, he began to consider the advisability of a change. On October 15, 1573, he notified the Duke of his intention to supersede him; a month later, Don Luis de Requesens, whom the king, after long hesitation, had selected to succeed Alva in the Netherlands; before the year was over Alva had departed for Spain. He carried with him, needless to add, the execrations of the entire population which he had so outrageously misruled. The chief result of his term of office had been to identify the government of Spain which he represented with the most intolerable of tyrannies in the Netherlands; indeed, he had made ultimately inevitable the ruin of the Spanish Empire in Northern Europe. Yet as even the Devil should be given his due, so it is but fair that two points should be noted in Alva’s favor. The first is the clearness of his perception, in the latter months of his rule, of the dangers to Spain in the Netherlands from England; had his views in this matter been heeded by the king, it was not impossible that the defeat of the Spanish Armada might have been avoided. The second is that the worst and most disastrous of his mistakes were virtually forced upon him by the emptiness of the Spanish treasury. In Philip’s inability to give his tercios their regular pay lay the basic reason for that long series of atrocious mutinies, which initiated in Alva’s time, reached its horrible culmination in the ‘Spanish Fury’ at Antwerp in 1576. The fact that the Spanish government was determined to make the Low Countries pay the costs of their own Hispanicization was what finally unchained the forces of revolution. The primary cause of it, in other words, was economic, though it was to need the additional impetus of Calvinism to give it victory in the Northeast. The blighting alcabala, with its various developments and ramifications, proved a cancer that was destined to eat away the very vitals of the Spanish Empire.

Luis de Requesens, whom the king, after long hesitation, had selected to succeed Alva in the Low Countries, was of ancient Castilian lineage, and the son of a favorite tutor of Philip’s boyhood days. He had already been ambassador to Rome and governor of Milan, when, at the age of forty-six, he was dispatched to the Netherlands. He was in failing health at the time of his appointment, and did his utmost to induce the king to confer it upon someone else; but Philip was obdurate, for he discerned in Requesens a man who would continue unabated the policy of Hispanicizing the Netherlands to which he had now committed himself—“a reliable man, who would tolerate no diminution of the authority of the crown.” The methods by which Requesens proposed to attain his ends were certainly much gentler than those of his predecessor, though things so fell out that he never got a fair chance to apply them; but the fundamental principles on which the Spanish administration was based remained, in all essentials, exactly what they had been before.

As far as relations with France and with England are concerned, the period of the rule of Requesens is singularly empty; no event of decisive importance in international affairs occurred during his tenure of office. Europe was taking a breathing spell after Alva, and before the still more arduous years that were to follow. The effects of the massacre of St. Bartholomew continued to dislocate the foreign policy and nullify the international influence of France. At home she was disturbed by “factions,
edicts, and Estates”; abroad she was much preoccupied with the unusual problem of getting an errant king back from Poland. With England Spain had inherited a temporary understanding, owing to the efforts of the Duke of Alva in 1573; and though neither party observed it with perfect loyalty, and there were consequently complaints and recriminations on both sides, there was never any real prospect of serious trouble. Both Philip and Elizabeth were content, for the time being, with the maintenance of the status quo. We turn, therefore, to the progress of events in the Netherlands themselves.

Requesens was convinced that the sole possible way to win back the Low Countries to their allegiance was to proclaim a general pardon for past offences, and to rescind the most unpopular measures—such as the imposition of the tenth penny—which had recently been enacted by the government of Philip II. But Alva, who stayed on in Brussels for a month after Requesens’s arrival, had no use whatever for such a policy as this. On his return to Spain he laid his views before the king, who had previously accepted the ideas of his successor, and the natural result was a long period of hesitation. Not till March 10, 1574, did Philip send his royal permission to proclaim the general pardon. Meantime Requesens was obliged, much against his will, to continue the war against the rebels which had been begun by his predecessor, and thereby convinced men, quite erroneously, that he was fully as blood-thirsty as Alva had been before him. The course of the struggle was at first inconclusive. The surrender of Middleburg to the Prince of Orange (February 18, 1574) deprived the Spaniards of their last stronghold in Zealand; but this reverse was fully compensated for by the crushing defeat (April 14) inflicted by Sancho de Avila and some 8000 Spaniards at Mook, near Grave, in the valley of the Meuse, on an army of German mercenaries which Louis of Nassau was bringing to his brother’s aid; Louis himself met death on the field of battle. The effect of this victory, however, was neutralized in turn by the disgraceful conduct of the Spanish soldiery who had won it. Furious at their failure to get their regular pay, they determined to recoup themselves by the plundering of Antwerp, and as it was utterly impossible to reestablish discipline by force, Requesens was obliged to negotiate with the mutineers in order to save Antwerp from being sacked. All this, of course, reacted most unfavorably on his own policy of conciliation. When he proclaimed the general pardon at Brussels on June 5, and followed this two days later by an offer to abolish the alcabala in return for a generous subsidy, his concessions fell painfully flat. No one seemed to care to take advantage of them; men interpreted them, rather, as a confession of weakness on the part of the government, and derived from them encouragement to persist in their rebellion. One of Requesens’s chief counsellors went so far as to tell him bluntly that “one can not do in the Netherlands what one does in Naples and Milan”. The falsity of the parallel on which Philip had based his policy in the Low Countries was now mercilessly and publicly exposed.

Meantime, on October 3, 1574, there had occurred the relief of Leyden by the cutting of the dykes. It was in some respects the most brilliant achievement of the entire war, and a crowning demonstration of the fact that although the Spaniards might still be invincible in a land battle, they had not learned all the possibilities of utilizing the sea. This event, together with the parlous state of Requesens’s finances, led to a fresh effort to secure peace by negotiation at the so-called conferences of Breda in February, 1575; but the commissioners would not trust one another without the giving of guarantees which neither side was disposed to concede, and the question of toleration for Calvinism proved an insurmountable stumbling block to agreement. In the following summer and autumn the hopes of the Spaniards were raised by a temporary return of fortune on the field of battle. They possessed themselves of all the islands between the northern outlet of the Scheldt and the Meuse and thus separated Zealand from Holland. But the rebels were by no means discouraged by this reverse; quite the contrary, at the very moment that it was taking place, the Estates of Holland and Zealand took the decisive step of ceasing to put forth their edicts in the name of Philip II. Hitherto they had preserved the fiction of loyalty to the Spanish monarch, and maintained that their rebellion had been directed solely against the representatives he sent out; now they resolved to have done with shams and offer their sovereignty to some other prince. But for the time being it was impossible to induce any one to accept it. Neither Elizabeth of England nor Henry III of France was willing to take the risk of openly defying the government of Spain.

Such was the perilous state of affairs in the Low Countries when on March 5, 1576, Requesens died of a fever. He had never had an opportunity to carry out his own ideas; even if he had, it would probably have been too late. So destitute was he at the time of his death, that his funeral had to be postponed for several days because of the impossibility of finding money to pay the expenses of it.

It was the first time that a royal governor of the Low Countries had died in harness, the first time that the continuity of the Spanish regime had been broken; eight months elapsed before Requesens’s successor could be appointed and reach his post. For Philip that interim was one long agony of suspense. The only representative of his authority in the Netherlands that was left standing was the
Council of State—composed, it is true, exclusively of Catholics officially loyal to the Spanish crown, but also convinced, save for its secretary, Roda, that Philip’s policy had been utterly wrong, and must be radically changed if the Low Countries were to be preserved. With such half-hearted officials on the spot, it was clear that the king was for the time being powerless; it was also equally obvious that a golden opportunity was thereby offered to the rebels to strengthen their position; and under the able leadership of William of Orange they were prompt to take advantage of it. In any history of the Low Countries, the events which occurred between the death of Requesens and the arrival of his successor are of capital importance, and must needs be recounted in detail; here it must suffice to summarize them in brief. Another furious mutiny of the Spanish tercios broke out in the summer of 1576; it centered in Brussels, and was caused, like its predecessors, by the determination of Philip’s soldiers to obtain, at the expense of the inhabitants on whom they were quartered, the pay which the royal treasury was unable to afford. This mutiny put all the Catholic southwestern districts up in arms, and gave William of Orange the chance to bring forward a plan for the union of all seventeen provinces in a common effort to expel the Spaniards. Hitherto he had tried to effect his ends through Holland and Zealand, backed by the support of England and of France; now for the moment, at least, it was evident that foreign aid was not forthcoming, and without it Holland and Zealand were powerless by themselves. Only by a united movement of all the Netherlands could he hope to accomplish his purpose, and, with the instinct of the statesman, he seized the psychological moment to act. After vainly attempting to persuade the Council of State to see the justice of his cause and to lend him its support, he succeeded, on September 4, in arresting the most refractory of its members, thereby removing it from Spanish control and hurling defiance at the government of Madrid. Before the month was over, a meeting of the States-General of the Low Countries was assembled at Brussels, on the invitation of the Estates of Brabant, and the departure of the Spanish soldiers was unanimously demanded. Realizing that there was no chance of Philip’s voluntary compliance with this request, the Estates promptly took steps towards the raising of a national army. In carrying out these measures there were collisions with the royal troops, which culminated, on November 4, in another ‘Spanish Fury’ at Antwerp, more terrible by far than any of its predecessors; over 7000 were killed, and there was an orgy of pillage and rape. The news of it naturally made the rebels more desperate than ever; it caused the religious differences between the Catholic Southwest and the Protestant Northeast to dwindle into temporary insignificance, in comparison to the unanimous determination to shake off the yoke of Spain. On November 8, there was solemnly proclaimed in the city that bears its name the instrument known to history as the Pacification of Ghent. It provided for an of Catholics and Protestants to expel the for the subsequent convocation of the States-General to settle the question of religion, for the suspension of the ‘placards’ and other edicts against heresy, for the liberation of prisoners condemned by the Council of Blood, and for the restoration of confiscated property to its lawful owners. Never had the Spanish authority in the Low Countries been challenged in such fashion before.

Meantime Philip had been anxiously considering the question of Requesens’s successor. He was still convinced that he must continue to conciliate, and the exigencies of the situation and the advice of his Council all pointed to his half-brother Don John of Austria as the obvious man for the vacant place. The fame that he had won at Lepanto was still fresh in men’s minds; his charming personality could be counted upon to effect much; he was not, like Alva or Requesens, an unmitigated Castilian; unlike them, also, he would satisfy the oft-expressed desire of the Netherlander that the royal representative in the Low Countries should have royal blood in his veins. As far back as 1574 Requesens had advised Philip to send him there, and the Council at Madrid had been of the same mind. But Philip, as usual, had been doubtful and hesitant. He was profoundly jealous of his half-brother, whose brilliant achievements and far-reaching schemes for the future aroused his deepest suspicions. He could not rid himself of the idea that Don John was possessed with the desire to carve out for himself an independent realm, and aspired to renounce all allegiance to Spain. Now, however, in view of the crisis with which he was confronted in 1576, Philip was forced to admit that Don John was the sole possible solution. On April 8 he wrote to his half-brother, who was in Naples, that it was his desire that he “should take wings and fly to the Low Countries”, and that in order to save the delay of a journey to Spain for a preliminary interview, full instructions would be sent forward to meet him as he passed north through Lombardy.

But Don John was by no means eager to comply with the royal command. The task of bringing order out of chaos in the Netherlands did not appeal to him in the least. His mind at that moment was filled with a daring scheme for invading England, dethroning Elizabeth, and replacing her with Mary Stuart, whom he hoped to make his wife; and he had no intention of proceeding to the Low Countries until he had obtained Philip’s formal consent to the prosecution of that magnificent plan. For this purpose it was necessary to return to Castile, and he did so, arriving at Madrid in early September, in defiance of the king’s order to go direct from Naples to the Netherlands. Philip, of course, gave him the
permission he desired, though it was hedged about with numerous conditions and reservations; he then proceeded to emphasize the instructions that had been drawn up for the guidance of Don John in the Low Countries. Conciliation was everywhere to be the keynote. In order to maintain true religion and the authority of the Spanish crown, Philip was now prepared to surrender on every other point at issue: to remove the Spanish troops, to rescind all innovations that had been set up since the arrival of the Duke of Alva, and to leave the administration of the government as far as possible in the hands of the Netherlanders themselves. Not only in essentials but in details was Don John adjudged to take the utmost care not to give offence; he was to speak French, not Spanish, and to avoid selecting his mistresses from among the principal families of the land. In order to dissipate any possible idea that he intended to follow a policy of compulsory Castilianization, it was decided that he should enter his new dominions by traversing France on horseback, disguised as the servant of his only attendant, Ottavio Gonzaga, the son of the old viceroy of Milan. It was on the evening of November 3, 1576, that the pair finally crossed the frontier into Luxemburg—one short day before the ‘Spanish Fury’ at Antwerp and only five before the signature of the Pacification of Ghent.

It would scarcely have been possible to arrive at a more inopportune moment, and it was but a few days before Don John discovered the full measure of his impotence. The revelation of his identity failed to procure him respect. The spectacle of the unrestrained licentiousness of his mother, Barbara Blomberg, who had been living in the Netherlands for the previous twenty-five years, served to remind men that he was a bastard, even if also the son of a king. The local authorities, whose existence he recognized and with whom he attempted to negotiate, showed that their sympathies were rather with the States-General than with him. On every hand he met the same reply; until the Spanish troops were sent away no talk of conciliation was possible; and within two months of his arrival he wrote to Philip to say that a rupture was inevitable, and that he must have more men and funds. On the other hand, he could not bear to relinquish his schemes for the invasion of England, in which he was assured of papal support; and he continued to labor to win peace in the Low Countries, in order that he might use the troops that would thereby be released for the prosecution of the great plan on which his heart was set. Meantime in the camp of the rebels the inevitable rifts began to appear. The statesmanship of Orange, with united action as its constant watchword, had produced great things in the heat of the universal resentment at the ‘Spanish Fury’ at Antwerp. Now, however, in the calmer days that followed, the effects of the particularistic aims of the different provinces, and, above all, of the great gulf between the Catholic Southwest and the Protestant Northeast, inevitably made themselves felt. By the beginning of January, 1577, the rebels were gradually dividing into two groups, alike, indeed, in the unanimity of their demand for the withdrawal of the Spanish soldiery, but differing in that one of them, which had its chief strength in the Southwest, regarded that removal as a preliminary to the reestablishment of Catholicism and reconciliation with Spain, while the other, inspired by Orange, and chiefly recruited from Holland and Zealand, cherished plans for the establishment of Protestantism and the overthrow of the authority of Philip II. Don John was enough of a statesman to discern that the widening of this breach was essential to the success of his own plans, and that the surest way to widen it was through concessions. On February 12, therefore, by an instrument which has always borne the singularly inappropriate title of the Perpetual Edict, he formally agreed to the majority of the Netherlanders’ demands, and especially to the departure within twenty days of the Spanish troops. But in the arranging of the details of that departure all his hopes were dashed. It had been his purpose to remove them by sea, in order, no doubt, to use them against England; but this could scarcely be done without their passing through Holland and Zealand, where all the seaports were, and Holland and Zealand obstinately refused to permit them to traverse their territory. The upshot of the matter was that in the month of April the Spanish troops departed to the southward by land for Italy; and Don John, his grand project all scattered to the four winds of heaven, wrote Philip to beg on bended knees to be recalled.

The king, however, paid no heed to his desires; eighteen months more of “weariness and death” at the age of thirty-three were all indeed, as Don John had foreseen, that were destined to be left to him. The history of this brief phase is complicated and not particularly important, save in so far as the attitude of the outside powers is concerned; we must therefore hurry as rapidly as possible over the internal history of the revolt and the attempts that were made to suppress it. The keynote of the period is increasing distrustfulness between Don John and the rebels. All the effect of the concessions he had made in the Perpetual Edict seemed to have been forgotten in the unseemly quarrel over the method of the departure of the Spanish troops. He was formally welcomed at Brussels, indeed, according to the ancient ceremonial, on May 12, 1577; but the States-General only recognized his official title by a majority of one vote; each side seemed convinced that the other was meditating treachery. So alarmed for his personal safety did Don John become that he soon retired from Brussels, and finally, on July 24, possessed himself, by a coup-de-main, of Namur; thence he wrote desperately to Philip to assure him
that a peaceful solution to his difficulties was impossible, and that the Spanish troops must forthwith be
sent back, in order to enable him to seize the offensive. It took a long time, as usual, to persuade the
Prudent King to reverse his policy, but finally it was done; in early December the vanguard of the
tercios began to file back into Luxemburg, where Don John welcomed them with open arms. The only
way in which he could now retrieve his fallen fortunes was by a military victory, and he knew it; and on
January 31, 1578, at Gembloux, near Namur, the army of the rebels delivered itself into his hands in a
way in which he could now retrieve his fallen fortunes was by a military victory, and he knew it; and on
January 31, 1578, at Gembloux, near Namur, the army of the rebels delivered itself into his hands in a
fashion which plainly demonstrated that, however antiquated the Spanish methods of governing, the
Spanish army still remained master on the battlefield. It was a rout rather than a fight. There were few
slain but a multitude of runaways, and an enormous amount of munitions and supplies was destroyed.
But Don John had not enough troops to enable him to follow up his advantage and strike direct at
Brussels. He had to content himself with gathering in some minor cities to the south. Meantime the skill
of William of Orange reconstituted the rebel party, and provided for it, as we shall soon see, the
immediate prospect of effective foreign aid. He utterly refused to be discouraged, and under his
inspiration the rebel army soon began to gather itself again. The lesson of these events was not lost on
Don John. Even his victories on the field of battle seemed but to serve to reanimate his foes. His dreams
of glory had vanished. He had become an object of suspicion to the master whom he had but reluctantly
consented to serve; his health was ruined, and he was in despair. Death came to his rescue at last, on
October 1, 1578, in his camp at Bouges near Namur.

We revert to the story of the relations of Spain to France and England, and more especially to
their effects on the situation in the Netherlands. Under Requesens, as we have already seen, these
matters subside into insignificance, but under Don John they return to the center of the stage; indeed, it
would probably be safe to say that the chief importance of the brief rule of Philip’s half-brother in the
Low Countries was that it brought once more into view the ultimate possibility of foreign intervention.
The widespread fame and ambitious projects of Don John really rendered this inevitable.

It was natural, in view of the commercial treaty of 1573, and of Don John’s own designs against
the government of Queen Elizabeth, that the question of Spain’s relations with England should come
prominently to the fore. It was a sordid tale of plot and counterplot. Elizabeth was still far from
converted to the view of the more radical of her counsellors that she should take a vigorous stand in
favor of the rebels. On the other hand she was fully alive to the necessity of keeping close watch on the
situation in the Low Countries, and also of forestalling any independent intervention on the part of
France. Messengers more or less secret had passed to and fro between her and Orange, to be treated,
each in turn, as the exigencies of the moment should dictate; but, save for promises of a loan, and one
downright cash payment of £20,000, the queen of England had insisted on keeping her hands free. With
Don John also she remained outwardly friendly, though she had surprisingly full information in regard
to his designs against her throne; when she complained of the presence of certain suspicious persons
about Don John’s court, he wrote her (March 7, 1577) a letter of explanation, which, despite the raised
eyebrows of her counsellors, she professed to accept with good grace. A little later Don John received a
friendly visit from Sir Philip Sidney, homeward bound from his formal embassy of ‘condolence and
congratulation’ on the recent change of rulers in the Empire. The undercurrent of spying and reporting
continued indeed unabated on both ends, but after the departure of the Spanish troops, and the
consequent probability that her own throne would remain secure, it became increasingly plain that
Elizabeth was not yet prepared to take sides. Of Orange and his adherents, as of all other rebels, she
entirely disapproved. She was ready to make use of them, in case it should be absolutely necessary to do
so, in order to enable her to defend her own shores, and she certainly did not propose to have them
become the cat’s paw of France; but as neither of these two contingencies seemed imminent, Elizabeth
relapsed into the old congenial game of marking time.

The story of the relations of France to Spain in the Low Countries during this period is also
inconclusive for the time being, though ominous for the future; it centers from first to last around the
person of the last of the Valois, the younger brother of Henry III, the Duke of Alencon and Anjou. In
the early spring of 1576 this wretched scion of royalty had burst into prominence by successfully
leading a party of ‘Malcontents’ in France, and extorting from the crown terms highly favorable to the
Huguenots by the celebrated peace of Monsieur (April 27); it was on this occasion that he received the
duchy of Anjou as a part of his reward, and thereafter he was generally known as the Duke of Anjou,
without the title of Alencçon which he had borne before. Since he had struck such a shrewd blow for the
new faith in France, it was but natural that he should attract the favorable attention of Orange. On May
6, 1576, two months after the death of Requesens, a document was drawn up, under Orange’s direction,
stating the terms under which the Estates of Holland and Zealand were willing to accept Anjou as their
count and hereditary sovereign. For some time the Duke hesitated. He was fully alive to the perils of any enterprise against the government of Philip II; he had no real love for Protestantism; he dreaded the disapproval of Queen Elizabeth, whom he had aspired, since 1572, to make his wife. But the consequences of the ‘Spanish Fury’ at Antwerp were a telling argument for immediate action; from that moment, as has been well said, the Duke “regarded the Low Countries as his certain prey”. His secret agents began to flood the Netherlands, and, on October 19, a correspondence began between him and the rebels which was practically uninterrupted until the day of his death. It is unnecessary to follow all the ebbs and flows during the governorship of Don John. The main things they proved were the inadequacy of Anjou’s abilities and the shallowness of his character; at one moment, indeed, he came near to being utilized as an opponent of Orange to the advantage of Spain. Elizabeth did her best to checkmate him at every turn. Not yet did he make war against Spain in the Netherlands, as was later the case, with her approval, in order to save her the trouble of doing so herself, and in some faint hope of winning her hand; for the present she seemed bent on keeping him out of them altogether. It looked, in fact, as if the ancient jealousies of France and England might come to the rescue of the Spanish Empire once more, and at a time when its leaders were far less competent than in earlier days. But it was not destined to be so. The period of Don John was not to close without witnessing the definite achievement of one more stage, slight, perhaps, in itself, but significant in its implications for the future, along the road to foreign military intervention against Spain in the Netherlands. Fear that, unless they came to terms with him themselves, he might be betrayed into doing harm to their cause, led the States-General, under Orange’s guidance, on August 13, 1578, to put their signature to a definite treaty with Anjou. The Duke was to maintain in the Netherlands, at his own expense, an army of 10,000 foot and 2000 horse for three months; he was to take the title of ‘Defender of the Liberties of the Low Countries’ against the tyranny of the Spaniards and their adherents; but he was, for the time being, to bear no part in their government. If Philip should be deposed, the Estates promised to place him first in the line of succession. If they should make peace with the king of Spain, they would recognize their great indebtedness to him, and reward him accordingly.

After such a long and complicated tale as this chapter has had to tell, it may be worthwhile to devote a couple of paragraphs to a summary of results, more especially as the attention of the reader in the ensuing pages is to be invited to the state of affairs in a very different corner of Europe.

The outstanding fact had been the progress of dissatisfaction and revolt in the Netherlands. Philip had accepted them, much against his will, from a sense of filial duty, and in flat defiance of the most obvious dictates of racial, geographical, and political expediency. He had alternately tried terrorism and conciliation, and had miserably failed in both. Revolution had broken out and was progressing, and was attracting the favorable attention of France and England, not so much because of any sympathetic comprehension on their parts of the aims of the revolution itself, as because of the opportunity it offered them to put a spoke in the wheel of Spain. France was much less menacing than she had been twenty years before, when she had been fighting Philip under a strong and powerful king and supported by the see of Rome; on the other hand, though she might now be internally weak and disrupted, she possessed an opportunity to strike at Spain in the Low Countries which had not been available for her in the days of Henry II, and the tradition of hostility between the Hapsburgs and the Valois was by no means yet extinct. With England the situation was infinitely worse. A score of years earlier Philip had been king consort there, the husband of a queen who gloried in the fact that it had been vouchsafed to her to restore her errant subjects to the see of Rome. Now he had been thrust forth, rebuffed, and insulted by the heretic government established after the death of Mary Tudor, and was regarded as an open enemy by the mercantile and seafaring portion of the population, however much the cautious lady who occupied the English throne might choose to preserve the appearances of friendship. But here too the ancient traditions came in—though in this case their operation was the reverse of that in the case of France—to cloud the issue as it presented itself to Philip’s mind. The Anglo- Spanish tradition, for nearly a century past, had on the whole been one of amity and alliance, and Philip, who was far more alive to the significance of historical precedent than to inherent probabilities for the future, could not bring himself to believe that the old ties would be easily snapped. He underestimated the latent peril from the Tudors even more than he overestimated the more open menace from the Valois.

A brief glance over the rest of Europe will serve to make still clearer the picture as Philip saw it in the last months of the year 1578. For the ‘plague spot’ in the Netherlands and its attendant vexations, his outlook was exceedingly bright. The Counter-Reformation had run its first triumphant course; indeed, the elements were all at hand which were soon to produce a fresh recrudescence of it. Spain and the ‘rechristianized’ papacy were once more moving hand in hand; there might be minor squabbles and
conflicts of jurisdiction, but there could be no doubt that Rome now looked to Madrid for support and guidance, and to Philip as her lay champion, in a manner and to an extent that she had never done before. The imperial throne, after two occupants who had tended to be disagreeably lenient to heretics, was now held once more by a fanatical Catholic, and Spain’s Italian possessions were generally in good order. The navy of the Turks had been laid low at Lepanto, and Spanish maritime supremacy erected in its place. The Philippines had been conquered and annexed, and the Spanish-American colonial regime was operating satisfactorily, according to the standards of that day and generation. And finally, in midsummer, 1578, two short months before the death of Don John of Austria, it so happened that an opportunity had suddenly presented itself to gain for the Spanish monarchy an extension of territory which would cause its predecessors to seem but puny in comparison—an extension, which, if obtained, would make the Spanish Empire by far the largest that the world had ever seen. The winning of this great prize occupied most of the next few years of the life of Philip II. Its successful accomplishment carried him to the climax of his power, and will demand our attention during the ensuing chapter.
CHAPTER XXXV
THE ANNEXATION OF PORTUGAL

We have several times remarked that Philip, in obedience to the wishes of his father, had made it the object of his policy during the first twenty years of his reign rather to guard his inheritance than to attempt to enlarge it. Whatever his methods, it is impossible to deny that the struggle which he was carrying on in the Netherlands and its attendant quarrels with England and with France were all of them, in his eyes, of a distinctly defensive character; he was but putting down rebels and those who aided and abetted them. Even Lepanto, if envisaged historically, could scarcely be regarded as an aggression; moreover, the benefits of the victory were shared by the whole of Western Europe. The sole real extensions of territory that Spain had achieved in the first half of Philip’s rule were the enlargements of his American possessions and the acquisition of the Philippines, and these had not been won at the expense of any European power; they were simply the logical fulfilment of Spain’s high destiny to carry the Cross to the heathen. Down to the year 1578 Philip could honestly maintain that he had played a strictly defensive game.

This predominantly defensive character of the king’s political program was accurately reflected in the choice of his most intimate advisers. The Emperor, it will be remembered, had left him a full account of the merits and defects of his various counsellors, and had warned him against the danger of giving any one of them full sway; but, down to his death in July, 1573, it was Ruy Gomez da Silva, Prince of Eboli, who enjoyed Philip’s confidence more than anyone else, and Eboli’s policy was in general that of the maintenance of the status quo. Ruy Gomez was of an ancient Portuguese house, and had come to Spain, while yet a child, in the train of the Empress Isabella. At her desire he had been detailed to the household of the baby Prince Philip; he had helped to dress and to undress the heir to the throne; he had accompanied him wherever he went, and usually slept in his room; there naturally grew up the closest intimacy between them. In 1553, as a further mark of the royal favor, he was permitted to contract marriage with Anna, the daughter of the Prince of Melito, of the great house of Mendoza; as the bride, however, was less than thirteen years old at the time of the wedding, she was separated from her husband, in accordance with the common custom of the time; not till the end of 1559, when Silva came back with Philip from the Netherlands, did the pair live together as man and wife. They had ten children in the next twelve years.

It was but natural, then, that on Philip’s return to Spain the Prince of Eboli should become his principal adviser. Of his absolute devotion to the king there could be no doubt. Their views on the conduct of the government coincided. “Ruy Gomez and [his] faction ... rule all alone”, wrote an English observer in 1563; he “does more than all” the rest, reported another in 1565. Until 1567 the Duke of Alva might possibly have maintained that he headed a war party in the Council in opposition to him; but when in that year the Duke was sent off to the Netherlands, the ascendancy of Eboli became more obvious than ever. Buy Gómez was in fact the only minister the king ever had who was really permitted to contract marriage with Anna, the daughter of the Prince of Melito, of the great house of Mendoza; as the bride, however, was less than thirteen years old at the time of the wedding, she was separated from her husband, in accordance with the common custom of the time; not till the end of 1559, when Silva came back with Philip from the Netherlands, did the pair live together as man and wife. They had ten children in the next twelve years.

This Perez was born in 1534, and eight years later received a patent of legitimacy from Charles V. he was given an excellent education, both at Alcalá and beyond the Pyrenees, and was early associated with the work of the government, where his keen intelligence, wealth of expedients, and almost unlimited capacity for hard work soon won him favorable attention. More and more did Eboli depend upon him; more and more did he instill into him his ideas; more and more obvious did it daily become that it was Pérez who was destined ultimately to fill his place and continue his policy. Philip had been thoroughly won over to him by the time that Eboli died. Men marveled at the way in which the
young upstart was suffered to beard the Duke of Alva at the royal dining table; and the canny ones took note of the fact that it was Pérez who decided, when the dispatches of the day were deciphered, what matters were to be communicated to the Council, and what matters were to be reserved for the king. It was also by Pérez that the evil custom of the sale of public offices, which had rapidly increased since the days of the Emperor, was for the first time erected into an established system; he was entrusted with the distribution of the plums, and was liberally rewarded by the recipients. So rapid a rise not unnaturally made him enemies. After he had been in the saddle two or three years, the elements began to combine which were destined to effect his overthrow, and ultimately to give a new and totally unexpected trend to the development of the Spanish Empire.

The events which led to the murder of Juan de Escovedo, the confidant of Don John of Austria, on the night of March 1, 1578, and the effects which it produced, have been recounted many times, in different ways, by many different historians. There is no lack of material bearing on the case; the sole real difficulty is what to believe. The story that is told by Mignet, Gachard, and Forneron, and received the most general acceptance until the latter part of the nineteenth century, lays the original blame at the door of the Princess of Eboli. It represents her as having been the mistress of Philip, as well as the wife of his chief minister; it emphasizes the fact that one, at least, of the children she had supposedly borne to her husband was strikingly like the king; it then goes on to point out (what no one, except Froude, denies) that after the death of her husband she also became the mistress of Pérez, whom she vastly preferred to Philip, that their liaison was discovered one day in dramatic fashion by Escovedo, and that Pérez felt it necessary to have him made away with in order to prevent him from reporting the facts to the king. Finally it describes how Pérez, by a diabolically clever series of false reports and insinuations, so succeeded in poisoning Philip’s ear against Escovedo, that he ultimately obtained a formal written order to have him assassinated, thus converting what had been a grave peril to his own position into an actual strengthening of it; for he now had evidence which he could hold in terrorem over the king, if ever the latter should seem inclined to abandon him. But other eminent historians, among them Ranke, Froude, and Lafuente, have rightly pointed out that it was not very likely that a woman who had become the mother of ten children within the space of twelve years, and wore a black patch over her right eye, should have been capable of commanding the allegiance both of the king and of his chief minister. They also emphasize the fact that the circumstances under which Pérez was subsequently to write his Relaciones make it difficult to put faith in their veracity; but they are confronted, in turn, with the serious difficulty of explaining the reasons for the murder of Escovedo. In general, they take the line that Pérez suddenly became jealous of Escovedo’s prominence at the court, and so worked on Philip’s dread of his influence with Don John that he finally persuaded the king to give orders to have him put out of the way, and this is perhaps the least improbable solution; at any rate the deed was done; six armed men, all hirelings of Pérez, lay in wait for Escovedo in the streets of Madrid at night, killed him with a single thrust, and reaped their promised reward. The position of the king’s minister now seemed established beyond the possibility of further challenge.

But the inevitable jealousies were speedily aroused. No one was particularly anxious to avenge Escovedo, but many coveted for themselves the place that Pérez had obtained, and resolved to utilize the situation for the purpose of depriving him of it. Perhaps the most dangerous of these aspiring rivals was the crafty Mateo Vazquez de Leca, a miserable orphan of Seville, who had made a name for himself as an informer, and subsequently became one of the secretaries of the famous Junta de Noche; he convinced himself that, by insinuating that Pérez had persuaded Philip to sanction the murder of Escovedo under false pretenses, he would ultimately be able to undermine the influence and position of the minister with the king. But it was a long time, as usual, before Philip could be induced to act, and the blow finally fell when it was least expected. All through the spring and early summer of 1579 he continued to assure Pérez of his confidence and friendship; on the night of July 28 he labored with him over sundry papers until ten o’clock, and ordered him to return for further work on the following morning. An hour after he had left the king, Pérez was arrested and taken to the house of one of the royal alcaldes. Shortly afterwards the Princess of Eboli, who had gone out with the intention of passing the night at Pérez’s house, was informed of what had happened, and made haste to return to her own home, to find the royal alguaciles awaiting her at her door. She was speedily sent off to the Torre de Pinto, three leagues south of Madrid, where she suffered so cruelly that she finally obtained permission to repair to her own castle of Pastrana and remain a prisoner there.

Philip had not struck in this dramatic fashion without careful preparation and forethought. The arrest of Pérez was more than the end of a ministry; it marks the termination of a whole policy and system of government, which for lack of a better name we may call the Eboli system. The essential principle of that system, as we have, already pointed out had been the maintenance of the status quo; it was the principle which Charles V had recommended to Philip in his instructions; it was the principle
which Eboli under Philip’s guidance, had developed; it was the principle which Pérez had inherited from Eboli. Now it was to be thrown over and exchanged for a different policy, more positive, more adventurous, more imperial. This exchange and its consequences, moreover, mark a deep dividing line, not only in the reign of Philip II, but also in the whole history of the development of the Spanish Empire; in a sense it was the beginning of the push over the precipice. We have summarized the undeniﬁng story of the personal jealousies and secret intrigues which furnished the background for it as seen from Madrid; now we can turn to the far more signiﬁcant task of seeking to discover what the deeper reasons for it were. The murder of Escovedo was by no means the only, or even the most important, cause, of the ruin of Antonio Pérez. Just at the time when the events we have been recounting reached their climax, a new opportunity for imperial aggrandizement had presented itself to Philip, which he was determined to embrace, and which he was convinced from the outset would render indispensable to him the services of a man of much larger vision than the lover of the Princess of Eboli.

Exactly one year after the murder of Escovedo, and four months previous to the arrest of Pérez, Philip had written to Rome to call Cardinal Granvelle across to Spain to bear aid in the tremendous task of annexing the empire of Portugal. It was not without signiﬁcance that he was unable to ﬁnd a Spaniard to help him in the solution of a problem so exclusively Iberian.

We have not encountered Cardinal Granvelle since the early days of Margaret of Parma and the Consulta in the Netherlands, whence it will be remembered that he had been given permission to ‘retire’ in the year 1564. The next twenty-one months he spent in his native city of Besançon in Franche Comté, vainly striving to busy himself with the patronage of letters and art, and really eating his heart out for lack of a political ofﬁce in which he could give free scope to his talents for ruling men. A rather reluctant command of Philip, and the call of the conclave for the choice of a successor to Pope Pius IV, gave him an excuse for departing for Rome in the last days of 1565. The election of Pius V took place while he was on his way there, but after his arrival he found useful and honorable employment in connection with the preparations for the great effort against the Turk which was to culminate so gloriously at Lepanto; no small share of the credit for that great victory belongs, in fact, to him. From Rome, in April, 1571, he was sent to Naples to assume the ofﬁce of vicerey left vacant by the death of the Duke of Alcalá; and there, during the next four years, he wrestled manfully with the proverbially various and vexatious problems associated with the administration of that most difﬁcult of Spain’s Italian dependencies. When in May, 1572, a new conclave was called at Rome to elect a successor to Pius V, he hastened thither, and within nineteen hours of his arrival brought about the unanimous choice of Gregory XIII. One reason, indeed, why Granvelle was so successful in Naples during the next three years was because his services to the new pontiﬁf gave him amity and cooperation in a quarter in which, according to the Neapolitan tradition, there had always been hostility and distrust. His friendship with Gregory, moreover, was of the utmost value to him when in the spring of 1575 he was sent back to Rome to give help and advice to the resident Spanish ambassador. So high did he stand in the conﬁdence of the Pope that he soon took precedence over all the rest of Philip’s representatives on the ground. The king was forced to recognize the value of his services and the wisdom of his counsels as he had never done before and asked his opinion with increasing frequency and insistence.

Granvelle was at this time some sixty years old. His character had been tested by prosperity and adversity, and his knowledge of mankind had been ripened by experience. He had been brought up to believe that the incontestable supremacy of the house of Hapsburg was a cornerstone of the development of Europe, indeed, almost an essential to the maintenance of civilization, and he never wavered in that faith. If his own dominant characteristic was a fondness for ruling, he never dreamed of trying to exercise it except for the advancement of his Hapsburg master; of his loyalty to the dynasty there could be absolutely no doubt. That the supremacy of the Hapsburgs should have become of recent years so inseparably associated with Spain was doubtless in his eyes a misfortune. He would have preferred the picture as it was in the early part of the Emperor’s reign, with the center of gravity north of the Pyrenees; in view of his origin, that could scarcely have been otherwise. But it was not in Granvelle’s nature to waste time and energy in vain efforts to alter established facts. Fate had decreed that the policy of the house of Hapsburg should be directed, for the time being at least, from Madrid and the Escorial; from Madrid and the Escorial it was therefore necessary to take orders. The most he could permit himself to do was to caution his sovereign against the dangers of too rapid an Hispanicization of the principles and personnel of the government of the Low Countries. Now, however, in midsummer, 1578, an event had occurred which threw the affairs of the Netherlands, hitherto all-prominent, into the background; the center of interest was to shift from the Low Countries to the Spanish peninsula. The next act in the great drama of *Austriae est imperare orbi universo* was to be performed on Iberian soil, and it was the irony of fate that the Burgundian Granvelle, who had proved insufﬁciently Spanish to satisfy his sovereign in the Netherlands, should have been selected, to the exclusion of aspiring Spanish
rivals, to bear aid in the gathering in of the Portuguese inheritance. Was it because twenty years of the Eboli system had exterminated the generation of great empire builders in Spain that Philip found it necessary, now that a fresh opportunity for vast expansion suddenly revealed itself, to bury all his inherited prejudices against foreigners, and to call in, to help him grasp it, a chief minister from outside?

Ever since the attainment in the twelfth century of independent national existence by the kingdom of Portugal, the sovereigns of Castile had persistently striven to reannex it. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they sought, for the most part, to gain their end by war; but the battle of Aljubarrota was a lesson not easily forgotten, and from 1385 onward they generally preferred to have recourse to the pleasanter method of marriage. John II of Castile married a Portuguese princess, who became the mother of Isabella the Catholic. Isabella, the eldest daughter of the Catholic Kings, married Affonso, the son of King John II of Portugal, and after his death in 1491, his cousin King Emmanuel the Fortunate; after her death in 1498, Emmanuel married her younger sister Maria, and after Maria’s death in 1517, he took as his third wife her niece Eleanor, the sister of Charles V. Charles V’s wife was his first cousin Isabella of Portugal, the daughter of Emmanuel of Portugal and of his second wife Maria; and Philip II’s first wife was also his own first cousin, Maria, the daughter of his aunt Catharine and of the Portuguese King John III. But despite all these efforts to unite the two dynasties, a Portuguese heir with an unimpeachable title, had hitherto been invariably on hand to keep all Castilian claimants from the Lusitanian throne. During the first twenty years of the reign of Philip II it was his nephew Sebastian, the son of his sister Joanna and of his first wife’s brother John, that blocked the hopes of the Prudent King for a reannexation of the western realm.

There can be no doubt that the ambitions of the Castilian sovereigns to gain control of the destinies of Portugal were enhanced by the speed at which the value of the prize increased before their eyes. Portugal in the days of Aljubarrota had been but a little strip along the west coast of the Iberian Peninsula; now, in the days of Philip II, it had become one of the mighty empires of the world. The genius of Henry the Navigator had furnished the inspiration; the capture (1415) of Ceuta, across the Strait of Gibraltar gave a starting point; by the time that Columbus had discovered the New World, the Portuguese had occupied the Azores, the Madeira group, and the Cape Verde Islands; they had slowly felt their way down the west coast of Africa, establishing trading posts as they went; they had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached Algoa Bay in 1486. In the next two decades their advance was more rapid still. We have already spoken of Cabral and of his discovery of Brazil, and of the Tordesillas Line by which Portugal was given title to it, but that, in the eyes of the Portuguese of that day, was only a subsidiary affair; the Spaniards, after all, had got ahead of them in the West; what they desired was to find an eastern route to India and the Spice Islands. In addition to circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope, they had begun to investigate the possibilities of getting to the East by the Red Sea. In 1488, Pedro da Covilham had crossed from Aden to Cananore, whence he had passed on to Calicut and Goa, and thence recrossed to Sofala in Africa. Then in 1497 came the great voyage of Vasco da Gama, the reaping of the fruits that had been sown by undaunted predecessors. Rounding the Cape of Good Hope in November of that year he passed up the east coast of Africa, covering the still unexplored stretch between Algoa Bay and Sofala and completing its circumnavigation. Then, from Melinde, where he obtained a pilot, he crossed in twenty-three days to the Malabar Coast near Calicut, where the jealousy of the Arab traders already established on the spot prevented his being given the most cordial of receptions; thence he passed north to Cananore and Goa, and finally got home to Lisbon in September, 1499. It was a magnificent achievement, and a fit subject for the greatest of Portuguese epics, but if it was to be utilized to the full extent of its possibilities, it was essential to follow it up. The unfriendliness of the rajah of Calicut promised to spell the ruin of the great scheme on which the Portuguese sovereigns had already staked their fortunes, namely, to seize the monopoly of the commerce of the Eastern Seas, and to prevent all others from navigating thereon; and the lesson was reenforced by the experience of Pedro Alvares Cabral, who, after touching at Brazil (April, 1500), had also made his way to Calicut. In his case there had been far more than latent hostility there; actual fighting had taken place. The inference was obvious. A great military demonstration was imperative, and in February, 1502, Vasco da Gama was again sent out to make it. Quiloa on the East African coast and Calicut in India were successfully bombarded. Rival fleets were burnt and their crews tortured. Cochin, Quilon, and Cananore were forced at the cannon’s mouth to renounce all commercial relations except with the Portuguese.

Such action was not merely an affront to the rulers of East Africa and the Malabar Coast; it was a challenge to all those who had traded with them hitherto. The interests of the sultan of Egypt were affected, as were those of the merchants of Arabia and even of the republic of Venice. Hostilities on a far larger scale were inevitable in the near future; and in order to be fully prepared for them King Emmanuel sent out, in the spring of 1505, a fleet of twenty ships, with 1500 soldiers. Command was
given to an experienced soldier, Francisco de Almeida, who was granted the title of viceroy of the Indies and was to hold office for three years. Those three years were filled with well-nigh uninterrupted fighting against African and Asiatic foes. Almeida was almost uniformly successful; so much so, in fact, that in 1505, when his term of office had expired, he refused to yield his authority to Affonso de Albuquerque, who had been sent out to take his place. Not till after he had established the supremacy of Portugal in India by defeating the Egyptian fleet in February, 1509, in a great battle off Diu, did he consent to hand over his authority to his successor. Albuquerque was the greatest of all the Portuguese empire builders. Less cautious than Almeida, he believed that his country was destined to be the mistress of the East, and he was convinced that in order to hold the Indian Ocean it was essential to obtain undisputed possession of all its principal ports, and especially of those which controlled access to it. He put this idea into practice on his voyage out to India. As he pushed up the East African coast, lie discovered Madagascar, which had hitherto been unperceived; in August, 1507, he seized the island of Socotra, and constructed a fort there.Ormuz in the next year he took but could not hold; but in February, 1510, he possessed himself of Goa, and made it the chief center of Portuguese power in the East. The following year he went on to Malacca, which he seized, thus gaining control of the access to the Spice Islands; thereafter he returned to the Malabar Coast, and in March, 1515, put the cap-stone on the edifice of his former achievements by definitely establishing the Portuguese power at Ormuz. Nine months later he died at Goa, in the heart of the great empire whose chief founder he may claim to be.

None of the viceroys who succeeded Albuquerque during the next sixty years was anywhere nearly his equal; but their average level was distinctly high, and under them the work of extending andsolidifying the Portuguese establishments steadily progressed. Various efforts, not particularly successful, were made to explore Africa; enough was discovered of Abyssinia to put an end to the famous myth of Prester John, which had been generally believed in Europe for centuries past. Portuguese navigators also penetrated to the heads of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; it was by them that the persistent delusions as to the color of the former were finally and definitely dispelled. More notable still were their achievements in the Far East. In the years after Albuquerque's seizure of Malacca the Portuguese circumnavigated Sumatra, passed on to Java, Amboina, and the Moluccas, visited New Guinea and Borneo, and, in all probability, touched the northern coast of Australia. They also followed up the shores of Asia to the northward. In 1518 they were at Canton, and in the next three years they sent ambassadors to Nanking and Peking. In 1542 they landed in Japan, and seven years later St. Francis Xavier began his efforts to establish the Christian religion there. But while the conversion of the natives was one of the chief objects of these early builders of the Portuguese empire, they did not attack the problem in quite the same way as did the Spaniards in the New World. Official Christianization was in their eyes indispensable for every one with whom they proposed to do business, in other words, for those who lived in or near the great centers of Portuguese power on the coast. No deviation or backsliding was tolerated, hence the cruel persecutions which got the Portuguese such an evil name in the days to come. On the other hand, they made little effort to provide for the instruction of those that they had brought into the fold, and they scarcely troubled themselves at all about the natives of the back country. This policy was but the religious expression of the fundamental conception of the Portuguese Empire as an empire for trading purposes and little more. Provided its founders were conceded the monopoly of the commerce of the lands and the seas that fell within their line of demarcation, they were not, for the most part, anxious to assume further responsibilities. They made few serious attempts to penetrate into the interior of the lands on whose shores they had established themselves. They had no idea of forcing the local rulers and their peoples to acknowledge themselves subjects of their own home government in the way that the Spaniards had done in the New World; payment of a tribute was the utmost that they demanded. They trusted to a vast chain of coastal fortresses and trading posts to enable them to keep the commerce of the Orient exclusively in their hands, and with that they were content.

These scattered holdings were divided for purposes of administration into seven different provinces, comprising together the so-called Estado da India, and stretching around in magnificent succession from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan. The viceroy, who resided at Goa, had practically absolute power under the crown; he is correctly described by a contemporary writer as the "true king and God of India." All the local authorities were responsible to him; the residencia which he was obliged to undergo at the expiration of his term of office was really a farce, for the consequences of making a complaint were likely to be so serious that it was the part of wisdom to refrain. The entire system was honeycombed with corruption. The pursuit of wealth was the universal aim, and every other consideration was sacrificed to it. Bribery became so common that it ceased to be regarded as a crime. If there was no other way of attaining the desired end, it was always possible to leave the native trader unpaid.
These conditions had their inevitable reaction on Portugal herself. In the first place, the colonial establishment which she was attempting to maintain was greatly in excess of her capabilities; the call for sailors and soldiers denuded the countryside and brought agriculture and pasturage to a standstill. The desire to participate in the trade of the Orient contributed in another way to produce the same results. Every one was determined to get to Lisbon, which was the center of it; the population of the capital increased by leaps and bounds, and its luxury and wealth were the marvel of all beholders. But this outward splendor failed to conceal from the keener minds the unsoundness of the foundation on which it rested. The country was flooded with African slaves, and manual labor was more and more despised. The best blood in the nation had been drained away across the seas; the army that was left at home was scarcely worthy of the name. Finally, King Sebastian, last scion of the house of Avis, was the despair of all who still hoped to escape Castilian bondage. He had succeeded his grandfather John III in 1557, at the age of three, but from his childhood onward “he had lacked the greatest blessing that a ruler can have, namely a wise man at his side in whom he could put his trust.” Though by no means destitute of fine qualities, he was a perfectly impracticable king. Leaving the government largely in the hands of others, he disciplined himself by rigorous military training and the severest forms of asceticism. The sole national enterprise which could evoke his enthusiasm was the project of a crusade against the infidels of Morocco; moreover, as all efforts to arrange a marriage for him proved unavailing, there was no hope of an heir to take his place.

It will be readily believed that Philip, who prided himself on the accuracy and completeness of his information on the course of events in every corner of Europe, had kept in intimate touch with everything that had occurred in Portugal since his return to Spain in 1559. The closeness of the relationships between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid gave him an excellent excuse for doing this, and the Portuguese origin of the Prince of Eboli furnished him abundant means; but the instrument which he chiefly made use of for the purpose was his Portuguese counsellor, Cristobal de Moura. Moura had come to Spain in 1554, at the age of sixteen, in the train of the Princess Joanna, the sister of Philip and the mother of Sebastian, after the death of her husband John, the son of King John III. Like his compatriot Eboli, he had risen rapidly in the favor of the Spanish monarch; he was made a knight of Calatrava and later of Alcantara, and given a variety of important posts about the court; but, as the years went on, it became increasingly obvious that his principal sphere of usefulness would be in connection with the developments in his native land. In the autumn of 1565 he was sent thither to discover the truth of reports which had reached Madrid to the effect that Sebastian was sexually impotent. He was also very useful in helping to settle various differences which had arisen between those who were managing the government of Portugal during Sebastian’s minority—his grandmother Catharine, his great-uncle Cardinal Henry, and his cousin Antonio, the prior of Crato; and he kept Philip fully informed of all the successive proposals which were made for Sebastian’s marriage. The policy of the Prudent King all through this early period was perfectly consistent. He was determined, when the time came, to possess himself of the Portuguese inheritance. On the other hand, he had no intention of hurrying the inevitable, or of putting in his claims before his rights were clear. His sole object for the present was to keep himself fully apprised of all that was going on, and to be certain that nothing was done to the prejudice of his own lawful interests.

It was Sebastian’s enthusiasm for crusading that brought matters to the final crisis; for the conquest and conversion of the Moors across the Strait of Gibraltar became, as he grew up, the one absorbing passion of his life. He made a reconnoitering expedition to Morocco in 1574, and would doubtless have started campaigning there and then, had it not been for the opposition of his grandmother Catharine at home, and the refusal of his uncle Philip to furnish him with the support for which he asked. On his return to Portugal he at once set about making ready for a renewal of the attempt. In December, 1576, there was held the famous interview between him and the Prudent King at the monastery of Guadalupe in Estremadura, rich in crusading traditions and in memories of the battle on the Salado. Once more Sebastian begged for his uncle’s cooperation, and the latter did his utmost to dissuade his nephew from his intended enterprise, or at least from taking command of the expedition himself. But Sebastian refused to listen to counsels of caution; he went back to Lisbon and continued his preparations. The death (February 15, 1578) of his grandmother Catharine served to remove what had been a principal restraining influence, and the remonstrances of Philip’s new ambassador, Juan de Silva, were impatiently waved aside. The situation in Morocco, indeed, was certainly such as augured well for his projects. The Turkish suzerainty there had not been established in any such fashion as at Tunis or at Algiers. The throne was disputed between a number of hostile claimants, non of whom bore any love to Constantinople, though some were not too proud to solicit its aid in effecting the dethronement of a hated rival. Since 1573 the legitimate sovereign, Abou-Abd-Allah Mohammed, had
been sustaining an unequal contest against his two uncles, Abd-el-Malek and Abu-el-Abbas, who were supported against him by the Porte. So well had they succeeded that Mohammed, after several vain efforts to gather his adherents and induce them to make a stand, had passed over to Spain to get the aid of Philip II in the recovery of his dominions. During the spring of the year 1577, he and his victorious kinsmen across the Strait bid against one another for the friendship of the Spanish monarch; but Philip, who was fully alive to the perils of North African campaigning, was determined from the outset not to support the dispossessed claimant. Despite the fact that his enemies were, ostensibly at least, in alliance with the Porte, he felt that it was safer to let them alone, and urged Sebastian to follow his example. But the Portuguese king remained deaf to Philip’s advice. His crusading ardor was deeply stirred. The fact that the actual rulers of Morocco were supported by Constantinople was in his eyes an added reason for attacking them, and the promise of Mohammed that, in case he was successful, he would turn over the port of Arzila to his Christian allies, did the rest. Sebastian threw himself heart and soul into preparations for an expedition in the following spring. He was undismayed by the difficulty of finding soldiers to accompany him and of collecting the necessary funds. He applied to Philip for help and obtained a certain amount of munitions and supplies; nothing, however, would induce the Prudent monarch to furnish the detachment of troops which was requested; the state of affairs in the Low Countries was made an excuse. Until the last moment Philip continued to urge, through his ambassador, Silva, that the enterprise be abandoned, or, at least, that Sebastian himself should not take part in it in person; if it ended, as he foresaw, in disaster, he was determined that the fault should not be laid at his door. But Sebastian continued to ignore his uncle’s remonstrances. In June, 1578, he finally got his army together—a motley horde of some 20,000 Portuguese, Italians, and Germans; on the 25th, amid magnificent ceremonies, the expedition left Lisbon. After a five days’ wait at Cadiz it landed at Arzila, where Mohammed, who had gone on ahead to make preparations, was awaiting it with but an insignificant portion of the troops that he had promised to provide.

The story of the next few weeks is briefly told. The rashness of Sebastian was only equaled by his ineptitude. He took no pains to establish his base on the coast, or to guard his lines of communications. Insulting messages which reached him from his enemies confirmed him in his determination to seek them out wherever they were, no matter what the risk. He declared that he wished to “conquer with peril”; if any one advised caution he attributed it to cowardice. The taunts of his foes made him abandon the strong position which he occupied near the coast, and advance inland across a stream which was spanned by a single bridge; no sooner had he reached the other side than a squadron of the enemy’s cavalry circled around behind him and cut off all retreat. Finally, on August 4, 1578, the hostile armies encountered one another on the great plain of Alcazar-el-Kebir. During the first moments of the conflict one of the two rival uncles of the infidel pretender, who had been seriously ill for weeks before, died in the litter in which he had been brought to the fight; but the fact was so well concealed and the plan of the battle had been so carefully laid that the Christians were in headlong retreat before the fact was known. A panic seized Sebastian’s forces; within two hours they were scattered in ignoble flight. Many were cut down by the weapons of their pursuing foes; more were drowned in the river that barred their retreat, among them, in all probability, Sebastian himself, who, though the Portuguese for a long time refused to believe his death, was never seen alive again; his protégé, Mohammed, also perished in the waves. Mohammed’s surviving uncle, Abu-el-Abbas, gathered in all the fruits of the victory and established his dynasty in Morocco in such fashion that it was not to be challenged for years. So weary were the Christians of North African campaigning that there were numbered among those who came to congratulate him on the establishment of his authority, if we may believe the contemporary Moorish chronicle, both representatives of Philip II and also of the regency in Lisbon.

The sad news reached the Portuguese capital on August 17, and eleven days later Sebastian’s great-uncle, the Cardinal Henry, the last male scion of the house of Avis whose descent was unquestionably free from the taint of illegitimacy, was proclaimed king; but as he was then in his sixty-seventh year and bound by his clerical vows of celibacy, it was obvious that his reign could be only the briefest of stop-gaps. The opportunity, in other words, which Philip and his predecessors had long desired seemed now at last to have actually arrived for the Spanish monarch, as the son of the Empress Isabella, the eldest daughter of Emmanuel the Fortunate, had unquestionably the best legal right to the Portuguese throne as soon as Cardinal Henry should die. But there were many rival claimants. First of all there was Antonio, the illegitimate son, by a converted Jewess, of Louis, the brother of Cardinal Henry and the Empress Isabella. Antonio had entered the order of the Knights of St. John of Malta and was prior of the rich commandery of Crato; he had accompanied Sebastian to North Africa, and was for the moment a prisoner in the hands of the Moors, but he finally escaped in the autumn of 1579, and was to be a thorn in the side of the Prudent King for many years to come. More immediately dangerous was Catharine, the younger daughter of Cardinal Henry’s younger brother Edward, a woman of high
abilities and ambition; but her worthless husband, the Duke of Braganza, was ultimately to ruin her chances, and her son, the Duke of Barcelos, was in the hands of the king of Spain. There were also three other candidates from abroad; Banuccio Farnese, the son of Alexander of Parma, whose mother, Maria, was a sister of Catharine of Braganza; Emanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, who was the son of Cardinal Henry’s elder sister Beatrice; and, finally, Catharine de’ Medici, who claimed descent from the mediaeval Portuguese King Affonso III and his repudiated wife, Matilda, Countess of Boulogne. None of these, however, had any idea of seriously prosecuting their claims; they only put them forward in the hope of extorting from the Spanish king counter-concessions which might prove useful to them in Italy and elsewhere. So strong in fact, during the first weeks of Cardinal Henry’s rule, did Philip believe his position to be, that he began to cherish hopes of gaining his ends without a fight.

