




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CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

A STUDY IN CHRISTIAN LIBERALISM

BY

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SOMETIME EXHIBITIONER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD
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SEVEN COINS OF THE PERIOD.

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 5 and 6. Severus. 7. Commodus.
 1, 2, 4, and 6 are from the Cabinet des Médailles et Antiques in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
 3, 5, and 7 are from the British Museum.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

CHAPTER XII

THE INCARNATION

CHRISTIANITY is a religion with a universal significance : it is also a religion with a historic origin. From the combination of these two elements arise alike its spiritual value and its most constant problems. Belonging, as it does in part, to the domain of Faith and Interpretation, in part also to that of Facts and Events, it may be viewed from either standpoint, yet loses its virtue and its characteristics so soon as the other is wholly forgotten or denied. We are concerned, on the one hand, with a divine Purpose, a universal Life, a spiritual interpretation of the Cosmos ; on the other, with a particular historic Person, connected by definite associations with events, localities, personages, conditions, on the temporal plane. The relation between these two elements may be variously represented : the stress and emphasis may be laid on either side ; and our process of thought may move from one or the other point of view. But except the two be in some manner related and united, there is no Christian Religion. The historic Jesus is in some sense the spiritual Christ. The Epistles stand side by side with the Synoptic Gospels. In religion as elsewhere there may be no entire divorce between philosophy and

facts. Our own age is attempting again the readjustment of the historic and the universal elements in Christianity, a process which from time to time becomes necessary, inasmuch as religion can never be isolated from the general movement of thought and knowledge.

For Clement, in the second century, it was an accepted principle that Christianity contained both these elements. The difficulties involved in their combination were only beginning to emerge. He stands midway between the New Testament and the Great Councils. Thus he inherits and accepts all that Saint Paul, Saint John, or the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, had taught about the manifestation of the Godhead in the life and the person of Jesus. On the other hand, he is not yet involved in the acute controversies over theories of the Incarnation, which so monopolised the Church's thought from the age of Arius to that of Eutyches. His acceptance of the Divine revelation in the Lord is joyous and characteristic: equally characteristic, however, is his unconsciousness of some of the problems involved, his readiness to speak of it in different and not entirely consistent terms. And throughout, as the previous chapter has made plain, his faith and interest find their centre in the universal Logos, rather than in the human life of Jesus. Like Justin and Origen he cares comparatively little for the Gospel history, but much for the great principles upon which it depends for its significance. Yet there is no hesitation or question in his recognition of the Incarnation. God had been manifest within the limits of a human life. He takes this doctrine over from Christian tradition and is not specially anxious to develop it into systematic consistency. His philosophy, however, brought this truth into relation with other tendencies of thought, some of which facilitated, some of which rendered more difficult, this central article of faith.

However little the Christian teacher might care to recognise it, there can be little doubt that there were elements in pagan Mythology which prepared the way for the belief in the Incarnate Christ. To one who, like Clement, had come over from Paganism it was not a wholly strange idea that God should manifest Himself on earth as man. The theophanies of the poets had in this way their value, and the crudest anthropomorphisms at least evidenced the connection between the human sphere and the divine. Hercules, the deity of laborious service; Æsculapius, the healer and physician; Prometheus, who suffered for his efforts to benefit humanity, had their obvious points of similarity with the ministry of the Son of Man. Celsus¹ had already made use of this resemblance for his own purposes, and the argument continued a favourite one with hostile critics of Christianity, as is evidenced by the insistence of Athanasius a century later on the differences between these pagan friends of humanity and the Christ.² Clement, in a similar strain, dwells mainly on the baser side of these affinities of the deities of Olympus with mankind.³ He scoffs at the servitude and bondage of the pagan gods on earth, though indeed the argument was a dangerous one for a Christian writer.

Not the less, it is sufficiently evident that all these ancient stories, enshrined in Homer and the Drama, must have rendered it easier to welcome the Gospel narrative of God's intimate association with the life of man. The religious imagination had already conceived it possible that there should be a ladder between Heaven and Earth. The divine Benevolence could come down, the nobler Humanity could ascend. So Clement delights to recall a suggestive thought which he attributed to Plato, and to

¹ Origen, *c. Celsum*, iii. 22.

² *De Incarnatione*, 49.

³ 31, and other passages in the *Protrepticus*.

think of good souls as voluntarily leaving the upper heavens and taking bodies on earth, in order by sharing the ills of humanity to be its benefactors as lawgivers or teachers, "than which no greater blessing ever came or shall come from the gods to humankind."¹ So, too, he is acquainted also with that opposite line of thought, which regards some singular and exceptional service of mankind as an avenue or title to a place among the gods.² Apart from all Christian influences, Clement is thus familiar with the idea of God coming down to share in the life of man, and of man being taken up to share the life of God. Moreover, he lived in the days of the Empire, and no subject of Cæsar could fail to remember, that one after another of this world's rulers had been numbered, even while living, among the company of Heaven. Even from the pagan standpoint there was no insuperable barrier to prevent the Word becoming flesh. Men were prepared to admit and to recognise a "way."

On the other hand, it is equally clear that Clement felt the force of many difficulties and objections. Just because the popular mythology had brought the divine down to human levels, and attributed all its own common failings to the gods, there had come among thoughtful men a reaction;³ and ever since Plato had banished from his state those who spread unworthy stories about the gods, the philosopher had always feared to desecrate the Divine by associating it too closely with the common and imperfect world. The Stoic doctrine of divine immanence found this prejudice difficult to overcome, and strangely enough it sometimes seemed the part of true religion to banish God altogether from His world. "The ordinary notions of the Deity," said Porphyry, "are of such a kind that it is more godless to

¹ 355. The reference to Plato is not quite clear.

² 22.

³ Cf. Clement's own words, *ὡν ἀπτεται πάθος, φθαρτὰ πάντα ἐστίν*, 846.

share them than to neglect the images of the Gods";¹ and Christianity, with its teaching of an Incarnation, had thus a strong and in the main a justified reluctance to overcome, before it could commend to the thinker its Gospel of the Word made flesh.

For the best of Hellenism and the best of Hebraism were here at one, and it is a remote and noble Monotheism for which Celsus pleads when he argues that "God is good and beautiful and blessed, and that in the best and most beautiful degree,"² and that "if He came down among men, He must undergo a change." More than once Clement refers³ to the objections urged by those critics of the new religion, who found it incredible that the divine should be in any way subject to external influences, liable to *πάθος*, conditioned by limits of place and time. A human Christ, a God made manifest in the life of man, seemed to involve all this; and the efforts made by the various Gnostic schools to bridge the gap by interposing many phases of being, each slightly less divine and more nearly human than the last, are sufficient evidence of the real difficulty which presented itself to the more thoughtful minds of the age, when the Church claimed that God had revealed Himself and taken human form in Jesus. Assent did involve an effort. It was one thing to accept in theory the doctrine of the all-pervading Logos, and to admit thereby the most intimate relation between the Sovereign Deity and the Cosmos. It was quite another, to maintain that in an unimportant province of the Empire a man of humble origin and no repute had really been the Word Incarnate, in spite of the fact that he had died as a criminal, and only induced a handful of negligible persons to accept his message. That Clement, with no slight touch of the

¹ Quoted in Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, i. 354.

² Origen, *c. Cels.*, iv. 14.

³ *E.g.* 370, 736.

intellectual aristocrat in his nature, felt the force of this difficulty is certain and not unnatural.

Thus it is that Clement received from Christian tradition the doctrine of the Incarnation, and yet found it impossible to hold it isolated from other tendencies of thought. The old and still unsettled debate, as to whether our Alexandrine father was fundamentally Christian or philosopher, is again and again suggested by his attitude towards this article of his creed. We may observe the blending of these tendencies in his mind, as we proceed now to examine more in detail his teaching on this doctrine. There is a passage at the opening of the Fifth Book of the *Stromateis*¹ in which he distinguishes four elements in the Christian faith in the Incarnate Son : there is the fact of the Incarnation ($\delta\tau\iota \hat{\eta}\lambda\theta\epsilon\nu$), its manner ($\pi\hat{\omega}\varsigma$), its purpose ($\delta\iota\grave{\alpha} \tau\acute{\iota}$), its climax in the Crucifixion ($\pi\epsilon\rho\grave{\iota} \tau\omicron\upsilon \pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$). Our appreciation of his theological teaching will be more complete, if we examine what he has to say on each of these four points.

The Word had come. That was a fact. It stood in line with other events of the historical order. There was no surrender here of the concrete and the particular. Clement's main interest is not in facts, but in principles and ideas. He can hardly be said to welcome both, with that generous equality of treatment which characterises, for example, the Fourth Gospel. For him always the stress falls on the abstract side : he is happiest when he can think of the divine as apart from places, times, persons.² Hence there is the more significance in the importance which he attaches to the fact of the Lord's coming. It is as solid for him as for the Synoptists. For once the philosopher takes his stand on an event. The divine was not only universally immanent : it had also arrived. God had come down ; $\epsilon\lambda\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, $\hat{\eta}\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\beta\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, are terms in constant use ; there had been

¹ 643.

² As, e.g., in 772.

an Advent, a *παρουσία*. This last common word for the Lord's special and historic Presence is with Clement habitual and significant. On this point he is prepared to meet objections from both Greek and Jewish sources.¹ Here there is a clear issue between the clever critics of Christianity and the Church tradition for which he stands.² It is a *terminus ad quem, a quo*, in human history and in God's revelation of His purpose.³ The Law and Prophecy and the Philosophy of the Greeks are stages which lead up to this more intimate manifestation. It is from the date of the Lord's birth that even the chronology of the Emperors is reckoned.⁴

Clement was familiar with various views as to the actual date of the crucifixion, and appears himself to have held the opinion that "the acceptable year of the Lord" implied that Jesus' public ministry was limited to a single year.⁵ From His birth to His cross, He passed through all phases of human experience, and so enacted the "drama of our salvation,"⁶ and by "drama" Clement meant not that which in any measure lacks reality, but that which is evident fact for all to know. He refers more often to the words than to the deeds of the Lord's life, but there are notices of his Baptism and Temptation, of the fact that Jesus drank wine, of the washing of the disciples' feet, of the feeding of the multitudes, and of the diadem of thorns.⁷ He refers also to the single life of the Lord, and gives his view of the reasons for it.⁸ He also infers from Isaiah's description of the "Servant" that the Lord was plain in appearance, with no beauty that we should desire Him: he believed, characteristically enough, that

¹ 736.

² οἱ δοκησίσσοφοι, 370.

³ The Advent is frequently so regarded; see, e.g., 366, 369, 374, 451, 467, 823, 898.

⁴ 407.

⁵ 407, 8. This was a Gnostic belief, see *Iren.*, ii. 22, 1, 5.

⁶ 86, 939.

⁷ 113, 186, 190, 214-5, 439, 665.

⁸ 533.

personal attractiveness in Jesus' appearance would have diverted His hearers from the higher importance of His teaching.¹

This is the substance of Clement's references to the facts of the Lord's life on earth. They are well nigh as scanty and occasional as his sadly infrequent mention of his own personal life. *θεολογείται ὁ Χριστός*, as Eusebius said.² Even though he mentions the Lord's weariness, as He sat on the well at Sychar, and the insight with which He watched Martha's busy domestic zeal, Clement hardly appreciated the full humanity which such incidents imply.³ It is Christ's teaching which appeals to Clement; the charm of the Galilean story, the depth of Gethsemane's sorrow, the colour of the Parables, are things for which he has no eye. The love of the Lord for children is one of the few beautiful elements in His humanity, that seem to have really arrested Clement's notice.⁴ So is a man limited by his dominant interests, and Clement, who moves about with ease in the higher realms of Christian Gnosis, has never made himself at home in Nazareth or Capernaum. But against this indifference to so much that seems to us of value in the Gospels must, as we have seen, be set in strongest contrast his assertion of the fact that the Word had really come. Details apart, there was the great reality, God made man, the Logos assuming flesh, the Divine coming very near. It was so glad and so clear a fact, that we feel again and again in Clement's treatment of it the old truth, "*Pectus facit theologum.*" His theology was really a religion, and Faith and Fact blend for him together in his joyous homage to the Word, who was made man for our salvation.

When we pass from Clement's unhesitating acceptance of the fact of the Incarnation to the question of its mode and implications, it is less easy to speak definitely. Indeed,

¹ 86, 252, 818.

² H.E., v. 28.

³ 148, 941.

⁴ 104 *sqq.*

there are evident indications that he had not thought out this aspect of the subject into any consistent theory. That he had not done this, need cause us little surprise; his date and mental characteristics alike account for his combination of really incompatible ideas. How, for example, does the manifestation or Advent of the Logos in the historic life of the Saviour stand in relation to other admitted activities of the Divine within the sphere of things temporal? Are the two wholly different in nature, or only in degree? Must we isolate the Incarnation or connect it with other events? Shall we regard its affinities or its uniqueness? On this fundamental question of Christian theology Clement speaks with two voices. We may be tolerably clear which is the true Clement, but undoubtedly both accents are to be heard.

With the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel and the Epistle to the Hebrews, this later Alexandrine teacher sees the Incarnation as an event in a series.¹ What happened at the Parousia had occurred before, in a lower degree and in different modes. The purpose of God for humanity has been gradually unfolding itself, and reaches a further stage in the coming of the Son.² The earlier dispensation of the Law, the later dispensation of Christianity, are parts of a single scheme.³ Through the Greek, as well as through the Jew, the same Logos who came in the humanity of Jesus had been at work. The Word is the "instrument" or organ of God, but Salvation is an ancient melody, and long before He became incarnate and "took a name," the Word was active for the welfare of humanity.⁴ So Clement does not hesitate to speak of the Incarnation as the greatest evidence of the divine Love, or as the "more intimate" revelation of the divine Will, in each case mentally classing it with

¹ The Advent is *ἡ τελευταία τοῦ σωτῆρος εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐνέργεια*, 679.

² 467.

³ 543.

⁴ 6, 132.

other modes of God's beneficence.¹ It is a supreme example of the principle, which he asserts in another connection, that most blessings are given from God through man's agency.²

This tendency to connect the Incarnation, rather than to isolate it, which is made constantly plain in Clement's undisputed writings, finds even clearer expression in other passages, which are probably quotations and not his own. In one it is said explicitly that the Word became flesh not alone at the Advent, but also when His activity was exerted through the Prophets.³ In another he tells us that just as the Saviour spoke and healed through a body, so did He formerly "through the Prophets," and now "through Apostles and Teachers." The Church is the channel of the Lord's activity, as He, in His incarnate life, was the channel of the Father's will. "For," he adds, "the loving God is always putting on humanity for humanity's salvation, of old the Prophets, now the Church."⁴ This is an important statement, and even if Clement only quotes it, he does so undoubtedly with full approval of its implication that the Incarnation is a *principle* of the divine action, rather than an isolated and unique event. Nowhere else in his pages do we find a more frank recognition of the continuity of the divine revelation. It is the truer expression of his mind which reaches us in such passages, rather than in those of a different order which we have now to consider.

For here and there, no doubt, Clement gives fair ground for the charge of Docetism. He will speak in the plainest terms of the Lord's humanity and then, as it seems, the old philosophic dread of contaminating the Absolute gets the better of him, and he reduces the human story of the Gospels

¹ ἡ μέγιστη τοῦ σωτήρος ἐπιφάνεια, 668. ὁ θεὸς . . . προσεχέστερον ἤδη διὰ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ παρουσίας σώζων κ.τ.λ., 467. The term *προσεχής* is frequent in this connection: *προσεχεστέρα ἐνέργεια*, 514, *προσεχέστερον ὤφθη*, 669; *cf.* 679. It unites the ideas of "recent" and "intimate."

² 325.

³ 973.

⁴ 994.

to a symbol or a show. It is ridiculous, he thinks, to suppose that the Lord's body required food and drink for its support. He eat and drank from no physical necessity, but merely to avoid creating suspicion in the minds of His companions.¹ He was not an ordinary man, and He did not belong to the world, though He came into it.² What men saw indeed in Him was not the reality of His nature :³ to apprehend this was beyond man's powers, and He took our flesh in order to manifest just what we were able to receive. Himself He was different from that which He assumed. Clement was even familiar with, and mentions without criticism, the view that the rejected, insulted, crucified, Son of Man was another than the real Christ. The human nature of Jesus is not actual reality, but something transparent, diaphanous, through which the higher nature is displayed. This is the sense, apparently, of the comparison of the Lord to a pearl.⁴

It is true that in some of these passages Clement seems to do no more than guard against the supposition that perfect Godhead could be fully revealed to the perception of sense. So far he would command full assent : a limitation, a *Kenosis*, an "accommodation" of some kind, is necessarily involved in the very notion of an Incarnation. But, when the different references to this subject are taken together, it is fairly clear that Photius had some ground for his charge,⁵ and that a certain Docetic strain does blend itself with his other teaching on the mode and fashion of the Incarnation of the Word. He never mentions the Psilanthropists, but perhaps he dreaded them more than he feared the Gnostics. The Church had some way to travel before it arrived at

¹ 775.

² Not κοινός, 533 : not κοσμικός, 803 ; *cf.* 439.

³ 812, 833.

⁴ 241 ; *cf.* the doubtful Fragment given in Dindorf, iii. 492 ; ἔστι μαργαρίτης κ.τ.λ.

⁵ μὴ σαρκωθῆναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ δόξαι. *Bibliotheca*, Cod. 109.

the formula of the two Natures in the one Person of the Christ. Hence come Clement's inconsistencies, for such they were rather than conscious difficulties. They are such as are bound to arise on any theory that starts from the absolute distinction between the human and the divine. We may notice a kindred fusion of really distinct alternatives, when he speaks occasionally of the Lord as human nature carried to its perfection,¹ more usually and habitually of the Godhead coming down and taking human form. Whether God condescends or man attains, the result may possibly be the same; but the theories start from different points of view. A full and true theology will perhaps find place for both, so that we may forgive Clement his combination of alternatives.

We must not leave the subject of his views on the mode of the Incarnation, without some reference to his statements in regard to the Virgin Birth. Clement receives it gladly as a part of the Church's tradition,² and has no difficulty in pointing out from time to time its significance in the Christian scheme. So far his example is in full accord with the statement that there are "no believers in the Incarnation discoverable, who are not also believers in the Virgin Birth."³ But it is in no sense true to say that his acceptance of the Incarnation depends on his belief in the Virgin Birth. For him the Incarnation is a great and significant fact, the highest expression of a widely regulative principle. The birth from a Virgin is a concomitant and notable incident, an element in Christian tradition which he cordially accepted; but in no measure does it form the groundwork or condition of his belief in the Incarnation of the Word. It could be eliminated from Clement's theology without disaster to the general structure. In whatever light the Church of the future may regard this most ancient article

¹ 156, 623.

² 123, 558, 804.

³ Gore, *Dissertations*, 49.

of her belief, it is well to point out that, for at least one important phase of Christology, it had no inseparable or necessary connection with the vital faith of the Word Incarnate.

For Clement, as for all Christian theology, the purpose of the Incarnation is the Salvation of Humanity, but this, of course, has been interpreted in various ways, and Clement's conception of salvation is his own and characteristic. There is, behind it all, the Divine Purpose. The coming of the Word is an "economy,"¹ something determined by the supreme Householder for the well-being of the inmates of His world; a piece of administrative work to which the divine hands have been set and which must not be left incomplete.² It was essential that this should be undertaken; it was a part of the scheme of Providence, and a necessary part, for Clement will have nothing to do with theories of the self-sufficiency of man's nature for his own redemption.³ On humanity's need of a Saviour he speaks with as much emphasis, as do those who have felt spiritual burdens press far more heavily than he had ever done himself. But, given this need of salvation, in what does it consist? How shall man appropriate it for his own?

Now, there is no one answer to this question. Clement would have agreed with the teaching of his great pupil, Origen, that the Saviour becomes many things, perhaps even all things, according to the needs of the whole creation capable of being redeemed by Him.⁴ But it is clear that for Clement the main purpose of the Word's Advent was to reveal the mind and purpose of the Father. The central thought is that of *self-manifestation*. He had found this in Saint John and in Saint Paul, and it dominates his

¹ *οικονομία*, 669 and elsewhere.

² 968.

³ 347, 645.

⁴ *In Joannem*, Tom. 1. 21-22. The passage is one of singular value.

whole conception of the Parousia. "The pre-existent Saviour was made manifest,"¹ he writes in the opening chapter of the *Protrepticus*. The word and its compounds are used half a dozen times in almost the same number of lines. Essentially the coming of the Word is light: He saves, as He illuminates and leads us out of the dark Cimmerian land.² Even by the Cross it is the power of vision that is given.³ The main function of the Word Incarnate, as of the universal all-pervading Logos, is to instruct and teach.⁴ The human life of the Lord is as a door, through which the divine revelation enters.⁵

Perhaps, in all this, we are reminded from time to time how true a Hellene Clement was. Even in his interpretation of the new religion, he does not wholly forget that he is Socrates' countryman, for whom virtue was knowledge and salvation dependent upon intelligence rather than upon the will. Still there is truth, if not the whole truth, in the thought of God's self-revelation in the Christ; and the outcome of the process, after all, is no bare intellectualism, but the raising of humanity to the divine level. For Clement anticipates all that is taught in the Athanasian Hymn on the "taking of the manhood into God." "Yea, I say, the Word of God became man, that you may learn from a man how man becomes God."⁶ By this heavenly teaching man is made divine.⁷ The full meaning of salvation, it seems, is nothing less than to share the life of God. It is not a fully developed soteriology, and it offers many points of contrast with the theories of later writers. But it is suggestive, elastic, sincere, and has its real religious value, as the closing chapters of the *Protrepticus* amply prove. The vicarious aspect of the Lord's life, though not emphasised, does not go without recognition: twice he speaks of the

¹ ἐπεφάνη, 7² 72.³ 419.⁴ 768.⁵ III.⁶ 8.⁷ 88-9.

“ransom”¹ paid for us. Elsewhere he writes that Christ “suffered on our behalf.”² This brings us to the fourth point on which Clement deems right faith as regards the Incarnation to be specially important—*περὶ τοῦ πάθους*, on the Passion of the Lord.

“Passion,” however, gives a very incorrect idea of the Greek term *πάθος*. It has acquired a restricted theological sense, by its special application to Christ’s death upon the Cross, but in Clement’s day it had not lost its philosophical connotations. That the Divine should be subject to *πάθος* resulted from the entry of the Godhead into a world of human experience, not always or necessarily painful in character, but in every case involving the liability of the Divine to some form of external influence. By this was implied a sort of contradiction of the principle of the self-contained Godhead, independent, secure, unmoved, and unaffected by any power outside Itself. Here, then, was the divine condescension of the Incarnate, not only, nor even mainly, that He suffered death, but that Himself He entered into our world of change and contingency and allowed Himself to be affected by agencies not His own. It meant limitation: He was bound by the flesh.³ It was a voluntary submission, an experience He willed to undergo.⁴ It involved some measure of weakness and liability; *τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοπαθῶς ἐπέειπασας*.⁵ The “cup,” which He must needs drink, was the completion of His experience, the crowning phase of a process which lasted from His birth unto the Cross.

How difficult it was for a man of philosophic training and outlook to accept the Gospel story of the Lord’s humiliation, we gather again and again from Clement’s

¹ 148, 956; *cf.* Segarii ad Lib. Q. D. S., Excursus v. in Dindorf, iii. 609.

² 137, 215.

³ 86, *σαρκὶ ἐνδεθεις*.

⁴ 875, 956.

⁵ 135.

references to this subject. When it has been all fully admitted and even asserted, there still occur the occasional hints of a reluctance to allow the full content of the truth. He shrinks from the admission that there was anything for the Lord to learn ; how could there be since He was God ?¹ The Lord was different from all humanity, in that He alone was wholly without desire.² Elsewhere He is said to have been altogether ἀπαθής, liable to no motive of pleasure or of pain.³ If He took our flesh upon Him, it was to educate it to a condition of passionless indifference. Such a phrase as ὁμολογία εἰς τὸν παθόντα⁴ reveals, at once, wherein the difficulty of faith and confession lay for the man of philosophic mind. Clement may seem here also to abate or retract his own assertions, but there was a real problem, as the Apollinarians made clear at a later date. What is important to observe is the fact that the Lord's πάθος meant, at this stage of Christian thought, something wider and more fundamental than the single experience of His death. That was the climax of His submission, but the real problem was raised, the real condescension of the Divine made manifest, the moment it could be stated that the very God had entered into the domain of man's experience. It is in this sense we should still interpret the clause, "He suffered," in the Creed : εἰ παθητὸς ὁ Χριστός⁵ is a phrase of similar implication in the New Testament.

Such in its principal aspects was Clement's view of the Incarnation. It is no developed and consistent interpretation with which he presents us. He has thought out few of the questions involved to their final settlement ; of many indeed he is unaware. But if he is often undetermined, he is often suggestive ; and if he found it difficult to fuse the religious, dogmatic, and philosophic elements of this great

¹ 113.² 875.³ 775.⁴ 189.⁵ Acts xxvi. 23.

truth into a harmony, it hardly lies with the moderns to blame his failure. It may be of advantage to compare what Clement has to say on this subject with its treatment by other representative writers. His outlook will be more easily understood, if we consider its relation to the teaching of such typical doctors as Irenæus, Athanasius, and Anselm.

Irenæus, who was an older man than Clement by about twenty years, had probably composed his work *Against Heresies* before Clement turned to writing books. Whether it was well known in Alexandria before the persecution of Severus, we cannot say with certainty. Clement knew it,¹ but his views on the Incarnation were in any case not dependent on those of his great contemporary of Lyons. Like Clement, and with more insistent assertion, Irenæus taught, as against the Gnostics, that it was the real Word of the Father who actually took human flesh upon Him. Like Clement, he held that the Word "for His immense love's sake was made that which we are, in order that He might perfect us to be what He is."² He sees, too, that the Incarnation is no isolated solitary event. It is a part of the whole scheme of God's providence and order.³ And through the manifold workings of the divine grace other teachers also, before the Word was born of Mary, had been the channels of His operation for man's good.⁴ In all this there is common ground to the two writers. On the fundamental issues between the Church and the Heresies there was little discrepancy.

But their differences also, if less weighty, are instructive. Irenæus belongs to the "great central party of the Church;"⁵ Clement to the outer country, where Christianity and Philosophy met without a boundary line. This general difference colours their treatment of the Incarnation. Irenæus, for

¹ H.E., vi. 13.

² *Contra Hæreses*, Lib. v., Præfatio.

³ *Ib.*, iv. 7, 4.

⁴ *Ib.*, iv. 14, 2.

⁵ Bigg, *Origins*, 215.

example, starts with the fact of the God-man : Alexandria with the theory of the Universal Logos. The important thing to Irenæus was the life and appearance of the Lord on earth, though this no doubt was only explicable by the wider doctrine of Godhead. Whereas for Clement the Incarnation is only one among many manifestations of the Word, of whose existence and beneficence there were good grounds of evidence apart from the human life. Thus Irenæus is historical ; Clement's tendency is to more abstract considerations. Irenæus believed the Lord's public ministry lasted for at least ten years :¹ Clement, with the Gnostics, is content to limit it to only one. The Bishop goes to the Gospels again and again for evidence of fact,² the head of the Catechetical School for the divine teaching. It is not without significance that, while both fathers have learned much alike from Saint John and from Saint Paul, the special affinities of Irenæus are with the Apostle who was the loved companion of the Saviour in His earthly ministry ; those of Clement with the other Apostle, whose knowledge of Christ after the flesh is so entirely doubtful. The respective attitudes of the two Apostles to historic fact, as an element in Christianity, may fairly be said to recur in the Fathers of Lyons and Alexandria.

There is a similar distinction in their treatment of Scripture. For Clement the five loaves, or the three hundred bells on the High Priest's robe, or the Saviour's crown of thorns, are all of symbolical value ;³ such details invariably veil a higher meaning for him as for Philo. But Irenæus takes Scripture in its primary, natural sense. He seeks for no wider interpretation. He values the literal and the concrete, and quotes almost every book of the New Testament, not to draw out an inner significance, but in order that plain statement may do its work. It is by this

¹ ii. 22, 6.

² *E.g.* ii. 22, 3 ; v. 15, 2 ; 21, 2.

³ 215, 665, 668.

manner of appeal that he maintains, as against Gnostic manipulation of selected texts, that the eternal Christ has wrought salvation by actual entry into the world of time. It is his settled principle that, though we may not understand all Scripture, we must not attempt to seek beyond it.¹ The whole of his important Third Book is grounded on this rule. His gospel is real redemption, on a New Testament basis. This sober limitation, with its fidelity to the letter, and a certain "happy blindness"² to possible difficulties, contrasts strongly enough with Clement's extraordinary readiness to find sanction for any idea of his own in the pages of Holy Writ.

Finally, and in keeping with the contrasts already drawn, Irenæus accepts the Incarnation, but declines to speculate upon it. He can be emphatic in his repudiation of Docetism, differing notably in this point from Clement, because he does not raise, or indeed is unconscious of, the question which the Docetic theory was meant to meet.³ Or consider his characteristic saying, "Should anyone say to us, How then is the Son produced by the Father? we tell him that this production, or generation, or utterance, or manifestation, or by what name soever one may denote His generation,—which is inexpressible—no man knoweth."⁴ This mental temperament has its value. There is significance in Harnack's remark that "At the present day, ecclesiastical Christianity, so far as it seriously believes in the unity of the divine and human in Jesus Christ . . . still occupies the same standpoint as Irenæus did"; as also in the suggestion of the same writer that, "If some day trust in the methods of religious philosophy vanishes, men will revert to history, which will still be recognisable in the preserved tradition, as prized by Irenæus and the rest."⁵ Clement ministered to minds of

¹ ii. 28, 2-3.

² Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 245.

³ ii. 32, 4; iii. 18, 6.

⁴ ii. 28, 6.

⁵ *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 275, 330.

a different order. It is probable that, so long as the Church retains its faith in the Incarnation, there will be need of these different types of teachers to interpret it. We shall require the latter-day counterpart of that historic faith which Irenæus taught in Lyons, and not less the counterpart of that philosophical presentation of the Gospel, which was taught by Clement with such large results in Alexandria.

Somewhat more than a century after the death of Clement, Athanasius, while still a young man of twenty-two, published his short treatise *De Incarnatione Verbi*. The Arian controversy had not yet arisen. The work was the second of two Essays addressed to Macarius, a convert from heathenism, "the first attempt," it has been said, "ever made to present the doctrines and facts of Christianity in a philosophically religious form."¹ There are certain notable differences between Athanasius' account of the Incarnation and Clement's scattered but not infrequent references to the same subject. Theology, in the hundred years that have elapsed, has become considerably more defined.

For in this treatise, which may be taken as representative of the Church's general mind at the period, the Incarnation is considered exclusively in relation to the Fall. Whether God would have so manifested Himself, had humanity not needed restoration; and whether it would not have been possible for God to restore humanity by other means, are speculative questions with which Athanasius does not deal. He is concerned with the one central fact and theme, that what had been lost by the Fall of Adam was restored by the Death of Christ. So he has much to say on the evil state of humanity after our first parents' sin.² Death and corruption entered in. Vice and violence prevailed

¹ Möhler, *Athanasius the Great*, quoted by Bright: *Orations against the Arians*, ix.

² C. v.

more and more. City was at strife with city ; nation with nation. God's originally implanted image was fast disappearing from man's nature. Man was doomed to death, "for God would not be true if, after He had said we should die, man did not die."¹

It is in contrast with this dark background that the Incarnation of the Word is presented to us. He alone could re-create what had been spoiled. He alone could discharge the liability that had been incurred.² Human repentance alone was insufficient. It needed a God to remedy the disaster. Where nature has failed so lamentably, grace must intervene.³ The fitness of the Incarnation being thus shown, the treatise proceeds to discuss the death of Christ, "more especially as this is the main point of our faith, and all men everywhere speak much of it."⁴ The writer reviews the reasons for the death of Christ ; its manner, at the hands of others and on the Cross ; its publicity ; the motives which induced Him to leave others to determine the kind of death which He should die. The Resurrection is set forth as the proof of the Lord's victory, and so the more positive portion of the treatise comes to its close, and the writer passes on to reply to objections raised from Jewish or from philosophic standpoints.

Now, in this short but notable and typical statement of the Church's doctrine, there is a twofold concentration or limitation of thought. In the first place, the Incarnation is set in the closest relation to the doctrine of the Fall ; in the second, its significance is seen exclusively in the Cross. It is true that the writer will sometimes allow his mind to range beyond these limits and dwell on the universal power and nearness of the Word,⁵ but our interest in the Incarnation is not claimed in connection with these wider thoughts ;

¹ C. vi.

² C. xx.

³ C. xiv.

⁴ C. xix.

⁵ C. viii., xliii., xlv.

in technical language, as compared with Clement, the cosmological outlook is less common with Athanasius, the soteriological more habitual. Much has been gained in the direction of clearness, connection, systematic thought. Something has been lost, perhaps, in suggestiveness, adaptability, variety of presentation. Like Clement, Athanasius is a Greek, and the hard rigidity of Roman theology is still wanting. But even so the legal, forensic element is there, and the stress of the later writer falls, to some extent, on the one element in Paulinism which seems to have made no impression on Clement's mind. Christianity, no doubt, was compelled so to define and formulate the content of its belief.

This tendency, of course, was to have abundant influence in the next two centuries, nor was the Church's instinct mistaken in fastening upon man's need of salvation and the death of Jesus on the Cross, as the two most significant elements in its scheme. But, from the modern standpoint, while Anthropology is challenging the common conception of the Fall, and legalistic theories of Sin and the Atonement are giving way to an interpretation of moral facts which is drawn from Biology and Evolution rather than from the domain of Law, there is advantage in remembering that, anterior to the age of Athanasius and Nicæa, there had been competent interpreters of Christianity who had not regarded its scheme and purpose as principally determined by the Fall; who held that God made man not perfect but capable of perfection, and for whom the supreme truth of the Incarnation lay, not so much in its unparalleled uniqueness, as in its close correspondence with God's many other manifestations of His will and nature, and in its entire harmony with what, *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*, to quote again Clement's favourite phrase, had been taught to humanity through other yet kindred channels. Athanasius

was a greater man than Clement, but the earlier Father had in some ways a freer and a less restricted outlook. Therein lies his value for our own day, with its notable collapse of systematic theology.

It is a far journey, in more respects than one, from Alexandria, and the age of the Fathers, to a Norman Monastery or an Anglican Archbishopric in the early days of Scholasticism. The religious and intellectual atmospheres are so different, that any comparison between typical representatives of the Eastern Church at the close of the second century, and of the Western at the close of the ninth, must in any case be difficult, and will not improbably be deceptive. So it is only with a certain caution, that Clement's view of the Incarnation is to be placed side by side with Anselm's famous treatise, *Cur Deus Homo*.

The two men, for all their differences, may be said to have had certain points of similarity. Both are strongly influenced by philosophy, though it is philosophy of a very different order; Clement's Platonism has little in common with the scholastic Aristotelianism of the great Archbishop. Both, again, with all their philosophy, were saved from dry intellectualism by a warmth of personal piety and by an activity of practical service, which carried their interests far beyond the circle of the school and the monastery. Both, too, were essentially teachers, masters of their calling and lovers of it. Both, in regard to the Incarnation, are far removed by the philosophic character of their outlook from the historic side of Christianity. Finally, while both accept the fact of the Incarnation, they are both also conscious, and, being the men they were, could not be otherwise than conscious, of the real difficulties which are involved in the condescension of the Divine to human conditions. It is significant that both Clement and Anselm resolutely refuse to allow that the Christ could

truly increase in knowledge.¹ Anselm's remarks upon the subject are almost as fully Docetic as anything to be found in Clement's pages.

These points of resemblance, however, must not be pressed beyond their true significance. The difference between the Alexandrian and the Scholastic theologies in reality far outweighs any affinity that can rightly be claimed. There is indeed an evident contrast, when we place Clement's interpretation of the Saviour's work side by side with Anselm's. In the earlier writer it is the manifold Christ we find: He has many offices. "The Saviour speaks in many tones and uses various methods for the salvation of man."² "Clement's idea of the Saviour," it has been said by one who understood him well, "is larger and nobler—may we say less conventional?—than that of any other doctor of the Church."³ With Anselm we approach the whole subject by the high *a priori* road of logical necessity.

At the outset we are invited to consider the Incarnation "as if nothing were known of Christ";⁴ that is to say, the facts and colour and suggestiveness of the Gospels are intentionally omitted, and abstract theological reasoning dominates the whole inquiry. We hardly feel surprised when, as the Dialogue proceeds, Boso, Anselm's interrogator, remarks, "The way by which you lead me is so walled in by reasoning on each side, that I do not seem able to turn out of it either to the right hand or the left."⁵ We are shown the reason or necessity which led to God becoming man. The impossibility of God's receiving into a state of blessedness anyone involved in the debt of sin is made plain. How the divine and human natures must coexist in the same Person; how it is antecedently appropriate that God should be born of a

¹ 113; *cf.* *Cur Deus Homo*, I., ix. ; II., xiii.

³ Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, 72.

⁴ *Cur Deus Homo*, Preface.

² 8.

⁵ II., 9.

Virgin ; how it could be right for the Father to allow the Son to suffer, and how this could effectively happen without detracting from the honour of the Godhead, are all demonstrated on grounds of abstract reasonableness.

The concentration of interest on the relation of the Incarnation to the Fall, and on Christ's satisfaction made on the Cross, is as marked in Anselm as in Athanasius. The doctrine is a part of the scheme of Salvation. The facts of Christianity are interpreted, not as a manifestation of the divine will and purpose, nor as a supremely important stage in the education of humanity, but as a divine *transaction*, stupendous in its results. Revelation, love, humanity, fall into abeyance, but the plan of God is commended as marvelously reasonable. We are grateful for Anselm's protest against the idea that the divine Justice is incompatible with Mercy ; we are not less grateful for his refusal to admit that the Lord's death was a species of payment to the Devil.¹ The wonderful ability and reverence with which the whole subject is handled strike the reader again and again, nor is it without hope for the future adaptability of Christianity to new intellectual conditions, that we observe the significance of the Incarnation interpreted through so apparently alien a medium as that of scholastic logic. But, for our own time, the general movement of religious thought, and the inevitable acceptance of critical and scientific methods, have rendered the *a priori* theories of the great Anselm as obsolete as they were once conclusive. "Neither in its principle nor in its details can the theory of Anselm be said to have survived to modern times."² Religion, happily, is more

¹ "The belief that the Redemption was essentially an act by which man was bought by God from the Devil prevailed among theologians during the first ten centuries of Christianity. It was accepted by S. Irenæus, by Origen, by S. Augustine."—F. C. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, 300.

² J. Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, ii. 176.

permanent than its interpretations in theology. Clement could never have written so masterly an argument from given data as the *Cur Deus Homo*. Yet his type of Christianity is more near to modern conditions. His theology is more suggestive, just because it is less systematic, and this perhaps is especially true in regard to his treatment of the Saviour's life and work.¹

Before leaving Clement's account of the Incarnation, it is natural to ask, whether his views on this fundamental article of Christianity have intrinsic value for our own time. It will always be allowed, by those who are competent to judge, that Clement's standpoint is important for the student of doctrine, and that, in its historical connections, his view of the Incarnation is serious, interesting, and representative. But, allowing that his place in the second century must not be ignored, is there justification for going beyond this and attempting to discover, in his teaching on the Word made flesh, elements of truth which the twentieth century can reappropriate and make its own, or at least fundamental similarities between such views as he held in his own age and those which we find it possible to hold to-day?

There are obvious dangers in attempting to substantiate any such association. It is so easy to exaggerate resemblances which are superficial, so easy to forget the subtle and yet continuous changes in the connotations of terminology. Besides, there are evident divergencies, not least the fact that, whereas Clement approaches the Lord's earthly life from the philosophic standpoint and cares only for the facts in so far as they can be regarded as the *media* and manifestations of abiding principles, the

¹ *Cp.* Harnack's account of St Anselm as "standing on the shoulders of Augustine, but eliminating the 'patristic,' *i.e.* the Greek elements of his mode of thought," *Hist. Dogm.*, vi. 67.

student or teacher of to-day must ground his theology on a historical basis, and undertake the "quest of the historical Jesus," before he can discover universal significance in the qualities of His person or the records of His career. Our problems for the most part are not those of Clement, our methods are further still removed from his. The pre-suppositions from which we start have been so modified by the intervening years that, even when the resemblances between Clement's time and our own have been most fully demonstrated, we have to qualify the parallel by remembering that history as a matter of fact does not repeat itself. All these things warn the student to abide by the severer methods of rigid history, and to suspect all attempts to rediscover the present in the past.¹

Yet there is one consideration which might predispose us to look for elements of permanent value in Clement, and it holds good in regard to the doctrine of the Incarnation in a peculiar degree. He lived when Christian thought had not yet formulated itself finally on this subject, when many various ideas were still current within the Church, when theology in important respects was fluid rather than dogmatic. In spite of all he says about tradition and the Church's rule, Clement was more free to ask questions than any subsequent teacher of importance. The theology of the Church passed afterwards into a phase of increasing definition. Theories on the nature of the Lord's Person, and on the purpose of His coming, grew, through perfectly intelligible influences, more precise, and with many changes have remained definite in character down to the rise of the modern spirit in all its various forms. To-day, again, Christian thought is more fluid, free, interrogative, indefinite, than in any other century since Clement's time. We depreciate the work and the greatness neither of

¹ For a fuller consideration of this point, see Chapter xx. *infra*.

Augustine, nor of the Schoolmen, nor of the Reformation, if we say that in certain important respects we have to take up the task of theology where the Alexandrines laid it down, for it had been truly remarked that they "moved among those deepest questions of the philosophy of religion, which have never come fully to the front again till our own time."¹

Now, there is at least one important characteristic in Clement's theology with which modern religious thought has evident affinities, though it can hardly be discovered as among the dominant tendencies of any intervening period. Clement is essentially synthetic. The whole bent of his intellectuality is towards unity. His didactic aim was the harmony of all truth. The Cosmos and man's understanding of it for him were essentially and ideally one. As we pass into the age of controversy and definition, this outlook is largely abandoned. Definition involved antithesis, and debate made thought more precise than facts. Men learned to see distinction, but forgot to look for unities. The strange history of the term "Catholic" is a signal illustration of the tendency towards contrasts, alternatives, boundary lines. Again and again the theological outlook upon the world and human life has been vitiated by such hard and sharp definitions, as have set Nature over against Revelation, the Law over against Grace, the Church over against the World, the saved over against the lost. The modern mind will have none of these contrasts, if they are represented as the final realities of our experience. If Science has taught us nothing else, it has taught us that the world is a unity, and our fixed determinations are, at best, the artificial landmarks in a domain where existences, supposed to be separate, in reality blend and intermingle by a process of continuous and imperceptible graduation.

¹ Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, ii. 89.

Our theology is consequently reverting to the synthetic type. We are discerning the unreality of many traditional oppositions. However slow the movement, the face of the age is set towards unity. Therein we are asserting the truth of the Alexandrian outlook.

Let us consider the similarity between Clement's age and our own in respect to some of those antitheses, which enter so prominently into much of the theology of the Incarnation. We have drawn sharp distinctions between Human Nature and the Divine; between the doctrine of Immanence and the doctrine of the Word made Flesh; between the historic and the spiritual foundations of Christianity, that is, between Fact and Faith; between Jesus and the Christ. It is, in reality, one contrast, one distinction, which in many phases runs throughout these various pairs of opposites. In our search for their reconciliation we may think of Clement as forerunner and ally.

There is a difference between the Human and the Divine, but it is a difference compatible with fundamental kinship. Man is made in the image of God. The goal and ideal of his spiritual development is to share the divine life. If there is a certain danger in the freedom with which the Greek Fathers use the term "God" in connection with human nature, there is also a profound truth. For if there be really an absolute distinction between the nature of God and Man, the Incarnation is only possible by depriving either the one nature, or the other, of its essential characteristics in order to facilitate their combination: the age of the great Councils abundantly manifests the difficulty of conceiving a personality, which should combine natures which are *ex hypothesi* diverse. The modern religious world is moving away from this theology. It is influenced by conceptions which "indicate an affinity between God and man and a nearness of God to man which the earlier creeds

obscured.”¹ So we come back to an idea of the Incarnation which represents it not as a new departure, nor as a divine afterthought and expedient, but as the climax or most emphatic expression of the divine element in human nature. “Let us make man,” God said, “in our image, after our likeness.” *καὶ δὴ γέγονεν ὁ Χριστὸς τοῦτο πλήρες*, adds Clement.² In Christ’s humanity this ideal and purpose were perfectly realised. Fundamentally, the difference is one of measure and degree, but not of kind. The distinction is not lost. But we see the unity beyond it.

It is on similar lines we must relate the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Divine Immanence. The latter has never been formally rejected. It stands so plainly in the statement of the Fourth Gospel, “He was in the world,” that it would have been difficult for the Church to abandon it; but, practically, it has been so generally ignored and neglected in the official ecclesiastical theology, that its reassertion in modern times has come upon us as a novelty and a surprise.³ As a general rule the coming of the Word has been represented as an incursion of the Godhead into an alien domain, at best as a beneficent intervention to set right what had gone awry. The Church has not believed, or else has forgotten, that “He came unto his own.” The immense significance of the Advent has seemed best secured by its isolation, and from this laudable and intelligible motive has come the tendency to narrow and restrict the ways of God.

Again, beyond the differences we see the unity. It is the “one increasing purpose,” the idea of the many spiritual forces which converge towards “the one far-off divine

¹ Professor Henry Jones in the *Hibbert Journal Supplement*, 1909, “Jesus or Christ,” p. 92. The whole article is well worthy of attention.

² 156.

³ On this subject I venture to refer to an article on *The Doctrine of Divine Immanence in New Testament Theology*, Church Quarterly Review, No. 133, October, 1908.

event," that are the supreme and dominant conceptions in the modern religious interpretations of the world. What we find in Christ, we find in other less clear, less unmixed modes, in history, in nature, in human character. The divine Logos, so central and fundamental in Clement's thought, or, as we may interpret it, the Divine Reason, Will, and Love, are manifested in all the higher tendencies of the cosmic order, as well as in the Person and the life of Christ. There is continuity. There is substantial affinity in many modes of expression. We render God a dubious honour if, in order to recognise His Presence in one human life, we ignore it through all its many other phases. The differences again are of degree and manner : the reality that is operant and manifested is the same, nor is it easy to give exact meaning to the objection, that at the Incarnation the Word came "Himself" : at other times it was in some other way. The belief in God as living and manifesting Himself in the world helps to interpret "His intensified presence in Christ."¹ In other words, the Incarnation is in line with the Immanence of God, and what in one figure we describe as the coming down of the Godhead, we might in another figure represent with equal truth as the emergence of the latent spirituality of the world. It is a *desideratum* of modern theology, that it should work out in greater detail the harmony between the immanent and the incarnate phases of the divine activity. In this regard the moderns may well visit Alexandria in the quest for truth.

Once again, we may consider the difficult problem of the connection between the historic and the spiritual elements in Christianity, the relation of universal religious ideals to the earthly life of the Son of Man ; in other words, the connection of Faith and Fact. On the one hand is the value of the concrete ; the personal appeal of the human Saviour ;

¹ Cf. Bishop Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 41.

the total impotence of abstract ideals and disembodied truths to touch the masses of humanity ; the liability of all philosophic theories to evaporate and to be lost. These things tell in favour of the historic aspect of the Faith. These things lead men to discern in Saint Mark's Gospel a more precious heritage than the Epistles of Saint Paul. These things convince us that Christianity is more truly learned in Galilee than in the Schools. Yet to all this there is another side. Can we rest the hopes of humanity on particular events ? Does man's spiritual nature stand or fall with the reliability of ancient documents ? Do we not needlessly hamper and limit religion, when we tie it down to facts and occurrences, on which criticism may have yet more words to say ?

