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THE
CIVIL AND MILITARY
HISTORY OF GERMANY,

FROM THE
LANDING OF GUSTAVUS
TO THE
CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA.

—♦—
BY THE LATE
FRANCIS HARE NAYLOR, ESQ.
—♦—

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.—PART I.



LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1816.

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TO
LADY JONES;

THE
PRESENT WORK

IS

DEDICATED

AS A TOKEN OF THE REGARD OF
THE AUTHOR;

AND OF THE AFFECTION OF

THE EDITOR.

ADVERTISEMENT.

FEW events in modern history are more remarkable, either on account of the circumstances with which they were attended, or the consequences they produced, than the "Thirty Years War." But while our shelves are laden with narratives of every other contest, in which Europe has been engaged, since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the "thirty years war" has not, in any language, at least with which I am acquainted, hitherto met with an historian to do it justice.

This consideration has tempted me once more to appear as a candidate for the indulgence of the public. During five years I have bestowed upon this Work all the diligence and attention, which it was in my power to afford; so that whatever faults it may possess, (and that it has many I am unfortunately conscious) I trust that negligence cannot, in fairness, be added to the number. The materials,

collected by the assiduity of others, I have copiously and cautiously used ; and as the subject is in great measure novel, I have been careful to substantiate every important fact, either by extracts from, or references to, contemporary writers. The introductory chapters embrace the period of time which elapsed from the abdication of Charles V. till the reign of Ferdinand II. and thus form a connexion between the present Work and the entertaining history of Robertson.

The Author of the present Work had completed and consigned it to the press, previously to his leaving England in September, 1814, for Tours, where he died a few months afterwards. The delay which has arisen in its publication has solely proceeded from extraneous circumstances. No change whatever has been made in the original manuscript.

F. G. H.

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HISTORY OF GERMANY,

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CHAP. I.

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AMONG the most strenuous champions of the communion of Rome the House of Austria has ever held a conspicuous place, and even appears to have identified her own celebrity with that of the papal throne. Convinced that civil and religious liberty are destined by nature to keep pace with each other, the haughty soul of Charles V. recoiled at the political principles of the Protestants, though there are circumstances in his life, which tend to inspire a belief, that his strongest objection to the doctrines of Luther was, their propagating sentiments of freedom. Other motives, likewise, scarcely less impressive, concurred in recommending a strict

adherence to the ancient faith;* for it was easy to foresee, that the King of France would be ready to avail himself of any occurrence that might weaken the Austrian power in Italy, where interest and prejudice alike combined to attach the natives to the papal communion. Neither could it be expected, that the pride and bigotry of the German prelates, would suffer the imperial crown to repose securely on the brow of a heretic.

The rigorous proceedings of the diet of Augsburg gave rise to the Smalcaldic confederacy, which first united the Lutherans as a political body.† But all their hopes being annihilated in the battle of Mechlberg, the power of Austria obtained an ascendancy, which had nearly proved fatal to the liberties of Germany.‡ And such must inevitably have been the event, had not a champion unexpectedly arisen in a man whose interested ambition had till then supported the cause of tyranny. The genius of Maurice destroyed in a day the mighty fabric of Austrian grandeur, which the artful emperor had laboured to erect by a long series of crimes and victories. The treaty of Passau gave solidity to a communion, which had hitherto owed a precarious existence to the moderation or policy of Charles.§ These advantages were confirmed in 1555, when it was settled by treaty, that all the princes and states who had embraced the confession of Augsburg, should be allowed in future the unmolested exercise of their religion, on condition of their granting a similar indulgence to their subjects of the Catholic per-

* Robertson, ii. 121.

† In 1530. Sleidan, 142.

† Robertson, iii. 142.

§ Recueil des Traites, ii. 261.

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suasion.* It was farther enacted, that those sovereigns, who, previously to the treaty of Passau, had appropriated to themselves the revenues of the church, should be suffered to retain them, without incurring the censures of the imperial chamber. This permission, however, was encumbered with a clause, restricting this privilege to that period, and declaring, that in future, every ecclesiastical prince, or prelate, who might abandon the ancient religion, should forfeit his benefice, and that a successor should be appointed, as if it had been vacated by a demise. †

By this pacification, which divided Germany into two distinct parties, the Protestants obtained a political existence, which they had never previously enjoyed. Yet, we should greatly deceive ourselves, were we to suppose, that these concessions arose from enlightened principles of toleration; on the contrary, they sprung from necessity alone, and were extorted from apprehension, not conceded by benevolence. This clearly appears from an article in the treaty, by which the adherents to the confession of Augsburg are the only members of the reformed church allowed to partake in the benefits of the act, while the Zuinglians and Calvinists continued liable to the penalties denounced against schismatics, by the sanguinary piety of the Vatican.‡ From this period the doctrines of Luther were sanctioned by law, and spread with rapidity over the north of Germany.

* The moderation, learning, and integrity of Melancthon, pointed him out as the fittest person for the execution of a task so arduous as that of defining limits for faith; and he was accordingly chosen to draw up the confession, which was presented to the diet of Augsburg.—Robertson, ii. 329.

† Fra. Paolo, lib. v. 17.

‡ Robertson, iii. 337.

It is a striking feature in this celebrated recess, and highly characteristic of the spirit of the times, that the choice of a religion depended solely upon the will of the sovereign; while the only privilege accorded to his subjects, was the right of removing, with all their property, to the territories of a prince, whose religious opinions accorded with their own. But no provision was made for the purpose of guarding against the abuses of tyranny, so likely to be resorted to by the violence of a bigot, when his faith and his pride were insulted.

The “Ecclesiastical Reservation” (as it is called by the Germans) afforded a momentary gratification to the catholics; because it gave a qualified superiority to their own communion, by preserving entire, to the church of Rome, the revenues and benefices of such prelates, as might hereafter abandon her tenets. The apparent equity of this decision, which seemed only to provide against the alienation of friends, from the purpose to which they were originally destined, at length silenced the opposition of the Protestants;* though they strenuously resisted it, when first proposed, from the conviction, that, by enlisting temporal interest in support of religious belief, it would operate more powerfully in favour of the Vatican, than the most elaborate arguments which her profoundest theologians could adduce. Subsequent events having confirmed these apprehensions, they positively denied, that they had ever assented to the proposal; pretending, that the question was of such infinite importance, that it had been reserved for future discussion.†

* Puffendorf de Reb. Suec. i. 14.

† Id. ib. Schiller, b. i. Mitbiller's Continuation of Risbek's History, iv. 4.

Hence the recess of Ausgburg ought rather to be regarded in the light of a truce, than in that of a definitive treaty; and so indeed it appears to have been considered by the contracting parties, since it was expressly declared, to be only a temporary expedient, to remain in force till a general council could assemble. And it was only in case that no permanent reconciliation should be then effected, that the validity of the treaty was to be finally established.*

The flame of war, though smothered for a time, was far from extinguished: each party was equally dissatisfied. The catholics, because they had conceded too much; the Protestants, because they had acquired too little.

The power of Austria, which had been raised so high by the craft and fortune of Charles V.† became far less formidable after his abdication. Divided into two separate branches, and subject to different sovereigns, whose views and principles were as remote from each other as the dominions over which they presided, it no longer possessed

* Id. ib. Schiller, b. i. Mithiller's Continuation of Bisbek's History, iv. 4.

† The talents of Charles V. appear to me to have been greatly overrated. That he possessed political sagacity, in a very considerable degree, it is impossible to deny; but it is vain to look for marks of those transcendent powers, which have immortalized an Alexander or a Caesar. Though uniting all the treasures of Mexico and Peru with Spain and Flanders, and extensive territories in Italy and Germany, his boasted armies were usually inferior to those at present maintained by the dependent sovereigns of Saxony and Bavaria; and, small as they were, they were generally destitute of every thing necessary for their subsistence. Compared with the volatile monarch of France, or the capricious tyrant of England, Charles certainly claims our praise; but, when opposed to Maurice or Soliman, he loses all pretensions to the character of a hero, and we almost wonder what qualities posterity can discover in the fugitive from Innspruck to extol and admire.

that vigour and activity, which made Europe tremble for her liberties. The mild virtue of Ferdinand I. formed a striking contrast with the intolerant bigotry of Philip II. The former, notwithstanding his Spanish education, and his known partiality for the Jesuits, endeavoured to appease the sectarian dissensions, which distracted the empire by conciliatory propositions,* while the latter disdained lenient remedies, as derogatory to the dignity of a sovereign, and attempted to enforce unconditional submission by the rack, the axe, and the faggot.

Yet, in spite of the loss of the Spanish crown, and its contingent treasures in America, the German branch still remained so formidable, that the most cordial unanimity could alone have enabled the protestants to support their independence. Unfortunately, however, they had already split into several sects, scarcely less hostile to each other's opinions, than to those of the papal communion. These unhappy dissensions (as Schiller observes with his usual sagacity) must† be ascribed entirely to the jealousy of the Lutherans, which led them to establish the Confession of Augsburg as the proper standard of religious belief. By prescribing limits to the spirit of investigation, they deprived the seceders from the Romish church of many advantages, which must otherwise have resulted from the renunciation of popery.

* Fulsit in omnibus imperatoris nostri Ferdinandi actionibus, judiciis, sententiis, vultu ac gestibus, etiam nativa bonitas, et moderatio ac clemensia vere regia et divina.—*Chrytraea in Oratione de Ferdinandino Cesare.* After making great allowance for the exaggeration natural on similar occasions, we must acknowledge this eulogium to be highly honourable.

† B. i.

The animosity, subsisting between the Lutherans and Calvinists, proved highly gratifying to the common foe, and no less injurious to themselves. What a field was opened for the display of wit,—that men should be found sufficiently presumptuous to prescribe to the world a new model of faith, before they had settled the articles of their own belief!*

The only rallying point that existed between the contending sects was their mutual dread of the catholics. This danger, though probably much exaggerated by the spirit of party, was still sufficient to justify the utmost precaution:† for, on what foundation could they rely? No oath, however solemn, deserved to be trusted, so long as the pope was supposed to possess the dangerous prerogative of dispensing with the most sacred obligations, and while the church of Rome continued to inculcate the diabolical tenet, that “no faith was to be preserved with a heretic.” Meantime, their apprehensions were continually revived by the indiscretion of the Jesuits, who affected to speak of the treaty as a measure dangerous to the Christian religion, negotiated in direct opposition to the wishes and remonstrances of the sovereign pontiff, and equally prejudicial to the glory and interest of the Catholic church.‡

Neither did the proceedings of the council of Trent tend, in the least degree, to dissipate their ap-

* Bossuet has managed this argument with his usual ingenuity, in his *Histoire des Variations de l'Eglise*; a work, which may teach a protestant logic, and a catholic divinity.

† See the able apology of Turretin, and the candid exposition of Limborch, a rational, sober, and inquisitive divine.

‡ *Les Lettres Provençales* have probably made the reader acquainted with the dexterous casuistry of that celebrated order.

prehensions. Notwithstanding the efforts of the imperial ministers, who persevered conscientiously in demanding a reform of those abuses, which had so long given scandal to Christendom, no attention had been paid to their representations.* Thus, the only benefit that accrued from this celebrated synod, was to display to mankind the duplicity of the Pope, the venality of the clergy, and the folly of the people, for having expected the amelioration of ecclesiastical discipline from a body of men, so materially interested in its corruption.†

Fortunately, however, for the protestants, the necessities of Ferdinand secured his adherence to the treaty of Augsburg; for, notwithstanding his boasted moderation and justice, his treatment of the Bohemians was not calculated to excite a very favourable opinion of his sincerity. Deserted by the narrow policy of Philip, it was impossible for him to have resisted the tremendous torrent, which rolled impetuously from the east, without the cordial co-operation of all the German powers: nor could this be obtained, without conforming implicitly to the literal stipulations of the treaty.

The unquestioned probity of Maximilian II., who succeeded his father on the imperial throne,‡ added to his secret inclination toward the opinions of Luther,§ inspired the protestants with the pious

* Schmidt has given a circumstantial account of Ferdinand's honest, but ineffectual endeavours, for that purpose.—*Neuere geschichte der Deutschen.* B ii. K. 10.

† Pallavicini and Sarpi have recorded its proceedings; the former with the accuracy of an historian, the latter with the sagacity of a philosopher.

† In 1564.

§ These opinions he is supposed to have imbibed from his preceptor, Wolfgang Severus, who was himself a convert to the Lutheran faith. Neither could this early impression be ever effaced by the exhortations

hope, of beholding their religion triumphantly seated on the throne of the Cæsars. This expectation was still farther strengthened, by the liberality with which he treated the members of the reformed church in his hereditary dominions,* to whom the exercise of their religion was freely conceded, though he was frequently admonished, of the pernicious consequences of toleration, by the sovereign pontiff.† *Letter XIII.*

In spite, however, of the declaration which he formerly made, that "he was ready to sacrifice all worldly interests for the sake of salvation," a due consideration for the tranquillity of the empire outweighed his private attachiments; since it was hardly possible for him to have abandoned the religion of his forefathers, without exposing his country to all the calamities of civil war; because, in case of his recantation, the zealous catholics might have attempted to elevate the intolerant Philip to the imperial dignity.

But, unfortunately for Germany, that excellent emperor was not destined long to promote the happiness of mankind.‡ After a tranquil reign of twelve years, he was succeeded by his eldest son,

or example of Philip, King of Spain. On the contrary, it increased with increasing reason, and even tempted him to engage a protestant divine in the capacity of private secretary, from whom he is said to have received the communion under both kinds.—Coxe, i. 609.

* At a time when the true meaning of the word *toleration* was scarcely understood in any country in Europe, he was often heard to say, "that "God alone possessed authority over the consciences of men."—Schimdt, ii. 27.

† Barre *Histoire d'Allemagne*, ix. 132—Mitbiller, iv. 110.

‡ That virtuous emperor (says Pebzel) listened with patience to the meanest and poorest of his subjects, received their petitions with benignity, and took care that they were treated with impartial justice. 627. *Nec enim illo ingenio mitius ullum regni contigit.* Grotius Ann. Bel. ii. 42.

Rodolph,* a prince no less inferior to his father in understanding than in justice, moderation, and benevolence. Abandoned from his cradle to the care of the Jesuits,† he was educated by them in those illiberal principles which were calculated to render their illustrious pupil the slave and instrument of their ambition. Some historians pretend, that he was endowed with talents, which, if properly cultivated, might have reflected lustre on a throne; that he was passionately addicted to scientific pursuits, and was a liberal patron of genius. These are unquestionably among the noblest purposes to which wealth and power can be consecrated. But it was the misfortune of Rodolph to deviate alike from the path of prudence, whether employed in the pursuit of laudable objects, or in those of an opposite nature. Shut up in a laboratory, a stable, or an observatory, he was occupied in inspecting the solution of a metal, in caressing a favourite courser, or in watching the conjunction of a planet, when the critical situation of public affairs should have engrossed his undivided at-

* In 1576.

† It was the misfortune of Maximilian to be married to a woman of weak intellect, and blindly attached to the catholic faith. Mary, the daughter of Charles V. resembled her brother Philip in her narrow views of religion, and being imprudently entrusted with the education of her eldest son, till he had attained his twelfth year, she inspired Rodolph with such a superstitious veneration for her favourite tenets, as ultimately led to those calamitous scenes, which desolated Germany during the subsequent reigns. This early prepossession was afterwards confirmed by a long residence at the Spanish court. With a view of succeeding to the crown of Spain, by marrying the daughter of Philip II. who at that time had no male issue, he was sent to Madrid to be instructed in the arts of government by that sanguinary tyrant, whose intolerant zeal was eminently calculated to mature the seeds implanted in his bosom by the misguided piety of his mother.—Coxe, i. 655.

tention. Even the patronage which he afforded to men of science lost half of its merit, from being confined to those, who wasted their time in the puerile studies of alchymy and astrology. It may be even fair to doubt, whether the splendid endowments of Tycho Brahe would have entitled him to the imperial favour, had they not been degraded by charlatanism.* When the flames of war were spreading from the Baltic to the Alps, the emperor's ministers were often refused access to his person, and were even compelled, in order to procure an audience, to assume the disguise of a groom or a friar. Hence, the most important transactions were treated with indifference, and sometimes with total neglect. Abandoning the reins of government to his mistresses, or his favourites, he seldom gave himself the trouble to inquire in what manner their authority was exercised.†

Though destitute of an heir to his extensive dominions, he was so jealous of authority, that he could never consent to the election of a King of the Romans.

The successful resistance of the Flemings to the intolerant bigotry of Philip II. might have afforded an useful lesson to a monarch, capable of deducing a salutary warning from the crimes and errors of others. But, instead of endeavouring to assuage the bitterness of faction by prudence or equity, Rodolph was weak enough to make use of compulsion. At the instigation of the Spanish court, he attempted to curtail the authority of the imperial chamber, by transferring all causes, in which the

* The literary history of that age will account for his extraordinary death. See his life by Gassendi.

† Schimdt, iii. 13.

church was concerned, to the aulic council—a tribunal composed exclusively of catholics, and entirely under his own control.* Instead of conforming to the enlightened policy of his father, he rescinded many important privileges, by which Maximilian had secured the affection of the protestants. A precedent like this proved too seducing for bigotry to neglect, and we accordingly find the emperor's conduct adopted as a model by the partisans of Rome, in every corner of the empire. Deprived of their property upon frivolous pretences, and excluded from every office of emolument or honour, it is by no means surprising that the protestants should have indulged their resentment, whenever an opportunity occurred for retaliation. Few circumstances could have demonstrated, in a clearer light, the animosity existing between the rival sects, than the obstinacy with which the members of the reformed church rejected the Gregorian calendar, for no better reason, than because it was introduced by the pope.†

Notwithstanding the levity with which Rodolph varied his favourite pursuits, it was apparent to all men of penetration, that he was wedded to every practice of the catholic worship, with the illiberal bigotry of a Franciscan. For some time, indeed, his constitutional indolence silenced the fears of the Lutherans; but when they discovered that he was acting in concert with the Vatican, and that he affected to consider the obligations, contracted by the treaty of Augsburg, as virtually abrogated by the council of Trent, universal consternation prevailed; since none were so dull as not to discover,

* Coss, i. 662.

† 1582. De Thou LXXIV. Barre, ix. 207.—Mitbiller, iv. 127.

that the liberties of Germany must stand or fall with the protestant worship.

Though Rodolph and his brothers were blindly devoted to the papal see, the same ardent zeal for the catholic faith was by no means common to their subjects. The new opinions had made considerable progress in the hereditary states, particularly among the higher classes, by whose influence and exertions the protestants had obtained a preponderating share in the municipal government. As the right of determining the amount of all subsidies resided entirely in the provincial diets, it was natural to expect that prudence, if not humanity, would have induced the imperial ministers to avoid every measure that might tend to impair the popularity of their master, or to weaken the confidence of his people. Yet, instead of endeavouring, by lenient remedies, to allay the ferment, they had rashly recourse to coercion, annulling at once, by one sweeping proscription, all the edicts which Maximilian had successively passed in favour of the protestant nobles.* Not satisfied with their imprudent act, they proceeded to remove them from all official situations. Encouraged by the incatious behaviour of the court, the catholics believed, that they were about to consummate their ardent wishes, and that an orthodox champion had been granted to their prayers, zealous to efface the disgraceful stain, which contaminated the purity of the Christian church, by the holy means of persecution. Anticipating the triumph of the righteous cause, they

* His concessions had been, perhaps judiciously, confined to the domains of the great nobility, from a wish to conciliate the higher orders, without endangering the public tranquillity.

exhorted the emperor to persevere with unabating constancy, till the meritorious work should be accomplished.

Had it been the study of Rodolph to undermine the foundation of Austrian greatness, a more convenient system could hardly have been devised. The uncertain tenure of the Bohemian crown had been often productive of civil dissensions, when the unpopularity or indolence of the reigning monarch prevented his obtaining, from that jealous people, the nominating of a successor. The throne of Bohemia was not only elective, but its constitution preserved, with laudable caution, many great and valuable privileges; which the king, at his accession, was compelled to ratify by a solemn convention. Thus the royal authority was circumscribed within narrow limits, the monarch being prohibited from imposing taxes, from making peace or war, or from introducing any change in the national code, without the concurrence of the diet. That assembly consisted of three estates—the great nobility, the equestrian order, and deputies from most of the towns and cities. Though the right of convocation was expressly vested in the king, yet, in turbulent times, the diet had been frequently known to assemble without waiting for the royal permission.*

Since the days of Huss, the kingdom of Bohemia had been never exempt from religious dissensions,

* The cortes of Castile and Arragon, the states-general of France, the parliament of England, and the diets of Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary, were originally possessed of constitutions nearly similar, and endowed with privileges almost equally extensive. "*Le beau système a été trouvé dans les bois.*" The genius of feudalism appears every where to have been the same. Happy the people, whose rigid adherence to the policy of their ancestors, has enabled them to maintain a steady course between the rocks of democracy and the shoals of despotism.

N. P.
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which, though occasionally appeased by a popular prince,* were ready to break out, with increasing violence, on the slightest provocation. No sooner, however, had Luther attacked the profligacy of the Vatican, than his doctrines were received with avidity in a country, where the mania of controversy was almost epidemical. Unable to combat the Saxon divine by rational arguments, the zealous indiscretion of Lewis had recourse to weapons more suitable to the feelings of bigotry, rashly attempting, by exile and torture, to silence those whom he found it impossible to confute. These intemperate proceedings compelled the Lutherans to shelter themselves under the tolerated name of *Calixtines*, and their accession contributed essentially to augment the wealth and influence of that formidable party.†

Such appears to have been the situation of the country when Ferdinand I. ascended the throne.‡ His treatment of the Bohemians was by no means calculated to heal the animosities which so generally prevailed, or to justify the high reputation of

* This was the case in 1483, when the moderation of Ladislaus effected a truce between the hostile sects, for the space of thirty-three years.

† The disciples of Huss, after the death of that martyr, divided into two powerful factions, distinguished by the names of *Calixtines* and *Taborites*. The former, so called from receiving the cup in the celebration of the eucharist, were a mild and peaceable sect, contenting themselves with enjoying their favourite privilege, without attempting to overturn the established religion. The appellation of the latter was derived from Mount Tabor. Their principles were those of wild enthusiasm, and they insisted, that all men should conform implicitly to their own extravagant theories—Mosheim, by Maclaine, iii. 448.

‡ Mr. Coxe has referred to such authentic sources, that, in this short sketch of the Bohemian government, I have relied with confidence upon his information; I do so the more readily, because I find it corroborated by the indefatigable industry of Schmidt.

moderation and equity, which his behaviour toward the Germans had acquired, and which we may therefore suppose to have been the result of policy, and not the spontaneous effusions of a benevolent heart. Too wise openly to attack privileges secured by treaty, and too rigidly attached to the papal communion, to behold with indifference the rapid progress of the Reformation, he persuaded the diet to issue a decree, prohibiting all farther innovations. Various other attempts were successively made to infringe the rights of the people, and to establish an hereditary claim to a crown, which he had solemnly acknowledged, by his coronation oath, to be held by the right of election.* It is the usual fate of similar engagements to be easily broken, but it is rarely the lot of an injured nation to oppose their violation with equal ardour. Yet in spite of their efforts, the success of Charles V. against the Smalcaldic league, gave so severe a blow to the protestants, that his brother was enabled to reduce the insurgents to unconditional submission. Having entered Prague, at the head of a victorious army, Ferdinand punished the leaders with such exemplary severity, that he had no longer any resistance to apprehend. His authority being established on the tremendous basis of terror, he proceeded to regulate the administration of justice on a system

* This claim was founded on his marriage with Anne, daughter of Ladislaus, King of Hungary and Bohemia. Being present at the coronation of an infant brother, (who never lived to inherit the throne) the young princess burst into a flood of tears, because she was not also to be crowned. Her grief was so violent, that nothing could appease it, till her father placed the diadem on her head. This circumstance being regarded as ominous by a superstitious people, they, by general acclamation, declared her heiress to the Bohemian crown, in case of her brother's demise.—Coxe, i. 603.

truly despotic; and as he attributed the resistance, which he had already experienced, to the doctrines disseminated by the Lutheran divines, he called to his assistance a phalanx of Jesuits, hoping, by casuistical cunning, to counteract the poison of heresy.

By the tolerant spirit of his government, Maximilian II. so far regained the confidence of the Bohemians, that he prevailed on the diet to chuse his son for his successor. His behaviour, on that important occasion, deservedly entitles him to the highest praise; as he managed the election with so much dexterity, that he avoided offending the delicacy of the states, without relinquishing the claim of hereditary right, so lately established by his father.*

Unfortunately for Rodolph, he was destitute of sagacity, to humour the temper of an unquiet people, though, at the commencement of his reign, he certainly acquired some degree of popularity, by fixing his residence at Prague. The sentiments of the nation, however, were materially changed when his character was better understood. From his refusal to confirm the edicts of Maximilian, the catholics and calixtines were the only tolerated religions; the Lutherans and Calvinists being not only prevented from worshipping their Maker, according to the rites of their respective churches, but even excluded from every public office. Emboldened by success, Rodolph proceeded rapidly in the career of injustice, and even ventured to abrogate many important privileges, which were constitutionally enjoyed by the calixtines.†

The same odious system was extended to the em-

* Id. Coxe, i. 641.

† Pebrel.

pire, where Aix-la-Chapelle and Donauwert were deprived of their charters, and put under the imperial ban, as a punishment due to apostacy. In the former city, the electors of Treves and Cologne, to whom the execution of the sentence had been committed, contented themselves with deposing the protestant magistrates, and abolishing the reformed religion; but the latter was exposed to more intolerable hardships, being not only stripped of all its franchises, but placed under the dominion of the Duke of Bavaria, by whom it was treated with all the severity of a conqueror.*

The discontent occasioned by such despotic conduct was manifested in a diet held at Ratisbone in 1608, when the protestants refused to grant any subsidies for the prosecution of the Turkish war, till their grievances were completely redressed.†

Convinced that the crisis was rapidly approaching, when they must either submit to the Austrian yoke, or assert their independence with the sword, their leaders assembled at Anhausen in Franconia, to provide for their future security.

The origin of this association, which, under the title of "Evangelical Union," was destined to act so distinguished a part in the annals of the times, may be traced to the year 1594, when, at the instigation of the Elector Palatine, a meeting was held at Heilbrun, which was attended by many of the protestant princes.‡ Having marshalled their complaints in a constitutional form, they presented a memorial to the emperor, in which they signified their determini-

* Schmidt, iii. 11 and 15. † Barre, ix. 309. Schmidt, iii. 15.

‡ The Count Palatine of Deux-Ponts, the Margraves of Baden-Dourlach and Anspach, and the administrator of Magdeburg, a younger son of the Elector of Brandenburg, were preserved.—Coxe, ii. 609.

nation to withhold all farther contributions till every cause of complaint should be removed.* The evils of which they complained regarded principally the infraction of their religious rights, and the unconstitutional interference of the Aulic council, in matters belonging to a higher tribunal. This confederacy might have an insuperable barrier to the ambition of Austria, had not the jealousy of the Calvinists prevented their leaders from uniting heartily with the Lutherans.† Too feeble to oppose the imperial power when left to themselves, the associated princes endured the mortification of beholding enormous supplies voted by the diet, without the smallest attention to their remonstrances.

Far, however, from being disheartened by want of success, they consoled themselves with having discharged an important duty to their country, and trusted to Providence for their remuneration. Meanwhile their popularity not only rapidly increased, but they acquired additional strength by the accession of the Duke of Brunswick, the Langgrave of Hesse, the Prince of Anhalt, and the Count of Nassau; which more than compensated for the defection of the Duke of Wirtemberg, who basely deserted his party.

* Schmidt, iii. 9. Pfleffel Abregé Chronologique de l'Histoire d'Allemagne, ii. 236.

† Of the animosity prevailing between the different branches of the reformed church, we may judge from the following distich, addressed to Casimir, who was entrusted with the administration of the Palatinate, during the minority of the elector.

O Casimire potens, servos expelle Lutheri,
Ense, rota, ponto, funibus, igne neca.

Schmidt, iii. 5.

The death of the Elector of Brandenburg* proved a fortunate circumstance for the allies, because his son John Frederic immediately joined the confederacy, which had already obtained such political consequence, that Henry IV. King of France, no longer hesitated to declare in its favour. Animated by the support of so powerful a monarch, they ventured to proceed another step, and concluded a treaty at Heidelberg,† by which they solemnly covenanted to oppose the encroachments of the Aulic council; to resist every attempt that might be made by the catholics to resume the secularized property of the church; and finally, to defend their civil and religious liberties against every one who should dare to infringe them. Deputies were also appointed to reside at Heidelberg, to whom the management of all business was committed, and the contingents were fixed, which every member was to furnish in the event of hostilities.

These necessary precautions having been unanimously established, confidential agents were dispatched to France and Holland, for the purpose of communicating the result of their deliberations, and to request assistance in case they should be attacked by the catholics. A clandestine correspondence was likewise carried on with the disaffected subjects of Austria.‡

A subsequent meeting§ at the monastery of Anhausen, in the Margraviat of Anspach, decided

* In 1598. In the course of this and the following year, the members of the union successively assembled at Friedberg and Francfort.—Pfeffel, 238.

† In 1603.

‡ Henrich reichsgeschichte, vi. 159.

§ In 1608.—Pfeffel, 246.

further, that no difference of opinion, respecting religion, should impair the cordiality so happily established between the members of the confederacy. With a view to the possibility of aggressive warfare, it was likewise agreed, that in case any conquests should be effected by their united forces, they should be divided among the members in exact proportion to their respective contingents. The Elector Palatine being declared head of the league, Joachin, Margrave of Brandenberg, was appointed general, and Christian, prince of Anhalt, lieutenant-general.

The final arrangements were, however, reserved for a meeting at Hall, in Suabia,* when, after confirming all the resolutions already enacted, the confederates entered into a specific engagement respecting the disputed succession of Cleves and Juliers. By this agreement, it was stipulated, that the treaty of Dorinund should be preserved inviolate; that proper measures should be taken to determine the sequestration, and the imperial administration be compelled to retire. This assembly was honoured by the presence of an ambassador from Henry IV. who, in the name of his master,† engaged to send ten thousand men, whenever his assistance should be required. Ministers were also accredited to the courts of London and Copenhagen, and to the republic of Venice, Switzerland, and Holland, to solicit protection against the lawless tyranny of Austria.

Regarding it as indispensable to their future success, that all the protestant states should combine

* In 1610.

† Le Vassor, i. 18.

together against the common enemy, no efforts were spared to secure the co-operation of Saxony.* All their overtures, however, proved ineffectual, as the emperor had already gained over the elector by promising him the investiture of Juliers.†

The strength and consistency of the Evangelical Union spread universal alarm throughout the catholic states, who saw no probable means of resisting its influence, except by forming a similar association. A confederacy was accordingly organized, under the appellation of the "Catholic League," consisting of the three ecclesiastical electors, and most of the mitred princes of Germany, at the head of which was placed Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, the only secular member of distinction.‡ To this circumstance he was indebted for the extensive authority with which he was invested, and which was far more unlimited than what the jealousy of the protestants could allow them to grant to the Palatine. By this well-timed confidence, he was enabled to act with decision and vigour; while the protestant generals were compelled to waste moments, the most important for active service, in vain and tedious debates.§

The facility, which they experienced in raising supplies, was also highly advantageous to the catholics. The opulent prelates, who began seriously

* They are said even to have offered the elector a positive assurance, that the decision, respecting the contested succession, should not prove injurious to his interest.—Coxe, i. 715.

† Puffendorf, i. 17.

‡ Barre, ix. 390.—Schiller, dreysigjähriges knig. i.

§ Ibid. The death of Frederic IV. Elector Palatine, was severely felt by his party, as his son was inferior to him in all those qualities which are necessary in turbulent times.

to tremble for the splendour and emoluments of the mitre, were easily persuaded to sacrifice a part of their superfluous wealth, in hopes of preserving the remainder. The protestants, on the contrary, experienced almost insuperable difficulties, in extorting even scanty supplies from their less rich, but less sagacious adherents.*

It is a singular circumstance, and highly characteristic of the general contempt in which Rodolph was held, that he was never consulted by the members of the League, though they were avowedly the champions of the catholic faith, of which he was officially the secular head,† from wearing the imperial diadem.

* Barre, ix. 390.—Schiller, dreysigjähriges krieg. i.

† Ibid.

CHAP. II.

Death of the Duke of Cleves.—Disputes concerning the Succession.—Pretensions of the different claimants.—Impolitic conduct of the Emperor.—Henry IV. of France declares in favour of the Evangelical Union.—His plan for humbling the Austrian power.—Rapacity of the Protestants.—Death of Henry.—Distress of his allies.—A treaty concluded with the Duke of Bavaria.—A general view of the Austrian government in Hungary and Transilvania.—Mathias.—His character, projects, and popularity.—Compels Rodolph to surrender Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, and to appoint his successor to the Bohemian throne.—Fresh troubles in Bohemia, which terminate in the resignation and death of Rodolph.

THE measures pursued by the rival confederacies operated so powerfully in producing the war, the events of which I have undertaken to describe, that it was essential to trace their rise and progress minutely. Neither could this be effected, without deviating a little from chronological precision, and postponing the consideration of the intricate disputes, occasioned by the death of the Duke of Cleves and Juliers, till the present opportunity.

John William, Duke of Cleves, Juliers, and Berg, dying without issue, various competitors laid claim to his dominions. Had the laws of inheritance been clearly defined, no subject for litigation could have arisen; since no question could possibly be more exempt from the intricacies of forensic confusion, than to determine, whether a fief should descend entire to the eldest of the female representatives, or be divided among all, who were equally connected by blood. Yet, so complex was the system of German jurisprudence, that the profoundest

civilians were puzzled to decide, whether or not an imperial decree ought to supersede the established customs of the empire. The subject, however, will be better understood, by stating the pretensions of the respective claimants.

The Elector of Brandenburg having married Anne, the only daughter of Mary Eleanor, the eldest sister of the deceased, demanded the duchies for his son, as the nearest male representative.* But Anne, the second sister, being still alive, endeavoured to establish a preferable title on the claim of nearer affinity. Anne was widow of the Count Palatine, of Neuburg, by whom she had a son, who, of course, was nephew to the late duke, to whom the hereditary Prince of Brandenburg was more remotely related by one degree. John, Duke of Deux-Ponts, and Charles of Austria, Margrave of Burgau, pretended likewise to the succession in right of their wives, who were also sisters of the deceased. The former, however, soon relinquished the contest; but the latter persisted with greater pertinacity, because he flattered himself to obtain from the partiality of a relation,† what it would have been weakness to expect from the equity of a judge.

The difficulty of determining to which of the competitors the contested territories should belong, seems to have arisen chiefly from the following circumstance; which, in the judgment of civilians, militated directly against the common laws of in-

* Pütter's Historical Development of the German Constitution, by Dornford, ii. 35. Struvius, period. 10. sect. 7. p. 2057. Khewenhillier, vii. 201.

† He was cousin to the emperor.

heritance. Two declarations had been successively issued by the Emperor Charles V.* In virtue of the first, in case of the failure of the male line, the whole succession was to devolve to the Ernestine branch of the house of Saxony, descended from Sibilla, eldest daughter of John III. Duke of Cleves.† Mary, however, contended on specious grounds, that this provision was virtually abrogated by a subsequent edict, by which the duchies were rendered female fiefs, revertible to daughters, or their male representatives.

This confusion was aggravated by an act of Ferdinand I. declaring the inheritance to be indivisible, and re-establishing the succession according to the ancient rule of primogeniture.‡

Supposing the territories to be revertible to females (a supposition contrary to the leading principles of feudal descent), they ought of course to have been divided among the four sisters, or their representatives.§ But, as it became daily more probable, that the dispute must be ultimately referred to the sword, the princes of Deux-Ponts and Burgan thought it prudent to withdraw, convinced of their inability to contend against the superior resources of Saxony and Brandenburg: for the margrave's expectations were now completely frustrated, since a more fortunate competitor had outstripped him in the emperor's favour. The

* Bougeant, *Histoire du Traité de Westphalie*, i. 21.

† Schmidt, iii. 22.

‡ Coligny, *Histoire du Palatinat*.

§ It would have been easy for the author to have produced the authority of the most celebrated publicists, and to have encumbered his pages with the contradictory decisions of diets and universities; but it is no part of his ambition to rescue from oblivion works, which have long and deservedly been buried in obscurity.

Elector of Saxony, in consequence of his descent from the Albertine branch, appeared on the list of candidates, producing a grant made by Frederic III. to the descendants of Albert, in case the male line of Juliers should be extinct.

Though possessing power sufficient to give a colour of justice to the most desperate suit, the elector preferred to rest his pretensions on a more solid foundation; and, with a shew of submission extremely flattering to the vanity of Rodolph, appealed to his equity for redress, while Brandenburg and Neuburg prepared to assert their pretensions by arms.*

It would have been deviating essentially from those principles, which have almost invariably influenced the policy of Austria, had Rodolph neglected this favourable opportunity for extending the imperial authority. Under the fallacious pretence of administering impartial justice, he commanded the litigants to suspend hostilities, and either personally, or by representative, to appear before the imperial throne?† Meanwhile, he ordered the territories to be put under sequestration, and even nominated an administrator to carry this edict into immediate execution.‡

This vigorous measure, which betrayed the intention of annexing the contested territory to the hereditary states, for which many precedents of injustice might have been produced; or else of conferring it upon the Elector of Saxony, whose venal

* Coxe, i. 718.

† Bentivoglio has given a detail of these proceedings in a work entitled, *Relazione della Mossa d'arme per le cose di Cleves e di Giuliers.*

‡ Barre, ix. 386.

friendship Rodolph was anxious to secure, brought the elector and the palatine to a speedy reconciliation. Convinced that their union was essentially necessary for the preservation of the country in dispute, they agreed jointly to govern the duchy, and with their aggregate strength to resist all intruders.*

In vain did the emperor prohibit the magistrates from doing homage to their new sovereigns, and depute Leopold of Austria to exercise the government as imperial commissary.† With the single exception of the town of Juliers, the whole country submitted to the protestant princes, while the representative of Rodolph was compelled to seek a precarious refuge in the capital.‡

From this time the contest assumed a different aspect. It was no longer regarded as an abstract question concerning the right of inheritance, but as involving interests of the highest magnitude. The possession of Juliers, however important, became a consideration of inferior moment, when compared with the eventful struggle for superiority between the rival religions of Rome and Luther. Whatever was calculated to stimulate ambition, to imitate pride, or to interest piety, inflamed the hearts of the combatants. If Austria triumphed, the liberties of Germany were sure to receive an incurable wound; and the modern Cæsars might possibly be enabled to establish a despotism, no less

* This agreement was signed at Dortmund, by the mediation of the Landgrave of Hesse, and under the guarantee of Henry IV. of France.—Schmidt, iii. 22.

† Londorp. iii. 15. Mitbiller, iv. 163.

‡ Ibid.

tremendous than that which had been formerly exercised by their ferocious predecessors in Italy.

For these reasons, the contest attracted the attention of all the powers in Europe, who had broken the fetters of the Vatican, or who beheld with abhorrence the overbearing ambition of Austria. It is, however, far from impossible, that the protestants, overawed by the dread of her superior resources, might have circumscribed their efforts to fruitless exhortations, had there not existed a man, whose sagacity anticipated the numberless advantages to be derived from uniting the members of the reformed church in one powerful confederacy, and who resolved to avail himself of the fortunate moment for humbling the imperial eagle.*

Henry the Fourth, King of France, had learned from experience, that there was nothing too base for Austrian ambition and Austrian bigotry to undertake. By deeds the most heroic, he had surmounted every obstacle which the subtle superstition of the Tiberius of Spain had been able to raise; and, when firmly seated on the Gallic throne, had displayed to the eyes of an admiring world, that rare phenomenon, a patriot king.

In every quarter of Europe, where gold could corrupt, or artifice deceive, the destructive effects of Spanish intrigues had scattered sedition and hatred. Implanted by nature in every breast in which the blood of Ferdinand of Aragon continued to flow, the insatiable spirit of dominion was neither glutted by an invariable current of success, nor extinguished by the rudest gales of adversity. As it degraded the weakest of Austrian princes, so it tarnished

the glory of the most illustrious. For more than a century the tranquillity of Europe had been constantly interrupted by their intrigues and usurpations. To oppose their attempts at universal empire, the plains of Europe had been covered with armies, her seas had been blackened with fleets. Her strength had been exhausted, and her industry fettered, by the enormous burdens, which the imperious dictate of self-preservation had compelled her sovereigns to impose. It was in vain to look for permanent tranquillity, or to form enlightened plans for the encouragement of those arts and manufactures which give vigour, and lustre, and stability to nations, while there existed a power in the very centre of Europe, continually occupied in fomenting jealousy or exciting revolts.

These considerations are supposed by many historians to have inspired the magnanimous resolution, embraced by Henry IV. of reducing the pride and power of Austria within limits so narrow, that it should no longer be able to trouble the repose of mankind. But, as the conduct of mortals, however wise it may appear to a careless observer, is seldom totally exempt from passion or prejudice, we may fairly infer, that ambition, envy, and personal pique, were not inactive in fomenting the animosity of Henry against the house of Austria.*

* Were it possible for posterity, to penetrate the real motives which have influenced the conduct even of the greatest men in the most important transactions of their life, we should frequently discover that caprice or anger, resentment or jealousy, had inspired resolutions, commonly attributed to disinterested magnanimity, patriotic enthusiasm, or refined policy. Thus, in the instance before us, a ridiculous attachment to the young Princess of Condé is supposed to have accelerated the preparations of Henry, impatient to rescue the fugitive beauty from the tyranny of a jealous husband and a bigoted archduchess. The account given by Sully

The weakness and unpopularity of Rodolph, together with the intestine divisions known to prevail in the imperial family, afforded an opportunity for humbling the German branch, too inviting for ambition to neglect; while the disputed succession of Cleves and Juliers, furnished Henry with a plausible excuse, for declaring himself the champion of the protestants. From his first accession to the throne, he had been constantly occupied in preparing for the execution of this important design. By the assistance of Sully, the most virtuous minister that ever directed the finances of any country, funds had been collected, sufficient for the maintenance of a numerous army during many campaigns,* and considerable force had been actually assembled on the frontiers of Germany, prepared to burst into the heart of the empire, when the signal should be given for hostilities.

Thus far the plan adopted by Henry was sagacious and intelligible. But it is difficult to reconcile with our ideas of prudence, the project imputed to him by Sully,† and scarcely less so to discover a

of his behaviour upon learning Conde's flight, serves in a great measure to confirm the suspicion. *Le Vassor, Historie de Louis xiii.* i. 18. —*Memoirs de Sully, Let. xxvii.* Of the former of these works, Madam Du Defand speaks in the following terms, Letters ii. 114. *Je continue la lecture de le Vassor, et je n'suis toujours contente. Je ne me soucie pas de Louis xiii. mais je m'interesse aux evenemens de son regne; on y voit le dessous des cartes de tout ce qui se passait; et le style de l'auteur me plait insinuement; il doit paroître trop simple et ingenu aux beaux esprits; mais il est tel que le peuvent desirer les amateurs de la vérité, on l'accuse d'être partial, et c'est ce que je ne trouve point; il l'est certainement entre le vice et la vertu; il loue les honestes gens, et tombe à cartouche sur les fripons, et les scelerats; en un mot, il dit ce qu'il pense, et n'écrira pas pour se faire admirer.*

* Sully gives a very interesting account of a conversation that passed on this subject between the king and himself, xxvii.

† Mem. xxx.

satisfactory clue to that strange political enigma. That the king should have exerted every sinew to weaken the power of an hereditary rival we may consistently with reason believe. But to suppose him capable of cherishing the chimeraical expectation of giving permanent peace to the world, by organizing Europe into a Christian confederacy, and establishing among its sovereigns a balance of power so nicely constructed, that its springs and movements could never be deranged, is to imagine the greatest of the Gallic monarchs, to have united the romantic folly of the hero of Cervantes with the visionary enthusiasm of Plato.

Desirous, however, of giving the appearance of justice to a contest, on the issues of which his future reputation in great measure depended, Henry directed the German ambassadors to explain their griefs and resources to the President Jeannin,* on whose probity and prudence he could rely. This formality having been complied with, and an opinion delivered completely in union with the wishes of the king, he graciously promised to undertake this defence with the zealous ardour of friendship.

Yet no sooner had he embraced that generous resolution, than various obstacles arose in a quarter, where he was least prepared to encounter them. Instead of experiencing the cordial confidence, to which his well-known integrity entitled him, he discovered, in the proceedings of his German allies, such evident symptoms of jealousy, as would have induced a soul, less magnanimous than his own, to have abandoned them instantly to destruction. Instead of adopting his schemes with zeal and una-

* Negociations du pres. Jeannin, i. edit. in 12.

nimity, they ungenerously attempted to confine their joint operations to the recovery of Juliers. Neither was their behaviour in the field less a subject of mortification to Henry.

In conformity to the plan, which he had sagaciously traced, religion was to be excluded from the dispute. This, indeed, was a necessary stipulation: both in order to prevent the contest from assuming that sanguinary character, too natural to wars undertaken in defence of speculative opinions, as well as to secure himself from the imputation of apostacy, to which his known predilection for the doctrines of Calvin might otherwise have given a semblance of veracity. But he unfortunately discovered, that he was connected with men, rapacious as avarice could make them: whose passions and enmities were equally insensible to the persuasive voice of reason, or the dictorial mandate of authority. Stimulated by hatred, and the thirst after riches, they devastated the dominions of the ecclesiastical princes with the savage fury of banditti; burning the towns and villages with remorseless barbarity, and carrying away every thing that could tempt their rapacity.*

Terrified at the rapid progress of the enemy, who were already masters of Alsace, and of the greater part of the duchy of Juliers, the catholics began seriously to tremble for the issue of a contest, in which their religion and property were equally concerned, when they were suddenly relieved from all their disquietude by the knife of a desperate fanatic.† Henry, when upon the point of depart-

* Schmidt, iii. 24.

† Malgré les grands préparatifs du roi, la maison d'Autriche paraissait tranquille. On ne s'apercevait pas qu'elle pensait à se défendre contre

ing to join his army, was stabbed by an obscure assassin, in the midst of his capital, and in open day; * and with him expired that great and energetic spirit, which gave life and animation to the confederacy.

The loss of such a man must, at all times, have been considered as a serious misfortune to the world; but it proved doubly calamitous at a moment, when he was preparing to overturn the empire of superstition, and to check the ambition of Austria. Distressed and confounded at the greatness of their misfortune, the allies were overwhelmed with dismay. Though assisted by a body of Dutch, under the Prince of Orange, and by fourteen thousand French, commanded by the Mareschal de la Chatre, their operations were conducted with so much languor,† that nothing important was achieved. Troops, indeed, might have been procured for more extensive operations, but friends were wanting for their equipment. Though never deficient in expressions of zeal, when declarations alone were required, the free cities soon grew disgusted at the burthen to which they were subjected, and loudly complained, with a truly mercantile policy, that although they were constantly called upon for additional supplies, their advice was scarcely ever demanded.

Hence, the situation of the "Evangelical Union" became daily more precarious. Conscious of their

un armament qui la menacait ouvertement; soit qu'elle attendait le corps que changea, bientot la face des affaires, &c.—Le Vassor, I. 25. What an insinuation is this against the honour of Austria!

* What an inconsistent people are the French? They murder the most humane and benevolent of princes, and suffer a tyrant to insult them with impunity.

† Bougeant, i. 29.

inability long to keep the field, and alarmed for the event of a negociation, their leaders were at a loss on what to determine; convinced that the difficulties attending protracted hostilities, were scarcely inferior to the danger of laying down their arms in presence of an exasperated enemy. Fortunately, however, for them, the pride and expectations of the catholic league were so much abated, that they listened with eagerness to the first proposals for an accommodation. Without deigning to attend to the emperor's orders, to drive the protestant army out of Alsace, and to reduce the sequestered provinces under his authority, the Duke of Bavaria concluded a treaty, by which it was stipulated, that Alsace should be evacuated, and the forces on both sides reduced as low as mutual security would admit; but the right of succession, the most important point in the estimation of Rodolph, was expressly reserved for future discussion.

Notwithstanding their consequence was materially improved by the death of their illustrious champion, the protestant league still continued to be formidable. Yet such was Rodolph's imprudence, that he allowed his passions to hurry him on from error to error, till they placed him in a situation more perilous than that from which he had so recently escaped.

In order that the reader may form a competent judgment of the dissensions which prevailed in the imperial family, it becomes necessary to revert to various occurrences, which it was impossible to introduce with chronological precision, without interrupting the chain of events.

Among the extensive dominions of the house of

Austria, none were more frequently convulsed by internal commotions, or more exposed to external aggression, than the half-civilized provinces of Hungary and Transilvania. The impossibility of protecting an extensive frontier against the formidable irruptions of the Turks, induced Ferdinand I. to resort to the dishonourable expedient of paying an annual tribute to the Porte, as the price of precarious peace.* This impolitic measure, by proclaiming the weakness of the Austrian power, served as an additional temptation to the turbulent barons to erect the standard of rebellion, whenever a favourable opportunity occurred for extorting fresh concessions from their feeble sovereign, under pretence of asserting their ancient immunities.

The Hungarian constitution was, however, far from despotic. When the nation submitted to the dominion of Austria, they reserved to themselves many valuable privileges, and particularly that of electing their sovereigns. This right, however, was frequently abused, by a people addicted to innovations of every kind, and impatient even of legitimate restraint. The facility of obtaining support from the restless ambition of the Ottomans, encouraged the Magnates to revolt the moment their pride was offended. Whenever they were disgusted at the severity of Austria, they threw themselves into the arms of the Turks: but, equally averse from every species of subordination, they no sooner felt the weight of the Mahomedan yoke, than they returned with alacrity to their former master. These frequent revolutions served to augment the general turbulence, and to weaken the attachment

* Isthuauibus, 277.

of a volatile people for any particular dynasty. Instructed, by experience, that little confidence was due to either of the rival empires, to which they alternately resorted for protection, they began to seek among their own nobility for wealth and power, and military skill, to justify the national suffrage. Yet such was the danger attending unsuccessful rebellion, that the aspiring chieftain was compelled to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Porte, ever ready to inscribe the royal suppliant on her list of tributary sovereigns.*

Ferdinand and Maximilian had exhausted the strength of their other dominions, to secure the tranquillity of Hungary and Transilvania, threatened alternately by the Ottoman arms and the flame of rebellion: nor could this be accomplished without rendering those unfortunate provinces the theatre of incessant hostilities. Provoked, that a spirit should any where exist, less servile than that which he had been taught, by the severity of German discipline, to consider as the only one becoming a subject, the Austrian soldier invariably treated the Hungarian peasants as rebels, unworthy of the protection of the laws; while penury too often compelled the sovereign to connive at the depredations of troops, whom he would otherwise have been unable to satisfy,

In this precarious state of anarchy and war, the crown descended to Rodolph, whose understanding and temper were equally unfit to provide an adequate remedy for the evil.† Desirous of curtailing

* Schiller, as usual, draws an animated picture of this tumultuous scene. B. i.

† *Isthuanus*, xxv.

the immense expense required for the protection of those distant possessions, he transferred the provinces, bordering on Croatia, as imperial fiefs, to his uncle Charles, Duke of Stiria, flattering himself, that the contiguity of that prince's territory might enable him to repel the inroads of the Turks with greater facility. Having constructed a fortress, which, under the name of Carlstad, is become the capital of Croatia, Charles parcelled out the territory, which had been ceded to him by the economizing timidity of his nephew, into various military fiefs, and conferred them on adventurers of every description, whose restless spirits, or daring crimes, had deprived them of a national asylum. These savage tribes, progressively spreading over the inhospitable forests of Sclavonia, increased so rapidly, that they soon supplied the Austrian armies with those formidable squadrons, which, under the barbarous denominations of Croats and Pandours, have since acquired an odious celebrity in the ferocious annals of plunder.

The eastern frontier being thus secured, Rodolph conducted himself with as much indifference to public affairs, as if the safety of Hungary had been the only object which deserved his paternal regard. Inattentive alike to the comforts and prejudices of a high-minded people, he neglected to gratify the vanity of the Hungarians, by appearing in person at the national diet. He likewise suffered the highest offices of the state, even that of Palatine, to remain vacant, at a moment, when by a judicious selection he might have secured the allegiance of the most potent families. And even when awakened from his natural indolence, the manner in which he disposed of those important posts proved a source

of universal discontent, as they were conferred on foreigners, in contradiction to the custom of former sovereigns, if not in direct violation of a constitutional statute. But, while thus shamefully indifferent to the welfare of his people in all temporal affairs, he was far from evincing the same inattention to their spiritual concerns: on the contrary, he attempted to fetter their opinions by a variety of edicts, no less odious for their severity than contemptible for their imprudence. He even permitted the governor, who, like most other ministers in despotic countries, studied to represent the folly as well as the authority of his master, to levy excessive fines on all who refused to conform to the established worship, and even to condemn to cruel and ignominious deaths such as presumed to murmur at his tyranny.

Anxious, however, if possible, to terminate the quarrel by negociation, before they had recourse to those efficacious remedies, which nature indicates as the ultimate resource of oppression, Stephen Botskai, a magnate, no less distinguished for eloquence than for military science, was sent to remonstrate with Rodolph;* but, upon his arrival at Prague, he was not only denied access to the imperial presence, but was treated by the ministers with so much contempt, that he abandoned every hope of redress. Convinced that submission is a relative duty, dependent on the enjoyment of protection, he resolved to vindicate the national honours, by means more consistent with the spirit of a soldier, than those which had been hitherto

* Isthuaf. xxxiii.

employed. In an animated address, he exhorted his countrymen to assert their independence by arms, and offered to partake in every peril to which they might in consequence be exposed. No sooner had he erected the standard of rebellion, (if opposition to a tyrant deserve the name of rebellion) than he was joined by such numbers, that he was in a short time enabled to commence offensive operations. Equally disgusted with the despotism of the emperor, the Transilvanians solicited the aid of Botskai, and found him ready to extend his protection to all, who groaned beneath the yoke of oppression. The efforts of the insurgents were every where successful; and, with the assistance of the Turks, they soon compelled the Austrians to evacuate Transilvania.* This was a proud moment for the victorious Botskai; for he not only conquered, but refused a sceptre. By the command of Achmet, the grand vizier made a public tender of the Transilvanian crown to the triumphant chieftain; but his haughty soul, revolting at the idea of a dependent diadem, rejected with dignity the proffered favour, unless confirmed by the national suffrage; declaring with magnanimity, or at least with prudence, that the only glory, to which he aspired, was to rescue his country from the fetters of despotism.†

Thus, through the indolence and incapacity of the reigning emperor, the Austrian power declined so rapidly, that the most fatal consequences might be apprehended. This alarming crisis, as is usually the effect of augmented evils, produced its remedy, by tempting the members of the imperial family to

* Isthuaf. xxxiii.

† Barre, ix. 354.—Isthuaf. xxxiv.

suspend their private animosities, and cordially to unite in wresting the sceptre from the feeble hand, by which it had been so long disgraced.*

After the death of his brother Ernest,† Matthias (the third son of Maximilian II.) became the presumptive heir of the Austrian monarchy. Educated by the learned and virtuous Busbequius, he had not only acquired a competent knowledge of the most useful sciences, but had been taught to contemplate the actions of men with the enlightened eye of a statesman; while jesuitical artifice had purposely degraded his elder brother into the passive tool of superstition. It could hardly be expected that dispositions so opposite should long agree; and, we accordingly find, even from his early youth, that Matthias was a stranger at the court of Rodolph. Impelled by a bold and enterprizing genius, and the thirst after military renown, he rashly undertook to defend the Flemings against the persecuting bigotry of his uncle Philip.‡ But the result of his endeavours was far from satisfying his own expectations, or those of that brave and generous people, whose rights he attempted to vindicate. After relinquishing a post, which he had filled without credit to himself, or advantage to the nation, he retired to Lintz on a miserable pension.§

The embarrassment occasioned by his own imprudence having compelled the emperor to solicit the advice and assistance of his brother, Matthias again appeared on the political theatre.|| Though invested with the government of Austria, and entrusted with the command of the imperial forces in

* Schmidt, iii. 13.

† In 1595.

‡ In 1580.

§ Bentivoglio Guerra di Fiandra, parte ii. 2.

|| In 1592.

Hungary, at that time invaded by the Ottoman arms, he soon discovered that his return to power was the effect of necessity, and not of inclination; and that, however successful his operations might prove, he could never hope to eradicate from the breast of his brother that inveterate jealousy, which his natural timidity, and the envy of his ministers, had equally contributed to inspire. He therefore resolved, by splendid actions, popular manners, and a strict adherence in all religious disputes to the beneficent maxims of his father, to conciliate the affection of his countrymen, that he might have some foundation more solid to repose on than the precarious friendship of a monarch.

By this artful conduct, for it in reality proceeded from the calculation of interest, and not from the impulse of benevolence, he gradually acquired the public esteem, while Rodolph, degraded by pusillanimity and prevarication, became daily an object of greater contempt.

The moment, for which Matthias had secretly panted, was now arrived.* After repeatedly remonstrating with his infatuated brother respecting the folly of his proceedings, and tendering his services and advice, he considered all the forms of decorum to have been fulfilled, and ventured to throw aside the mask. Anxious however to sanction opposition by the imperious plea of necessity, he assembled the princes of the Austrian family at Presbury;† and, in a studied oration, expatiated on

* In 1606.

† The meeting consisted of his brother Maximilian and his two cousins, Ferdinand and Maximilian Ernest, of the Stirian branch. The resolutions, entered into by the different members, were afterward ratified by the Archduke Albert, at that time sovereign of the Low Countries.

the incapacity of Rodolph, and the consequent evils that must ensue. In this alarming crisis, he said, it became a paramount duty with those, to whom the glory of Austria was dear, to provide against the calamities which threatened to overturn the magnificent fabric, erected by the genius of their immortal progenitors.*

The wishes of his auditors proving in union with his own, Matthias was chosen to defend the dignity of a throne, disgraced and endangered by the indolence and imbecility of Rodolph: and, as a necessary step to the execution of this important trust, he was declared the head of the Austrian family, and invested with all the authority which his colleagues were able to confer; who further engaged to exert their influence, in order to secure his election as King of the Romans.†

Confident in the assistance of such powerful friends, Matthias hastened to avail himself of his popularity, for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to Hungary. By a treaty with Botskai, whom he knew to be labouring under an incurable disease, he allowed him, during life, to retain the whole of Transilvania, together with the eastern provinces of Hungary, upon condition, that after his disease they should return under the dominion of Austria.‡ Delighted as was natural with the successful issue of this negociation, he prevailed on Botskai to mediate a peace with the Porte; and, with his assistance, concluded a truce for twenty years, on terms no less

* Coxe I. 693. Schiller i. Schmidt iii. 13.

† This curious document is preserved by Goldastus, Appen. 223.

‡ Schmidt, 26. Isthuanius, xxxiv.

honourable than advantageous.* Yet so jealous was Rodolph of his brother's reputation, that he positively refused to ratify the treaty, under pretence, that Matthias had exceeded his power, in granting toleration to the protestants; and that he had sacrificed the honour of the imperial throne to views of private ambition.† However just the accusation in many respects, it was certainly unfounded on the present occasion; and the folly of the emperor, in withholding his consent, was productive of serious mischief. On the death of Botskai, who did not long survive the return of tranquillity, the Transilvanians, disdaining to submit to a monarch who had so recently violated his faith, elected Sigismund Ragotsky for their sovereign.‡ Though highly injurious to the interests of Rodolph, this step was by no means equally prejudicial to the designs of Matthias, because it served to furnish him with a plausible pretext for levying troops: and, without the aid of an army, it was impossible for him to realize the mighty projects which he had conceived. The eyes of Rodolph being at length completely opened to the danger by which he was surrounded, he determined, by the advice of the Spanish court, to which Matthias was particularly odious on account of his conduct in Flanders, to secure the fidelity of the Styrian line, by procuring the reversion of the imperial crown for Ferdinand. With this intent he addressed a rescript to the Germanic states, inveighing in acrimo-

* Upon receiving the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, under the title of a voluntary donation, the Sultan consented to relinquish the tribute so disgracefully paid by Ferdinand I. and his son.—Isthuanus, I. xxxiv. Lento et tabisco, hydropoe turgentibus omibis membris, extinctus est.

† Schmidt, 26.

‡ Ibid.

nious terms against the treachery and ingratitude of Matthias, and calling upon them to protect their constitutional chief against the nefarious machinations of a traitor.

The plan of the emperor was so far successful, that he gained over the Styrian princes, and reduced his competitor to the dangerous alternative of recurring immediately to open force, or renouncing for ever the noblest object of his pursuit. A mind inflamed with the thirst of dominion could not long remain in suspense; but, being fearful of shocking the national feeling by a bold avowal of his design, Matthias endeavoured to conceal his projects under the appearance of zeal for the public welfare. Secure of obtaining the concurrence of the people, if he could once persuade them that he was risking his life in defence of the national faith, he convened the states of Hungary and Austria at Presburg, under pretence of consulting what measures could be pursued to vindicate their honour and his own.* To procure from them the ratification of a convention, which secured their domestic repose, was far from an arduous undertaking; particularly, as he had previously conciliated most of the leading members by various grants, no less liberal than politic. Neither was it difficult to persuade the two nations to unite in a covenant, by which they mutually engaged, not only to carry the treaty into execution, but to regard as enemies to the public good, all who should presume to violate it in the most trifling article.†

Having thus secured the affections of the Hun-

* A. D. 1608.

† Strucius per. x. sect. 7.

garians, and gained over the protestants in Moravia and Austria, long disgusted with the bigotry of Rodolph, he assumed, in his intercourse with the imperial court, a tone of higher authority. In vain did Rodolph, alarmed at the gathering tempest, endeavour to atone for former errors by the most abject concessions. As a temptation to Matthias to suspend his warlike preparations, he offered to his adherents a general amnesty, promising henceforth to treat him with confidence and affection, to redress all the grievances of which his subjects complained, and to ratify the treaty of Vienna.* But it was too late to propose an accommodation, when Matthias, after receiving homage from all the Austrian states, was advancing rapidly toward the Bohemian frontier, at the head of a formidable army.†

Had Rodolph possessed either prudence or courage, his affairs might still have been retrieved; notwithstanding the numerous errors of his administration, the loyalty of the Bohemians was unshaken, and the whole nation would‡ have armed in his defence. But this effeminate monarch was destitute of courage, to avail himself of the enthusiasm, kindled by his distress. Ingloriously preferring the wiles of negociation to a gallant appeal to the sword, he still continued to treat with the invader, flattering himself by promises to retard his progress, which he was too irresolute boldly to oppose. But though Matthias consented to listen to the proposals, nothing could induce him to suspend his march, or

* Schmidt, 26.

† Ibid.

‡ At the head of the dissidents was the celebrated patriot, Count Thurn, who is destined to act a distinguished part on the following pages.

even to signify his demands in clear and specific language. On the contrary, his claims progressively augmented, in proportion to the fears and weakness of his rival, till he at length extorted from the wretched monarch, a formal surrender of the Hungarian crown, together with the government of Moravia and Austria; and further, compelled his unfortunate brother, by a public document, to declare him successor to the throne of Bohemia.

Elated with the prosperous issue of a contest, in which he had succeeded beyond his most sanguine expectations, Matthias consented to evacuate Bohemia, and returned in triumph to Vienna.* But he shortly discovered, that it was an easier task to wrest a sceptre from the hands of indolence, than to satisfy the expectations of the ambitious nobles, to whose turbulent spirit he had been indebted for victory. The love of independence, which rendered that potent order averse to the government of Rodolph, tempted them to behold with increasing jealousy the authority of a prince, whose power was the effect of usurpation. The states of Austria, being convened for the purpose of taking the accustomed oath of allegiance, demanded the confirmation of many ancient privileges, which time and tyranny had nearly effaced; and farther, insisted that the most ample toleration should be granted to Christians of every description.† In vain Matthias attempted by caresses and promises to appease the gathering storm. The zeal of the petitioners was much too fervid for words to content; and their sovereign had taught them, by his own example,

* July 18, 1008.—Schmidt iii. 20.