Much depended, of course, on the attitude of the Portuguese themselves, and Philip spared no pains to turn it in his favor. Foreseeing the probable outcome of Sebastian’s expedition, he had taken his first measures before his nephew’s death; thereafter he redoubled his efforts. Legists, theologians, and professors were drafted from all over Europe to demonstrate the justice of his cause. Letters were written to Lisbon and the other principal cities of Portugal to express his sorrow at the death of Sebastian, to remind them of his close relationship to the house of Avis, and to profess his affection for the Portuguese. But he found the most efficient instrument for the attainment of his ends in Cristobal de Moura. Moura was convinced that the sole possible salvation for Portugal lay in reunion with Castile. His intimate knowledge of his native land told him where and how the most effective blows could be struck, and he was furnished with an abundance of money, most of which he used to gain popularity for his master by ransoming the prisoners who had been captured at Alcazar-el-Kebir; the rest of it he distributed in well placed bribes. The evidence in regard to the measure of success which these efforts attained is most contradictory, but it seems probable that they counted for much. At the outset there was undoubtedly much opposition; for the age-long struggle of the Portuguese to maintain their independence made them naturally regard the Castilians in the light of hereditary foes; “rather would we become Frenchmen, Englishmen, or even Turks than Spaniards”, said the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid to the Venetian envoy Morosini in February, 1579. But in the ensuing months the tide began to turn the other way. In November Antonio of Crato, who had just got back from his captivity in North Africa, wrote in deep discouragement to the French ambassador, Saint-Gouard, that “the king of Castile is certain to reign over the Portuguese; all of them have been won over to this solution”. And in February, 1580, the writer of the Fugger news letters from Lisbon declared that “the struggle cannot last long, for all the best people here are in favor of Spain, but dare not let it be seen... When the King of Spain appears here with his army he will be better received than he expects... I fancy the authorities set up in this country have an understanding with the Spaniards. I have no doubt that Spain will take possession of Portugal, as is fitting. I hope that then there will be better government and better business.”

Meantime, in the winter of 1578-79, it became evident that the Portuguese problem, though apparently exclusively Iberian, could not be solved without affecting the course of European politics beyond the Pyrenees. So mighty were Philip and Spain that any further increase of their power was bound to be regarded with dread by the other European states, all of which were eagerly looking for an excuse which would justify their interference in opposition to the Prudent King. Such an excuse was finally furnished by the news that Cardinal Henry, who, though at first anxious to prevent the succession of the Spanish monarch, was by no means wholly friendly to any of the other pretenders, had resolved to seek dispensation at Rome from his vows of clerical celibacy, in the hope that he might possibly be able himself to produce an heir; though this was regarded in Madrid as practically out of the question, it was also apparently believed there that, in case the dispensation were secured, it was possible that the aged claimant might be provided with a pregnant wife. At any rate Philip was determined to prevent, if possible, the granting of this dispensation, and sent envoys to Rome to effect that end. Pope Gregory was thus placed in an exceedingly awkward position. He had been his hope to keep entirely out of this difficult Portuguese affair, for he was unable to determine which side he hoped would win. On the one hand, he dreaded to see the power of Spain, already excessive, still further enhanced; on the other, he was reluctant to offend Philip II, whose support was essential to his policy in other parts of Europe. The situation was further complicated by the French, who did their utmost to advance the granting of Cardinal Henry’s dispensation; it was also much affected by the fact that the term of the clerical subsidy in Spain, indispensable to Philip, expired in 1579, and that Gregory obstinately refused to renew it; indeed, the Pope persisted in his refusal until November 6, 1581, when he yielded in the hope of securing Philip’s support in the affairs of England. The Prudent King’s contemporaneous policy of seeking peace with the infidel, the status of the Neapolitan exequatur and a host of other traditional points of difference between Rome and Madrid became involved in the
had been inevitable from the first, gave its decision in favor of the claims of the Prudent King. During
evidence to the contrary, they professed themselves satisfied; but Cardinal Henry, who bore no love to
successor, and promised to accept any one he should select, provided only he should be a Portuguese;
to endure the thought of subjection to a Spanish monarch, begged the cardinal to nominate his own
the Spanish candidacy. The influence of his Jesuit confessor, who had been won over
the early autumn, the sentiments of Cardinal Henry veered steadily more and more in the direction of
of Philip II, refused to accept this verdict, and banished Antonio from his court. The Spanish jury, as
the prior of Crato, and whose hostility to him was further enhanced by the representations of the envoys
question.
Philip replied by assembling another body of legal lights at Madrid to give their verdict on the same
months of 1579 were really a period of preparation for the moment when decisive action should become
necessary. Such were the delays of travelling in those days that it was not until July 8 that the pair reached
Barcelona, whence they were ordered to proceed at once to the Escorial. When word reached Philip that
they had actually landed, he made haste, as we have already seen, to dispose of Perez and the Princess
of Eboli, on July 28-29; a few days later he received the cardinal “as a deliverer” at San Lorenzo. The
last vestiges of the old defensive Eboli peace party had been destroyed. Philip was to have the priceless
aid of an able, energetic, and aggressive statesman in the launching of his new policy of imperialism.

Such then was the situation of Spain’s foreign and internal affairs which determined Philip, on
March 30, 1579, to call Cardinal Granvelle from Rome to the position whence he had already
determined to dismiss the lover of the Princess of Eboli. The tone of the letter, countersigned by Perez
himself, which summoned Granvelle is very urgent; “I need your person and your help”, so it runs;
“The sooner you come the happier I shall be”. Granvelle, when he first received it, was in some doubt if
it would be wise for him to accept. He had never been popular with Castilians, and he was by no means
certain exactly how Philip intended to utilize him; but personal ambition and loyalty to the house of
Hapsburg decided the issue, and on April 20 he wrote to the king that he would soon be on his way to
Madrid. In Genoa he met with Juan de Idiaquez, who was to be the companion and continuance of his
work; Idiaquez was thirty-nine years old at the time, and had been called home from the Spanish
embassy at Venice to bear aid to the cardinal in the accomplishment of the great task that awaited him.
Such were the delays of travelling in those days that it was not until July 8 that the pair reached
Barcelona, whence they were ordered to proceed at once to the Escorial. When word reached Philip that
they had actually landed, he made haste, as we have already seen, to dispose of Perez and the Princess
of Eboli, on July 28-29; a few days later he received the cardinal “as a deliverer” at San Lorenzo. The
last vestiges of the old defensive Eboli peace party had been destroyed. Philip was to have the priceless
aid of an able, energetic, and aggressive statesman in the launching of his new policy of imperialism.

It naturally took Granvelle some months to get used to the details of his new office. Moreover,
he was particularly careful to seek to give the appearance of keeping his hands off Portuguese affairs, in
order to avoid rousing the jealousy of the Spaniards, who could not understand why Philip had selected
a Burgundian as his principal adviser. Not until matters came to a crisis with the death of Cardinal
Henry in the following year did the new minister take the lead in the question of the hour; the last five
months of 1579 were really a period of preparation for the moment when decisive action should become
necessary. Ostensibly they were filled with a struggle of opposing factions around the throne of Cardinal
Henry, whose hopes of a dispensation from Rome had by this time vanished, and who was consequently
faced with the problem of deciding to which of the rival candidates for the succession he should lend
the advantage of his own support. In the preceding April he had summoned the Portuguese Cortes to
Lisbon, to select eleven judges to pronounce upon the validity of the conflicting claims. As was natural,
Philip replied by assembling another body of legal lights at Madrid to give their verdict on the same
question. The Portuguese body decided in favor of Don Antonio, of whose legitimacy, despite all the
evidence to the contrary, they professed themselves satisfied; but Cardinal Henry, who bore no love to
the prior of Crato, and whose hostility to him was further enhanced by the representations of the envoys
of Philip II, refused to accept this verdict, and banished Antonio from his court. The Spanish jury, as
had been inevitable from the first, gave its decision in favor of the claims of the Prudent King. During
the early autumn, the sentiments of Cardinal Henry veered steadily more and more in the direction of
the Spanish candidacy. The influence of his Jesuit confessor, who had been won over to Philip’s cause,
counted for much, as did the rumors which reached him of the military preparations which the
Spaniards were making to enforce their claims, if necessary, by the sword. But the partisans of Antonio
were loud in their disapproval, and finally in the end of October Cardinal Henry, who felt that his days
were now numbered, and was desirous above all of having the matter peacefully settled before he died,
took the advice of the Pope, and once more summoned the Portuguese Cortes to Almeirim, in the hope
of arriving at a solution satisfactory to all concerned. When the assembly met on January 9, 1580, the
cardinal came out strongly for the claims of Philip II; most of the clergy agreed, and also the majority of
the nobility, whom Moura had won over by his bribes. But the representatives of the people, still unable
to endure the thought of subjection to a Spanish monarch, begged the cardinal to nominate his own
successor, and promised to accept any one he should select, provided only he should be a Portuguese;
and when Henry refused, they produced historical precedents to prove that, on the extinction of the male
line of Portuguese kings, it belonged to the Cortes to settle the succession to the throne. Apparently they
still desired that the choice should fall on Antonio, who was in hiding at the time, but whose claims
were so strong that Philip offered him an annual pension of 50,000 ducats and a governorship if he
would renounce them. Finally, on January 31, 1580, the event that had been so long expected occurred,
and the old king-cardinal died after a reign of one year, five months, and five days. He left behind him a
regency of five members to govern the realm until his successor should be chosen. Of the five, three
were already won over to the support of Philip, and though they did not dare openly proclaim their
position for fear of arousing the popular wrath, they saw to it that nothing effective was accomplished towards putting the kingdom in a state of defense against him.

The irresolution and disruption of the government of Portugal had given Philip time to prepare his forces for the trial of strength which now seemed inevitable; and it was in the acceleration of these preparations that Granville rendered his first and greatest service. The king’s new minister had seen from the outset how essential it was to be ready to invade as soon as Cardinal Henry should die, before opposition could be organized, and had busied himself with the task of making preparations to that end. First of all he attacked the problem of the Spanish national finances, which had been left in sorry condition by the administration of Antonio Pérez. Not only was the treasury empty, it was burdened by enormous debts; peculation was rife; the Castilian grandees were in league with the foreign bankers to cheat the government out of the revenues that were justly due to it, and the prospects for the future were even darker than the existing conditions. All this was gall and wormwood to Granvelle, who lost no time in telling his worries to the king; but although Philip admitted the facts, he could not be induced to take any effective measures for reform. Money must somehow be found to pay for the army, and to supply Moura in Portugal with the means of bribery; but it was not to be by the stopping of corruption or the curtailment of expenses in other directions. The only method which Philip comprehended was that of further mortgaging the future; and Granvelle, whose knowledge of the principles of sound finance was as much in advance of his times as that of his master was behind them, must have been deeply cast down at the prospect. Not even these financial discouragements, however, could avail to shake his faith in the necessity for preparedness. He fully realized that foreign influences hostile to Spain were already at work in Portugal, and that the only way to make certain of success was to be ready to strike both by land and sea as soon as the fitting moment should arrive. Numerous efforts were made by the foreign representatives at Madrid to persuade the Spanish government that there would be no occasion for fighting; of these the majority—particularly those of France—were intended to lull Philip into a false sense of security and thereby give the Portuguese a chance to prepare to resist him; the Holy See, on the other hand, exhorted Philip to submit the case to papal arbitration. So effective, however, was the cardinal in finding means of accommodating the various differences that still kept the king and the proud Duke at odds, that on February 22, 1580, Alva received his appointment to the command of the invading force. It was further decided that Philip and his family should accompany the army to the Portuguese frontier, in order that he might appear in his new kingdom the moment that it should seem best for him to do so; on March 4 he left Madrid on his way to Guadalupe. Fearing the machinations of the other sovereigns of Europe, he refused permission to their representatives to accompany him, and insisted that they should stay on at the capital, where Granvelle remained in charge.

Three months more, however, were to elapse before Alva led his army across the frontier. The intervening time was filled with plots and intrigues, and Spanish hopes that Philip after all might possibly be recognized without opposition. At first there seemed some reason to believe that this would be the case. The five regents left by Cardinal Henry were generally conceded to be the best soldier in Spain; but Philip’s resentment against him was still so deep that it is doubtful if he would have got the place without the intervention of Granvelle. So effective, however, was the cardinal in finding means of accommodating the various differences that still kept the king and the proud Duke at odds, that on February 22, 1580, Alva received his appointment to the command of the invading force. It was further decided that Philip and his family should accompany the army to the Portuguese frontier, in order that he might appear in his new kingdom the moment that it should seem best for him to do so; on March 4 he left Madrid on his way to Guadalupe. Fearing the machinations of the other sovereigns of Europe, he refused permission to their representatives to accompany him, and insisted that they should stay on at the capital, where Granvelle remained in charge.

The choice of a commander-in-chief was the hardest problem of all. Public opinion demanded the Duke of Alva, who, though he had been sent into retirement on his estates at Uceda after his return from the Low Countries in 1573, was universally conceded to be the best soldier in Spain; but Philip’s resentment against him was still so deep that it is doubtful if he would have got the place without the intervention of Granvelle. So effective, however, was the cardinal in finding means of accommodating the various differences that still kept the king and the proud Duke at odds, that on February 22, 1580, Alva received his appointment to the command of the invading force. It was further decided that Philip and his family should accompany the army to the Portuguese frontier, in order that he might appear in his new kingdom the moment that it should seem best for him to do so; on March 4 he left Madrid on his way to Guadalupe. Fearing the machinations of the other sovereigns of Europe, he refused permission to their representatives to accompany him, and insisted that they should stay on at the capital, where Granvelle remained in charge.

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wore on, that it would be impossible for Philip to enter upon his new inheritance without some use of military force. He promised all sorts of concessions to the Portuguese, in regard to the maintenance of their independent institutions and officials, as soon as he should be recognized as king. All the immemorial principles of Spanish separatism were to be maintained; another entity was to be added to the Spanish Empire, but there was to be no merging of the new body in the old. Moura and the other Spanish representatives in Portugal surpassed themselves in the energy and skill they exhibited in their efforts to win over the Portuguese to the cause of their master; and Philip kept postponing, against Granvelle’ advice, the day of the invasion for which every preparation was now complete, in the hope that the Portuguese would accept him of their own free will. There were negotiations with representatives of the five regents at Guadalupe in late March and early April, but nothing came of them. Philip would not submit his claims to arbitration, as the regents desired, even with what amounted to a preliminary assurance that the verdict would be given in his favor; he stood out for the form as well as the substance, and insisted that his rights were so clear that it was useless to call them in question. Such an attitude was incomprehensible to those who still opposed him. It encouraged them to prepare for resistance; in late April and May the French ambassador at Madrid, the Seigneur de Saint-Gouard, redoubled his exertions to bring about the intervention of his master against the Spanish king. By this time it had become evident that if resistance were actually to be offered the official leader of it must be Don Antonio. He had now issued from his place of concealment, so that his presence in the realm was generally known; he had a gallant manner, and ability to arouse popular enthusiasm, and his bastardy, of which irrefutable proof had been recently brought to light, did not trouble his partisans in the least. His sole possible rival, the Duke of Braganza, derived all his claims from his wife; he was, moreover, the last man in the world to fight an uphill battle. As soon as he saw that the cards were going against him, he began haggling with Philip over the price that should be paid him in return for a renunciation of his rights, and apparently was ultimately satisfied with a collar of the Golden Fleece. Antonio, on the other hand, was unwilling to accept the offers which were made him through Moura. The Spanish monarch bid higher and higher for his submission, but Antonio would be satisfied with nothing short of the post of Philip’s representative in Portugal and the right to nominate the chief officials in the Portuguese dominions beyond the sea— with what amounted, in fact, to recognition as a sort of second king; and this Philip refused to grant. Antonio made capital for himself at home out of the failure of the Spanish monarch to bribe him; henceforth it was inevitable that he should become the standard-bearer of the cause of national independence.

On April 16 Philip sent the Portuguese an ultimatum. If they would recognize him officially as their lawful king within twenty days, he would keep all his previous pledges to them; if not, they must be prepared to feel the full weight of his displeasure and vengeance. At the expiration of the appointed time, he ordered his army to concentrate on the Portuguese frontier near Badajoz. The Castilian cities sent on their contingents. By ship came Spanish veterans of the Sicilian, Neapolitan, and Lombard tercios, a large force of Valencians, three coronelas of Italian infantry, and a strong regiment of Germans. The whole army counted some 35,000 infantry, 2100 cavalry, and 136 pieces of artillery. The Duke of Alva was most graciously received by Philip at Merida; the monarch repressed any feelings of personal resentment that he continued to cherish, in order to give his commander-in-chief the advantage of appearing to enjoy the full confidence of his king. A fleet was also collected in the harbor of Cadiz under the Marquis of Santa Cruz; its assigned function was to sail around Cape St. Vincent, capturing such ports as it could on the way, and cooperate with the army of invasion against Lisbon. The Spanish representatives at the Portuguese capital were recalled and made their preparations to depart, though most of them did not actually leave the country until after the invasion had begun. A final attempt of the regents to find a peaceful solution failed miserably, and on May 21 the king and his whole court transferred themselves to Badajoz. A league thence, at Cantillana, Alva assembled his legions in a great camp, where they were reviewed, on June 13, by the king and queen, the Cardinal-Archduke Albert of Austria, and the commander-in-chief. The proximity of so great a force caused the Portuguese fortress of Elvas to yield on June 18 without resistance. Villa Viscosa was occupied by an advanced detachment on the 22d. On June 27 the main army broke camp and, under the eyes of the king, crossed the frontier in battle array.
Had Philip followed Granvelle’s advice, and struck two months earlier, he might well have encountered no resistance at all; as it was his delays had given his opponents a chance, though an inadequate one, to prepare. Most of the impetus was furnished by the patriotic zeal of the masses, the monks, and the lower clergy, but the encouragement and direction of the representatives of the king of France also counted for much. Saint-Gouard was rude and defiant toward Philip, and openly urged his master to declare war; when the Prudent King refused to receive him, he made ostentatious preparations to depart, thus threatening a breach of diplomatic relations. Efforts also were made at Paris to secure the cooperation of Queen Elizabeth on behalf of the Portuguese; a French ship which arrived at Plymouth, having on board a thousand arquebuses and a quantity of powder intended for Portugal, was permitted to depart without hindrance. More useful still to the Portuguese cause was the action of Jean Pierre de Abbadie, the French secret agent in Portugal itself, and of Pierre Dor, the French consul at Lisbon. In cooperation with the papal nuncio Frumento, they labored to check a last movement on the part of some of the patriots to transfer their allegiance to the Duke of Braganza. The latter, they insisted, had better be completely ignored; only by concentrating on the prior of Crato was there any chance of success; Dor even went off to France to get aid for Antonio’s cause. Meantime sporadic levies began to collect. If, as seems likely, Antonio’s adherents were in the minority, they were more vocal and more active than the partisans of the Spanish king. There were boasts that Philip’s foreign soldiers were few, and that the Portuguese had defeated the Castilians before and had no doubt of their ability to do so again; if necessary, they were prepared to call in the Moors from North Africa to their rescue. But it was not until news came of the surrender of Elvas that the friends of Antonio took the decisive step of proclaiming him to be their lawful king. On June 18 the bishop of La Guarda pronounced a vehement discourse at Santarem, urging all men to support him. On the following day the popular enthusiasm had reached such a height that it was felt safe to hold a solemn service of recognition in the church; Frumento was present to lend to the ceremony the approbation of the Holy See. Thereafter the new monarch proceeded to Lisbon; and despite the obvious disapproval of the upper nobility, he at once showed his mettle by ordering the five regents out of the town of Setubal, where they had taken refuge, and which they had plotted to hand over to the Spanish fleet.

In the meantime the Spanish army under Alva continued its practically unobstructed advance into Portugal, while Philip and his wife remained behind at Badajoz. Olivenza, like Elvas, surrendered without a fight. In the first days of July the Duke and his forces were before Estremoz, where Moura, who could no longer remain safely in Portugal and was making the best of his way back to Spain, brought them precious information of the state of the kingdom. The Spanish fleet left Cadiz on July 8 and soon got possession of Lagos and other places nearby. A little later it established communication with Alva and his army before Setubal. On July 18 that strong fortress surrendered after a nominal resistance. There was much plundering and cruelty to the defenseless inhabitants, particularly in the suburbs of the town; the Italians apparently were the worst offenders, and Alva, who had been ordered by Philip to prevent such things, caused some of the guiltiest to be beheaded. From Setubal there were three possible methods of advancing on Lisbon: (1) to turn northward and cross the Tagus where it narrows at Santarem; (2) to make directly for Almada, opposite Lisbon, and be carried over by the fleet; and (3) to sail around to Cascaes, west of the capital, and attack it from there. The first was abandoned because of the bad roads and the distance involved, and because the army would necessarily lose the support of the fleet. The second was judged too dangerous because of the batteries on the opposite shore. The third was accordingly adopted, with a feint to the north to make the enemy believe that the Spaniards intended to cross at Santarem. The enterprise was not free from peril, for the coast near Cascaes was so high and difficult that a landing could have been prevented with ease, and a reverse at that moment and in that place would have had an enormous effect upon the popular mind. But the Portuguese were incapable of realizing their opportunity, and the disembarkation was effected without striking a blow. The neighboring fortresses soon fell in succession, and the prisoners captured were treated with pitiless severity. Diogo de Menezes, Antonio’s general-in-chief, a scion of one of the most important families in the land, was condemned to a traitor’s death; the same fate was decreed for the alcalde of Cascaes; the common soldiers were sent to the galleys, and Philip formally approved of it all. It has been well said that Alva reckoned quite as much on the terror of his hangman as on the power of his armies, as he approached the Portuguese capital.

The advance of the Duke’s army naturally had an immediate reaction, highly favorable to Spain, on her diplomatic relations with the other European states. Granvelle did his utmost to delay the mission of the papal legate Riario; it must have given him grim satisfaction to be able to utilize the very same Spanish slowness, which had so often caused him misery in the past, for the actual furtherance of the ends he had in view. Riario was held at Barcelona by illness until June 21. Sumptuous entertainments
were arranged for him at every town through which he had to pass on his way from Barcelona to Castile; not till the middle of July did he reach the Portuguese frontier. By that time, of course, all thoughts of a peaceful solution at the arbitration of the Pope had been abandoned. Antonio had now been formally recognized by the Portuguese as their king, and Granvelle lost no time in informing Riario that the only sure method by which further effusion of blood could be prevented was to persuade the nation to give its allegiance to Philip. The new Spanish representative at the Vatican, the Count of Olivares, laid the same considerations before Gregory XIII, and with such good effect that Frumento, who had taken sides with Antonio, was recalled, while Riario was commanded, in case Antonio did not abandon his ‘usurped claim’ to the disputed throne, to leave Portugal and take up his permanent residence at the court of Spain. Gregory had thus been converted, in a few weeks, from a potential arbiter of the Portuguese succession into an obedient instrument of the policy of the Prudent King. French machinations against Spain were also checked at the same time. A new Spanish ambassador, de Tassis, was dispatched to Paris on the death of his predecessor, Vargas, to deal with the situation there. He soon found that Henry III and his mother were so much discouraged by the news of the advance of Alva’s army that there was no longer any chance of their interfering, unless they should be supported by Queen Elizabeth. But this was quite out of the question. The Portuguese representative in London, Antonio de Castilio, had by this time gone over completely to the side of Spain, and cooperated with his Spanish colleague, Bernardino de Mendoza, to thwart the efforts of the special envoy Joao Rodrigues de Sousa, whom Antonio had sent to ask Elizabeth’s aid. He was not even permitted to have access to her, and she openly declared, in the early part of August, that she now regarded Philip as the actual ruler of Portugal.

Meantime, in Portugal itself, the military verdict was finally delivered in the latter part of the same month, in favor of the Prudent King. While Alva had been advancing from Cascaes on Lisbon, the Spanish grandees whose domains lay close to the Portuguese border had invaded the realm with another army of some 30,000 men, which they had raised at their own expense. Before the end of August they gained possession of all the principal cities in the southern part of the kingdom. Their advance relieved the Duke of all anxiety lest he should be attacked from behind; the secret negotiations in which he had continued his master’s efforts to bribe Antonio into peaceful submission had by this time definitely failed; and on August 24, he advanced to the bridge of Alcantara just outside Lisbon, where the enemy had gathered a force of some eight or ten thousand men to defend the ravine that separated the invading army from the capital. They were a mixed rabble, hurriedly collected, monks, tradesmen, and artisans, “fitter to fight with words than with arms”, and impotent to withstand the methodical attack of Alva’s superior forces. On the 25th the Duke sent forward Prospero Colonna with his Italian arquebusiers “to open the ball” with an assault on the bridgehead, while Sancho de Avila led on his Spaniards by the side ridges to take the defenders on the flank. Everything was covered by a devastating artillery fire from the land and from the fleet, most of it directed against the bridge, and the rest against the houses of Lisbon. After a brief resistance, the Portuguese broke and fled, leaving fully a thousand of their number dead or wounded on the field; on the Spanish side the casualties numbered less than a hundred. Antonio, who bore himself like a hero and was wounded in the forehead, strove gallantly but vainly to rally the fugitives; finally, seeing that all was lost, he leaped on a horse with his follower, the Count of Vimioso, and rode off up the Tagus to Santarem. At the same time the remnant of the Portuguese fleet made haste to surrender to the Marquis of Santa Cruz.

The outrages which had already got the Spanish soldiery such an ugly name at Setubal had been continued as they advanced on the capital. Philip had expressly forbidden Alva to permit his men to plunder, and the Duke did his utmost to prevent it, but without success. “The disorders which are occurring here,” so he wrote to the king on August 6 from Cascaes, “are such as I never thought to see, nor would have believed possible among soldiers. I have done everything I can to stop them, but without success; for disobedience and disrespect are rife, and it is all the fault of the officers, for I assure your Majesty that there is not a colonel, a camp-master, a captain, nor any other commander who is doing his duty as he ought to do it, and that they ought all to be suspended from their functions”. At Lisbon it was much the same. The capital surrendered unconditionally on the evening of the battle of Alcantara, and had every reason to expect merciful treatment; but Alva, though he preserved the inner part of the city from harm, was unable to keep his men from working their will in the suburbs. The king was apparently kept in ignorance of what had occurred on this occasion, for he wrote to the Duke of Medina Sidonia on August 28 that Lisbon had surrendered without bloodshed or sack, as he had desired. Unfortunately the evil example which his enemies had set him was followed by Antonio in the ensuing weeks. Though he had failed at Lisbon, the prior still had hopes of reconstituting his party in the North. He established himself at Coimbra, and sought to terrorize all men into joining him by his cruel maltreatment of those who refused. Even Sancho de Avila, the butcher of Antwerp, who was sent,
in late September, to dislodge him, was amazed when he found what had occurred. In view of all these things it was no wonder that the last phases of the campaign, which virtually ended in October when Avila entered Oporto, evoked the bitterest hatreds on both sides. Most of Philip’s earlier efforts to conciliate the Portuguse were forgotten; the ancient enmities were revived, and Antonio began to become, to an extent that he had never been before, a national hero, and the personification of the cause of escape from Castilian bondage.

The correspondence of Philip with Alva and his other representatives in Portugal during the months of September and October is an accurate reflection of all these things. Instead of drastic commands to check the outrages of his own soldiery, the Prudent King issued savage orders for the punishment of all who continued to resist him. To make sure that there was no undue leniency, he sent a number of Castilian judges into Portugal to carry with them, into a country where there could be no tics of kinship or friendship, the full rigor of the Spanish law. Above all he insisted that Antonio should be taken, or at least that he should not be suffered to escape from the realm; he offered a reward of 80,000 ducats for his delivery alive or dead. But Alva made little effort to carry out the royal commands. He remained at Lisbon, busy himself with the reform of the administration of the city, and the ceremony of the solemn proclamation of his master as king of Portugal on September 12; and Antonio was given the opportunity to escape. Barred by a tempest from his intended flight by sea, he sought refuge with a few companions in the wild hills of Northern Portugal. His friends there were loyal to him in his hour of need; and the prior, who was at his best when personal courage was needed, was successful, after months of hair-breadth escapes, in getting passage in a Dutch ship from Setubal to Calais. In a manifesto, published four years later at Leyden, he gives some account of his adventures during that perilous time: how he wandered in disguise from one peasant’s hut to another, often recognized, yet never betrayed; how he spent whole days in the reeds with the water up to his chest, and how his wounds and his illnesses often made him despair. We may well believe that the story lost nothing in the telling, but there is no reason to doubt that the main lines of it are true. Philip was so enraged when he learned that his prey had escaped that he ordered the execution of Beatrice Gonzalez, the devoted woman to whose energy Antonio owed it that he was finally got on board ship. Nor did Philip exaggerate the importance of Antonio’s escape; to the day of his death the prior continued to breed trouble for Spain. He carried to the sovereigns of northern Europe a highly colored account of the conquest of Portugal, and of the difficulty and cruelty with which it had been accomplished. He assured them that the most effective of all the ways in which they could satisfy their hatred of Philip would be to lend him their aid in an attempt to recover his throne. He converted what had been originally an Iberian affair into a matter of vital interest to all the states of Europe, and linked the conquest which carried the Spanish Empire to its greatest territorial extent with the forces which were to combine to effect its dissolution.

While Alva and his tercios were overrunning Portugal, Philip had remained behind on Spanish soil at Badajoz. Astrologers had insisted that the year 1580 was certain to be unlucky, and Philip was not above listening to their prognostications. An epidemic of catarrh was also raging, and the king was stricken down by it. At one moment he was convinced that he was going to die, and when, finally, he did get well, his recovery was universally attributed to the audacity of his physician, Valles, “who ventured to purge him during a conjunction of the moon”. His wife, Anne of Austria, who had accompanied him to Badajoz, was less fortunate, for she died on October 26, 1580, at the age of thirty-one, and the whole court was plunged in grief. But the need of Philip’s presence in Portugal was so obvious that it was impossible for him to delay his departure long; on December 5 he left Badajoz for Elvas, with his kinsman, the Archduke Albert of Austria, whom he had practically adopted as a son and who had recently been made a cardinal. Only a small number of ministers and courtiers accompanied him, in order that the more places should be left free for his Portuguse subjects. At Elvas he was received with appropriate ceremonies by three Portuguese bishops and a number of the prominent nobles of the land, and he was convinced by their protestations of loyalty that he would be universally welcome in his new kingdom. It was here at Elvas that the Braganzas, through a representative, swore allegiance to Philip as lawful king of Portugal; it was also here that Philip conferred his first real favor on the Portuguse by abolishing the line of custom houses that separated their country from Castile. Finally, it was from Elvas that the new king issued a summons to the Portuguese Cortes to meet in the following April at Thomar in order that the formal ceremony of recognizing him might take place, and that the representatives of the three, estates might receive in return such favors as it should please him to grant. The usual delays prevented the assembly from actually meeting until April 16; and Philip, who left Elvas for the westward on February 28, spent the intervening weeks to excellent purpose in efforts to win the affection of the Portuguse. At the advice of Moura, he distributed a number of favors and
dignities to the more important nobles; he took pains to dress and cut his beard after the Portuguese fashion, and forced the Castilians who accompanied him to do likewise. In the last days before his departure from Elvas, he gave audience to the papal legate, Riario, and received his assurance that the Pope had now come round to full approval of the very solution in Portugal which he had been sent out to prevent.

The meeting of the Cortes of Thomar was a notable occasion, and the contemporary historians exhaust themselves in describing the costumes and ceremonies of the day. The king solemnly swore before the three Portuguese archbishops of Braga, Lisbon, and Evora to observe all the laws, customs, and privileges of the realm in the same form that they had been observed by his predecessors; thereafter he received, one after the other, the oaths of fidelity of the nobles, clergy, and representatives of the third estate. On the following day, with similar ceremonies, Philip’s eldest surviving son, Diego (born July 12, 1575, died November 21, 1582) was solemnly recognized as his father’s heir and successor. A sweeping act of pardon followed, from which some fifty partisans of Antonio were specifically excepted; of these the most prominent were Joao de Portugal, bishop of La Guarda, and the Count of Vimioso. Opinion naturally differed between Castilians and Portuguese as to the generosity of this course, but we are at least assured by Veldazquez Salmantino that in the succeeding period Philip successively cancelled the exceptions, so that in the end the pardon was practically universal. We are also informed that he refused to listen to the advice, given by some of the more rancorous of his Castilian followers, that he should suppress the ancient university of Coimbra on account of its ardent support of the cause of his rival.

But the proceedings of the Cortes of Thomar are by no means so significant for the purpose of the student of history as is the statement of the principles on which Philip determined to govern his newly conquered realm; this statement was finally issued at Lisbon as a car
ta patente on November 12, 1582. The concessions contained in this document were really replies to the petitions of the Cortes of Thomar in the preceding year; but the basis of them was a set of “fundamentals”, agreed upon between the late Cardinal Henry and the Spanish representatives, the Duke of Osuna and Cristobal de Moura, at his court, a short time before the cardinal’s death, when he had decided in favor of the right of Philip to succeed him on the Portuguese throne. They summarize the basic principles on which Philip’s administration of his new kingdom was henceforth to be founded.

Besides his oath to maintain all the laws, privileges, and customs of the realm, Philip promised that he would never hold the Portuguese Cortes outside the kingdom, and that no legislation affecting Portugal should be permitted in any assembly which met beyond its frontiers. He also gave his word that he would confer the office of viceroy or governor only on Portuguese or on members of the royal family; that all greater and lesser offices of justice, finance, and administration should be given only to Portuguese and never to foreigners; that all the ancient posts in the kingdom should be maintained for Portuguese occupants, as they had been in the days of his predecessors, and that the same principles should apply with regard to all other offices, great and small, on the land and on the sea, already existing or to be created in the future; and that all garrisons stationed in Portugal should be composed exclusively of Portuguese. He also agreed that the commerce of India and Guinea and of the other Portuguese colonies, already discovered or to be discovered in the future, should be continued as at present and in no wise changed; that the officials in charge of it should continue to be Portuguese and should sail only in Portuguese ships; that all gold and silver coined in Portugal should be stamped with the arms of Portugal and with no other; that all prelacies, abbey rights, benefices, and other ecclesiastical preferments in the realm should be conferred only on Portuguese, and that the same principle should govern in regard to the office of inquisitor general, the commanderies, pensions, and functions of the Military Orders (in which there was to be no innovation whatsoever), and the priory of Crato; and that there should be no tercias or other taxation payable by the Portuguese clergy to the state, nor any request for bulls to permit the same. He promised that he would not make any royal grant of any city, town, place, or jurisdiction within the realm to any one save to Portuguese; that crown estates which had become vacant should not be absorbed into the royal domain, but should be regranted to some relative of the previous tenants or to some other well-deserving Portuguese; Castilians and other foreigners, however, who were at that time resident in Portugal, or had been servants of earlier Portuguese kings, were not excluded from this privilege. Nobles were to come into the enjoyment of their moradias at the age of twelve, and Philip and his successors were to receive every year “two hundred Portuguese servants who should also have their moradias”; those who had not the privilege of nobility were to serve in the armed forces of the kingdom. Philip also promised, for himself and his successors, that whenever they came into Portugal they would not demand compulsory entertainment as was the custom in Castile, but would follow the usages of Portugal; and that when his Majesty or his successors were outside the kingdom they should always have with them one prelate or other ecclesiastic, one official of
finance, one secretary, one chief chancellor, and two oidores, all of Portuguese birth, who should jointly compose a Council of Portugal, with whose aid all the business of that realm should be transacted in the Portuguese language. All chief civil magistracies and other judicial positions were to be filled from within the realm, as was at present the case, even though his Majesty should be absent, and the same principle was to apply to all financial posts; all matters of justice and finance were to be determined and carried out within the realm as hitherto. The service in the royal chapel at Lisbon was to be continued according to the custom of previous reigns; Portuguese were to be admitted to the offices of the royal household, “in accordance with the Burgundian custom”, on the same basis with the Castilians and his Majesty’s subjects of other nations; the queen was usually to have Portuguese women among her principal ladies. “For the benefit of the whole people of the kingdom”, all frontier customs between Castile and Portugal were to be abolished, and merchandise was to pass freely in both directions as was done before the imposition of the duties actually being levied at the time, and every facility was to be given for the importation of Castilian grain into Portugal; and Philip promised to give 300,000 cruzados, of which 120,000 were to go for the ransom of captives, 150,000 to be placed at the disposal of the chamber of Lisbon, and the rest to be used for the relief of the victims of the pestilence. The king also agreed that in providing for the fleets of India, and the other squadrons required for the defence of the realm, for the chastisement of corsairs, and for the security of the frontiers of Africa, he would, after consultation with the representatives of his new realm, take such measures as should seem most wise, even if they involved the giving of aid by his other kingdoms, and great increase of expense to his royal treasury. Finally, though it was recognized that in view of the multitude of other realms which it had agreed that in providing for the fleets of India, and the other squadrons required for the defence of the realm, for the chastisement of corsairs, and for the security of the frontiers of Africa, he would, after consultation with the representatives of his new realm, take such measures as should seem most wise, even if they involved the giving of aid by his other kingdoms, and great increase of expense to his royal treasury. Finally, though it was recognized that in view of the multitude of other realms which it had pleased God to give him, it would be impossible for Philip to live continually in Portugal as the Portuguese would have liked, yet he promised to do his utmost to reside there as long as he could; and that when no other more important consideration intervened to prevent it, he would allow his son and heir to visit Portugal, in order that he might be brought up there in part, and get to know and love his future subjects.

These certainly look like large concessions; and in general it may be said that Philip continued to observe the most important of them, in letter at least if not entirely in spirit, to the day of his death. In some particulars he even went beyond what he had promised, as in the establishment of a court of appeal at Oporto for the convenience of the northern provinces. It appears, however, that in 1593 he restored the frontier customs between Portugal and Castile; and the Count of Ericeira enumerates several other infractions of the privileges of Thomar, among them being the occupation of the fortresses of Portugal by Castilian troops. It would have been too much to expect of the Prudent King that he should even admit the possibility of any country being worthy of comparison with his beloved Castile; in his choice of officials to help him govern his newly conquered realm, he generally selected those Portuguese who had been notoriously Castilianized, like Moura; and he availed himself of the stipulation that he might send a member of his own family to represent him in Lisbon by selecting as his first appointee to that office the Archduke Albert of Austria, who was his cousin, his nephew, his brother-in-law, and in later years his son-in-law. But it is difficult, save in the matter of the customs, to find cases of direct violation of his pledge of 1582 that cannot be plausibly excused as measures of military necessity or public emergency. The first clear instance of the imposition of the Castilian tax came in 1636, during the reign of Philip IV and as a result of the policy of Olivares; and four years later the revolution broke out which was to end in 1668 with the acknowledgment by Spain of Portuguese independence. The contrast between the policy of Philip the Prudent and that of the masterful and ambitious minister of his grandson is very marked. Olivares imposed the tax which brought on the catastrophe largely, without doubt, in order to satisfy the needs of the moment —such was ever his way; but perhaps it is not entirely fanciful to see in his action something more than merely that. There is evidence that enough of the spirit of contemporary France had penetrated his mind to convince him that the principle of constitutional separatism, which, as we have often remarked, underlay the whole fabric of the Spanish Empire, was no longer practicable or wise, and that some sort of closer administrative union between the different scattered states and colonies that composed it had become imperative. He had visions of doing something such as the Bourbons did with the Spanish Empire in the eighteenth century, after some of its most burdensome limbs had been lopped off; but he had not the ability to carry through his program, and the experiment ended in disaster. Philip II, on the other hand, was far too deeply imbued with the ancient traditions of his native land to think for one moment of embarking on any such hazardous adventure as this. The principle of the maintenance of the constitutional separatism of the different states that composed the Spanish Empire in Europe had never been violated, from the days of the little Pyrenean Christian realms in the early period of the Reconquest down through the gradual acquisition of the Mediterranean and Italian dependencies, of the Netherlands and of Franche Comté; it had even begun to permeate the administration of the Spanish territories of the New World. Now that at last Philip had obtained what he probably coveted most, the sole portion of the Iberian
Peninsula which had escaped his forefathers, and whose reacquisition had virtually been bequeathed to him by them as a duty, he never dreamed of depriving it of its own independent form of government. The concessions which he had made, partly no doubt in deference to the wishes of his new subjects, were fully in line with his own preconceived ideas as to how his new territories should be managed. The measure of autonomy which the Portuguese demanded and received was in some respects more complete than that of the realms of the crown of Aragon, of the Mediterranean and Italian states, and of the Burgundian lands, notably in the stipulations for the exclusion of Castilians from the government and the provisions against the introduction of Castilian taxation; but that was merely the more perfect carrying out of the oldest and most fundamental principle of the administration of the Spanish Empire. The terms on which Portugal had finally been superadded to the vast agglomeration of separate states, now comprised in that huge and unwieldy organism, were fully in accord with the most ancient traditions of its upbuilding.

The acceptance of Philip as the lawful sovereign of the different colonies of which the vast Portuguese empire was composed was effected, save for one notable exception, with an ease and absence of turmoil, which is perhaps chiefly significant in demonstrating how slight were the changes which the advent of the new dynasty brought about. The concessions hitherto enumerated, which Philip had made in 1581, guaranteed that there should be no real alteration in the methods or the personnel of the administration of the Portuguese empire; the colonies remained colonies of Portugal, which under Castilian rule continued to retain as before the monopoly of their commerce for the benefit of its own ports. The Portuguese colonies for the most part showed themselves utterly indifferent to the change of dynasty. What mattered it to them to what family their sovereign belonged, or whether he resided in Lisbon or in Madrid, in Cintra or in the Escorial? And, moreover, at first sight there seemed to be many positive advantages in becoming the subjects of the most powerful monarch on the face of the earth; in case of danger they hoped to be assured of effective protection. In Brazil, furthermore, there was a special consideration in favor of the recent change, for it would ensure the peaceful termination of those boundary disputes between the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America which had already begun to loom large as a possible danger for the future. As things ultimately developed these happy expectations were never realized. Within less than a decade of the annexation of Portugal, Spain’s naval power had been broken; the maritime and commercial nations of Western Europe were swift to seize the golden opportunity to dismember her vast empire for their own advantage, and the Portuguese colonies, which had most recently been brought into the combination, were among those that suffered most; instead of being protected, they were specially singled out for attack. But the first results of this adverse development, which was ultimately destined to obliterate all the favorable ones, were not felt until the very last part of the reign of the Prudent King, and its full effects were not visible until a much later time. The Portuguese empire continued to flourish during the years immediately following the Spanish conquest, though the storm clouds were beginning to gather thickly on the horizon. It took Europe another long half century to realize how utterly Spain’s vitality had been sapped, and down to the peace of Westphalia in 1648 her diplomats played the game of bluff to perfection.

It would be futile to attempt any detailed narrative of the course of events in the different parts of the Portuguese empire during the seventeen years of Philip’s occupation of the Portuguese throne, but some of the outstanding facts may be briefly set down. For the purposes of the short summary which alone is possible here, we may safely omit the Portuguese colonies on the west coast of Africa; the tendency was rather to neglect them in this period and to concentrate instead on the Orient and on Brazil. We will begin, then, with a glance at the fate of those scattered territories, extending from the Cape of Good Hope around to China and the Spice Islands of the Pacific, which acknowledged the authority of the Portuguese viceroy at Goa.

That office was held by six different incumbents between 1581 and 1598; all of them, in accordance with the promises of Philip at the time of his accession, were of ancient Portuguese families, and the period of their rule is chiefly filled with struggles with rebellious natives and Turkish pirates from Mombasa in East Africa to the Moluccas. The new king’s accession was proclaimed without resistance at the church at Goa on September 3, 1581, and from that time onward his representatives seemed wholly absorbed in extending the possessions of their new sovereign, and in defending what had already been acquired. In 1585 they attempted without success to utilize the rivalries of the kings of Tidore and Ternate in order to regain possession of the fort which they had once possessed on the latter island; but a little later they beat off an attack on their establishment at Malacca by the king of Johore, and afterward destroyed the city of Johore and forced its ruler to flee for his life. At the same time they convincingly reasserted their authority over Mombasa and their East African establishments, an action which was made imperative by the imminent danger of a Turkish advance into that region; they also erected a powerful fortress at Muscat to strengthen their control over the entrance to the Persian Gulf.
Perhaps the most notable achievement of the period was the proclamation of Philip, in 1597, as king of Ceylon. Various uprisings by Christianized as well as non-Christian natives had given the viceroy adequate excuse for vigorous interference there. At the outset their efforts were most unsuccessful. They were driven from Kandy by a rebel Cingalese, who had previously embraced Catholicism and been baptized with the name of Don John. This leader, who now styled himself Wimala Dharma, reverted to the religion of his fathers in order to win the support of the priesthood, and announced that he was in possession of the dalada, or sacred tooth of Buddha, which was regarded as a proof of his right to the throne. In the rest of the island, however, the Portuguese were more fortunate; and when its lawful king, who was a more permanent convert to Christianity, died at Colombo in May, 1597, it was found that he had appointed King Philip to be his heir. The Spanish monarch’s power extended nominally over the whole of the island save Kandy, where he had been repulsed, and Jaffna, where the authority of a local ruler was still recognized. There was a solemn ceremony of recognition and allegiance, in which the inhabitants, though stoutly refusing to permit the introduction of Portuguese laws and customs, promised absolute loyalty to their new master, provided he would observe and respect the native ones. On one point alone were they willing to make any concessions; the priests and religious orders were to have full liberty to preach the Catholic faith and make what converts they could.

Such is the brighter side of the picture, as seen from the standpoint of Philip and his representatives, and down to the death of the Prudent King it was unquestionably the most prominent one; but before the reign ended, the first signs had appeared of the advent in the Orient of other powers, whose presence was ultimately to spell ruin for the Spanish Empire in that part of the world. Five years after Philip’s recognition as king of Portugal, he was at open war with the Dutch, who were supported—if somewhat halfheartedly—by England. Reports of the rich cargo of the Portuguese carrack San Filipphe, which had been captured by Sir Francis Drake, in June, 1587, on its way back from Goa to Lisbon, were not slow to reach Holland, and convinced her of the profits that could be derived from the Far East; the existence of a state of war with Spain, and the seizure in 1585 of all Dutch ships in Spanish and Portuguese harbors, gave her ample excuse for invading the Oriental monopoly of her ancient foe. The States-General made matters difficult by issuing a series of prohibitions against trade of all kinds with Spain or Portugal or with any lands or islands which acknowledged the authority of their king; but these prohibitions were never very strictly enforced, and it was, moreover, easy to evade them by the device of sailing under a neutral flag. Precious information as to routes, trade winds, quicksands, and the course of commerce were furnished by Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the son of a West Frisian burgher, who had resided for two years in Lisbon, and thirteen in India. Finally, in April, 1595, a number of Dutch merchants provided the funds for the dispatching of four ships to “the countries lying on the other side of the Cape of Good Hope”. The expedition was not entirely successful. It was detained for five months at Madagascar by storms and illness, sailed thence direct for Java, and on June 22, 1596, reached Bantam. The natives, doubtless inspired by the Portuguese, gave the newcomers a hostile reception; fighting ensued; the Dutch captain, Cornelis Houtman, was captured and had to be ransomed. Thence the invaders proceeded to the Moluccas, where one of their vessels became unseaworthy and was abandoned; the crews also were sadly reduced, and the survivors were lucky to get home with three ships in July, 1597. But though the cargo they brought back was insufficient to pay for the expense of the expedition, it was more than adequate to demonstrate the wealth of the Orient. New ‘companies’ for similar experiments were rapidly formed; and in the following year—the year of Philip’s death—no less than twenty-two Dutch vessels sailed for the East Indies. Three years later, in March, 1601, these different companies were amalgamated, under government direction and support, into a single body, the Dutch East India Company, and from that moment onward the ruin of the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly in the Orient became a certainty. Philip’s ill-omened Burgundian inheritance and the methods by which he had attempted to retain it were to have consequences of which he would never have dreamed.

The Count of Ericeira, in his Portugal Restaurado, tells us that Philip offered to his rival, the Duchess of Braganza, the whole of Brazil and the title of king of it for her husband, in return for their abandonment of all claim to the Portuguese throne, and that she refused. Since Braganza was subsequently bought off by a collar of the Golden Fleece, this story, if true, certainly throws a curious light on the slight importance attached in those days by Europeans to their transatlantic possessions; and the tale is particularly amusing when one contrasts it with the action of the descendants of that same Duke and Duchess of Braganza in the early part of the nineteenth century. The descriptions of Brazil that have come down to us from the time it passed into Spanish hands would indicate that it was a land which any ruler ought to have been proud to possess. The principal settlements were at Sao Salvador (now Bahia);
Pernambuco, Olinda, and Sao Vicente. The first named boasted a population of 800 inhabitants, of whom 100 enjoyed incomes of over 5000 cruzados; and the whole reconcavo, or coast line of the surrounding bay, some 2000, exclusive of Indians and negroes. There were sixty-two churches in the city and district, and the country for miles around was covered with plantations. There were fifty-seven sugar works in the neighborhood, whose annual export amounted to 2400 hogsheads, and oranges and lemons, cocoa and ginger, were grown in enormous quantities. Cattle raising was also extensive and successful. Horses and cows, sheep and goats were brought over from Europe and the Cape Verde Islands and flourished in their new home. The other settlements were somewhat smaller. There were various insect scourges and much disease. The morals of the community at large were not good, and the enormous importation of negro slaves did not work altogether to the advantage of the colony. Yet the prevailing impression one receives is of a happy and prosperous life, predominantly agricultural and pastoral in its interests, and far less strenuous than that of the Spanish colonies farther westward.

The government until about the middle of the sixteenth century had been almost entirely in the hands of a number of captains-proprietors, each of whom had been given a stretch of coastline extending north and south for a distance of fifty leagues, and the land westward therefrom stretching indefinitely inland; each exercised exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction within his captaincy, though appeals could be sent home to Lisbon in case of capital punishment. Naturally the fortunes of these captaincies varied widely in accordance with climatic conditions, fertility of the soil, and the abilities of the grantees; but six of them were ultimately converted into permanent settlements. Beginning with the reign of John III (1521-57) the power of the captains-proprietors was considerably restricted. The local magistrates whom they had hitherto nominated themselves were gradually replaced by royally appointed officials sent out from Lisbon. Finally, in 1549, some measure of unity and cohesion was given to the scattered settlements by the appointment of the first royal governor, Tome de Sousa, with supreme supervisory power over all the authorities on the ground. He established himself at Bahia, which thenceforth became a sort of capital of the entire colony, and did his best to carry out the elaborate instructions which had been given him by the home government for the regulation of the conduct of the captains-proprietors. But as he had no direct jurisdiction over any one of them, his efforts and those of his successors resulted rather in paralyzing local initiative than in effecting healthy centralization; so that at the accession of Philip II Brazil was still rather a loose federation of different settlements than a single colony.

It would not seem that the Prudent King or his successors effected any very serious change in the situation as they found it in 1581. Three new captaincies were set up; Parahyba in 1585, Sergipe in 1589, and Rio Grande do Norte in 1597. A certain number of improvements, particularly in the administration of justice, were introduced in the different captaincies, and various attempts were made to check non-residence and decentralization and to establish an official hierarchy. But the period of the Hapsburg rule in Portugal was too short and too disturbed to permit of much permanent achievement in this line; and when Portugal regained its independence in 1668, the government of Brazil was not essentially different from what it had been when the Spaniards assumed control.

The narrative history of Brazil during the period of Philip II is largely that of conflicts with hostile powers, who, after the Spaniards had got possession of it, redoubled the efforts which they had made in Portuguese days to gain for themselves footholds on its attractive coasts. It was in the year 1555 that the first serious attempt in this direction had been made by a party of French Huguenots, sent out under Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon by Admiral Gaspard de Coligny to found what was proudly called ‘La France Antarctique’. They established themselves at what is now Rio de Janeiro, kept on good terms with the Indians, and were unmolested by the Portuguese for at least four years. But Villegagnon proved a traitor to his employers. He quarreled with the Huguenots, gave up his command, returned to France, and went over to the Guises; meantime in 1558 the Portuguese had sent out a new and vigorous governor, Men de Sá, who nine years later (1567) completed the expulsion of the intruders. The French, however, were not willing to relinquish without further effort all claims to the place where they had gained such a promising foothold, and the accession of Philip to the Portuguese throne gave them an excellent excuse for renewing their attempts. They established a trading post at Parahyba, whence the task of ousting them was entrusted in 1583 to Philip’s admiral, Diego Flores Valdes, on his way back from a vain effort to secure control of the Strait of Magellan. After some delay the work was successfully accomplished, and the French did not again venture to appear in South America until the seventeenth century.

More troublesome by far were the incursions of the English, who, though they had previously traded in Brazil, had never gone there as enemies until the initiation of the Spanish regime. Their subsequent expeditions thereto were naturally of an increasingly hostile nature and became a part of the
general maritime struggle of Spain and England all over the world. In December, 1582, Captain Edward Fenton, ostensibly bound for the Strait of Magellan and the Far East, came to anchor, with a small squadron, off Santa Catalina Island. His objects were apparently peaceful; but the contemporaneous exploits of Drake made the Spaniards suspicious and they proceeded to attack him. An inconclusive moonlight engagement followed, in which one of the Spanish ships was sunk, and the English finally escaped to the open sea. In 1586 another squadron, fitted out by George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, and commanded by Captain Robert Widrington, entered the port of Bahia and remained there for six weeks. Despite the sturdy defense of the place by the converted Indians of the adjoining country, who did notable things with their bows and arrows, the marauders succeeded in doing a considerable amount of damage. Five years later Thomas Cavendish made a rather futile attack on the town of Santos, burnt Sao Vicente, returned to Santos again, where he was treated even more roughly than before, and finally lost a large portion of his men in an attempt on Espirito Santo; so deeply was he cast down by this last repulse that he died, it is said, of grief on the voyage home. Most notable of all was the expedition commanded by Captain James Lancaster in 1594-95. Its objective was Pernambuco, where there happened to be a number of heavily laden East Indiamen. The place was taken and the booty captured; but while Lancaster was loading his vessels for the voyage home he was constantly harassed by attacks from the Portuguese, who strove to cut off his water supply, floated fire-ships down the river to dislodge him, and, finally, established a battery at the mouth of the harbor to prevent his escape. The destruction of this work cost the English a considerable number of men, but their expedition finally got home in safety, and the wealth it brought with it was unquestionably an incentive to the formation of the English East India Company. Both Holland and England, Spain’s most dangerous potential enemies, had thus got a good taste of the possibilities of commercial and colonial expansion at her expense before the end of Philip’s reign.

Very different was the story of the establishment of Philip’s power in the Azores. Though less valuable than the East Indies or Brazil, they were destined to give the Prudent King more trouble than all the rest of his Portuguese acquisitions put together. Their geographical location involved them in the current of European politics more intimately than the Asiatic and American lands, and they remained a thorn in Philip’s side till the end of his days. And the first note of warning in the Azores was sounded by the efforts of his rival Antonio of Crato, in league with the French.

Of the nine islands of which the archipelago is composed, Sao Miguel, the largest of the group, was the only one which had immediately acknowledged Philip and been occupied by the Spaniards. Terceira, the next in importance and size, gave convincing evidence of its loyalty to the cause of Antonio, who, before he fled from Portugal, had sent thither one of his adherents, Cipriao de Figueiredo, to make the most of the situation; he was aided by the Franciscan friars, while the local Jesuits, against the almost unanimous desire of the rest of the clergy, vainly attempted to advance the cause of Spain. The Spaniards in Sao Miguel neglected the situation in Terceira until after Antonio’s partisans had gained full control there; moreover, the Terceirans succeeded in persuading the inhabitants of the seven lesser islands to follow their example and take sides against the Spanish king. When Antonio finally succeeded in getting away from Portugal to France, it was reasonably clear that his best hope of recovering his dominions was by gaining full control of the Azores and establishing a base there. The archipelago was a rendezvous for fleets from America and from the Orient; in more ways than one it was a focal point, where all sorts of trouble could be bred for Philip of Spain. Antonio had carried the crown jewels of Portugal away with him; knowing the fondness of the queen of England for precious stones, and the enthusiasm of her sea-rovers for maritime adventure, he attempted to interest Elizabeth in his cause. But that wary lady was not yet ready for overt action. Drake and Hawkins were anxious to utilize the opportunity to the utmost; a subscription list was opened and many contributions were sent in; but the royal approval was long withheld, and the small squadron which was finally permitted to sail never saw action against the Spaniards. But Antonio had another string to his bow. While he had been negotiating with Queen Elizabeth, his agent, the Count of Vimioso, had been active in France, where he found a situation much more favorable to his master’s plans. Matters there had developed in anti-Spanish fashion since 1578. The Huguenots were enthusiastic for Antonio’s cause; the queen-mother’s own claims to the Portuguese throne were enough to insure her sympathy and support; another good omen was that on August 17, 1581, the Duke of Alençon-Anjou had seized Cambray, almost from under the nose of Alexander of Parma. For the sake of appearances it was judged wise that King Henry III should remain officially ignorant of all plans to aid Antonio; but as a matter of fact he was fully apprised of them, and desired that they be carried out. It was not, however, until the early summer of 1582 that the expedition was ready to start. It was composed of some sixty ships with upwards of 6000 soldiers, beside the crews, under command of Catharine de’ Medici’s favorite general,
the condottiere Filippo Strozzi. It left the port of Belle-Ile on June 16 and carried Antonio, Vimioso, and also an efficient and perfidious Spanish spy, by the name of Miguel Vaez, whom the pretender, in his innocence, believed to be the most loyal of his followers.