No man who breathes the atmosphere of the modern religious world can fail to be conscious of the force of these two tendencies, of the difficulty of adjusting their different claims. For Clement, as we have seen, the Incarnation was pre-eminently a manifestation of higher truth. The universal Word took our flesh under particular conditions in order that He might be seen. And if it be remembered, on the one hand, that no historic facts, however fully demonstrated, can possess religious value, except in so far as they express that which appeals to the spiritual consciousness of humanity at large ; and, on the other, that no truth ever becomes accessible and available except by its embodiment in particular forms and modes, we may realise that, however difficult it be to formulate satisfactorily their true relationship, at least the two elements are essential, at least in principle Christianity was right in asserting the necessity of their combination. Negatively, we can, for our religious needs, be as little satisfied with mere Miracles as we can with mere Ideals. Positively, it is because, even under modern critical conditions, we can discern elements of

paramount and universal spiritual value in the life of Jesus, that we must assert a historic basis for the Faith. It is not that such spiritual verities as the divine love, or the destiny of man, or the value of human life, *depend* on particular occurrences ; or that for ourselves the old interpretation of the Lord's incarnate life, as in some sort a divine transaction or readjustment, retains its value. God's attitude to man is not altered but revealed by the Incarnation. The spiritual verities are as they were ; it is the light and the knowledge of them that are new. In particular events humanity read great and abiding principles. The eternal is ever the eternal, but our knowledge of it comes in time. In the Saviour's life, and in the Saviour's death, the Church has discerned an expression of the divine love and will. The Incarnation then is more properly connected with the thought of Revelation than with that of Sin. On some such lines we may adjust, under to-day's conditions, the elements of Faith and Fact in our Christianity, neither indifferent to the historic element, nor yet dependent upon its absolute actuality. The fact gains its value through the principle or idea it embodies : and this becomes operative only through the facts. Clement's view of the Incarnation may be fairly said to recognise both these conditions.

And, finally, if after the manner of the Gnostics some modern teachers would dissociate the Jesus of History from the Christ of Faith ; if a corresponding distinction is sometimes drawn among the human faculties, and the mind and understanding are depreciated, and the religious powers of our nature exalted as of independent validity and worth, here again there is need that we should not forget that Christianity has stood for the unity of the Christ and Jesus, and that no psychology can rest satisfied with a permanent discord among the powers of the human soul. Where we love and where we believe, there, so far as our limited

intelligence reaches, we must also understand. All that Christ stands for in the life of the Church, and in the onward movement of humanity, is in some ways so related to the Jesus of Nazareth, that attempts to treat the two as fundamentally distinct and independent seem, if we may judge by recent efforts in that direction, to have little prospect of success. Clement would accept no sort of entire separation between Jesus and the Christ. Here he takes his stand unhesitatingly by the side of Irenæus and Saint John. The distinction was common in his age ; he knew it well, but rejects it. He saw the unity, in spite of difficulties which confronted him from the philosophic side. To us it is from other sources that the problems principally come. Historic inquiry, and the movement of the human spirit, lead us to ask whether we can still discern the ideal of humanity in the life and words of the Galilean Master, who, to an extent we find hard to estimate, was limited by conditions of time and place. It is one among the latter-day tasks of Christian thought to justify this appeal anew, and to restate, in terms that are valid for the modern mind, the grounds upon which it adheres to the great acknowledgment, first made at Cæsarea Philippi, that Jesus was the Christ. However much our point of view may have altered with the ages, however considerably we may have changed the connotation of our terms, we must still make essentially and fundamentally the same momentous synthesis, if with anything of Apostolic or Alexandrine conviction we are to carry on the Christian religion into the years that are to be.¹

¹ "The course of events in the second century enables us to understand some of the reasons which led the Church to cherish on the whole a historical, as distinct from an ideal, account of the foundation of Christianity." F. C. Burkitt, *op. cit.*, Preface to Second Edition, *ad fin.*

CHAPTER XIII

GNOSTICISM

CLEMENT never loved controversy. He possessed by nature few of the qualities of the partisan and, even where he had convictions, cared little for their aggressive exposition. We have already had occasion to notice how the whole trend of his mind was towards unity and affinities, rather than in the direction of contrasts, discrepancies, and antagonisms. Nevertheless, through his writings, and no doubt equally through his life, there ran one trail of contention, and that was his opposition to Gnosticism. It has been said that this was "his one trouble."¹ As we shall see, it is by no means an unqualified hostility, for, if he found much to criticise, he found much also to accept. "No Church teacher of the earlier period stands so near to the Gnostics as Clement."² But with all deductions, it is still the case that Clement felt bound to oppose these dangerous innovators. To demonstrate their errors was an unavoidable task of criticism ;³ nor is it difficult to see that Heresy, in his eyes, rather than Paganism, was the real enemy. The philosopher, for instance, might be a "near friend," and so proverbially less dangerous than the "distant brother,"⁴ who had taken to these dubious paths of extravagant speculation and wilful heterodoxy.

Now, it will be less difficult to understand Clement's

¹ Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, 115.

² Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis*, 502.

³ ἀναγκαῖα ἀντιλογία, 562.

⁴ 374.

attitude towards Gnosticism, if we recur to the fact that he is here, as always, fundamentally the teacher, and remember that it is as much in the interest of pupils and inquirers, as from his personal love of abstract truth, that he assails the Gnostic theories.¹ An intelligent man of the time, trained in the encyclical instruction of the schools, and not without acquaintance with philosophy, who had been drawn by such effective appeals as Clement's *Protrepticus* to throw in his lot with Christianity, would, in many cases, need no very lengthy course of instruction in good manners at table, or propriety in regard to raiment, or decent behaviour at the baths. The *Pædagogus* would soon lead him through this intermediate stage, and, since the new convert would hardly be content to remain permanently among the number of those *simpliciores*, who thought inquiry always dangerous, if not wrong, he would be asking, within a few months of his Baptism, in what direction the higher instruction promised by his new Religion must be sought. To such a man, alert, intelligent, only recently converted, with Alexandria as his environment, there can be little doubt that Gnosticism had much to offer. Let it be supposed, for example, that he attends such meetings as those Eusebius describes as conducted about this time by Paul, the popular teacher of heresy.² If we can portray his state of mind at the end of a series of Paul's lectures, we may be the better able to appreciate the danger Clement faced.

To begin with, the new convert was not asked to leave the Church in which he had so lately found spiritual shelter ; for Gnosticism was not an external rival to Christianity, but a movement or tendency within it.³ Such severance

¹ See esp. 895. He writes, ἀποστρέψαι βουλόμενος τῆς εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις εὐεμπτωσίας τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας.

² H.E., vi. 2.

³ 897-8, *cf.* 374, quoted above. The Gnostic was a "brother," though distant, *i.e.* a member of the family. Tares and wheat grow together, 774.

as did exist came rather by the Church's action than from the Heretics, who commonly claimed to be true and lawful members of the Society, and complained bitterly when their title to its privileges was denied.¹ So the way was easy; no renunciation or transition was involved, but the intelligent believer was invited to add to the common faith of ordinary Churchmen the higher treasures of advanced knowledge, for which his natural gifts and aptitudes had clearly destined him.

Moreover, if he had any doubts or qualms as to the wisdom of such a spiritual venture, there were many reflections by which this hesitation would be dispelled. For, after all, this "Gnosis" was no new thing. It was implicitly sanctioned in the Lord's often quoted words, "Seek and ye shall find;" and, in point of actual priority, there was not much to choose between the Apostles and Simon Magus, or even between Saint John and Cerinthus. In germ and principle, with no doubt many faulty exaggerations and perversions, Gnosticism had had its place within and upon the Church's borders since Saint Paul wrote Epistles to Corinth and Colossæ, and the folly of endless genealogies was pointed out to Timothy. Had not Peter's teaching been conveyed through Glaukias to Basilides, and had not Theodas been a similar link and intermediary between Saint Paul and Valentinus?² More than that, did not the esoteric teaching of the Saviour, imparted after the Resurrection, not merely during the forty days, but throughout a period of many years, still survive in the *Traditions of Matthias*?³ Besides, while the Canon of the New Testament was still in debate, who could effectively prove the inferiority of such Gnostic

¹ Irenæus, iii. 15, 2.

² 898.

³ 900. Hippolytus, vii. 20. For the duration of the Lord's teaching after the Resurrection, see C. Schmidt, *Gnostische Schriften in koptischer Sprache*, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, viii. 438 sqq.; also δάδεκα ἔτη in 762.

Scriptures as the *Preaching of Peter*, and the *Gospel according to the Egyptians*, to the Synoptists and Saint John? Even if Irenæus had settled the point for the Church of Lyons, it was still an open question in Alexandria.

But antiquity and continuity of tradition were not their only credentials. Half a century before Clement taught in the Catechetical School, Gnosticism had reached its maturity in the reign of Hadrian. It had organised its forces, given some definition to its distinctive tenets, and could appeal now to an abundant literature, to numerous and flourishing schools, and to a company of great teachers, whose memories and authorities still survived. There had been something astonishing in the prolific rapidity with which heretical books appeared. So serious had the propaganda seemed to Justin, that he composed a treatise to counteract its influence, and the alarm of the Church's leaders had not been forgotten, when Eusebius wrote his history more than a hundred years later.¹ Towards the end of the second century it was probably easy for anyone, who so desired, to procure in the book-shops of Alexandria a copy of Basilides' four-and-twenty *Commentaries*, the similar treatises of his son Isidaurus, the collected letters and homilies of Valentinus, the *Antitheses* of Marcion, or the notorious work of the young and remarkable Epiphanes on "Justice." Apelles and Heracleon were, perhaps, actively engaged at that date in writing books of a similar nature;² while imaginary conversations of the Lord with His disciples must have been already a recognised and common type of Gnostic literature. Such books were chiefly concerned with the interpretation of Scripture, but the Gnostics, even more than

¹ Justin, *Apol.*, i. 26; H.E., iv. 24.

² For Apelles' *συντάγματα* see Hippolytus, *κ.* 20. The Fragments of Heracleon are edited by A. E. Brooke in *Texts and Studies*, i. ; they are also given in Stieren's *Irenæus*, i. 936 *sqq.*

Clement himself, understood the art of discovering their own ideas in the sacred text. That the ability and popularity of such writings induced many members of the Church to ally themselves with Gnosticism, is amply evident to every reader of Clement or Irenæus. And, as with their books, so with their schools. These existed in Rome, in Alexandria, in Antioch, and elsewhere, and afforded the leading Gnostic teachers the most effective opportunity of spreading their opinions.¹ The "School," indeed, became in some ways more closely identified with Heresy than with the Church Catholic.²

More important than the literature and the lecture-room had been, of course, the teachers themselves. They aroused attention and opposition because, with all their extravagances and pretensions, they were really men of considerable power. Even as we know them now from the unfavourable accounts of the Fathers and Historians, we cannot fail to recognise their originality and power of influence. Though it be admitted that Simon Magus was an impostor, Marcus a licentious quack, Carpocrates a specious defender of lubricity, the discredit which such persons brought upon the "Name" could not obliterate the prestige and influence of Basilides or Valentinus, of Marcion, or of Clement's contemporary, Bardaisan. Renan may be right in speaking of the "icy resignation" of Basilides,³ but at least there was a severe and fearless logic in his reduction of the Absolute Deity to non-existence, a noble passion for the purity of the Divine Nature in his refusal to attribute any fragment of evil to Providence.⁴ So, too, behind all the crude impossibilities of the system of Valentinus, may be discerned the outlines of a great and poetical view of the drama of the universe, half Hellenic, half Oriental in its character, not more tenable or success-

¹ H.E., iv. 7, 11.

³ *L'Église chrétienne*, p. 165.

² See the mention of *διαρρηθῆ*, 889.

⁴ 600.

ful than other attempts of the human intellect to take infinity captive, yet deserving of honour as the great venture of a great mind, in spite of all its inevitable failure. The Valentinian school was more prominent than any other in Alexandria, and its tenets must have been well known to all Clement's more educated hearers. Marcion had been a teacher of a very different type, less imaginative than Valentinus, with less of the Hellene in his nature, but far more deeply conscious of the problem of moral evil than any other religious teacher of his time. Clement, who was shocked, after the manner of Job's friends, by Marcion's impiety, was right in calling him a "giant."¹ Such teachers did not fail to leave their mark, and though, as a rule, the resulting Gnostic schools fell far below the level of their various founders, and soon lost themselves in the mazes of uncontrolled speculation or moral licence,² it remained for many years no slight commendation for an opinion that Valentinus had held it or Marcion believed it true. Such an appeal to the great names of the last generation would lead many an Alexandrine Churchman in the direction of this aristocratic heterodoxy. Where, indeed, should Gnosticism have its stronghold, if not in the city which was connected with the names of Cerinthus and Basilides, of Apelles and Valentinus, and in which there was less hindrance, than in any other great centre, to the abundant development of its schools?

But we must turn from its credentials to its message, and ask what were the elements in Gnosticism, which made it so evidently attractive? No single answer can, of course, be given to such a question, for though Tatian and Carpo-

¹ ὁ θεομάχος οὗτος γίγας 522. There is, of course, a reference to the giants of mythology, who attacked the gods.

² Cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Valentinianos*, 4, "Itaque nusquam jam Valentinus, et tamen Valentiniani."

crates might both be accounted Gnostics, their teaching would appeal to very different natures. But, among the reasons which were likely to lead the better educated members of Clement's flock to adopt Valentinian or Marcionite opinions, we shall hardly be wrong in accounting the following as prominent and considerable.

To many the glamour and completeness of a cosmological theory would no doubt appeal. In an age when Philosophy had limited its most serious concern to moral conduct, and Science, in the modern sense of the term, did not exist, here was a doctrine which offered to solve those deeper riddles of the universe, at which Heraclitus and Anaxagoras had vaguely guessed, and for which neither Plato's *Timæus*, nor the later Stoic theories, could promise more than tentative solutions. To be led up to the absolute, the original, the uncontaminated Source of Being, and then, stage by stage, to trace the delicate gradations by which Existence, Time, Sense, Matter, Evil, and a multitude of half poetical, half personified Activities, and finally this concrete World-Order as man knows it, came into being, was indeed a fascinating prospect for an intrepid intelligence, with no knowledge of its own limitations. Basilides dreamed of such a comprehensive theology. The attempt of Valentinus in the same direction has been placed remorsefully on record by Irenæus. Clement, as we have seen, had himself some such idea of a great scheme of knowledge and hoped, it may be, to meet here the Gnostics on their own ground. The Gospel in this way came to be defined as "the knowledge of supramundane things."¹ Modern critics of these bygone speculations remark that they contradict common sense. The criticism is true for the moderns. It was also true for Irenæus. But for many an Alexandrine Catholic it was by no means self-evident

¹ Hippolytus, vii. 27.

that the Valentinian teaching was absurd. The prospect, from the intellectual standpoint, was at any rate so splendid as to justify some considerable element of risk.

Moreover, this higher way of Knowledge was only for the few. It was the Royal Road of the elect, appointed only for that "spiritual" minority, who were by nature a distinct order, with whom the crowd of "natural" or "material" souls could claim little in common.¹ The man of philosophic training, who found the brotherhood of the uncultured a somewhat exacting part of Christian obligation—Catholicism, says Renan, has no aristocracy²—found a welcome relief from the familiarity of slaves and wool-combers in circles where the claims of culture and the intellect seemed to be held once more at their proper value. The Gnostics were not a humble people. Conceit was a true and easy charge to bring against them.³ They held themselves aloof from the multitude of the believers, and disdained to cast their pearls before the common swine. On the other hand, it is easy to understand the attraction of the higher, esoteric enlightenment for the educated section of the Church.

Moreover, for all whose previous training had been in the schools and philosophies of Greece, Gnosticism had the further advantage of close affinities with Hellenism. It is a disputed point among the authorities whether, fundamentally, the Hellenic or the Oriental characteristics predominated in these Heresies. Probably, in the many phases of their development, now one and now the other tendency was supreme. But in Alexandria at any rate the

¹ This frequent distinction, *πνευματικοί, ψυχικοί, υλικοί*, is given, *e.g.*, in 982-3.

² "Déjà l'essence du catholicisme était de ne souffrir aucune aristocratie, pas plus celle de la philosophie hautaine que celle de la sainteté prétentieuse," *L'Église chrétienne*, p. 168.

³ Their *δαξοσοφία* and *φιλοτιμία*, 892. Their *οἴησις*, 894.

Greek element was the stronger, though it may have been otherwise in Antioch or Edessa. Basilides and Valentinus really carried on the work of Philo. They were in line with Plato and Pythagoras. It was a common charge against them, that they were indebted to such earlier sources, and their title to be accounted Christians was questioned on this very ground.¹ Such indebtedness, whatever else it may have involved, at least preserved for the baptised Hellene much that he had valued before he came over to Christianity. Clement's own example has already given us an illustration of the importance of this concession. Gnostic teachers had anticipated him in retaining Plato while they read the Gospels ; they gained, no doubt, their most important adherents by the assurance that citizenship in the New Jerusalem was quite compatible with entire loyalty to the essential claims of Athens. What chance had even Tertullian's indignation against such attractive overtures as these ?

More important, however, though not always recognised, was the *religious* element in Gnosticism. The extravagances of these schools have been amply preserved, and we can form a tolerably clear estimate of their dangers ; but it needs some care and vigilance, if we are to deal fairly with their spiritual value. It is not only true that "they were the Theologians of the first century,"² and that "there is no mean thinking in some of their strange theories."³ Side by side with their intellectualism and their cosmological speculations ran a strain of practical teaching, with a true Gospel of Grace and of Redemption and a definite attempt to meet religious needs.⁴ To this ethical and truly Chris-

¹ *E.g.* by Hippolytus.

² Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, i. 227.

³ Gwatkin, *Early Ch. Hist.*, ii. 67.

⁴ On the distinctively religious element in Gnosticism see Mansel, *Gnostic Heresies*, p. 3 : Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis*, pp. 18 *sqq.* : C. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, 424 *sqq.* Marcion, in particular, "was a religious character." *Hist. Dogm.*, i. 269.

tian side of their activities the Catholic Fathers are not unnaturally indifferent, yet it is just in virtue of this element that Gnosticism never became a mere philosophy. The work of the Saviour may be spiritualised or reinterpreted, but it is never abandoned. The need of a divine Power for human recovery is recognised in all their more important systems, while the ultimate victory of the higher and spiritual forces in the Cosmos is never surrendered, even when Gnostic Pessimism takes its most sombre forms. There is more true religion in the Gnostic *Hymn of the Soul*, than in many ancient and modern productions which have passed as Catholic, and if any disciple of Clement ever fell in with either Heracleon or Ptolemæus, he probably gained piety as well as instruction from such association. Not the least attractive element in Gnosticism was that, in professing to show the road to higher Illumination, it did not abandon its purely religious message. It appealed to the spirit as well as to the intelligence.

An interpretation of the Cosmos, a place in the higher order of the elect, the right to bring Plato into Christianity, together with the hope and full assurance of a true Gospel of Grace and Redemption, were thus among those enrichments of the new faith which Gnosticism, at its best, could offer to the select spirits, who were meet for such possessions. By these positive gains the great heretical teachers won their followers, and stirred the more central forces in the Church to activity and opposition. But there were negative advantages also, a freedom from certain burdensome elements in Christianity, escape from which must often have been welcome.

Both the Hellene, and the man whose affinities lay further East, must have been relieved by the Gnostic depreciation of all that was concrete, sensible, material. It was not really in the flesh that the Word had come.

There had been a temporary association of the Divine with the human, but no more. Thus the heavenly Christ had neither been truly born of Mary, nor truly suffered upon the Cross. The Resurrection, His and ours, was spiritualised and freed from its incongruities, while the whole drama of Redemption was shifted from the temporal and historic to the supramundane plane. For those who are elect, the souls chosen from the greater number of "the called" and recognised as of higher spiritual birth,¹ the body was really of no account. Therefore it might either be allowed its will, or repressed in rigid asceticism. Marcion and Carpocrates were agreed that, in itself, the soul's material vesture should be treated with disregard. So the Gnosis offered diverse forms of freedom from the claims of the body, and the message of Christianity was relieved of all necessary implication in historic, concrete, material events. The "Apathy" of the Stoic schools, and the Platonic dislike to contaminate the Divine by contact with birth and with becoming, were both allowed. Gnostic Christianity abandoned here too much. Its surrenders were soon seen to be incompatible with its claims. But they were undoubtedly welcome to many who, from lifelong conviction, regarded the material not as the Spirit's medium but as its foe.

So with the Old Testament. To sincere and thoughtful monotheists it was difficult to accept the national Deity of the Hebrews as the supreme Source and Ruler of the universe. It was not less difficult to reconcile the evident evil of the world with absolute Beneficence. And though Marcion had no complete Cosmology to offer, after the manner of Basilides and Valentinus, at least he got rid of one which, from the Hellenic standpoint,² was demonstrably

¹ εὐγένεια, 526, 546.

² The Greeks always "ran down the Law," 492.

false, when he declared that the Deity of the Old Testament was the subordinate and not entirely good Creator. The moral difficulties of the narrative, the severity of the Law, the excessive claims of Hebraism, and all else that had driven Philo a century before to allegory, were frankly thrown over by the great heresiarch of Pontus. His sombre pessimism was more unrelieved than any that the soul of Greece had ever known, yet a Christian who came from Athens may well have welcomed the relief from many difficulties, which his criticisms secured. Marcion's dualism is as impossible as any ever propounded. The difficulties of the Old Testament are as little to be solved by his expedient, as by Philo's allegory. But he faced real problems, and we can feel no surprise that his teaching found considerable acceptance in Alexandria. Besides, the Jews were more unpopular there than in any other great city of the Empire, and some "enlightened" Churchmen may have been glad to be assured that they owed no manner of allegiance, either to their Scriptures, or to their severe Deity.

There were other ways, perhaps less creditable, in which Gnosticism relieved the elect few from difficulty. In particular, it was often less rigid and unbending than the Church, and had fewer scruples in accommodating itself to the surrounding world. This is only true of certain phases of Gnosticism, for at times its asceticism could run to any extremes, and Marcion's refusal to baptise persons, who had been guilty of marriage, could hardly have commended his tenets to those who sought a comfortable creed.¹ But often its very claim to superiority resulted in an indifference to rules and obligations ; though these might seem necessary enough for "Galileans" or the merely faithful. The followers of Nicolaus saw no harm in eating things offered

¹ On this point see, however, Professor Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 311.

to idols ; others placed statues of the philosophers side by side with the figure of the Lord,¹ while it was commonly held that the Gnostic was at liberty to deny his faith in the exigencies of persecution. His testimony, or martyrdom, was of another order, and he probably approved as little as Marcus Aurelius of the "sheer obstinacy" of many Christians. Often there was real justification for the charge that they loved their lives too well,² though this attitude was not universal. Both the Valentinian and Marcionite schools could point to their lists of actual martyrs.³ And, in the main, the later adherents of Gnosticism were guilty of a laxity which could never have been charged against its eminent leaders. But there may well have been timid and yet sincere natures within the Church, to whom it was a real relief to know that the impossible was not demanded. It is never quite easy to say how Naaman should behave in the house of Rimmon.

Thus, like Irenæus in Lyons, Tertullian in Carthage, Hippolytus in Rome, Clement found himself confronted in Alexandria with a rival teaching so varied, so diffused, so subtle, that it was as difficult to attack as it was dangerous to leave unchallenged and uncriticised. It is impossible to sum up in any single statement Clement's attitude towards the many doctrines, which pass under the common name of "Gnostic."⁴ Like many other teachers of wide information and liberal views, he found an unqualified judgment quite impossible. He must often blame, but he

¹ Iren., i. 25, 6 ; 26, 3.

² φιλοζωῶσι, 571.

³ Iren., iv. 33, 9 ; H.E., v. 16. Clement mentions how some—"not of our people"—sought this death.

⁴ How many varieties of teaching have been termed "Gnostic" may be seen by the German epigram—

"Was man nicht definieren kann,

Das sieht man gern als 'gnostisch' an."

Herzog, *Encyc.*, art. "Gnosticismus," Bd. vi., p. 730.

can sometimes praise, and for this he shared the suspicion which so commonly attaches itself to a balanced verdict. Let us consider where the stress of his blame and of his commendation falls.

In the main, Clement is quite conscious of the general divergence between the Church and the Heresies. Part of his purpose in writing was to set forth the tenets of the most important sects and to show their error.¹ He believed that every perversion or travesty of the truth could be fairly refuted from Scripture, though it needed a keen and trained mind to conduct the argument.² As compared with the Church, two defects characterised the Gnostic teaching. It was extremely varied : what one sect taught, another denied : time would never allow him to deal with all these numerous and incompatible views.³ All this shifting diversity seemed to stand in marked inferiority to the ideal unity of the Church. A second defect of not less moment became apparent, when one compared the antiquity and orderly growth of the Church with the later origin and rapid formulation of Gnostic views. Their doctrines had been published with such haste and rashness ; even their best known leaders, such as Marcion or Prodicus, were so inferior to the great men of old,⁴ and there were, besides, such evident differences between the founders of the various schools and their successors, that the advantage of the ancient tradition over this mushroom growth of novelties seemed an indisputable argument in the Church's favour.

It is in this strain that Clement refers to the conceit and assertive confidence of the Heretical Schools.⁵ He challenges their motives ; they were ambitious, anxious to find a specious cloak for moral laxity ; even Tatian did not deal fairly and honestly with truth.⁶ They stole the Church's rule for their

¹ 324.² 543.³ 529, 893.⁴ 896.⁵ 112, 128-9, 456, 997.⁶ 547, 895, 897.

personal ends ; they were ready to say, "Lord, Lord !" but they did not do as the Lord said, and so grave scandal fell often by their default upon the Name.¹ Sometimes he is so indignant, that he declares an opinion is unfit for discussion in his book.² Sometimes he tells them roundly, that their perverted doctrine is more likely to show the way to a brothel than to the kingdom of God.³ Much of their teaching seemed to be impious and irreverent, and he recurs constantly to the ingratitude of all Pessimism in its rejection of the gifts of God.⁴ So he compares Gnostic opinions in the Church to the tares sown among the wheat.⁵ In another passage he says that their dogmas are as bitter as wild almonds ; he also complains of their "patchwork," much as Irenæus did ;⁶ but it is all a matter of human teaching and human assemblies,⁷ they have no claim or title to the possession of the grace and truth of God. His utterances are sometimes contemptuous ; on occasion he even accuses Basilides and Valentinus of chattering nonsense,⁸ and in other cases uses similar terms with a greater measure of justification.

Now all this is the language of pronounced and decided hostility, and, if it were taken alone, it would convey a very partial and erroneous impression of Clement's mind upon the subject. It might indeed be argued from some of his statements that, after all, Clement was much in line with Irenæus and Tertullian, and saw as little good as they did in the teaching of these bold innovators. But it is not difficult to account for the vigour of his criticism. On the extreme side of Gnosticism, where it was most remote from the doctrine and practice of the Church, there were insidious

¹ 511, 901.² 513.³ 524.⁴ 520, 584, 593.⁵ 774.⁶ 893. Iren., i. 9, 4 ; ii. 14, 2.⁷ αἰρέσεις ἀνθρώπων, 890. ἀνθρώπειαι διδασκαλῖαι, 896. ἀνθρώπων συνηλύσεις, 898.⁸ 448.

moral dangers, of which Clement had a profound and creditable dread. His antagonism is far more determined by ethical than by intellectual considerations, and originated no doubt in large measure from his actual knowledge of scandals and depravities in Alexandria. A certain pastoral strain seems to come out in the "professor's" nature, as we recognise his fear, lest those who have been known to him in the lecture-room should be captured by the dangerous attractions of specious laxity. His business is not to discover the elements of real value in the medley of Gnostic doctrines, but to save the educated section of the Church from being led along the slippery paths of a dominant and dangerous speculation. Hence comes his normal attitude of opposition. As we shall see, this was not incompatible with some effort to do justice to those with whom he differed, nor even with a very considerable indebtedness to the better elements of their achievement. He does not wholly forget his characteristic charity, for, with all their errors, the Gnostics, he holds, deserved pity rather than hatred.¹ He is willing to defend Nicolaus, one of their leaders, against current misrepresentations;² and, in marked contrast to Polycarp's attack upon "the first born of Satan," expresses the charitable hope that Marcion,³ who must now have been dead some years, may perchance be induced by repeated arguments to change his mind and think more kindly of the Creator.

Out of the strange diversity of doctrines into which the

¹ 895-6.

² 490-1, 523.

³ 593. This reference to Marcion is very curious. Clement writes with his amendment in view; *εις ἐντροπήν Μαρκίωνος, ἢν πως μεταβάληται πεισθείς*. As the words stand they would naturally imply that Marcion was still living. Clement's writings could hardly reach him in another world. But the general view is that Marcion did not survive Anicetus, *i.e.* that he died not later than A.D. 165. He had clearly been dead some time when (about A.D. 200) Tertullian wrote the *De præscriptione hereticorum*, c. 30. There is no ground for suspecting the text of the passage in Clement.

Gnostic movement seemed to be dissipated, there emerge certain larger and prominent issues, on which the controversy was maintained at higher levels. In the case of certain other elements in the false Gnosis, there was no need of any laboured demonstration. Their own extravagance was their best refutation. The *Pistis Sophia*, for example, at whatever date it may have been written, was never likely to exert any great influence over Western minds. It could safely be ignored. But it was otherwise with such fundamental issues as the Freedom of the will, Dualism, the speculative Cosmology of the Valentinians. On such points the Church could not afford to leave her teaching doubtful. Clement, in these matters, takes the Gnostics quite seriously, and his attitude is worth examination.

It was a common theory with some of the most important sects, that the world contains three separate classes of men. These, though not invariably distinguished by the same terms, are usually described as "spiritual," "natural," and "material" by nature. Their separation into such types is a part of the predetermined order, for the supramundane Wisdom is a power of distinction,¹ and a man's destiny is assigned to him before his birth. Only the highest class is foreordained to eternal life, and such a supreme gift is inalienable, no matter what the manner of a man's life may be. Such higher birth, as we have already seen, brings the dangerous right to entire freedom of conduct in its train.² It is quite evident that in such a scheme no place is left for human responsibility. The gifts of the Spirit are not to be sought and won, nor is the prize to him who fights life's battle best. The world-order determines a man's spiritual qualities, as absolutely as it fixes the courses of the stars.

The Gnostics were here raising an ancient and still

¹ 448.

² 510. Gnostic εὐγένεια conferred ἐλευθερία, 546.

unsettled controversy, and their solution of it was no more final than Aristotle's, or Calvin's, or Bishop Butler's. The strange thing is that they were not delivered from such determinism by their indebtedness to Plato, whose familiar dictum on freedom and responsibility was surely well known in their schools.¹ Clement on this point is at direct issue with their teaching. The followers of Basilides had borrowed from medical science a term by which they described the passions as the "appendices"² of the soul. Certain spirits, they held, were attached to man's rational nature without his will, and other strange growths were appended in turn to these. In this way a man carries within him the characteristics of the wolf, the lion, or the ape, and even other influences from the lower vegetable and animal worlds. Such latent elements expressed themselves from time to time in his actions. The forces were there and operated according to their natures, and if a man did not "let the ape and tiger die," the fault lay somewhere outside the range of his control.

Clement does not deal with this curious anticipation of Darwinian theories at any length. Such a discussion is postponed, after his manner, till he comes to write his treatise on the Soul, but he remarks that a man's nature becomes, on this Basilidean hypothesis, a sort of "Trojan horse" or, as he might have added, a kind of Noah's Ark. He gains a clear point in the argument by a clever quotation from a work of Isidorus, Basilides' own son, in which it is admitted that, if the soul is thus allowed to be a complex and composite nature, the wicked have no slight justification for their plea that they were forced, or carried away, or driven to act without their will. In other words, Clement appeals to the very school he is criticising

¹ αἰτία ἐλομένου θεὸς ἀνάτιος. *Rep.*, 617. It is a favourite quotation with Clement.

² προσαρτήματα, 488.

for a recognition of the evident truth that all moral action depends on freedom. He mentions a modification of this theory by Valentinus,¹ who compared the soul to a caravan-serai, within which all kinds of visitors make their habitation, with little care or consideration for their temporary lodging. But according to Valentinus the soul is cleansed and purified by the action of divine Providence, and so is freed from the desecration of these dæmonic influences. To which Clement replies by raising the question, Why did not the divine Providence take charge of the soul from the beginning? Either the soul did not deserve it, in which case Providence seems to have changed its mind; or else, on Valentinian grounds, it was a "saved nature," in which case it should never have admitted such intruders, unless, indeed, it was too weak to keep them out. The theory of Valentinus prevents his admitting, what Clement would have deemed the true explanation, that the soul itself repented and chose the better part. Such is the divergence of views which results, according as our theory of salvation makes it dependent on repentance and obedience, or on mere nature, without act of will or moral effort. Clement carries conviction when he adds that it is we, and not evil spirits within us, who commit sins. Conversely, man has the power of himself to choose the noblest course. Over all obstacles he may rise triumphant. The shadow of Oriental Fatalism seems never to have fallen on Clement's happy soul.

The unmerited sufferings of the Righteous have formed a problem for man's faith in the divine order ever since the days of Job. Christian martyrdom brought the difficulty again into prominence; indeed, the sufferings and death of Jesus raised in reality the same question. Basilides had dealt with this matter in the twenty-third book of his *Exegetica*,² and had advanced, or revived, the somewhat

¹ 488-9.

² 599 sqq.

hazardous theory, that all such suffering was a beneficent penalty for sin. Substantially, his explanation did not differ from that of Eliphaz and his comrades in the Hebrew Drama, though he amplifies the theory by suggesting that the *liability* to sin may in some cases be punished and not the actual deed. In other words, the perfect man, like a child, suffers remedially for his undeveloped propensities, even though the occasion for evil actions has never presented itself. The explanation is further safeguarded by being combined, as in the Karma of the Buddhists, with the doctrine of Metempsychosis. Our sufferings in this life may be the outcome of our deeds in a previous state of existence.

Now this, again, is a very thorough-going piece of determinism, and Basilides, who never shrank from pressing his principles to their full conclusions, had even, it seems, been willing to argue from the Passion to the sinfulness of the human Jesus. Clement criticises severely the impiety of this suggestion, though he is also quite fair in allowing that Basilides' motive throughout is to maintain the absolute goodness of the providential Order. He succeeds in placing Basilides in a considerable dialectical difficulty, by raising the question of the man who denies the faith before his judge, and so escapes penalty. Let me ask Basilides, says Clement, whether it is Providence that decides whether the man shall make his confession and receive punishment, or fail to do so. Clearly, if he denies his faith, he will not be punished. Now if Basilides argues in this case from the result, and says that Providence determined the man's denial and escape, because he did not deserve to be punished, then, however little Basilides may wish it, he implies that Providence is also responsible for the ultimate perdition which must befall one who shall be guilty of such a denial. Moreover, on this supposition, what indeed becomes of the Martyr's crown?

Clement conducts his argument against Basilides with not a little acumen, though he is more convincing in his proof that the extreme Determinism of the Gnostics cannot be consistently maintained, than in his own solution of the problem under discussion. He believes the Providence and the Goodness of God can both be defended on the theory that the sufferings of the righteous occur, not because God wills them, but because He does not prevent them.¹ This is an explanation which does not in reality explain. It does more credit to Clement's piety than to his intellectual mastery of the subject. But his intense interest in maintaining human freedom is undeniable and stands to his honour. If he has not been able to reconcile this with the divine Sovereignty, he fails at least in good company.

A further typical illustration of Clement's attitude on this subject may be found in the opening chapter of the fifth book of the *Stromateis*.² Clement is discussing faith. He turns aside to consider the Gnostic theory, that man's knowledge of God depends upon his natural qualities, and refers to Basilides' view that faith is superior to intelligence, to be interpreted as spiritual loyalty, true riches, the right to approximate to the Creator. On this theory faith is not a faculty, but a matter of essence, nature, substance, of our make rather than of our will, an "undefined grace of our inalienable creation," but not the reasonable assent of an independent soul. Consider what follows from this. The commandments of the Old and New Testaments are useless, if a man is saved, faithful, and elect in virtue of his nature. Human nature, of itself, could have recovered in the course of time without any advent of a Saviour. Whereas, if the necessity of the Lord's coming is admitted, natural qualifications fall to the ground at once as insufficient, since the salvation of the elect becomes dependent, not on nature,

¹ 602.

² 643 *sqq.*

but on instruction, purification, and good works according to the Saviour's teaching. Take the faith of Abraham. Was he elect or not? If not, how shall we account for his immediate and evidently natural faith? But if he was elect, this theory collapses, for then election and salvation would be found to have existed before the Advent. In this case the Saviour's coming, the necessity for which Gnosticism strongly asserted, would have no sufficient and intelligible purpose.

In all these discussions Clement, at any rate, realises the magnitude of the issue. Christianity cannot be defended, on the Gnostic theory of distinct natures, as a religion possible for free men and for the striving multitude, however pleasant its doctrine of a spiritual aristocracy might be to the scanty minority of the elect. Here, for once, the learned father fights the battle for simple and commonplace believers. He pleads the cause of those who were despised as "natural" men. The "babes" of Christ must not be robbed of their great heritage, nor the lowly seeker after light and truth excluded from the new Israel. And in his main contention, that Determinism is a theory which will not account for all the facts, he is right from the logical, as well as from the spiritual, point of view.

Probably the most dangerous of all the opponents of the central and Catholic teaching of the Church was Marcion, the wealthy shipowner of Pontus. Several years must have elapsed since the end of his long life, when Clement made critical references to his views. Possibly Marcion's desire in old age for reconciliation with the Church of his Baptism, though it was never destined to be fulfilled, accounted for the generous hope which Clement expresses for his reversion to older and better ways.¹ How Clement regarded Marcion's teaching on marriage we have already explained in a previous

¹ 593, see note on p. 50, *supra*.

chapter. He must also have had considerable acquaintance with Marcion's views on Scripture. But there were also other issues involved, and the extent and danger of the Marcionite teaching may be gathered from Clement's reiterated references to the main points of the controversy. There is a notable difference in the tone of the criticism, when we compare Clement's treatment of Valentinus with his attitude to Marcion. Yet Alexandria was the native home of the Valentinians, and hardly the atmosphere in which Marcionite doctrine would have been expected to take root and thrive. The more significant is Clement's pronounced opposition. The view that Marcion was the most formidable opponent of orthodoxy, may find considerable justification in the fact that Tertullian's attack on his teaching, if stripped of its aggressive rhetoric, does not go beyond the deep and fundamental divergence, which inspires the many references in Clement. On this point the representatives of Carthage and Alexandria were at one.

Where Clement, like the other Fathers, joins issue most directly with Marcion is over his Dualism. It was the central element in his system, and his attitude on other points was invariably determined by it. God is so good, said Marcion, that He could not have made the world we know. Therefore it must be the work of another, of a Creator, or Demiourgos, who is not good, but is identified with the hard, just, national Deity of the Old Testament. Redemption by the Advent of the Christ is the work of the good God ; and it is thus a real salvation, a real revelation, a real reversal of the world's evil order, that is offered us in Christianity. The theory is strongly antithetic and dualistic. Its entire pessimism as regards Nature is in exact proportion to its tremendous claims on behalf of Grace. The world is depreciated to the greater glory of the Gospel, and Paulinism pushed to its most startling extreme. There is

some doubt as to the exact position of the second God or Creator, for the Dualism is obviously not complete, if the just, creative Deity is in any degree subordinate to the good God ; but the real intention of Marcion's work, as Harnack has made clear,¹ was religious and soteriological. He has no Cosmology and no absolute Being, but an over-mastering consciousness of the evil of the world and of the magnificent redemption effected by the Incarnation. If the "Gnostic warp and woof" in his theories is sometimes evident, there is still good ground for the claim that his "ideas were Christian through and through,"² and his system, with all its pessimism, may well have attracted Greeks by its entire depreciation of the Old Testament, and Christians by its unprecedented estimate of the Gospel. It is not given to everyone to feel enthusiasm over a mere republication of the moral law.

Clement's criticism of this teaching is that the world, in spite of its contradictions and diversity, is a unity. Goodness and justice cannot be antagonistic.³ The fear and punishments of the Law are not irreconcilable with love, but indeed are one of its manifestations. It is not true that the good God cannot be the Creator of the world because of His goodness. Rather, it is because He is good that He became Father and Creator.⁴ There is no entire opposition, such as Marcion taught, between the Creator and the Saviour, the Law and the Gospel.⁵ The truth is that the same God works through both Dispensations ; the variety is in the means employed, but never in the purpose or in the directing agency. Clement will allow no justification for the hostility

¹ See his account in *Hist. Dogm.*, i. 266 sqq.

² F. C. Burkitt, *Gospel History and its Transmission*, 291.

³ ἡ νομοθεσία τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθότητα καταγγέλλει, 473 ;
cf. 153.

⁴ 150.

⁵ 457, 542, 544-5 ; *cf.* his continual justification of fear as a motive ;
 λογικὸς φόβος, 446.

of these heretics to Nature and the Cosmos ; their antagonism to the Creator seems to him a piece of thankless impiety, and their theory that existence is the prison house of the soul neither true nor even original.¹ Even Marcion's soteriology will not bear examination, for if the good God did nothing to rescue humanity before the Advent, it discredits His goodness that He left redemption till so late, and His interference then seems a poor imitation of such saving beneficence as the Creator Deity had already accomplished.² Moreover, consistent Pessimism was impossible : even a celibate must eat food and breathe the air, and so avail himself of the blessings of the evil world.³ Marcion's followers had as little esteem as the Montanists for Christians of the merely "natural" order, but would they maintain that even their leader himself was as wise as the great Masters of old, whose teaching and traditions he had handled with such reckless disregard ?⁴

Such is Clement's attitude, consistently maintained, to Marcion and his school. Two points come out in strong relief, when we gather together his many scattered references to this living controversy. Clement's nature, as we have often had occasion to notice, was fundamentally unitive, harmonious, reconciling. He loves to collect truth from many sources ; he hates antagonisms. Nowhere does this native characteristic display itself more strongly than in his attitude towards this mighty yet dangerous teacher of the last generation, who divided the Gospels with a penknife, set Moses at variance with Saint Paul, turned Prophecy into an enemy of the Gospel, and even introduced his irreconcilable discords into the very being and nature of the

¹ 516, 528.

² 645. This was a common criticism : *cp.* Tertullian, *Adv. Marcionem*, i. 22 ; ii. 28.

³ 516, 527-8.

⁴ 896.

Godhead. "I will tear your Church,"¹ said Marcion to the Roman elder. To Clement it seemed that he had rent the seamless robe of truth and the beautiful unity of God's order. It is hard to conceive that any offence would appear more impious and disastrous in the eyes of the Alexandrine master of synthesis and accommodation.

But it is not less clear that Clement had never grasped Marcion's problem. The experience of life had given him many things, but it had never led him to those dark places of the soul, where spiritual forces clash without fusion, and the strife of Empedocles seems to reign supreme.² He had neither sounded the problems of evil, nor measured the depth of humanity's needs, nor trodden those wild, tempestuous regions of the spirit, of which the horrors of Marcion's native Pontus, as Tertullian described them,³ might well be graphically symbolic. Therefore, while we feel that Clement in his treatment of the most dangerous heresy of his time is undoubtedly more right than his opponent, we are conscious also that there is a certain superficiality in his criticisms. They are justified and they are true. They convince us, as similar arguments in the writings of other Fathers do, that Marcion's theories cannot stand. But the soul of Marcion had known the iron and the tragedy of life as neither Clement nor Irenæus nor Tertullian knew it, and his orthodox opponents, while they saw his errors, did scant justice to his greatness. Not the least notable consequence of his achievement is the fact that, through opposition to it, a convinced and usually consistent Hellene such as Clement, comes forward as the champion of Hebraism and the Law.

¹ Epiphanius, *Adv. Hæres.*, I, iii. 42 (2).

² Hippolytus, vii. 29 *sqq.*, connects Marcion's teaching with that of Empedocles.

³ See the remarkable description of the locality in Tertullian, *Adv. Marcionem*, i. 1.

There is no special difficulty in defining Clement's attitude in relation to the foregoing controversies. If the Gnostics denied, at least by implication, the doctrine of Human Freedom, Clement asserted it. If Marcion and his school declared the Cosmos was divided and two Gods ruled, Clement stood for unity and a monistic basis. The issues are clear and direct. But when we come to other departments of Gnostic speculation, Cosmology, Angelology, and the like, the case is different. It becomes at once impossible to draw sharp contrasts between Clement and, for example, the Valentinians. The task of distinguishing between his criticisms and his debts grows here particularly delicate, while the literary questions connected with the *Stromateis*, the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, and the *Eclogæ Propheticæ*, introduce a further complication.

We have already seen in a former chapter that Clement left his great undertaking incomplete. His intention of presenting a scheme of the totality of truth from the Christian standpoint was never fully accomplished, and the reader may recollect that, among the possible causes for this surrender of his purpose, the most probable appeared to be his sudden departure from Alexandria, combined with his growing realisation that the magnitude of the task lay beyond his powers. But there is good ground for the supposition that he hoped at one time to erect, upon a Scriptural basis, a theory of Cosmic Order, which would in part have been suggested by the Gnostic speculations, and in part have formed their refutation. We have already remarked the frequency with which he refers to a projected discussion of "Principles."¹ There are similar references to a proposed treatment of the Origin of the World.² When he speaks of a Gnostic science of Nature, he most probably includes in

¹ ἀρχαί, 448, 564, 571, 604, 733, 737.

² φυσιολογία, κοσμογονία, 564. κόσμου γένεσις, 325, 827; cf. 779.

his purpose a consideration of what, in modern terminology, would be described as ontological problems. Now it is significant that many of these anticipations of his never fulfilled, and highly speculative, project occur in passages in which he is dealing with the Gnostics and their teaching.¹ In Clement's mind the dream of a complete and Christian scheme of all truth and all knowledge was never far removed from those Gnostic cosmologies, with which he was so familiar. He was well acquainted with Valentinian æonology and with the speculative philosophy of Basilides, whose purpose has been well described as a "pantheistic representation of the evolutions of the world in a series of necessary developments."²

From such advanced and arbitrary theories it is evident that Clement's system would have differed in two particular respects. It would have been far more closely related to Scripture. His cosmogony, for example, was to be an interpretation of the opening section of the book of Genesis.³ Heretical vagaries were to be corrected by the sound rule of the sacred text,⁴ and the whole scheme was to be firmly established on the sure basis of the received books. So sanity and consistency and contact with reality were to be maintained, even in those high, rare realms of pure ideas, where great minds had so often adventured themselves, only to end in the disaster of sublime absurdity. It was a further point of difference that, while the Gnostics commonly started with the Absolute, or the One,⁵ and attempted by grades of being, gradually descending from this source, to bridge the gap between remotest Infinity and the immediately concrete Fact, Clement's purpose was to work in the opposite direction, progressing by a series

¹ This is the case in pp. 448, 516, 520, 603-4.

² Mansel, *Gnostic Heresies*, 159.

³ 564.

⁴ 891.