† Ibid.

the proper means of obtaining redress. Closely uniting with the Hungarian sectaries, they flew to arms, and insisted upon being placed on an equal footing with the members of the Catholic church. Matthias, alarmed at the impending danger, had recourse to negotiation; an impolitic system, because, in proportion as he acceded to one demand, fresh claims were brought forward more decidedly hostile to the royal prerogative. In his situation, however, all opposition was useless; and, having yielded in one important point, no choice remained but to submit to every thing, or to risk the loss of his sceptre.*

Having thus established their liberties upon constitutional grounds, the states of Hungary declined to interfere in favour of those, with whose interests

* I will not trouble the reader with a minute enumeration of all the privileges which firmness extorted from fear; but shall content myself with mentioning a few of the leading articles, in order to shew, that the time has been, when the subjects of Austria understood the value of liberty. The most important point, and consequently that which was most reluctantly granted, regarded religious toleration; as the people not only insisted that every sect, which had abandoned the communion of Rome, should be allowed to celebrate its respective rites without the smallest restriction, but that the members of it should be placed upon an equal footing with the catholics with respect to all political privileges. The crown of St. Stephen (an easy concession) was never to be removed from Presburg, and a Palatine to be chosen out of four candidates to be presented to the king by the nation; this high dignitary was to exercise all the functions of government in the absence of the monarch, assisted by a council of regency, the members of which were to be alternately nominated by the sovereign and the states. All foreign troops were to evacuate Hungary, as soon as peace was concluded with Turkey. Neither were any fortresses to be garrisoned with Germans, except Raab and Comorn, and even those were to be commanded by Hungarians. And lastly, with laudable prudence it was required, that the Jesuits should never be introduced into the kingdom; and that each ecclesiastical authority in all its branches should be subject to judicial control.—Schmidl, iii. 20.

they had apparently identified their own. Confining themselves entirely to wishes and exhortations, they recommended forbearance to the Austrian deputies, who retired in disgust at their selfish policy, though far more inclined to profit by the example than by the precepts of their ungenerous confederates.

The storm had no sooner abated in one quarter than it collected in another: in Moravia and Austria a flame was kindling, which threatened to spread over all the adjacent provinces. The antiquated pretensions of prerogative, which had so long terrified mankind, were no longer capable of imposing upon the world. Superstition and tyranny march hand in hand; they are the growth of ignorance, and, like all prescriptive usurpations, cannot long resist the lights of philosophy. Matthias was no stranger to this important truth; and, by a popular edict, confirmed every privilege which had been granted to the protestants by Maximilian II.*

That there is no epidemic more contagious than that of liberty, the apprehensions excited in the breasts of courtiers, by the glorious prospect of expanding freedom, may serve to establish as a paramount principle in politics. The prosperous termination of the civil dissensions in Austria and Hungary, encouraged the Bohemians, by similar means, to aspire to similar advantages. In conformity to an engagement contracted with the nation, Rodolph no sooner found himself delivered from the perils of civil war than he assembled a

* Schmidt, iii. 20. Barre, ix. 379.

diet, for the express purpose of taking into consideration the differences which prevailed respecting religion.* Strong alike from unanimity and numbers, the protestants evinced the firm resolution of rejecting all partial concessions, convinced that upon every principle, both human and divine, they were entitled to an equal participation of all constitutional privileges. Misled by the pernicious counsels of the Jesuits, the timid emperor endeavoured to elude the demand ; but, perceiving that the members were too cautious to be deceived, and too honest to be seduced, he dismissed them with marks of displeasure.. This hasty measure served only to increase the general ferment.

Without deigning to wait for the consent of their sovereign, the protestants appointed another meeting in the following spring, and actually assembled with the usual forms, notwithstanding the prohibition of Rodolph. The popularity acquired by this decisive step alarmed the weakness of that misguided prince, who, terrified at the idea of a fresh appeal to Matthias, consented to ratify by a solemn decree, or " Letter of Majesty," (as it was emphatically styled) whatever his subjects required. Religious toleration, in its most extensive form, was granted to the sectaries of every denomination, with permission to establish an ecclesiastical consistory for the management of their spiritual concerns, and to found schools and universities for the education of protestant children.† By way of additional security, they were authorized to nominate thirty delegates, who, under the modest appella-

* 600.

† Lotichius de rebus Germ. i. 12.—Schmidt, iii. 21.

tion of "Defenders of the Faith,"* were destined to protect the rights of the people against the encroachments of the royal prerogative. And, lastly, as the most powerful bulwark which prudence could oppose against despotism, a clause was added, annulling every edict that might be eventually issued by the successors of Rodolph, to infringe this great fundamental act, justly regarded by the Bohemians as the palladium of their liberties.†

The constitution of Bohemia had now undergone an entire change, having assumed a republican form. The emperor retained only the shadow of authority, all real power being vested in the deputies, who exercised their jurisdiction with the arrogance of men unaccustomed to rule, and ambitious of popularity, without attending to the means by which it was acquired.

Rodolph, however, was now so fallen, that he was daily exposed to fresh indignities. Scarcely had he signed the "Letter of Majesty," when a deputation arrived from the united protestants of Germany, upbraiding him with the miseries to which their country had been exposed through his neglect and incapacity, demanding redress for every grievance; and threatening, in case of the smallest delay, to proceed themselves to a general reform. Rodolph, as usual, attempted by promises to suspend the blow, solemnly engaging, within a limited period, to correct the abuses of which they complained. But, whether this was indeed the effect of contrition for past misconduct, or merely in-

* Puffendorf, i. 20.

† A detailed account of the whole transaction may be found in Goldastus, ii. apperi. 368.

tended to postpone the evil, it is difficult now to determine; because the troubles which embittered his latter days, would at all events have prevented his fulfilling the compact.

The injuries which the emperor had received from Matthias were too poignant for time to obliterate. All the united efforts of the Austrian family were hardly sufficient to smother the flame, which, in spite of their endeavours, was continually breaking out in fresh contentions. The object of the latter, in suffering his brother to retain even the shadow of power, was clearly to prevent the desertion of his adherents; while that of the emperor was evidently to deceive the adverse party, by an appearance of moderation, that he might avail himself of the confidence which his affected levity inspired, to crush Matthias at a moment when he was unprepared to resist.*

No sooner had the latter disbanded his forces,† than Rodolph, believing the fortunate instant to be at length arrived, formed a plan for his brother's destruction. The Archduke Leopold‡ was still at the head of a considerable army, originally intended to oppose the Evangelical Union. This prince was lately become a great favourite with the emperor; not so much on account of his personal merit, as because he was naturally the rival of Matthias and Ferdinand, both of whom Rodolph was desirous of excluding from the throne of Bohemia.§ The right of election, so highly cherished as the darling privilege of the nation, might

* Schmidt, iii. 25.

† 1610.

‡ Leopold was the younger brother of Ferdinand II.

§ Schmidt, *ibid.*

conduce; he thought, to facilitate this design; and, by prudently availing himself of a popular prejudice, he hoped at once to flatter the vanity of his subjects, and to gratify his own resentment. The only thing wanting was a military force, and that was fortunately at the disposal of Leopold. Under various pretences the troops were kept together till the plot was ripe for execution; but no sooner were the preparations completed, than the soldiers were purposely left destitute of all the necessaries of life, that distress might excite them to plunder. Rendered desperate by hunger, they made a sudden irruption into Bohemia, spreading terror and desolation like a destructive hurricane.*

Notwithstanding the solemn protestations of Randolph, his well known duplicity excited a strong suspicion, that Leopold was acting with his approbation.† Convinced that, by the assistance of a mercenary army, he was preparing to annul the concessions so recently made, the defenders summoned the protestants to join the national standard, and sent to implore the protection of Matthias.‡

A request so agreeable to his secret wishes was obeyed with alacrity by that ambitious prince. Putting himself at the head of a numerous army, destined to reduce the insurgents in Hungary, he advanced toward Prague, which was immediately evacuated by the troops which Leopold had introduced into the city by treachery.§ Nothing now obstructed the progress of Matthias, who entered the capital amidst the shouts and acclamations of a delighted populace, who hailed him as

* Mitbiller, iv. 171.

† Schmidt, iii. 25.

‡ Ibid.

§ Coxe, i. 719.

the deliverer of their country.* But, previously to his arrival, Rodolph had been stripped of all authority, and confined a close prisoner in his palace.†

Having rescued the Bohemians from all their fears, it remained for the victor to receive the recompense due to his services. This, however, could not be effected, unless his pusillanimous brother resigned the crown; because several of the German princes had declared their intention of supporting Rodolph, in case rigorous measures should be employed. This threat, however, was in great measure illusory, since it failed to intimidate the states, secretly encouraged to accomplish the important work by the exhortations and offers of the "Evangelical League."‡ Sensible of the advantages to be derived from their present situation, the Bohemians resolved to reduce the royal prerogative within such narrow limits, that it should be no longer an object of terror. Incapable of asserting any right to the crown, except that of the national suffrage, Matthias was constrained to ratify the right of election, so warmly disputed by his predecessors, and to admit as constitutional the wildest claims which the enthusiasm of freedom could assert.§

Nothing now seemed wanting to confirm his authority, except the title of sovereign; and Rodolph was accordingly summoned, by a deputation from the states, to absolve his subjects from their allegiance. To fulfil a condition so humiliating to pride

* Schmidt, iii. 25. † Pebzel, 654. ‡ Khevenhuller, vii. 102.

§ Barre, ix. 403.—Schmidt, iii. 26.

was a trial too severe for the degraded emperor; though destitute of courage to vindicate his authority, he was weak enough to betray his feelings with the petulant fury of a child. After repeated refusals to execute the deed, he subscribed his name in a transport of rage, then blotted the writing with his fingers, and, throwing down the pen, stamped upon it, as the passive instrument of his disgrace.*

Neither was this the termination of his misfortune. Unable to subsist upon the scanty pension allotted for his maintenance,† Rodolph implored the electors to interfere in behalf of their degraded sovereign, nor to suffer the chief of the Germanic body to languish in poverty and contempt; but, instead of receiving consolation, as he fondly expected, he met with bitter reproofs. They upbraided him with being the author of his own misfortunes, by listening to the advice of improvident ministers, of whose incompetence they had so frequently warned him; and concluded, by exhorting him to summon a diet, in order to take into consideration the disastrous state of public affairs, and to elect a king of the Romans.‡

This proposal gave a fatal blow to the hopes of Rodolph, who seems to have regarded it as a salutary admonition to abdicate a crown which he had so long dishonoured by his weakness. Too timid

* Schiller i.—Schmidt, iii. 26.

† According to Coxe, the annual sum of four hundred thousand florins (about forty thousand pounds) was destined for his support, with permission to reside in the palace at Prague. Schmidt reduces the pension to 300,000; but, provided a tyrant be deposed, it is not material what sum is allotted for his subsistence.

‡ Barre, ix. 405. Schmidt, iii. 27.

to repose, and too proud to submit, he attempted, by artifice, to elude their demand; but perceiving that his character was too well understood, for equivocation any longer to avail, the apprehension of losing the imperial crown occasioned so violent a dejection of spirits, that it soon conducted him to the grave.* That he should have parted with life without much regret, the misery which accompanied it may induce us to believe; but, that he should have displayed the serenity of a Christian hero, in his latest moments, as some writers affirm, is a fact which we cannot so readily admit; because he possessed neither fortitude to overcome the terrors of death, nor virtue to make it acceptable.†

* A.D. 1612.

† The character given of Rodolph, at the commencement of his reign, has, I conceive, been fully justified by his subsequent conduct; yet such is the force of flattery, that even this contemptible pageant of a king has found a panegyrist; and his administration has been celebrated by a Bohemian historian (not a contemporary one) as the golden age of his country. Was this intended as a satire upon his successors, or must we say with a lively poet—

“*Dans le pais des avengles les borgnes sont rois?*”

He is thus painted by Pleffel with characteristic brevity:—“ Il meurt hâ des uns, méprisé des autres, abandonné de tout le monde, et plaint de personne.” il.

CHAP. III.

Matthias succeeds to the imperial throne.—Difficulties to which he is exposed.—He, at length, yields to the demands of the protestants, and consents to the election of a King of the Romans.—Character of Ferdinand, Duke of Styria.—Fresh commotions in Bohemia.—The insurgents, headed by the Count of Thurn, at whose instigation the council of regency is deposed; its leading members being thrown from the windows of the castle.—Moderation of Matthias completely frustrated by the violent temper of Ferdinand.—Death of Matthias.

No motive seems to have operated so powerfully upon the minds of the electors, in raising Matthias to the imperial throne, as the terror inspired by the Mahomedans. In that paramount passion all inferior considerations were absorbed ; and, however they might fear the authority of an emperor, possessing Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria, their dread of the Turks was much greater.*

The talents displayed by the new emperor, in situations peculiarly trying, inspired hopes that the inglorious reign of Rodolph would be succeeded by one of prudence, vigour, and activity. But the conduct of Matthias soon dispelled the pleasing illusion, and proved to the world, that it is far easier for a man to censure others than to act wisely and virtuously himself.

Having attained the summit of his ambition, Matthias began to exercise his authority for the humiliation of those, to whose support he was indebted for a sceptre. It was by favouring the protestants that he supplanted his brother, and an

* Barre, ix. 413.—Schmidt, iv. 1.

ample confirmation of all their privileges was naturally expected in return. An enlightened spirit of toleration has rarely graced the scanty catalogue of Austrian virtues. Matthias had assumed it as an expedient necessary to facilitate his plans, but in his heart he was as much an enemy to religious freedom as the most bigoted tyrant of his family.* Relying on the deceitful basis of popularity, he flattered himself to direct the turbulence of contending sects, as caprice or interest might suggest; but the first diet which met manifested an attention to the public weal, which entirely frustrated the fallacious expectation. By prudently withholding pecuniary supplies, till all their complaints were redressed, the protestants shewed, that they were no less inaccessible to the temptations of interest than deaf to the suggestions of fear.

Persuaded of the impossibility of extorting money either from the generosity or the apprehensions of the Germanic body, Matthias addressed himself to his hereditary subjects: but the application was attended with no better success. Instead of finding them grateful for the privileges formerly conferred, as the recompense of their disloyalty toward his brother, he was surprised to discover that they still regarded him in the light of a debtor, and considered the diadem, which they had placed on his brow, as an obligation never to be requited.†

* Greatly as I admire the talents of prince Eugene of Savoy, I cannot subscribe to his opinion of the Austrian family. *Il n'y a pas un seul de la maison d'Autriche qui ait été méchant, excepté Philippe II. toute sa vie, et une ou deux fois, Ferdinand II.* With respect to the latter, I should reverse the sentence, and say, that there are very few actions in his life, which do not deserve the severest reprehension.—*Mémoires du Prince Eugène*, 150.

† Schmidt, iv. 1.

With opinions, differing so materially upon essential points, no permanent cordiality could subsist. In Bohemia and Hungary the same spirit prevailed : in the former, a diet was loudly demanded to examine into the national grievances, the minds of the protestants being sorely exasperated by some imprudent restrictions, which, if they did not amount to positive violations of their chartered rights, were highly offensive and impolitic. The latter had suffered too severely, from the calamities of war, to sanction a plan, submitted to the states by the Austrian ministers, for the recovery of Transilvania, where Bethlem Gabor, confiding in the splendour of the Turkish crescent, bade defiance to the eagle of Austria.*

Despairing of reconciling the discordant interests, or of conquering the prejudices of the nation, Matthias was compelled to abandon the brilliant projects, by which he aspired to signalize his government ; and, availing himself of the amicable disposition manifested by the Porte, he renewed the truce for an additional period of thirty years.†

Hitherto the emperor's attachment to the catholic faith, though strongly suspected of bordering upon intolerance, had not been displayed in any overt acts of oppression.‡ But the treatment which he experienced from the different sectaries determined him no longer to preserve appearances, but to conform

* Schmidt, iv. 1. Heinrich, vi. 300.

† This treaty was signed in Vienna, in 1616, by a Turkish ambassador, the first who ever appeared in that city.—Coxe, i. 734.

‡ A general assembly of the protestants was held at Nuremberg, in 1614, in which the Elector Palatine, who had lately married Elizabeth, daughter of James I. King of England, was declared the head of that party, in the place of his deceased father.—Pfeffel, ii. 264.

in future to the united wishes of Rome and Madrid. Of this decision no doubt could be entertained, when he imprudently revived the imperial bar against the protestants of Aix-la-Chapelle, who, taking advantage of the general confusion, had deprived the catholics of all share in the government, and transferred it to persons of their own persuasion.*

Persevering in the same oppressive system, he directed the princes of Brandenburg and Neuburg to dismantle Mulheim, which, as joint possessors of the duchy of Berg, they had strongly fortified, and endowed with a variety of religious privileges, to the annoyance and injury of the orthodox citizens of Cologne.† Thirty days only were allowed for the execution of the decree, rigorous penalties being denounced as the punishment of contumacy.‡

Imperial pride must however have contented itself with a new display of authority, had not the spirit of discord begun to spread among the members of the Evangelical Union. Connected alike by interest and fear, the sovereigns of Brandenburg and Neuburg adhered with fidelity to the treaty of Dortmund, while menaced by the armies of Leopold. But no sooner was the danger removed than they quarrelled concerning the division of the spoil, each of them pretending that his colleague enjoyed a larger portion of power than he could legally claim by the articles of partition. Alarmed at the detriment, which must inevitably result to the protestant cause from these unfortunate dissensions, their mutual friends suggested various expedients

* Struvries, 1797. Mitbiller, iv. 180.

† Ibid.

‡ Barre, ix. 418.

for an amicable termination of the dispute. A proposal to combine their discordant interests, by a marriage between the Palatine and the elector's daughter, was nearly brought to a prosperous issue, when their endeavours were frustrated by the violent temper of her father, who, heated with wine, gave a blow in public to his intended son-in-law.* Justly incensed at an insult, which hardly admitted of reparation, the Duke of Neuburg renounced his religion, and, as a means of obtaining the assistance of the Catholic League, embraced the tenets of Rome, and espoused a Bavarian princess.† Neither did his rival hesitate, by a similar sacrifice, to strengthen his cause; but, publicly abandoning the opinions of Luther for those of Calvin, secured the protection of Holland. Together with the faith of the Vatican, the Palatine, having adopted its characteristic spirit of intolerance, announced his conversion by various acts of persecution. The immunities granted to Mulheim were accordingly revoked, and its fortifications razed, that it might no longer afford an asylum to heresy.‡ This ill-timed schism, converting the contest into a religious dispute, called forth the champions of the adverse creeds in aid of their favourite theories. While Spinola, at the head of a Spanish army, maintained the cause of orthodoxy and of Rome, the prince of Orange conducted his patriot bands to defend the tenets of Calvin.§

* Mitbiller, iv. 180. Schmidt, iv. 3.

† Ibid. Barre, ix. 433.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.*

§ The history of the Dutch revolution, the most glorious triumph of liberty and toleration over bigotry and despotism, might still afford an ample scope for splendid talents, notwithstanding it has been treated by

Both parties appealed to the emperor; the one against the violence of the Dutch, the other against the rapacity of the Spaniards. The infirmities of age had, however, so completely cooled the ardour of Matthias, that he trembled at the idea of involving Germany in the quarrel. Abandoned entirely to their own resources, the contending princes were reduced to the painful necessity of patiently submitting to the depredations of those, whose protection they had improvidently courted; and who, equally deaf to prayers and remonstrances, positively refused to evacuate the towns into which they had been admitted as protectors.*

Though grown indifferent to transactions, in which his personal safety was not immediately concerned, Matthias was far from beholding the interests of his family with equal stoicism. Destitute of children, as well as his brothers,† no prince remained of the house of Hapsburg, to preserve the honours of the German line, except Ferdinand, Duke of Styria. In him, therefore, it was probable that the Austrian dominions would ultimately centre; but it was not likely that he should obtain with equal facility the imperial diadem, unless secured by a previous election; because it was far

so many authors. Strada was biased by prejudice, and Grotius misled by a pedantic imitation of a great, but affected historian. The compilations of Le Clerc are as dull and uninteresting as it is possible for such a subject to become. Watson's abilities were avowedly inadequate to the undertaking. Neither could the biographer of Philip II. be supposed to treat with adequate justice the disinterested heroism of the house of Orange. Bentivoglio, though perhaps the least defective of any, was restrained by professional shackles; yet it cannot be denied that he is generally candid, and sometimes philosophical, in spite of the Roman purple.

* Schmidt, iv. 3: Struvius, 1203.

† Maximilian and Albert.

from improbable that the King of Spain might become a candidate, in case of a vacancy.

The plan of proceeding immediately to the election of a king of the Romans appears to have originated with Maximilian, the next in succession to the reigning emperor; but many unexpected difficulties arose, before he could bring it to maturity. Matthias entertained so strong an antipathy to the Duke of Styria, that rather than consent to his elevation, he would have almost preferred the risk of having his family deprived of the imperial diadem. Neither was he without apprehensions, that if he should consent to the election of a king of the Romans, all homage would be directed to the rising sun, while his declining star would sink into obscurity, like that of his unfortunate predecessor.* This also was the opinion of Cardinal Klesel, his confidential minister, who strenuously exhorted him to oppose the design, and never voluntarily to expose his latter days to turbulence, neglect, or indignity.† The perseverance of Maximilian, however, ultimately triumphed, and extorted a reluctant assent.

Notwithstanding the prosperous issue of the negotiation, so far as it concerned the cabinet of Vienna, Maximilian had still to contend against the interested obstinacy of the Spanish court. Though delighted at beholding the imperial sceptre secured to a prince, so zealously attached to the catholic religion, Philip III. was by no means disposed, gratuitously, to sacrifice his personal interests even

* Schmidt, iv. 4.

† Ibid.—Kbevenhüller, Anon. Ferdin. viii. 804.

to those of heaven itself: but his scruples were at length overcome by a promise, that in the event of the failure of male issue, the Spanish princesses should inherit in preference to those of the German dynasty.* It was also currently reported, that he received from Ferdinand the secret assurance of ceding to him, at his eventual accession, some part of the Austrian territories †

All impediments being at length removed, by this mercenary compromise between pride and superstition, Matthias presented his cousin Ferdinand to the Bohemian diet, as a prince endowed with every quality requisite to promote the glory and happiness of the nation. His brothers, he said, being childless like himself, and having passed the meridian of life, they had agreed to resign all their pretensions to the Duke of Styria, upon his solemnly engaging never to interfere with the administration of public affairs, till he should be called by Providence to the throne.‡

This flattering appeal to the prejudices of the nation, accompanied by a promise on the part of Ferdinand, to ratify every privilege which had been successively granted to the Bohemians, by the prudence or generosity of his predecessors, pro-

* Schmidt, iv. 4.

† This treaty was signed June 16, 1617, and was the second of the kind concluded between the different branches of the Austrian family; the first having been executed at Brussels, in 1521, between Charles V. and his brother Ferdinand.—Dumont corps diplo. v. p. ii. 299.—Le Vassor asserts, but without naming his authority, that Ferdinand engaged to cede Alsace to Spain, though, on account of the jealousy of the German princes, the agreement was never carried into execution, iv. 86.

‡ Puffendorf, i. 24.

duced an appearance of unanimity, which, considering the character of the man whom they elected, is calculated to excite our astonishment.*

The Count of Thurn alone, with his usual sagacity, pointed out all the dangers to which the protestants might be exposed by conferring the crown upon a bigot; but his warning voice was heard with indifference, by an audience already deceived by the delusions of hope, or influenced by the suggestions of interest. The misery occasioned by the blind zeal of Rodolph seemed already forgotten, though likely to recur in a tenfold degree under the government of a prince, who, to a bigoted attachment to the catholic faith, united eminent talents, persevering industry, and unshaken energy of character. Educated at the university of Ingolstadt, under the direction of the Jesuits, the keen observation of that politic order anticipated the advantages which must infallibly accrue to the orthodox church, could they infect a soul, like that of Ferdinand, with the narrow prejudices of superstition. No effort was accordingly left untried to degrade a genius designed by nature to adorn and elevate the Austrian name; and so successful was the attempt, that he is reported frequently to have regretted, that his splendid destiny prevented him from embracing a monastic life, and exchanging a corruptible for an incorruptible diadem.

Thus trained to become the tool and champion

* According to Pfeffel, the royal bigot had no sooner retired into his private apartment, than he abjured the oath in presence of his confessor, a crafty Jesuit, and received full absolution from the hands of the hypocrite, ii. 269.—If this statement be correct, the title of *flagellum dei* is not applicable to Attila alone.

of the Vatican, it was natural for him to imbibe an inveterate animosity against religious innovators of every description, and often to confound the interests of heaven with those of the catholic priesthood. Such was the effect produced by this early impression upon his future conduct, that he was repeatedly heard to declare, that rather than suffer the purity of religion to be defiled, he would reduce his children to beg their bread from door to door, and perish himself by the axe of the executioner.* With such an education, assisted by the principles which he had before imbibed from his guardian, the Duke of Bavaria, nothing could have prevented him from becoming as odious and contemptible as Philip II. of Spain, but a vigour of understanding, which, under proper discipline, might have raised him to a level with the greatest sovereigns.†

Neither was this the effusion of youthful enthusiasm, but was so engrafted in his nature, that it formed the vital principle of all his actions. No sooner was his zeal emancipated from every restraint, by the death of his father, than he hastily revoked all the privileges which that prudent prince had humanely granted to the protestants, interdicting the celebration of any rites unsanctioned by the papal approbation. During a pilgrimage to Loretto, performed with the pious humility of a hermit, or the foolish fervor of an enthusiast, he solemnly engaged, by an inconsiderate vow, to extirpate heresy from every country, which should be eventually subject to his authority. Proceeding to Rome, he was consecrated by the hands of Clement VIII.

* See Schmidt, iii. 16.

† Ibid.

whose praises and exhortations still farther confirmed this pious resolution.*

The admonitions of the Pope were productive of fruits no less grateful to the Vatican than fatal to the repose of mankind. Upon his return from the capital of Italy, Ferdinand issued an order for the immediate banishment of all protestant divines, and the demolition of all heretical schools and churches; re-peopling the seminaries, which were thus deserted, with the orthodox learning of the Jesuits. Indifferent alike to the wishes and welfare of his subjects, when it came in competition with their external glory, he commanded all persons to evacuate his dominions, who hesitated to embrace

* *Guil. Lamormainus*, in his eulogium upon the virtues of this prince makes use of the following words, p. 3. "Annos natus non plures viginti, in ipso suscepti regiminis exordio, Laureti in agro Pieeno, eoruna virgine matre, deo vovit, vel cum vitæ discrimine abacturum se a Stiria, Carinthia, Carnisia, sectas, sectarumque magistros. Tertio supra quadragesimum anno, Ungarie Bohemiæque jam rex, et Cæsar, idem se in Bohemia, illique regno adjunetis provinciis acturum, cellis (ubi in Stiria et Austriae finibus precipua religione virgo colitur) sanete, constantè vivit. Tandem octo ante obitum anno obstrinxit se voto, nullis defuturum occasionibus, quas deus dignaretur offerre, quin fidem catholicam in Ungaria, olim ut catholicissima ac piissima, sic sub beatissimæ virginis patrocinio fortissima felicissimaque, protegeret, et modis mediisque licitis ac honestis propagnaret. Ad simile votum edendum inuitavit, et induxit e consiliariis eum, cuius opera maxime utebatur, ut scilicet promitteret se advigilarum, et pro viribus Cæsaris zelo cooperaturum. Hanc segnius restituendæ religionis votum deo reddidit, quam concepit. Primo, ut alibi vidimus, Stiriam, Carinthiam, Carniolam, ponitus expurgavit. Deinde ex Bohemiæ regno, et Moravia, et ex ultraque Austria ueatholicos prædicatores omnes dimisit, catholicosque suffecit, eo animorum preventu, ut nonnulli absque temeritate se affirmare posse existiment, Ferdinandi zelo (*crudelitate* might be a more proper expression) ac opera centies centena millia hominum ad ecclesiæ catholicæ gremium et caulas esse revocata; adeoque Ferdinandum omni jure posse, et debere harum provincias apostolum dici, aut *Apostolici Imperatoris* cognomento decorari.

the religion of Rome, though a considerable majority of the inhabitants were ardently devoted to the opinions of Luther. The vacuity occasioned by this improvident edict he endeavoured to fill by numerous draughts from the unenlightened forests of Wallachia. Yet so universal was the terror excited by his severity, that these impolitic schemes were carried into execution without producing any violent commotion; the states confining their indignation to fruitless exhortations, and the people expressing their dissatisfaction in ill-concerted insurrections, which served only to establish the authority of their sovereign on a more firm or formidable basis.*

Having secured the reversion of the Bohemian sceptre, Ferdinand addressed his solicitations to the Hungarian diet, where he experienced still fewer obstacles. The right of election being at least tacitly acknowledged by this formal appeal to the nation, all other considerations were hastily sacrificed to the attainment of that favourite object.†

The appearance of unanimity, which accompanied the elevation of Ferdinand, was too deceitful to continue. Scarcely had the Bohemians acknowledged his title, than they found cause to repent their indiscretion.

In the "Letter of Majesty," an article highly important to the safety of the protestants, had been, perhaps intentionally, worded with so little precision, that it was capable of very different interpretations. Though little doubt could be entertained

* Puffendorff, i. 21.—Khevenhüller, Ann. Ferdin. V. Schmidt, iii. 16.

† Schmidt, iv. 7.

that the real meaning of the clause was to extend toleration to every order of citizens; yet, by an illiberal construction, it was possible to restrict it to the possessions of the nobility alone, leaving no better security than the caprice of their masters, to those whom nature had degraded to the condition of vassals.* While the privileges of the people were thus loosely defined, it was natural that they should be exposed to various acts of oppression, particularly when subservient to the illiberal tyranny of an ecclesiastic. So long as power is exercised with a lenient hand, it will ever be entitled to respect; but there is a latent spark implanted by the Almighty in the breast of man, which oppression kindles into a flame; and dreadful is the conflagration, when civil wrongs are still farther aggravated by the fury of religious persecution.

In conformity to the opinion almost universally entertained of the advantages to be derived from the edict of Rodolph, protestant chapels were constructed at Branau and Klostergrahen; the former of which was subject to the jurisdiction of an abbot, the latter to the Archbishop of Prague. Affecting to consider the extension of heresy as an infringement of their feudal supremacy, the mitred sovereigns, after ineffectually exerting their spiritual

* The article runs thus: "If any of the united states of the kingdom, who receive the communion under both kinds (i. e. the protestants) should be desirous of building more chapels or schools, in the towns or villages, or elsewhere, it may be done without hindrance or molestation, by the nobility, the members of the equestrian order, and the citizens of Prague, of Kuttenburgh, and of *all other towns*."—Maiestat. Briefe Art. vi.—The words "*all other towns*," appear to convey a very extensive right, notwithstanding the limited construction of the Austrian civilians, to which Mr. Coxe seems inclined to subscribe, i. 747.

authority, applied to the emperor for redress ; little doubting, in virtue of that tacit compact, which had so long subsisted between the crosier and the sceptre, to find a ready champion in Matthias. A prohibitory mandate was accordingly issued, forbidding the workmen to proceed ; but, by the advice of the defenders, they neglected to obey ; and, force being employed to compel them to desist, a confederacy was formed among the Bohemian sectaries for their mutual defence.*

This decisive measure announced a spirit of independence, which rigour was sure to inflame, but which might possibly have been appeased by moderation. Moderation, however, though strongly inculcated by the precepts and example of the divine founder of the Christian dispensation, is seldom displayed in the actions of those to whom the ministry of that religion is committed. Debilitated by the infirmities incidental to age, the mind of Matthias no longer retained the energy which animated his youthful career. His was the shadow of power only ; every measure of government being, in fact, inspired, if not ostensibly directed, by the inflexible courage of Ferdinand. The system pursued, though less avowedly hostile to the rights of mankind than the unblushing despotism of Charles V. was founded on similar principles ; neither was it less pernicious for being disguised. It was under the prostituted forms of justice, and by the illegal decisions of corrupt tribunals, that the shaft was aimed against civil and religious freedom. The supremacy of the house of Hapsburg over all

* Puffendorf, i. 22.

other powers was the fundamental article of the Austrian creed, while long possession was supposed to have conferred a prescriptive right to the imperial diadem.* These pretensions, which vanity no longer deigned to conceal, were calculated to awaken the jealousy of men, who regarded the head of the Germanic constitution, not as an absolute monarch, presiding over vassals whom an hereditary title had subjected to his sway, but as the chief of a confederacy, composed of princes and states, whom their voluntary choice had deliberately raised to that elevated station, in order to give stability and lustre to the association.

Fortunately, however, for the house of Austria, a large proportion of the German princes still adhered with pertinacity to the papal see; and, though many of them beheld with envy and apprehension the preponderating power of Matthias and Ferdinand, they beheld the progress of the Reformation with still greater abhorrence. To these motives we are compelled to recur for a satisfactory explanation of many subsequent events, since we cannot account, upon any other principle, for the powerful support which princes so unpopular experienced.

The contempt manifested by the protestants for the imperial edict, respecting the demolition of the churches, though highly offensive to the pride of

* In a memorial presented to Matthias by his brother Maximilian, respecting the necessity of electing a king of the Romans, this claim is arrogantly avowed. "The succession to the imperial throne," says that ambitious prince, "depends necessarily upon that to the hereditary states; *the one follows the other of course.*"—*Bedenker herzog Maximilians über die Romische konigs-wahl.* Moser's Diplom. und Historis. Belustigungen. I. 368.

Matthias, might possibly have been suffered to pass uncensured, had not the bigotry of Ferdinand interfered. At his instigation a hasty mandate commanded the buildings to be levelled with the ground. This injunction having been executed by the archiepiscopal officers with little interruption, the abbot was encouraged to adopt a similar process at Brunnau : but his intention having been made public, the people assembled to oppose it. Unwilling however to confide entirely in their own exertions, they sent delegates to Vienna, to explain their motives, and to implore a mitigation of the decree. To listen to the remonstrances of a disaffected people being deemed inconsistent with the dignity of the imperial crown, the deputies were arrested by order of Matthias, and measures undertaken for the immediate suppression of the reformed religion in all abacial domains.*

This act of severity, being justly regarded as a violation of the constitutional act, excited a general ferment. Persuaded that no alternative was left between passive obedience and open resistance, the outraged protestants resolved to conduct themselves with the courage of men, who justly appreciated the value of freedom.

Henry Matthias, Count of Thurn, though descend-

* Barre, ix. 456.

† The precise limits of obedience, and the consequent right of resistance, have been variously fixed by the daring spirit of philosophy, and the subtle casuistry of despotism. *Non nostrum est tantas compонere lites.* We will however venture to affirm, that the people are not often in the wrong ; that the measure of their patience can only be exhausted by the most galling oppression ; and that the patriot has oftener found cause to lament the extent of their acquiescence, than to censure the precipitancy of their opposition.

ed from a noble family at Goritz, possessed considerable estates in Bohemia, upon which he usually resided ; because he was there unfettered by many restrictions to which his native country was exposed. Trained to the hardships of a military life, he had acquired celebrity and experience in the Turkish wars. The affability of his manners was equally calculated to captivate admiration and to conciliate friendship. Generous even to prodigality, he gained by his liberality the suffrage of those whom his vigorous understanding and persuasive eloquence might sometimes fail to convince. No less bold in the conception than impetuous in the execution of every plan, he was accustomed from the cradle to the turbulence of faction, and inured to the arts of intrigue. Anticipating the commotions about to ensue, he looked forward with delight to that eventful period, when genius would outstrip the competition of birth ; for his enlightened mind disdained all distinctions, except those of personal merit. Yet while he courted popularity by defending the people against their oppressions, he was too prudent to reject the favours of royalty, when unpurchased by the sacrifice of principle. Hence he was not only entrusted with the custody of the regalia of the crown, a post of profit and honour, but was elevated to the dignity of Burgrave of Carlstein, one of the most conspicuous offices that regal kindness could bestow.*

It would be difficult for any man, endowed with the abilities and the principles of Thurn, long to retain the esteem of a despot, but he enjoyed what

* Schmidt, iv. 5. Schiller, i.

was far more valuable in a patriot's eyes, the esteem and confidence of the nation. The vehemence with which he opposed the election of Ferdinand occasioned the loss of his employment, of which the haughty heir of Austrian power, imprudently giving way to the impetuosity of his temper, deprived him in the heat of resentment. This hasty measure was pregnant with serious mischief; because it not only severed the tie which had hitherto connected him with the court, and softened his aversion to arbitrary power, but, by increasing his popularity, gave him ampler means of revenge. Determined that Ferdinand should repent his folly, he not only employed his versatile talents in augmenting the number of his partisans, but immediately entered into a clandestine correspondence with the malcontents in Hungary, Moravia, and Austria, and further endeavoured to strengthen his party by an alliance with the Evangelical Union.*

The impolicy of the court had opened to Thurn a career of glory which he ardently hastened to enter. In consequence of his office, as one of the defenders, it was his duty to protect the rights of the people against the encroachments of the royal prerogative; and he accordingly remonstrated, in terms of asperity, against the measures adopted by the Austrian government, for the suppression of the protestant worship. With manly eloquence he represented to the people, that nothing could save them from the chains preparing by the enemies of their religion, but fortitude, perseverance, and unanimity. He exhorted them accordingly to summon

* Coxe, i. 746.

a meeting of the friends of freedom, to be held at Prague, to which every circle should be invited to send six delegates, invested with ample powers to establish some plan for the general safety. Such an appeal to the feelings of a generous nation could hardly fail of success. On the appointed day, the deputies met in the capital of Bohemia,* and, after mature deliberation, declared the decree, imprudently issued at the instigation of Ferdinand, to be a fragrant violation of their constitutional rights, and prepared an address to be presented to the emperor, enumerating the grievances of which they complained, demanding complete and instant redress, and requiring that the deputies, who had been illegally imprisoned, should immediately be restored to their liberty.

These resolutions having passed with unanimous approbation, the meeting was adjourned to a future day, when the answer of Matthias was to be taken into consideration.† Meanwhile the delegates, returning to their estates, kept alive the flame which had been recently kindled by the usual arts of intrigue.

The system pursued by the cabinet of Vienna required little exaggeration to render it obnoxious. The reply of the emperor to the remonstrance of the Bohemians was couched in language precisely calculated to increase their apprehensions. Affecting to treat the proceedings of the assembly at Prague as the factious opposition of a disaffected party, he attempted to justify his own proceedings

* March 6, 1618. Schmidt, iv. 5.

† The 21st of May was fixed for that purpose, *ibid.*

by ancient precedents and absolute authorities. Expatiating with delight upon his equity and moderation, he accused his opponents of being actuated by views of personal emolument and the wildest schemes of ambition. Denouncing vengeance against every one who insulted his dignity, he strictly prohibited all public conventions, unless summoned by royal authority, and concluded by promising, that he would shortly visit his Bohemian subjects, and provide for their future security.*

But, lest the substance of his address should prove inadequate to rouse the national spirit, the manner in which it was conveyed to the public ear was the most offensive that arrogance could have chosen. Instead of being delivered, as it ought, to the representatives of the people, by whom the petition was framed, it was directed to the council of regency, an unpopular tribunal, and particularly odious to the protestants.†

The advantages to be derived from this improvident step did not escape the sagacity of Thurn. The insolence of the court, in disdaining the legitimate prayer of the people, afforded a copious theme for popular invective. Too prudent to offend the prejudices of the vulgar, by a direct attack upon the sovereign, that wary patriot levelled the thunder of his eloquence against the unanointed heads of the ministers, accusing them openly of being the authors of the reply presented to the nation in the name of Matthias. Incensed almost to madness by this inflammatory harangue, the minds of the populace appeared prepared for the most desperate un-

* Schmidt, iv. 5.

† Ibid.

dertakings. Dexterously availing himself of the enthusiasm he had excited, Thurn enlarged upon the crimes of the ministers, asserted that it was fruitless to look for the enjoyment of freedom, while Slavata and Martinetz were suffered to remain at the head of affairs;* artfully suggesting, that the propitious moment was arrived, when by imitating the glorious example of their ancestors, they might deliver their country from those inveterate foes to justice, religion, and liberty.†

Thurn was too well acquainted with the capricious movements of popular assemblies, to allow this ardour to evaporate. He gave the signal, and with tumultuary rage the people burst open the doors of the council chamber, where the members of the regency were in close debate. Thurn demanded in a manacing tone which of them had presumed to advise the emperor to treat the petitions of his people with neglect. "If the house of Austria," continued he, "pretends to reign with despotic sway over a nation accustomed to freedom, it becomes requisite for us to assert our rights by methods more efficacious than intreaties."‡

Too prudent to contend against the violence of the torrent by open force, Lubkowitz endeavoured to quell its impetuosity, by apparently yielding to the current. He admitted that the nation had reason to complain, and acknowledged that the royal edict of Rodolph had not been observed, on every occasion, with the strict attention which it merited; but at the same time he assured them, that this had

* The inhumanity of these men toward their protestant vassals had rendered them no less odious to the nation than favourites at court. Schmidt, iv. 5.

† Ibid. Coxe, i. 750.

‡ Barre, ix. 457. Schmidt, ib.

happened without the emperor's knowledge, and even contrary to his intentions ; adding, that all who knew him were convinced that his actions had been invariably dictated by the purest motives, that his heart was animated by the most ardent zeal for the happiness and prosperity of the Bohemians.

This sagacious appeal to the feelings of the populace being ably seconded by the persuasive eloquence of the Burgrave of Prague,* might possibly have produced a temporary calm, had not the haughty souls of Slavata and Martinitz disdained to temporize. Thinking it degrading to the dignity of their exalted stations, to listen to the murmurs of an insolent mob, they upbraided them with disaffection, for having presumed to arraign the actions of their sovereign, and to pry into the secrets of his government.

The fury of the populace was no longer to be restrained ; rushing forward with an impetuosity which nothing could withstand, they seized Slavata and Martenitz, and hurrying them to the window hurled them down with shouts and imprecations into the ditch which surrounded the castle. Fabricius, who occupied the post of secretary, and had been long the object of popular hatred, was consigned to a similar punishment.† Yet, amid the general indignation, the insurgents were governed by a sense of justice, which led them to exempt the burgrave and Lubkowitz from the rigorous chastisement inflicted upon their colleagues. As the

* Schmidt, iv. 5.

† This species of punishment was in some degree founded on ancient precedent, though it appears to have been inflicted upon none but traitors. Mitbiller iv. 185.

height from which they were precipitated exceeded eighty feet, it could hardly have been expected that they should survive the fall; but the ditch being filled with water and mud, they escaped without material injury; an event so extraordinary, that it allowed room for superstition to attribute their preservation to the miraculous interposition of Providence, in favour of men who had courted martyrdom in defence of the orthodox worship.*

This rash action, as might naturally be expected, appeared to the nation in very different lights, according to the views and principles of those by whom its merits were canvassed. By some it was extolled as the noblest effort of indignant patriotism, while others lamented the violence of a measure which precluded every hope of accommodation. That this was in fact the object of Thurn his subsequent conduct disclosed; for he was too well acquainted with the human heart to suppose it possible for imperial pride to accept of any atonement. Aware of the necessity of throwing away the scabbard, when the sword of rebellion was once unsheathed, he was resolved never more to confide in the clemency of a prince whom he had so grievously offended. He therefore ardently strove to convince his associates, that every avenue to negociation being finally closed, no alternative was left, except to bow their necks like dastards to the axe of the executioner, or

* Lotichius, i. 14. Nani, a Venetian senator, and repeatedly entrusted by the republic with important missions, gives credit to the popular tale. *Il miraculo del successo è convinto dal sito, il cui aspetto dimentisce l'imprudenza di quelli, che con false invenzione hanno procurato di denigrarlo,* lib. iv. Nani's works are to be found in the collection of Venetian historians. T. viii.

to have recourse to arms for their defence. Mounting his horse, he paraded the streets haranguing the people, whose feelings were for the most part in perfect unison with his own. Many, even among those who had till then appeared most zealously attached to the papal see, grew alarmed at the impending storm; justly regarding the protection afforded to their favourite tenets by the bigotry of Ferdinand to be more than balanced by his despotism. Convinced of the danger to which their liberties must be exposed, should he ever mount the throne of Bohemia, they no longer hesitated to unite with the protestants, whose powerful resistance afforded the only hope of defeating his dangerous projects. The happy results of this formidable combination were displayed in the most vigorous counsels; the imperial ministers being deprived of all authority, a committee was chosen of thirty directors, impartially selected from the different classes, to whom all the direction of affairs was entrusted; the unpopular* ecclesiastics, by whose severity the insurrection had been excited, were banished as enemies to their country; the Jesuits were ordered to evacuate Bohemia without the smallest delay, and forbidden ever to return; and measures were taken for immediately placing all the national fortresses in a state of defence, and for raising a considerable body of troops, of which Thurn obtained the command.† Being prepared to resist, they attempted to reconcile the scruples of those, whose vacillating prudence recoiled at mea-

* Puffendorff, i. 22. Narie, iv.

† Schmidt, iv. 5.

sures so decisive, by a studied apology transmitted to the emperor in all the outward forms of respect.*

No external homage could however extenuate the guilt, or dispel the alarm it occasioned. Dismayed at the tempest which appeared to be gathering in every direction, Matthias looked around for consolation or for support, but all his researches were fruitless.† That the affections of the Bohemians were irrecoverably estranged by the intemperate piety of Ferdinand was clearly demonstrated by the alarming rapidity with which the flame of rebellion expanded; but he was still ignorant to what extent the ramifications diverged. Did the Bohemian insurgents act in concert with the protestants of Austria, Moravia, and Hungary? Would the princes, who refused obedience to Rome, espouse their cause? and would the friends of freedom, now thickly scattered over the whole of Germany, repair to the standard of independence? These were questions, which, though involving interests of the highest magnitude, were hidden in impenetrable obscurity. Yet when time or accident threw occasional light upon the gloomy

* The principles on which they attempted to justify the outrage are no less curious than original, as they clearly shew that the cant of fanaticism was by no means confined to the English puritans. "The punishment inflicted upon the imperial ministers," I copy the words of their defence, "is designated in scripture as a proper chastisement for atrocious criminals, and was inflicted upon Jezabel by the chosen people of God."—Schmidt, iv. 6.

† If we believe Lotichius, the remissness of the Emperor in preparing for war almost exceeds the bounds of credibility, since the troubles, which so long convulsed Bohemia, were previously announced by heaven in language too intelligible to be mistaken. These prodigies are related by the pious German with the credulity, if not with the elegance of Livy.—Lotichius de rebus Germ. l. 5, &c.

scene no ray of comfort appeared. The torch of liberty shed its genial light in every district; prescriptive tyranny had lost the magic charm which it derived from ignorance, and which ignorance alone could impart; and the understanding of men began seriously to investigate the origin and object of all legitimate government. Strong symptoms of disaffection were progressively displayed in the hereditary provinces, while preparations were making in various parts of the empire, which indicated a spirit of hostility.

It is said that Matthias, whose active genius was almost subdued by disease and infirmity, was desirous of attempting by lenient remedies to appease the general ferment. This pacific system was warmly recommended by Cardinal Klesel, his confidential minister, who endeavoured to mitigate the zeal of Ferdinand by wise and salutary counsels. But the natural impetuosity of that prince's disposition, when inflamed by religious enthusiasm, despised the guidance of reason. To compromise with heresy was in his opinion the most heinous offence that an orthodox Christian could commit. Far from being terrified at the impending tempest, he rejoiced that the moment was at length arrived, when the church might recover its ancient splendour; and he returned thanks to the Almighty in a holy transport, for having selected him as the chosen instrument to efface the stain of apostacy. "The ingratitude of the protestants toward the mild Matthias, whose clemency had even exceeded the bounds of duty," he said, "would completely justify, in the eyes of Europe, the utmost severity to which imperial anger could resort. Not satisfied with enjoying more extensive privileges than sub-

jects ever before possessed, many of which were neither consistent with the glory of the sovereign, nor compatible with the safety of the state, they aimed at abolishing every remaining vestige of royal authority, and of establishing in its place that pernicious system of anarchy and licentiousness, which had invariably accompanied the doctrines of Luther and Calvin, when unfettered by salutary restrictions. Insubordination to legal power was the fundamental tenet of those wicked sects, which bid defiance alike to the divine Governor of the universe and to his anointed vicegerents on earth. With an enemy so active, it was both impious and dishonourable to capitulate; because, if from mistaken motives of humanity they were permitted to live, the throne and the altar must perish.* It was alone by extirpating the foes of religion that the catholic faith could be preserved. The crisis to which they were reduced by the temerity of their opponents, inforced the necessity of vigorous resistance, and was therefore to him a situation of triumph. By their own imprudence the insurgents had deprived themselves of the only plausible argument by which their fanatical preachers had hitherto inflamed the minds of their followers; since it must be evident to the world, that they were no longer contending for religious sincerity, but for uncontrolled and unconditional freedom. To the house of Austria, therefore, no alternative remained but tamely to surrender the numerous crowns, the rewards of valour and virtue; or to resort with confidence to those exhaustless re-

* The language of power is always the same, whether employed by the despot or the orator; whether veiled by the religion of Ferdinand or adorned by the fancy of Burke.

sources with which Providence had entrusted it for the glory and welfare of millions. In a contest undertaken in defence of the church they might confidently rely on the divine support, while the confiscated property would furnish abundant funds for defraying the expenses attending the struggle. Even supposing it possible for the rebels to prevail, it was more becoming the dignity of a sovereign to perish with arms in his hand, than, submitting without a struggle to a desperate faction, to fall ignominiously by the axe of the executioner."†

To this system of rashness, which was probably honoured by superstition and pride with the title of dignified and energetic, though strenuously seconded by the vanity of Maximilian, the ambition of the Jesuits, and the bigotry of Spain, Matthias opposed the sober dictates of wisdom, experience, and moderation. Apprehensive, however, that any pacific overtures might be attributed to fear, unless offered at the head of an army, he ordered troops to be levied with the utmost expedition, and appointed Dampierre to command them, a veteran officer, who had acquired a high reputation in Italy. This army, amounting to ten thousand men, was to be reinforced by a band of Spanish veterans, conducted from Flanders by the Count de Bucquoy, a Flemish general, trained to arms by the example and precepts of the accomplished Spinola, and who, after the junction, was destined to assume the chief direction of the campaign.‡

Convinced that, when backed by so formidable a

† Schmidt, iv. 6. Khevenhuller, ix. 82. Schiller, i.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.*

force, he must escape the imputation of cowardice, in preferring entreaty to coercion, Matthias solemnly protested that he had never entertained an idea of infringing the edict of Rodolph, declared himself ready to disband his troops, and to give the Bohemians the most satisfactory pledge for their future security, provided they laid down their arms.*

The character of Ferdinand, however, proved an insuperable barrier in the way of accommodation; for how was it possible for the protestants to repose the smallest confidence in the promises of a prince so blindly devoted to the Jesuits, that he was supposed to have adopted, in its fullest extent, their diabolical tenet, "that no promise ought to be binding when made to a heretic."† Neither was his behaviour at this important juncture in the least calculated to diminish their apprehensions. No sooner did he find himself unable to overcome the pacific resolutions of Matthias than he resolved to remove his confidential minister, to whose advice he imputed this unexpected opposition. Cardinal Klesel was accordingly arrested in the imperial palace, with the knowledge and approbation of Maximilian, and being stripped of his robes without the smallest respect for his sacerdotal dignity, was forcibly conducted to a fortress in the Tyrol, and there detained in the strictest confinement. The rage of the emperor, when informed of the insult thus offered to his authority, deprived him at first of the

* Schmidt, iv. 6. Lotichius, i. 17.—Puffendorf does not quite agree in this statement, but asserts that Matthias required the Bohemians to lay down their arms, in order to entitle them to his clemency. If this be so, it is difficult to deny that they were fully justified in refusing, i. 23.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.*

power of utterance. But a little reflection convinced him, that the indignity to which he was exposed was entirely the result of his own imprudence, in having yielded too easily to the importunities of his family, and consented to the elevation of Ferdinand. That fatal step having deprived him of every thing except an empty name, he thought it most prudent to submit in silence, since he wanted the ability to resist.†

Ferdinand having now obtained a permanent ascendancy in the imperial councils, the Austrian generals received orders to treat the insurgents with all the severity of martial law. Neither were they remiss in obeying the command, but marked their progress in characters of blood, laying waste the country through which they paraded with the wanton barbarity of savages. This ferocious system, far from producing the desired effects, served only to increase the general ferment. Instead of being dismayed at the terrors of war, the spirit of the people augmented with the dangers by which they were surrounded; for they distinctly foresaw the miseries which awaited their unhappy country should the power of Austria be permanently established. Almost every town in the kingdom declared in favour of the defenders, and by vigorous exertions prepared to second the cause of freedom, so that the army of Thurn in a few weeks amounted to upwards of ten thousand men, and was daily receiving additional reinforcements. Desirous of fulfilling the expectations of his countrymen by some signal exploit, that gallant commander determined

† Schmidt, iv. 7. Khevenhuller, ix. 202. Narie, iv.

to attempt the reduction of Budweiss, Krüminau, and Pilsen, the only places of strength which still maintained their allegiance to Austria. The second was surprised with little loss; but the activity of the garrison, and the obstinacy of the inhabitants, rendered abortive every effort to reduce the former.* Frustrated in his endeavours to take it by assault, and prevented by the approach of Dampierre from commencing a regular siege, he attacked and defeated the imperial commander in two successive engagements.† Nothing, therefore, was left for the general of Ferdinand, but to remain on the defensive, till the arrival of Bucquoy, who was rapidly advancing to his assistance. This, however, was attended with greater difficulty than the pupil of Spinola expected; because it is inconsistent with the vanity of regular troops to suppose that undisciplined courage can arrest their career. But he found the defiles so strongly guarded, that he was compelled to fight at every step, while the opposing army was continually drawing additional levies from the resentment of the natives, rendered desperate by the outrages of the imperial soldiers.‡

The unpopularity of Ferdinand had prepared the minds of all, who were destined to submit to his haughty dominion, to resort to the standard of freedom. Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia successively declared in favour of the insurgents; but what was considered by their leaders as far more essential to ultimate success, they received considerable reinforcement from the protestant league.

* Lotichius, i. 25.

† First at Czadau, and then at Lomnitz.—Coxe, i. 756.

‡ Schmidt, *ibid.*

With secret satisfaction the members of the Evangelical Union had beheld from its commencement this struggle for independence, and firmly persuaded that their own stability depended upon the event of the contest, they wisely determined to assist the Bohemians. Elated with the honour conferred upon him by being placed at the head of the protestant party, and vain of his alliance with the valuest of kings, the Elector Palatine already indulged in those chimerical projects, which were ultimately productive of such bitter distress. Without deigning to balance the efforts of a confederacy, whose obedience was voluntary, and of course precarious against the gigantic resources of a mighty empire, which had threatened all Europe with fetters, he suffered himself to be guided by the sanguine delusions of hope, expecting, by the assistance of British gold, to be enabled to wrest the imperial sceptre from Ferdinand, and procure a crown for himself.* The Count of Mansfeldt was selected as the fittest emissary to conduct the negociation with the Duke of Bavaria, to whom the crown of the Cesars was offered ; neither was a doubt entertained that the splendid prize would induce Maximilian to break his engagements with the Austrian court. The co-operation of a prince so highly esteemed for sagacity and courage, would have given additional lustre to the confederacy, and the influence which he possessed in the electoral college would have tended greatly to facilitate the execution of their designs. The Archbishop of Treves was his younger brother, and of course his suffrage was secure ; the Elector of Brandenburg

* Schmidt, iv. 8.

was so firmly attached to the protestant cause, that his support was regarded as certain; and when Frederic mounted the Bohemian throne, which he doubted not of effecting after the death of Matthias, two other votes would be united in his own person. According to this calculation the protestants were secure of obtaining a majority at the approaching election, even supposing Saxony, with characteristic meanness, should sacrifice religion at the shrine of interest. Thus far the plan had a plausible appearance: one important consideration however had been hitherto overlooked, and that was the consent of Maximilian. Too wise to be dazzled by the blaze of glory, which burst so unexpectedly upon him, that prudent prince deliberately weighed in the scale of reason the many difficulties which accompanied the undertaking. The event of the contest was at best uncertain, even admitting his allies to act with greater unanimity than is usual in similar situations. But allowing every thing to succeed according to their fondest expectations, what happiness could he derive from a triumph, which must infallibly ruin the catholic party, and exalt a rival religion on its ruins? Such were the motives which induced the Duke of Bavaria to decline the perilous honour, though eagerly pressed by the protestants.†

Though frustrated in his attempts to seduce the cautious Bavarian, Frederic resolved never to aban-

† Barre, ix. 475. Schmidt, iv. 14.—According to Le Vassor, a warm debate took place in the French cabinet, respecting the policy of transferring the imperial sceptre to the house of Bavaria. But the timidity of Lewis presented obstacles which no arguments could at that time overcome.—*Histoire de Louis,* xlii. 220.

don the design of excluding Ferdinand from the imperial throne ; and he accordingly addressed himself to the Duke of Savoy, whose unbounded ambition, stimulated by inveterate animosity against the Spanish court, seemed to promise better success. Undecided at first what course to pursue, that crafty statesman for some time fluctuated between ambition and prudence ; and even when the latter prevailed, he wanted candour to declare his resolution. The advantages to be derived from attracting the attention, and the forces of Spain, to objects remote from Italy, were inducements too powerful for Cisalpine politics to resist, even when purchased at the expense of integrity. He accordingly determined not to frustrate the expectations of the protestant princes by a hasty refusal, but by protracted negotiations which he might terminate at pleasure, to establish, if possible, a permanent interest with the party.† Anxious also to attach them more firmly to his cause by the ties of gratitude, he furnished subsidies sufficient for raising a body of four thousand men, to be left at the disposal of the Elector Palatine, and commanded by Mansfeldt.

Mansfeldt, so deservedly celebrated among the greatest warriors of that warlike age, is commonly supposed to have been the natural son of Ernest, Count of Mansfeldt, who succeeded the Duke of Parma in the government of the Netherlands ;‡ but, according to the opinion of some historians, his birth was legitimate, though his mother was induced from prudential motives to conceal her marriage, lest her

† Coxe, i. 758.

‡ Bentivoglio Guerra di Fiaudra, iii. 1.

husband should be injured in his sovereign's opinion, for having contracted an alliance with a plebeian beauty.*

At all events, it is immaterial to investigate a subject which can lead to no important results; since all that he inherited from his father was an illustrious name. By nature, however, he was more kindly treated, since she endowed him with every heroic quality that can adorn or elevate the human mind; and thus highly gifted, sent him into the world to make his fortune by courage, genius, and his sword. By several of the catholic writers he has been compared to Attila, and in some points the comparison may hold. No less brave and enterprising than the King of the Huns, he considered nothing too arduous for valour to accomplish. Without fortune, without territories, and without troops, he bade defiance to the stupendous power of Austria, and, in spite of all the difficulties which he had to encounter, supported the contest, with various success, through many bloody campaigns. When compelled to yield to superior numbers, he rose like a giant refreshed by sleep; while his reputation, augmented with every defeat, because no disaster could ever reduce him so low, that he ceased even for a moment to be formidable. Not less prompt in discovering some unexpected resource, than rapid in the execution of his plans, he conducted a retreat with such masterly skill, that he often eclipsed the glory of the victor. Disdaining repose, and the inactive pleasures of a luxurious life, he turned his thoughts exclusively to military studies. The bustle

* Schmidt, iv. 8.

of a camp was congenial with his feelings; the thunder of cannon was music to his ear. Capable of supporting, with unwearied patience, the meridian ardour of an Italian sun, or the nocturnal blasts of a Bohemian winter, neither fatigue, nor hunger, nor the longest marches performed on foot, could subdue his constancy. Bred from the cradle to the profession of a soldier, he commenced his military career in the Austrian army, and served under Leopold against the Evangelical League: but being either dissatisfied at finding his merit neglected, or induced by his partiality toward the tenets of the reformers, he shortly abandoned the Imperial service, to enter into that of the Union.* Such a man was eminently calculated to shine amid the storms of civil commotions; but, unfortunately for mankind, his inventive genius imparted to the world a fatal lesson; which, matured by the ferocious ambition of Wallenstein, increased the resources and the horrors of war.

No event could have proved more gratifying to the protestant leaders, than the offer made them by the Duke of Savoy, since it afforded an opportunity of assisting the Bohemians, without subjecting the people to additional burthens. Mansfeldt had no sooner assembled his troops, than he entered Bohemia; and, being joined by numbers of the war-like natives, he determined to open the campaign by some signal exploit, and laid siege to Pilsen, the second fortress in the kingdom,† which surrendered after an obstinate defence. By this acquisition, he not only secured to his army a safe retreat,

* Barre, ix. 462. Schmidt, iv. 8.

† Lotichius, i. 37.

in case of any sudden reverse, but totally disconcerted the schemes of the enemy, by compelling Dampierre to fall back upon Austria, and Bucquoy to seek shelter under the cannon of Budweiss.*

Persuaded of the impossibility of intimidating men who fought in defence of their dearest rights, Matthias at length prepared to vindicate by arms his insulted authority. Relying upon the apparent justice of his cause, he convened together the Austrian states, in hopes of obtaining the necessary supplies; but, instead of meeting with servile addresses of thanks, for the honour which he had done them in explaining his necessities, complaints and remonstrances were only heard; for experience had shewn, that the only effectual way of procuring redress was to withhold subsidies till it was granted.

Neither was the application made to the catholic princes productive of better success. Alarmed at the prospect of civil commotions, they warmly recommended an accommodation; and in the critical situation in which Matthias was placed, a wish was almost equivalent to a command. Convinced that nothing but ruin could result from a contest commenced under such unfavourable auspices, the emperor began seriously to think of accommodating every difference by negociation. Many difficulties however occurred during the treaty, both from the bigotry of Ferdinand, and the turbulent temper of the Bohemians. These obstacles being surmounted by patience and perseverance, it was mutually agreed, that plenipotentiaries should immediately repair to Egra, and continue the conferences under

* Schmidt, vi. 8.

the mediation of the Electors of Mentz and of Saxony, and the Palatine and the Duke of Bavaria.*

This flattering prospect was suddenly clouded by the death of Matthias, whose debilitated constitution was unable to struggle against the evils to which he was exposed. With his latest breath he recommended moderation;† but it is rarely the lot of such exhortations to produce a lasting impression, particularly when the admonition has been uniformly contradicted by the former practice of the expiring penitent; and, unfortunately for the world, neither the example of Matthias, nor the disposition of Ferdinand, was calculated to give them a better chance of success.

* Puffendorf, i. 25. Lotichius, i. 39.

† Barre ix. 406.

CHAP. IV.

Accession of Ferdinand II. Critical situation in which he was placed. His firm and resolute behaviour.—The Bohemians renounce their allegiance, and confer the crown upon the Elector Palatine. Bethlem Gabor declares in his favour, and enters Hungary.—Vienna besieged.—Measures adopted by the Union and by the League.—Imprudence of Frederic strongly contrasted with the wisdom and perseverance of his rival.—The Hungarians defeated, and Vienna saved.—The protestants arm, and their example is immediately followed by the catholics. Dissensions which prevail among the former conduce to the success of the latter.—The Duke of Bavaria invades Bohemia.—Measures pursued by James I. King of England, and by Lewis XIII. King of France.—Spinola enters the Palatinate, and meets with little opposition.—Distress of Frederic; he is compelled to retire to Prague, and being defeated by the Imperialists in a decisive battle, abandons his kingdom for ever.

THIS introductory sketch will supply the reader with such preliminary information as may be requisite to prepare him for the stormy scenes which are about to ensue. In future I shall proceed with greater circumspection, and endeavour to represent succeeding events under all their different bearings.

The accession of Ferdinand to the imperial throne may be regarded as the signal for that sanguinary contest, which depopulated Germany during the calamitous period of thirty years, reducing to ashes many of her noblest cities, and converting her luxuriant and populous plains into wild and solitary deserts.