Philip was fully informed of all these preparations. His ambassador at Paris was a marvel of efficiency in the use of secret informers and spies, and everything he learned and did was duly laid before his master. But the Prudent King as usual was determined if possible to avoid a fight. In early May, 1581, he dispatched to the Azores one Ambrosio d’Aguier Coutinho, a Portuguese who had been won over to his service, to see if he could not persuade the inhabitants of Terceira and the smaller islands to acknowledge the authority of Spain; but the effort completely failed. In the next two months two small fleets were sent out, under Pedro de Valdes and Lope de Figueroa, primarily in order to get in touch with the Last Indian and American fleets which were due at the Azores at that time, and prevent them from being persuaded to join with the rebel Terceirans; secondly, for the purpose of continuing the attempts of Coutinho to win over Terceira without a fight; and thirdly, in case these efforts failed, to attack Terceira by force of arms. Largely by good luck, the first of these objects was successfully attained; but the attempts to gain the second and third were miserable failures, and the defeat that Philip’s forces sustained in their operations against the Terceirans encouraged the islanders to persist in their resistance. The accounts which the crestfallen commanders brought back to Lisbon, together with the news that kept pouring in of the progress of hostile preparations in France, sufficed to convince the Prudent King that the Azores could never be won without a far greater military and naval effort than he had contemplated hitherto; and he forthwith ordered the Marquis of Santa Cruz to be ready to sail in April, 1582, in the hope that he might be able to anticipate the French. The expedition did not get away till July 10 nor reach the Azores till the 21st, six days after the arrival of the enemy. It was, however, a far more imposing armament than its predecessors. It was composed of two galleons, the San Martin and the San Mateo, nineteen galleys, and sixteen smaller boats, and carried, according to the official muster roll, something over 8000 soldiers. It seems clear, however, that the number of ships and of fighting men who actually got to the Azores was considerably less.

The French had already landed 1500 of their men at Ponta Delgada in Sao Miguel. They had successfully repulsed a sortie by the garrison of the castle, which they were besieging when the Spaniards arrived. Neither side was apparently in any hurry to begin to fight. The French had underestimated the size of the enemy’s fleet; their commanders were at odds with one another, and they had hopes of the arrival of help from England which never came; Santa Cruz was also expecting reinforcements, and for nearly a week scarcely a shot was fired. Finally, at dawn on July 26, the San Mateo, which had maneuvered itself into an isolated position between the two fleets, was attacked by several of the best French ships at once; an hour later the combat had become general, and lasted for five hours. The Spaniards strove to grapple and board, while the French tended in general to trust to cannonading; but their guns were not sufficiently powerful to enable them to do this with success; their seamanship was inferior; and despite the fact that they had more ships, the Spaniards were ultimately victorious. Strozzi and Vimioso were killed; a number of the less ardent of the French commanders, and also Antonio, sought refuge in ignominious flight; two of their ships were burned, four were sunk, and four more fell into the hands of the victors; some 2000 of their sailors and soldiers met their deaths, and upwards of 390 more, including seventy-six caballeros, were taken prisoners. On the Spanish side the losses were considerably less, amounting in all to 224 dead and 553 wounded, though the list included some of the most noted soldiers and sailors of the time. It was a gallant and well fought battle, and Santa Cruz won universal praise for engaging so powerful an enemy in a place where if he had met defeat he could not possibly have escaped; but his victory was stained by a deed of savage cruelty which he perpetrated five days later. Deaf to the murmurs of his officers and men, who cherished no rancor against their valiant foe, he caused all the prisoners who had fallen into his hands to be taken on shore and executed in cold blood. The gentlemen were beheaded, and the common sailors and soldiers hanged, “for the service of God, of the king our master, and of the king of France”, as he put it in his report to Philip. In the last six words of that quotation is to be found—if there be one—the sole possible justification of this barbarous deed. Santa Cruz did not regard his opponents as honorable foes, but as lawless pirates who had gone off on a marauding expedition without the sanction of the French government; they were therefore beyond the pale, and their execution was but ridding their king of a pack of dangerous criminals. It is as hard for us today to palliate the act as it is to exculpate Menendez de Aviles for his slaughter of the followers of Jean Ribaut; but the theory that really underlay both deeds was the same, namely, that by papal donation all land and water west of Europe belonged without exception to Spain, and to Portugal which had now been annexed to Spain, and, consequently, that all foreigners who trespassed thereon did so at their own peril. That Santa Cruz could describe the act as a service to the king of France only proves that he refused to believe that the French government could
officially sanctioned such intrusions. The protests of his men showed plainly that they did not understand his reasoning or accept its logical consequences; but we know that Philip approved, as he had of the massacre in Florida. According to present-day standards, he was wholly and unquestionably wrong; but in passing judgment on him and on his admiral it is but fair that we should bear in mind the theories and principles of the times in which they lived.

If Santa Cruz was barbarous in his treatment of his prisoners, he was also neglectful of his opportunities to utilize to the full the victory that he had won. It would seem obvious that he should have seized the moment when the inhabitants of Terceira were dismayed at the rout of their French allies to take possession of the island and hold it for Spain, and Philip, when he learned of the victory that his admiral had won, was most anxious that he should do so. The king’s message, however, did not arrive on time; Santa Cruz returned to Lisbon, and his failure to complete the conquest of the archipelago encouraged Spain’s enemies to try again. Once more the tireless pretender gained the sympathy and support of Catharine de’ Medici and Henry III. Another expedition was dispatched in May, 1583, under command of Aymar de Chaste, governor of Dieppe and first cousin of the Duke of Joyeuse, and in June Santa Cruz had to be sent back to the islands to beat him off. This time the invaders made considerably less trouble than in 1582, though Terceira and the lesser islands were not completely in Spanish hands until the end of August; the real importance of this second expedition against the Azores lies in the influence which it exerted upon the future. On the one hand its reports, doubtless grossly exaggerated, of the heroism of the islanders’ resistance to the Spaniards, caused all Philip’s enemies to select the archipelago as the most favorable place to attack him in the stormy years which were to follow. On the other, the belief, current in Spain, that there had been an English contingent in Chaste’s force, caused Philip’s admirals to believe that they had beaten two enemies at once, and led them greatly to underestimate the naval resources of Queen Elizabeth. We shall revert to this phase of the story in another place. The Azores, at least, had been conquered in 1583, and with them the last stronghold of the independence of Portugal, and when Santa Cruz got back to Cadiz in the middle of September, 1583, he was received with enthusiasm by the multitude and was heartily thanked by his sovereign.

Not such was Philip’s reception of the news of the death of his old general, the Duke of Alva, which occurred at the Portuguese capital on December 11. After the actual fighting had been finished, the king had no more use for him. Since the autumn of 1580 he had withdrawn more and more authority from him and handed it over to others; on the other hand, he refused all Alva’s requests for permission to retire. Despite all the Duke’s services to the Prudent King and to his father, despite the fact that he had organized and led the army that had conquered Portugal, Philip was unable to forgive the past or forget his ancient grudge; and even the Portuguese were profoundly shocked when he gave open demonstration of his ingratitude by dining in public, in defiance of precedent and tradition, on the day following the death of the greatest of his generals.

In the middle of February, 1583, Philip bade good-bye to the kingdom which he had won, and in which he had resided for more than twenty-six months, and returned to his beloved Spain, which he was never again to leave. On the whole, he had good reason to look back with satisfaction on the work that he had accomplished since Cardinal Henry’s death. The change from a generally defensive to a comparatively aggressive policy, which he had made at that time, and which was exemplified by the calling of Cardinal Granvelle to the post of chief minister, seemed to have been fully justified by the results it had produced. He had put the capstone on the edifice that had been erected by Ferdinand and Isabella by uniting the Iberian Peninsula under a single scepter for the first time since the days of the Visigoths. Moreover he had done it, as he loved to do, with relatively little fighting; compared with the last two conquests—Granada and Navarre—by which the Spanish dominion of the peninsula had been rounded out, the annexation of Portugal had been almost bloodless. From the imperial standpoint his achievement was more remarkable still. The acquisition of the Portuguese colonies carried the Spanish dominions to their greatest territorial extent; so that they now constituted the most extensive empire that the world had ever seen. The Portuguese colonies, as we have already pointed out, were for the most part really only coastal trading posts. Little effort had thus far been made to penetrate into the interior and subdue the native inhabitants; it is, therefore, perhaps scarcely fair to regard the lands in which the Portuguese had established themselves as belonging to Portugal in the same sense that Spain’s American possessions belonged to Spain. On the other hand, the Portuguese had a far better claim to them than any other European nation. They had been unquestionably the first on the ground; they had, moreover, at least in the eyes of all good Catholics, valid rights under the papal bull of demarcation and the Tordesillas Line; and if we adopt this method of measurement, and call all the lands on the shores of
which they had established themselves Portuguese, the acquisition of these territories by the Prudent King caused the Spanish dominions to cover considerably more than half of the habitable surface of the globe. When we reflect that eight and a half centuries earlier the domains of Philip’s predecessors had been restricted to an indeterminate patch of ground in the rocky fastnesses of the Asturias, we cannot but marvel at the rapidity, the grandeur, and most of all at the continuity of the development by which that little kingdom had been extended southward, eastward, westward, and eastward again, until at last it could be said to encircle the earth. Measured by the extent of the territory over which he theoretically held sway, Philip was the most powerful monarch that the world has ever known.

But the attainment of such unprecedented greatness was the signal for the beginning of decline. Spain’s resources, Spain’s knowledge of economics and of the principles of successful colonial administration, most of all Spain’s traditions and her conception of the work in the world that she was destined to perform were not such as augured well for her ability permanently to retain and develop such gigantic possessions. Her empire had become so top-heavy that it was almost inevitable that it should fall with its own weight. And the jealousy which her preponderance naturally aroused among her neighbors rendered what was inherently probable an absolute certainty. That jealousy, it is true, was of comparatively recent origin. The reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the infidel had for the most part been accomplished with the blessings and applause of Spain’s neighbors to the north. The Mediterranean empire of the realms of the crown of Aragon had been won in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries without provoking the active enmity of any of the European powers save France. French hostility was also the only serious menace to the development of Spain under the Catholic kings. The treacheries of Ferdinand in his later years had certainly served to put his neighbors on their guard; but down to the accession of Charles V it is safe to say that Spanish expansion, both in the Old World and in the New, had proceeded without evoking any general sentiment of suspicion or distrust among the rest of the European states. Under the Emperor, of course, all was changed. The union in one hand of the Hapsburg and Trastamara dominions, and the uncovering of the resources of the Western Hemisphere, had combined to make the Spanish Empire appear for the first time in the light of a universal menace. The unholy Franco-Turkish alliance and the calmness with which it was regarded by the rest of Europe proclaimed as much; and England and the papacy, both of which in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella had been rather pro-Spanish than pro-French in their inclinations, gave ominous signs of veering around to the other side. The Emperor, as we have seen, had been acutely conscious of the danger, and in the latter years of his reign had done his best to aver it by advising his son to follow a policy of ‘sturdy defensiveness’; and down to the year 1578, save in his dealings with the infidel, Philip had generally acted upon his father’s advice. Then, finally, there had come this God-given opportunity for the annexation of Portugal and for the completion of the task which his ancestors had striven vainly to perform. To achieve it would necessitate indeed an abandonment of ‘sturdy defensiveness’ and the resumption of the comparatively aggressive. On the other hand, there was no question that Philip had the best legal claim to the Portuguese throne; moreover, he proposed, if he possibly could, to enforce that claim without a fight. Last of all, he regarded the Portuguese question first and foremost as a cosa de España, a purely Iberian matter, in which his neighbors north of the Pyrenees were in no wise concerned, and in which he hoped and believed that they would not venture to interfere. But it was just in this last hope that he was doomed to disappointment. Had it not been for Portugal’s colonial empire, the case might have been otherwise, for Portugal herself was regarded by the rest of Europe with comparative indifference; but her possessions in the Orient and in the Occident made her annexation by Spain an affair of the whole world. Their acquisition by Philip threatened to give the Prudent King the same kind of monopoly in Brazil and in the East Indies that he already claimed to possess in the Spanish dominions in America, and thus to enable him to control the trade of the globe: to do just what sundry corsarios Luteranos—Dutch, French, and English—were firmly resolved to prevent, and were striving with might and main to persuade their respective governments to give them official support in preventing. The struggle over the Azores, though the Prudent King had been ultimately successful there, was really of ominous significance. As soon as the official policy of Philip’s neighbors to the north of him, particularly of England, should align itself with the activities of the sea-rovers whom they still for the most part continued to disavow, the advance of the Spanish Empire was certain to be arrested, and the stately process of its territorial aggrandizement, which had gone on virtually unchecked since the beginnings of the Reconquest, to be succeeded by disintegration and decline.
The reign of Philip II was not a period of far-reaching institutional innovations. Save for the remodeling of the constitution of the kingdom of Aragon in 1593, which followed as an inevitable consequence of the suppression of the great rebellion stirred up there by Antonio Pérez, the Prudent King was content, in matters internal as well as foreign, to preserve all the essential features of the system which he had inherited from his predecessors. Maintenance and increase if the royal power were the dominant principles throughout; yet, in theory at least, the institutional autonomy of the component parts of the Spanish Empire was scrupulously preserved. Philip was too deeply imbued with the traditions of Spanish separatism to dream of erecting a centralized government such as the Bourbons were to bring with them across the Pyrenees in the early years of the eighteenth century. On the other hand his preference for Castile—for he was even more a Castilian than a Spaniard, coupled with the financial resources derived from the wealth of the Indies, gave that part of his dominions a preponderance over the rest still greater than that which it had attained in the Emperor’s day. Even the remodeling of the constitution of Aragon, to which reference has just been made, though it was rendered possible by exceptional circumstances, is really to be regarded as but a step in the great process of the progressive Castilianization of the Spanish Empire.

Yet if the underlying principles remained the same, the methods of their application were somewhat changed; and the changes were chiefly due to the differences in the personalities of Philip II and of Charles V. The fact that Philip never left the peninsula after his return thither in 1559 is of fundamental importance in the history of the internal government of the Spanish Empire; for he was thus able to concentrate on the details of administration with an intensity which had been quite out of the question for his perpetually travelling father. The energies which Charles had spent on foreign campaigns Philip believed to have been largely wasted, and he was fond of pointing out that the imperial armies had won greater victories under the command of de Leyva, Colonna, and Pescara than under that of the Emperor himself. Such matters, in his opinion, should be delegated to professional soldiers, always provided, of course, that they kept as constantly and closely in touch with Madrid as distance and the difficulties of communication would permit, and never deviated a hair’s breadth from the instructions that he sent them. The time that Philip saved from travel he spent in intimate and meticulous supervision of the internal administration of his Spanish realms. He proposed to know and direct everything that concerned them. The accuracy and extent of his information were the wonder of his contemporaries. Elaborate lists and statistical tables were perpetually being drawn up for him; his secret agents sent him constant reports of existing conditions in every municipality and diocese, and of the instruction given at the universities. He was far better informed of the state of his revenues than any of his ministers of finance. If anyone applied to him for a place, he had his record by heart. Most of what he learned he kept to himself. It was part of his theory of political life that the rank and file of the government servants should work in water-tight compartments, each keeping to his narrow path, ignorant of the activities of his colleagues; an atmosphere of secrecy, and consequently of suspicion, pervaded everything. Even the king’s most intimate counsellors were told only what Philip in his supreme wisdom decided that it was well for them to know. If, perchance, they should happen to learn more, the king was sure to hear of it, and they would be likely to lose their posts; Antonio Pérez is a case in point. To himself alone Philip reserved the stupendous responsibility of knowing and coordinating everything, and then, in his omniscience, of making the final decision.

Philip’s principles and methods of government are admirably illustrated by the manner in which the great system of councils, inherited from the Catholic Kings and Charles V which formed the heart of the Spanish Empire under the house of Hapsburg, was enlarged and modified during his reign.
The *Consejo de Estado*, or Council of State, remained, as in his father’s day, officially at the head of the list, and the contemporary writers exhaust themselves in their descriptions of its dignity and preeminence. It dealt with foreign affairs and international relations, “with the loss, gain, and just conservation of kingdoms and states, three principal points so different from the evil objects and opinions to which Machiavelli refers.” Its membership, however, was considerably modified. The non-Spanish element, which in the Emperor’s day had been at times preponderant, was now completely eliminated. After Philip’s return to the peninsula in 1559 the Council was composed almost exclusively of Castilians; when Granvelle entered it twenty years later, he did so by virtue of being president of the Council of Italy, whose chief, together with the president of the Council of Castile, was generally given a seat there. Unlike the Council of Castile, the number of its members was not fixed, but depended, like the choice of the individuals that composed it, on the will of the king. It had no rules or traditions of action or deliberation, nor were the limits of its competence strictly defined. Philip was officially the president of it, but apparently never attended its meetings. He preferred to communicate with it through his secretaries, and to be informed of its deliberations by a consulta. He still further diminished its real efficiency by using it as a stage for his favorite game of playing off the heads of rival factions against one another. It was the chief scene of the struggles between Eboli and Alva, until the time of the latter’s departure for the Netherlands in 1567. Its official ‘supereminence’ over the other Councils and its exclusively Castilian membership gave the king an admirable opportunity of serving notice on his fellow sovereigns that the Spanish Empire was governed from Madrid; but there, for practical purposes, its importance came to an end. If a really vital question of foreign policy was to be settled, it was Philip himself who made the decision. The Council might be made to seem, in the eyes of the masses, to share the responsibility, but the shrewder observers were not deceived. Writing of it in 1557, the Venetian Federico Badoero said: “At the court the opinion about this Council is that it is not the source of such advice, deliberations, and performances as make for the honor and advantage of the king; for there seem to be no written rules or customs to produce order in its deliberations or decisions, nor is membership in it either convenient or dignified; and the result is a decline in the vitality of its discussions.”

With the Council of Castile, or *Consejo Real*, on the other hand, the picture is almost precisely reversed. Despite the fact that it had been invested since 1480 with the supreme legislative, executive, and judicial power, under the crown, within the realm, and that its president ranked next to the monarch, it had suffered a decline both in the number and in the competence of its membership during the closing Wanderjahre of the Emperor’s reign. So fearful was Charles of a usurpation of his own authority during his many absences from Spain, that lie had allowed it to dwindle from sixteen to eight or nine; moreover he chose his councilors on the basis of loyalty and absolute obedience, rather than on that of independent ability and initiative. This policy, coupled with the enormous amount of work with which the Council was charged, resulted in a staggering accumulation of unfinished business; even before Philip returned to the peninsula the Cortes were insistent in their demands for a reform. In 1551 they asked that the number of councilors be augmented by six, “since they are so old and infirm at the time of their appointment that they cannot perform the work that is laid before them.” In 1555 they begged for the establishment of another sala in the *Consejo*, to deal with the most important suits. In 1555 and 1558 they requested that the councilors be given larger salaries. In 1559-60 they complained that the great increase in the duties of the Council had become the occasion of excessive delays, and they reiterated their previous demands for an increased membership, and for the creation of a special sala to hear cases of great importance. Philip was well disposed to listen to these requests. Having resolved to reside in Spain and never to travel abroad, he had no need to fear lest the Council become too independent in his absence; and so deep was his affection for his native Castile, and so high his sense of duty to her, that he was determined that she should have, under his constant supervision, the best administration which he was capable of devising.

His first step towards the improvement of the existing conditions was to issue, as regent, just prior to his departure for England in the summer of 1554, the so-called ordinances of Corunna, defining more precisely the limits of the jurisdiction of the Council, and also investing it for the first time with the increasingly important function of censorship and regulation of the press. On his return to the peninsula in 1559 he immediately complied with the request of the Cortes that the number of councilors be increased; from that time onward until the end of the reign there were sixteen of them in addition to the president. In regard to the other matters in which the Cortes demanded reform, he showed himself less complaisant. Not till the very last years of his life could he be brought to see that the same body could not reasonably be expected to act both as a supreme administrative council and as the highest court of the realm, and to initiate the process, already long overdue, of dividing the *Consejo* into separate *salas*, each with a special function of its own. It is commonly said that the division of the Council into four separate chambers was postponed until the reign of Philip III, who reorganized it by a
royal cedula of January 30, 1608; but in justice to his father, it should be pointed out that orders to that effect were issued by the Prudent King almost exactly ten years before. By pragmáticas of February 14 and 17, 1598, Philip decreed, “in order to improve and accelerate the dispatch of business”, that the president and five other councilors should constitute a sala de gobierno for executive and administrative affairs; and that the remaining eleven members of the Council should be split into three sections: the first, with five members, being entrusted with “public affairs which demanded speedy action, with pleitos de mil y quinientos and with residencias”, while the other two, with a membership of three each, were to occupy themselves exclusively with matters of justice. The names of the members who were to constitute each sala were specifically set down in the decree, and there was the usual wealth of detailed instructions in regard to hours and methods of procedure, and the spirit that should animate the members. Whether or not these pragmáticas were immediately carried into effect is another question; from the fact that the ordinances of 1608 so closely resemble them, it looks as if they were not. On the other hand Lobo Laso de la Vega, writing in 1607, speaks of the Council as being divided into five or six salas according to the pleasure of the president; from this one would infer that Philip’s ordinance of 1598 was informal and permissive, rather than definite and authoritative, and that the presidents of the Council availed themselves of it or not as they saw fit. In any case it seems clear that Philip the Prudent learned, before he died, the lesson which the procuradores had so often attempted to teach him, though he practically took the whole of his lifetime in the process.

In view of his reverence for the church and for the law, it is somewhat surprising to find Philip at the beginning of his reign departing from the precedent, set by his father, of always appointing a cleric to the presidency of the Council of Castile. Juan de Vega, viceroy of Sicily, who was given the post on April 18, 1557, died December 19, 1558, and Cristobal Vaca de Castro, who had brought order out of chaos in Peru, filled in, as an interim appointee, for the next three years; finally, in 1561, the office was conferred on Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, second Marquis of Mondéjar, who had distinguished himself as a foe of the Comuneros forty years before, and who had been president of the Council of the Indies from 1546 to 1559. It was doubtless chiefly the universal prevalence of hate of the legists, and his own desire to show his sympathy with his subjects’ wishes, that led Philip to make these appointments. In the case of Mendoza he may also have wished to serve notice that he now regarded the monarchy as so firmly established that it no longer had anything to fear from its ancient enemies the grandees. But the forces of tradition and precedent were not slow to reassert themselves. After Mendoza’s retirement in 1563 Philip again gave the job to a cleric, Juan Rodriguez de Figueroa, and on his death in 1565 to a licentiate, Diego de Espinosa, who proved a miracle of vigor and efficiency during his seven years of service; of Espinosa’s four successors, all but one, the Count of Barajas (1583-92), were also either legists or clerics. Their respect for precedent and routine was more agreeable to Philip than the more modern methods advocated by such men as Barajas, who ventured to send him a vigorous memorandum on the delays and confusion which render intolerable the office of president of this Council. There is no order of precedence,” he continued, “in the cases that come before it, save the memory of those councilors who have to deal with them … so that it is necessary for all who have suits to be tried to pace up and down the courtyard and struggle with one another to get nearer the door of the Council in the hope that they may be the next to be called before it … and though there are functionaries called porteros, they do not know whom to call, nor how to forewarn their advocates, and when they go to seek for them, they are either not to be found, or else they arrive late, so that many cases go by default for lack of a defense”. It may possibly have been this remonstrance which induced Philip, in 1588, somewhat to lighten the burden of the Council’s labors by definitely giving separate existence for the first time to the so-called Cámara de Castilla, established for the distribution of crown pensions, privileges, and appointments both lay and clerical. Hitherto the Camara had been but a section of the Council; now it became an independent body of four members, though the president of the Council always had the right to sit and vote there. But save for this comparatively minor change, which was really only the logical consequence of what his father had done before him, Philip did nothing to remedy the existing situation in the Consejo down to the pragmática of 1598, by which he divided it into salas. The spectacle that the Council presents, down to the very end of the reign, is that of a body of universal competence, under the king, in matters legislative, administrative, and judicial, but so hopelessly ill-organized and overloaded with work, particularly on the judicial side, that efficiency in action was impossible.

A new ramification of the great conciliar system was the creation, in the year 1555, of a Council of Italy, distinct from that of Aragon. It seems clear that hitherto the Council of Aragon had exercised a certain measure of jurisdiction over the Mediterranean and Italian lands belonging to the Spanish crown. Certainly it had every historical justification for so doing, for all these lands save Milan had been conquered for the Spanish Empire from the eastern kingdoms, and enjoyed some measure of
consciousness of a common past. But the process of Castilianizing these Mediterranean and Italian territories had now advanced so far that Charles and Philip felt justified in giving formal expression to it; moreover they were probably not sorry to do something towards obliterating the memory of the mediaeval Aragonese Empire, whose animating spirit had been so different from that of the larger agglomeration in which it had been swallowed up and over which they now held sway. The new Consejo de Italia, whose organization was further perfected by Philip in an ordinance of the year 1579, resided at the court of Spain and was composed, at the end of the reign, of a president, the treasurer-general of the realms of the crown of Aragon (the sole vestige of the ancient Aragonese connection that was allowed to remain), and six regents, three of them Spaniards, and three Italians, one each from Sicily, Naples, and Milan; apparently the administration of Sardinia, like that of the Balearic Islands, was allowed to remain in the hands of the Council of Aragon. The functions of the Council were "to deal with the government of Italy, to make mercedes de Ventajas to the soldiers quartered there, to provide officers of justice for the cities, and grant titles to magnates, all in consultation with his Majesty. Only in this Council are the affairs of Italy taken up". The Council of Aragon, in the meantime, continued to perform similar functions for Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean. It was composed of a president, who had the title of vice-chancellor, the treasurer-general of the realms of the crown of Aragon, who was not necessarily a native of any one of them, and six oidores, two of them Aragonese, two Catalans, and two Valencians; there were also a number of royal secretaries and other special officials. As in the Emperor’s day, it remained constantly in attendance on the sovereign; but whereas this had meant, under Charles, that it travelled all over Europe and got a cosmopolitan point of view, it resulted, under Philip, in its remaining almost perpetually at Madrid or the Escorial, subject to the same process of Castilianization which is observable everywhere else.

The composition and functions of most of the other Councils—Gabriel Lobo Lasa de la Vega enumerates no less than eleven of them in all—will be taken up in connection with our examination of the special duties with which they were respectively charged. But it may not be amiss to insert one brief word here about the Council of the Orders, of which no mention has been made since its inception in the days of the Catholic Kings. The extent of its responsibilities and the amount of property which it controlled may be judged by the fact that no less than twenty-two of the eighty-eight corregimientos into which Castile was divided were placed wholly under its jurisdiction and withdrawn from that of the Consejo Real. Its regular members were a president and four oidores, all of whom must be caballeros limpios, and wear the garb of Santiago, Calatrava, or Alcantara. It was to determine all suits arising on the lands of the Orders (the audiencias having no jurisdiction there); to make certain of the limpieza of all those on whom his Majesty proposed to confer the honor of membership therein; to punish comendadores who violated their rules; and to make recommendations for all minor appointments and offices depending on them. One gathers from contemporary documents that the ancient dignity and prestige of the Castilian aristocracy had been suffered to decline in the Emperor’s day, and that the Council of the Orders was expected to restore them. Nothing, of course, was to be done without consultation with the king, who, as chief of all three Orders, had a special interest in the work of this Council, "which is less universal than that of any of the rest".

The history of the Castilian Cortes in the reign of the Prudent King has usually been painted in doleful colors. It has been justly pointed out that the abstention of the nobles and clergy after 1538 had reduced the national assembly to a single chamber, composed of thirty-six representatives of eighteen different cities, chosen, usually by lot and sometimes in rotation, from certain privileged families or categories of the municipal magistracy, and in such fashion that royal interference and manipulation were easy to exercise should the crown so desire. It has also been made clear that their ineffective procedure, and their failure to make redress precede supply, still further sapped the vitality of the Castilian Cortes; that they made no use, for the assertion of their own privileges, of their traditional right to withhold official recognition of a new sovereign, or of the heir to the throne, or to refuse to grant the servicio. Moreover they permitted Philip, early in his reign, to subvert another ancient prerogative which the national assembly had successfully maintained in the Emperor’s day, namely, that of refusing to consent to the revocation of laws passed in previous Cortes: "If it be my pleasure," declared the Prudent King in 1555, "I shall annul, without the Cortes, the laws made in the Cortes; I shall legislate by pragmáticas and I shall abolish laws by pragmáticas". All this would seem to show that the functions of the national assembly had practically dwindled to the voting of taxes, and that it exercised that function solely in accordance with the will of the king.
Yet there are certain other considerations which point to the conclusion that this picture has been somewhat overdrawn. Philip’s attitude towards the Castilian Cortes, in the first place, was in some respects less hostile and suspicious than was that of his father. Despite the progressive Hispanicization of his point of view, Charles’s interests, during the greater part of his life, had been rather international than Iberian. He wished to get his money without delay, and to use it, often for non-Spanish purposes, without being bothered by petitions and discussions; hence all but a very few of the fifteen meetings of the Castilian Cortes during his reign were finished in less than three months. With Philip it was a very different story. His interests were predominantly Spanish and Castilian. Though he did not doubt that he was vastly wiser than the representatives of the nation, he was by no means averse to hearing their views. Indeed, he rather liked to daily in solitude over the petitions of the procuradores before he answered them; it was a most obvious method of obtaining the information for which he always hungered. Noncommittal replies or point-blank refusals were indeed their usual fate, but at least Philip seemed to give them careful consideration; he did not answer the cuaderno of the Cortes of 1583 till sixteen months after they had closed, nor that of the assembly of 1588-89 until three full years after its dismissal. Doubtless this is largely to be ascribed to his incorrigible slowness; certainly it was ‘poor business’; but it also shows that he felt his subjects’ desires to be worthy of attention. Another significant fact in the same connection is the progressive lengthening of the sessions of the Cortes under the Prudent King. The earlier ones were comparatively brief; as in the Emperor’s day; but those of 1579, 1583, and 1588, continued, with intermissions, for an average of over two years, while the last one, which met at Madrid in the spring of 1592, was still in session when the king died. Apparently Philip longed for the advice and consolation of the representatives of his people in the avalanche of misfortune, both at home and abroad, with which, at the last, they had been overwhelmed together.

If the procuradores were gratified by the changed attitude of the monarch, they were also determined to do their utmost to maintain all the vestiges that still remained of the ancient parliamentary liberties. In this it was inevitable that they should encounter the opposition of the crown, for though Philip was anxious to be apprised of his subjects’ desires, he was none the less firmly resolved to keep all the real power in his own hands. The principal barrier in the way of his having what his Tudor contemporaries called a ‘tractable parliament’ was the poderes, or instructions to the procuradores, by which the municipalities whom they represented attempted to prescribe their conduct in the Cortes; and Philip strove his hardest, from the very beginning of his reign, to convert these poderes into what today would be called ‘blanket powers’. In 1560 he commanded the cities to amplify the instructions to their delegates, so that in addition to recognizing Don Carlos as the heir to the throne, they might be empowered to hold a regular session of the Cortes; at the opening of the Cortes of 1566 he forced the procuradores to swear that their poderes were “unlimited and unrestricted”. In 1573 we find him sending instructions to local corregidores and theologians to use all their efforts to effect the same end (in this case he even appears to have attempted to influence the voting in the ayuntamientos). In 1592 the same measures were still more intensively applied; the king did not even shrink from employing the confessional. On such occasions, it is perhaps needless to add, the royal objects were always ultimately attained; but the fact that the king was forced to have recourse to such methods in order to effect his ends shows that the ancient spirit of parliamentary independence was not by any means wholly extinguished. Another characteristic, if wholly futile, method by which the procuradores sought to keep alive the memories of a glorious past, was the vigorous maintenance of the time-honored struggle for precedence between the delegates of Burgos and of Toledo. In 1563 this virtually attained the proportions of a rough-and-tumble fight, and the king was obliged to intervene to restore order.

The cuadernos also contain abundant evidence that the procuradores were determined that all their ancient rights and privileges should be constantly reasserted in principle, even if they were pitiable unable to effect their reestablishment in practice. They constantly complain of the infringement of their prerogatives by the imposition of new taxes and the alienation of the royal patrimony without their consent, and they harp on the excessive number and exactions of the royal tax-collectors. They show their jealousy of the way in which the Consejo de Castilla had usurped their legislative authority, and they demand that no new law or pragmática be made by the king alone while the Cortes are in session. They never hesitated to tell Philip just what they thought of his own manner of life and of work. In 1559, after the king’s return from the North, their old fears of Burgundian luxury, inherited from the Emperor’s day, made them protest against the expenses of the royal court and table, “since there is in such matters no inviolable law save the example which your Majesty is pleased to give”; and when further observance of their new sovereign’s way of living relieved them of all fears in this regard, they changed their tune and begged his Majesty to take less responsibility on his own shoulders in the dispatching of business, and to restrict his activities to the conduct of foreign affairs and of war, which thereby would be more expeditiously decided. And in theory at least, Philip made no objection to these assertions of
parliamentary power. In 1569 there were published at his command the *Leyes del Reyno*, commonly cited as the *Nueva Recopilación*, the seventh *título* of whose sixth book contains thirteen laws—the first of them of the reign of Alfonso XI—in which all the principal powers of the Cortes, in legislation and in finance, are specifically stated to be in force, and the privileges and methods of election of the procuradores are fully described. It gives a pretty illustration of the wide gulf between theory and fact which had always characterized the government of Castile, of her fondness for recalling the memories of the past, and vainly attempting to weave them into the life of a totally altered present.

The attitude of the Castilian Cortes towards the course of foreign affairs during the reign of the Prudent King was naturally quite different from what it had been in the time of his father, and the obvious cause of the change was Philip’s constant residence in the peninsula. Under the Emperor one of the chief worries of the procuradores had been his preoccupation with non-Spanish matters, and they vigorously protested whenever they thought that he was sacrificing their interests to those of the house of Hapsburg. With the accession of Philip these fears were of course relieved. The national assembly generally approved of his foreign policy, which until 1584 was successful rather than the reverse; even in the Netherlands, where in some respects the strain was heaviest, the struggle could now be represented chiefly in the light of a religious war, and when it was a question of the suppression of heresy, the Castilian was never found wanting. At the end, of course, there was disaster everywhere, but the procuradores, like Philip, were convinced that it was the hand of God that caused it. They could commiserate with their sovereign, but they did not venture to offer him advice. The fact that they ceased to attempt to influence the course of foreign affairs left them the freer to occupy themselves with internal ones; to those, and particularly to matters economic, they devoted virtually their exclusive attention. Whether their knowledge of such affairs was greater or less than that of the king to whom their petitions were addressed is a question which is easier to ask than to answer. Certain it is, only, that their viewpoint was predominantly local, while his was perforce far more national and universal, and that both were tragically out of touch with the modern policies and ideas which were beginning to take root in the more enlightened countries to the north of them.

Of all the grievances of which the procuradores demanded redress, the most oft repeated was the financial and economic condition of the realm. The procuradores were for the most part convinced, at least in the early part of the reign, that Spain had it in her to be a really prosperous country, if only her natural resources were properly fostered, the royal exactions limited, and foreign competition restrained. “Though there exists in Spain”, so runs the eighty-fourth petition of the Cortes of 1559, “plenty of iron, steel, wool, silk, and other raw materials of industry, we are so far behind other nations in our capabilities of utilizing them that they are taken away to foreign realms, where they are manufactured and whence are sold back to us at exorbitant prices”; the procuradores therefore requested that these “necessary and useful arts” be introduced into Castile, distributed among the pueblos, and put in charge of “practical and intelligent persons, who should be encouraged by governmental privileges and exemptions as long as it should seem desirable”. Petitions for the maintenance and increase of agriculture and pasturage, for the enforcement of the laws about hunting and fishing, for the restriction of luxury and costly raiment, and for the limitation of the rates of interest, are to be found in every one of the cuadernos of the reign; and protests against the alienation of the *patrimonio real*, against the sales of lands and patents of nobility, and against the imposition of new taxes and the raising of the rates of the *encabezamiento* and *alcabala* occurred with increasing frequency as the years rolled by. As late as 1576 we find a demand that the debts of the Emperor be promptly paid. The taking of money out of the realm, “as if we were Indians”, was another fertile source of complaint; such action was directly in contravention of the laws of the land, but Philip, like his father before him, sold numerous privileges to violate them, and the petitions of the procuradores could not induce him to desist. Another matter on which he was more ready to listen to their demands was the annulment of the letters of naturalization which his father had granted to Englishmen, Flemings, and Genoese, “who came with their ships to the prejudice of the native Spaniards,” and had got into their hands the carrying trade of the realm. We also find him, in 1588, agreeing to the absolute prohibition of the importation of foreign silk, because of its bad quality, and of “baubles, glassware, dolls, knives, and other similar things of no use to human life” which came in from France. In theory the king shared the conviction of his subjects that Spain was quite capable of providing for her own needs. In practice the immediate exigencies of the royal exchequer obliged him to violate or ignore many of the recommendations whose underlying principles he fully approved. Under such circumstances it was impossible to follow any consistent policy, and at the end of the reign there was wellnigh universal chaos. The story of the duties on the Portuguese frontier affords a pretty illustration of this. At the beginning of the reign the procuradores demanded free trade in cloths with the western kingdom, and a little later the abolition of the customs houses which had recently been established on the border. Down to the time of the annexion in 1580-81, Philip did not feel that he
could afford to comply with these requests, and when at last he became king of Portugal, the ensuing abolition of the duties was but temporary. In 1593 his financial embarrassment caused him to reestablish the customs on a frontier which, politically speaking, had ceased to exist.

In the early years of the reign the procuradores were much exercised over the lack of adequate coast defenses of the Mediterranean shores of Spain, the insecurity of commerce, and the frequency of the visits of Moorish pirates. “The greatest commerce of the world”, declare the procuradores, “was that of the Mediterranean Sea, which bore the trade of Flanders and France with Italy and Venetians, Sicilians, Neapolitans, and with all Greece, and Constantinople too, and all the Morea and all Turkey, and of all them with Spain, and Spain with them. All this has ceased, because now the Turkish and Moorish corsairs are so much lords of the sea that not a ship sails from the Levant that does not fall into their hands; and so great are the captures which they have made, as well of Christian captives as of estates and goods, that the riches which the said Turks and Moors have won, and the great destruction and desolation which they have made upon the coast of Spain, are alike beyond comparison and number”. No one dared live within four or five leagues of the shore, and much land suitable for agriculture and sheep raising was consequently wasted. After the battle of Lepanto, these complaints are less frequent, and, in the later years of the reign, there is less notice than one would naturally expect of the depredations of the English sea-rovers on the coasts of the Atlantic; doubtless the procuradores realized that Philip was by this time as powerless to prevent them as he had been to control the tempests which had completed the destruction of the Armada. The increase and prosperity of the Granadan Moriscos, “who neither go to war nor enter the church”, was another fertile source of complaint, particularly in the latter part of the reign; the way was well paved, before the death of the Prudent King, for the edict of expulsion of September 1609. But Castile’s proverbial loyalty to the faith did not prevent her representatives from constantly protesting against the many abuses of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Petitions against the amount and inalienability of the property of the church are frequent, down to the session of 1586, when repeated failure to gain the ear of the king caused the procuradores temporarily to desist; and the same demand occurs again in 1598? Almost equally numerous are the protests against the abuse of the interdict by the jueces eclesiásticos whenever the secular authorities attempted to defend their own jurisdiction. In 1588 and in 1592 there are vigorous complaints against the excesses of the Inquisition; in the first of these cases the king promised improvement, but the repetition of the protest makes it evident that he did not keep his word? He showed just as much zeal in defending the ‘supereminence’—and the abuses—of his favorite tribunal at home, as he exhibited in guarding against the attempts of the papacy to control it from abroad.

It is also evident that the procuradores were much concerned over the decline of the pristine fighting qualities which had characterized the Spaniards in mediaval times, and enabled them in the Emperor’s day to perform prodigies in the conquest of foreign lands. In the fifteenth petition of the Cortes of 1576 it is pointed out that the Military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara had been established in these kingdoms in order to fight the Moors, but that ever since the infidel had been expelled from the peninsula, the Knights had given themselves up to a life of ease, and had forgotten the profession of arms. They recommend that in order to prevent the further progress of this evil, the Orders be established on the frontiers of the Spanish territories in Africa, where the Knights should be obliged to reside, and where those who especially distinguished themselves against the Moors should be rewarded with encomiendas. The request, ten years earlier, that military exercises and tournaments be introduced in place of bull-fights, is another phase of the same story; as are petitions that prompt measures be taken for the improvement of the breed of horses. The manners and customs of the students at the universities also gave food for thought. The seventy-third petition of the Cortes of 1558 makes it evident that the rector of Alcalá was powerless to repress the excesses of youth. In 1598, the procuradores demand that the printing and reading of obscene literature be forbidden. Apparently the representatives of the realm feared that Castile was no longer producing the type of manhood which had made possible her glorious past.

There was only one meeting, during the reign of the Prudent King, of any of the separate Cortes of the different realms of the crown of Aragon, and that was the famous session of the Cortes of Aragon at Tarazona in 1592, rendered necessary by the ‘troubles’ stirred up by Antonio Pérez; the consideration of it will be reserved till a later chapter. There were, however, two meetings of the General Cortes of the eastern kingdoms in 1563 and in 1585, at Monzón, to which a few words must be devoted here. The fact that there were but two sessions of this assembly in Philip’s reign, in contrast to six in that of his father (under whom there were also held five meetings of the separate Cortes of the different kingdoms), is but another of the innumerable proofs of the Prudent King’s incorrigible Castilianism. He never visited his eastern realms save in order to get their formal recognition of an heir to the throne, or to obtain donativos, and it is needless to add that the latter were significantly small in contrast to the revenues
which he derived from the Cortes of Castile. The constitutional machinery of these Eastern assemblies, and the limitations which they were still able to impose upon his royal authority, must have been gall and wormwood to him; and, as we shall later see, he utilized the first opportunity to subvert them.

It will be remembered that these General Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon were, in effect, merely a juxtaposition of the assemblies of the three eastern kingdoms, each of which dealt separately with the affairs which immediately concerned it, and not seldom continued its sittings in its own capital after the close of the joint meeting at Monzón. But there is such a striking similarity in the proceedings of all three that we are dispensed with the necessity of following them separately. Like those of Castile, they showed singularly little interest in the course of foreign affairs, despite the fact that both in 1563 and in 1585 the proposition real was largely occupied with what had been accomplished abroad. Local matters, particularly the impartial administration of justice and the restraint of the excesses of the Inquisition, in which they rightly discerned a potential instrument of Castilianization as well as of extirpation of heresy, were their principal cares; even the ancient cosmopolitanism of the county of Catalonia seems to have vanished away. It was quite characteristic of them that in 1563 the Cortes of Monzón began by formally erecting into a law of the land, with some amplifications and improvements, the provisions of the pragmática by which Philip, eight years before, had reconstituted the Council of Aragon and separated from it that of Italy. Matters legal and constitutional, many of them of the most trivial practical importance, were, as ever, the chief preoccupation of the stiff-necked Aragonese; and even in maritime Catalonia and Valencia, where enthusiasm for trade had generally taken the precedence of insistence on the technicalities of the law, there is evidence of a tendency in the same direction; a dread of Castilianization was common to all three realms. On matters financial and economic, there is surprisingly little legislation or complaint. There is much more, as would be expected, in the session of 1585 than in that of 1563-64, but nothing comparable to what is to be found in the cuadernos of the Cortes of Castile. One gets the impression that the ancient rights and privileges of the eastern kingdoms were still sufficiently vital to afford considerable protection against the exactions of the crown. Though they were probably quite as well able to pay as Castile, Philip preferred to continue to impoverish the kingdom of his choice, rather than to take the trouble to fight the battles in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, which an attempt to secure a more equitable distribution of the burden of taxation would have necessitated.

Taken as a whole, the history of the different Spanish Cortes in the reign of the Prudent King is that of a series of heroic efforts to keep alive the memory of the constitutional rights and privileges of an earlier age, which no longer had any place in the monarchical atmosphere of the sixteenth century. In practice, as we have seen, these efforts were unavailing. In Castile Philip’s power was so firmly entrenched that in any difference of opinion with the procuradores he always emerged victorious. With the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon, where the popular liberties were so much more strongly established, he followed, until circumstances forced him to abandon it, the policy of avoiding a decisive issue. Yet it would be a grave error to regard the national assemblies of the Spanish kingdoms in the reign of Philip II as wholly without significance. Their records give us the best picture at present available of the popular aspirations and desires. They show the importance of keeping alive the forms of constitutional liberty, even though the animating spirit be lost. If they fall far below the Parliaments of Queen Elizabeth, they counted for more than the contemporary États-Généraux. Not until the degenerate successors of Philip the Prudent had ceased to perform the functions of royalty did the Cortes of the Spanish kingdoms disappear from the picture.

The foregoing paragraphs will doubtless have made it clear that the really fundamental problems of the reign of Philip II—even though the king was unable to realize it—were those of finance and economic conditions. We have therefore to investigate the state of the royal exchequer, and the ability of the king’s subjects to replenish it.

The body with the supreme authority under the crown over the management of the royal finances, which Philip inherited from his father, was officially known in the Emperor’s day as the Contaduría Mayor, and was composed, as we have seen, of two contadores mayores and two contadores mayores de cuentas, aided by eight or ten special officials. In 1554, while he was still Prince of Asturias, Philip enlarged it by the addition of three letrados; “to hear and determine all cases which should arise” in connection with the work of the contadores, and the organization was further perfected by a royal ordinance of October 28, 1568. There also appears, beginning with the year 1523, a body with the official name of the Consejo de Hacienda. Originally composed of six persons, it is described, in the middle of Philip’s reign, as consisting of a president, three of the senior oidores of the Consejo Real, and an unspecified number of “contadores mayores de su majestad”; obviously its function was to
A brief summary of the history of the successive financial expedients which he adopted will serve to show the steps by which an originally bad situation was suffered to get infinitely worse.

But the Contaduria and the Hacienda were after all but obedient instruments of the royal will; it was primarily at Philip’s own door that the blame is to be laid for the dismal financial history of the reign. In justice to him, it should be made plain at the outset that the situation which his father had bequeathed to him was beset with difficulties. Certainly he himself had no knowledge of or interest in finance. He expected the money to be furnished by others. His treasury, in fact, was the only portion of the government service which he did not meticulously superintend; it was the exception that proves the rule. Moreover, in addition to the extent of his possessions and the expense inevitable to the maintaining of them, over and above the totally disproportionate share of the burden of Spanish taxation which fell on Castile, he had been left with a debt generally estimated at 20,000,000 ducats. What was even worse, his father had set him a bad example of financial recklessness and mortgaging of the future. He had seen the borrowing of vast sums at high rates of interest from foreign bankers. He had watched the development and extension of the evil system of juros, and of the even more ruinous practice of the sale of public offices. On the other hand he had inherited in Castile a national assembly which still maintained, in theory at least, that no new tax could lawfully be imposed without its consent, while the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon had practically succeeded in erecting that theory into a fact. The Castilian procuradores continued, indeed, throughout the reign to vote him servicios, as they had done ever since 1542, to the annual amount of 150 cuentos. In 1570 they even added an extra 150 for the marriage of his Majesty to Anne of Austria, though the procuradores of Granada roundly declared on this occasion that their constituents would not contribute, and that they only voted in order that others might pay. The realms of the crown of Aragon contributed scattering donativos. But these sums, as the sequel will show, were insignificant in comparison with Philip’s annual expenditures. Certainly the financial problems which Philip inherited were of the hardest. In view of the disasters which overwhelmed him in later years, they could justly be described as insoluble. Had he succeeded in maintaining the status quo, or even an approximation thereto, it would be unfair to blame him. But his actual record was almost unbelievably worse than that of his father before him. Not only were all the ancient’ and most ruinous imposts maintained and increased; many new ones were superadded, in defiance of the law of the land, and the tax-paying capacity of the realm was exhausted. In 1557 and again in 1592 the number of municipal offices was increased in order that they might be sold for the profit of the crown. Important posts in the national government could also be obtained at a price, and the children of clerics bought patents of legitimacy right and left. The juros, and the sums borrowed at exorbitant rates from foreign bankers, mounted by leaps and bounds; on two occasions Philip was forced to make what amounted to a declaration of bankruptcy. Mortgaging the future was the sole policy which he could comprehend—always deluding himself with the belief that the scales were bound to turn. But the great victory which he confidently expected never came, and in the end he left his successor with a debt four times as great as that which his father had bequeathed to him. A brief summary of the history of the successive financial expedients which he adopted will serve to show the steps by which an originally bad situation was suffered to get infinitely worse.

The process began even before his return to Castile. The war with France and the papacy cost heavily; neither the Netherlands nor the Italian dominions were able to help him; like his father before him, he was driven back on Castile and the Indies. In 1555 he took a step which the Emperor had often considered, but never actually adopted, namely, the extension by law of the alcabala to New Spain and New Castile. In the same year the export of Castilian wool was subjected for the first time to a heavy duty (derecho de lanas); in 1561 it was calculated to yield 80,000 ducats; and in 1577,150,000, of which 130,000 were pledged in advance (empeñado en juros). In 1559 a line of custom houses was established on the frontiers of Portugal, which had hitherto enjoyed free trade with Castile; and duties at the rate of ten per cent were enforced on all exports and imports, as on the confines of Aragon, Valencia, and Navarre. In the same year Philip decreed that all gold, silver, and quicksilver mines in Spain should be turned over to the crown; he also bought back the diezmos de la mar, or customs revenues of the Biscayan ports, from the Constable of Castile, to whose family they had been granted...
for over a hundred years, and raised the rate. In 1561 they were calculated to be worth 48,000 ducats; in 1577, 150,000. In these same years the royal monopoly of playing cards, which had been established, in theory at least, from a much earlier date, was for the first time rigidly enforced; in 1577 it netted over 53,000 ducats. And in 1564 all the salt pits of the realm were incorporated into the royal domain; thirteen years later they yielded the king’s treasury an annual income of 250,000 ducats.

All these, however, were but trifling beginnings. They may have infringed the letter of the law of the land, but Spain was so glad to get back her king that the Cortes hardly made a complaint; indeed their protests did not become violent until ten or fifteen years afterwards. Nevertheless the year 1561 did not close without a fresh innovation, immediately more much more lucrative, though ultimately far more harmful, than any of Philip’s previous ones. It will be remembered that under an arrangement inherited from the Emperor’s day, the cities of Castile had been paying in annually to the royal treasury a lump sum of 334 sueldos, called the encabezamiento, in lieu of the crown’s abandonment of its right to the tercias and alcabala. This encabezamiento was already the largest item in the royal income, but Philip was determined that it must be still further increased. Chiefly on the plea that it was the king’s prerogative to raise the rate of the alcabala, whose abandonment by the crown was the principal basis upon which the encabezamiento rested, he now proposed to the procuradores an increase in the latter which should bring its annual yield up to 456 sueldos, besides certain payments in kind; and the procuradores accepted the arrangement in return for Philip’s solemn promise to alienate no more of the royal domain and to impose no new taxes. The repartition of the payment of this increased encabezamiento among the different localities was made in accordance with the results of a special investigation of the state of the population and the resources of the various parts of the realm. No pains were spared to make the apportionment as fair as the excessive demands of the crown would permit, and any community or individual who so desired was granted exemption from the encabezamiento in return for direct payment of the tercias and alcabala. In 1561 Philip obtained from Pope Pius IV a yearly subsidy (subsidio) of 300,000 ducats, increased in the following year to 420,000, for the preparation of a fleet to fight the Turk; and in 1571 Pius V permitted him, on the same plea, to collect for the royal coffers the tithe due to the church from the house in each parish which paid the highest tithe. This new tribute, called the excusado, yielded in 1577 the sum of 293,000 ducats. In 1566 the almojarifazgos and other customs duties were greatly increased. It seems safe to say that between Philip’s accession and 1573 the revenues of the state approximately doubled.

Much more, however, was still to come. In 1571, and again in 1573, the representatives of the government informed the Cortes that the ordinary income of the realm for the ensuing five years had already been spent in advance, and that the outstanding debts were perilously near 50,000,000 ducats; some new and drastic method must forthwith be devised in order to meet the existing situation. After various proposals and counter-proposals had been made and had failed, Philip intervened (November 9, 1574) with a proposal to the procuradores for a new and greater increase in the encabezamiento which should raise its annual yield to 1395 ‘cuentos’, ten months later (September 1, 1575) he issued a royal decree declaring all interest on state debts to be suspended until new means of liquidating them could be found. As these two drastic measures marked the beginning of the utter bankruptcy with which the reign closed, it is worthwhile to follow the results of them in some detail.

Let us begin with the encabezamiento. The procuradores made difficulties, of course, but Philip was not to be denied. He exerted every influence, lawful or unlawful, that he could bring to bear, and finally got the Cortes to sanction the measure. But the actual collection of the funds proved to be a far harder matter. As soon as the new rates had been announced, a large majority of the Castilian cities exercised the right which they indubitably possessed, of refusing to accept the encabezamiento, and reverting instead to the payment of the alcabala; the government soon found that the sums which it could derive from the places which had elected to follow this method of procedure were often only a half, and sometimes only a third, of the amount which it had reckoned that it would gain. This fact, together with the protests which the new rates evoked on every hand, caused Philip, in 1577, to diminish the total amount of the encabezamiento to 1018 sueldos, besides the payments in kind, where it remained, save for an increase of fifteen cuentos in 1590, until the end of the reign. Even with this modification, the government had the utmost difficulty in persuading the Castilian cities to accept the encabezamiento in place of the alcabala and tercias; and Avila, Granada, Cordova, and Toro stood out against it till the very end. Philip had indeed succeeded in more than trebling the yield of the largest of the various sources of the government revenue during the course of his reign, but in so doing he had wellnigh exhausted the tax-paying capacity of his realm. The blighting effect of the alcabala, which was the chief basis on which the system of taxation rested, was first revealed in its fulness during the reign of the Prudent King.
As for the decree of suspension of payments, September 1, 1575, its first obvious effect was to cause a panic among all those to whom Philip owed money both at home and abroad, and to ruin Spanish credit in Europe. There had been previous occasions, notably in 1557 and 1560, when he had been unable to discharge his obligations, and many of the German bankers on whom his father had relied had already begun to fight shy of investments in Spain; but now the Genoese, who had hitherto stood by him, refused to lend him another ducat. For some time after the issuance of the decreto, Philip was utterly unable to borrow funds. At all costs he must take measures to reestablish his credit abroad; and in 1577 he temporarily succeeded in so doing by the arrangement known as the medio general. This consisted, in brief, of the issuance of new pledges in place of the old ones, to all the state’s creditors, from the foreign bankers to the holders of juros, by which the said creditors were promised their interest at varying rates out of the regular revenues of the crown. For the time being the expedient served the purpose for which it was intended, for Philip was thereby enabled to borrow money again; but ultimately it left him worse off than before, for the sole principle that underlay it continued to be the same old vicious one of mortgaging the future. Larger and larger were the proportions of the government revenues that were drawn off from the treasury by the king’s various creditors, smaller and smaller his actual receipts; and finally in 1588 he reached the nadir of his fortunes, when instead of the great victory to which he had so confidently looked forward as the sole means of relieving his embarrassments, came the news of the defeat of the Invincible Armada. It had cost him, so he plainly told the Cortes, 10,000,000 ducats. This time he frankly admitted his own inability to meet the situation, and told the procuradores that they must find means to help him out; and the result was the first imposition, in 1590, of the tax that came subsequently to be known as the millones. In the form that it was voted by the procuradores in that year (Granada, Segovia, and Soria standing out) it consisted of a direct contribution of 8,000,000 ducats, the collection to be spread over a period of six years; but when the term had expired, and the amount had been paid in, it was prolonged, this time at the rate of 500 escudos per annum, for four years more. In theory the Prudent King, who died in 1598, should only have had the benefit of the first two of these four years; but the actual state of affairs is revealed by the fact that his son, on his accession, explained to the procuradores that the income of the last two had already been spent in advance. Moreover even the millones did not save Philip from the necessity of issuing a second decree of suspension on November 29, 1596, and the object of this one, as has been justly remarked, was no longer to reestablish the royal finances, which now were past praying for, but solely to get easier rates on the sums already borrowed.