⁵ *Cp.* the account of Basilides' theories in Hippolytus, vii. 20, and the passage in Clement, 524, ἐν ἧν τὰ πάντα κ. τ. λ.

of orderly advances from the common to the rare, from the lesser to the greater mysteries, from physiology or ontology to the transcendently divine.¹

This high purpose was of course never fulfilled. But the very fact that Clement so seriously entertained it, differentiates him at once in his relation to Gnosticism from all the other champions of the orthodox and Catholic teaching of the Church. It constitutes him Basilides' debtor as well as his critic, and justifies the view which regards his work as a phase in the development of the Gnosis.² What survive among his writings as the *Excerpta ex Theodoto* and the *Eclogæ Propheticae* are no doubt a further stage in the preparation for the great undertaking of his dreams. They are the fragmentary and partial fulfilment of his desire to expound and correct heretical speculation; yet it is so impossible to distinguish between the words of Theodotus and the words of Clement, there is so little antagonism and so much sympathetic presentation, in short it is so wholly beyond our critical powers to say where the Valentinian ends and where the Catholic begins, that these curious literary remnants can only be interpreted as a farther evidence of Clement's genius for discovering affinities and kindred teaching in quarters commonly regarded with suspicion and dislike.

There runs in this way, all through Clement's higher theology, a certain strain of Gnostic influence. His departure from the traditional eschatology of the Church,³ his undue depreciation of historic reality, his evident interest in speculation, his unfeigned delight in some of the better

¹ 564 and other passages.

² "Das Lehrsystem, das seine Schriften enthalten, bildet selbst ein neues wichtiges Moment in dem Entwicklungsgange der Gnosis," Baur, *Die christliche Gnosis*, p. 502.

³ On this subject see C. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, 526 *sqq.*: Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, i. 261.

examples of Gnostic exegesis, his profound belief in the possibility and the value of the higher "Gnosis," together with his bold appropriation of the term itself for that ideal of advanced Christian life, which the next chapter will describe, are all evidences of the extent to which a tendency he felt bound to criticise had found lodgment in his own nature. Probably Clement was more conscious of his opposition to Gnosticism than of his obligation to its influence and resources. In any case, he would have been too cautious to parade his debts to Valentinus. It remains true that his sympathies as well as his antagonisms must be equally considered, if we would understand his actual relationship to those varied phases of speculative theology of which Gnosis was the common name.

The desire to conserve the integrity and purity of Christianity, by its isolation from alien influences, is a familiar feature of all Church history. The first instinct of every religious institution which believes in the value of its own spiritual heritage, is to preserve this unimpaired. So the "New Learning" in all its forms is held suspect; and the contrasts between the Church and the world, between the old and the new, between the sacred deposit and the impieties of innovation, are sharply drawn in the interests of orthodoxy. The natural tendency of all that is traditional and established is towards belief in the value of possessions, towards distrust of the unexplored. Hence comes the honour which we pay to the Defenders of the Faith, who may be kings or controversialists, inquisitors or saints. It is sufficient that they protect the sanctuary from the invasion of unclean abominations, and that through their devotion Israel retains her heritage secure. This is the normal and natural tendency of every religion, from the moment at which it becomes conscious of its message. Its champions, from Tertullian to our latter-day

conservatives, express and formulate this fundamental instinct.

Clement belongs to a different line. He is an early example of that other tendency within the Church, which is the corrective and correlative of the defensive attitude. For all life involves the power of assimilation, as well as the power of resistance, and the organism maintains its existence as much by the appropriation of new forces as by self-protection from its foes. Hence comes the Church's need for that minority of wider minds, who discover values as well as antagonisms in the external forces, and whose liberal standpoint, while it inevitably loses something of religious intensity and conviction, finds compensating gains in the areas which stricter orthodoxy has left unexplored. The temptation, to the man who is conscious of truths and appeals for which the Church seems to have no ear and no aptitude, is to go over to the side of the new forces, and to leave the more ancient institution to a rude and tardy awakening. To remain within the traditional borders, and to plead in such an environment for those elements of truth, which are perverted or exaggerated but still vitally progressive in the teaching of the Church's rivals, is an ill rewarded, though it is an invaluable, service. Neither Clement nor Erasmus followed the line of an immediate success ; while many, who have prepared the way for the reception of suspected truths, have accomplished this honourable duty because they have preferred obscurity or unpopularity within the Church to recognition and more evident influence among the Heresies or Sects. To few types of ministry is Christianity more indebted than to that limited succession of teachers, who have never broken with the old ways, and never gone over to the foes or rivals of their Jerusalem, but who, after the manner of Jeremiah, and often with equally little popularity, have still discerned

in the external forces a veritable manifestation of the divine purpose. It is in this spirit that Clement opposes Gnosticism. We are sometimes inclined to wonder why he did not break with the suspicious and querulous company of the Orthodoxasts, and boldly add another to the many Valentinian schools. He remained true to his earlier allegiance, and it was to Catholicity, whatever that may have meant in Alexandria at the time, not to Heresy, that his services were given.

Yet he is the disciple of the heretics as well as their opponent. If the Gnostics had made Christianity possible for the educated, so did he. If Gnosticism is really Hellenism, Clement was a Hellene. If Gnosticism held religion to be a matter of ideas rather than of facts, so did the master of the Catechetical School. If the heretics claimed that the essence of advanced religion was the mind's apprehension of ultimate truth, Clement taught in principle the same scheme. It is hard to say whether criticism or assimilation predominates in his attitude. In any case, it is due to such recognition of the value and the necessity of higher teaching, that the Church was able to meet and outbid this competition. In controversy the truest victory lies with those who appropriate the rival truth. And, as the mind passes the succeeding phases of the Church's history in review, as we watch the various tendencies of the changing ages exert their influence upon her development, the twofold process of opposition and appropriation repeats itself with notable frequency. The "Ecclesia docens" is also the "Ecclesia discens," and "Fas est et ab hoste doceri." In the controversy with Arius, in the Revival of Learning, in the Reformation, in various Puritan movements, in the modern growth of Science, in the rise of the Critical Spirit, in the evolution of Democracy, the Church has been confronted by tendencies, which have in varying degrees been diverse

from her modes of thought and from her accepted traditions. From all, in varying degrees, she has had also to learn. In some instances her power of service for future ages has depended on such assimilation. Clement's relation to Gnosticism owes its interest to the fact that he so admirably exemplifies this twofold process, which is essential to religious vitality. He is at once the custodian of a heritage and a pioneer of a new spirit, at once the champion of continuity and the leader of wise and timely innovation.

When, however, all allowance has been made for the evident influence of Gnosticism upon Clement's interpretation of Christianity, the fact remains that his one serious controversy is with the Gnostics. In his works, as we possess them, there is a constant sense of the obligation to confront and disprove the dangerous elements in their teaching; and though he may think Nicolaus has been misrepresented, or discover wise exegesis in Heracleon, it is the errors and extravagances and immoralities of Gnosticism that even this liberal theologian has most in mind. Here, then, so far as he ever plays the *rôle* of the controversialist, we see Clement challenging the Church's rivals and doing battle for the truth. The spirit of the man comes out in his conduct of the argument. It cannot be claimed that he was specially effective as a fighter, or that his avowed dislike of rhetoric gave him that power of conviction, which sometimes specially belongs to the quiet men whose words are few. He is too discursive, and too far removed from the partisan temper, to be a giant of debate, and when Irenæus or Tertullian make the same points in controversy, they do it, as a rule, with greater incisiveness and effect than their contemporary in Alexandria.

But in one regard Clement's treatment of Gnosticism still remains a model for the religious teacher, who is involved in controversy. It is with the great and impor-

tant issues that he deals, and the motive is always the assertion of truth rather than rhetorical victory. The things he really cares to assert, as against the Gnostics, are the goodness of the World's order, human Freedom, sane morality, the spiritual possibilities of the unlearned, the true method of interpreting Scripture, the supremacy of the one God of Christian belief. It did not accord either with Clement's disposition, or with the scheme of his work, to give an adequate or final treatment to any one of these great issues. To a large extent he deals with them incidentally; he is fully conscious that some inevitable superficiality attaches to his handling of these themes. But at least he realises where the momentous issues lie, at least he places the controversy on its highest levels. Though he does not argue without a sense of humour, he is neither personal, nor violent, nor consciously unfair. He does not make great play with the minor mistakes or extravagances of his opponents, and even when he is dealing with Carpocrates and his doctrine of free love, it cannot be said that he throws mud. Probably the moral scandals of heresy were not less frequent in Alexandria than in Gaul, and Clement must have known episodes quite as discreditable as the career of Marcus, which is so fully portrayed in Irenæus. But, if he possessed such materials, Clement did not care to make great use of them; he may fairly be said to have met his opponents on the most serious issues they had raised. Tertullian was as familiar with Gnostic teaching as Clement was, but it is hard to conceive his treating any Gnostic work with such deliberate care and honesty, as we discover in the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*.

It is so easy and it is so common in theological controversy to impute motives, to take your opponent at his worst, to achieve trivial victories, and to involve the central issues in the dust of irrelevant debate, that tribute is surely due to every

defender of tradition who has desired to convince rather than to exasperate his opponents, and who has risen so far above the common temper of debate, as to retain his width of view and his sense of proportion unimpaired through many contests. The Christian Church cannot regard her conduct of such discussions with any great sense of satisfaction. Since party spirit reigned in Corinth, or Jerome poured out his vituperative wrath upon Jovinian, or Luther regretted that Savonarola's feet were soiled with theological mud, a change for the better has come over religious discussions, and the modern controversialist is at least more cautious in his imputation of motives to an adversary. But it remains an inherent liability of all religious argument that, where convictions are strong and the momentous character of the issues is keenly felt, our sense of fairness, our desire to think no evil, our limitation of interest to the vital elements in discussion, and, above all, our resolve to carry on the debate upon the highest and worthiest levels, are apt to fail. We strive to defend the Kingdom by violence, and deem sweet reasonableness a useless weapon in the stress of combat. To his temperament, to his nature, to his width of sympathy, Clement owed the possession of a finer spirit. If he did not stand out, like Athanasius or Luther, against the world, he may at least be said, even in controversy, to have retained something of the mind of Christ. There are few more searching tests of the reality of a man's religion.

In closing our account of Clement's relation to Gnosticism, it will be well to reassert and emphasise the true significance of his position. The Gnostics, whether of the Oriental or the Hellenic type, were at their best religious people, with a sincere sense of the value of redemption, and a true allegiance to Christianity, as they interpreted its message. But they held, and it was the one principal element common to all phases of the Heresy, that ultimate

spiritual values were to be discovered in the realm of ideas, knowledge, abstract being, eternal principles, and philosophic verity. They are the religious idealists of their day, and few authorities on the subject fail to remark the parallel between these early disciples of the Absolute and the kindred idealism of Hegel and his company. But with the Gnostics the outcome of this philosophic creed was the entire depreciation of all the lower elements of experience, not their transformation, or re-interpretation, through the pervading action of the higher principle. Plato and Eastern Dualism helped them to this result ; and, as an inevitable consequence, this material world and its diverse elements, all historical events, the changing drama of the individual life, the humanity of the Lord, the bodily vesture of the soul, and all that goes to give substance and colour to the common story of average men and women, are estimated in sharp contrast as the valueless and positively evil obstructions to the true life of the soul. The bulk and mass of human experience form the dark background, against which the higher activities of the elect minority of souls shine forth in painful and illuminated rarity.

How far Clement is drawn in this direction should be known to the reader from previous chapters. He, too, is in many respects a member of the fraternity of the Gnosis. But, on the central issue, he belongs to Christianity and the Church ; he takes sides, against the drift and prepossessions of his nature, with Irenæus and not with Valentinus. The world for him was God's good order. History had a divine purpose. The Lord entered the temporal and finite sphere. The Body had its value. For the multitude there was a Gospel. These, in spite of all apparent weakenings and abatements, are central articles in his creed. It is in virtue of these convictions that his Christianity dominates even his philosophy. Therein, for

all his Hellenism, he is at one with the Man of Nazareth, in claiming, as Jesus claimed, that the temporal and the material and the partial and the distinctively human factors in the Cosmos have an eternal significance and value, which is heightened and not depreciated by the pure light of revelation. The Gnostics sought freedom by the abandonment or elimination of the material world and all its associated elements. But there is a better way. It is the principle of the Athanasian Hymn, when it speaks of the "taking of the Manhood into God." Christianity teaches indeed a real redemption, a possible spiritualisation of all elements and of all persons, under the higher influence of which its Gospel tells. Clement, Alexandrian and philosopher, is with the Church in this fundamental assertion. To-day, when the world seems once again to be in quest of a Gospel, his attitude has its peculiar interest.

CHAPTER XIV

THE HIGHER LIFE

THE Church decided on the whole against Gnosticism. The Church was probably right, and Clement, as the previous chapter has shown us, was here in accord with Catholicity. Yet the tendency, of which the organised Gnostic schools were the expression, had existed within the Church from Apostolic times. Saint Paul regarded "Gnosis" as a gift of the Spirit, and knew that a certain natural satisfaction went commonly with its possession. He had seen no difficulty in stating the contrast between the "babes" in Christ, whose diet must be spiritual milk, and those who, being come to man's estate in understanding, could profit by the stronger fare. Among them that were perfect he, like Clement, could "speak the wisdom of God in a mystery." The Fourth Gospel pointed clearly in the same direction when it spoke of the further truth into which the Spirit should guide the Lord's followers, and of the "many things" which as yet they were unable to understand. From the first even the spirit of Christian brotherhood could never entirely obliterate the distinction between the intelligent and the simple. "Not many wise men" were called, but there were a few. Even the Kingdom of Heaven was to have its Scribes with their keys of knowledge. The difference between an Apollos and a Cephas did not always lead, as in Corinth, to open friction, but it must have been found

in most of the early Christian communities and never without its consequences. At the end of the first century Barnabas¹ is familiar with the idea of an esoteric Gnosis, within the Church; and Ignatius,² like Saint Paul, employed terminology of which fifty years later the heretical schools made abundant use. Celsus, too, writing in days when Gnosticism was at its height, knew that it was properly a growth inside the Church.³

Thus the intelligence and the spirit of inquiry claimed their own from the first. However deplorable the scandal which erratic speculation, or advanced morals, brought upon the faithful, still their company was never wholly freed from the men who added the love of knowledge to the love of Christ. The age was too intellectual for such a tendency to remain permanently ignored or in abeyance, but it had not hitherto been dominant or welcome. Charity had been more prized than learning. The Church believed too profoundly in her message to speculate upon it. "Knowledge puffeth up" was a much reiterated warning; and when the strange teaching of Valentinus and Marcion began to spread, and the worse dangers identified with Carpocrates or Marcus became known, it grew more difficult than ever to plead the cause of knowledge within circles where piety and unquestioning orthodoxy reigned supreme. The Episcopate was developed to secure the Church's heritage of truth, and it often seemed that this purpose was best attained by rigorous suppression of all questions and of all avoidable speculation.

Hence, in spite of the fact that the Apologists had been mostly men of culture, and that learned books of "Irenæus,

¹ *E.g.* vi. 9; ix. 8.

² For references see Lightfoot's Index, *Apostolic Fathers*, Part II., vol. II. (ii.), p. 1096, s.v. "Gnostic phraseology."

³ Origen, *c. Celsus*, iii. 12.

Melito, and the rest,"¹ were current in the Church before his time, it was a bold step for Clement to propound his characteristic theory of an orthodox Gnosis. It may be doubted whether the heretics or the simpler Churchmen were the more startled by this unexpected appropriation of a suspected term. It does not appear that any writer from the ecclesiastical standpoint had as yet hazarded the suggestion, that the Gnostics were right in principle, and only wrong in their mistaken deductions. And there was evident alarm in many minds when Clement asserted that simple faith was not the whole of Christianity, that higher ways of conduct, of vision, of spiritual life, and of Christian contemplation, were open to all who had the patience and the grace to climb them.

He was as wise as he was bold. To criticise Marcion, and to show that Basilides was in error, like all other destructive enterprises, was a negative method after all. If the converted Hellene was not to find rest for his questioning spirit in the Gnostic schools, where was he to turn? Back to the old philosophies? Or to the half-way house of Philo's allegories? Or should he set out, as Clement had done himself, on a tour of intellectual quest, hoping in Rome, or Tarsus, or Edessa, to light upon a second Pantænus? There was no need, Clement assured him. The Church could meet his needs. In her keeping, latent, unappropriated, yet capable of carrying the human spirit to any heights on which the atmosphere was not too rare for it to breathe, was the esoteric tradition of the Lord and His Apostles, at once the stimulus and the solution of all inquiry after higher truth. To his more intelligent pupils, many or few, who had not been drawn away from Mother Church by the liberty and the speculations and the prestige of the Gnostic schools, Clement offered an adequate alternative.

¹ H.E., v. 28.

Orthodoxy, too, had its Gnosis and its advanced teaching. Construction as well as criticism was a function of the Master. There were further stages attainable on the Royal Way, greater Mysteries to succeed the lesser, fairer visions than the soul had yet beheld. All these were open and offered, without any new departure or any dangerous alliances. So he points the road to the Higher Life.

We shall understand him best, if we recall the stages through which the *Protrepiticus* and *Pædagogus* guide us, and then trace the course of the Heavenward Journey onwards, till at length all traces of the route are lost in the splendours of the Beatific Vision. Like all other great conceptions of the Spirit, it has its practical and its ideal aspects: we may no more ask Clement than we would ask his masters, Christ or Plato, to draw the sharp defining line between the two. Roughly, and more for our own convenience than because they are separate in actuality, we may distinguish the various stages on the road, or, as they may be otherwise described, the several elements, or avenues, or manifestations, of the Higher Life.

About the initial stage there is little question. It is Faith. The moral training of the *Pædagogus* was for those who had responded to this appeal. The further spiritual advance, which is now in question, is only open to those who have this elementary qualification. Hence arises the interesting, if somewhat difficult, problem of the relation of Faith to those more developed gifts and graces, Beneficence, Apathy, Vision, Knowledge, and their kind. It is impossible to bring all Clement's utterances on this subject into any rigid consistency. His use of terms is somewhat variable, nor perhaps is he always master of his own language. But we shall probably do him no injustice, if we recognise that he regarded the connection between Faith and Knowledge as being close and intimate, and yet on

occasion found it necessary to lay considerable emphasis on the distinction between the two. His accounts vary with his point of view, and are often different without being incompatible.

There is, for example, in the *Pædagogus*, much that might seem at first sight to lead us to the identification of Faith and Knowledge.¹ Perfection, he says, is given with Baptism. Faith is the completion of learning. Illumination comes with our admission to the Church, and illumination is Gnosis. He writes strongly against those who would too completely distinguish "milk" from "meat" in the well-known passage of Saint Paul.² All are equal, all are spiritual. It recalls the equal penny of the Lord's parable. There seems to be no allowance for grades and distinctions, nothing to hint at the difference, elsewhere recognised, between the man who believes and the man who knows. Yet the passage itself shows that no such levelling equality is intended. He is writing to oppose the Gnostics who, as Clement thought, drew their lines of demarcation far too sharply, and tended to inflate the pride of the elect few and to despise the crowd.

As against this vicious separation, he emphasises the unity of the Church. The essential matter is to be within the boundaries of life. Only within this spiritual area is full attainment possible. It is more important that a man has passed within the domain of Light, than that he has or has not yet attained to this or that higher grade of vision. It seems, then, that he is really asserting a conviction which elsewhere³ also finds frequent expression in his pages, the truth, namely, that potentially the highest gifts of Christianity are for all. With the earliest faith, as soon as God is known at all, there comes the possibility of advancing to fullest intimacy

¹ See especially the sixth chapter of the First Book, 112-29.

² Elsewhere he fully accepts this distinction, 659-60, 685.

³ *E.g.* 593.

of communion and of vision.¹ Theoretically, it was a democratic Gospel ; practically, attainment was limited by human capacity and by human choice. The whole scheme of the *Pædagogus* depends on the assumption that by the proper training anyone who possessed faith might, in proportion to the measure of their spiritual capacities, pass on to the higher stages. The treatise, as we have seen, provided discipline for the ordinary believer in the world, and also fitted those who could profit sufficiently by it for the higher way of certitude and intuition.

Moreover, the "common faith" is never invalidated, never abandoned. It remains the foundation, the basis, the preparation for all later and nobler spiritual erections.² Without it, the higher gifts could not come to us.³ It is necessary, as the air we breathe ; assimilated, like the milk of our childhood, into the more settled and developed nature.⁴ Nothing is further from Clement's mind than to sever Faith from Knowledge. It finds its completion and perfection by growing up into surer vision, only lost, as childhood is lost, in maturity.⁵ For there is continuity in the spiritual life. Faith itself becomes of a higher quality as the soul ascends.⁶ In its intrinsic character it is not alien from the intelligence, for it may be defined in terms which belong to the category of the mind.⁷ If it is the "logical assent of an independent soul," if it can develop into "certain demonstration,"⁸ it is clearly not a quality divorced from reason ; we must hardly expect any such conception from so true a Hellene as the Stromatist. Rather we must believe that Clement conceived of Faith as the initial assent of man's nature, not least yet not solely of his intelligence, to the message and offer of the Gospel. There were many stages yet for him to travel, but,

¹ 831.² 659, 736.³ 643.⁴ 445. *πέπηγεν τῆ πίστει ὁ γνωστικός*, 456.⁵ 865.⁶ 608, 644.⁷ 444.⁸ 645, 775.

throughout them all, the significance and consequence of such primary illumination are never lost.

So far, Clement is concerned to assert the fundamental unity of all phases of the Christian life. So far, he claims for the ordinary believer spiritual kinship with the rare and elect minority, and holds that "knowledge and faith may be spoken of as in substance identical."¹ But within this common area he goes on to draw sharp contrasts, recurring again to the thought of the Higher Way, that was possible within the Church. To say that he erected a "barrier"² between the multitude and the few may be a partial, if not an untrue statement; but at least the distinction is one to which he deliberately gives great prominence. He is prepared to deny that mere abstention from evil, characteristic as it was of the ordinary believer, could ever be identified with Christian perfection.³ He is prepared to deny that simple faith can be placed on a level with full knowledge, for "to know is more than to believe."⁴ The range of Gnosis stretches far beyond the domain of elementary instruction, and the "perfection," which is potentially ours in Baptism, must be kept carefully distinct from the realised attainment of the Higher Way.⁵ The first spark of fire within our nature does but kindle all the higher faculties to move on to clearer intuition.⁶ Our first inclination towards salvation is not its full possession, and while faith is valued for its precious results, for the liberation it brings and the rewards it offers, knowledge or vision can only be prized for its own sake, for it is itself the best.⁷

Again and again there are hints of a cultivated aristocracy of finer spirits, suggestions of an aloofness from the many, which bring Clement, for the moment, just as near as a

¹ See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 82, n.

² "Scheidewand." See Harnack, *Gesch. der altchrist. Litt.*, II. (ii.), p. 4.

³ 770.

⁴ 794.

⁵ 826.

⁶ 818.

⁷ 789.

Christian writer ought to come, to the dictum of Plato that a "philosophic crowd" is impossible, or to the Pharisees' impatience with "this multitude that knoweth not the law." No doubt, in his essential purpose, Clement was right. He was claiming, as against those who sought to forbid the spirit's quest and to limit Christianity to what the uneducated could receive, that all the higher faculties of human nature, and in particular the mind, had full title to recognition and satisfaction in the scheme of the Divine Society. So having won his convert from Paganism to the Church, and having trained him by the wise and temperate moral discipline which was common to all believers, he delights to point him to the upward pathway of the soul, to assure him that the resources of Christianity are not exhausted in our mere acceptance of its first offers, and to disclose to his apt pupil the motives, the inward discipline, the outward line of conduct, the training of the soul's vision, which should lead him from the domain of elementary belief to that perfect and uninterrupted communion with ultimate reality which, though never doubtful, lay beyond the power of his pen and tongue to describe in terms of human speech. These things "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard," he says, in apt quotation.¹ On these lines full Gnosis is set in strongest contrast to simple Faith. Let us again remember that it is forbidden to none, and that it involves and not invalidates belief. With these cautions we may follow Clement in the blessed and arduous ascent.

If we ask what is the motive power which determines such spiritual advance, a threefold answer must be given, though the process in reality is one. To begin with, human choice must play its part. It is of ourselves that God desires we should be saved.² Man's will is always involved in his progress towards perfection, and towards the more

¹ 615.

² 788.

intimate association with the divine Word, just as it was involved in his acquirement of elementary faith.¹ Gnosis is chosen : there is no compulsion on this higher road : a man's place among the separate company of the elect depends on the worthy decision of his soul.² So our noblest possessions are won by quest and effort. It is not merely a question of the nature that is given us. The make of a character does not alone determine its destiny. Again and again we are reminded of the autonomy of the soul. The appeal is frequently with Clement, as it was principally with Jesus, to the central stronghold of the will. The kingdom is taken by violence.³ We ourselves must to some extent be the motive power of our own advance.

But the heights are not climbed by sheer decision alone. Clement makes frequent reference to a trinity of predisposing forces, which assist or impel the will. These are Fear, Hope, and Love.⁴ The relative measure of their influence is in some sense a key to our spiritual attainment ; for Fear, albeit a wholesome and legitimate motive, of which Clement has many commendatory things to say, is in the main the motive of the crowd, while even the Hope of the future is sometimes severely restricted to the ordinary believer.⁵ No doubt there are grades of fear,⁶ and there are hopes which can only be surrendered when they have been merged in full possession ; but the distinction holds up to a point, and leaves Love as the dominant influence of the higher way. The lower motives pass into this supreme spiritual force, which is at once the incentive and the satisfaction of the soul. It is the love of affinity rather than of desire.⁷ It transforms the servant into the brother, friend,

¹ *κοινή ἢ πίστις τῶν ἐλομένων*, 833. *αἰτία ἢ αἴρεσις τῆς γνώσεως*, 835.

² 734, 832.

³ 565, 654, 868-9.

⁴ 445, 569 ; *εἶς μόνον τὸ προαιρετικὸν καὶ τὴν ἀγαπὴν σφίζωμεν*, 623.

⁵ 789.

⁶ 450.

⁷ 776-7.

or son.¹ It takes a man out of himself to unite him with his Lord.² It surpasses understanding,³ and though Clement cannot naturally agree with Saint Paul that "knowledge shall vanish away," he is at one with the Apostle in holding that, right on to the end, when it becomes indistinguishable from Knowledge, Love never fails. All that he has to say of the final goal of human life, of that likeness to God on which the diverse teachings of Platonism, Judaism, and Christianity seemed so wonderfully to coincide, is an appeal to this power of Love, which has many degrees and many phases, but only one conclusive end, the union, namely, of man with God. Clement is afraid, as a rule, of emotion. He could hardly have judged fairly, and he had certainly never experienced, the passionate longing of the soul for God in the form in which we see it in the Psalmists or in some later Hymns. Yet, even with Clement, there is a warmth in love. This new Christian power, so wholly diverse from the *έρως* of Paganism, seems to touch the reason's colder nature with its own glow and radiance.⁴ If intellectualism has in other respects led Clement astray, it has at least not hindered him recognising, by instinct rather than from argument, that the supreme influence of Christianity upon human character lay in Love.

And yet it is not alone through deliberate choice and the love of the highest that spiritual progress is secured. Clement is no stranger to that paradox of the inner life, which has its simplest expression in the "I, yet not I" of his favourite Apostle. Human will and human love are, when viewed from another standpoint, indistinguishable from the grace and the care of God. So divine action must also be recognised in all stages of the soul's ascent. We

¹ 542.² 777.³ 872. ἀγάπη κυριωτάτη πάσης ἐπιστήμης—he does not say γνώσεως.⁴ θερμόν τι χρῆμα ἢ ἀγάπη, Frag. in Migne, *Patr. Græc.*, ix. 773.

choose, like Mary, the better part, but we are also chosen for it.¹

“ Draw if thou canst the mystic line,
Severing rightly His from thine.”

We are taken back again to the thought of the divine Word as the universal and unfailing teacher of humanity, for all that is said of the earliest guidance of the *Pædagogus* holds good of that later training towards perfection, when the higher functions of the “ Master ” come into play. Without the divine grace we cannot attain. The Father draws His children to Himself.² If on the human side knowledge must be sought, on the divine it is given as a grace.³ Plato was right : our best things come to us by divine appointment.⁴ Faith, Hope, and Love are sacred bonds, which draw us with our Lord upwards into the Holy Presence.⁵ The God who cares for all men bestows peculiar aid and oversight upon the Gnostic soul.⁶ In such terms does Clement’s happy mind dwell upon the care and guidance and inspiration of the unseen Teacher, without which, indeed, human wills and even human love must prove of slight avail. So the motive power, which impels the spirit upon its upward course, has its threefold character. It is a question of man’s choice, and of man’s love, and not less of the grace of God. And these three are one. The resultant is a single inward force, tending ever heavenwards.

Such being the motives of the higher way, what are its features or stages ? Such a life will best be considered on its inner side, before we ask what manner of man Clement’s Gnostic must have appeared to the outer world. It is remarkable to observe how moral qualities preponderate in his description of it. The goal was vision, pure uninterrupted communion with God’s reality, a final phase of

¹ 803.

² 647, 696.

³ 689, 914.

⁴ 696.

⁵ 865.

⁶ 824, 860.

spiritual life, for which Platonic language was less inadequate than any other. And Clement himself was a man of the mind, Hellenic, Alexandrine, even when he was most Christian. Yet the upward way was largely distinguished by its virtues of character. Choice, disposition, affections, inward freedom, count for more than knowledge or mere intellect: even the philosophy that was so dear to the writer is included only as an addition to the feast.¹ Thus he recognises the great principle of Christianity, that purity of heart is the condition of the divine vision, that it is through doing God's will that we come to understand His truths.² Hence conduct and morality retain their importance far beyond the preliminary stages described in the *Pædagogus*. Even in the later books of the *Stromateis* it is with a discussion on character, with a sketch of the greatness and beauty of the Gnostic's disposition, that we are concerned.³ Speaking of his treatment of such subjects, he compares his work to that of a sculptor modelling a figure: on the other hand, his occasional hints of Gnostic vision and insight are given only sporadically, here and there, as a man might scatter seeds.⁴ Again we notice how superficial is the view which would regard Clement's Christianity as purely intellectual. His ideal of the higher life may be open to many criticisms, but at least it provided for the heart and character and not only for the mind.

Nor again was there any doubt in Clement's mind about the distance and the difficulty of the spiritual goal. He will write with a generous enthusiasm on the universal summons, on the free right of the humblest member of the Church to choose this upward path. But let none imagine

¹ 824.

² *Cp.* παιδῶντες τὸ θέλημα γινώσκωμεν, 338: and φῶς ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγενόμενον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς ὑπακοῆς, 531: *cp.* St John vii. 17.

³ 735, 827.

⁴ 901.

that it is an easy journey, or that he may travel its stages carelessly, without sacrifice and without effort. "We may not," he writes in a beautiful and impressive passage, "be lifted up and transported to our journey's end. We must travel there on foot, passing over all the distance of the narrow way."¹ And though elsewhere he tells us that it is natural to the man who has faith to go on to knowledge, and allows that the soul has wings,² there is constant mention also of the "force and effort," of the difficulty and long toil, of the tedious training, through which the ascent is made.³ It is as true of the soul's highest needs, as it is true of the body's most elementary wants, that, figuratively, a man shall only satisfy them "by the sweat of his brow."⁴ In spite of all his optimism and all the even tenor of his happy disposition, Clement must have known something of the inward pain of spiritual effort. To his disciples he points the highest way as he understands it, but he never deludes them with the false assurance that it is all easy or all pleasant, or that the Promised Land lies very near. He would have had little patience with the common delusion of the religious Philistine, that the interior life is a facile undertaking for those who have the inclination and the time.

A principal element in this way of attainment was the purification of the soul from evil. The island of Crete, so said the naturalists, sheltered no beasts of prey.⁵ The Gnostic soul was to resemble this happy country and to be as free as Crete from devastating influences. It is not the consciousness of moral guilt, still less the fear of future penalties, that occasions this rule. The obligation to purity lies in the fact that it is the condition of vision. This is the old Platonic principle, that pure truth can only be

¹ 627.

² 696, 819.

³ βία καὶ πόνος, 675; ἐν πολλῇ καμῶτι, 788; διὰ πολλῆς τῆς παιδείας, 794.

⁴ 736.

⁵ 997.

apprehended by the pure soul. Such *κάθαρσις*, then, is a process, a long process, carried out with an end in view. It is an equivalent, in Clement's understanding of the Higher Life, of what the pagan world demanded in preparation for the Mysteries.¹ The Pythagoreans, Apollonius of Tyana for example, had always recognised the necessity of such inward cleansing for the religious and philosophic aspirant, while the prominence of the similar principle in Buddhism is well known. Clement under some such influences had probably learned this truth before he became a Christian.

On few points is he more convinced than on the impossibility of beholding the Highest without this inward purity. Deeds morally wrong, ideas speculatively false, must alike go.² As silver is rid of its alloy, as the soil is rid of its weeds, so is it with the soul.³ The practice of positive virtue is inseparable from the elimination of evil.⁴ God's true priests are always the pure in heart: they are the veritable Israelites.⁵ The Gnostic prays alike for forgiveness and for future freedom from sin,⁶ but the dread of penalties is clearly a slight influence in comparison with his intense desire to attain. The lustrations of the High Priest and the Baptismal rite of Christianity are alike symbolical expressions of that inward purity, which renders the soul fit for its final entry on the Blessed Life.⁷ For the process has its term and completion. At last there comes a rest from constant cleansing; we pass beyond it to a higher stage.⁸

“Longa dies, perfecto temporis orbe,
Concretam exemit labem.”

It is commonly said that Clement is defective in his

¹ 844-5. Cp. Philostratus, *Vita Apollonii*, i. 8; ii. 30; Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III. (ii.), 145 (3te Auflage).

² 877.

³ 770.

⁴ 443.

⁵ 635, 794.

⁶ 791.

⁷ 628, 669-70.

⁸ πεπαυμένοι τῆς καθάρσεως, 865.

sense of Sin. But no reader can gather together his different statements on this purification of the soul, without discerning that in reality his spiritual standard is as high and exacting as that of many writers of other schools, who have dwelt, as Clement never cared to dwell, on the internal terrors of the conscience and the after sufferings of the damned. The bondage of Egypt counts with him for but little: the splendour of the Promised Land with all its far distances makes him forget the past. "Let the dead," he might have told his hearers, "bury their dead."

The process of purification leads at last to a state of entire "Apathy." Of this inward condition Clement has much to say. It is one of his dominant ideas in the moral domain. His fondness for the conception has laid him open to much criticism. Perhaps it is peculiarly difficult for western minds, under modern conditions, to be fair or patient in their estimate of this principle. Clement held that, in proportion as the soul attained to purity, it acquired independence of the passions and affections. For *πάθος* meant all liability to external influence, all risk of a man's true self, which to the Greek was his reason, being overpowered by the solicitations that came to him chiefly, though not exclusively, through the channels of sense. To arrive at so pure and so calm a state that all these influences found no interior response, was the final and conclusive freedom of the spirit, the absolute liberty essential for perfect contemplation. This ideal is, of course, as well a gradual process: it is indeed another aspect of purification and discipline. Human nature is to strip off the appetites of the flesh, and the soul to be gradually separated from the body.¹ The moderate and regulated condition of the desires gives way at length to a state in which the desires are not so much regulated as non-existent.² Neither courage,

¹ 686.

² 775, 777.

nor grief, nor anger, nor jealousy, nor any sort of passion, remain ; even ordinary affection must go with the rest.

In such a condition our nature is incapable of feeling resentment, is conscious of no distinction between a sister and a wife, regards all human beauty with the same cold recognition with which we may be conscious of a statue's grace.¹ Strangely negative as such a state of passionless detachment appears, it is yet in reality only the obverse side of the higher life of renewed Humanity.² To attain it so completely that it becomes, not an occasional mood nor a difficult endeavour, but a permanent and unvarying condition of unruffled inward serenity, is to be once and for all master and conqueror of the passions, and the fully qualified aspirant for the uninterrupted and unsatiating vision of God Himself.³ At times Clement is carried away by his ideal, at times he seems drawn back by mundane facts and limitations. It may be of interest to compare his extreme statements with his concessions and his reactions in the direction of average possibility.

On the one hand, we are told of a state in which desire has actually ceased to occupy its place in human nature.⁴ We find the strange suggestion of a passionless marriage, entered upon purely for the discipline which wedded life affords.⁵ We are told that even bravery has no proper place in such a character.⁶ The condition of the soul becomes so entirely homogeneous and unified, that it is unaffected by the shifting variations of normal experience and cosmic process.⁷ It seems to have passed beyond the stage at which

“Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity.”

And such things apparently are more than a dream and a

¹ 616, 884.

² 836.

³ 581, 886.

⁴ 537-8.

⁵ 869.

⁶ 776.

⁷ 633, 694, 777.

vision : while we are still in the body, he says, this Apathy and entire Tranquillity may be ours.¹

Side by side with such statements must be placed many admissions which abate its exacting idealism. There is a difference, he allows, between the passionless nature of the Lord and man's hardly acquired imitation of it.² In the case of human nature the process is lifelong and has many stages.³ And he must indeed be different from the average of mankind, who can really treat with indifference the *ἀδιάφορα* of our life.⁴ More than once he seems to be satisfied with an "Apathy" which does not exclude the normal and necessary demands of our nature. More than once he recognises the inevitable limitations of the present state : it must be "so far as is possible for human nature."⁵ His general sanity of view, so manifest in his treatment of such subjects as marriage, property, and martyrdom, does not fail him here, and though he never loses sight of the summits, he remembers that the higher way must not be too abrupt for the steps of the traveller to climb.

No doubt his theory leads him into frequent inconsistencies. He has not really thought out the relation of the two phases, ideal and practical, of his conception as above described. He denies "gladness" to his perfect character in one passage, only to claim it for him elsewhere.⁶ And when the worst has been said about Pleasure, it is allowed that the Christian Gnostic has pleasures of his own. Once at least he seems to have felt the difficulty, and makes a hardly successful attempt to prove that Christian love has in it no element of desire.⁷ But he had made of course, not without good authority, the initial mistake of

¹ 588.

² 156, 623, 875.

³ 569, 810, 836.

⁴ 487.

⁵ *εἰς ὅσον δύναμις*, 642 ; *cf.* 500, 792. Even the Christian Gnostic *συμπάσχει τῷ σώματι*, 868.

⁶ *εὐφροσύνη* denied, 777 ; claimed, 789, 835, 894.

⁷ 776-7.

drawing his line, not between higher and lower objects of desire, but between desire as such and the reason. The consequences of this are frequently evident, notably so in relation to the divine nature, for along with his reiterated assertion that God and even the incarnate Word are wholly passionless and without affection, go the many references to the divine sympathy and to the condescension of the Word, who for man's salvation becomes liable to *πάθη*, subject, at least in some measure, to the conditions of the creature's life.¹ The Stoic and Christian elements are clearly not entirely fused.

Yet we must not blame Clement too severely for this truly Hellenic element in his ideal of the Higher Life. He could hardly have been the man he was, had he shed entirely, on his entry into the Church, all that suspicion of the senses, all that distrust of the changing shows and the evanescent pleasures of our life, which, since the days of Heraclitus, had been so fundamental a principle with the most serious spirits of his race.

“Eheu ! eheu ! mundi vita,
Quare me delectas ita ?”

This twelfth-century hymn shows how deeply the ascetic, world-renouncing temper was to strike its roots in Christianity, and Clement, with all his extreme demands for “Apathy,” was far less rigorous in his asceticism than much of the Gnosticism of his day, and much of the Monasticism that came later. Moreover, we know something of his surroundings. As he watched the life of the volatile populace of Alexandria, and marked on how slight grounds they could be stirred to pillage Jewish houses or to shout for the lives of martyrs, as he beheld them carried beyond all

¹ He finds in God τὸ εἰς ἡμᾶς συμπαθές, 956. *Cp.* ὁ συμπαθὴς θεός, 251. He is aware of the difficulty involved, 686-7. But his explanation does not really meet it.

control by the excitements of the theatre or the horse-race, or by sensuous music, or inflammatory rhetoric, or again, as he reflected on the small percentage of those who professed philosophy, to whom money and fame and the entry into great houses, and even lower things, were in reality matters of indifference, he may well have felt that no true and full salvation of the spirit within man was possible, until by his own efforts or the divine grace he attained to freedom from external things, and made his exodus from that restless, divided, variable realm of *πάθη*, of which he remembered that Egypt was a type.¹ So his environment co-operated with the Stoicism he had heard Pantænus teach, and the result was his strange portrayal of the Christian Gnostic as one who has no emotions and responds to no appeal, seeming to anticipate the disembodied life on earth, and to be as pure and faultless and inhuman as the statue to which he was compared.² And yet Clement was a man of very different type himself.

And, from his own standpoint, he had a further justification. For this "Apathy" was a quality common to the divine and human natures, a point in which man's life could through long training in a measure resemble the life of God. The end of all our efforts, as he had learned from many sources to conceive it, was likeness to God. Plato in the well-known passage in the *Theætetus*;³ the Book of Genesis in the saying, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness"; Philo again as he had fused these two strains of teaching,⁴ and Saint Paul in his admonition, "Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ," had all recognised that to attain first to the image and then to the likeness of God was the true goal of the human spirit.⁵ Clement definitely accords

¹ 453. *Cp.* 678. Egypt was τοῦ θείου λόγου ἔρημος.

² 827.

³ Plato, *Theæt.*, 176.

⁴ See Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, ii. 287.

⁵ 500-2.

with this teaching, drawing, as De Faye¹ has pointed out, no careful line between its intellectual aspects in Plato and its moral aspects in Christianity, but recurring again and again to the familiar and suggestive, if somewhat elastic definition. It is worth noting, how frequently this likeness of man to God is mentioned in connection with "Apathy."² The two can hardly be said to have been identical, for resemblance to the divine nature must have involved much else—elements of a more positive character, and a fuller measure of the abundant life. But of these it was not easy to speak in human language. They belonged to the domain that lies beyond the range of eye and ear and understanding. Hence, in default of any detailed account of the soul's ultimate estate, this somewhat negative "Apathy" remains as a principal feature in his sketch of spiritual attainment. To possess it is so far to resemble God.

And then, in language which sounds strange to our ears, he passes even beyond this conception of resemblance. This higher way of the soul leads to more than similarity. It issues at last in an actual identity with God, a state in which man can be described as being God. That man was to be equal with the angels, or that God was to make His shrine within human nature, or that there was an ancient and inborn affinity in man with heaven, are claims made frequently by Religion and Philosophy alike. Clement, like other Greek Fathers, goes beyond them; he says it is possible for the Gnostic to become God, and to walk about as a god in human flesh.³ He appeals in support to language used by Heraclitus and by Plato and to the Psalmist's words, used also by the Lord, "I said ye are gods." How far the

¹ *Clément d'Alexandrie*, 295, n. 3.

² 542, 632-3, 836, 883, 886.

³ τούτω δυνατόν τῷ τρόπῳ τὸν γνωστικὸν ἤδη γενέσθαι θεόν, 632. ἐν σαρκὶ περιπολῶν θεός, 894. *Cp.* 797, 830.

deification of the Emperors, or the conviction of thoughtful minds that many of the gods of Olympus had originally been men, contributed to make such a conception possible, it is hard to say. It was generally allowed in the Greek Church ; it was to be found even in Western writers, and survived, Harnack tells us, till Saint Augustine brought it to an end.¹ Some reduction in our conception of the godhead is certainly involved in such phraseology. Clement, after his manner, finds no difficulty in asserting elsewhere that there is no identity between divine and human virtue.² It is hard to say exactly how much he intended by this *θεοποίησις*. It is not his own invention. Here, as often, he is using one of the conceptions current in his world. In other respects his supreme Deity is not too near, but rather too remote, from human life. The boldness of his claim, however startling to western ears, implies no real irreverence. He follows the progress of the spirit along the higher way, and if faith and hope carry him somewhat further than we can accompany him, we should rather envy his optimism than criticise his terms.

One of the most beautiful traits in this ideal character is seen in Clement's account of the Gnostic's prayers.³ Such a man prays indeed with the understanding, for his conception of God is true, and his standard of things desirable rests on reality. Hence he prays, not as ordinary men, for boons that may prove disastrous, but for such spiritual gifts as forgiveness, freedom from sin, indifference to things indifferent, independence of the flesh, knowledge of the will of God. He will pray aloud, sharing the common petitions of the faithful, which are the true incense, "composed of many tongues and voices";⁴ or,

¹ See the note in Hort and Mayor, p. 203, and Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, i. 119; iii. 164, n.

² 886.

³ See esp. 853-61, 876, 880.

⁴ 850.

preferably, he will pray silently, without utterance, speaking in the heart to God. He is familiar with the paradox involved in prayer that, although God knows our wants before they are uttered, and gives, unasked, every good gift to those who are fit to receive it ; still prayer, even in the sense of petition, is right and has its use and function in the spiritual economy. In one passage Clement makes the illuminating observation that prayer is a return of Providence upon itself, the human will being so identified with the divine that God receives back the suggestion of His own purpose from ourselves. This is almost a beautiful anticipation of the "Da quod jubes" of Saint Augustine.

But indeed, though God gives to such a soul in response to inward desires and thoughts, the higher purpose of prayer is not any ulterior end even of a spiritual character ; it is rather a converse with God and precious on its own account. Such communion is independent of set times and places ; alone or in company, walking or reading or at rest, a man may hold this inward communion with God, "subconsciously," as we perhaps should add. So all life becomes a festival, and prayer is "without ceasing," and, avoiding all wordy petitions, the soul lives in such higher fellowship, gratefully, hopefully, yet not without humility, for there is risk of falling even on the higher road. There is a further touch of humility in Clement's inclusion of himself among the number of those, who may be benefited by the prayers of the pure in soul.¹ This is a Christian sentiment and must be set over against two prayers,² one that of a Martyr, the other that of a Greek Athlete, both of which are offered as examples, though indeed there is a certain ring of philosophic complacency in them, more consonant, as Mayor points out, with the class-room of Epictetus than with the spirit of the Gospel. But, this apart, there is

¹ 880.

² 588, 860.

much true piety in Clement's account of the Christian Gnostic's prayers. It contains hardly anything that jars upon modern feeling on the subject, and is specially suggestive for all those more thoughtful minds, which have long since abandoned "the battery theory of prayer." One such spirit Clement found in his own day in Origen, whose *De Oratione* bears clear traces of his master's teaching.

These are the stages and tendencies of the higher life, as Clement describes it on its inner side. And yet throughout we are never allowed to forget that it has its outward as well as its inward aspects, and may be observed and read of men. Though in a sense this true Gnostic has left the world and is "away from home to be with the Lord," he is still liable to constant recall, as the ties of a family, the wants of his neighbours, the claims of citizenship, the pressure of circumstances, or the care of pupils, or the interests of cultivated men, remind him that he has not yet received his final summons to depart and be with Christ. Such a character, taking its share in the affairs of the city, the market-place, and the home, could not fail to leave an impression on the mind alike of the intelligent pagan and of the average Churchman. We have frequent hints in Clement's pages as to its most notable features. Putting these together, we may see what manner of man this higher life produced in the sight, not of God, but of his neighbours.