Having previously obtained the Hungarian sceptre, and a reversionary title to the throne of Bohemia, Ferdinand naturally considered himself as the legitimate sovereign of both kingdoms, after the

demise of Matthias. Maximilian also was dead, and Albert having renounced every claim to Austria, Ferdinand flattered himself that nothing could resist his authority, but that the wished-for period was at length arrived, when the religion of Rome was about to triumph over every sect, which had been impiously suffered to insult its purity, by the weakness or the indifference of his predecessors.*

Such appear to have been the feelings of Ferdinand, but those of his subjects were widely different. Considering themselves to be released from every tie by the death of Matthias, they resolved to establish their constitutional rights on a solid foundation.†

In the kingdom of Bohemia the arms of the insurgents had been every where triumphant; and, of all her cities, Budweiss alone afforded a solitary example of loyalty. Inflamed with similar zeal, Moravia was preparing to shake off the yoke; Silesia and Lusatia were already in arms, incensed at the refusal of the court of Vienna to concede to the protestants the free exercise of their rites, and an equal participation in all civil immunities. The malcontents of Hungary were ready to avail themselves of the general confusion, and were formidable, alike from the popularity of their cause, and the powerful support of Bethlem Gabor. In Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, the scourge and gibbet had hitherto prevented the numerous sectaries from openly avowing their opinions, but they now felt eager, by a bold confession of their faith, to efface the stain of apostacy. Upper Austria had joined

* Barre, ix. 467.

† Puffendorf, i. 25.

the confederacy; and, by seizing the passes which led to Bohemia, obstructed the movements of the imperial troops. While in Lower Austria the flame of insurrection was scarcely suppressed by a numerous army, and the vigorous exertions of the catholics,* this melancholy picture of domestic confusion was rendered more gloomy by the dread of foreign aggression. The conduct which France might eventually pursue became an object of serious alarm; because, notwithstanding the weakness and superstition of her sovereign, there were men in her cabinet capable of appreciating the true interests of the nation, and of acting with wisdom and energy.† The republic of Holland had openly espoused the cause of the insurgents, while most of the protestant parties, either avowedly supported, or clandestinely encouraged, their enterprise. Even the timid and pedantic sovereign of Britain, with all his aversion to blood, was not expected to behold with indifference a contest, in which the interests of religion, the safety of his daughter, and his own personal honour were so deeply concerned.

Availing himself of the advantages already obtained, Thurn advanced without opposition to the

* Puffendorf, xi. 25. Schmidt. iv. 13.

† These apprehensions indeed were soon removed, when it was found, upon trial, that neither the admonitions of Savoy, nor the exhortations of the Venetians, could rouse the timidity of Louis, nor counteract the effects which Spanish gold had produced on the minds of some of his ministers. To the Italian ambassadors that pusillanimous monarch replied, in the language of fear, "That the house of Austria alone was capable of supporting the dignity of the imperial diadem, or of defending Europe against the Ottomans. From these considerations," he said, "he was induced to sacrifice his personal interest to the general welfare of Christendom, and determined to favour the election of Ferdinand."—Le Vassor, iv. 447.

gates of Vienna, then totally unprepared for sustaining a siege, and ready to rise in his favour.* In the opinion of his enemies, the fall of Ferdinand was no longer doubtful. Hurled from his throne by the anger of an avenging deity, they destined him to pass the remainder of his days within the gloomy solitude of a cloister, the austerities of which seemed perfectly suited to his rigid ideas of devotion. Separated from their father, and thus preserved from the contagion of bigotry, his children, when educated in the pure principles of protestantism, might perhaps be suffered to reign over part, at least, of their hereditary dominions, without endangering the rights of mankind.

Under these circumstances no ordinary portion of fortitude was required to brave the storm; and the resolution, embraced by the successor of Matthias, to remain undaunted at the post of danger, must be ascribed entirely to his own intrepidity: for, in the estimation of his friends, no alternative was left but immediate flight, or pretended compliance: the former was recommended by his wisest counsellors, the latter secretly instilled by the Jesuits; by the one he would be saved from the fury of the rebels, by the other he would be enabled to deceive them; and, when securely seated on the throne of his ancestors, it would be meritorious to retract those dangerous concessions, to which necessity had forced him to consent. Ferdinand, however, with becoming dignity rejected both. By abandoning his capital, he might, indeed, have secured the enjoyments of life; but, by the sacrifice of every thing which can render life

* Grisons, *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, i. 41.

desirable in the estimation of honour, the loss of Austria must have been the inevitable consequence of an ignominious retreat, and with it he must have relinquished the imperial crown; because it would have been the excess of folly to have expected the electors to confer that exalted dignity upon a man, incapable of defending his hereditary dominions.* Yet he equally despised to owe his preservation to a negotiation, which must have degraded him for ever in his own opinion: in spite of the lessons of casuistries and deceits, which he had imbibed from those who superintended his education, a sentiment of honour still lurked about his heart. In the protection of Providence he therefore resolved to confide, little doubting that Heaven (for such is the usual language of bigots) would assist the cause of the righteous.

This determination was scarcely embraced, when the doors of the apartment flew violently open, and gave admission to a band of men clad in armour. These were persons of rank and consideration among the disaffected party, and came as delegates from the circle of Austria, to demand permission for the states to confederate with the Bohemians. Though firmly resolved to endure every indignity, rather than subscribe to an instrument which would have invested rebellion with legal authority, Ferdinand expostulated with the deputies upon the impropriety of their behaviour, in presenting their petition in so unconstitutional a manner. "Ferdinand, wilt thou sign?" was the laconic reply; while, seizing his robe, the spokesman insinuated,

* Schiller, i. Schmidt, iv. 14.

by a menacing gesture, that a refusal might be attended with personal hazard.*

At this perilous crisis, when called upon to decide between honour and life, the trampling of horses was distinctly heard in the court of the palace. The breast of Ferdinand beat high with hope that some unexpected succour was arrived. That hope was converted into certainty, when the trumpets sounded with a triumphant flourish, announcing victory.† Overwhelmed with consternation, the intruders fled, nor thought themselves secure, till they had found an asylum in the camp of the besiegers.‡

For this lucky escape, which gave a sudden turn to the tide of ill fortune, Ferdinand was indebted to the activity of Dampierre, who embarked five hundred cavalry on the Danube with so much secrecy, that they descended the river unobserved by the enemy, and entered Vienna by an unfrequented gate, which had been left unguarded. The unexpected arrival of this little troop struck the disaffected citizens with dismay, as their numbers were equally magnified by the fears of one party, and the policy of the other. Encouraged by the appearance of a military force, augmenting rapidly by the junction of additional squadrons, the Burghers vied with each other in displaying their loyalty, by forming themselves into civic corps, and were immediately joined by the students of the university,

* Schmidt, iv. 14.

† It is said, that the party which arrived so opportunely to the assistance of their sovereign, was headed by Wallenstein, and that to this circumstance he was indebted for the commencement of his splendid fortune.

‡ Ibid. Schiller, i.

who flew in crowds to the standard of despotism, with an ardour truly unphilosophical. By their joint exertions, the mutinous spirit was entirely repressed—tranquillity restored, and every exertion made for resisting the foe with the fairest prospect of success.* This happy event was shortly succeeded by another still more important. By the defeat of Mansfeldt Thurn was compelled to raise the siege, and to hasten to the protection of Prague.†

This was a fatal blow to the Bohemian patriot, who felt so confident of reducing the capital of Austria, that he had prepared a constitution for the enfranchised province, which, according to the opinion of many historians, would have borne a strong resemblance to that of England.‡ But, while indulging his vanity in these visionary schemes, the fabric was destroyed by the activity of Bucquoy; who, while the Bohemians were engaged in distant enterprises, quitted his intrenchments under the walls of Budweiss; and, having surprised Mansfeldt, compelled him to retire with precipitation. The defeat of this brave and intelligent officer exposed Bohemia to the incursions of the Spaniards, and even endangered the safety of her capital. The approach of Thurn, however, impeded their progress, as the victorious Fleming, too weak to hazard another battle, returned to his former position.§

The events of the campaign having constrained the protestants to evacuate the defiles, from whence they interrupted all the communication between

* Schmidt, iv. 14.

† Lotichius, i.

‡ Puffendorf, i. 25. Barre, ix. 473.

§ Ibid. Lotichius i. 58. Puffendorf, ibid.

Vienna and Frankfort, Ferdinand set out upon his journey with a numerous retinue ; having previously to his departure invested Leopold with the vicegerency of his dominions.

No object could be more important to the protestant interest than to prevent Ferdinand from voting in the electoral college ; and a deputation was accordingly dispatched from Prague to contest his right, upon pretence, that as he had not yet taken possession of the Bohemian throne, to which that privilege was attached, the right must necessarily devolve to the nation. The majority of the electors being inclined to favour the pretensions of Ferdinand, affected to consider this objection as destitute of solid foundation, insisting that the ceremony, upon which the enemies of Austria attempted to rest their opposition, was merely an outward formality ; and that the Duke of Styria, having been legally chosen successor to Matthias, ought, according to every principle of equity and reason, to be regarded as the legitimate sovereign. Without condescending to enter into any farther discussion, or even listening to the representation of the ambassadors, they proceeded to dispose of the vacant sceptre, and Ferdinand was accordingly elected emperor without one dissentient voice.*

Incensed at the contempt with which their remonstrance was treated, the states of Bohemia assembled at Prague,† where, in conjunction with deputies from the adjacent provinces of Moravia, Silesia,

* Finding it impossible to influence the decision of his colleagues, the Elector Palatine was unwilling to incur the disgrace of a defeat by a solitary negative.—Bougeant, i. 51. Barre, ix. 478.

† On the 17th of August, 1619.—Lotichius, i. 60.

and Lusatia, they declared that Ferdinand had forfeited the crown, and appointed a day for the election of another sovereign. Orders were in consequence issued for public prayers, according to the fanatical spirit of the times, to implore from Heaven the requisite light for the due execution of that important function. For in spite of all which the nation had suffered from the tyranny of kings, they were still attached to a monarchical government, by a prejudice no less strange than unconquerable.*

Though four different princes were proposed as candidates for the vacant throne, it is probable that this was only artifice, to conceal the designs of the anti-Austrian party. The forms of election were however strictly observed, and the deserts and demerits of every claimant, in appearance at least, impartially canvassed. The power of Denmark presented many allurements, but they were more than counterbalanced by its remoteness, which prevented it from affording the speedy succour, which the exigency of the moment required. The same objection, but with additional force, applied to the Duke of Savoy, though Nani affirms, that he refused the sceptre with voluntary prudence.† This assertion, however, must be received with caution, when we reflect that he was vain enough to aspire to the imperial dignity, and even to the papal tiara. To give permanence and consistency to their labours, it became indispensable to elect a sovereign, whose extensive resources, and contiguous territory, might oppose an insuperable barrier to the indignation of Ferdinand. These were con-

* Le Vassor, iv. 471.

† Nani Historia Veneta, iv.

siderations which recommended the Elector of Saxony; but his devoted attachment to the Austrian family, joined to the selfish character which he universally bore, created a suspicion that he might be easily tempted to abandon their interest. Neither was diversity of religion without its effect in excluding him from the throne of Bohemia. John George was the head of the Lutheran party, and the opinions of Calvin had taken firm root in Bohemia.* But while the popular virtues of the Elector Palatine attracted the admiration of the people, considerations more weighty induced the nobility to make him an offer of the sceptre. Frederic, which his greatest enemies never attempted to deny, was blessed with humanity and benevolence: his manners were affable, his conversation lively, and his generosity unbounded, though his attempts to render himself popular often degenerated into familiarity.† As acknowledged head of the Evangelical Union, he might be supposed to possess sufficient influence with that formidable body, to have their forces entirely at his disposal. His near connexion with the Duke of Bavaria inspired a hope that the ambitious Maximilian might

* According to Galetti, the Duke of Bavaria and Bethlem Gabor should be added to the number of candidates for the Bohemian throne. Galetti's *Geschichte des Dreissigjahreng Kriegs*, i. 14. This work was published at Gotha in 1791, and forms part of the *Algemeine Weltgeschichte*. See the first volume of Meusel's *Bibliotheca Historica*, for an account of this extraordinary undertaking.

† Der König macht sich mit den Leuten, mit den Landhern, und Frauenzimmer ganz gemein, begleitet sie aus seinen Zimmern, und zeucht seiner Hut ab fast gegen jedermann. Wenn jemand zu ihm kommt, fragt er allezeit seinen Ober-Cammerer Herrn von Ruppa, was er thun soll, und sagt zu ihm, was Rath hätt der Herr. Er geht oft spazieren ganz hinaus in den Thiergarten, mit einem jungen, und lacqueyen. Auctor des greuels der verwüstung, apud Londorp, i. 926.

be persuaded to remain a tranquil spectator of the approaching contest. As nephew of Maurice, Prince of Orange, he was entitled to the support of a consummate general, and of a rising republic, the natural enemy of Austria ; and as son-in-law to James, he might expect to be assisted by the armies and the treasures of Britain.* These advantages, chimerical as they proved, being magnified by the zeal and the partiality of the Calvinists, a solemn embassy was dispatched to Frederic, with a formal tender of the sceptre.†

Though the decision of the diet was clearly anticipated at the court of Manheim, Frederic requested time to consult his allies before he returned a definitive answer.‡ That his resolution, however, had been previously taken, there is the strongest reason to believe ; and, without injustice to his reputation we may fairly infer, that the apparent hesitation with which he received the Bohemian ambassadors arose entirely from the natural weakness of his character, which prompted him to wish for the approbation of others, though predetermined to reject their advice, unless it accorded exactly with his own ambitious projects. By the sovereigns of Brandenburg, Bavaria, and Saxony, he was admonished of the danger which awaited him, should he rashly engage in the enterprise with resources so inadequate to the attempt. The influence of his mother, the wise and virtuous Louisa Juliana, was

* Puffendorf, i. 27. Schiller, i.

† 1619. Barre, ix. 479. Schmidt, iv. 15.

‡ Notwithstanding the assertion of Spanheim, it is difficult to believe that Frederic was unprepared for the offer,—*Mémoires de Louise Julie*, 143.

also strenuously exerted to the same effect; * while the King of England declared, that no considerations should tempt him, by patronizing rebellion, to undermine all legitimate authority.†

Frederic's determination, however, if ever vacillating, was confirmed by the approbation of his uncles, Maurice and the Duke of Bouillon,‡ both consummate statesmen, but who probably suffered their zealous attachment to the protestant cause to bias their sober judgment. This opinion was seconded by the inconsiderate ardour of his confidential minister,|| by the pride and presumption of the Calvinist preachers, who arrogantly predicted success,§ by the animosity and violence of Bethlen Gabor, who eagerly grasped at every opportunity of humbling Austria, without deigning to reflect

* Struvius, *Corpus Hist. Germ.* Period x. sec. ix.

† Mr. Hume's partiality toward the house of Stuart has led him to defend the timidity of James. But, with all due respect for such high authority, I cannot admit that the determination of the king to abandon his son-in-law was the result of policy. With greater propriety it may be ascribed to the weakness of his understanding, which revolted at a measure tending to overturn his favourite theory, of the divine and indefensible right of kings. Had I ever doubted that it is for the interest of England to take an active share in the politics of Europe, I should no longer hesitate on the subject. The question, in my opinion, has been completely decided by the repeated efforts of her inveterate foe, to exclude her entirely from the continent.—*Hist. of England*, c. xl.

‡ The duke was so delighted with the idea of seeing his nephew seated upon a throne, that in a letter to one of his friends, by whom he had been informed of the intrigues carrying on at Paris, in order to obtain the *ordon bleu*, he says, *pendant que vous penser à faire des chevaliers, je travaille à faire des rois.*—*Le Vassor*, iv. 528.

|| Comerarius displayed the condition of a civilian in his animated apology for his master's conduct. But the talents of a lawyer are widely different from those of a statesman.

§ Struvius, *ibid.* Brachelius X.V. calls him “princeps moderatae indolis; sed pravi senatores (he continues) et promissa astrologorum in uincititia consilia juvenem impulerunt.”

upon the difficulties which presented themselves ; and lastly, by the vanity of a wife, whom he adored with almost idolatrous affection, who seems seriously to have believed, that the illustrious blood of the Stuarts was destined by Providence to instruct and govern the world.*

Advocates like these, when pleading in unison with personal inclination, could hardly fail to persuade. Frederic was also stimulated by a romantic sentiment of honour, to hazard every thing in defence of a nation, which had selected him for its guide and champion. The votaries of a religion, oppressed by bigotry, had addressed themselves to him for protection. Could he then consistently with the dictates of generosity abandon them to the fury of a despot, prepared to revenge the insult offered by an apostate and rebellious people to their sovereign and their God.

Under such circumstances it was in vain for reason to assert her claims, because ambition simultaneously whispered, that in proportion to the danger the glory would increase : with these sentiments he repaired to Prague, where he was crowned with unusual pomp by the hands of a Calixtine divine, because the archbishop, a zealous catholic, refused to perform that ceremony.†

Satisfied of the propriety of explaining to the world the real motives of their conduct, the states,

* Barre, ix. 480. Struvius, *Corpus Hist. Germ.* Period x. sec. ix. Lotichius, i. 77. Puffendorf, i. 27. Thoroughly acquainted with the weakness of her husband, she called in devotion to the aid of love, declaring with a pious enthusiasm, well calculated to produce the desired effect, that she would willingly sacrifice every jewel she possessed, rather than abandon a cause so just and righteous as that of the Bohemians.—Le Vassor, iv. 628.

† 1619. Barre, *ibid.* 481. Lotichius, i. 69.

in conjunction with their new sovereign, prepared a manifesto, enumerating the reasons by which they had been induced to change the order of succession. "Ferdinand," they said, "had violated the engagements solemnly contracted in face of the nation, when he was chosen successor to Matthias. By a sacred promise, he at that time covenanted never to interfere with the administration of affairs, till called to the throne by the death of his predecessor; and even when that event should occur, he undertook to confirm, in their fullest extent, all the privileges derived from the bounty of their former sovereigns, or from the constitutional laws of the kingdom. By the breach of these articles he had annulled the compact, and forfeited his title to the throne, even supposing the election to have been originally conducted with every requisite formality. The arrestation of Klesel in the royal palace was no less offensive to the dignity of the nation than to the personal feelings of its monarch. The introduction of foreign mercenaries was a palpable infringement of the fundamental principles upon which the rights of the people reposed; while the convention signed with the Spanish court, by which the Bohemian sceptre might be eventually transferred to that tyrannical race, was an indignity too flagrant to be borne with patience by men, who were not educated in the trammels of slavery.*

To these allegations Ferdinand replied by denying the right of election; insisting that it was only a conditional privilege, which never existed, when an heir could be found lineally sprung from the

* Schmidt, iv. 15.

royal stock. His claim, as he pretended, was founded entirely upon hereditary descent, as the legal representative of the Princess Ann, who married his grandfather, Ferdinand I.* The language which he employed, however, was more mild and moderate than might have been expected from a prince, possessing notions of prerogative no less wild and extravagant than those of the British monarch. Convinced that the succession must ultimately be decided by the sword, he endeavoured to secure the support of the catholic league, and entered into negotiations with all the European powers, who still adhered to the papal communion.

Frederic, on the contrary, commenced his reign under the most favourable auspices. The protestants universally exulted at the prospect of being governed by a monarch, whose religious opinions

* Bougeant, i. 48, and Barre, ix. 468, make use of the same expressions. Both have probably copied from the same source, without taking the trouble to alter a syllable. The futility of this argument might however be easily shewn by a reference to the national arms; from whence it will appear, that when the regal title was first bestowed on Ottocar, by the Emperor Frederic II. during the thirteenth century, it was accompanied by a grant, conferring upon the nation the privilege of electing its future sovereigns, who were bound to receive the investiture from the hands of the emperor; and we accordingly find in the following century, that the Bohemians elected John, son of Henry VIII. the reigning dynasty having failed. That prince, being desirous of exchanging his newly-acquired sceptre for the palatinate, applied to the states for their consent, which they refused upon the specific ground, *that such a transaction would deprive the nation of its elective franchise.* The same principle prevailed upon another occasion. The Emperor Sigismund, being last in descent from John of Luxemburg, and leaving no male issue, the crown was given to Albert, who had married a daughter of the late king; and he also dying without a son, it was offered by the diet to the Duke of Bavaria, upon his consenting to tolerate the Calixtines. That pious sovereign, however, with more fervour than wisdom, rejected the gift, declaring, that he *had rather die than accept a throne upon the condition of countenancing heresy.*--Le Vassor, iv. 479.

coincided with their own; while the majority of those, who still adhered to the see of Rome, rejoiced at being delivered from the iron yoke of Austria. Anticipating all the blessings of the golden age, which they fondly believed was about to receive, they gazed with admiration upon a sovereign, whose graceful person and affable demeanour formed a striking contrast with the haughty reserve, which has almost invariably characterized the descendants of Rodolph of Hapsburg.*

Venice was the first of the European states to acknowledge the title of Frederic. Her example, however, was shortly followed by most of the northern potentates.† But the hopes of the Bohemians appear to have rested with greatest confidence on the active valour of Bethlen Gabor, that formidable foe to Rome and Ferdinand. Not satisfied with having established an independant throne on the ruins of the Austrian power, that artful chieftain caught with alacrity at the present opportunity, of extending his authority in Northern Hungary, from the banks of the Teiss to the gates of Presburg. Perfectly secure from any interruption from the Ottoman power, whose projects accorded with his own, he concealed his intentions from the imperial court under the warmest professions of amity; assuring Ferdinand that his alliance with the Bohemians was fallacious; and that the moment he obtained a stable footing in that rebellious country, he would throw aside the mask, and co-operate with him

* Barre ix. 481.

† Sweden, Holland, Denmark, together with several of the German potentates, *ibid.*

in reducing the insurgents to obedience.* How far the emperor may have been deceived by these professions it is immaterial now to investigate ; because the disastrous situation of his affairs must have imposed the necessity of concealing his suspicions, had he in reality entertained any ; delay was to him of such infinite importance, that to procrastinate the contest was almost equivalent to a victory. No precautions, however, could long protract the fatal moment ; for, upon entering Hungary, the rapacious Waivode no longer deigned to dissemble. Preceded by the terror of a mighty name, he traversed that kingdom in uninterrupted triumph ; while the disaffected flocked in thousands to his standard, and were rewarded for their treachery by being allowed to share in the plunder of a sovereign, whom they had basely deserted in his distress ; while those, who, in spite of example and interest, still maintained their allegiance, were punished by tortures or confiscation. Destitute of forces to arrest the progress of the invaders, Homonai, the imperial general, was compelled to save his little army by a precipitate retreat, leaving Presbury exposed to an attack. Cassau, Neuhausel, Tiernau, and Nietra, successively opened their gates,† and thought themselves happy to obtain a formal confirmation of all their local immunities, as the recompense of early submission. The Palatine of Hungary had retired to the capital, to shelter himself from the fury of the tempest ! but, scarcely had he begun to prepare for its defuse, when he received a summons from the victorious Transilvanian. Far more remark-

* Schiller, i. Schmidt iv. 15.

† Lotichius, i. 102.

able for prudence than for courage, and more attentive to interest than fame, Forgatzy requested a short delay before a final answer should be returned, alleging in excuse, "that it was impossible for him to decide upon so momentous a question without previously consulting the other generals." The council being summoned, and coinciding in opinion with their timorous chief, a capitulation was signed, by which the town and citadel being ceded to Gabor, religious toleration was established in its fullest extent, and Forgatzy confirmed in his former dignity, after taking an oath of allegiance to the conqueror.*

Meanwhile the Bohemian army, under the orders of Thurn, again advanced into the heart of Austria, with the intention of joining the victorious Waivode under the walls of Vienna. Alarmed for the safety of the capital, Leopold deemed it advisable to disarm the inhabitants, many of whom were known to carry on a clandestine correspondence with the insurgents. By repeated couriers he solicited Bucquoy to hasten to his assistance, and to endeavour, if practicable, to prevent a junction between the hostile commanders, to whose united strength no adequate force could be opposed. These directions were executed by the Flemish general with no less address than activity. Having entrusted Barameda with the defence of Budweiss, he ordered Dampierre to meet him on the confines of Moravia. Far from being discouraged at finding that their combined armies scarcely exceeded twelve thousand men, he gallantly resolved to give battle to the

* Puffendorf, i. 28. Lotiebier, i. 107.

enemy, though nearly triple in numbers. The contest, though supported with desperate resolution during too successive days, would ultimately have proved of no essential benefit to the cause of Ferdinand, had it not been accompanied with more important success in another quarter.* Homanai in returning to the theatre of war with a numerous reinforcement of cossacs, surprised and defeated a corps of Transylvanians, which had been left by Gabor, under the command of Ragotzy, to preserve the communication with the interior of Hungary. This unexpected reverse determined Béthlem to raise the siege of Vienna, that in a more secure position he might refresh his troops, completely exhausted by continual fatigue, the severity of the weather, and the total want of provisions.† Wallenstein who had been exiled from Bohemia, together with several other nobles, for their opposition to Frederic, distinguished himself during the siege in repelling the attacks of the assailants.‡

The departure of his colleague rendering it impracticable for Thurn to continue the siege, he retired into the mountains of Bohemia, where he dispersed his troops into winter quarters. The efforts of the Austrians having been exclusively directed to the safety of Vienna, Mansfeldt had resumed offensive operations with his accustomed energy, and by the capture of Piseck reduced the enemy to the greatest distress.

* Grimoard *Histoire des Conquêtes de Gustave Adolphe*, i. 51.—an author who contemplates the operations of war with the critical eye of a soldier.

† Lotichius, 112. Coxe, i. 772.

‡ Galetti, i. 18.

Ferdinand had no sooner obtained the imperial crown, than he flew to the defence of his capital, which, though relieved for a while from immediate danger, could never be regarded as perfectly secure, while the forces of the enemy were superior. During his residence at Francfort, however, the situation of his affairs had materially altered for the better, and he could now look forward with well-founded confidence to future success. Till then he was uncertain how far he might depend upon the assistance of the Catholic League. The views of Maximilian were likewise involved in impenetrable mystery; who, notwithstanding his attachment to the papal see, might possibly be allured by the charms of ambition to behold with pleasure the humiliation of Austria, as a preparatory step to his own exaltation. But these apprehensions were now entirely dissipated; the mercenary disposition of the Duke of Bavaria had been tempted by offers too seducing to be resisted, and in the event of a war he had not only promised reinforcements to the imperial army, but had even undertaken to command it in person. Ferdinand also had engaged to indemnify him for any losses which he might eventually sustain in the course of hostilities, and actually mortgaged a part of his hereditary dominions by way of additional security.*

The influence of Maximilian decided the conduct of the Catholic League; and a treaty was concluded between the emperor and the ecclesiastical electors, by which they engaged to support

* Barre, ix. 487. Schmidt, iv. 16.

with all their authority the orthodox champion of the Vatican.*

Though he had secured the co-operation of such valuable allies, Ferdinand was aware that, in a struggle like that in which he was engaged, it was of the utmost importance to conciliate the affection of his subjects, and he accordingly determined by a public declaration to efface every cause of complaint. In a spirited address, so artfully worded that it appeared to flow from humanity and not from apprehension, he signified his intention of allowing them in future to conform to the confession of Augsburg, and of re-establishing them in the enjoyment of every privilege, which had been granted them by the policy or the benevolence of Matthias. This prudent appeal to the strongest propensities of the human heart, contrasted so strongly with his former violence, that foreseeing the probability of its being imputed by his adversaries to sinister motives, he wisely accompanied it with the denunciation of the most rigorous punishments against all, who rejecting his proffered clemency, should adhere to the standard of rebellion. This politic mixture of concession and severity contributed essentially to appease the ferment, by impelling numbers by the powerful incentives of hope and fear, to acknowledge the authority of their legitimate sovereign, rather than expose their fortunes to the hazard of a defeat. The same rapid

* A prince more sagacious than Frederic, who had been placed at the head of the Evangelical Union, would have converted his quarrel with Austria into a religious dispute; but he unfortunately persuaded himself, that by an opposite conduct, he should deceive the catholics and prevent them from assisting Ferdinand.—Galetti, i. 20.

change in the current of popular opinion was no less visible in the proceedings of the Hungarian diet. So long as victory accompanied the waivode of Transilvania, his cause was regarded as the road to fortune, and embraced as the decision of Heaven. But no sooner was he compelled to measure back his way with diminished glory, than the zeal of his partizans abated, and they began seriously to calculate the evils, which might ensue from favéuring the projects of a desperate adventurer. Impatient to atone for their former errors, the members of an assembly convened expressly to confer the crown on Gabor now hesitated to proceed, and evinced by their timidity that his visions of greatness were for ever dissipated. Disgusted at the weakness and the ingratitude of a people, on whose attachment he could not depend, he resolved to abandon them to their destiny, and accordingly consented to a truce with Ferdinand, which enabled the latter to direct his undivided attention toward the turbulent scenes in Bohemia.*

It was evident, however, that the event of the contest must in great measure depend upon the conduct of the Evangelical Union. That the inclination of the protestants would induce them to side with the Bohemian monarch there was every reason to believe; but whether their religious attachment would prove strong enough to counteract the baneful effects of jarring interests and personal jealousies, and allow them to act with concord and confidence, was a question of a very different nature. Distrust and disunion, the fatal consequences of sectarian schisms, were known to prevail in an

* 1619. Coxe, i. 777. Le Vassor, iv. 491.

alarming degree between the followers of Luther and those of Calvin, who beheld the eccentricities of each others opinions with as much abhorrence, as they did the idolatrous pageantries of the Vatican.

Having gratified his vanity with the empty splendour of royalty, Frederic repaired to Nuremburg, to be present at an assembly of the protestant princes, hoping by his influence and exhortations to involve them in hostilities with Austria; but against this his antagonist had previously provided, who aware of the difficulties to which he must be exposed, should a personal contest for the Bohemian crown be converted by fanaticism into a religious dispute, had addressed* an elaborate memorial to the states, complaining of the injustice with which he had been treated, and boldly asserting that, from motives of humanity, he had left nothing unattempted to appease the troubles which disaffection had excited in Bohemia. Though strongly characterized with firmness and decision, his language was that of moderation. Of the insubordination of his people he complained in terms of asperity, but still preserved a decorous silence respecting the behaviour of Frederic.†

To this address the convention replied, by recapitulating the grievances of which they had so often complained, and which they boldly imputed to the intolerant principles of the catholic faith, the despotic conduct of the Austrian family, and the preponderating influence of the Vatican. After sup-

*The Count of Hohenzollern.

† Barre, ix. 486. Lotichius, i. 115.

plicating the emperor, in a respectful tone, to listen to the remonstrances of the Bohemians, they declared their resolution to protect the palatine, if attacked in his hereditary dominions, and concluded, by urging him to give to the world an unequivocal proof of moderation, by compelling the league to disarm; assuring him, that they were ready to follow their example, from the anxious desire of preventing a war, of which, if once unfortunately kindled, no human sagacity could foresee the extent.*

Though foiled in his endeavours to seduce the members of the Evangelical Union, Ferdinand had little reason to be dissatisfied with the general aspect of his affairs. Alarmed at the proceedings of the protestant diet, the league, in a meeting held at Wurtzburg, declared their decided resolution of protecting the orthodox faith, inseparably connected with the power of Austria. Considering hostilities to be unavoidable, they proceeded to regulate the quotas to be furnished by every member, and appointed Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, generalissimo of the catholic armies.

Though the emperor had disclaimed, in his address to the protestants, every idea of a religious contention, it is confidently asserted, by the most credible historians, that he gave the pope a positive assurance that he would never lay down the sword till he had extirpated heresy in Germany; and that in return for this pious resolution, he received a grant of the tenth of all ecclesiastical property in Spain, in Flanders, and in Italy; a donative less

* *Mémoires de Louise Juliane*, 150,

offensive to the avarice of the Borghesi than any personal sacrifice of riches. A contest, undertaken in defence of the church, soon roused the superstition of the court of Madrid, whose bigoted sovereign requested permission to consume the remaining strength and treasures of his exhausted dominions in that meritorious struggle. The restless spirit of the Duke of Lorraine added another member to the conspiracy.*

No sooner were these resolutions imparted to the protestant leaders, than they dispatched a confidential agent to Munich, with positive directions not to abandon the court, till he should have obtained from Maximilian a satisfactory explanation respecting his future intentions. Disdaining concealment, when he had nothing to risk by disclosing his projects, the duke defended his conduct on the plea of expediency, insisting that it would be an unpardonable error in policy, for the catholics to remain in a defenceless posture, when the agitation prevailing in all the protestant states so plainly indicated that some important enterprise was in contemplation. Notwithstanding this answer clearly proved that hostilities were about to commence, yet still a parsimonious spirit of commerce prevented several of the imperial cities from contributing to an undertaking, from which no adequate returns could be expected. Their constant opposition to the suggestions of those whom experience and study had qualified for the discretion of great political concerns, so far impeded the movement of the machine, that a resolution was

* Grimoard, I.55, Barre, ix. 486.

passed, restricting the confederacy to a defensive system, and prohibiting its members from furnishing either men or money to their protestant brethren in Bohemia. By this impolitic vote, Frederic was abandoned to his own resources, and left singly to defend the reformed religion against the gigantic power of Austria.*

The defection of Saxony gave a fatal blow to the hopes of Frederic, as notwithstanding the selfish character of the elector, he would never believe that the descendant of a prince, the champion and victim of the Lutheran faith, would desert the cause of religion. To account for an action at once so repugnant to his honour and interest, we must suppose that John George was seduced by the flattering offers of Ferdinand; since it is impossible to admit that any being, endowed with the faculty of reason, should have given credit to an assertion, which represented the quarrel to be nothing more than a contention for power, and totally unconnected with the welfare of the church. This assurance, it is true, was corroborated by the duplicity of the ecclesiastical electors, and by the protestation of Maximilian, who solemnly declared, that they did not entertain the smallest hostility toward the protestant worship, nor even harboured a thought of ever attempting to recover the secularized property of the convents. Such artifices, however, were too shallow to beguile, unless received with voluntary credulity; but to the breast of the Saxon they found easy access. Jealous of the ascendancy obtained by Frederic he con-

* Le Vassor, iv. 535.

tempted his distress with secret satisfaction, in hopes that his ruin might accelerate the fall of the Helvetic antichrist, which he detested scarcely less than the Roman. Neither could his sordid heart forgive the triumph accorded to a rival by the Bohemians; for though he wanted fortitude to undertake the arduous enterprize, he was offended that another should excel in qualities of which he was totally destitute.*

Though by no means deficient in personal courage, the character of Frederic was little calculated for a situation, where pre-eminent talents were required. If we attentively examine his actions, during the short period that he wore a royal crown, we shall find him no less culpable for what he did, than for what he neglected to do. By the alliance contracted with Bethlem Gabor, the friend and dependent of the Ottoman Porte, he offended the delicate scruples of the pious, by whom he was accused of sacrificing the peace and security of the Christian republic to the chimerical pursuits of ambition. His zealous attachment to the doctrines of Calvin led him also to the adoption of measures, scarcely less offensive to the followers of Luther, than the iconoclastic fury with which he overthrew the images of saints and martyrs, proved abhorrent to the feelings of the catholics.† The unbounded prodigality of their new sovereign formed another source of complaint, and was beheld with feelings little short of disaffection by a parsimonious people, whose economy would have revolted at every burthen, which necessity compelled him to

* Schiller, i. Coxe, i. 775.

† Lotichius, i. 126.

impose. The ardour of the nobility, who overrating their services had anticipated rewards proportionate to their vanity, began rapidly to abate when they found their calculations erroneous. Even Thurn and Mansfeldt, the firmest pillars of the revolution, were justly offended at seeing themselves deprived of those military honours to which their talents and services entitled them, and subjected to the command of the Prince of Anhalt, an officer indeed of acknowledged merit, but totally unconnected with Bohemia. It was the misfortune of Frederic to be extremely defective in those solid virtues necessary to confirm the favourable impression, which a graceful figure and popular manners hardly ever fail to inspire.* Instead of devoting his attention to public affairs, and prudently endeavouring to provide resources to meet the impending storm; he lavished his revenues in balls and festivals, and in improvident largesses to undeserving favourites.

While the fortune of Frederic thus rapidly declined, the situation of his rival progressively improved. Having secured the neutrality of some of the German princes, who adhered to the protestant faith, and purchased the alliance of others, Ferdinand directed his attention to external objects; convinced, that if he could succeed in preventing France and England from taking an active part in the contest, he should find little difficulty in reducing Bohemia to subjection. At the English court he was prepared to encounter almost insuperable ob-

* Constantinus Peregrinus affirms, "Fridericum Pragæ prope molendinum magnum, magna omnium indiguatione, cum force populi lavantem visum fuisse."—Koeler, 49. A curious method of courting popularity.

stacles, but to his inexpressible astonishment he found the prejudices of James in perfect unison with his own wishes ; for it was a paramount principle in the British monarch's political creed, that it was utterly impossible for subjects to be in the right, when they opposed the will of their sovereign. In support of this contemptible theory of folly and despotism, he not only sacrificed the glory of Britain, but endangered the safety of the protestant church. Taking advantage of the foibles of the royal pedagogue, the Spanish minister assured him that the exalted reputation for justice and moderation which he universally enjoyed, would induce the emperor to submit to his arbitration in the present difficult crisis. He was also easily persuaded, that the intimate connexion, which he was about to contract with the court of Madrid, by the marriage of the Prince of Wales with the Infanta, might enable him to prevent the ruin of his son-in law, without risking the lives of his people. For so excessive was his vanity, that he never suspected that his inactive virtue was despised as much as it was extolled.*

Having moulded to his satisfaction the arrogant imbecility of the British king, Ferdinand dispatched an ambassador to Paris, in hopes that by alarming the scruples of the timid monarch, and flattering

* Mr. Hume (c. xlviij.) says every thing in defence of James that human ingenuity can suggest, but still I contend, that a more despicable monarch is scarcely to be found in the annals of history. James prided himself upon his wisdom, and reduced to theory the intricate science of government ; but if we refer to his actions (which indisputably afford the fairest test) for a practical illustration of his precepts, we shall find the boasted science of king's-craft to be nothing more than a miserable compound of pedantry, folly, and cowardice.

the pride of his self-sufficient favourite, he might present the degenerate son of Henry the Great from adhering to the plan which his illustrious father had traced for the splendour and the prosperity of his kingdom. Furstemberg, who was selected for that important mission, was powerfully seconded by the venality of the courtiers, many of whom were actually the pensioners of Spain ; by the intrigues of the Jesuits,* who artfully predicted the ruin of the catholic faith, and by the clamours of the bigots, who seriously believed it in danger. To so formidable a cabal, operating upon the fears and superstition of an imbecile mind, it was fruitless for those, who had been taught to appreciate the true interests of their country by the first and the greatest of the Bourbon line, to oppose the dictates of prudence ; insisting, that it was incompatible with every principle of enlightened policy to support the natural rival of the nation. Having secured the co-operation of a venal faction, the Austrian plenipotentiary, by calumniating their motives, attempted to invalidate the hostility of all who shewed themselves adverse to his pretensions. For this purpose he circulated a pamphlet, in which he endeavoured to prove, that a conspiracy was formed by the secret enemies of monarchical government, for the destruction of all legitimate authority, the degradation of rank, and equalization of property.†

* Le Pere Arnoux, who was confessor to Lewis XIII. exercised an unlimited influence over his weak understanding.

† Le Vassor, iv. 538. It is curious to trace in the clumsy labours of a German civilian the groundwork of one of the most splendid efforts of human eloquence. Furstemberg and Burke, though as remote from each

Notwithstanding this attempt to impose upon mankind met with merited contempt, from all who were able impartially to appreciate its absurdity, yet so strong was the empire of prejudice, that not a member of the council had the courage to propose to the king to acknowledge Frederic as sovereign of Bohemia, though their sentiments were divided respecting the conduct which it might be proper to pursue with regard to Austria.

Half measures have always been the favourite resources of little minds. Too prudent to shock the public feeling by abandoning principles which ancient habit has sanctified, and equally destitute of courage and of capacity to keep pace with the progress of the human understanding, when its faculties are stimulated by some extraordinary concession, men of ordinary abilities, if unfortunately placed in prominent situations, endeavour by palliatives to postpone the evil which they tremble boldly to encounter. Acting under the impulse of a similar incentive, the influence of the favourite* determined his master to recur to negotiation when the most vigorous measures were necessary. It was accordingly resolved by a splendid embassy to attempt the reconciliation of the contending parties, whose ambition was about to desolate Europe.†

other as the sublimity of Newton from the arrogance of Kant, were both impelled by the same spirit of hostility toward every thing that could lead to innovation; both studied to enrol the prejudices of the great in support of the cause which they defended; but unfortunately for mankind the success of the latter proved more decidedly fatal to the cause of liberty, and has eventually contributed to erect a power, the most tremendous of any which ever threatened the world.

* The Duc de Luines, a minion almost as despicable as any of those, on whom James I. lavished the treasures and the dignities of England.

† The Duc d'Angouleme, the Comte de Bethune, and the Abbé de

The prosperous results of the enlightened system pursued by Ferdinand, soon manifested to the world the superior wisdom of his councils; but together with his fortune his language altered. In a manifesto addressed to the German potentates, he strenuously exhorted them to remain tranquil spectators of the impending contest, and concluded by recommending, in a menacing tone, to the Elector Palatine, to relinquish a crown, which he had seized in defiance of the laws of justice, and which he could not retain without exposing his country to civil convulsions.†

Since the defection of Saxony, the prospects of Frederic had gradually assumed a darker hue. Not content with refusing his assistance to those whom he had formerly treated as his dearest allies, John George resolved by active service to merit the wages of treachery. Throughout all his dominions preparations were made for an active campaign. The regiments were recruited and new ones raised; the arsenals were replenished with military stores, and magazines collected in all the principal fortresses. These extraordinary exertions demanded explanation, and the Bohemians in consequence sent an embassy to Dresden, to inquire their object, and earnestly to solicit the

Chateauneuf, men of rank and ability, were selected for the mission, because the favourite was desirous by the characters of the negotiators to give consequence to a measure, no less dishonourable from its motives than contemptible for its folly. Though apparently occupied with the interests of Europe, he was in fact indifferent to every thing that passed, provided he was suffered to insult the nation by retaining a place to the duties of which his talents were totally incompetent.—Le Vassor, iv. 667.

† 1620. Puffendorf, i. 30. Lotichius, i. 134. Schmidt, iv. 28.

elector's support in defence of a cause equally interesting to all the friends of the Reformation. "They were contending," they said, "for the existence of a religion, of which the Saxon princes had ever been regarded as the political leaders. Should the emperor be permitted to extirpate (what he impiously denominated) heresy, in Bohemia, little doubt could be entertained that he would extend the persecution to every sect, which deviated from the papal communion, till he succeeded in establishing his idolatrous worship throughout every province of Germany."

Incensed at an insinuation, tending equally to inculcate the soundness of his understanding and the purity of his heart, the elector gave vent to his indignation by loading the deputies with bitter reproaches, for having presumed to proceed to the election of a king, after Ferdinand had been acknowledged by the electoral college as the legitimate sovereign of Bohemia. The alliance contracted with Bethlem Gabor became next an object of reprehension; which he affected to consider as no less disgraceful to the dignity of the nation than dangerous to the general welfare of Christendom. "Though bound to acknowledge no superior authority, except that of Heaven and of the imperial throne," continued the Saxon, in a tone of defiance, "I have no hesitation in declaring, that I am induced to arm by a due attention to the safety of my subjects. Warlike preparations are carrying on in every state between the Alps and the Baltic; and the empire is inundated with foreign mercenaries. Under such circumstances to remain inactive would be no less derogatory to

my personal glory than prejudicial to the interests of my people.*

Had the plans of the elector been previously involved in obscurity, this bold avowal was sufficient at once to dissipate the cloud, even in the estimation of men, most disposed to contemplate the transactions of the world through the delusive medium of hope. At a subsequent assembly of the catholic princes,† his intentions were manifested in less ambiguous language. Under pretext of appeasing the commotions in Bohemia, all the members professed the most unqualified devotion to Ferdinand; but being anxious to disguise their real motives under the mask of equity, they resolved to preface hostilities with a monitorial address to the Palatine. After expressing their abhorrence of his disloyalty toward the legitimate chief of the Germanic constitution, they exhorted him "no longer to listen to the pernicious counsels of designing men, who flattered his ambition with chimerical projects, not from any attachment to his sacred person, but from motives which they blushed to avow." Having thus far complied with the forms prescribed by diplomatic duplicity, they plainly intimated that, "in case he should neglect this salutary admonition, they were bound by their allegiance to assist the emperor in recovering a sceptre, to which he was justly entitled by every claim that could give validity to power." After expatiating at large upon the inadequacy of the elector's resources to contend against the strength of Austria, they concluded by conjuring him to

* Lotichius, i. 140.

† Held at Mulhausen, 1620.

renounce an undertaking, which must eventually lead to the ruin of his family, and the loss of his hereditary dominions.*

This exhortation was followed by a second, addressed to the Bohemians, in which the same arguments were still more strongly enforced by a vivid picture of the unavoidable calamities to which the nation must be exposed by protracted resistance.

In a third manifesto, the Evangelical Union was admonished of the pernicious consequences, inevitably resulting to all legitimate governments, from the fatal example delivered to the world by openly patronising insurrection. The cause of Ferdinand was represented as that of all rightful sovereigns, "should his rebellious subjects be suffered to prevail, the basis must be sapped upon which the authority of princes had hitherto reposed, and nothing but anarchy could in consequence ensue.†

Confident of the support of a powerful party, Ferdinand ventured at length to throw aside the mask of moderation, and in the dictatorial language of an irritated master, commanded the Palatine to lay down his arms, and to evacuate Bohemia within the space of a month, under pain of incurring the severest penalties which imperial anger could inflict.

To these addresses the Bohemians replied with manly dignity, boldly asserting their right to dispose of the vacant throne, and disdainfully rejecting all foreign controul. In support of a privilege, so

* Lotichius, i. 140. Barre, ix. 489. Puffendorf, i. 30.

† Barre, *ibid.* Lotichius, i. 145.

dearly cherished, they contended, that the national courts had ever been regarded as independent tribunals, adequate to decide the most momentous questions, without being liable to any appeal. They farther shewed, that their laws and constitution differed no less essentially from those of Germany, than the language and customs of the inhabitants; and that to attempt to subject the decrees of the diet to any revision, or even to doubt its competency to exercise the highest functions of legislation, would be to degrade the nation to a state of vassalage, too humiliating for any but slaves to endure.*

While the civilians were sedulously employed, either in elucidating or perplexing the case, the commanders on both sides were occupied in labours more likely to bring it to a decision. The Duke of Bavaria, at the head of twenty-five thousand well-appointed troops, crossed the Danube at Donauwert, while the Marquis of Anspach (now acting as general of the protestant army) assembled his forces in the vicinity of Ulm. Thus the important hour seemed rapidly approaching, when the destiny of the empire was to be decided, and limits prescribed to the rival religions, which it would be dangerous for them to transgress. Yet at this tremendous moment, when the minds of all men were turned toward the plains of Swabia, where every thing most sacred in the eyes of piety, or dearest to the feelings of freedom, was about to receive a fatal blow, or to be permanently established on the rock of victory, a convention was unex-

pectedly signed, by which both armies separated without ever firing a cannon.*

By this treaty, effected by the mediation of France, it was stipulated that both parties should in future abstain from hostilities; the protestants engaging to leave the emperor at perfect liberty to assert his claim to the Bohemian throne, upon condition that the catholics should not attack the Palatinate.†

It is natural to inquire into the causes which produced this sudden reverse. The question, though frequently canvassed, is still involved in considerable obscurity. In similar cases it is usual to resort to treachery, in order to discover a satisfactory solution. Whether it operated at all upon the present occasion, or to what extent it was employed, it is by no means easy to ascertain; but, without recurring to any except ostensible motives, we may fairly ascribe the triumph of catholicism to the zeal and activity of Maximilian, which enabled him to bring into the field an army far more formidable than the vacillating economy of the adverse party would allow them to levy. The terror, excited by the superiority of the catholics, both in numbers and in discipline, was greatly augmented by the approach of Spinola, hastening at the head of his veteran bands to inundate the almost defenceless Palatinate.

The treaty of Ulm having neutralized the forces of the "Evangelical Union," Ferdinand was enabled to direct his resources against the Bohemians. Availing himself of the consternation universally disse-

* July 3d, 1620. Schmidt, iv. 18. Barre, 489. This treaty is given in detail by Le Vassor, iv. 653.

† Pfeffel *Histoire d'Allemagne*, ii. 287. Schmidt, *ibid.*

minated by the defection of their allies, the Duke of Bavaria compelled the insurgents in Lower Austria to lay down their arms, and to do homage to the emperor as their legitimate sovereign, upon his consenting to confirm all their religious privileges.

History affords few examples of a more rapid revolution than now took place in the fortune of Ferdinand. Bethlem Gabor, his most dangerous foe, was prevented from marching to the assistance of Frederic, by the scientific dispositions of Dampiere, while the Margrave of Jagerndorf, a Bohemian general, was compelled to evacuate Lusatia by the Elector of Saxony. Meanwhile the main operations were directed against the Palatine by Maximilian in person, assisted by Tilly, so celebrated for courage, superstition, and cruelty.* After forming a junction with Bucquoy, his force amounted to fifty thousand men; a body too vast to be supported in a country where provisions were far from abundant. In order, therefore, to obviate the distress arising from inadequate supplies, it was resolved that the duke should march against Bud-

* Tilly, who was undoubtedly one of the most conspicuous personages at an era so fertile in splendid talents, is said to have been originally designed for an ecclesiastical life, and to have been educated under the direction of the Jesuits. After performing his novitiate with considerable applause, he quitted the order for the more active profession of arms, for which he always entertained a strong predilection, and served with distinction in the Netherlands. Impelled by the holy zeal which he had imbibed in a monastery, he followed the Duc de Mercœur into Hungary, eager to assist in the extermination of the unbelievers. The reputation which he acquired, by his sagacity and valour, attracting the notice of Rhodolph, he was raised to the rank of general; and peace being soon concluded with the Turks, he entered into the service of the Duke of Bavaria, with the title of Commander-in-Chief; and, by his indefatigable exertions, soon established in the army the most perfect discipline, in which till then it had been greatly defective. Coxe, i. 778.

weiss, while the Flemish commander, advancing by a circuitous route, should endeavour to join him under the walls of Piseck ; an important fortress, the capture of which was expected to decide the ultimate success of the campaign.

Bucquoy, being punctual to his engagement, a summons was sent to the Governor of Piseck, who immediately entered into a negotiation ; but while the articles of capitulation were settling, the Walloons and Cossacs, indignant at the idea of being defrauded of their booty, rushed toward the ramparts with spontaneous fury, and were already masters of the city before their commanders were apprised of their intention. The dreadful carnage which ensued, with all the military relaxations of rape and robbery, created such consternation in the adjacent country, that all men endeavoured, by unconditional submission, to avert a similar destiny.*

It would have required talents very different from those which Frederic possessed, to have provided a remedy adequate to his distress. Destitute of any ally on whose fidelity he could depend, since the ungenerous desertion of the Union, he knew not to whom to apply for advice. In spite of the solemn promise given by the Duke of Bavaria to the protestant chiefs, as an excuse, or compensation, for their baseness, Spinola continued to advance ; while the Margrave of Anspach, though at the head of an army expressly destined to cover the Palatinate, remained a tranquil spectator of his progress. It has been urged, in justification of the unfortunate elector, that his ruin was less to be im-

* Coxe, i. 778.

puted to his own misconduct than to the treachery of those in whom he confided ; and, in support of this opinion, his partisans have argued, that had Anspach protected his hereditary estates, and the reinforcements which he expected from England and Holland arrived in time, the issue of the contest might have been different. This, however, is nothing more than to exculpate him from the charge of temerity, at the expense of his understanding ; since it was folly to expect the co-operation of a monarch, who, by the mouths of his ambassadors at Madrid, at Brussels, and at Vienna, had publicly expressed his disapprobation of Frederic's conduct. Neither can we, without subjecting him to the same imputation, believe him deceived by the fallacious appearance of deference and respect, so ostentatiously manifested by the Austrian cabinet, for the wisdom and equity of the British Solomon ; because it required no greater portion of penetration than falls to the lot of the meanest capacity, to discover that the sentiments entertained of the royal pedagogue, by all the continental powers, were those of contempt.*

But even were it possible to excuse the supineness of Frederic, with respect to his electoral territories, the negligence with which he prepared for the defence of his newly-acquired kingdom, can admit of no palliation. Exclusively of the national militia, whose ardour was greatly abated, and Mansfeldt's army left entirely destitute of every resource except what plunder casually supplied, the whole force which was collected to dispute with Austria the sovereignty of Bohemia, comprehended only a

* Le Vassor, iv. 667.

body of eight thousand cavalry, for the most part Hungarians, and a few regiments of German infantry.* His popularity also was rapidly declining, as it became every day more apparent that his accomplishments were merely external; and that, with the exception of personal bravery, he was totally destitute of every quality requisite to struggle against adversity. No treasures arrived from the English court, to reward the venal services of his adherents, who gave vent to their disappointments in loud complaints, on account of his partiality toward the Germans, upon whom every office of emolument and honour was improvidently bestowed. His imprudent attachment to the evangelical simplicity of the Calvinistical rites was equally offensive to the Calixtines and Lutherans; while the licentious excesses of an undisciplined army exasperated the peasants to the highest degree.† Still this ill-advised prince was so infatuated with the ephemeral splendour which irradiated the dawn of his tempestuous reign, that he beheld with indifference the gathering storm; wasting his time and revenues in festive pomp, as if the gratification of personal vanity had been the only object for which he coveted royalty.‡

He probably was led by the same inordinate passion to mistake for affection the enthusiasm of triumph which greeted his arrival, and which induced him to believe that the whole nation would rise in defence of a sovereign, whom they had spontaneously raised to the throne. But when called upon to protect the object of their choice, even the citi-

* The whole, according to Barre, did not exceed thirty thousand men, ix. 409.

† Puffendorf, i. 33.

‡ Ibid.

zens of Prague, his most zealous partizans, shewed little inclination to hazard their fortunes in defence of a prince so unworthy to govern. Neither was the intelligence which arrived from the army better calculated to console him; mistrust and despondency seemed universally to prevail: the commander suspecting the fidelity of the troops, the soldiers depreciating the talents of their commander. Nothing therefore remained for the unfortunate monarch, but to repair to the camp, and to endeavour by his presence to inspire courage and confidence.*

However repugnant to the dictates of prudence the behaviour of Frederic may appear, that of Lewis XIII. was scarcely less calculated to excite contempt and astonishment. Though he was actually at the head of a numerous army when he received intelligence of the march of the Spaniards, he appears to have beheld their ambitious projects with an indifference bordering upon insensibility; and, in his excessive zeal for the propagation of the catholic faith, to have buried every sentiment of generous pity for the fate of an ancient and faithful ally. And his conduct upon this occasion became still more inexcusable, because the invasion of the Palatinate was a flagrant violation of the treaty of Ulm, so lately concluded under his own mediation. Instead of resenting an insult thus openly offered to the dignity of his crown, the pusillanimous monarch remained satisfied with the assurance that the operations of Spinola were intended solely to compel the elector to recal his troops for the defence of his hereditary states, and not undertaken with a view of conquest. It was in vain for the chiefs of the pro-

* Cox, i. 781.

testant party to expatriate upon the danger which threatened Europe, in case Austria should be permitted to establish in Germany the same arbitrary power which she had already erected in Spain. Totally occupied with plans for the extirpation of heresy, Lewis contemplated with delight the gigantic strides which Ferdinand was making in the career of despotism, because they tended directly to the destruction of principles which he held in pious abhorrence.*

No sooner was it ascertained that the forces of Spinola were directed against the Palatinate, than the Duke of Wirtemberg, in the name of the Evangelical Union, wrote to the French ambassador at Vienna, requesting him to inform the imperial ministers, that in case the Spanish army should act offensively against any of its members, they should consider themselves as released from every obligation imposed by the late convention. This menace, however, was mitigated by the assurance that nothing could be farther from the intention of the allies, than to refuse a passage to the imperial troops, provided they were destined for the recovery of Bohemia; it being their decided resolution never to interfere with the internal politics of that distracted kingdom, but to confine their efforts entirely to the preservation of the tranquillity of the German empire.†

A declaration, couched in such ambiguous terms, demanded a candid reply. But equivocation was the language of the Austrian cabinet; and the answer returned was, in consequence, mysterious as that of the Delphic oracle; for though it abounded

* La Vassor, iv. 685.

† Ibid.

in general professions of amity, it left every thing open to the ambition of Ferdinand, without a positive breach of veracity.

Such was his conduct towards the ambassadors of France. Toward England he behaved with equal indignity; but though his treatment of the British monarch was highly insulting, it was at least exempt from the imputation of duplicity. Upon the first intelligence that arrived of the armaments equipping in Flanders, James required an explanation from the court of Brussels respecting its object, and received for answer, that it was assembling in consequence of directions from Vienna; but that the projects of the emperor had not been imparted to Archduke Albert, though they might possibly be known to the commander. The English minister now addressed himself to Spinola, but without procuring additional information. The general assured him, with an air of candour, that his orders were sealed, and were not to be opened till he arrived at Coblenz, where the troops were appointed to rendezvous; but promised the ambassador, if he would accompany him thither, to communicate his instructions without the smallest reserve. The invitation was accepted, and the engagement fulfilled; when it appeared, that he was instructed to levy war against all who supported the Bohemian rebels. Though the destination of the armament could no longer admit of the smallest doubt, yet so excessive was the vanity of the credulous monarch, that, in spite of conviction, he persevered in believing that the dominions of his son-in-law would be spared, out of respect for the wisdom and virtue of his father. Not satisfied with remaining inactive himself, he prevented the Dutch

from taking part in the war, by assuring them that, notwithstanding all hostile appearances, the Palatinate was perfectly secure.*

The folly of the king, egregious as it was, would have failed to produce its full effect, without the concurrence of Anspach, whose conduct, at this important crisis, is difficult to be accounted for, except by supposing him blinded by Spanish dollars.†

While Spinola, availing himself of the supineness of his foes, forced every barrier that impeded his progress, the protestant princes were entirely occupied with internal disputes, accusing each other of negligence and treachery—a reproach justly merited by the majority.

The vanity of James prevented him from discovering the ridiculous part he was acting. No proofs could convince his understanding, no insults could rouse his resentment. Instead of manfully vindicating the honour of the nation, he continued to address himself to the justice and moderation of a prince, to whom moderation and justice were strangers; directing his ambassador to propose to Ferdinand to terminate the dispute respecting Bohemia by a treaty. Unwilling to offend his credulous friend by a positive refusal, and equally resolute not to accept it, the emperor contented himself with evading the demand by the convenient excuse, that he could not decide upon so important a measure without consulting his allies.

The representative of a sovereign less pacific than James, would have instantly quitted the Aus-

* La Vassor, 689. Puffendorf, l. 32. Hume, xcviij. Rushworth, l. 14.

† Puffendorf, *ibid.* Lotichius, i, 190.

trian court, and considered his mission as terminated; but Wotton was too well acquainted with his master's infirmity, to risk his displeasure by a dignified action.

The success, which had attended the imperial arms in other quarters, was suddenly clouded by the death of Dampierre, who fell in a gallant attempt to surprise the city of Presburg. Confounded by the loss of that able commander, the troops, though upon the point of entering the town, were seized with a panic, and fled in disorder. This unforeseen disaster afforded an opportunity for attacking the Austrians before they recovered from the shock, and the wary Transylvanian with his accustomed activity availed himself of the confusion, to cut off some scattered detachments, and to capture Hainbourg, a place of considerable importance.*

Whatever hopes might have been entertained by the friends of Frederic, while revelling in the joys of the capital, the scene which presented itself upon their joining the army was calculated to dissipate them immediately. Destitute alike of clothing and of pay, the soldiers in loud and tumultuous murmurs expressed their indignation at being exposed to hardships too severe for human patience to endure. A difference of opinion prevailed also among the commanders upon a question of the highest importance. By some it was proposed, with more zeal than prudence, to hazard a general battle, lest the hardships, incidental to a protracted campaign, should induce the troops

* Lotichius, i. 196. Schmidt, iv. 20.

to quit their standards—an event by no means improbable. This plan, strongly recommended by the ardent courage of the younger Thurn, was as warmly opposed by Anhalt, unwilling to confide to the decision of arms, what he flattered himself to accomplish by cautious delay. The enemy, he maintained, must suffer most from the scarcity of provisions, and as winter approached, would be compelled to retire from want of subsistence. The opinion of the commander prevailed, and it was determined in consequence to avoid an action. Proposals were even sent to the Duke of Bavaria for an amicable termination of the contest, but the weakness of the enemy was too notorious to allow of his treating upon any terms consistent with the honour of Frederic. The instant renunciation of the Bohemian sceptre was insisted upon, an indispensable article, a degradation to which he was certain the elector would never consent, unless reduced to unconditional submission.*

The Fabian tactics adopted by the Bohemian army obliged it to fall back, and sometimes with a rapidity not totally consistent with discipline, till it reached the suburbs of Prague; and as its decaying ramparts precluded the possibility of a regular defence, intrenchments were thrown up on the summit of a mountain, which commands and coyers the city.† The natural strength of this position, augmented hourly by additional works, presented obstacles, which, if judiciously employed, might have proved insuperable.

On the 8th of November, after reconnoitring in

* Schmidt, iv. 18.

† The Weissenberg, or White Mountain.

person the position of the enemy, Maximilian resolved to storm their lines. In the beginning of the action, some trifling advantage was obtained by Anhalt's cavalry, which was prematurely considered by Calvinistical presumption as a certain omen of victory. But the delusion was momentary, and served only to embitter the pangs of disappointment. Thrown into disorder by the impetuosity of the Austrians, the Hungarian horse fled precipitately. Their dastardly behaviour became contagious, and in the space of an hour the hopes of Frederic were levelled with the ground, his forces dissipated, his artillery taken, his reputation tarnished, and nothing left him but the disastrous prospect of irretrievable ruin, and the empty title of King. From the walls of his capital, where he retired before the battle, he beheld the slaughter unfortunately increased by the precaution of Anhalt, who, as an incentive to his soldiers to fight with desperation, had ordered the gates to be barricaded.*

It would have been more consistent with the character which he was proud to assume, had Frederic sought in the field of glory an honourable termination to all the calamities, into which rashness and vanity had plunged him. Yet instead of partaking the danger like a hero, even at the tremendous moment when fortune and glory were at stake, he is said to have been indulging his taste

* Lotichius, i. 210. Coxe, i. 782. Schmidt, iv. 81.—Galeotti, i. 11. who seems strongly to suspect Anhalt of treachery.—The citizens of Prague offered to defend the town, and the younger Thurn supported the same opinion, as seventeen battalions were still unbroken, 8000 Hungarians were on their march to Prague, and Mansfeldt was at Pilsin with his whole army. ib. id.

for ostentation in giving a splendid entertainment to the English ambassador. The alarming intelligence, which arrived from the field, roused him at length to a sense of danger. Quitting the banquet, he rushed toward the ramparts, where he beheld a scene which overwhelmed him at once with despair and consternation. Scarcely conscious of what he did, he ordered the gates to be thrown instantly open, that the fugitives might find an asylum. He then retired to the palace where, being joined by Anhalt and Hohenlohe, he at their recommendation sent an officer to the victor, requesting a suspension of arms till the following morning. This demand was haughtily refused; but, after some expostulation, a truce was accorded for eight hours, upon condition that he should consent by a public document to renounce every claim to the Bohemian sceptre. With this humiliating demand, the vanquished sovereign was happy to comply, because it afforded him an opportunity of escaping with his family, the only object to which his fallen ambition seemed any longer to aspire.*

So precipitate was his flight, that he neglected even to carry away the crown for which he had paid so dearly. Anhalt also left behind him a treasure of greater value, his private papers, which served as a foundation for the curious collection, which still derives its appellation from its original owner.†

* Puffendorf, i. 34. Schmidt, iv. 18. "There are virtues," said the unhappy fugitive to one of the gentlemen who accompanied him in his flight, "in which adversity alone can instruct us! It is the sad destiny of princes to be totally unacquainted with their real character, till they are taught it in the school of misfortune!" Barre, ix. 502.