The foregoing paragraphs will have made it abundantly clear that the most serious drain on the Spanish exchequer was the payment of the interest on the various crown debts; it even exceeded the ‘extraordinario’, or sums appropriated for foreign diplomacy and wars. There are all sorts of different ways in which the total of it can be reckoned up, but in any case it is clear that before the decreto of 1575 it amounted to at least one-third of the regular income, and at the end of the reign to two-thirds; in other words, at the time of Philip’s death, considerably less than half of the state revenues were actually at the disposal of the government. The rate of interest paid to the foreign bankers and other asentistas steadily rose until it was arbitrarily scaled down in 1575 by the decreto. Under the Emperor it probably varied from five to twenty per cent. In the first half of his son’s reign, it was certainly far nearer the latter extreme than the former. After 1575, of course, the rates which the government consented to pay cannot any longer be taken as an index of the measure of its solvency. For this we must look to the number of individuals and of banking houses, both in Spain and abroad, whose trust in it had been rewarded by financial ruin.

From our consideration of the state of the royal exchequer under Philip II, it is natural to turn to that of the general economic conditions in Spain; and a few words must be devoted at the outset to the much vexed question of the state of the population during the reign of the Prudent King. An abundance of material on the subject has come down to us, for Philip -was even fonder than his predecessors of taking periodical censos de poblacion, both for his own private information, and for the purposes of royal taxation. These censos, buried for over two centuries in the archives of Simancas, were discovered, and many of them published, in 1S29, by a painstaking scholar named Gonzalez, and one of the most complete of them, taken in the year 1594, gives materials from which the entire population of Spain at that date has been estimated as 9,034,410. This impressive total is less than two-thirds of that usually given for the population of contemporary France; but it is twice as large as that of England and Wales in the same period. Certainly it seems extraordinarily high in comparison with some of the modern estimates, and in view of the reiterated complaints of the Cortes of the period about the depopulation of the rural portions of the realm. Yet further consideration inclines one to believe that there are valid reasons for accepting it. The density per square mile is only half that of the population of
France, and but fifty-seven per cent of that of England and Wales; and the depopulation of the rural districts can be adequately explained on the theory of urban concentration.

A further analysis of the figures of Gonzalez throws light on the way in which the inhabitants were divided among the different portions of the realm. Old and New Castile, with the northwest provinces and the ancient kingdom of Leon, are given a total of 6,020,915, with an average density of over sixty per square mile; Murcia and Andalusia get 1,656,790, with an average density of thirty-nine; Aragon, 378,710, Catalonia, 336,970, Valencia, 486,860, and Navarre, 154,165; in Aragon there were barely twenty-one souls to the square mile. These figures are, of course, primarily significant as evidence of yet another phase of that Castilianization of the Iberian Peninsula to which we have so often referred; but they also show that, within the limits of the western kingdom, the inhabitants preferred the pasture lands of the north, and the cities of the central plateau, to the fertile valleys of the Guadiana and Guadalquivir. In other words, they seem rather to confirm than to contradict what we can gather from other sources in regard to the decline of Spanish agriculture. There is evidence that the population declined in the closing years of the century. In 1597 a deputy in the Cortes declared that in nothing were the Spanish realms so poor as in people.

The reign of the Prudent King witnessed a new phase of the age-long struggle between the rival interests of agriculture and pasturage in Spain. The various privileges which the Emperor had granted to the Mesta had sufficed to establish it in a position of unquestioned preponderance for the rest of the century. Philip had little to do save to confirm the existing arrangements, and the Cortes apparently recognized the futility of attempting to alter them; there is a notable absence of petitions on the subject in the cuadernos of this reign, in comparison with those of the preceding and succeeding ones. But if the state of the grazing interests remained, relatively speaking, happy under Philip II, that of the tillers of the soil became much worse. The petitions of the Cortes and the testimony of contemporaries bear witness to it at every turn. Year by year we learn of fertile fields being abandoned, of real wealth “vanishing in papers and contracts”; in 1593 the Cortes deplore the depopulation of these “richest realms in Europe, in such fashion that almost every year there is sterility and lack of food, because the laborers have faded away, and two-thirds of their number are missing”. The causes of the decline were doubtless numerous. The departure of the Moriscos after the Granadan rebellion, emigration to the Indies, the wars of Italy and the Low Countries, and a series of blights and scant crops were all, no doubt, partially responsible for the decay; but there can be no question that the greater part of the blame is to be laid at the door of the government. The need of encouraging agriculture became increasingly imperative as the reign progressed, but the means that were adopted to effect it were most inadequate. Philip could not be made to realize its importance. His attention was exclusively occupied with the increase of the yield of the alcabala and the _encabezamiento_, to which the comparatively self-supporting farmer contributed little or nothing, and he generally refused or ignored the petitions that were addressed to him for the relief of the sad state of the tillers of the soil. The experiment, which had been tried and failed before, of fixing the price of agricultural products was repeated at the request of the Cortes in 1558; but when, eight years later, the procuradores had discovered their mistake, and begged that the schedules be abolished, Philip refused; the rates were maintained and steadily increased until the end of the reign. It is needless to add that the scarcity and consequent dearness of food became increasingly serious problems as the reign progressed. An eminent specialist has calculated that the price of wheat in Spain increased, during the sixteenth century, 456 per cent, and that of wine 500 per cent. To an extent, of course, it is only fair to regard this rise as but a part of the general price revolution contemporaneously in progress all over Europe, but it was certainly far greater than it would have been if the general financial policy of the government had been more wise. It was the tragedy of the situation that Philip’s foreign loans deprived Spain of the wealth of the Indies at the very moment she needed it most. After she had brought it across the Atlantic it flowed through her as—water through a sieve to profit other lands; and she was left—without resources to meet the increased costs which the achievements of her own empire-builders had been largely instrumental in creating.

On the side of industry and commerce the story is scarcely less depressing. Presumably the depopulation of the fields was counterbalanced to some extent by an increase in the size of the cities, and there have been those who have maintained that the decade 1550-60 was a thriving period for Spanish manufacture and trade. But there can be no question that the period as a whole saw a rapid decline. The procuradores at the outset demanded protection against foreign competition in the form of prohibitions of the admission into the realm of goods manufactured abroad, and of the exportation of raw material from Castile. They also requested that the Castilians be given the opportunity to become acquainted with the newest and best methods of manufacturing. In theory Philip approved of this program, and gave orders for the carrying of it out; but before long the immediate needs of the royal exchequer became so pressing that everything gave way before them. Philip could never understand that
no king can be really rich unless he has a wealthy nation behind him. We have seen that in order to get
more revenue, he levied heavy export duties on Castillian wool in 1558, and he increased them in 1562
and 1566; but in spite of these imposts, which one would expect to find helpful to the native clothiers,
woolen goods of foreign manufacture constantly made their appearance in Spain, either as a result of the
revocation of the pragmáticas forbidding their importation, or by virtue of special licenses to transgress
the established laws granted by *he government in return for pecuniary rewards. The silk industry,
which had been one of the glories of Granada, was by this time almost ruined by the progressive
increases of the *rentas to which it had been subjected, while the raising of the rates of the
encabezamiento and alcahala after 1577 cramped all commercial activity within the realm; the only
notable exception was Seville, whose prosperity was kept alive and increased by the trade with the
American colonies. The effects of the decreto of 1575 were also most harmful to Spanish commerce
abroad, for the foreign merchants whose loans Philip had declared his inability to pay revenged
themselves, at least in part, by cancelling their contracts with the Spanish export houses. Every effort
the king made to lighten his financial burdens left him, and also his subjects, worse off than before.

Amid all these evidences of economic disintegration and decay, it is refreshing to note that in
one respect the Prudent King was actually in advance of his day and generation. He may be justly called
the first of modern sovereigns to have established a postal service for the use of the general public. A
correos for the dispatch of royal letters and mandates throughout the different Hapsburg dominions in
Europe had been organized and set up in the Emperor's day under the direction of the de Tassis family,
and there was another for the Indies administered by Lorenzo Galindez de Carvajal. Under Philip the
existing facilities were greatly expanded. It seems probable that the credit for originating the idea of a
postal service for general use belongs to one Francisco de Cuevas, who in the early years of the reign
established a correo ordinario at Burgos; but we may well believe that the king, with his passion for
detailed information in regard to everything that was taking place all over Europe, did his utmost to
forward and develop it. In 1580, with the hearty support of Granvelle, there was established a
fortnightly service for general use between Rome and Madrid; the charge was two reales (i.e., about
two-elevenths of a ducat) for every ounce of paper.

We have several times remarked that Philip II was essentially a law-loving man. Of this his
whole policy, both foreign and internal, affords convincing proof. Such acts as the free and easy piracies
and pillagings of the English sea-rovers were beyond his understanding. Whenever he himself assumed
the offensive he took meticulous pains to justify his actions in the eyes of legal experts; the care with
which he established and fortified his lawful rights to the Portuguese throne on the death of his nephew
Sebastian is perhaps the most striking of the many instances of it that have come down to us. The same
quality is even more plainly observable in his conduct of internal affairs. He justified his own most
arbitrary acts on the ground that as king by right divine he was himself the ultimate source of all law; on
the other hand, he was most insistent on the literal observance of existing legislation by everybody else.
Like his great-grandmother, Isabella the Catholic, he was zealous for the punishment of every sort of
violence and crime. He filled his realms with innumerable agents, charged to detect and report all
infractions of the laws. Indeed, the keynote of his whole system of internal administration was strict
and constant surveillance.

If Philip expected his subjects to observe the laws, it was obviously essential that they should
know what those laws were; but at the time of his accession this could not be fairly expected of them.
The many defects in the most recent existing code, the Ordenanzas Reales of 1484, and the enormous
number of new elements that had come into play during the Emperor's reign, had created legal chaos in
Castile long before Philip assumed control. The Cortes, as we have already seen, had been loud in their
complaints, and at least as early as the year 1537 Charles had taken the first measures for the drawing
up of a new code. The first three of those to whom the work was entrusted all died before the end of his
reign; a fourth was so busy in the Consejo Real that he was unable to finish the task; and it was finally
completed, early in Philip's reign, by the licentiate Bartolome de Atienza, also of the Consejo, and
therefore presumably in close touch with the king. It was formally approved by a royal cedula of March
14, 1567, wherein it was specifically stated that it was to be exclusively used by all judges and tribunals
of the realm, even though its provisions were contradicted by the earlier codes; and it was first
published at Alcala de Henares on January 11, 1569. It was principally composed of “laws made in
Cortes”, but it also included some 300 pragmáticas and cedulas issued on the royal authority alone, as
well as a few autos acordados del Consejo. Both its content and the method of its establishment as the
law of the land afford the plainest evidence that the king regarded himself as possessed of supreme
legislative power, independent of the national assembly. It was by far the most important legal compilation in Spain since the days of the Partidas, and it continued, with periodical additions, to be the law of the land down to the publication of the Novísima Recopilación in 1805.

The supreme judicial tribunal of the realm remained under Philip, as it had been under his predecessors, the Royal Council of Castile. We have already examined the course of its development during the reign; here we need only remark that the vast number of cases which were permitted to come before it afford additional proof of the fondness of the king for everything pertaining to the law, and of his resolve, in so far as it was humanly possible, to keep himself in close touch with its interpretation and administration. Next below the Consejo came the four great regional courts of the realm—the Chancillerias of Valladolid and Granada, and the Audiencia of Galicia, inherited from the days of the Catholic Kings, and the much more recent Audiencia of Seville, established in 1556; ten years later Philip set up a fifth tribunal at Las Palmas in the Canaries, whose inhabitants had hitherto resorted in important cases to the Chancilleria of Granada. The two Chancellerias continued to maintain their ancient preeminence over the more recent audiencias; “the greater part of Spain has recourse to them in the districts committed respectively to their charge.” The membership of each, namely, sixteen oidores, divided into four salas, inherited from the Emperor’s day, does not seem to have been altered by any law in the reign of the Prudent King; but a document of the eighth decade of the century describes each as composed of “twelve oidores, a president, and four alcaldes, and three alcaldes de hijosdalgo”, all of them appointed by the president of the Council of Castile; doubtless the accumulation of suits necessitated a gradual increase in the number of the magistrates. The same document gives interesting details in regard to jurisdiction and procedure; it is particularly enlightening as to the method of appeal from the Chancilleria to the Sala de Mil y Quinientos in the Consejo, and reveals exactly why and how the latter got its name. No such appeal could be made if the amount at stake was less than 4000 ducats. The appellant must deposit 1500 doblas beforehand, and if the verdict of the higher court went against him, he was obliged to pay one-third of the 1500 doblas to the Cámara Real, another third to the judges who gave the verdict, and the rest to his opponent in the suit. There were certain very definite limitations to the jurisdiction of the Chancellerias. By pragmáticas of 1561 and 1568 they were forbidden to take cognizance of any case arising out of the decrees of the Council of Trent, such matters being exclusively reserved for the Consejo Real; and the seventy-fourth petition of the Cortes of Madrid in 1583 was erected into a law which inhibited them from concerning themselves with “lo que se huvierne vendido” in the Consejo de Hacienda.

The Audiencias of Galicia and of Seville were lesser bodies. The area of their jurisdiction was smaller, and they were forbidden to deal with cases of ‘hidalguía’, in other respects their competence was virtually identical with that of the chancelleries. The former was composed of a regent, four oidores, and four alcaldes; in the latter the number of the oidores was six. We also find a Consejo de Navarra—obviously rather a court than a council—with full jurisdiction over all cases arising in that realm. It was composed of a regent, six oidores, and four alcaldes, and there was no appeal from its decisions to the Sala de Mil y Quinientos.—There is no evidence of any important alteration in the existing judicial arrangements in the eastern kingdoms down to the time of the ‘troubles’ in Aragon in 1591.

Yet the composition and activities of the higher courts of the realm, important though they be, give a far less characteristic picture of Philip’s conception of government than the methods by which justice was administered in the municipalities. Here we find the most perfect exemplification of his resolve that royally appointed officers should carry the king’s will into every corner of the realm, of his fondness for fusing administrative and judicial functions, and of his passion for complete and accurate information in regard to everything that was taking place throughout the length and breadth of the land. The heart of the whole system was the corregidor and the residencia: both described, during his reign and shortly afterwards, with a wealth of detail, by two of the greatest of contemporary legists, Jeronimo Castillo de Bovadilla and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, who gloried in tracing back the origins of both of them to the days of the Creation and of the Garden of Eden.

The institution of the corregidores was common to all the Iberian kingdoms, but it was so much more highly developed in Castile than elsewhere that it will suffice to examine its workings in the sixty-six corregimientos into which that realm was officially divided in the reign of the Prudent King. The office itself underwent several significant changes in Philip’s day, some of them in contravention of the law of the land. In the first place the appointment of the corregidores, which had hitherto remained in the hands of the crown, was now actually made by the president of the Council of Castile. According to Castillo de Bovadilla, this change (which had gone into effect before 1578) was due to the popular outcry against the inefficiency of some of the appointees; but we may also take it as an evidence of the
closeness with which Philip kept in touch with the Consejo Real. It was obviously an advantage to have its members make preliminary investigations of the fitness of the candidates, while it was, of course, inconceivable that any final appointment should be made of which the king did not approve. In the second place, it is to be noted that the period of incumbency, long since fixed at one year, with the provision that it might be extended to two, was suffered gradually to prolong itself beyond the legally established limit. Such prolongations had not been unknown in the Emperor’s day; but under Philip they ceased to be the exception and became the rule. The corregidores continued, indeed, to be appointed for one-year periods, as the law required; but at the expiration of that time, the term was often extended for two, three, or even more years, or until a successor were dispatched, so that at the close of the reign it was not uncommon for corregidores to remain in office for five years or longer. The Cortes heartily disliked the change, as productive of corruption and perversion of justice, and the procuradores vigorously demanded that the laws be observed; but there is no evidence that any attention was paid to their complaints. The constant changes which the literal enforcement of the law would have demanded became increasingly repugnant to the careworn king; moreover, the shorter term which the Cortes desired gave the incumbent scant time in which to become acquainted with conditions in his corregimiento, or effectively to maintain the power of the crown.

The corregidor, like the sovereign he represented in the district committed to his charge, was at once a judicial and administrative officer. In almost all the accounts of his office which have come down to us more space is devoted to his functions as a judge than to his duties as an executive. “He represents the person of the king”, so runs a contemporary description of his powers, “and may sit in judgment and mete out punishment for any sort of crime ... and condemn the guilty party to confiscation, or death, or the galleys, or a fine to be paid to the Cámara del Rey, and in all such cases the corregidor has a free hand, even though the accused be a titled lord or a noble of the realm”. The corregidor, moreover, was generally selected from the letrado class, though corregidores de capa y espada (or sin letras, as they were sometimes called) were not unknown, and it would appear from the eighty-seventh petition of the Cortes of 1571 that the procuradores preferred the latter type, particularly for the frontier towns. The corregidor’s one, two- or three tenientes, whom he himself appointed subject to the approval of the Consejo Real, were also invariably letrados; and in case the corregidor himself was not a legist, he was obliged to relinquish the exercise of his judicial functions to his teniente. All this is an interesting comment on the predilection of the Spanish monarchs for the judicial side, on their faith in the efficacy of the Roman law as essential to the maintenance of civilized society; and certainly no previous Spanish sovereign had ever exhibited that predilection as plainly as the Prudent King. But the picture cannot be complete without some account of the various administrative functions which the corregidor, as the years went on, had gradually been permitted to superadd to his primarily judicial ones, and which carried his office, in the latter half of the sixteenth century, to the climax of its prestige. It was with good reason that Castillo de Bovadilla describes him as being “with the exception of the sovereign, the highest authority in the community which he governs.”

As ruler, under the king, of the district committed to his charge, the first duty of the corregidor was to see to the enforcement of all royal pragmáticas and decrees, and to maintain in all respects the authority of the crown. He was to make himself acquainted with the local ordinances, to enforce those that were good, and to see that unsuitable ones were revised or abolished, though he could not take action to that end save in conjunction with the municipal regimiento. He was expected to visit each year all the communities in his corregimiento, including the villas eximidas; to make sure that justice and good government were well maintained; to see that roads, walls, bridges, and other public works were kept in good repair, that the streets and markets were kept clean, and that the district was well supplied with meat, fish, and other provisions, at reasonable prices; and to prevent the unauthorized construction of castles or other fortifications. He was to guard the royal prerogatives from any encroachment on the part of the clergy or ecclesiastical courts, and see to it that no papal bull or indulgence was published in his corregimiento except in the form and manner prescribed by law.

The most interesting and significant light on the position which the corregidor actually occupied in the district committed to his charge is afforded by the state of his relations to the ayuntamiento. At first glance it would seem that no efforts were spared to preserve all the high traditions of Castilian municipal autonomy. On his arrival, the corregidor, who had already taken oath before the Consejo Real, had to be sworn into office a second time by the local ayuntamiento, before being permitted to enter upon his duties. Though the corregidor, or in his absence, his teniente, alone possessed the right to convene and adjourn the ayuntamiento, he had no vote there save in the case of an even division, and there are a number of specific instances during Philip’s reign in which the Royal Council and the Chancillerías gave orders that the corregidores abide by the decisions of the ayuntamiento. though no general legislation to this effect was ever enacted. Moreover, if the matter under discussion in any way
concerned his own discharge of his functions, the corregidor was always required to withdraw, leaving his teniente in his stead, and the regidores reserved the right to meet privately if they desired to formulate complaints against him to the crown. These and other passages in Castillo de Bovadilla make it perfectly clear that, whatever the powers inherent in his office, the corregidor had no legal right to dominate the ayuntamiento. But it is also evident that, in the monarchical atmosphere of the sixteenth century, the prestige of his royal appointment gave the corregidor an initial advantage in cases of conflict with the ayuntamiento which was nearly always sufficient to turn the scale in his favor. He possessed extensive jurisdiction over the persons and actions of the regidores, both during the meetings of the ayuntamiento and outside, and not seldom sent them to prison for misconduct. Whenever they exercised their privilege of holding meetings in his absence, the tendency of the government was to regard such action as a usurpation of authority; Castillo de Bovadilla was very much against it. The right of the corregidor to bring up any matter that he chose for the consideration of the ayuntamiento gave him an invaluable initiative in the deliberations of that body; and the records of the Cortes of the reign furnish abundant evidence that, whatever the regulations by which he was theoretically bound, he not seldom acted in opposition to the wishes and decisions of the regidores. He was not only the principal executive, but also the supreme judge in the district committed to his charge; and as the authority of the crown which he represented became increasingly potent, it was inevitable that he should continue, in practice, to usurp a steadily increasing proportion of the powers which under the law of the land still belonged to the concejos. When one remembers, in addition to all this, how many of the local offices were sold to the highest bidders, the decline of the Castilian cities ceases to cause surprise.

It will be readily believed that if Philip was willing to let the ancient municipal liberties and privileges of his kingdom become gradually weakened through the extension of the authority of the corregidores, he was also determined to make certain that the corregidores were zealous and just in the performance of their duties, and, above all, that they remained implicitly obedient to the commands of the crown. For this double purpose the instrument at his disposal was the residencia. Probably no other existing institution in Spain, save, possibly, the Inquisition, was dearer to Philip than this. It seemed to be made expressly to promote the cardinal principles of his system of government: to secure even-handed justice for each and every one of his subjects, to make certain that no royal official misconducted himself in any way, or neglected or exceeded his instructions from the crown, and to give the monarch constant and detailed information, duly attested and in writing, of everything that was occurring throughout the length and breadth of the land. We have already examined the workings of the residencia, particularly that of the higher officials, in the Indies. A few words may be added here in regard to its operation, at the lower rungs of the ladder, in Spain.

The Emperor, as we have already seen, had tended to neglect it. He had been altogether too busy with international affairs, and on Philip’s accession there was crying need of reform. Under Charles the residencia of an outgoing corregidor had been usually taken by a special juez de residencia or pesquisidor, sent down for the purpose; not until he had completed his task, which sometimes required ten months or a year, could the new corregidor enter upon his office, and once there it was his first duty to take the residencia of the juez. The Cortes resented this practice and complained of it, petitioning that the ad interim jurisdiction of the juez de residencia be abolished, and that new corregidores be immediately appointed on the expiration of the term of the outgoing ones. Philip acceded to this request, at least in part; but the result was that for some time to come only letrados were appointed as corregidores, displacing the corregidores de capa y espada whom the representatives of the nation in general preferred, and that the first months of their term of office were almost exclusively occupied with taking the residencias of their predecessors. The defects of this system became so immediately obvious, that in 1564 the experiment was tried of sending out special jueces de residencia with all new corregidores, thus leaving the latter free for the performance of their regular duties; in 1592 this practice became general throughout the realm. No sooner had the change been made than the procuradores began to clamor for a return to the earlier system; the remedy, in their eyes, had proved worse than the disease. There were numerous complaints that the jueces de residencia failed to fulfill their duties, that bad corregidores got off scot free, while good ones were not given adequate recognition for their services; above all, there were protests about the unnecessary expense. At the beginning of the reign the cost of the residencias was borne by the crown, but as the years went on and the financial situation grew more and more precarious, Philip gradually began to shift the burden from the royal treasury to the shoulder of the residenciados, and ultimately to those of the community itself; and when it came to paying heavily for a process of whose value to themselves they were increasingly doubtful, it was not unnatural that the concejos should draw back. Even Castillo de Bovadilla was of one mind with the procuradores on this matter, and vigorously protested against the abuses of the jueces, above all the way in which they prolonged the legal period of the residencia—thirty days—in
order to fill their own pockets. But Philip refused to make any change. The very cumbersomeness, the
delays, of the system initiated in 1564 appealed to him; if it gave rise to corruption it was doubtless
regrettable, but that, as he once said, was “simply one of those evils inevitable in all human affairs.”
And it is but fair to add that there were many cases in which the system worked well. The practice,
initiated at the close of the reign, of appointing ex-corregidores of proven ability as jueces de residencia
did much to improve the efficiency of the institution.

There were a multitude of meticulous regulations in regard to the conduct of a residencia. It was
duly proclaimed beforehand, so that everyone in the corregimiento might be given an opportunity to
make complaints, which could be preferred during the whole period of the residencia, down to the latter
part of the reign, when it was ordered that they must be presented during the first twenty days of it. The
pesquisa secreta, or private examination of witnesses by the juez de residencia, occupied the first part
of the proceedings. The corregidor provided the juez with a list of persons who might be expected to
bear him a grudge, and who therefore should be excluded from the pesquisa; but apparently sonic of
these persons were almost invariably summoned by the jueces, on the principle that the truth could be
more easily ascertained from the enemies of the residenciado than from his friends. There was a list of
standard questions, forty-three in number, which were regularly to be put to the witnesses at the
pesquisa; they indicate the high measure of Philip’s interest in the political and economic well-being of
the municipalities, and, still more, the universal prevalence of bribery and corruption. At the end of the
pesquisa the outgoing corregidor, who was required to remain at his post during the whole period of the
residencia, was apprised of the charges preferred against him, and permitted to present his defence,
whereupon the juez de residencia rendered judgment. If the residenciado was found guilty, the almost
invariable penalty was a fine. If it only amounted to 3000 maravedis or less, he was obliged to pay it
before appealing to the Consejo Real; if more, payment was suspended, provided good security could be
found, pending the decision of the Consejo, to which a full report of the residencia was always sent
within fifteen days of its completion. No matter what its outcome, the case had to be reviewed by the
highest court of the realm before the residenciado could be reappointed to office, and in case the
outgoing official had been found guilty by the juez de residencia, he always had the right to appear
before the Consejo to plead his case on appeal. No wonder that the Royal Council, with this addition to
the multitude of its other responsibilities, had more work on its hands than it could properly perform.

We pass for a few moments to the administration of the Italian dependencies, whose
Castilianization, which had begun in the Emperor’s day, reached its climax in the reign of his son. The
independent establishment of the Consejo de Italia, to which reference has already been made,
constituted the first and most important step in this direction; the course of the internal history of Sicily,
Naples, and Milan, and the names of their viceroys are further manifestations thereof. Five of Philip’s
nine representatives in Sicily were of Castilian lineage; so also were eight of the nine in Naples, and
nine of the ten in Milan.

It was, of course, in Sicily that Philip encountered the most serious difficulties in erecting the
type of well ordered despotism, managed from afar, which was so dear to his heart; and it was with
good reason that his biographer Cabrera de Cordoba characterized the island as “fatal contra sus
virreyes”. When the inhabitants, proud of the “liberties” which they had inherited from Norman and
Hohenstaufen times, rose in protest or revolted against the policies which Philip from Spain imposed
upon his representatives at Palermo and Messina, the usual outcome was that the monarch abandoned
his viceroy and retired him; then another was sent out and the conflict began anew. The Sicilians were
far better equipped to wage such conflicts than were either the Neapolitans or the Milanese. Barons,
clerics, and cities were zealous for the maintenance of their ancient privileges; when the three orders
were united in Cortes, the viceroys had to use deceit and corruption in order to obtain the donativos. But
the viceroys, on their side, were well armed for the fray. The administration of justice was largely in
their hands, for they appointed the judges, most of whom held office for only two years, and naturally
did everything in their power to please the king’s representative in order to be continued at their posts;
the viceroys, moreover, made good use of letrados, of the typical Castilian variety, to extinguish the
memory of the ancient liberties of the realm. There were also unending conflicts between the viceregal
government and the Inquisition, which had won here for its officials immunities far beyond those,
which were permitted in Spain herself. In 1577 the viceroy declared that there were 25,000 familiars,
and that they included all the nobles, the rich men, and the criminals. When one adds to these
considerations the important fact that Sicily still continued to be rent by a multitude of family feuds
inherited from its checkered past, and that the whole political structure, from the viceregal palace to the
lowest of the courts, was honeycombed with corruption, one ceases to wonder that the island was in
constant turmoil. The real source of trouble was at Madrid and the Escorial, for no sort of government of which Philip approved would ever have been tolerable to the liberty-loving Sicilians; the curious thing is that the Prudent King should not have afforded any consistent support to his representatives on the ground. Whether it was his preoccupation with other cares, or his haunting dread lest his representatives in his various dominions should get out of hand, it is difficult to say; the fact remains that when complaints against his Sicilian viceroys reached the Consejo de Italia, they were on the whole rather welcomed than the reverse. For Philip, as for his father before him, Sicily constituted one of the most uneasing of minor cares; indeed, at certain crises of their Mediterranean campaigns, it might have been characterized as a major one. But as neither of them was able to spend sufficient time or energy on it completely to extirpate its ancient liberties, they preferred, as in so many other cases, to leave an unsatisfactory situation alone.

In Naples there is a totally different tale to tell. Its historical background, as we have already had occasion to observe, was far more favorable to royal absolutism than that of the island to the south of it; the Seggi of the city of Naples took the place of the ancient Neapolitan parliament; the size of the revenues which it annually paid in to the crown, and the rate at which they increased, are significant indications of the extent of the royal power. Its viceroys were granted a measure of authority which was vouchsafed to no other representative of the Spanish crown beyond the limits of the Iberian Peninsula; and the very exceptional fact that their residencias were seldom if ever taken may plausibly be explained on the theory that their power was so firmly established that nobody ventured to complain of them. Like their master at Madrid, they were surrounded by a series of councils whose members did their will. Contemporaries remarked on the resemblance between the Consiglio di Santa Chiara and the Consejo Real de Castilla. The Camera della Sommaria controlled matters relating to taxes, feudal tenures, and the royal patrimony. The Consiglio Collateral—or ‘papacy of doctors’ as Lippomano called it, because it was the center of everything—was modelled on the Spanish type of consulta which was so dear to Philip’s heart; it was composed of two Spaniards and two Italians, but one of the Italians was always at the king’s court. The government was particularly successful in playing off against one another, to its own advantage, the rival interests of nobles, clergy, and the third estate; and it had at its disposal a large standing army, always in readiness to suppress revolts. Altogether the situation in Naples must have been far more satisfactory to Philip than that in any other of the Spanish dependencies overseas.

The only really dark spot in the Neapolitan picture, as it presented itself in the eyes of the Prudent King, was the danger lest his own authority and that of his viceroys might be threatened by the encroachments of the power of the Popes, who had claimed, since the eleventh century, to be overlords of the realm. This danger was particularly acute at the beginning of the reign, owing to the events of the pontificate of Paul IV. It prolonged itself during the succeeding years in struggles over the publication of certain decrees of the Council of Trent extending the jurisdiction of the clergy over the laity, of which Philip wholly disapproved, and against which he waged constant war in all his dominions, and still more over the bull In coena Domini, which limited the king’s power to impose taxes upon the clergy of his realms. The obvious weapon which Philip possessed against these dangers, and “the brightest jewel of his Neapolitan crown”, was his right to withhold the royal exequatur, without which no papal decree could be published within the kingdom; and a pragmática of August 30, 1561, shows that the king proposed to make the fullest possible use of it, despite vigorous papal protests that the terms of his investiture did not permit him to do so. It became a question, in other words, whether the monarchy or the papacy should be able to win the majority of the Neapolitans to its support, and the decision of this issue was highly favorable to the crown. The nobility, many of whose domains had been acquired at the expense of the church, were in mortal terror of being deprived of them, and rallied loyally to the king; so also did the third estate, who feared that the clerical exemptions from taxation demanded by the Pope would serve materially to increase their own burdens. As for the clergy, though on the one hand they wished to emancipate themselves from the control of the king, they dreaded, on the other, too much domination by the Pope, and Philip succeeded in manipulating these conflicting interests in such fashion that the mass of the Neapolitan clerics gave their allegiance to the crown. The influence of Cardinal Granvelle, both at Naples and at Home, and the fact that the papacy was so dependent on Spain at the time of the campaign of Lepanto, were both potent factors in determining the issue. Thus the monarchy obtained well-nigh unanimous national support in its struggle against the papal pretensions, so that by the end of the reign there was practically nothing left of them, save the privilege of annually receiving from Philip’s vicerey at Naples a present of a white palfrey on the feast of Saint Peter and Saint Paul.

The pages in the preceding volume devoted to the administration of Milan in the Emperor’s day render it unnecessary for us to do more, at this point, than to notice certain changes in the situation there
which came to pass during the reign of his son. Measured by modern standards it was doubtless a period of decline. On the other hand the fact remains that in the first half of the seventeenth century the Milanese looked back with fond memories to the rule of the Prudent King, and wished that he could be brought back again to live till the end of the world.

The obvious explanation of this apparent paradox lies in the political situation in Western Europe during the three different periods concerned. Under the Emperor, and again in the time of the Thirty Years’ War, Milan was the scene of constant fighting, but the reign of Philip was a calmer interlude when the strife was diverted to other lands. Charles’s ordinances in regard to the duchy, as we have already had occasion to observe, were quite as liberal as the military exigencies of the moment would permit. He defended the privileges of the Senate and the communes, and when, under Philip, the military pressure had been removed, it would have been reasonable to expect an extension of these privileges. But that was not the way of the Prudent King. His own authority and that of his viceroys must at all costs be preserved, and it is significant and characteristic of him that he forthwith provided the latter with a consulta, in which the generals of the local troops and the heads of the different tribunals were equally represented, and their respective interests played off against one another. He attacked the rights of the Senate as vigorously as his father had defended them, bitterly complaining that it exceeded its jurisdiction, and he arbitrarily deprived it of many of its ancient prerogatives. Another accompanying feature of the period is a further decline of the liberties of the communes, whose consigilos steadily diminished both in membership and in prestige. The only exception to the rule was Cremona, who not seldom refused to guarantee the donativos demanded by the viceregal agents. Occasionally her example prevailed over that of her more complaisant neighbors, who postponed their action until they learned what hers was to be, and it is incidentally worth noting that while the annual revenues from the royal treasury in Naples apparently increased between 1561 and 1577 from 1,200,000 ducats to 2,400,000 ducats, those in Milan remained constant at 800,000.

The opposition which the monarch occasionally encountered, in matters financial, from the municipalities was but trifling compared with that which he met, at least during part of the reign, at the hands of the Milanese archbishops. In so far as the public liberties within the duchy were preserved at all, it was indeed largely due to the conflict of the highest spiritual and temporal authorities there. The protagonist of this struggle was the celebrated Carlo Borromeo, nephew of Pius IV and hero of the Counterreformation, who was raised to the see of Milan in 1560, at the age of twenty-one, though he did not actually arrive in his archbishopric until 1566. Under him the pristine glories of the see of Ambrose wore revived. At the outset there seemed no prospect of his colliding with the civil authorities; but when he began to occupy himself with the conduct of the laity, over whom he attempted to exercise a supervision comparable to that of Calvin over the Genevese, the government complained that he was exceeding his jurisdiction, and open war was soon declared. The moral ascendancy of Borromeo gave him a tremendous initial advantage, and he was fearless in his use of the power of excommunication; but the viceroy was also strong in the possession of military resources, and for some years there was a battle royal between them. As long as Borromeo was in office the side that he represented was consistently victorious, and Philip’s viceroy, the Duke of Alburquerque, was reduced to the extremity of seeking absolution at the hands of Pope Pius V. But after Borromeo’s death in 1584 the tide turned the other way. His successors were quite unworthy of him, and when one of them proposed to excommunicate Juan Fernández de Velasco, the ablest of all Philip’s representatives in the Milanese, the Pope not only refused to support him, but even gave orders that the excommunication be not pronounced. From that time royal authority was permanently reestablished. Though the power of the archbishop may have henceforth constituted an annoyance, it never really threatened.

Philip’s reign saw no important modification in the organization of the Spanish army which he had inherited from his father. The rebellion of the Granadan Moriscos (1567-71), which necessitated the recall of a number of veterans from Italy to suppress it, showed the imperative need of a new alistamiento for the increase of the available forces within the realm; but it was not till 1590 that the plan for it was approved by the Consejo and put into active operation. Twenty-three new tercios for service abroad were created by Philip between 1566 and 1597, but many of these had only temporary existence, especially those formed for the acquisition of Portugal. The plain fact of the matter was that though Philip was obliged to use soldiers, he never really liked them; this, and his inability to pay his troops on time, were the underlying reasons for the decay of the ancient military spirit of Spain, which is one of the most significant phenomena of the period. Lack of leadership was also doubtless a contributory cause of the decline. Philip would gladly have Castilianized the command of his army, like everything else, but the material was not at hand. Alva was the last of the great Spanish soldiers of the
Emperor’s day, and the Prudent King mistrusted the foreigners by whom he was succeeded, particularly Alexander of Parma.

Yet the terror of the infantry created by Gonsalvo continued to hold Europe in its grip till the end of the Thirty Years’ War. The most eloquent testimonies to its efficiency were paid in the Emperor’s time; but there is plenty of contemporaneous evidence, in Philip’s day and even later, that other nations still regarded it as unconquerable, and the consensus of modern opinion ranks it higher than any other army in Europe down to the peace of Vervins in 1598. Doubtless its deficiencies would have been sooner revealed had the campaigns which it fought in the Netherlands and in Northern France been of larger size, so that considerations of strategy could have come into play; but rarely, if ever, were more than 40,000 men engaged. On land, at least, the Spanish forces maintained their preeminence.

On the sea, of course, there was another tale to tell. After the defeat of the Armada the naval forces of the realm were at least temporarily paralyzed; and if another fleet of fighting ships was constructed in the Spanish ports before the end of the reign, it was accomplished rather despite than because of the wishes of the king. The fact is that Philip never, comprehended, until too late, the importance for his empire of the control of the sea, and neglected to take the most, obvious measures to maintain it. The petitions of the Cortes on the subject were largely disregarded. The naval activities of the northwestern ports, which had been so successfully revived by his father, were suffered once more to decline. The king preferred to purchase or hire his ships in foreign lands, rather than to stimulate his own subjects to construct them at home. He liked fighting on the sea even less than on the land, and the economic possibilities of a strong navy never dawned on his horizon at all. There was also lamentable deficiency of sailors and sea-captains. No foreigner comparable to Andrea Doria entered the Spanish service during his reign, and Alvaro de Bazán was the last of the old Castilian sea-dogs. The dying-out of the great race of empire-builders in Spain is perhaps exemplified more tragically than anywhere else in the story of the decline and fall of her navy and her consequent loss of the command of the sea.

If Philip hated to fight, he dearly loved to negotiate; his reign is the greatest of all periods in the history of Spanish diplomacy. Finn foundations for its triumph and prestige had been laid by the Catholic Kings, but under the Emperor most of the important posts had been given to Flemings and Italians while the Spaniards were elbowed aside; in no branch of the government service was there a better excuse for Philip to pursue his favorite policy of Castilianization. We may well believe that he did not suffer the opportunity to escape him; though the foreign element was not absolutely eliminated, all the really important ambassadors of the reign were of ancient Castilian lineage, and Spanish diplomacy was once more in Spanish hands. The average level of his representatives abroad, particularly in France and in England, was exceedingly high; the best of them, such as Alava and Bernardino de Mendoza, challenge comparison with the greatest names among the ambassadors of modern times. Many of their methods were doubtless such as would not be tolerated today. They spied, and they plotted. They started insurrections and even commanded rebellious troops, but the ethics of their profession had not yet been established; they were really no worse, but merely more effective, than their rivals and contemporaries of other lands.

To their efforts and activities it was primarily due that the magnificent bluff of Spanish preponderance was so successfully maintained for a long half century after the Prudent King had been in his grave. They furnished notable examples, to be followed in the succeeding generations by such men as the masterful Gondomar at the court of James I, and the haughty Peñaranda at the Congress of Westphalia. Their achievements seem the more remarkable when we consider that they, like the army and the navy, were perpetually in difficulties because of the shortage of funds. Bernardino de Mendoza had to pawn his jewels and his silver in the service of his master before finally returning from Paris to Madrid.

The prevailing impression of the majority of foreign visitors to the Spain of Philip II was unquestionably that of the power and prestige of the Roman Catholic church. There were clerics everywhere, and their influence seemed all-pervasive. Yet it would be a grave error to conceive of the government of the Prudent King as ‘priest-ridden’ in the ordinary sense of the term; his conception of the monarchy was far too exalted to permit of that. We have already had occasion to point out how zealous he was to defend his royal prerogative against papal encroachments. Like many other strong monarchs in the history of Europe, he expected Rome to reward his unwavering loyalty to the faith with virtual control of the church within his own dominions. His ideal was to have church and state march hand in hand, both under his own guidance, and each lending-to the other its indispensable support.
If we keep these fundamental ideas clearly in mind, it is easy to see the reason for Philip’s well-known predilection for the Spanish Inquisition. It seemed to embody the main principles of his life. On the one hand it was the relentless foe of heresy and dangerous innovation; on the other it fortified the absolutism of the crown. In the latter part of the Emperor’s reign it had not been in a flourishing state. Charles’s many absences had not helped it, and the avaricious Inquisitor-General Hernando de Valdes, who had evaded his share of the forced loan demanded of the clergy, was perilously near disgrace. Something was desperately needed to restore his prestige and that of the institution over whose activities lie presided, and in 1557-58 that need was at least temporarily supplied by the discovery of the two small Protestant communities in Seville and Valladolid, to whose extirpation he devoted himself in 1559. The number of victims, both reconciled and relaxed, was not very great but the work was so thoroughly done that, save for a few sporadic instances, we hear nothing more of Spanish Protestantism during the remainder of the reign; indeed the chief significance of the whole episode was that it served to tide the Inquisition over a danger point in its existence, when it threatened to perish for lack of fuel to feed its flames. But Valdes was not yet satisfied. At all costs he must make certain of the support of the Prudent King. He also was most desirous to feed fat an ancient grudge against a man who had recently and most unexpectedly been elevated to a post which he had coveted for himself, Bartolome de Carranza, since 1557 archbishop of Toledo, and Carranza, accordingly, was accused before the Suprema of having expressed heretical opinions in his Commentaries on the Catechism. There was not the slightest basis for the charge. Carranza was an ardent advocate of reform within the church. That he had no sympathy with Protestantism is proved by his career in England, where, if we may believe his boast, he burnt, reconciled, or drove from the realm 30,000 heretics, and brought back 2,000,000 souls to the faith. But Valdes was fortunate in being supported in his attack by Melchior Cano, who enjoyed the unlimited confidence of the king, and he finally succeeded in poisoning Philip’s ear against Carranza. Not only did the king suffer the trial to proceed; when the papacy intervened, he did his utmost to prevent the case from being sent to Rome. That it was sent there at last, after a delay of seven years, that the final verdict was so much milder than the Inquisition desired, and that Valdes was ultimately forced to resign his position, are, for our present purposes, comparatively unimportant; the main fact that demands our attention here is that the affair committed Philip irrevocably to the cause of the Holy Office against all who attacked it both at home and abroad, as the strongest bulwark of the omnipotence of the crown. From that time onward its ‘supereminence’ was doubly assured, and it was utilized at will, not only for the extirpation of potential enemies of the church, but for the suppression of political unrest.

The influence of the church was naturally predominant, as it was in all other Catholic countries during the age of the Counter-Reformation, in education and in learning, in culture and in art. The universities were largely controlled by Jesuits and Dominicans, who regulated the subjects taught and the methods of teaching them. But it would be quite wrong to think of the reign of the Prudent King as a period of intellectual stagnation. On the contrary it is characterized throughout by a burning interest in scholarship; it ushers in, even if it does not last to see the culmination of, the golden age of Spanish literature. That such things should have been possible in an atmosphere of unquestioned clerical predominance, is but one of a number of convincing refutations of the theory, not yet extinct, that the tendencies of the Romish church have always been obscurantist. That they should have occurred in an age of political and economic decline is but another illustration of a phenomenon observable in many other countries, at many other epochs, ever since the days of the Roman Empire. The greatest periods of intellectual and artistic development have tended on the whole to follow rather than to coincide with those of the most notable political achievement.

The greatest works of scholarship in the reign were produced in the field of history, theology, and law; nearly all of them were of the ponderous, monumental type which was to become prevalent throughout Western Europe in the seventeenth century. In history the greatest names are those of Ambrosio de Morales (1513-91) and of Jeronimo de Zurita (1512-80). The former was appointed to the post of official chronicler in 1563, and continued the work of Florian de Ocampo; the latter was secretary of the Inquisition, and in 1548 was elected the first coronista of Aragon by the unanimous vote of the Cortes. Both are notable for their patient zeal in the search and use of manuscripts and inscriptions, and for their daring rejection of unproven legends; indeed they may be justly regarded as the founders of critical historical scholarship in Spain. And there were also a host of lesser lights. On the borderline between history, theology, and political science stands the imposing figure of the great Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1535-1624), whose work was largely done in the reign of the Prudent King, though most of it was published in that of his successor. He was a paragon of learning, and a master of Spanish prose. To characterize as ‘scientific’ a history which begins with the statement that “Tubal, the son of Japheth, was the first man that came to Spain” seems to us excessive; but when Mariana deals
with contemporary affairs his views become at least modern, if not positively revolutionary. In his treatise De Rege et Regis Institutione, which was published in 1599 with the sanction of the Spanish crown, he justified the slaughter of tyrants in extreme cases; and when Ravaillac, who was popularly supposed to have been influenced by the book, assassinated Henry IV in 1610, it was burnt by the public executioner in Paris. In theology the outstanding figures are those of the Jesuits, Luis Molina (1535-1600) and his follower Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), who attempted to reconcile the doctrine of predestination with the ideas of the freedom of the will then current in the church of Rome. Suarez also earned an enviable fame in England in the succeeding reign by his treatise against the oath of allegiance which James I demanded of his subjects. And since theology and law marched hand in hand in the Spain of the Prudent King, it is not surprising to find priests like Suarez distinguishing themselves also in the field of international jurisprudence. A notable precedent for their activities in this direction had been set them during the Emperor’s reign by the noble Dominican friar Francisco de Vitoria, who has been called, with but slight exaggeration, “one of the precursors of the League of Nations”; and his example was eagerly followed by the writers of Philip’s day. Grotius owed much to Suarez’s Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislate, in which the theory of the divine right of kings is refuted and the essential equality of all men is maintained. Balthazar Ayala’s De Jure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Allitarii (1552) is a notable attempt to mitigate the horrors of war. Probably the most learned legal writer of the day—he has sometimes been called the Spanish Bartolus—was the Toledan, Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva (1512-77), professor of canon law at Salamanca. He wrote on the Council of Trent and on many legal topics, but he was by no means exclusively a scholar, for he held judicial posts at Burgos and Granada, was bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Segovia, and finally rose to the presidency of the Council of Castile.

The ascendency of the church is also plainly discernible throughout the reign in the realms of poetry and imaginative prose. The works of Santa Teresa de Avila, of San Juan de la Cruz, of Fray Luis de Leon, and of Fray Luis de Granada furnish perhaps the most striking examples of it; and though Fernando de Herrera, who was far greater than any of them, cannot be classed as a strictly religious poet, he attains his highest successes when celebrating the triumphs or mourning the defeats of the Christians in warfare against the infidels. But all these names, and many others besides, pale into insignificance in comparison with those of Cervantes and Lope de Vega, both of them realists of transcendent genius, wholly emancipated from ecclesiastical limitations, who carried the fame of the Spanish story and the Spanish drama throughout the four quarters of the globe. Neither of them can be said to belong to the age of Philip in quite the same sense that Spenser and Shakespeare belonged to that of Elizabeth. Cervantes did not begin Don Quixote till after 1591, and the first part was not published till 1604 or 1605; and the first work of Lope saw the light in the very year of the death of the Prudent King. Yet it was under Philip II that both men had the various experiences and adventures, both at home and abroad, which furnished the material for what they subsequently wrote. Cervantes was wounded at Lepanto, suffered cruel captivity as a galley slave at Algiers, and collected taxes in La Mancha; Lope served in the Invincible Armada. Both knew their country in the height of its glory as well as on the threshold of its decline, and they have immortalized its splendor and its tragedy, its comedy and its pathos, and, most of all, its unlimited variety, for the benefit of all the succeeding generations of mankind.

Architecture, sculpture, and painting, on the other hand, are almost totally dominated, during Philip’s reign, by the influence of the church of the Counter-Reformation. The king, as we have already had occasion to observe, took a lively interest in the fine arts and directed them; the Escorial is the mirror in which his tastes are most accurately reflected. In architecture the leading figure is that of Juan de Herrera (1530?-97), a master of the construction of edifices “conformable to the somber thoughts of the monarch”; and it was largely as a result of his influence that the plateresque style, which had held the forefront of the stage in the Emperor’s day, almost completely disappeared in the reign of the Prudent King. In sculpture and painting the tale is much the same. The names of Philip’s favorite artists, both native anti foreign, have been given in another place, and we have also seen that they painted numerous portraits; but fond though the king was of pictures from real life, he cared most of all for representations of sacred subjects, of the contemplative or ecstatic qualities exhibited in the works of his most characteristic religious painter, Luis de Morales, and later in those of Murillo. One curious fact is the paucity of pictures or sculptures showing the achievements of the Spaniards in the New World. Possibly it may indicate that contemporaries did not regard the American possessions as playing a part in the Spanish Empire as considerable as that which is usually ascribed to them today, though the wealth of historical material about the American lands may plausibly be adduced as evidence on the other side.
In music the reign of Philip was veritably a golden age. Its greatest name is that of Tomas Luis de Victoria (1540-1613?), whose hymns entitle him to a place with Palestrina in the forefront of the composers of the era of the Counter-Reformation. Secular melodies were also much in vogue, and it was an essential part of a gentleman’s education to know how to play the guitar; but in music as in almost all other activities of the time the power of the church remained transcendent.

Spanish history is full of contrast and contradiction—at no period more than in the reign of Philip II. Regarded from the modern standpoint, in which economic considerations are so preponderant, the age of the Prudent King seems emphatically to be an age of decay; yet even in its last and most tragic decade it produced men of genius whose names will survive forever. Certainly Philip did not stifle the life of his people. The most notable figures in Spain’s military and political annals were indeed gone, but from their ashes there had arisen a generation of men of letters which has seldom been equaled and never surpassed, and the greatest of all painters was to follow close behind. At the moment that the scepter of empire was slipping from her grasp, Spain won the crown of immortality in literature and in art.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE INVINCIBLE ARMADA

We have already had occasion to observe that, a great, change had been effected in the policy of Philip of Spain between the years 1578 and 1580. The dismissal of the last remnants of the old Eboli peace party, the summoning of Cardinal Granvelle from Rome, and the vigorous prosecution of the Spanish claims to the throne of Portugal were all symptoms of the fact that the Prudent King no longer proposed merely to rest on the defensive, but was prepared to take the lead into his own hand. And this change did not end its sole expression in his dealings with the problems of the Iberian Peninsula; it was also reflected in his attitude toward England and France, and most of all in his treatment of the rebels of the Low Countries, which continued, for at least a decade more, to be the focal point of the international politics of Western Europe. Save for the six years of Alva’s rule, the keynote of Philip’s policy there had hitherto, on the whole, been conciliation. His representatives on the ground may not always have been able to give effect to it, but that at least was the line they were told to take. Now, however, Philip had become convinced, particularly by the news of the treaty which the rebels had made, August 13, 1578, with the Duke of Anjou, that more vigorous action was imperative, unless the Low Countries were to be lost; and in the successor whom he selected for Don John of Austria he found an able and effective instrument for the accomplishment of his purpose.

Alexander of Parma, who was given the post, was born in Rome on August 27, 1545, the son of Ottavio Farnese and Margaret of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Charles V, who was to be regent in the Netherlands from 1559 to 1567. At the age of eleven, he became attached to the court of Philip II in the Low Countries. Three years later he returned with the Prudent King to Spain, and was educated there with Don Carlos and Don John. But he never became thoroughly Hispanicized. His character and outlook on life continued, to the end of his days, to be those of the Italian soldier and statesman of the Renaissance. He followed the precepts of Machiavelli’s Prince, and also of Castiglione’s Cortegiano. Primarily a soldier, he did not hesitate to expose his person on the battlefield, when by so doing he could reanimate the drooping spirits of his men, but he never pushed his courage to the point of foolhardiness, and had no patience with those who did. With his military talents, moreover, he united the qualities of true statesmanship. He knew when to fight and when to treat, and possessed rare gifts in handling men; in this last respect he offers a curiously close parallel to his great rival, William of Orange; if he was less genial and friendly, he had greater dignity and distinction. He never underestimated the power of his potential foes, nor blinded himself to their virtues. In his letters to the king one finds none of those expressions of contempt and disdain for the Netherlanders which are so painfully frequent in the correspondence of his predecessors. Last of all, he was firmly resolved to make a brilliant success in the great task to which Philip had called him, and of which, unlike Don John, he fully comprehended both the difficulties and the importance. He knew that the eyes of Western Europe were focused upon him. He hoped to terminate, definitely and victoriously, the great contest which his Spanish predecessors had only embittered and prolonged.

The situation in the Low Countries, at the time of his advent to power, was so ticklish that, for the time being at least, it was obvious that he must act with the utmost caution. The military power of the rebels had been greatly increased by their treaty of the previous August with the Duke of Anjou, while the immediate prospect of the annexation of Portugal rendered it impossible for Parma to get more troops from Spain. Clearly he must have recourse to diplomacy and avoid war. Equally clear was the object which his diplomacy must seek to attain, namely, the reopening of the breach between the Protestant Northeast and the Roman Catholic Southwest, which the ineptitude of Don John had almost healed; to the Orange motto, l’union fait la force, he must oppose the classical Divide et impera. The state of affairs after the death of Don John was not unfavorable to the attainment of this end. Few Protestants or Catholics could be brought to give hearty support to the policy of toleration as a means to political cooperation, enunciated in the draft for a religious peace which William of Orange had submitted to the Estates on July 10, 1578; and the Protestant minority in the Walloon provinces, urged on by the Calvinists of Ghent, were now convinced that, by a little forcing of the pace, they could carry all the southwestern provinces into the camp of the Reformation. An account of their attempt and failure to accomplish this, and of the futile intervention in the Low Countries on their behalf of the firebrand
Count Palatine John Casimir, is not necessary for our purposes here; suffice it to say that by clever utilization of the jealousies and resentments of the Catholic leaders in the rebel army, which had been defeated by Don John at Gembloux, Farnese convinced most of the southwestern provinces that the “barbarous insolence and tyranny of the sectaries exceeded that of the Spaniards,” and paved the way for their acknowledgment, at the price of liberal concessions, of the sovereignty of the Spanish king. The Union of Arras, concluded January 6, 1579, between the deputies of the Estates of Artois and Hainault and the city of Douai, “to bring about a general reconciliation with the Catholic-King, our natural lord and sovereign”, was the first triumph of his diplomacy, and on May 17 following, in the instrument known as the peace of Arras, the terms of that reconciliation were arranged. They demanded, in brief, the reestablishment of all the autonomous privileges of the Netherlands which Philip and his regents had attempted to subvert. The foreigners were to depart; the government was to be carried on by the Netherlanders themselves, and the king was to be represented only by a prince of the royal house; short of renouncing the sovereignty of the Spanish crown, it would have been impossible, politically speaking, for him to have conceded anything more. But in reality the peace of Arras was a victory for Philip in disguise. In the first place it provided for the exclusive maintenance, in the provinces that accepted it, of the Roman Catholic faith, and thereby made irreparable the breach with the Protestants of the Northeast. In the second, by removing political grievances, at the same time that it satisfied the conservatives in religion, it caused the latter to look to Spain as their champion in a way that they had never done before. And certainly Philip had need of all the advantages that it furnished him. On January 23, 1579, seventeen days after the Union of Arras, there had been formed the Calvinist Counter-Union of the Northeast. In the second, by removing political grievances, at the same time that it satisfied the conservatives in religion, it caused the latter to look to Spain as their champion in a way that they had never done before. And certainly Philip had need of all the advantages that it furnished him. On January 23, 1579, seventeen days after the Union of Arras, there had been formed the Calvinist Counter-Union of Utrecht. This comprised the seven northeastern provinces of the Low Countries; and the Protestant towns of Flanders and Brabant, of which the most important were Antwerp, Brussels, and Ghent, soon cast in their lot with it. Its objects were the maintenance of the Reformed religion and enfranchisement from the sovereignty of Spain. The Netherlanders were now divided into two irreconcilably hostile groups, and Philip was henceforth to have the alliance of the one in his efforts to subjugate the other. The problem with which he was hereafter to be confronted in the Netherlands was doubtless hard enough, but he owed it to the diplomacy of Alexander of Parma that it was not infinitely worse.