What must have struck the observer most was the fact that this lover of contemplation was also constantly active in well-doing. He would extol Apathy, and then puzzle his hearers by some act of charity, or by the earnest exhortation of a younger friend, or by his delight in the instruction of a child.¹ His days were full of fair deeds; his kindly consideration for inferiors was often remarked; he had none of the clever man's contempt for simple and

¹ 861, 880-1.

stupid souls.¹ For good deeds, Clement knew, follow knowledge as its shadow follows the body.² Even in God beneficent action never ceases.³ And he brings a thoroughly Hellenic principle into his Christian ideal by asserting that, though a man may do without knowing, in no case can a man know without doing.⁴ So the world could take knowledge of this consecrated visionary, for indeed he differed from other men not so much in the things he did, as in the manner of his doing them. His action was always conscious and intelligent. Men felt that the motive of his deeds was often different from their own, that he saw more significance in common duties, and discerned in circumstances the order of the will of God. He would face martyrdom, if it came to that, with unflinching courage, though he thought it wrong to seek it, and took no pride in irrational bravery.⁵

As to details, he was frequently a vegetarian :⁶ on the other hand, he might on occasion be met at a banquet where, like his Master, he had the art of leading conversation to more serious themes and levels. He was more often than not a married man ; and, if public positions were offered him, filled them sometimes remarkably well.⁷ Though usually a man of frugal habit, he was never known to neglect the body's actual needs : its care, he recognised, was a duty for the sake of the soul it enshrined.⁸ People who had heard him accused of asceticism and detachment from ordinary interests, were surprised, when they met him, to find that he would discuss philosophy or music or geometry or even agriculture⁹ with them, and that, if things went well with him, he accepted his prosperity gratefully, though it left his nature quite unspoiled.¹⁰ They felt this saint was still human, and even his enemies knew that, notwithstanding

¹ 607, 678-9, 779, 873.

² 882.

³ 792.

⁴ Stählin, iii. 212.

⁵ 569, 871.

⁶ 850.

⁷ 837, 874.

⁸ 573, 779.

⁹ 773.

¹⁰ 688.

his advanced and illuminated piety, he might be found sharing the common prayers and worship of slaves and sailors and women and country labourers, who formed the Church's rank and file.¹ So far he was in the world and even of it. But they never saw him in the theatre or at the gladiatorial shows.² And they were often conscious that in many other ways he was different from themselves, that envy and anger and resentment had less place in his nature, that he was somehow above the persecutions they dreaded and the pleasures they most enjoyed, that he was less influenced by flattery or blame or ill repute or superstition, that he had the strength of an inward purpose from which none could move him, and that living in the midst of the great city, and sharing all its lawful interests, he was still at heart a stranger amongst them, with his real home elsewhere.³

To whatever high degree of contemplative vision and communion such a character might be led, this outward life of active well-doing was never here to be forgotten or neglected. The association of practical activity with the higher grades of insight is asserted with notable insistence.⁴ Contemplation is "meliorative."⁵ These two aspects of the perfect life, Activity and Knowledge, which, since they were first distinguished by Aristotle, have never again been entirely unified, are to some extent combined in Clement's scheme, when he dwells on the Gnostic's delight in imparting higher truth. It is the crown of his activity to train others like himself and to fashion, as Pantænus and our Stromatist himself had done, the successors who should carry on his work.⁶ Nowhere does the Gnostic influence on others take so high a form, as in this ministry of spirit to spirit, mind to mind. Clement's own position and career give colour here to his ideal, and there is something not only pardonable

¹ 797, 860.⁴ 453-4, 581, 796, 801, 895.² 852.⁵ 830.³ 878.⁶ 862-4.

but noble in the delight with which he magnifies his office and dwells on the dignity of the Gnostic calling. It is a personal touch, which gives concrete reality to his conception. Of one at least of the outward aspects of this life Clement's contemporaries and fellow-citizens must have learned something from his own labours and "conversation."

Under such guidance we have followed the Gnostic Christian of Alexandria along the stages of the Higher Way. We have traced his upward journey from the domain of primary and simple Faith. We have analysed the motives which impel him, his choice, his Love, the Grace of God. We have seen him pass through the many phases of Purification to the high estate of Apathy ; and we have also looked upon this type of spiritual life in its exterior aspects, its activity, its beneficence, its dignified share in common things. It remains to gather up the fragmentary hints which are given us of the ultimate goal of this journey of favoured souls. We shall not be able fully to understand or describe it, for Clement knew well that this could not be done. But we may learn a little more of its direction and its character, before words and vision fail, and the way is lost in the glory of the Light ineffable.

Throughout his account of the higher life, Clement never allows us to forget for long that Vision, Insight, Contemplation, Gnosis—for the reality has many names—are always the end in view. Much as he says about Love and Beneficence and Salvation and Purity, these are not the ultimate criteria of attainment : they are the conditions of Vision or, as in the case of Love, they pass into it and are valued, if the question is pressed home, for their relation to it. The end, he says, is Contemplation.¹ Gnosis is the distinguishing feature of true well-being.² It is a sort of

¹ τὸ τέλος . . . εἰς θεωρίαν περαιούται, 883.

² ὁρος εὐδαιμονίας, 733.

perfection of man as man.¹ Obedience is good, Beneficence is good, but Contemplation stands first.² The knowledge of God and eternal salvation are so inseparably connected as to be in fact identical. But if their severance were possible, and the Gnostic were offered his choice between the two, it is on the knowledge of God that, without a moment's hesitation, his choice would fall.³ This is the final stage of the soul's progress, foreseen in the *Protrepticus* and the *Pædagogus*, and never for long out of the writer's mind, even when he discusses marriage or digresses into a diatribe on plagiarism. But Gnosis may be recognised as such, even in its earlier manifestations. Initiation into the lesser Mysteries precedes admission to the greater.⁴ The spirit and aptitude of the Gnostic are revealed in his power to find profit in the old philosophies, or to pierce below the language and symbolism of Scripture to its hidden meaning, or to prove himself a worthy recipient of the sacred trust of the esoteric tradition of the Church.⁵ These are but his *προγυμνάσματα*.⁶ It is in such preliminary exercises that the highest faculty in his nature finds its training and has its foretaste of the immortal state.⁷

Three characteristic features seem to belong to this final stage of the soul's attainment. The first of these is its permanence. The fluctuations of our highest moods are among the common disappointments of all inward experience. "No human faculty," complained Aristotle, "can maintain a continuous activity."⁸ "A little while and ye shall not see me; and again a little while and ye shall see me." We are taken beyond these limitations, when Clement speaks of "an abiding and unalterable state of contemplation;" of an exercise of vision that is uninterrupted; of a permanence of communion that corresponds with our

¹ 864.² 453.³ 626. See Ch. xxi., p. 309.⁴ 564.⁵ 348, 376, 678, 779.⁶ 624.⁷ 613.⁸ *Ethics*, x. 4.

extremest hopes and prayers.¹ Such a phase of experience is not so much an activity of our being as a state. To attain it is to reach a spiritual condition absolutely unified, absolutely free from change.² The feast of unending vision never ceases and never cloys.³ The soul becomes, rather than has, its experiences.⁴ It attains to indefectibility, and lives eternally on the levels where neither loss, nor power of abatement, can touch its blest estate. Such is the permanence of ultimate and perfect Gnosis.

The second characteristic comes out in Clement's references to the union of the spirit with its object. Both in love and in understanding there is a certain identification of man's individual nature with the external fact or person, in so far as this is loved or understood. We are what we see. There is a certain kinship between the mind and what it apprehends. The final stage of vision, as Clement seems to conceive it, is the fulfilment of this principle in its completest term. We have already seen how the increasing likeness of the soul to God issues, at last, in a condition in which man *is*, rather than resembles, the divine. It is the most intimate phase of his being's contact with supreme reality. It is more than knowledge, though it is less than ecstasy: "communion," perhaps, is the nearest equivalent in English, though the conception never loses a certain intellectualist tone. Man has intercourse with the divine and shares its holy nature.⁵ "The apprehensive vision of the pure in heart" is consummated in fellowship with God.⁶ "We close with all we love," and with all we know. It is the Pauline conception of "seeing face to face," the entire accord and harmony that unites the soul to its kindred environment.⁷ Language is a poor medium for portraying the final intimacy of the soul with God. There

¹ 771, 789, 859.⁴ 581. ⁵ 581.² 776-7.⁶ 835.³ 835.⁷ 873.

is more, Clement knows, than he can say ; it is significant that he can only conduct the spiritual traveller up to the vestibule of the sanctuary. The great High Priest must do the rest.¹

Yet of one other point we are assured. This permanent estate of spiritual communion is the soul's final peace. All the tranquillity the philosopher had desired ; all the rest remaining surely somewhere for the people of God, of which old Canaan had been such a disappointing type ; all the calm which Alexandrian mariners had found for a time in the quiet waters of its great harbour, are gathered up and fulfilled in this ultimate repose in God. The quest ends in discovery, beyond the reach of debate. Quietness and rest and peace, always kindred qualities to the Gnostic soul,² have their final development in unbroken serenity. "The toil is over : the soul's gain abides."³ To such high and unalterable attainment, in the full enjoyment of the Beatific Vision and in the closest union with God, has the human spirit been guided along the Higher Way. τὰ δ' ἄλλα σιγῶ.⁴ It is best to say no more. Words are no longer adequate. The account must remain incomplete and fragmentary. It is sufficient, however, to make the modern reader feel, with Clement, that it remains only to glorify the Lord.

Such is the Alexandrian father's outline of the highest life open to humanity. Many things might be said about this ideal. We might examine the sources from which it was derived, or the points at which it was most open to criticism, or the relation it bears to subsequent developments of religious philosophy, both inside and without the Church. Specially might we dwell upon its value for all who find in Mysticism the surest element in religion. But it is best here to omit such discussions, partly because some of these

¹ 858.² 456.³ 792.⁴ 835.

subjects must be dealt with in another chapter, partly because Clement's conception may well be left to rest upon its own intrinsic merits. Undoubtedly it bears the evident impress of his own personality, of his environment, of his time. Undoubtedly, too, it contains elements to which our busy western Christendom can only accord a qualified admiration. The world moves on and our ideals are transformed and modified, as the years accomplish the changes which are essential to the continuance of life. The monastic recluse, the vigorous champion of the Church's rights and the Church's order, the subtle controversialist, the devoted missionary, the enthusiastic philanthropist, the fierce assailant of social wrong, are all types of Christian character and enterprise, produced by the action of the world's shifting environment upon the original and fundamental achievement of the Gospel. They have their vogue, their day, their validity. They have no assured permanence. Least of all in our own century do we need to be reminded, how transitory is the dominance of even the highest ideals. The value of Clement's contribution to the cause of Christianity must be estimated principally by his conception of the Gnostic character, and this, like the ideal of virgin womanhood, or of crusading enterprise, can claim no unalterable pre-eminence. But so long as the higher intuitions of finer spirits are not entirely sacrificed to the common needs of the devoted multitude ; so long, too, as we face the problems of adjusting the claims of the exterior and the interior lives, and of discovering new harmonies between Knowledge and Love, there will be gain and profit in looking back to the sketch that Clement has left us, and in tracing anew the features of the highest Christian character, which it was in his power to conceive.

CHAPTER XV
THE CHURCH

FOR the student of Church History a special interest and importance belongs to the period covered by Clement's lifetime. In many ways the epoch was one of rapid formation, when tendencies were being consolidated into institutions, when Christianity was recognising the need and utility of organisation, and Faith deciding upon the fashion of its apparatus. "Le christianisme," says Renan, "était entièrement fait avant Origène."¹ The new religion quickly acquired or developed its essential elements, and not a few of these received substantially the form in which they were to survive for many centuries, between A.D. 150 and 220. How the Church with her growing membership was impelled to systematise her internal administration ; how the presence of strange doctrines led naturally to greater precision in her authorised teaching ; how the clearer consciousness that she possessed in this world a future destiny and mission, made practical efficiency of greater moment than it ever could have been in the days when her mind was set wholly on her Lord's return, are subjects upon which something has already been said in a former chapter.²

It is only natural, under these conditions, that we should look with special expectation to Clement for information on

¹ *Marc-Aurèle*, p. 511.

² Chap. iii.



POMPEY'S PILLAR IN ALEXANDRIA.

the institutional aspects of Christianity. He belonged to a city second only in importance to Rome itself, and a picture of the Church's order and arrangements in Alexandria during his lifetime would be a legacy of peculiar interest. Unhappily his writings are singularly devoid of information of this nature. His references to the details of Church life are comparatively scanty, and their allusive character often raises rather than resolves inquiry. He is entirely silent as to the origin of the great Church with which he was connected, throwing no light whatever upon the tradition of its foundation by Saint Mark. The vivid glimpses which Tertullian gives us, from time to time, into the ecclesiastical customs of Carthage have few parallels in his contemporary of Alexandria. It is disappointing that a writer, in other ways so instructive and valuable, should not have contributed more towards filling "the worst gap in our knowledge of early Church History."¹

The reason of this is twofold, nor does it lie far to seek for one who will bear in mind the characteristic features of Alexandria, and the mental temperament of Clement. For indeed the great city, with its mixed population and its many creeds and philosophies, loved nothing less than order and definition. In all the principal departments of ecclesiastical organisation, in respect of the Ministry, of the Sacraments, of the Creeds, and of the Canon of Scripture, Alexandria was notably behind the other great Churches in the rate of its development. It accorded with the spirit of the place to leave thought free and practice unfettered for as long as possible, and no vigorous personalities had as yet arisen to make use and custom binding and precise. How difficult and intractable a nature the Alexandrians brought with them, even into their Church life, the later centuries were abundantly to evidence. It might not have been possible for Clement to

¹ Harnack, *Mission*, ii. 158.

write so warmly as he did on the subject of the Church's unity, had the predecessors of Demetrius in this metropolitan see been insistent on unvarying uniformity of practice. Thus, if in many matters of interest Clement seems singularly silent as to rule and custom, the explanation must partly be sought in the freer, and comparatively unregulated, conditions of his environment.

But the further, perhaps the principal reason, lies in his own temperament and affinities. He is a Christian philosopher. He is a forerunner of the mystics, if even he does not belong to their company. He is a Platonist, and cares more for the idea than for its partial and concrete embodiments. So he does not set great store by form and rule and details of Church order, and, had not the Gnostic heretics carried liberty too far, he would probably have cared for such things even less. His inclination is always to treat customs and institutions much as he treated the letter of Scripture, on the principle of Allegory ; when the reader is anxious to know exactly how some ceremony or ordinance was carried out, he is led away instead into some lengthy and not too relevant discussion of its possible inner significances. No doubt, in fairness to our author, we must bear in mind that his principal extant writings have their special purpose, and that, if the inward aspects of Christianity predominate in them over the external, this is part of a deliberate plan. On many points his fears of "divulging mysteries" kept him intentionally silent. He had no desire that Christian rites should be exposed to the sort of ridicule he himself had poured on those of Eleusis. Nor should it be forgotten that, among his lost works, there was a discussion on the Easter question, another on Fasting, and an Address to those recently baptised. These titles, taken in conjunction with the surviving *Quis Dives*, may enable us to realise the truth in De Faye's remark that "Il

a été peut-être plus homme d'Église qu'on ne le suppose."¹ But when all such allowances have been made, it remains notwithstanding true that on many points of interest he tells us far less, than we might have hoped, of the ways and customs of the Church in Alexandria; also that in large measure we must find the explanation of this omission in his own character and interests.

This disappointing scarcity of information is, however, quite compatible with a noble and exalted conception of the Church's purpose and ideal. Occasional references and expressions betray a consciousness of the divine society's mission, which proves that Clement did not always sustain the rôle of the detached philosopher. At times he gives utterance to an enthusiasm of churchmanship, not in every case easy to reconcile with his poor estimate of many particular facts. He delights, for instance, to dwell on the Church's unity. Essentially the Church is one.² Its membership implies the pursuit of unity, the quest of the "good monad."³ "The one Church" had some inherent affinity with the nature of ideal unity. He brings all the Pythagorean doctrine of the One into his conception of the Christian Body, and finds in this a supreme characteristic of the Church.⁴ It is in this feature that he discerns the chief superiority of the Church to the numerous heresies of the age, advocating, on theoretical grounds, the very claims which other teachers were already enforcing in the interests of practical order. Many roads indeed there are, but the King's High Way is only one.⁵

But the Church could claim antiquity as well as unity. The Apostles, after Christ, founded the Church, and suffered for it.⁶ The Church is the keeper of an unbroken continuity of tradition.⁷ The sequence of truth has been preserved by

¹ P. 49.

² 103, 542, 899.

³ 72.

⁴ ἡ ἐξοχὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, 900.

⁵ 888.

⁶ 597.

⁷ 793, 802.

its members, and the true treasures of the spirit are to be found in the "ancient Church" alone.¹ Here is a further contrast with the heresies. "The heresiarchs began quite late, about the time of Hadrian."² The Church goes back to the date of the Lord Himself, and can claim the further antiquity of Prophets and Apostles and the divine eternal purpose. The ancient things are always venerable in Clement's eyes. Perhaps these are the two features which he prized most highly in his conception of the Church, its unity, its antiquity. But there are many other aspects which emerge from time to time. We have the familiar thought of the Church as a Mother. "The mother calls her children, and we seek our mother, the Church."³ "Only one maiden became a mother; I love to speak of her as the Church."⁴ "Let us make the fair beauty of the Church complete, and run like children to our good mother."⁵ All the care of motherhood, all the delight of the mother in her children, find a place in his ideal of the Church; his love of home-life gives a quaint and tender colour to his thought.

There is, besides, the thought of the Church as a Body. A body, of course, is a unity, and the idea of the one body and many members is naturally familiar to Clement, as the disciple of Plato and of Saint Paul. But he adds the further thought, that the body is the instrument of the Spirit. As the Saviour spoke and healed through the medium of His bodily frame, so now "the Church subserves the Lord's activity."⁶ God is ever "putting on" human nature, now He "puts on" the Church. Some Gnostics depreciated the body, but "how, apart from the body, could the divine purpose for us in the Church have been realised?"⁷ The suggestive conception of the divine society as the medium of spiritual life is clearly contained in such teaching. The

¹ 888.² 898.³ 110.⁴ 123.⁵ 310.⁶ 994.⁷ 559.

Church again is the heavenly Kingdom, in which we are enrolled as citizens.¹ It is the Bride of the Lord, and, by an extension of the figure, to forsake the Church for other teaching is to be guilty of spiritual adultery.² It is the Holy Mount, the true Zion, aloft, above the clouds, to which the Good Shepherd leads us.³ The Church is in the world, yet distinct from it, with its own walls and entrances, and its members are conscious of their separate way of life.⁴ "We," he says, "or our people," follow certain rules: his recognition of Christian fellowship comes out in the simple yet significant pronouns.⁵ And the Church, he says, is Catholic—Catholic, as distinct from the heresies. It is strange that a man of Clement's theology should be the first Greek writer to use this debated term in its technical sense with marked emphasis.⁶

These are some of the features or "notes" of the Church as Clement conceived it. The best characteristics of the ideal Christian society are all there: unity, antiquity, purity, service—he knows the value of them all. But he was too true to Plato and the New Testament to expect all the excellences to be fulfilled in Alexandria. Hence comes his crowning thought of the Church as spiritual, heavenly, invisible, a city "laid up" in the Heavens, of which shadows and images and approximations are all we must expect on earth.⁷ No one can fairly accuse Clement of indifference to the actualities. It is of a real, live society that he writes with such enthusiastic piety at the close of the *Protrepticus*. Yet we may also be grateful that he saw beyond it, and that his true Jerusalem was built for ever, because never built at all.

From the ideal, however, we must turn now to concrete facts and inquire what amount of light Clement's rare and

¹ 69, 74-5, 167.

⁴ 897. ⁵ 447, 571.

⁷ 642, 793, 873.

² 533, 547.

³ 3, 148.

⁶ See Lightfoot, *Ignatius*, II. (i.), 311, n.

frequently vague references throw upon the actual state and practices of the Christian society with which he was familiar. Who, in the first place, were the men and women who were enrolled upon its lists of membership? Previous chapters have anticipated, to a large extent, the answer to this question. Plainly they were a mixed company, reflecting in all their varieties of race, culture, and worldly position, the heterogeneous characteristics of social and political Alexandria. The majority were converts to Christianity, born under other influences and shedding their accustomed habits with difficulty.¹ Some few were wealthy; the majority were of moderate means. Some few were highly educated, but the rank and file had little culture. The Greek element must have predominated considerably, but it is clear that the number of converts from Judaism was no negligible quantity.² We might have expected that in Philo's city the Law and Synagogue would have retained their own; on the other hand, the liberal tendencies of Alexandrian Judaism had numerous affinities with the Christianity of Clement's school. In any case, it is clear that many for whom he wrote had come over from the following of Moses, and that he expected to make more such converts by his lectures and his books.³

There was much variety in occupation and social position. Above the slaves, whose number in the Church was evidently considerable, were the men who led a labourer's life.⁴ Higher still in the scale we hear of the retail trader and the dealer of the market-place.⁵ Some of the Christian company were sailors and probably made the voyage to Puteoli many times in the year;⁶ others were soldiers, some won perhaps by

¹ Note especially his frequent references to *κοσμική συνήθεια* (97), *πάθη σύντροφα* (958), and similar influences.

² The Jewish and Greek elements in Clement's Church are mentioned together, 736, 770, 793.

³ 429, 886.

⁴ 80, 872.

⁵ 299.

⁶ 80.

watching the fortitude of their prisoners, as Basilides became a Christian through Potamiæna.¹ Even the outlying country was not unrepresented. The new faith was a link to connect the toiler of the fields with city folk.² Some were very poor and betrayed their poverty by their attire.³ Some came over to the Church as old people, "in the eventide of life."⁴ Occasionally a whole family belonged; in other cases a single member would come in from a pagan house. But, as we have seen before, the tendency was setting in the direction of the Church, and people of means and education were already far from rare. "God's philosophers" were a recognised element: the rich man heard the divine call: now and again an official would give in his name.⁵

As to the standard of their lives, it evidently varied. The difference between the Gnostic Churchman, who was well advanced on the road to "apathy," and the ordinary believer, who still needed lectures on table manners and on Christian deportment in the streets, was considerable enough. And it is evident that Clement felt the danger of the Christian profession without the corresponding life. Many, he complains, believe in name alone.⁶ Many made traffic of their religion.⁷ The pagan life was sometimes lived within the Christian society:⁸ such members were the useless flesh of the spiritual body. There were some who attended worship and associated themselves with the faithful, but in the rest of their lives were indistinguishable from the common and naughty world.⁹ The range of standard and attainment was very wide, and Clement is often much concerned at the scandal brought by unworthy professors upon "the Name."

¹ H.E., vi. 5.

² 80.

³ 954.

⁴ 84.

⁵ 793-4, 837, *οἱ πλούσιοι κλητοί*, 936.

⁶ Stählin, iii. 212.

⁷ Dindorf, iii. 492. This is, however, a very doubtful fragment.

⁸ 885.

⁹ 300.

His more constant trouble did not lie, however, in the domain of morals. The diversity of the Church was even more marked in the matter of culture. It has already been necessary to point out the acute division which existed between the multitude of the faithful and their better-educated fellows. It is strange that in Alexandria, with its wide diffusion of culture, this should have been so; but there can be no question as to the aggressive intolerance, with which the majority of the believers assailed the few who, like Clement, associated learning with religion. For these troublesome, if well-meaning people, he has many names. They are "my critics," "ignorant alarmists," "unlettered believers"; "gifted people," he says sarcastically, "who can dispense with everything but faith, and expect to gather grapes without taking any trouble about the vine."¹ Sometimes, too, he has them in mind when he speaks of "the crowd." "Orthodoxasts" was already a recognised term for them. Churchmen of this type asked what was the use of culture, and frankly declared that there was no advantage in understanding causes so long as one knew the facts.² Philosophy, they believed, came from the devil: their dread of learning was like childhood's terror of hobgoblins.³ There was a certain "boorish" quality in their religion, and often their insistence on faith went along with very imperfect conduct.⁴ Clement had constantly to face their criticism, nor was he perhaps so wholly indifferent, as his own ideal Gnostic, to the ill favour of the multitude.⁵

There were critics, too, of an opposite type within the Church, who from intellectual or Gnostic standpoints depreciated the simplicity of faith.⁶ Clement pleads that

¹ 326-7, 336, 341, οἱ πολλοί, as in 780, 789, etc. In contrast with these are οἱ φιλοθεάμονες τῆς ἐκκλησίας, 900.

² 786.

³ 773, 780.

⁴ 784, 794.

⁵ οὔτε μέμψως οὔτε κακοδοξίας τῆς ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀντιλαμβάνεται ὁ γνωστικός, 838.

⁶ 112, 367, 466.

these two classes, those who act, and those who know, should lay aside their suspicions and understand one another better. But indeed he was between two fires. It was a very mixed society in which he found himself. There is no hint of any sorting out of the different elements into separate congregations. Throughout his pages we hear the undertone of many minor discords. Converts did not drop the peculiarities of race and rank and temperament at the moment of Baptism, and the plea for a philosophic Christianity brought fresh division, rather than the divine tranquillity of the schools. Certain phases of modern Church life present striking and close analogies. In regard to Alexandria, the very diversity of these many elements is an additional testimony to the power of the new religion, which could blend them, all surviving distinctions notwithstanding, into any sort of effective harmony and concord.

To the Christian Ministry Clement's references are not numerous. He thought more of spiritual qualities than of official position, and held antiquity to be of greater importance than ecclesiastical rank. Hence it has been truly said, that the Gnostic is his real priest. Even the ordinary believer may attain, through discipline and the perfect life, to a place in the select list of the Apostolate.¹ So does he love to spiritualise the external orders and distinctions. Yet his occasional references to the ministry have a special interest, in so far as they have any bearing upon the origin of the Alexandrian Patriarchate. Jerome, it is well known, states in one of his letters that down to the times of Heraclas and Dionysius (A.D. 233 and onwards) the presbyters of this Church "always nominated as Bishop one chosen out of their own body and placed in a higher grade."² This statement is supported by a story about Pœmen, the hermit,

¹ 793.

² Epist. cxlvi. ; see Lightfoot's Dissertation, *Philippians*, pp. 230 *sqq.*

which was current in Egypt in the fourth century ;¹ also by a letter of Severus of Antioch (c. A.D. 530) ;² and by Eutychius, himself a Patriarch of Alexandria (A.D. 933-40).³ The reliability of the tradition has been questioned, e.g. by Bishop Gore on the ground of Origen's silence in regard to it. Others have explained it away, as a fiction fabricated by his enemies with the object of discrediting Athanasius. It is generally admitted (not, however, by Bingham) that consecration as well as election is involved.⁴ The subject is one of sufficient interest to justify our asking whether Clement's language is in accordance with Saint Jerome's statement. He was himself a Presbyter and must have been quite familiar with this exceptional practice, if it existed in Alexandria in his day, though indeed he would probably have seen no special importance in the deviation.

He speaks of Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons, as ecclesiastical ranks which are imitations of the angelic hierarchy :⁵ elsewhere he mentions Presbyters, Bishops, Deacons, in this order.⁶ Here, it seems, is a threefold ministry. It is in accordance with such expressions that he refers to the Pastoral Epistles, as teaching the duty of the Bishop to preside over the Church.⁷ Such an office may still be described as *διακονία* : we must clearly be very careful in assigning a technical meaning to his terms. On the other hand, he mentions more than once Presbyters and Deacons together, without any hint of a third order.⁸ He speaks of himself, a Presbyter, as among "the leaders

¹ See Migne, *Pat. Græc.*, lxx. 341 ; also the *Historia Lausiaca* of Palladius in *Texts and Studies*, vi. (i.), 213 ; *cp.* (ii.), 26.

² See *Journal of Theological Studies*, ii. 612-3 ; also iii. pp. 278-82, for Bishop Gore's view.

³ Migne, *Pat. Græc.*, cxi. 982.

⁴ So Lightfoot, *op. cit.*, 231 ; Bingham says Jerome "speaks not of the ordination of the Bishop, but of his election," *Antiquities*, Book II., Ch. iii., §5.

⁶ 793.

⁶ 309.

⁷ 546, 561-2.

⁸ 552, 793, 830.

of the Churches,"¹ and in the story of Saint John and the young robber treats the terms Bishop and Elder as applicable to the same person, though the scene of the incident was Asia Minor.² It is difficult to resist the conclusion, that he regarded the Episcopate as an office not wholly distinct from the Presbyterate. In this general sense his language is in harmony with Jerome's statement. There is, besides, one specially notable passage in which he speaks of an Elder being "honoured with the chief seat," which may most naturally be explained as a reminiscence of an actual practice with which he was familiar.³

As to other functions of the Episcopate, Clement says nothing, as Harnack has pointed out,⁴ of any special duty of the Bishop to conserve and protect the faith; nor is there any hint in his pages of Apostolic powers as inherent in the Episcopal office; still less, though he recognises Peter as the first of the Apostles,⁵ of any primacy of the Roman see. The suggestion that ecclesiastical officials in Clement's conception of the Church "resemble the English orders," is suggestive and interesting, though, indeed, the comparison to some extent is one of undetermined quantities on either side. The Episcopal office in Alexandria was to develop into an important Patriarchate, and Demetrius, in Clement's own lifetime, was to make his assertion of a Bishop's claims. But his predecessors appear to have left no mark upon the Church over which they presided. The considerable independence of the Catechetical School is

¹ 120. *Cp.* the quotation from Clem. Rom. in 612. ² 959-60.

³ 793. The phrases *χειροτονούμενος, ἐπὶ γῆς πρωτοκαθεδρία τιμᾶσθαι*, in connection with a Presbyter are significant. It is difficult to reconcile with this passage the view expressed in Cabrol, *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie*, 1. (i.), 1209: "Clément . . . suppose toujours aussi la même distance entre prêtres et évêques qu'entre diacres et prêtres."

⁴ See the important note in *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 70-72.

⁵ 947.

itself an evidence that they had not been strong rulers : it was well perhaps for Clement, that he did not require episcopal sanction for all he taught. So far as we can construct any scheme of the Ministry from his pages, it is more characterised by service and freedom than by order and power of government. We have a glimpse of the Presbyter administering the laying on of hands in token of divine blessing,¹ and another of the activity of women in mission work to their own sex.² The clergy, like the laity, were free to marry.³ Widows seem to have been a separate order and to have been held, if they abstained from second marriage, in high repute.⁴ The duty of the Shepherd to restore lost sheep is mentioned,⁵ and the beautiful story, with which the *Quis Dives* closes, points to a high ideal of pastoral care. There is a reference in the same treatise to the " man of God " who acts as a rich man's chaplain, probably, as Bigg points out, a layman, yet a true director and spiritual guide in spite of his unofficial standing.⁶ It is interesting to compare the position of this adviser in a Christian household with that of the salaried philosopher in a pagan family.⁷ These are the main references which Clement's pages contain to the persons and functions of the Christian ministry. We do not see much of any ecclesiastical hierarchy, nor are the grades of official status defined with any exactness. On the other hand, the standard of piety and devotion was high, and sometimes an occasional phrase affords us a glimpse of true pastoral care.

There is still less precision in point of doctrinal formulæ, though it could be demonstrated without difficulty from

¹ 291. *Cp.* χειροθεσία, 974. There were Gnostic equivalents of this rite, 510. It was apparently used for the sick, 955.

² 536.

³ 552.

⁴ 309, 558, 875.

⁵ 465.

⁶ 958. See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, 102, n. 3.

⁷ See esp. Lucian's Treatise, *De mercede conductis*.

Clement's writings, that the substance of the Apostle's Creed was matter of common acceptance among Christian people in Alexandria in his day. The only Article to which it might be said there is no reference of any kind, is that of the Communion of Saints, in so far as this is understood of any spiritual fellowship between the living and the departed. But as this clause never had any place in the Eastern Creeds, Clement's silence on the matter need occasion no surprise. It is interesting to notice upon what portions of the Faith he lays special stress, and in respect of what others there is abatement of emphasis and interest. God is Father, Almighty,¹ Maker of Heaven and earth. Jesus Christ is His Son, our Lord, who suffered in the sixteenth year of Tiberius,² and who lives eternally in Heaven in closest association with the Father. The doctrine of the Trinity is spoken of as profitable and even necessary to salvation.³

To these cardinal verities he assigns a primary importance. Beyond them, he may be said to insist or minimise according to the complexion of his theology. The Lord was born of a Virgin, born also spiritually *from*—not *by*—the Holy Ghost.⁴ The preposition is the same as in the Creed of Constantinople. He lays considerable stress on the Descent into Hell, showing much interest in the doctrine of Christ's preaching to the Departed.⁵ He valued this tenet, on which the Gnostics, too, set great store, as an evidence of the universality of the Gospel. Irenæus and Tertullian emphasise it less: it has no place in their rule of faith. Clement believes, as we have seen, in a Holy and Catholic Church: he is equally clear on the Forgiveness of Sins and Everlasting Life.⁶ On the other hand, his only mention of

¹ παντοκράτωρ, 691, 833.

² 407.

³ 997.

⁴ ἐξ ἁγίου πνεύματος, 975. So the Latin Formula has "de" or "ex" more usually than "per Spiritum Sanctum." Cp., too, St Basil, *De Spir. Sanct.*, v.

⁵ 765 sqq.

⁶ 95, 138.

the Ascension, in any physical sense, must be found in his quotation of the words in the Epistle to the Ephesians, "He that descended is the same also that ascended."¹ He speaks not infrequently of the Resurrection, but on the future of the body it is clear that speculation was rife. The Gnostics usually had no place for any bodily resurrection in their systems, and whether Clement personally expected a "restitutio carnis" must be left an open question.² He gives very little prominence to the work of the Holy Spirit. The Logos practically fulfils all the offices of the Third Person.³ It would have been entirely foreign to Clement's thought to use such a phrase as "Vicarius Domini" of the Comforter.⁴ So, too, he says little of the final Judgment. It is referred to, indeed, as an accepted doctrine,⁵ but Clement is concerned very slightly with the future episodes of the present dispensation. He never dwells on the second Advent and knows of no earthly Millennium. In Eschatology he stands at the opposite pole to Papias, who only preceded him by one generation. Clement's future is that of the soul's perfect communion with God: he looks for no cosmic catastrophes, but for the fulfilment of spiritual hopes. Thus his "proportion of faith" is in some sense characteristic. The external and temporal elements are minimised; the stress falls on the inward side of belief; his creed was a "symbol," in a different sense from that which the term usually conveyed. It is impossible to say how far this interpretation of the faith was peculiar to Clement, how far it was commonly held in the Church in Alexandria. The influence of Gnosticism is unmistakable.

¹ Eph. iv. 10, 979.

² *Cp.* esp. Iren., v. 31, 1. The heretics erred "non suscipientes salutem carnis suæ."

³ See vol. i. 359-60.

⁴ Tertullian, *De virgin. velandis*, 1.

⁵ 721, 835.

One point, however, seems to be clear. The formula or summary of doctrine can hardly have had in Alexandria the same authority, which at this date it possessed in other places. Some baptismal Creed probably existed, for Clement speaks of "the confession on the points of greatest importance" as a special part of the Church's rule, and regards the doctrine of the Trinity as being "sealed to the faithful," doubtless in their Baptism.¹ Of the content of such confessions we cannot be sure; it may, as Harnack says,² have been as elementary as that of Hermas; in any case Clement's whole scheme of esoteric interpretation is evidence conclusive that no precise formula was regarded in his time, in Alexandria, as definitely regulating all belief. It is true that he has much to say about the Church's rule, but of this it will be best to speak in another place; it concerns Scripture rather than summaries of doctrine. He refers once to "the common element in belief." He mentions frequently "the teaching that had been transmitted from earlier ages" and speaks even of "a Rule of faith."³ But we are never sure of the exact implications of these terms, and a study of the connection in which they occur lends some colour to the belief, that their content was as often moral as doctrinal. The master who thought a three or four years' course advisable for catechumens,⁴ must have had many things to say, and his instruction was little fettered by authority. Thus, in the matter of the Creed, as well as in that of the Episcopate, the Church of Alexandria developed more slowly than Rome or Asia Minor. Even the imminent danger of Gnosticism did not produce, till after Clement's time, the reaction to rigid definition. So free was even

¹ ἡ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ὁμολογία, 887; ἐκείνη (sc. ἡ τριάς) τοῖς πιστοῖς ἐσφραγίζεται, Dindorf, iii. 507, but this fragment is rejected by Stählin.

² See the discussion in *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 32 sqq.

³ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πίστεως, 892; ὁ κανὼν τῆς πίστεως, 607; *cf.* διδασκαλίας παράδοσις, 322.

⁴ 479.

Christian thought in that home of speculation, though it is curious to watch how, even in Clement's case, all teaching about the Church grows firmer and more precise through opposition to the heretics and their notions.¹

At the date with which we are concerned, Christianity had already its separate "places of worship," and Clement uses the term "Church" exactly as we do, both for the company of the faithful people and for the place of assembly.² He speaks of coming to or from Church, of a Church echoing, of the correspondence which should exist between our worship in Church and our life outside.³ So when he expressly mentions prayer in the home, or says that to the Gnostic no one place is more sacred than another, his language implies that prayer was not always domestic and that sacred places did exist.⁴ When he says that Saint John "rode away from the Church" to seek the young robber,⁵ he is throwing back the customs of his own age to an earlier century, incidentally proving how thoroughly established was the assignation of separate places to the purposes of worship. But the building apparently was still an ordinary house. It was not till considerably later that more imposing structures were obtained for Christian assemblies. On the other hand, there seems to have been no secrecy as to the locality of worship. To go home from Church was as ordinary an event as to go home from market.⁶ The right of assembly seems to have been unquestioned, without the fiction of a "Burial Club." The "areæ" of Tertullian have no parallels in Alexandria, and, though the city had many catacombs, we have no hint that any of them were used at this date for the gatherings of the faithful. The peace of

¹ This is specially apparent in the closing portion of *Strom.*, vii.

² 375, 846.

³ 228, 300-1.

⁴ 851; *cp.* "Oratio quæ fit in domo," Stählin, iii. 215.

⁵ 960.

⁶ 228.

the Church, which came with Commodus' accession, brought such freedom in its train.

Alexandria and Egypt were so rich in their sacred buildings, that the contrast between the humble houses of Christian assembly and the elaborate shrines of other cults must have struck even a mind so indifferent to externals as Clement. He was quite conscious of the architectural grandeur and costly decoration, which characterised the temples of the Egyptian gods.¹ He betrays, too, some archæological interest in discussing the orientation of the oldest shrines.² He must have been quite familiar with the wonderful Cæsareum, most splendid, in Philo's judgment, of all the structures erected in the divine Emperor's honour.³ At least one shrine of an ancient divinity was destined in after years to become a Christian Church.⁴ In Alexandria, too, there were many Synagogues, some of them buildings of considerable magnificence, if the later accounts of the famous "Diapleuston" may be trusted. There is some evidence that the practices of Jewish worship in Alexandria had special influence in determining the interior arrangements of the Church.⁵ Outside the city, beyond the Mareotic Lake, he may have seen the chapels or "monasteries" of the Therapeutæ: they may have helped to give meaning to one of his favourite terms.⁶ But, for the most part, he has little desire to see Christianity more worthily enshrined in houses made with hands. How impossible it is, he says, to localise God. Zeno and Euripides, he thinks, were right in their protests against all such attempts to circumscribe divinity; and it is with a certain malicious satisfaction that he records how many temples have been

¹ 252.

² 856-7.

³ Philo, *Leg. ad Caium*, 22.

⁴ Cabrol, *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie*, i. (i.), 1107.

⁵ Leclercq, *Manuel d'Archéologie chrétienne*, i. 343 sqq.

⁶ *μονή*, from St John xiv. 2. See Hort and Mayor's index. *μοναστήριον* (the derivation, of course, is different) occurs in Philo, *De vita contemp.*, 3.

destroyed by fire, including that of Serapis in Alexandria.¹ Clement's true shrine is the soul of man. The inviolable sanctuary into which we pass through the gate of salvation is not a building, nor even a society, but a spiritual state.² It would have been alien to his nature to think, as the Emperor Alexander Severus did, of building an elaborate shrine for Christ.³ Or, if God must have a visible temple, it is the universe, as Plato said,⁴ or perhaps the place "where two or three are gathered together" in the home. Even when he says that "the great shrine is the Church," he is probably not thinking of a building.⁵ For the craft of the architect, of the mason, of the mural decorator, he has no more sympathetic appreciation than he had for the statue of the Olympian Zeus. Art, for Clement, has no offering to make to worship. Its medium is necessarily material, and, like a true Platonist, he shrinks away into the inward and spiritual world and erects there his habitation for the Most High. Doubtless he was quite content with the ordinary house, that served in his day for worship. Men of his type may gain something by such superior detachment, but, on the whole, Hooker's was a wiser attitude. The Church was to learn before very long how greatly things material and things external may minister to the spirit, and how subtly the shrine on earth may suggest its prototype in heaven. "But this," he might doubtless have replied, "is for the multitude."

From localities we come naturally to times and seasons. Here, too, his real sympathies are all with those advanced souls whose Christianity, passing beyond the limitations of "feasts and appointed days," keeps the whole of life as a spiritual festival.⁶ Still, even for Clement, the year, the

¹ 691, 46-7.

² 55.

³ "Christo templum facere voluit," Lampridius, *Alexander Severus*, 43.

⁴ 691, 845.

⁵ 882.

⁶ 851.

week, and the day had their special seasons. There is a calendar and a sequence, however elementary. It was about half way through his period of residence in Alexandria that the Quartodeciman controversy again flared into life through the vigorous action of Victor, Bishop of Rome, in excommunicating the churches of Asia Minor. Alexandria, with her traditional interest in all matters of chronology, was drawn into the controversy, and this doubtless explains why Clement wrote a treatise on the Easter question to oppose the views of Melito, now laid to rest in Sardis.¹ He sides unhesitatingly with Rome: the Last Supper was, he believes, on the thirteenth Nisan, and the Lord Himself was the Passover victim on the fourteenth. This, of course, is Saint John's view, but Clement boldly claims an entire harmony of the Gospels for his side.² A century later the Bishops of Alexandria were to settle the date of Easter for the whole of Christendom.³ There is no hint of any such authority as yet, though the interest with which Clement discusses the year of the Lord's birth, and his mention of other calculations, which "somewhat needlessly" attempted to define the actual day, point to the prominence of such inquiries even in Christian circles.⁴ But these matters in Alexandria were still within the domain of private judgment: there is no hint of any authoritative decision, no trace of any Council being held formally in Egypt, though the Easter question was dealt with in this manner in Palestine, in Gaul, and even in Pontus.⁵ In any case, Easter was the one important season of the Church's year; there was no Christmas, no Lent, no festival of the Spirit. But there is a possible reference

¹ H.E., iv. 26.

² See the Fragments in Stählin, iii. 216 *sqq.*

³ Bingham, *Antiquities*, Bk. xx., c. v., § 4. He quotes a letter of Leo's, stating that this point was decided at Nicæa.

⁴ *περιεργότερον*. So, too, τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ ἀκριβολογούμενοι, 407-8.

⁵ H.E., v. 23.

to the Epiphany: our 6th of January was observed by some of the Basilideans as the day of the Lord's Baptism.¹ There is no evidence as yet of any other annual festival. Clement says nothing about the celebration of the birth-days of the martyrs. The Church was to learn in time that the fuller calendars of the pagan and the Jewish years had their practical value for religion.

As to the week, the days seem to have been observed much as at the date of the *Didache*. The "Lord's day" is, of course, the most prominent.² It was the day for remembering the Lord's Resurrection and reappropriating its spiritual power. The Jewish Sabbath had now been wholly abandoned by Christians, though in the fourth century its observance, as a day of Christian worship, was revived. But Wednesday and Friday were already kept with some measure of fasting.³ The syncretism of Alexandria is curiously exemplified in the fact, that these days of the Jewish week had been associated with the pagan deities, Hermes and Aphrodite. In this the Gnostic read the suggestion of abstinence from greed and indulgence. Whether in Alexandria or elsewhere there were assemblies for public worship on these days, or whether their observance was still private custom, Clement's single reference does not enable us to say. The week, at any rate, had its seasons more fully determined than the year.

Finally, there was the day. In germ the canonical hours were already established. "Some," he says, "assign fixed hours to prayer, the third, the sixth, the ninth."⁴ Tertullian gives us similar information. The practice of Daniel and the Psalmist had been adopted by the Church.

¹ Duchesne, *Origines du culte chrétien*, p. 263. "Le plus lointain indice qui se rapporte à cette fête nous est fourni par Clément d'Alexandrie." See Hort and Mayor's note, p. 265.

² 877.

³ 877.

⁴ 854; *cp.* 851.

After his manner, Clement sees in this threefold division of three a mystical reference to the Trinity. He regards the individual Christian as quite free, however, to observe the hours or not. There is no binding rule; devotion by day rested on the same ground as the prayer which was customary on retiring to rest, or even, in some cases, during the still hours of the night.¹ "A man should rise from his bed frequently during the night and bless God." Perhaps this was a counsel of perfection. A single word gives us the picture of the worshippers returning home in the early morning after service: it is the equivalent of Pliny's "stato die ante lucem."²

Such are the few references in Clement to the times and seasons of religion. Apart from the interest they possess as giving colour and precision to our conception of his environment, they are significant also as evidence of the formative stage of customs which were to prevail in the Church for many centuries. We watch private practice slowly crystallising into general rule. It is remarkable to observe in how many applications this holds good of Clement's portrayal of Christian life in his great city.

In the technical sense of the term he pays little attention to Church discipline. Only rarely are we told anything about its rules, penalties, and practical administration; nor does he ever enable us to say exactly what action was taken by the Church, when one of the faithful contracted a third marriage or another adopted the heresy of Marcion. Clearly the Church, as Clement knew it, had need of discipline. Laxity had come with numbers. Pagan habits were not unknown within the Christian circle. We have referred already to the difficulty of keeping the Alexandrian character within rules and bounds. And Clement has his remedies for all this. His threefold work is a continuous

¹ 216, 218, 506; *cf.* 958.

² ἐωθινόρον, 228. Pliny, *Ep.*, x. 96.

scheme of education with its appropriate discipline of character. He gives us in the first book of the *Pædagogus* a whole string of terms expressive of correction and reproof.¹ He defends the beneficial severity of the Law; refers repeatedly to the "Church's rule"; and asserts without reserve the principle of "everything in order."² But the sanctions are always of the moral kind. The authority to which he usually appeals is not ecclesiastical, but the higher authority of the Word, whether written or in the heart. So he turns to Plato to enforce truth, but never to the Bishop, and significantly recommends those, who are unsettled in opinion, to seek advice from the "peacemakers of doctrine," whoever they may have been.³ Throughout, in morals and in theology, he speaks as the master of the school, appealing to the highest motives, referring often to the discipline of the providential order, but rarely hinting that the Christian Society could insist on the observance of its rules. Yet Demetrius was Bishop in Alexandria when he wrote, and it is difficult to imagine that his exercise of authority was anything but vigorous. We must refer once more to the possibility that, for the last years of Clement's residence in Alexandria, there was some measure of divergence between the Church and the School. Clement preferred to rest Christian obligation on the ground of man's higher nature; life was a better thing than rules.

Against this general background of individual and philosophic Christianity, must be set the occasional references to the more definite regulation of conduct by the Church's corporate action. Suppose her members fell into sin, were there any remedies beyond the offender's own conscience, or the kindly counsel of a friend? Alexandria was here apparently in line with Rome and Carthage, for Clement leaves it beyond doubt that one offence, and only one, after

¹ 143 sqq.

² 613.

³ 894.