† "Anhaltischen Kantsley"! Schmidt, ibid.

It is probable that Maximilian, in granting a respite to his fallen foe, intended to favour his retreat; and the shortness of the truce was exactly calculated to produce the desired effect. Suspicion is the child of misfortune, and we accordingly find that every moment which Frederic was constrained by the preparations necessary for his departure, to pass within the walls of his capital, appeared an age to his distempered imagination, which anticipated the calamity of being delivered up to his rival by an ungenerous people, as an atonement for all their transgressions, and he was too well acquainted with the implacable temper of Ferdinand to question the efficacy of such a sacrifice.

CHAP. V.

Distress of Frederic after the battle of Prague.—Maximilian resigns the command.—Bethlem Gabor resolves to continue the war.—Internal state of Hungary.—A general review of the situation of the different European powers, with respect to their political interests and resources.—Despotic conduct of Ferdinand; he deposes the Palatine without the formality of a trial, and resolves to deprive him of his hereditary dominions.—His cruelty to the Bohemians.—The Evangelical Union dissolved.—Heroical behaviour of Mansfeldt.—James I. interposes in favour of his Son-in-law.—Frederic joins the army commanded by Mansfeldt.—The Margrave of Baden and Christian, Duke of Brunswick, take up arms; exploits and character of the latter.—Frederic, being persuaded to disband his forces and throw himself upon the Emperor's clemency, is deprived of the electoral dignity.

IT is in the nature of man to exalt the successful far above the level of their intrinsic deserts, and to depreciate the unfortunate in an equal degree. Hence the conduct of Frederic, after the battle of Prague, has afforded abundant materials for animadversion, and scarcely met with a single apologist. According to the opinion of many respectable writers, the capital might have been defended, notwithstanding the dilapidated condition of its fortifications, and the war protracted till terms could have been obtained, neither incompatible with the honour of the sovereign, nor fatal to the liberties of the people. Mansfeldt's army had not been engaged, but maintained its position at Pilsen. The restless ambition of Bethlem Gabor might have been roused with facility, and by a powerful diversion have compelled the Emperor to recall, at least, a part of his army for the defence of Hungary. The panic, excited by the recent defeat, must have

gradually subsided; when the Bohemians, impelled by every motive capable of inspiring the human heart with intrepidity, might have resumed their arms with an enthusiasm becoming the descendants of Zisca. The enemy, on the contrary, had equally to contend against the inclemency of the season, and the rooted animosity of the inhabitants. Cold, sickness, and famine are formidable foes, which set both valour and prudence at defiance.*

These advantages, however, were entirely thrown away by the flight of him, whose presence was requisite to encourage his partisans. After the departure of their sovereign, Thurn and his adherents retired into Silesia, hoping to find a safe asylum till the fate of their country should be decided. But circumstances occurring, which led them to suppose that the place of their retreat was discovered, and thoroughly persuaded that the vindictive spirit of Ferdinand would leave nothing unattempted to effect their destruction, they withdrew into Transilvania, confident of meeting with an amicable reception from the inveterate enemy of Austria.

The situation of Frederic was equally insecure. After remaining a short time at Breslau, he fled to Berlin,† from whence, being dissatisfied with the reception given him by the elector, he removed into Holland, where he was assured of experiencing protection and sympathy from the affection and generosity of the Prince of Orange.

The misery of Bohemia seemed almost hopeless:

* Schmidt, iv. 18.

† Puffendorf, §. 34.

though it still remained uncertain whether the conqueror would attempt to conciliate the hearts of the people by moderation and clemency, or to establish his authority on the tremendous basis of terror. Forsaken by the man whom they had chosen for a protector, the citizens of Prague had no alternative left, but to throw themselves unconditionally at the feet of the victor, and trust to his humanity for pardon. No time was allowed for deliberation, as the ferocious Spaniards were actually preparing to scale the walls, and could hardly be restrained by the threats and intreaties of their commander.*

Though the humanity of Maximilian protected Prague from the horrors inseparable from an assault, no further indulgence was granted; and even that was subject to the degrading condition, that they should immediately deliver up their arms, dissolve the confederacy, and submit to the authority of their legitimate sovereign.† Having thus completed the subjugation of this unfortunate people, Maximilian resigned the government of the conquered country into the hands of Prince Charles of Lichtenstein, appointed by the emperor to succeed him; and, leaving Tilly behind with a force sufficient to repress rebellion, he returned in triumph to Munich.‡

The example of the capital was immediately fol-

* Barre, ix. 502.

† Coxe, i. 785. Ambassade d'Angoulene, 378.

‡ Coxe, ib. Galetti, l. 38.—Immediately after the surrender of Prague, all books were publicly burnt, and the re-establishment of the Jesuits was the first act of the emperor.

lowed by the principal towns, such only excepted as were actually occupied by Mansfeldt, who, by a splendid example of persevering valour, resolved to elucidate the folly of Ferdinand in preferring a general so decidedly his inferior.*

The victories of Ferdinand were celebrated by the catholics as religious triumphs in almost every country in Europe; and the blood, profusely shed by the axe of the executioner, was regarded by them as a propitiatory sacrifice, no less grateful to Heaven than to the Jesuits.† The protestants, on the contrary, both at London and Paris, refused to give credit to the report, affecting to treat it as an artifice of the enemy to damp the national ardour.

The waivode of Transilvania was in the vicinity of Presburg, occupied with preparations for his approaching coronation, when he received intelligence of the defeat of his ally. The fall of Frederic gave a fatal blow to all his prospects, because it enabled Ferdinand to concentrate his forces for the recovery of Hungary. But what added greatly to his affliction was the bitter reflection, that the ruin of his friend was occasioned by his own imprudence.

* Puffendorf, i. 34. Schmidt, iv. 18.

† The words of Lotichius deserve attention. "Certe Ferdinandus II. imperator, quem moribus parthevium, pietate sanctum fuisse accepimus, potius precibus, sacrificiis, processionibusque solennibus, loco debite erga deum gratiarum actionis, operam dedisse, quam choreis, tripudiis, epulisque aut poculis vacasse, evincitur. Ille igitur fastigio imperator, devotione sacerdos, sanctitate patriarcha, non absque religiosa devotione, non sine mitissima, humiliissimaque submissione, clericorum choris mistus, à splendore antico seqnestratus, processiones suo modo sacras celebravit." i. 214. This man certainly mistook his vocation when he mounted a throne!

Had he continued in arms, it would have been impossible for the emperor to have assembled an army adequate to the conquest of Bohemia, without abandoning Hungary entirely.

Though he had treacherously consented to a suspension of hostilities, Gabor however had not wasted his time in total inactivity, but had conceived a plan in concert with the Porte for the annihilation of Austria. To his sanguine temper nothing appeared more easy than to realize that chimerical project, and as a prelude to more arduous undertakings, it was resolved to commence the important work by his assuming the regal title.*

Notwithstanding the resources of the Transilvanian were greatly overrated by his ardent disposition, they were still sufficiently formidable to excite considerable alarm at Vienna. Having once experienced the benefit of French mediation, Ferdinand was desirous of persuading the ambassadors of Lewis to open a negociation with Gabor. This honour, however, they wisely declined, without a positive order from their court; and addressed to the king an able memorial, representing the impolicy of permitting the German protestants to be oppressed.† No remonstrances, however, were able to overcome the religious scruples of their master. Instead of attending to their advice, Lewis directed them to assist in promoting a reconciliation between Austria and the invader of Hungary; but it soon became evident that neither party was sincerely desirous of peace, but that they were employed by the emperor as instruments of deception,

* 1620, Schmidt, iv. 19.

† Ambassade d'Angoulene, 348.

and not of conciliation ; and that the imbecility of its sovereign had so completely degraded the dignity of France, that it no longer retained its proper weight in the general balance of Europe. Animated by the exhortations and the example of Thurn, Gabor resolved to recommence hostilities, without waiting for the reinforcements which he expected from Turkey. Advancing at the head of a considerable force, he spread terror and desolation to the gates of Vienna ; but as the prudence of Ferdinand had swept the country of every thing requisite for the maintenance of troops, he was compelled to retire after the vain parade of having insulted the capital of Germany. Falling back upon Ternau, an important post, he carried away the crown and the regalia of Hungary, to which the natives attached the most superstitious veneration. This circumstance created a suspicion that he intended to maintain the title of king, though in fact his real motive was only to deprive his rival of a treasure, essentially necessary, in the eyes of the vulgar, to give a legal sanction to his authority.* Delay was to him of the utmost consequence, as he had nothing to lose by protracting the contest, and when inclined to sheath the sword, was perfectly secure of obtaining advantageous conditions ;† and should any revolution of fortune restore his ally to the Bohemian throne, he, in that case, looked forward with well-founded expectation to the pos-

* This prejudice extended so far, that the Hungarians would never have regarded any prince as their legitimate sovereign, who had not been invested with the crown of St. Stephen.—Lotichius, i. 230.

† The edict, by which he annulled the proceedings of the Hungarian diet, is given at length by Lotichius, i. 221.

sibility of establishing a permanent dominion in the eastern* provinces of Europe.

Such was the situation of Hungary: let us now direct our attention to that of Bohemia. The triumph obtained over the electoral army had raised the power and arrogance of Ferdinand to an alarming height; the future destiny of Germany depended entirely upon his decision. By a generous oblivion of every injury, he might have given happiness and security to an admiring nation; but in the intoxication of success he aimed at completing the mighty plan ascribed to the ambition of Charles V. and, though luckily for mankind he failed in the attempt, he overwhelmed his country with a series of calamities, to which history scarcely furnishes a parallel.†

At this momentous crisis, when all the powers of Europe were about to engage in a sanguinary conflict, progressively extending devastation and misery from the frontiers of Poland to the banks of the Rhine, and from the shores of the Baltic to the Alps, it may be advantageous to examine the internal situation of the Germanic body, both in a religious and political view, and to comprehend in the inquiry the contiguous states; so far at least as they were concerned in the memorable struggle.

The doctrine of the reformers had gained such numerous proselytes in the northern provinces of the empire, that they almost balanced the strength of the catholics. For though the latter were undoubtedly superior in numbers, and possessed many

* Lotichius, i. 221.

† Schiller, i.

advantages from which their rivals were excluded by the ancient constitution, they had also various difficulties to contend with, which prevented them from acquiring a permanent ascendancy. The dominions of the protestants lay contiguous to each other, and were governed by princes whose abilities rose above mediocrity. Under a wise administration they had made a rapid progress in science, commerce, and manufactures; while the catholic states adhered to the prejudices and abuses of ancient times, with the pertinacious blindness of superstition. The free cities of Germany, enriched by trade, and uncontested masters of all the northern coast from the Elbe to the Vistula, were almost exclusively followers of the Lutheran doctrines. It was probable, indeed, in the event of a war, that the bigotry of Spain and Italy would arm in support of a party blindly devoted to the papacy, but the new sectaries might look forward with equal confidence to the assistance of many of the northern powers, and might even reckon among their allies the impetuous valour of the Turks. In the electoral college, they could oppose to the three ecclesiastical votes, those of Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Palatine. The resources of the Union, if sagaciously employed, might have rendered the contest dubious; but, unhappily the jealousies, which prevailed among the different members, prevented them from acting with zeal and unanimity. Those possessed of courage to encounter danger were deficient in power; while those who were formidable from their natural resources, wanted prudence, activity, and resolution.

The splendour reflected upon the Saxon family, by the talents and services of Maurice, had accus-

tomed the protestants to consider the chief of that illustrious house as their political leader. John George, being fully aware of the importance attached to his conduct, resolved to sacrifice every consideration to personal interest. Having formed a plan for his own aggrandisement at the expense of his party, he endeavoured to conceal his selfish designs under the mysterious veil of irresolution, apprehensive that a premature disclosure might depreciate the value of treachery, as he expected less from the gratitude of the emperor than he hoped to extort from his apprehensions. Had he been really blessed with that enlightened judgment, with which some of his biographers have endowed him,* he would have rejected the temptation so artfully thrown out by the interested policy of Ferdinand; but he was weak enough to believe that, when a bigot should have established the most unlimited despotism on the ruins of the protestant faith, he would act with justice and generosity towards him; not considering, that by fulfilling his promise, he must violate every principle most venerable in his eyes, both as a king and a theologian.

While avarice tempted the Saxon to abandon his honour, his friends, and his religion; fear operated no less powerfully upon the Elector of Brandenburg, by impelling him to embrace a system of in-

* Schiller, b. ii. speaks of him as a prince governed solely by prudential maxims of policy, and superior to religious enthusiasm; but it is difficult even for the talents of that ingenious writer, to defend his probity, without sacrificing his understanding. No wise man could have given credit to the assertion of Ferdinand; no honest man would have assisted him without it.

decision, which was equally prejudicial to his interest and his reputation.

The house of Hesse was divided by religious opinions, as well as by political attachments; for while the princes of Darmstadt adhered to the confession of Augsburg, those of Cassel had embraced the tenets of Calvin. Ever faithful to the example of his illustrious progenitor, so celebrated for courage and misfortune, and regardless of danger when faith and freedom were at stake, the latter stood forth the intrepid champion of toleration, while the former bartered fame and independence for a miserable pension. Endowed with firmness which nothing could shake, when the safety of his country was concerned, the Langgrave of Cassel was the first German prince who formed an alliance with the Swedish hero, and afforded a glorious example to his contemporaries, which few of them had spirit to imitate.

While the liberties of Germany were basely sacrificed by many of those most intimately concerned in protecting them, the necessity of the times created heroes for their defence. Those prominent situations, however, which ought to have been occupied by the splendour of the electoral houses, were filled by Mansfeldt, by Christian of Brunswick, and by a race of warriors, sprung from the Ernestine branch of the Saxon family, so justly hostile toward Austria.

This example of magnanimity, however, was in great measure thrown away, since neither exhortation nor precedent were able to rouse the compromising timidity of the Dukes of Wirtemberg, of Mecklenberg, of Luneburg, and of Pomerania. Overawed by the superior resources of Ferdi-

nand, they deemed it prudent to avert the impending danger by tamely submitting to his authority.

In the person of Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, the catholics possessed an able leader. Cool and persevering in the pursuits of glory, he became the defender of the ancient faith, from worldly motives. He fought the battles of the church, because he foresaw that his personal aggrandisement was identified with that of the papal communion. The other princes devoted to the see of Rome, seemed destined by nature to act in subordinate stations, the tools and dependents of Austria. Educated for the most part in the narrow prejudices of a religion, whose leading tenet prohibits the free exercise of the understanding, and raised sometimes from a cloister to a throne, the mitred sovereigns became the advocates of intolerance, rather from the dictates of perverted reason, than from innate depravity of heart. Slaves alike to Ferdinand and the Vatican, they displayed their hatred of the reformers in petty acts of personal hostility against individuals, endeavouring to compensate for the paucity of their means by the violence of their persecution.

The tremendous power established in Spain by Charles V. and gradually undermined by the bigotry of his successor, rapidly declined during the feeble reigns of Philip III. and IV. The splendid fortunes, suddenly acquired by the plunder of America, and which almost entirely inverted the natural order of society, by elevating adventurers from the meanest stations to the enjoyment of every thing that riches could procure, diverted the attention of all men of daring tempers from commerce and agriculture to

military enterprize. For this reason, the victories of Cortes and Pizarro proved scarcely less fatal to the prosperity of Spain than destructive of the happiness of the Americans. Meanwhile the merchants of Flanders, of Genoa, and of Venice, amassed honourable wealth, by wisely employing the resources so improvidently wasted by the haughty indolence of the Castilians. The loss of population, occasioned by the conquest of a new hemisphere, and the expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula of the Pyrenees, those memorable achievements of ferocity and superstition, converted into deserts some of the most fertile provinces in Europe; while the boasted treasures, extracted from the blood of a devoted people, were prodigally lavished in fruitless endeavours to extirpate freedom in Holland, to exclude a hero from the throne of France, and to overturn the power of one of the greatest sovereigns that ever swayed the sceptre of England. Alarmed at the debility which their folly had produced, the Spanish monarchs endeavoured to conceal it from the eyes of the vulgar, under the vain display of Asiatic magnificence, and by assuming a tone of arrogance in all foreign negotiations, which would have proved no less offensive if accompanied with adequate power, than it appeared weak and ridiculous without it. Guided entirely by the counsels of upstart minions, or of ignorant monks, they ventured to offer their presumptuous incapacity as a model for the imitation of Austria; encumbering their protection with so many burthensome conditions, that it might have afforded matter for serious reflection, whether it was really worth that extravagant price. Yet under every disadvantage, it was still difficult for a power to cease to be formidable,

which comprehended under its sway such extensive dominions in either hemisphere; whose numerous armies, highly disciplined, were commanded by generals of consummate talents and great experience, and whose boundless ambition, adhering from habit as well as from inclination, to the system pursued by Ferdinand II. his grandson, scrupled not to resort to the dagger of the assassin, when bribes and artifices no longer availed, nor hesitated to degrade the representatives of the Castilian despot into public incendiaries. The object which at that time most immediately occupied the court of Madrid, was to find an equivalent for the loss of Holland, by an extension of territory in Italy; persuaded that in case they could unite their possessions with those of Austria, by subjugating all the country between the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, an empire would be erected in the south of Europe, too formidable for any thing to resist.

Terrified at a project so destructive to their schemes of petty conquest, the native sovereigns, too feeble and disunited to resist the torrent, regarded their ruin as inevitable. Under his twofold character of sovereign and pontiff, the vicegerent of heaven was often constrained to act with inconsistency. As the supreme head of the catholic church, he officially cherished the bigotry of Spain as the firmest prop of his spiritual authority; but, as a temporal monarch, he beheld her encroachments with the utmost jealousy and dismay. As successor of St. Peter, he was impelled by interest, no less than by duty, to pray for the success of the Austrian arms; but, as sovereign of Rome, he was equally tempted to dread the destruction of the German protestants, because their fall would annihilate

the only power capable of opposing the oppressors of Italy. Each of these sentiments seems alternately to have prevailed, exactly in proportion as hope or fear, ambition or piety, were his predominating passions. The danger of the moment was invariably the strongest; and the enemy who triumphed appeared of course the most formidable. It would have been inconsistent with nature to have acted otherwise; because the dread of losing a present advantage is always more active than the wish of escaping a distant peril. This explanation affords a clue to many incongruities in the papal conduct; nor can we any longer be surprised that the vicar of Christ should at one moment unite with Spain and Austria for the extirpation of heresy, and be found at another clandestinely favouring the friends of the Reformation. Had it been possible for the jarring interests of theology and politics to have been so united, as to have allowed the pope to exert his undivided power for the consummation of one important object, the most fatal consequences might have ensued.

With Henry IV. the splendour and influence of the Gallic throne sunk prematurely. A stormy minority relaxed all the sinews of government. A vain and ambitious regent, incapable ministers, and undeserving favourites, squandered in dissipation and intrigue the treasure collected by the economy of Sully, and destined by his master to the noblest purposes. Surrounded on every side by jarring factions, and exclusively occupied in a selfish contention for the spoils of the nation, they had neither leisure nor inclination to attend to foreign affairs. The same impolitic spirit of intolerance, which had armed one half of Germany against the other, had

also kindled in France the flame of rebellion; so that when Lewis assumed the reins of government, he found his kingdom convulsed by domestic dissensions, and destitute of external consideration. Repressed by the wisdom and the humanity of his father, the Hugonots had availed themselves of the weakness incidental to a divided government, to give extent and stability to their power, and had rendered Rochelle, a strong and commercial city, the centre and capital of rebellion. Too superstitious to employ the only adequate remedy, an enlightened system of toleration, and destitute of resources to carry into execution the injudicious plan, which he foolishly resolved to adopt, the son of Henry was shortly reduced to the humiliating expedient of purchasing the allegiance of haughty nobles, whom he was no longer able to control; thus rendering rebellion the surest road to honours, wealth, and authority. His impolicy in deserting the German protestants has been already discussed. Such ill-directed measures tended equally to undermine the prosperity of France, and to degrade her national character; but, fortunately for the glory and aggrandisement of a country destined eventually to support so illustrious a part on the splendid theatre of the universe, the schemes projected by the wisdom of Henry IV. were about to revive with increasing energy under the vigorous administration of Richelieu.

While the splendour of France was sullied by the feebleness and venality of her government, the republic of Holland, having gloriously broken the fetters of Spain, established the fabric of her commercial prosperity on the solid basis of freedom. The enthusiasm of liberty, infused into every bosom by

the glorious example of the princes of the house of Orange, transformed a mercantile nation into a nation of heroes. Grateful for the assistance which they had formerly received from the German protestants, they felt eager to repay the important obligation; convinced that, by contributing to their emancipation, they must eventually raise an insuperable barrier against the despotic projects of Austria. But their exertions were circumscribed by necessity. To resist the machinations of the Spanish court demanded every effort of strength and understanding that the infant commonwealth could command. Yet the anxiety to assist an unfortunate ally overcame every minor consideration, which might have fettered the activity of more powerful states; and we accordingly find a Dutch army prepared to co-operate in the defence of the palatinate.

Notwithstanding the crowns of England and Scotland were at length united, no real accession of strength had accrued to the British nation. On the contrary, the consideration which she had enjoyed under the politic administration of Elizabeth, was quickly impaired by the timidity of her successor. Convinced that the stability of her own throne depended upon the success of the protestant cause, the daughter of Henry consented to sacrifice one of the strongest propensities of her heart, the love of economy, in support of every enterprise which tended to circumscribe the influence of Spain. To have persevered in a scheme of such consummate prudence, required talents very different from those with which the son of Darnley was endowed. Taught by the pedantry of his education to consider wisdom as consisting in the knowledge of words, or the systematical arrangement of a syllogism, he ren-

dered himself despicable in the eyes of Europe by the pompous imbecility of his measures ; neglecting every object that ought to have occupied the attention of a prudent prince, for the pursuit of trifles equally undeserving of his notice, as a man, a scholar, or monarch. While the frugal Elizabeth, with well-timed generosity, poured forth her treasures in aid of the Dutch, and assisted in placing a protestant hero upon the throne, James abandoned his daughter and her unfortunate husband, to the malice of their inveterate enemy. Absorbed in deducing the regal authority from the special appointment of heaven, he totally forgot that the absurdity of the attempt endangered the claim which he foolishly wished to establish.

Such was the prelude to those disastrous scenes, which, overwhelming England with discord and blood, in the struggle between prerogative and privilege, prevented her from interfering with continental politics. The storm had been long collecting, and burst with a fury that nothing could resist. Whether the greatest talents, combined with the greatest moderation, could have averted its impetuosity, must ever remain matter of speculation; certain, however, it is, that the system pursued by the misguided Charles had a directly opposite tendency. Impressed by his father with the most extravagant notions concerning the divine authority of kings, and possessing courage and cunning for the attempt, he rashly undertook to realize the preposterous theory. Hence arose that war, which (as Mr. Fox observes, with his usual discrimination,) "has been so intemperately denominated a rebellion," and which terminated in the death of the king, and the extinction of monarchy.

The situation of Sweden will come under consideration at a future period, with greater propriety; and respecting Denmark, it may be sufficient to remark, that the active genius of Christian IV. by creating a navy, introducing discipline and order in the management of the army, and establishing a regular system of economy in the internal administration, had given security, consideration, and energy to his country.

In conformity to the pressing solicitation of his allies, Ferdinand had postponed the gratification of his resentment, till enabled by victory to be unjust with impunity. But when the battle of Prague had subjugated Bohemia, and annihilated all the hopes of his rival, he no longer set bounds to his vindictive temper, but determined, by one decisive blow, to gratify his hatred of Frederic, and of heresy.

On the 21st of January, 1621, an edict appeared, by which, without assembling a diet, or even attempting to conceal the iniquity of the proceeding under the prostituted forms of law, Frederic and his adherents were subjected as traitors to the bar of the empire. By this violent act, no less repugnant to the spirit than insulting to the members of the Germanic constitution, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Jägendorf, the Prince of Anhalt, and the Count of Hohenlohe, were deprived of their honours and territories.* The execution of the sentence was committed to Archduke Albert, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, as protector of the circle of Burgundy, and to the Duke of Bavaria; the former of whom was directed to invade the Lower Palati-

* Lotichius, i. 231. Barre, ix. 507. Schmidt, iv. 10.

nate, while the Upper was occupied by the troops of Maximilian.

This vigorous measure spread universal consternation among the protestants, while it was applauded by the catholics with exaggerated praise, as the consummation of wisdom and virtue. There were not wanting, however, even in the Austrian cabinet, men sufficiently enlightened to discover the impolicy of deviating from judicial precedents, and to foretel the consequent dangers. Hohenzollern, the president of the Aulic council, refused to be present at the ratification of the decree, alledging, in his excuse, that his conscience forbade him to sanction a measure, which invested a man with the functions of judge in his own cause, in which the execution had preceded the sentence.* And this was literally the case, as the invasion of the Palatinate was undertaken previously to the condemnation of the elector, and in direct violation of the treaty concluded with the "Evangelical Union." Neither was the system pursued less contrary to the forms than subversive of the principles of jurisprudence. Frederic had been condemned without being suffered to plead in his own defence, or even being cited to appear before any tribunal; and yet Ferdinand, upon his accession to the imperial throne, had signed a capitulation, by which he solemnly engaged never to issue the ban against any member of the Germanic confederacy, without strictly adhering to every formality usual in forensic processes. Circumstances, however, were now materially altered, and, as he no longer wanted support, he scarcely deigned to

* *Mémoire de Léonise Julianæ*, 175. It is said that Ferdinand, upon this occasion, was governed entirely by the advice of the Spanish court.

offer any apology for this flagrant breach of his coronation oath, or even attempted to palliate an action, which could not be defended on any grounds, except the tyrant's plea of necessity.

That a sovereign, educated according to the maxims of the Spanish court, should regard terror as the readiest instrument of government, it is consistent with reason to expect: we cannot therefore be astonished to learn that the Bohemian insurgents were treated with relentless severity. Three months, however, were suffered to elapse, after the battle of Prague, involved in awful suspense. This mysterious silence tempted many, who had fled in the general confusion, to return again to their estates; and so great was the delusion, which universally prevailed, that numbers remained at home in perfect security, though secretly admonished of the impending danger by Tilly.* At length, however, the tempest burst in all its fury: at the same hour precisely, and in the dead of night, forty-eight of the leaders of the disaffected party were seized in their beds, and being brought to trial before a special commission, seven and twenty were condemned to suffer upon a scaffold, and their property ordered to be confiscated.† Being for the most part persons in opulent circumstances, it may be presumed that the sentence was regarded by their judges as a financial expedient. Those who escaped with their lives were either doomed to banishment, or to per-

* Though this fact is mentioned by Cox, upon the authority of Pelzel, it is not easy to believe, that the callous breast of the plunderer of Magdeburg was ever accessible to pity.

† Piacessius speaks thus of the execution of the Bohemian nobles, "suppliciis, nob Christiano solum homini, sed quantuvis barbaro, ob inumanem crudelitatem, execrandis," 350.

petual imprisonment, accompanied with the sequestration of their fortune. The rage of party being thus far satiated with the destruction of those, who had imprudently trusted to a tyrant's humanity, a citation was issued, commanding the emigrants to appear before the imperial tribunal within a limited period ; and their neglect being construed into a proof of criminality, they were declared guilty of treason, and incurred in consequence the penalty of death and confiscation. Among these was Thurn, and several other noblemen, conspicuous for talent and probity.*

Had the proscription been confined entirely to those, who had taken an active part in the war, it might have been easy for flattery to have extenuated inhumanity by precedents of the highest authority ; but for the atrocities which ensued, no precedent could be found since the days of the second triumvirate. An edict, devised with more than inquisitorial severity, commanded all land-holders, who had been concerned in opposing the authority of the emperor, to make an ample confession of their guilt before commissioners appointed to receive their depositions, under pain of incurring the most rigorous punishment. Terror now pervaded every condition of life ; because a field was opened for malice and delation to which loyalty the most unshaken had nothing to oppose. Persuaded that the penalty attached to discovery would be less rigid than that denounced against concealments, above seven hundred persons of noble birth

* Lotichius, i. 235.—After the detail he gives of this bloody tragedy, the reader cannot but be surprised to meet with an eulogium upon the clemency of Ferdinand.

inscribed their names on the list of delinquents. To these unfortunate victims of credulity, imperial clemency (for so it was insultingly styled in the partial language of the court,) condescended to grant their lives and titles ; but as justice required that such atrocious crimes should not escape with impunity, their estates were confiscated, either in part, or wholly, according to the measure of their offence ; and thus were many of the most opulent families reduced to absolute penury.*

Having satisfied resentment, and filled his treasury, Ferdinand resolved to avail himself of the general consternation for the extirpation of the protestant tenets. Yet being apprehensive of the consequences, which might naturally be expected from a sweeping edict of unconditional proscription, he deemed it adviseable to proceed by progressive steps, though his unbending temper revolted at the idea of even a temporary compromise with heresy. The first effects of his indignation were accordingly levelled against the unorthodox preachers of the capital, who received positive injunctions to evacuate Bohemia. The part which they had acted during the late revolution, by exciting the people in seditious sermons to persevere in the righteous cause, was alledged as the motive for their banishment, because the emperor was still anxious to conceal from the protestants the extent of his secret designs.† His zeal however was much too intemperate for prudence long to restrain it ; and we accordingly find that the exercise of every religion,

* Pelzel, 731.

† Lotichius, i. 240. Puffendorf, i. 36.

except the papal, was shortly forbidden by an imperial rescript.*

In the political constitution of Bohemia he made few alterations.† Some historians indeed affirm, that he commanded the documents, from which the national privileges were derived, to be delivered into his hands, and that he immediately burned them with many expressions of contempt. This accusation however reposes upon no solid foundation, as the original deed is still in existence. The seal and signature of Rodolph are torn off from the "Letter of Majesty," but all the other acts are entire; nay more, were confirmed by Ferdinand himself, in 1627, at his son's coronation, ‡ with the additional concession, that no contributions in future should be imposed upon the Bohemians, without the concurrence of their representative.§

Notwithstanding the enormous sum of forty millions of florins,|| is supposed to have entered the imperial coffers, from the forfeitures levied upon the adherents of Frederic, yet so prodigal was the emperor in his donations to the clergy, and so insatiable were the Jesuits in their demands, that he found it impossible to recompense the services of his friends, without resorting to fresh confiscations. To find an adequate reward for the deserts of Maximilian was indeed a difficult task; but to satisfy his expectations was impossible. Previously to the commencement of hostilities, the emperor had

* 1621. Puffendorf, i. 36.

† Hist. Persecut. Eccles. Bohem. 294.

‡ Schmidt, iv. 19.

§ Pelzel, 753.

|| About four millions sterling.

engaged by a solemn contract to reimburse him for the expenses which he might incidentally incur in his defence. The hour of retribution was now arrived ; but the treasures extorted from the plundered nobles were already lavished. In this dilemma, the spoils of the Palatine afforded the only resource. By transferring the honours and territories of that unfortunate prince to the house of Bavaria, he gratified at once all the meanest propensities of his nature ; by crushing a rival he indulged his pride and resentment in their fullest extent ; he rewarded Maximilian without the smallest sacrifice at which avarice could repine ; and satisfied every scruple with which a conscience more delicate might have allayed his triumph by promoting the glory of orthodox Christianity.

The " Evangelical Union," so unworthy of the appellation which it ostentatiously assumed, and of the cause it undertook to defend, began now to experience the fatal consequences of its former indecision. With an indifference, almost surpassing the limits of human imbecility, the members had beheld the ruin of their leader, who, if permanently seated on the Bohemian throne, and properly supported by his allies, might have become the firmest pillar of the protestant church, and established it upon a foundation too solid for despotism or bigotry to undermine. Having imprudently suffered the propitious moment to escape, no alternative remained but to endeavour to purchase precarious safety by the dereliction of every principle for the protection of which they had coalesced. Terrified by the example of Frederic, they hastily concluded a treaty at Mentz, by which they abandoned that unfortunate prince to his unhappy destiny ; and, as

a convincing proof of their pacific intentions, consented immediately to disband their forces. By this dishonourable act the confederacy was dissolved and no attempt was afterwards made to revive it.*

Though shamefully abandoned by his former colleagues, Frederic still possessed a friend, who served him with fidelity under every reverse. Secure behind the ramparts of Pilsen, Mansfeldt bid defiance to the whole power of Austria. Though uncertain of ever receiving the smallest reward, he defended the town with heroical courage, till the soldiers actually began to mutiny for want of pay. Destitute of funds to satisfy their importunity, and too weak to enforce obedience, he left the command to an officer of experience, upon whose fidelity he thought he could rely, and repaired to Heilbron, where the protestant princes were assembled, in hopes of obtaining a scanty subsidy, to alleviate his immediate necessities. But while he was exerting every effort in support of a cause, to which his reputation and honour were pledged, Tilly prevailed upon his lieutenant to surrender. This disastrous event was soon followed by the loss of all the Bohemian fortresses.†

In the opinion of his contemporaries, that gallant adventurer had now terminated his eccentric career; but, at the moment when he was supposed to be irretrievably ruined, he suddenly appeared in the Upper Palatinate, more an object of terror than ever. Having received a scanty supply from Denmark and England, and more extensive powers

* Lotichius, i. 242. Schmidt, iv. 19.

† Lotichius, i. 251. Schmidt, iv. 23.

from Frederic, he collected an army of twenty thousand men, the greater part of whom had been recently dismissed by the Evangelical Union. So formidable a force, depending entirely upon their rapacity for sustenance, and commanded by a general of consummate ability, whose only fortune consisted in his sword, could not fail to excite universal dismay. By many it was believed, that an attempt would be made to recover Bohemia before reinforcements could arrive from Vienna. To others, however, it appeared more probable, that Mansfeldt would direct his vengeance against the unprotected members of the Catholic League; and by levying contributions on all ecclesiastical property recruit his ruined finances. But whatever in reality might have been his intentions, little time was allowed him for carrying them into effect, as the Duke of Bavaria, after forming a junction with Tilly, marched with the utmost celerity to the succour of his allies. Incapable of opposing the overwhelming torrent, Mansfeldt was compelled to fall back upon Franconia, whose unexhausted fertility promised abundant supplies. But scarcely had he taken a strong position in the vicinity of Nuremberg, when the Bavarian army appeared. His situation was now become critical in the extreme, as he was equally in want of provisions and ammunition, should his camp be invested by Maximilian. Neither could he attempt to extricate himself by a precipitate retreat, without exposing his harassed and disheartened troops to inevitable destruction. Nothing, therefore, remained, except to endeavour by stratagem to overreach the foe, and to this he accordingly resorted. A confidential officer communicated to the Duke of Bavaria, under the seal

of secrecy, his commander's determination to abandon a cause rendered desperate by the disunion of its leaders; and further hinted, that he might be induced by an adequate offer to enter into the imperial service. The prospect of gaining over such a formidable adversary was too seducing even for the wary Maximilian to resist; and, without further hesitation, he sent back the officer with unlimited powers to treat. A negotiation so delicate could not be concluded without some deliberation. The electoral troops were destitute of every thing necessary for their subsistence; and, if not immediately relieved, might desert. The honour of Mansfeldt was at stake; and money and provisions were in consequence dispatched from the Bavarian camp sufficient for the exigency of the moment. This was exactly the object at which Mansfeldt had aimed. His soldiers were refreshed, their arrears were discharged, the enemy was lulled into security. Availing himself of their supineness he decamped in the night; and, though pursued by Tilly with the utmost celerity, he gained the Lower Palatinate in safety.*

Though the contemptuous neglect with which his remonstrances had been treated shewed plainly that nothing could be expected from negotiation, still the timidity of James revolted at the idea of involving the nation in hostilities. Allured by the offer of a marriage between his son and the Infanta,† he patiently suffered himself to be amnised by promises repeatedly broken, and no sooner broken than

* Barre, ix. 508.

† In this celebrated transaction, it is difficult to determine which most deserves contempt, the credulity of James, the romantic folly of Charles, the insolence of Buckingham, or the duplicity of Spain.

fair would be amicably terminated, the moment the King of England should have compelled his son-in-law to make proper atonement for his misconduct." He farther added, that "as the emperor had hitherto acted by the advice of his allies, it was necessary for him to consult them upon the present occasion. The result of their deliberations he promised to communicate to his Britannic majesty, without the smallest reserve, immediately after the conclusion of the diet. It was, however, requisite," he said, "to observe, that the contending parties, being unequal in rank, they could not treat on terms of equality. Notwithstanding the nature of the war, (a war between a rebellious vassal and his legitimate sovereign) still the clemency of Ferdinand was disposed to pardon every insult offered to his authority, provided the Palatine would produce undoubted proofs of the sincerity of his repentance, and give security for his allegiance in future.*

Digby, who had too much penetration to mistake the meaning of this declaration, no sooner heard of the movements of the Bavarian army than he renewed his remonstrance in more urgent language; and, being referred to Maximilian, as the only person invested with powers to conclude an armistice, he set out immediately for Munich. Upon opening the business, and assuring the duke that the emperor had consented to a suspension of arms, that artful prince jocosely told him, "that it was superfluous to enter into any negociation, because hostilities had actually ceased; and I doubt not," continued he, with a triumphant smile, "to prevent any-

* Le Vassor, v. 230.

farther commotions, by keeping possession of the Palatinate, till a permanent peace shall be established."*

Such insolent treatment could not fail to excite the indignation of any man, who felt for the honour of England, and Digby accordingly complained to the emperor, with a spirit becoming a Briton. Ferdinand asserted, "that the conduct of Maximilian was strictly conformable to the laws of war; and that he had done his duty in protecting his allies against the incursions of Mansfeldt, who had invaded their territories at the head of an army, avowedly in the pay of the elector."†

The truce having expired between Spain and the Dutch, Spinola was recalled from Germany, in order to take the command of an armament destined for the invasion of Holland. Gonsales de Cordova, his successor in the Palatinate, anxious to distinguish himself by some splendid achievement, invested Frankendahl with a degree of precipitation more creditable to his courage than to his capacity. The vigilance of Mansfeldt was always ready to take advantage of the errors of an opponent; and as the operations of the seige too plainly indicated that the troops were no longer under the direction of Spinola, he determined, by a bold and unexpected blow, to revive the lustre of the electoral arms. With him a project was no sooner conceived than it was carried into execution. The army was instantly put in motion, and by hasty marches surprised Gonsales, who being unprepared for their reception, abandoned the siege with the utmost precipitation.

* Hume, *aix.*

† 1621. Le Vassor, v. 234.

Though highly glorious to the military reputation of Mansfeldt, this splendid action was attended with no permanent benefit, because he found it impossible to support himself in a country completely exhausted by former depredations; but as Frankendahl was rescued from imminent peril, and the garrisons of Manheim and Heidelberg were reinforced, he quitted his position with less anxiety. Directing the torrent of his arms against the ecclesiastical principalities of Strasburg and Spires, he swept every thing before him with the impetuosity of a deluge. Those wealthy provinces, which as yet had experienced only a scanty share of the horrors of war, afforded the necessary refreshment for his harassed soldiers, and ample funds for the prosecution of hostilities.*

To follow minutely this active commander through all his various enterprizes would lead into useless details; because, though characterized by the most striking illustrations of genius, they seldom led to important results. Suffice it to remark, that notwithstanding he was endowed with abilities which have rarely fallen to the lot of mortal, and which frequently give to the best authenticated facts the equivocal splendour of romance, he was scarcely less indebted to the jealousies which prevailed between Tilly and Cordova, than to his own unrivalled talents for success. Had they heartily co-operated in one regular plan it would have been impossible for him long to have resisted; but he was saved by their private dissensions; and when compelled by their approach to evacuate one province, or over-

* Schmidt, iv. 20.

whelmed in appearance by a host of foes, either by the celerity of his movements or the fertility of his invention, he always found means to escape.

The indolence of James had been at length stimulated to send a small body of English to assist in the defence of the Palatinate. Their commander, Sir Horace Vere, though at the head of no more than six thousand men, compensating by courage and activity for every deficiency,* rendered himself so formidable to the imperialists, that Frederic began once more to cherish the delusive hope of recovering his dominions. Impelled by a disposition naturally sanguine, and the transient gleam of prosperity, he quitted his asylum in Holland, and arriving in disguise in Mansfeldt's camp, conferred the sanction of an illustrious name upon the operations of a predatory banditti. Encouraged by the success of the British troops, and anxious to shew their beloved sovereign to a brave and loyal people, Mansfeldt crossed the Rhine,† and uniting with the Margrave of Baden-Dourlach, prepared for a vigorous campaign.‡

* We may fairly conclude, that the ambassador of James would not, voluntarily disparage his exertions, and we may consequently give unbounded credit to the following statement, transmitted in a dispatch to secretary Naunton. "The new English troops, commanded by my Lord general Vere, began to rise this day out of their several garrisons, where they have lain thus long for want of good arms; those which were provided them by such as were put in trust, being unserviceable; and now I have procured them to be well and sufficiently furnished out of the state magazines, with all other helps fit for their journey." 485.

† At Germesheim.

‡ Lotichius, i. 302.—Before he ventured to declare war against the emperor, the Margrave resigned his dominions to his son, with positive injunctions to observe the strictest neutrality; by which precaution he flattered himself to prevent the ruin of his family, in case of his own defeat.

While the western provinces of the empire were alternately ravaged by friends and foes, another adventurer arose in the north, more fierce and sanguinary than any commander who till then had wielded the sword of plunder. Christian, of Brunswick, a younger brother of the reigning duke, and himself administrator of Halberstadt, instructed by Mansfeldt in the important secret of maintaining soldiers without any natural resources, erected his standard in Lower Saxony; and, being joined by crowds, whom want or profligacy had rendered desperate, soon collected a formidable army. Animated by an ardent passion for military renown, and by hatred no less violent against the papal religion, because his own revenues being derived from the secularised property of the church depended on the stability of the protestant communion, he pillaged the wealthy prelates of Saxony with the inexorable rapacity of a barbarian. Yet the same man, who carried his detestation of popery to such a pitch, as to coin money out of the plate of which he plundered the convents, with the following ludicrous inscription—“Christian of Brunswick, the friend of God, and the enemy of priests,” affected all the patriotism of an ancient German, and all the chivalrous gallantry of romance.* Enriched with ecclesiastical spoils, and strengthened by numerous reinforcements, he shaped his destructive course toward the banks of the Rhine, hoping, by a junction with the electoral army, to render his power irresistible. The ex-

* 1622. His admiration for the Electress Palatine is represented by all historians as unbounded.

pectations of the protestants began now to revive ; they no longer contemplated the resources of Austria in sullen despair, but looked forward to victory and retaliation.*

The conquest of the Palatinate, and the destruction of a rival, were objects so dear to the emperor, that every thing was sacrificed to their attainment. He therefore felt happy to conclude a truce with Bethlem Gabor, upon terms not inconsistent with honour, in order that his troops might be at liberty to act upon the banks of the Rhine ; convinced that his losses in Hungary would be easily recovered when the fate of Frederic should be finally decided.

Since the death of Bucquoy, killed in a skirmish with a foraging party,† the affairs of the emperor had gradually deteriorated in Hungary, because it was impossible to discover among the Austrian generals a commander of equal capacity. The Poles having also been defeated in a sanguinary battle with the Turks, the latter now remained at liberty to turn their impetuous valour against Austria. These considerations tempted Ferdinand to abandon all power and patronage to Gabor, provided he was suffered to retain the regal title.‡

* The princes of Hesse Cassel and of Wirtemberg were the first who began to prepare for war. The greater part of the money coined by Christian was derived from twelve silver statues of the apostles, which the bigotry of preceding ages had consecrated in the cathedral of Munster. When accused of impiety by some of his followers, he sheltered himself under the authority of scripture, and pretended to have only realized the ancient precept,—“ Go hence into all the parts of the earth.” —Galetti, i. 52.

† Lotichius, i. 256.

‡ Almost the only article of importance obtained by Ferdinand, in re-

No sooner, however, was peace concluded, than a revolution at Constantinople threw the Turkish empire into such confusion, that all the apprehensions of Ferdinand were removed. The insolence of the Janizaries had risen to such an alarming height, that the sultan was little more than a titled slave, whose authority, and even life, depended entirely on their caprice. Eager to escape from this ignominious thraldom, Osman was supposed to have formed the project of conducting the greater part of those undisciplined bands into a distant province, under pretext of a pilgrimage to Mecca, and then abandoning them to the fury of the provincial troops, collected in numbers to destroy them. Whether founded in reality, or propagated merely as an incentive to insurrection, the report was received with avidity, and excited the fury of the pretended victims to such a degree, that they rushed into the seraglio with tumultuous violence, deposed the trembling sultan, whose dastardly behaviour proved him unworthy to reign, and elevated in his place the stupid Mustapha, whom a former revolution had hurled from the throne, but whom the clemency of his successor and his own insignificance had preserved. This wretched puppet, whose propensity to gluttony would have induced him to barter the Ottoman sceptre for a favourite dish, was too contemptible even for the contemptible office allotted him by a mutinous soldiery, who valued him only on account of those qualities, which rendered him

turn for many valuable concessions, was the re-establishment of the Jesuits in Hungary; and this was subject to the condition that the reformed religion should enjoy the most ample toleration.—Lotichius, i. 271.

an object of universal derision. A government so despicable could not long exist; and a party being formed in favour of Amurat, a younger brother of Osman, created such dissensions in the Turkish councils, that they had neither leisure nor inclination to disturb the repose of Christendom.*

The presence of Frederic, by giving reputation and courage to his troops, excited fresh alarm at Vienna. In case a junction should be effected between the three protestant armies, which pillaged the provinces between the Rhine and the Elbe, it was far from impossible that hostilities might be carried into the hereditary provinces of Austria. It was therefore determined by splendid offers to tempt the venality of the hostile generals. Isabella, governess of the Spanish Netherlands, was accordingly instructed to enter into a negociation with Mansfeldt; and the overtures made him were no less gratifying to his vanity than advantageous to his fortune. A principality supported by an adequate revenue, a large sum of money to be advanced immediately by way of gratuity, the rank of marshal in the imperial service, with five thousand horse at his own disposal, were strong inducements to a soldier, who had nothing in the world that he could call his own. The proposal, however, brilliant as it was, failed of success, and it is even matter of doubt, whether it was ever seriously listened to. Like a man accustomed to subsist on the uncertain produce of gaining, Mansfeldt could not bring himself to renounce the visionary prospect of precarious power for the tranquil comforts of rational repose.†

* Nani Historia Veneta, lib. v.

† Schmidt, iv. 21.

Encouraged by the presence of a legitimate chief, this daring adventurer compelled Tilly to abandon the siege of Tilsberg, and to fight him upon disadvantageous terms ; and, after defeating that experienced veteran with considerable slaughter, he completed his glory, by conducting Frederic in triumph to the electoral palace at Heidelberg.

The same spirit of jealousy, which had rendered abortive the designs of Tilly, proved scarcely less fatal to the protestants. While Mansfeldt continued with the Margrave of Baden, the Austrians were too feeble to oppose them ; but after the armies separated, they were no longer equal to offensive operations. It is impossible to attribute this destructive measure to want of foresight ; the talents of the commanders refute the accusation. We must therefore suppose, either that the surrounding country was so thoroughly drained as to be incapable any longer of affording supplies for their united forces ; or, what is still more probable, that the haughty soul of Mansfeldt, inflated with victory, and the proud conviction of transcendent merit, disdained to decide the command with a colleague, whose rank prevented his serving in a subordinate station, though decidedly inferior in abilities.*

While Mansfeldt remained to defend the Palatinate, the margrave undertook to divert the attention of Tilly, by a sudden irruption into Bavaria. That vigilant general, however, prevented by his activity the completion of a project, which must have greatly embarrassed his future operations. No

* Puffendorf, i. 38.

sooner had he penetrated the designs of the enemy, than he invited Cordova to sacrifice for the present their private animosity to the public service, and to co-operate in an enterprize, which, if carried into execution with vigour and success, could not fail to reflect the greatest honour on both. The Spaniard, unwilling to be outdone in generosity, accepted the proposal; and, hastening to the assistance of his rival, they intercepted the margrave in his march, and defeated him at Wimpfen* after a sanguinary battle.

The event of the contest, which deprived the vanquished of all his military resources, proved still more disastrous from its political effects. The vindictive temper of Ferdinand never lost an opportunity of insulting the distress of a prostrate foe; and he accordingly availed himself of a dispute, between the protestant and catholic branches of the house of Baden, respecting the right of succession to certain bailiwicks, to adjudge the litigated property to the orthodox claimant.†

The calamitous consequences of the margrave's temerity were in some measure repaired by the diligence of Mansfeldt, who, crossing the Rhine with unexampled celerity, defeated a considerable body of Austrians, which had taken advantage of his absence to lay siege to Haguenau, a strong fortress in Alsace, and on that account selected by the electoral general as a secure asylum for plunder.

Elated with victory, and eager to punish a de-

* 1622. Puffendorf, i. 38. Lotichius, i. 304. Schmidt, iv. 21.

† Theatr. Europ. i. 678. Puffendorf, *ibid.* Barre, ix. 521.

generate member of the reformed church, he directed his march along the banks of the Rhine, and pouring all his vengeance upon the defenceless territory of Darmstadt, surprised the capital, which was abandoned to the fury of a licentious soldiery, as a recompense worthy of their toils, and seizing the langrave in the midst of his little court, conducted him a prisoner to Manheim.*

Terrified at the vicinity of such formidable neighbours, the mercantile timidity of Francfort hastened to offer a moderate ransom under the precarious title of donation ; but the approach of the imperialists suspended the negociation, and compelled the elector and Mansfeldt to regain the Palatinate, an undertaking of difficulty and danger.

But the loss sustained during a hasty retreat was far from proving the greatest calamity which this predatory enterprise occasioned. The Austrian commanders being now secure from any attempts on their rear, directed all their efforts against the Duke of Brunswick, and falling in with him as he was preparing to pass the Maine, at Hoechst, near Francfort, took all his artillery and baggage. Pursuing this advantage with masterly skill, Tilly followed him into the Palatinate ; and though unable to prevent his junction with Mansfeldt, it was not long before he obliged them both to evacuate the electoral territory, and to seek security and subsistence in the more fertile province of Alsace.†

* *Theatr. Europ.* i. 678. *Puffendorf*, i. 83. *Barre*, ix. 521.

† It is curious to observe with what inveteracy the orthodox and pious Caraffa directs the vengeance of Providence against heretics. Speaking of the defeat of Christian, he emphatically says, “ecclesiasticos pecunia

The prospects of Frederic became now so gloomy, that the margrave deemed it prudent to avert impending ruin, by withdrawing entirely from the stormy scene. Having embraced this resolution, he disbanded his troops, and repairing with a few attendants to the castle of Hochberg, his favourite residence, he resolved to pass the remainder of his days in the tranquil enjoyments of retirement. The fortitude of Mansfeldt, however, was not to be subdued by the rudest shocks of adversity; while he had a single regiment equal to the active duties of a campaign, or a single enemy to plunder, his persevering courage looked confidently forward to better times, conscious of deserving the admiration of his contemporaries, and of occupying a conspicuous place in history.

While he was diligently employed in providing sustenance for his followers, at the expense of the pillaged Alsacians, Tilly completed the conquest of the Palatinate by the reduction of Manheim and Heidelberg. The former indeed offered little resistance; but the latter was defended with a determined courage, which should have entitled the inhabitants to a milder destiny. Humanity, however, was not among the virtues of Tilly; and he probably regarded it as an effeminate quality, disgraceful to the character of a soldier. The city at length being carried by assault, and given up to plunder, was treated with all the insolence and barbarity which

multavit, ecclesiae thesaurum invasit, et sacra Lipsana saucti liborū optimo argento et auro inclusa profauavit, aureamque thecam sacrilige furatus, in stipendia militum insolentissimorum post cusam monetam effudit; quod sacrilegium non occulte deus in principe tam iniquo ulcisci voluit; nam notarunt nonnulli, post tam probosum, scelestunque facinus, nunquam poster victoram aliquam reportavit." 117.

rapine or bigotry could inflict. The calamities occasioned by the devastation of arms, may, in general, be repaired by time and industry; but, during the sack of Heidelberg, there perished treasures which it was impossible ever to replace. The electoral library, one of the richest in Europe in curious manuscripts, and formed at an enormous expense, was irrecoverably mutilated, by the ignorance of men, incapable of appreciating its inestimable value. The greater part of the books, however, being luckily preserved, were afterwards distributed by the Duke of Bavaria, as marks of friendship to his allies;* and the rarest works being allotted, with pious prodigality, to the papal library, were carefully deposited in the Vatican.†

This unwearied course of prosperity, however, proved insufficient to calm the apprehensions of Ferdinand, who looked forward with dread to an approaching reverse, while Mansfeldt and Brunswick were in arms; for he was no stranger to the intentions of the protestant princes: he knew that from necessity, as well as inclination, they were hostilely inclined, and were ready to declare in favour of the elector, whenever it could be done with impunity. These considerations determined him to work upon the credulity of the English monarch, and thus render him instrumental to the ruin of Frederic. James's aversion to blood had induced him

* Caraffa is unable to conceal his contempt for the Germans, for having permitted this valuable collection to be carried out of their country: "Dum electores variis imperii negotiis intendereat, ego, impetrata a Bavariae electore bibliotheca Heidelbergensi, quae et copia librorum, et raritate manuscriptorum omnibus aliis in Germania, et forsitan in Europa, antecellebat, Roman transmittendam curavi." 150.

† Lotichius, i. 320. Bougrant, i. 91. Barre, ix. 528.—This valuable collection has been removed to Paris by Bouaparte.

to listen, with childish facility, to the treacherous overtures of the imperial cabinet; and, finding his efforts for the restoration of peace, not only seconded by Denmark, but even openly supported by the Saxon court, he began to flatter himself that the moment was at length arrived, when his endeavours would be crowned with success. Though determined to elude the demand, Ferdinand listened with benignity to the English ambassador, expressing his anxiety to bring the contest to an amicable issue, but declining to enter into any specific engagements, alledging, that it would be derogatory to the imperial dignity, to pardon a prince who still resisted his authority, laying waste the most populous provinces of the empire, and setting its laws and constitution at defiance. While the elector retained in his service men justly proscribed for the enormity of their crimes, it would be fruitless, he said, to offer plans of conciliation; but the moment Frederic should dismiss Mansfeldt and Brunswick, those foes to religion and social order, he would be ready to accede to any equitable arrangements which might lead to a general pacification.*

Persuaded that the emperor was for once sincere, though he had invariably deceived him in every negotiation, James prevailed on his son-in-law to disband his forces, and entirely to submit his future destiny to the precarious issue of a treaty.† Though no longer sanctioned by legalized appointments, the electoral generals were not disheartened, but resolved to continue a piratical warfare. Mansfeldt, indeed, was forced to relinquish the chimerical hope

* 1622, Puffendorf, i. 39.

† Schmidt, iv. 21.

of erecting for himself an independent principality in Alsace; but the world was open before him; the lustre of his reputation, and the relaxation of discipline, which distress compelled him to tolerate, drew to his standard adventurers of every nation; and to plunder he trusted for supplies. Determined boldly to face the persecutions of fortune, he collected the treasure deposited at Haguenau, and, in conjunction with the romantic admirer of the Electress Palatine, directed his course toward the frontiers of Lorraine, at the head of an army, consisting of eighteen thousand foot and eight thousand horse, with fourteen pieces of artillery, and attended by a prodigious concourse of women, whose profligacy and prodigality added greatly to the general confusion. Accustomed to subsist, like a horde of banditti, on the precarious produce of pillage, and to consider as their own whatever inflamed their cupidity, they equally derided the municipal institutions of civilized society and the divine commands of the Almighty. Proceeding onward in the career of devastation, they crossed the Moselle, and laid the opulent dioceses of Metz and Verdun under heavy contributions.

It now became requisite to make a selection between various plans, which presented themselves to the option of the commanders. The duchy of Luxembourg abounded in every thing to tempt avidity; the army might there repose in plenty from all its fatigues, and when their excesses should have exhausted that fertile province, there was nothing to obstruct their march towards Holland, where the bold adventurers had little doubt of meeting with a reward commensurate with their merits. Meanwhile the archduchess had renewed her invitation,

in the name of the Spanish court. Ferdinand also endeavoured to appease the resentment of Mansfeldt, by the most seducing proposals of dignity and emolument; while the King of England conjured him, with prayers and presents, not totally to abandon a cause, of which he was the firmest support. The Venetians were desirous of conferring upon him the supreme command of their armies; his services were even courted in France, where the Duke of Bouillon attempted to interest his active genius in defence of the Calvinists. Terrified by the exaggerated reports which daily arrived of the horrid excesses committed by his followers, the court likewise opened a negotiation for conferring upon him more solid advantages in the royal service. Never, perhaps, was mortal placed in a more extraordinary situation. Without a single acre that he could call his own, without property of any description, without rank or connexions, and even without any decided religion (for it was always dubious to what sect of Christians he belonged), by transcendent talents, and heroic courage, he had exalted his reputation to so elevated a height, that the greatest potentates contended for his favour.*

The character of Ferdinand was little calculated to overcome the scruples of Mansfeldt, and his pride revolted at a subordinate station though inferior only to Spinola. The prospects which presented themselves in the Dutch service were more analogous to his disposition; yet circumstances affording a favourable opportunity of extorting money from France, his necessities induced him to seize it.

* Bougeant, i. 94. Barre, ix. 530.

and he accordingly listened with apparent complacency to the proposals made him by Bouillon. Louis was at that time absent from his capital, occupied entirely with the senseless project of extirpating heresy in the south—the northern frontier was left unguarded. The queen-mother, to whom he had entrusted the management of affairs, grew alarmed at the danger to which she was exposed, anticipating all the horrors which awaited Paris, when a ferocious banditti should be in possession of the Louvre. Too feeble to assume a menacing aspect, the ministers had recourse to intrigue, and conceiving their only safety to consist in delay, they directed the Duke of Nevers, at that time governor of Champagne, to enter into a treaty with Mansfeldt, and to endeavour, by presents or promises, to retard his progress, till a force could be collected to oppose him. The attempt was less difficult than it at first appeared, because that eccentric hero had never entertained a serious thought of invading France, but intended merely by the terror of his name to tax the timidity of a fearful woman. The design however was not concealed with sufficient art to elude the penetration of Nevers, who protracted the negotiation under various pretences, till the enemy, reduced by disease and desertion, was constrained to retire precipitately. Having forced a passage through the Spanish army which attempted to impede his career, Mansfeldt persevered in his original plan of offering his services to the Dutch, and pursuing his way through an enemy's country, continually harassed by flying parties, and frequently reduced to the utmost distress for food and forage, he reached at length the frontiers of Holland, with

diminished numbers, but augmented fame; his retreat being admired by all competent judges as a masterpiece of military genius. After forming a junction with the Prince of Orange, the combined army was strong enough to compel Spinola to raise the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom.* This important enterprize being accomplished, the disorderly behaviour of their new allies alarmed the frugality of the Dutch, who caught with eagerness at the first opportunity of getting rid of such troublesome champions. Dismissed and rewarded by the sagacious republicans, Mansfeldt returned to the theatre of his former exploits.†

Though the heart of Louis XIII. was a perfect stranger to all the finer feelings of humanity, yet had it not been equally callous to the suggestions of prudence, he could not have contemplated without serious alarm the increasing influence of Austria. Few of his ministers indeed were blest with discernment duly to appreciate the danger, which threatened Europe, should Ferdinand be permitted to proceed undisturbed in his ambitious career. The sage Lesdiguières alone had spirit to combat the disgraceful system of temporising imbecility adopted by the cabinet of Paris: with an energy becoming his rank and experience, that gallant veteran represented to the king, that it was no less inconsistent with the interest than derogatory to the honour of his crown, to remain a tranquil spectator of the ruin of a prince, the firm friend and ally of his father. To this enlightened counsel his secret advisers opposed ideas more

* *Leticibus.*

† Barre, ix. 530. Schmidt, iv. 21. Puffendorf, i. 39.

analogous to the prejudices of the monarch, and more consistent with their own incapacity. Devoted from interest to the court of Madrid, or subjected through bigotry to the papal see, they endeavoured to persuade their master that the aggrandisement of Bavaria was a favourable circumstance for France, because the destruction of the protestants, a necessary consequence, would deliver his kingdom from every danger with which it must be threatened, while that restless sect should be able to abet his rebellious subjects in all their most desperate attempts. Addressing their arguments to the weakness of his intellect, they contended, that heresy could no longer maintain its impious dominion in France, when capable of deriving no further assistance from the parent fountain. "What motive," they asked, with an air of triumph, as if proud of the important discovery, "could render the prosperity of Maximilian prejudicial to the welfare of France." He alone, among the catholic princes of Germany, was capable of balancing the power of Ferdinand. By opposing his views of personal aggrandisement, the king would necessarily oblige him to unite his interests by closer ties with those of Austria; but by favouring his pretensions to the electoral dignity, he could not fail to establish a permanent ascendancy in the Bavarian councils, and to secure for ever the friendship of a prince, whom nature intended for his ally.*

Though totally destitute of solid foundation, and even repugnant to the most obvious principles of policy, this mode of reasoning had an air of

* Le Vassor, v. 337.

plausibility capable of misleading a man superior in sagacity to Louis; and he accordingly resolved to remain a tranquil spectator of the ruin of Frederic.*

That ill-advised prince was so completely stripped of his possessions, that he had nothing to lose except the electoral dignity; and to deprive him of that, without the consent of a diet, was too bold an infringement of the Germanic constitution, even for the arrogance of Ferdinand to attempt. A diet was accordingly convened at Ratisbonne, to which the apostate members of the protestant party were invited: for weak and divided as that party was, it was expected that their fears would render them subservient to the will of the emperor. The opposition of Saxony could alone prove formidable; but whatever might be the elector's personal feelings respecting the deposition of Frederic, he could not dispute the power of Ferdinand to depose a rebellious vassal, without invalidating his own claim; because he was indebted to a similar transaction for his seat in the electoral college. Still, however, he declined to sanction by his presence the injustice of a proceeding for which no precedent could be produced, except that of his ancestor Maurice. This resolution would have been highly creditable to the character of John George, had it proceeded from patriotism alone, and not been polluted by the sordid passions of avarice and superstition. But bigotry took fright at seeing the Lutheran divines involved in the Bohemian proscription, while covetousness murmured at the negligence of Ferdinand

* Le Vassor, v. 337.

in delaying so long the promised reward. The vacillating policy of the Elector of Brandenburg rejoiced at finding in the behaviour of his colleague an excuse for his own inactivity ; and their example was followed by the less powerful sovereigns of Brunswick and Pomerania, who refused even to send their representatives.*

Though the absence of many of the German

* Bougeaut, i. 99.—The jealousy of the protestants had been lately excited by an intercepted letter from the emperor to Don Balthasar Zuniga, who, during his embassy from Spain to the court of Vienna, had gained the confidence of Ferdinand. This curious document having fallen by accident into Mansfeldt's hands, was immediately published ; and, as it contributed to throw additional light upon the projects of Ferdinand, I have made the following extracts. After attributing the success of his arms with affected humility to the favour of Providence, propitiated by the purity of his faith, he thus proceeds—"with the Elector Palatine, its firmest prop, the abomination of heresy must be overthrown, unless we should be tempted with unpardonable lenity to take the sleeping serpent into our bosom. After the injuries which he has already sustained, no reconciliation with Frederic can be sincere. Besides, it is the very essence of Calvinism to regard no action as criminal, which can tend to disseminate its impious principles. The catholic religion, and the house of Austria, can never look for security, while they leave the power of injuring them in the hands of a rival at all times ready to exert it."