The very fact that Parma had shown such efficiency made him an object of suspicion to the Spanish king, for Philip dreaded the concentration of political and military authority in the hands of such a man. He took advantage of the provision in the peace of Arras which stipulated that the royal representative in the Netherlands should be of royal blood to withdraw the administration of the Low Countries from Parma, and place it once more in the hands of his mother Margaret, who returned in the early summer of 1580 to the office that she had laid down in 1576; it was the king’s plan that her son should continue only to command the army. But Parma did not propose to be treated in such fashion as this. He knew that, under the existing circumstances, it would be fatal to separate the military from the political control, and he was determined to regain the latter. He had a number of painful interviews with his jealous mother, but expediency was so plainly on his side that she and Philip were ultimately obliged to give way. In December, 1581, the provisions of the peace of Arras were violated by his official reinstatement in the government of the Low Countries—an interesting evidence of the futility of the concessions it vouchsafed to the Netherlanders in comparison with the solid advantages which it obtained for the king. Meantime, while Parma plotted to regain political control, he continued his military preparations. Until May, 1579, when the peace of Arras was signed, he could still use foreign troops, and though Spaniards were no longer available, he purchased the services of some 30,000 Germans; with their aid he captured the city of Maestricht on the Meuse, after a four months’ siege, on June 29. This triumph was stained by outrages reminiscent of those of the days of the Duke of Alva; nevertheless, it caused several towns which had hitherto wavered between the two camps to declare for reconciliation with Spain. In the succeeding months Parma was obliged, under the terms of the peace of Arras, to send off his foreign mercenaries and create a new army out of the loyal Catholics on the ground. It was a puny force in comparison with the German levies whom he had been obliged to dismiss, and it failed miserably in an attempt to keep the Duke of Anjou from getting into the Netherlands and relieving Cambray. But lack of support from France, and desire to visit Queen Elizabeth of England, prevented Anjou from pushing his advantage; in October, 1581, he took his departure, and thus gave Parma a chance to attack Tournai, the sole important city in the Southwest which remained friendly to the Union of Utrecht. The place fell on November 30, 1581, and the terms of its capitulation, in sharp contrast to the horrors enacted at Maestricht, are a significant evidence of the fact that Parma and the more enlightened outlook and policy which he represented were now firmly in the saddle. The garrison was permitted to march out with the honors of war. The citizens, in return for a levy of 200,000 florins, were allowed to remain unmolested in their persons and goods. Even the Protestants in Tournai were given leave to remain there if they would live ‘without scandal’, which doubtless meant without openly professing their faith, and those who would not submit to these
conditions were permitted to sell their property and depart. On the other hand, all demands for the maintenance of the Pacification of Ghent were peremptorily refused. Parma did not propose to let Tournai be the instrument of mending the great breach which he had been at such pains to create.

Before carrying the history of the revolt of the Netherlands into the stormier years that were to follow, we must take time to draw France and England into the picture. The simplest way to do this will be to retrace our steps for a bit and follow the career of the Duke of Anjou, who had now become the chief link between the rebels in the Low Countries and those outside powers from which they hoped to get support. Since his treaty with the Estates in August, 1578, the Duke had done little to justify the hopes of further assistance to the rebels in the Low Countries which he had then held out. Neither his brother nor his mother would support him wholeheartedly. They were reluctant to sanction anything which savored of open defiance of the king of Spain; moreover, they both of them had use for Anjou in France, where his mediation (November 26, 1580) was successful, as it had been four years before, in terminating that rather ridiculous phase of the intermittent struggle between the Huguenots and the Catholics which is generally known as the Guerre des Amoureux. But the Duke did not relinquish his projects in the Low Countries. Indeed the chief reason why he had consented to act as a mediator in the civil strife in France was that he hoped thereby to strengthen himself for his intended enterprise abroad; and meantime the rebels continued their negotiations with him. The success of Parma’s diplomacy made his help more than ever indispensable to them. William of Orange was convinced that without it they were lost. On September 19, 1580, their representatives came and found him at Plessis-les-Tours, where they got his signature to a treaty in which it was stipulated that he should be made “prince et seigneur” of the Netherlands as his predecessors of the house of Burgundy had been; and that, in return, he should bring with him to the Low Countries the alliance and support of the king of France. But here the Duke was promising far more than he could perform. Henry III, it is true, had given him much encouragement in words. On the eve of the treaty of Plessis-les-Tours he protested that he would help his brother jusques à sa chemise. On the day of the peace which ended the Guerre des Amoureux he even put his signature to a secret pact to the same effect, but this time his promise was made conditional on the Duke’s being “effectually received and admitted to the lordship” of the Low Countries; in other words, it was so phrased as to give every opportunity for indefinite postponement. Meantime Anjou began to collect his army of invasion—a motley band, for the king, alarmed by the protests of the Spanish ambassador, did everything possible to put obstacles in his way; but the Duke was so confident of success that he continued to go boldly forward. Finding it impossible to restrain him, Henry and Catharine now determined to make the best of the situation as it was, and to draw from it what advantage they could. With this idea in mind they gave the Duke just such support as they hoped would induce Philip to pay them a high price for abandoning him, and it was with a similar idea in mind that they espoused, at the same time, the cause of Antonio of Portugal. But the king and queen-mother did not even persist in this new policy. The support they gave the Duke was so half-hearted and ineffectual that he only succeeded in revictualling and strengthening Cambray; then, as his cavalry, made up of gentlemen volunteers, had “only enlisted for a summer’s amusement”, he disbanded his forces, and departed for England to press his suit for the hand of Queen Elizabeth.

The net effect of these long months of backing and filling, as far at least as Franco-Spanish relations were concerned, had been very slight. If Anjou was to be a potential troublemaker for Philip, it was evident that he would not receive, for the time being, the cordial support of France. If he were to become really dangerous, it would be through the backing of England, and a chief reason why he had gone forward so boldly with his projects in the Low Countries in the face of the half-heartedness of his brother and his mother was because he had recently been encouraged to believe that he could obtain it.

Ostensibly, at least, the state of the relations of Spain and England had changed for the better since we last considered them. After having been vacant for more than six years, the post of resident Spanish ambassador at London was filled once more in March, 1578.

Don Bernardino de Mendoza, whom Philip selected for the task was one of nineteen children of Alonso Suarez de Mendoza, the third count of Coruna, and Juana Ximenes de Cisneros, a niece of the great cardinal; he was born in Guadalajara in 1540 or 1541. Before he had reached his twenty-first year, he had been given a command in the royal forces; he served at Oran, Peñón de Velez, and Malta from 1563 to 1565. In 1567 he attached himself to the Duke of Alva, and accompanied him into the Low Countries, where he demonstrated his ability and usefulness in many ways; such in fact was his mastery of the military and political situation there, that when he was sent back to Madrid in the spring of 1573, on the proverbially difficult errand of extracting more men and money from the king, he succeeded, after a stay of only two weeks, in obtaining them. From that time forward he was a marked man, and
when, in December, 1577, Elizabeth sent Philip a demand that he make peace with his subjects in Low Countries, the king seized the opportunity to dispatch Mendoza as resident ambassador to London with his reply. His selection, incidentally, was an interesting evidence of the extent to which everyone realized that the fate of Anglo-Spanish relations was bound up with the Netherlands, and of the firmness of Philip’s determination that his official representative in England should be fully apprised of the situation there. Mendoza did not bring with him any specific answer to the point on which Elizabeth had demanded satisfaction, and his failure to do so made his first interviews with the queen rather stormy; but in general his instructions were to be conciliatory. When, in August, 1575, the death of King Sebastian at the battle of Alcazar-el-Kebir opened the prospect of Spain’s annexing Portugal, the king’s anxiety to maintain good relations with England was substantially increased. He was going to have need of all his resources at home. Any dissipation of his energies would be fatal.

There was, however, another side of the picture. Mendoza himself was too hot-blooded to be an entirely willing instrument of the policy of watchful waiting which his master desired him to pursue; incidents occurred almost every day which ruffled his dignity and infuriated him. Important events, moreover, began to occur soon after his arrival in London, which could not fail to strain the relations between England and Spain. The Jesuit mission for the subversion of Elizabeth’s throne, of which Campion and Parsons were the leaders, began its work in 1550, and continued to be a menace until December, 1581; though it was dispatched by a Pope with whom Philip was at odds, and carried out by members of an order of which he disapproved, it was naturally regarded by Englishmen as an expression of Catholic hatred, and Philip, the acknowledged lay head of the forces of the Counter-Reformation, inevitably came in for a generous share of the odium which it aroused. It was also believed that Philip was fomenting rebellion in Ireland; moreover, on December 13, 1577, Sir Francis Drake had set sail on the memorable voyage which put a girdle around the globe; even before his return (September 26, 1580) news had reached Europe of his depredations in the Spanish settlements in the New World. Mendoza remonstrated—more vigorously, in fact, than Philip, in his desire to avoid war, would have approved. The queen countered with queries in regard to the purpose of a great armament which was being assembled at Cadiz; when Drake got back, she refused to give up any of the plunder which he had brought with him, while some of her counsellors mortally offended Mendoza by offering him a good bit of it as a bribe if he would smooth matters over with the Spanish government. There was, finally, the question of Don Antonio of Portugal. In June, 1580, he had sent an envoy to Elizabeth to ask for her recognition and support of his claims, and though the queen was not yet prepared to commit herself, their correspondence continued; by April, 1581, her secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham, had been won over to the pretender’s cause, and two months later Antonio himself arrived in England, where preparations to aid him were at once begun. Every effort was made to conceal the facts, but Mendoza soon got wind of them and reported to Philip, who wrote to Elizabeth demanding that Don Antonio be given up; it was doubtless largely for that reason that Antonio, shortly afterwards, was allowed to cross over to France. Elizabeth did not want war any more than Philip; but the force of events was driving them further and further apart, and the Spanish ambassador at London found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to the temporizing policy of his master. Such, then, was the situation when the Duke of Anjou arrived in London from the Low Countries in November, 1581. He was by this time a familiar figure in England. He had been put forward, as we have already seen, as a suitor for Elizabeth’s hand in 1572, and though rebuffed at the time, he had never abandoned hope; six years later, when he first began seriously to interest himself in the fate of the Netherlands and needed help there, he returned to the charge once more. In August, 1579, he paid her a secret visit, and was on the whole encouragingly received; on the other hand, she could not then be persuaded to give him any assurance that she would vigorously support him in the Low Countries. But now, in 1581, conditions had radically changed. In addition to all the other events of the intervening two years which had threatened to make trouble between Spain and England, the victories, both military and diplomatic of Alexander of Parma imperiled the fate of the revolt in the Netherlands, which it was essential that Elizabeth, for her own safety, should keep alive. Hitherto she had had hopes that France could be brought to perform that important service for her, but now there seemed much less chance of this; the air was full of rumors of a Franco-Spanish understanding, and of the possibility that Anjou might wed a Spanish bride. The inference was obvious. Elizabeth must herself lend aid to the rebels in the Low Countries; she must also encourage Anjou’s matrimonial aspirations to whatever extent it might prove necessary, in order to prevent him from seeking another wife. The first she did with extreme reluctance; the second more willingly—for it rather amused her—, until Anjou, actually convinced that she was in earnest, forgot about the Netherlands and threatened to outstay his welcome in England; then indeed she was hard put to it to get rid of him. She had sent him £30,000 before he reached London, largely as a means of encouraging him to come. He got £10,000 more from her while he was there, and the promise of another £50,000 after he should return to the Netherlands, whither he finally departed in February,
1582. She had bribed him to come in order to bind him to her cause; she had bribed him to go in order to keep him at his task. Nevertheless, despite all the attendant tergiversations and histrionics, this second English visit of the Duke of Anjou marks an epoch in the history of the relations of Philip and Elizabeth. It was the beginning of the end of her policy of marking time. Henceforth she was to be obliged, though most reluctantly, to take sides with increasing definiteness against him.

Meantime in Spain the influence of Cardinal Granvelle was steadily gaining ground, and Philip, in spite of himself, was being driven every day to the adoption of a more aggressive policy against his numerous foes. In his dealings with France and England, the king contrived, indeed, for a little longer to preserve the status quo, for in this phase of Spain’s foreign relations the cardinal had not yet actively intervened; but the success of the Portuguese campaign was a telling argument in favor of more vigorous action, and the place where, next after Portugal, the cardinal was most anxious that vigorous action be taken was in the Low Countries. The events of the year 1579, and above all, Parma’s astonishing success in splitting the Netherlands into two hostile camps, and in winning back the southwestern one to its allegiance to the Spanish monarchy, convinced him that, by a little forcing of the pace, the whole rebellion could be crushed, and the Spanish power re-erected beyond the possibility of overthrow; with that once accomplished, Spain could make her own terms with England and with France. His correspondence in 1580, both with Philip and with Farnese, is full of pleas for severity and repression. To treat or conciliate any longer, he averred, would make the Netherlands kings and Philip their subject. The effect of his representations was speedily evident. On March 15, 1580, there was formally drawn up, and in the following June published, the famous ban of the king against William of Orange, in whom Philip had now recognized the chief source of all his difficulties. It declared him to be a traitor and an enemy of his country. It put a price of 25,000 gold crowns upon his head, and promised the successful assassin forgiveness of any and all crimes that he might have previously committed, and if he were not already noble, a coat of arms. It was answered, before the end of the year, by the famous ‘Apology’ of William of Orange, and again on July 26, 1581, by the solemn deposition of Philip from the sovereignty of the Low Countries by the representatives of the Estates of the provinces of the Union of Utrecht, assembled at the Hague. Save for Holland and Zealand, which stoutly refused to have any other ruler than William the Silent and their own provincial estates, the Duke of Anjou was now the official prince et seigneur of the rebel provinces, under the terms of the treaty of Plessis-les-Tours. When he returned to the Netherlands from England, in early March, 1582, he was received with all honors by the States General, convened at Antwerp, and formally welcomed as their new sovereign. It was evident that before long he and Parma must come to blows.

Neither side, however, was as yet so confident of success as to be willing to be the first to appeal to arms. Anjou had many difficulties in smoothing over the dissensions between the different factions of which his motley following was composed. Despite the wise advice and loyal support of William of Orange, he could not quiet the complaints of the Calvinists against the exercise of Catholic rites by his own immediate suite, or allay the suspicions of the Flemings against the French. Parma, on his side, was even less ready for battle; he had not as yet enough money or enough men. And so it came about that the months after Anjou’s return to the Low Countries were chiefly memorable for a series of attempts by Philip and his representatives to remove their principal enemies by assassination. The years 1582 to 1584 are the great era of murderers and hiring of murderers in the reign of the Prudent King. The resources of diplomacy had been exhausted. If war, which Philip still dreaded, was to be avoided, there seemed to be no other way. In the Low Countries the publication of the ban against Orange had, of course, furnished the king and Parma with a host of applicants for the ugly task for which it promised reward. The first of them to make the attempt was the Basque, Jean Jaureguy, who tried to kill William with a pistol on March 18, at Antwerp, and was slain by the prince’s attendants on the spot. Orange was badly wounded, but finally recovered; the incident, however, did great harm, for the time being, to the cause of the Duke of Anjou, for the mass of the population, with their memories of Coligny and St. Bartholomew, were at first convinced that the plot was of French origin, and were with difficulty brought to understand that it was Spain that was really to blame. In the following summer, an Italian by the name of Baza, and a Spaniard, Salcedo, were caught in an attempt to poison both Orange and Anjou, and confessed that they had both been hired by Parma for the purpose; and three other plots to kill Orange, all of them instigated by Philip or his minions, were detected and foiled before the final and successful one in July, 1584. And it was not merely in the Netherlands that the Spanish government planned to use hired assassins. In England Mendoza, egged on by the Jesuits, Creighton and Parsons, got closely in touch with all the disaffected Catholics in the realm, and dabbled in plots for the murder of Elizabeth. In this case it seems probable that Philip rather sought to restrain than to encourage the efforts of his ambassador. Despite the decision of the Consejo in 1571, he could not bring himself to regard the assassination of a reigning, if heretical, sovereign, like the queen of England, in quite the
same light as that of an arrant rebel like William of Orange; on the other hand, it would appear that he
gave his endorsement to a scheme for that purpose which originally emanated from the Duke of Guise.
In any case, the confession that was racked out of Francis Throgmorton in November, 1583, showed
that Mendoza had been sufficiently implicated in various treasonable designs to make it undesirable that
he should remain any longer in England; in January, 1584, he was ordered out of the realm. The post
that he left vacant in London was not to be filled again during the lifetime of the Prudent King, and
Mendoza was promptly transferred as Spanish ambassador to Paris.

While Philipps campaign of assassination was developing, the weakness and incompetence of
the Duke of Anjou became more and more painfully evident. Seldom, if ever, in history has a hard-
pressed nation called in a more unworthy deliverer. The troops which he had raised in France were
almost useless, and totally failed to prevent Parma from capturing Oudenaarde (July 5, 1582); moreover,
it soon became clear that Henry III would not send him any more, for the Valois court had by this time
turned against him. Since it was thus obvious that Anjou would be unable to redeem his promises in the
treaty of Plessis-les-Tours, the Netherlanders felt themselves absolved from the necessity of keeping
theirs. Though the urgency of Orange, who still felt that the French affiance was the only hope of
salvation, had persuaded them to give him official recognition as their sovereign lord, they showed him
no real respect, and soon refused to obey him; by midsummer, 1582, the queen of England began to
complain of the scant support accorded to her lover. The treatment that the Netherlanders gave Anjou
not unnaturally embittered his feelings towards them. He had no real use for them, save as a means to
enable him to wear a crown. With their aims and ideals, both political and religious, he was almost as
unsympathetic as was Philip of Spain. The situation, so he told his French followers in January, 1583,
had become intolerable, and there were but two ways out of it. Either he must retire from the
Netherlands for good, which would disgrace him, or he must assert his authority there in such fashion
that it would not be questioned again. A plan was therefore concocted whereby his French troops, which
he had brought into the Low Countries in order to fight the Spaniards, should simultaneously seize
possession of the principal towns in Flanders at the expense of the native garrisons. detachments were
dispatched to deal with the smaller places; Antwerp the Duke reserved to himself as his ‘special prey’.
On January 17 he gathered 3000 of his men before its walls on the pretext of holding a review; at
midday, while the burghers were at dinner, a signal was given, and the French rushed into the city
shouting “Ville gagnée! Tue, tue!” A furious street fight ensued, and many were slain, but Orange was
on hand to quiet the tumult, and if need be, organize resistance; by night time order had been restored
and Anjou’s treachery foiled. Needless to add, this ‘French Fury’ at Antwerp was the end of his career
in the Low Countries. For five months more he hung on at Dendermonde, where his adherents had
obtained control, and where Orange continued to negotiate with him in a last desperate attempt to
conserve the French alliance; by the end of June, however, it became evident that nothing could be
done, and Anjou, on the pretext of consulting his mother and getting help from Henry III, retired to
France amid the execrations of his former subjects, and died there (June 10, 1584) of consumption. One
month later William of Orange fell a victim, in his house at Delft, to the bullet of the Burgundian
Balthazar Gerard, and the Netherlanders were left leaderless to face the vengeance of Parma.

The latter, in the meantime, had been getting everything in readiness; now, at last, he was
prepared to launch the great campaign which he had resolved to postpone until he should be certain of
success. The year 1582 had been most fortunate for him. Taking full advantage of the universal
contempt for Anjou, and the conviction that he would be unable permanently to give the land the peace
for which it longed, he persuaded the Estates of Artois and Hainault to permit him to transgress that
section of the peace of Arras which forbade the use of foreign soldiers in the land. The cessation of
hostilities on the Portuguese frontier came in the nick of time; by the month of August three of Philip’s
best tercios arrived from Spain, and were reenforced shortly afterwards by a few regiments from Italy.
Against these the rebels had but a bare 6000 men in the field. The rest were occupied in garrison duty;
militarily speaking, the game was now in Parma’s hands. Yet even now he took no risks. Like the
master whom he served, it was ever his policy to make assurance doubly sure. The eyes of all Europe were
focused on him; it would never do to fail. The years 1583 to 1585 were to be golden years in the
reign of the Prudent King. His power and prestige continued to advance in a line parallel with his
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success. The years 1583 to 1585 were to be golden years in the
He knew, on the other hand, that the wealth of the Netherlands lay in the cities, and that without them the countryside could not support itself. The cities, in other words, must be taken, but they must be taken by the slow and certain methods of starvation and blockade; he must rely on his engineers rather than on his officers. He must, in the first place, close all the rivers so as to cut off the most obvious means of communication with the adjacent countries and the sea. He must erect blockhouses at strategic points, and keep constantly on the watch for unexpected convoys of supplies. These methods, by the spring of 1583, were already in full operation. Ypres, in January of that year, was the first large city to be cut off, and finally surrendered in April, 1584. Bruges followed on the 20th of the following May. Ghent, which came next on the list, offered a tragic spectacle of futile heroism, desperate and prolonged, but no effective resistance. When the inhabitants learned of the murder of William of Orange, they sent their condolences to Maurice of Nassau and congratulated him on being there to lead them against the tyranny of Spain. They told each other heartrending tales of Spanish Catholic bigotry and cruelty. The slow inexorable processes of famine, however, it was impossible to defy; on September 17, 1584, Ghent bowed to the inevitable. Brussels followed on March 10, 1585, and here, as in every other case, men noted with wonder and admiration the extreme liberality of the terms which Parma offered to the inhabitants of the vanquished towns. It was Tournai all over again, and even more. General pardon, preservation of all the ancient customs, trifling indemnities (in the case of Brussels the amount was remitted entirely), were the order of the day. The Protestants were dumbfounded to discover that one of whom they had heard such dreadful things could be so generous, and Parma, as he had doubtless intended from the first, made much capital for himself within the walls of still defiant Antwerp. All exercise of the reformed religion was indeed strictly forbidden, but the Protestants were given two years in which to decide whether or not they would conform. Certainly no servant of Philip II could have been expected to concede more; indeed Parma was so disturbed lest his master should find him too lenient and disavow him, that he wrote a full explanation of his policy to Madrid.

Meantime, beyond the limits of the Low Countries, the diplomacy of Spain had been proceeding with marvelous success. The rebels still continued, after the flight of Anjou, to pin their hopes on France, and on April 25, 1584, they had recognized Henry III as his successor in the sovereignty of the Low Countries. But the king of France was in no position to assume such an arduous responsibility. Even in the more promising years that had preceded, he had been by no means enthusiastic for his brother’s cause; now, far from taking up the cudgels against Spain in a foreign land, he found himself obliged to seek measures of defense against her at home. On the last day of the year 1584, Philip played the card that he had held up his sleeve for so long, and amply revenged himself on the Valois for their lukewarmness in religion, by alloying himself with the Guises in the treaty of Joinville, against the French crown and the heretic Bourbon who was there to claim it as soon as Henry III should have passed to the grave. French opposition to Spain in the Low Countries could be safely ignored for the next few years; the Valois were amply occupied at home.

And now the eyes of all Europe were turned on Antwerp. Until Antwerp was taken, Philip could not call himself undisputed master of the provinces of the Union of Arras; and until rebellion was utterly crushed in the provinces of the Union of Arras, Parma could not safely attack the chief strongholds of his master’s enemies farther north. The city was garrisoned by a strong force of Netherlanders, French Huguenots, and Scots, ably led by Orange’s devoted friend Marnix, and all of them enthusiastic for their cause; moreover, it was so situated that the mere methods of starvation and blockade, which Parma had employed so successfully at Ghent and Brussels, would not suffice to compel its surrender. It possessed a number of exterior forts, from which sallies could be effectively made against beleaguering armies. More important still, the Scheldt, on which it stands, was so broad that Parma’s few small ships were unable to guard it, and as long as the Scheldt remained open, provisions could not be cut off. But Parma’s engineers were fully equal to the occasion; only give them time, and they promised that the Scheldt should be closed. And so, in September, 1584, the long process began, methodical, unrelenting, inevitable, after a fashion that must have delighted the heart of the Prudent King. Clearly some sort of a barrier or estacada must be built across the river. The difficulty was that the cannon of the forts of Antwerp commanded the chief approaches to all available points, so that the enterprise was generally regarded as impracticable. But the Spaniards were able, at this crisis, to utilize the peculiar characteristics of the Low Countries against the Netherlanders, almost as effectively as the Netherlanders, in former years, had utilized those same characteristics against them. The ‘canal of Parma’ dug with infinite labor across the marshy land of Waes, made it possible to bring the necessary materials to the desired point in flatboats. On February 25, 1585, the estacada was finished, the Scheldt closed, and Antwerp’s principal avenue of supplies cut off. The fall of Brussels, on March 10, the failure of Holland and Zealand to send effective relief, and the increasing conviction that Henry III could do nothing for them, all served at the same time to dishearten the garrison and the inhabitants of
the beleaguered city; the civil and military authorities were at loggerheads. Every effort was indeed made to break down the estacada and reopen the Scheldt. Floating batteries and infernal machines were sent down the river whenever there was a favorable wind and tide; but after the most formidable of them all, constructed by the Italian Gianibelli, had failed in April, 1585, permanently to accomplish its purpose, it became evident that starvation could not long be delayed. The slow inexorable advance of Parma’s besieging forces in the next few weeks, the capture of the Kownestyn dyke on May 26, and of Mechlin on July 17, served to convince the most obdurate that surrender was now inevitable. On August 17 Antwerp capitulated, on terms essentially similar to those which had been granted to Brussels and Ghent, though the period of grace granted to the Protestants, in which to turn Catholic or leave the land, was extended in this case to four years. Never had Parma shown himself greater than in victory. Never did he forget that his ultimate object was not to terrorize the Low Countries into unwilling submission, but rather to win them back gladly to their allegiance. When he made his formal entrance into the conquered city, he took pains to keep his Spanish and Italian officers away. His escort was solely composed of the scions of the most ancient families of the land. It was like the joyeuse entrée of a national prince in the good old Burgundian days.

It has been well said that the capture of Antwerp marks the climax of the career of Alexander of Parma; it might also be characterized with equal truth as the apotheosis of the reign of the Prudent King, and perhaps indeed of the power and prestige of the Spanish Empire. We have already had occasion to point out the great strength of Spain’s position in 1575-79, but now it was far stronger still. In the intervening years the conquest of Portugal and of the Portuguese Empire had been converted from a dream into an accomplished fact. France had been immobilized, and the larger and more important part of the Low Countries had been won back to allegiance. Militant Catholicism was once more in the saddle, with Philip as its acknowledged lay leader. Hopes were even cherished that Protestantism might be utterly stamped out. Never had Spain seemed so majestic, so invincible. The world was apparently at her feet.

Four years later the picture had wholly changed, and England was to be the chief instrument in effecting that tremendous reversal. We therefore return to the relations between Philip and Queen Elizabeth, which we left in the month of January, 1584, when the Spanish ambassador Bernardino de Mendoza was ordered out of the realm.

The story of the conversion of the Prudent King to whole-hearted approval and support of a vigorous Spanish attack on England will probably never be fully known, but it seems certain that the process was not complete till late in the year 1585. At the outset he had shown no inclination to proceed vigorously against the realm in which he had reigned as king consort from 1554 to 1558. The Anglo-Spanish tradition was, as we have seen, on the whole, distinctly amicable, and despite his initial rebuff by Queen Elizabeth, Philip cherished high hopes, during the first half of his reign, that England might ultimately be brought back into the Roman fold without a war. England seemed to him, moreover, to lie somewhat outside the orbit of European politics. Certainly he had many other more immediately pressing responsibilities. Even if he should attack and conquer her, there was grave question whether or not he would be any better off. He would doubtless be able to re-Catholicize the kingdom, at least on paper, but he could not set up a Spanish government there. The legal heiress of Elizabeth was Mary queen of Scots. Philip, a stickler for legality, would be in honor bound to place her on the English throne, and in view of the Scottish queen’s maternal ancestry and affiliations, her accession in England would redound to the benefit of Spain’s traditional enemy, France. All these, and other considerations, combined to make the Prudent King hold back, when his ambassadors and admirals urged him to attack in force. He dabbled indeed in Catholic plots, and gave the discontented English Romanists large promises of Spanish support. In February, 1580, he even concluded an offensive alliance against Elizabeth with the grand duke of Tuscany and the Pope. But when it came to giving actual effect to these proposals, he could not be induced to move. Three years later it was the same story over again. When the Marquis of Santa Cruz had defeated the second of the two squadrons which the pretender Antonio had sent to the Azores, he I wrote (August 9, 1583) to Philip urging an immediate and vigorous attack upon England; indeed, his letter to the king is generally regarded as the initial step in the preparations for the sending of the Spanish Armada. But Philip was not yet prepared to do much more than “take his admiral’s proposal into consideration.” He wrote him, indeed, a letter of thanks, and spoke vaguely of certain indispensable preliminary orders to be issued. He also sounded Alexander Farnese at the same time in regard to the feasibility of the plan and received from him a characteristically cautious reply. The letters they exchanged are particularly interesting as evidence of how closely the attack on England and the suppression of the revolt in the Netherlands were connected.
in the minds of the king and of his nephew, and of the way in which they both regarded the former, from the very outset, as a land and a naval expedition combined. But for the time being nothing more was done. During the year 1584 the whole project was apparently dropped again.

In the autumn of 1585 fresh rumors of an ‘English expedition’ began to fill the air. Lisbon was to be the rendezvous for the various contingents; the king, if his health permitted, was to go thither in person to superintend things. Gradenigo, the Venetian ambassador, was at first inclined to believe that it might all “be only a ruse to induce the Pope to grant the bull of crusade”, but things developed before the close of the year in such fashion as to convince him that this time Philip really meant business. The greatest of Drake’s plundering expeditions, to Vigo, Santiago, Santo Domingo, Cartagena, and Florida, had left Plymouth on September 14; full reports of its first depredations had already reached the Spanish court, and exceeded anything that had been heard of corsarios Luteranos before. Hot on the heels of this came word of the expedition under the Earl of Leicester which Queen Elizabeth had finally consented to send to the relief of the Netherlands. We may well believe that this conjunction of events roused fury in the heart of the Spanish king. He had been patient, infinitely patient, vastly more patient than his soldiers and sailors could possibly comprehend, in suffering the insults and injuries of England. He had hoped against hope that “time would cure all things”, but it seemed, instead, to have made them decidedly worse. His mounting prestige and accessing of territory and power had neither impressed nor terrified the English pirates as he had expected; quite the contrary, they had but stimulated them to unprecedented outrages. His heretical sister-in-law had hitherto confined her activities on behalf of the rebels in the Low Countries to vague promises of encouragement and lending of money. Now she had dispatched an expedition of 6,000 men to their relief; she was assuming the role which France had been obliged to lay down. Small wonder if Philip was at last convinced that the game of patience had been played out, and that the great enterprise, which he had hitherto postponed and postponed in favor of every other item on his vastly overloaded program, must be undertaken whole-heartedly and at once. When the Marquis of Santa Cruz wrote to him a second time on January 13, 1586, again advising him to fit out and dispatch an expedition against England, the king ordered his secretary, Idiaquez, to request him to draw up a plan of campaign.

Two months later the Marquis sent in his preliminary estimates, gigantic in size, meticulous in detail; not only Spain and Portugal, but also all the Italian and Mediterranean possessions were to bear their share of the tremendous burden. There were to be 150 ships in all, not counting urcas de carga and navios pequeños; of these nearly one-third were classified as galleasses or galleons, and the rest as naves gruesas or armed merchantmen; the total tonnage was estimated at 77,250. The fleet was to carry with it no less than 55,000 infantry, of whom 28,000 were to be Spaniards, 15,000 Italians, and 12,000 Germans; there were also to be 1600 horse and over 4000 artillerymen. The land forces on board were, in fact, to be twice as numerous as the sailors; evidently, even in the mind of such an old salt as Santa Cruz, the real purpose of the Armada was to convey the invincible Spanish army to a point where it could engage, either on the decks of the ships or on shore, with the land forces of the foe. The whole cost of wages, armament, ammunition, and supplies for eight months, was reckoned at 3,801,288 ducats; of this 1,211,769 was to be levied in Naples, Sicily, and Milan, thus leaving 2,589,519 to be charged to the crown of Castile.

Philip approved the plan; and by the spring of 1586 there were signs of great activity in all the ports and shipyards of Spain, Portugal, and the Spanish possessions in Italy. No one was to be allowed, according to the king’s instructions, to know exactly what the object of all the preparations was, but it must have been clear to every one that some great enterprise was afoot. Those preparations were not permitted to go on undisturbed. News of Drake’s depredations in the Indies reached Philip in April, and he promptly commanded Santa Cruz to sail thither and take vengeance; but before the admiral could depart, word came that the pirate had got safely back to England, and Santa Cruz remained at home. In the summer of 1586 five London merchantmen, returning from the Levant, decisively defeated and put to flight Philip’s Sicilian squadron of two frigates and eleven galleys, which had been lying in wait to intercept them off the little island of Pantellaria. A year later the king received an even more disagreeable and dramatic reminder of the daring insolence of the corsarios ingleses. In April, 1587, Drake appeared off Cadiz, sailed straight into the harbor, sank or burned eighteen of the ships that were lying there, and captured six more, all laden with provisions and munitions of war. He then passed along the coast of Algarve, pillaging as he went, and established a base at Cape St. Vincent. Through May and early June he cruised in the adjacent waters, capturing dispatch boats and preventing concentrations, and, finally, possessed himself of a Portuguese East Indiaman, the San Filipe, said to have been the largest merchantman in the world, with a cargo worth more than 250,000 ducats, with which he returned in safety to England. Small wonder if Philip’s great machine was paralyzed by such whirlwind tactics as this. And just at the moment that the Spanish monarch was in most desperate need
of vigorous and aggressive advice and support, he was deprived by death of the most efficient of his servants. On September 21, 1586, Cardinal Granvelle, who, ever since his summons to Spain in 1579, had headed the war party in the royal councils, and had ardently supported the expedition against England, succumbed at last to the attacks of a fever which he had gallantly fought off during the three preceding months. His influence, during the last four years of his life, had been considerably less powerful than in the days of the annexation of Portugal, when for a brief space he had literally managed everything; the king, as usual, had grown jealous of his chief minister, and withdrew much of the authority with which he had been previously invested. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the vigorous, aggressive line of action which the cardinal personified had remained the basis of the royal policy, even after its originator had been elbowed aside; the king might make the actual decisions, but the guiding principle of them was still Granvelle’s. Whether Philip would have consented to avail himself of the cardinal’s administrative genius in the final stages of the preparations of the Armada had Granvelle lived, may well be doubted; but the fact remains that his death removed the only man in Spain really capable of effectively directing the organization of the vastest enterprise that the Prudent King was ever to undertake.

The loss of Granvelle and the ravages of Drake were not the only misfortunes that Philip suffered during the period when the Armada was being got ready to sail. The state of Spain’s foreign relations was a constant anxiety to him; and he was particularly disquieted by the attitude of Pope Sixtus V. At Rome, of course, he had emphasized the fact that the Armada was to be sent primarily for the purpose of bringing England back to the Catholic fold; it was to be the realization of a plan that had been cherished by the Holy See ever since the accession of Queen Elizabeth. It was to be the fulfilment of the motto of the Counter-Reformation, “No heretic shall be allowed to reign”. Obviously, under these circumstances, Philip felt that he had the right to expect the hearty approval and support of the Pope in his great adventure; he counted on him, moreover, for a liberal contribution in funds. But Sixtus V was inclined to view the matter in a somewhat different light. He did not conceal from himself the fact that, politically speaking, the expedition, if successful, would redound chiefly to the benefit of Spain, and that her preponderance, already intolerable, would thereby be so much further enhanced that Rome would henceforth have to take her orders from Madrid. He recognized that England under the ‘new Jezebel’ was rapidly becoming the chief stronghold of heresy; but at the same time he was fully alive to the great qualities of Elizabeth, and he still cherished the hope that she might be induced by peaceful means to return to Rome. There was a long period of diplomatic thrust and parry between the Pope and Philip’s representative at the Vatican, the Count of Olivares, in the winter of 1585-86. It showed, on the one hand, how deep was the distrust between Spain and the Holy See; on the other, it made it evident that neither could afford to bid the other defiance. Before Christmas, 1585, the Pope had been prevailed on to grant Philip for seven years all the revenues of the bull of crusade, which amounted annually to 1,800,000 crowns. But on his side, Sixtus not unnaturally felt that he had a right, in return for such a liberal contribution, to expect that Philip would get something promptly done. He was loud in his complaints of the Spanish monarch’s interminable delays and of the fact that the great undertaking was again and again postponed. It would be difficult to conceive of two personalities less fitted to understand one another and effectively cooperate than the brilliant, fiery, impetuous pontiff, and the slow-moving, meticulous, Prudent King.

The situation was, of course, still further complicated by the state of affairs in England itself. Mary queen of Scots, the legal heiress of Elizabeth, and in the eyes of all good Catholics the lawful queen of England, had been a prisoner in her cousin’s kingdom ever since her flight from Scotland in 1568. She had been the center and rallying point of all sorts of conspiracies against Elizabeth’s life and throne; men marveled that she had been permitted to live. But Elizabeth was deeply loyal to her grandfather’s idea that the crowns of England and Scotland must someday be united. Provided she herself was permitted to live out her own days in peace, she was fully prepared to have Mary succeed her; and the fact that Mary’s son, the future James I, had gone over to Protestantism in 1585 naturally tended to confirm the English queen’s resolution. Mary, on the other hand, was so angered at her son’s defection from the cause of Rome that she made haste to disinherit him. On May 20, 1586, she wrote to Bernardino de Mendoza at Paris that she formally handed over all her rights to the English succession to his master the king of Spain; and a month later Mendoza transmitted to Philip a genealogical chart for the purpose of making clear to him that he, as a direct descendant of Catharine of Lancaster, the daughter of John of Gaunt, who had married Henry III of Castile, was himself, next after the Stuarts, the lawful heir of the crown of England in his own right. All this naturally had far reaching effects on the policy and plans of the Prudent King. He was, by nature, deeply respectful of precedent and law. One of the things that had made him hesitate so long over the enterprise against England was the reflection that, if successful, it would redound to the political advantage of the Stuarts, and also indirectly, owing to
their French affiliations, to that of his most powerful continental rival. Now, after Mary queen of Scots should die, the Stuart claims would lapse and Spain would reap the reward she so richly deserved. Of course these same facts would make Sixtus hold off, for they would redouble his dread of Spanish preponderance; but James’s conversion to Protestantism was a telling argument on the other side. Unless the Pope supported the expedition, there was every probability that England and Scotland would be permanently lost to Rome. So forcibly, in fact, was this latter argument advanced by Olivares at the Vatican that by midsummer, 1586, the Pope declared himself prepared to grant 500,000 scudi out of the papal treasury, and 2,000,000 more from the revenues of the Spanish clergy, if Philip would add another 2,000,000 of his own.

By the summer of 1587, however, the state of affairs had been considerably clarified. Philip’s preparations were by this time so well under way that Sixtus could no longer doubt that he really meant business; and the execution of Mary queen of Scots on February 8/18 served to force Pope and king, despite all their mutual suspicions, into closer alliance against England. One of the chief causes of Philip’s long delays had been the fact that Mary had been permitted to live so long. If England, through her means, could be brought back to the Roman fold without a war, he would be spared the necessity of the invasion which he never really desired to undertake. Mendoza, in Paris, when first informed of the schemes that lay at the bottom of the Babington plot, wished to halt all the projects of attack until the issue of the conspiracy had been determined. Now, however, that the plotters had been foiled, and Mary’s head had fallen, there remained no alternative to war. Then, in the second place, the removal of the Scottish queen made Philip, at least in his own eyes, the lawful king of England, and, in view of the situation across the Channel at that juncture, the possession of England would be invaluable to him. He made haste to demand of the Holy See that he himself be invested with the English crown, and when Sixtus demurred, he asked that it be given to his daughter, Isabella Clara Eugenia—thus reviving all the Pope’s fears of an intolerable Spanish preponderance. On the other hand, the execution of the Scottish queen was a deed of blood which the church of Rome was in honor bound to punish and avenge. The faint hopes which Sixtus had once cherished that France might be used for that purpose had now been shattered; only by availing himself of the services of the king of Spain would it be possible for him to accomplish his purpose. So, on July 29, 1587, a definite treaty was drawn up between the Holy See and the Spanish crown. Sixtus promised a subsidy of 1,000,000 scudi, on condition that the expedition should set sail before the end of the year. Philip, if successful, was to nominate for England, subject to papal approval and investiture, a king pledged to restore and, maintain the Roman Catholic faith. How fully the treaty would have been observed, had the great enterprise been successful, may be open to question; but it seems, clear that for the present Philip had succeeded in getting the Pope into line.

During all the period covered by these negotiations it had become increasingly plain that the Spanish invasion of England was to take the form of a land and a naval expedition combined, and that the fleet which was being prepared in the Spanish ports was to act in cooperation with the Spanish forces in the Netherlands. It will be remembered that Philip had consulted Alexander of Parma as to the feasibility of the enterprise years before, in 1583, when the idea was still nebulous. In the following year he placed a large measure of the direction of it in Parma’s hands; apparently, at this stage of the proceedings, it was only to his nephew in the Low Countries that the Prudent King ventured to open his whole heart with regard to the invasion of England. Parma was even more certain than Philip that the conquest of Britain and the suppression of the revolt in the Netherlands were but parts of the same problem; England was the head and Holland and Zealand the neck and arms of the same body. The expedition of the Earl of Leicester, though barren of immediate results, had still further emphasized the closeness of the connection, and Parma must have been delighted to receive from his uncle a letter written on December 29, 1585, in which Philip declared that without full po session of a port in the Low Countries nothing could possibly be accomplished against England. But when it came to giving effect to this idea, it was a very different story. No decision could be reached for a long time as to what port should be selected for the purpose. Parma’s capture of Sluys, in August, 1587, seemed momentarily to settle the matter; but Parma, like Sixtus, had expected the invasion to take place in 1587. He had calculated on a rapid concentration and the effects of a surprise. By the postponement of the expedition to 1588 his enemies were given time to make counter-preparations and prevent the flatboats which had been constructed in the heart of Flanders from ever reaching Sluys at all. There were also numerous threats of a diversion in the form of an attack from the Huguenots in France. Though no such attack ever took place, the fear of it was a constant anxiety to the duke. But all these troubles paled into insignificance in comparison with the increasing difficulty of cooperating with Madrid. Philip’s counsellors had worked on their master’s well-known fear lest distant subordinates should get too independent in order to discredit Parma. They insisted that he had vast ambitions of his own and was aiming solely to fulfil them. By the winter of 1587-88 Philip was often at cross purposes with the only
man to whom four years before he had been willing to give his full confidence; he sent him neither the money nor the reinforcements on which the duke had counted. In Parma’s eyes, from the very first, the Spanish army in the Low Countries had been the vital factor in the whole affair, and the sole function of the Armada was to be to insure its safe transportation to England. In Philip’s mind the enterprise still took the shape of a land and a naval expedition combined, but the naval part of it had by this time assumed far greater relative importance than he had originally intended or Parma ever desired.

Parma was not the only one of Philip’s servants whose efficiency and independence made them objects of suspicion to their master; there still remained one more, the last of the old sea-dogs of Lepanto, Alvaro de Bazán, the venerable Marquis of Santa Cruz. One of the chief reasons why the king had steadily tended, since the beginning of 1586, to lay more and more weight on the fleet and the naval side of the expedition, and less and less on the Spanish regiments in the Low Countries, was that the former, in Spain and Portugal, was more or less under his eyes, and therefore subject to his control. He demanded that every smallest detail of its preparation, provisioning, and armament be referred to himself for final decision; never before had he pretended to such unlimited omniscience. All this was gall and wormwood to Santa Cruz. He was well aware that he knew more of naval affairs than any man in Spain, and that the king was almost totally ignorant of them; to be bound hand and foot by instructions from the Escorial was intolerable to him. Yet in spite of all the difficulties with which he was beset, he gallantly carried on his work; and it is vastly to his credit that he had got practically all the fleet concentrated at Lisbon and ready to sail, when death overtook him on February 9, 1588. The king was by no means sorry to be rid of him. The Marquis was not only far too independent, but also much too popular to suit his taste; in any case, his removal gave Philip the opportunity to place in command of the Armada a man of whom it may truthfully be said that such was his ignorance of naval affairs that he had no alternative save blindly to obey the commands of his sovereign. Alonso Perez de Guzman el Bueno, Duke of Medina Sidonia, who was given the post, was the richest peer in Spain. He was thirty-eight years old at the time of his appointment and had been married since 1572 to the daughter of Philip’s old minister, Ruy Gomez, and the Princess of Eboli. He was dumfounded when he learned that the king had selected him, and protested, with pathetic truthfulness, that he had no qualifications whatsoever for the post; but Philip insisted, and of course ultimately had his way. It was characteristic of him that in a crisis like the present, when time was of the essence, he permitted six full weeks to be wasted in futile correspondence with his new admiral; Medina Sidonia’s formal appointment as ‘captain-general of the Ocean Sea’ was not issued until March 21. With it was sent a long letter of instructions, which reveals, if nothing else, how completely the king had now assumed control. Some of the topics with which those instructions deal shed a flood of light on the workings of Philip’s mind. One example will suffice: Medina Sidonia was ordered to take special care to prevent his soldiers and sailors from swearing, and from gambling because it led to swearing.

The Duke had been ordered to set sail as soon as possible; he had hoped, in fact, to get away by the end of March, in order to avoid the strong north winds which blow down the Portuguese coast in the later spring. But as soon as he had arrived at Lisbon, it immediately became evident, even to his inexperienced eye, that another long postponement was inevitable. Most of the provisions that Santa Cruz had got on board had by this time gone bad; it was essential to replace them. More alarming still was the shortage of munitions, especially of powder. Not only was there not nearly enough on board, it was apparently almost impossible to purchase any more; the king, as usual, was loath to grant any money, and there was much talk of cheating, if not of treason, on the part of the purveyors and contractors. Such were a few of the more immediate practical problems with which Medina Sidonia was confronted, and his confusion became worse confounded still when in early April he received a letter from Philip instructing him in the ways in which the forthcoming campaign was to be fought. Cooperation with Parma and the transportation of his veterans to England were, of course, to be the keynote of it. But Parma was now virtually blockaded by the Dutch, and besides, the sailing of the Armada had been so often postponed that there was no longer any possibility of effecting the surprise on which he had counted; the English had had every opportunity to forecast Philip’s plans, and were aiding their Dutch allies to forestall them. The Armada, so the king directed, was to remain in close formation, and never to separate in pursuit of a fleeting foe. It was to fight at close range, while the English would be certain to shoot from a distance; how this was to be effected in view of the enemy’s recognized superiority in speed Philip could not define, but doubtless God would take care of it. Throughout the entire paper one finds evidence that the king was convinced that only a small portion of the English fleet was at Plymouth and that the main body of it would be encountered in the narrows of the Channel, where it would certainly be stationed in order to keep watch on Parma. The Armada was therefore to proceed directly to the narrows and get control of them before it attempted to gain a base in England. At the time (April 1) that the king wrote these instructions, the disposition of the enemy fleet
was, indeed, very much what he had supposed. Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher were at Plymouth, but Lord Howard of Effingham, who was, officially at least, the English commander-in-chief, was still, with some of his best ships, patrolling Calais Roads. By mid-April, however, it had become obvious that a much smaller squadron, under Lord Seymour, was quite adequate to the task of watching Parma. It was also evident that Howard could be more useful farther westward; and on May 23, long before the Armada finally left the coasts of Spain, all of the really effective vessels in the English fleet were united in Plymouth Sound. The sequel will show that this change was to be of primary importance in determining the issue of the campaign.

Submerged by the steadily rising tide of conflicting orders and demands, Medina Sidonia struggled bravely, if incompetently, on; by May 10 everything was at last as nearly ready as he was able to get it. The Armada, when finally united, was considerably less imposing than the estimates of Santa Cruz had called for two years before. There were now 130 vessels as against 150, and of these only 73 could be fairly regarded as fitted to take their place in the battle line; the rest were lighter craft and hulks. The total tonnage was now 57,868 instead of 77,250; the gente de guerra had diminished from 63,890 to 19,295; the gente de mar y de remo had shrunk to 10,138; and all these figures were to be still further lessened before the Armada got into contact with the English fleet. It was divided into a number of territorial squadrons, Portuguese, Castilian, Andalusian, Italian, etc., according to the custom of the time, each of them commanded by an officer of experience and distinction; Juan Martinez de Recalde, Miguel de Oquendo, Martin de Bertendona, and Pedro de Valdes were perhaps the most eminent. Diego Flores Valdes, who had already made a name for himself in American waters, sailed with Medina Sidonia on his flagship, the San Martin. The king had commanded that in all questions of tactics the Duke should defer to his advice, so that he became, in fact, the real commander of the Armada. Why Philip selected him must always remain a mystery, for all the other squadron commanders had more experience and better fighting records than he.

None of the many comparisons that have recently been made between the fighting strengths of the Armada and of the English fleet is wholly satisfactory, because conditions shifted so rapidly during the ten days in which they were in contact; but they all tend to emphasize the important fact that the Armada was by no means so much the larger as used to be popularly supposed. Though the Spaniards had at least thirty more vessels than their foes when first they met off Plymouth Sound, the superiority was much less than it seemed, for they were not able, as were the English, to develop all the offensive power they had; and by the time that Seymour had joined with Howard and Drake off Gravelines, it seems clear that the English were actually more numerous than the Spaniards. In tonnage the Armada was indeed greatly superior, at least on paper; but the Spanish system of tonnage measurement was so different from the English that it now appears that the amount of their superiority should be reduced by at least one-third. Furthermore, that superiority, such as it was, became, under the circumstances under which the fight was to be fought, a positive disadvantage; for the Spaniards, rising tier on tier out of the sea, both fore and aft, till the “ocean groaned under their weight”, made a far easier mark than the English vessels, which were high out of water only at the stern and cut very low in the bows. The greater weatherliness of the English ships, perhaps the crucial factor in the whole campaign, was also largely ascribable to the same cause. The proportion of soldiers to sailors on the Armada was far larger than on the English fleet, but this again, as things actually worked out, was destined to do it more harm than good. In weight, range, and efficiency of gun power the English were clearly preponderant. Had the Spaniards been able, as they hoped against hope, to lure their foes into an old-fashioned encounter of ramming and boarding, on the lines of the battle of Lepanto, they might have had a chance. Under the conditions which the English were able to impose upon them, they were foredoomed to failure.

But it was not in Philip’s nature to foresee new things. Parma from the Netherlands kept urging him to send the Armada on, and finally communicated some measure of his impatience to his master; the king was now anxious to have the great enterprise begin. There might still be practical deficiencies in leadership, munitions, and supplies, but every single man in the Armada had a certificate stating that he had confessed and been absolved, and monks and nuns had encouraged the commander with assurances of divine help. On May 14 Medina Sidonia reported to the king that the fleet had begun to drop down the Tagus to Belem; on the 30th he had put to sea. The wind on that day was a mere zephyr from the northeast, but the Armada was unable to make way against it. On June 1 it had drifted down to the south of Cape Espichel; not till a fortnight later did it regain the latitude of Lisbon. Meantime the results of bad provisioning had become tragically apparent. The food stank, and the water was foul; 500 of the men were already down with dysentery; the crews complained, and the officers were in despair. On June 10, the wind shifted to the southwest, and the Armada at last got fairly started to the north; but the sickness on board continued to increase, and when, on the 19th, the wind became a gale, there was nothing for it but to put in at Corunna. At first only forty of the ships were able to make the port; for
despite the king’s insistent orders that the fleet keep close together, the wind had scattered it. Not till more than two weeks later could it be collected again, and when the crews got on shore, large numbers of them deserted. The Duke was despondent. He feared that the news of his plight would reach England, and that corsarios would be sent to capture his battered ships. On June 24 he wrote to Philip, advising the abandonment of the enterprise. But the king would not hear of it; on July 5 and 12 he sent vigorous letters to the Duke, promising to provide him with everything he needed, but commanding him to set sail at the earliest possible moment. The vice-admiral and the generals, too, were all opposed to giving up. Valdes was particularly insistent, and Recalde seized the opportunity to make a final though futile appeal to Philip to modify his instructions, and permit the fleet to secure a port on the English coast before advancing to the narrows of the Channel. Meantime fresh food and good water had been taken on board. The necessary repairs were made, and the gaps in the crews were filled up. Every man on the fleet confessed and received the sacrament again; and finally, on Friday, July 22, the Armada made a fresh start out of Corunna. This time the wind blew strong out of the southwest; in the next three days the fleet had crossed the Bay of Biscay and reached the mouth of the English Channel. There they encountered another storm, which scattered them and sent most of the galleys and the flagship of Recalde flying for refuge into the nearest French ports; but on Friday, the 29th, the majority of the stragglers had been collected again. The wind now blew gently from the southwest, as the fleet came in sight of the Lizard. On the following day, at two o’clock in the afternoon, Medina Sidonia, convinced that the crucial hour had at last arrived, determined to reenact the great scene that had inspired the Christians on the eve of Lepanto. A standard, displaying Christ crucified on the one side, and the Virgin Alary on the other, was run up at the masthead of the flagship; three pieces of artillery were shot off, “and every man in the fleet knelt down and prayed our Lord to give us victory over the enemies of his faith.”

But the crisis which the Duke anticipated was not to come. While he knelt with his followers on the deck of his galleon, it was actually occurring, if not already past. Early on the Friday afternoon, Captain Fleming of the Golden Hind had burst in on Drake and his officers, who were playing their historic game of bowls on Plymouth Hoe, with the news that the Armada was already off the Lizard, and slowly proceeding before the southwest wind toward Dodman Point. The Spaniards, in other words, now threatened to catch the English in the very predicament in which the English had so often sought to catch them: cooped up in a narrow harbor, with the breeze blowing full into the mouth of it, where a vigorous attack, prepared with fire-ships, could scarcely fail of complete success. There was but one way to meet the situation, namely, to get to sea at once, and to the windward, if possible, of the Armada, where the superior gunnery and sailing qualities of the English ships would be fully available; and this, despite the obvious perils of uncovering the threatened port, Drake and Howard determined at once to do. On the Friday night the ships were warped out of the harbor; on Saturday morning the best of them were beating out of Plymouth Sound. In the early afternoon fifty-four of them had almost reached Eddystone, where for the first time they caught sight of the Spaniards. At the same moment the wind died down, and rain and fog came on, so that there was nothing further to be done save to lie still under bare poles in order that the enemy might not see them. On the Armada, in the meantime, a council of war was being held, in which the expediency of attacking Plymouth in defiance of Philip’s instructions was ardently debated. What decision was reached we cannot surely tell, for the accounts are very contradictory. At any rate, when sunset at last revealed the English fleet a few miles to the leeward, off Eddystone, the Duke immediately came to anchor, for he was convinced that he must keep the weather gauge in the attack which he confidently expected on the following morning.1 But this was just what the enemy was determined at all costs to prevent. Soon after sundown, the southwest wind rose once more, and the English ships again made sail. The main body of them stood south, out to sea, across the front of the Armada, but apparently the Spaniards never saw them; their attention was distracted by eight other ships which were beating dead to windward, between the left wing of the Armada and the shore. Consequently the Duke made no effort at all to prevent his right flank from being turned, and at daybreak on the Sunday morning he was dumfounded to discover the pick of his daring foes reunited in safety to the windward of him. The position had been assumed which, skillfully maintained and improved by Drake and his followers during the next ten days, was ultimately to transfer from Spain to England the sovereignty of the seas. It was the decisive maneuver of the entire campaign.

It used to be said that the Armada advanced up the Channel in the form of a huge crescent, convex side to the fore, and this conception has been confirmed by numerous contemporary charts and drawings and by the tapestries in the House of Lords. But recent research has made it abundantly clear that this was not the case. The basic idea on which Philip’s elaborate instructions and Medina Sidonia’s orders were founded was that the Armada would be exposed, as it sailed up the Channel, to attacks in both front and rear: in the rear from Drake and his ships who were known to be in Plymouth, and in
front from the main body of the English fleet, which the Spaniards confidently believed would be awaiting them in the narrows. Even after Medina Sidonia learned, on Sunday morning, the 31st, that Howard had joined forces with Drake, he could not get it into his head that practically the whole fighting force of his enemies was behind him. He therefore adhered to his original formation. He himself, on the flagship San Martin, led the vanguard or ‘main battle’, consisting of two squadrons of his best galleons, each strengthened by a galleasse; in the center, directly behind him, were the hulks and the victuallers; and behind them, in turn, a strong rearguard of four squadrons, of which the two hindmost were placed on the extreme left and right, and each protected by a galleasse. As all the attacks of importance were to come from behind, it will be readily seen that the adoption of this formation virtually wasted a large proportion of the Duke’s best ships, because they could not get into the fight; it will also serve, at least partially, to explain the origin and persistence of the idea of the crescent formation, since it was like a crescent that the Armada must have appeared when seen by the English from behind. The English tactics, on the other hand, were devised with the idea of making the fullest possible use of the two unquestioned points of English superiority, namely, better sailing ability and better gunnery; having got the weather gauge, they were prepared to take every possible advantage of it. Their fleet, in brief, was drawn up in a single long line—en ala, as the Spaniards called it—, which tacked back and forth across the rear of the weather most Spanish ships, keeping them perpetually under fire, but resolutely refusing to come to close quarters. Such a refusal, of course, confirmed the Spaniards’ conviction that the English were cowards, but that was about all the comfort that they got from it. The fact, of course, was that their enemies had turned a fresh page in the book of naval strategy. The Duke and his followers were confronted with a situation with which they were powerless to deal.