Baptism could be atoned for by repentance and confession. But repeated repentance was practically no better than unbelief. The Lord in His mercy has allowed a second repentance to those who fall after receiving the call.¹ Clement is so precise on this point, and shows such close agreement with the *Shepherd of Hermas* and Tertullian, that the reader is inclined to wonder whether, in other respects also, there was not a good deal more positive regulation in Alexandria than his pages would suggest. However that may be, he is familiar with the term "Exhomologesis," already specifically used of public confession.² Perhaps when he speaks of reproof as "an utterance which sets our sins in the light of publicity," he has some practice of the Church in mind.³ He also makes it clear that, after grievous sin, restoration to the Church has its defined conditions: fasting, prayer, and exhortation were essential, though the discipline was one of love.⁴ So when he says that certain scandalous characters are to be forbidden "our city" and kept at a distance, the similar exercise of some positive authority is implied.⁵

Yet, when all is said, the "spiritual sword" of the Church is an instrument of which he knows very little. Even sin more than once repeated after Baptism must not cause entire despair.⁶ God is merciful and the gates are not absolutely closed. And, after all, the severest penalty for such sin is the consciousness of its committal, and the spiritual loss which it involves.⁷ For some offences, he says, we must give forgiveness to ourselves—a curious doctrine which he had learned, apparently, from the Valentinians.⁸ Sometimes a

¹ 459. On the subject generally, see Swete in *Journal of Theological Studies*, iv. 321-37.

² 460, 769, 880.

³ προφορά ἁμαρτίας εἰς τὸ μέσον φέρουσα, 144.

⁴ 960.

⁵ 226.

⁶ 634, 957. For ἀπόγγνωσις see 936 and Dindorf, iii. 507.

⁷ 795.

⁸ 957, 993.

lay adviser would impose discipline, or even strengthen his weaker brother by an informal laying on of hands.¹ It is thus clear that Clement's Church was not wholly without the disciplinary system which must have been necessary to maintain its standard. Besides, the asceticism of the Montanists and of other sects may have often shamed believers out of laxity. But, on the whole, Clement relied little upon the formal exercise of authority. He sets before his pupils many motives for the heavenward way, but among these the fear of the Church's censure is as little prominent as the dread of penalties hereafter. His attitude in the matter is quite characteristic.

Postponing for separate chapters all consideration of the Scriptures and the Sacraments, we may now pass from this outline of the Church's life to some short notice of her external relations. No longer an isolated and detached society, the Church had her numerous points of contact with forces and tendencies which were not her own. She was conscious of their influence, though she exerted an influence of her own in turn. If we could fully understand this process of action and reaction, and watch in the details of daily life the relation of the believer to those that were without, our knowledge of the growth of Christianity would be far more complete than it is. Clement does not tell us much. It is chiefly in scholarly retirement that we know him. But the subject is of such interest that it is not lost labour to collect the various references to it from his pages. We may, for example, consider his occasional hints of contact between the Churchman and the Gnostic, or between the Christian and the State authority, or again between the Missionary and the unconverted world.

Heresy, of course, is not schism, yet it is difficult to say whether the heretics of Clement's age were within or without

¹ 510, 958.

the Church. Alexandria knew of no authoritative decision on the point, and Clement's language is quite contradictory. The heretics, he says, leave the Church; to lapse into heresy is desertion; the heresies are cross winds or swelling waves, through which the believer must guide his ship; heresy is the caricature which invariably follows excellence; the heretics, like other wild growths, needed to be grafted into the tree of life, and force in their case was necessary, wherein they were inferior to the philosophers.¹ He draws sharp contrasts between the Church and a school, between the Church and human assemblies.² The heretics had their separate meetings, their own ritual, their own appointed days. Saint John's flight from the presence of Cerinthus and Polycarp's recognition of Marcion as "Satan's first-born" did not occur in Alexandria, nor in Clement's generation, but even there and at that date it was remarked as exceptional that "our people" should have attended heretical lectures.³ All this points to sharp and acute division, to an absence of intercourse between the Churchman and the Gnostic, to a defining line, which shut out the heretic in practice.

Yet the separation was far from being final and complete. The heretics, Clement complains, break through the Church's wall; they have a vice key and a side entrance.⁴ They are inside, but they are intruders, as weeds grow in a garden or the tares among the wheat.⁵ If they leave the Church, still they claim its name. They were "brothers," though at a distance.⁶ Moreover, there must have been much personal intercourse. Irenæus had met and discussed with numbers of these dangerous guides, though he would prefer the faithful to hold aloof.⁷ Clement himself had listened to heretical teachers and heard their peculiar emphasis and

¹ 108, 375, 800, 816, 887, 889.

² 889, 898.

³ *ἡμέτεροι* contrasted with *αἰρετικοί*, H.E., vi. 2.

⁴ 897.

⁵ 774, 887-8.

⁶ 374.

⁷ ii. 17, 9.

intonation in the public reading of the Scriptures ; he was familiar also with their perverted interpretations of its meaning.¹ He frequently discusses the wisdom of "accommodation,"² and it is probable that he himself acted upon the principle of "all things to all men" in many of his dealings with these doubtful brethren. In this spirit he rejects the interpretation which would refer the "seat of the scornful" to the heresies.³ He prefers the suggestion that it is theatres and law courts that are intended. Thus his language is not consistent and it remains to say, in brief, that for Clement the heresies were and were not a part of Christianity. Both estimates may be found in his pages. His references have the interest which belongs to an intermediate stage. Perhaps his most illuminating parallel is found in the remark, that the heresies stand to the Church in the same relation as that in which the Epicurean stands to other Greek Philosophy.⁴ Each in some sense belongs to the main body, yet there is a difference and a separation.

But, whatever measure of connection and intercourse between the Church and the heresies may have existed in other respects, there is one mode of contact which is plainly revealed in Clement's writings. Each side made diligent study of the literature of their opponents. The contest was fought as much by books as in the schools. The heretics may have despised much of the orthodox literature as worthless, but they read it.⁵ Their books in turn circulated freely, even in Church circles, and were discussed by orthodox lecturers.⁶ It is hard to say what manner of theologian Clement would himself have been, if he had never known this abundant and eventually rejected literature.

Definitely outside the Church was the State and its authority. Cæsar and Cæsar's rule were of the earth.⁷ The

¹ 490, 529, 615.

² 169, 863, 881.

³ 464-5.

⁴ 774.

⁵ 892.

⁶ 514, 997.

⁷ 995.

Church had a higher and not always compatible allegiance. And the most notable and frequent contact between the two arose, when the State declared "Non licet esse vos." There were no special Edicts in force when Clement wrote, not, at least, if the view be correct that he wrote the *Stromateis* before the proclamation of Severus in A.D. 202. Yet persecutions went on in Alexandria, as they did in Carthage, on the authority of the ordinary laws.¹ Christianity was "Religio illicita." To decline to sacrifice to Cæsar was "Læsa majestas." Either charge was sufficient justification. It is clear that many prosecutions started from the Name alone—from the mere profession of Christianity, apart from any proved crime.² Clement must have known of many instances, or he could hardly have spoken of the daily stream of such spectacles.³ Several features in these trials evidently arrested his attention. The magistrate was often prejudiced, ignorant of the real tenets of Christianity, and unwilling to inquire.⁴ Sometimes the attacks were specially directed against those who, like Clement, were public teachers of the new religion.⁵ The motives behind these persecutions were very varied, sheer hatred, or jealousy of the Church's progress, or desire for the reward due to the "delator" who proved his case, or, again, just the fury of the crowd.⁶ At other times it was so wholly unreasonable, that it could only be put down to dæmonic influences. Occasionally the accused would deny their faith, but more often they were immovable and made a great impression by their fidelity, shaming even their persecutors and greatly strengthening the Church.⁷ Indeed, Clement is much concerned at the growth of the passion for martyrdom.

¹ Tertullian's *Ad Martyras* and *Apologeticus*, probably dating from A.D. 197, make this clear. See Appendix I.

² 598.

³ 494.

⁴ 598.

⁵ 82.

⁶ 871, 949.

⁷ 601.

He likes this excess as little as the heretical justification of denial under stress. Christians had no right to be rash or to "leap upon death."¹ A self-sought end was no true martyrdom. He knew of numbers, whose whole life seemed a preparation for the fiery exit which should unite them to their Lord. Already such a death was recognised as the purification from all sin.² This, together with the abundant honours paid to the martyr, made the stronger spirits among the faithful more anxious to secure their place in this roll of honour, than to assure themselves that such was the divine purpose for them. So Clement doubtless had many critics, when he quoted with approval the famous text, "When they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another ;"³ and perhaps still more when he acted on this principle a few years later.

It is clear that the penalties imposed by the magistrates were very various. Short of actual death, Christians seem to have suffered exile, loss of civil rights, confiscation of their property, torture, and, if finally it came to the last extremity, this was enacted in many ways, by crucifixion, or beheading, or the beasts of the amphitheatre, or the flames of the "tunica molesta."⁴ Clement, like many other characters of his type, was little fascinated by the glamour of these glorious surrenders. He had nothing of the Oriental in him, as Origen had ; and perhaps he shared Aristotle's belief in the value of the normal span of human life. Yet his references prove the truth of the well-known paradox that the State, by its very efforts to suppress Christianity, promoted its growth. Indeed, he says as much explicitly :
*ἡ δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀνθεῖ.*⁵

Finally, if we ask what was the exact secret of the Church's power to win the world, and seek in Clement's

¹ 571, 871.

² 596.

³ St Matt. x. 23, quoted 597.

⁴ ἀτιμία, φυγή, δήμεσις, 587 ; βόσανοι, 862 ; *cp.* 494, 589.

⁵ 827.

pages for some hints of the methods and incidents of the propaganda, it is only a partial answer that can be given. In Alexandria, at any rate, it was rather by teaching the truth than by activity in "good works" that the Church, in so far as these two can be separated, won her extraordinary success. Clement is himself the born teacher, and his gospel is light, rather than charity or consolation. We have already seen how he appealed to thoughtful Greeks, how anxiously he desired to save his converts from lapsing into heresy, how highly he estimated the task of instructing others in the Way.

This conception of the Church's office as an important stage in the divine scheme for the education of humanity, is so congenial to his nature and so prominent in his extant writings, that we may easily be misled by it into supposing that the victory was, in Clement's view, due wholly to argument and doctrine. But Christianity, even in an intellectual environment, is never a matter for pure reason, and Clement, whose main interest lies, no doubt, in tracing the interior life through its higher stages to perfect communion with God, has still left us sufficient evidence of that other side of Christian activity, which is so much more highly rated in the West than in the East. Though it was not his special task in life to go out "into the streets and lanes of the city" and bring in the poor and the maimed, he knows the duty of loving your neighbour even though he be uncongenial, of praying for his faults, of caring for the aged, the orphan, and the widow, of ministry to the sick, and of pity for those who are in distress.¹ Exposed children were not forgotten, and even for the departed generations some share was claimed in the Christian hope.² Not by the power of her message alone, but by this in combination

¹ 861, 880, and many passages in the *Quis dives salvetur*.

² 265, 999 *sqq.*

with an activity of service and of love, did the Christian society convince the world. Divine blessings come as a rule through human instrumentality :¹ many and diverse were the modes in which this principle held good for the Church's ministry to the world as Clement knew it.

Such, in outline, is the picture of the Church, which we may discover in the pages of our Stromatist. We can recognise without great difficulty its deficiencies, whether of performance or of ideal. On the other hand, it is possessed of qualities which may justly move our admiration, and, according to our standpoint, we may either note the contrasts and divergencies which separate it from the Church of our own time, or we may fix our attention on the singularly striking points of similarity between its conditions and our own. In any case, it is an interesting society at an interesting period of its development with which Clement brings us into contact. We would gladly have known more about it, and watched at closer proximity the lives and customs of its members, but our author did not write for the information of remote posterity, so that we must needs make the most of occasional references and incidental hints. But there is one feature, which even Clement's scanty information brings clearly into light, with some mention of which our consideration of this subject may conclude.

As Clement knew it, and as we know it through him, the Church in Alexandria was one of many contrasts. Side by side with the frequent claim that the Church is "one" must be set this particular Church's marked lack of uniformity.

Freedom, for example, strongly characterises this society. It is less defined in doctrine and organisation than other Christian communities. Its discipline is not strict. Externally, it knows no authority of Pope or Council. In-

¹ 325.

ternally, its chief presbyter claims as yet no patriarchal rights. But, in contrast with this freedom, it rejects the heretics, talks much already about the Church's rule, forbids its members to wear dyed raiment, and dictates the manner of their expenditure to the wealthy who believe.

It is a young society, with all the vitality and enthusiasm and assimilative power of youth. Its message is "new music." Its face is set towards the future. It is possessed of purpose and the power of growth. On the other hand, it is the Church of Egypt, the oldest of all the lands whose shores were washed by the Mediterranean, and habitually visited "cognoscendi antiquitatis." So it claims already to be the "ancient Church," looks back to what the Elders taught, delights to assert that the wisdom it has inherited from the Hebrews is more original than that of Greece, pays special honour to the most "ancient philosophy." It is the Church of hope and memory at once.

It possesses cultured members. Clement pleads their cause. They read Homer and Plato, as well as the Bible. They loved to find affinities between Philosophy and the Gospel. They could appreciate Euripides. Athens as well as Jerusalem was their city. But in the same Church were men and women as narrow and limited as their latter-day descendants have ever been, suspecting all culture, believing their own road was the only road, sincerely detesting the spirit of inquiry, holding that faith was everything and knowledge naught. Few contrasts in Alexandria were more acute than this.

Here, again, were those whose standard of Christianity was of the highest. They would die as martyrs readily, if the summons came. Or they would live with their affection set on things above. Ascetic purity, detachment from many interests, loyalty to ideals, marked them off from ordinary men. But the ordinary men were there as well, bringing

the ways and interests of the average world with them, falling away when persecution threatened, lapsing often into grievous sin, needing elementary instruction in the Christian way of life, making profit of religion.

Thus in Alexandria the Church, not less than the world, was a mixed society. Its contrasts present themselves in every direction. It entirely justifies the peculiarly Alexandrine phrase, *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως*, of which Clement made such frequent and characteristic use. If there are many theologies and many moralities in the Church of our own day ; if we have serious reason to ask how the older and the newer, or the broader and the narrower, interpretations of Christianity can cohere ; or if, by the very sincerity of religious conviction, we are sometimes led to deny the manifold diversity of the ways of God, there is some reassurance, and some degree of wholesome corrective, to be found in the actual facts of a particular Church's life, as they present themselves with all their many contrasts in the pages of the most multifarious of all the Fathers.

CHAPTER XVI

SACRAMENTS AND WORSHIP

WHATEVER other elements of value may have been rightly claimed by Christian Theology for the Sacraments of the Church, there is little question as to their supreme utility in one particular respect. These simple and primitive rites have formed the centres or "nuclei," around which spiritual associations might cluster and collect. Already in Apostolic times they had acquired a certain measure of essential character. The Baptism in water, the broken Bread and the shared Cup, are among the few indisputable elements of original Christianity. To these visible and sanctified *media* religious significance and mystic value have appropriately belonged. Their very simplicity has lent itself to a variety of symbolism and interpretation, and this in turn has occasioned and justified the elaboration of external ritual and the insistence on regulated and valid forms. Men protested with good reason that God dwelleth not in temples made with hands, and that we must not attempt to localise or define our deity. And then, in spite of this protest, they set to work to develop and perpetuate the special and definite channels, through which a divine presence and a divine grace might be appropriated and brought to mind. To the bulk of mankind a universal Love, or an all-pervading Reason, become real only in proportion as they can be limited, and hence arises the practical dependence of all

spiritual influences upon the forms and channels through which they operate. The pure, immediate communion of the human spirit with the divine has been only for the very few. Plato knew something of it, and the Mystics knew more, but the Church has been entirely right in retaining her consecrated elements with jealousy and insistence, and in so connecting her highest message with visible external rites. Humanity, apart from its rare saints and philosophers, needs such aids and apparatus; divine truth must receive some manner of embodiment before we can truly claim it as our own.

There is a certain interest in watching this principle at work in Clement's mind. He is by nature a man indifferent to religious forms. We have already seen him point out the upward pathway of the soul's progress to the stage at which thought and language altogether fail. His spiritual ideal lies, indeed, very far from all forms, all rules, all organisation. And we might have expected in Clement some impatience of even sacramental rites. In other ways, as we have already realised, he had none too much sympathy with the spiritual limitations of the multitude. Such an expectation, however, receives little justification from his writings. His references to Baptism and the Eucharist are not, indeed, so detailed and so explicit as those which may be found in the works of his contemporaries and even of his predecessors. Ritual order, so far as it was developed and established in the Alexandria of his time, is never fully described in his pages. It was already familiar to those whom it chiefly concerned, and Clement had no desire to divulge his "mysteries." From the *Didache*, Justin, or Tertullian, we can derive material for a far closer and more detailed portrayal of sacramental ceremonies, than could ever be constructed from the evidence of Clement alone, but this scarcity of detail need not lead us to underrate the signifi-

cance of the wealth of symbolism and association, which he characteristically discerns in these essential rites. In technical language, the grace of the Sacraments, as he understood it, stands for far more with Clement than the sign. Yet it is evident that he recognised the service and importance of the external sign as the form, channel, and embodiment of the invisible spiritual gift, as the evident and tangible centre, to which different interpretations and ever varied values might profitably be attached.

One further point should be mentioned, before we examine Clement's references to the Sacraments in greater detail. It concerns his treatment of the Eucharist more than his allusions to Baptism, but in some degree both are involved. We meet not infrequently in Clement's pages with language which bears obvious similarity to ritual formularies, known to have been established in the Church at a later period. For example, Clement's terminology shows considerable correspondence with the Prayers of Bishop Serapion, and with the later Liturgy of the Alexandrian Church. And, in regard to Baptism, many usages which were unquestionably recognised later, have their similar anticipations in his writings. Each hint or reference of this order must no doubt be explained and dealt with on its own merits. How far, for example, the term *εὐχαριστία* has already in Clement a technical sense, is a question to which the answer can only be given by an examination of the passages in which he employs this term. But, speaking generally, where the language of the later sacramental formularies seems to be anticipated in Clement's pages, two explanations of the facts are possible, and it is a matter of some little liturgical interest to decide between the two.

For it may either be that Clement, in his allusive manner, is employing terminology with which he had become familiar in the Church's already regulated, although still unwritten,

forms ; or, in the other alternative, it is possible that such language was as yet only the current and elastic phraseology of Christian circles, from which, at a later date, the fixed and authorised formularies were naturally in large measure derived. Custom must, in any case, have preceded the authoritative establishment of Eucharistic and Baptismal forms : the question is, whether at the close of the second century in Alexandria the stage of liturgical development was so advanced, that Clement's language must be regarded as borrowed or suggested, rather than as itself one among the many origins, from which the Church's formularies were afterwards composed. The former explanation, so far as it applies to the Eucharist, is maintained by Probst,¹ who says much of Clement's intentional secrecy, and holds that a "Missa Fidelium" already existed in such a measure of detailed completeness, that the Stromatist's terminology must be interpreted as reminiscent of this source.

Yet there is much to be said on the other side. No written liturgical forms can be shown to have existed for more than a century after Clement's date.² As recently as in Justin's time the prayers at the Eucharist were mainly free and extemporaneous. The Baptismal Order, too, in many important respects, was still far from finality. And in all matters of organisation Alexandria is known to have been behind other important Churches in the rate of development. Liturgical authorities are in the main inclined to discover little for their immediate purpose in Clement's writings.³ It may be inferred that they regard his language as the anticipation, rather than the reflection, of sacramental formularies. To the general question only a general answer

¹ *Liturgie der drei ersten christlichen Jahrhunderte*, pp. 130-41, where the writer refers to an earlier article on the same subject.

² See F. E. Warren, *Liturgy of the Antenicene Church*, pp. 105 sqq.

³ This is true, e.g., of Brightman's *Liturgies* (see esp. Appendix J, pp. 504 sqq.), and of Duchesne's *Origines du cult chrétien*.

can be given. But, on the whole, it is the safer course, when Clement's language corresponds, as it so frequently does, with what is known in later days to have been the authorised terminology of the Church, to treat it as source and material, unformulated and undefined, out of which, when ritual precision grew more necessary, some of the most valuable elements of her liturgical abundance were derived.

From such general considerations we may pass to consider more in detail Clement's various allusions to the Sacraments. It will be convenient to consider Baptism first, and afterwards the Eucharist; also, in the case of each, to distinguish the evidence he offers us as to the actual rite and its performance from the inward significance which he attaches to the external form. To some extent it is legitimate and even necessary in dealing with such a writer to give some greater measure of precision to what he only allusively suggests.

Adult Baptism was clearly still the rule. This is evident in many ways, principally by the fact that the *Protrepticus* is addressed to the unbaptised, the *Pædagogus* to those who have received the rite. Normally, then, it took place between the two stages which these books represent, after adherence had been given, before the more advanced instruction had been received. Yet some instruction, more detailed and definitely Christian than the appeal of the *Protrepticus*, clearly preceded Baptism. Information and catechetical training came before the Sacrament,¹ though inward experience, Clement warns us, must not be too precisely dated. The doors and gates of salvation are "rational" in character, and they who enter the Church by this sacrament, act with intelligence and understand the self-committal of their assent.² Yet infant Baptism, with which

¹ 116.

² 9-10, 55.

Tertullian and Origen were certainly familiar,¹ was perhaps not wholly unknown to Clement. "Children drawn out of the water" is a phrase which seems to imply it, and it would perhaps be difficult to understand such an expression as "Christ the children's guide," if Clement's Church had not already found a place in her membership for those of tender years.² Immersion was, of course, still practised. The baptised "went up" out of the water.³ They were as "Fish" caught by the divine Fisherman, or born "from the womb of water"⁴—a phrase which recalls the Lord's conversation with Nicodemus in the fourth Gospel.

Other elements in the rite do not pass wholly without notice. The baptised person received the blessed seal, by which term Clement no doubt meant, like Tertullian, the sign of the Cross.⁵ "To bear the sign," or "to bear about the stigmata of Christ," are expressions applicable to those who have received Baptism.⁶ The "seal" is specially connected with the name of the Trinity.⁷ It appears that the threefold invocation was made both at the immersion and again later, when the sign of the Cross was imposed. Another usual adjunct of Baptism was unction. Clement, perhaps, once refers to it: "I will anoint you," the Word promises his disciples, "with the unction of faith."⁸ The symbolism is probably suggested by the rite. It is notable, however, that in the considerable section of the *Pædagogus*, in which he deals with the use of unguents and criticises its luxurious excess, there is no hint or suggestion of the baptismal unction of the Church. Again and again, as we read the passage, we come upon contexts in which such a reference would have been entirely natural. "A man must

¹ Tert., *De Baptismo*, 18; Origen, Hom. VIII., in *Levit.* (Migne, *Pat. Gr.*, xii. 496).

² 117, 289, 312.

³ 172, 987.

⁴ 312, 637.

⁶ 434, 959.

⁶ 880, 989.

⁷ 690, 987; *cp.* Dindorf, iii. 507.

⁸ 93.

carry about with him the scent, not of myrrh, but of nobility ; a woman must have the aroma of Christ, the royal unguent.”¹ Some mention of the sacramental anointing would have been here so appropriate, that its absence, taken in connection with single reference to the subject made by Origen, might well lead us to suspect that in Alexandria this element in the baptismal ceremony was less prominent and invariable than it was at the same period in Antioch and in Carthage.² But the argument from silence is peculiarly unsafe, when Clement’s silence is in question.

Then there is also a mention of the mixture of milk and honey, which was administered immediately after Baptism. This curious symbolism had special prominence in the Roman and Alexandrian Churches. It signified the Christian hope of final rest in the heavenly Jerusalem, “where it is written that milk and honey fall like rain.”³ Through the material,” he proceeds, “we seek the holy sustenance.” It is, in other words, “a means whereby we receive the same.” It is interesting to notice how accurately Clement had caught the principle of sacramental theology. We have already referred⁴ to the infrequent mention made in his pages of “the laying on of hands,” and of the acknowledgment of the most important articles of belief. With some probability, we may connect these with Baptism and find in them the rite of Confirmation and the “*Redditio Symboli*,” in so far as these existed in Alexandria at his time. We may summarise the scanty information he gives us, by saying that with Clement Baptism is mainly for adults, after careful preparation, administered by immersion, conditional upon a confession of the faith, and followed by unction, by the sign of the

¹ 208.

² See Warren, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-1. For the practice in Antioch see Theophilus, *Ad Autolyicum*, i. 12 ; for Carthage, Tertullian, *De Baptismo*, 7.

³ 125 ; *cp.* 119. See Duchesne, *op. cit.*, p. 338. ⁴ *Supra*, pp. 114 *sqq.*

Cross, by the laying on of hands, and by the tasting of the milk and honey. His references are in substantial agreement with what we know of the Church's practice from other authorities for this period.

If we compare Clement's references to this Sacrament with the Baptismal prayers in Bishop Serapion's *Euchologion*, we notice certain developments which the intervening century had brought. In the later authority there is a separate prayer for the sanctification of the water. The descent of the Word *and* of the Spirit is definitely invoked. The anointing oil is blessed before use. And Confirmation is separated from Baptism. But it does not seem that any important element has been added that is wholly new, and there are notable correspondences of terminology and ideas. Alexandria may have had a less precise and elaborate ritual than Carthage in Clement's day, but it does not appear that any principal items of the later baptismal ceremonial were wholly wanting in her ecclesiastical order.

But Clement's main interest is not in the actual rite or "opus operatum." He cares more for the truths and associations which were connected with it. His attitude is exactly that, which we have already seen him adopt in regard to the historic life of the Lord. He breaks away from events and particulars into the wider and spiritual verities. And Baptism stood with him for many such. Indeed, if one should raise inquiry as to the exact "gift" which Christianity had to offer, and the reasons why it was able to attract the world, there could hardly be any better answer than that which lies to hand, when we have collected the various interpretations which Clement and his contemporaries attached to its initial rite. We may enumerate the most notable of these.

The baptised person became the member of a spiritual State, Kingdom, Commonwealth. He was registered, and acquired a new citizenship. He possessed a fresh *πολιτεία*,

with all its privileges and all its obligations. By nationality he was henceforth neither Jew nor Greek, but a part of that "third race," whose life was centred in the spiritual City, at once of heaven and on earth, "which no foe may capture and no tyrant oppress." *σπουδαῖον γὰρ ἡ πόλις*, Clement adds, like a true Hellene.¹

But the Christian conception of the Household or Family is even more prominent. In Baptism we become sons of God. The thought of regeneration is frequent and emphatic. It is our new birth, by water and the Word.² The Sacrament stands for nothing less than the full sonship of the true Father. Clement would never have denied the doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God. He does indeed assert it. But, like Saint John, he knew that for the Christian this common truth had a deeper and more intimate significance.³

Forgiveness of sin, too, came by Baptism.⁴ This association was traditional, going back to the New Testament and to John the Baptist. The severity with which the Church treated sin after Baptism is a proof of the spiritual value and importance, which was attached to such sacramental remission. Clement accepts, but does not develop or accentuate, this aspect of the rite. The legal view of religion, in spite of all he says in praise of the Law, never really possessed him, and the comparatively slight emphasis laid on forgiveness and the sense of pardon is thus characteristic.

But more is said on the kindred principle of Purification. Baptism was a "spiritual washing," and in dwelling on this idea Clement was in line both with the Prophets and with Plato.⁵ He had an even closer precedent in the Mysteries; purificatory rites "are the first stage of the

¹ 642, 761.

² 156, 450, 551.

³ Note the expression *τὸν πατέρα ἀπολαμβάνειν*, 69, 88.

⁴ 114, 128, 460.

⁵ 282.

Mysteries of the Greeks, as Baptism is with the Christian " or "barbarian."¹ Cleansed and pure and fresh, he says, should we enter upon sacred rites and prayers. In the ritual washings of Penelope and Telemachus before their devotions he discerns an anticipation of the Christian Sacrament.² Our very bodies are deserving of more honour through such cleansing.³ Our nature is purified from its worthless elements ; indeed, the process is one of straining or filtration, which leaves the soul free from infected taint :⁴

"purumque reliquit
ætherium sensum."

There is a further development of this aspect of Baptism in the idea that it brought protection, and security from the powers of evil. The demons, which might possess the human soul, were to the world of ancient days as fully real as the Devil was to Luther, and it is hard to say whether Plutarch or the New Testament affords stronger evidence of the potency of this belief. Before Baptism these evil powers were renounced ; the Sacrament itself was "salvation," because it conferred safety from their possession and control. Within its secure doorways the soul found a veritable asylum, whence no demon might drive it out.⁵ The "seal" of the rite was the symbol of complete protection from such influences.⁶ The words of the Lord's parable are quoted ; these evil spirits might not return to the house from which they had been expelled, for God had occupied it and the seal had marked it as His holy place. So the Sacrament brought security, not merely from remote penalties elsewhere, but from very near and actual enemies in this present world.

There were, besides, more positive aspects of Baptism. Remission, purification, protection, did not exhaust its

¹ 688-9. ² 628-9. ³ 241. ⁴ 117. ⁵ 55. ⁶ 959, 992.

significance ; it conferred gifts as well as immunities. Prominent among them was Immortality. This was no inherent, inalienable possession of man's nature as such. It is rather that in the Sacrament we put on the incorruptibility of Christ.¹ It is "the Word of incorruptibility" who confers upon us this higher birth.² By spiritual unction we throw off our liability to dissolution.³ "Upon you alone of all mortal beings do I bestow the fruit of immortal life," says the divine Word, with a hint that through the Sacraments the Incarnation had conferred the privilege which had been denied to man in Paradise. "Be initiated and thou shalt have thy place in the angels' choir, around the one true God, unbegotten, incorruptible." Death was gone. Eternal life was a gift, and Baptism the outward and visible means of its conveyance. So the Church believed.

One other aspect of Baptism remains, which was peculiarly attractive to Clement's mind. This Sacrament, besides its many other interpretations, was also known as "Illumination." This conception had its special appropriateness in Alexandrian theology and would recall, by its associations, both the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Pagan Mysteries.⁴ It is Clement's favourite synonym for Baptism. Instruction and illumination are for him identical with regeneration.⁵ "We have been illuminated, which means to know God."⁶ The Father summons us to cleansing, to salvation, above all to illumination.⁷ It is the term that denotes the completion of all stages preliminary to the full possession of Christianity.⁸ Afterwards, potentially, we are

¹ 117.² 90.³ 93.

⁴ Heb. vi. 4 ; x. 32. For φωτισμός in the Mysteries, and the connection of its use there with the Christian Sacrament, see Wobbermin, *Die Beeinflussung des Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen*, 166 sqq., and E. Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 294-300.

⁵ 653.⁶ 113.⁷ 75-6.

⁸ ἀπόλαβε τὸ φῶς, χωρήσωμεν τὸ φῶς, 87-8 ; ἐγρήγορεν . . . ὁ πεφωτισμένος, 218.

perfect and full grown. To receive Baptism is to receive illumination, because the Sacrament marked the transition from ignorance to knowledge, from darkness to light, from the outer gloom to the brilliantly lighted sanctuary of the faith. The soul in Baptism is not unconsciously cleansed, but is washed in "rational water," or the water of the Word;¹ it understands what the process means. Gnosis, knowledge, is often used in passages where the term "Baptism" might take its place.²

Illumination, again, is the name given to the instruction which reveals the hidden truths of God; it is the power which, through the Saviour's grace, heals sick souls by leading them to possession of the truth.³ Behind all this teaching we discern the fact that the knowledge of the Church's faith was cautiously imparted to the believer before his Baptism. There was a "Traditio Symboli" or something of the kind; and always afterwards the baptised person was conscious that he possessed the clue to the higher interpretation of the world. So Clement loves, as we might express it, to intellectualise the Sacrament, though indeed the light of this illumination is with him no cold dry light of the bare reason, but a flame that warms and cheers as well. Still, there is a characteristic insistence, throughout his references to Baptism, upon the right of the baptised to gather the fruits of the tree of Knowledge as well as those of the tree of Life. We recollect that the prisoner in Plato's cave turned his eyes gradually towards the light. Undoubtedly there is a certain "Hellenising" of Christianity to be seen in the significance Clement most delights to discern in this rite. With the growth and prevalence of Infant Baptism much of Clement's language has ceased to be applicable. The Church was right in her decision to extend her welcome to those of tender years. Yet something has been lost in the inevitable separa-

¹ ἕδωρ λογικόν, 79.

² E.g. 80, 83.

³ 684, 936.

tion from this Sacrament of all those important associations for which, as Clement understood it, "illumination" was the most general and significant term. There is slight trace of them, even in the English form "For those of Riper Years." Nor does the "Order of Confirmation," in spite of its reference to the "spirit of wisdom and understanding," wholly make up the loss.

So much Clement tells us about Baptism. We pass on to consider his references to the Eucharist, noting incidentally how completely these two rites overshadow all minor ordinances. To that extent he is with the Reformers and their two Sacraments, rather than with Rome and seven, though his principles are indeed elastic enough to extend to many particular applications.

Clement's references to the Church's central act of worship are not infrequent, but they are usually allusive and indistinct in character, leaving many interesting questions still in doubt. We are quite sure of his general view and estimation of the Eucharist, but in much uncertainty about the details of its order. We shall consider the externals of the Sacrament first.

The number of believers who assembled habitually for worship was considerable. It was not a case of "two or three" gathering together in the Name, but a "muster of the troops of peace" with Christ as leader.¹ Their one assembly was a union of many members. The blending of the many voices in one great harmony was notable and impressive.² The "coming together" of a congregation may be discerned in the terms employed.³

This worship, if not elaborate, contained most of the

¹ συναχθῆναι, 72; συνάξει τοὺς εἰρηνικοὺς στρατιώτας, 90; *cf.* the use of *σύναξις* in the Liturgies.

² 72, 848.

³ *συνήλυσις*, 167.

various elements, which were afterwards developed in the Liturgies. There is a passage in which its five principal constituents are mentioned together, and we may follow Clement's order, without committing ourselves to its complete accuracy.¹ He knew that these things were subject to regulation, for he refers to the Church's rule as defined and binding in connection with the Sacrament.²

There was a Homily or Exhortation. To hear this was a part of the Eucharistic observance. It was commonly an exposition of Scripture.³ And possibly there are hints of the distinction, more definitely drawn in later times, between those who are "hearers" only and those who are more advanced.⁴ Hearing is distinguished from full participation in the mysteries, and they who could not read, at least might hear.⁵

But the hearing was not confined to the Homily. Scripture was read: there were lections from the Old Testament and from the New.⁶ The connection between the use of the Scriptures and the Eucharistic rite is definitely stated to be a part of the Saviour's intention.⁷ It is another form of Clement's frequent plea for intelligence in worship.

The Oblation is next mentioned. Bread and wine were the elements offered: this was the Church's rule, though some heretics used water only, in defiance of the plain language of Scripture.⁸ The wine was mixed with water, according to the custom in ordinary life.⁹ Clement never

¹ 797. He mentions (i.) ἀκοή, (ii.) ἀνάγνωσις, (iii.) προσφορά, (iv.) εὐχή, (v.) Praise—ψυχὴ . . . αἰνοῦσα, ὑμνοῦσα, εὐλογοῦσα, ψάλλουσα. The accumulation of terms for this last item is significant and characteristic.

² 375. ³ 76. ⁴ 248. ⁵ 299.

⁶ προφήται λαλοῦσιν, 92. The Gospels are read aloud, 794.

⁷ 343.

⁸ 375; *cp.* 186. Note the insistence on *αἶνος*. On the use of water in the Eucharist see Harnack, *Brod und Wasser: die eucharistischen Elemente bei Justin*, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, vii. 115 sqq.

⁹ 177.

speaks of an altar in connection with Eucharistic ritual, though he may, perhaps, have had the Sacrament in mind when he spoke of the "table of truth."¹ It was a "holy" offering, a "holy" supper, as was every meal at which Christ was present.² And man's gift to God became in turn God's gift to man, and through the elements souls were fed on spiritual food.³ The words of institution were familiar to Clement,⁴ as was the idea of the divine Word being blended with the material substance ; but there is no definite reference either to the act of consecration, or to the invocation of the Word or the Spirit. The recognised practice was for the elements to be administered to the faithful, but a different use was sometimes followed and the communicants allowed each to take his share from the Table.⁵

Prayer comes next in Clement's order, though we must not suppose that it did not precede as well as follow the actual rite. Clement's language frequently resembles that of the later liturgical forms. The "rest" of the departed, the "loving kindness" of God, the "medicine" of hallowed elements, the "knowledge" that comes by communion, are all expressions which occur frequently in Clement's pages and are found also in the Prayers of Bishop Serapion.⁶ So, too, in the Alexandrian Liturgy of Saint Mark, "the holy and only Catholic Church," the thought of the faithful as "the flock" of God, the conception of the Lord as the haven of the storm-tossed, and the physician of souls, have all their obvious resemblances to phrases common in Clement's works. We cannot, as before observed, argue with certainty from these and other notable correspondences to the existence of a prescribed liturgical order in Clement's time. But they may still form some evidence

¹ 173.² 205.³ 948.⁴ 186, 343.⁵ 318.

⁶ ἀνάπαυσις, φιλανθρωπία, φάρμακον, γνῶσις. So, too, Serapion's use of βελτίωσις, ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι, συγκατάθεσις, recalls Clement's terminology.

as to the style and manner of the petitions offered in public worship in his day. The beautiful prayer to the Word, with which the third book of the *Pædagogus* closes, may afford us an even closer insight.¹ Standing was the usual attitude in worship, with head erect and hands raised and the heels lifted from the ground and the face turned to the East.² The prayer was said by the priest alone, but it closed with a common and united utterance, in which every voice joined, though whether more than the "Amen" was repeated by all the worshippers, it is impossible to say.

Finally, there was Praise, and with Clement this was an important element. To him we owe the earliest Christian hymn still extant, and music counted for much in Alexandria. From the many references in his pages to hymns and praise, it is clear that Christian worship, as he knew it, had a glad and joyous character, and that in Alexandria the Eucharist fully deserved its name.³ The Divine Word seemed himself to join with the uplifted voices of the worshippers.⁴ And Clement knew, what so many moderns have forgotten, that false theology mattered even in a hymn.⁵

At some point in this order, possibly before the Oblation, place must be found for the Kiss of Peace. Clement tells us that already this custom had fallen into some abuse. Some people even made the Church echo with their salutations.⁶ The greeting lost all its "mystical" character, when decency and restraint were thus forgotten. Tertullian was scandalised at the suggestion of the omission of the kiss, even on days of fasting.⁷ Clement has reason

¹ 311.

² 107, 854, 856.

³ But instrumental music, which Clement thought morally dangerous, was evidently not yet used in worship; *cf.* 193.

⁴ *συνυμνοῦντος ἡμῖν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου*, 92.

⁵ 853. *Cf.* Bardaisan's use of hymns for purposes of teaching.

⁶ 301.

⁷ *De Oratione*, 14.

to deplore just the opposite defect. It is strange to find the Carthaginian father protesting against needless strictness, the Alexandrian pleading for rigidity. But Tertullian is thinking of the Eucharist, Clement mainly of the Agape.

This last distinction is, in Clement, a point of much perplexity. Were the Eucharist and Agape, as he knew them in Alexandria, distinct or not? Does his Church order unite the Christian Sacrament with the Christian meal, and fall into line with that of the *Didache* and Ignatius; or does it correspond to the opposite practice, with which Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen were familiar? His interpreters differ and it is hard to say. Clement is nowhere more mystical and allusive than in his treatment of sacramental rites, and on this particular point his references are interpreted by some authorities to imply that the Eucharist was still connected with the Agape and celebrated in the evening, while others hold that they afford evidence of a distinct and morning rite. There is a very full excursus in Hort and Mayor, and considerable reason for their conclusion of "non liquet."¹

On the whole, when we consider the various passages in question, there seems ground for the belief that there did exist in Clement's Church a recognised practice of receiving the Eucharist in the morning. Morning attendance at Church is in one passage clearly mentioned as a usual custom.² It could hardly be for any other service than the Eucharist. The term Eucharist is used by Clement both in a technical and also in a more general

¹ The separation of the two in Clement's Church is maintained by Keating, *The Agape and the Eucharist in the Early Church*, pp. 78-93, and by Zahn, art. "Agapen" in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*. It is disputed by Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, pp. 102-5, by Allen, *Christian Institutions*, p. 522, and by Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 143, n. See Hort and Mayor, Appendix C.

² 228.

sense, and technically employed seems to suggest a separate rite.¹ In one specially important passage he writes that our "regular food" may be a Eucharist, if we receive it with thanksgiving, implying apparently that it was not customary to connect the term with anything of the nature of an ordinary meal. Moreover, in the two passages in which Clement speaks of the Oblation, the term "Eucharist" occurs as well, but the idea of offering does not appear to be so closely associated with the Agape.² Such considerations may not prove conclusively that Clement thought of the Eucharist as a service distinct from the freer afternoon assemblies of the faithful, but they give some probability to the supposition. Alexandria, we may suppose, had already separated the two elements which were latent in the primitive Supper of the Lord.

But if here, as elsewhere, the morning Eucharist existed, it is also clear that the Agape was still a popular institution, with considerable religious significance and no little liability to scandal and abuse. The term was elastic, covering formal assemblies of the Church and more social gatherings in houses. Its associations, though not the actual name, were extended to the ordinary evening meal of the family.³ Such gatherings may have commenced by daylight, in the late afternoon; they were continued into the evening, with the lamps alight.⁴ They retained a sacramental character; the table was a table of truth; the food was heavenly fare; the Scriptures were read aloud; the kiss of peace was given;

¹ The word has a technical sense in such passages as the following: *κρᾶσις ποτοῦ τε καὶ λόγου εὐχαριστία κέκληται*, 178: *ὡς εἶναι τὴν δικαίαν τροφήν εὐχαριστίαν*, 170: *τὴν εὐχαριστίαν διανέμειν*, 318: *ἕδωρ ψιλὸν εὐχαριστοῦσι*, 375. It is used in the less restricted sense of "thanksgiving" in *πρὶν ὕπνου λαχεῖν εὐχαριστεῖν ὅσιν τῷ θεῷ*, 194; also in 683, 851, 879.

² *προσφορά*, 375, 797.

³ I cannot find that *ἀγάπη* in Clement ever means nothing more than the ordinary evening meal of the family.

⁴ 514.

thanksgiving and hymns brought the evening to its close ; contributions were made to the needs of the poorer brethren.¹ A certain measure of consecration attached to it, in so far as it accorded with its true purpose and ideal.² It was a feast of reason, a banquet of the mind, a supper of which love was the motive. Such were the general associations of the Agape. How far its more public forms differed from private practice, it is not possible to say. In a rich and luxurious city like Alexandria, with men and women of the world beginning to find their way into the Church, it is easy to understand the liability of such an institution to abuse. The heretics employed the term freely, to give a specious decency to many of their worst extravagances,³ and even in Catholic circles the religious character of the meal tended to be obscured by licence and indulgence. So discredit fell upon the very ordinance of the Lord. Clement is seriously concerned at the laxity of Christian practice in these assemblies. He seems to feel that a beautiful and spiritual institution is being vulgarised and spoiled. Among the Carpocratians this might be natural, but it troubles him to see any similar defection in the Church.

Such in its central and most sacred rite was Christian worship in Alexandria, so far as it is possible to hazard its reconstruction from Clement's pages. But, as with Baptism, so with the Eucharist and the Agape, it is not in the rite that Clement's interest lies. It is the truths and associations gathered round it, the mystical significance it suggested, the "grace" of the Sacrament, as in manifold fashion he loved to interpret it, for which Clement truly cares. Not that he is wholly indifferent to ritual, but the inward things are always more.

The dominant conception is that of feeding upon the

¹ 72, 165-7, 171, 173, 228, 301, 860-1.

² ἡ ἀγάπη ἡ ἡγιασμένη, 165.

³ 892.

Word. To the sound in soul He himself is spiritual nourishment.¹ "I am thy sustainer," says the Christ, "and give myself to thee as bread."² There is a mystical element in the Sacrament, forasmuch as it is the flesh of Christ.³ It is heavenly food that the faithful seek.⁴ The blood of the vine is "the Word shed abroad for many." The divine food that is above is ours, of which those alone who are worthy may have a share.⁵ In such language Clement's mind dwells upon the central truth of the Eucharist, finding mystical and allegorical significance in the mixed chalice, in the properties of the blood, in the qualities of milk, which is "white as the day of Christ."⁶ For him, as for Saint John and all his like, there is no rigid limitation of such spiritual feeding to the Eucharistic rite. It is the universal privilege of our higher nature, as interpreted by Christianity. Heavenly fare is the nourishment of the soul. Day by day we drink the cup of the Lord. To all his children the Word supplies their proper nurture. The Church had gathered up and focussed and centralised this universal need and privilege of human nature in her one principal rite, and this centralisation was to be more and more marked in the after years. For Clement, the act or process of spiritual feeding is still inward, mystical, elastic, aided, not restricted, by outward rules. Even he was already beginning to recognise the need for order and regulation, but the fact upon which his thought habitually dwelt was that of Christ, the Word, as always, with or without the *media*, the meat and drink of faithful souls.

And "the benefits whereof we are partakers thereby"? These are principally two, Truth and Immortality. For just as Baptism was illumination, so are Eucharist and Agape the continued sustenance of our rational and intelligent

¹ 123.⁴ 165.² 948.⁶ 169.³ 125-6.⁶ 121-2, 128, 177.

natures. The two Sacraments have indeed a certain natural affinity, just as milk and water are kindred in their properties.¹ It is the Lord's will that we should "eat rationally."² The Saviour's teaching is "spiritual meat and the cup which knows not thirst."³ When we eat and drink of the Word, we have the knowledge of the divine being.⁴ The soul's highest fare is the uncloying contemplation of the true reality.⁵ In such terms he loves to translate the rite and ordinance into mystic vision, and to appropriate angels' food for the understanding soul. Ceremony passes imperceptibly into meditation, and the Supper in the upper room is intellectualised, so that Hellenes may share the feast. Thus the Gnostic may receive sacramental grace as he needs and can appropriate it. Because Christ is the Truth, He is also the true Vine and the Bread of life.

That is one interpretation of the inward gift ; it is also Immortality. Here, again, the implications are similar to those of Baptism. Just as in the initiatory rite man puts on the incorruptibility of the Lord, so in the Eucharist he partakes of the "medicine of immortality."⁶ The idea specially connects itself with the mixed cup : the blending of the different substances suggests the fusion of the divine nature with our humanity.⁷ To drink the blood of Jesus is to share the incorruptibility of the Lord. Day by day He gives us the cup of immortality, and whoso eats of the divine bread has no further experience of death. Thus does Clement anticipate the common conception of the later Liturgies, that in the Eucharist man obtains eternal life.⁸

Clement does not emphasise the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. He is familiar with the conception of sacrifice as originally a feast upon a victim,⁹ and neither the idea of

¹ 127-8.² 343.³ 896.⁴ 686.⁵ 169.⁶ 83.⁷ 128, 177-8.⁸ *E.g.* ζῶης αἰωνίου τυχεῖν in the Liturgy of St Clement.⁹ 849.

a Real Presence, nor that of Transubstantiation, are foreign to his thought; but he does not appropriate or expand these principles in his treatment of the Sacrament.¹ He connects, indeed, the thought of Christ's death with the gift of the Bread and Cup, and even, in a strongly allegorical passage, speaks of "having the Word in one's mouth."² In a fragment, of which the authorship is at best doubtful, the language is more definite, and Christ is said to be both flesh and bread, and to give Himself as both for us to eat.³ But Clement's most characteristic teaching runs upon other lines. "We do not sacrifice to God, but we glorify the victim offered upon our behalf."⁴ The oblation, as he interprets it, consists of prayer and teaching.⁵ The true altar is the assembly of the believers, or the righteous soul.⁶ The Church's sacrifice is the utterance which rises like incense from holy souls, or incense itself is prayer. His thought in these matters is mystical, fluid, variable, rather than precise. Both parties in later controversies have claimed him as their ally, but indeed in this, as in so many other connections, we have no right to demand from him a verdict on questions which in his day had not been raised. He is emphatic in his demands for decency and order, and in his regard for the Church's rule. He knows the sacred symbols stand for a hidden and higher reality. And Christ, the divine Word, is for him the veritable and unfailing Food of souls. Let us be grateful for such wide and generous doctrine: it was not wholly to his disadvantage, that Clement lived before the Church's Eucharistic teaching had grown erudite, definite, and controversial.