To this letter, written by a confidential secretary, a postscript was subjoined by Ferdinand himself; as he probably considered the concluding paragraph of too great consequence to be entrusted to any except Zuniga. " Could we obtain (I translate with literal precision, because the passage transcribed seems clearly to prove that in the breast of a bigot superstition may be a passion subservient to pride,) another vote in the electoral college, we might depend upon seeing the imperial crown immovably fixed upon the brow of a catholic, and probably upon that of an Austrian prince, because gratitude would induce the Duke of Bavaria, to devote himself entirely to the aggrandisement of a family, to which he is indebted for his own elevation."—Schmidt, iv. 22. This inference is by no means just, but the whole epistle presents a strange medley of sense and bigotry, of humility and presumption, of hypocrisy and resentment. It served however to elucidate two essential points of the utmost importance to the friends of the Reformation ; first, that it was the intention of the Austrian court to tolerate no religion except the papal ; and secondly, that it had formed a regular plan to render the imperial dignity hereditary.

princes, upon whose support he had confidently relied, proved a sensible mortification to the emperor, he had still the satisfaction of finding his conduct approved by a numerous assemblage of catholics. Encouraged by the servility, or the venality, of the audience, he opened the session in a studied harangue. After expatiating largely upon the extent and nature of the imperial prerogative, and his own moderation in exercising it, he adverted particularly to the case before them, the excesses committed by the Palatine troops, and the insult offered to his own authority. He then proceeds to state that as the merited retribution for such enormous offences, and in virtue of the power entrusted to him by Providence, and the unanimous assent of all the German states, he had thought proper to deprive a rebellious vassal of the electoral dignity, and to transfer that honour to the Duke of Bavaria, as a recompense due to his important services, as well as to his zeal for the orthodox religion.

To this splendid donation, with mercenary munificence, the Upper Palatine was annexed, in exchange for that part of the Austrian dominions which had been mortgaged to Maximilian.* An ample portion of the Lower Palatine was at the same time conferred upon the Duke of Neuberg, by way of compensation for his claim to the electorate, and the remainder was given to the Spaniards.†

A measure so decisive could not fail to excite the most enthusiastic delight in the bosoms of all who were blindly devoted to the papal see, but the im-

* Bougeant, i. 100.

† 1623. Ibid. Puffendorf, i. 40. Schmidt, iv. 22.

pression made on the minds of the protestants was widely different. The former contended that Ferdinand, by the exemplary punishment inflicted upon a bold and contumacious rebel, had not transgressed the bounds of his legitimate authority, but had merely fulfilled a sacred obligation, which in quality of guardian of the Germanic constitution he owed to heaven and to his country. The latter on the contrary censured the whole proceeding, as being essentially deficient in the necessary formalities, if not totally repugnant to the established principles of justice. To pass judgment upon an elector belonged alone to the electoral college; nor could any sentence be valid, unless confirmed by the unanimous assent of the whole order. But, in the present instance, that invaluable right had been grossly violated; as the first prince in the empire had been tried and degraded, without the participation of his peers, and even without being cited to appear before any tribunal whatever, a privilege conceded to the meanest criminal.*

Such were the sentiments entertained by the contending sects; but even when divested of religious enthusiasm, and unbiassed by the spirit of party, we calmly investigate the conduct of Ferdinand, it is difficult to justify it upon any principle of enlightened policy. Let us again recur to the arguments employed by his adversaries. After having clearly shewn that he had not only transgressed the forms universally prescribed in all criminal trials, but had even violated the engagement solemnly contracted with the whole German people at his coro-

* Schmidt, iv. 22. Lotichius, i. 342. Barre, ix. 538.

nation, they proceeded to examine the wisdom of his decision, as conducing to accomplish his designs. "The object of the emperor," they said, "as he has publicly declared, is to restore tranquillity to the empire; but is it probable that this should be effected by an action tending directly to inflame every hostile passion? Can it be supposed that Frederic will tamely submit to his unmerited destiny, while he has the means of continuing hostilities? Rigour, therefore, even admitting it to be founded in justice, is not the way to appease his resentment. By clemency indeed his anger might be disarmed. A generous oblivion of every transgression would not only awaken the gratitude of Frederic, but it would also serve to exalt the glory of the emperor, more than all the victories which he has obtained.*

"But even allowing that the Palatine by seditious practices has forfeited his hereditary honours, it would be the height of injustice to involve his innocent children in their father's disgrace. They have never transgressed the statutes of the empire; they have never rebelled against its sovereign."

However discordantly such well-established truths might sound in a despot's ear, prosperity had raised his presumption so high, that he rashly resolved to accomplish his purpose, in spite of the censure of mankind. Yet he so far condescended to sacrifice resentment to the public feeling, that he left open a door for reconciliation, assuring the friends of the degraded elector, that in consideration of their solicitations, he would not refuse to receive that unfortunate prince into his imperial favour, provided

* Barre, ix. 544.

he should immediately return to his duty, and make proper atonement for his past offences. He farther consented, that the transfer of the electorate to the house of Bavaria should not affect the rights of Frederic's children, nor those of the collateral branches of the Palatine family; but that they should be at perfect liberty to assert their claims after the death of Maximilian. To this delusive concession a declaration was annexed on the part of the Duke of Bavaria, expressing his readiness to ratify the compact by a specific engagement.*

Nothing now was wanting except the ceremony of investiture, which took place on the twenty-fifth of February,† in the presence of many catholic princes, and was conducted with extraordinary magnificence. Neither the Saxon nor Prussian deputies could be tempted to be present at this solemnity. Even the Spanish ambassador refused to attend, as his court affected to disapprove the deposition of Frederic, and had even protested against it. This device however proved too shallow to impose on any one, except the credulous successor of Elizabeth, who seemed delighted to find that his superior wisdom had at length met with the respect which it so deservedly merited.‡

* Londorp, x. 135. Barre, ix. 544.

† 1623.

‡ *Memoires de Louise Juliane*, 262.

CHAP. VI.

Consternation excited by Ferdinand's violence.—Religious persecution commenced in the Palatinate.—Mansfeldt and Brunswick continue hostilities. Attempt of the latter to recover Bohemia frustrated by the vigilance of Tilly.—Sudden change in the politics of England and France.—Treaty of Marriage between the Infanta and the Prince of Wales broken off, and an alliance contracted with Henrietta of France.—Growing power of Richelieu.—Disputes concerning the Valteline between the courts of Vienna and Paris.—The vigour and decision of the Cardinal.—Vast projects of Ferdinand excite the jealousy of all the Protestant states. A league formed to oppose him; and the command of the army entrusted to the King of Denmark. Imprudence of the choice in great measure ascribable to Charles I. of England. Activity of the Emperor.—Appearance and Character of Wallenstein; he levies an army at his own expense, seizes the bridge at Dessen, and repulses Mansfeldt, while Tilly defeats the Danish monarch. Mansfeldt rallies his forces, penetrates into Hungary, where he effects a junction with Bethlem Gabor. His death.

THOUGH the protestants had beheld the ruin of Frederic with apparent insensibility, they were at length awakened from the disgraceful torpor by the presumptuous insolence of the conqueror. The solemn mockery of justice, by which the liberties of Germany were in fact annihilated, gave a decided preponderance to the papal religion in the electoral college; and thus threatened to render the imperial crown hereditary in the Austrian family.* This however was a distant evil, and could affect only a part of the existing generation. But there were

* The protestants had only two votes, Brandenburg and Saxony, to oppose to those of Bohemia, Bavaria, Mentz, Treves, and Cologne.

other calamities, whose grievous pressure might be immediately felt, and toward these they looked with a degree of horror, bordering upon despair.

Ferdinand having humbled his personal enemies, had leisure to direct his fury against those whom he regarded as the enemies of God ; and a violent persecution was accordingly commenced in the hereditary states against every description of sectaries. The papal religion was also forcibly established in the Palatinate, and declared to be the only one which would be tolerated in future. This rash proceeding clearly indicated that a plan was in contemplation for the total extirpation of protestantism ; and that, with the freedom of worship, its followers would be deprived of all the secularized benefices.

Notwithstanding the alarm became general, it is highly probable that it might have been productive of nothing more formidable than complaints, and even those "not loud but deep," had not Brunswick and Mansfeldt been still unconquered. In spite of the heavy losses sustained in various encounters, no sensible diminution appeared in their ranks, as the chasms were instantly filled. The unbounded licentiousness in which their troops were indulged, the rich booty collected by those who survived, even the toils and chances of a military career, gave a zest to life, more congenial to the feelings of desperate men, than the regular enjoyments of domestic society. The characters of the commanders were also admirably calculated to attract the confidence and affection of beings, who considered valour as the most eminent of all human endowments. Invariably foremost at the post of danger, they shared in every hardship with the meanest soldier, when

money and provisions ran short; but when fortune smiled upon the adventurous enterprize, they also partook in his rudest gratifications with apparent delight. Thus the popularity of their manners, together with the advantages arising from indiscriminate plunder, attracted volunteers to their standards, while those of the regular and better disciplined armies could hardly procure a single recruit.*

After separating from his colleague, Mansfeldt supported himself for a considerable period by ravaging the fertile province of Friesland; till having reduced it by rapacity to extreme distress, he accepted a gratuity of three hundred thousand crowns, as a compensation for the humanity with which he had treated the inhabitants.†

Meanwhile the Duke of Brunswick had retired into Lower Saxony, where he was amicably received, upon promising not to molest the catholics. Convinced, however, that repose was abhorrent to his restless temper, the directors of the circle conferred upon him the command of the provincial militia, flattering themselves that the innocuous amusement of a parade might compensate the fatigues of more active service; but all endeavours to restrain the impetuosity of a man, designed by nature to shine amid the wreck of empires, were as ineffectual as an attempt to chain the winds, or to prescribe bounds to the ravages of the ocean. To personal friendship for the unfortunate elector, with whom he had been intimately acquainted in Holland, he united a romantic attachment for the daughter of James, which in the true spirit of chi-

* Schmidt, iv. 23.

† Ibid.

valry he proclaimed to the world, by substituting in the place of his ancient device the following motto: "For God and Her." Animated by the desire of restoring a sceptre to the object of his adoration, he formed the bold design of penetrating into Bohemia, and having united his forces with Bethlem Gabor under the walls of Prague, to replace Elizabeth and her husband on the throne.* The brilliant prospect thus presented to the enterprising courage of the Transilvanian by the ardour of Christian, and supported by the eloquence of the elder Thurn, who had been long exerting his powerful talents to rouse the jealousy of the Porte, was too seducing to be withstood, particularly as he was assured of the concurrence of several independent bashaws, who had been gained by the Bohemian patriot.†

Confident of adding to his former laurels, the waivode advanced to the frontier of Moravia with a formidable force, in full expectation of being received with open arms by an oppressed and irritated people; but the star of Austria again prevailed. The projects of Christian had been prematurely frustrated by the vigilance of Tilly, who, suspecting that some important plan was in agitation, suddenly quitted his cantonments in Hesse, and watched the valorous champion of religion and beauty so closely, that he was compelled to abandon his original scheme, and to endeavour to fortify himself

* Elizabethæ conjugi Frederici creptam de manibus chirothecam pileo suo accommodans, juraverit, non demissurum se symbolum illud e capite, priusquam regem Fridericum solis pragensi redditum vidisset.—Brachel. Hist. 58.

† 1623. Schmidt, iv. 23.

by a junction with Mansfeldt. Tilly, however, being aware of the design, pursued him with accelerated speed; and having overtaken him at Statlo, in the bishopric of Munster, a sanguinary conflict ensued, in which the gallant defender of Germanic freedom was severely wounded, and totally defeated, with the loss of all his artillery. Among the prisoners taken by the victorious army were the Dukes of Weimar and Altenburg, both officers of promise, and sincerely devoted to the protestant party.*

The result of this important triumph was no less fatal to the hopes of the vanquished† than it was honourable and advantageous to the victor. No longer in a condition to act offensively, Mansfeldt was reduced to the humiliating necessity of suffering Lipstadt to be taken before his eyes. The emperor, on the contrary, was left at liberty to employ all his resources for the defence of Bohemia. Gabor advanced, without interruption, to the gates of Brunn, and burned the suburbs with wanton ferocity. That, however, proved the extent of his depredations, as the imperial general, Montenegro, after routing his detachments in various skirmishes, reduced the main body to such distress, that sanguine expectations were entertained at Vienna of its being forced to surrender at discretion. Though decidedly inferior to the Austrian commander in tactics, Gabor greatly surpassed him in the arts of intrigue: when unable any longer to contend against his antagonist in the field, he had recourse to nego-

* Barre, ix. 519. Puffendorf, i. 42. Lotichius, i. 358.

† The remains of the army took refuge in Holland, where many of them entered into the service of the republic. Barre, *ibid.*

ciation, with his wonted duplicity; till, by concessions and promises, to which he never meant to adhere, he induced Montenegro to consent to a suspension of arms, which speedily terminated in a peace.*

This temporary calm (for no engagement contracted with that perfidious enemy could be regarded as permanent) was of essential benefit to Ferdinand, since it extricated him from a situation so pregnant with danger, that he is said seriously to have lamented his own want of sagacity, in having reduced the Palatine to despair. So great was his apprehension from the gathering storm, that, according to the assertion of contemporary writers of acknowledged veracity, he had actually conceived the design of repairing the injustice of his former conduct, and even made a proposal to his friend Maximilian, respecting the establishment of an eighth electorate, to be given to him as an equivalent for that which he had unjustly usurped, and which he was now invited to restore. But the sudden change which had taken place in the aspect of affairs, having appeased the terrors of Ferdinand, every sentiment of compunction subsided, and left his breast accessible only to its accustomed inmates, resentment, pride, and superstition.†

Mansfeldt and Brunswick being no longer in a situation to continue offensive operations, and the animosity of Gabor having abated, Ferdinand appeared to rule with uncontrolled authority over a nation of slaves; proudly mistaking for abject submission the sullen torpor of despair. The scene, however, was about to change, and fresh actors

* 1623. Schmidt, iv. 23.

† Ibid.

were preparing to mount the ensanguined theatre. Hitherto we have beheld the kings of England and France degrading the honour of two warlike nations by their contemptible policy; but events had occurred, which not only roused the constitutional indolence of James, but even excited Louis to unsheath the sword against a sovereign who professed himself the champion of the Vatican.

James had hitherto sacrificed the glory and welfare of his kingdom to the ridiculous project of marrying his heir to a Spanish princess; but the insolence of Buckingham having broken off the treaty, by insulting the delicacy of Castilian pride, in the person of Olivares, all the influence of the favourite was excited to promote a rupture with the court of Madrid. Though the vanity of the king was deeply concerned in the event, and, in order to promote it, had consented to terms no less repugnant to the prejudices than prejudicial to the interests of his people, yet, so great was his weakness, that he was unable to resist the united intreaties of Charles and Buckingham. It is the characteristic of folly to be always in the extreme. James, till then, had trusted for the restoration of his son-in-law to the generosity of Spain; but he, on a sudden, resolved to act with vigour, and to obtain by arms what he had vainly attempted to procure by negotiation. For this purpose, however, it was necessary to recur to a measure most hateful to the House of Stuart, and to summon a parliament. The money granted by his subjects, for the recovery of the Palatinate, had been squandered, as usual, with childish prodigality; but as the unpopular alliance with a catholic princess was abandoned, he flattered himself that the expenses incidental to a war, under-

taken in conformity to the wishes of the people, would be liberally provided.

To account, however, for this sudden alteration in the polities of the court, and to explain the motives which led to a quarrel with Spain, without exposing the favourite to universal indignation, required no little dexterity; but as artifice, and not genius, was the characteristic of the Scottish line, Buckingham was commissioned to lay before the parliament a varnished narrative, which, by suppressing some facts, and misrepresenting others, in some measure satisfied the nation, and saved the favourite from merited disgrace. Lest suspicion, however, should attach to the assertion of a man, not more remarkable for veracity than for humility, the Prince of Wales was brought forward to prostitute his sacred word, in confirmation of a premeditated falsehood.*

Notwithstanding the glaring contradictions contained in Buckingham's statement, it answered the purpose for which it was intended; for so eager was the nation for war, that generously overlooking every inconsistency, they expressed their joy by illuminations and bonfires.† The rupture with Spain having deprived the Prince of Wales of one bride, it became requisite to provide him with another; yet, in spite of the antipathy manifested by all ranks and conditions of men against an alliance with a pa-

* Mr. Hume contents himself with remarking, that "it is difficult fully to excuse the conduct of these princes." A more impartial writer would probably have said, "that it is impossible to find expressions adequate to express the contempt which such infamous prevarication deserves." It is in the breasts of sovereigns that truth and justice ought to find an asylum, when banished from the commerce of the world.

† Hume, xlix.

pist, the vanity of James revolted at the idea of admitting any female, except the daughter of a king, to the chaste embraces of his son. Henrietta of France was accordingly selected to replace the infanta in the affections of Charles; and so eager was the English monarch for the completion of the ceremony, that he consented to entrust her with the education of her children, till they should attain the age of thirteen. To which imprudent concession we are probably indebted for being delivered from a family, which their warmest partizans are forced to acknowledge to have been the decided enemies of freedom.

The period, however, for active interference had been suffered to escape; yet, in spite of every obstacle, it was resolved, by the warlike council of this pacific monarch, to reconquer a country situated in the heart of Germany, defended by numerous and well-disciplined armies, and so entirely surrounded by potent enemies, that it had no communication whatever with England. But when ministers are ambitious of acquiring the reputation of vigour, no difficulties can deter them from an undertaking; and they frequently embrace it with greater avidity, in proportion to the obstacles which attend it. Mansfeldt was accordingly taken into the English pay, and an army levied, consisting of twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, which was destined to unite with a powerful reinforcement, supposed to have been promised by Louis. Relying confidently upon professions which, if ever made, were intended only to deceive, the troops were embarked, and sailed to Calais, where, instead of meeting with the friendly reception which James's credulity had anticipated, they were refused

permission to land, and obliged in consequence to direct their course toward the more hospitable coasts of Holland. But no previous intimation of the destined voyage having been communicated to the Dutch government some objections were made to receiving them, which occasioned considerable delay; and a pestilential malady having broken out in the fleet, more than half the troops fell victims to its fury, before permission arrived for their disembarkation; and the wretched remnant appearing unequal to the arduous attempt, the expedition of course was abandoned.*

The councils of France had likewise experienced a total change. The genius of Richelieu having triumphed at length over every competitor, was paving the way for that paramount influence which he afterwards exercised to enslave and aggrandise his country. Unwilling openly to engage in the tempestuous scene of German politics, till he had subdued every domestic faction, he confined himself entirely to intrigues and promises, and occasional subsidies. The lofty soul of this aspiring prelate, however, felt too tenderly for the honour of a crown, of which he was destined to become the firmest prop, to permit the smallest insult to escape with impunity. This manly spirit, so different from that which had till then enfeebled the resources of France, was first displayed in his decisive conduct respecting the Valteline.

A religious dispute, fomented by the selfish ambition of Spain, had exposed the romantic vallies of the Valteline to all the horrors of civil commo-

* 1623. Hume, xliv.

tions.* These dissensions afforded an opportunity for the court of Madrid to attempt the subjugation of a province, highly important as a military station, under pretence of vindicating the violated authority of the Grison league.† After forcibly seizing the principal passes, the Duke of Feria, at that time governor of Milan, ordered fortresses to be erected to defend them; thus flattering himself to secure an easy communication between the Spanish possessions in Italy, and the hereditary provinces of Austria. The timidity of the Italians, justly alarmed at an event so pregnant with ruin to their degraded country, had immediate recourse to France; endeavouring to excite the jealousy of Louis, by representing the action as making part of a general system to subvert the liberties of Europe. But the degenerate son of the immortal Henry was too much occupied with the paltry cabals of a court, to have leisure to attend to foreign affairs. Yet as it would have been totally inconsistent with the dignity of a powerful nation, the friend and protector of the Helvetic confederacy, to remain a tranquil spectator of its ruin, an ambassador was sent with unlimited power, for the purpose of mediating a reconciliation. After various subterfuges a treaty was concluded, by which Spain engaged to demolish the forts, and to evacuate the country. Nothing however could be more remote from her intention than faithfully to execute the contract; and a thousand excuses were in conse-

* There is a short account of this transaction, which took place in 1620, in the History of the Helvetic Directory, to which I beg leave to refer, iv. 523.

† Marshal Bassompierre was sent to Madrid in 1621.

quence framed to elude it. A proposal however being at length made to surrender the castles into the hands of the Pope, for the express purpose of being destroyed, the piety of Louis induced him to acquiesce ; and though it was manifest to the world that the holy father was blindly devoted to the court of Madrid, his abject spirit was terrified at the idea of entering into a dispute with the vicegerent of heaven. This bold attempt was reserved for one of the chosen pillars of the church. Cardinal Richelieu was no sooner placed at the head of affairs, than all the measures of government were directed with a degree of activity and resolution unknown since the days of Henry the Great. Indignant at the degradation to which France was reduced by the weakness and venality of its rulers, he recalled Sillery from Rome, under pretence that he had exceeded his powers, boldly insisting that the treaty of Madrid should be fulfilled in every respect.* This decisive step was followed by measures equally vigorous. An alliance was concluded with Venice and Savoy for the recovery of the Valteline, accompanied by a promise on the part of Louis, that if the contingents furnished by the contracting parties should prove inadequate, an ample subsidy should enable Mansfeldt to make a powerful diversion in Germany.† The Marquis de Cœuvres was at the same time entrusted with an important mission to the Helvetic government, which he executed with so much address, that permission was granted to levy troops for the expulsion of the Spanish and papal forces. Having overcome the

* Bougeant, i. 108. Le Vassor, v. 634. † 1624. Ibid. vi. 99.

scruples of the catholic cantons, and secured the co-operation of the protestant, he laid aside his diplomatic character, and putting himself at the head of ten thousand men, he compelled the enemy to evacuate the Valteline, while the Duke of Savoy commenced offensive operations against the Genoese.*

Considering that the object of the confederates was widely different, the result of their measures was far more favourable than under similar circumstances might have been expected. Their ultimate success ought however to be ascribed to the commanding genius of Richelieu, who had equally to contend against the fears of his master, and the prejudices of the zealous catholics. Predetermined never openly to engage in a foreign war till he had reduced the Hugonots to submission, it became necessary, in order to avoid a rupture with Spain, that the French should assume the modest title of auxiliaries, acting in conformity to an ancient treaty, as the allies of the Grison confederacy. The army confided to the command of Cœuvres was accordingly composed almost entirely of Swiss, reinforced by two French regiments.†

Persuaded that the security of their own republic depended upon the expulsion of the Spaniards from Italy, the Venetians artfully endeavoured by intrigues and entreaties to extend the sphere of hostilities. The restless ambition of the Duke of Savoy induced him warily to second this project, in the hope of obtaining an augmentation of territory.‡

* 1624. Bougeant, 109. Le Vassor, vi. 101.

† Ibid. 93. ‡ Ibid.

The insult offered to the papal authority by an officer in the service of France, excited the resentment of Urban VIII. who had the prudence however to confine his anger to official complaints, and to reject the proposals of the Spanish court for a general league against Lewis.* For he wisely preferred trusting to the piety of that feeble monarch, rather than to his own exertions for redress, and an ambassador extraordinary was accordingly sent with special instructions to flatter his vanity, and alarm his religious scruples. But the ascendancy of Richelieu was now so great, that neither the usual modes of negociation, nor the dignified character of Cardinal Barbarini, the nephew and favourite of the sovereign Pontiff, were able to shake his resolution.† The forts remained in the posses-

* The bold genius of Richelieu is clearly developed in a conversation between him and the Spanish ambassador, detailed at length by Le Vassor, iv. 105. Unacquainted with the real character of the cardinal, the Marquis of Mirabel endeavoured to alarm him by expatiating upon the injury which would accrue to his reputation from espousing the cause of heresy. "Sir," replied the minister of Lewis, not a little piqued at the insult thus offered to his understanding, "I trust I am capable of distinguishing between a political and a religious dispute. Though a catholic and a cardinal, I am also the minister of a powerful monarch, and as such I am bound to promote the glory of my master, instead of rendering myself subservient to the interests of Spain, from an ill-founded apprehension of offending the Pope. When the king was engaged in the laudable enterprize of extirpating the protestant opinions in France, you took advantage of the opportunity to attack our allies; is it then improper for us to avail ourselves of a moment of domestic repose, to afford them assistance in their distress? You are now acquainted with our intentions, and are at perfect liberty to shape your conduct accordingly. We have no apprehensions respecting the event, the Hugonots are no longer a formidable body; and in spite of all the efforts of the Spanish court, the power of the king is sufficiently great, to preserv the internal tranquillity of his kingdom."

† Lewis was so well tutored by his minister, that he could be no longer terrified like an infant. Relying upon his weakness, the pontifical

sion of France, till finally restored to the Grison league by the treaty of Moncon.*

The occupation of the Palatinate by the Spanish troops was likewise an object of jealousy to France, whose enlightened minister could not behold with indifference that ambitious power establishing itself in a country so calculated to furnish increasing means of annoyance.

Such was the origin of that formidable league, which when matured by the genius of Richelieu, and conducted by the heroism of Gustavus, gave a blow to Austria from which she never recovered. At present, however, her prospect was serene, though clouds were gathering in every quarter. No enemy was any longer in arms; and the authority of Ferdinand appeared firmly established on the tremendous basis of terror. This therefore was the moment for disbanding his forces, had security been his only object. But no hints were given of a similar intention; no preparations were made to effect a reduction. An army of upwards of one hundred thousand men, under the command of Tilly, and other experienced officers, spread terror and desolation from the banks of the Rhine to the frontiers of Bohemia. A general alarm was in consequence excited, and little doubt entertained

ministers, (Nari and Spada) expatiated largely upon the outrage offered to the sacred character of their master in language as lofty as ever was employed by the proudest of his predecessors in the darkest ages of superstition. "I will consult my council," was the laconic answer returned by the king, desirous of being freed from the persecution of men, toward whom his fears of the cardinal, and his fears of the pope, made it equally difficult for him to act with propriety. *Le Vassor*, ii. 131.

* Signed in 1626 by the Due d'Olivares, and the Marquis du Farge, the French ambassador. *Dumont. Corps Diplom.*

of the designs of the emperor to render his authority despotic in Germany, and to convert an elective into a hereditary monarchy.

A crisis so extraordinary was calculated to awaken all the energies and passions of the human heart. The pride of the league looked down with contempt upon a prostrate foe, though their hatred diminished with their apprehensions. The union on the contrary, confounded at the degradation into which they were fallen, and overwhelmed with the humiliating reflection that it was the merited recompence of disunion and imbecility, scarcely ventured to cherish the most distant expectation of ameliorated fortune, though they panted after an opportunity of revenging the injury to which their religion and liberties were exposed.*

The project of James for the recovery of the Palatinate were resumed with vigour by his son, who told his parliament, with greater sincerity than was usual with him in similar communications, that he had prevailed upon his uncle, the King of Denmark, to enter into a war with Austria, by promising to support him with the troops and treasures of England. That warlike monarch, he said, would no sooner erect his standard in the north of Germany, than it would be resorted to by all who were desirous of emancipating themselves from the fetters of Austria.† A confederacy had been formed with the greatest secrecy between Christian IV. the Dukes of Brunswick and Mecklenburg, and all the states of Lower Saxony, with the exception of Luneburg, for the express purpose of compelling Tilly

* Schmidt, iv. 24.

† 1624. Hume, I. Clarendon Hist. of Rebell.

to evacuate the circle, now completely exhausted by the imperialists. Preparations conducted on so extensive a scale as became necessary for the success of the undertaking, could not escape the notice of so vigilant a commander. Anxious to stifle the kindling flame, Tilly addressed a menancing letter to the states, commanding them to suspend all farther levies, under penalty of incurring the emperor's displeasure, and being treated with all the severity of military execution. Undismayed at the threat, they calmly replied that their object was solely precautionary. While surrounded on every side by numerous armies, not accustomed to observe the strictest discipline, it would be inconsistent with prudence to remain unarmed ; but they at the same time protested that they entertained no hostile designs against any member of the Catholic League, and least of all against Ferdinand.* Too wary to be deceived by professions when positively contradicted by facts, Tilly repeated his injunction in still stronger terms, and prepared to enforce their obedience.

Delay however was of so much importance to the opposite party, that they endeavoured by every expedient to postpone the conflict. Troops indeed were levied, and magazines were provided, but opinions disagreed respecting the commander to whom the defence of the reformed religion should be confided. It was universally acknowledged that the only two princes capable of undertaking that momentous charge were the Kings of Sweden and Denmark ; for to England as usual they looked for

* Puffendorf, i. 44. Schmidt, iv. 24. Lotichius, i. 414.

subsidies, and subsidies only. The military talents which Gustavus Adolphus had already displayed in the Polish war, and the celebrity he had acquired in different negotiations, seemed to point him out as the fittest champion of protestantism. Christian, on the contrary, was far more distinguished for the qualities of a statesman, than for those of a soldier ; but the proximity of his territory, and the actual possession of the rich province of Holstein, were powerful inducements, and in the opinions of many, outweighed the superior talents of the Swedish monarch. The political views and attachments of both were directed by the same leading principles. To both the aggrandisement of Austria was an object of almost equal alarm ; to both, the protestant tenets were equally precious, and both appeared equally interested in preventing the emperor from establishing a naval forcee in the Baltic.*

The elector of Brandenburg, who began seriously to repent his folly in having remained a tranquil spectator of the ruin of Frederic, and who was among the warmest admirers of Gustavus, made the following proposals to the English court, in the name of that illustrious monarch.

1st. "That the powers allied in defence of the

* Christian was also influenced by personal motives of hostility toward Austria, besides the interest which he took in the fate of a prince so nearly allied to him as Frederic. The rich sees of Bremen and Verden were designed by the King of Denmark as a provision for the younger branches of his family ; and it was more than probable that these would be irrecoverably lost, should the emperor be suffered to establish absolute authority in Germany. The permission granted by the court of Vienna to the courts of Schaumburg to assume the arms of Sleswick annexed by Christian I. in 1459, to the royal domains, was another subject of complaint.—Coxe, i. 790.

Germanic constitution should use their utmost endeavours to prevent any armament from being assembled at Danzic with hostile intentions toward Sweden."

2d. "That the King of Denmark should engage not to attack Sweden, while she was occupied in hostilities against Austria."

3d. "That an English fleet, consisting of not less than seventeen ships, should unite with the Swedes."

4th. "That Gustavus Adolphus should maintain an army of twelve thousand foot, and two thousand horse, at his own expense."

5th. "That the allies should pay twenty-four thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, to be levied in the name, and subject to the orders of the King of Sweden, to whom they should take an oath of fidelity."

6th. "That a free passage should be granted to the Swedish army through all the territories of the allies."

7th. "That no member of the confederacy should enter into any treaty, with the court of Vienna, or with any of its adherents, without the consent of the other members."

8th. "That Bremen and Verden should be delivered into the hands of Gustavus for the reception and security of his military stores, and in order to preserve the necessary communication with his hereditary dominions."

9th. "And lastly, in case a reverse of fortune should compel the protestants to conclude a peace, they should do every thing in their power to facilitate the retreat of Gustavus."

Gustavus required an early answer, that in case

his offers should be accepted, he might have time to negotiate a prolongation of the truce, which was nearly expired with Poland, before his treaty with England should be made public.*

This project having been communicated to the court of France, was strenuously supported by Richelieu, who as an additional inducement to facilitate the negotiation, offered a liberal subsidy in the name of his master; though he declined to become an active member of the confederacy. He farther suggested the propriety of restricting the alliance to the procuring a fair and honourable peace, and establishing a balance between the rival religions, which alone could tend to preserve it. And with this view, he proposed that in case of a negotiation, the Kings of France and England should be chosen joint mediators.†

Envious of the reputation which the Swedish hero was about to require, Christian resolved to deprive him of the command, and, in consequence, proposed to undertake the charge and conduct of the war upon far more reasonable terms. The artifice succeeded, and being warmly seconded by the recommendation of Charles, his offers were accepted by the allies. Fears, however, were entertained, that this imprudent preference might offend Gustavus; but his elevated soul, superior to every selfish feeling, and anticipating the result of this inconsiderate choice, replied with dignity to the communication made him, that he wished the King of Denmark the utmost success; ironically adding, “that the choice of the commander appeared to him a favourable pre-

* 1625. Grimoard Hist. de Gustave Adolfe, i. 247.

† Ibid. 251.

sage, as it furnished an unequivocal proof of discernment.*"

The incapacity of Christian for a great military undertaking, though known to Gustavus, was not even suspected by himself. With a presumption, by no means uncommon to men who suppose themselves capable of the most arduous enterprises because they have excelled in the management of less important concerns, he flattered himself at once to terminate the contest, and to reduce the power of Austria within the bounds of moderation, in the course of a single campaign. Appointed generalissimo of the armies of the confederates, he soon found himself at the head of sixty thousand men; and being joined by considerable reinforcements from Brunswick and Mecklenberg, he thought nothing too difficult to be accomplished.

The intentions of the confederates could no longer be disguised, and it was apparent to the world that they had more in contemplation than a system of cautious defence. The measures concerting with England and Holland, and the clandestine communications with France, evidently embraced a sphere of action more extensive than that of internal security, and clearly indicated the intention of attempting the re-establishment of the Palatine, and the humiliation of Austria.†

Too cautious to be deceived by empty professions,‡ and too haughty to yield to compulsion, Ferdinand determined, by vigour and decision, to de-

* Grimoard *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe I.* 427.

† Schiller, ii.

‡ All doubts respecting the real intentions of the confederacy were entirely dissipated by an intercepted letter from Frederic to the Count of Thurn, which fell into Tilly's hands.—Schmidt. iv. 24.

stroy the confederacy before it attained to maturity. Tilly therefore received instructions to commence hostilities, and to endeavour by every means in his power to prevent the King of Denmark from forming a junction with the Duke of Brunswick and Mansfeldt, who were levying troops with their accustomed activity. Such an object was worthy of the talents of a soldier renowned alike for foresight and courage. Tilly accordingly, by rapid marches, took possession of the passes in the mountains contiguous to Hesse, as he had received undoubted intelligence that it was the intention of Christian to advance towards Cassel, and that the Landgrave was ready to declare in his favour. While uncontested master of the left bank of the Weser, Tilly laid the whole country under contribution; the king confined his operations to the right, but wishing to diminish the sufferings of his allies, he weakened his army by numerous detachments, at a time when measures the most decisive were indispensably requisite, to give confidence and courage to his adherents.*

The emperor had hitherto employed the troops of the League for the subjugation of the Palatinate, and the conduct of the war had been entrusted entirely to the Elector of Bavaria, as commander in chief of the army of execution, and by him had been delegated to Tilly. To a man of boundless ambition, such a state of dependence could not be satisfactory; for though splendid success had hitherto crowned every enterprize, he could not but feel that power, supported by extraneous exertions, was sub-

* 1625. Schiller, ii.

ject to various chances, and that a collision of interests might at any time endanger the stately fabric they had erected. Neither was it probable that the attachment of the catholic party, or even the gratitude of its leader, would induce them to second the extensive schemes with which victory had inspired the Austrian cabinet. If they had hitherto assisted in depressing the protestants, it was in the cause of religion they had combated. Maximilian had now attained the most exalted dignity that imperial bounty could confer. Enriched with the spoils of his ruined friend, he had nothing more to expect from the hands of the emperor, and would consequently behold, with an eye of jealousy, the rapid aggrandisement of Austria. A formidable army, supported entirely at his own expense, and thus rendered independent of all foreign controul, was necessary for the execution of Ferdinand's designs, and to aid in establishing that paramount authority over all the members of the empire, to which his despotic temper aspired.*

However essential to his projects such a measure appeared, the difficulties attending it seemed almost insurmountable. His territories were impoverished, his treasury was exhausted, his subjects were discontented; yet all these obstacles were unexpectedly removed, and an army assembled, more formidable than any which till then had supported the catholic cause, by the eccentric genius of a hero.†

Count Waldstein, or Wallenstein, as he is more frequently called by the German historians, was one of the most extraordinary personages of this extra-

* Schmidt, ii.

† 1625. Ibid.

ordinary era. Descended from an ancient, and once opulent family, in Bohemia, he was born at Prague, in 1583; destined by his parents to receive a learned education, he was sent to the university of Padua, where he gave himself up to the study of mathematics and of judicial astrology, the fashionable folly of his contemporaries. This latter pursuit, to which he was addicted with a puerile credulity, led him imperceptibly to regard the position of the planets as inseparably connected with the destiny of man; and probably first suggested to his ardent imagination those splendid visions, which enabled him, without family connexions or hereditary wealth, unsupported, and even frequently opposed, by the government he served, to dictate laws to the Germanic confederacy, and even to render himself formidable to the court of Vienna. The pedantic regularity of a college, however, in a short time disgusted a temper proud and turbulent in the extreme, and panting after distinctions more rapid and tangible than those of literature. Indignant at the restraints of scholastic discipline, he resolved to devote himself to the profession of arms, and, as a preparatory step, entered into the service of the Margrave of Burgau, in quality of page; where he acquired every accomplishment ornamental to a gentleman, or necessary for a soldier.

A disposition naturally severe and gloomy is best adapted for the reception of those enthusiastic impressions which are apt to degenerate into superstition. Wallenstein was educated by his father in the protestant tenets, but having fallen into the hands of an artful Jesuit, during his residence at Innspruck, he imbibed a strong predilection for the religion of Rome, whose pageants and miracles were

far more congenial to his heated fancy than the evangelical simplicity of his primitive faith. An accident, however, determined his conversion: having escaped unhurt from a perilous fall, and being taught to consider his preservation as a warning from heaven to abandon his former errors, he obeyed the call with alacrity.

The narrow sphere of a Tyrolian court soon ceased to excite the emulation of a man stimulated by the resistless impulse of genius, and an implicit confidence, in astral culminations to aspire ultimately to a regal diadem. Taking leave of the Margrave, he successively visited France, Holland, England, Italy, and Spain, that he might study the interests and relations of the different European powers in a school commensurate with their importance. With the enlightened eye of a statesman he examined the progress of each of these nations in arts, in science, and in commerce, inquired into their resources, their political alliances, the strength and discipline of their armies and navy, the temper and pursuits of their inhabitants, the form of their government, and the power and capacity of their sovereigns, overlooking nothing that could gratify curiosity, or enlarge the sphere of his understanding.

Thus qualified to support an eminent part in every situation of life, he returned to his native country, eager to distinguish himself in that profession by which Hannibal and Cæsar had acquired immortality. Pride however revolted at the idea of appearing in the field without those brilliant accoutrements which were the characteristics of rank, but which his straitened income was unable to procure. But having improved his fortune by marrying a widow in the decline of life, he deter-

mined to indulge his reigning passion, and give unbounded scope to his military genius.

During the war in the Friuli between the Venetians and Ferdinand, before he obtained the imperial crown, Wallenstein raised a regiment of cavalry at his own expense, and distinguished himself so much by his enterprizing spirit and judicious execution, that he rose high in the favour of Ferdinand. After the conclusion of peace, he passed a winter at Vienna, and having lost his wife whom he never loved, he contracted an alliance more suitable to his inclinations and interests, by marrying the daughter of the Count of Harrach, who at that time filled an important post under the Austrian government. The insurrection in Bohemia opened a wider field for his ambition. On either side there was ample room for exertion.* But his connexions and principles leading him to embrace the defence of despotism, his property was sequestered by the opposite party, and he himself condemned to exile as a rebel to his country.† But after the battle of Prague, where he added materially to his military reputation, he was nobly rewarded for his services by the princely liberality of the conqueror, who bestowed upon him a considerable portion of the confiscated estates.

* The following passage from Gualdo deserves notice on account of its absurdity, but which the author probably admired for its eloquence.
" Di privato divenuto poi principe, di colonello assunto al generalato, di pazzo scopritosi savio, diè a conoscere, che il suo studio non fu per cambiar pensiero, ma per mutar condizione e che non meglio si può difender da i colpi dell'invidia, e della malignità, che col nome di prudente, che colo piovono i favori della fortuna, ove sono le nubi della stravaganze, i. 267.

† 1625. Galetti, i. 10.

In a man destined to support so conspicuous a part, every thought and action becomes peculiarly interesting ; I shall therefore paint him as described by Sarrazin, a contemporary writer.* To boldness or rather temerity in the conception of his plans, he united prudence and activity in their execution. His countenance, though intelligent, was rather majestic than agreeable. By nature temperate, and an enemy to indulgence, he allowed himself little time for sleep, and when awake was constantly occupied either with business or in writing. Endowed by nature with a robust constitution, he was alike indifferent to heat or cold ; and though his table was covered with the choicest viands, it was from ostentation, not from sensuality, since he took nourishment only because it is necessary to the support of life, and not for the indulgence of appetite. No man was ever less communicative in company, or more sparing of his words in conversation. When he spoke, it was generally in the language of command ; to dictate orders, and not to canvas opinions. All dispatches of consequence were invariably written by himself ; for so regular was he in the distribution of business, that he never wanted leisure for any occupation. Inexhaustible in expedients for regulating the internal economy of an army, he always found soldiers on every emergency, as well as the means of supporting them. Severe to punish the smallest relaxations in military discipline, he was no less liberal in remunerating merit, but always regulated his favours by the scale of desert, and not by the impulse of caprice. Je-

† His work entitled *La Conspiration de Valstein*, was published in 1636.

lous in the extreme of his own reputation, he beheld with envy the brilliant actions of his contemporaries, from a delicate apprehension that they might obscure the lustre of his own exploits. His anger was always more easily kindled than appeased; and when once seriously offended, his resentment became implacable. Passionately addicted to external pomp, which he considered as a powerful instrument for inspiring respect, or captivating popularity, the splendour of his household, of his equipages, and of his retinue, was conducted on a footing of Asiatic magnificence. However repugnant his actions might sometimes appear to those established principles which pass with the timid for prudence, even when they deviated most essentially from moral rectitude, they were the result of calculation, and usually disguised under the imposing garb of a patriotic attachment to his country. Though naturally credulous, he seems to have regarded both religion and morality as duties subordinate to ambition, yet he frequently assumed the mask of piety as a covering to his blackest designs. His penetration, however, was equal to his dissimulation; for, while his own intentions were involved in the profoundest mystery, he dived with facility into the hearts of those whose thoughts he was desirous to discover.* Yet this impenetrability of character was hardly suspected by many of his most assiduous attendants, as he affected unbounded ad-

* It is difficult to read the character of Wallenstein, as described by Sarrazin, without recollecting the following passage from Sallust: "Animus andax, subdolus, varius, cuiuslibet rei simulator ac dissimulator, alieni appetens, sui profusus—Vastus animus, immoderata, incredibilia, nimis alta semper cupiebat."—Bellum Catilin. 5.

miration for candour and sincerity, to which he allotted an elevated rank in the scale of moral virtues.*

Such was the man, whose extraordinary talents were destined to raise the imperial prerogative to the highest pitch that it ever attained, and who would have tyrannized over Germany with unlimited sway, had not his mighty projects, most fortunately for mankind, been frustrated by the superior ascendancy of a monarch, whose military genius exceeded his own, and who stood alone and unrivalled in the proud career of justice, moderation, and virtue.

Confident in the fertility of his own resources, and relying upon his fortunate stars, which predicted success in every undertaking, Wallenstein submitted a project to the court of Vienna, by which he offered to raise and equip an army at his own expense, and to maintain it without any charge to the imperial treasury, provided he was permitted to augment it to fifty thousand men, was entrusted with the absolute command, and allowed to dispose of all the commissions, independently of every control.†

That a plan so romantic should ever be realized far exceeded the bounds of probability. And we accordingly find, that the ministers of Ferdinand‡ affected to treat it as the chimera of a heated ima-

* Besides Sarrazin I have consulted Schiller, ii. Schmidt, iv. 25. Grimoard, i. 259. Coxe, i. 802. Galetti Bougeant, i. 115. Gualdo, I. 266. The latter always speaks of this celebrated man with the partiality of a Jesuit.

† Khenenbiller, x. 802. Galetti, i. 67.

‡ It is but justice to except the Prince of Eggenberg, who was a friend and admirer of Wallenstein. Schmidt, *ibid.*

gination, without deigning to reflect, that an ardent genius, unshackled and undebased by the trammels of official forms, was capable of actions at which their littleness of mind was astonished. But as no precedent could be produced in the Austrian archives to sanction the grant, they would have willingly suffered this glorious opportunity to escape, rather than transgress those rules, to which they adhered with the pertinacious pedantry of long established habit. Ferdinand, however, more capable of appreciating the efforts of genius, was not disposed to reject a project as impracticable, because it was attended with difficulties which appeared insurmountable to common understandings. He had besides suffered too severely from the activity of Mansfeldt, not to admit the possibility of extending a system so ably conceived; and he was also too well acquainted with the character of the projector to doubt his accomplishing whatever could be achieved by activity or perseverance. He felt, also, the importance of the service to be performed, should the offer be fulfilled only in part. A favourable answer was accordingly returned, particular districts in Bohemia were allotted for the purpose of enrolling recruits, and the title of Duke of Friedland was conferred upon the general, to give dignity and consequence to the undertaking.*

Having in a few weeks assembled twenty thousand men, Wallenstein quitted the Austrian territory; and as the popularity of his name, and the brilliant advantages held out to his soldiers attracted crowds of adventurers to his standard, his army was so rapidly augmented during the march,

* 1025. Schmidt, iv. 25. Schiller, ii. Cox, 804.

that it amounted to more than thirty thousand, when it entered Lower Saxony. Even sovereign princes, stimulated by an ardour for military renown, or impelled by less honourable motives, offered to levy regiments in support of the imperial cause; so that in a short time, the forces assembled for the destruction of the protestants considerably exceeded the stipulation.*

An Austrian army, penetrating into the heart of the empire, though calculated to excite universal consternation throughout all the protestant states, was an event by no means agreeable to the catholics. The Duke of Friedland had instructions to form a junction with Tilly, that their united forces might overwhelm the King of Denmark, before Mansfeldt and Brunswick could join him. But jealousy of Tilly, to whose veteran talents he knew the success of the campaign would be universally ascribed, made Wallenstein resolve to conduct his operations on a separate plan, that the glory which he anticipated might be without competition. Unwilling however to proclaim his designs by an unqualified act of disobedience, he advanced towards Gottingen by hasty marches, apparently for the purpose of co-operation; but instead of waiting for Tilly, in conformity to his orders, he turned suddenly northwards, and by a rapid movement made himself master of the bridge, at Dessau, which secured a passage over the Elbe. The object thus accomplished, though it obstructed for a time the operations of Tilly, was ultimately attended with

* Among this number were even some of the protestant persuasion, viz. Adolphus, Duke of Holstein, the Prince of Lauenburg, and George, Duke of Luneburg.—Schmidt, iv. 25.

beneficial results to the common cause, and productive of immediate and most important advantages to himself. The rich country extending on both sides the river lay open to his incursions, and as it had not hitherto been visited by the hostile armies, it afforded ample resources for plunder and contributions. The command of the Elbe also enabled him at pleasure to fall on the rear of the Saxons, or to penetrate without opposition into the hereditary dominions of their general.*

The King of Denmark's position was now become critical in the extreme, and it required talents very different from those which Christian possessed to escape from so perilous a situation. Alarmed at the impending tempest, the states of Lower Saxony weakly endeavoured to avert it by the arts of negociation. Under the joint mediation of Saxony and Brandenburg a congress was opened during the winter at Brunswick; but no sooner had the momentary panic subsided, than impediments arose in arranging the articles of peace, which victory alone could surmount.† Presumptuously confiding in his own resources, Ferdinand insisted upon unconditional submission, while the King of Denmark, who from the beginning had shewn himself averse to the treaty, and had not only formed an alliance with Transilvanian waivode, but received a promise of subsidies from England and Holland, was more anxious than ever for continuing hostilities. The confidence he inspired by exaggerated representations of the probable results of another campaign overcame the scruples of the states, and

* Schmidt, iv. 25. Schiller, ii. Lotichius, i. 419. Galetti, i. 72.

† Barre, ix. 556.

it was accordingly resolved, in conformity to a plan which he laid before them, to recommence offensive operations with increasing activity.*

Being now joined by Mansfeldt and the Duke of Brunswick, Christian found himself at the head of sixty thousand men, a force superior to that of either Tilly, or Wallenstein, while acting separately, but totally inadequate to contend against them, should they be suffered to unite. To prevent their junction became therefore indispensably necessary to the success of the campaign; and Mansfeldt accordingly undertook with a strong detachment to keep Wallenstein in check, while the main army should attempt to force a passage into Hesse and the Palatinate.

This enterprise, though planned and conducted with all the celerity and judgment for which Mansfeldt was so conspicuous, was frustrated by the vigilance of his opponent. Undismayed by the vast superiority of the enemy, the protestant commander imprudently attacked Wallenstein in his intrench-

* 1626. Barre, ix. 556. Lotichius, 426.—On the part of the emperor, it was required "that the protestants should immediately disband their army, indemnify the emperor for the expenses of the war, and deliver into his hands the Count of Mansfeldt, Christian, Duke of Brunswick, together with some others of inferior quality, who had been subjected to the imperial bar; that the King of Denmark should immediately retire out of Germany, and undertake to make good the losses to which the Duke of Luneburg had been exposed by the invasion of his territories; that the circle of Lower Saxony should enter into an engagement never more to oppose the imperial authority, or to give countenance or assistance to his enemies."

In answer to these extravagant demands, the states offered to disarm provided the imperialists would evacuate the circle, make compensation for the damage they had occasioned, and promise never again to molest the protestants on account of their religious opinions, or to attempt any innovations in the government. Ibid. 438.

ments at Dessau; convinced that if he could drive him from that important post he should paralyze his exertions during the rest of the campaign. No efforts of valour, however, could succeed against a general, who knew how to avail himself of every advantage, arising equally from situation and numbers. Repulsed with the loss of three thousand men, but formidable, even after his defeat, Mansfeldt retired into the Electorate of Brandenberg, where he allowed his army a little repose. Being joined by the Duke of Weimar, with considerable reinforcements, he made a sudden irruption into Silesia, determined, by one adventurous effort, to carry terror and devastation to the gates of Vienna.*

Meanwhile Tilly was occupied in preparing for the reduction of all the towns and fortresses on the Weser, an enterprise which required a force far more considerable than that which was actually at his disposal. This project was frustrated by the jealousy of Wallenstein, who refused to detach a few regiments to his assistance, under pretence that he wanted them to maintain his communication with Bohemia.†

The King of Denmark, on the contrary, had opened the campaign with the capture of Peina and Lalenberg; while the Duke of Weimar, at the head of a separate corps, overran the Bishopric of Osnaberg, and compelled the chapter to elect his son coadjutor. Having no enemy opposed to him of strength sufficient to arrest his progress, it is possible he might have laid the whole adjacent

* Schiller, ii. Schmidt, iv. 25. Pfeffel, ii. 298.

† Galetti, i. 72.

country under contribution, and even have planted his standard on the walls of Munster, had he not suspended his operations, without any intelligible cause, and rejoined the army. The motives for this decision were so little understood, that they were almost universally imputed to venality.*

No sooner had a detachment of the Saxon army approached the frontiers of Hesse than the landgrave declared in favour of the allies, and sent a reinforcement of seven thousand men to join the Duke of Brunswick. This decisive example of honour and courage excited the resentment of Tilly, who immediately quitted the banks of the Weser, and took possession of Minden and Göttingen. The Duke of Brunswick's position being no longer secure, he fell back in haste upon Wolfenbüttel, where he shortly after died of a malignant fever.†

Tilly was less successful in an attempt on Nordheim, being compelled upon the approach of the Saxon army to raise the siege; but having at length received a strong reinforcement from Wallenstein's army, he recommenced offensive operations, and by a masterly movement cut off the King of Denmark from Thuringia, where he was endeavouring to penetrate; and having pursued him to Lutter, near Goslar, completely defeated him, after an obstinate engagement. Having left five thousand men upon the field of battle, besides a considerable number of prisoners, and abandoned his artillery

* Grimoard, i. 276.

† 1626. As in those days it was impossible for a person of distinguished character to die by natural means, the court of Vienna was accused of having hastened his death by poison, *ibid.* 278. Lotichius, i. 450.

and baggage, Christian fled towards the Elbe, at the head of his cavalry, which had sustained no material loss; and, after a retreat, attended with infinite difficulty, returned to Holstein, having plainly proved to the world, that he was not designed by nature for a hero.*

Mansfeldt's project for the invasion of Austria is supposed to have been originally suggested by the elder Thurn, who anticipated the most important results from the undertaking, provided Gabor could be persuaded to break the truce with Austria, a measure to which he was always sufficiently inclined. The government of Ferdinand, no longer induced by prudential motives to restrain his natural arrogance, was grown so unpopular, that in various districts the peasants were actually in open rebellion. A large body of insurgents, after pillaging several towns, on the banks of the Danube, laid siege to Lintz, and were supposed to carry on a clandestine correspondence with the malcontents in Hungary and Bohemia. Though frustrated in the attempts to capture a city, which would have given lasting reputation to their arms, the insurgents continued to support the contest with unabating energy, till the return of Papenheim from Italy. After the cessation of hostilities between France and Spain, that gallant officer received directions to march against the rebels in Upper Austria, with a few regiments which had been serving under his orders in Lombardy.† The character of the war

* Grimoard, 290. Puffendorf, i. 49. Pfeffel, ii. 301.

† This celebrated commander had received, like Wallenstein, a learned education; and, like him, had visited most of the European courts, before he embraced the profession of a soldier. Destined to act a distinguished

was now totally changed ; every enterprise was combined with judgment ; every attack was conducted with vigour ; till being routed in a battle with the loss of their leader, the undisciplined band was so entirely dissipated, that they never afterwards attempted to assemble.*

The consternation occasioned by the approach of an enemy, whom the hatred and fears of the catholics had honoured with the appellation of the modern Attila, induced Ferdinand to dispatch courier after courier to recal Wallenstein to the defence of his capital ; but every exertion of that active commander was frustrated by the vigilance of his antagonist. In spite of all the impediments which valour or artifice could oppose, Mansfeldt continued to advance, and after cutting in pieces a strong detachment of the imperialists at Oppela, and capturing Ratibor, Ieagerdorf, and Troppau, effected a junction with Gabor, in the vicinity of Presburg. The restless ambition of that enterprising chieftain, stimulated by the eloquence and the ardour of Thurn, by whom the condition of Mansfeldt had been artfully painted in the most flattering colours, had recommenced hostilities with Austria. But previously to the arrival of the fugitive hero, the disastrous intelligence of Christian's defeat had clouded the hopes of the Transilvanian ; who, when instead of a conqueror, enriched

part in the sanguinary contest about to ensue, he gave an early presage of his future celebrity. At the battle of Prague he was covered with wounds, and left for dead. Progressively raised by superior merit, he was entrusted with the command of a considerable corps in Italy, during the contest between the courts of Paris and Madrid, respecting the Valteline. Coxe, I. 806.

* 1626. Lotichius, 460.

by the spoils of plundered states, and accompanied by a numerous army, he beheld a miserable wanderer, destitute of all resources but what he might be able to derive from the generosity of a friend, began seriously to reflect that the issue of a contest commenced under such sinister auspices was not likely to prove advantageous. He accordingly resolved as soon as possible to get rid of a guest, whose situation did not promise to be productive of benefits commensurate with the expense he must occasion.*

Mansfeldt too late discovered that there is a tide in human affairs, against which it is in vain even for heroic courage to struggle. Confiding in the powers of an unbounded genius, he trusted to the resources of his own mind, without deigning to attend to difficulties, which the greater part of mankind would have deemed insuperable. Had he confined his system of predatory warfare to the theatre of his early exploits, he might not only have avoided destruction, but might even have added to his abundant laurels ; but by grasping at objects too vast to be accomplished by human ingenuity, he rendered himself subservient to the fluctuating counsels of caprice and interest, and in some degree obscured the lustre of a life, which, considering the situation in which he was placed by nature, and the extraordinary actions he performed, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of history. Cut off from Germany by an army too formidable to be attacked without imminent danger, abandoned by the calculating policy of a mercenary warrior, whose friend-

* Schmidt, iv. 25. Grimoard, i. 295. Lotichius, 452.

ships and enemies were equally venal, and destitute of funds for supporting an army in a country where plunder was less easily obtained than in the opulent dioceses of Germany, he resolved to embrace the only scheme which appeared likely to restore him to glory. Having disbanded his handful of men, and sold his artillery and warlike stores, he set out for Venice with a retinue suitable to his humble fortunes. The offers repeatedly made him by that republic induced him to hope that he might shortly resume a distinguished part on the splendid theatre of Europe. But his career of glory was about to terminate. Worn out with exertions too excessive to be borne by the fragile frame of a mortal, irritated by disappointments, and the acrimonious string of frustrated ambition, and debilitated by the increasing progress of a malady which had long preyed in secret on his athletic constitution, he was compelled to stop at a miserable village in the vicinity of Zara in Dalmatia. Perceiving that his end was rapidly approaching, he dressed himself in one of his richest uniforms, and girding on a favourite sword which he constantly wore in battle, summoned all his officers to attend him. Supported by two of them, whom he wished to distinguish for their unshaken fidelity, he exhorted them to persevere in the pursuit of glory, and in their inveterate hostility toward Austria. With the indifference of a man preparing for a journey of no extraordinary importance, he continued tranquilly to converse with his friends to the latest moment of his existence. His body was interred with military pomp, at Spalatio in Dalmatia, at the expense of the Venetians. Thus was the emperor delivered from an enemy, who though often defeated, never

ceased to be formidable ; and whose transcendant genius was so fertile in resources, that without the smallest funds to support the expenses of war, he maintained an honourable contest during seven campaigns against the most powerful monarch in Europe.*

* Schmidt, iv. 25. Nani *Historia Veneta*, iv. Schiller, ii.—Two anecdotes related by Barre (ix. 568) are not unworthy of the heroes of Plutarch. Having discovered that Cazel, an officer in whom he particularly confided, betrayed his plans to the enemy, Mansfeldt made him a considerable present in money, and dispatched him with the following letter to Bucquoy, "Finding that Cazel prefers your interests to mine, I send him to you, that you may profit by his talents." His generosity toward an apothecary, who had undertaken to poison him was no less characteristic of magnanimity. Being discovered in the act of preparing the fatal potion, he was brought before Mansfeldt, trembling at the prospect of a cruel death; but instead of treating him with the severity which he so justly merited, the hero thus addressed him in the language of mercy,—"As I cannot persuade myself that a man whom I never injured should wish to deprive me of life, necessity must have induced you to undertake the crime. That motive shall no longer exist; take this and be honest in future." After this short admonition, he presented him with a purse full of gold, and dismissed him. Nani, who was no admirer of his character, pays an involuntary eulogium to his memory. "Uomo per altro, che senza invidia può chiamarsi celebre, è senza biasimo celebrarsi per grande in un secolo, nel quale son alcuni stati eletti dal cielo ministri della divina giustizia, è delle pubbliche calamità. Egli ardi di provocare solo, è con auspicii privati la tremenda potenza degli Austriaci. Fà sempre vinto in battaglia, ma per la felicità di rimettersi niente meno celebre de vincitori. Nel negotio superiore a grandissimi ingegni; audace nel incontrar i pericoli, accortissimo nel sottrarsene; amatore di torbidi, è novità; soffrente della fame, delle vigilie, è dell' intemperie; eloquente è sagace; profuso del sno, cupido del altrui, visse tra grande speranze, è disegni; morì senza stali, è senza thesori."

CHAP. VII.

Conduct of France with respect to Germany.—Ambitious projects of Ferdinand; success of Wallenstein; distressed situation of the King of Denmark; the Dukes of Mecklenberg put under the imperial ban, and deprived of their dominions.—Exactions of Wallenstein; he obtains the dukedom of Mecklenberg; he aims at establishing an independent power; means employed for that purpose.—Negociations for peace; pretensions of Ferdinand; offers made by Frederic.—Diet held at Mulhausen.—A proposal for recovering the secularized benefices.—Fruitless attempt to procure the election of a King of the Romans.—Wallenstein aims at establishing a naval force in the Baltic, and endeavours to get possession of Stralsund. Gustavus Adolphus having taken that city under his protection, compels the Duke of Friedland to raise the siege.—Congress assembled at Lubec; peace concluded with Denmark.—Views and policy of Cardinal Richelieu.—Mantuan war.—Negociations of Charnace in Germany.—Wise policy of Maximilian.

THE deaths of Mansfeldt and Brunswick delivered the emperor from two of his most formidable enemies without increasing the prospect of peace. On the contrary, it became probable, from the general aspect of affairs, that the flame of war was about to extend over a wider surface.

Though seriously occupied in the siege of Rochelle, the capture of which was essential to the success of his projects for reducing the Hugonots, Richelieu still found leisure to attend to northern politics. For the present, however, he resolved to confine himself to clandestine intrigue, till the moment should arrive when he might safely throw aside the mask, and declare it was hardly possible to afford such assistance to the protestants as was necessary to prevent their utter destruction, without risking a rupture with Austria.

The ambitious projects of Ferdinand were no longer concealed under the veil of mystery, but presumptuously blazoned in the face of the universe. Emboldened by victory, his partizans and dependents proclaimed the design, long harboured in secret, of establishing throughout every province of Germany, that unity of worship which he deemed no less essential to his future happiness, than unity of power to his present security. Nothing, he thought, was wanting to complete his glory, but to extirpate heresy, and to reduce every member of the Germanic confederacy under the authority of an hereditary sovereign. With characteristic insolence, Wallenstein boasted, "that the moment was approaching, when the electors would be reduced to the rank of Spanish grandees."^{*} Neither was this the empty menace of arrogance, but confirmed by a series of concurring circumstances, too notorious to be misunderstood. The troops of Tilly and Wallenstein levied contributions indiscriminately in the catholic and protestant states, indifferent alike to the claims of justice, the dictates of compassion, and the common forms of decency.

Another attempt, simultaneously made, served still more to increase the general alarm. The Archduke Leopold having been tempted to abandon the ecclesiastical profession for an advantageous marriage with Claudina de Medici, widow of the Duke of Urbino, the emperor invested William, one of his younger sons, with the valuable bishoprics of Strasburg and Passau. This indeed was a natural exertion of patronage, and found a ready excuse in

* 1627. Barre, ix. 571.

one of the strongest propensities of human nature. But his subsequent conduct was without palliation, and plainly demonstrated, that he was resolved to avail himself of the terror inspired by his numerous armies, to procure for the younger branches of his family all the benefices which had been wrested from the catholic church, since the treaty of Passau. The diocese of Halberstadt being vacant, by the death of Christian, Duke of Brunswick, the chapter was compelled to elect the new Bishop of Passau for their diocesan. A bull was also obtained from the Pope, conferring upon him the archiepiscopal mitre of Bremen, together with the rich abbey of Hirschfeld, both of which had been secularized, and were actually enjoyed by princes of the protestant persuasion.* Not satisfied with this flagrant abuse of authority, while any thing remained for avidity to grasp, he declared the wealthy see of Magdeburg to have been vacated by the rebellion of Christian William of Brandenburg, who enjoyed its revenues under the title of administrator. Supposing the former incumbent to have forfeited all claim to that exalted dignity, there was still another obstacle to be overcome, before it could be transferred into the imperial family. According to a practice long established in Germany, a coadjutor was chosen to all episcopal sees, during the life of the occupant, who succeeded of course upon a vacancy. Unfortunately for Ferdinand, the destined successor was the son of the Elector of Saxony; he was therefore reduced to the distressing dilemma, of either renouncing the tempting prize, or of offending a prince

* Barre, ix. 571. Nani Historia Veneta, vi.

with whom he was as yet unwilling to quarrel. Yet, notwithstanding every obstacle which impeded his wishes, recourse was had to the papal authority, and a bull procured, annulling the former election. But as neither the canons nor the Saxon were likely to pay much attention to the decrees of a man whose religion they despised, and whose power they derided, an imperial rescript was issued, forbidding the son of John George to accept the appointment. To persuade the elector to abandon his interest, however, proved a less easy task than to persuade him to abandon his friends. A warm contest ensued, which ultimately terminated in a compromise, Augustus being allowed to retain possession of the see, in the name and under the authority of the archduke.*

With an unbroken force at his disposal, and assisted by the advice of one of the ablest generals of modern Europe, the King of Denmark had been unable to contend with Tilly upon equal terms: what then could be expected from his exertions, with an army no less disheartened than diminished by its recent defeat, and destined to oppose the legions of Wallenstein, united with those of the League? After following Mansfeldt to the banks of the Danube, without being able to obtain any decisive advantage, the Duke of Friedland directed his efforts against an isolated corps left for the protection of Silesia, under John Ernest, Duke of Weimar; but the command of which, after the death of that gallant prince, had devolved on the younger Thurn. Too weak to resist the imperialists, the pro-

* Barre, ix. 571. Coxe, i. 115.

testants fled from post to post, abandoning every fortress at the approach of Wallenstein, who, after driving them before him into the march of Brandenburg, compelled the elector to revoke the protest which he had formerly issued against the proceedings of the diet of Ratisbonne.*

The hereditary dominions of the house of Austria being thus delivered from all appearance of danger, the whole resources of that powerful monarchy were concentrated in the northern provinces of Germany, and destined exclusively for the dissolution of a confederacy already verging to decay. With the confused rapidity of a flight, rather than the organized movements of a well-conducted retreat, the Danes had abandoned all their posts upon the Weser, the Elbe, and the Havel. Having received a reinforcement of six thousand English, under the command of Colonel Morgan, the king resolved to defend his hereditary dominions; but every attempt to arrest the progress of the victor proved fruitless, and he was compelled to abandon all the fortresses of Holstein, with the single exception of Gluckstadt. After dictating laws to the Elector of Brandenburg, in his capital, the Duke of Friedland advanced to the theatre of war, anxious to share with the veteran general of the League in the glory of terminating the campaign. In his march towards Sleswick, whither the King of Denmark had retired, he took possession of the duchies of Mecklenburg; as the allies of Christian, both its dukes† were declared to have incurred the penalty of treason, and in conse-

* 1627. Puffendorf, i. 50.