The first contact of the two fleets outside of Plymouth on Sunday, the 31st, was to give an inkling of the way in which these rival tactics worked. As the west wind bore him along opposite the mouth of the Sound, Medina Sidonia stood in shore, partly perhaps with the idea of threatening the port, inkling of the way in which these rival tactics worked. But these efforts merely gave a golden opportunity to the English squadron coming out of the Sound: it worked to windward and soon rejoined the main fleet. Even with this reinforcement, Drake and Howard were unwilling to risk a general engagement, at least at close quarters; when Medina Sidonia finally succeeded in rallying his galleons to the relief of the battered Recalde, they simply discontinued the fight. No great damage had been done to either side, but it was ominously evident that the English could henceforth dictate just how and when all future encounters were to be fought. Meantime the wind and the tide had carried both fleets to the east of Plymouth. The Spaniards could do no further damage there, and practically all the effective force of their enemies was reunited to the windward of them.

Monday, August 1, passed by without any important event. On the morning of Tuesday, the second, the two fleets, their relative positions unchanged, had reached the waters off Portland Bill, when the wind, for the first and only time in that memorable week, hauled into the northeast and gave the Spaniards the precious weather gauge; they consequently made ready to attack. The action that ensued was complicated in the extreme, but not productive of serious results; it was, on both sides, a day of lost opportunities. The efforts of the English to get to windward enabled Medina Sidonia to cut their fleet in two; but then, instead of concentrating on the slower or inshore part, which he might have compelled to engage in a contest at close quarters, such as all the Spaniards desired, he foolishly gave chase to the swifter seaward portion, which he was totally unable to catch up with. The long-range cannonading of the English proved its effectiveness once more, and the smoke from their heavy discharges had the additional advantage of concealing their position from the Spaniards. In the afternoon the wind shifted back again into the southwest, and Medina Sidonia’s flagship, which was momentarily isolated in a heroic attempt to protect the westernmost ships of the Armada, received terrible punishment from the batteries of Howard and Drake. The comments of the Spanish narrators on the fight of that day are bitter in the extreme; they felt that they had had victory within their grasp, and then had been unaccountably deprived of it. There was talk of treachery and cowardice, of the unwillingness of those ships “in which there was no caballero or person whom the seamen respected” to go to the rescue of the Duke and his capitana; above all, it had been finally proved to them “that it was impossible to board if the enemy did
not so desire”. The first of these difficulties was dealt with at once; sergeant-majors visited each ship in the Armada to learn how every man was doing his duty; but the second, from its very nature, was irremediable. The Armada continued on its eastern course, in substantially the same formation as before, while the enemy, now considerably augmented by ships that had come out to join it from the various ports which it had passed, was henceforth divided into four separate squadrons, headed respectively by Howard, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher. Each was directed to follow the same tactics which had been used hitherto by the entire English fleet, tacking back and forth astern of the Spanish rear guard, and pouring in volleys at long range; the only difference was that henceforth the assault was to be delivered in four places at once.

Wednesday, the third, was a day of calm, in which neither of the fleets could make any appreciable headway. Recalde was apparently the target of some heavy cannonading, and at one moment the English threatened to surround and cut off his capitana; but when Medina Sidonia bore up to his support, the action was immediately discontinued. In the late afternoon the west wind rose again, and the Spaniards came in sight of the Isle of Wight, where they had by this time decided, in defiance of Philip’s instructions, to try to establish a base and await the arrival of Parma. The action that ensued on the morrow, to the south of Dunnose, is again very difficult to comprehend, principally because none of the contemporary accounts distinctly states the precise direction of the wind; it seems most probable, however, that it was more nearly south than west. This would account for the fact that the port squadrons of the English fleet, which got to the north of the left rear of the Armada in order to prevent a possible attempt to land, were temporarily deprived of the weather gauge; the Spaniards were confident that they had one of the English capitanas at their mercy “when nine light boats got her under way again and took her out of our hands with such speed that it was a thing of wonder to see”. “We attacked, and got near them, and they fled,” goes the account of the master of one of the Seville ships; “they were broken in two parts and the victory assured, when the enemy’s capitana turned upon our fleet, and the galley San Mateo, on the point of our weather wing, gave way to it, and retreated into the main body of the Armada. Seeing this, the enemy took heart, and attacked the said wing with his whole fleet or the greater part of it, and got us into a corner, in such fashion that if the Duke had not gone about with his flagship, we should have been vanquished that day instead of the victors that we were”. This account makes it clear that while the rear port squadrons of the Armada had been occupied with the English ships which had got between them and the shore, their vanguard had been vigorously attacked by the starboard squadrons of their enemies under Drake and Hawkins, who had kept the weather gauge, and as usual had been completely successful; the phrase “got us into a corner” doubtless refers to the possibility, of which the English had planned to take full advantage, that the Armada might be driven upon the dangerous banks called the Owers. Medina Sidonia’s pilots were also alive to this peril. To remain where he was would bring certain disaster; to pass on to the east meant the abandonment of all his hopes of establishing a base on the Isle of Wight; but of the two evils the latter was obviously the less. So he signaled to his scattered ships to re-form around him, and by the middle of the afternoon he was once more headed straight east for Calais, his terrible foes hanging relentlessly on his heels.

The rest of that day and night and the following morning both fleets continued on their eastward course, and there was no action worthy of the name. But if one reads between the lines in the various contemporary relaciones it is only too evident that the Spaniards were deeply disheartened. They had looked forward to the action off the Isle of Wight as critical. Once more they had thought that victory was theirs; then it had been suddenly snatched away from them by tactics with which they were powerless to cope, and they had been driven past the point where they had hoped to establish their base. They had lost seven good ships since leaving Corunna, and had seen their enemies constantly reenforced as they sailed up the Channel. Their powder was getting short. There were a number of dead and wounded; and though Medina Sidonia had proved himself both loyal and gallant in the way that he had come to the rescue of his hard-pressed friends, it was only too evident that he was no seaman. Still if Parma and his veterans were awaiting them at the narrows, the game was not yet lost. Means would surely be found to guard their transfer across the Channel, and no man doubted that if a Spanish army was once landed on English soil, the defenses of their enemies would fall like a house of cards. Message after message had been dispatched to Parma, ever since the fleet had left Lisbon, begging him to be ready, but so far there had been no definite word from him, and on Saturday morning, the sixth, when the Armada had reached Calais Roads, Medina Sidonia sent him a final appeal to come out with his flatboats. But Parma, as we shall later see, had no mind to do this. He was on hand, indeed, as he had promised Philip that he would be, but he resolutely refused to put to sea till the fleet should be able to protect him, and that, for the moment, was obviously impossible. The hopelessness of the Armada’s position was at last fully revealed. Medina Sidonia could not beat back to the westward. To drift on past Calais and Dunkirk was to abandon all remaining hope of transporting the tercios—the fundamental
object of the entire expedition—not to speak of the danger of being driven aground on the treacherous shoals farther east. To remain where he was would obviously be perilous, as the governor of Calais took pains to point out to him, but under the circumstances, there was no other alternative. And so, at five o’clock on the Saturday afternoon, the Duke came to anchor, and signaled to the rest of the fleet to do likewise. At the same time the Spaniards, already deeply disheartened, were still further cast down by observing a group of thirty-six enemy ships, which had been lying to leeward, and which they erroneously believed to be commanded by Hawkins, beat up around their north flank, and join forces with the rest of the English fleet.

It was, of course, the squadron of Seymour, who had been told off to watch Parma, but who now, seeing that he could no longer be of any use in the position to which he had been originally assigned, had very wisely decided, in the face of conflicting orders, to get to windward of the enemy at all costs and unite with Howard. Such was his contempt for the failure of Medina Sidonia to make any effort to prevent this obvious move, that one of his ships poured a broadside at close range into the northern flank of the Armada as he sailed by, and then passed on, while the two rear galleasses ‘returned thanks’ with their stern culverins. The whole of the English fleet, which had also come to anchor, was now within cannon-shot to the windward of the Armada.

Sunday, August 7, passed off without any important engagement, but while the English spent it profitably in devising means whereby they might dislodge their foes, the Spaniards could do nothing but worry and wait. Messages from Parma made it plain that the Dutch blockade of the Flemish ports would render it impossible for him to send out the ammunition and provisions of which the Armada was now in desperate need, and he persisted in his refusal to move his troops or his flatboats until the Armada should be ready to protect them. The enemy divined the Spaniards’ discouragement at the plight in which they found themselves, for he seized the opportunity to intimate his contempt for them in characteristic fashion. At four in the afternoon a pinnace from the English fleet bore down on the capitana real, fired four shot into her at close range, went about and got away with no damage to herself but a culverin-shot through her topsail. “Its daring”, comments the author of the relación which records the incident, “was very notable, and more than ever we saw how with their very good and very light ships they could come and go as they pleased, the which we could not do”. But much worse was soon to come. How far the position in which the two fleets now were had been foreseen in England, it is of course impossible to say; but we know that the exploit of Gianibelli at Antwerp in 1585 had been noised abroad all over Europe, that Gianibelli was in England at the time with letters of introduction to Sir Francis Walsingham, and, finally, that Walsingham had sent orders and material for the construction of fire ships to Dover some days before the Armada reached Calais Roads. It certainly looks as if some plan of dislodging the Spaniards by the use of vessels filled with combustibles had been carefully considered by their relentless foes. In any case, the conditions on Sunday night were as favorable as could be desired for such an attempt. The west wind had risen, and the tide was boiling up the channel. So fearful, in fact, were Howard and Drake that such an opportunity might never come again, that they decided not to waste time by sending in to Dover for the fire-ships which had been got ready there, but to sacrifice eight of their own smaller vessels for the purpose. Shortly after midnight the ‘hell burners’ were set adrift, and came flaming down on the huddled mass of the Armada, “spurting fire and their artillery shooting,” so runs the Spanish account of it, “which was a horror at night time, and when all of our ships had to have two anchors out.” Medina Sidonia did not dare remain where he was; he could not weigh; and so in despair he gave orders for the cables to be cut, and the Armada, with the ships that composed it running afloat of each other in helpless confusion, drifted on out of the narrows of the Channel toward the shoals of Dunkirk. The eight fire-ships, in the meantime, had burned themselves out, and had become harmless; “yet they had accomplished” as the Spanish narrator bitterly remarked, “what the enemy had neither been able nor ventured to do with 130 sail.”

When dawn, on the Monday morning, revealed to the English admirals the plight of their Spanish foes, they promptly gave chase, intent on dealing a knockout blow before the Armada had had a chance to reform. In order to prevent this, and also because his pilots told him that he was getting perilously near the Flanders banks, Medina Sidonia came up in the wind, facing his pursuers, and signaled to the rest of the fleet to do likewise; some fifty of them managed to obey and gather around him, and it was by these that the battle of Gravelines was fought. The English remained true to the tactics that they had so successfully followed during the preceding week. They refused to grapple and board, and shot into their foes at the water line. The Spaniards, of course, were as powerless as ever to prevent this, or to bring on a battle of the sort that they wished to fight; though under the circumstances it was impossible for them to win, it cannot be denied that their courage was superb. All the accounts by Spanish eyewitnesses ring with special praises of the heroism displayed by the Portuguese galleons, the San Felipe and the San Mateo; the glory, be it noted, goes wholly to the generals and soldiers on board.
them; there is not a word about the sailors. Both placed themselves in the hottest of the fight. Each was surrounded by over a dozen of the enemy’s ships, and fought them off for hours “without help except from God.” Offers of quarter were contemptuously refused. But finally the weather, which had been so favorable to the English during the previous ten days, came temporarily to the rescue of the hard-pressed Spaniards. In the late afternoon a terrific squall of wind and rain blew up, so that further firing was impossible; moreover, while the English came up in the wind and faced it, the shattered Spaniards were unable to do this, and simply drifted to leeward, with the result that the two fleets became separated; after the squall had passed, the fight was virtually over. But despite the fact that it had been interrupted by the elements, the battle of Gravelines had been decisive. The Armada had been driven past the point where it had hoped to unite with Parma, and there was practically no hope of its regaining it. The only real question now was what proportion of the fleet would be able to get safely back to Spain.

For, though Philip’s great Armada had itself become innocuous, it was by no means out of danger of destruction. All Monday night the wind blew hard out of the northwest, and when the Spaniards discovered their position on Tuesday morning, it became evident that they were being rapidly driven down on the treacherous shoals to the eastward. Medina Sidonia and a few of his best ships made desperate efforts to weather them, but the bulk of the Armada was unable to do this. A mile or more away the English hung relentlessly on their windward quarter, content to watch them pass on to their inevitable fate. The Spaniards took soundings again and again—eight fathoms, six fathoms, five fathoms; the pilots vowed that such large ships had never passed that way before; clearly they were now at the mercy of God, and officers and men betook themselves to prayer. But, sometime about noon, when they were all expecting death at any moment, “it pleased God to work the miracle” for which they had besought Him. The wind eased off a point or two, and began to blow out of the southwest. The Spaniards were just able to avoid the shoals, and in the early afternoon they had got together again in some kind of formation in the deeper waters of the North Sea. For the moment, at least, they were safe, and the English had been robbed of their prey.

Later in the day Medina Sidonia called a council of war on board his flagship, to determine what was next to be done. A few of his officers believed that when the wind shifted, it might be possible to return to Calais Roads and engage the English again. The Duke himself, who was certainly no coward, would have been glad to do so, had it not been for the fact that the ammunition was practically exhausted; but without powder and ball it was evident that they could not fight. Some of them were in favor of passing on to a point in Norway to spend the winter and refit; but the Duke did not like the idea of seeking refuge in the territory of strangers; moreover, it would never do to leave the Spanish coasts unguarded. The only alternative then was to get home as quickly as possible, and with the least possible loss; and with the wind in the west and the enemy between them and the narrows of the Channel, the only way to get home was to sail up to the north beyond the Orkneys, and thence around the west of Ireland to Spain. Even this course had its dangers. The provisions were almost as short as the ammunition, and the water supply was the lowest of all. They had brought with them many horses and mules to drag the artillery after it had been landed in England, and these they might now have killed and eaten in order to appease their hunger; but instead they elected to throw some eighty of them overboard in order to husband their water supply. All this, and the fact that they were now in full retreat, took the heart out of officers and men. Investigation revealed that there had been numerous cases of cowardice and insubordination. A court-martial was held, and twenty were condemned to death. Of these, however, only one was actually executed, being hung from the yard-arm of a pinnace; the others were let off with degradation and minor penalties “through the great clemency of the Duke.” During Wednesday and Thursday, the 10th and the 11th, the English continued to pursue. They thought that the Spaniards would never dare return home with nothing accomplished, and feared lest they might possibly combine with the Catholics in Scotland. On Friday, however, it became evident that the Armada was bent on flight, and the English abandoned the chase. They were almost as short of powder as their foes, and the queen was most reluctant to pay for any more. Now that the danger was over, her parsimony asserted itself; and as the surest way of preventing any further activities on the part of her fleet, she peremptorily summoned Howard to attend in his place at her Council.

The misfortunes of the Armada were not yet at an end. Its homeward journey was beset by gales. As far north as the Orkneys the fleet held together; but when it started to beat westward into the Atlantic, the ships that had suffered most in the fighting were unable to keep up with the rest. Many sank, riddled like sieves, in the Northern Ocean; others fell away to leeward and were wrecked on the rocky coasts of Northern and Western Ireland. If the soldiers and sailors on board them were fortunate enough to escape death in the waves, they were most of them robbed and murdered by the wild Irish, or else shot in cold blood by the English garrisons; the narrative of Captain Francisco de Cuellar, who was
The defeat of the Spanish Armada was unquestionably the supreme disaster of Philip’s reign. It proved that Spain’s navy could be beaten, and that she could be deprived of the sovereignty of the seas. It presaged the independence of the Low Countries and the break-down of the monopoly of Spain in the New World; indeed, it is usually regarded as the death-knell of the Spanish Empire. One would gather, moreover, from a perusal of the pages devoted by the older English historians to the last fifteen years of the reign of Elizabeth that all these tremendous results were immediately evident, that the English seafarers sacked Spanish cities and plundered Spanish colonial ports and treasure fleets at will, and that the Spaniards were powerless to prevent them. More recently a high authority on naval affairs has challenged this classical interpretation of the period, and maintained that the Spaniards, for years after the Armada, remained far more formidable than is popularly supposed. It is probable that he, in turn, somewhat overstates his case, but there is certainly something to be said for the view that he advances. As regarded from the Spanish standpoint, the history of the war with England during the years 1588-98, which alone concern us here, falls into three distinct periods, each with well-marked characteristics of its own, and sharply differentiated from one another. We will now proceed to consider them in order.

The first is comprised in the year 1589, and the central event of it is the English expedition against Lisbon. In view of the fury of Drake and his associates at being robbed of their prey when forbidden to pursue the Armada to the northward, it was inevitable that they should ask leave to make reprisals in the following year; the nation virtually demanded it and Elizabeth dared not refuse. In Spain all this had been foreseen, for Philip still had his spies in England, who kept him informed of the enemy’s plans; moreover, it had been correctly surmised that the chief objective would be Lisbon, for the pretender Antonio had the ear of the English government and had promised that the Portuguese would rise in his favor to a man. With the aid of his Portuguese minister, Cristobal de Moura, and Pedro Enriquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes, Philip accordingly did everything possible to prepare resistance. In April, 1589, the blow fell, but not at first at the expected point. A fleet of some 130 sail, carrying upwards of 15,000 men, under Drake and Sir John Norris, suddenly appeared before Corunna. They promptly landed 7000 troops, attacked and captured the lower town, killed 500 Spaniards, and took prisoner the commander of the place; but then they scattered to pillage, and finding large casks of Spanish wines in the cellars of sonic warehouses, a large proportion of them soon became helplessly drunk. Prudence, under the circumstances, would have dictated a prompt withdrawal, with such booty
as they had managed to collect, but Norris insisted on remaining to lay siege to the upper town, which by this time had had a chance to prepare. Prodigies of valor were performed by both sides, but the Spaniards were inspired by the heroic example and leadership of some of the women of the town, which apparently produced mujeres varoniles of the old Castilian sort, and the English were forced to retire with the loss of 1200 men. After consoling themselves by cutting to pieces a Spanish reinforcement sent on from Puerto de Burgos, and laying waste the surrounding country, they finally withdrew to their fleet. From Corunna they passed south to Peniche on the Portuguese coast, some thirty-five miles north of Lisbon. There Norris landed, with 6000 men, and easily captured the place; he then started overland for the Portuguese capital, while Drake sailed around to the mouth of the Tagus to support him with an attack from the river. Both parts of the expedition signally failed to accomplish their purpose. The winds were so unfavorable that Drake could not enter the river, and in the meantime the army of Norris had been dogged by misfortune. Fuentes had retreated before him, and denuded the country of supplies; Norris did not venture to pillage for fear of alienating the sympathy of the Portuguese, from which so much had been hoped. The heat was terrific, and when the invaders reached the suburbs of Lisbon and found that the fleet had not got there, they lost all heart; in fact, they felt themselves fortunate in being permitted a little later to reembark, virtually unmolested, at Cascaes. Sickness had decimated their ranks, but their provisions were replenished by the fortunate capture of a convoy of sixty Hanseatic ships with cargoes of corn for Portugal. On the way home they revenged themselves by entering the harbor of Vigo, burning the town and the ships at anchor there, and devastating the country for miles around; but when the last scattered remnants of the expedition got back to Plymouth, it was found that some thirty of the ships were missing, and that over 9000 men had died or been killed. Practically no booty had been brought back; the queen was ill pleased, and, despite the verdict of contemporaries like Camden, it is evident that the whole affair was regarded in England as a disastrous failure. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that Spain was dissatisfied that the invaders had got off so cheaply. She had merely got rid of them, but they had not been decisively defeated. Both sides, in other words, felt that little was to be gained, for the time being, in continuing the struggle, at least in European waters; and that feeling must have been intensified, in Philip’s case, by the fact that the assassination of Henry III (August 2, 1589) necessarily turned his attention once more in the direction of France.

The result was that the next phase of the war, which lasted till 1595, assumed a complexion totally different from that of its predecessor. Philip made no serious effort against England. Elizabeth did not attempt to invade Spain, but permitted her sea-rovers to harry the Spanish colonics and lie in wait for the Spanish treasure fleets. From her point of view, it was obviously the proper course. It cost almost nothing; it might conceivably prove very lucrative, and it only semi-officially committed her to the continuance of a war which she never really wished to wage. In the summer of 1589 the Earl of Cumberland sailed with thirteen ships for the Azores and captured Fayal, where he maintained himself till October. He seized the vessels which were lying in the port, and intercepted others homeward bound from the New World and laden with treasure. In the following year both Hawkins and Frobisher returned empty-handed to England, after similar attempts, and 1591 was the year of the last fight of the Revenge. If the gallantry of Grenville remains one of the most precious traditions of the British navy, it is but fair to add that his Spanish opponent, Alonso de Bazán, the brother of the Marquis of Santa Cruz, paid him all the honor and courtesy which his heroism so richly deserved. In 1593 the principal scene of interest is transferred to the Indies. The Earl of Cumberland resumed his activities there, and ravaged Havana and the shores of Trinidad. In that same year Sir Richard Hawkins, the son of Drake’s old companion in arms, set sail with a roving commission to harry the Spaniards, and passed through the Strait of Magellan into the Pacific. After plundering Valparaiso and capturing several prizes, he was forced to surrender, grievously wounded, to Don Beltran de Castro in the bay of San Mateo (July 2, 1594), and was sent back a prisoner to Spain. It was partly on the pretext of avenging him that his father and Drake got permission from the queen to sail, in August, 1595, on what proved to be their last voyage. On this occasion they made first for the Canaries, only to be repulsed before Las Palmas; indeed, the chief result of their appearance there was to give the Spaniards a chance to send out warnings to the colonies and treasure fleets in the New World. When the Englishmen reached the Antilles, everything was in readiness for them. After being driven off from Porto Rico by the Spanish artillery, they passed on and seized Nombre de Dios. But when the troops they brought with them tried to cross the Isthmus of Panama on foot, they were stricken with dysentery and had to return. They were also utterly demoralized by the loss of their two great leaders. Hawkins had sickened on the voyage across the Atlantic, and died, off Porto Rico, on November 22, 1595; Drake fell a victim to the yellow fever of the Isthmus on February 7, 1596, and was buried at sea off Porto Bello. Needless to add, the news was received throughout the Spanish Empire with transports of joy, and Lope de Vega, who had had some personal experience of the ways of ‘El Draque’ and ‘Achines’ when he served in the Armada, wrote a poem of triumphant gratitude for the removal of the scourge of the church.
The only Spanish reply to the ravages of the corsarios Ingleses was a raid on the Cornish coast in the summer of 1595; it did a certain amount of damage, and caused fear and irritation in England, but nothing of permanent importance was accomplished. But the same statement holds true, mutatis mutandis, of the much more dramatic exploits of the English buccaneers in the Antilles; indeed, the chief result of them had been, as Sir William Monson expressed it, “to waken rather than to weaken” the Spaniards. In the first place, Philip’s naval men had made good use of the respite from attack that had been accorded, in these years, to the Spanish ports themselves, and had constructed a whole new fleet of fighting ships. One high authority speaks of the period as actually witnessing “the birth of the Spanish navy.” In the second, the English sea-rovers had signally failed to accomplish their chief objective, that is, to capture the Spanish treasure fleets, and get command of the trade routes. Isolated ships and even smaller squadrons had indeed been cut off, but the ‘Flota’ and the ‘Galleons’ continued to sail as before; the fact, already noticed elsewhere, that the sums the Spanish crown derived from the Indies in the last decade of the reign were nearly four times as large as those which it got from them in the sixties, speaks volumes in this connection. Might it not be possible for Philip, who, as the years rolled by, became increasingly anxious to concentrate all his forces against Henry IV of France, to persuade Elizabeth that the efforts of her corsairs were practically fruitless, and terminate the war which neither of them was really anxious to continue. The older historians used to believe that Philip attempted in 1594 to get Elizabeth poisoned, and bribed her Portuguese physician, Dr. Rodrigo Lopez, to accomplish it for him. More recently this view has been attacked, and it has been demonstrated that Lopez was never really proved guilty of the crime for which he was executed. Is it not even possible that Philip was really trying to utilize him simply to approach the queen with an offer of peace? In view of the state of feeling in the England of the time, it would have been essential for him to have a very secret agent to accomplish this, and the use of physicians for diplomatic purposes was by no means unfamiliar in the sixteenth century.

If Philip actually made an offer of peace, it never had a chance of success. The queen, as we have remarked, might have been willing to entertain it, but she dared not fly in the face of the wishes of England, and England longed to avenge the death of Drake. The war party, too, was once more dominant in the Royal Council, and was vigorously led by Elizabeth’s youthful favorite, the Earl of Essex, whom she was at all costs anxious to please. Since buccaneering had not accomplished what had been expected of it during the last five years, it was decided to revert to the tactics of 1589, and make a great thrust at the heart of Spain. Cadiz was selected as the point of attack; on June 30, 1596, a fleet of sixty ships, commanded by Howard, of Armada fame, and carrying 10,000 English soldiers under Essex, and 5000 Dutch under Louis of Nassau, suddenly appeared at the mouth of the harbor. Practically no preparations had been made to receive them, and the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who as governor of Andalusia was summoned to protect Cadiz, showed himself even more incompetent than he had been in 1588; he did practically nothing save to report to Philip almost hour by hour the rapid progress of the enemy, which he was totally unable to impede. His indecision prevented the few Spanish warships in the harbor from giving as good an account of themselves as they otherwise might. Several of them were sunk by the cannon of the foe; some of the rest escaped up the Guadalquivir; all the merchant vessels were burnt by the Spaniards themselves in order to save them from capture. Meantime the enemy’s troops had been landed, and entered Cadiz practically without resistance. The inhabitants promptly fled inland, and the English were left to plunder the place at their good pleasure. For sixteen days the process continued, and then, after Cadiz had been completely emptied, it was set on fire, anu a large portion of it, including the old cathedral, reduced to ashes. Raids into the interior would have yielded a rich harvest and were seriously contemplated by the invaders, but the English did not realize the extent of Spain’s unpreparedness; they also feared for the personal safety of the favorite of the queen, and so they finally decided to make for home. Faro on the south shore of Portugal was plundered on the way, and there was even talk of an attack on the Azores; but the members of the expedition had been so demoralized by the booty that they had taken that they were in no condition to attempt anything further. They reached England safely on the 8th of August.

The expedition to Cadiz had the merit of proving to Philip that his dreams of a peaceful settlement with England were illusory; during the two remaining years of his life he burned for revenge. In some respects he was now better situated than he had ever been before for a direct attack on England. He was in close touch with the Catholics of Ireland, who longed to strike a blow for their faith, and promised him a base there if he would support them. The Spaniards, too, as we shall subsequently see, had captured Calais in April, 1596, and were thus possessed of the Channel port whose lack had been so fatal to them in 1588. And so orders were sent out for the assembling of a new armada at Lisbon and San Lucar. Medina Sidonia had proved so useless at Cadiz that the command of it was given to Martín de Padilla y Manrique, the adelantado mayor of Castile. But despite the change of commanders there
were the usual interminable delays. Philip did his utmost to hurry things, but the tradition of tardiness and inefficiency had been too firmly planted to be uprooted in a day; the fleet was but half-ready by the middle of October, when the king had absolutely insisted that, ready or not, it should set sail. No sooner had it put to sea than it was struck by a southwest gale and scattered; a third of the ships that composed it were wrecked, and over 2000 men were lost. “Truly,” wrote Herrera in his Historia General del Mundo, “an admiral, like a doctor, must have fortune on his side.”

Still Philip did not despair. A new though unsuccessful attempt of England to invade Spain in July, 1597, still further infuriated him; and later in the same year, when Essex, with the best of the English fleet, was off on the ‘Islands Voyage’ at the Azores, where he hoped to intercept the Flota from the Indies, the king sent the last of his armadas against England. It was a most imposing fleet, almost as large, in fact, as that of 1588. A detachment of the Spanish soldiers in Brittany was to cooperate with it. Its commanders had had experience of English naval tactics, and its destination, the port of Falmouth, had been kept profoundly secret. But the munitions and supplies were of poor quality and insufficient; worst of all, the departure of the expedition was so long delayed that it had no chance to reach the Channel and establish a base there, as had been originally planned, before the return of Essex from the Azores. Instead, the two fleets, in complete ignorance of each other’s positions, sailed simultaneously, on converging courses, for the mouth of the English Channel, from Corunna and from the Azores; but before contact between them could be established, the inevitable northeaster blew up and dispersed the Armada, while the English found refuge in their own ports. The king was deeply cast down when he got the news, and the renewal of the exploits of the corsarios Ingleses in the Indies, particularly the capture of Porto Rico by the ubiquitous Earl of Cumberland in the summer of 1598, must have further enhanced the agonies of the last weeks of his life. Yet no one could possibly maintain that he had tamely surrendered or abandoned the fight without a struggle; moreover, the example that he had set was followed in the next reign, and England did not cease to be worried over ‘invisible armadas’ and Spanish invasions of Ireland until the peace of 1604.

The great issue between Spain and England had indeed been settled in 1588, but neither side was aware of it at the time, and it was primarily owing to the Spaniards’ heroic, if misguided, continuance of the struggle during the next sixteen years that the real facts of the situation remained so long concealed; not only from the two contestants, but also from the rest of Europe as well. The Spanish Empire of the early seventeenth century was a ghost of its former self, but the world at large did not realize it until after the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. The legend of its invincibility was kept alive, by a masterly game of bluff, long after it had ceased to be in any way formidable, and James I often groveled at the feet of the Spanish ambassador in London, the Count of Gondomar.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
ANTONIO PÉREZ AND THE LIBERTIES OF ARAGON

The foregoing chapter will have made it clear that the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 marks the turning point in the history of Spain’s struggles with England and with the Netherlands. The dispersal of Philip’s great fleet saved the former; it made it probable that the latter would ultimately go free. The crucial years of Spain’s conflict with France were to come, as we shall subsequently see, somewhat later. Not till Henry IV renounced his Protestantism in 1593—perhaps not, indeed, until five years afterwards, when the Edict of Nantes was issued and the peace of Vervins signed—was it evident that Philip’s projects in that quarter were also destined to fail. Between these two great sets of disasters in the field of foreign affairs, there occurred a most extraordinary contest on the soil of Spain itself, a contest which reveals perhaps more clearly than any other episode in Philip’s whole reign the nature of the king’s methods and viewpoint, and the measure of his impotence in coping with the new foes which were springing up all around him. The accumulated weight of long centuries of tradition enabled him, indeed, to emerge officially victorious from this contest at home; but the way that the story of it was circulated in foreign lands increased the bitterness of the hatred of his fellow sovereigns, and encouraged some of them to believe that they could safely give vent to it. The legend of Spain’s invincibility, though it was not broken till the middle of the seventeenth century, received rude shocks during the two closing decades of the reign of the Prudent King.

We have had many occasions to remark that the process of Castilianization of the Spanish Empire, initiated really under the Catholic Kings and advancing rapidly under the Emperor, had reached its climax in the reign of Philip II. The fact that the Prudent King fixed his capital at Madrid in 1561 was the outward and visible symbol of it, and his refusal, during the twenty-six years after his return to Spain in 1559, to pay more than one visit to the realms of the crown of Aragon made a most painful impression on his subjects in these kingdoms. Their pride was wounded by the fact that he ignored them for so long, save for the viceroys and governors who represented him in his absence; in this respect, as in others, his reign stood out in marked and disagreeable contrast to that of his father, whose long and patient sojournings among his East Spanish subjects went far to atone, in their eyes, for his numerous absences from the peninsula. Their resolution to maintain all the forms and emblems of their ancient liberties and privileges—inanimate, almost, though they had now become—was vastly enhanced by the policy of the Prudent King. Material began rapidly to accumulate, from the very beginning of the reign, for the conflagration which finally burst forth in 1591.

Of all the defenders of the ancient autonomies of the eastern realms, the most ardent, and perhaps also the most unreasonable, were the nobles of the kingdom of Aragon. It will be remembered that they inherited from mediaeval times a position almost unique among the aristocracies of Europe; that they formed two of the four brazos into which the Aragonese Cortes were divided; and that they had given evidence on countless occasions of their uncompromising obstinacy and lack of cosmopolitanism. They were zealous indeed for the maintenance intact of all the national liberties of the kingdom of Aragon, but they were more zealous still for the preservation of their own special privileges within that kingdom, and of their position as a caste within the body politic. Certainly some of these privileges were such as had no place in the civilization of Western Europe in the latter part of the sixteenth century. We may cite as an instance that which gave some of them the unquestioned right to strangle their vassals without hearing what they had to say in their own defense, a right of which Don Diego de Heredia, of whom we shall shortly hear much, was afterwards not ashamed to boast that he had twice availed himself. Small wonder if Philip ardently longed to break down such a position and such pretensions as these. Not only were the traditional rights of the Aragonese aristocracy a flagrant contradiction to the principles of the strong monarchy which he and his predecessors had established; they were also, from a purely humanitarian point of view, atrocious, and we must not forget that Philip was a humanitarian in his own way. Certainly this group, at least, of the Prudent King’s subjects was far more mediaeval than he. But Philip was too much attached to Castile, and too busy with other affairs, to be able for a long time to take effective measures to remedy these things. Like almost every other problem with which he was confronted, he preferred to deal with it from afar off, by instructing his
representatives in Aragon to support the attempts of the rural population to transfer themselves from seigniorial to royal jurisdiction, and by using his efforts in favor of marriages in Castile of the heads of the more prominent Aragonese families, in the hope of breaking down the barriers between the two kingdoms and of making his East Spanish subjects enter more sympathetically into his own point of view. A single instance will suffice to show what measure of success this policy attained.

The great and ancient county of Ribagorza, extending north from the neighborhood of Monzón to the Pyrenees near Bagnères-de-Luchon, and including seventeen towns and 200 villages, with some 4000 vassals, was held, at the accession of the Prudent King, by John of Aragon, Count of Ribagorza, who was descended, though illegitimately, from Alfonso of Aragon, the bastard brother of Ferdinand the Catholic. In 1564 he married Luisa, of the Castilian house of Pacheco, and went to live with her in Toledo; but shortly afterwards, on the ground that his wife was unfaithful to him, the Count caused her to be brutally murdered. It was the beginning of a terrible blood feud. The sister of the murdered Countess was the Countess of Chinchon, who spurred her husband on to vengeance. The Count of Ribagorza was forced to flee from Spain, was finally captured in Milan, brought back to Madrid, and publicly garroted, like a common criminal, in 1572. Needless to say, the news of these events was hailed with delight by the vassals of Ribagorza, who had suffered cruelly under the harsh rule of the Count, and now eagerly seized the opportunity to demand that they be attached to the royal domain. They were, of course, vigorously supported by Philip, who asked nothing better than an opportunity to increase his own power and lands in Aragon at the expense of the most unruly of his subjects. At one stage of the proceedings he is said to have tried, though vainly, to get the Inquisition to exhume traces of Jewish blood in the family of the Count of Ribagorza; if such had been found, he would have insisted that the territories in question must not be allowed to remain in the hands of any of its descendants, especially since Ribagorza lay so perilously close to the heretical viscounty of Bearn. But the Justicia decreed that the Ribagorza lands went lawfully to the Duke of Villahermosa, the brother of the executed count, and the Justicia’s verdict was law; the Council of Aragon supported him, and so, much as Philip disliked it, did two of his own most trusted Castilian advisers, Idiaquez and de Moura. Legality, if not expediency, was clearly against the crown, and the Prudent King saw that he must submit. But the vassals of Ribagorza, having come so close to the attainment of their ends, were far less respectful than their monarch to the sentence of the Justicia. They rose in revolt, organized their forces, elected leaders, and virtually took the control of the county into their own hands. A situation, in fact, not remote from civil war had begun to exist, and the necessity of dealing with it, together with that of getting the recognition of the future Philip III by the representatives of the eastern kingdoms, was the principal cause of the resolution of the king to summon and personally attend a meeting of the General Cortes at Monzón in the summer of 1585. The pleasure of accompanying his daughter Catharine, who had just married Charles Emanuel of Savoy, as far as Barcelona on her wedding journey, was an added inducement to the Prudent King to depart from his beloved Castile.

An account of that journey has been left us by Henry Cock of Gorcum in Holland, notary apostolic and archer of the royal guard; but as it concerns itself chiefly with brilliant ceremonies and descriptions of the places through which the court passed, it has little of interest for us here. Certainly most of the solid business that was transacted at Monzón passed wholly over Cock’s head. Philip was forced, much against his will, formally to recognize the rights of the Duke of Villahermosa to the Ribagorza lands, but he made no efforts whatever to put down the revolutionists. Indeed, he tacitly encouraged their worst outrages, and gladly seized the opportunity to incorporate into the crown domain other territories, such as Teruel and Albarracin, where the seigniorial rights were less clear.3 Needless to add, under these circumstances, the revolts in Ribagorza continued with unabated violence after Philip’s return to Castile, and they were rendered more horrible still by risings of local Moriscos, who were massacred with relentless cruelty by the mountaineers. The decision taken at Monzón had not improved matters; it had really made them worse, and Philip, whose chief adviser for Aragonese affairs was now Villahermosa’s mortal enemy, the Count of Chinchon, was convinced that he would have no peace until the Duke was induced to abandon his lands. Much plotting ensued, for the purpose of inducing the Duke’s friends to desert him, and finally Villahermosa was obliged to give way. He unwillingly surrendered his territories in return for a few high-sounding titles and a generous money indemnity, and Ribagorza was at last incorporated into the royal domain. But others of his countrymen were even less content with this solution than he. The risings in Ribagorza were indeed soon suppressed, but Philip’s policy had entailed too much going and coming of Castilians to suit the mass of the Aragonese. The municipal authorities of Saragossa, the Cortes, and, most of all, the Justicia were firmly convinced that the national fueros were in danger; and their anger reached its climax when, at the beginning of 1588, the king sent to Aragon the Marquis of Alinena, of the great Castilian house of Mendoza, to oust the existing viceroy and bring order out of chaos. This was certainly a practical, if not a technical violation...
of the law which provided that all the king’s officers in Aragon should be Aragonese; and this was promptly brought home to Philip by the way in which Almenara was treated on his arrival. The court of the Justicia, always a stickler for the letter of the law, was inclined indeed to be favorable to his pretensions; but he was regarded with contempt by almost every one else. The aristocracy refused for the most part to accept his invitations, while the populace characterized as ‘Soup Knights’ those who did; before long he retired to Castile, to report to the king, leaving behind him what had started as a mere local disturbance in Ribagorza already half transformed into something like a national uprising. But Philip was not to be denied. Shortly after Almenara’s return to Madrid, the Count of Sastago, who had filled the office of viceroy of Aragon for the past twelve years, was removed; his successor, Andres Ximeno, the bishop of Teruel, was the son of a plain citizen of Saragossa, and obviously only intended as a stop-gap; and when Almenara came back, in the spring of 1590, with increased emoluments and powers, it was evident to all men that it was the king’s plan that he should have all the authority, and the viceregal title also, provided he could extract from the Justicia’s court a definite verdict favorable to his pretensions. With all his irritation Philip was not yet quite prepared openly to defy the existing law; that was to be reserved till later.

With things thus balanced, as they were, on the point of a needle, a new and dramatic personality was brought upon the scene by the arrival in Saragossa of Antonio Perez, the disgraced minister of the Prudent King, escaped from his gloomy prison in the dungeons of Madrid.

Antonio Perez had led a most unhappy existence since his sudden arrest and fall from power, on the night of July 28, 1579. At first the king did not seem disposed to be severe. He gave no immediate orders to institute any process against his late minister, and sent the Cardinal Quiroga to assure Perez’s wife, the devoted Juana Coello, who had stood loyally by him through all his divagations, that her husband had been only temporarily removed because of the hatred of Rodrigo Vazquez de Arce, the new royal favorite. Perez himself was visited by the royal confessor, and even permitted to see his children. When, in spite of these encouraging signs, he fell ill, he was allowed to remove to his own house; and after eight months’ seclusion there, he was given leave to go out to mass, and to receive visitors. Shortly afterwards the king departed for Portugal, and Perez, taking advantage of his absence, began to lay plans for the recovery of his influence and position.

But Philip was only dissembling. He cherished a mortal grudge against Perez, and, as usual, was only waiting to feed it fat. The king had every reason to be cautious. Perez was in possession of important state secrets and numerous documents; above all, if he were driven to extremities, he would infallibly reveal damning evidence that the king had formally authorized the murder of Escovedo. But the reports that he played for high stakes with his friends in his house gave his enemies the opening which they desired; and when the facts were reported to Philip, he ordered Vázquez de Arco to start a secret inquiry into the honesty of Perez’s career as a minister. His vigilance, needless to add, was only too easy to prove; it was found that, although his father had left him nothing, he had amassed an enormous fortune and lived in regal luxury. But the king, after his return from Portugal at the beginning of 1583, was still in no hurry to act; not until fresh rumors began to circulate in regard to the responsibility for the murder of Escovedo did Philip decide to strike again. On January 23, 1585, merely on the ground of his peculations, Perez was sentenced to two years or more of imprisonment in a fortress, according to the king's pleasure, to perpetual banishment from the court, and to the payment of an enormous fine. But when the royal alcaaldes arrived to arrest him, they found him, to put it mildly, a troublesome prisoner. While they were ransacking his house for documents, he escaped to sanctuary in a neighboring church, and when the king’s officers made bold to arrest him there, a quarrel was started between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities of Madrid which did not terminate till four years later. The documents, moreover, which were found in Perez’s house were not at all what Philip wanted. Two more large boxes of them were indeed subsequently delivered up by Juana Coello, on receipt of a written order to do so from her husband, who feared for her safety if she refused; but even then, the wily Perez contrived to retain the most important of them all, and particularly a number of notes signed in the king’s hand. He was destined at a later date to make good use of them for his own advantage.

After the papers had been delivered up, in the summer of 1585, orders were given for another brief intermission in the rigor of Perez’s captivity, most probably for the purpose of putting him off his guard. He was brought back to Madrid, installed in a sort of semi-confinement in one of the best houses of the town, and permitted to receive visitors from the court. But the king, at this juncture, was absent in Aragon, and the implacable Vazquez, who accompanied him thither, seized the opportunity to interrogate a native of Saragossa, who had confessed himself implicated in the killing of Escovedo. The son of the murdered man was on hand in Madrid to feed the flames. A formal though secret investi-
gation of the crime was decreed, and Perez was once more placed in strict confinement. For more than four years the miserable affair dragged on. There were countless phases and ramifications of it, into which it is not worth while to enter. From first to last Perez took the line that he had nothing whatever to do with the crime, and in September, 1589, by a marvelously clever series of secret missives and insinuations, he persuaded young Escovedo to abandon his case and request that his enemy be set at liberty. But the rancorous Vázquez had by this time so poisoned Philip’s ear against his former minister that the government pursued the matter on its own account more relentlessly than ever. Not only was the imprisonment of Perez continued and its rigor increased; he was actually placed in irons. Finally, as all other efforts to make him confess anything had failed, the king, on January 4, 1590, sent to tell him that he admitted having ordered him to murder Escovedo, but that, for his own satisfaction and that of his conscience, he must know whether or not the causes which had been given him for this action were adequate; he therefore ordered Perez to state these causes in detail and give proof. In this way he hoped to lure the latter into a confession of the crime, while he trusted that, having secured the incriminating evidence in the documents that he had obtained from his former minister, he could clear himself in the eyes of the world from all complicity therein. But Perez refused to fall into the trap. He persisted in denying all knowledge of, or participation in, the crime, until Vázquez and his minions, despairing of eliciting a voluntary confession, determined to extort it from him by force. On February 21, 1590, Perez was chained to the wall of his prison. The following day he was once more put to the question, and when he continued to remain obdurate, he was handed over to the executioner to be tortured. The rack was brought in, and after he had suffered eight turns of the rope, he finally confessed, in great detail, the part that he himself had played in the murder of Escovedo. When, however, it was told to explain the reasons that had moved him to persuade the king to order the crime to be committed, his replies were less satisfactory. The information, he protested, would be found in the documents which had been taken from him; the murder, too, had taken place twelve years ago, and most of those who could bear witness to the truth of what he said were no longer to be found. And so the proceedings were again left unfinished. The king had got only half of what he wanted; moreover, despite all the secrecy of the inquisitors, enough leaked out of Philip’s complicity in the whole affair to evoke strong protests at the court. Men asked what manner of crime it could be, in which the king and his fallen minister had collaborated, but for which, nevertheless, one ordered the other to be put to the torture, and sympathy for Perez was aroused on every side.

But the end was close at hand, though not in the way which Philip had expected. Perez was keen enough to perceive that after the king had got everything out of him that he could, there was no reasonable doubt that he would be given over to the executioner, and he determined to make one final effort to save himself by flight. There was only one place where he could possibly find a safe retreat. As the battle between Philip and Antonio Perez had been fought thus far under most unequal conditions. In Castile the king held all the cards, and the wellnigh universal sympathy which the cause of the fallen minister had evoked bore eloquent testimony to that love of fair play which happily characterizes the mass of mankind. But the moment that Perez reached the kingdom of Aragon the whole situation changed. He found himself under the protection of a constitution which gloried in defending the rights of the individual against any and every sort of tyranny, and in the midst of a people whose sensitiveness to its own dignities and privileges had just been stirred to the depths by the events recounted in the early pages of this chapter; he could not possibly have arrived at a more propitious
moment. No essential feature of the government of Aragon had been abolished, or even seriously modified by the Emperor or the Catholic Kings. They had simply followed the plan of concentrating their efforts on the increase of the royal power in Castile, and of leaving Aragon as far as possible alone, in the hope that what they deemed it imprudent to subvert by force might ultimately perish from inanition. Thus far, for more than a century past, this policy had, on the whole, worked well. But now the Aragonese were suddenly thrust forward into the limelight again. They became all at once a center of interest. Stirring memories were inevitably aroused. They had a cause to fight for once more, and proposed to show that they were capable of defending it. A battle royal was obviously imminent, and most of the rest of Spain proposed to sit by and enjoy it. Even Philip’s favorite court fool ventured to twit him about the situation in open court.

Naturally the king could not endure the thought of being openly defied in his own dominions. At all costs Perez must be recaptured and brought back. Philip’s first act was to vent his anger on the only victims who were for the moment within his reach. On Holy Thursday, the day after Perez’s escape, his wife and children were seized and cast into the public prison in Madrid. Perez, on his part, had not yet reached the stage of bidding his former master defiance. On April 24, from his place of refuge in Calatayud, he had written the king a most humble and respectful letter, offering peace and abandonment of all attempts to rehabilitate himself, provided he were only permitted to withdraw, with his family, into obscurity; and he was deeply incensed when he learned what Philip had done. Meantime the king lost no time in the pursuit. Ten hours after the fugitive reached Calatayud, there arrived a royal order to seize him, dead or alive, before he passed the Ebro. But Perez had already taken his precautions. Though right of asylum had not availed him in Castile, he still had some faith in its efficacy in Aragon; and when the king’s representatives arrived to arrest him, they found that he had sought refuge in a Dominican convent. Even this step, however, might only serve as a stop-gap, with Almenara and his officers rallying to the royal cause; the only permanent hope of safety lay in a manifestation and the protection of the Justicia of Aragon. Gil de Mesa, Perez’s devoted friend, who had accompanied him on his flight from Madrid, was accordingly dispatched in hot haste to Saragossa to obtain it, and with the happiest results. Juan de Luna, one of the deputies of the realm, appeared at Calatayud with fifty arquebusiers, to claim for Perez the ancient privileges of Aragon, just at the moment that Philip’s emissaries were about to seize him in the convent and deport him to Madrid. The people of the town rose for the defense of their liberties, and Perez was carried off in triumph to Saragossa, where the whole populace turned out to bid him welcome; he was lodged at once in the cárcel de los manifestados. Philip had been decisively beaten in the first round of the fight; but, legal minded as ever, lie was not yet prepared to infringe the established constitution. He accordingly entered a formal plea against Perez before the Justicia’s court, on the grounds of his having compassed the murder of Escovedo on false pretenses, of his having altered dispatches and divulged state secrets, and, finally, of having escaped from prison.

The conflict now entered upon a prolonged judicial phase. Perez had the good sense not to be rendered over-confident by the evidences of popular favor which greeted him on every hand. Once more he wrote to the king and to the royal confessor from his refuge in the cárcel de los manifestados, offering peace if Philip would only leave him alone, but hinting, in unmistakable terms, that if the king continued to persecute him, he had ample means of defending himself. But Philip would not listen; he was determined to fight to a finish. On July 1, 1590, he ordered Perez to be condemned to the death of a common criminal by the tribunals of Madrid, and sent word to the Marquis of Almenara to push the case vigorously in Saragossa. Perez was prompt with his reply. He now confessed before the Justicia that he had ordered the murder of Escovedo, but only at the king’s own command; moreover he produced a number of documents which he had secreted about his person, many of them written by Philip himself, in proof of the truth of his assertions. The effect of these revelations was tremendous. The people of Saragossa took delight in them and circulated them broadcast. Philip and his worst methods were exposed to the gaze of Spain, and also to the rest of Western Europe, for the case had by this time begun to attract universal attention; it was a terrible blow to the king’s prestige. Obviously nothing was to be gained by continuing the royal suit before the Justicia’s court, and an attempt of the Marquis of Almenara to subject Perez to an encuesta, on the ground that he had been unfaithful in his services as crown minister, was also speedily disposed of; the Justicia issued a firma, and the process was stayed. At several junctures during these trying months the king had plans of using force, as is proved by his orders to the Castilian grandees dwelling on the confines of Aragon to muster their vassals and be ready for war; but Philip could not bear actually to appeal to arms until the uttermost resources of his various jurisdictions had been exhausted. There still remained one tribunal in Spain against which the fueros of Aragon and the authority of its mighty Justicia were of no avail, the tribunal of the Supreme and Holy Inquisition; and into its clutches Philip now planned to deliver Perez. The
necessary preparations were made with devilish ingenuity. The king and his confessor, Almenara, and Chinchon collaborated to furnish evidence to show that Pérez, during his imprisonment and torture, had uttered words implying doubts of the existence of God, that he had planned to flee to the heretics of France and Bearn, where his knowledge of weighty affairs of state and important papers could have done much harm, and that the fact that he had succeeded in winning such devotion from the people gave reason to suppose that he possessed diabolical powers. The evidence was dispatched to the tribunal of the Suprema at Saragossa. Precautions were taken to make certain that the worst possible interpretation was placed upon it. The local inquisitors in haughty terms demanded of the Justicia’s court that Pérez be given up; and the Justicia, Juan de Lanuza, who, though zealous for the maintenance of the authority of his office against all secular jurisdictions, belonged to a generally royalist family, and was in mortal terror of the church, soon decided, with the unanimous approval of his lieutenants, to do what was required of him. On the morning of May 24, 1591, Pérez was transferred from the cárcel de los manifestados to the secret prison of the Inquisition in the palace of the Aljafería.

The people of Saragossa were less overawed than the Justicia by the authority of the Holy Office. The Inquisition had never been really popular in Aragon, where its essentially Castilian origin caused it to appear, in the present tense state of popular excitement, almost in the light of an importation from abroad; certainly it was far less national and less ancient than the fueros which all men were now sternly resolved to defend. Rapid though the Inquisition had planned that its prisoner’s removal to the Aljafería should be, Perez had been able to notify his friends; and on the way he was met by a group of them, including some of the most eminent men of the city. Efforts to make the Justicia interfere proving fruitless, the tocsin was sounded, and the populace called out; a vast crowd, nobles, clergy, and commons, shouting Contra fuero! Viva la libertad! rushed to the palace of the Marquis of Almenara, who was popularly held responsible for what had occurred. The Justicia, hooted in the streets as he passed, had already taken refuge there; realizing the seriousness of the crisis, he begged the Marquis to flee. But the scion of the Mendozas knew no fear. He had, moreover, a Castilian’s contempt for a rabble horde, and was confident that he could assert his own authority. His sole reply was to send an order to the inquisitors forbidding them to deliver up Perez. Meantime the rioters had broken down his door; and the Justicia, as a last resort, mounted to the balcony above, and called out to ask them whether, if he would consent to take the Marquis and his adherents to prison, they would engage, on their word as gentlemen and cavaliers, to do no violence to him on the way. The promise was given by the leaders of the crowd below, but the rage of the mass of the rioters had by this time mounted so high that it proved impossible to make them keep it. When the Justicia and the Marquis issued from the palace, they were suffered indeed to proceed a few paces in safety, but soon the Justicia, jostled by the crowd, fell and was trampled under foot; and when he was lost to view, the mob became uncontrollable. In front of the ancient Iglesia de la Seu, the rioters hurled themselves on Almenara, beat and stabbed him; they would have killed him on the spot, had not a few of the nobles interfered; his servants, too, were treated as cruelly as he. Obviously there was no chance of getting him, alive, as far as the cárcel de los manifestados. He was therefore deposited, bruised and bleeding, in the old town prison, which was on the way, and there two weeks later he died. In the meantime another band of rioters had rushed to the prison of the Inquisition at the Aljafería. They demanded that the inquisitors deliver Perez into their hands, and threatened, in case of refusal, to fire the building, in order that the inquisitors might themselves experience the same suffering to which they sentenced others. For a time the inquisitors hesitated; but at last the bishop of Teruel, who was still officially viceroy, the zalmedina of Saragossa, and two representatives of the archbishop succeeded in persuading them that only by yielding could they hope to end the revolt. And so, finally, about five o’clock in the afternoon of the day that the insurrection had broken out, the Holy Office surrendered its prisoner, with the stipulation that he should be guarded with special care, and treated in all respects as if he were still in its clutches. Perez was driven back to the cárcel de los manifestados in a coach. His progress thither was like a triumphal procession, and as he disappeared behind the walls of the cárcel, he was adjured to show himself thrice a day at the window, in order that all men might know that their fueros were not infringed. In one day he had made himself the emblem of the maintenance of the liberties of Aragon.

Philip was in bed, at nine o’clock in the morning, when he was told by the Count of Chinchon of the death of Almenara. Stroking his beard thrice, he rose, dressed himself, and issued orders which resulted, in a few weeks, in the concentration of large forces of infantry and cavalry at the town of Agreda on the confines of Aragon. Evidently it was his first idea that the rebellion must be put down by force. But, as ever, he was slow to take vigorous action; and while his troops were assembling, a number of considerations began to present themselves, all of which strengthened his unwillingness to appeal to arms. If he invaded Aragon in force, he would be virtually proclaiming to the world that Spain was in a state of civil war, and this, in the existing condition of his foreign relations, he was extremely
he was loyal, for the time being at least, to those who had helped him in distress, and who now care that he was kept well concealed. He now had plans of heading a real revolution against Philip, and dare-devil that he was. returned in disguise on October 2 to Saragossa, where his faithful adherents took On hearing, however, that the royal troops were pursuing him, he lay hidden for a few days; and then, mounted a horse and fled north toward the mountains, at first with the intention of escaping to France. manifestados before. After a brief resistance, the royal guards took flight, and Pérez, delivered from the authorities. Another scene of violence ensued, more terrible in some respects than that of four months out. Perez and his friends had been too active; among the crowd which assembled at the time of the transfer was to be effected on September 24; but just two days before, Philip’s projects suffered a heavy blow in the death of Juan de Lanuza, the Aragonese Justicia, whose complaisance and moderation during the past five months had been infinitely helpful to the royal cause. His son, also named Juan, who succeeded him at the age of twenty-seven, was far less respectful to the authority of the crown, and wholly lacking in experience. He complied, indeed, with the legal formalities which were necessary before his prisoner could be given up—in loyalty to the memory of his father he could scarcely do less; but when September 24 came, he found himself powerless to see to it that the king’s orders were carried out. Perez and his friends had been too active; among the crowd which assembled at the time of the transfer, they were fully as numerous and far more desperate than the supporters of the constituted authorities. Another scene of violence ensued, more terrible in some respects than that of four months before. After a brief resistance, the royal guards took flight, and Pérez, delivered from the cárcel de los manifestados, was borne off in triumph to the house of his best friend, Diego de Heredia. There he mounted a horse and fled north toward the mountains, at first with the intention of escaping to France. On hearing, however, that the royal troops were pursuing him, he lay hidden for a few days; and then, dare-devil that he was. returned in disguise on October 2 to Saragossa, where his faithful adherents took care that he was kept well concealed. He now had plans of heading a real revolution against Philip, and he was loyal, for the time being at least, to those who had helped him in distress, and who now desperately needed his leadership to save them from the vengeance of the king.