Side by side with these ordinances of the Christian

¹ See Bigg, *Christian Platonists*, p. 106, n. 4. The idea of sacrifice came in with Origen. Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 133, n.

² 298, 948.

³ Dindorf, iii. 505.

⁴ 836.

⁵ Stählin, iii. 204.

⁶ 848.

Society existed the pagan Mysteries, and the heretical Sacraments of the Gnostics. Clement was familiar with both. We shall briefly consider the relation between these rival ceremonies and the Church's forms of initiation and of worship, as Clement's pages reveal them to us.

To some extent the influence of the Mysteries may be traced in the New Testament. Saint Paul, Saint John, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, all made use of the terminology proper to Eleusis, and such conceptions as those of purification, of revelation, of an assured Hereafter, are common to certain phases of apostolic Christianity and to the Mysteries. How far there was direct appropriation, how far the correspondence is explained by the general religious atmosphere of the period, is a difficult and undetermined question. When we pass from the New Testament to Clement, the influence is still more evident; his writings are indeed of peculiar interest and importance in any consideration of the action of pagan cults upon developing Christianity.

Like other ecclesiastical writers, he is the severe critic of these ancient rites, dragging forth every absurdity and every obscenity into the light of day. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, he is debtor where he scorns and ridicules; and this indebtedness is specially evident in his treatment of the Sacraments. Sometimes, like Tertullian, he makes direct comparison between the Church's rites and the mysteries of Paganism.¹ Sometimes, by looser association, he speaks of the "mysteries" of the Agape or of the "mystery" of the Bread.² Certain terms specially appropriated to the Sacraments have been derived most probably from the Mysteries: among these "Illumination," "the Seal," "Perfection," were recognised

¹ 688-9. *Cp. Tert., De Baptismo, 5.*

² τὸ μυστικὸν τοῦ ἔργου, 125; τὰ τῆς ἀγάπης μυστήρια, 956 (though perhaps the word ἀγάπη is not used here in its special sense).

names for Baptism. Let anyone watch in the *Protrepticus* and in the *Pædagogus* how Clement exploits these terms, or how, in another passage, he speaks of Eucharistic wine as the "mystic symbol of the Holy Blood,"¹ and he will hardly question, that there was a recognised parallelism in Clement's mind between the rites of Eleusis and the Church. This comes out specially in the closing chapters of the *Protrepticus*, where the Church's membership is described as the fellowship of the initiated, the Lord is portrayed as the true Hierophant, and the technical language of the Mysteries is freely employed to commend, in a strain of exalted enthusiasm, the privileges of those who are admitted to the spiritual shrine.²

Like the Mysteries, Christianity drew the sharp line of distinction between those who were initiated and those who were not. "I have no concern," says Clement once, letting his words carry him far beyond his practice, "with the uninitiated," that is to say the unbaptised.³ Like the Mysteries, Christianity demanded long and careful preparation for share in its full membership. Like the Mysteries, Christianity had its symbolic meal, its ritual responses from the novice, its protection by sacred ceremonies from evil powers. And the parallel is even closer, when we consider how each, by sacramental acts, brought its adherents out of darkness into light, and how each secured in a similar manner the assurance of immortal life. Clement is an important witness for all these points of similarity, nor is it in the Sacraments alone that he discerns such correspondence. Like many men of his age, as we have already had occasion to observe, he must in earlier life have been profoundly influenced by his initiation into what was at once the most spiritual and the most naturalistic phase of pagan religion. When he comes over to the Church he forgets the Mysteries just as little as he forgets his Homer

¹ 184.² 91 *sqq.*³ 936.

and his Philosophy. All the higher and nobler elements of their scheme are brought to the service of Christianity, and the sacred ordinances of the Lord, which had been adapted originally from Jewish practice, receive a Hellenic setting and interpretation. To the Greeks they became as Greek. The trend so given to the Church's sacramental teaching has never since been wholly lost. Clement has a twofold interest for us in the matter ; first, in so far as he enables us to watch this syncretistic process in actual operation ; and secondly, in so far as his attitude in the matter is another evidence of the generous elasticity of his mental and spiritual temperament. He will claim for Christianity every element of which the new religion could make fruitful and honourable use.

A closer parallel to the Sacraments of the Church is to be seen in those of the Gnostic sects. Clement's references to these are in keeping with his whole attitude to Gnosticism generally : at times he criticises and condemns ; at times he commends and appropriates. The number of passages in the *Excerpta* and *Eclogæ* which refer to the Sacraments, is an interesting evidence of the recognised importance of these rites in the earlier Valentinian system. Incidentally, it is to be noticed that the influence of the Mysteries is even more evident in the sacramental practice and teaching of the Gnostics than in those of the orthodox Church.¹

Clement naturally found much to condemn in the licence of the Carpocratian assemblies. Sectarian ambition and sectarian indulgence seem to him to mark the chief places of their misnamed Agapæ.² He finds fault, too, with those who used only water in the Eucharist.³ And he seems to question the validity of heretical Baptism : it is " not proper

¹ See especially Wobbermin, *op. cit.*, 70 *sqq.*

² οὐ γὰρ ἀγάπην εἶποιμι' ἂν ἔγωγε τὴν συνέλευσιν αὐτῶν, 514 ; *cf.* 892.

³ 375.

or genuine water," he says, extracting a condemnation of it from the LXX version of Prov. ix. 18.¹ Cyprian later made use of the same passage, possibly influenced by the Alexandrian father's example. Clement must have been well aware of the importance which the Gnostics attached to Baptism. The Lord's Baptism, in most Gnostic systems, marked the union of the Christ with the man Jesus. There was therefore special point in his remark that, if the Gnostics adhered to their theories, they rendered Baptism superfluous.²

But these criticisms are probably outweighed by his appreciation of the use which the Valentinians made of the Sacraments. To the passages he extracted from their writings he appends few comments or objections, and we sometimes wonder whether he thought they interpreted these ordinances more successfully than the Church. In any case, he has preserved for us much interesting information as to Gnostic practice and belief. It was held that in some cases angels received Baptism on behalf of men, and the phrase "unto angelic redemption" is quoted from some Gnostic liturgy, where it was used at the laying on of hands.³ The elements, bread, oil, water (wine is significantly omitted), were consecrated "by the power of the Name."⁴ The rite of Baptism was brought into relation with astrological beliefs, and held to free men from the power and influence of fate.⁵ He mentions the curious superstition that unclean spirits, if not successfully expelled, might descend with the candidate into the baptismal font and be rendered incurable by receiving the influence of the seal. The "Baptism of Fire," of which the Lord spoke, gave rise in these circles to the practice of branding the ear of the baptised person with hot iron.⁶ Also, the inward signifi-

¹ It was not γνήσιον ὕδωρ. Cp. Benson, *Cyprian*, 412.

² 449.

³ 974.

⁴ 988.

⁵ ἡ εἰμαρμένη held good only μέχρι τοῦ βαπτίσματος, 987.

⁶ 995.

cance of the rite received fresh interpretation : it was the "escape from matter" ; it gave salvation, not by washing alone, but also by Gnosis.¹ Its symbols stood for "an intelligible water" and "a discerning fire."² So the Eucharist confers life, both as food and as knowledge.³ The "divine fare," which is to be received after fasting, is spiritualised and interpreted as seven Christian virtues.⁴ Again, prayer on the bended knee is a recognised element in worship.

In such fragmentary, disconnected references we catch a glimpse of Christian rites and worship, as they existed in the heretical communities. In many respects there was deviation from the Church's custom or addition to her recognised order. But in certain respects, too, there was anticipation of later Catholic practice ; or rather customs, which originated with the Gnostics, found eventually a lodgment within the domain of orthodoxy. The consecration of the water in Baptism, to which Clement's own allusions are doubtful, has clear recognition in these Valentinian extracts.⁵ Kneeling in prayer seems to have been more usual with the Gnostics than in the Church.⁶ The correspondence between the Coptic Gnostic writings and the later Catholic practice has been made clear by recent inquiry,⁷ and similar anticipations are not lacking in the Gnostic extracts which Clement has preserved, and whose date is probably quite early in the second half of the second century. Thus the Church's wisdom in learning and adopting, even where, in the main, she was bound to criticise and oppose, is as evident in the case of the heretical Sacraments as it is in regard to the Mysteries. That Clement's pages enable us to watch both

¹ 987, 990.² 991, 995.³ 971.⁴ 992.⁵ τὸ ὕδωρ . . . ἁγιασμὸν προσλαμβάνει, 988 ; *cf.* 114, 117.⁶ γονυκλισίαι, 988.⁷ See the treatises of Harnack and Carl Schmidt, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, VII. and VIII.

phases of this process is surely no accident. His entire approval must have rested on both appropriations.

Since Clement led thoughtful pagans to the saving and illuminating waters of Baptism, and shared with these, his spiritual children, the sacred meal of the Christian household, many changes and controversies have passed over these primitive institutions of our religion. The significance we attach to Baptism has suffered regrettable diminution. The Eucharist, sad as the confession is to make, has become as much a power for division as for unity in Christendom. Still, the Church at large has never made formal abatement in the character and estimate she attaches to these holy ordinances. For us, as for Clement, they remain the distinctive rites of Christianity. And, at least in one respect, we might well desire to reappropriate the sacramental teaching of the Alexandrine Master.

For, however in other details opinion and practice may have altered,—Infant Baptism superseding adult, fresh elaboration of ritual attaching to the Eucharist, new attempts at definition limiting and formulating our conception of the sacramental presence—there are still retained in each of these principal rites the outward and the inward elements, the symbol and the belief in the reality symbolised, the sign that can be seen and handled, and the grace that is invisible, given, divine. The combination is recognised as essential, and a sound use of these ordinances depends on the power to assign its proper value to each of the two parts or aspects, which in every true Sacrament are combined.

Now it is just in this, in the balanced estimate of sign and gift, in the singularly true distribution of stress and emphasis in his sacramental teaching, that Clement is so sane and valuable an example. Already within the Church or on its borders the tendencies existed, which would depreciate, on the one hand, the inward experience, or, on the

other, the outward form. The mere act was sometimes regarded as so potent, that it became hardly distinguishable from magic, as when Baptism was described as a remedy for evil spirits, or the Eucharistic elements as a medicine of eternal life. Conversely—and it is notable that both exaggerations were found within the Gnostic schools—it was sometimes taught that the material elements were indifferent, and that truly spiritual religion will wholly dispense with external aids.¹

How often in later centuries were like tendencies to operate, sometimes the mere *opus operatum* acquiring a hard, unspiritual efficacy ; sometimes the soul's inward experience being exalted, by the abandonment of such expression and ordered regularity as can only be secured through outward forms. In either manner of one-sidedness it is really the wisdom of the Lord's ordinance that is called in question, and so long as the present conditions of human life prevail, the Church can wisely ignore or depreciate neither outward sign nor inward grace. And that, in singularly happy balance, is Clement's attitude throughout. Again and again we are made to feel that the signs are there, prescribed, regulated, available, parts of an established external order, tangible, visible centres, round which associations may cluster, as elastic in their possibilities of interpretation as they are unalterable in their material character. Mystic as he is, he never belittles them or speaks of them as needless. The water matters in Baptism, for the Lord Himself was baptised in water. The elements are important in the Eucharist, for we must keep to the example of Scripture and the Church's rule. In a man of Clement's temperament this is a notable insistence ; it is an insistence on the value of externals from one whose religious bent might have led him to quite a different point of view. It reminds us of his refusal to

¹ *Cp.* Irenæus, i. 21, 4.

depreciate altogether either the human body, or the historic life of the Incarnate Word. In their place we want these outward things.

But, on the other hand, how far is he from binding down spiritual experiences and unseen truths to the forms which express and actualise them. Like Hooker after him, he knew grace "was not tied unto the Sacrament." His signs are signs of a higher thing, his symbols tokens of the inexpressible, and there is an infinite variety in the ways and means of grace.

"Alles Vergängliche
Ist nur ein Gleichnis,"

he might have said with Goethe, and he loves to pass in thought from the transient images and figures to the hidden, inward realm, of which allegory was for him the key. And thus, in his own figure, the outward, material elements become as "doors," and through them we are led into those blessed fields of spiritual thought, where the soul is purified and made white, and man's nature attains its true perfection, and the light of God shines round about His children, and we feed on Christ, who is the very Bread of life, and the soul closes with absolute reality in the intimate communion of perfect knowledge.

Our Lord's bidding to baptise, and His mandate to eat the bread and drink the cup, will not have been treasured by the Church in vain, so long as the outward and the inward aspects of the religious life can be united in such harmonious proportions, as they received in the sacramental teaching of Clement of Alexandria.

CHAPTER XVII

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES—CANON AND TEXT

CLEMENT'S use of Scripture is an interesting and difficult subject. It raises many problems, to some of which no certain answer can be given ; but we are never doubtful as to the importance he consistently attached to Scripture, nor as to his extraordinary command of its abundant stores. How he acquired his familiarity with the Bible is worth considering, before we go on to ask what his Bible was, and in what manner he employed it.

It is probable that, before he finally came over to Christianity, he paid considerable attention to the sacred books of the new religion. Educated persons in the second century, even while outside the Church, were frequently acquainted with her literature. Celsus, for example, has many shrewd things to say both about the Old and New Testaments ;¹ and Trypho had read the Gospels.² Moreover, Clement himself speaks of the value of the Scriptures for inquirers,³ as well as for the faithful, recalling, in all probability, the experience of his earlier years. Thus his study of the Bible may have been originally due to his love of books as well as to his desire for guidance, but, however commenced, it was never abandoned. It was a pursuit and

¹ He compared the Scriptures with Plato to their disadvantage : Origen, *c. Cels.*, vi. 1.

² Justin, *Dialog.*, 10, 18.

³ 65-6, 429.

interest in which he counted it happy to live and to grow old.¹

After his conversion came his travels, and "the true traditions of blessed teaching," to which he listened under many masters, can hardly have been dissociated from the Christian documents in which it was enshrined. Certainly, if Tatian was his Assyrian teacher, he must have learned much from him about both the Old and New Testaments; and when he finally settled in Egypt, as the pupil and assistant of Pantæus,² it was to hear the expositions and to share the studies of one who was a master in his own line of exegesis, who had gathered his "honey" from prophetic and apostolic sources, and grown rich in treasures of interpretation; whose zeal, moreover, as a missionary, did not diminish his scholarly delight in the discovery of an unknown manuscript of the Gospel. The Biblical trend in all Clement's writings was probably more due to the influence of Pantæus than to any one other cause, and competent judges have counted Clement as more Biblical than even Origen.³

Nor, again, was his acquaintance with Scripture only a matter of the lecture-room. The frequency with which he mentions the reading of the Scriptures, sometimes as an element in Christian worship, sometimes as a private habit—as the prelude, for example, to the common domestic meal—leads us to reflect that such frequent lections must have largely contributed to his own familiarity with the text of holy writ.⁴ To this cause we may principally set down Clement's power to quote so abundantly from memory, as also his consequent and lamentable inaccuracy.

¹ The Gnostic is described as *ἐν αὐταῖς καταγεγραμῶσιν ταῖς γραφαῖς*, 896.

² *κατὰ τοῦτον* (sc. Pantæus) *ταῖς θεαῖσι γραφαῖσι συνασκούμενος ἐπ' Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐγνωρίζετο Κλήμης*. H.E., v. 11.

³ Redepenning, *Origenes*, i. 95 (pub. 1841), holds this view, though recognising that many authorities dissent.

⁴ 305, 786, 860, 997.

To these influences must be added his twenty years' work in the Catechetical School, where he dealt, indeed, with many subjects, but with none so frequently as the Bible ; and where no topic lay too far afield for it to receive proof or illustration from this source. The teacher beyond all others is the true learner, and Clement's mastery of Scripture is in part his indirect reward for his devotion to his pupils.

Moreover, in all Christian centres, and especially in Alexandria, exegesis had become the question of the day. The interest in it was extraordinary ; the necessity, too, was pressing. For the heretics were threatening to capture the Church's books, much as the Church had captured the Old Testament from the Synagogue ; so the orthodox had to defend their own. Thus the literary activity of the Church in combating heresy was fundamentally scriptural, differing in this from the work of the Apologists. Melito significantly wrote a work entitled the *Key*.¹ Irenæus is scriptural to the core. The fight with the Valentinians was largely over interpretation. Such was the atmosphere. The authority of the Book, on the whole, was greater than that of the Church. In Clement's case there is no question on this point.

Finally, there is the personal factor. Essentially Clement was a man of books, and the books known as Scripture came naturally first. He liked to persuade himself that, however far he might seem to wander from the text, still the source of all his life and inspiration as a teacher lay there alone.² There was a power in Scripture to stir the soul's latent faculties into flame, and to direct the eye of our understanding towards the higher vision.³ Truth was given in the Scriptures, accessible to those who would seek till they found it, and, once found, it was to be in constant use.⁴ The

¹ H.E., iv. 26.

² 829.

³ 321.

⁴ *Cp.* ἡ χρῆσις τῆς ἀληθείας, 66.

enthusiasm with which he will again and again refer to the subject betrays alike the consciousness of a great spiritual possession, and the delight of a scholar in his books, and the confidence with which, as a champion of the faith, he relied on these sure and adequate resources. Here, as frequently, outward circumstances and natural disposition lead Clement in the same direction.¹

It is to such and similar causes that we must set down the prominence of the Scriptures in Clement's writings, and his ready command of their material. We approach a far more difficult question, when we ask what Clement meant by "Scripture," and what was the nature of the distinction he drew between these and other books. His Bible was a whole and a unity, for he will allow of no discord between the Old Testament and the New,² but it will be convenient, for several reasons, if we consider the older and the later Scriptures separately.

The Canon of the Old Testament had been settled for upwards of a century in Clement's time,³ and the Church had in the main accepted all that it contained. Melito, Clement's contemporary, gives a list of the Jewish Scriptures compiled by careful inquiry, and it accords, save for the single omission of the book of Esther, with the Hebrew Canon.⁴ A similar result is obtained when we examine the quotations and references in Clement. No significance must be attached to the fact that he does not make use of the book of Ruth, or quote directly either from Nehemiah or from the short prophecy of Obadiah.⁵ The absence of quota-

¹ On the whole subject see Harnack's *Bible Reading in the Early Church*, esp. pp. 32-89, E.T.

² This is frequently asserted as against Marcion and others, e.g. ἐνδὸς γὰρ, κυρίου ἐνέργεια . . . ὃ τε νόμος τὸ τε εὐαγγέλιον, 424.

³ H. E. Ryle, *Canon of the Old Testament*, p. 172, places the "Jewish official conclusion of the Canon about A.D. 100."

⁴ H.E., iv. 26.

⁵ Nehemiah himself, however, is mentioned, 392.

tions from these books may quite reasonably be set down to accident, or to Clement's personal preferences. Moreover, it is to be remembered that Ruth was usually regarded as one book with the Judges, and Nehemiah similarly united to Ezra. Obadiah must have had his right place in Clement's Book of the Twelve Prophets,¹ or their number would have been incomplete. No significance, then, is to be attached to the fact that Clement neither quotes from, nor refers to, these three less important books of the Old Testament. There is no reason to believe that he ever questioned their right to a place in the Canon.

On the other hand, there is possibly some significance in the fact that he nowhere quotes the Song of Songs. The canonicity of this collection of poems was for long a matter of debate among the Rabbis,² and, though it had been accepted before Clement wrote, his dread of the emotional element in love may well have led him to question the wisdom of the decision. It was reserved for Origen to boldly spiritualise these beautiful and passionate lays. Ecclesiastes, another book of doubtful canonicity, Clement quotes three times.³ It is a writing so alien to his temperament that, here again, he may have wished the Synagogue had retained its own. But the quotations are quite clear, so that our optimistic father gives more recognition to this sad Scripture than his predecessor, Philo, who never refers to the book at all.⁴ But the most doubtful book in the whole Hebrew Canon is that of Esther. Clement knew, of course, Esther's history. He mentions her with high commendation as among admirable women,⁵ and in one passage it is just possible that he quotes the book itself.⁶ But elsewhere he mentions it as a book known to be in

¹ οἱ δώδεκα, 392.

² Ryle, *op. cit.*, 137, 198.

³ 349, 350, 700.

⁴ Ryle, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, Introd., xxix.

⁵ 617.

⁶ 72. See Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus und die Septuaginta*, 58.

circulation, though hardly as one to which much authority attached.¹ Thus, to some extent, he supports Melito's omission of Esther from the Canon.

With these reservations the Old Testament was for Clement what it had been, through the greater part of the century, for all Hellenistic Judaism. He took over the heritage as a whole, and selected from it what best served his purposes. His Canon, so far, was the Canon of the Synagogue, as the Church had accepted or appropriated it.

Here arises, however, another question. Did the Canon of the Church's acknowledged books agree with the Jewish rule, not only in what it included, but also in the books that it shut out? More particularly, was Clement's attitude to the Apocrypha of the Old Testament identical with that of Judaism? The question is rendered more complicated by the fact, that it is extremely difficult to define the amount of authority which Judaism did attach to the Apocrypha. In all probability this varied considerably, Alexandria giving these writings a higher place than Palestine, and the second century, on the whole, paying them more honour than the first. Still, even by Alexandrian Judaism they were never strictly canonised, nor must Philo's complete neglect of the Apocrypha be treated as a merely inconclusive silence. On the fringe of the Canon were these doubtful books, some Hebrew in origin, some claiming the prestige of a great name, all gaining a greater vogue and influence through the LXX. On the whole, the Church made more use of them than the Synagogue did.² The Christian teacher, especially in Alexandria, was more prone to appropriation than to criticism, and he could hardly be expected to guard the Old

¹ 392.

² In the Church of Origen's time "the Old Testament Apocrypha formed the first stage in Bible reading," Harnack, *Bible Reading*, p. 73.

Testament Canon from encroachment with the jealousy that was natural in a Jew.

Clement illustrates this tendency. For he makes considerable use of the Apocrypha, and will introduce quotations from Ecclesiasticus or the Book of Wisdom by formulæ identical with those which he places before passages from Prophecy or the Law. Thirteen times is the former book cited as "Scripture"; it is a channel through which the divine Instructor speaks; it is described frequently as "Wisdom." Similar is his estimate of the Wisdom of Solomon; it is "divine"; it is "Scripture"; it is in some sense authoritative.¹ These two books he uses most frequently; but he knows Judith also, and directly quotes the Book of Tobit.² Thus his Canon of the Old Testament is not easy to define with complete accuracy. We cannot say that he would ever have been prepared to dispute the finality of the Jewish settlement. To the full he accepts all that has been claimed for Moses and the Prophets. His estimate of the Psalms and of the Proverbs is almost equally clear. Beyond these limits his views have less precision. Probably, being a Hellene and not a Rabbi, Clement was not greatly concerned as to the technical canonicity of the less important books. He found a larger measure of truth in Sirach than in Ecclesiastes, in the Book of Wisdom than in the Song of Songs. Into further questions he is not concerned to inquire. It was no part of his task to amend the list of ancient and inspired Scriptures. Had he ever set his hand to such an undertaking the result would have been interesting. Possibly Plato would have been canonised. As it is, he estimates his Old Testament sources largely by the spiritual value of their contents, claiming considerable freedom of judgment whenever he passes outside the specially sacred area of Law and Prophecy.

¹ See Stählin, *Cl. Al. und die LXX.*, 45, 46.

² 503.

From the Old Testament we turn to the New, which, approximately speaking, Clement quotes, or refers to, twice as often.¹ There is no question as to his familiarity with the great majority of the books in the New Testament Canon; with few exceptions, they are all directly quoted. The only portions about which any doubt arises are four of the Epistles, that of Saint James, 2 Peter, 3 John, and the Epistle to Philemon. In the case of the first two of these the evidence is uncertain. Eusebius states that Clement dealt in the *Hypotyposeis* with "the Epistle of Jude and the remaining Catholic Epistles,"² and this statement is supported by Photius. As they both knew the contents of the *Hypotyposeis* well, it is difficult to resist the conclusion, so far, at any rate, as the Epistle of James and 2 Peter are concerned, that Clement knew them and regarded them as Scripture. This receives some support from certain passages in his extant works. Once, at least, he seems to betray unquestionable acquaintance with the Epistle of Saint James,³ and a similar deduction as to 2 Peter may be drawn from another place in his writings.⁴ The other references, while in some cases reaching probability, are more doubtful.⁵

¹ In Dr Stählin's edition there are about 1300 references to the Old Testament, about 2400 to the New. In many cases Clement has Scripture in mind, but cannot be said actually to quote the text. Several parallel passages, especially of course in the Synoptic Gospels and in the Pentateuch, are frequently cited in connection with one passage in Clement. But, substantially, the proportion of one to two in the references to the two Testaments holds good.

² H.E., vi. 14.

³ 825. *Cp.* James ii. 8. The combination of βασιλικός with ἀγαπᾶν seems to me to prove the reference, in spite of Stählin's "vielleicht."

⁴ 871. *Cp.* 2 Peter i. 10.

⁵ Credner, *Geschichte des N.T. Canon*, p. 382; Harnack, *Das Neue Testament um das Jahr 200*, p. 85; Westcott, *Canon of N.T.*, ed. 1896, p. 364; Kutter, *Clemens Alex. und das Neue Testament*, pp. 1 and 100, think there is no evidence of the use of James and 2 Peter. Zahn, *Supplementum Clementinum*, pp. 151-3, finds traces of the influence of James, not of 2 Peter; Hort and Mayor think both are quoted, pp. 115, 117; Stählin, iii. 48, takes the same view. The other possible references to the Epistle of James are

So far as the third Epistle of Saint John is concerned, the statement of Eusebius has still to be borne in mind. It would certainly be among the "Catholic Epistles" when Eusebius wrote. But the one possible quotation in Clement's pages is extremely doubtful,¹ while his reference elsewhere to "the longer Epistle" of the Apostle seems to suggest that, after the manner of the Muratorian Canon, he knew of only two.² There is no reference to the Epistle to Philemon. The brevity of this charming letter, which saved it from Marcion's criticisms, is perhaps responsible for Clement's neglect. He might have found its purport congenial and suggestive, when he had occasion to refer to slavery. To sum up these doubtful points, the probabilities are that the Epistles of James and 2 Peter were known to him, but that 3 John, and perhaps Philemon—the only two private letters in the New Testament and both addressed to laymen—were not recognised portions of his collection. John 3, at any rate, seems definitely excluded; Philemon must be left in doubt.

As in the case of the Old Testament, so, and even more in the case of the New, it is exceedingly difficult to set limits to Clement's list of Sacred Books. His Canon was not authoritatively defined; indeed, it is probable that in Alexandria at his date there had been no final settlement of the matter made. It is true that Clement recognised a certain pre-eminence as belonging to the four Gospels:³ it is true also that he allowed special weight to all that could claim "Apostolic" authority and origin.⁴ But it is quite impossible to show that all the books of the Canon, as we have it, formed for him a distinct and separate body of to be found in 124 (*ἀποκνηθέντες* is a very doubtful reference, but see Zahn), 613, 707, 872; to 2 Peter in 83, 115, 955.

¹ 203. *εἰρήνη σοι*; *cf.* 3 John 15.

² *ἐν τῇ μείζονι ἐπιστολῇ*, 464. The Muratorian Canon has "Johannis duas" epistolae.

³ 553.

⁴ See Kutter, *op. cit.*, 127-35.

inspired writings. He knew of other Gospels, notably of the "Gospel according to the Hebrews" and of that "according to the Egyptians." Another similar Scripture was the *Traditions of Matthias*.¹ Again, he makes considerable use of the writings of the subapostolic age. The *Shepherd of Hermas* is with him a book of great account. The *Stromateis* open with a quotation from this work, and the appeal to it is always made as to an authority. Hardly lower is his estimate of the Epistle of Barnabas, a work naturally much in vogue in Alexandria. Barnabas is quoted as an "Apostle,"² and it is constantly implied that quotations from his Epistle carry weight. Clement of Rome, too, our writer's namesake, is also termed an "Apostle,"³ and his Epistle to the Corinthians is quoted with the significant formula, "It is written."⁴ The *Didache* Clement calls "Scripture."⁵ Finally, there were the *Preaching* and the *Apocalypse* of Peter, as to the apostolic authorship of which Clement does not appear to have been in any doubt.⁶ What are we to say, in general, of our writer's attitude to all this literature, which, after much contention and debate, has finally been placed by the Church outside the Canon of her Sacred Books?

Leaving on one side the question as to the existence of a New Testament Canon in Alexandria at this time—a question which, in passing, it may be remarked depends much for its answer on the way in which the term "Canon" is defined⁷—an examination of Clement's use of his authorities leads to the conclusion that his estimate

¹ The use he makes of these works may be best seen by consulting E. Preuschen's *Antilegomena*, pp. 2-15. ² 445. ³ 609.

⁴ 613. So *ἐπιγραφαί*, 764, of the *Shepherd*; *φησίμ*, 677, of *Barnabas*.

⁵ 377. ⁶ Preuschen, *op. cit.*, 87 sqq.; Kutter, *op. cit.*, 89-91.

⁷ Harnack and Zahn, for instance, use this term in senses which differ considerably. See the references to Leipoldt's view in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, ix. 606 sqq.

of their value and importance is one which descends from the four Gospels to the Pauline Epistles, and then on to other books, with many nuances and gradations, but with no final and rigid lines. He would never have admitted books written in his own day to a place of equal authority with the earlier Christian Scriptures. So far his list is closed against all further additions. But, among its lower items, this list contained many works as to whose title Clement has no final decision. In other words, the conception of a "Canon" of the New Testament, as a definite and settled collection of the Scriptures, is far less clear in the Alexandrine father than it is in Irenæus, Tertullian, the Muratorian fragment, possibly even in the scheme of Melito, so far as our information goes.¹ The two covenants, in Clement's use of the term, are modes of revelation rather than fixed collections of books.² His rule or canon is something other than a list of authoritative writings, and to a very large extent his strong preferences and affinities determine his use of the Church's literature, rather than any decision of authority from without. Thus, while it is quite clear that Clement attached less weight to the Epistle of Barnabas than he did to the Epistles of Saint Paul, it would be going beyond our evidence to declare that this was because the latter were canonical and the former not. The grounds for the different degrees of authority are not explicitly declared. What the Lord had said was of primary weight. What could claim to be "Apostolic" came next in order. These distinctions were unquestioned and sufficient. Beyond them, lay a domain where some questions were still undecided or unrecognised.

The extensive use which Clement makes of Scripture

¹ See Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 43.

² *διδθηκαι*, 761, 800. See *infra*, pp. 204-5.

has induced many scholars to inquire with interest, not only as to what books he recognised as sacred, but also as to the particular text with which, in each case, he was familiar. It is only recently that Clement's own text has been brought into anything like its final form, but, now that the result of Dr Stählin's labours is available, there is no obstacle to the patient investigator, who will work out the correspondences and deviations which appear in Clement's writings, when their numerous quotations and references are compared with the MSS. of the Septuagint and the New Testament. The most important work in the case of the LXX. has been done by Dr Stählin himself,¹ in the case of the New Testament by the Rev. P. M. Barnard.² The result in the one instance may be regarded as disappointing, in the other as surprising. Before considering, however, the outcome of these inquiries, the reader may be invited to pay some little attention to the serious drawbacks which beset Clement's testimony to ancient texts.

His extreme familiarity with Scripture has been in this connection a hindrance. He knew the Bible so well, that he could make use of it by allusion or by reference, as it suited his purpose, without the labour of finding and transcribing the actual words. Thus, in proportion as he held a book to be important and was consequently familiar with its contents, his verbatim use of it decreases and his less exact allusions become more numerous. For example, Clement makes about the same amount of use of the Epistle to the Galatians as he does of Ecclesiasticus. But the former was more familiar to him: consequently his actual quotations from the Epistle are about half as numerous as his quotations from the Old Testament work. On the other hand, his allusions and less exact references

¹ In *Clemens Alexandrinus und die Septuaginta*.

² *The Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria*, in *Texts and Studies*, v.

are correspondingly more frequent. Thus, if there were doubtful readings to settle, Clement would be less available as a witness for the Galatians than for Ecclesiasticus. In connection with the Gospels this consideration becomes specially important.

Then again he quotes from memory. In many passages, which are more than mere allusions, and fully justify the inverted commas in which they stand in the Berlin edition, the quotation was certainly made without immediate reference to any copy of the book in question. This is sufficiently evident from the many unimportant deviations from all known MSS., and not less from his habit of introducing a passage by such a formula as "a certain prophecy says," or "the Spirit says somewhere," or "in some such words."¹ Often, indeed, the passages are too lengthy and the quotations too accurate for us to account for them, except by the supposition that the papyrus roll was actually before his eyes. The same conclusion holds in the many instances in which he does not transcribe a passage in full, but commences it, and then adds "down to," after which the concluding sentence stands.² But the majority of his shorter quotations are from memory,³ and if the scholar of modern days is frequently tantalised by his inaccuracy, we must hardly on that account refuse the admiration due to Clement's truly remarkable mastery of his resources. On the whole, he quotes Plato more accurately than the Bible, though, to judge Clement by the standards of his time,

¹ φησί τις προφητεία, 78 (Stählin asks "woher?"); λέγει δέ που τὸ πνεῦμα, 131; Παῦλος . . . ὅδε πως γράφων, 117; *cf.* εἰς τῶν δώδεκα προφητῶν, 557.

² καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς ἔως, 430, 451, 524; ἔως alone, 501. He is the first Christian writer to make frequent use of this abbreviation. See Zahn, *Suppl. Clem.*, 93, n. 4.

³ Dindorf, I. xxi. It is "satis manifestum codices quibus utebatur sæpe non inspectos ab eo, sed locos memoriter allatos fuisse, quod alios quoque ecclesiæ Patres sæpissime fecisse novimus."

this does not imply that he thought Plato the more important of the two. It is a question of some nicety to say, in any given case of variation, whether Clement had really a different text before him, or whether he deviates from the authorities simply through misquotation. On the whole, the rule laid down by Zahn may be accepted as regards his evidence for the text of Scripture generally, "Consentientibus inter se reliquis testibus, huic uni non facile credideris."¹

But there still remains a further limitation. Clement adapts Scripture with considerable freedom. Not only will he alter tense, number, person, and the like, to suit his context, he will also add words, or omit, or change, when it fits his purpose so to do. This may be made clear by one or two examples: "It is easier," he says, "for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to *be a philosopher.*"² Christianity being in Clement's eyes the true philosophy, the last phrase is not an unnatural equivalent to write in place of the words, "enter into the kingdom of God," which stand in the Synoptic Gospels. But it is clearly an intentional variation, not a different reading. So, in quoting 1 Cor. xiii. 8,³ he substitutes for "whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away," the words "cures are left behind on earth." Not even Saint Paul's authority will induce Clement to say that knowledge, Gnosis, shall vanish away. He would rather risk giving offence to the whole medical College of Alexandria, of whom many perhaps were his personal friends. So the text of Saint Paul is adapted accordingly.⁴ Thus, in spite of all he says in praise of Scripture and in assertion of its authority, he has few scruples about making minor alterations in its text to suit

¹ Gebhardt, Harnack, and Zahn, *Patrum Apostol. Opera* (1876 ed.), 1., pt. ii., Prolegomena, xxviii.

² 440. ³ 956.

⁴ So φόβω, 1 Pet. iii. 2, is changed to λόγω, 292; καὶ ψυχικόν is added in Phil. ii. 2, 604. See Kutter, *op. cit.*, 32 sqq., for other instances.

his purpose. Philo before him had done the like,¹ and the Jews, if we may trust Justin, amended, or even altogether omitted, awkward passages in the LXX.² Such an attitude may be preferable to that of slavish veneration of the letter, but it is easy to see how it diminishes the value of Clement's evidence for purposes of textual criticism. Such freer handling of the Scriptures was quite natural in a Greek father, but our more scientific modern scholarship can see value, albeit for its own reasons, in the jealous scrupulosity of the Rabbis.

These and similar causes, partly due to Clement's own habits and temperament, partly to the common literary practice of his time, have made his abundant use of Scripture less valuable and conclusive for the reconstruction of the LXX. and New Testament texts than, from the number of the cited passages, might have been expected to be the case. Such results, however, as have been obtained, are not unimportant, and more may yet be gained, perhaps especially by the investigation of his quotations from Saint Paul's Epistles, and by a detailed comparison of his New Testament text with that of Origen. For the present the following, among other points, seem clear.

Considerable interest was taken in Clement's day in the Greek Versions of the Old Testament. For about a century the Christian Church had in the main used only the LXX. translation, and Clement accepts without question the common tradition of its origin, believing, apparently, in its verbal accuracy as well as in the inspiration of its ideas.³ It was, in short, the Hellenic equivalent of "Prophecy," and as Clement knew no Hebrew and could make no use of those copies of Old Testament writings in their original

¹ Ryle, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, xxxv. sqq.

² *Dial. Trypho*, 71 sqq.

³ 409-10. Note the force of *καὶ τὰς διαβολὰς καὶ τὰς λέξεις*; *cfr.* 807.

tongue, which the Library of the Serapeum is known to have contained,¹ he might have been expected to pay the greater attention to the accuracy of his Greek texts. Moreover, he must have known that such questions were discussed, for already in Justin's day there was controversy over the reliability of LXX. renderings,² and such topics were always sure of their full measure of consideration in Alexandria. Two of his contemporaries, Symmachus the Samaritan, and Theodotion the Ephesian proselyte to Judaism, had made their own versions of the Old Testament, the latter being a revision of the LXX. by fresh comparison with the original. Thus the question of the true Greek equivalent of the Hebrew Scriptures was one of recognised importance, though it would hardly have been in keeping with Clement's genius to devote to it the minute and laborious attention, which made the work of his greatest pupil so justly famous.

It is probable that Clement possessed or had access to different versions of at least some portions of the Old Testament; and that of the LXX. version he was acquainted with more than one MS. copy. He quotes, for example, Prov. i. 7³ and i. 33,⁴ and other passages, in different forms; and the difference is more naturally accounted for by supposing him to have been familiar with various renderings of the original, than by setting the variation down to mere inaccuracy. Certainly, in the case of a considerable passage of Ezekiel (xviii. 4-9), which is quoted twice, the differences are such as to point to distinct translations as their source.⁵ In the case of the Pentateuch, more especially in reference

¹ Tertullian, *Apol.*, 18.

² *Dial. Trypho*, 131.

³ 143, 446, 448, 874.

⁴ 449, 502, 632.

⁵ 154, 501; *cf.* Stählin, *Clem. Al. und die LXX.*, 68 *sqq.* Ezek. xviii. 4-9, "ist zweimal citirt und zwar in so verschiedener Form, dass zwei verschiedene Übersetzungen zu grunde liegen müssen." One version was probably Theodotion's.

to Genesis and Deuteronomy, it is more difficult to draw any such inference, as his familiarity with these books was greater, and variations may more naturally be set down to his practice of quoting from memory.

Clement's acquaintance with Theodotion's version, which is clear from the form in which he quotes several other books,¹ is specially important in his citations of the prophecy of Daniel.² Here he is mainly, if not entirely, dependent on this version. In this point he is in accordance with the subsequent practice of the Church. Theodotion's rendering was accepted in Carthage in Cyprian's time, and its adoption, as the standard text for the Greek version of this prophecy, became later on universal. If the date of Theodotion's version be rightly located in the reign of Commodus,³ Clement's acquaintance with it may be an interesting evidence as to the rapid circulation of religious literature in his age.

A further point of interest is the evidence to be derived from Clement's quotations as to the reliability of the extant manuscripts of the Septuagint. If the Vatican Codex, "B," "on the whole presents the version of the Septuagint in its relatively oldest form,"⁴ we might naturally look for some close similarity between the quotations of a writer of Clement's date and this important manuscript. The results of investigation do not, however, entirely accord with this expectation. How the case actually stands, and upon what strangely conflicting evidence the reconstruction of Clement's

¹ See the passage of Ezekiel referred to above ; also Isai. ix. 7, as quoted, 112 ; Isai. xlvi. 22, as quoted, 154.

² These, six in number, are given in Stählin, *Cl. Al. und die LXX.*, 71 *sqq.* Stählin dissents from Swete's view that "a sprinkling of LXX. readings can be found." He thinks Clement used Theodotion's text alone.

³ See F. C. Burkitt, art. "Text and Versions," *Encyclopædia Biblica*, iv., col. 5018.

⁴ Hort, quoted by Swete, *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*, 486-7.

Old Testament in Greek depends, may best be seen by definite examples.

The last four books of the Pentateuch (Genesis is almost wanting in the Vatican MS. and so best left out of account) are either quoted or referred to by Clement about 300 times. From these passages 47 cases of variation may be taken, in which Clement's text either coincides with, or approximates to, B (Codex Vaticanus) as against A (Codex Alexandrinus), or to A as against B. How is this support distributed? In 22 cases Clement's version favours B, in 25 it is nearer to A. If the comparison be restricted to the more notable and significant variations, the result is 7 for B as against 10 for A. From such figures very few conclusive deductions can be drawn.

Another example may be taken. The prophecy of Isaiah is quoted or referred to about 170 times, more than twice as frequently as any other prophetic book. The citations contain 54 instances in which support may be claimed for B or for A, with which latter Codex the Sinaitic frequently agrees. These 54 variations tell 28 times in favour of B, 26 times in favour of A or A α . But the more important differences support A 8 times, B only 4. It may be noticed that Clement's use of passages from Isaiah gives clear evidence of his acquaintance with the versions of Symmachus and Theodotion. But in this book, again, results are not conclusive.

For a third instance, the book of Ecclesiasticus may be considered. It is used, almost always in direct quotation, about 66 times. Here 32 variations may be noticed and, in the case of this book, the preponderance of evidence goes the other way. Clement's text supports B 19 times, A only 13. Of the more important of these variations 5 fall to B, 3 to A, which is as usual often reinforced by α . Throughout the whole of his use of Ecclesiasticus there runs

a marked similarity with the Latin version, which still further complicates the problem for the textual critic.

From these three representative books the aggregate results are as follows : Clement's text supports B 69 times, A 64 : of the more important variations, however, 21 fall to A, 16 to B. It may be said that these figures show no great divergence from the results of the same kind of test when applied to Philo's quotations.¹ In 60 cases Philo supports B as against the other authorities, in 52 the evidence of his text goes the opposite way. The balance of the testimony in Clement's case falls, no doubt, on the side of A as against B, but the difference is not great enough to be conclusive. It is probably an overstatement to say that "the one result which emerges all through the Old Testament is the continuous antipathy of Clement for the text represented by B."² His support is rather so evenly distributed that indifference, more than antipathy, characterises his attitude. If there is no clear predominance of "B" readings, neither is there such evidence for any other text. B is deposed, so far as our author determines the question, from the position of superiority which has been sometimes claimed for it. But Clement places no other Codex or version in the vacant place. Thus the critics have good reason to complain that for the Greek text of the Old Testament he is negative and disappointing.³

When we come to consider the New Testament in the light of Clement's citations, several fresh considerations demand our notice. To begin with, the Lord's teaching was for Clement the most authoritative and important element in the whole collection of the Scriptures. It is, therefore, antecedently probable that his familiarity with the

¹ Swete, *Introduction to O.T.*, 375 ; Ryle, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, pp. xxxix. *sqq.*

² *Journal of Theological Studies*, v. 140.

³ See Stählin's summary of the results of his inquiry ; *op. cit.*, 75-7.

Bible will here be at its highest, and his tendency to quote *memoriter* consequently more pronounced than elsewhere. This is borne out by the fact that his quotations from the Gospels (and these are mainly quotations of *teaching*: incidents are referred to but rarely in the *ipsissima verba* of the text) are less closely in accordance with the MSS. than quotations from other New Testament books. In quoting the Acts,¹ for example, he appears usually to have referred to his Codex, and his citations from Saint Paul's Epistles are often in entire correspondence with the text, as the principal authorities represent it. It is different with the Gospels. The citations here are far less exact. And the whole question is still further complicated by the fact of the parallelism of the Synoptic Evangelists: his citations from one Gospel are frequently coloured by his reminiscences of the phrases peculiar to another, so that his text is not uncommonly of a "conflate" character.² A somewhat similar case arises in connection with his use of the Old Testament, where parallel regulations are found in Leviticus and Deuteronomy. But the Synoptic parallelism is, of course, more marked and more important.

Perhaps the best way to enable the reader to understand the kind of problem which Clement's New Testament quotations offer to the textual critic, will be to give one or two concrete examples. Final results in such matters can only come from the minute investigations of the specialist; yet the impression left by an examination of a few particular instances is probably sufficiently near the truth to be worth tentative consideration.

¹ See *The Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria*, Texts and Studies, v. 62.

² Compare, *e.g.*, the passage quoted in 570 (Stählin, ii. 255, lines 18-20) with St Matt. xix. 29, and with St Mark x. 29. Clement takes ἕνεκεν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου from the second Gospel; καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματός μου substantially from the first.

(I.) Clement's longest quotation from the Gospels is given in the *Quis Dives Salvetur*.¹ It is the account of the Rich Young Ruler's interview with the Lord and forms the text of the Sermon. The passage is taken from Saint Mark's Gospel, x. 17-31. The extract is prefaced by the remark that "there is nothing like hearing again the actual words ;"² and we are told, at the conclusion of the passage, that "these things are written in the Gospel according to Mark," and that the narrative is given in all (*sic*) the other recognised Gospels, with occasional verbal differences. Clearly, it would be said, Clement means to give an exact quotation from Saint Mark's text, with full consciousness that the parallel accounts did not entirely coincide.

What is the condition of the text of these fifteen verses of the second Gospel, as we find them in Clement's sermon ? "It is impossible to produce a fouler exhibition" of the passage. Such was the trenchant observation of Dean Burgon, and it is fully justified by the facts. For if Clement's quotation, as given in Dr Stählin's edition, be placed side by side with the passage as given in Westcott and Hort's Greek Testament, the following results arise. There are 265 words in the quotation. Verse 25 (15 words), part of verse 27 (8 words), part of verse 29 (8 words), or 31 words in all, are best omitted from detailed comparison, because the deviations in these verses are too considerable for such a method to be employed. Of the remaining 234 words in Clement's text 25 differ from those found in the Gospel, as Westcott and Hort present it ; 20 words are added ; there are 21 omissions, and 8 changes of order. The influence both of Saint Matthew's Gospel, and of Saint Luke's to a less degree, is apparent in Clement's version of Saint Mark's text. For at least 10 of the above-named differences there is other

¹ 937-8.

² οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶον αὐτῶν αὐθις ἀκοῦσαι τῶν ῥητῶν, 937.

MS. authority of considerable weight, but, even deducting these as doubtful, we have as the net outcome of the comparison 64 deviations from the best evidenced text of Saint Mark in a total of 234 words. The proportion of divergence, if it can be estimated numerically, rises to something like 1 difference for every 4 words. In addition to this, the three passages left out of account because of their even greater deviation (31 words) must be borne in mind. It is extremely difficult to draw conclusions from these strange data. Clement may have been peculiarly careless in copying his papyrus. Or he may have been sufficiently familiar with Saint Mark's Gospel to give the passage, as we find it, from memory. Or his own copy of the Gospel may have been in the "foul" condition which scandalised Dean Burgon. On any hypothesis there is much to puzzle the inquiring student.