† The Mecklenburg family was, and is still, divided into two reigning branches—that of Schwerin, and that of Strelitz.

quence of this illegal sentence, they were put under the ban of the empire.* Thus was the defence of the Germanic constitution against the violent attack of despotism, punished with all the severity which it would have been possible to inflict on crimes of the blackest atrocity. Without deigning to attend to the common forms of justice, without citation, or trial, the emperor presumed, in the plenitude of power, to proscribe and depose two of the most ancient sovereigns of Germany, and shortly after to transfer their dignity and states to the ready instrument of his iniquity.

The behaviour of Wallenstein now disclosed to the world the extent and nature of his projects. The astonishment originally occasioned by his offer to the imperial court was converted into despair, when the resources were discovered by which he intended to fulfil his apparently extravagant promises. It had been a leading principle in Mansfeldt's politics, "that one war must be supported by another." His troops had been fed at the expense of the country where they happened to be quartered, without the smallest consideration to the religion, the principles, or the politics of the inhabitants. These predatory incursions were however necessarily attended with many vicissitudes, arising out of the system itself. When one province was exhausted, they were compelled to remove to another, like the Tartarian hordes in search of booty; and sometimes were forced to abandon the undevoured harvest by the approach of a superior force. Yet in spite of every obstacle that art or nature could prevent, the capital of

* Schiller, ii. Bougeant, i. 131.

Austria had been made to tremble by a troop of banditti. If such were the achievements of an unprotected soldier, the child of fortune, it was not difficult to anticipate the wonders that might be achieved by an army strong enough to enforce unconditional submission; commanded by a general unrestrained by the compunctuous feelings of pity, the ties of morality, or the dictates of justice, and secure of impunity in every enterprize; since the haughty wearer of the imperial crown no longer scrupled to degrade his paramount dignity by embracing a system of rapine and confiscation, which a needy adventurer had been constrained to follow from necessity rather than from inclination.

Wallenstein had attentively studied the Mansfeldtian tactics before he submitted his plan to the cabinet of Vienna. He knew that the facility of the execution must augment in proportion to its apparent difficulty, because a numerous army, by the terror it inspired, would extort supplies from the timidity of those, to whose compassion an inferior one might petition in vain for assistance. The more violent the oppression exercised by the commander, the less cause he had for apprehension; because the fruit of extortion, if properly applied, was certain to purchase indemnity. By open rebellion most of the northern provinces had incurred the resentment of Ferdinand, and the most vigorous treatment might in consequence be justified by the casuistry of civilians. Toward those who adhered to the imperial throne through interest, attachment, or fear, he resolved to act more humanely, unless constrained to exceed the bounds of moderation by the irresistible plea of necessity.

This politic gradation in the scale of iniquity kept alive a spirit of jealousy, sufficient to prevent the different members of the empire from combining for their mutual security; while the exhausted situation to which they were reduced, precluded the possibility of insulated resistance. Thus was Germany converted into an immense magazine for the use of the imperial troops, and the authority of the emperor rendered no less despotic in Swabia and Saxony, than it was in Austria and Bohemia. A general cry of indignation was raised in every state unawed by the presence of an army, against the tyranny of Ferdinand; but still more against that of the Duke of Friedland, who exceeded the limits prescribed to his authority by acts of unqualified violence. Too weak to oppose the overwhelming storm, the wretched victims of oppression appealed in crowds to the imperial throne, against the exactions of a general, who was supposed to enjoy the unbonnded confidence of his master, and to act in conformity to his secret instructions; but whatever might have been the inclination of Ferdinand, he had no longer the power to restrain a man, whom riches, and honours, and unlimited authority had rendered completely independent.

Though the exhausted resources of the protestant states might inspire the hope of a speedy termination to the war, Wallenstein continued to augment his forces, till he found himself at the head of a hundred thousand combatants. Elated with success, he then began to enlarge his views, and endeavoured in consequence to gain both officers and men, by excessive largesses, and a rapid promotion; surrounded with more than regal pomp, he

gave away money with the liberality of a man who never experienced any difficulty in procuring it. Large sums were expended in corrupting the army, and larger still in well-timed applications to the excessive venality of the Austrian cabinet. All this however was easily effected without ever recurring to the imperial treasury, by the enormous contributions promiscuously levied upon friends and foes; for he no longer deigned to make the smallest distinction between them.* Indifferent alike to the murmurs of despair, or the compunctions of conscience, he knew that in proportion to the extent of his exactions his means of remuneration must increase, so long as he had the power of rewarding his followers, he never doubted their attachment. Thus his very enormities secured him from danger, because they enabled him to bid defiance to justice.

It is alleged by some of the German historians, from a wish to extenuate the guilt of Ferdinand, that he was unacquainted with the atrocities committed by his troops; though they confess that he was almost daily assailed by the complaints of those, who were the devoted victims of their oppression. It is generally admitted that his ministers were in the pay of the Duke of Friedland, that they in consequence endeavoured to conceal the truth, and represented the remonstrances of a

* The sums raised by Wallenstein in Germany are so ridiculously exaggerated by the hatred of some, and the admiration of others, that no rational calculation can be formed. Schiller talks of sixty thousand millions of dollars levied in the space of seven years; I am however inclined to think that this must be a typographical error, and that it should have been sixty millions instead of sixty thousand; which would amount to about one million, five hundred thousand pounds sterling a year.

ruined people as the murmurs of disaffection. But the character of Ferdinand is little calculated to justify the supposition. His failings, though many, were not those of indolence. Ever active and vigilant, he seems to have chosen Charles V. for his model, and like him to have been guided by his own judgment, more frequently than by the advice of his ministers. All that can possibly be alleged in the emperor's justification, is, that he had raised the power of his general so high, that he was no longer able to control it. With secret satisfaction he beheld the conduct of Wallenstein, so long as he maintained his allegiance to the imperial throne, equally indifferent to the sufferings of the people and the complaints of the nobility. Delighted to see the princes of the empire depressed and humbled, and satisfied that when all intermediate gradations of rank between the throne and cottage should be swept away, no resistance would be offered to his authority, he never suspected that the Duke of Friedland's intention, in making him the sole dispenser of law, was to tyrannize with impunity as his representative. On the contrary, he believed, that like a dependent satellite, Wallenstein must sink into obscurity, when deprived of his reflected lustre. But the plans of his general were too artfully combined to be subject to the vicissitudes of a sovereign's caprice. He knew that the power of the emperor was entirely the work of his own creation, and believed that with a single blow he might dash it in pieces; but he also felt that his own ascendancy was inseparably connected with that of his master. The countenance of a mighty name was no less essential to the execution of his designs than his army to the pre-

potency of Ferdinand. He therefore resolved to involve him in a maze of difficulties, from which he thought it impossible for him ever to escape. By pretending to act in strict conformity to orders from Vienna, mitigating their severity so far as was consistent with the duty of a faithful subject, he rendered the emperor's name supremely odious, convinced that in proportion to the hatred inspired, the value of his own services must augment. To emancipate the emperor from the forms and shackles of the Germanic constitution was the second object of his ambition, the first was to keep him dependant upon himself.*

The facility with which he had obtained the title of duke emboldened him to look forward to higher and more substantial honours; and he accordingly demanded possession of the duchy of Mecklenberg, by way of security, for the money advanced to the emperor during the preceding campaign.† Though most of the Austrian ministers were blindly devoted to the interest of Wallenstein, there were still some who contemplated the extent of his ambition with jealousy, and endeavoured accordingly to prevent their master from consenting to a proposal, no less dangerous to his authority than derogatory to his glory. "The house of Mecklenberg," they said, "one of the most illustrious in Germany, derived its origin from the remotest antiquity, and was allied to most of the reigning

* Schiller, ii.

† 1627. Acquainted with the penury of the imperial treasury, he applied for payment in the most urgent terms, convinced that Ferdinand must of necessity consent to gratify his ambition, though at the expense of justice.—Galetti, i. 84.

families in Europe. Hence it must be expected, that many powerful protectors would rise in their defence. Neither was an act of such uncommon severity less repugnant to the precepts of equity than to the common dictates of prudence. The conduct of the Dukes of Mecklenburg was, in no respect, more reprehensible than that of all the members of the circle to which they belonged. To deprive them of their territories would in consequence excite a general alarm; and not only create additional obstacles to a peace with Denmark, but might eventually draw the forces of Sweden into the heart of the empire.*

The partizans of the Duke of Friedland, on the other hand, maintained the necessity of stifling every spark of rebellion by some signal act of severity, since the punishment inflicted upon the Elector Palatine had failed of intimidating the disaffected. The services performed by their favourite hero afforded an ample theme for panegyric, and were represented as deserving the most brilliant rewards. But, should gratitude be suffered to plead in vain, there was another monitor they said, whose counsels required attention. An opportunity occurred, of eternally binding the greatest military genius of the age by the indissoluble ties of gratitude and interest; whereas, a refusal might tempt him in disgust to abandon the service—a loss which could never be repaired.†

With respect to the danger attending compliance, they affected to treat it with utter contempt. The

* Galetti, i. 84.

† Schmidt, iv. 27.

subserviency of the diet had been so clearly manifested upon recent occasions, that it would be unjust to doubt of their loyalty. The King of Sweden, they said, was so completely occupied in the Polish war, that he had neither leisure nor inclination to interfere with the politics of Germany; while the Danish monarch would be happy to regain his conquered territory by any concessions. In addition to these important considerations another was urged more cogent still. It was triumphantly argued, that as the northern shores were the seat of heresy and rebellion, it would be no less advantageous to the cause of religion, than to the private views of the emperor, to transfer the sovereignty of those disaffected provinces to an orthodox member of the catholic church, on whose courage and fidelity he could rely, and who would be ready to act with vigour and ability in every emergency. By his aid and co-operation, a marine might be created, capable of dictating laws to Sweden and Denmark, and of gradually engrossing the whole commerce of the Baltic.†

Wallenstein, however, was too dexterous a negotiator to trust solely to argument for success. Thoroughly acquainted with the emperor's weakness,—against that he directed his attack. Though decidedly hostile to the Jesuits, more probably from political than from religious motives, he determined to avail himself of the unbounded ascendancy which they were known to possess over the scrupulous conscience of Ferdinand; and to secure their interested support, he promised to

* Schmidt, iv. 27. Galetti, i. 85.

erect a magnificent college for the use of the order in his ducal domain, and richly to endow it out of the secularized property of the church. A splendid establishment on the shores of the Baltic, from which they had till then been excluded with meritorious caution, and whence they flattered themselves to be enabled to scatter the seeds of conversion, and reclaim the heretical North, proved a temptation too alluring to be resisted. From the opponents they suddenly became the partizans of the Duke of Friedland, and by a happy application of that ingenious casuistry, which is the striking characteristic of the fraternity, soon convinced the emperor that he was in conscience bound to consent to Wallenstein's claim, since gratitude held a most distinguished rank in the scale of Christian virtues.*

It was impossible for Europe to behold with indifference the ambitious projects of Ferdinand, which plainly tended to establish an unbounded despotism throughout all the regions of the north. Yet France and England, the only powers by whom they could be opposed with a well-founded prospect of success, were too much occupied with internal dissensions to have leisure for the arduous undertaking. Various attempts indeed had been ineffectually made, to induce Louis to grant an asylum in France to the eldest son of the unfortunate Palatine. Alarmed at the prepotency of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria had endeavoured to penetrate the intentions of Richelieu respecting Germany, artfully insinuating, that he should not

* 1627. Schmidt, iv. 27. Galetti, i. 85.

be averse to concur in any measure proposed by that enlightened statesman, for preserving the balance of Europe. Even the Elector of Treves had applied to France for protection, as the only means of preserving his affrighted subjects from the insolence and tyranny of the Austrians.*

These repeated addresses were no less flattering to the vanity than conformable to the views of the cardinal; but being resolutely bent on accomplishing the destruction of the Calvinists, before he engaged in a contest with Austria, he contented himself with offering the mediation of France, and proposed the assembling a general congress. Convincing that, by allowing the electoral prince to reside within the dominions of Louis, he should hasten a rupture which he wished to delay, he eluded the request, under pretext that it would be utterly inconsistent with the dignity of his master, to countenance that unfortunate youth, without openly declaring himself his protector; a step which would of necessity prevent him from consenting to any treaty which did not extend to the complete restoration of the Palatine family. Nothing could be more ingeniously devised to silence all farther applications, as this was a point concerning which the opinions of the protestants were greatly divided; many of them considering that, under existing circumstances, no hope could be entertained of effecting it.†

The situation of the allies, however, was grown so desperate, that it required no little dexterity to suspend their total destruction, till the period

* Le Vassor, vii. 612.

† Barre, ix. 573.

should arrive for active interference. Richelieu therefore determined, by liberal promises, and a moderate subsidy, to preserve them from utter despondency. Marcheville was also dispatched upon an ambulatory mission to the German courts, with directions to endeavour, by every artifice, to impede the election of a king of the Romans, which Ferdinand was anxious to accomplish. He was at the same time instructed to offer the mediation of France for the re-establishment of peace, or if that could not be obtained, at least for a suspension of hostilities.*

But as the main object of Richelieu was to detach Maximilian from the protestant interest, Marcheville was directed to flatter his ambition with the prospect of obtaining the imperial diadem, whenever a vacancy should occur, while he artfully insinuated to the other electors the danger which threatened the Germanic constitution from the overgrown power of Austria. As the only means of avoiding this increasing evil, he suggested the necessity of electing for their chief a prince possessed of less extensive dominions, whose projects of aggrandisement, should he rashly attempt to infringe their prerogatives, would consequently be more easily defeated. The cardinal, however, was too well acquainted with the weakness and venality of the German cabinets, and with the state of humiliation to which they were reduced, to flatter himself that he should be able to inspire them with the courage necessary for his purpose; but he determined, if possible, to

* 1627. Barre, ix. 673. Le Vassor, vi. 612.

prevent them from proceeding to the election of a king of the Romans. With this view he represented to the electors the impolicy of consenting to the emperor's proposal; for, while something remained for them to bestow, Ferdinand would be induced to treat them with greater lenity; but the moment he should have secured the reversion of the imperial sceptre, he would give unbounded scope to his haughty temper, and no longer consider them in any other light than that of dependants and vassals.* This latter argument, as more particularly applicable to the interests of the moment, having produced the desired effect, and excited suspicions in the breasts of the electors, which neither bribes nor persuasions could overcome, the election was deferred till a more favourable opportunity. Though defeated in a plan so dear to his vanity, Ferdinand endeavoured to console himself by compelling the Bohemians to confer their crown on his son, who had previously obtained the Hungarian sceptre. The ceremony of a coronation was the only thing required, as he would not permit the nation to proceed even to the prostituted forms of a compulsory choice; and by this act of injustice, a fatal blow was given to the expiring liberties of Bohemia, which was in future considered as an integral part of the hereditary dominions of Austria.†

While the imperial generals were successfully employed in subjugating the north of Germany, Ferdinand continued to amuse the courts of London and Paris with the prospect of a speedy paci-

* Barre, ix. 573. Le Vassor, vi. 612. † Barre, ix. 573.

fication. The Dukes of Lorraine and Wirtemberg, assuming the sacred character of mediators, repaired to Colmar in Alsace, where Frederic was tempted by the fallacious hope of recovering his dominions, to depute two of his confidential friends as negotiators. It appeared, however, that the pretensions of the imperial court were dictated by a spirit of overbearing pride, which precluded every expectation of a favourable issue. Not satisfied with the Palatine's renunciation of all his claims to the Bohemian crown, Ferdinand insisted upon his relinquishing the electoral dignity in favour of the Duke of Bavaria. It was further required, that the catholic religion should be established in the Palatinate, with all its appendages of indolence and celibacy; that he should indemnify the emperor for the expenses of the war, and in particular discharge the heavy debt for which Lusatia and Upper Austria had been mortgaged to the Electors of Saxony and Bavaria: and, lest anything should be wanting to complete his degradation, Frederic was expected to acknowledge in a public diet the clemency of the conqueror.*

Terms so unreasonable could never be acceded to by any one not totally insensible to the dictates of honour, or destined by nature to become a slave. Anxious, however, to evince to the world the sincerity of his intentions, Frederic offered to abandon his pretensions to the contested throne, and, through the medium of an ambassador, to implore forgiveness for his past imprudence, provided no concessions should be required derogatory

* 1027. Le Vassor, vii. 622. Nau, vi. Grimoard, i. 305.

to the character of an independent sovereign ; and that he should be immediately reinstated in his dominions. With respect to religion it was proposed, to place it exactly upon the footing on which it had existed previously to hostilities ; but the impoverished condition to which the Palatinate was reduced, was strenuously urged as an excuse for rejecting every pecuniary demand. To the proposal concerning the electoral franchise, the following answer was returned : that Frederic would consent to its being alternately exercised by Maximilian and himself, during the life of the former, provided that at his death it should be exclusively attached to the Palatinate.

Every attempt to soften the resentment of Ferdinand having proved ineffectual, with the haughtiness of a conqueror he signified to the mediators that his ultimatum had been delivered at the commencement of the negociation, from which it was his unalterable resolution never to recede. Desirous, however, of concealing the implacability of his disposition, he attempted to cast the odium of a rupture upon his unfortunate rival, by attributing it solely to his unreasonable pretensions.* In a letter addressed to the Duke of Wirtemberg, he expatiated upon the obstinacy of Frederic in rejecting his equitable offers, though it was evident, that by accepting them he would have exposed his family to the greatest distress, impoverished his dominions, and forfeited every claim to the sympathy of mankind, by sanctioning his own degradation.

* Le Vassor, vi. 612.

The protestants were now so overwhelmed with confusion, that the Duke of Brunswick endeavoured to avert the ruin which threatened his party, by placing his territories under the protection of Ferdinand. This fatal instance of temporising prudence convinced the King of Denmark that it was no longer possible to continue the contest; and he accordingly applied to the Elector of Saxony for his mediation. A diet about to assemble at Mülhausen in Thuringia afforded an opportunity for making the attempt, notwithstanding the views of the emperor were too generally known for any rational hopes to be entertained. This opinion was fully justified by the event—since the efforts which were made for healing animosities, tended only to envenom their rancour. Ferdinand, however, being desirous of conciliating the electoral chamber, directed his ambassador (Baron Strahendorf) to open the conferences with a specious display of moderation, but cautiously to avoid fettering his actions by any specific engagements. He accordingly expatiated with more zeal than judgment upon the justice and clemency of his master, lamenting that his endeavours for restoring tranquillity to his distracted country had been hitherto frustrated by the intrigues and ambition of his enemies; he next intreated the assembly to deliberate upon the means of terminating a contest, no less destructive to the happiness and prosperity of Germany than repugnant to the inclinations of the emperor; and concluded by exhorting them, as a necessary step toward permanent repose, to consent to the election of a king of the Romans. Marcheville also, who had lately assumed the character of plenipotentiary, exhorted the assembly in a

studied oration to put an end to the calamities of war; while the electors endeavoured by professions and flattery to appease the resentment of Ferdinand.*

The spirit displayed by some of the members, unworthy as it was of so glorious a cause, proved no less surprising than unexpected to Ferdinand, who flattered himself to meet with no opposition; but no sooner did he find that neither bribes nor promises could procure the election of his son than he altered his language, affecting to treat as seditious every allusion made to the ancient liberties of Germany, though the insolence of power was in some measure tempered by the dictates of prudence, a distinction being made in favour of those whose friendship it was important to conciliate.†

The emperor's intentions, however, were more plainly demonstrated in this assembly than at any former period of his government. Conceiving the moment to be at length arrived, when the long meditated blow might be struck with safety, a petition was presented by the catholic prelates, demanding the restitution of all the ecclesiastical benefices usurped from the church since the treaty of Passau. A measure, productive of so material a change in the relative situation of the rival communions, was calculated to produce the utmost consternation, or excite the warmest applause, according to the views and interests of the parties concerned. And we accordingly find, that it was immediately sanctioned by the approbation of the

* Schmidt, iv. 26. Barre, 573. Nani, vi. Memoires de Louis Julian, 283. Galetti, i. 105.

† 1027. Barre, 573.

catholic princes, and no less strenuously resisted by the protestants. Ferdinand, however, no sooner perceived that he had miscalculated the influence of terror, than he ceased to press the demand, satisfied with obtaining a material advantage, in having submitted the proposal to the consideration of the diet, and resolved to resume it at some future period, when the spirit of opposition should be completely subdued.*

But as this could not be accomplished at present, he deemed it advisable to dismiss the assembly, lest any steps should be taken to limit his authority; since he clearly saw, that prudence and policy considerably outweighed the claims of gratitude in the breast of Maximilian; and further discovered, that there were certain concessions, for which the pliant timidity of the catholic prelates were as yet unprepared.†

Meanwhile the imperial generals had proceeded in an almost uninterrupted career of victory. Lubec and Breinen had been constrained to abandon the protestant party, the Electorate of Brandenburg was reduced to indigence by the devastations of Wallenstein; while Arnhem at the head of a powerful detachment, compelled the fortresses of Pomerania to receive Austrian garrisons.‡

Having driven Christian out of Germany, the active genius of Wallenstein was occupied in a plan for transporting his troops to Copenhagen. Even the want of a fleet was by no means an obstacle that appeared insuperable to his enterprizing courage; for

* Puffendorf, i. 51. Barre, 573. Schmidt, iv. 26. Lotichius, i. 499. Pfeffel, ii. 302. Galetti, i. 105.

† Barre, 573.

‡ 1627. Grimoard, 322.

he fondly persuaded himself, that the terror of his name would compel the cities of the Hanseatic confederacy to furnish shipping. A demand was accordingly made for transports, and certain commercial privileges were offered in return, provided they would in future confine their navigation to the Spanish and Austrian harbours. But the daring spirit of mercantile enterprize could neither be blinded by illusory hopes, nor checked by ambiguous menaces. Unfettered freedom is the soul of trade, and every legislative regulation, whether dictated by jealousy under the name of restriction, or inspired by avarice as an unnatural stimulative, argues narrowness of capacity, and a total misconception of the fundamental principles of all commercial speculations. Of this the northern merchants were so fully convinced, that they rejected the proposal upon the enlightened plea, that to a people whose prosperity depends upon their intercourse with foreign nations, war is the bitterest of all human calamities.*

This unsuspected disappointment, far from damping his passion for maritime renown, seems rather to have inflamed it with additional ardour. Not satisfied with possessing the uncontrolled direction of the imperial armies, he procured a patent from Vienna, appointing him Admiral of the Baltic. An empty title however was by no means calculated to content the ambition of Wallenstein, who deeming nothing too arduous for perseverance to accomplish, resolved upon creating a navy, and rendering the emperor no less formidable by sea than he had al-

* Harte's Life of Gustavus Adolphus, edit. in Oct. 1767, i. 96.—Puffendorf, i. 52.

ready made him on the continent. With indefatigable industry he directed his operations against the northern ports, and having reduced them to obedience, constructed docks, engaged by ample salaries the most experienced artificers, and turned all the energies of his active mind to naval architecture. The possession of Stralsund however appeared essential to the final completion of his extensive projects; as it would furnish him at once with a well provided arsenal, numerous vessels for transporting his troops, and immense magazines of provisions. Once master of that important place, he foresaw no impediments to the conquest of Denmark, and anticipated the glory to which he should attain, when the imperial flag floated triumphantly in the northern ocean.*

Alarmed at the danger with which he was threatened, should the Duke of Friedland be suffered to establish a formidable marine in the Baltic, the King of Denmark determined in secret to oppose the execution of a project so hostile to his future tranquillity; and he accordingly sent a Scottish regiment, commanded by Lord Rea, to the defence of Stralsund, assuring the inhabitants that all his forces, if necessary, should march to their relief. Aware of the difficulties attending a siege, Wallenstein had recourse to a stratagem, and sent directions to Arnhem to demand winter quarters for a part of his army; determined, if he once should be able to obtain admittance, never more to evacuate the city. But neither the character of the general, nor the behaviour of the troops, was calculated to inspire con-

* 1628. Puffendorf, i. 52. Harte, i. 96.

fidence. Suspecting his intentions, the magistrates declared that it was totally inconsistent with the privileges which they enjoyed to be burthened with the expense of a foreign garrison. This excuse being founded on ancient precedent, afforded no pretext for coercion, and Wallenstein therefore resolved if possible to exasperate the magistrates by petty annoyances, till some act of hostility on their part might afford a plausible excuse for attacking the city. Convinced that in the estimation of a mercantile people, loss of money is a misfortune inferior only to the loss of liberty, he demanded a heavy contribution. As the requisition might have been eluded under various pretexts, Wallenstein expected a refusal; but, contrary to his wishes, the money was paid: for these commercial politicians were too expert in calculation to question the policy of a temporary sacrifice for the attainment of permanent repose.*

No sacrifice however, except that of independence, could satisfy Friedland, and he accordingly had no sooner received the money than he ordered the city to be invested. Convinced that their preservation must depend entirely upon their own exertions, the inhabitants resolved to bury themselves underneath the ruins of their houses, rather than part with their freedom. Troops were not wanting to man the fortifications, and the magazines overflowed with provisions; but the most essential article was wanting for defence,—a sufficient stock of ammunition. A letter addressed to the Danzickers, announcing the deficiency, and requesting a supply, fell by accident into the hands of Gustavus

* Harte, i. 323. Grimoard, 323. Puffendorf, ii. 5. Loitchius, i. 559.

Adolphus, who immediately dispatched an abundant cargo.* This important present, accompanied with assurances of the generous interest which he must ever feel in their welfare, would have been sufficient to inspire the most timid with courage; but to a people predetermined vigorously to resist, it seemed at once to dispel their apprehensions. This noble resolution was speedily shewn in the reception given to the imperial forces, who rashly ventured on a general assault.†

Nothing indeed could be more absurd than an attempt to capture a strong maritime city, accessible only by a narrow causeway, without being able to blockade it by sea; but the obstinacy of Wallenstein augmented in proportion to the obstacles which he encountered. Finding that Arnheim made little progress, he imputed his failure to want of ability, and resolved in person to direct the opera-

* The letter which accompanied this valuable present is preserved by Lotichius, i. 560.—*Succorum Rex ac S. P. Q. Stralsundensi.* “Ex autographo vestro, ad Dantiscanos directo, nobisque e portu transmisso, intelleximus, vos hoc tempore periculi pleno masculum parare defensionem, sed rei tormentariae, pulverisque nitrati, apparatu destitui. Intuitu igitur religionis, et libertatis, vestraeque erga nostrum inclinationis, intermittere non debuimus, quin et sympathiam nostram contestaremur, et quam regre nobis accidat, vos de libertate ac securitate vestra periclitari, declaremus. Mirari ergo subit, vos eos esse, ut cum finitimi et vicini in consilium administrandi, haec tenus nihil delibaretis. Quid enim salutarius, quam cum pereulis nascentibus amicorum uti consiliis? Nihilo minus, ut appareat, quam optimè vobis cupiamus, ecce! quantitate in desiderati pulveris pyrii submittimus. Plus enim pro tempore clavigri praesens non permisit expeditio nautica. Interim adhortamur vos, animum super libertatis, atque *evangelicae religionis*, securitate vindicanda, semel commasculatum, deinceps constanti fortitudine tecumini. Nec dubium est *Deum* omnipotentem hos pios vestros conatus secundaturum esse. Si quacunque re libertatem vestram conservare possimus, credite, vobis ordine hoc potentibus, non de crimus. Valete. Dabantur apud classem nostram apud Landhantum, iii. Non. Mai. 1628.

† Grimoard, i. 342.

tions of the siege, swearing "that he would make himself master of the city, though it were suspended from heaven by a chain of adamant."*

He soon discovered, however, that it was less easy to accomplish the presumptuous threat than vanity had led him to anticipate. The energy of the inhabitants, and the gallantry of the garrison, defeated every attempt successively made by the persevering courage of the besiegers. Fearful, however, of trusting entirely to their own exertions, the government endeavoured to depreciate the resentment of the emperor by the most dutiful assurances of attachment; and as nothing could be more acceptable to imperial pride than a decent pretext to abandon an undertaking rendered hopeless by repeated repulses, he sent orders to Wallenstein to decamp. But it was no longer in the power of the Austrian court to regulate the actions of that imperious chieftain; the commands of his sovereign were not only treated by Friedland with contemptuous neglect, but the operations were pursued with renovated vigour, as if he had been desirous of proving to the astonished world that he acted independently of all control. The authority of Ferdinand he might defy with impunity, the lives of his soldiers he might waste with indifference, but the resistance of a people resolved to perish rather than to submit, it was not in his power to overcome. The Danish troops being diminished by continual fatigue, Christian advised the magistrates to apply to the King of Sweden. Ever ready to shelter the distressed, that magnanimous prince immediately sent a consider-

* Lotichius, 562. Puffendorf, ii. 6. Loccon. Hist. Sacra. vii. 556.

able reinforcement to their assistance, by whose skill and bravery Wallenstein was compelled to abandon the enterprise, after having sustained very considerable losses.*

The check thus given to the imperial arms was of infinite importance to the northern powers, as it prevented Ferdinand from establishing a navy in the Baltic. Had the attempt proved successful, neither Denmark nor Sweden would have been any longer secure against the ambitious projects of Wallenstein; and the measures adopted for the protection of Stralsund clearly manifested that they were aware of the danger. While they acted in concert it was impossible for the emperor to extend his conquests beyond the coasts; but could any expedient be devised to secure the co-operation of Christian, sanguine hopes might be entertained of excluding Gustavus from ever interfering with German politics, and even of planting the Austrian eagle on the walls of Stockholm. Such, at least, was the plan which the Duke of Friedland conceived for his own aggrandisement, and which he artfully presented to the imperial court, as no less easy than glorious. The promises made by this extraordinary man, though they seemed to embrace impossibilities, had been so frequently realized, that even the most cautious of the Austrian ministers scarcely ventured any longer to oppose his designs. He accordingly experienced but little difficulty in persuading Ferdinand to enter into a negotiation with Denmark, and to invest him with authority for terminating the con-

* 1628. Lotichius, 564. Schiller, ii. According to the former, the loss of the imperial army amounted to upwards of ten thousand foot and twelve hundred horse.

test, without prescribing the conditions to be proposed.*

The power of Wallenstein depended so much upon the prolongation of hostilities, that at first sight it appears a little surprising to behold him the advocate of peace; for even supposing his influence at the imperial court to have been sufficient to procure the ratification of all the grants which had successively recompenced his military achievements, as Duke of Mecklenburg, he was still inferior in political consequence to many of the German potentates; whereas, while he remained at the head of the army, he exercised an authority, unrestrained by law, over all the northern circles. Nothing, however, could be farther from his intention than to lay down the office of dictator. His object was to change the theatre of contention, and not to extinguish the torch of discord. The fame of Gustavus had excited his jealousy, and he vainly flattered himself, by the conquest of Sweden, to give a lustre to his character more permanently splendid than had illuminated the actions of any general since Julius Cæsar; besides, with the acquisition of the duchy of Mecklenburg, his views had suddenly altered. Till he had obtained a seat among the sovereigns of Germany, it was his study to render the emperor despotic; but no sooner was his brow encircled with a ducal crown, than he began seriously to reflect that he was labouring to degrade an order which it was now become his interest to exalt.†

* Schiller, ii.

† According to Schmidt (iv. 27.) this opinion is conformable to a declaration made by himself in 1632, as appears from the following passage:

"Nec uegairt ipse, cum die 18 Febr. anni 1632, in familiari colloquio

For the purpose of accomplishing those mighty projects, which he was generally supposed to have entertained, and which probably embraced the formation of an independent kingdom in the north, of which Mecklenburg was destined to become the centre, an alliance with Denmark was indispensable. The friendship of Christian was therefore to be secured by sacrificing the interests of Austria.* This supposition explains many parts of Wallenstein's conduct, which otherwise appear enigmatical; and we now discover a reason why, in the distribution of commissions, a preference was always given to protestants; why no Austrian subject was ever elevated above the rank of colonel; and why, in defiance of repeated orders from Vienna to reduce the army, he continued recruiting with increasing activity.†

Though it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty of Copenhagen, that neither Sweden nor Denmark should conclude a separate peace, the overtures of Wallenstein, for opening a negociation, were received by Christian with a degree of avidity, which plainly shewed that he would never hesitate at any sacrifice, which personal interest might recommend. Notwithstanding the opposition of England, France, Holland, and Sweden, who were unanimous in their endeavours to protract the war, a congress assembled at Lubec, from which the Swedish plenipotentiaries, who caine expressly to intercede in fa-

cuidam viro principali Znoime narraret; uti sibi in consiliis aliquando fuerit, imperii monarchiam Cæsari acquirere, mutasse hanc mentem, dum Megalopolitanæ dux crearetur."—Alberti Fridlandi *perduellionis chaos, sive integrati animi abyssus.* 1634.

* Schmidt, iv. 19.

† Ibid.

vour of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, were dismissed by Wallenstein with studied marks of contempt: the unlimited power entrusted by the emperor to his general was employed by the latter for the advancement of his own private concerns. All the conquests made by the imperial arms were restored to Denmark, upon condition that she engaged never more to interfere with the affairs of Germany, though, as Duke of Holstein, Christian was materially interested in almost every transaction. He was likewise compelled to renounce all claims to the disposal of certain bishoprics, the patronage of which had belonged to his family ever since the abolition of popery; and was further called upon to pay to Austria a considerable sum, by way of indemnification; but the most degrading concession was his consenting to abandon the Dukes of Mecklenburg, who had taken up arms at his instigation, and whom he scandalously deserted in their distress. At the intercession of Wallenstein he was spared the humiliation of expressly agreeing to their deposition, their names being purposely omitted in the treaty, though, by a leading article, the title of Maximilian to the electoral dignity was recognized. Thus, by the sacrifice of every principle that ought to be most precious to the heart of man, and most sacred in the eyes of a sovereign, did Christian regain possession of his continental dominions; the claims of the emperor to certain bailiwicks, which were considered in the light of imperial fiefs, being reserved for future discussion. Nothing, however, could induce him to consent to the proposal of furnishing a squadron to act in concert with the Austrian fleet, under pretence of securing the free navigation of the Baltic. But it is highly probable, that

this requisition was never seriously made, and was inserted solely to persuade the world, that there were degradations to which the spirit of the humbled Dane was too haughty to submit.* .

Peace had been concluded in direct opposition to the wishes of Richelieu, who had no sooner succeeded in reducing Rochelle, than he directed all the energy of his active mind against the overgrown power of Austria. The daring projects of that enterprizing minister being conceived with an extent of genius too vast to be embraced by vulgar understandings, his plans, when submitted to the examination of the council, were treated by his colleagues as chimerical. "The despotic authority now exercised by Ferdinand over the whole of Germany, placed at his disposal a mass of power, against which it would be madness to contend." Such were the objections raised by Cardinal Bérulle and Marillac,† to alarm the timidity of Louis, and to conceal their real designs. But, in spite of their artifices, the weakness of their arguments was too apparent to escape even the limited penetration of the king, when they proceeded to defend, in the language of bigotry, the conduct of the emperor toward the protestants. "The intention of that great and enlightened prince," they unblushingly argued, "did equal honour to his zeal and discernment. He fought in defence of the orthodox faith, and aimed only to rescue from the grasp

* 1629. Puffendorf, i. 54. Harte, i. 101. Guimard, i. 377.
Schmidt, iv. 28.

† Marillac was keeper of the seals, and so great a favourite with Mary of Medici, that he was in hopes of undermining the power of Richelieu. Le Vassor, viii. 1.

of heretics, domains, which had been consecrated by pious Christians to its glory. With what colour of justice, therefore, could a Christian monarch oppose a measure so advantageous to the common interests of Christendom? Instead of rashly attempting to obstruct the progress of Ferdinand, it would be far more consistent with the dictates of religion to second the meritorious undertaking; and, instead of wantonly engaging in a doubtful contest, to secure and merit the admiration of mankind by extirpating heresy in his own dominions."

These insinuations were exactly calculated for the weak understanding of Louis, and were regarded by his mother with as profound a veneration as if they had been communicated directly from heaven. Her political attachments being now in perfect unison with her religious prejudices, she endeavoured to persuade her bigoted son, that by acting in concert with the imperial and Spanish courts, he would forward the designs of the Almighty.*

Fortunately, however, for the prosperity of France, the ascendancy of Richelieu was too permanently established to be shaken by folly or faction. Confiding in the superiority of an enlightened genius, he bid defiance to their clandestine attacks, resolved by his actions to merit the dignity to which his ambition aspired. No minister ever formed a more magnificent plan, or executed it with greater ability. While to the generality of mankind the colossal power of Austria appeared

* Le Vassor, viii. 3.

erected on a basis too solid even for the united efforts of Europe to overthrow, he plainly discerned its inherent defects, and secretly determined, with the assistance of Sweden, to subvert it. The other members of the administration regarded Maximilian as inseparably bound to the interests of Austria by the ties of gratitude; but he, appreciating the feelings of the human heart with the acuteness of a man deeply versed in worldly intrigue, was fully aware, that in elevated minds ambition keeps pace with power, and that envy towards those in more exalted stations usually operates as a stronger stimulus than the sense of past obligation. For these reasons he did not despair of seducing the Duke of Bavaria, and even the venal piety of the ecclesiastic electors, from their present connexion with the imperial court, as they had already shewn some striking symptoms of alienation. Neither were his fears excited by the apprehension of danger on the side of the Pyrenees; for he knew that the finances of Spain, though actually possessing all the treasures of Mexico and Peru, were in a state of embarrassment, which precluded the possibility of her furnishing subsidies to the emperor.* As a prelude, therefore, to more important enterprizes, he persuaded Louis to declare himself the protector of the Duke of Mantua.

Vincent II. Duke of Mantua, being no longer able to cherish the hope of transmitting his crown to a legitimate heir, married his niece to the Duke of Rhetoloiis, eldest son of Charles Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers; and, in consequence of this union, de-

* Le Vassor, viii. 5. Exclusively of the marriage Nevers was the nearest in blood.—Nani, vii.

clared the latter, by a public act, successor to all his dominions. After the death of Vincent,* who did not long survive the ceremony, Nevers repaired to Italy, to receive the homage of his new subjects. But scarcely was the pomp of inauguration finished, than his title was disputed by various competitors. The aspiring soul of Olivares beheld with regret so fertile a province in the hands of a prince inviolably devoted to France. The Duke of Savoy, frustrated in his expectations of establishing an antiquated claim to Montferrat, by uniting his son with the destined heiress of Vincent, beheld with indignation the important prize transferred to a more fortunate rival. Cæsar, Duke of Guastalla, collaterally descended from the ducal stock, asserted an hereditary title, though he depended less upon the regular transmission of blood than upon the interested protection of Austria. Contenting themselves with dismembering from the plundered duchy whatever best suited their convenience, the courts of Madrid and Turin espoused the cause of Cæsar, because they were persuaded that inherent weakness would prevent him from reclaiming their usurpations; and they accordingly prevailed on Ferdinand to confer upon him the investiture of Mantua, in quality of a fief of the empire.†

This being regarded as the signal for hostilities, the Duke of Savoy entered Montferrat with a force too numerous to be resisted, while the Spaniards

* According to Nani, the dispensation did not arrive from Rome till the duke was in the agonies of death; but the ceremony was performed the moment he had breathed his last, with necessary, perhaps, but indecent haste, vii.

† Nani *Historia Veneta*, vii. Barre, ix. 682. Bougeant, i. 135.

laid siege to Casale, a strong fortress, entrusted to the valour of a French garrison, as the defence of his capital was more than sufficient for the contracted resources of Nevers. By the vigour of his measures, however, he endeavoured to compensate for the paucity of his means. An imperial commissary, deputed to sequester the contested states till the rights of inheritance could be decided, was refused admission into Mantua. Troops were levied with unabating activity, and every castle, capable of arresting the progress of the invaders, was immediately furnished with troops and provisions. From the Venetians, whose interests were connected with his own, Nevers received considerable reinforcements, and was even permitted by Louis to enrol his subjects, though he refused to interfere more openly in his favour till after the fall of Rochelle.*

The policy, if not the compassion, of the papal court was deeply interested in preventing Italy from becoming the theatre of war; yet, notwithstanding every effort to promote an accommodation the ambition of Spain proved inexorable. The siege of Casale was pressed with so much vigour, that it was difficult even for the heroical resistance of the garrison to protract its fall, till Louis had leisure to assemble troops for its relief. No sooner had he planted the royal standard on the walls of Rochelle, than believing himself formed for military renown, and anxious to emulate his father's glory, he resolved to cross the Alps at the head of an army strong enough to dictate laws to Italy. This

* Bougeant, i. 135.—Nani draws a striking picture of the timidity and indecision of his countrymen, in the beginning of the seventh book of his valuable history.

project was no sooner embraced than it was carried into execution with a celerity, which proved that the resources of France were no longer crippled by venality, indecision, or bigotry. Before the duke was aware that Louis had quitted his capital, he had actually entered the defiles of Savoy, and was advancing towards Turin by hasty marches. The forces stationed to guard the important pass of Susa were instantaneously dispersed, upon which Charles Emanuel hastened to conclude a separate peace as the only means of preserving his capital.*

The approach of the French compelled the besiegers to abandon Casale. Reduced by the perfidy of Charles Emanuel to a situation of imminent danger, the Spaniards felt happy to avail themselves of the stipulation inserted in the treaty, at the express desire of their treacherous friend, who hoped to cover the turpitude of his secession by procuring for them a safe retreat. But they were too well acquainted with his real character to attribute this precaution to generosity ; on the contrary, they knew that a rejection of the terms would gratify his insatiable ambition, which would catch with avidity at any pretext to indemnify himself

* 1629. The following conditions were dictated by the victorious cardinal, "that the Duke of Savoy should grant a free passage to the French army, and furnish provisions and military stores for the relief of Casale ; that, as an additional security, the citadel of Susa (an impregnable fortress) should be delivered into the hands of Louis, upon his undertaking to procure from the Duke of Mantua the cession of Triuo to Charles Emanuel, by way of compensation for the loss of Montferrat, and to guarantee the integrity of his other dominions ; this latter article, however, was subject to the condition of his joining the League for preserving the independence of Italy."—Dumont *Corps Diplom.* v. 2d partie, 571.

for his recent disappointment, even at the expense of a plundered ally.*

In subscribing the conditions imposed by Richelieu, Charles Emanuel with premeditated duplicity resolved not to observe them a moment longer than he was compelled by necessity to be honest. Fatigued with the monotonous regularity of a camp, Louis had no sooner signed the treaty than he pantied after the pleasures of Paris; desirous of appearing in the midst of a delighted capital, surrounded with all the emblems of victory. Scarcely had he reached the banks of the Seine, when he was suddenly roused from the enchanting dream by the important intelligence, that a formidable army, commanded by Colalto, a veteran officer, was advancing to vindicate the authority of Ferdinand: while Spinola, at the head of the Spanish forces, was preparing to resume the siege of Casale. Neither could it be doubted that the Duke of Savoy must henceforth be added to the hostile list, since interest and resentment alike conduced to render him unfaithful to his recent engagements.†

The active genius of Richelieu, incensed at being overreached by Italian duplicity, was not to be intimidated by difficulties. Resolved to recover the ascendancy of France, yet anxious if possible to postpone the conflict till he could meet it with greater effect, he determined not to unsheathe the sword till he tried the result of a negociation. Perceiving however that nothing could be obtained from the fears or the moderation of the imperial

* Le Vassor, viii. 89. Nani, vii.

† Bougeant, i. 137. Le Vassor, viii. 241. Grimoard, I. 398.

cabinet, he prepared for open hostilities. In spite of his energy, Casale was invested before he could march to its defence, and Mantua taken by assault. The fertile banks of the Po, laid waste by the ravages of a licentious soldiery, rendered the name of Ferdinand no less hateful in Italy than it was become in Germany by the exactions of Wallenstein. The consternation was general, and every petty state from the Alps to Calabria, anticipating a destiny severe as that, which the haughty conqueror of Christian continued to inflict upon the miserable victims of his ambition, called down curses on the head of their oppressor; even the Roman conclave, sacrificing pride, and ambition, and jealousy to fear, is supposed to have offered up a silent prayer for the success of the protestant arms.*

Meanwhile the negotiations of Charnace, charged with an important mission to the German courts, were conducted with various success. To separate Maximilian from the Austrian interest was the leading object of his endeavours. Though evidently jealous of the power of Ferdinand, the prudent elector still hesitated to accept the proposals of Louis. "What security," he asked, "could possibly remain for the members of the Catholic League, in case the protestants should ultimately triumph?" To this question no answer could be returned likely to remove the apprehensions of Maximilian. For nothing was more evident than that the re-establishment of the Palatine would be the necessary consequence of victory.† The policy of Ferdinand,

* Schiller, ii.

† Le Vassor, viii, 123.

in dismembering the territories of that unfortunate prince, became now more apparent than ever; because, by dividing the spoils among the strenuous supporters of the catholic church, he secured their co-operation, and chained them indissolubly to his triumphant car by the adamantine fetters of interest.

Yet indifferent as they seemed to every consideration, except that of personal aggrandisement, it was impossible even for the warmest partisans of the Vatican to deny, that the authority of the emperor was rapidly attaining that tremendous height, when it might bid defiance to all legal restraint; and when the electors themselves, degraded from the rank of independent sovereigns, would be reduced to a level with the Spanish grandees. The penetration of Maximilian had long beheld the approaching danger with dismay, and the remedy which he applied affords a convincing proof of his sagacity. Anticipating the ruin which must necessarily result to the catholic cause, should Ferdinand be compelled to disarm, he secretly determined to oppose the execution of such a proposal, should it be brought forward as was expected at the approaching diet. He resolved however to set bounds to his despotism by depriving him of the services of the only man, in whose hands that despotism was truly formidable. If Wallenstein were removed, he flattered himself that the command of the imperial troops would of course devolve on himself: but when the resentment of Austria, and the caution of Spain raised an insuperable barrier to his wishes, he conducted his plan with such consummate address that he procured it for Tilly, on whose fidelity he could confidently rely. His

management respecting the election of a king of the Romans was equally skilful. Too wise to embark in a chimerical contest for the imperial sceptre, though repeatedly solicited by France, he confined his ambition to attainable objects. Dreaded alike by Austria and Spain, whose interest he had repeatedly imminolated to his own; and respected by the enlightened minister of France, who admired the wisdom which penetrated and defeated his own aspiring projects, Maximilian steered his course with so much dexterity, that he not only preserved the electoral dignity during his life, but even transmitted it to his posterity.*

Charnace's instructions respecting his conduct at Munich were chiefly directed to the following points: to endeavour to inspire the elector with pacific sentiments towards Denmark, and the other members of the protestant union; to prevent him from taking an active part in the Italian war; and lastly, to strive by every expedient to excite his jealousy against Austria. With this view he was instructed to urge the impolicy of his sacrificing his interests to ideas of friendship, which became ridiculous, when they were no longer reciprocal; and if possible to persuade him, that his further elevation was totally inconsistent with that narrow policy which ever influenced the sister cabinets of Madrid and Vienna; both of which would behold with equal suspicion the aggrandisement of a prince, who alone among the members of the

* He is called by Nani, "principe di profondissimi sensi, è che sopra ogn' altro ha saputo cavare da communi interessi privati vantaggi, col mercantare il tempo, e maneggiare la fortuna." iv.

Germanic constitution possessed talents and popularity capable of disputing the imperial diadem.*

An intimate alliance with France was artfully suggested as necessary for the attainment of that elevated dignity, and a plan traced to facilitate the execution. The Bavarian ministers however were so blindly devoted to the imperial court, that they received the offer with studied indifference, assuming in their intercourse a distant reserve, more suited to the suspicious character of a spy, than to the accredited agent of a regular government.

By patience and perseverance, however, Charnace at length obtained an audience of Maximilian. More thoroughly acquainted with his real interests than any of those whom he employed, that sagacious prince seized, with the intuitive glance of a statesman, all the different bearings of the project. He readily admitted that the Duke of Mantua was unjustly persecuted, and promised never to contribute to his overthrow. Evading the question of the imperial crown, he confined himself entirely to general assurances of grateful acknowledgment for the flattering offer; but declined to enter into any unnecessary discussion, respecting peace, as a negotiation was actually pending at Lubec. Disdaining, however, to disguise his intentions in the event of an unfavourable issue, he plainly signified, that he should consider himself inviolably bound to support the emperor, so long as the interests of religion were concerned. Though the result of the interview was by no means so favourable as the mi-

* Le Vassor, viii. 125.

nister of Louis could have desired, yet it was easy to discover, from the general tenor of Maximilian's conversation, that he was by no means satisfied with the behaviour of Ferdinand. Of Spain he spoke in less ambiguous language, complaining, that his projects were constantly thwarted by the intrigues and jealousy of Olivares. But when he mentioned Wallenstein, it was impossible for him to restrain his indignation; but giving way to the natural warmth of his temper, he expatiated upon his rapacity, his arrogance, and his cruelty, in terms of bitter reproach. The elector's discourse was evidently studied; yet, with all his dissimulation, he could not so entirely suppress his feelings, as to conceal from Charnace, that interest and ambition were the reigning passions of his soul, and that to the gratification of these, every other consideration, except that of religion, would be readily sacrificed.*

Convinced that it was impracticable under existing circumstances to shake Maximilian's resolution, Charnace departed for Lubec, determined to try if bribes or promises could prevent the conclusion of peace. The reader is already apprised, that all his endeavours proved abortive. The total indifference hitherto manifested by the Parisian court, for the distress of the German protestants, and the persecution experienced by their brethren in France, were little calculated to excite the confidence of Christian, who plausibly discerned, that it was the voice of interest, and not of compassion, that pleaded with Richelieu in his favour.†

* 1629. Le Vassor, viii. 125.

† Ibid. 128.

CHAP. VIII.

Situation of Austria extremely favourable to the establishment of peace. Presumption of Ferdinand in losing the opportunity. The unsettled state of Europe calculated to excite his aspiring hopes. His despotic treatment of the hereditary states, and particularly of Bohemia. He forms plans for the extirpation of the protestant faith, and for recovering the secularized property. He publishes the edict of restitution.—Jealousy excited by the preponderance of Austria, even among the catholic states.—Views and conduct of the Duke of Bavaria.—Meeting of the catholics at Heidelberg; they demand a diet for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to Germany.—Wallenstein besieges Magdeburg. Gustavus Adolphus undertakes its defence, though engaged in a war with Poland. His domestic improvements, and military discipline.—Remarks upon the general system of war, and the customs and prejudices of the age.

FERDINAND had now, for the second time, an opportunity of restoring tranquillity to Germany, as nothing could have been easier, had he seriously desired it, than to have extended the treaty concluded with Denmark to all protestant powers. By indulging the wishes of a suffering people, almost driven to despair by the licentiousness and rapacity of his soldiers, he might still have recovered their affections, and endeared his name to posterity. Such also was the situation in which victory had placed him, that every concession would have been accepted with gratitude, and placed to the account of benevolence; for so hopeless was the condition to which his enemies were reduced, that nothing could have been imputed to apprehension.

It has been urged by his partisans, that at this momentous crisis, he was constrained to act in di-

rect contradiction to his own inclination by the importunate zeal of the catholics. Their pretensions were unquestionably great; but it is probable they would have been satisfied with the permanent ascendancy obtained in the electoral college, had they been once convinced that he entertained no views of personal aggrandizement to the prejudice of the Germanic constitution, but was actuated solely by a disinterested attachment to the papal religion. The unvarying prosperity, however, which had hitherto crowned all the measures of his reign, and which he presumptuously attributed to his fierce exertions in favour of Rome; the almost implicit obedience attending his edicts; the arrogance of the Jesuits, who aspired to exercise unlimited authority in Saxony; and the intemperate councils of the Spanish court, weak enough to believe that the long expected hour was at length arrived, when the heretical tenets of Luther and Calvin would cease to pollute the orthodox purity of the Christian church; inspired him with an excess of pride and temerity, which led him to think, that no human efforts could any longer resist his gigantic power, or set bounds to the flight of his victorious eagle.*

It is difficult to determine with critical precision the exact extent of his ambitious designs, because no specific documents exist to substantiate them; but it may fairly be inferred from the conversation of those most intimately acquainted with his plans, as well as from the general tenor of his own actions, that he seriously intended by the aid of the ca-

* 1629. Puffendorf, ii. 56. Schiller, ii. Coxe, i. 813.

tholics to extirpate the protestant faith, and afterwards to render his own authority superior to all legal restrictions.*

Supposing this to have been really the object in view, the moment for undertaking it was judiciously selected, because all the powers, whose policy might have imposed an effective barrier to his wishes, were either engaged in foreign hostilities, or convulsed by domestic dissensions. France, the most formidable of all his enemies, was not only involved in a contest with Spain respecting the Mantuan succession, and in a maritime war with England, but had much to fear from the resentment and jealousy of the Hugonots. Charles I. by repeated acts of duplicity, and an open invasion of the British constitution, had already awakened the suspicions of a people, who alone among the nations of the modern world understood the value of freedom. Engaged in a struggle against his subjects for the extension of the royal prerogative, and in hostilities with France and Spain, he had little leisure to attend to the affairs of Germany. The protection of their liberties against the secret machinations of Austria and Spain engrossed the attention of the Dutch; while the internal commotions, which gradually ruined the Ottoman power, secured Vienna against the restless ambition of her most formidable adversary. Bethlein Gabor was no longer capable of inspiring terror. The period assigned by Providence to his turbulent career was rapidly approaching, and all that he coveted was to be allowed to pass the scanty

* Puffendorf, ii. 56. Schiller, ii. Coxe, i. 813.

remnant in repose. The presumption of Denmark had been covered with disgrace; and the valour of Gustavus Adolphus, as yet confined to a distant theatre, when the resources of Sweden were fairly estimated, had little to alarm the mighty monarch of Austria.*

Persuaded that the disjointed system of Europe was peculiarly adapted for the completion of his favourite project, Ferdinand resolved no longer to delay the destruction of a religion which he hated with all the inveterate rancour of a Jesuit. Could he accomplish an undertaking, to the attainment of which the gigantic power of Charles V. had proved inadequate, he doubted not that his name would hereafter figure with those of Dominic and Ignatius in the Roman calendar. The event of the experiment in the hereditary states was calculated to invite his intemperance to proceed. Hungary alone had been exempted from the general proscription, not through clemency, or reverence for the sacred obligation of an oath, but from fear of Gabor, and the Ottoman cohorts.

Equally indifferent to the claims of justice, and the feelings of humanity, he forcibly abolished the reformed religion in Austria, though legally established by an edict of Maximilian, and sanctioned by his own approbation. Proceeding with the unbridled ardour of a fanatic in the career of tyranny, he prohibited the use of all Lutheran books under the severest penalties; annulled the religious ceremonies of marriage and baptism, unless performed by a catholic priest; and commanded all persons of

* Coss., i. 814. Nani, vii.

every description either to abandon his dominions, or to conform to the pontifical ritual.*

Bohemia was treated with still greater severity; for, as he no longer dreaded the spirit of a people broken down by oppression, he gave unbounded scope to his national violence, revenging with relentless cruelty the insult formerly offered to his authority, under pretence of vindicating the honour of the Almighty. Though three-fourths of the inhabitants were sincerely attached to the Lutheran tenets, he published an edict forbidding the public profession of any form of worship except that of the Vatican; ejecting the Protestants from the schools and universities, and replacing them by mendicant friars, indiscriminately chosen for that important office, not on account of their learning, but of their religious opinions. No persons, except those of orthodox tenets, were permitted to exercise any trade or manufactory; heavy fines were imposed on all who presumed, even in domestic retirement, to address their Creator in the language of the heart; marriages were declared invalid, unless they had been solemnized according to the pompous ceremonial of Rome; even the wills of protestants were no longer binding in the tribunals of Austria. With a barbarity, characteristic of bigotry alone, he deprived sickness and age of those asylums which charity had erected for their solace, unless admission was purchased by apostacy. From the towns and cities the burghers were expelled, unless they renounced the worship of their fathers. Even the remotest hamlets were not exempt from persecution, but were

* 1629. Puffendorf, i. 57. Harte, i. 102.

exposed to the visits of itinerant friars, commissioned to scrutinize the opinions of the inhabitants with inquisitorial severity; and if they found them polluted with the smallest stain, the offence was expiated by capital punishment. A military force, sufficient to impress the most courageous with awe, attended this bloody tribunal, whose natural ferocity receiving an additional stimulus from the savage zeal of their coadjutors, exposed the wretched peasantry to every calamity that fanaticism or licentiousness could inflict. Some were murdered in their houses with deliberate cruelty, after beholding the violation of their wives and daughters; others, pursued into the woods and mountains, like beasts of prey, were compelled to receive the mystic symbol of charity and faith under a form abhorrent to their souls, amid the insults and mockery of their persecutors.* To sum up his vengeance in one sweeping act of proscription, a period was fixed, at the expiration of which all persons, who refused to return within the pale of the church, were banished for ever from Bohemia. By this decree, no less remarkable for its impolicy than its injustice, thirty thousand families were driven into exile; and, as in this number many were included conspicuous for the acquirements of knowledge, the talents of industry, and the gifts of fortune, a wound was inflicted on that devoted kingdom, from which it never recovered.†

The picture drawn by a Catholic historian,‡ of the wretched situation to which his native country

* Coxe, i. 814.

† Pebrel, 739.

‡ Pebrel wrote at a time when all party-feelings were extinguished.

was reduced by the intolerance of Ferdinand, is highly deserving of attention, since he can hardly be suspected of exaggerating the defects of the most strenuous champion of the church. "The pages of history," observes that candid writer, "scarcely furnish an instance of a change so rapid in the prosperity of a nation, as that which Bohemia underwent during the reign of Ferdinand II. At that monarch's accession, with the exception of a few of the principal nobility, and an inconsiderable number of friars, the whole of the population was protestant; at his death, it was all, at least in appearance, catholic. Previously to the fatal battle of Prague, the states enjoyed privileges no less ample than those of the English parliament, imposing taxes, enacting laws, confirming or rejecting treaties, and even electing a successor to the vacant throne. But these valuable rights all perished together in one general wreck; and with them vanished the warlike character of the Bohemians. Till that disastrous era they were universally celebrated for military talents, an ardour for glory bordering upon enthusiasm, and for a contempt of death, when life was incompatible with honour. But the spirit of enterprise is for ever extinguished; kindled by national pride, it expired with the last spark of freedom. Individuals indeed were still conspicuous for personal prowess, and sometimes even attained to high military commands; but as the waters of the Moldau, when united with the Elbe, no longer retain their original name, so they were lost and forgotten amid the triumphs of Austria. The national language, like the national character, sunk into contempt, and was replaced by the German in the pulpit, the forum, and even

in the common intercourse of society. Persons of rank, and even the industrious class of mechanics, grew ashamed of their mother tongue, which was no longer employed except by the peasantry in unfrequented districts—a mark of vulgar obscurity. The arts and sciences, which embellished and enriched the capital in the days of Rodolph, fell also into decay; so that for many years not a single man appeared in Bohemia eminent in any branch of literature. Placed under the direction of the Jesuits, the universities afforded no inducements for application, nor propounded any questions for public discussion except on theological subtleties; and, by an express injunction from Rome, no academical honours were any longer conferred, however great the merit of the student."

" Of all the monastic orders, the Jesuits were undoubtedly the best informed, but they were, also, the most artful and intolerant. Convinced, from experience, that an enlightened people will never long continue subservient to the caprice of a tyrant, they resolved to extinguish every spark of science, that they might trample with impunity on unresisting idiots.* With this view they deputed a certain number of their fraternity to make domiciliary visits in every town and village, for the purpose of inspecting books, and with positive directions to destroy or carry away every work that might nourish

* This fact alone would serve to ascertain that Ferdinand was a tyrant by theory. He had deeply studied the code of despotism, and knew that nothing is so dangerous to absolute power as instruction. Lotichius vainly endeavours (i. 620) to defend him, under pretence that the Bohemians had behaved with equal violence toward the catholics. " In templis, exercitiis, officiisque catholicorum *Procerum* injecerunt manus, etiamque patres societatis (a heinous offence) sub iudicto aeterno exilio, e regno ac provinciis amoverunt."

the Lutheran faith or cherish the flame of liberty. Under this denomination of course were included all the precious treasures of antiquity, because they breathed a spirit too pure to be trusted in the hands of men destined to slavery. Not an author was left, which in an age of refinement would be ever referred to by a man of taste, or be even found in a well-chosen library. Even the ancient annals of the nation were sedulously concealed from the descendants of those who had illumined their country by their courage or their geniis. So complete was the exclusion, and so rigid the punishment inflicted on the smallest transgression, that the writings of the learned and patriotic Balbinus on Bohemian literature, could not be published with safety, till after the suppression of the order.*

A prince, mad enough to sacrifice the prosperity of his own subjects at the shrine of superstition, wanted not inducements to pursue the same destructive system, when it could be attempted at the expense of others. Hence little doubt was entertained that the moment he thought it could be undertaken with safety, he wold annihilate the remnant of Germanic independence, which was still permitted to exist. Yet possessing a capacity to appreciate the feelings of indignant patriotism, he was aware of the obstacles which were likely to arise, should he venture by one bold act of authority to overturn the ancient constitution. He therefore determined to proceed with caution, gradually undermining the venerable edifice, till the moment should arrive when the spirit of the catholics being completely

* Pebrel, 288.

subdued, the decisive blow might be given. Acting by the advice and with the assistance of the Jesuits, those systematical foes to every liberal sentiment, he conducted his measures with such address and perseverance, that the extinction of freedom seemed inevitable.

The reader may recollect, that during the diet at Mulhausen a proposal was made for compelling the restitution of all such ecclesiastical property secularized since the treaty of Passau. The equity of this claim having been admitted by the majority, the question was suffered to rest, because the difficulty of the undertaking at that time appeared to be insuperable. Not a prince had abandoned the religion of Rome, who was not personally interested to oppose it, as they all derived a considerable accession both of power and wealth, from the plunder of the episcopal and abbacial revenues.