But Philip still dissembled. The news of the insurrection of September 24 doubtless convinced him that force would ultimately have to be used. His advisers at Madrid were convinced of it, and their views were confirmed by the letters that poured in from Saragossa, where the rebels, led by Diego de Heredia, had made themselves masters of everything. The royal forces at Agreda had by this time increased to upwards of 12,000 men, most of them raw levies, but with a nucleus of 800 veterans. The command of them was now given to an Estremaduran officer, Alonso de Vargas, who had served in the Netherlands; he was doubtless selected principally because he came from the West of Spain, and could therefore have no real sympathy or affiliation with the Aragonese. But it was not till the very end of October that Vargas was permitted to cross the frontier. Most of the intervening weeks were occupied with correspondence between the king and the rebel leaders. Both sides were anxious, if possible, to avoid bloodshed, but each was determined to assert what it regarded as its inalienable rights. The rebels, who had always maintained in their most violent moments that they were acting solely in defense of the ancient liberties of the realm, stoutly asserted that the entrance of a Castilian army on Aragonese soil
would constitute a breach of their fueros. They persuaded the Diputacion del Reyno, and also the youthful Justicia, to give them formal support in this contention; they notified the king of the position they had taken and of their intention to organize armed resistance if he ignored it; they even sent word to Vargas to inform him that he was condemned to a traitor’s death in case he should invade the realm. The king, on the other hand, took the line that, fuero or no fuero, order must be restored and the royal authority maintained. He was encouraged by the fact that most of the Aragonese cities, except Saragossa, had declared themselves favorable to his cause, and he was vastly relieved by the news that the rebels had been unsuccessful in their efforts to get help from the sister county of Catalonia and the kingdom of Valencia. The Valencians refused to have anything to do with them at all. The Diputación of Catalonia and the councilors of Barcelona were more sympathetic, and wrote to Philip to beg him not to invade Aragon; on the other hand, they were quite unwilling to lend armed support to the revolt, and it was chiefly because of their refusal actively to participate therein, that their own lands were later left untouched by the royal vengeance. Meantime in Saragossa the rebel forces became divided among themselves. Diego de Heredia was too much of a firebrand to suit the views of those whose chief aim was to preserve intact the letter of the ancient laws. He circulated a rumor that the Justicia and the chief nobles who had stood by him had sold themselves to the crown. A riot ensued, in which the youthful Juan de Lanuza was violently handled, while the Duke of Villahermosa and the Count of Aranda took refuge in flight. On the following day calmer counsels prevailed. The Justicia was persuaded once more to accept the official responsibility of defending the liberties of the realm. On November 8 he issued forth from the town, with all pomp and ceremony, holding aloft the banner of San Jorge at the head of a company of some 400 men, to stop the army of Vargas, now advancing to the bridge of Alagón. But this demonstration was no better than a solemn farce. Vargas and his forces had been generally well received in the cities of the realm through which they had already passed, and their power was plainly irresistible. After a futile attempt to negotiate with him, in the hope of inducing him not to enter Saragossa, the Justicia and his adherents fled north to Epila. On receiving this news, the rebels in Saragossa dispersed. Perez, who, whether because he did not venture to issue from his hiding place, or because he had temporarily lost his genius for moving men, had failed to accomplish anything since his return, took flight for the last time on November 11, and found safety in Bearn. On the following day Vargas and his army made their entrance unresisted into the ancient capital of Aragon.

Although the rebellion now seemed utterly crushed, the slow-moving king determined to make assurance doubly sure before he enjoyed his vengeance. Well informed, as always, on the situation as it developed day by day, he learned that the Justicia, Villahermosa, and Aranda were now planning to create a new center of resistance at Epila, that they had high hopes of aid from the Catalonians, incensed by the presence of a Castilian army on the soil of Aragon, and that Perez was striving for intervention from France; if possible, these new perils must be averted without the use of force. Vargas played his part to perfection. Whether owing to the royal commands, or to his own admiration of the sturdy patriotism of the Aragonese, he showed the utmost courtesy and kindliness in his dealings with everyone with whom he came in contact. In a few weeks he so succeeded in convincing all men that Philip’s sole desire was a peaceful solution of the existing difficulties, that the ‘Junta of Epila’ broke up, and the Justicia and his adherents returned to Saragossa. Prolonged correspondence with the king ensued, in which Vargas and his advisers unanimously advocated lenient treatment; but the majority of the royal counsellors in Madrid took the other view, and insisted that an example be made of the rebel chiefs. For some time Philip hesitated; but the Castilian element in him was too predominant for the issue to remain long in doubt. He had everything now under his hand; at last it was safe to strike. On the morning of December 12 a secret messenger was dispatched with a note to Vargas, who, when he opened it, is said to have burst into tears. “On the receipt of this paper,” so it ran, “you will seize the person of Juan de Lanuza, Justicia of Aragon, and—let me hear of his death at the same moment that I learn of his arrest. You will have his head cut off.” The order -was obeyed. The youthful Justicia was seized, cast into prison, and given one night to prepare for death. His protest, perfectly valid under the fueros, that he could not legally be condemned “save by the full Cortes, the king, and the kingdom”, availed him nothing; and at ten o’clock on the following morning, December 20, the last of the independent Justicias of the kingdom of Aragon was beheaded in the public market-place of Saragossa. The soldiers of Vargas, under arms, were the sole witnesses of the scene. The Saragossans were a prey to terror and dismay, and dared not issue from their houses.

Obviously there were other victims to follow. The ancient fueros were for the moment in abeyance; men wondered where the next blow would fall. On January 17, 1592, Philip issued a general amnesty and pardon; but twenty-two persons were specifically excepted therefrom, in addition to those actually in prison at the time, a category which included the Duke of Villahermosa and the Count of Aranda, who had been carried off to Castile. The king, moreover, was at great pains to state that the
Holy Office had full liberty to demand satisfaction for the indignities to which it had been subjected. Before effect could be given to these orders, the attention of all parties concerned was diverted once more by the necessity of repelling an invasion from the north which Perez and his friends had organized in Bearn. This, in itself, was a very trifling affair. The invaders, a mere handful, got no farther than Sallen and Biescas, and Vargas and his forces soon drove them back across the mountains. Perhaps the most notable thing about the whole matter was the success with which the government used the war cry of ‘Navarrese heresy’ to stimulate the ardor of the Spaniards against the new danger, and the loyalty with which the mass of the Aragonese supported Vargas. Much though they feared the loss of their fueros, they dreaded still more the prospect of invasion from a foreign country under the rule of a Protestant king; and Perez, who, while he had dwelt among them, had been a popular idol, was now branded as a traitor to his native land. These events occupied the greater part of February, and Philip was highly gratified at the evidences of returning loyalty which had been afforded him; the original leaders of the insurrection, however, he could not bring himself to forgive. The spring, summer, and autumn of 1592 witnessed a tragic series of executions and torturings, the chief object of the latter being to obtain evidence from the leaders of the revolt in Aragon which would enable Philip to proceed legally against Villahermosa and Aranda in Castile. Both of these noblemen, however, died mysteriously in prison, Aranda probably on August 4, and Villahermosa on November 6, “before it was even known that he was ill”; but the process against them continued into the reign of Philip III, and ended, significantly, with an acquittal. The final vengeance of the Inquisition took the form of an unusually imposing auto-da-fe at Saragossa, on October 20, in which six of the condemned were burnt alive, and over seventy others sentenced to different forms of lesser punishments. Since Perez, the archfiend in the eyes of the Holy Office, was now beyond its reach, there was nothing left save to burn him in effigy, in coroza and sanbenito, with all possible attendant maladies and vilifications, which was done. His children and his descendants in the male line were declared incapable forever of holding secular or ecclesiastical office, and were forbidden “to wear gold, silver, pearls, precious stones, coral, silk, camlet, or fine cloth, to ride on horseback, or carry arms, or do anything else that is forbidden by the laws of the realm and the regulations of the Holy Office to those under similar disabilities.”

The insurrection was thus put down, its ringleaders punished, and peace restored; there now remained the further problem of how to prevent its recurrence. That the situation demanded radical modifications of the existing fueros was clear. However admirable the spirit of independence in which they had been originally conceived, they certainly had no place in an absolute monarchy such as Philip and his predecessors had set up. The real question at issue was whether it was safe to stop at that, or whether advantage should not be taken of the excuse which the rebellion had offered to abolish entirely the constitution of the kingdom of Aragon, as was ultimately to be done by Philip V in 1707.

That the Prudent King finally decided not to go so far as this has often provoked surprise. Certainly he had all the power in his hands, and the pretext which his great-grandmother, Isabella the Catholic, had so often desired for ‘conquering Aragon had been amply afforded him. But there were a number of considerations which inclined aim to the more lenient course. In the first place, he had always declared that he proposed to respect the fueros, and he did not wish to go back on his word. In the second, he desired to show his gratitude for the loyalty with which the mass of the Aragonese had rallied to his side, when it was a question of repelling the invasion from Bearn. Thirdly, the situation in Catalonia and Valencia doubtless counted for much. The former had perhaps sympathized with, but nevertheless had abstained from any active interference in the rebellion in Aragon, while the latter had held wholly aloof. The king, therefore, had no possible excuse for proceeding against them, and unless their separate governments were abolished, as well as that of Aragon, he could not have a constitutionally united Spain; if their autonomy, in other words, not to speak of that of Portugal on the other side of the peninsula, must necessarily continue, there was not much point in putting an end to the fueros of Aragon. And, lastly, there was Philip's innate reluctance to violate the traditions of his native land. Even more than his father before him, he was reverent of the past. Separatism, of wellnigh every sort, was, as we have repeatedly pointed out, the most ancient and dominant inheritance of Spain; being Spanish, it must necessarily, in Philip’s eyes, be right. Aragon must be brought into line with Castile, but her autonomy was to remain intact.

Negotiations were therefore begun between the victorious king and the representatives of his rebel realm. Of these the foremost was Martin Bautista de Lanuza, a kinsman and lieutenant of the executed Justicia, who, however, was a royalist at heart, and had carefully refrained from any active participation in the recent insurrection. In pursuance of the policy which the king had decided to adopt, the Cortes of the kingdom of Aragon were summoned to Tarazona, in order that the changes which were contemplated should have the sanction of the representatives of the realm; but the agenda for their deliberations were drawn up by a junta specially constituted for the purpose and carefully instructed by
the crown. Of this junta the most important members were Andres de Cabrera y Bobadilla, archbishop of Saragossa, who was then at the court, and the Count of Chinchón. Moreover, the first of these two was delegated by Philip formally to open the assembly in his name, for the king cherished bitter memories of his experiences at Monzón in 1585, and did not propose to appear until all the real business of the session had been done. The meeting, originally fixed for May 9, 1592, did not finally take place until June 15. The brazos, needless to add, made difficulties over the royal absence, which they regarded as derogatory to their dignity. There was also much trouble over getting them to accept the king’s demand for the abolition of the ancient fuero requiring absolute unanimity of the votes of each estate, and the substitution of majority rule; but authority, if not tradition, was now on the royal side, and in the end they submitted. In the course of these events, the archbishop of Saragossa died, and Philip appointed Doctor Juan Campi, the regent of the Council of Aragon, to take his place as the royal representative; but the news that daily poured in from Tarazona made it increasingly evident that everything was ultimately bound to turn out in accordance with the royal desires, and in mid-November the king, with Prince Philip, arrived at Aragon. They were welcomed at least with outward cordiality. There was a solemn solo of the four brazos in the archiepiscopal palace at Tarazona on December 2, at which the Prince of Asturias swore to observe the fueros of the realm. The king solemnly sanctioned all the changes in the constitution which the Cortes had made, and formally declared the session closed. On the following day he granted a general amnesty to all who were still prisoners in the realm. On December 5 he left Tarazona. On the 30th he was back at Madrid.

The constitutional changes which had been voted by the Cortes of Tarazona were simple but effective. Dictated, as they virtually had been, at the fiat of the monarchy, they put an end to the real independence, if not to the formal autonomy of the kingdom of Aragon. Nothing was absolutely suppressed, but all power to resist the crown was removed. The king was given the right, at least until the next meeting of the Cortes, to nominate a foreign viceroy; Aragon alone, of all his different realms, had hitherto succeeded in reserving this office for natives, and she was now brought into alignment with Valencia, Granada, and Navarre. In the Cortes, the abolition of the fuero requiring unanimity was the most important change; the right to vote also, though not to attend, was taken away from those members of the two brazos of the aristocracy who had not attained the age of twenty years; the Diputación Permanente, too, was deprived of a large measure of its control over the use of the national funds and over the national guard, and of its right to call together the representatives of the cities of the kingdom. The Justicia became for the first time removable at the pleasure of the king, and the chief guarantee of his independence was thus annulled. The nomination of his five lieutenants and of the seventeen legists who advised him was also rearranged in such fashion as to put their selection much more largely in the royal hands; indeed, it was the changes in matters judicial that were the most important of all. A number of other constitutional anachronisms were either radically modified or else done away with. Notable among these was the so-called fuero of the via privilegiada, which enabled a prisoner to regain his liberty, temporarily at least, in case of any illegality in the form of his arrest; its operation was now greatly restricted by the enumeration of some thirty important crimes for which it was no longer to be valid. All in all, it is impossible to deny that most of these modifications, save perhaps that which provided that the Justicia should cease to be irremovable, brought real improvement; for conditions had so altered since the ancient Aragonese constitution had first come into being, that it was no longer possible that it should be practically enforced. The tragedy lay in the fact that the changes had not been evolved as a result of the constitutional development of the kingdom itself, but imposed, instead, at the command of a monarch who was so incorrigibly Castilian in his viewpoint that the Aragonese really regarded him almost in the light of a foreigner.

A few minor difficulties still remained to be settled after the dissolution of the Cortes of Tarazona. Of these the most important was the withdrawal of the Castilian army, which the Cortes had demanded, and the whole realm ardently desired. It was not effected, however, until December, 1593, and Philip insisted, as a price of it, on the construction of a fort and the establishment of a royal garrison in the Aljafería, on the plea that the safety of the Inquisition must be insured. He followed this up, in the next two months, with a general disarmament of all the Moriscos in the realm. Their outbreaks during the preceding troublesome years furnished a pretext for it. The measure was in fact a fore1 shadowing of the edict of general expulsion which was to be put forth for all Spain in 1609. All in all, there was no question that the king had issued victorious from his struggle with the rebel Aragoneses; in Spain, at least, he had triumphantly asserted the absolute supremacy of the crown. On the other hand, his most powerful enemy had escaped, and was already revealing the most closely guarded secrets of his ancient master at the courts of France and England, and moving heaven and earth to induce them to combine against him. The ‘troubles of Aragon’ were not merely a cosa de España. They also had an international
Henry IV did not officially declare war on Spain until January 17, 1595; but Philip since 1584 had been author of these dastardly attempts, and there was no question where he could most effectively seek it. Men met at Tours in the spring of 1593. The fugitive minister ever since he had crossed the Pyrenees, to send him northward at once; and the two disposition of Perez. Henry therefore wrote to his sister Catharine at Bearn, who had befriended the France under Henry's was paid 600 ducats to shoot him in Paris in 1595. Small wonder if Perez vowed vengeance on the intended victim that she ended by offering him protection and support. Two Irishmen, at the behest of Philip's representative in the Netherlands, sought to compass his death when he was in England in 1594, but were promptly seized and executed; and the same was the fate of the Baron de Pinilla, who was paid 600 ducats to shoot him in Paris in 1595. Small wonder if Perez vowed vengeance on the author of these dastardly attempts, and there was no question where he could most effectively seek it. Henry IV did not officially declare war on Spain till January 17, 1595; but Philip since 1584 had been ardently supporting the League, which continued to hold Paris till 1594, and thus prevented the union of France under Henry's scepter. The French king could make excellent use of a man with the genius and disposition of Perez. Henry therefore wrote to his sister Catharine at Bearn, who had befriended the fugitive minister ever since he had crossed the Pyrenees, to send him northward at once; and the two men met at Tours in the spring of 1593.

One of Henry's chief desires at this time was to gain for himself the alliance of the cautious Elizabeth of England for the defense of his northeastern frontier in the war against Philip, which, though not yet declared, he foresaw was inevitable; and he promptly dispatched Perez to London, with a letter to the queen, to obtain it. But there were grave difficulties in the way. Lord Burleigh and the majority of the Council were averse to participating in a Continental war. Elizabeth, as ever, was loath to spend money, and Perez was driven to seek the support of the Earl of Essex, who led the small group which advocated a bolder policy. While in London Perez really lived at his expense, and on the proceeds of a beggarly pension which Essex obtained for him from the queen; through Essex he became friendly with Francis Bacon, much to the alarm of the latter's Puritanical mother, who could not endure to see her son in the company of such "a proud, profane, costly fellow." But to attain the real object of his mission, and induce England to join France against Spain, proved for the time being to be quite impossible. All of political consequence that Perez achieved during his first visit there was to inform the English government of the state of Spain and to circulate exaggerated stories of the infamies of her king; it was at London in the summer of 1594 that he first published his famous Relaciones, under the significant pseudonym of Raphael Peregrino.

A year later he was back in France, where war, in the meantime, had been declared on Spain, and operations had begun on the northeastern frontier. Henry was now more than ever in need of English aid, and after begging for it in vain during the autumn and winter, he sent Perez back to London once more on a last desperate effort to secure it in the spring of 1596. At the time of his arrival the Spaniards were besieging Calais, and shortly afterwards (April 25) captured it. Elizabeth consequently changed her tactics, and began once more to flirt with the French alliance which she had hitherto opposed; all this was of course highly favorable to the success of Perez's mission. But, unfortunately, when he reached London he found that the Earl of Essex, on whose ardent support he had counted, had gone off to Plymouth to prepare for the great expedition against Cadiz. Nothing would induce the queen's favorite to return and run the risk of seeing the dramatic stroke on which he had staked his reputation diverted to a tamer purpose in the English Channel, and Perez recognized with bitterness that he had become merely the sport of factions and the plaything of political chance. He bore no real part in the settlement of the Anglo-French treaty, which was signed on May 24 and ratified later in the year; and when he at last returned to France, he was disheartened and worn out. He was encouraged once more in January, 1597, by being taken over, on generous terms, into the service of the French monarch; for Henry recognized his great abilities, and as long as the war with Spain should last, he was confident that he could make good use of him. For some months thereafter Perez devoted his best energies to maintaining intact the Anglo-French alliance, but this ultimately proved to be a task beyond his powers. Henry's recapture of Amiens, on September 24, convinced Philip that he could no longer profitably continue the war, and he soon afterwards offered the French king terms which induced him to abandon the ally who had so often disappointed him in the past, and sign a separate treaty with Spain at Vervins on May 2, 1598. When Perez saw that the peace which he had labored to prevent was inevitable, he made a strong effort to get himself included in it, with provision for the liberation of his wife and...
children and the restoration of his property; but he hopelessly failed. The new turn of events made him a liability, not an asset, at the court of Henry IV. Moreover, his numerous reverses and rebuffs in the course of the past six years had converted into bitterness and insolence that rare personal charm which had hitherto been his most powerful asset; everyone now turned him the cold shoulder. The sole consolation brought him by the year 1598 was the news of the death of Philip, on September 13.

Perez survived his ancient master for more than thirteen years, but the last part of his life saw no betterment of his fortunes. He was encouraged, indeed, in 1599, by the events that signaled the initiation of the rule of Philip III: the rumor that Philip II had advised his son to get reconciled to his exiled minister, the fall from grace of his ‘arch executioner’, Vazquez de Arce, the liberation of Juana Coello and her children, and the general atmosphere of hedonism and forgiveness which characterized the reign of the ‘Picture King’; more than ever did he hope to be allowed to return to Spain. With the idea of gaining favor with the new monarch, he tried to make himself useful in connection with the Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations of 1604, and so confident was he of success that he rashly resigned his pension at the French court; the attempt, however, was a miserable fiasco, for the French government had warned the British that Perez’s aims were purely selfish, and James I was furious when he learned that he had been even permitted to land in his realm. Returned to France, Perez was hard put to it to find a living. He was obliged to move from one lodging to another, each meaner than the one before. His petitions to the different Spanish ambassadors at Paris to intercede for him at Madrid were fruitless. A final hope that he could make capital for himself out of the negotiations for a double marriage between the courts of France and Spain in the spring of 1611 was cruelly disappointed, and on November 3 of that year he died, and was buried in the church of the Celestines at Paris.

In Spain Juana Coello continued to labor for the repeal of the harsh sentence which the Inquisition had pronounced against Perez and his descendants in 1592, and in June, 1615, she was finally successful. It would appear to have been stipulated, however, that this act of leniency should be kept secret, or, at least, unheralded; for when Gonzalo, one of the sons of Perez, ventured to make it public too ostentatiously, he was promptly cast into prison, and his mother, on learning of his arrest, died of grief shortly afterwards in the arms of her daughter Luisa. The rancors that had been engendered by her husband’s extraordinary career were not to be allayed in his own generation.
CHAPTER XXXIX
SPAIN, FRANCE, AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1584-98

The dramatic interest of the story of the defeat of the Spanish Armada and of the subsequent naval struggle with England must not make us forget that the period during which they took place was also of critical importance in the history of Spain’s relations with France. To the history of those relations we now return, and therewith, at the same time, to the history of the revolt in the Netherlands, which, as the years rolled on, became more and more closely involved with them.

Down to the death of the Duke of Anjou in June, 1584, the policy of the Prudent King with regard to France can fairly be summarized as one of ‘watchful waiting’. The last Valois were so fully occupied at home in their struggle to maintain themselves against the Guises on the one hand, and the Huguenots on the other, that it was out of the question for them to wage a foreign war in any such fashion as their predecessors had done in the Emperor’s day. The most they could do, when they wished to make trouble for Philip, was to lend aid, directly or indirectly, to the rebels in the Low Countries. Philip, in turn, sought to parry these thrusts, and also to make additional capital for himself out of the situation in France, by secretly intriguing, through his ambassadors and other agents, with the various malcontents there. He might have minor grievances, indeed; but, in general, the status quo—a France internally disrupted but still officially Catholic—was highly satisfactory to him. Certainly he had nothing to gain by provoking war, and if any of his representatives at the Valois court threatened to become too belligerent, he promptly recalled him.

The continuance of this policy became impossible after 1584. The death of Anjou was the first of a series of events destined to force Philip into vigorous intervention in France. The Duke was the last, save one, of the sons of Henry II and Catharine de’ Medici; his death meant that when his elder brother, the childless reigning sovereign, Henry III, should follow him to the grave, the legal heir of the crown of France would be the Protestant Henry of Bourbon, who in 1572 had inherited from his mother, Jeanne d’Albret, the French fragment of the kingdom of Navarre. The succession of a heretic, and of a heretic with a tradition of bitter hostility to Spain, was now an imminent peril. Something must be done, and done at once, to avert such a catastrophe; and the obvious move under the circumstances was for Philip to draw near to the ultra-Catholic party in France, then headed by the three sons of Francois de Lorraine, second Duke of Guise. Hitherto the Spanish monarch had been generally opposed to the projects of this family, whose interests, though intensely Catholic, were politically opposed to his own, but now there seemed no alternative to an alliance with them. Henry III had been officially recognized as their sovereign by the rebels in the Low Countries in the previous April, and since his brother’s death in June, he had been suspiciously friendly to Henry of Navarre; clearly, for the moment, there was nothing to be expected from him. So, on December 31, 1584, Philip’s ambassador in France, Juan Bautista de Tassis, and the representatives of the Guises signed a treaty at Joinville which reanimated the League of 1576 by bringing it the support of the monarchy of Spain. The high contracting parties made a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance for the preservation of the Roman Catholic faith, for the extirpation of heresy in France and in the Low Countries, and for the exclusion of the Bourbons from the French throne. Philip was not yet ready to send his tercios to the aid of his new allies, but he promised subsidies to the amount of 50,000 crowns a month, and even agreed to pay in six months the total amount that he had pledged for the year. The crisis must indeed have seemed to him grave.

The year 1585 saw several fresh developments of the situation. In April the masterful Bernardino de Mendoza, who had recently been ordered out of England, supplanted Tassis as Spanish ambassador to France. He immediately established contact with Henri, third Duke of Guise, and soon became, in fact, rather Philip’s representative with the League than at the Valois court to which he was officially accredited. At the same time it is evident that his confident and imperious bearing made a profound impression on the vacillating Henry III. The French king desired above all things to detach the king of Spain from the League, and even offered Philip his alliance against England as the price of it; but Mendoza was not to be tempted by any such proposal as this, and the final result was that in midsummer Henry weakly capitulated to the Guises. By the treaty of Nemours (July 7) he came to agreement with the forces of the League on terms which made it perfectly clear that the Guises and not
the Valois were the master. A furious edict against heresy was put forth, giving the Huguenots the naked alternative of confession or exile. All sorts of powers and favors were accorded to the Guises; the monarchy virtually placed itself under their tutelage in the conduct of the now inevitable war against the followers of Henry of Navarre. But since the Guises, in turn, took their orders from Mendoza, the treaty of Nemours meant not merely the extirpation of French Protestants; it signified that France’s political destinies were being delivered over to the king of Spain, and that Spanish preponderance, already intolerable, was to be still further enhanced in a new and unexpected direction. But this the new pontiff, Sixtus V, who had been elected in the preceding April, was resolved, if possible, to prevent. The saving of French Catholicism was in his eyes of paramount importance, but he wished it accomplished without the interference of the Spanish king; for the maintenance of a powerful united monarchy in France was essential to the preservation from Spanish dictation of the independence of the Holy See. Accordingly, when the Guises asked for his alliance, he refused to commit himself. Against heresy, indeed, he took a definite stand by launching a bull of excommunication against Henry of Navarre, but he was unwilling to make common cause with the dominant faction in France for fear of indirectly increasing the power of Spain. He wished the Valois to fight their own battles against Protestantism and civil war and reap the full rewards of victory. Philip knew from that moment that the political jealousy and distrust of the Holy See, of which he had so often complained in preceding years, were certain to be continued, if not intensified, as long as Sixtus remained Pope.

During the next three years Philip’s attention was centered on the expedition against England, so that the story of his relations to France falls somewhat into the background; but Bernardino de Mendoza was incessantly active there in his efforts to promote the interests of his master. The course of the ‘War of the Three Henrys’ that broke out in 1585 proved that the king of Navarre was a formidable opponent in the field, and the inconstancy of the Valois monarch caused the scene to shift almost every day; but in general it may be said that the efforts of the, Spanish ambassador were directed rather towards the preservation and extension of Spain’s political influence in France than to the extirpation of heresy there. Henry III, as was to be expected, at once became terribly restless under the control of the Guises. Before the end of the year 1586 there was talk of his seeking reconciliation with the king of Navarre. This Philip, of course, was determined to prevent, and notified the Pope that he would never consent to it. On the other hand, in France, Mendoza put forth every effort to widen the breach between the Guises and the king, for he wished the factions there to multiply and exhaust themselves in civil strife, and to make sure that the control of the League should remain in the hands of Spain. The success that he attained in this difficult task is a wonderful tribute to the power of his personality; he seemed to tower like a giant above the weaklings who surrounded him. Guise was constantly running to him for Spanish aid, for funds from Madrid, and for soldiers from Alexander of Parma; he took delight in his smile, and trembled at his frown. Mendoza also found time, to intervene in the affairs of England. He strove to bring about a Scottish Catholic rising in 1587, and organized fresh conspiracies for the murder of Queen Elizabeth. When it came time for the Armada to set sail, he saw to it that the French monarch was impotent to give effect to the threats he had made that he would go to the assistance of England; nay more, when in May, 1588, the Day of the Barricades had forced Henry to abandon his own capital and take refuge at Chartres, Mendoza actually had the effrontery to present himself before him and demand an assurance of his support in the enterprise on which his master was about to embark. He virtually insisted that the Most Christian King give him a definite guarantee that no Frenchman would ever put let or hindrance in the way of the projects of Philip of Spain.

The news of the defeat of the Armada was a great shock to Mendoza, but as soon as he had recovered from it, he redoubled his own activities; for if England was to be lost to Spain, there was all the more reason why Spain should maintain her influence in France. Ever since the beginning of the year the Guises had resolved to force Henry to cast in his lot again with the League, and on such terms as would reduce him to impotence; they demanded the capitulation of the king to a faction admittedly controlled from abroad. All their actions had been directed to the attainment of this end. Mendoza ardently supported them, and on July 21, by the so-called Edict of Union, they had apparently accomplished their purpose. The king submitted on all points, and pardoned those responsible for the Day of the Barricades. But the permanence of these arrangements remained to be tested, and the test was to come at the meeting of the States-General, which had been summoned to Blois in the autumn. The Guises did their utmost to secure the return of members favorable to themselves, and with excellent success. When the assembly met it was found that they had practically all the clergy, a majority of the nobles, and nearly three-quarters of the Third Estate; they were certain that permanent victory was at last within their grasp. But the wily Mendoza was less sanguine than they, for he realized, as they did not, the utter untrustworthiness of the king. In September, without a word either to his aged mother or to the Duke of Guise, Henry suddenly dismissed his chancellor and two secretaries of state, and replaced
them with men who would take their orders from him. In October, when he first addressed the Estates, he made it evident that he did not intend to abide by his promises of three months before. The Guises were furious, and were supported by the assembly. So confident were they in the assurance of popular support that they felt sure that in the end the king would be forced to yield; only Mendoza had any suspicions of foul play, and even he believed that he would be able to forestall it. For nine long weeks the struggle continued, but when Henry became finally convinced that he could not win over the Estates, he determined to have recourse to murder. On December 23, the Duke of Guise was summoned to the royal council chamber, and was slain as he entered by the royal guard; the next day his brother, the cardinal of Lorraine, suffered a similar fate. On January 5, 1589, the aged queen-mother died in the castle of Blois, and the last wretched scion of the house of Valois was left quite alone to wrestle with the herculean task of unifying and enfranchising his native land.

Mendoza was utterly cast down when he learned of the murder of Guise. Four days later he wrote to Philip, assuring him of the many warnings that he had given the Duke, and bewailing the fact that all the hopes which he and his master had built upon the League had now “gone up in smoke”. Philip, too, was deeply disheartened by the news, and is reported to have declared that he counted it an even worse misfortune than the loss of the Armada. Yet both the king and his ambassador underestimated the intensity of the antiroyalist feeling in France that had been aroused by the murder. The central committee of the League in Paris, popularly known as the Seize, not only raised the standard of revolt at the capital, but sent messages to all the chief cities of the realm, urging them to do the same. Guise’s sole surviving brother, Charles, Duke of Mayenne, was made “lieutenant-general of the state and of the crown of France”. The material was ready to hand which would have enabled Philip, had he utilized it promptly and effectively, to keep France under Spanish control for many years to come. But just at the very moment when he should have acted boldly, the Prudent King elected to play safe. He liked to have the French monarchy in leading strings, but he could not quite bring himself to countenance open rebellion. He instructed Mendoza to keep close to Henry III at all costs, to refrain from asking him to explain what he had done, and to strive in all possible ways to rekindle the courage of the Catholics; instead of stimulating the activities of the League, the ambassador was given the impossible task of preventing an understanding between the Valois and the king of Navarre. In the meantime Mendoza’s courage had come back. He saw the chance to play the bolder game, and finally, in defiance of Philip’s commands, he betook himself to Paris; but he was not able to accomplish much after he arrived there, and his departure from the court gave Henry an excuse for sending a special messenger to Madrid to demand that he be recalled.

Again Philip hesitated, but this time hesitation was wise. Even before Mendoza had left the court, it was perfectly obvious what the king of France would do. The successes of the League and the ebullitions of anti-royalist sentiment which it had evoked left him no alternative save an alliance with Henry of Navarre. He made one last effort, indeed, to draw close to Mayenne, but it was evident from the first that it was certain to fail; and while he was awaiting the inevitable refusal, the king of Navarre put forth his famous appeal to the French nation (March 4) which proved that even though he might be a heretic, he was a patriot first of all, who would tolerate no interference by foreigners within the realm. On April 3 the two Henrys agreed to the terms of an alliance. On the 30th they met at Plessis-les-Tours. In the succeeding weeks they advanced together on Paris, their forces rapidly increasing every day. By the end of July they were prepared to lay siege to the capital. Within the walls there was terror and confusion. It was bitter indeed for the Leaguers to lose, after victory had seemed so near; and finally a fanatic Dominican persuaded himself that the only way to save the cause was to do unto Henry of Valois as he had done unto Henry of Guise. On the last night of July Jacques Clement stole out of the capital. On the morrow, by dint of forged papers, he obtained access to the king at St. Cloud, and plunged a dagger into his breast. The assassin was slain on the spot; that same evening the last of the Valois died.

Mendoza reported to his master on the following day how “it has pleased our Lord to deliver us by an event so happy that it cannot but be attributed to His all-powerful hand; indeed it gives us reason to hope that we are finished with the heretics”. But Philip, when he got the news, was much less enthusiastic. For the moment he seemed far less interested in the vast possibilities which the assassination opened up for him than horrified at the murder, by a monk of his favorite order, of a legitimate, if unworthy, sovereign. His servants and counsellors, taking their cue from the king’s mood, though they persisted in speaking of the event as “a marvelous judgment of God”, took pains also to state their conviction that Philip should make every effort “to care for the safety and well-being of his own royal person.”
Before we can carry further the story of the Spanish monarch’s dealings with the situation in France, it is essential that the state of affairs in the Netherlands be brought up to date. We left them, it will be remembered, at the time of Parma’s capture of Antwerp on August 17, 1585.

That capture, as we have remarked, was a notable triumph for Parma, for Philip, and for Spain; it completed the reconquest of the Catholic Southwest, save for Ostend, Sluys, and a few other places, and isolated the republic and the Reformation in Utrecht, Holland, and Zealand. But that final stronghold was destined to prove the hardest problem of all; indeed, it was before its walls that Philip’s great war machine was ultimately to wear itself out. The three provinces were virtually surrounded by water—on the west by the North Sea, on the north and east by the Zuyder Zee, and on the southeast and south by the Yssel, the Waal, and the Meuse—and could not be taken by assault; obviously a siege would be required, and a siege, not of an isolated town or fort, but of a whole district. That district, moreover, could count on ample supplies. Its defenders had ships in plenty, and the Spaniards almost none. Their many friends could send them, almost at will, provisions, munitions, and men. Though Orange and Anjou were gone, there was no lack of leaders to fill their places. Maurice of Nassau, seventeen years old, son of William the Silent, was promptly elected to fill his father’s office. His youth made it necessary that he should be guided for some time by a council; but in a few months he gave evidence of military talent which was subsequently to prove a thorn in the sides of the Spaniards. Though the death of Anjou, and the state of affairs in France, showed that no further help could be expected from that quarter in the immediately succeeding years, that very fact was enough to convince Queen Elizabeth that she must henceforth bestir herself more actively in the rebels’ behalf. In the autumn of 1585 she agreed to take them under her protection and send them 5000 troops; in December her favorite, the Earl of Leicester, arrived at Flushing.

Leicester speedily made it evident that he had neither the ability nor the tact to carry out the exceedingly difficult task with which he had been entrusted. His squabbles with the States-General and with his mistress at home soon reduced him to impotence, and convinced Parma that for the time he could be safely ignored. And so it came about that the year 1586 saw Philip’s representative in the Low Countries principally occupied with the task of separating the United Provinces from another set of allies whom they had recently discovered within the Empire. In the year 1582 Gebhard Truchsess, the archbishop of Cologne, had gone over to the Reformed religion, thus menacing the integrity of the Rhenish ‘priest street’, and offering the Dutch rebels the chance of obtaining valuable support in a position of the highest strategic importance. The war which broke out in Cologne in 1583, after Truchsess’s conversion became known, was thus closely linked from its earliest inception with the course of the revolt in the Netherlands. Orange had sent troops to help Truchsess; it was his hope to get the whole of the Lower Rhine into Protestant hands and isolate in Friesland the northeastern detachment of the Spanish army under Verdugo. Parma, on the other hand, did everything he could for Ernest of Bavaria, the bishop of Liege, whom the Catholic members of the chapter of Cologne had elected in place of Truchsess. He had quartered some of his best regiments on the confines of Gelderland. There had been a series of inconclusive engagements between the rival forces. And now, in 1586, Parma determined to concentrate on this problem and solve it. On June 7, in spite of all the efforts of Leicester and his allies to prevent him, he took Grave, thus opening to the royal armies the passage of the Meuse; three weeks later Venloo surrendered. Thence Parma advanced rapidly into the electorate, captured Neuss, and massacred its garrison; to complete the task that he had set himself to perform it only remained to capture Rheinberg. But this he was unable to accomplish. His foes had by this time discovered the way to thwart his plans, not indeed by meeting him at the point of attack, but by diversions, for which their command of rapid river transport rendered them particularly apt; no sooner had Parma begun the siege of Rheinberg than he was obliged to go to the rescue of Zutphen. During the remainder of the year, and also in 1587, he continued, indeed, to win a majority of victories in the field; but save for the capture of Sluys (August 5, 1587) they brought him little advantage. The center of the rebellion continued successfully to defy him.

Parma’s capture of Sluys was an evidence to all men that the expedition against England, so often mooted and postponed, was now to be carried through to the exclusion of everything else. The duke had always maintained that a port on the coast of the Netherlands was essential to success, and he wished to be permitted to follow up the taking of Sluys with that of Flushing; but Philip would not hear of it. Though Parma had been almost the first person whom the king had consulted when the plan of the expedition had been originally broached, matters had developed in such fashion in the intervening years as to make effective cooperation between them no longer possible. The root of the difficulty was, as usual, Philip’s perennial jealousy of distant and too efficient subordinates, a jealousy of which Parma, since the capture of Antwerp, had become the principal object; it was largely that jealousy which had caused the king to concentrate the control of the expedition in Spain and thereby get it out of the duke’s
hands. The delays and postponements were another source of friction. Parma had counted from the first on the effects of a surprise, but that was now impossible; the English knew more of the state of Philip’s preparations than Philip knew himself. Add to all this the fact that the king kept his nephew terribly short of funds, and it is no wonder that Parma was gradually becoming lukewarm with regard to the whole enterprise against England; indeed, in letters to Philip of January 31 and March 20, 1588, he frankly foretold its failure. His misgivings had also manifested themselves in another form at a much earlier date. In the first months of the year 1586 he had made overtures for peace to the government of Queen Elizabeth. Philip had consented, not indeed with any idea that the negotiations could possibly be successful, but rather in the hope of lulling the English into a feeling of security and thereby gaining time. The queen was anxious at all costs to avoid war, and though her counsellors had little faith in the sincerity of the Spanish offers, there was apparently some hope that Parma could be induced to betray his uncle in return for a promise of independent sovereignty in the Low Countries. The negotiations dragged on for over two years. In March, 1588, Parma was so certain that the Armada must fail that he advised Philip to abandon pretense and seek an accommodation in earnest before it was too late, but the king refused. The negotiations continued, and finally culminated in conferences held at Bourbourg in June, 1588, needless to add, without success. Each side knew by this time that the invasion of England was inevitable, and merely sought to feint and spar for time. The only real significance of the whole affair is the light it incidentally sheds on the relations of Parma and the king. There is no reliable evidence that the duke actually intended to play his master false. On the other hand, he was disgusted at the delays and inefficiency of Philip’s plan of campaign, and unenthusiastic, to say the least, about cooperating with it.

The king was fully aware of his nephew’s state of mind, but under the circumstances he could neither replace nor dispense with him. On September 4, 1587, he wrote him a most intimate letter to tell him how completely he depended on him, and how essential it was that he should be ready to do his part when the crucial moment should arrive. And so, with a heavy heart, since his own wiser plans had been rejected, Parma prepared to conform to the king’s, which he knew were certain to fail; he must adhere to the strict letter of his instructions, in order to avoid any share in the responsibility for the inevitable defeat. In the early part of 1588 his headquarters were for the most part at Ghent; but in May he moved over to Bruges, where his flatboats were assembled in the canals, and whence he had arranged to have them towed to Nieuport and Dunkirk when the Armada should have reached Calais Roads. The expeditionary force was quartered in the adjacent villages, and on July 18 he wrote to the king that everything was at last in readiness. Thereafter he began to receive constant, increasingly plaintive, and self-contradictory letters from Medina Sidonia, informing him of the Armada’s condition and whereabouts; the last three of these, written on August 6 and 7 from Calais Roads, beg him to “hasten his coming out”, and “bear aid in resisting the enemy’s fleet”. All this Parma had foreseen; and he would not, because he knew he could not, comply. In two letters to Philip (August 8 from Bruges and August 10 from Dunkirk) he indignantly reiterated that it was the Armada’s duty to protect his passage and clear the sea of enemies, and that he would not stir until it was in a condition to do so. And so the duke bore silent witness, in an impotence that was probably not altogether ungrateful to him, to the tragedy of the next three days, the battle of Gravelines and the dispersal of his master’s great fleet. If Philip had trusted him, he would have done his utmost to bring him victory. If his original advice had been followed, it is even possible that the Armada might have accomplished its object; but in view of the way in which the king had listened to the slanders of his rivals and enemies, it is small wonder that when the critical moment arrived he refused to do more than the part that had been assigned to him. “What adds more than I can here express to my grief at this disaster”, so he wrote to Philip from Dunkirk on August 10, “is that it was humanly impossible to remedy it, or aid in any way.”

Parma came in for more than his share of the taunts and invectives with which Spain resounded when the shattered remnants of the Armada got back to port; he was blamed, indeed, quite as much as the Duke of Medina Sidonia. He was accused of unwillingness to perform the part that had been assigned to him, and of treachery to his master. The old report that he was aiming to obtain a separate sovereignty for himself in the Low Countries was circulated once more. It would even appear that Elizabeth, taking advantage of the resentment which she knew these cabals would inevitably arouse in him, consented to have it suggested to him that he assume the crown of the Netherlands as the ally of England—a proposal which Parma indignantly rejected. Philip for the time being refused to listen to these calumnies of his traducers; possibly he began to realize how much wiser it would have been to have placed more reliance on Parma from the outset. In letters of October 10 and 17, 1588, he assured his nephew of his complete satisfaction, and directed him to draw up plans for a new expedition. For the moment, however, it was obvious that nothing more could be accomplished against England; and Parma, his courage restored by the renewal of the royal confidence, returned in the end of 1588 to the
problems of the rebels in the Netherlands and of the Protestants in Cologne. He sent troops to the aid of
Ernest of Bavaria; and though he himself was unsuccessful in an attempt to take Bergen-op-Zoom, his
lieutenant, Peter Ernest of Mansfeld, seized Wachterdonk, and thus extended his power in Gelderland.
In 1589-90 he gained greater victories still. In Cologne Ernest of Bavaria decisively defeated the
adherents of Truchsess, so that Parma was relieved of all anxiety in that direction. Rheinberg, which had
defied him in 1586, finally surrendered to Mansfeld in January, 1590, and nine months earlier Parma
himself had got possession of Gertruyenberg. Holland and Zeeland were isolated at last as they had
never been before; and Farnese, whose achievements had been the more remarkable in view of the
wretched state of his own health and the mutinies of his discontented soldiery, was confident that the
last embers of the rebellion could be speedily stamped out.

But once more it was the duke’s hard fate to be called off from the task which he had originally
been given, and was on the way to accomplish, to attack another, which in the estimation of his master
was of even greater importance. The assassination of Henry of Valois on August 1, 1589, convinced the
king that everything must be sacrificed to the opportunities thus opened for him in France, and Parma
was ordered to bear aid to the forces of the League. To serve a master with as many irons in the fire as
Philip was almost more hopeless than the serving of two.

Never had the Spanish monarch shown himself more ‘prudent’ than when he received word of
the murder of Henry III. He had been profoundly shocked, as we have already seen, and at first a little
terrified by the news; then, when he began to realize the opportunities that it offered him, he elected,
instead of acting promptly, to lay plans for the remoter future. As son-in-law of Henry II, he could
himself lay claim to the vacant throne, if the Salic Law were ignored, and some of the French, in their
first enthusiasm at getting rid of Henry III, declared for the “election of the king of Spain, and the
placing of everything in his hands”. But Philip at first seemed in no way desirous to grasp the prize.
Quite the contrary, he instructed his representatives at Paris to favor the candidacy of the aged cardinal
of Bourbon, who had been proclaimed king by Mayenne under the title of Charles X. Having made
excellent use of a moribund cardinal as a stop-gap once before under similar circumstances, at the time
of the annexation of Portugal, he was happy to repeat the experiment. It would serve to embarrass the
king of Navarre and give cohesion to the forces opposed to him; on the other hand, it could not place
any permanent obstacle in the way of Philip’s own ultimate plans, for the cardinal had been a prisoner
of the French crown ever since the assassination of the Guises, and the League was never able to
liberate him. At the same time Philip dispatched his former ambassador Juan Bautista de Tassis and a
certain Commander Moreo to collaborate at Paris with Mendoza, who had displaced Tassis there.

Apparently the principal objects of their mission were merely to keep the king informed of everything
that occurred and to distribute bribes; in any case, when their money ran out, in June, 1590, they both of
them returned to Madrid. One thing, however, they accomplished during their brief stay in France,
which was very encouraging to the king of Spain; and that was the establishment of cordial relations
with the papal legate, Cardinal Errico Caetani, whom Sixtus had dispatched to Paris when he learned of
the murder of Henry III. That event had dealt a rude blow to the pontiff’s hopes of re-erecting the
supremacy of the Catholic church in France without the aid of Spain. Unless the king of Navarre would
turn Catholic, which at that moment seemed improbable, the Pope would have to make common cause
with Philip in order to keep France within the Roman fold; and in December, 1589, he actually offered
to conclude an alliance with the Prudent King in order to effect this end. Before Philip had had time to
accept, representatives of the Catholic adherents of Henry of Navarre arrived in Rome, and revived the
pontiff’s hopes that he might do without Spanish aid. When Philip’s ambassador, the Count of Olivares,
tried to bully him, he became furious, and even threatened to excommunicate the Spanish king; in fact,
down to the day of his death, which occurred on August 27, 1590, he avoided definitely committing
himself to the Spanish cause in France. But in the meantime the legate Caetani, in spite of the Pope’s
complaints, did everything possible to favor the designs of Philip; moreover, the Prudent King rightly
foresaw that, when Sixtus should die, the worst of his troubles with the papacy would be over, for it was
inconceivable that another Pope should be as violent in his opposition to him. As long as the king of
Navarre remained a heretic, it now seemed almost inevitable that Spain should have the support of
Rome.

While Philip planned and plotted, his rivals and enemies were far more active. The king of Spain
was not the only foreigner who aspired to control, or if that were impossible, to dismember France. His
son-in-law Charles Emanuel ‘the Great’ of Savoy, who as grandson of Francis I had a claim to the
French throne, saw a chance in prevailing confusion to fulfil a long-cherished dream of reconstituting
for himself the ancient kingdom of Arles, and launched an army against Provence in the autumn of
1589. A little later the duke of Lorraine, who was a son-in-law of Henry II, made a similar attempt against Champagne. But these efforts and others like them encountered vigorous opposition. The Savoyards soon became “rather the besieged than the besiegers in Provence”, and Charles Emanuel betook himself to Madrid to ask for Spanish help. The principal Lorrainers, too, after their initial repulses, tended to gravitate in the same direction. By the end of the year 1591, it became evident that the king of Spain was the only foreign pretender whose ambitions need be taken seriously; the battle, in other words, was to be fought by him and those in France whom he could induce to support him, against the patriotic though heretical king of Navarre. The latter had lost no time after the assassination of Henry III. On August 4, 1589, he had put forth his famous declaration promising the maintenance of the Catholic faith within the realm, in the hope of rallying all true Frenchmen to his cause; but it did not produce the effect he had anticipated. Too many of the recognitions it elicited were but provisional, and there were many defections. Some even of his Protestant friends deserted him because he had promised too much; his army soon dwindled to half its original size. But he speedily demonstrated that he could make good use of his shrunken forces in the field. Realizing that it would be madness, for the present, to attack Paris, he retired into Normandy, pursued by Mayenne with a much larger army; and so sure were the Parisians that their champion would return victorious that they hired windows in the Rue St. Antoine to witness the spectacle of the king of Navarre brought back in chains. But Mayenne was fatally hesitant when the critical moment arrived. He had all the worst of that series of skirmishes during the last ten days of September, which are collectively designated as the battle of Arques; finally, in October, he retreated to Paris, pursued by the rival whom he had been expected to capture. Henry even ventured to attack the suburbs, but, realizing that he was not yet strong enough to take the capital, he soon retired westward, and established the seat of his government for the winter at Tours.

Against such an active adversary a policy of mere bribery and plotting could not avail; every day it became increasingly evident that Philip must send military aid to the forces of the League. But the question was where to find the money and the men. The defeat of the Armada had been a terrible blow both to his treasury and to his tercios; and he was more than ever in need of military and financial resources in Spain, to repel the counter-attacks of the English and to stifle potential rebellions. Under all the circumstances, then, it seemed to Philip that the wisest course was to send the duke of Parma from the Low Countries against Henry of Navarre. His ability as a soldier was well known. He was nearer the scene of action than any other of the king’s commanders. Possibly Philip was influenced by the old fear that, if left with nothing else to do but suppress the rebellion in the Netherlands, Parma might possibly prove too successful, and set up an independent sovereignty there. As far back as 1586 he had commanded him to keep his eye on the situation in France. On September 7, 1589, after he had learned of the murder of Henry III, he wrote him to rest on the defensive in the Low Countries in order to save money to be distributed to his French friends, and even spoke of the possibility of armed intervention; in November, after he had received news of Arques, he evidently regarded such intervention as ultimately inevitable, and sent Juan Moreo to the Netherlands to bear aid in organizing it. To Parma, as will be readily imagined, all this was unwelcome in the highest degree. He was very ill; he longed to finish his task in the Netherlands; he knew that, at the best, he had barely enough money and men to accomplish that. He could not believe that an expedition into France would have any hope of success, and in letters to Philip of March 24 and July 22, 1590, he plainly told him so; at the same time Moreo aroused Philip’s suspicions of Parma once more by writing back from Flanders, on June 22, that the duke’s ill-will would be the ruin of all his plans. But meantime the king of Navarre was again advancing on Paris. Unless something were speedily done, there was every probability that he would take it; and so Parma, not yet ready to move himself, sent the Count of Egmont from Flanders with 500 arquebusiers and 1200 Walloon lancers to the rescue of Mayenne. With the army of the League they met the king of Navarre at Ivry (March 14). Henry won the most brilliant of his victories. Egmont was killed, and his forces took flight. The Bourbon continued his triumphant march on Paris.

Unless Philip was prepared to lose all hold on France, it was evident, after Ivry, that he must have done with half measures. Nothing short of Parma himself, with all his available forces, could possibly save the situation, and the king sent Tassis to Flanders to hasten the departure of the duke. Parma’s misgivings were unabated, but it was not his reluctance that was the chief cause of the delay; it was the lack of funds to pay his troops, and the incipient mutinies among his soldiers which followed as the inevitable result. By midsummer, however, the money had at last arrived, and in the early days of August he crossed the frontier. Henry had invested Paris on April 25. Within the next two months the food had run out. Mendoza won golden opinions by his liberal giving and by his organization of relief. At this crisis he played the part of the Roman Catholic fanatic, declaring that his master had no political ambitions in France, but cared only for the preservation of the ancient faith; he was even credited with a plan for making bread out of dead men’s bones. But by early August things had reached a point which
flesh and blood could no longer endure; 13,000 people had already died of starvation, and negotiations preliminary to a surrender had begun, when suddenly news came, on the 30th, that Parma had united with Mayenne at Meaux and was rapidly advancing to the rescue. Henry, anxious to prove his valor against the most celebrated soldier in Europe, raised the siege of Paris and advanced to meet the foe. Parma, whose object it was to save the capital without the decisive battle which the king of Navarre desired, entrenched himself between the Marne and a swamp, and awaited the enemy’s attack. So strong was the position that Henry did not venture to assault it; then at last, after seven days of waiting, the duke, under cover of a sally, got two of his regiments across the Marne on a bridge of boats, and took Lagny. With both banks of the river in his control, he soon was able to revictual Paris, but the reception accorded him within the walls did not measure up to his expectations. The inhabitants seemed less grateful to him for their deliverance than suspicious of the Spanish domination which his arrival portended; and Parma, after writing frankly to the king of the unpopularity of the Spanish army in France, and the dangers of attempting to dominate the country, retired in November to the Low Countries. He had brilliantly accomplished the almost impossible task which his master had given him to perform, but he had the gravest forebodings for the future.

The achievements of Parma should certainly have convinced Philip that his representative in the Low Countries was by far the most efficient of his servants; had he sent him at once all his available troops and supplies, the duke, though he might not have been able to make his master king of France, would almost certainly have succeeded in putting an end to the revolt in the Netherlands. But just at the very moment when he should have concentrated his resources, Philip elected to dissipate them; never before, in his entire reign, had the disastrous results of the multiplicity of his plans and of his jealousy of over competent subordinates been so painfully apparent. If he could not gain control of the whole of France, the next best thing, from his point of view, would be to dismember her. At the very moment that he was utilizing Parma in an attempt to effect the one, he dispatched two other armies in the hope of accomplishing the other. The first of these was a comparatively small force which he sent into Languedoc in the spring of 1591, at the invitation of the Marechal of Joyeuse, the chief representative of the League in that province; he had hopes of regaining at least a part of the great domain north of the Pyrenees which had formed part of the county of Catalonia in the Middle Ages. But the whole affair was half-heartedly conducted. Philip desired to have his army ready in the neighborhood of the realms of the crown of Aragon to deal with any insurrection which the activities of Antonio Perez might stir up there; he also wished to keep an eye on the progress of the duke of Savoy farther eastward; and these and other distractions were fatal to the success of the invasion of Languedoc. A certain number of small towns and petty fortresses were taken, but there were many desertions. The French Leaguers did not cooperate effectively; and all Spain’s hopes of gaining territory in that quarter were blasted by a decisive defeat at Villemur (September 10, 1592); their commander was drowned in the ensuing flight.

In Brittany, on the other hand, whither Philip dispatched 3500 men by sea from Corunna in September, 1590, there was a different tale to tell. In the eyes of the legislat, that province had never become fully part of the realm of France, but was still the property of the ancient ducal line; on that theory Philip could plausibly lay claim to it on behalf of his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia, the great-granddaughter of Claude, the wife of Francis I. At that moment Brittany was occupied by the brother-in-law of Henry III, Philippe Emmanuel de Lorraine, Duke of Mercœur, whose wife, Marie of Luxemburg, was a descendant of the ancient ducal house. Mercœur had declared for the League, and Philip probably thought he could utilize him for his own purposes and get rid of him afterwards; while Mercœur, who had solicited the intervention of Spain, doubtless counted on reversing the process. In November, 1590, the allies began to besiege Hennebont; but their military achievements were far less notable than the scandalous bribery which the Spaniards employed to win the Bretons to their cause, and keep them from being too friendly to Mercœur; the natives were too poor to refuse, but they lost all respect for the Spaniards. Philip’s army, however, remained in Brittany, and was to be heard from again in the ensuing years.

But the center of interest still remained at Paris. Since his general had rescued it, Philip felt that some recognition of the services of Spain was due him. Until the death of Charles of Bourbon, he had desired to have the title of Protector of the realm, on conditions so generous that “no one believed he would observe half of them”. Now he openly put forward the claims of his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia to the throne; and Mayenne sent Pierre Jeannin, the president of the Parlement of Dijon, to Madrid to discuss the validity of the Salic Law with the chief jurisconsults of Spain. Mendoza in Paris was the king-pin of these negotiations. He also succeeded, in February, 1591, in bringing into the capital a small permanent garrison of Spaniards, Neapolitans, and Walloons from across the frontier of the Netherlands—an even more visible proof that his master meant business. It was the last important service which the great ambassador was to render to the Prudent King. He had suffered cruelly during
that Parma entered France, the king's representatives never ceased to demand of the chiefs of the justification for this, but the real reason for the choice was pressure from Spain; for Philip wished to brought to do his will rather than that of the king of Spain. In the meantime Parma had been grievously ceed with the summoning of the Estates; he even had hopes that after they had assembled, they might be the circumstances, dared not definitely refuse; but they replied with counter-demands for concessions be forthwith convoked to ratify this action and select a husband for the princess. The Leaguers, under Craon. Naturally Philip did not propose to render such aid as this without recompense. From the time May, when Mercoeur and the Spaniards in Brittany joined forces to defeat the Prince of Conti before April, 1592. Another splendid demonstration of the power of Spanish arms was given in the following spring and captured Noyon (March 30, 1593), it would seem that the chief object of this final to cross the frontier again. His main object on this occasion was to relieve Rouen, which Henry of Navarre with English auxiliaries began to besiege in December, and this he brilliantly accomplishe d in effective means to bring pressure on Mayenne and the League to do his bidding. Philip, however, was convince d that he must make another demonstration of his military superiority in France, and in August, 1591, Parma received orders to cross the frontier again. His main object on this occasion was to relieve Rouen, which Henry of Navarre with English auxiliaries began to besiege in December, and this he brilliantly accomplished in April, 1592. Another splendid demonstration of the power of Spanish arms was given in the following May, when Mercoeur and the Spaniards in Brittany joined forces to defeat the Prince of Conti before Craon. Naturally Philip did not propose to render such aid as this without recompense. From the time that Parma entered France, the king’s representatives never ceased to demand of the chiefs of the League that they recognize the rights of his daughter to the French throne, and that the Estates-General be forthwith convoked to ratify this action and select a husband for the princess. The Leaguers, under the circumstances, dared not definitely refuse; but they replied with counter-demands for concessions from the Spanish king, and above all for subsidies in such quantity as Philip was unwilling to grant. Until the delivery of Rouen the Spaniards had, ostensibly at least, the best of the bargaining; after that service had been rendered, the backs of the Leaguers stiffened. Mayenne showed no disposition to proceed with the summoning of the Estates; he even had hopes that after they had assembled, they might be brought to do his will rather than that of the king of Spain. In the meantime Parma had been grievously wounded in attacking the little town of Caudebec (April 25), and soon afterwards drew off his forces to a place of safety at Château-Thierry; he himself was carried back in a litter to the Netherlands, and spent most of the summer at Spa in a vain effort to regain his health. Without the inspiration of his leadership, the Spanish forces were comparatively valueless, and Philip was at his wits’ end to find other equally effective means to bring pressure on Mayenne and the League to do his bidding.