(II.) Leaving Saint Mark, let us take, at haphazard, nine passages from the other three Gospels, of an average length of 45 words.¹ There are 401 words in all. If these 401 words in Dr Stählin's edition of Clement's text are compared with the corresponding passages in Westcott and Hort, the differences in all are 71. This total is made up of 34 words changed, 6 changes of order, 9 words added, 22 omitted. For 19 of these changes there is some good MS. evidence: it is right therefore to deduct them from the total of the variations; the figure 71 is thus reduced to 52. But 52 differences in a total of 401 words is almost 1 in 8. This is not so high a proportion as was found in the passage of Saint Mark previously considered. Still, it is very high, if compared with Westcott and Hort's dictum that "the words in our opinion still subject to doubt can

¹ St Matt. xxiii. 37-9, 145; xxv. 34 *sqq.*, 307; St Luke vi. 29, 307; xii. 22-4, 27, 231; xii. 35-7, 218; xvi. 19-21, 232-3; St John viii. 32-6, 440; xvii. 21-3, 140; xvii. 24-6, 140.

hardly amount to more than a thousandth part of the whole New Testament.”¹ Clement was indeed “a bad quoter.” More regard to accuracy must not be demanded of him than the standard of his age prescribed, but it is easy to see that for critical purposes the value of his abundant quotations is not a little deceptive. It is worthy of note that, in the nine passages considered, the variations in the case of Saint John’s Gospel are very slightly over half the proportion found in the quotations from the Synoptists.

(III.) Let us turn to the Pauline Epistles. The conditions here are very different. There is no book in the Bible of which, in proportion to its length, Clement makes such frequent use as he does of the Epistle to the Ephesians. Its 155 verses are quoted or referred to about 110 times. The first Epistle to the Corinthians comes next, being quoted or referred to almost as frequently in proportion to its length. Then stands Saint Matthew’s Gospel, whose thousand and odd verses are quoted or referred to over 500 times, though in this case the frequent difficulties of assigning a citation or a reference to any *one* of the Synoptic Gospels must be borne in mind.

The Epistle to the Ephesians was thus in some sense Clement’s favourite work. The nine longest quotations from it amount to 556 words.² In these there are 37 deviations from the text as given in Westcott and Hort. This total is made up of 17 words changed, 3 differences of order, 5 words added, 12 omitted. There is, however, MSS. authority for 5 of these variants, which should accordingly be deducted, leaving the total amount of divergence 32 in 556 words. This proportion of 1 difference to 17

¹ *The New Testament in Greek*, small edition, 565.

² Ephes. iv. 11-13, 624; iv. 13-15, 108; iv. 17-19, 69-70; iv. 20-4, 262; iv. 20-4 (*bis*), 524; iv. 24-9, 371; iv. 25-8, 31, and v. 1-2, 308; v. 1-4, 524; vi. 1-4, 7-9, 308.

words is an evident contrast to the 1 in 8 which resulted in the case of the Gospels. The figures tell us much as to the excellent preservation in which Saint Paul's letters had been kept. No doubt they had been copied far less frequently, and, highly as Clement valued Saint Paul, he still appears to have referred usually to his copy for purposes of quotation.

(IV.) Still more striking are the results, when we apply the same tests to an Epistle with which Clement was less familiar, the second Epistle to the Corinthians. The seven longest passages found in his works amount to 197 words.¹ There is 1 word changed. There are 3 words omitted. One deviation to every 50 words is a singularly low proportion in a writer whose literary standard and habits were those of Clement.

(V.) Let us make one other comparison. No part of the Bible was better known to Clement than the Prologue (i. 1-18) to Saint John's Gospel: no other passage in the Scriptures of similar length exerted an influence comparable to that of this profound exordium upon his theology. On certain points of interpretation, interesting to all students of this Gospel, it is worth while to ascertain the bearing of Clement's quotations.

(a) In verses 3-4 Clement quite definitely supports the division of sentences which is given in the margin of the Revised Version: "without him was not anything made. That which hath been made was life in him." That Clement understood the passage in this sense is placed beyond doubt by his manner of quoting it. Origen and the other Ante-Nicene fathers are here generally in agreement with him.²

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 7-9, 623; v. 10, 539; vi. 4-7, 623-4; vi. 14-16, 539; vii. 1, 539; x. 3-5, 588; x. 15-16, 826.

² *χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν. ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν κ.τ.λ.* This punctuation, placing a stop before, not after, *ὃ γέγονεν*, is confirmed by Clement, 114, 769, 787, 803, 812, 968, and elsewhere (thirteen passages in all).

(b) He gives, perhaps to our regret, no support to the interesting suggestion in regard to verse 9, which is also to be found in the margin of the Revised Version. "The true light, which lighteth every man, was coming into the world" is a possible rendering, and has its clear affinities with Clement's favourite doctrine of the varied and universal action of the Logos. But he takes his side with the older interpretation, which makes the clause "coming into the world" qualify "every man."¹

(c) Then there is the doubtful reading in verse 18. Are we to read *μονογενῆς θεός* or *μονογενῆς υἱός*? Three times out of five Clement supports the former reading. Thus his evidence is inconclusive. Both renderings were evidently well known to Clement, and both find support in his theology.²

These instances of the relation of Clement's quotations to the text of the New Testament illustrate the kind of evidence which his pages offer. When he differs from all other authorities, he is practically certain to be wrong. No critical scholar would admit to his text a reading which had only Clement's evidence to support it. Where other authorities differ, his testimony has considerable value on one side or the other. But, on the whole, when we recollect that he is a man of learning, writing in a great centre of culture, and that the importance of textual questions was by no means unrecognised in his day, it is disappointing to find how largely his numerous citations of the New Testament are disqualified, as evidence, by careless and inaccurate reproduction.

Finally, however, there is one really important result

¹ ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον. That Clement connected the participle with *ἄνθρωπον*, not with *φῶς*, is evident from 439, 979.

² *μονογενῆς θεός*, 695, 956, 968; *μονογενῆς υἱός*, 422, 968. Note the proximity of the two readings in 968.

which has been derived from the study of Clement's New Testament text. The Rev. P. M. Barnard has made a detailed examination of the relation of this father's quotations from the four Gospels and the Acts to the extant Manuscripts.¹ Now, it is generally recognised by modern textual scholars, that the two fourth-century MSS., Codices Sinaiticus and Vaticanus, represent a tradition of far higher authority than the Antiochene presentation, which passed later into the Textus Receptus of the Church. This "B" text can be traced back in Egypt as far as the middle of the third century, and in particular to Origen; but what of Origen's master? If this type of text, which lies at the basis of Westcott and Hort's edition, is to be securely connected with Apostolic times, or with the original documents, it must be traced backwards, from Origen, through Clement towards its source. But the trail is lost in the earlier father; for Clement's quotations from the Gospels and the Acts give no clear support to the "NB" tradition. Again and again we find him take sides against "NB" with the "Western" text, as represented in Codex Bezae (D) and the Latin version. Let the reader examine Clement's text in some of the passages quoted previously in this chapter, and he will find certain notable correspondences between Clement and these "Western" sources, as against the agreement of NB and other MSS.² Other similar instances are to be found in Saint Luke vi. 31; ix. 62; or Acts xvii. 27.³ The "adnotatio critica" in Professor Souter's Greek Testament is quite sufficient to show how frequently Codex D and the oldest Latin versions have Clement on their side. It is generally recognised that the more recent tendency of criticism has raised the authority of the Western text, and it

¹ *The Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria*, Texts and Studies, v.

² E.g. St Mark x. 22, χρήματα for κτήματα, 938. St Luke xii. 24, οὐχ for πόσφ μᾶλλον, 231.

³ 304, 889, 372.

has even been claimed that the testimony of our Alexandrian witnesses becomes more and more Western, the earlier they are. The examination of Clement's quotations from the Gospels and the Acts gives definite support to this contention. The authorities with which he agrees are no doubt found in very various combinations, and occasionally, though rarely, he will side with \aleph B against the Western text,¹ but the strongly marked line of affinity, which runs throughout his quotations from the Gospels and the Acts, leads undoubtedly to the conclusion that his New Testament, in its five longest books, was closer to the Western text than to that of Origen. Inquiry here has given us a fairly assured and definite result. What exact deductions² are to be drawn from the facts with which Clement has supplied us, and whether in particular the textual critic is to accept the invitation to "come out of the land of Egypt" and betake himself instead to Carthage and Edessa, the future developments of this delicate and interesting science alone can show. If only Clement, sitting in his library among the papyri that were his most intimate friends, could have foreseen the questions which his pages were to be asked to solve in after years!

¹ *E.g.* Eph. iv. 19. Clement reads ἀπηλογότες with \aleph B : D and Latin have ἀπηλικότες : 70. St Luke vi. 45, Clement omits αὐτοῦ with \aleph B, 944.

² It is, for example, questioned how far the prevalence of a particular text in A.D. 180 proves its originality. See Von Dobschütz's review of Mr Barnard's monograph, *Theol. Litteraturzeitung*, 1900, No. 7.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE HOLY SCRIPTURES—AUTHORITY AND EXEGESIS

WE have already had occasion to recognise it as a characteristic feature of Clement's nature, that he accommodates different tendencies in his thoughts with a happy unconsciousness of their incompatibility. A notable instance of this confronts us in his use of Scripture. At times, in his treatment of the Bible, he will follow his own bent with marked independence : at other times he will accept without criticism or hesitation the prevailing opinion of the Church. His general attitude towards the Bible is thus a strange fusion of freedom and dependence. He will, on occasion, be as bold in exegesis as the heretics ; or he will again keep closely to the pathways of tradition with grateful and unquestioning docility. Constantly the question rises, Did this occur to the Stromatist, sitting in solitude among his books, as a thought of his own ; or was it a theory or opinion derived from the older teachers, or current in Christian circles in Alexandria ? It is hard to say whether freedom or dependence prevails ; on the whole, in his use of Scripture, the mind is the mind of Clement, in spite of his obvious indebtedness.

The extremely Biblical form into which all his teaching, whether on minute points of conduct or on the deeper problems of theology, is thrown, proceeds from his un-

questioning recognition of Scripture as a final authority. All truth, all sure guidance, came from the Divine Logos, and, while the methods of his instruction are manifold and varied, the teaching of the Scriptures stood first and pre-eminent among them. In the Lord, as He guides us through Prophets, Gospel, and Apostles, we have the source and principle of instruction, beyond which no inquiry can be made.¹ Scripture is thus the criterion and test of truth. Given the right interpretation, no further question arises as to its authority. Clement held what would to-day be regarded as an extreme view of inspiration. "The wise prophet, or rather the Holy Spirit in him, reveals God."² The power which speaks is variously named: "the Word," "the Instructor," "the Spirit," employ the human writer as their instrument:³ it is *through* Moses or Jeremiah that the truth and will of God are known. This is the fundamental principle in Clement's theory: Scripture is the medium or embodiment of divine truth.

From this follow certain consequences, and first and most obvious among them the distinction between the Bible and other books. Highly as he prized the Greek philosophy, he draws the contrast without abatement. "The truth of the Greeks," he says, "is different from truth as we know it, though it shares the same name; it differs in its range of knowledge, in the authority of its proof, in its divine power, and in similar ways. For the divine instruction is with us, who are trained in the truly sacred writings by the Son of God."⁴ Thus a convert from philosophy, whatever his previous stage of attainment, was still in need of the higher lessons of Scripture:⁵ the sufficiency of Plato is never once

¹ 890.² 66.³ *E.g.* λόγος, 129; παιδαγωγός, 227; τὸ πνεῦμα, 149; διὰ is used in each case of the writer. *Cp.* The Law was given διὰ Μωσέως οὐχὶ ὑπὸ Μωσέως, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ λόγου, διὰ Μωσέως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 134; *cp.* 223, 420.⁴ 376. So θεῖαι γραφαί are distinct from σοφία κοσμική, 257.⁵ 347, 786.

admitted, however great and welcome his services as an ally.

It is a second result or aspect of Clement's principle, that proof from Scripture is final and incontestable. It may be difficult to determine the true meaning of a passage, but, if this can be done, "cedit quæstio." "He who believes in the divine Scriptures and is possessed of sure judgment, receives as incontrovertible demonstration the voice of God who bestowed the Scriptures."¹ "I suppose our method of demonstration alone is certain, inasmuch as it is derived from the divine Scriptures, even from the sacred writings and the wisdom which, in the Apostle's phrase, is 'taught of God.'"² It is from the warrant of the Almighty that the authority of the written Word proceeds, and upon this basis a structure of demonstrated certainty can be erected.³ There are many references to the certain, reliable, and demonstrative character of this proof. It is a primary conviction with Clement, nor does he ever seem to have suspected the extent to which his extraordinary latitude of interpretation nullified its practical value.

Clement never attempts to give reasoned demonstration of this far-reaching doctrine of inspiration. He regards it as axiomatic and, for Christians, as uncontested. But, while not primarily dependent on evidence, this estimate of the Scriptures is still fortified by subsidiary support of a more concrete character. Clement took over from other writers the strange theory that the Hebrew Scriptures were the source of all the better elements in Greek philosophy. Justin had said the same thing before him, and the assertion can be traced back, through Philo, to the uncertain authority of Aristobulus.⁴ Clement knew the work of Aristobulus on

¹ 433.

² 454.

³ ἐξ ἀθθεντείας παντοκρατορικῆς, 564; *cp.* 888.

⁴ Justin, *Apol.*, i. 44. See Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, i. 242 *sqq.*; P. A. Scheck, *De Fontibus Clementis Alexandrini*, 29 *sqq.*

the Mosaic law, and may have been considerably influenced by it. In any case, however suggested, this clumsy theory occupies a place of considerable prominence in his pages. With laborious calculation he proves the antiquity of Moses. He quotes repeatedly the Lord's saying, "All that ever came before me were thieves and robbers," and is at pains to prove its reference to the teachers and masters of other lands, in particular of Greece. These "thefts" consisted in the unacknowledged appropriation of their noblest doctrines from Hebrew sources, or, as Clement boldly says, "from us."¹ With a certain sly satisfaction he quotes, too, Plato's own words to justify the assertion of the priority of the Law. The Egyptian priest says in the *Timæus*, "O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are ever children. Not a Hellene is really old. You have no learning that is hoary with time."² The question of the relative antiquity of Hebrew and Egyptian wisdom, Clement discreetly forbears to raise; meantime, the passage does good service in supporting the general thesis, that "barbarian" culture is anterior to that of Greece. So Plato had borrowed from Moses, and Numa had derived his wisest legislation from the Law.³ The dicta of the Seven Wise Men had in like manner the wisdom of Solomon for their source.⁴ It becomes an emphasised and laboured commonplace in Clement's pages, and nowhere is he more open to criticism than in his constant use of it. It fundamentally contradicts his own favourite thesis of the universal education of humanity by the Logos, and ties him down to a narrow conception of revelation, which is quite alien to the general trend of his religious views.

It would be interesting to know what impression was

¹ 752.

² *Timæus*, 22, quoted 356 and 426.

³ 359.

⁴ 466. So of Heraclitus, 442; Orpheus, 692; the Peripatetics, 705. Even the tactics of Miltiades were learned from Moses, 418.

left on the mind of an educated Hellene by Clement's long diatribes on Greek plagiarism, even when tempered by the admission that, "if they stole the truth, at any rate they possess it."¹ The more thoughtful can hardly have been attracted by this novel claim for the law of an unpopular race, which incidentally involved the denial of the grace of originality in Plato. On the other hand, the very intrinsic weakness of the theory, and its plain dissonance with so much of Clement's other teaching, only bring into clearer prominence the intention and motive to which its adoption on Clement's part was due. He will break, it seems, with no current view, so long as it serves to exalt the Scriptures. He will not abandon even a needless claim, when it is made on behalf of the venerable Hebrew Law. Rarely, perhaps, in the course of its long history has a greater sacrifice been made in the Bible's honour, than in the days when a Greek father, steeped in the thought of the Platonic and Stoic schools, was constrained for the moment to abandon his Hellenism and his universalism, and to expose himself, consciously or not, to criticism and retort, with the single aim of asserting in the most uncompromising terms the original and final supremacy of the written Word.

This authoritative revelation is conceived by Clement as a unity with recognised distinction in its elements. A technical "Canon" of Scripture, particularly in regard to the New Testament, was, as we have seen, at that time in Alexandria only in process of formation. That is to say, the area of assured inspiration was not yet finally determined. But this process had so far advanced that it was possible, in general terms, to speak of "Scripture" and "the Lord's Scriptures" as a whole.² Thus "our Scriptures" contrast as a unified collection with other writings.³ Or an argument may be supported by going through the Scriptures and

¹ 377.

² e.g. 786, 890.

³ 583.

selecting a string or series of quotations.¹ When the heretics rejected the Pastoral Epistles they were shutting out what had been included and accepted.² Clement speaks of "all Scripture" and "the whole of Scripture," though in each case the primary reference, at least, is to the Old Testament.³ His use of the term "Scripture" is not indeed completely defined, so that too much must not be made to depend upon the term ;⁴ but Clement's sense of its unity is still sufficiently apparent, and forms, indeed, the background against which the distinction of the various elements stands out.

How the Scriptures, or Scripture, form a single body of truth and yet contain diverse elements, each with its separate characteristics, is expressed when Clement says that music may be taken as a figure of the harmony of the Church, as this is to be discovered in the Law, the Prophets, the Apostles, and the Gospel.⁵ The recognition of these four principal elements as constituting a harmonious whole, and as standing in the closest relation to the teaching and authority of the Church, was not a new theory : it is, for example, explicitly taught in the *Epistle to Diognetus*.⁶ But it is so fundamental in Clement's thought, that we can hardly better analyse his conception of the Bible than by considering how he both connects and distinguishes these several elements, which are included in the unity of the whole.

Between the Law and the Prophets Clement is not concerned to draw distinctions. They had stood side by side in the Jewish Church for at least four hundred years,⁷ and Christianity sought for no contrasts where the order of

¹ εἰρμός, 564 ; *cf.* ἐκλεγόμενοι, 802.

² 457.

³ 664, 753.

⁴ "γραφὴ ἰστ kein Wegweiser," Harnack, *Das Neue Testament um das Jahr 200*, p. 41.

⁵ 784.

⁶ xi. 6.

⁷ In Alexandria "the canonicity of the Prophets had been accepted since the beginning of the second century, B.C." Ryle, *Canon*, p. 108.

Providence had secured agreement. In our time fuller knowledge of the Old Testament has brought differences into light, and the Priestly and Prophetic standpoints present their constant antitheses to every modern student. Clement was untroubled by any sense of this contrariety. The discovery of the Law in Josiah's reign stirs for him no question of its antiquity.¹ "All the ancient Scriptures" were anterior, he believed, to the date of Ezra and even to that of the Captivity.² What is evident in this connection from Clement's pages, is the heightened importance of Prophecy in the Church as compared with the Synagogue. The limitation of Philo's interest to the Pentateuch was significant; but Clement quotes the Prophets freely,³ and applies the term "Prophetic Scriptures" to the whole of the Old Testament.⁴ Moses is a "Prophet," as well as "embodied Law": David and Solomon come into the same category.⁵ The Old Testament authors as a body are described as "Prophets," and the common tendency to discover hints and anticipations of the Christian dispensation, even in the details of the Law, facilitated the treatment of the whole of the ancient Scriptures as "prophetic." Thus Clement tends to minimise rather than to emphasise the distinction between Prophecy and the Law. He, of course, employs both terms, and knows they stand for things habitually distinguished. But it is foreign to his purpose to dwell upon the differences.

A far more vital and momentous question arose, when he passed on to consider the relation of the Gospel to the

¹ 390-1.

² 410.

³ Comparing the Pentateuch with the Prophets, his quotations or references stand in the proportion of 5 to 3. Genesis in the one case, Isaiah in the other, are used most frequently, the use made of these two books being about equal.

⁴ 65, 467. The Law was given *ἐν τῷ στόματι τῶν προφητῶν*, 439.

⁵ 386, 421, 753.

Old Testament. Clement and his contemporaries, in asserting their harmony and connection, had to face a twofold opposition, proceeding, curiously enough, from the extreme champions and from the extreme assailants of the ancient Scriptures. The extreme champions were, of course, the Jews, who claimed Moses and David as peculiarly their own, and whose resentment of the Church's appropriation of their spiritual heritage seemed natural enough to independent observers such as Celsus and his like.¹ The extreme assailants were Marcion, Tatian in his later days, and their company; who set the Law and the Gospel in their sharpest antithesis, often discarding the Old Testament and denying the identity of its Deity with the God and Father in heaven, whom Jesus Christ revealed. Many Greeks in Alexandria were ready to follow Marcion in his depreciation of the Law. The double attack is in Clement's mind, as he makes the constant claim that the differences between the Law and the Gospel do not invalidate their fundamental unity, as phases in a single revelation.

First, as against the Jews, he claims unhesitatingly the continuity of the Gospel with the Old Testament. From the Christian standpoint the same divine Logos, the same watchful Educator, spoke through the Law and the Gospel. Moses and the Apostles might be contrasted, but they rendered service to the same "Word."² If it was easy to draw distinctions between the Old Testament and the more recent revelation to "the Saints,"³ the point at issue was one of degree only, the truth revealed being identical, only the measure of its manifestation various. It was one salvation in Christ, that belonged to the righteous men of ancient days and to the Christians who came after them.⁴ The Lord, as He said Himself, came not to destroy but to fulfil; and Love, the distinctive grace of the New Covenant, had

¹ Origin, *c. Celsum*, ii. 4.

² 307.

³ 682.

⁴ 609.

been claimed by an earlier Christian than Clement as the fulfilling of the Law.¹ The Old Testament was only fully intelligible in the light of the New, since the hidden significance of ancient rites needed the life and still more the teaching of the Lord for its elucidation. In such manner, with much conviction and a kind of sense that the times were with him, does Clement assert, as against the Jews, the harmony of the Gospel and the Law. The fulfilment of ancient predictions in the circumstances of the Lord's life is not overmuch elaborated ; and the identity of the power at work in the old and new dispensations is asserted, in such a manner that the reader feels it is rather the intelligent Hellene than the hostile Jew that Clement has in mind.² Still the Christian claim, that the Old Testament belonged to those who had given welcome to the new revelation, was a crucial one, and though Clement feared the Jews less than the heretics, they are never for very long entirely absent from his thoughts.

But then, in the second place, if the Jew had been dealt with, it still remained to answer Marcion. Suppose the claim to the Old Testament made good, and the Church's portion in the books of Israel proved, was this indeed a gain? Their harsh law, their stern, just, unloving deity we do not want, said Marcion ; much as from a different standpoint the Christian of to-day might hesitate to appropriate the passionless and unforgiving God of Science. Clement's answer to Marcion was not final : perhaps, in some form or other, Marcion's views will survive so long as men are confronted with the sombre contrarieties of the world ; but in one important particular he proves his case against the great heresiarch. The sternness of the Law is not really cruel. In so far as it is severe, its severity may be loving and beneficial. There is no necessary incompati-

¹ 532, 614.

² See esp. 429.

bility between Justice and Love, in other words, between the characteristic principles of the old covenant and of the new. These things had been set in opposition, but there was no real conflict; "continuity" was a truer word.¹ Just as a physician by treatment, which must be often stern and rigorous, seeks his patient's good, so the Law aims at man's highest welfare, even removing altogether in the interest of others the cases proved incurable.² The heretics made much of the text, "By the law is the knowledge of sin."³ But the Law, replies Clement, does not cause sin, it reveals it. Its fears, so far from being irrational, may be the beginning of wisdom, and with all its sternness it is a veritable gift of God, "ancient grace," not alien from that everlasting grace which came by Jesus Christ.⁴ And often we are led from the domain of external ordinances to the Biblical conception of an inward law, written upon the heart, and rising into its highest forms as conscience and the love of God.⁵ In controversy Clement is not always convincing or at his best, but he meets those who would have discarded the Old Testament for its harshness, with admirable sanity and a clear recognition of the spiritual value of restraint. He is never a legalist, but he would have approved, perhaps, had he lived in later days, of Wordsworth's *Ode to Duty*, or of the philosopher's view that the "categorical imperative" was as wonderful as the starry heavens.

Thus is the harmony of the Gospel with the Law and the Prophets maintained against various attacks. There is variety in the manner of revelation, but its source and aim are one, and no element in the scheme is properly intelligible apart from all the rest. And yet there is a difference when we pass from the Old Covenant to the New. In the former,

¹ οὐ δὴ μάχεται τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ νόμος, 507; *cf.* 549. ἡ ἀκολουθία τῶν διαθηκῶν, 894; *cf.* 550.

² 422-3.

³ 447.

⁴ 133-4, 448.

⁵ 85, 307.

the authority centres in the book : what is written is the crucial question. In the latter, the stress lies on the Lord's teaching, and on the fact that any given doctrine could claim the Lord's authority : only secondarily is it important that this teaching is recorded in certain books. The distinction, of course, is not complete, but one of emphasis and proportion. Even in the case of the Old Testament the personality and authority of the teacher still counted for much, as is made clear by the epithets Clement applies to Moses. Genesis and Deuteronomy are of authority because they may claim his name. To a less degree other Scriptures commanded attention because Solomon or Isaiah was the writer. And, conversely, the term "Scripture" is frequently applied to the Lord's sayings and to the writings of Saint Paul.¹ Still, a certain difference is there. "It is written"—that is the final authority in the Old Testament. "The Lord said it"—there is the equivalent in the New.² What Clement mainly quotes from the Gospels is the teaching and actual words of the Lord. Incidents and environment count for less, and sometimes surprise has been expressed that he valued the mainly narrative records of Saint Mark as highly as he did. We seem, as it were, to catch in the pages of our Stromatist the last echoes of the living voice of the Son of Man. The transition from the teacher to the book appears when we find, for example, such a formula as "The Lord in the Gospel" uses certain language,³ or when "the voice and scripture of the Lord"⁴ are combined, or the four authoritative Gospels distinguished from other records. It would be easy to press this distinction too far. Its interest lies in the glimpse which,

¹ *E.g.* 294, 440, 773, etc. So γέγραπται, 523 ; γεγράφθαι, 366.

² *Cp.* Kutter, *Clemens Al. und das Neue Testament*, p. 105 : "Man kann . . . gar nicht sagen, dass Clemens die Evangelien als Schriften so sehr gewertet habe."

³ 246, 684.

⁴ 890 ; *cp.* the use of φωνή in 329, 543, 698, etc.

incidentally, it affords into one of the many processes by which the Bible as we know it attained its recognition.

The last of the main elements in Clement's "Scriptures" is the Apostolic. What could claim the authority of the Apostles was important, because they were the immediate recipients of the teaching of the Lord. Clement does not formally draw any distinction within their number: James, Peter, John, Paul, are mentioned together as of great authority:¹ all the Apostles were "perfect,"² and when a truth could claim "apostolic" support, no further question need be raised. Thus in theory all their writings stood upon the same level. In practice, however, there is an evident prominence assigned to the Apostle Paul. Again and again he is quoted as "the Apostle." The "blessed," "divine," "noble" Apostle are terms frequently employed in his honour.³ In the important discussion on marriage the appeal is constantly to his teaching, and, save for the comparatively recent date at which he lived,⁴ Clement will hear nothing to his disparagement. Much is made of Saint Paul's relation to the Old Testament, which perhaps in some measure compensated for the fact that he could not directly have received the instruction of the Lord. His inspiration, Clement remarks, was largely derived from the older Scriptures, with which he was in close agreement, and in the interpretation of which he was an acknowledged authority.⁵ When it is remembered that the importance of Saint Paul's teaching had only recently been recognised, and that such recognition had come from heretical, before it came from orthodox, sources, Clement's marked admiration for this great innovator does credit to his judgment. No doubt he saw that the Church could not afford to let the heretics appropriate so valuable an asset as the Pauline

¹ 774.

⁴ 625.

² 625.

³ 57, 69, 374, etc.

⁶ 134, 550, 625; *cf.* 730.

Epistles, but his veneration for their author is not the less genuine, because it was also politic. The Apostolic writings stand, no doubt, somewhat below the Gospels in authority, and they are not very clearly marked off from the group of other Scriptures (Barnabas, Hermas, and the like), to which the previous chapter has referred. But they are an element in Clement's Bible, and also in his theology, of considerable moment. In his estimate of Saint Paul we are often reminded that he himself resembled the Apostle in claiming to be in close accordance with past tradition, while really delivering a message of almost revolutionary novelty.

Such were the phases and sequence of Revelation. There were great diversities, yet an essential unity of scheme. The varied and unfading Scriptures were like the bright pattern of flowers on the ideal robe that adorns the Lord,¹ and yet the robe was single and seamless, and must not be torn or severed by alien or heretic hands. It is said that Clement did not grasp the whole problem which the Scriptures present, and the remark is true. But in its main features his conception of their origin and purpose is a great and noble one, not unworthy of the master of Origen.

There are three terms of constant occurrence in his writings, which are worthy of notice, if we would understand his views on the authority of the Bible. They are the familiar terms "Covenant" or "Testament," "Canon," "Tradition." What did he understand by each of these?

In the main Clement adheres to the Biblical conception of the Covenant as an agreement or compact between God and man, with the implied qualification that God enters into the relationship of His grace and goodness,² man in the spirit of duty and obedience. He speaks frequently of the two covenants, that under the Law and that under the

¹ 238.

² *Cp.* ἡ κατὰ τὰς διαθήκας δόσις, 850.

Gospel, once correcting himself to add that these are in reality one covenant, transacted at different periods.¹ The Old and the New Covenants are frequently mentioned, and the word is often hardly distinguishable in meaning from the other term "Dispensation." The dominant element in the conception is the idea of God bringing man into a moral relationship with Himself. "God Himself," Philo had said, "is the highest covenant,"² and Clement uses similar language, when he says that Moses used this term of the Lord and did not mean anything in writing.³ Thus the word has not finally in Clement the definite meaning we attach to the term "Testament" as a collection of books. But it is easy to see how the sense of spiritual compact or relationship passed over into that of the Scriptures, in which these were embodied and expressed. When Clement says that what Saint Paul wrote depended on the old Covenant—or Testament⁴—we have come very near to the "Old Testament" in our sense of the term. The word *διαθήκη* is translated "Testament" in one passage by Hort and Mayor.⁵ Thus, like its Latin equivalent "Testamentum," the Greek term was at the end of the second century in a fluid or transitional state.⁶ Incidentally Clement's use of it illustrates the fact, that what he values primarily in the Bible is not the mere *littera scripta*. Behind it are spiritual verities and relationships. These give the written book its value: these it is the function of the letter to express and guarantee. In this sense he stands far apart from the literalist.

More difficult is his use of the term "Canon." He takes the word in its primary sense of a "rule" or

¹ 899.

² *De mutatione nominum*, 8.

³ 427. Clement also speaks of four covenants, 666, 1001; *cf.* Irenæus, iii. 11, 8.

⁴ 625, 669; *cf.* 682.

⁵ 894.

⁶ See Westcott's *Hebrews*, 298 *sqq.* Lightfoot's *Galatians*, 141.

“measure”—that to which any given material should conform. Hence it is the standard or ideal, by which we may determine values or defects. He applies the term in many different connections, but his central idea is that the Church had her own rule in conduct and in doctrine, and that this “ecclesiastical canon” could be used to settle any appeal. This “rule” applied to subjects as varied as the manner of celebrating the Eucharist, the control of the desires, or the virtues of the Gnostic character,¹ but also and especially to the interpretation of the Scriptures: *κανονίζειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν* means to understand the scheme and proportion of truth, as it is to be learned from the Scripture by true exegesis.² The “canon” in Clement’s use of the term is thus never a collection of books, a sense the word did not acquire till a century later. It is the rule of Christian truth, not so much in the form of an objective formula or creed, as rather an inner principle of consistent interpretation.³ The Bible is to be explained and understood according to the rule of truth.⁴ The heretics, who did this in a perverse and arbitrary manner, had “stolen the Church’s rule.”⁵ The true principle lay in the harmonious and concordant interpretation of all the various elements in Scripture.⁶ Such interpretation was not to be learned so much by independent study as by the authority of the past, and thus we have a “venerable rule of tradition,”⁷ handed down from earlier days, and of great importance in Clement’s scheme of truth. No doubt the “rule” is also to be sought through inward guidance; “the canon of truth must be learned from the Truth itself”⁸ is a dictum which must be understood according

¹ 375, 543, 608, 806, 836, etc.

² 818.

³ Or even of Christian conduct. *ὁ κανὼν τῆς πίστεως* in 607 has this sense.

⁴ 802, 803, 826.

⁵ 897.

⁶ See esp. 803.

⁷ 325.

⁸ 890.

to his favourite doctrine of inward illumination, but there is a clear connection between the rule and "tradition," and thus we pass to the third of these important terms.

Clement's high estimate of "Tradition" is a particular aspect of his veneration for the past. "Few are the equals of our fathers," and no commendation of a doctrine or practice is so convincing as the demonstration of its antiquity. It is no surrender of this principle for him to trace all tradition to the teaching of the Lord during his earthly life, for this teaching did but bring to clearer light the truths established before the foundation of the world, but reserved as hidden secrets till the Incarnation.¹ From the Lord himself proceeded a line of tradition, handed on through the Apostles, and then to the successive generations, and still accessible to those who could understand. Of this the contents were various. The selection of the four Gospels as of special authority was matter of tradition :² the test of true doctrine as distinct from false was the continuity of its tradition.³ Much that was inherited in this manner was the common property of the whole Church, and thus the Church's tradition could be contrasted with the novel and invented assertions of heresy.⁴ But more usually Tradition, as Clement thought of it, had an element of secrecy. It was esoteric, imparted to the few who were its chosen and qualified recipients, and comparable in its nature to the heathen Mysteries.⁵ Especially was this the case in regard to that large element in the body of Tradition, which dealt with the interpretation of the Scriptures. The Gnosis that was only for the minority consisted very largely in a deeper insight and exegesis.⁶ This unwritten, limited, teaching was distinct from Scripture, yet closely related to it ; it is a kind of key by which the stores and treasures of the written Word

¹ 682.² 553.³ 890.⁴ 893, 896.⁵ 771, 845, 865.⁶ *Cp.* ἡ τῶν γραφῶν παράθεσις τε καὶ δόξαις, 454.

are opened to those who have the gift of insight.¹ Clement's Tradition is notably different from that of Roman Catholic theology, because it depends not on authority so much as on the illuminated intelligence. He characterises it as "divine," "sure," and "mystic."² In relation to the Scriptures it brings prominently to our notice the fact that, when the last word has been said about the authority of the Bible, there still remains the hardly less important question of interpretation. We must not leave the subject without examining Clement's teaching from this point of view.

Properly speaking, the selection of certain books or passages of Scripture as specially important, is a phase of interpretation. It implies that the *littera scripta* is not taken simply as it stands, and that the argument "It is written" must be in one case emphasised, in another ignored. For the selection will be made upon some avowed principle, or in accordance with the tendencies of the interpreter's theology; in either case a standard of exegesis distinct from the mere written text comes into operation. Now Clement can, on occasion, say hard things of the heretics for their manipulation of Scripture. They do not, he complains, use the whole Bible, nor do they even accept and employ all the contents of their favourite books.³ They pick out and select what suits their purpose, and their Bible becomes little better than a piece of patchwork.⁴ No doubt the charge was true enough. But is Clement himself wholly beyond such criticism?

We can hardly acquit him, when we examine his use of Scripture. Indeed, he himself speaks frankly of "selecting testimonies."⁵ He commends those who "elaborate dogmas by a selection of appropriate passages."⁶ The principle which is thus admitted carries us a long way. Throughout,

¹ 321, 786, 806, 897.

⁴ 528.

² 768, 804, 896.

⁶ 802.

³ 891.

⁶ 883.

he is indeed very far from letting the Bible "speak for itself," and this is evidenced not least by his obvious preference for certain books and passages. With the narrative or purely historical element in both Testaments he has little concern. The Books of Kings and the Acts of the Apostles are only quoted infrequently; on the other hand, the Psalms and the Pauline Epistles are in constant use. There are very few references to our Lord's eschatological teaching; there is little tendency to dwell on the sterner aspects of the New Testament doctrine of Sin; there is similar disinclination to deal with the notable antitheses of Saint Paul's theology. In the "Wisdom Literature" Ecclesiastes is rarely quoted, and Job's problem never faced. On the other hand, the kindlier teaching of the Proverbs, the Wisdom of Solomon and of the Son of Sirach, are in constant use. The frequent references to the Prologue of the fourth Gospel have been previously noted. The well-known phrase from the book of Genesis "in our image, after our likeness,"¹ was, of course, invaluable to Clement, as to Philo and every other Biblical Platonist. The most Johannine text in the Synoptic Gospels is naturally used several times,² while the saying, "Seek and ye shall find," was of considerable service against those who feared all inquiry.³ Now in all this selection of books and passages, with its alternate emphasis and diminution, a definite tendency of thought is at work. Clement, like other men, brings to the Bible his own affinities, and he takes from its pages such elements as respond. He may claim to interpret Scripture by Scripture,⁴ and to find demonstrative proof in the text; but his reader never remains unaware for long that, dependent as Clement may be upon Biblical resources, the material from this plentiful storehouse is selected with considerable predilection and discretion. In effect he says to his reader,

¹ Gen. i. 26.

² *I.e.* St Matt. xi. 27, quoted 10, 109, 425, 697.

³ *E.g.* 650.

⁴ 891.

“This and this and this element in Scripture are important ; that and that and that may be passed by.” And this constitutes a kind of exegesis.

But there is a further stage in this process, of even greater consequence. Given the passage, what is its meaning? We come here upon a large question, in regard to which Clement takes his place as Philo’s follower and Origen’s master, and is a true representative of Alexandrian principles, as against the greater literalism of other Churches. For all the teachers of this school it is a fundamental rule that the Scriptures conceal their most important truths. The written Word is a veil, a parable, a symbol ; the true meaning lies beyond or below. One thing is said, another is intended ; therein lies the whole theory of Allegorism. The insistence on this principle is constant in Clement’s pages. The fifth book of the *Stromateis* is mainly a defence of this doctrine of “concealment.”¹ We are reminded that truth lies hidden in the secret recesses of the shrine ; that poets and philosophers have time after time expressed themselves in riddles ; that the pathway to assured knowledge lies through the understanding of dark sayings ; that the Lord intended this, when He likened the Kingdom of God to leaven.²

This principle is the key of Scripture, but it unlocks other doors as well. The Hieroglyphics of Egypt, the Gnostic utterances of the Wise, the teaching of Plato and the Pythagoreans, have all this deeper esoteric significance,³ so that when a mystic meaning is assigned to the Cherubim or the candlesticks or the High Priest’s robe, Clement only deals with Scripture as he is prepared to deal with other books. “The Word,” he says, “loves concealment.”⁴ The sacred books, like the Blessed Virgin, are pregnant, containing hidden truth.⁵ He speaks once of a fourfold signi-

¹ ἐπίκρυψις, 656, and frequently.

³ 657-8, 680.

⁴ πολυκευθῆς ὁ λόγος, 806.

² 659, 676, 694.

⁵ 889-90.

ficance of the Old Testament;¹ elsewhere he recognises a mystical (or typical), a parabolic, and a fully revealed mode in the Lord's teaching of his Apostles.² Here he is clearly preparing Origen's way. But usually the various distinctions of meaning are not so finely drawn; he is content with the assertion of an external and an inward sense; as Joshua, he tells us, saw two Moses, one among the Angels, the other by the ravines upon the mountains.³ The bodily Moses stood for the body and letter of Scripture; the Moses in glory with the Angels is the inner meaning which underlies the words. So we must understand the Bible "in the great sense;"⁴ we must rise to the height of its argument, penetrate to the recesses of its truth.⁵ When we fail to do this, we interpret the Scripture in an unspiritual manner, or in a merely human sense; we resemble the Jews, who believe in the bare word of the Law; or the heretics, who take literally what was spoken in parable.⁶ Thus the real meaning lies behind the veil, and this veil adds dignity to the hidden truth, and protects it from vulgar intrusion.⁷ Only the few are fitted to pass within the Holy Place. There is real insight in his remark that what appears to be the simplest teaching often demands our closest attention.⁸

This allegorical principle, of which Clement makes such constant use, is clearly connected with his distinction between the different classes of believers. For the simple Christian, who does not pass beyond the domain of Faith, the plain meaning may suffice.⁹ But the possession of Gnosis implies, indeed to a large extent consists in, the power to penetrate

¹ 424.

² 985. I take *σαφῶς καὶ γυμνῶς* to denote the final stage of full and clear revelation, all the hidden meaning being brought into light. Bigg gives the sense as "literal," apparently taking the terms differently. *Christian Platonists*, p. 57, n. ³ 806-7. ⁴ 897. ⁵ 938, 946, 950.

⁶ *σαρκικῶς*, 467; *σαρκίνως*, *ἀνθρωπίνως*, 938; *cf.* 451, 528.

⁷ 665, 679-80.

⁸ 938.

⁹ 309.

through the text to the deeper sense. So the Bible has its grades of truth, appropriate to the different stages of the Christian Way. And the reason which mainly induces Clement to set such store by his principle of concealment and allegory, is the peculiar support which it lends to his exaltation of Gnosis. Thus he differs in his motive from others who had used the same method. Philo used allegory to explain away the difficulties of the Old Testament. The Stoics had employed it in order to purge the old mythology of its crude anthropomorphism. It was the readiest, if not the only, available solution of the problem which arose, when a purer religious consciousness was confronted with the teaching and legends of an immaturer time. But Clement is not greatly concerned with these difficulties. They had been dissolved so often that they retained little substance, and he is free to use his method with a positive rather than an apologetic aim. The crudities of the ancient tales no longer trouble him. His mind dwells upon the stores of meaning, which Revelation and Gnosis have to offer to the favoured children of the truth.

It would be tedious and hardly profitable to follow Clement through the whole range of his allegorical interpretation. But a few examples from the Old and the New Testaments may serve a useful purpose in illustrating the method of exegesis, upon which he set such store. He delights, for example, to see great significance in names, and in this could claim, of course, the older Scriptures as well as contemporary practice for his support. The single letter added when "Abram" was changed to "Abra[h]am," symbolised the patriarch's knowledge of the one and only God; he is no longer a "high father," but a chosen father "of sound," or an elect intelligence, productive of reason or the Word.¹ The explanation is not very convincing, but it

¹ 648. See Stählin *in loc.* for the references to Philo.

is largely drawn from Philo, though without any acknowledgment. So Jerusalem is "the vision of peace";¹ Isaac, the laughter or delight or the playful spirit which may exist in the divine nature;² the upright *iota* in the name Jesus is the abiding goodness of the Lord.³ In another connection the land of Egypt and the people of Canaan are taken as types of passions and vices, of deceits and worldly follies, with which the Christian must have no dealing.⁴ So when it is said "the horse and his rider hath he thrown into the sea," the real meaning is that the impulsive passions bring man's nature into the turbulent waves of worldly disorder.⁵ "Earth, earth, hear the word of the Lord," is an appeal to the senseless and unbelieving, who are earthly in their nature.⁶ Even the details of the law are full of significance. The three measures, which form the ephah, stand for sensation, reason, intelligence, in human nature.⁷ The furniture and carved work in the tabernacle had a symbolic value, even in their minutest arrangements.⁸ Animals which failed to chew the cud were types of the heretics; those which failed to divide the hoof, of the Jew.⁹ The prohibition to yoke ox and ass together was a secret intimation of the danger of imparting advanced truth indiscriminately to fit and unfit minds.¹⁰ A lesson on the virtue of simplicity is extracted from the story of the golden calf; a reproof of the clean shaven from the ointment upon Aaron's beard.¹¹ The tying of the colt to the vine is the union of the children of God with the divine Logos; the Logos is also typified by Abel's blood and by many other figures.¹² Finally, the Queen in a vesture of gold is the Church, as Clement would

¹ 332.

² 110-11. *αἴτη ἢ θέλα παιδία . . . αἴτη ἢ μυστικὴ παιδία.* Compare Homer's laughter among the Gods of Olympus.

³ 148-9.

⁴ 453.

⁵ 677-8.

⁶ 640.

⁷ 455.

⁸ 784.

⁹ 900-1.

¹⁰ 478-9.

¹¹ 246, 289.

¹² 106-7, 126.

like to have seen her, arrayed in the robe of elaborate culture.¹

Such is his method of extracting the inner meaning from the Law and the Prophets. For his principles and for his examples he is greatly indebted to Philo, and in all this exegesis there is scant recognition, as De Faye remarks, of the rights of authorship. Yet Clement can also employ his method with considerable independence and originality, and this naturally becomes more evident, when we turn to his interpretation of the New Testament. Here it was no longer possible to follow Philo in details, though there were many Christian or half Christian exegetes already at work, and we can never say what exact proportion of his suggestions was due to the teaching of Pantænus. But, whether derived or original, there are not a few happy and appropriate pieces of exegesis in Clement's treatment of the Gospels and Epistles. Of them, and of others less commendable, the following shall serve as examples.

He mentions the woman who anointed the Lord's feet with precious ointment.² It did not suit Clement's purpose to allow this to stand as a justification of the use of unguents, so he apologises for the literal sense—the woman was still a sinner ; she brought what she thought was best—and passes on to discover in the ointment a hint of the Lord's suffering, or of His teaching. The anointed feet are the Apostles, the woman's tears are our sinful selves, her loosened hair the renunciation of finery. Or it may even be that the ensnaring ointment is a hint of the treachery of Judas. So varied and abundant are the possibilities when we get away from the letter. Again, the five barley loaves stand for the Law, which is earlier than and inferior to the true wheat of the Gospel ; the two small fishes are Greek philosophy, born in the waters of the Gentile world and

¹ 786.

² 205-6.

swept about by its uncertain currents.¹ The tares sown in the field of the Church are naturally the heresies.² If we are to leave father and mother for the Gospel's sake, this is no literal injunction, but our "mother" stands for our country and our "father" for the State's laws.³ The charge of "incivism" naturally suggests itself, but Clement is thinking of the higher claims of God. Foxes who have holes are wealthy mineowners.⁴ Fasting is abstention from evil deeds.⁵ The pearl of great price is the "pure diaphanous Jesus," a figure quite congenial to his docetic bent.⁶ The Lord's long robe is the variegated beauty of the divine Scriptures.⁷ The thorns which form His crown signify, among other things, the once unfruitful lives now brought closer to the Church's head.⁸ And so examples might be multiplied, as in his discursive way Clement leads us on to discern in the lamps of the five wise virgins a type of the few enlightened souls, in bread and fishes a monition of simple fare, in "two or three gathered together" a suggestion of the Christian home.⁹ His allegory is a very elastic principle and gives us very various results. He applies it just as readily to the New Testament as to the Old. The Gnostics also had done so, and he is not far from their company.

It is easy to criticise this method. The interpretations to which it leads are "altogether arbitrary." Its results are "visionary and futile." It is an "excellent means of finding what you already possess." Sometimes only is it "relatively sober."¹⁰ Two defects, in particular, lie patent to every modern reader, of which the more important is its

¹ 787. ² 887. ³ 570. *Cp.* how he explains away *μισεῖ*, 948.

⁴ 577. ⁵ 791. ⁶ 241. ⁷ 238. ⁸ 214. ⁹ 172, 541-2, 655.