It cannot be denied that by the "religious peace" many points of the highest importance were left undecided, on account of the impediments which arose in adjusting them. But uninterrupted possession for more than half a century, the silent acquiescence of successive emperors from the time of Charles V. and lastly the permission formally accorded to all the princes of the empire, to establish within their respective states whatever communion they might prefer (a concession which of course would have been rendered nugatory without the privilege of appropriating the benefices of the church), seemed to confer a right, which could not be infringed without the most flagrant violation of justice. Neither was the immediate loss of revenue and consequence the only misfortune to be apprehended; on the contrary, their weight as a political

body must be greatly impaired by the prodigious accession of strength which their opponents would derive from the votes attached to the bishoprics and abbeys about to revert to the catholic prelates. Aware of the obstacles against which he must contend, should his projects at once be disclosed, Ferdinand resolved to proceed with the utmost caution, and prudently to withhold the fatal blow, till he was morally certain not to strike ineffectually. The execution of the scheme was however unexpectedly hastened by the presumption of victory, the ardour of the Jesuits, and the assurance of support from the Catholic League, in case of resistance to the decree.*

Respecting the expediency of the measure there seems to have existed no variety of opinion in the Austrian cabinet, though there was much with regard to the manner of its execution. By some of the members it was proposed to begin with the greatest circumspection, confining the attack to the weaker states, as the venality of the electors was calculated to inspire a well-founded expectation, that if they were left for the present in the uninterrupted enjoyment of their usurpations, they would behold with indifference the ruin of their inferiors. Others recommended the adoption of judicial forms, by allowing the sufferers to present their complaints before the different tribunals of the empire. This mode of proceeding appeared most consonant to the principles established in all

* Sarrasin, 82. Puffendorf, i. 57. Schmidt, iv. 28.—Lotichius as usual defends the emperor, and attributes his conduct to any motive rather than to inclination. But in a country where ministers are not accountable to the nation for the advice they give, the responsibility must of course attach to the sovereign.

forensic disputes, and subject of course to fewer inconveniences. By the gradual operation of this artful system, the ecclesiastical property would in a few years be recovered without exciting any violent emotion, and an opportunity afforded to the emperor, by suspending the suit, or retarding the decision, to favour those whom interest might prompt him to conciliate.*

The zeal of the bigots however could not be satisfied with any measure short of unqualified proscription; and the pride of Ferdinand being in unison with their wishes, the fatal edict appeared.† Previously to its publication it had been sanctioned by their approbation. In a long and studied preamble, Ferdinand, in virtue of the imperial authority, assumed the privilege of expounding all the controverted articles of the religious peace, thus constituting himself the sole judge and arbitrator between the contending parties. This prerogative, according to the opinion of the courtly civilians, was derived from the practice of former times, and various precedents were produced to establish it.‡

Nothing certainly could be more preposterous than such a pretension, which if once acknowledged, would invest the emperor with the power of deciding a cause, in which he was too deeply interested to act impartially. But his zeal or rapacity could no longer be restrained by the dictates of prudence.§ Impelled by the natural impetuosity

* Puffendorf, i. 57. Le Vassor, viii. 133. † 1029. Lotichius, i. 623.

‡ I wonder whether any measure, however repugnant to sense or justice, could be instituted by a sovereign in any country, for which the ingenuity of a minister would be capable to produce a precedent.

§ The following passage from Caraffa will serve to shew the opinion entertained by the court of Rome respecting the edict. "Quare sua mages-

of his temper, and the intemperate counsels of Spain, he issued a decree, declaring "every confiscation of ecclesiastical property, made subsequently to the treaty of Passau, to be contrary to the spirit of that convention, and consequently destitute of all legal validity." The secular occupants were commanded to restore the domains which they had seized with impious profanation; and commissioners were appointed to carry the edict into immediate execution. By an additional article, all catholic princes, or great landed proprietors, were authorized to banish their subjects or vassals, unless they embraced the papal religion. It was further enacted, that the privileges accorded by the peace of Passau, extended only to the adherents to the confession of Augsburg; by which artful interpretation the Calvinists were exposed to the penalties of heresy.*

According to this iniquitous decision, every illegal possessor of an ecclesiastical benefice, and consequently every secular occupant was called upon to surrender it into the hands of the Austrian commissary, under pain of the imperial ban. So severe an injunction could not fail to create universal consternation throughout all the protestant states, as they plainly foresaw, that this fatal blow

tas ipsos electores imperii consulere voluit, an ea, quae meritò exigebantur, nunc tandem defunctis tot bellis, deberent restituiri. Neque enim de cause justitia questio erat, sed de executione, quam sua majestas absque electorum judicio, ac voto, solus noluit, contra plurimorum mentem aggredi illo tempore." 311. Little doubt can be entertained that the legate spoke the fashionable language of the Vatican.

* "Il ne faut pas douter (says pere Bougeant, i. 145) "que le zèle de la religion n'eut part à ce dessein." This is evidently the observation of a bigot, who views the actions of statesmen through an inverted glass. Such folly would be hardly excusable in a monk; but what could be alleged in defence of a minister who should act on similar principles?

to freedom of conscience, was intended as a prelude to the total subversion of the Germanic constitution. Neither was the immediate loss an object of indifference, since it comprehended no less than two archiepiscopal and twelve episcopal sees, besides many abbeys and monasteries.*

To an ordnance enforced by the army of Wallenstein what hope of resistance remained? The Elector of Saxony too late discovered the fatal error which avarice had tempted him to commit. Exposed to the reproaches of the friends whom he had betrayed, he had nothing to offer in his excuse, but felt with all the bitterness of conscious shame the sting of merited reproof. Proud and presumptuous in the exercise of injustice, and resolutely determined that nothing should be wanting to aggravate the humiliation of those he despoiled, Ferdinand selected Augsburg for the commencement of the prosecution, because it was the cradle of protestantism. The reformed religion was prohibited in the city, where it first assumed a political form; the bishop being reinstated in all his prerogatives.† In Lower Saxony the house of Brunswick was deprived of the episcopal revenues of Hildesheim; at Magdeburg and Halberstadt the protestant priests were constrained to relinquish their prebends; and the archbishopric of Bremen by a pontifical decree was added to the enormous list of preferment already lavished upon the Austrian family. The same iniquitous system was pursued

* The archbishoprics of Bremen and Magdeburg, and the bishoprics of Minden, Halberstadt, Osnaburg, Verden, Lübeck, Ratzburg, Meissen, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, and Camin.—Bougeant, i. 146.

† Ut insultatio foret manifestior ab Augustane urbe initium fit.—Puffendorf, i. 58.

in Franconia, Westphalia, and Suabia, where the protestants were ejected from every benefice.*

This forcible resumption of ecclesiastical property was universally regarded as a preparatory step to the total suppression of the reformed religion. But at the moment when the tempest appeared ready to burst over the devoted heads of the protestants, their ruin was averted by the jealousy of those at whose instigation the edict had been issued. The enormous power and pretensions of the imperial court at length excited the apprehensions of the catholics, who anticipated the loss of their own independance, should Ferdinand be allowed to proceed with impunity in his ambitious career. The authority which he exercised exceeded that to which the most despotic of his predecessors had aspired. The deposition of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, and the investiture of Wallenstein, by the simple operation of an imperial rescript, though at first overlooked by the violence of party, appeared on cooler reflection to establish a precedent, calculated to degrade all the members of the empire to the most abject condition of vassalage. Another instance of rapacity, scarce less alarming, had been displayed in the treatment of Bogislans, Duke of Pomerania, whose dominions had been seized without any pretext, except that of their probable revertibility to the chief of the empire in quality of an imperial fief.† All the emperor's proceedings tended equally to indicate the boundless extent of

* 1629. Schmidt, iv. 28.

† A most melancholy picture is drawn by Galetti of the misery of that unfortunate people ; " das kriegsvolk di unterthauen mit schlagen behandle, in ganze land alles verbrenne, die kirchen beraume, des gottesdienst kindere, weiber & jungfranen bis auf den tod nochzuchtige, und hernach die leichname den hunden zur speise vorwerfe," i. 130.

his ambition. The subjugation of Holstein, at which he evidently aimed, though circumstances had induced him to defer the execution, by rendering him master of the shores of the Baltic from Kiel to Colberg, would enable him to form a navy capable of dictating laws to northern Europe. Assisted by the Polish fleet, with whose sovereign he was connected both by interest and blood, he anticipated the destruction of the lucrative commerce carried on by the Dutch in those stormy seas, and justly regarded by that enlightened nation as a nursery for their marine. The conquest of Denmark no longer presented insuperable obstacles, and even Sweden itself might be unable to resist. Having reduced the north under his absolute control, the subjection of Germany would follow of course; for what resistance could be opposed by her disunited chiefs to a system so artfully combined?*

Though the objects embraced by the avidity of Ferdinand were too manifest to be any longer mistaken, the plan was prepared with so much sagacity that it was not easy to impede its execution. An Austrian army had already penetrated into Italy, and threatened the independence of Mantua; while another was destined for the recovery of Poland, whose timid monarch, at the head of numerous forces, was discomfited by a handful of Swedes.†

It was scarcely possible to contemplate with an unbiassed judgment the alarming posture of public affairs, and not to tremble for the liberties of Germany. Conscious of having contributed, through

* 1629. Pfeffel, ii. 304.

† Ibid. ii. 310.

mistaken policy, to the creation of a power grown truly formidable to themselves, it is probable that the members of the Catholic League would have sunk under the conviction of their own inferiority, had they not been roused by the active genius of Maximilian, the foe and rival of Wallenstein. Disgusted at the ascendancy of a man, whom he equally hated and feared, the Duke of Bavaria examined all the operations of the Austrian cabinet with a jaundiced eye, and so atrocious was the system which it had long pursued, that no eloquence was required to kindle indignation in every bosom capable of appreciating the blessing of independence.. The recompence conferred by imperial favour was regarded as much beneath his merit, and cancelled by recent neglect. At his instigation the catholic princes assembled at Heidelberg, and drew up a petition, requesting the emperor to convene a diet for the purpose of restoring tranquillity to Germany, and correcting the disorderly behaviour of his armies. In reply to a requisition from Ferdinand, to disband the troops which were no longer necessary for the protection of their dominions, they boldly declared, "that till security should be given for their complete indemnification for all the expenses incurred in defence of the common cause, they would neither reduce a single regiment, nor relinquish a foot of territory.*

This unexpected display of patriotic firmness disconcerted the emperor's projects, and tempted him to consent to their request without sufficiently attending to the serious inconveniences likely to

* 1629. Schmidt, iv. 28. Lotichius, i. 651. Pfeffel, i. 310.

arise from a general assembly in the unsettled posture of affairs. But before we enter upon the proceedings of the diet of Ratisbonne, the exertions of which prescribed an insuperable barrier to the ambition of Austria, it is necessary to advert to other transactions, scarce less important in their results.

While the genius of Wallenstein exalted the power of Ferdinand, his arrogance and rapacity, by alienating the affection of the catholics, undermined the foundations of the colossal fabric, before it arrived at maturity. The slightest hesitation in obeying his orders was invariably punished by that vindictive chieftain, as a proof of rooted disaffection. The citizens of Magdeburg had attracted his resentment, by detaining some vessels laden with corn, for the supply of the imperial army. Whether this was the effect of mistake, or of intention, it is unnecessary now to inquire: but whatever may have been the real motive, the magistrates were seized with a sudden panic, and offered ample atonement.* No explanations, however, were sufficient to mollify his inflexible soul; no excuses, however humble, were admitted. In expiation of perhaps an unpremeditated offence, they were commanded to equip a regiment for the imperial service, and to maintain it at the expense of the city. The plea of poverty having been in-

* Lotichius excuses the inhabitants. "Ita instructus audacia, sublimitate, ferocia, copia, viribusque, Friedlandus fortuam amplius haud metuebat; cum cam virtute suam fecisse sibi fingeret. His igitur subsidii fultus nihil non facile contempsit. Ut super Magdeburgo, praeципue, intra imperium posito, facilem sibi promitteret triumphum." I, 654.

effectually urged, Wallenstein at once put an end to the negotiation by investing the city. Justly alarmed for the safety of an ally, the Hanseatic confederacy sent deputies to the camp, to deprecate his anger by intreaties. Considering supplication to be a confession of weakness, the haughty chieftain replied, that if the burghers were really desirous of averting his wrath, they must submit to the following conditions. The grain which had been detained must be immediately restored; the delinquents must be brought before him in chains, to be punished at his discretion; and lastly, an Austrian garrison must be admitted into the town as a security against all future misconduct.

These demands, if granted, would have virtually extinguished every spark of freedom, and enabled the emperor to execute the edict of restitution with respect to Magdeburg, whenever he chose to enforce it. They accordingly refused, with commendable prudence, to admit a foreign garrison; but tempered the answer by the most exaggerated assurances of respect and attachment, imploring permission to send an embassy to Vienna, to explain, more fully, the motives by which they were actuated. This request was rejected with sullen disdain, and five days only allowed for their final decision, after the expiration of which, all intercourse was prohibited, and every avenue shut to reconciliation.*

Convinced that nothing was to be expected from the mercy of the foe, the citizens prepared for active resistance. During a protracted siege of

* 1629. Hartc, 1, 107.

twenty-eight weeks, they withstood all the efforts of Wallenstein, who finding it impossible to subdue their constancy, and being anxious to conceal his disappointment under the ostentatious display of generosity, summoned a deputation of the magistrates to his camp, and after expatiating upon his clemency in a studied harangue, dismissed them with the assurance that their magnanimity having disarmed his resentment, hostilities should in consequence be suspended.*

The succours afforded by Gustavus Adolphus to the inhabitants of Stralsund had so deeply offended the Austrian pride, that an opportunity was sought after for revenge. It was, therefore, with more than hostile activity that an expedition was prepared for the assistance of Sigismund in Poland.†

In order to understand the cause of the quarrel, we must refer to the annals of Sweden, where we find, that after a glorious reign of thirty-two years, Gustavus Vasa, the deliverer of his country, left three sons. Eric, the eldest, after vainly aspiring to the hand of Elizabeth, Queen of England, gratified a romantic passion for a plebeian beauty. But being equally indulgent to all his other propensities, he was deposed by his subjects, in whose eyes his vices and effeminacy had rendered him contemptible. After governing Sweden during four and twenty years, his brother John was succeeded

* Lotichius, i. 665. Galletti, i. 121.

† The arrogance of Wallenstein is fully displayed in his orders to Arnheim; "Take," said the haughty warrior, "ten thousand men, and drive Gustavus out of Poland; but in case you should prove unable to accomplish it, tell him Wallenstein will effect it in person."—Swedish Intelligencer, part i. 43.

by Sigismund, his eldest son, by Catharine, daughter of Sigismund II. King of Poland. That prince however having imprudently listened to the suggestions of a bigoted mother, and abandoned the protestant faith, the sceptre was not only transferred to Charles, Duke of Sudermania, the youngest of Vasa's sons, by the unanimous voice of the nation, but rendered hereditary in his family. To sanction an act so repugnant to the established rules of descent, a decree was passed by the states, declaring popery a political disqualification, and rendering the exactment a fundamental law of the constitution.*

Though the national welfare ought undoubtedly to precede every other consideration, yet doctrines like these are too frequently expunged from the statute-books of kings, who are sometimes apt to consider the public inheritance, like a private fortune, entrusted to them, not for the benefit of others, but for their own use and enjoyment. Sigismund, like many of his royal compeers, being deeply infected with these tenets, was far from admitting the national right to limit, or alter the succession. On the contrary, he exerted all the arts of intrigue to undermine the authority of Gustavus, who mounted the throne after the death of his father.† In these clandestine attempts he was secretly abetted by the court of Vienna, and the

* Upon the deposition of Sigismund in 1599, his son Ladislans (then an infant) was chosen in his place, but on condition that within the space of six months, he should be sent to Stockholm, to be educated in the Lutheran tenets. This clause, which was probably inserted as a salvo for delicate consciences, not being complied with, his title was forfeited of course.—*Swedish Intelligencer*, i. 40.

† In 1612. *Swedish Intelligencer*, 41.

active casuistry of the Jesuits. Hence arose that enmity which eventually led Gustavus to the defence of Germanic freedom, and gave so violent a shock to the Austrian power, that it tottered to its very foundation. Sigismund, when seated on the throne of Poland, endeavoured by arms to vindicate his title to Sweden. Hostilities however were of short duration ; and after the conclusion of a truce, Gustavus had leisure to direct his attention to the internal regulations of his kingdom, by ameliorating the laws, augmenting the marine, and establishing an enlightened system of economy in every department of government. But what particularly occupied his active mind was the perfecting of the military discipline, or rather the creating it anew, since he regulated all the operations of an army on principles hitherto unknown, no less with respect to its internal arrangement, than to the laborious duties of a campaign. The management of the artillery was simplified, the muskets were lightened,* the pikes shortened,† and manufactories of arms established in various parts of his own dominions ; by which the exportation of money was judiciously obviated, as those articles had been formerly procured, at an enormous expense, from the fabrics of Spain and Italy.‡

Having thus secured to his people internal prosperity, he directed his attention to foreign alliances, as the surest means of preserving it ; and Denmark

* The muskets made use of in the Swedish army before the reign of Gustavus were extremely cumbersome and unwieldy, and when fired were supported upon a rest ; by lightening the former, the latter being no longer necessary, was suppressed.—Grimoard, i. 435.

† The pikes were reduced from eighteen feet to eleven. *ibid.*

‡ Harte, i. 30.

being the power, whose political interests were most likely to clash with his own, he requested a personal interview with Christian, convinced that by an amicable disclosure of their mutual pretensions, more might be effected in a few hours conversation, than in weeks, or even months, pompously wasted in the ceremonious discussions of diplomacy.*

A good understanding being thus established with Denmark, Gustavus resolved to visit Germany. But being anxious to avoid the irksome honours of a royal reception, he assumed a fictitious name, and under the modest appellation of Monsieur GARS,† examined the strength and resources of that powerful empire with the penetration of a statesman. This however appears not to have been the only object of his travels; for justly regarding the marriage state as decisive of the happiness, or the misery of life, he was unwilling to trust for the beauty and temper of his destined bride, to the flattering pencil of a pensioned artist, or the fallacious praises of a courtier.‡

The insidious conduct of Sigismund, whose machinations were conducted with greater facility under the cover of amity, than amid the perils and precautions of war, determined Gustavus to recommence hostilities with redoubled activity. Entering Livonia without any formal notice, at the head of a numerous army, he opened the campaign with

* Harte, i. 36.

† A word composed of the initials of Gustavus, Adolphus Rex Sueciae.

‡ From Sir Dudley Carlton's Letters we find, that in the summer of 1620, Gustavus, after passing through Germany under a borrowed name, ended his journey at Berlin, in order to see the young princess of Brandenburg whom he intended to marry, 481.

the siege of Riga. Anxious to reduce it, before succours could arrive, he conducted his operations with so much ardour, that in a few days it was completely invested. Convinced that activity is the soul of war, he worked in the trenches with a mattock and spade, while his example was followed by Oxenstern, Horn, and Banier, and a train of heroes, destined to support a conspicuous part in the future pages of history. Alarmed for the safety of a rich commercial city, the Polish monarch dispatched Prince Razivil to attempt its relief with an army of fourteen thousand men. Finding upon his arrival that the Swedish lines were too strongly fortified to be assailed with the smallest prospect of success, he submitted to the humiliation of watching the rapid progress of the besiegers from the opposite bank of the Dwina, and was forced to retire after vainly attempting to reinforce the garrison. Though reduced to distress for want of provision, and destitute of every hope of assistance, the besieged refused to capitulate till the mines of the enemy were ready to explode. Upon the signal being given, the citizens would have been buried under the ruins of their habitations, had not the humanity of Gustavus, his admiration of bravery even when displayed by a foe, pleaded powerfully in their favour, and tempted him to indulge the generosity of his disposition, by granting honourable terms to the garrison.*

* The following anecdote, related by Harte on the authority of a gentleman for whose veracity he professes the highest respect, is so descriptive of the feelings of the Swedish hero, that I cannot withstand the temptation of inserting it. Seaton, a Scotch officer, in the service of Gustavus, who was severely wounded during the siege of Riga, stood high in his sovereign's favour, which he attracted in a manner no less

Every successive campaign proved equally glorious to the Swedish arms, and equally disgraceful to Sigismund. Yet no considerations being sufficient to reconcile the latter to the loss of a crown, of which he thought himself unjustly deprived, the flame of war was never extinguished, while materials could be found to foment it. The constitution of Poland however was so little calculated for military exertions, that it was frequently necessary to impede the progress of the victor by a display of moderation to which the heart of Sigismund was a stranger. Hence occasional truces intervened, but which were observed no longer by the Polish monarch than was rendered indispensable by the

honourable than singular. A little time previous to the Polish war, the king, offended with Seaton for some inadvertence at a public review, gave him a blow in presence of the army. The business of the day was no sooner concluded than the indignant Scot demanded his dismission, which was signed by Gustavus in the heat of passion, and accepted by Seaton in sullen silence. Reflection, however, having suggested to the former the cruelty of his behaviour, his first occupation on the following day was to inquire after the man whom he had so grievously affronted. Being informed that he had departed at an early hour, and taken the road to Denmark, Gustavus immediately ordered his horses; and, attended only by a confidential friend, and two menial servants, quitted Stockholm, regulating his motions with so much exactness, that he always slept where Seaton had dined. When arrived at the confines of Sweden, he left his attendants; and, riding forward with augmented speed, soon overtook the fugitive. "Dismount, sir," cried the magnanimous monarch as he approached him, "you have been severely injured, and I am come to afford you the only satisfaction that can compensate so unjustifyable an offence. I am no longer in my own dominions, and we are therefore equal now. Both of us have swords and pistols, and the affair of course will be soon decided." Seaton no sooner recovered from the astonishment occasioned by this exalted act of generosity, than falling on his knees he expressed his gratitude for that striking mark of condescension, and requested permission to live and die in the service of a prince who so nobly atoned for his errors. Raising him from the ground with great emotion, the king embraced him, and ever after honoured him with his friendship. i. 46.

penury of his finances, the weakness of his army, or the intractable obstinacy of a factious diet.*

These intervals of repose were employed by Sigismund in endeavours to bias the venal suffrage of a corrupt aristocracy, and devoted by his rival to domestic improvements. Conscious that he had nothing to conceal from the world, Gustavus beheld the degradation of Swedish literature with deep regret, and, by additional endowments to the university of Upsal, by the foundation of colleges at Dorpat and Abo, and the establishment of schools in all the principal towns, he introduced a taste for science and letters, which would have been alone sufficient to render him immortal.†

While the Swedish monarch was securing the affections of a grateful people by acts of public utility, Sigismund was sinking, with no less rapidity, in the national esteem, by the weakness and rapacity of his government. In direct violation of a constitutional law, the richest benefices of the church were conferred on his sons, though they were utterly disqualified by their tender years from discharging the functions of religion. Large estates were also purchased, in the name of the queen, though by an ancient statute the reigning family was declared incapable of acquiring landed property; and, lastly, the coin was debased and adulterated, to the unspeakable detriment of commerce.‡ These grievances, though loudly calling for animadversion, were still further aggravated by the clamour of party, till the name of Sigismund

* Harte, i. 52.

† Grotius was one of his favourite authors, whose excellent treatise, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, was almost constantly in his hands. Ibid.

‡ Piaseccii chronica in ann. 624.

became so unpopular, that when the truce expired, in 1625, he found the utmost difficulty in procuring supplies for another campaign. Yet, as nothing could induce him to sheath the sword, hostilities were renewed with so much vigour on the side of Gustavus, that Livonia was reduced in the course of a single summer. Proceeding forward in the career of victory, he crossed the Dwina on a bridge of boats, took Posvolia, Birzen, and Mittau, and defeated the Poles, in a sanguinary battle, in the extensive plains of Semigallia. The strength of the enemy consisted chiefly in a numerous cavalry, mounted on fleet and active coursers, and accoutred with a magnificence approaching to Asiatic profusion. In a country affording sufficient space for all the pompous variety of evolutions, which constitute the pride and terror of an eastern army, the rapid movements of these desultory squadrons were believed to be irresistible, when opposed by infantry alone. But notwithstanding the use of the bayonet was then unknown, Gustavus had invented an admirable substitute in the shortened pike, which, by judicious management, rendered his battalions impervious.

The victories of Gustavus, during the Polish war, however, are not sufficiently connected with the present history to require a circumstantial elucidation. Suffice it to remark, that he was invariably successful in all his operations, and that his triumphs were owing less to the bravery of his troops, or to the capacity of his generals, than to his own matchless superiority in tactics. Yet, notwithstanding the brilliant results of his enterprizes, he was never averse to a negociation; for, as he loved his people with parental affection, he could not endure

the thought of augmenting their burthens, when no adequate returns of aggrandizement or glory were likely to compensate the sacrifice. These considerations induced him to listen with perhaps imprudent eagerness to every overture for peace; and it was always with reluctance that he found himself constrained, by the duplicity of his adversary, to re-commence hostilities.

The capture of Elbingen supplied him with funds for continuing the war, as well as with abundant magazines;* while that of Marienburg, the capital of the Teutonic order, by rendering him master of the banks of the Vistula, secured the possession of Polish Prussia, in spite of the united efforts of Cossnopoliski and Sapieha, the ablest generals of Sigismund.†

Never inattentive to the minutest occurrence which tended to promote the prosperity of his people, or to protect the protestant faith, he published an edict in 1627, offering to all the members of the reformed church, who were driven out of Germany, on account of their religious tenets, an asylum in Sweden; and, as a farther inducement, he promised them an exemption from all taxes during a stated period.‡

* In 1626. Harte, i. 71. † Ibid. 77.

‡ This edict is preserved by Lotichius, i. 546. "Gustavus, &c. codicilis, hisce, omniaq[ue] interest notum facimus, nobis exploratum esse, quo pacto magna pars vicinorum per Germaniam nostrorum ab adversariis eo adigantur, ut interveniente persecutione, relictis domiciliis, agris, et fortunis fere omnibus emigrare peregrinasq[ue] sedes querere cogontur. E quibus multos esse innotuit qui in Sueciam nostram confugere velint, modo consensu ante nostri certiores esse possint. Siquidem igitur nos erga omnes in universum, ea necessitate preventos, more ingenii christiani commiseratione tangimur, tum vero nostri munieris esse putamus, nt vicini nostris tantum non hac sub afflictione occurramus, sed omnibus confessioni nostrae addictis solatio simus. Hanc ob rem be-

The only reverse experienced by the Swedish troops, during the Polish war, was in the spring of 1627, while Gustavus was employed in domestic improvements at Stockholm. Teufel and Strief, both officers of acknowledged valour and experience, were entrusted with the command of eight thousand men at a season of the year, when the severity of the weather seemed to preclude offensive operations. Depending too confidently upon physical obstacles, and relaxing in necessary precautions, they were surprised by Conospolski, whom they believed reposing in winter quarters at a considerable distance from their encampment. Both the commanders were detained in captivity, but the common men were dismissed upon honourable conditions. Gustavus was so little accustomed to the frowns of fortune, that he might have been expected to punish the negligence of the prisoners with the greatest severity; he, however, bore his misfortunes with the equanimity of a philosopher,

nevolentium et sympathiam nostram ad omnium notitiam divulgare placuit. Venireut igitur omnes in Sueciam nostram, quicunque et auxilio et protectione opus habent, scirentque nobis hoc volupè, illisque quicunque sunt concessum, licitumque esse.

"Primun ergo illis potestatem facimus amplissimam, ut absque ullo ouere atque impendio, hanc iu Sueciam nostram educere, ac nostra sub protectione vivere, possint, usque dum Deo meliora tempora reddere visum fuerit. Alterum est illos omnes sub nostro hoc regno securè, absque ulla recognitione, onere, sive tributo, futuros esse liberrimos, quoad fortunis facultatibusqù uteutes suis, civilibus commereiis abstinebunt. Interim si quis forte civium negociationes exercere cupiant, illi eodem loco essent, quo eives ipsimet. Denique quibuscumque temporibus iu melius emendatis, ad lares patrios reverti allubescat, illis hoc quovis tempore concessum, integerrimumque foret. Neque anset esset quispiam ab illis sub discessum, vel tenuuncium exigere!" What a model is this for imitation!

and seems to have regarded those unfortunate men as sufficiently humbled by disgrace.*

In an action fought at Dirschau, Gustavus received a wound in the arm, while reconnoitring the enemy's position. This circumstance would hardly have merited our attention, did it not serve to shew the attachment of the troops, and the pious confidence of the monarch. Alarmed for the safety of their heroic leader, the commanding officers, with Oxenstiern at their head, repaired to the royal pavilion ; and, with the tenderness of affectionate children, entreated their sovereign to be more careful of a life on which the happiness of thousands depended. This proof of regard, so grateful to his feelings, drew tears from the eyes of Gustavus; who replied, with unassuming dignity, " that their affection led them to over-rate his merit, since he could not believe himself so important to the world, as they were induced by their partiality to suppose. Should the Supreme Being," continued he, " think fit to terminate my short career, he will undoubtedly raise some abler champion to protect the throne of Sweden : but, while its defence shall be entrusted to me, it is my duty to perform the allotted task without ever attending to the event; and, should it be my destiny to fall at the head of my troops, to perish in the defence of his people's rights is the most glorious death to which a sovereign can attain."†

* Harle, 80.

† Ibid. i. 83. Oxenstiern having remonstrated with his master upon another occasion, respecting the rashness with which he exposed his person, the king told him, with a smile, " that he was of too cold a temper."—" Possibly," replied the chancellor; " but if my ice did not sometimes

The rapid progress of Gustavus at length excited a serious alarm both at Vienna and Madrid; because the conduct pursued by both these courts, during the Polish war, exposed them almost equally to his resentment. Anticipating, that in the event of a successful termination of the contest with Sigismund, he might direct his victorious arms against Germany, they endeavoured by the most unbounded promises to prevent that disheartened monarch from listening to the pacific overtures of Sweden. Auxiliary troops, a powerful fleet, and liberal subsidies were successively offered, in order to induce him to persevere; though it was evident to the world, that by protracting the struggle, his kingdom must be exposed to ruin and disgrace. Sigismund, however, had no sooner rejected the proposals made by the generous victor, than he too late discovered, that his friends were no less remiss in fulfilling their engagements than they had been forward in contracting them. No ships appeared, no money was remitted; and, when Sigismund complained of this treacherous conduct, his remonstrances were treated with so much neglect, that he could no longer doubt the perfidy of his allies.*

Persuaded that adversity could alone overcome the obstinate resentment of the Polish monarch, and extremely anxious to terminate a war which obstructed the execution of more important pro-

cool your fire, your majesty might have been consumed before this."—*Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, par Monsieur D. M. 119, quarto, anno 1764.—The author professes to have been assisted by MS. notes by M. Arkinholz. I shall hereafter quote it under the title of *Histoire de Gust. Adol.*

jects, Gustavus prepared to carry on his operations in 1629 with so much activity, that he might reduce his rival to unconditional submission. The continued series of misfortunes which had hitherto attended the Polish arms, having increased the unpopularity of the contest, the cry of the nation was unanimously pacific, yet the exhortations of the Pope, and the arrival of Arnhem with an Austrian army, revived the drooping courage of Sigismund, and determined him in spite of fatal experience to hazard another campaign.

Gustavus, being informed that the emperor had sent a reinforcement to Sigismund, dispatched an officer to Wallenstein, to remonstrate on a measure directly tending to interrupt the harmony which so happily subsisted between the courts of Vienna and Stockholm, and which it had been his constant study to preserve. With his accustomed duplicity the haughty duke assured him, that no blame could attach to the imperial court, as neither the emperor nor himself had the smallest concern in the transaction, the nature of which had been totally misunderstood. The mistake he supposed had arisen from the following circumstance: "that a part of the imperial army having been disbanded, some companies had enlisted in the Polish service; but, as this had been done without his knowledge or approbation, he was not only entirely unacquainted with the amount of their numbers, but considered himself as exempt from all kind of responsibility.*

After the junction of Arnhem with the Polish army, Gustavus was unable to keep the field, till

* Grimoard, i. 400.

reinforced by fresh levies from Sweden. The position of Marienberg affording every advantage for defensive operations, he resolved to concentrate his forces under the walls, till it should be in his power to adopt a system more suitable to his enterprizing spirit. This plan, however, though wisely conceived, was by no means easy in its execution: a retreat was to be effected over extensive plains, in sight of an army abounding in cavalry, and elated with temporary success. Yet, in spite of every obstacle that the enemy could oppose, Gustavus, having repelled them in various attacks, arrived at Marienberg with little loss, though not without considerable risk, as he was once actually surrounded by a party of horse, but was rescued by the valour of his followers.*

The soul of Gustavus was never designed by nature to endure with patience even the shadow of disgrace. Having received reinforcements, he resolved to recover his former ascendancy, and prepared for a general action. Without designing to attend to the enormous disparity of force, he replied to an officer, whom he had sent to reconnoitre, and who appeared alarmed at the strength of the enemy, "In proportion to their numbers our fire must prove destructive." The anticipations of the king were completely verified, as the allies were defeated in various encounters, in which they engaged with more courage than discretion.

In an army composed of different nations ill fortune invariably produces dissension. Accustomed to pillage, and the unrestrained gratification of

* Grimoard i. 403.

every licentious passion, the imperial troops affected to treat the Polish peasants with the same brutality which they had exercised in Saxony and Westphalia; and, when punished for their rapacity, appeared astonished to find that any excesses were prohibited by the military code of Poland. The impossibility of maintaining regular discipline among men made ferocious by indulgence, excited a suspicion that Sigismund seriously entertained the design of rendering himself absolute, by the assistance of Ferdinand; and this unfounded opinion contributed to increase the general discontent and disaffection. To complete this scene of misery and disorder a pestilential disease broke out in the camp, which was rapidly augmented by the total defect of wholesome sustenance, because the dread of infection prevented the peasants from furnishing provisions. The coolness which existed between Conospolski and Arnheim was so much embittered by distress, that they actually accused each other of treachery. Satisfied that it was impossible for men so justly exasperated by unmerited reproaches ever again sincerely to co-operate, Sigismund applied to the imperial court for the recall of Arnheim, who, being removed in consequence, was succeeded by the Duke of Saxe-Lauenberg.*

The change of commanders, however, producing no alteration in the fortune of the war, Sigismund began seriously to feel the necessity of averting destruction by a negociation. Richelieu, who was no less attentive to the interests of the northern nations than to those of Italy and France, was no sooner

* Grimoard, i. 406. Harte, i. 117.

informed of the wishes of the Polish monarch than he instructed Charnace to repair to Poland, and offer the mediation of Louis. In this attempt he was warmly seconded by Sir Thomas Roe, the English minister; and, as neither Gustavus nor Sigismund were averse to a treaty, no material impediments intervened. The prejudices of the latter, however, were less easily subdued than the resentments of the former. The Swede, perhaps, anticipated triumphs more brilliant than the destruction of a Polish army; but Sigismund, though completely disgusted with the dissensions of his generals, and the indiscipline of his soldiers, could hardly bring himself to renounce an antiquated claim, though it was no longer possible for the most sanguine temper to cherish the hope of establishing it. The splendid promises of Ferdinand, though always fallacious, had made so strong an impression on the Polish monarch, that it required some address to persuade him, that they were merely illusory, and intended only to occupy the Swedes in distant enterprizes, without ever considering, that the security of Austria must be purchased by the ruin of Poland. Aware that the object nearest to the heart of Sigismund was to transmit the crown to his descendants, Charnace artfully insinuated that an alliance with Sweden was the only certain means of effecting it, since it could hardly be doubted, that he would otherwise find a dangerous competitor in the ambition of Ferdinand, who already destined the throne of Poland as an appanage for one of his children.

This latter argument having proved conclusive, conferences were held in tents erected at equal distances from the hostile camps; and, after a negotia-

tion of thirty-nine days, conducted to a six years' truce, which was afterwards extended to a longer period.*

Though by a specific article Sigismund acknowledged the title of Gustavus to the Swedish sceptre, he stipulated in secret for the reservation of a claim, now destitute of all solid foundation. This, however, can be regarded in no other light than as an innocent sacrifice to pride, as the question was never likely to be revived, and Gustavus had too much sense and magnanimity to deprive his country of a real blessing, when it could be procured at the expense of a shadow.†

Having thus terminated a contest that promised no adequate compensation of glory, Gustavus prepared for the execution of an enterprize, which, if crowned with success, could not fail to allot him a distinguished station in history, and which, though replete with difficulties apparently insuperable, it was no trifling honour to have encountered.

Gustavus had long meditated in secret the humiliation of Austria as the inveterate enemy of protestantism. Too prudent, however, to hazard an undertaking of such magnitude, till all his preparations were complete, he examined with attention the strength and resources of that formidable power, which he boldly aspired to overthrow; and, having deliberately calculated the obstacles which he possessed for overcoming them, he courageously embraced the magnanimous resolution of prescrib-

* At its expiration in 1635 it was protracted for one and twenty years. Harte, i. 120. Grimoard, i. 409.

† This treaty may be found in Dumont, v. p. 2, 594.

ing bounds to the despotism of Ferdinand, or falling heroically in the attempt.

But before we follow him in an undertaking the most arduous, perhaps, ever conceived by the genius of man, let us direct our attention to the internal situation of Sweden, that we may be able to form a more correct opinion of the astonishing effects which wisdom, activity, and courage can produce.

No prince was ever more deservedly popular with every class of his subjects than Gustavus Adolphus, yet it was not by a relaxation of the reins of government, or an indiscreet compliance with every demand, that he secured the affection of the people, but by a vigorous attention to the administration of justice; by denying to others those pernicious indulgences which he constantly refused to himself, and by tempering the effusions of his natural liberality by prudential maxims of economy. By his soldiers he was revered with filial affection, but their adoration was tempered with respect.* The strictest discipline was observed in every department of the army;† so that

* "Et vulgus militum non ut regem, sed quasi numen venerabatur." Burgus de bello Succico, 29. In another place he says, speaking of Gustavus, "miles strenuus, invictus, prudens, cui nihil objici fere aliud posset (si alieni regni occupationem *more nostrorum temporum excuses*) quam quod alioquin praeclarum ingenium, in hoc incautum, deceptoris Lutheri augis subdiderat."—It is to be hoped that Burgus is a better historian than a divine!

† Ce serait oublier un des beaux traits de l'histoire militaire de Gustave, si je ne disais pas que la discipline qu'il établit dans ses armées, fut la première cause de ses grands succès. La plus severe subordination animait ce grand corps, et Gustave en dirigeait tous les mouvements au but qu'il se proposait, n'ayant jamais à craindre de se voir arrêté par le brigandage du soldat, ou l'inconduite des chefs. Ce grand corps ne savait qu'obéir, et marchait avec confiance partout où son roi le conduisait. Le

his camp was rendered a school for decency, regularity, and religion ; and, being temperate, or rather abstemious, himself, he never allowed his officers to live luxuriously. By this judicious attention to the behaviour of his soldiers, he introduced habits of moderation, highly conducive to the success of his future plans ; for, such were the patience and frugality of the Swedes, that they could subsist during three months upon the same quantity of provisions which would have been consumed in one, by an equal number of Austrians.* Accustomed from their cradles to a life of fatigue, they endured, without a murmur, the rudest blasts of a northern winter, or the meridian ardour of a southern sun ; indifferent alike to every feeling, except that of having contributed by their personal exertions to the glory of a sovereign, whom they equally loved and admired.†

The views and expectations of a Swedish soldier were bounded exclusively to his profession. In the course of the thirty years war numbers arrived at the age of maturity, who were born and educated in the “tented field.” Without the strictest regard to the rules of morality, such a mode of existence must have engendered habits of savage ferocity and dissolute licentiousness, as was the

plus grand avantage pour les Suédois fut sans doute de combattre sous les yeux d'un maître chez qui les récompenses comme les châtiments étaient toujours en proportion du mérite, et qui avait pour principe d'aller au-devant de la mort, pensant qu'elle n'est dangereuse que pour ceux qui la craignent.—Francheville, Tableaux Militaire, 328.

* The numbers of foreigners progressively enrolled in the Swedish armies, as they advanced into the interior provinces of Germany, proved highly injurious to their discipline.—Schmidt, v. 2.

† Harte. Essay on the Military State of Europe, prefixed to the Life of Gustavus Adolphus, 4.

case with the imperialists, who, both in their dress and demeanour, affected the terrific fierceness of barbarians. In the Swedish camp schools were daily opened with as much regularity as amid the tranquil occupations of domestic pursuits.*

Unremitting in his attention to field exercises, Gustavus was more inclined to overlook an inadvertence in a private soldier than to forgive a similar fault when committed by an officer, because the former was likely to be attended with less serious consequences. It was, besides, a paramount principle in his military code scarcely ever to inflict corporeal chastisement, however great the offence; as in his estimation a sentence of death was less repugnant to those exalted feelings of honour, which it was his constant endeavour to excite, than the disgrace inflicted by a blow. Though averse to punish he was ever ready to reward; and so minutely attentive to the characters and actions of every individual, that there was scarcely a man in the whole army distinguished by courage or regularity, with whose name he was unacquainted. The smallest inadvertence in executing a manœuvre never escaped his notice; but, instead of loading the offender with curses or with stripes, he would dismount from his horse, and correct the defect with the persevering kindness of friendship.†

* This Spartan discipline, according to Harte, converted the very children into heroes, and rendered them insensible to dangers, which might have appalled the courage of men. "One day," as he informs us, "a caisson-shot pierced the tent where the boys were studying, and killed two or three of them, while occupied with their books. But no sensation whatever was produced; as not a single youth started from his seat, or even dropped his pen.—Essay 5. Education, I am persuaded, may do much, but this appears to exceed its powers.

† Simplicity in the construction of every military evolution, and rapidity

The system pursued, with respect to promotion, was admirably calculated for the encouragement of merit, as the claims of seniority were never suffered to operate to the prejudice of superior talents. Hence every loss was immediately replaced by an officer perfected by experience in a subordinate station, or destined by the splendour of precocious genius, to shine in an elevated situation.* The pretensions of birth were totally disregarded, neither was money accepted as an equivalent for service.

No less careful of the morals, than of the health of his soldiers, Gustavus allotted two chaplains to every regiment, men judiciously chosen to impress, by the weight of their own example, the doctrines which they were bound to inculcate. Neither vagrants, nor gamesters, nor thieves, nor prostitutes, were suffered to contaminate the virtue of men, whose lives were devoted to the noblest purposes—the defence of their country and their religion.†

By attending to the minutest articles of expenditure, and preventing all jobs and fraudulent contracts, Gustavus was enabled to maintain numerous armies, without oppressing his subjects by immoderate taxes, or even impoverishing the subjugated provinces, by levying enormous contributions. Yet,

in its execution, were justly considered by this consummate warrior as constituting the most important principles of tactics. From him the modern conquerors of the continent have borrowed many lessons of value. Grimoard, i. 434.—See *Essai sur le Système Militaire de Bonaparte*.

* Formed under the eye of a sovereign capable of appreciating every species of merit, no officer was ever entrusted with a command, who was not perfectly competent to the undertaking.—Grimoard, i. 434.

† Harte's *Essay*, 7.

notwithstanding the contracted state of his finances, it does not appear that his troops were reduced to greater hardships, that must naturally attend an invading army, in a country exhausted by predatory incursions. Neither is there any instance on record, of a mutiny having been excited on account of the deficiency of pay or of provisions.*

Intimately acquainted with the tactics of Greece and Rome, the King of Sweden availed himself of their discoveries, whenever they could be employed with advantage, adopting them to the modern practice of war by ingenious devices of his own.† By reducing the unwieldy squadrons of cavalry,‡ he

* The subsidies received from foreign powers were comparatively small. France contributed no more than twelve hundred thousand livres a year (about fifty thousand pounds sterling) towards the conquest of Germany. Compare this with the sums which England has lavished on fruitless expeditions, and the inference will be truly alarming.

† "Distinguons la tactique, du génie de la guerre. Manuel de ce qui s'est pratiqué, la tactique n'a du mérite, que jusqu'au jour où quelque élève hardi, s'avise de refaire le leçon. Les règles restent, elles sont simples, le vulgaire les connaît; l'application seule varie; temeraire, heureuse, elle appartient au génie. Ce'st un jeune inventeur qui, poussé par un sentiment de nécessité, au lieu de s'engager dans le labyrinthe d'une antique machine, préfère courir les hazards de quelque moteur nouveau. Dans son impatience il a ignoré, négligé, ou sacrifié même des ressources utiles; ses rivaux sont plus savans que lui, et plus méthodiques; mais il emporte sur eux par le vif élan d'une penetration, qu'il sait se passer du savoir, et se jouer de l'habitude."—*Mémoire sur les effets de la Religion de Mohammed*, par M. Oelsner. There is much truth in the above remark.

‡ The strength of a regiment of cavalry, and even the number of troops of which it was composed, varied according to circumstances. The troop, however, usually comprising one hundred and forty men, was commanded by a captain, a lieutenant, and a cornet. The heavy dragoon wore an iron cap, and cuirass, both musket-proof, and was armed with a carbine, two pistols, and a long sword. The arms used by the light cavalry were nearly similar, but their offensive weapons were less heavy, and their sabres crooked instead of straight.—Grimoard i. 437. The imperial horses were in general cased in iron, and thus rendered inactive by the weight of their armour.—Tableau Milit. 260.

rendered them more proper for active service ; and by stationing infantry between the bodies of horse, he enabled them to resist the ponderous shock of the Austrian cuirassiers, which till then had proved irresistible.* Instead of being condensed in enormous squares, according to the practice of contemporary generals, the Swedish army was usually drawn up in two lines, supported by a body of reserve.† Four surgeons were allotted to every regiment, a precaution no less recommended by the suggestions of policy than by the common dictates of humanity, yet probably neglected by the callous pride of Austria ; as it appears that Tilly,‡ after the battle of Leipsic, was obliged to recur to a practitioner of Halle to dress his wounds, which would hardly have happened, had not the imperial army been defective in medical assistance, or the medical men been sadly defective in talent.||

To particularize every improvement introduced by Gustavus, would require proficiency in the science of war, to which I have little pretence. I shall, therefore, forbear to enter into minute details, contenting myself with simply enumerating the ob-

* Francheville, *Tableau Militaire*, 289.

† The comparative advantages of the Swedish and Imperial orders of battle are scientifically discussed by Francheville, 289. 304.

‡ Francheville states the strength of the imperial squadron at 150 men ; but he says, (259) les régiments Suedois étaient moins forts que les impériaux. Un escadron, était composé de 66 cavaliers ; les compagnies d'infanterie étaient de 144.

|| Harte, *Essay* 11. Griboard supposes one medical assistant to have been attached to every regiment of three thousand men ; but, as he never condescends to mention his authority, it is impossible to ascertain the degree of credit which his assertion may deserve. Francheville corrects the assertion of Mr. Harte, by telling us, that the surgeons were with the baggage.—*Tab. Mil.* 258.

jects to which his attention appears to have been directed with the most striking advantages. To him is attributed the discovery of the brigade or column* of firing in platoons,† and of leatheren portable artillery.‡ In his knowledge of military architecture, the construction of bridges and batteries, and in every thing relating to the higher departments of an engineer, he certainly

* An anonymous historian, quoted by Harte, gives the following account of the column:

Dicebat se novam et præcærissimam in ipsis exercitu formam aciei observasse, quam hoc loes describere nimis prolixum foret. Summa huc credit, eam munitioni similem, qua ab omni parte, qua hosti accessus patet, eum destinatis ictibus petere queat; neque tantum machinas commode posse displodi, sed etiam quemque sclopétarum virilim jaculari, et hostem ferire: quod in magno agmine quadrato fieri nequeat, ubi duobus aut tribus ordinibus sclopeta displodentibus reliqui ictus sint inanes, adeo ut agmen illud ab irruente equitatid facile dissolvi possit: quod iu acie Suecica fieri nequeat; nam priusquam hostilis equitatus se loco movere aut impetum facere possit, sclopétarios sub praesidis non tantum hastatorum, sed etiam equitum, tanquam duorum propagulacorum, que ad latera habeant, tutos esse; ad haec multos gradus inter sclopétarios esse ad receptum, ut priusquam hostilis equitatus ad ultimum agmen pervenire et illud disturbare possit, cum dissipari necesse sit. Cum igitur coherentia toliu aciei, equitatus et peditatus, tormentorum majorum ac minorum, nec non et sclopétariorum maximi sit momenti; se non videre, quomodo hujusmodi acies, nisi Deo ita volente, aut si prius quam instruta sit, hostis eam ex improviso invadat, fundi fugarique possit; in eam autem victoriam vertè, ut audines serventur, nec acies rumpatur.—Harte, ii. 363.

† Le maniement du monsquet chez les Suedois eut beaucoup moins composé; que chez les imperieux—par le retranchement de la fourchette les mousquetaires Suedois gagnaient plusieurs tems, et etaient aussi plus leste dans les marches.—Tab. Milit. 276.

‡ According to Grimoard, who appears particularly conversant with all military details, these cannon were constructed upon principles entirely new, and consisted of a thin tube of copper, strengthened by four iron hoops, and entirely enveloped with cord. Over these was drawn a case of boiled leather, fitted to the tube with great exactness. The principal advantage derived from this species of artillery, was the facility with which it was brought into action, being light enough to be drawn by two men; and the difficulty with which the cannon were heated, which ren-

excelled all preceding generals; and probably equalled the most accomplished commanders of our times, so far at least as genius could attain, unassisted by more modern discoveries in mechanics, and the astonishing progress which Europe has made in all the higher branches of mathematics; after his death, it seems gradually to have declined, till the days of* Frederic II.†

Gustavus is said to have repeatedly declared, that he never desired to command an army exceeding forty thousand men; but this probably proceeded solely from the difficulties which would have arisen in providing supplies for a more numerous body.‡

dered them capable of being fired much oftener than ordinary guns, without exposing the artillerymen to the smallest risk. i. 438. Galetti, ii. 295. On croit que le Baron Melchior de Wurmbrand est l'inventeur des canons de cuir, on en fit usage pour la premiere fois au siege de Worms. Tab. Mil. 317. The French used them till 1756, under the appellation of *pièces suédoises*. The cannon weighed 625 pounds, and was four feet in length; they were all four-pounders, and the charge of powder required was equal to a third part of the weight of the ball. Ibid. 318.

* In a rapid sketch like the present, I may be allowed to speak in general terms, and in that light the assertion is correct. Marlborough and Monteculi, Condé and Turenne, Eugene and Luxemburg, were splendid exceptions; but, in spite of the practical lessons which they gave to the world, the cumbersome system of German tactics became the fashionable standard for imitation. Instead of vying with each other in celerity of motion, commanders prided themselves solely upon manœuvring scientifically through a theatrical campaign; and, if they proved fortunate enough to gain a few leagues of country, or to capture a fortified town, they retired contentedly into winter quarters to repose on the laurels so cheaply acquired; while processions and *Te Deums* imposed upon the nation, and made them submit to the heaviest burthens with patience, if not with alacrity.

† *Friedrich der einzige*, as he is called by the Prussians.

‡ The achievements of France against the powerful coalitions opposed to her usurpations, and which have been full as much owing to the numerous population, over which she exercises a paramount control, as to the genius of her commanders, or to the superiority of her tactics, has fatally illustrated the present question, and proved to

The reader will probably be surprised to learn that the pay in those days was comparatively much higher than at present. A colonel of infantry in the Swedish service received yearly three hundred and eighty pounds sterling; a lieutenant-colonel half as much; and a captain one hundred and twenty eight. The stipend of a common soldier amounted to nearly sixpence a day.* In the imperial army the emoluments of the officers were considerably greater;† but, on account of the defalcations and retardments to which they were subject, their situation appears, on the whole, to have been much less comfortable. This remark applies exclusively to the period, when the complaints of Germany, and the rapid progress of the Swedes, compelled Ferdinand to prescribe bounds to the rapacity of his commanders; as, during the splendid tyranny of Wallenstein, officers were restrained by no ties except those of discretion, being suffered to live with Asiatic profusion on the fruits of extortions and cruelty.‡

the satisfaction of all impartial observers, that *ceteris paribus*, superiority of numbers is almost certain to prevail.

* The bounty money given to recruits was also prodigiously great, and was said, toward the conclusion of the thirty years war, to have amounted to the sum of 56 florins for a foot-soldier, and 100 ducats for a horseman; the amazing difference which existed between the two services was owing to the latter being expected to provide himself with a horse.—Galetti ii. 203.

† Tab. Milit. 263.

‡ The system of war almost universally adopted before the time of Gustavus was a system of robbery. The preparations necessary for opening a campaign required little previous foresight, when armies were supported without magazines at the expense of the country they occupied. Accustomed to procure all their resources from pillage, they no sooner exhausted one province than they removed to another, where the means of subsistence were more abundant.—Grimoard i. 444.

No regular cartel being established for the exchange of prisoners, it frequently happened that they were detained for years in captivity,* or were constrained to pay enormous ransoms for their release.†

It is no trifling glory to the Swedish monarch, that he contributed essentially to mitigate the horrors of war by his generosity toward those whom fortune subjected to his power. The situation of a province, desolated by the inroads of an invading enemy, appeared to him sufficiently wretched, without wantonly adding to its misery; he accordingly checked the ferocity of his victorious cohorts by salutary regulations, punishing inhumanity with unremitting severity, as the most disgraceful stain that can tarnish the character of a soldier.

The number of generals employed in an army was far inferior to that which modern practice has introduced; neither in the hour of battle was the same attention paid to seniority. Hence it frequently happened, that the command of a battalion was entrusted to a colonel, though a more ancient officer was present. Even the direction of a separate army did not necessarily confer the rank of general. Holk entered Misnia with eight thousand men, and Arnhem conducted a still larger body to the assistance of Sigismund, yet neither of them

* This was actually the case with respect to Gustavus Horn, and Jean de Wert, who did not recover their liberty till after the peace of Munster.—Harte, Essay 24.

† That of a colonel frequently amounted to a thousand pounds, and so on in proportion to the prisoner's rank. Ferdinand paid the enormous sum of four thousand pounds to Verdugo, to purchase the liberty of the young prince of Anhalt.—Essay 36.

was invested with a higher title than that of colonel.*

Another singularity, universally prevalent in the habits of war, was the facility with which officers were allowed to abandon the service of one sovereign and to enter into that of his enemy. Custom having sanctioned this dangerous practice, it was no longer attended either with danger or disgrace. The slightest offence was sufficient to tempt them to withdraw in disgust, even without signifying the intention to their commander. Such behaviour would now be punished as desertion; but the manners of the age so completely palliated the turpitude of the action, that it would be difficult to produce more than a single instance, in which it was punished as criminal.†

The reputation acquired by Gustavus in the cabinet was little inferior to his glory in the field;‡ and, as a statesman, he may dispute the palm with Oxensteirn, one of the most enlightened ministers of any age or country.

The generosity of commanders, in rewarding merit, almost exceeded the bounds of prudence; for though these opposite qualities are rarely allied in private life, they ought never to be separated in public stations. Notwithstanding the contracted state of his finances, Gustavus rarely promoted a common soldier without adding a munificent pre-

* Galetti, ii. 28.

† Ibid, 20.

‡ Mr. Harte appears to have regarded this as an honour exclusively applicable to the warriors of this splendid era, though it has in fact been the characteristic of genius, in every period of the world, to unite the talents of a statesman with those of a soldier. Without recurring to the annals of antiquity, where Pericles and Epaminondas, Hanibal and Julius Cæsar, and many others of almost equal celebrity, would fur-

sent. This system of remuneration, like all the other qualities of that extraordinary man, was carried by Wallenstein to excess, who scarcely ever rewarded an officer of rank with less than five hundred pounds. Tilly received from the emperor such extensive estates in Lower Saxony, as enabled him at his death to bequeath a legacy of ten thousand pounds to the Walloons, besides providing amply for his family.* Ferdinand's liberality toward the Duke of Friedland surpassed belief, and was almost great enough to satisfy the pretensions of a man whose vanity and ambition were unbounded.

Till the arrival of the Swedish monarch in Germany, contributions had been levied with an unrelenting rapacity;† for which history was then unable to furnish a precedent. The portion allotted to remunerate the soldiers was divided by the colonels according to the muster-roll, by which ingenious device the shares of the non-effective men were appropriated to themselves. The art of supporting armies, without any expense to their sovereign, constituted the principal secret of the mili-

nish illustrations no less splendid than striking, it will be sufficient to select, from modern times, a Marlborough, a Frederic, and a Wellington. Without transcendent talents, a general may acquire such a mechanical knowledge of his profession, as will enable him to trace the plan of a campaign, or to direct the operations of a siege; but the endowments requisite to form a hero are imparted by nature to few, and it is probably true, that no man ever attained to the highest excellence in the military art, whose talents were exclusively military..

* Harte, Essay 36.

† Some idea may be formed of the rapacity of the soldiers from the following passage: "Usus militaris est in Germania hyemali, et eo, quo in stativis militares morantur, tempore, ut singuli, vel bini, aut terni unam habeant incolarum dominum, cuius dominus victus militi, et equo, si equum miles habet, dare tenetur. Paganus quoque, ceu civitas, ubi stativa sunt, contributioines porrigit secundum multam, quos deinceps in singulos milites pro rata parte distribuantur. Praeter haec unusquisque

tary art, as practised by the imperial generals.* The regiments of Papenheim and St. Julien are reported to have drawn sixty thousand pounds from the Middle Marche; and Wallenstein is said to have extorted the enormous sum of two millions sterling (though it is probable that the amount has been greatly exaggerated by the resentment of a suffering people) from the Electorate of Brandenburg alone.†

Many of the most eminent commanders rose entirely by personal merit, having neither birth nor fortune to recommend them. Aldringer and Merci were of humble extraction; Jean de Wert was the son of an illiterate peasant; Beck originally a shepherd, and Stalhaus a menial servant.

The military dress presented a singular mixture of ferocity and foppery. Ruffs were almost universally worn, frilled and frittered into the most fantastical fashions. Tilly's accoutrements were highly grotesque, and calculated to render his diminutive figure an object of general ridicule.‡ Wigs were

aliquid semper ab herbo domus extorquet, donativi nomine, quod incolae, etiam si inviti, dant tamen, ne in suam familiam, facultatemque milites deserviant."—Burgus, i. 48. The author was himself a soldier.

* This important secret has since been employed with increasing success by the revolutionary generals of France, and in particular by Bonaparte.

† Harte, *Essay 39.*

‡ His person and manners are thus described by the author of the *Life of Gustavus*:

" Le Comte Tilly etait d'une taille au dessous de la mediocre, maigre et sec, le bas du visage pointu, de grandes moustaches, des cheveux courts, gris, tout plats et fort negligés, un nez fort long, des joues creuses, le front large et ride, une phisionomie seche et rude, la barbe courte et mediocrement fournie. Ce grande capitaine etait toujours vetu d'une maniere bizarre. Le Marechal de Grammont raconte que, l'etant alle voir par curiosite, il le rencontra a la tete de son armee, qui etait en

seldom made use of, except by the French; but the hair was variously arranged, according as taste or temper directed. The Austrians, who affected a terrific air, would not suffer it to cover their foreheads, but by the opposite party it was usually dressed in the manner adopted by Vandyck, in most of his juvenile portraits. Whiskers, however, were universally regarded as essential requisites for a soldier, and were twisted and curled most fantastically.* The vanity of rank was particularly displayed in the beauty and magnificence of the golden chain, which decorated the neck of an officer. The colour of the scarf, as well as its materials, depended entirely upon the choice of the wearers, whose taste was displayed in the richness and variety of the embroidery. The swords were large and cumbersome, but seldom overcharged with ornament, as they were intended for defence rather than deco-

marebe. Il etait monte sur un petit cheval gris, vetu d'un pourpoint de satin verd avec des manches a bandes comme un Espagnol, et des hauts de chausse de la meme etoile; un petit chapeau retroussé, surmonté d'une plume d'autruehe rouge, qui lui descendait jusqu'a sur le dos; un baudrier de deux pouces de large par dessus sa veste, auquel pendait son epee de bataille, et un seul pistolet a l'arçon. Lorsque le marchal approcha pour lui faire la reverenee, Tilly, eroyant remarquer qu'il s'étonnait de le voir dans cet equipage, lui dit, Monsieur, vous trouvez peut-être mon habillement extraordinaire. J'avoue qu'il n'est pas toute-a-fait conforme a la mode de France; mais il est a mon gre, et cela me suffit. Je pense aussi que ma haquenee, et ce pistolet tout seul vous surprennent, pour le moins autant que mon accoutrement. Pour que vous n'ayiez pas mauvaise opinion du Comte de Tilly, a qui vous faites l'honneur de rendre une visite de curiosité, je vous dirai que j'ai gagné sept batailles decisives, sans avoir été obligé de tirer une seule fois le pistolet que vous voyez là; et mon petit cheval ne m'a jamais abandonné, et n'a jamais balancé à faire son devoir."—*Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, 142.

* Mr. Harte observes, that he never saw a picture of any general of that age without them, except that of Christian, Duke of Brunswick. *Essay 43.*

ration. Instead of being fashioned after the model of the leg, the boots were rather calculated to protect it, being made of materials strong enough to resist a pistol bullet. Spurs were of brass, with a curved neck, and had a large box (which served as a pivot for the rowels) filled with small metal balls, as if their only use was to jingle.* Armour† was frequently studded with gold and silver. Many, however, objecting to the weight, contented themselves with casing their breasts and backs in steel, and covering the rest of their bodies with a dress of leather, so stiffened as not to be easily perforated.‡ Gustavus never made use of any defensive garment except an elf-skin waistcoat; but he was no less conspicuous for contempt of danger, than for the unrivalled powers of his mind.§

In an age, when the long duration of hostilities may be supposed to have blunted the finest feelings of the heart, it might be expected that private quarrels

* Mr. Harte informs us, that he once saw a spur of this description, which had been found near Prague, on the spot where the famous battle was fought which decided the fate of Bohemia. Amid the incongruous productions of fashion and folly, it is hardly credible that any thing so intrinsically defective should have become an object for modern imitation.

† I have seen a magnificent suit, richly inlaid, which belonged to Duke Bernard, and is preserved as a memorial of his ancestor's prowess by the reigning Duke of Saxe Weimar.

‡ Harte, Essay 45. It is impossible to say too much in commendation of this author's accuracy and indefatigable diligence, which form a striking contrast with his style.

I am very sorry to tell you, that Harte's Gustavus does not take at all, consequently sells very little: it is certainly informing, and full of good matter; but, it is as certain too, that the style is execrable: where the devil he picked it up, I cannot conceive, for it is a bad style of a new and singular kind; it is full of Latinisms, Galicisms, Germanisms, and all *isms* but Anglicisms; in some places pompous, in others vulgar and low.—Lord Chesterfield's Letters, iii. 177.

§ Ibid. Francheville, 265.

would not only have happened more frequently, but that they would have also been attended with more fatal consequences than amid the pleasures and refinements of domestic society.* Yet during the course of the thirty years war, very few instances occur in which the contentions of individuals were decided by duels; neither did any stigma attach to the reputation of those who declined accepting a challenge.† By the code of Gustavus, disputes between officers were submitted to a military tribunal; but if a captain or lieutenant permitted privates to fight, he was rendered responsible for the mischief that might ensue, deprived of his commission, and frequently compelled to serve in the capacity of a common soldier. The honour of a warrior, in the judgment of that enlightened prince, might be displayed in actions more character-

* By an edict of Gustavus, every person engaged in a duel was to be punished with death. Soon after its publication a quarrel took place between two officers of rank, who knowing that the steady temper of their sovereign would not pardon a transgression of the law, applied to him for permission to decide their difference by single combat. Though justly offended at their presumption, the king smothered his anger, acceded to the request, and signified his intention of being himself a spectator of their prowess. The hour was appointed, and the king arrived, attended by a body of infantry, whom he formed into a circle around the combatants. "Now, gentlemen," said he, addressing them as they were preparing to engage, "you are at liberty to fight till one of you falls." They drew their swords, when Gustavus, beckoning to the provost martial of the army, added with a stern dignity, "The moment one is killed behead the other." Confounded at this unexpected display of firmness, the officers fell instantly on their knees, imploring forgiveness for their temerity, which they at length obtained upon condition of their solemnly promising to be reconciled.—Harte, i. 90.