After the summer of 1592 there was a lull in the military operations in France. Parma had received orders to undertake a third campaign there in the autumn, but death overtook him in December, before anything could be accomplished. Though his successor, the Count of Mansfeld, advanced in the following spring and captured Noyon (March 30, 1593), it would seem that the chief object of this final invasion of France from the Low Countries was not so much to wage war as to bring pressure on the Estates-General, which Mayenne, in fulfilment of his promises, had summoned in the previous June; on them all eyes were now focused, for it was by them that the great decision must be made. Rheims had been chosen as their meeting place. Since it was to be their duty to elect a king, there was historical justification for this, but the real reason for the choice was pressure from Spain; for Philip wished to
have the business done in proximity to Parma’s army, and Mayenne dared not refuse. But Parma’s death
(December 2-3, 1592) removed the only one of Philip’s representatives whom Mayenne really feared or
respected; and as soon as he learned of it, he promptly transferred the meeting of the Estates to Paris,
where he felt that he would be free from Spanish tutelage and able to play his own game. He was further
encouraged by the support of the new Pope Clement VIII, who took a vigorous stand against the claims
of the king of Navarre; and though Henry declared against the Estates, and forbade all the parts of the
realm which he controlled to send deputies, he did not succeed in discrediting them. At the time of the
opening session, which took place on January 26, 1593, at the Louvre, the deputies had some
justification in feeling that they really represented France.

Well informed, as always, of the march of events, Philip recognized the importance of the
approaching crisis, and in October, 1592, he dispatched a special ambassador, Lorenzo Suarez de
Figueroa, Duke of Feria, to represent him at the Estates. Feria was instructed to do his utmost to have
the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia either declared or elected queen, or, failing that, to have the choice of
the new monarch left in Philip’s hands. Failing that, again, he was to urge the election of Albert or
Ernest, the archdural brothers of the Emperor Rudolf. If he could not compass this, he was to support,
as a last resort, the claims of the Duke of Guise or of the cardinal of Lorraine; and he was commanded
do his utmost to prevent the dissolution of the assembly until one of these candidates had been
chosen. Feria, travelling by way of Genoa and the Netherlands, joined the Spanish army in February,
1593, at Landrecies; a few days later Mayenne came out to meet him at Soissons. The latter did not yet
feel strong enough to dispense with Spanish aid. If Parma’s death meant the loss of an effective army,
he was still more than ever in need of funds; and so he drew up a sort of treaty with Feria, in which he
promised to recognize Isabella Clara Eugenia as his queen, provided the Estates accepted her, and to use
all his influence to persuade them so to do. Feria, in return, pledged himself to furnish large subsidies.2
On the second of the following April, the Spanish ambassador was received with impressive ceremonies
by the Estates. On this first occasion he made no mention of the claims of the Infanta, but contented
himself with enumerating the vast services rendered by his master to the Catholic cause in France since
the days of Henry II. It was not altogether tactfully done; and Cardinal de Pellevé, who replied for the
Estates, did not omit to point out that France had also done many favors to Spain in the past, from the
time when the Catholic Franks chastised the heretic Visigoths of Spain and forced them to renounce the
Arian faith, to that when Bertrand du Guesclin overthrew Pedro the Cruel. Nevertheless, the impression
of Philip’s power and prestige which Feria had succeeded in producing was undeniable. If no other
outside influence were brought to bear on the Estates, it seemed that he might win his game.

But the very prospect that Philip would attain his ends roused the royalist Catholics in France to
make a last desperate effort to keep the crown out of foreign hands. They demanded a conference with
the chiefs of the League. The Estates accepted, and when their delegates left Paris to meet the royalists
at Suresnes, the acclamations of the populace convinced them that they had made no mistake. When
they met the representatives of the other side, they embraced each other; the first thing that they did was
to arrange a truce; clearly their dominant feeling was the desire to unite all Frenchmen and rid the realm
of strangers. But when the first effusions of patriotic ardor were over, it became evident that the heresy
of the king of Navarre would prove a stumbling block to complete accord; the most that the deputies of
the Estates would do was to recognize the priority of his rights to the French throne, but they stoutly
maintained that they were nullified by his Protestantism. There was but one way out of the impasse, and
Henry had the wisdom to see it. On the 25th of the following July, in the ancient cathedral of St. Denis, he received him into the communion of the church of Rome. It was indeed "the marriage ceremony of the king and the kingdom of France."

The Spanish representatives at Paris, when they first got word of the king’s intention to be
converted, did their utmost to prevent the step from having any effect. It probably did not greatly
surprise them or their master, for who could put faith in a heretic? They justifiably doubted its
genuineness, or at least were convinced, and with good reason, that Henry had abandoned his
Protestantism as a means to a political end. But it had come at a most awkward moment for them. Their
attention had been wholly concentrated on Mayenne and the Estates, and the problem of the Infanta’s
recognition there. They had counted on getting that settled first, and on dealing with the heretic
pretender afterwards, and now the news of the intended abjuration had thrown everything into the
melting pot again. But they did not despair. They opened their purses and distributed bribes. Over
24,000 crowns were handed out to the Estates, and lesser sums to the captains and magistrates of Paris,
and more was promised in the near future. Meantime, in the end of May, the candidacy of the Infanta
was definitely put forward. When the Estates demurred on account of the Salic Law, it was announced
that Philip would be entirely satisfied if they would elect as king the Archduke Ernest of Austria, whom

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the Spanish monarch had selected to be the husband of his daughter. Then, when the Estates insisted on having a Frenchman for their king, the Spaniards assured them that Philip would not object, provided that he could have the choosing of him, that he should marry the Infanta, and that the crown of France should be held conjointly by them both. The Spanish representatives even proposed, as a last resort, in the middle of July, that the Infanta be married, under the same conditions, to Charles, the young Duke of Guise, whom all the Parisians adored. But these rapidly mounting concessions merely proved how completely the ground had been cut from beneath the Spaniards’ feet by the action of the king of Navarre. The real scene of interest had been shifted elsewhere. In early August the Estates were prorogued, having signally failed to accomplish what had been expected of them, though in different ways, both by Philip and by Mayenne. They had not succeeded in providing France with a king.

In the meantime the Spanish monarch, with a truer sense of where his best chance lay, had been moving heaven and earth to prevent the acceptance of Henry’s conversion by the see of Rome. The personalities had shifted there since Philip’s last great issue with the papacy in 1589. The place of the fiery Sixtus V was now occupied by the gentler but perhaps even more conscientious and hard-working enthusiast Clement VIII, while that of the Count of Olivares had been taken by the Duke of Sessa; and the latter was commanded to do everything in his power to turn the new Pope against the king of Navarre. At first this did not seem an impossible task. Clement was full of scruples and fears. For him religion was the only thing that mattered, and he fully realized that Henry’s action had been dictated by raison d’état. He was also indignant that the Gallican church should have taken the initiative in the matter of the abolution, to the prejudice of his own sovereign pontifical rights. By showing tact and sympathy with the hard position in which the Pope was placed, Sessa could have effected much; but instead he took the bullying tone, and threatened to retire to Naples if Clement permitted the envoy of the king of Navarre to remain in Rome. Such menaces simply served to turn the Pope against the Spanish cause. In November, 1593, he consented to give an audience to Henry’s ambassador, the Duke of Nevers, though he still firmly refused to grant the absolution for which he prayed. For nearly two years more the matter hung fire. Sessa surrounded the French envoys at the Vatican with spies in the hope that they might discover something that he could use to good effect. He was encouraged, in the end of 1594, by the expulsion of the Jesuits from France, as the result of two attempts to assassinate Henry which were traceable to their influence, and by the anger the measure evoked at Rome. As a last resort he protested not against the absolution, but against the recognition of Henry as king of Navarre and duke of Brittany, on the ground that this was an infringement of the rights of the king of Spain. But this shift from considerations religious to political spelt the final ruin of the Spanish cause. Clement had come to his decision before Sessa made his protest, and it only served to strengthen his conviction that he had decided right. On the very next day (September 17, 1595), the representatives of Henry received the papal pardon and recognition for their master, and the Bourbon was at last formally reconciled with the see of Rome.

Long before the papal absolution had been obtained, the situation in France had completely altered to the prejudice of the League and the Spaniards and to the advantage of the king of Navarre; in fact, the latter, though fully realizing that reconciliation with Rome was indispensable to him, had elected to act as if it were ultimately inevitable. All sorts of gratifying evidences reached him, in the last part of the year 1593, of the growing strength of his cause. On the 27th of the following February, at Chartres, he was formally crowned and anointed king of France. Everything now depended on Paris, for until he was master of the capital of his realm he was sovereign only in name; and in spite of their recent reverses, the Spanish army and diplomats in Paris were by no means negligible. There was even talk of sending the Spanish forces in the Netherlands to its rescue again, and on March 6 Mayenne left the city to go and consult with Mansfeld. His place at the capital was taken by a violent Catholic named Brissac, who was apparently on the best of terms with Feria and the Spaniards. All in all it looked as though Paris might be able to withstand the attack which Henry was obviously planning to deliver. But the king wished to avoid further bloodshed. He coveted popularity at all costs, and knew that his subjects were weary of civil war. If he could bribe Brissac to turn traitor and open the city’s gates, he was only too glad, and Brissac rose to the bait. It speaks volumes for the extent to which Feria and his Spaniards had lost their hold there, that they had not the wit to forestall his treachery. They had received warning of his intentions on March 21, and Feria had made him go the rounds on the following night, in a pouring rain, accompanied by some Spanish captains, who had orders to kill him at the slightest sign of trouble; but Brissac survived the test, and a few hours later opened three of the gates of Paris to the soldiers of the king. So accurately had the affair been timed that the Spanish troops were completely surrounded before they realized what had happened, and could offer no resistance. Henry could have captured or killed them all, had he so desired but he preferred to pose as the purveyor of universal happiness, and notified Feria that if the Spaniards would leave Paris that day and swear never again to
bear arms against him, he would gladly grant them their liberty and their lives. And so at three in the afternoon the Spanish garrison evacuated the capital of France, which they had occupied since 1591, and turned their faces toward the Low Countries. “We left”, reported Ibarra to Philip, “with our flags flying and our drums beating, and without giving the semblance of despairing of our cause”. But the dignity of the Spanish retirement made a far less permanent impression than the conduct of the French monarch as the tercios filed past. Men never forgot, to their dying day, how Henry, from a window in the Porte St. Denis, saluted his departing enemies, and called after them, “Commend me to your master, but never come back again.” The haughtiness of the Spaniard was no proof against such tactics as these.

There were touches of comedy, too, of which Henry made the most, in the story of the relations of Spain and France in the months which succeeded the evacuation of Paris. It was the heyday of the intercepting of letters. During the final weeks of the Spaniards at the capital a last desperate plea for help had been dispatched to Philip. Henry had caught the bearer of it on the way, and then, simply for the fun of seeing how the Spanish king would reply, sent it on to Madrid by a henchman of his own, one Fouquet de La Varenne, an old cook of Margaret of Valois, with instructions to play the part of messenger of the League. So well did this man perform the role that had been assigned to him that he was twice called before the king’s consulta, and sent back with a packet of letters, which, needless to add, he delivered to the king of France. After the Spaniards had evacuated Paris, Henry made use of Varenne a second time. Rumors of the king’s intention to divorce his first wife on account of her sterility had already reached the Spanish court, and it occurred to Philip that since it was now obviously impossible to keep the Bourbon off the French throne, he might save something from the wreckage of his plans by offering him the Infanta in marriage; he therefore sent a messenger with such a proposal to Paris. Henry’s counsellors did not wish their master even to receive him, but the king insisted on doing so; and shortly afterwards he once more dispatched Varenne to Madrid, with instructions to get in touch with Bernardino de Mendoza, who was living in retirement nearby, and see what could be made of the situation. It is difficult to believe that Henry took the matter seriously, and Varenne’s efforts at Madrid merely resulted in imperiling his master’s reputation with Elizabeth of England and the Protestant princes of the Empire; but both of the envoy’s missions seem to indicate that, for the time being at least, the French king believed that the wisest way to deal with Philip was to try to make a fool of him.

The mass of Frenchmen had not the same sense of humor as their king. Mayenne, who appeared with a safe-conduct at Brussels, was loaded with reproaches by Feria and Ibarra, who accused him of ruining their master’s cause in France, and wished to have him arrested. A letter of Feria to Philip on the matter was intercepted by Henry and sent back to Mayenne, who was furious when he read its contents, and solemnly demanded leave to vindicate his honor by a duel with his principal accuser. The resentment of Mayenne against Spain and the Spaniards was shared, though for very different reasons, by most of the rest of France. There was a feeling that Spanish influence had not yet been wholly eliminated. Though Philip’s soldiers had by this time been cleaned out of Picardy, except La Fère, they still hung on in Brittany, and threatened on the southern and eastern frontiers. It was rightly feared that the Spanish monarch, defeated in his hopes of gaining control of all the realm, would revert to plans for its dismemberment. Under the circumstances there was no alternative save to transform what had hitherto been a civil strife into a national one, and bring it to a conclusive end. On January 17, 1595, Henry formally declared war by land and sea against the king of Spain.

In order to be able to follow the course of the ensuing conflict, we must once more revert to the story of the parallel struggle in the Netherlands.

The calling off of Alexander of Parma to relieve Paris in the autumn of 1590 had given the rebels in the Low Countries an admirable opportunity to resume the offensive, and under the lead of Maurice of Nassau they prepared to take advantage of it. Hitherto their foreign alliances had availed them little. Anjou had been a flat failure, Leicester a disappointment, and the Protestants in Cologne had been crushed; but the king of Navarre promised better things. His interests were now almost identical with those of the Dutch, and geographical proximity virtually compelled them to work in unison. The alliance between France and the United Provinces, which Orange had sought in vain to inaugurate, was now practically established by the march of events, and was destined to endure, to the undoing of Spain, down to the age of Louis XIV.

Parma, on his departure for France, had entrusted the government of the Low Countries to Peter Ernest of Mansfeld, and the command of such troops as were left there to his son Charles; the small detachment under Verdugo in Friesland had been almost cut off from communication both with Brussels and Madrid since 1587, and was to remain so till 1594. The Mansfelsds, moreover, proved quite
unable to discharge the duties that had been laid upon them. The younger resigned, almost immediately after his appointment, in a huff, and thereafter succeeded in so poisoning his father’s ear against Parma that the old man began to write letters, traducing the duke, to Madrid. All this furnished a golden opportunity for young Maurice. Encouraged both by Elizabeth and Henry, he soon seized the offensive. He used the period of Parma’s first absence in France to make his preparations. In the spring of 1591, when Parma had got back, with his attention divided and his forces diminished, Maurice was ready to strike. The campaign of that year was disastrous to the Spanish cause. In May and June, Maurice took Zutphen and Deventer, and thereby gained control of the course of the Yssel, which, while in Spanish hands, had cut off Drenthe, Overijssel, and most of Gelderland from communication with the heart of the republic. The next three months were largely spent in a struggle to get command of the Vaal, so as to render the provinces of Holland and Utrecht safe from Spanish attacks on the south. The most important fortress on this river, Nimwegen, on the left bank, was still occupied by Philip’s troops; but their position there was made uncomfortable by the garrison of a hostile fort on the opposite side, which Parma besieged in July but was unable to take. Soon after he had drawn off his forces, the counter-stroke came. On October 21 Maurice captured Nimwegen. He had not only solidified the defences of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht; he had prepared points of attack against the territory of the Spaniards.

Parma was already on his way to the relief of Rouen when he learned the news. It was a crowning demonstration of the wisdom of his counsels to Philip to concentrate, not to dissipate, his energies.

But Parma, though he was spared the pain of ever knowing it, was being dealt, at that moment, a blow far more cruel than assignment to an impossible task; the master whom he had served so loyally and so long had at last made up his mind to betray him. It was the old, old story, in its final and most aggravated form, of royal suspicion of a distant and too competent representative. Ever since the tragedy of the Armada and the days when there had been rumors of Parma’s ambition to set himself up as an independent sovereign in the Low Countries, Philip had been on the watch for accusations against the duke. It was no wonder that they were furnished him. The atmosphere of his court and his methods of government lent themselves readily to just that sort of thing; and the jealousy of the Spaniards was easily aroused by the brilliant successes of one whom they never ceased to regard as an Italian and a foreigner. One of his principal detractors was the Duke of Medina Sidonia, whose calumnies wore on to Philip by his friends. Old Verdugo, who was convinced that it was Parma’s fault that he was isolated in Friesland, was another; the commander Juan Moreo, vilest of intriguers, was a third. Parma had had some inkling of these accusations at the time of his first campaign in France, and wrote vigorously to the king to complain of them and to assure him of his loyalty and devotion. He also took pains to remind him that he had several times requested, in the course of the last few years, to be relieved of his post in the Netherlands. He was in failing health, and his views of his duties and responsibilities were so diverse from the instructions which were sent him from Madrid that he was utterly discouraged. All Philip needed to do, if he wished to get rid of his nephew, was to accept these requests at their face value and give him permission to retire. But the king and his most intimate advisers did not dare to do this; they were afraid of what Parma might do if he were at large. They determined that somehow or other Alexander Farnese must be got back to Spain.

So in February, 1592, Philip sent the Marquis of Cerralvo to the Netherlands, the bearer of a letter to Parma, requesting him to report to Madrid; but as Cerralvo died before he could accomplish his task, it was entrusted in the following June to Pedro Enríquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes, who had come into some prominence three years before in defending Lisbon against the English. He was sent on the pretext that his presence was necessary in order to retrieve the military situation, but he carried a commission as governor and lieutenant-general, and subsequently received a confidential letter which implied in almost every paragraph that Parma was to be got rid of and sent back to Spain. But Philip did not propose that his nephew should have any suspicion of the fate that was awaiting him until the blow was ready to fall. Four days after signing his instructions to Fuentes, the king wrote to Parma to congratulate him on the delivery of Rouen and urge him to take care of his health. In several subsequent letters he spoke indeed of his desire to consult with the duke in Spain, but assured him that he would receive the warmest welcome there, that he enjoyed the full confidence of the king, and that no calumnies against him would be heard. On December 6, he even wrote a final letter of instructions to his nephew in regard to the conduct of his third campaign in France; but Parma was already beyond its reach. After an inspiring exhibition of physical courage before his troops, holding himself bolt upright on horseback when he was in no condition to leave his bed, he had died, at the age of forty-seven, at Arras, on the night of December 2-3, 1592.

Parma was the last of the really great servants of Philip II; after his death, the Prudent King was reduced, in Europe at least, to valiant captains and obsequious secretaries. Philip was not the first Spanish sovereign to treat his ablest representatives as he had Parma. He had inherited the practice from
his forbears, though he may have carried it to greater extremes than they. It was after the same fashion that the Emperor had rewarded Ximenes and Cortes, and Ferdinand the Catholic the Great Captain. And the inevitable reflection which occurs in connection with all these tragedies—in the case of Parma it is particularly true—is that, judged by modern standards at least, it was the servant who was always right, and the master who was invariably wrong. The worst of all Philip’s faults was his intolerance, political as well as religious, his inability to see that any conception of state or church save his own could have any virtue in it whatsoever. His worst error in his dealings with the Netherlanders had been his contempt for them, his refusal to believe that they were even to be regarded as honorable foes. Parma made neither of these mistakes. In matters religious he was always in favor of concessions; he was, in fact, an advocate of liberty of conscience before its time. He always made a point of treating the rebels in the Low Countries like gentlemen; even in the moments of his most notable triumphs, he invariably accorded them the courtesies due to a valiant, if defeated foe. Had he been given a perfectly free hand in the great task that had been laid upon him, at the focal point of international politics during the age in which he lived, the whole course of European history might well have been changed.

The years 1593 and 1594 were almost as disastrous to the progress of the Spanish arms in the Low Countries as they were to Philip’s hopes of gaining control of the kingdom of France. As Parma’s successor in the government of the Netherlands, the king had designated his own nephew, the Archduke Ernest of Austria, the brother of the Emperor Rudolf, who had spent most of his youth at Madrid, and was familiar with his uncle’s ideas; but as he was not able to arrive in the Low Countries until nearly twelve months after his appointment, all authority remained concentrated in the hands of the Count of Fuentes during the year 1593. Fuentes was a competent soldier, but also a Spaniard of Spaniards, a brother-in-law of the Duke of Alva, and his term of office gave the king a chance to return to his old policy of complete Hispanicization of the government of the loyal provinces, in a way which Parma would never have allowed, and which violated the terms of the peace of Arras. All Parma’s Belgian and Italian advisers were dismissed, and their places taken by Spaniards. Exchanges of prisoners with the rebels were henceforth definitely forbidden; any soldiers of the enemy who were captured were promptly sentenced to the gallows. Small wonder if the change infuriated the Netherlanders. They had feared, but also respected the duke of Parma; but now this reversion to the methods of Alva, under a leader whom they believed to be less able, inspired them to efforts of desperation. They had made good progress under Maurice of Nassau in 1591-92. They now had high hopes that they could rid their country of the Spaniards.

Fuentes was in no position to meet such determined foes. Since Philip kept him even shorter of funds than his predecessors, there were many mutinies among his troops, with the usual results. Furthermore his attention was divided, quite as much as Parma’s had ever been, between his difficulties in the Low Countries and the necessity of interfering in France. At the time of his appointment, the king’s interest was chiefly there. One of the main reasons why Philip had sent his nephew Ernest to the Netherlands was that he might be close at hand if the États-Généraux could be persuaded to elect him king of France; and Fuentes received constant orders to have his army in readiness on the French frontier, or, if possible, across it, so as to bring pressure on the assembly at Paris when the decisive moment should arrive. His efforts in this direction, however, were quite sterile, save for Mansfeld’s rather futile capture of Noyon; moreover they prevented him from offering any effective opposition to Maurice. On June 24, 1593, the latter recaptured Gertruydenberg, thus closing one of the last breaches which had been opened by the Spaniards in the defenses of Holland; thence he turned northward against Friesland and Groningen. The key to the control of these regions was the strong fortress of Koeworden in Drenthe, which commanded the chief access to them across the morasses, and old Verdugo had attempted intermittently, for the previous six months, to wrest it from the hands of the rebels; but in May, 1594, Maurice appeared before the place and drove him off. The siege of the city of Groningen followed; it surrendered on July 24, and its fall was the signal for the elimination of the last vestiges of Spanish control in the northern provinces. Verdugo’s long term of isolation was at an end, and he was permitted to retire to Luxemburg, where he continued to fight valiantly until his death in the following year. In January, 1595, the rebels were still further encouraged by the news that Henry IV had formally declared war on Spain and was anxious to act in concert with them against their common foe; and the death of the Archduke Ernest in February seemed at first sight to deal another blow to the authority of Philip in Northern Europe.

But the death of the archduke was to prove rather an aid to Spain than the reverse. It was a full year before his successor could be appointed and reach his post. During the interval all authority was once more concentrated in the hands of Fuentes, and, under his able and energetic leadership, the
spanish infantry were to give one more splendid demonstration that they were still the finest soldiers in Europe. The cause for which they strove was ruined, indeed, by the intolerance and ineptitude of the monarch whom they served; but they valiantly fought on to the bitter end. Henry’s schemes for the cooperation of the French and Dutch armies were effectively checkmated. His general, the Duke of Bouillon, was speedily driven out of Luxemburg by Verdugo. The nonagenarian Colonel Mondragon had all the best of a series of ensuing skirmishes with Maurice of Nassau and his cousin Philip. In the meantime Fuentes had led another army across the French frontier to rescue the few places that still held out against Henry in the region of the Somme and the Oise. He arrived too late to save Ham. The town was captured and its Spanish garrison massacred on June 21; but three days later tie occupied Le Catelet, and on July 24 he won a splendid victory over the combined forces of the Duke of Bouillon and the Count of St. Pol outside Doullens. A week afterwards he entered Doullens itself, one of the “bulwarks of the frontier”, and slew its garrison as the French had slain that of Ham. Finally, on October 7, he took Cambray.

In other parts of France the course of the struggle was less favorable to the Spanish cause. A threat of Henry against Franche Comté had brought Juan Fernandez de Velasco, the governor of Milan, across the Alps to its rescue, with an army of over 15,000 men. Mayenne had joined forces with him, and they finally encountered the French at Fontaine-Française outside Dijon, in a battle which had been virtually won by the Spaniards when a last desperate charge by the French monarch, an act of foolhardy courage of the sort which Henry loved, turned victory into defeat. Mayenne was so much discouraged at the issue that he shortly afterwards made his submission to the king, and many of the other old chiefs of the League followed his example in the ensuing months. In Brittany Mercœur held out till 1598, but three years earlier his opposition had ceased to be serious. He was now completely at odds with the Spanish detachment there. They fought against each other quite as often as in alliance; the whole province was turned over to brigandage; it was a “forest of robbers”. Clearly Henry could not call himself master of his kingdom while Brittany was in such a state. On the other hand, it was perfectly obvious that he could take his time in reducing it; as long as he was content to leave it alone, it would certainly do the same by him. His only important problem, and the sole remaining hope of the Spaniards, lay on the northeastern frontier.

Fuentes was not given the opportunity to win further military victories in 1596. In February a new governor general arrived in the Low Countries, and Fuentes soon afterward departed to Spain. The man to whom Philip had now decided to confide the administration of the Netherlands was another of his archducal nephews, Albert, the younger brother of Ernest, who had died in the preceding year; like him, he had been sent at an early age to be brought up at the court of the Prudent King. He had absorbed far more of Spanish ways than Ernest. He spoke Spanish in preference to any other tongue. In his aspect, his temperament, his methodical laboriousness, and his fervent piety, he closely resembled his royal uncle; there was complete confidence and intimacy between them. In 1577, at the age of eighteen, he had been appointed a cardinal by Gregory XIII; but his uncle had more need of him in the state than in the church, and in 1583 he had been sent as viceroy to Portugal. Certainly dispensations from vows of clerical celibacy were not difficult to procure. Since the close of the last campaign the French king had been besieging La Fère, which was still held by a Spanish garrison, and which commanded the most direct route from the Low Countries to Paris, and the most obvious thing for the invading army to do was to relieve it. But that was not the plan of the Spanish captains who were managing the cardinal-archduke’s campaign for him; they showed an originality, an unexpectedness, which reminds one of the Great Captain. La Fère, surrounded by swamps, proved even more difficult to relieve than to invest, and the invaders left it to its fate; it was
starved out on May 22. Instead, the Spaniards diverted their attack to the north, and in early April they suddenly appeared before Calais. The place was utterly unprepared. Its garrison was inadequate and its fortifications almost in ruins; there was no resistance worthy of the name. On April 17, 1596, the Spaniards entered the city without striking a blow. A week later they captured the citadel and massacred its few defenders; on May 23 they also took Arders without firing a shot. Both places yielded them an enormous booty. Guines and Le Catelet surrendered shortly afterwards, and the commander at Ham was bribed to follow their example. All and more than the old ‘Calais Pale’ of the days of the English occupation was now in Spanish hands; moreover its capture had at last given Philip the Channel port whose lack had been so fatal to him in 1588; another Armada might use it to excellent advantage. Yet it is worth noting that when Henry sent over a hurried message to Elizabeth to beg for her aid, after the siege was begun, the queen at first refused to help him, save on the condition that Calais be restored to England. Rather than see it in French, she preferred that it should remain in Spanish hands; for the moment she seemed far more alarmed by the prospects of the recovery of France than by this temporary recrudescence of the power of the Spanish arms. The progress of the Spaniards in the next four weeks convinced her, it is true, that it would not do to hold off too long. On May 24 she finally signed a treaty by which she granted Henry a force of 2000 men and a loan of 20,000 crowns, in return for his promise not to make peace with Philip without her consent. But it was at best a half-hearted step, and Elizabeth deeply repented it two years later when Henry broke his word and deserted her. She always sought to envisage the future, while Philip scrutinized the past, and she rightly foresaw that a united France would prove a far more formidable enemy of England in the years to come than the tottering empire of the Prudent King. Had she lived on into the succeeding age she would not have been misled, as was her successor, into thinking that Spain was still “the greatest of all the kingdoms of the earth.”

The capture of Calais was the last great military achievement of Philip’s reign; from that time onward the tide turned steadily against the Spaniards. In August, 1596, the cardinal-archduke felt obliged, despite the desire of his captains to pursue their advantage in France, to return again to the Low Countries to deal with Maurice of Nassau; like Parma and Fuentes before him, he was distracted by the impossible task of being in two places at once. In August he recaptured the town of Hulst from the rebels; but this triumph was rendered nugatory by the great victory of Maurice at Turnhout in the following January, and during the rest of the year 1597 one important town after another fell back into the hands of the Netherlanders. One more attack in France, led by Hernan Tello Portocarrero, the Spanish commander at Doullens, succeeded, indeed, in taking Amiens by surprise on March 11, 1597; but the Marshal de Biron hurried across from Rouen to recapture it, and was successful in the following September, despite all that the cardinal-archduke could do for its relief. Worse than all these defeats in the field was the shortage of money. The year 1596 had seen Philip repudiate his financial obligations, and without money it was impossible to continue to fight. And there were various other considerations which made for a general movement towards peace. The French king was also in great straits for funds, and anxious to spare his kingdom from a prolongation of the wars which had devastated it for so long; the merchant classes in the Netherlands were weary of fighting. Pope Clement VIII, too, had been laboring, ever since his abdication of Henry IV, to bring about a reconciliation between Spain and France; he rightly feared that it would be the Protestant states of Europe that would reap the sole benefit of the continuance of the strife between the two chief Catholic powers. Perhaps most important of all was the ardent desire of the Prudent King himself to end his days in peace. He had never really liked war, and had often gone to great lengths to avoid it. Since 1595 he had known that he could not live much longer; he desired reconciliation with his enemies on earth, in order to have opportunity to become reconciled to his Maker. After the French had recaptured Amiens, in September, 1597, there was no longer any doubt of the speedy end of the war. Negotiations for peace between Spain and France, already begun in Paris through the instrumentality of the papal legate and the general of the Franciscans, were formally opened at Vervins in the following spring. The course of the proceedings there was closely followed by the cardinal-archduke, who had been given full powers to treat in the name of Spain. He had his own interests, as we shall see in a moment, in having them reach a successful termination.

Elizabeth of England did her best to prevent an accord. She had counted on Henry IV to bear his share on land in the war against Philip which she was to continue to wage on sea; and she complained with justice that the French king had promised her two years before that he would not conclude a separate peace. The news of the ‘perpetual and irrevocable’ Edict of Nantes (April 30, 1598), by which Henry granted a measure of toleration to the French Huguenots, may well have given Philip pause. There seems to be no record of what he said or did when he learned of it, though we know that his representatives at Rome did their utmost to make use of it to poison the Pope’s ear against the French king; it was a harbinger of modernity, of a totally different world, which Philip could not comprehend,
and in which he felt he had no place; very possibly it may have strengthened his desire to be gone. In any case the peace conference at Vervins was not interrupted, and on May 2, 1598, a treaty was signed there, which was characterized by a contemporary as “the most advantageous that France had concluded for five hundred years.” The Spanish king gave up Calais, and all the other places that he still held in Picardy and Brittany. His claims to the duchy of Burgundy were recognized in theory, but as he promised to seek to vindicate them solely “by the friendly way of justice and not by appealing to arms” the recognition was tantamount to a renunciation. For forty years past he had alternately aspired to influence, to control, and to dismember France; now, in order to have peace with her before he died, he had been obliged to recognize her integrity and independence under the rule of a king who had been a heretic born, and had recently announced his intention to be tolerant of heretics. Finally, after all his concessions, he failed actually to obtain one of the principal advantages which the treaty ostensibly accorded him. One of the chief reasons why he had been in such haste to obtain peace with France was that he might be free, before he died, to settle the question of the Netherlands; and he had every right to expect that, after the treaty of Vervins had been signed, the French king would cease to support his enemies in Holland. But Henry, in this matter, did not live up to his word. He heartened the United Provinces with promises of his continued support. Though he had ceased to wage war openly against the king of Spain, he continued it covertly by aiding the rebels in the Low Countries, and the latter were encouraged to persist in their struggle until they won formal recognition of their independence at the peace of Westphalia.

We turn finally, then, to the settlement in the Netherlands; for if Henry was not altogether loyal in his observance of the treaty of Vervins, Philip was not quite free from duplicity in the arrangements which he sanctioned in the Low Countries. If he had been really wise, if he could have had a glimpse into the future, he would have gone the whole way in his quest for reconciliation, and granted the Netherlands their freedom in return for the peace for which his whole soul longed. They had been a liability throughout his reign, a ‘plague spot’, a ‘running sore’; it was largely through the ramifications of his difficulties with them that he had become involved in his disastrous struggles with France and England. Spain and the Spanish Empire would have been vastly better off if he could have got rid of them. But Philip could not possibly bring himself to see this. As we have often remarked, he looked backward, not forward. The decision of his father that the Low Countries should go to Spain—the worst mistake the Emperor ever made,—and his precepts to Philip to cherish and retain them, counted for far more in the king’s eyes than the problems inherent in the future. The fact that half of the Netherlands were now in full revolt against him, and were trying to set up, in defiance of his authority, a system of government and religion which he abhorred, made him all the more certain that it was his bounden duty to get them back into Spanish control. On the other hand, he had the wit to see that for the present it was utterly impossible for him to accomplish this. His treasury was empty, his army in poor shape. He probably already realized that his son, so shortly to succeed him, was little more than a pleasure-seeker, who could not be trusted to expend the energy and labor which were essential to the continuance of the Netherlands. Everything pointed, under the circumstances, to the necessity of devising a stop-gap—some arrangement by which Spain could be given an opportunity to rest and recuperate, so as to be able to carry on the struggle successfully in later years, and by which, in the meantime, the Low Countries should not be permitted to pass out of her hands.

Philip, as we have seen, had contemplated such a solution of his difficulties at the time that he had sent the Cardinal Archduke Albert to the Netherlands in 1595-96. To marry Albert to his cousin, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, and set them up as joint sovereigns of the Low Countries under Spanish suzerainty seemed now to be the only way out. The Spanish king was strengthened in his determination to adopt this expedient by the fact that there was ample historical precedent for what he proposed to do. Clear back in 1539, his father had had a scheme of detaching the Netherlands from the rest of his possessions by giving them as a dowry to one of his daughters and marrying her to the Duke of Orleans. A similar plan had been considered for one of the Infantas in 1573; Requesens had advocated it in 1574, and Juan de Zuñiga in 1586. On all these occasions the solution had been refused. In those happier days it had seemed unnecessary, for it looked as though Spain could keep the Netherlands without adopting it; but now the situation had completely changed. And so, on May 6, 1598, four days after the conclusion of the treaty of Vervins, Philip put his signature to the act by which the Low Countries were handed over to the cardinal-archduke and the Infanta, who were to be married as soon as possible, to be ruled by them as ‘sovereign princes’; the seven rebel provinces of the Union of Utrecht were of course theoretically included in the arrangement, as well as the loyal ones of the Union of Arras. But the phrase ‘sovereign princes’ must not be interpreted to mean that the ‘archdukes’ were in any sense really emancipated from the tutelage of Spain. In the first place, it was provided that whenever either Albert or the Infanta should die, the Low Countries should revert to Spain, unless there were issue of their
marriage; and Philip had good reason for believing that their union would prove, as it ultimately did, to be sterile. In the unlikely case of their producing offspring, it was stipulated that the child, if a boy, should not marry without the consent of the Spanish crown, and if a girl, should be wedded either to the Spanish king or to his son. The archdukes, furthermore, were obliged to give assurances that they would maintain the Roman Catholic faith and do their utmost to extirpate heresy; if the Pope should accuse them of being contaminated by it, they promised to renounce all their rights. It is worth noting also that they were rigorously excluded from commerce with the Indies; though hedged about with all kinds of Spanish restrictions, they were denied the privileges of Spaniards in the New World. And there were other secret clauses besides, by which the archdukes were still further bound. Altogether the arrangement was such as made them little more independent than the various royal representatives in the Low Countries from the days of Margaret of Parma to those of her son. Under their rule all the traditions of the Spanish regime were maintained, and on the death of the cardinal archduke in 1621, the Netherlands reverted once more to the Spanish crown, in accordance with the plans that had been laid by the Prudent King.

Certainly Philip had earned his rest. He may have taken the wrong turn with disastrous persistency, but no one could deny that he had labored, valiantly and unremittingly, to the very last, to do his duty as he conceived it to be. And, in addition to the political reverses and economic disasters of the last few years, he had been tortured all the time by the steadily increasing ravages of a terribly painful disease.

Rumors that he was not well had reached Rome and even Constantinople as early as 1593, but it was not until two years later that his condition began to give cause for real alarm. On May 13, 1595, the Venetian ambassador reported that the doctors said that the king’s body ‘was so withered and feeble that it was almost impossible that a human being in such a state should live for long’. Philip’s original ailment was the gout; but in the later stages he also suffered intermittently from a “double tertian [fever] with irregular spasms”, and painful sores and ulcers broke out all over his body. A crisis was feared on Good Friday, 1596, chiefly, it would appear, because there was an eclipse, and Philip “recalled how his father, his mother, and others of his house had died at a similar conjuncture”; but on that very day an improvement took place, possibly because he had been bled, “though the blood flowed with difficulty and two-thirds of it was watery humor.” There were also other occasions, in December of that same year, and in September, 1597, when it was believed that he was likely to die, but Philip survived them all, and in May, 1598, when there was a great festival, “the King, though in bed, gave his orders and directed the ball with as quick and lively spirit as if he had been at the head of his army.” On the last day of the following June he insisted on being carried in a litter from Madrid to the Escorial, against the advice of his doctors, who dreaded the effects of the journey. Their apprehensions were more than justified by the event. For a week after his arrival at San Lorenzo Philip had another violent attack of fever; in July there was a temporary improvement, but in early August all his different afflictions came back upon him at once, with redoubled violence, and continued unabated to the end.

It is useless to follow the harrowing details of the progress of the king’s malady during those last dreadful weeks. He was in constant agony. His bed linen was impregnated by the suppuration from his abscesses, but it was apparently impossible to change it, for he could not bear to be move; the odor was frightful, and vermin began to appear. He seemed literally to be rotting away, a microcosm of the vast empire which had begun to disintegrate under his rule. But neither Philip nor those who watched by his bedside gave their principal attention to these terrible things. The king transacted such business of state as he could, but his thoughts were chiefly fixed on the next world. His patience in suffering was the wonder of all who beheld it; they compared it to the patience of Job. He constantly harped on the sins of which he had been guilty, and humbly expressed his hope that they would be forgiven. He took comfort in confession, in the prayers of the priests at his bedside, and in gazing on the sacred relics of the Escorial which were brought to be contemplated by him for the last time; the church was more than ever the last place of the king’s malady during those last weeks. He was in constant agony. His bed linen was impregnated by the suppuration from his abscesses, but it was apparently impossible to change it, for he could not bear to be move; the odor was frightful, and vermin began to appear. He seemed literally to be rotting away, a microcosm of the vast empire which had begun to disintegrate under his rule. But neither Philip nor those who watched by his bedside gave their principal attention to these terrible things. The king transacted such business of state as he could, but his thoughts were chiefly fixed on the next world. His patience in suffering was the wonder of all who beheld it; they compared it to the patience of Job. He constantly harped on the sins of which he had been guilty, and humbly expressed his hope that they would be forgiven. He took comfort in confession, in the prayers of the priests at his bedside, and in gazing on the sacred relics of the Escorial which were brought to be contemplated by him for the last time; the church was more than ever the last place of the king’s malady during those last weeks. He was in constant agony. His bed linen was impregnated by the suppuration from his abscesses, but it was apparently impossible to change it, for he could not bear to be move; the odor was frightful, and vermin began to appear. He seemed literally to be rotting away, a microcosm of the vast empire which had begun to disintegrate under his rule. But neither Philip nor those who watched by his bedside gave their principal attention to these terrible things. The king transacted such business of state as he could, but his thoughts were chiefly fixed on the next world. His patience in suffering was the wonder of all who beheld it; they compared it to the patience of Job. He constantly harped on the sins of which he had been guilty, and humbly expressed his hope that they would be forgiven. He took comfort in confession, in the prayers of the priests at his bedside, and in gazing on the sacred relics of the Escorial which were brought to be contemplated by him for the last time; the church was more than ever the last place of the king’s malady during those last weeks. He was in constant agony. His bed linen was impregnated by the suppuration from his abscesses, but it was apparently impossible to change it, for he could not bear to be move; the odor was frightful, and vermin began to appear. He seemed literally to be rotting away, a microcosm of the vast empire which had begun to disintegrate under his rule. But neither Philip nor those who watched by his bedside gave their principal attention to these terrible things. The king transacted such business of state as he could, but his thoughts were chiefly fixed on the next world. His patience in suffering was the wonder of all who beheld it; they compared it to the patience of Job. He constantly harped on the sins of which he had been guilty, and humbly expressed his hope that they would be forgiven. He took comfort in confession, in the prayers of the priests at his bedside, and in gazing on the sacred relics of the Escorial which were brought to be contemplated by him for the last time; the church was more than ever the last place of
that monarch had given to the son who was to succeed him, and who, like the Infante, was to bear the title of Philip III. It is filled with exhortations to love God and live righteously; to reverence the church and avoid war; to administer justice fairly; not to be cast down by adversity nor puffed up with pride by success. Certainly it contained nothing to which any one could take exception; but it was no more apposite to the needs of the Spain of 1598 than it is to those of any country or any age, and it speaks volumes for the extent to which Philip at the last had managed to forget the rivalries of this world, that he preferred it, written as it was by a monarch of the realm which had been the traditional enemy of his house, to anything that he could have invented himself.

In the early days of September it was evident that the end could not be long delayed. Philip’s courage never deserted him, and his love of minutiae exhibited itself to the very last. “He has made himself most familiar”, wrote the Venetian ambassador, Soranzo, “not only with the thought of death, but with the details and the discussion thereof, and with all that should be done after he is gone. He has arranged every detail of his funeral, and has ordered the purchase of a large quantity of black cloth to drape the church of the Escorial. He has caused them to bring into his room and to his beside a shirt of lead, in which he is to be wrapped after he has breathed his last, and a leaden coffin for his corpse when his hour is come. He examined both and caused himself to be measured, and gave orders for the necessary alterations”. At daybreak on the morning of September 13, he died, in a little room twelve feet square, whence he could look out on the altar of the great monastic church whose construction had been one of the deepest satisfactions of his life. It would have been impossible to find a more fitting spot for the termination of his arduous labors.

Just two weeks later Soranzo reported that he had “heard the Adelantado of Castile declare that they would see what the Spanish were worth now that they have a free hand, and are no longer subject to a single brain that thought it knew all that could be known, and treated everyone else as a blockhead”. But this was only the view of a discontented grandee, who rejoiced in the relief from the tension to which Philip’s rule had subjected him and others of his kind; he doubtless foresaw for himself both financial favors and political preferments in the reign of a king who delegated everything to subordinates and was immersed in the pursuit of pleasure. A far truer picture of the feeling of the Spanish people the news of Philip’s death was first known is given by a brief paragraph in a letter from the same Venetian ambassador, which was written on the day that the king expired. “Although change is usually popular”, so he reported, “yet nobles and people, rich and poor, universally show great grief”. Despite all the misfortunes which his reign had brought them, the Spaniards loved their Prudent King.
CHAPTER XL
FINAL REFLECTIONS

At the close of so long a book, the author may be permitted, if not expected, to moralize. And the question on which his opinions, if they be worth anything, will naturally be desired, is that of the fundamental reasons which combine to explain why the Spanish Empire, so overwhelmingly preponderant in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, should have disintegrated with such tragic rapidity in the succeeding age. Like every other similar phenomenon in the history of the human race, its fall was the product of a complex of different causes; and we are still quite as far from having discovered them all, and from having reached any general agreement as to the relative importance of those that have been already assigned, as we are in the case of those that have been given for the fall of Rome. Yet it is only by constant statement and restatement of the views of successive generations of historical students that there is any hope of ultimately obtaining the truth. Even if opinions be expressed which are subsequently proved wrong, there is always a chance that they may render a real service; for it is not seldom through the very process of subverting them that fresh light is incidentally revealed.

The first, and, in some respects, the most far reaching of the considerations that must be borne in mind by those who seek to know the causes of its fall, is that the Spanish Empire was rather the result of a series of accidental and artificial agglomerations than of a normal and natural growth. It exhibits, indeed, a certain magnificent continuity, the product of the crusading ideals which animated and inspired it from the cave of Covadonga to the death of Philip II; but those crusading ideals were shared in very unequal proportions by the different realms in the Iberian Peninsula. They furnish, it is true, a chief impetus to Castile, in completing the great work of the Reconquest; but we must not forget that down to the days of the Catholic kings, and the discovery of the New World, Castile played a relatively small part in the upbuilding of the Spanish Empire. Save for the Canaries, to which Spain’s title was not definitely established till the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, all the various mediaeval conquests of Spain beyond the seas were the result of the activities of the realms of the crown of Aragon, and the origins of those activities were rather hostile than friendly to the church. Two really divergent currents were united by the marriage of the Catholic Kings. The events of the succeeding period, particularly the discovery of America, served to place Castile, which had had far less imperial experience than the Eastern Kingdoms, permanently in the forefront of the picture, and the Spanish Empire became progressively Castilianized. Small wonder, considering her fresh responsibilities and opportunities across the Atlantic, that Castile was reluctant to assume the duty of maintaining the Italian and Mediterranean possessions which had been foisted on her by the union with Aragon. And then, on top of all this, came the Hapsburg inheritance and all that it implied, particularly the baleful responsibility of the Netherlands, an even more heavy and unnatural burden for a nation, which for eight centuries had been almost exclusively occupied at home, to be called upon to bear. After long ages of comparative isolation, Spain was summoned to assume, under the leadership of her most uncosmopolitan part, the stupendous task of governing a world empire composed of a large number of widely scattered and heterogeneous units accidentally drawn together as a result of two fateful marriages.

There can be no doubt that all the difficulties arising from the conditions described in the preceding paragraph were perpetuated and intensified by that tendency toward separatism and diversification which, as we have often remarked, is a distinguishing characteristic of the Iberian peoples. It rendered it impossible for Ferdinand and Isabella and their Hapsburg successors to unify the administration of the various territories over which they held sway. It was a chief barrier to the efficiency that ought to have been the finest fruit of the system of royal absolutism which, in full accord with the prevailing political theories of that day and age, they established and attempted to maintain. The variety of the problems with which they were inevitably confronted was so bewildering that no monarch could possibly deal with them all, particularly if, like Philip the Prudent, he was unwilling to delegate anything to subordinates. No doubt the Catholic Kings and their successors were fully conscious of this difficulty, and Philip, in abolishing some of the most cherished of the ‘liberties of Aragon,’ took a step toward remedying it; but he was far too good a Spaniard to go the whole way, and put an end to the separate constitutions of the Eastern Kingdoms. Their corpses—for all the vitality had long since gone—were suffered to remain unburied, until the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth
It is but a platitude to remark that the Spanish Empire of the sixteenth century was vastly over-extended, that Spain was called upon to shoulder a burden which it was beyond her capacity to bear. But if the process of over-extension had been more gradual, the effect of it might well have been less unfortunate; it was the appalling suddenness with which world empire was thrust upon her that accounts in large measure for Spain’s failure to maintain it. We have already remarked that the only portions of the Iberian Peninsula which had had any practice worthy of the name in the management of overseas possessions, down to the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, were the realms of the crown of Aragon. When, under the Catholic Kings and the Emperor, the really great advances came, things so fell out that the leadership of the Spanish Empire was shifted to Castile, which was totally unprepared to assume it; the Eastern Kingdoms gradually faded from the picture, and their imperial experience was thus largely thrown away. Of course the non-Spanish responsibilities of the Emperor made the situation even more difficult still. Charles saw it all, plainly enough, in the closing years of his life. His division of his inheritance, and his advice to Philip to forbear to attempt any further increase of his territories or power, show that he realized that fate had suddenly saddled Spain with a burden beyond her power to bear. For the first twenty-five years of his reign the Prudent King followed his father’s counsels. Though champion of the forces of militant Catholicism, he rested, politically speaking, on the defensive. Then Destiny once more intervened and another great empire fell into his lap. From Philip’s own standpoint, his annexation of Portugal and its dominions was not an act of aggression, but merely the gathering in of an inheritance indubitably his own; but it is easy to see why the rest of Europe refused to regard it as such, and was appalled at the incredible rapidity of Spain’s rise, in little more than a century, from a position of comparative insignificance to the leadership of the most extensive empire that the world has ever seen. And not only did the suddenness of the transformation put the rest of Europe up in arms, in a way which in all probability a more gradual growth would not have done; it was also fatal to Spain’s hope of a successful defense. Such widely scattered and highly diversified territories could not possibly be welded together, under an efficient imperial organization, in such a comparatively short space of time.

Without the Indies, and the revenues they yielded, the picture would of course have been totally different; and a paragraph may well be devoted at this point to the consideration of the dictum of a recent writer that “America, in Spanish history, was a white elephant”. If one thinks solely of the role of Spain in Western Europe, this verdict is unquestionably sound. Had it not been for the monopoly which she claimed in the New World she would not have gained the position in the Old, which drew down on her the jealousy and hatred of her neighbors; she might well have devoted herself, with their full approval and support, to the conquest of a more permanent domain in North Africa. But the subject of this book is not so much Spain as the Spanish Empire, and if we envisage the question of the American lands from the standpoint of empire, we are likely to be led to a very different conclusion. They were, after all, a sine qua non of its existence, and a fundamental cause of Spain’s greatness while it lasted; without them she could scarcely have attained imperial power at all, at least in the sixteenth century. And though, three hundred years later, the American colonies declared and won their political independence, the language and culture which they had inherited from their mother country remain as their permanent possession. If empire be measured by standards other than the political and economic, the Latin American lands are still a part of the picture, and the glory of having settled and civilized them belongs forever to Spain.

Another consideration, of tremendous significance in the problem of the causes of the fall of the Spanish Empire, is the fact that the main principles and ideals which underlay it had become antiquated by the end of the sixteenth century. Its most ancient tradition, namely, that of crusading, lost its hold on men’s minds after the battle of Lepanto, and the kindred idea that it was the duty of all true Christians to extirpate heresy collided with the nascent conception of religious toleration. Politically, too, the tale was much the same. The overwhelming preponderance which the Hapsburg inheritance and the discovery of America had given to Spain was a flagrant contradiction of the principle of national individuality, and of the modern idea of the balance of power, which was being gradually evolved as the most obvious method of maintaining it. Certainly it was rather Spain’s misfortune than her fault, the result of her inheritance rather than of her own choice, that she found herself committed to these antiquated ideals; but it was none the less inevitable that when the crisis came, she found that practically all the more modern states of Europe were arrayed against her. Her failure to grasp any of the principles of sound economics, which were just beginning to emerge in the end of the sixteenth century, and were
subsequently to become one of the chief controlling forces of the modern world, is but another chapter of the same story; the phrase of Siguenza, “those good old centuries when there was so much faith and so little money”, is deeply significant in this connection. Spain longed for the return of them, because she was out of place in the modern world. Laudator temporis acti was the role that appealed to her most; she hated to look forward; she loved to look back. And perhaps the hardest part of it all was the suddenness with which Spain was brought into collision with all these unsympathetic forces of modernity during the last two decades of the reign of Philip II. Until the annexation of Portugal he had made a strong effort to maintain the good old ways. In obedience to his father’s counsels he had rested, politically speaking, on the defensive the Counter-Reformation had given him a welcome opportunity to champion the ancient faith. Then, in a trice, the scene had shifted, and the Prudent King had assumed the offensive, only to be confronted with new foes who used weapons which he could neither compete with nor comprehend. The suddenness of the rise of the Spanish Empire has already been noted. If it partially explains, it was certainly exceeded by the suddenness of its fall.

The breed of empire builders, who had been responsible for Spain’s greatest triumphs under Ferdinand and Isabella and Charles V, had begun to die out before the accession of Philip II, and nothing worthy to be compared with them was produced during his reign. His best soldiers and sailors, such as Alva and Santa Cruz, were inheritances from his father. In politics and diplomacy the decline was perhaps not quite so marked, but the fact that he had been obliged to call on a Burgundian—Cardinal Granvelle—to aid him in the gathering in of the Portuguese inheritance, was certainly ominous for the future. But the further question still remains: What were the reasons for the disappearance of this race of empire builders? Was it that Spain had been so exhausted by what she had accomplished in the preceding period that she was no longer capable of producing them? Or was it the result of the transference of so much of her best talent to the New World? Was it due to the unconscious growth of a conviction that her empire was already so great that it could not, with safety, be further enlarged? Of the spirit of defensiveness that Charles had commended to Philip? Of Philip’s well-known aversion to war? Of a progressive paralysis of initiative by a system of monarchical surveillance and residencies? Or was it just the inevitable ebb which sooner or later succeeds the flood of the “tide in the affairs of men”? None of these questions is susceptible of definite answer; none of the alternative explanations which have been offered is wholly satisfactory; yet there is probably a measure of truth in every one of them. Perhaps, after all, it would be fairer to regard the phenomenon which we have just been considering, not as a process of decline and decay, but rather as a transference of the energy and genius that had hitherto manifested themselves in conquest and in war, to the gentler realms of literature and art. Certainly the Spain of the seventeenth century—the dreariest of all periods in her political annals—produced writers and painters whose names will remain immortal.

The considerations which we have thus far put forward as possible causes of the decline of the Spanish Empire are all, of course, of the most general nature; to complete the picture it is essential to bear in mind that there were also a large number of more immediate and specific ones. Of these, Charles’s utilization of Spanish resources for non-Spanish purposes, his bestowal of his Burgundian inheritance on Philip instead of on Ferdinand, the Prudent King’s meticulous paternalism, and still more his ruinous economic impolicy, are among the most important; but as these matters have been fully set forth in the last two volumes of this work, it scarcely seems worthwhile to enlarge upon them here. One of the principal objects of this concluding chapter has been to remind the reader of a fact which we attempted to emphasize in the opening paragraphs of our first volume, namely, that though nine-tenths of the history of the Spanish Empire is concentrated between the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella and the death of Philip II, the origins of it reach back to the early Middle Ages and beyond, and that its development, during the century of its greatness and decay, cannot possibly be understood without some knowledge of what had gone before. Its story, from first to last, is full of amazing contradictions, and the comparison with the British Empire, with which this book began, may well be recalled at its close. The Spanish Empire had a continuity, a background, which the British Empire lacked. Spain’s expansion under the Catholic Kings in North Africa and in the New World was but the logical sequel of the Reconquest. The wars with France which occupied the latter part of their reign, and were bequeathed by them to their successor, followed inevitably as the result of the mediaeval achievements of the Catalans and the Aragonese in Italy and in the western basin of the Mediterranean. England, on the other hand, had been practically driven off the continent of Europe, and had virtually renounced all thought of further conquest there, by the time that the exploits of the Tudor sea-dogs opened visions to her gaze of an empire beyond the seas. She had got out of the Old World before she started to win the New. By breaking with her mediaeval traditions and turning her back upon the past, she was enabled to concentrate her attention on the future, and to develop, normally and gradually, in the new fields to which she had elected to devote herself. But Spain could not bring herself to relinquish her inherited
responsibilities in Europe at the time that she was presented with an empire across the Atlantic. Her reverence for the past and the accidents of fate combined to overwhelm her with a load of responsibilities, all over the world, so tremendous that she could not carry it for long. Paradoxical as it may seem, it was the very continuity of her imperial tradition that furnishes the chief explanation of the suddenness of her rise and of her fall. For her it was all or nothing; and her loyalty to the great task which Destiny had given her brought her into fatal conflict with the principles that rule the modern world.

THE END

EL VENCEDOR EDICIONES