† Cratz in a transport of fury challenged Wallenstein; yet this insult offered to the authority of his general was attended with no serious consequences. Merode was killed by Jean de Wert, but the combat was not premeditated. A few other examples might be produced, but they are insufficient to controvert the general principle.—Harte, Essay 46.

istic of valour than the murder of his brethren in arms.

Science is indisputably the offspring of tranquillity: hence the Muses are represented with great propriety as delighting in solitude and retirement. It cannot therefore be supposed, that at a period when Germany was desolated by conflicting armies, her progress in literature would be conspicuous. The human mind, however, has constant need of nourishment; and, if not supplied with wholesome sustenance, will fatten on offals. Hence judicial astrology became the fashionable study of the age; so that no measure of importance was ever undertaken without consulting the planets. Grebner, Braunborn, and Battista Seni were beheld with an adoration approaching to idolatry, as men possessing supernatural powers, and capable of deciphering the mysterious volume of futurity. Even the splendid genius of Tycho Brahe would scarcely have risen to celebrity, had it not been degraded by the paltry tricks of divination. Each religion had its soothsayers, who interpreted the constellations, as the interests of their party designated.* Ferdinand is reported to have entertained the highest reverence for these literary impostors, and to have regulated the most momentous transactions of his reign in consequence of their presumptuous admonition. The credulity of Wallenstein exceeded belief: not a plan was embraced, nor an enterprize attempted, without the advice or sanction

* In the north Gustavus was the *Arctic Lion*, the *vis visida* of the Reformation, while in the south he was called the *modern Attila*, and the *Scourge of God*.—Harte, Essay 46.

of Seni.* Chemnitz, an author of acknowledged merit, appears implicitly to have given credit to the prodiges which he has transmitted to posterity. According to him, and his rivals in credulity, the industrious Lotichius, a thousand miracles, totally reversing the established order of nature, announced the calamities, which awaited Germany, to a blind and obstinate people.† The fall of a column was adduced by the Austrian ministers as a powerful argument to prevail on Ferdinand to consent to the deposition of Wallenstein. The hearts of the bravest officers in the imperial army are said to have experienced a sudden depression upon discovering that they were holding a council of war, in the house of a grave-digger at Lepsic, the walls of which were besmeared with allegorical figures.‡

Nothing was too absurd to meet with credit, and stories even became popular in proportion to their absurdity. Distinguished personages were persuaded that their armour, and even their bodies, might be rendered impenetrable by enchantment, like those of Achilles and Orlando.§ The preva-

* There were some that sayd, that even by the skill of some in the starres (wherein besides others he made use of Kepler, a great master), and by the Chaldeans art was foresignified his times and fates to be come.—Swedish Intelligencer, i. 12.

† According to Gallobellgicus the fate of Magdeburg was announced by the following miracle. “A city captaine’s wife dying in child-bed desired to be ript; the child was found a boy, almost as bigge as one of three yeares old. Hee had a head-piece, and an iron brest-plate upon him; great bootes of the French fashion, and a bag by his side, with two like musket bullets in it.”—Ibid. 119.—Blind indeed must be the people who can behold with indifference such prodigies as those!

‡ Mr. Harte enters into many details to shew the prevalency of superstition, from which I have borrowed the foregoing anecdotes.

§ Not the Achilles of the Iliad, as Homer expressly tells us of his being

lency of this opinion may be inferred by consulting the military code of Gustavus; the first article of which, under the strictest penalties, prohibits the use of enchanted arms, or the recurring to magical incantations.[†] Could this extraordinary clause proceed from a belief in the powers of sorcery, or was it only a sacrifice to the credulity of his contemporaries?"[‡]

wounded in the arm; but the ideal hero of the tragic poets, and of the Alexandrian school.

* *Memorant eo momento, excitata magis Sacerdotum carminibus procella, magnum grandinis vim cælo demissam, quam obvius ventus in obsessorum faciem impellebat.*—Burgus, 38.—It is rather surprising, that an orthodox catholic should attribute so much influence in heaven to heretics.

† Lotichinius, however, may keep in countenance the last mentioned author, as the following story will prove. "Wiblenger, a shoemaker, who commanded the insurgents in Upper Austria, was possessed of a secret to render himself invulnerable. In the engagement with Pappenheim a cannon shot struck his side; but instead of doing him the smallest injury, it recoiled like a tennis ball from a racket." Having established this fact upon uncontrovertible testimony, the author informs us in the following page that this extraordinary personage, in spite of his incantations, was killed by a pistol. Circumstances so contradictory could hardly have been recorded by the same writer; had he not supposed that some part of the cobler's body was exempt from the charm, like the heel of Achilles.—Lotichinius, i, 464.—Such however was the miserable taste of the age, that three dissertations were published by the learned Wallin, a professor at Upsal, respecting the magical qualities of Gustavus's sword, where, if the reader has either leisure or inclination for such researches, he may find a matchless waste of erudition.—Wallin de gladio Gustavi Adolphi.

CHAP. IX.

Diet at Ratisbonne.—The public opinion favourable to peace.—Views of the different parties.—Reasons which induced the Emperor to convene a diet. His imprudence in doing so. He opens the assembly in a studied speech, and demands supplies for continuing the War.—Unpopularity of Wallenstein; the German princes insist upon his removal, and positively refuse to proceed to the election of a King of the Romans till their complaints are attended to. Ferdinand attempts to allay the ferment by partial concessions.—Conduct of France. She sends an embassy to Ratisbonne.—Character of Father Joseph.—Plans of Richelieu.—Difficulties attending the deposition of Wallenstein; his behaviour.—Peace concluded with France. Reasons which influenced Richelieu. He disavows the ambassador, and obliges the emperor to consent to a revision of the treaty.—Gustavus Adolphus addresses a manifesto to the German princes. They return an answer.—Wallenstein's behaviour during his retirement.

THOUGH every attempt hitherto made for the restoration of tranquillity had proved abortive, yet so ardent was the desire for peace, that men, suffering their inclinations to outstrip their judgment, looked forward to the proceedings of the approaching diet with sanguine hopes of success; yet, when they impartially examined the views and resources of the contending parties, it was difficult to suppose, that amid the cavils and jealousies of popular discussion, so many jarring interests could be amalgamated. Exhausted by the exactions of the imperial commanders, the protestants were anxious for the termination of hostilities; but still they required some satisfactory pledge for their future security. Their endeavours indeed were confined to objects more attainable than those of their opponents; and it is highly probable, that they would have been

completely satisfied with the unmolested enjoyment of the secularized property, and the free exercise of their religion. No less offended with the arrogance and rapacity of Wallenstein, than alarmed at the aggrandisement of Austria, the catholics were scarcely less eager for peace; but in the pride of conquest they disdained to treat upon equal terms, presumptuously demanding, as the price of conciliation, the immediate restitution of all ecclesiastical benefices from the church, with an adequate compensation for the losses occasioned by the unconquerable obstinacy of their opponents. Neither was Ferdinand averse from a pacification, provided his edict was admitted as a preliminary.*

The emperor's facility in assembling a diet created universal astonishment, as a spirit of opposition was widely diffused, and complaints and murmurs were every where heard, too loud and violent to be treated with contempt. The apprehensions even of those who on all former occasions had manifested unshaken allegiance toward the imperial throne were at length awakened, for they no longer doubted that the ruin of the protestants would pave the way for their own subjugation.†

The popular manners of the Duke of Bavaria, when contrasted with the sullen haughtiness of Ferdinand, produced a comparison too mortifying for vanity to endure with patience. The ties of interest which had so long united their discordant spirits had gradually relaxed; so that it was generally expected that the jealousy excited by the favour of Wallenstein, and recently aggravated by the in-

* 1630. Schmidt, iv. 29.

† Puffendorf, i. 58.

trigues of France, would kindle into a flame, when they were mutually irritated by collision. Though the Electorate of Bavaria had hitherto escaped the calamities of war, it was impossible for the aspiring soul of its sovereign calmly to endure the superiority of a man, whose rapid elevation prematurely frustrated his splendid visions, and robbed him of the glory which he fully anticipated as the reward of victory. The preference given to the brilliant talents of Friedland had totally extinguished every spark of gratitude in Maximilian's bosom, and even prepared him for joining the enemies of Austria, when a favourable opportunity should occur.*

These considerations, however, were either entirely overlooked by imperial pride, or yielded to others which appeared more important. Without the assistance of the diet it was impracticable for Ferdinand to provide for the expenses of the Mantuan expedition, or even successfully to oppose the King of Sweden, who was actually preparing for the invasion of Pomerania; because it was dangerous any longer to persevere in a system, which had so completely alienated the affections of the nation, that every individual might be expected to join the hostile standard, when displayed in the cause of freedom. But his principal aim in convening a diet was to secure the reversion of the imperial dignity to his eldest son; and this he was persuaded could never be effected, unless the wishes of the electors were gratified.

Resolutely determined to sacrifice every thing to the attainment of that paramount object, he repaired

* 1630. Puffendorf, i. 58. Schmidt, iv. 29.

to Ratisbonne, with extraordinary pomp, toward the end of June, 1630, accompanied by the empress, and his eldest son, already King of Bohemia and Hungary. The Duke of Bavaria and the ecclesiastical electors were previously assembled to receive him, accompanied by numerous and splendid retinues, and decorated with Asiatic ostentation. The electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, however, declined attending, alleging, in their excuse, that their dominions, exhausted by the calamities of war, were utterly incapable of providing funds for so expensive a journey.* This, probably, was an exaggerated statement, but they were happy to avail themselves of a popular pretext to avoid an altercation with Ferdinand, being both predetermined to refuse their consent to the election of a King of the Romans. Neither were they entirely exempt from apprehension respecting their personal security; as in case their correspondence with Gustavus should be discovered, they had every thing to dread from the resentment of an offended despot.†

The imperial commanders appeared at the diet in a style of magnificence, which plainly shewed how great part of the plunder had been applied. But the equipages and attendants of Wallenstein eclipsed even the splendour of Maximilian and Ferdinand. Six hundred gentlemen marched in his train, whose costly attire, while it excited admiration, contrasted too strongly with the general misery to be viewed without silent imprecations.

* Unde non omnino falsa ipsorum excusatio poterat videri, ni paulo post colligendo contra Cæsarem militi thesauros fere erogassent. Burgus, 41.

† Harte, i. 165. Puffendorf, i. 58.

The situation in which the emperor had imprudently placed himself was little calculated to increase his popularity, or to ensure his tranquillity in future; since he had not only to combat the inveteracy of his avowed opponents, but to contend against the jealousy of his apparent partisans. The former, however, he beheld with disdain, convinced that nothing could render them formidable, while he possessed the support of the catholics. And of that he appears never to have entertained the slightest suspicion; but seriously to have flattered himself that he had completely satisfied their most romantic expectations by the "edict of restitution," and eternally bound their ambitious leader by raising him to the electoral dignity.* Desirous of concealing his lofty designs under the specious veil of moderation, he addressed the assembly in a studied harangue, in which he boldly asserted, that neither the origin of the war, nor its long duration, could justly be imputed to him, since he had never neglected a single opportunity which could lead to the termination of hostilities. If all attempts toward negotiation had proved abortive, the failure arose from the implacability of his opponents. The obstinacy of Frederic, in refusing to accept the conditions proposed at Mulhausen, was notorious to every member of the Germanic constitution, by the majority of whom they were approved. Instead of endeavouring to obliterate the stain of rebellion, by humbly acknowledging his fault, he actually carried on a traitorous correspondence with the external enemies of the empire; in consequence of

* Schiller, ii.

which he exhorted the electors seriously to consider, whether he had not justly forfeited every claim to forgiveness.*

The attention of the members being diverted to objects of far greater moment, the consideration of the claims of the unfortunate Palatine was consequently suspended, though the question was revived in a subsequent session, at the instigation of the English ambassador. Anxious to obtain the reinstatement of his unhappy brother-in-law, Charles I. deputed Sir Robert Anstruther to the diet, on purpose to intercede in his behalf. Had this petition been delivered with that dignified firmness which announces resolution, and the lofty feeling of national honour, it could hardly have failed of meeting with attention; but the hereditary prejudice of the house of Stuart, in favour of prerogative, combining with the dissensions which prevailed at home, prevented the king from employing the only language to which the emperor was likely to attend. Desirous, however, of palliating the harshness of a refusal by every external token of respect, Ferdinand endeavoured to gratify the vanity of Charles by conferring upon his representative the most flattering marks of distinction.

The friends of Wallenstein, who had still a numerous party at the imperial court, contended, that nothing could be more impolitic than to drive the Palatine to despair, since it was by no means improbable that circumstances might arise, when it might be highly expedient to restore his dominions, as a necessary counterpoise to the inordinate

* Schmidt, iv. 20. Lotichius, 734.

ambition of Bavaria. But the ascendant of Maximilian again prevailed, and what he owed to gratitude he secured by fear. Ferdinand no longer dared by an equivocal declaration to leave his intentions dubious; but when pressed by Anstruther for a final answer, he, without hesitation, replied, "That in consideration of his respect for the kings of England and Spain, he would consent to recall the sentence of proscription, provided Frederic accepted the conditions already offered, and gave proofs of repentance by his submission. That indispensable ceremony being duly performed, he promised to restore that part of his dominions which was actually in the hands of the infanta Isabella."* An offer like this, however qualified, ought to have been regarded in no other light than that of adding insult to injury, and should have animated the exertions of an indignant sovereign in defence of his own and the national honour.

The political situation of Europe engrossed much of the attention of the diet, as Ferdinand endeavoured, by various arguments, to enforce the necessity of providing supplies for the prosecution of hostilities, in case his earnest endeavours for the restoration of peace should terminate unsuccessfully. "The position of Germany," he said, "was highly critical, as a coalition was forming, whose hostile designs threatened to extend the flame of war more widely than ever, unless the machinations of their enemies were rendered abortive by the vi-

* Le Vassor, ix. 446. Barre, ix. 594. Saunderson's Charles I. 143. Lotichius, i. 756. Burnet's Mem. of Hamilton. Rushworth's Hist. Collect.

† Schmidt, iv. 29. Lotichius, 734.

gorous exertions of those who adhered to the orthodox faith with pious constancy. The projects of Sweden, no longer concealed under the veil of mystery, could not escape the observation of the most shallow politician. Notwithstanding the truce concluded with Poland had given peace and security to his realm, Gustavus Adolphus continued to augment his armies with as much activity as if his dominions were threatened with an invasion. His boundless ambition, disdaining the narrow limits prescribed by nature, would never repose till it had enveloped Europe in a general conflagration." Proceeding to examine the motives which might be supposed to influence that monarch's conduct, he triumphantly asked, "of what injuries the King of Sweden had to complain? what insults had he received from the Germanic empire? on what pretence could he interfere with her internal regulations? The dispute occasioned by the occupation of Stralsund might be speedily brought to an amicable adjustment, provided Gustavus would consent to accept the mediation of Denmark. But should he perversely reject so fair an offer, it was equally for the interest and for the honour of the German nation, to prepare for the invader so warm a reception, as would make him long repent his temerity."^{*}

The Mantuan war coming next under consideration, Ferdinand attempted, with his usual duplicity, to prove that it had been a war of necessity, and that he had been compelled by the restless ambition of France to take up arms in defence of the rights and dignity of the imperial diadem. In this

* Schmidt, iv. 738.

unavoidable contest, involving the dearest interests of all the German states, full as much as it regarded his own, he could not doubt their alacrity to furnish supplies.*

Subsidiary demands to an enormous amount appearing to require some palliative, Ferdinand concluded his address in a tone of benevolence by no means natural to his feelings. After lamenting the hardships to which every part of the empire had been unfortunately exposed by the long duration of hostilities, he conjured the assembly to take into consideration the calamitous state to which their country was reduced, and to endeavour by wise and salutary regulations to provide an adequate remedy. "To alleviate the burthens of a suffering people," he said, "was the dearest wish of his heart, and was no less recommended by the dictates of prudence than enforced by the voice of humanity, since nothing could tend so effectually as their internal dissensions to promote the desigus of their enemies."†

By this artful attempt to disguise rancour and ambition under the specious veil of compassion, Ferdinand expected to elude all complaint respecting the tyrannical proceedings of Wallenstein: but the indignation excited by the insolence and rapacity of that haughty chieftain was too inveterate for words to appease. Instead of simply replying to the imperial address, in the official language of flattery, they resolved to avail themselves of the only opportunity that might ever occur for obtaining effectual relief. The miseries occasioned by the

* *Lotichius*, 734.

† *Barre*, ix. 591.

licentious excesses of the imperial troops were detailed in all their enormity; compensations were demanded for the injuries sustained, and security required against their future recurrence. Of the inefficacy of remonstrances they had already experienced such inveterate proofs, that it would have been the height of credulity to have depended upon promises, without possessing the means of compelling their fulfilment. For so predominant was the influence of Friedland, that every complaint preferred against him was artfully attributed, by the Austrian ministers, to envy, excited by his pre-eminent talents, or to secret disaffection toward the head of the empire, whose legitimate prerogatives none dared to dispute, while defended by the genius of Wallenstein. These arguments, however, though indisputably supported by uncontested facts, were no longer calculated to produce their wonted effect, because they could not be acted upon with security. Even those members of the diet who had supported Ferdinand, in his most extravagant schemes, now warmly espousing the popular cause, insisted upon the removal of the only general capable of opposing Gustavus.* Imploring the emperor, in pathetic terms, to have compassion upon the sufferings of a hitherto patient people, whose silent endurance of the most galling tyranny entitled them to pity,† they intimated that a conti-

* *Quem (meaning Wallenstein) odium ac nauseam humani generis vocitabant.—Puffendorf, i. 58. Galletti, i. 131.*

† If Burgus be correct, and, as he was an officer in Wallenstein's army, he had every means of ascertaining the truth, the people had cause enough to complain. “Conquesti praeter omnia sunt de Vollenstaino summo armorum Cæsaris prefecto, illum oblique perstringentes, quod superbus homo, ambitione elatus, ad militum benevolentiam captaudam, tantam exercitui concessisset licenciam, ut nihil tam facinorosum esset,

nuance of the same oppressive system might impel them to listen to the dictates of despair, and to seek that redress under the banners of Sweden, which they had ineffectually solicited from the justice and humanity of their legitimate sovereign.

The losses sustained by the different states were described in terms of merited indignation. By Brandenburg they were estimated at twenty millions of dollars, by Pomerania at ten, by Hesse Cassel at seven, and by the other members of the Germanic constitution according to the same exaggerated scale of calculation.*

Ferdinand would have willingly postponed the discussion of every other affair till he had secured the election of his son; because, while that important question remained in suspense, he was compelled to subject his impetuous temper to many irksome restraints, as the smallest inadvertence might at once have destroyed his visionary plans of ambition. But intrigues and duplicity proved equally fruitless; no promises could satisfy the expectations of the nation, no artifices could elude its

quod milites contra miserrimos populos non auderent; sævire in homines, virginibus vim inferre, combuscare domos, civitates devastare, depopulare provincias, pium putarent; militaribus præceptis contineri piaculum ducerent, esse has non conservandi, sed perdendi imperii artes; non instruendi milites, sed corrumpendi; irritari militum potulantia populos, inde rebelliones, et bella civilia oriri."—Burgus, i. 45.

* Schmidt, iv. 29. Lotichius, i. 738, &c. Ferdinandus enim per prædatorium, et sine ordinum consensu conscriptum militem suum, solos evangelicos ordines, belli hujus curriculo, immensa auri vi emunxit, quanta, præteritis aliquot seculis, etiam extrema necessitate ingruente, a toto imperio exacta et contributa non est. Dissertatio de Ratione Status in imperio Romano Germanico, Authore Hippolitho a Lapide. 457.—This satirical work, which is attributed to Chemnitz, is extremely scarce, as it was suppressed by order of the Austrian government soon after its publication. (Friestadii, 1647). I am indebted to Mr. Coxe for its perusal.

discernment. Encouraged by the flattering promises of France, and confident of being supported by the whole German confederacy, the Duke of Bavaria protested against the validity of an election, which, considering the circumstances under which it must be conducted, would necessarily be deficient in a most essential point—unbiased freedom of suffrage. In a city surrounded by the imperial troops, the decision of the electors could not fail to be treated as the effect of compulsion, and of course as illegal. “What necessity,” said Maximilian, in a tone of defiance, “exists any longer for maintaining such numerous armies, except to render the Duke of Friedland as much an object of terror to the German princes, as he is an object of detestation to the people?”*

Ferdinand, though represented by many historians as not naturally cruel and vindictive, was assuredly more sensible to the voice of interest than to the calls of humanity. The sympathy of a despot is rarely awakened by the distresses of those whom Providence has subjected to his fury; but if not totally insensible to the suggestion of prudence, he will sometimes assume the garb of mercy, when necessary, to appease the murmurings of an indignant people, rendered formidable by despair. Perceiving therefore that nothing would satisfy the diet but a partial acquiescence with their demands,

* Barre, ix. 591. *Ferdinandus, ut in aliis omnibus, ita etiam in hoc passu, fidei a se date, uno impetu peripit, ac pro libertu suo, generali exercituum ducem in imperio, Wallenstenum, sopitis jam fere publicis turbis, et discriminis omni submoto, creavit. De Rer. Stat. 464. Lieet imperatori nomen istud, quod caput imperii, tam in militaribus, quam in civilibus, cit, tribuatur; jus tamen creandi supremum belli ducem, imperium sibi reservavit. Ibid. 506.*

he judged it expedient to comply, rather than to hazard his authority in a precarious contest. He accordingly consented* to disband eighteen thousand of his bravest troops, flattering himself, by this act of condescension, to silence the jealousy of the electors, and to render them more tractable in future.

It is but fair to acknowledge, that Ferdinand was placed in a most critical situation, and that it would have required extraordinary talents to extricate him with credit from a maze of difficulties which became gradually more intricate as he advanced. Temerity, perhaps, would have been the resort of wisdom; because to desperate diseases none but desperate remedies should be applied. Ferdinand, however, was desirous of reconciling so many discordant interests, that it was out of his power to act with decision, or to meet the danger with a resolution adequate to its urgency. The scruples of religion (for though frequently misguided by intemperate zeal, religion undoubtedly formed the master-spring of all his actions,) could hardly fail to interfere with the bold suggestions of ambition; neither was it easy to reconcile the timid counsels of friars, who aimed at accomplishing their insidious designs by the tortuous paths of intrigue, with the lofty projects of Wallenstein, whose ardent courage panted to overturn by force of arms every intervening obstacle, that obstructed his passage to uncontrolled authority. The former, regarding the enforcement of the edict of restitution as the principal object to be effected, when policy suggested the necessity of its suspension during a

* Pio sed pernicioso consilio.—*Burgus*, 47. Pfessl, ii. 312.

limited period, as the surest expedient for preventing the protestants from uniting with Sweden, they positively denied, that the imperial prerogative extended to such profanation. "Ecclesiastical property," they presumptuously contended, "was independent of all human control: to protect it was the noblest duty of royalty, but to alienate it exceeded its utmost prerogatives." Addressing themselves to the weakness of the pious monarch, they further asserted, "that, by permitting the church to be robbed of her possessions, he became no less criminal in the judgment of Heaven than if he had appropriated the spoil to the profanest uses. For what purpose," they asked, "had Providence crowned his arms with uninterrupted success, except that he might employ his victorious cohorts in defence of the orthodox faith?" They further insisted, that "he was irresistibly called upon to display his gratitude by some immediate act of beneficence toward those, whose unwearyed supplications had drawn blessings on all his undertakings, instead of deferring the execution to a distant period, when it might possibly never be accomplished."^{*} Wallenstein, on the contrary, whose sagacity foresaw the gathering storm, expatiated upon the imprudence of reducing the army at the decisive moment when he was about to gather the long expected harvest of all his fatigues. "The spirit of opposition, which had so unexpectedly shewn itself in the diet, arose entirely," he strenuously contended, "from the indecision of the emperor, and the secret promises of Sweden. To reduce the factious to silence, and to complete the

* Pfeffel, ii. 312.

subjugation of Germany, required nothing except a little perseverance in the same salutary system, which had hitherto been pursued with so much advantage and glory. The menaces of Gustavus he affected to treat with a levity bordering on contempt, arrogantly boasting, that if the hardy Goth should be rash enough to hazard his reputation on German ground, he would drive him back again with a rod.*

Though the wisdom of this advice could not be easily controverted, Ferdinand wanted resolution to pursue it; imprudently resorting to a middle system equally distant from the opposite extremes, by which he hoped to appease the violence of party without exposing the empire to a general convulsion.† Maximilian, being perfectly acquainted with the emperor's prejudice in favour of the priesthood, and wishing to protract the decision, combatted the opinions of the Jesuits, by artfully suggesting, that no stain had attached to his immediate predecessors on the imperial throne, for having sacrificed the pretended interests of the church to the peace of the empire. He readily admitted (for had he ventured to reduce the clergy to a level with the laity, his arguments would have lost all their weight), that it was the paramount duty of a Christian sovereign to shield the ministers of religion from every insult; but, he contended, that a monarch had other obligations no less urgent to perform; and that it would be highly criminal to risk

* Barre, ix. 593. Nani, viii.

† The *mezzo termine*, so highly extolled by the politicians of Italy, is perhaps the most dangerous course that a statesman can pursue in a difficult crisis, yet it is usually that to which most men resort, who value themselves on that questionable quality, called prudence.

the tranquillity of a mighty nation, in pursuit of an object which he was by no means certain to accomplish. The resources of the protestants were, in his estimation, far more considerable than their adversaries were disposed to admit, and if united with those of a foreign foe they might bid defiance to the power of Austria.*

These insinuations were admirably calculated to produce the effect which Maximilian wished, as they tended to reconcile the jarring counsels of pride and prudence. Ferdinand, however, was unable to conquer his religious scruples, and preferred to expose himself to any extremities rather than incur ecclesiastical censures. By deferring the decision to some future period, he hoped to assuage the fears of the protestants, without offending the pious delicacy of those whom he venerated with an adoration approaching to idolatry.†

In justice to Ferdinand, we are bound to acknowledge, that almost every thing conduced to thwart his projects, or to mislead his judgment. The policy of terminating hostilities with France was either felt, or pretended, by all the princes of Germany, as a necessary preliminary to a rupture with Sweden. This opinion coinciding with the projects of Richelieu, an embassy was appointed to Ratisbonne. But that sagacious minister having objects in contemplation, far more interesting to the glory and prosperity of France than the most favourable conclusion of the Mantuan war, it was essential to employ in this important mission the talents of an able negotiator; and those talents were found under the humble garb of a mendicant

* Schmidt, iv. 18.

† Ibid.

friar. Francis Tremblai, so justly celebrated in the annals of diplomacy, by the title of Father Joseph, the name he assumed upon taking the habit of St. Francis, possessed, in an eminent degree, every quality requisite to deceive. Under the mask of austere piety, and an affected indifference for all worldly concerns, lurked the aspiring soul of a statesman, and a genius commensurate with the most arduous undertakings.* By a minister less discerning than Richelieu, this extraordinary man might have been suffered to waste his transcendent faculties in indolently begging from door to door, some scanty pittance for the convent, or in cultivating a garden with his fellow-drones; while his aspiring soul spurned at an occupation in which unlettered piety was more likely to succeed, than the splendid endowments of a Leo X. or a Julius II.

* I find the following anecdotes in Harte, which he professes to have taken from a Latin MS. written by a Carmelite friar. According to this account, Father Joseph was descended from the ancient family of Le Clerc, and born 1579. His youth was passed in scientific pursuits, in manly exercises, and in the practice of arms; at Padua he perfected himself in mathematics and jurisprudence; at Rome he studied men and politics. He next visited Germany and England, made himself acquainted with the constitutions of both countries; and, though he travelled with little expense, frequented none except persons of eminence. At the age of twenty-three, he assumed the habit of St. Francis, in direct contradiction to the advice of his friends, who thought him better qualified for a military life. By his interest with the great he procured considerable benefactions to the order, and undertook the department of superintending the missionaries sent to preach the gospel in the East Indies. He talked most of the modern languages fluently, and was particularly distinguished for his acuteness in conducting a theological dispute. The pious biographer proceeds to inform us, that his hero refused a cardinal's hat; but, as he produces no authority to confirm the assertion, I feel as little inclined to give credit to it, as I do the miracles of his protecting saint. Richelieu, who outlived his confidant, was too well acquainted with the talents and ambition of that extraordinary man, to have exalted him to a situation in which they might have proved dangerous even to himself.—Harte, i. 183.

The latent spark, which required only the fostering breath of power to kindle into a resplendent flame, when cherished by the kindred mind of Richelieu became a resplendent luminary in the political hemisphere. The address manifested by Father Joseph, in the management of a secret negociation at Rome, attracted the cardinal's notice, who discovered a spirit analogous to his own in the man, whom monastic ignorance disdained as a weak and visionary enthusiast. He perceived that the ostentatious piety of the monk proceeded from policy, and not from conviction ; and, as he valued accomplishments far more than sanctity, he called the hypocrite from his cell to act a distinguished part on the splendid theatre of the world. Disdaining mediocrity in any station, the aspiring monk, from the very moment he abjured the pleasures of life, aimed at celebrity by the only methods which poverty offered. Severe in penance, fervent in prayer, and exemplary in the performance of all the minor duties of a monastic vocation, he perhaps looked forward with mortified ambition to the honours of canonization, when they were the only honours within his grasp. But no sooner did the career of earthly glory expand to his dazzled sight, than he embraced it with all the ardour of a man, who, after a long and tedious banishment, finds himself restored to the society of those, whose feelings and language correspond with his own; while by his subsequent actions he plainly shewed, that in assuming the penitential habit of St. Francis, he mistook his vocation, and that if he ever obtained a place in the Roman calendar, it would not be acquired by the virtues of a martyr.*

* Le Vaissor, ix. 425. Leon Brulart, his colleague in the embassy,
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The partiality of Ferdinand toward the monastic habit pointed out the cupuchin as the fittest instrument that duplicity could employ to overreach him; for, while the austerity of his manners inspired veneration, it was hardly possible for the pious emperor to suspect that the man he admired was more deeply versed in the writings of Macchiavel than in those of St. Jerome. But as it would neither have been consistent with the humility of his profession, nor decorous in the eyes of the German people, to invest a votary of St. Francis with the pomp inseparable from the representative of an illustrious monarch, the cardinal cast his eyes upon Leon de Brulart, at that time ambassador in Switzerland, as likely to be satisfied with the external shew, without presuming to dive into the mysteries of the mission.*

The expectations of Richelieu were completely justified by the event, as the monastic diplomatist was treated by the emperor with as much respect as would have been paid to an angel from heaven.†

He drew the following portrait of him, in a private letter: "Ce capucin n'a rien d'un chrétien, que le nom, ni d'un religieux que son froc, et sa corde. Jamais on ne vit une dissimulation plus profonde, ni une plus trompeuse duplicité. Imbu des maximes de la politique la plus raffinée, il s'est uniquement appliquè à surprendre les princes d'Allemagne, à surprier toutes les règles de la bienséance, et de l'honuiteté, et ne s'est jamais proposé d'autre but, que ce qui serait plus utile, et plus propre à lui assurer les bonnes graces du Cardinal de Richelieu."

* Grimard, ii. 35.

† The author of the *Speculum Theopoliticum*, supposed to be Ferdinand's confessor, thus describes his veneration for the clergy. "Mortaliū neminem in terris aequo reveritus est, atque sacerdotes, in quibus omnibus divinum numen venerabatur, atque honorabat. Auditus est non sine admiratione dicere, occurrentibus sibi eodem loco, ac tempore, angelo et sacerdote, se primum sacerdoti, deinde angelo honoris officium persolvaturum." Caput, ix.

In vain did the ministers of Spain and Savoy explain the secret projects of the Parisian court, insisting that the real object of the embassy was to create disunion in the electoral college, and impede the election of a King of the Romans. A single word from the friar produced a stronger effect upon the pious emperor than the most elaborate discourse from the unhallowed mouth of a mundane counsellor.

The arrival of a pompous legation from France, by giving a novel direction to the public opinion, suspended for a moment the fall of Wallenstein: for, singular as it may appear, the intervention of Louis was regarded alike by the catholics and protestants as a subject of universal gratulation. It gratified the former, because it displayed an interest in the politics of Germany, which could only be attributed to jealousy of Austria, whose power they were anxious to reduce. Scarcely less sanguine in their expectations, the latter persuaded themselves, that whatever might be the motive which actuated the son of Henry, whether he intended openly to favour the enterprizes of Sweden, or merely to counterbalance the influence of Spain, it must prove ultimately beneficial to themselves, since it was hardly possible for the imagination to figure to itself a political revolution, from which no eventual good should accrue.

It is probable that Richelieu, in proposing a negotiation, never seriously intended to pursue it, but regarded the sanctity of a diplomatic character to be the safest covering for intrigue. At least it is certain, that the termination of the dispute respecting the succession of Mantua, being at best a secondary consideration, was left to the capacity or the

incapacity of Brulart, as the crafty friar had business to transact of a more urgent nature, which entirely engrossed his attention. The main object of his instructions being to procure the deposition of Wallenstein, it was to the accomplishment of that important point that all his artifices were directed. To remove from the command of the Austrian armies a general, who had led them from victory to victory, at the moment when the greatest warrior of the age was preparing to penetrate into the heart of Germany, was an enterprize worthy of the genius of Richelieu.*

The singularity of the attempt, combining with the period at which it was made, has induced many writers to assert, that the abasement of Austria was previously planned between the minister of France and the chiefs of the catholic party; but this opinion appears to have been hastily taken up in consequence of the event, and to be unsupported by any authority. To form a rational judgment of the whole transaction, we should indentify the feelings and the prejudices of the German princes at this momentous crisis, their exalted notions of their own military skill, and the contempt with which they viewed the troops and tactics of all other nations. Under these circumstances we shall no longer be induced to tax them with pride and presumption for believing, that after the reduction of the imperial army, and the removal of its haughty commander, neither generals nor men would be wanting to chastise the temerity of Sweden.† Was it consistent

* 1630. Schmidt, iv. 29. Schiller, ii.

† Independently of the Italian army, the Austrian forces amounted to forty thousand men, and those of the League to thirty thousand.—Schmidt, iv. 29.

with reason, much less with vanity, to believe that the barbarous sovereign of a half-civilized people, that the King of Finland and Lapland, whose name had never reached the genial regions of southern Germany, should be destined to change the destinies of Europe? The dominions of the Goth were too poor, too remote, and too defective in population, to inspire the smallest apprehension. By those confident statesmen the wars and politics of Sweden had been contemplated with the same haughty indifference with which they viewed the savage incursions of undisciplined Tartars, or of the wandering robbers of Arabia.*

The intrigues of the diet for the humiliation of Wallenstein were resumed with greater ardour than ever, when his enemies were assured of the co-operation of Richelieu. Even the Spanish ambassador was impolitic enough to unite in the prevailing cry, and to solicit the dismission of the only general capable of supporting the fortunes of Austria. Still however their united efforts might have proved ineffectual, had not the irresolution of the emperor been at length overcome by the artful insinuations of Father Joseph. Concealing his attack under the appearance of zeal for the welfare and glory of Ferdinand, he dexterously suggested, that it would be acting conformably to the dictates of prudence to remove a man whose arrogance had justly rendered him unpopular,† because little

* Schmidt, v. 1.

† Piancesius, 410, thus describes the oppression of Wallenstein: "Et simul insolens militis alendi introducta ratio, invitis provinciarum populis, eo onere contra praescriptum antiquarum sanctionum imperialium gravatis, idque nulla aequabili moderatione servata, sed licencie militaris arbitrio, ut civitates et oppida quasi in predam datae, a receptis hospitio,

doubt could be entertained that in return for this concession, the diet would immediately gratify his wishes, by proceeding to the election of a King of the Romans. The loss sustained by the absence of that victorious commander could not be attended with serious consequences, since the moment the emperor had accomplished the mighty object upon which parental affection was so meritoriously bent, he might replace the Duke of Friedland at the head of his armies, and by conferring upon him additional titles and estates, obliterate the mortification of a temporary disgrace.

An opinion, delivered with prophetic emphasis by so persuasive an advocate, dissipated all the scruples of Ferdinand; yet it is possible that jealousy might not be without its share in deciding the question: for though he exercised an authority over the whole of Germany more absolute than any of his predecessors, it was an humiliating reflection for Austrian pride, to feel that he was indebted for this unprecedented splendour to the genius of a man, who a few years before was confounded among the crowd of Bohemian nobles. Neither was it easy for him to believe, that the hand which had raised the tremendous fabric was deficient in strength to overturn it.* In proportion, however, to the extent of Wallenstein's power, the difficulty of re-

seu praesidii imperatorii titulo militibus, stipendiis nomine diriperentur, coinventibus ad omnia eorum prefectis. Isti enim non aliud responsum dabant ea de re conquerentibus, nisi quod imperator mallet suos subditos halere pauperes, quam rebelles."

* Ferdinand's heart was not very accessible to gratitude. "Cum acerrime Fridlandi abdicationem urgerent electores, inter alias hac quoque usi ratione, quod Mecklenburgica ditio facilius inertim quam armato, avelli possit."—Puffendorf, i. 58.—How far this suggestion operated, subsequent events prevented posterity from ascertaining.

moving him augmented; and should he refuse obedience to the imperial mandate, as his enemies artfully suggested, it was impossible to foresee to what dangerous lengths he might be hurried by passion and resentment.* From an army entirely of his own creation, and implicitly devoted to his commands by the united impulse of interest, fear, and admiration, what a formidable opposition might arise. The immensity of his wealth, the fruit of extortion, afforded funds for supporting the partners of his triumphs, should he bid defiance to the imperial authority, while his unbounded vanity would feel the indignity with the keenest sensibility. His behaviour, however, upon this trying occasion was widely different from that which was anticipated by the fears of his friends, or foretold by the malice of his adversaries. Perceiving that the influence of the Bavarian faction was about to prevail, he retired to Memminghen, a town in Swabia, to await the event in apparent indifference, but more probably with the design of shaping his future course as the stars and Seni might admonish. Fearful of irritating a spirit so alive to glory, and so impetuous in all its decisions, the emperor resolved to proceed with the utmost circumspection, and he accordingly selected two of Wallenstein's friends to convey the tidings of his disgrace,† with directions to soften the unwelcome message by the most flattering assurances of esteem.

* Certe maximum est, et prodigio proximum, quod et Cesar electoribus, et Walsteinus Cæsari obsecatus est. De Comitiis Ratisbonæ celebratis epist.—Theod. Berenici Noric.

† Questenberg and Werdenberg, both men of rank, and filling distinguished offices.—Lotichius, i. 755. Schmidt, iv. 20. Swedish Intelligencer, i. 11.

Wallenstein was previously acquainted with the purport of their visit, before the messengers of Ferdinand arrived ; and though his bosom was convulsed by conflicting passions, the serenity of his countenance was far from indicating the tempest that raged within. "The emperor is betrayed," said the Duke of Friedland, producing an astronomical calculation, "the ascendant of Bavaria prevails ; but as the conduct of Ferdinand is the result of necessity rather than of inclination, I feel disposed to pity and to forgive him. The result of his determination is no secret to me ; on the contrary, I clearly foresee that he is destined to repent the imprudent sacrifice which he has been tempted to make ; I will not, however, resist his orders."

This unexpected composure no less astonished than delighted his friends, who were prepared for a very different reception ; and whom he now dismissed with magnificent presents, and a letter to the emperor, imploring him to continue his protection and favour, in the submissive language of respect.*

That the haughtiest of human beings should have bowed submissively to a decree which seemed at once to level his proudest hopes, was a subject of universal astonishment. But it would have been inconsistent with the character of that extraordinary man to have acted a natural part ; and as he was firmly persuaded that his meridian splendour was obscured only by a transient cloud, he looked forward with confidence to the happy moment when it should burst forth more resplendent than

* Schiller, ii. Barre, ix. 593. Galetti, i. 133.

ever. Such at least was the opinion of those, who viewed his actions in a favourable light;* others indeed pretended, that having deliberately weighed in the scale of prudence the probable consequences of resistance, he discovered that by prematurely throwing off the mask, he might forfeit the pleasure of revenge. As yet his preparations were incomplete. His estates, though immense, were scattered in different provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, and might be easily seized by the activity of his enemies, before he could arrive to defend them. With these the nerve of his power would be lost; and he was inclined to think too ill of mankind to believe that human fortitude could resist the bait, should they be held out as a temptation to treachery. To time alone he trusted for redress, resolved not to impair his future prospects by his own temerity.† That his career of glory was not finally closed, the astrologer Seni, in whose predictions he confided with the credulity of a child, had plainly discovered from the planets; yet it was unnecessary to recur to supernatural sources to illustrate a fact, which a volume more accessible to human infirmity might have clearly unfolded. The approach of an enemy like Gustavus Adolphus could hardly fail to summon from his inglorious retreat the greatest general that Austria possessed.

Want of firmness in one essential point usually leads to imprudent concessions in others. After sacrificing Wallenstein to the intrigues and jealousy

* Among these was Nani, who expresses his admiration in the following words: " restando dubbio, sè apparisse maggiore nel esercitare il commando, ò ne'l lasciarlo, viii.

† Schiller, ii.

of Maximilian, it was in vain for Ferdinand to contend against the impetuous current of popular opinion, in a question still more important to prerogative. It had long been a subject of serious complaint, that the Mantuan war had been undertaken without obtaining the concurrence of, and even without consulting the diet, who affected to construe this contemptuous neglect into a flagrant breach of their constitutional privileges, and not without an appearance of reason; because the troops which had been ordered to cross the Alps formed part of the army of the empire. Ferdinand ineffectually endeavoured to elude the attack by expatiating upon the necessity of an unanimous effort to oppose the common enemy of the papal religion; flattering himself, that if he should succeed in exciting their apprehensions for the safety of the church, he might depend upon their cordial concurrence. Contrary, however, to his expectations, the proposal was received with an indifference more demonstrative of courage than of foresight. Every consideration relative to personal security was absorbed in the idea of prescribing bounds to the exorbitant power of Austria. Encouraged by the facility with which they had hitherto carried all controverted points, they proceeded with ardour in the work of humiliation, requiring from the emperor a positive assurance that he would never more engage in a foreign war without the consent of the diet. They further required, that he should immediately establish so rigid a discipline, that no member of the empire might have any thing to fear from the licentious conduct of his army.*

* 1630. Swedish Intelligencer, i. 12.

Mortifying as these concessions must have appeared to the unbending spirit of Ferdinand, it was impossible for him to withhold his assent without risking an open rupture; and having thus sacrificed the fruit of many painful years of fatigue and dissimulation, he felt secure of meeting with a grateful return. But no sooner did he urge the election of his son than he plainly discovered his error. Various causes for delay were successively started. The unquiet state of the empire was alleged by some as a satisfactory reason for deferring the discussion; by others it was argued, that the forms of the constitution expressly required that the ceremony should take place at Francfort, and not at Ratisbonne; while the two protestant electors, deriving courage from the general confusion, boldly declared, that they would never consent to continue the imperial crown in the Austrian family, till the edict of restitution should be revoked.* The eyes of Ferdinand were at length opened to the danger that surrounded him; when too late to retract he repented his concessions, and plainly discovered that he had been made the dupe of an unprincipled friar.†

The prospect of an immediate rupture with Sweden making it necessary to appoint a successor to Wallenstein, the ambition of Maximilian, secure of the support of the Catholic League, aspired openly to that important command. The difficulty of the times, so argued his numerous partisans, required that the most cordial harmony should

* Grimoard, ii. 64.

† The hypocrisy of Father Joseph made so deep an impression on the mind of Ferdinand, that he was often heard publicly to say, "that a capuchin friar had disarmed an emperor with his rosary, and covered six electoral bonnets with his cowl.—Schiller, ii.

subsist between the army of Austria and that of the League; and the surest means of preventing dissensions, would be to place them both under the orders of the same commander. The valour and skill displayed by the Duke of Bavaria in the Bohemian war, his prudence, power, and popularity, seemed to point him out as the only general to whom this important commission could be securely entrusted. In the estimation of Ferdinand, however, these were insuperable obstacles. When placed at the head of the united forces of Austria and the League, what might not his ambition attempt! The imperial crown might be for ever wrested from the House of Hapsburg; neither was this improbable, since the secret emissaries of the emperor pretended to have discovered, that a project was actually formed, with the knowledge and approbation of the Electors of Mayence, Cologne, and Saxony, for transferring the sceptre to Bavaria, after the death of its present possessor.*

The bare suspicion of a design, so decidedly hostile to the aspiring projects of Austria, was sufficient to awaken the ancient jealousies, which had long subsisted between the ancestors of Maximilian and those of Ferdinand.† Though secretly resolved to elude the demand, the emperor was sensible, that the strength and popularity of the new elector would make it dangerous to offend him by an open and unqualified refusal; he therefore had

* Et dubiò procul Cæsar elegisset heroem, agnatum, fortē, splendidum, fortunatum, circumspectum, nisi secretè aliud insurasset communis illa *principum* noverca, *ratio status* nuncupata.—Lotichius, i. 760. Mémoires de Louise Juliane, 294.

† Eam esse electoris Bavari eminentiam, ut jurisdictionem illam militarem non nisi absolutam sit admissurus. Ut plus ctiam illi, quam Friedlando, debeatur. Ibid.

recourse to the arts of intrigue, and, without formally resisting the wishes of the catholics, annexed to the exalted dignity of generalissimo a thousand irksome conditions, at which the pride of Maximilian was sure to revolt. This necessarily led to a protracted negociation, and ended in a compromise, by which the command was conferred upon Tilly, the friend and client of Maximilian.*

Nothing now remained to occupy the assembly except to terminate hostilities with Louis; and as it became requisite to recal the troops from Italy, in order to oppose the progress of the Swedes, the emperor embraced the resolution of concluding a peace, though it necessarily involved some unavoidable sacrifices of pride and prerogative. But, admitting that it was evidently for the interest of Austria to put an end to the Mantuan war, it should naturally follow, that to have protracted the contest would have been equally advantageous to France; because it served to divide the attention of Ferdinand, instead of permitting him to concentrate the whole of his force in the north of Germany, when threatened by the valour of Gustavus. It would be unjustly depreciating the sagacity of Richelieu, to suppose him blind to so obvious a truth; yet, though he clearly distinguished the line of conduct which it would have been most advisable for him to pursue, he was no longer at liberty to adopt it. The constitution of Louis, naturally delicate, was ill calculated to struggle against the violence of a malady, which his physicians pronounced to be mortal. In the event of his death, the crown devolved to the Duke of Orleans, a weak

* 1630. Lotiehius, i. 760. Barre, ix. 644. Schmidt, iv. 29.

and volatile prince, alternately governed by his mother and his favourites. His hatred of the cardinal, whose interests had long been at variance with his own, must unavoidably have exposed that haughty minister to the full weight of royal resentment. Richelien had therefore no alternative left, except to brave the storm with unshaken fortitude; or to endeavour to avert it, by the powerful protection of his ancient mistress; and by gratifying her inclination in an important point, he hoped to obliterate the remembrance of past ingratitude. To have embraced the former, required a degree of magnanimity which conscious integrity could alone inspire, but to which the cardinal's heart was a stranger; for, however bold he might appear, when dispensing the favours and exerting all the authority of the crown, he bent beneath the blast of adversity with more than female timidity. The partiality of Mary toward the Spanish court, had rendered her, from its commencement, averse to the war; and this dislike was considerably increased by the apprehension of the danger to which France might be exposed by losing its sovereign at that critical period. These considerations appeared to the cardinal too weighty to be despised, and he accordingly dispatched a courier to Father Joseph, with positive directions to terminate hostilities upon any conditions.*

Aware of the embarrassment in which he might be involved, should Louis recover, and Richelieu disavow his instructions, the artful monk declined affixing his name to the instrument, under pretext

* Le Vassor, ix. 449.

that it would be totally inconsistent with the rules of propriety for him to subscribe it, as he was not invested with any public character. The imperial ministers, however, were not so easily deceived. They knew that he alone possessed the confidence, and was entrusted with all the secrets of the cardinal, and positively refused to be bound by any conditions which he objected to sanction. The disciple of St. Francis being now compelled to submit, the following treaty was concluded :

" That in consideration of the harmony which should in future prevail between the courts of Vienna and Paris, their sovereigns engaged neither openly to attack each others dominions, nor to afford assistance to any foreign power, with whom they might be engaged in hostilities."

" That the Duke of Guastalla, in consequence of a pension to be regularly paid out of the revenues of the duchy of Mantua, should cede all his claims to the Duke of Nevers."

" That upon the latter soliciting, in respectful language, the investiture of the duchy, and acknowledging its dependence upon the imperial throne, the emperor would immediately confer it, and within a stated period withdraw his troops from the fortresses which they actually occupied."

" That the Spaniards should likewise evacuate Piedmont, upon condition that the French should repass the Alps."*

A compensation was allotted to the Duke of Savoye, for the loss of Susa, Pignerol, and some other towns of inferior value, retained by Louis.

* This treaty may be found at length in Dumont's valuable collection, v. partie ii. 615.

The republic of Venice and the Duke of Lorraine were expressly comprehended in the negotiation, upon conditions highly favourable to their interests.

The general sentiment excited by the foregoing convention, was very far from conforming to the expectations of those, by whom it had been negotiated. All parties, on the contrary, appeared equally dissatisfied. When Ferdinand reflected upon the numerous sacrifices to which he had been tempted by the fallacious promises of Father Joseph, he grew enraged at his folly, for having suffered piety to get the better of prudence; yet felt himself entangled among so many difficulties, that it was too late to think of retracting. The Duke of Mantua complained that his territories were dismembered, even without the empty ceremony of asking his consent; more sensible to the trifling losses he sustained, than to the permanent tenure which they ensured. The pride of the Venetians, though certainly treated with greater attention, was offended at the indifference of Louis, forgetting that they had lost all political consequence with the invaluable commerce of Asia. It would have been a proper compliment, they thought, to the dignity of the senate, to have deferred the signature till the arrival of their ambassador, who was actually on his journey to Ratisbonne. The Spaniards were still more severely mortified at the neglect they experienced: accustomed to take the lead in every negotiation, they could not endure the humiliation of being obliged to abide by the arbitration of others, in a question so interesting to themselves.*

* Le Vassor, ix. 451. Barre, ix. 696.

The recovery of Louis having released the cardinal from all his apprehensions, he attempted, by a flagrant violation of truth, to correct the imprudence which timidity had induced him to commit. Determined that nothing should engage him to ratify the article which *precluded France from assisting her allies, should they become the enemies of Austria*, he endeavoured to preserve the honour of his master, by accusing the negociators with having acted in contradiction to their positive instructions; without deigning to reflect, that in return for an engagement so important to Ferdinand at that perilous crisis, he had acceded to the proposals of the French plenipotentiaries respecting the evacuation of Mantua. Brulart was not only reprimanded for disobedience of orders, but received an absolute injunction to follow the emperor to Vienna, to declare that his master was resolved to withhold his ratification till the objectionable clause should be expunged; and, in order to give a more serious air to this ridiculous farce, the monk, upon his arrival at Paris, was refused access to his former patron, and commanded to retire into a cloister. This disgrace, however, was of short duration; and, after a few weeks passed in monastic seclusion, he appeared at court a greater favourite than ever.*

It was during the sitting of the diet that a manifesto was received from the King of Sweden, explanatory of his motives for taking up arms. They were exposed in a long and elaborate memorial,† from which it will be sufficient for our present purpose to extract a few of the leading articles. He began by complaining, "that in the year 1625,

* La Vassor, ix. 451. Barre, ix. 506.

† Lotiehius, i. 782.

while engaged in hostilities with Poland, Ferdinand had caused a Swedish courier to be intercepted, charged with dispatches of infinite importance, the contents of which had been published with the grossest misrepresentations, and the messenger treated with gratuitous cruelty. Not satisfied with offering this unpardonable insult to an independent sovereign, he had assisted Sigismund with troops and money, had encouraged him by promises to continue the war, and even issued a proclamation forbidding the Swedes to recruit in Germany, a privilege common to all the nations of Europe: that, in direct contradiction to the established principles of justice, and in violation of the forms of the Germanic constitution, he had deprived the Dukes of Mecklenberg of their dominions, both of whom were allied to Gustavus by the strictest ties of friendship; that he had occupied several towns on the shores of the Baltic, and equipped a navy, with a view to usurp the sovereignty of that sea, though universally acknowledged by the law of nations to be subject to the jurisdiction of Sweden; that he had seized and confiscated her trading vessels, and interrupted her commerce with the Hanseatic cities; that he had laid siege to Stralsund, though avowedly placed under the protection of Gustavus, and had even excluded his ambassadors from the congress at Lubec, when they appeared to prefer their just complaints.* That he had presumed to declare the King of Sweden by a public document an

* Legati ipsius modè non cum contemptu rejecti sunt, sed etiam minis in illos sævitum est; nisi a Lubecca, immo Germaniæ finibus, excedant, fore ut omnia expectant ultima.—Lotichius, 784.

enemy to the Germanic empire, and had sanctioned by his approbation certain scurrilous writings, in which the character of Gustavus was falsely traduced, and his power derided."*

Instead of openly resenting these acts of injustice, the king affirmed, "that he preferred to seek satisfaction by pacific attempts. Remonstrances had been presented to the electoral college, but had been treated with silent contempt. Not satisfied with neglecting his just demands, the catholic members had purposely omitted to give him the title of king." Having thus stated his griefs with becoming dignity, he concluded by regretting, in pathetic language, that all his endeavours to prevent the effusion of human blood had hitherto been rendered abortive. "Humanity," he said, "had induced him to stifle his resentment, but should the emperor continue to reject his complaints, as the sovereign and protector of an independent nation, he must stand acquitted before God and his fellow-creatures, should he resort to those means with which Providence had entrusted him, for asserting the unquestionable prerogatives of his crown, and the rights and interests of his people."†

Depending for justification upon the integrity of his motives, and anxious to avoid a sinister interpretation, Gustavus directed Oxenstiern, his confidential minister, to repair to Dantzig, for the pur-

* Galetti, l. 148.

† Εἰσην μὲν τοις μεταὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ, καὶ τριπότος, καλλίστου εἴτε πτυχία καὶ λαοποτήσατος μετὰ δὲ κακοῖς καὶ δευτεραπονητοῖς, πάτερ αἱρέχετος καὶ βλαβερωτάτος. Polyb. ii. 31. T. 2. p. 79. ed. Schweigh.

Dumont, v. ii. 609. Harte, i. 144. Barre, ix. 591. Swedish Intelligencer, i. 43.—In justification of his own conduct he says, "tametsi omnia singulatim exactissimè deponderare velim, non inuenio, quo jure, quoque titulo, praesentis belli causa mihi sit imputanda.—Lotichius, i. 798.

pose of communicating with the Count of Dohna, the Austrian ambassador. But it soon became apparent, that it was far from the intention of the imperial cabinet to remove the obstructions to peace : on the contrary, it was evident, that their only object was to ascertain to what the preparations of Sweden amounted, and if possible to embroil her with the senate of Dantzic, in order to deprive her of the facilities afforded for recruiting. The partisans of Austria having totally misrepresented the objects of Sweden, the chancellor of Gustavus was publicly insulted in the streets ; and deeming it unbecoming his sacred character again to expose himself to a similar outrage, he proposed to Dohna to adjourn the conferences to Elbing, or to any other city which combined convenience and security in an equal degree. Convinced by the Austrian's reply that his professions were insincere, Oxenstiern thought it expedient to bring the negotiation to a speedy issue by producing the outline of a treaty, the counterpart of that intended to have been submitted to the congress at Lubec, had an opportunity been allowed for presenting it, which he delivered as the ultimatum of Sweden.

" The imperial troops were required to evacuate the circles of Upper and Lower Saxony, to demolish the forts erected on the shores of the Baltic, and to allow to all its maritime cities uninterrupted freedom of commerce. The court of Vienna was further called upon to suspend her naval armaments ; to re-establish Bogislaus, and all the other princes of the protestant persuasion in the full possession of their legal prerogatives ; to reinstate the Dukes of Mecklenburg, who if really criminal might be brought to trial before a competent tribunal, and subjected i;

consequence to whatever penalties an impartial judgment might award. Some compensation was also required for the injuries sustained by the inhabitants of Stralsund, from the unjustifiable aggression of Wallenstein.*

To these proposals the Austrian plenipotentiary hastily replied, that terms so degrading could be dictated only at the head of a victorious army. All farther communication accordingly ceased, and the king prepared to assert his rights at the head of his warlike battalions.*

Gustavus's threats do not seem to have produced any great sensation at Ratisbonne; but as it would have been inconsistent with the electoral dignity to have allowed the imputations to pass unnoticed, the following answer was returned:—That the injuries complained of did not appear sufficient to justify an appeal to the sword, because the court of Vienna had not been accused of any overt act of hostility. With regard to the omission at which he was offended, they solemnly protested, that it did not arise from want of respect, but was strictly conformable to ancient precedents; it having never been customary for the German princes to address an elective sovereign by the regal title. Disclaiming all interference concerning the duchies of Mecklenberg, they declared the decision of that important question to be an unalienable branch of the imperial prerogative; "it belonged," they asserted, "to the emperor alone to dispossess a rebellious member, and Ferdinand had therefore exercised a legitimate right in punishing an undutiful vassal." Proceeding in the same submissive style they at-

* 1630. *Burgus*, i. 34.

tempted to vindicate the behaviour of their chief during the Polish war, pretending that it would have been utterly inconsistent with the united characters of a brother, and an ally, to have refused his assistance to Sigismund; but as the states of the empire took no part in the contest, they were surprised to hear that the preparations of Gustavus were directed against some of its members. Still however it was in his power to terminate the contest by an amicable discussion, and should he be disposed to act with moderation, they declared themselves ready to concur in any measures calculated to preserve the tranquillity of Europe.

This letter was accompanied by another from Ferdinand, in which he expressed his astonishment that a Swedish army should have entered Pomerania without any previous declaration, and defended his conduct as strictly agreeable to the forms of the Germanic constitution. He finished by conjuring Gustavus seriously to reflect on the dangers which awaited him, before he ventured to provoke the resentment of a monarch, whose victorious armies had so often chastised the temerity of those who disturbed the public repose.*

Before we advert more particularly to the exploits of Gustavus, let us follow Wallenstein into his retirement, that we may see the effects which disgrace produced on that eccentric character. With a mixed sensation of indignation and sorrow, the imperial army learned the degradation of their triumphant commander, whose generosity, indul-

* Historia delle guerre di Ferdinando, ii. è Ferdinando, iii. del Conte Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato. L. 10.—Though these letters were written after the landing of Gustavus, for the sake of connexion I have inserted them here.'

gence, and splendid talents, equally attracted their love and admiration. Many officers of distinction immediately threw up their commissions, and solicited permission to share his fortunes. Those whose merits or attachment had raised them highest in his favour, received the honourable distinction of a household employment; while to others, whose zeal was less conspicuous, or on whose fidelity he could not rely with equal confidence, pensions were assigned sufficient to procure all the comforts of life, and to attach them for ever to his interest: for though he had resigned his employments with the magnanimity of a sage, it was not with the intention of burying his talents in obscurity, but in order to prepare for his return to power with more extensive and more permanent authority. Disdaining to gratify the malice of his opponents, by the most trifling indication of mental depression, he lived at Prague in a style of magnificence, more suitable to the sovereign of a wealthy people than to the degraded people of Austria. Six spacious gates conducted to a palace, erected in the midst of the capital of Bohemia, on a commanding spot, where a hundred houses had been cleared away to make room for the stately edifice. Profusion and taste were equally displayed in the Corinthian columns which adorned the portico, and in the painted ceilings and costly tapestries which decorated the long suite of apartments, and which presented to the inquisitive eye of the philosopher the singular phenomenon of a retired officer surpassing monarchs in affluence. His household, established after the expensive model of a royal court, comprehended all those idle appendages of pomp and ostentation, who are accustomed to waste an useless

existence in the flimsy ceremonies of etiquette. Gentlemen of illustrious families accepted with pride the key of chamberlain; many even are said to have resigned the offices which they held about the person of Ferdinand, for the more flattering distinction of being permitted to wait in the antichamber of Wallenstein. Sixty pages, instructed by the ablest masters in all the sciences and accomplishments which enrich the understanding, or give grace and agility to the body, attended him when he appeared in public. A guard of fifty soldiers, in costly uniform, was stationed in an outward hall, to preserve their master against the plots of his enemies, or the too great importance of his friends. Four chamberlains were placed at the door of his apartment, whose business it was minutely to investigate the name, the quality, and the business of every one who demanded access, that none might intrude through motives of curiosity on the leisure of a man, whose moments were too precious to be consumed in colloquial intercourse, or complimentary salutations. His table, consisting regularly of a hundred covers, was daily spread with the most delicate viands; and it is remarked by some contemporary writers, as an instance of uncommon refinement, that clean napkins were furnished at every repast; it would be difficult to produce a more striking proof of the semi-barbarity of the times. The richness of his liveries, the splendour of his retinue, and the magnificence of his furniture, are represented as almost surpassing belief; yet, in an age and country where unsoiled linen was regarded as a luxury, we may readily conceive that every thing approaching to common comfort must have excited the greatest admiration. When he removed from Prague to

Gedsen or Sagan, a hundred waggons transported his plate and wardrobe, and sixty carriages conveyed his attendants, while the cavalcade was closed by fifty grooms, each leading a noble courser, richly caparisoned.* Six barons, and as many knights, attended daily to receive and communicate his orders, while a party of soldiers constantly patrolled the adjacent streets, to prevent his meditations from being interrupted by the bustle of commerce, or the shouts of festivity. No carriages were permitted to approach the palace ; no sounds of active industry were heard, but sad and solemn silence prevailed, as in the gloomy precincts of a Carthusian monastery. An enemy to frivolity of every kind, he never wasted a minute in those trifling amusements, which frequently constitute the most serious occupation of courtiers. Grave and reserved in his deportment, as if he regarded taciturnity to be the criterion of wisdom, he was far more liberal of his money than of his conversation ; and even when he deigned to impart his ideas, he did it reluctantly, and with repulsive condescension. Disliking mirth, and even innocent recreation, he was scarcely ever known to relax the severity of his features ; and the coldness of his constitution enabled him to resist the seductions of the senses with stoic apathy.

* The wonders related respecting his stables, the racks and mangers of polished steel, the stalls divided by columns of marble, and the portraits of the horses painted by the most excellent artists of Italy, approach too nearly to the fictions of eastern poetry, to be allowed a place in the serious pages of history. But if we may judge from a palace which still exists in the vicinity of Teplitz, inhabited by one of his descendants, and which is deservedly called by the Prince de Ligne, "the Chantilly of Bohemia," Wallenstein's taste for magnificence was unbounded. Much may be substracted from the exaggerations of Sarrasin and De Prade, and still much remain to admire.

Though engaged in a correspondence with persons of eminence in every European nation, he seldom had recourse to the assistance of a secretary, so little confidence did he repose in the discretion or the fidelity of others.*

In this stately obscurity Wallenstein awaited with a steady, though not with a tranquil mind, the happy hour when fortune, more just to his perfections, might render him once more an object of terror to the enemies of his country and his own. The victories of Gustavus announced that moment to be rapidly approaching, and he looked forward to it with all the ardour of a mind inflamed alike by ambition and revenge. Absolved by ingratitude from every obligation which imperial bounty had formerly imposed, his aspiring genius no longer hesitated to embrace the boldest designs which pride or resentment inspired. Whatever conduced to the humiliation of those by whom he had been offended, he regarded as lawful; whatever promoted his own elevation, he hailed as just and meritorious.†

* Schiller ii. Harte ii. 105. Carve Itinerarium i. 90.—The former is always ingenious, lively, and entertaining; the second accurate, laborious, and useful; the third was chaplain to Devoroux, one of Wallenstein's murderers, and was himself an eye witness of his prosperity. His political attachments would naturally lead him to view the Duke of Friedland's actions with a prejudiced eye; so that when he speaks of his power he may safely be credited.

† Wallenstein had few personal graces to boast of. Tall, thin, of a sallow complexion, his hair short and red, his eyes small, but beaming intelligence and fire, his figure was better calculated to inspire terror than to create respect.