¹⁰ See Farrar, *History of Interpretation*, 182-7; E. de Faye, 228; M. Denis, quoted in Bigg's *Christian Platonists*, 148; Renan, *Marc-Aurèle*, 164. Renan speaks of "Les docteurs orthodoxes, avec leurs interprétations allégoriques et typiques tout à fait arbitraires."

complete disregard of the literal, historic sense. "Not the words, but the sense," pleads Clement ; and on the strength of this principle he reads the most remote and diversified significance into passages wholly innocent, in their original intention, of any such meaning. He does not seem able to distinguish, as we might do, between the fact or meaning which was present to the writer's mind, and the various extended applications in which the applied principle might be said to hold good. Thus, when he deals with the golden calf, or with the Lord's command to the young ruler, his exegesis leads him into violent treatment of the original sense : even the familiar camel of the East must not be regarded as a literal camel, it is ὑψηλότερόν τι.¹ Throughout we are kept far away from the facts and miss the balance and sanity of view which their influence should secure. This indifference to the historic and the concrete was due in part to the Alexandrian tradition, but it is clearly also a personal quality in Clement. We have noticed it before in his view of the Incarnation. It is his principal point of contact with the Gnostics, as may be evidenced by the difficulty of deciding whether any given fragment of exegesis in the *Excerpta* proceeds from Theodotus or his commentator. Yet even here opposite tendencies affect him : witness his insistence on the historical antiquity of Moses, and his surprising appreciation of the Gospel according to Saint Mark.

It is a second defect that, when he employs allegory, he is content with such trivial identities. Parabolical teaching in Scripture conserves in the main a true parallelism between the symbolised principle and the illustrative tale. There are real elements of identity. Even when the Lord employs the Parable as a veil, the measure of correspondence remains considerable ; and the same is true of Plato's myths.

¹ 246, 937, 950.

But allegory knew little of such canons and limitations. If the three measures which form the ephah really denote three elements in man's nature, then there is no reason why anything should not be the symbol of anything, for an equivalent point of identity could usually be found. If the "strange woman" of the Proverbs is really a figure of secular culture,¹ then a system of typology is established which demands only that it shall be possible to apply a common epithet to either side of the parallel. Origen complained not infrequently of the violent and arbitrary character of Heracleon's exegesis;² but he must have heard much similar exposition from his own master. It is true that even the sober Irenæus was convinced that the treasure hid in the field meant Christ hidden in the Old Testament,³ and it may be urged that in this regard also Clement was a man of his own age. If it pleased him to fancy that the pillar of salt, into which Lot's unhappy wife was turned, denoted the power which savours and seasons the souls of those who have the gift of spiritual vision, we must not too severely condemn his arbitrary exegesis. The results, it has been truly said, are often better than the method.

And, with all its obvious defects, allegory had as well its merits and its service. It enabled Clement to accept the Scriptures without surrender of his broad and universalistic outlook. It was the best available *via media* between literalism and the abandonment of the Church's sacred books. We may feel that many of the parallels which Clement discovers or adopts between Plato, Homer, the dramatic poets, and the Scriptures, are remote and unconvincing. We may have difficulty in reconciling the judgments which speak of him as "more Biblical than Origen"

¹ 332.

² See the remarks of A. E. Brooke, *Texts and Studies*, i. p. 48; *cf. πᾶν βίαιως*, *ib.* 53; *σφόδρα ἀπαραιτήτως*, *ib.* 69.

³ *iv.* 26, 1.

and "more philosopher than Christian." But under these divergences lies the important fact that he could retain, without conscious contrariety, the best of the Hellenic heritage and yet accept both the Hebrew and the Christian Testaments. The particularism of the Jew did not trouble him. Saint Paul's attitude to wisdom and philosophy raises no great difficulty. The details of the Law are not an intolerable burden. He can harmonise all these limitations and antagonisms with something of the wide outlook, which made the ideal Hellenic philosopher a "spectator of all time and all existence."¹ He could not do this by the methods and principles which are available for us. He could not even apply fearlessly to Scripture such wide regulative ideas as were certainly his own. But allegory resolved the difficulty. There was no contradiction, because the wider meaning could always be read into the narrower letter. So Moses and Saint Paul and the Lord Himself come into harmony with Hellenism, and Christianity becomes the true philosophy. What is particular becomes universal, and the special precepts of an age or a people reveal hidden meanings, which are valid for every man, or at least for every enlightened Christian. Allegory, says Harnack, saved the Church from becoming "the religion of the book."² It also, at least in Alexandria, enabled the Church to retain her book.

Allegory also solved the difficulty which arose within the sacred books, when the Old Testament was contrasted with the New. The obvious differences in the two phases of revelation had already induced Marcion to abandon the older Covenant, and even the Letter of Ptolemy to Flora takes the position that, though the Law was not given by the devil, it certainly was not given by God. Greek converts to Christianity were naturally inclined to stumble at

¹ Plato, *Republic*, vi. 486.

² *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 65.

the Law, and sometimes this criticism was dangerous and effective. Clement, as we have seen, asserts unhesitatingly the fundamental unity of the two covenants. He will have no dealings with Marcion and his kind: the Law and the Gospel proceed from one source. This position, not wholly an easy one to defend, he justifies in detail through allegory. The older covenant was symbolical. Its secret meanings, interpreted by the key of Gnosis, are prophetic of the Lord. All that appears to be anthropomorphic in the teaching of the Old Testament about God's nature, is really allegory.¹ The prohibition which forbids a man to wear a woman's garment must be taken spiritually, as a protest against effeminacy.² In this way whatever seems harsh or stern or unreasonable in the Law is toned down or illuminated. For all the ordinances of Moses there were hidden reasons: we must not be deceived by the apparent absence of ground for his prohibitions.³ Thus, like Saint Paul, though by other methods, he praises and abandons the Law. It is declared to have no inherent contrariety to the Gospel, but then, on Clement's interpretation, it is hardly any longer recognisable as the code of Moses. But the gain is surely greater than the loss. Clement would have fallen from his own comprehensive principle had he expelled Moses and the Prophets from his sanctuary. That he could retain them, and be untroubled by any discord between things old and new, is largely the result of his elastic method of exegesis.

In such of his works as have survived Clement's use of Scripture is characteristically discursive.⁴ One text suggests another, or a line of Homer will recall a saying from the Prophets. Thus the *Stromateis* retain their miscellaneous nature, and their author's favourite quotations⁵ on the

¹ 687.² 471.³ 175.⁴ *Cp.* esp. the long discussion of the term *παῖς*, 104 *sqq.*⁵ Eph. iii. 10: Heb. i. 1.

variegated character of the divine Wisdom, and on the many modes and measures of Revelation, are taken as guiding principles for his own literary practice. But at times he could venture on more continuous work. Once, as a specimen of Gnostic interpretation, he devotes a whole chapter to the exegesis of the Decalogue. And there still survive a few fragments from the considerable commentary, eight books in length, which was known as the *Hypotyposesis*, and which, Eusebius tells us, contained expositions of all the canonical Scriptures. A glance at each of these will add something to our knowledge of Clement's powers and limitations as an interpreter.

His summary exposition of the Decalogue¹ starts with the remark that ten is a sacred number. Its mystical properties lie deep in the nature of things, for there is a physical decalogue in the heavens, another in the earth, another in the nature of man. His interest in number again appears in his comments on the "two tables": they stand for the two covenants, or the ruling and the subject spirits, or for the dual activities of thought and deed. Similar are his remarks on the seventh day's rest. That six is properly the number of completed work is shown by the sun's motion from solstice to solstice in six months, by the history of the human embryo, or by Pythagorean reckonings. But seven holds the position of honour, for the whole created world "revolves in sevens"; the Pleiades are seven—so he says; there are seven sense organs on the human face; the moon has seven phases; there are seven ages in the life of man, as Solon's elegies declare. So he says with David of the Sabbath, "This is the day which the Lord hath made." It is curious to reflect, as we read all this, that the seventh day of the week was probably quite unobserved in the Alexandrian Church. But Clement was living among his

¹ 807 *sqq.*

books, and indeed the whole section may be largely dependent on Jewish-Alexandrine sources. So great was the interest in the mystical properties of number : the Church found room for Pythagoras as well as Plato. The bare parallel of numerical similarity seemed to denote some inward correspondence or affinity, and the ingenious interpreter might discern such parallels as he pleased.

There is more permanent value in Clement's remarks, in reference to the fourth commandment, that the order of creation is properly not an order in time, but an order in the divine purpose, anterior to time ; and that God's rest is the rest, not of inactivity, for He could not cease to do good, but of inviolable order. We are to honour father and mother : Father clearly means God, Father, Creator, Lord. What of our "Mother" ? Is it the "essence" from which we are sprung, or the Church, or the divine wisdom and knowledge called by Solomon—so Clement says—the "mother of the righteous ?" Surely the latter, says Clement, the knowledge that is desirable for its own sake and that proceeds, like all else that is fair and venerable, from God through the Son. It is a characteristic piece of interpretation. Adultery, of course, is to desert the Church's true teaching for the foreign novelties of heresy. Murder is to do away with the true doctrine of God and immortality. Theft is either the work of the artist or sculptor, who, in "making" their paintings or statues, seem to claim the divine prerogative of creation, or else the appropriation of the true philosophy by teachers to whom it did not properly belong. The chapter ends with a reference, somewhat remotely connected with the prohibition to covet, to the universal Providence, which originates with God and works down through secondary causes to the individual details of life. This mystical exegesis leads us a very long way from the Decalogue. The indifference to the natural and original

sense of its prohibitions is complete. The Lord Himself, we recollect, had given a wider and spiritual significance to the Law. Clement's more literary exposition, though not without its elements of value, suffers by comparison.

This chapter on the Decalogue is inserted in the *Stromateis* as a specimen of Gnostic exegesis. It is natural to connect it with the far larger undertaking of the *Hypotyposesis*, of which sufficient remains survive to afford an insight into the character of the work as a whole. Of this commentary some mention has already been made in a previous chapter.¹ The reader may recollect that it consisted mainly of remarks or "scholia" on passages taken from various books of both Testaments; that it incorporated also certain traditions about the Apostles, some of which are of considerable interest; and that, in addition to the Greek fragments which have survived, a larger and more continuous passage is extant in the Latin translation known as the *Adumbrationes*. Beyond the fragments themselves both Eusebius² and Photius³ afford us information about the work, the latter saying much about its heretical tendencies, though he thinks there may have been interpolations. Our present purpose is to give from these scanty remains some further examples of Clement's interpretation.

A woman is to be veiled "because of the angels."⁴ The angels, Clement explains, mean righteous and virtuous men, who must not be tempted into sin. "They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh"—not, of course, in a literal sense, but by the surrender of passion and desire. The "due time" at which the Lord was manifested was the period in which men were ready to believe. The care

¹ See vol. i. pp. 194 *sqq.*

² H.E., vi. 14.

³ Cod. 109-11 (Stählin, I., xiv. *sqq.*)

⁴ This and the following passages quoted may be best seen in Stählin's edition, iii. 195-215.

“especially for those of his own house” is really a care for the inner economy of the soul, where passion is to be eradicated. The “many witnesses” are the testimony of the Law and the Prophets. Such is the character of the commentary. Even in the longer fragments which survive in Latin, the annotations are of the same brief nature. The things “reported unto you by them that have preached the Gospel,” are the ancient symbolical actions of the Prophets, never understood by the world at large, only now revealed by the Gospel. Christians are a “royal priesthood”; “royal” because they are called into the Kingdom; a “priesthood” because of their oblation of prayer and teaching, “quibus adquiruntur animæ, quæ offeruntur Deo.” To “speak evil of dignities” is to abuse the angels. The “clouds without water” are souls bereft of the divine and fertilising Word. To “sit on the right hand” is to rest in the place of honour. The comments on the Johannine Epistles are some of the most interesting. On “that which was from the beginning” Clement’s comment is “*generationem tangit sine principio filii cum patre simul exstantis.*” Here is the doctrine of eternal generation, unless the translator has modified the text. In God “is no darkness at all”; that is, no anger, no passion, no harbouring of evil for any man, finds place in His nature: He ruins none; He gives salvation to all. The Spirit, the water, and the blood stand for life, regeneration, knowledge. “Perfect love casteth out fear,” for love, Clement comments, is the perfection of the believer.

As we read the dozen pages which have survived from this lengthy work of exegesis, perhaps our first impression is to say that we feel little surprise that the greater part of its contents has perished. Many of the comments seem to us obvious; many seem far fetched. Only here and there do we find an interpretation which is of abiding value. But

so harsh a judgment is probably undeserved. It is the commentator's office to bring the permanent text of Scripture into relation with the ideas and intellectual environment of his day. As these perpetually shift and alter, we must recognise the consequence, that most commentaries are valuable only for the conditions of their own period. Of the works of many greater and later exegetes than Clement, it may be said that, if they survive to-day at all, it is mainly in the library, on the shelf. According to his light and the manner of his age, Clement helped his contemporaries to realise that the value of Scripture lay not in the mere letter, and that we must bring to the Bible our best knowledge and intelligence, if we would receive its treasures for our own. We need not altogether regret that the *Hypotyposesis* have perished: nor need we doubt that they did good service for their day and generation. They mark a stage in exegesis. We have passed beyond it. But who will say that even here finality is yet attained?

Before leaving the difficult and interesting subject of Clement's attitude to the Scriptures, it may be well to consider, as a concrete example, the use he made of one particular work. Many books in both Testaments readily suggest themselves for such examination. His use of Deuteronomy, or of the Psalms; his special liking for the Proverbs and Ecclesiasticus; his abundant quotations from the first Gospel; or the manner in which he judiciously selects from the Epistle to the Romans such elements as can be fitted into his own scheme of thought, might well repay detailed consideration. Or we might find a link with the present in ascertaining why the Epistle to the Ephesians, perhaps the most modern book in all the Bible, is, in proportion to its length, more frequently used by Clement than any other. But perhaps the most natural book to select is the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is always

recognised as more or less akin in style and thought to the Alexandrian type of Christianity. What is Clement's view of this writing? To what extent is he indebted to it?

Dr Stählin finds between ninety and a hundred quotations or allusions to this Epistle in Clement's extant works. About one-third of these may be called "quotations"; references or allusions account for the remaining sixty. It is only rarely that he makes a long quotation:¹ sometimes, when he requires a passage of any length, he merely gives the opening words, adds "down to" according to his practice, and then appends the concluding sentence.² By far the greater part of his use of the Epistle consists of short texts or single phrases, which occur to him readily, and make his familiarity with the Epistle clear. With the central lines of its teaching Clement has much evident affinity. The typological interpretation of the Old Testament, alike of its laws, its ritual, its persons, and its events, is exactly in accordance with one of his own favourite principles. Moreover, the Logos doctrine is definitely taught in the Epistle, even though the subject, as in the other New Testament books which contain it, is not elaborated. Here was a further point of contact. Then the recognition of the value of the Law, albeit "the law makes nothing perfect," is a further point of clear similarity. Yet it would hardly be true to say that the book was one upon which Clement relied. He is in sympathy with many of its dominant ideas and draws from it much which is apt and serviceable, but he does not employ it, though he might have done so, as a weapon against Marcion. His use of the Epistle for purposes of controversy is notably less than his use of certain other Epistles against the Carpocratians. And, generally, he is more indebted to particular texts

¹ But Heb. x. 32-9; xi. 36-xii. 1, are quoted, 608-9; *cp.* 434-5.

² So 434-5, 501.

or ideas than to the fundamental thought of this treatise as a whole.

But, in this lesser manner, his obligations are considerable. The remarkable and illuminating phrase with which this Epistle opens, occurs constantly in Clement's pages.¹ With few Scriptural ideas is he more entirely in sympathy than with the conception of God's self-revelation "in many degrees and in many modes." So, too, the conception of the Lord as the great High Priest, who has entered within the veil, is of frequent recurrence.² The distinction between those who need infant's diet and those who can assimilate strong meat, and the reference to those "who have their senses exercised," are naturally congenial to the teacher of Christian Gnosis, and the passage is quoted more than once.³ The well-known definition of faith, and the splendid chapter on its heroes ;⁴ the conception of Moses as the typically faithful servant,⁵ and that of Melchisedech as the king of peace ;⁶ the Christian lot as that of strangers and pilgrims ;⁷ the spiritual dangers of sin after knowledge ;⁸ the significance of the veil ;⁹ the belief in angels and ministering spirits ;¹⁰ the penetrating and incisive power of the Word of God¹¹—"discerning fire," as he calls it—are all borrowed by him and turned to good account. Twice he employs the book in a more hortatory fashion, to encourage faith or to hearten in persecution.¹² And there are frequent minor adoptions of its language, as his thought falls without effort into the Scriptural phrases. Clement held the Epistle to be of Pauline authorship ; this,

¹ πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως, 331, and in five other passages. πολυτρόπως alone in two. The thought recurs constantly.

² Heb. iv. 14, 666, 833.

³ Heb. v. 13-14, 336, 347, 685, 829.

⁴ Heb. xi. 1, 432-3, 609.

⁵ Heb. iii. 5, 423, 831.

⁶ Heb. vii. 2, 637.

⁷ Heb. xi. 13, 554.

⁸ Heb. x. 26, 459.

⁹ Heb. ix. 3, 656.

¹⁰ Heb. i. 14, 986.

¹¹ Heb. iv. 12, 851.

¹² 69 *sqq.*, 608 *sqq.*

indeed, was the usual view in the Church of Alexandria, which differed here from the Churches of Rome and Carthage. He believed it to have been written by the Apostle in Hebrew and translated by Saint Luke into Greek ; hence the similarity of style between this Epistle and the Acts.¹ But the work of the translator was a minor point ; the Epistle is regularly quoted as Saint Paul's.

When the various passages in which Clement makes use of this Epistle are put together and compared, several points seem to call for special notice. The readiness, with which any apt or suitable quotation occurs to him, betrays the constant student of Scripture. His blending of the teaching of the Epistle with ideas drawn from other sources—as, for example, the High Priest of the Jewish Law seems to coalesce with the High Priest of Egyptian ritual, and the “sharp and piercing” word of God blends with the “wise fire” of the Stoics—is the outcome of his comprehensive attitude and a good instance of his keen perception of affinities. His entire neglect of all the Epistle has to say on the subject of sacrifice, especially on the sacrifice of the Cross, combined with his quick appreciation of its more congenial elements, proves how fully he retained his freedom of thought, in spite of all his professed dependence upon the written Word. And, finally, the really religious spirit of the man comes out, as he follows the Biblical writer in pleading that his readers will not neglect God's call, in reminding them that their true country is not on earth, in his recurrence to the figure of the faithful servant, and in his continual recognition of the world which lies beyond and within the veil of sense.

Such was Clement's Bible and such was the use he made of it. The study of his text of Scripture leaves the modern student with more problems than certainties. His Canon

¹ Παῦλος . . . τοῖς Ἑβραίοις γράφων, 771. See, too, H.E., vi. 14.

was still indeterminate. His fundamental principles of exegesis belonged to his own city and his own age. The results, so far, are mainly negative. Perhaps least of all in this important element of his work, can we appropriate his guidance and his methods for ourselves. Yet even in regard to Scripture the reader of to-day may find the Alexandrian Father not wholly without his services. Interesting primarily in its historical associations, Clement's treatment of Scripture has also suggestions of permanent value.

He illustrates, at any rate, the crucial importance of the right to interpret. It is to little purpose that the authority of the Book is demonstrated, unless the exegesis also can be controlled. It was as easy for Clement to discover Platonism in the Bible, as it was for later schools of thought to discern Catholicism or Calvinism in its pages. When the material is so varied and so abundant, it can be constructed by adaptation and selection into systems of extreme diversity. Hence the old saying, "the Church to teach, the Scripture to prove," leaves the settlement really in the Church's power. For what we prove from Scripture depends largely upon what we attempt to prove. The determining element lies not so much in the text as in the mind of the exegete. There may, no doubt, be interpretation so extravagant that it is sure, sooner or later, to be corrected, just as Alexandrine Allegorism was corrected by other interpreters, who re-asserted the value of the historical element in the Bible. But this leaves the limits still wide, within which the settlement rests in the interpreter's control. He can "quote Scripture to his purpose," and decide its meaning, till some rival or successor convinces the world of a better way.

In the later centuries, and already in some Churches in the second century, this right to interpret rested with official authority. The debated clauses of the Creeds were

mainly so determined, and even to Irenæus the succession of the Episcopate was valuable principally as a guarantee of sound doctrine. But Alexandria stood for a different principle, for the place of the scholar, the doctor, the lecture-room, in determining Christian truth. Pantænus, Clement's master, had probably been a layman, and his pupil, though he was in Holy Orders, hardly contradicted the saying that "le docteur . . . est très souvent laïque."¹ Pressure and opposition from heretics and self-willed amateurs compelled the Church to concentrate her authority and to restrict exegesis. The liberty of prophesying underwent an inevitable restriction. Within the Society extravagance of exegesis became too dangerous to be tolerated. So the scholar surrendered his rights to the Bishop, and when the Bishop was also a scholar, all went well. When he was not, the surrender, though inevitable, had its dangerous consequences. Under modern conditions there seems some probability that learning will regain its old influence, if indeed it has not already done so. The "doctor," and even the lay doctor, exert through their books an influence which is independent, to a large extent, of their official position in the Christian society. As we look back to Clement and follow him through his exegesis, we are able to appreciate the great value of this freedom, and also the dangers of its abuse in incompetent or careless hands. In the main, with all his mistakes, he stands for the cause of light, and sound learning, and the spirit which is prepared to follow wheresoever the argument or the Word may lead.

Finally, we shall not underestimate his enthusiastic appreciation of the Bible. No epithets are too strong for him to apply them to its great writers. His own discursive intelligence found abundant delight in the manifold variety of Scripture. Nor does his learning altogether rob him of

¹ Renan, *Marc-Aurèle*, 431.

that simple and receptive attitude towards its teaching, which characterises so much of true religion. He never forsakes his old friends, Homer, Plato, and the rest. But they do not stand for him on the same level as Moses, David, the "blessed Apostle," and the Lord Himself. Within his spirit there is no discord between the Hebrew and the Hellene; these different elements are at one in Christ. Joyfully accepting the things written for our learning, he derived, by those methods which his age allowed, such comfort, hope, illumination, from the Scriptures, as sufficed not only to direct him on his own pathway, but made him also the valued guide of other souls.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PIETY OF AN INTELLECTUAL MAN

MUCH truth lies in Goethe's saying that "Thought widens and lames." Many men, who have pondered over the issues of life, have lost thereby the power to take active sides in its contest. The philosopher, when he is crowned, does not always make the best of Emperors. Nor is it an uncommon thing in seats of learning for great knowledge to prove itself inimical to the spirit of Christian love. So the mind's interests may drive out devotion, and piety of heart shrink and fade before the advance of intellect, while the simple believer, in spite of his imperfect life and lack of knowledge, may find the entrance into the Kingdom more readily than the learned Rabbi who has no common sins. Of our several human faculties we may develop one or another, as personal choice or circumstances may lead the way ; but most advances involve suppression or limitation elsewhere. Hence it comes that inspiration and reflection do not go hand in hand, that the best critic is the worst leader, that Saint Paul betrayed no admiration for the sculptures and architecture of Athens, and that the man who lives in a theological library is often far from the saintly life. "Qui multo peregrinantur raro sanctificantur" is a similar saying from the *Imitatio*.

Clement was a man of books and thought and learning ; he had been a traveller and he loved retirement ; his

profession gave him academic interests and surroundings ; he was blessed with comfortable means ; he cared for ideas more than facts. Here are the very conditions which again and again have stifled piety. Moreover, he was a broad Churchman, and to fail in devotion has been the constant liability of his school. That these various influences did not rob him of the spirit of true piety is therefore a fact, which all who have regard for his memory will delight to recognise. His learning qualified without abating his religion. Thought widened his view without "laming" his spirit. Not forgetting Athens, he can still pray that the spirit of Christ may give him wings to fly "to my Jerusalem."¹ Perhaps the Church has had few teachers in whom the characteristics of the Philosopher and of the Christian have combined so intimately and in the like degree. As our study of him draws to a close, we may recall some of the features of his learned piety. Previous chapters have already dealt with these to some extent ; the reasonable sobriety of the Christian life ;² the ideal of the Christian home ;³ the right use of wealth ;⁴ the higher life, with its bliss of perfect vision,⁵ had all their elements of religious value. These may be recalled or supplemented in a more general survey.

We may begin by reverting once again to the instinct for unity, which lay so deep in Clement's nature. More than once we have seen him harmonise tendencies which were usually set in opposition. He sees relationship where others discern antithesis, and blends in his personality, not less than in his teaching, factors which are far more often contrasted than combined. He refuses, for example, to separate Religion and Philosophy, Faith and Knowledge, Thought and Action. For Clement, each term demands the other. The distinctions are recognised, but the synthesis counts for more.

¹ 642.² Chap. viii.³ Chap. ix.⁴ Chap. x.⁵ Chap. xiv.

Philosophy, which for Clement meant Greek philosophy as he knew it, was, like the Law, a preparation for Christianity.¹ It was from above, heaven sent, a gift as well as a discovery, and its true enterprise was the quest for reality.² Even the strange alternative explanation of its origin, that it was truth stolen from the divine revelation, is never allowed to depreciate in any serious measure its real value, and all criticisms of particular schools, all allusions to the sophistries of its unworthy exponents, count for little as against the reiterated assertion that philosophy is a part of the divine education of the world. But it is inadequate and incomplete. It needs the complement of religion.³ For all its excellence, it failed by a twofold infirmity, first, because its range of vision and knowledge was too limited for the full apprehension of the truth, and, secondly, because it was weak in action.⁴ Hence the necessity for the fuller revelation and the stronger motive power. Philosophy is the preliminary to the Christian life, as childhood is the preliminary to the maturity of our powers;⁵ and its intrinsic value can never outweigh its ulterior service as the guide or avenue to complete attainment. It achieved more by its ministry to religion than it had ever done by its absolute claims.

From the other side of this partnership there is an equally explicit acknowledgment. Not only was Christianity indebted to philosophy for its preparation of the road, but even afterwards it stood in need of the services of Hellenic wisdom. By such means alone could false teaching be distinguished from true, the corrupt from what was sound. Nor was there any other method available for the defence of truth from the clever attacks of subtle adversaries.⁶ In the face of considerable opposition Clement defends with emphatic conviction this holy alliance between Reason and Revelation. For culture within the Church he

¹ 335, 366.

² 453, 771.

³ 770.

⁴ 366.

⁵ 347.

⁶ 377.

pleads abundant justification.¹ And though with a certain diplomatic depreciation he will, on occasion, speak of philosophy as merely one of the condiments or accessories to the spiritual feast of life,² this is very far from being his true and serious estimate of its value. With Clement philosophy is so essential an element in true religion, that he will apply the term without hesitation to the teaching of the Old Testament and to Christianity itself. The one is "barbarian philosophy," and the barbarians were older than the Greeks. The other, the Gospel, is "the true philosophy," and the woman, child, or slave, who becomes a Christian, is potentially a philosopher, and, though far from perfect attainment, has at least come over into the light.³ They are on the way to the knowledge of God and of reality, and this was the common goal of Plato and the Saints.

So intimate in Clement's view is the connection between Philosophy and Religion. It is a common criticism to say that he does not really blend the two, but that he converts the Gospel into an intellectual system and attains a harmony by suppressing its distinctively religious elements. No doubt his interest lies more in knowledge and in vision than in feeling and in action, and every man will tend to interpret Christianity in terms of his predominant interest. It is not the less true that Clement had, in personal experience, found something in Christianity which he had never discovered in the philosophic schools, and that, with obvious pleasure and conviction, he delights to reconcile the two. He blends the Gospel with the best results of Hellenic wisdom, and it is as true to say that his philosophy is religious as it is that his religion is philosophic.⁴

¹ 786.² 824; *cp.* 377.³ 115, 563.

⁴ In this connection De Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, esp. pp. 265, 315 *sqq.*, seems to me to estimate Clement more fairly and correctly than Merk, *Clemens Alexandrinus in seiner Abhängigkeit von der griechischen Philosophie*.

Similar is his attitude towards the contrasted powers of Faith and Knowledge. What were for Clement the exact connotations of these terms, and how the one was related to the other, are points much discussed by his interpreters. His language is not always strictly consistent, and the problem is complicated by the fact that in each domain he recognises varieties and degrees. Without repeating what has been said in a previous chapter,¹ it may be observed that Clement does not usually employ the term faith in the sense of an "unreserved self-committal" of our whole nature unto the care and power of God. As an act or experience of the religious life he is quite familiar with such a process: trust in the divine power is the very groundwork of his thoughts and confidence; but he does not commonly denominate this as "Faith." Though it is the mother of the virtues,² and involves the will, and is the way to salvation, and is possible for the unlearned, Faith is also not unfrequently a more narrowly defined activity, being identified in many cases with the mind's initial assent to the appeal of religion. It is thus the response on man's part to revelation on God's.³ Or, in a figure, it is the key that unlocks the gateways of the realm of vision.⁴ Thus it is never properly the final stage of the religious life, or, at most, it is only so for those whose inward or external limitations prevent their full spiritual development. It must lead on to experience, to the exercise of demonstration, above all, to search and quest.⁵ For Faith must seek, and so in its higher and more advanced stages it issues in discovery and knowledge and certitude of apprehension, and thus passes at last into that fullest phase of vision, in which our whole spiritual and intellectual nature closes in unbroken intimacy with the supreme reality which is its object. Faith

¹ See *supra*, pp. 75 *sqq.*

² 441.

³ 442.

⁴ 9-10.

⁵ 72, 327, 650.

and Knowledge in this way involve one another.¹ Alike in the earliest and in the final stages of the process, proof and reasoning are out of place. Supposition, as it blends with Reason and with Knowledge, loses its isolated, unrelated character. The foundations of Faith and the superstructure of Knowledge are seen to be one harmonious fabric.² The assent, which originally involved venture and effort, becomes a welcome and necessary certainty, and so experience is unified, and the soul finds rest and peace. Clement did not have it in his power to say the last word on this deep subject. But the outlines of his thought are sufficiently clear for us to realise how perfect is the eventual concord, which he discerns between Faith and Knowledge. To appreciate the beauty of this reconciliation at its true worth, we must remember that Gnosticism and the simple Orthodoxy of the Church were alike proclaiming at the time its entire impossibility.

Hardly less pronounced is his determination to admit no severance between Thought and Action. The Gnostic, as we have seen, is no academic theorist, but one in whom outward conduct accords perfectly with the inner life: *οἶος ὁ λόγος τοῖος ὁ βίος* is a favourite maxim.³ In the preparatory stages of the Christian life the good foundation is laid alike by right conduct and by right instruction; and when the perfection of our salvation comes in view, there are still the two ways, which are not two in reality, the way of deeds and the way of knowledge.⁴ For right action is for man in this present life inseparably linked with advanced knowledge; deeds follow knowledge, as its shadow follows the body; illumination must never be dissociated from obedience, nor the martyr's testimony in word lack the corroboration of his life.⁵ We may remember that among

¹ 436.² 660, 683.³ 531, 893.⁴ 318, 581.

⁵ 454, 531, 570, 882. Plotinus, too, called action *σκιὰ θεωρίας καὶ λόγου*, but with a different implication. *Enn.*, iii. 8, 4; Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, 96 [ed. 1912].

the characteristics of the Christian Gnostic are his liberality, his habit of doing good, his prayer for others, above all, his ready delight in the teacher's ministry. The measure of stress which is laid throughout upon active beneficence, as the complement of spiritual insight and interior attainment, is really noteworthy and forms a protest, all the more striking because it proceeds from a centre of libraries and lecture-rooms, against every severance of knowledge from active service. It is like Saint John's teaching that he who wills to do shall know ; like Saint Paul's refusal to praise "all knowledge" where charity is wanting. It was no doubt a cause of this happy association of thought with action, of words with deeds, that Clement in his own personal life had combined the two. Once again we are reminded of the correspondence, so often discernible, between his abundant teaching and our scanty acquaintance with his history. And it is a consequence of this same association that, in spite of all he says about the transcendent remoteness and isolation of God, he can still not infrequently remind us of the active benevolence of Deity. "For, being good, if He were ever to cease doing good, He would cease also to be God, a thing one should not even say."¹

There is another element in Clement's piety, difficult to define, but of recognised importance, in virtue of which he has close affinities with the Mystics, though he never belongs wholly and properly to their company. The attempt to locate him with any precision in this connection gives rise at once to a number of problems, on which there is little unanimity among his interpreters. How much did he borrow from the Hellenic Mysteries, whose vogue was so increasingly considerable in his time ? What was the true nature of his relationship to Neoplatonism ? At what point does he separate himself from other teachers, of whose title

¹ 813.

to be Mystics proper there has never been any doubt? All these inquiries confront us, when we attempt to estimate this element in his teaching. Perhaps elaborate and thorough discussions of the subject would not carry us much further than Bigg's conclusion that, "though the father of all the Mystics, he is no Mystic himself," never entering "the enchanted garden which he opened for others."¹ We may indicate briefly what constitutes his affinity with Mysticism; also what ultimately marks his deviation from a school or tendency with which he has so much in common.

It is probably in terminology that his indebtedness first strikes the reader. Alike in reference to rites and to doctrine, his use of the language of the Mysteries is constant.² He is familiar with the three great stages of the Mystic life, Purification, Initiation, Vision; and these terms are frequently employed in reference to Christianity. He thinks of the Divine Word as the true "Mystagogue," quite as readily as under the other figure of the great High Priest. And if his indebtedness to Neoplatonism is far less clear than his obligation to the Mysteries of Eleusis, this by no means rules out all relationship between the Christian father and the fellowship of Plotinus. It only means that the connection was not one of direct appropriation, in particular that, on chronological grounds, Clement can hardly have reckoned Ammonius Saccas among his teachers.³ But there can be very little doubt that the tendencies, which afterwards resulted in Neoplatonism, were actively at work in Clement's mind. They never take him so far as Ecstasy. They never lead him to open depreciation of understanding and intelligence. But there is a certain tinge of emotion in Clement's highest stages of spiritual vision. Something which is not

¹ *Christian Platonists*, 98.

² See the list of terms in Hort and Mayor, lv., lvi.; *cp. supra*, pp. 157 *sqq.*

³ Merk, *op. cit.*, 35, n.

the dry light of reason enters in. He draws near to a country, into which he does not venture, where thought, after finally suppressing the desires and the senses, seems to become that passionate consciousness of union with its Object, in which feeling reasserts its claim. So far is Clement led by the forces which create the mystic nature. He is conscious of the spirit's trend to that which lies beyond. He discerns inner meanings and values, delights in allegory and symbols. He will write at times of the Beatific Vision with a glow of genuine emotion. To behold the face of God is, for him, the equivalent of absolute tranquillity and entire content. The inward things with him are ever the highest and the really precious. Does not all this once and finally make good his title to the Mystic's name?

So far, yet not completely. For, though it is probably true that the religious element is stronger and more determinative in Clement's nature than the intellectual, and that more ties of affinity unite him with the Mystics than with the Rationalists, still he carries over his intellect into his religion, his reason into the visions of his soul, in a manner which is alien to the true mystic disposition. No doubt it is as difficult to define Mysticism as it is to define Gnosticism, and Clement's relative position must depend upon where we locate or discover the central spiritual factors of the mystic nature. Sometimes it is spoken of as including "all believers in whom the emotional element predominates largely over the intellectual."¹ Sometimes its interpreters are led to dwell upon "the hopelessly irrational character of all great religions," and on the doom of the true intellectualist, who "is obliged in the end to adopt some form of sceptical philosophy."²

¹ Bigg, *op. cit.*, 99, n.

² Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*, pp. 17, 20. See, too, the various definitions of Mysticism collected in Inge, *op. cit.*, Appendix A.

Now such statements, and much more of the language which is current in the literature of the school, take us into an atmosphere which would have been alien and disquieting to Clement's spirit. It would never have been natural to him for his soul "to divest herself of all form,"¹ or to employ habitually such a symbol as that of the soul's "mystical marriage," so characteristic as it is of the distinctive experience of this interior life. So far as we know, experience had never led Clement through the "Dark Night of the Soul," and his even temperament would have been steadily averse to those alternations of mood which are implied in the well-known maxim, "gyrans gyrando vadit spiritus." To the last he is the true Hellene, loving form and sanity and balance and control. Reason he knows, but not rapture; he will possess his soul and understand it, but he will not let it go.² And though the range of his outlook takes his thoughts to those far confines of the world of experience, where logic and definitions seem to fail, and the realities to be too great for human measurement, this is still with Clement always a goal and a prospect, rather than a phase of personal history. Hating vagueness, and therefore accepting or loving limitations; never quite trusting the soul without the mind; at heart a man of Athens, even when Oriental tendencies were most operative in his environment, he thus stops short of that line of demarcation which separates, in so far as such separation may or must be drawn, the typically mystic temperament from that of the religious philosopher, who finds the goal of the spirit's achievement in the conscious knowledge of Reality and God. How intimately these two elements may fuse and be united, no one who has understood the Fourth Gospel is

¹ Quoted by Inge, *op. cit.*, 97.

² This is generally true, in spite of *εἰ ἐπιρρίψαμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, 689.

ever likely to forget. Clement, who owes so much to the Fourth Gospel, reflects its synthesis and combination. The things of the spirit stand first, yet the mind and the reason retain their own.

We pass to a different aspect of Clement's piety when we come to consider how he reconciles the divine and the human activities. In some fashion every teacher in the domain of things spiritual must deal with this fundamental problem, which underlies the familiar contrasts of Grace and Works, Providence and Freedom, the Cosmic Order and the Individual Life, God's Sovereignty and the Responsibility of Man. Clement was familiar with both terms of this antithesis, partly by his philosophical training, in which he had learned both the self-sufficiency of the sage and the universality of the providential order; partly, too, by his acquaintance with Christianity and the Scriptures, where the duty of initiative and the sense of dependence are so closely intertwined. He had not thought out all the questions that are involved, and he hardly felt the full stress of the problem of moral evil, but he succeeded in combining a genuinely high estimate of human nature with a very clear recognition of the universality of the divine order. That he never pressed the two to the point of incompatibility may stand as a charge against his logic, but not surely against his piety.

For man, as Clement thinks of him, is "a heavenly plant."¹ He is lovable on his own account, the fairest element in all the range of divine workmanship, a being naturally dear to God.² "By nature man is a lofty and majestic creature, bent on attaining excellence, as being the workmanship of the only God."³ Though he is not born virtuous, he is born to become so; and though essential kinship of nature between man and God is explicitly denied, this is only said to save the formal principle of the incom-

¹ 22, 80.

² 101-2, 135.

³ 276.

municable character of absolute Deity.¹ We remember how the advanced Gnostic is "a god while moving in the flesh."² This he holds true of man at his best. Like many other philosophers he means by humanity idealised humanity, that which man in the perfection of all his faculties would become, or that which he had become once in the single instance of the Lord.³ Fundamentally, in his estimate of human nature, Clement is an aristocrat. His standard of measurement is the highest and the best, and here lies the secret and the reconciliation of his wide sympathies and of his intolerance of the crowd. Sometimes there seems no limit to his generous comprehensiveness. All manner of persons are made welcome in his Church. Old barriers seem to have vanished. Salvation is for all alike. The slave and the retail trader and the simple believer have their place equally with the wise and the learned. The doctrine of Christian fraternity, and God's choice of the weak things of this world, seem taught here to the full.

But elsewhere he writes in such a different tone. He has no real trust of the multitude. They need the wholesome discipline of fear and the Law. The quality of their faith is lax and unreliable. Their mood is fickle and variable as the weather. A wise man will never try to please them, and to set before them the esoteric teaching of Christianity is to invite ridicule and to cast pearls before swine.⁴ This philosopher's impatience of the unlearned does not harmonise at first sight with the Christian love of the brotherhood, but perhaps there is no fundamental contradiction. Clement has placed absolutely beyond doubt his wide range of sympathy, his willingness to love and serve and welcome every brother and sister in the Lord. But no less clear is his determination to refuse to see the final growth of human character and knowledge in the average Christian as he knew him.

¹ 467-8, 788.² 894.³ 156.⁴ 144, 341, 348, 566, 753, 789.

This brother's title to admission and to welcome confers on him no right to bind the ideal and to restrict the type. And so Clement's mind moves far beyond the average and normal standard of the mixed multitude, with whom he was associated in the common Name, and with all his generosity he insists on the highest. The fullest knowledge, the clearest purity of nature, the most entire alienation from lower interests, the most perfect resemblance to God—this is what he understands by Man : this is that "perfect man" of the Apostle, towards which all character must slowly develop, till the finality of completion is attained. Perhaps it was a philosopher's ideal, but that is only an adverse criticism for those who are prepared to say Clement was wrong in his fusion of religion and philosophy.

It is in accordance with this high view of human achievement that Clement insists so frequently on the Freedom of the Will. Choice is a gift,¹ and, though a bad man might well deem it a blessing to be rid of so dangerous a prerogative, it remains an inalienable possession, for otherwise praise and blame could have no meaning.² For men, after all, are not mechanical puppets ; they know the alternatives, and each, individually, is responsible for his choice.³ We may choose or reject the good life.⁴ The acquirement of knowledge lies in our own power.⁵ Our use of our possessions depends upon our will.⁶ On the one hand alienation from God, on the other all attainable excellence, are contingent upon our decisions.⁷ Even the plea of delusion will not hold, for belief in a lie may be voluntary, and the mind's assent, as well as purposed action, are said to be within the area of choice.⁸ "It is God's will that our salvation should be from ourselves ;"⁹ this is a fundamental principle with Clement.

¹ 994.² 368, 481.³ 207, 434.⁴ 149.⁵ 468.⁶ 943.⁷ 605, 620, 940.⁸ 437-8, 458.⁹ 601, 788.

In this sense he is fond of quoting the Platonic maxim, *αἰτία ἐλομένου θεὸς ἀναίτιος*. Virtue for him, it is often said, consists in knowledge, as it did for Socrates. But sometimes he will so far depart from the traditional Greek view as to push back the source of human virtue behind the intelligence to the will, and knowledge is said to depend on choice rather than choice on knowledge. "A fixed decision has great effect upon our knowledge."¹ "In all matters the will takes the lead. For the reasoning powers are by nature the ministers of the will."² It can hardly be said that he has fully thought out the relationship between the cognitive and the initiative faculties in man's nature. Philosophy influences him more in his treatment than the Scriptures, and his philosophy was so eclectic that a certain inconsistency not unnaturally resulted. But in any case he will have no determinism. Whether such teaching comes from the materialist or from the Gnostic, it is equally intolerable. The power of choice must be as jealously defended as even the greatest of the Christian virtues, love.³ Characteristically, Clement does not recognise any risks or drawbacks in making these wide claims for human freedom.

Side by side with all this discussion of the idealised possibilities of man's nature and of his liberty to achieve the highest if he will, there runs through all Clement's teaching a different and complementary strain. Not less insistent than his assertion of man's freedom is his doctrine of God's Providence. Here Saint Paul, Philo, and the Stoics are alike with him. Few offences in his eyes are so serious as to question this cardinal religious truth. Newman once said that Providence and the Future Life were the two religious doctrines in which the average Englishman really

¹ 433.² 469.³ *μόνον τὸ προαιρετικὸν καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην σφίζωμεν*, 623.

believed. And of the former of these it might have been said with equal truth, that it was normally held by all serious and educated persons in the Græco-Roman world of Clement's day. It was the crowning scandal of the Epicureans that they denied Providence, and they were a marked community. Lucian knew that this charge was a most serious and dangerous accusation.¹ Clement himself thinks of it as requiring punishment rather than argument.²

This theory, on which the philosophic schools had, with the one notorious exception, attained so entire a unanimity, harmonised exactly with Clement's conception of the office of the Logos, and also with the more distinctively Christian doctrine of the love and care of God. Church and World had here a point of agreement. All good things, "whether they belong to the Hellenes or to us,"³ might with confidence be referred to this source. Many of Clement's observations on this subject are extremely interesting. Providence has its origin with God, who rules his world, and with it his goodness stands or falls.⁴ But it operates in a gradually descending series of secondary causes, till it finally determines the most immediate and particular events. There is no least fragment of the world's order which escapes its influence.⁵ It is as pervasive, he says, in a figure which sounds quaint to modern ears, as the ointment on Aaron's beard.⁶ The individual life, the life of the community, the movement of the universe, are all alike determined by its action.⁷ Even chance and contingency are not outside its range.⁸ It is good and it is sovereign.⁹ It is just another aspect of the control of all cosmic process by the Word.

There is interest, too, in his assertion that Providence overrules even wrong deeds to good ends.¹⁰ He gives a

¹ E.g. *Calumniæ non temere credendum*, 14: *Juppiter Tragædus*, 4, 17.

² 646.

³ 331.

⁴ 602.

⁵ 833.

⁶ 820.

⁷ 831-2.

⁸ 373.

⁹ 423.

¹⁰ 367.

glance in such statements at the difficulty of reconciling *all* facts with the theory of a universally beneficent order. "If God cares for you," people asked him, "why are you persecuted and put to death?" but, for the most part, without probing the riddle too deeply, he is content to discern one of the greatest achievements of the divine Providence in the admitted fact that out of evil, out of bodily disease and base actions, some good and useful end may triumphantly be brought.¹ And in another passage, too, there is a reflection worth our notice, when he remarks that it is through the lives of gifted men, great as leaders, great as teachers, that the activity of Providence has its most signal demonstration.² Often, too, Clement will give to these philosophical conceptions a more definitely religious tone, and in place of the abstract idea of a regulative order we hear of the philanthropy of God, of the Father's love for his children, of the unceasing care of the Saviour and Physician of humanity, of the Good Shepherd, of the loving Father, whose saving activity never stays.³ There is hardly any part of his creed in which he found more genuine and unqualified delight.

This recognition of divine goodness as ordering all things well, is one cause of Clement's optimism: side by side with it we must rate his singularly happy disposition as another. Few men of thought have had so serene an outlook upon the world; few have been so happily untroubled by its contrasts and its discords; few have known so little of the *amari aliquid*, which in general vexes the man of "many books" more than the man of action. But Clement possessed the secret of "rejoicing in the Lord," and neither critics nor heretics nor persecutors seem ever to have robbed him of it. Existence he definitely held to be a blessing.⁴ Being was better than not being.⁵ Greek poets might speak as they would on

¹ 369.² 822.³ 75.⁴ 532.⁵ 819.

the sadness of life, but they never convinced him ;¹ and when he once remarks that man cannot fundamentally be of "one substance" with God, so evident is the confusion and evil of our life, the words strike the reader at once as exceptional, and at variance with Clement's general tone.²

He will have no dualism :³ it is a good world, God's and not the Devil's. Creation is the outcome of goodness.⁴ "Existence, Nature, Angels, Powers, Souls, Law, Gospel, Gnosis," are all parts of one good scheme, depending on "Genesis," without which the Cosmos could not hold together.⁵ If there is suffering, goodness triumphs over it.⁶ If flesh and spirit are in conflict, it is "a useful conflict."⁷ If death comes, it is not really an evil.⁸ How can the Word be Lord and Saviour, unless He is Lord and Saviour of all ?⁹ All the constant process of change, which we see in "seasons, crops, and elements," is an onward movement towards the better state and, under the power which administers all things well, the cosmic order, from the Christian standpoint of interpretation, is an unceasing, undeviating advance.¹⁰ He is not wholly a stranger to the toil and struggle of existence, but he could have felt as confident as our modern poet that it was never aimless, always "co-operant to an end."

This general and pervading optimism expresses itself in particular opinions, which were at least his own even if they were not original. His attitude towards Nature, his view of the world unseen, his theory of punishment, his serene disregard of the darker elements of human experience, are all phases of this enviable temperament. One by one we may briefly consider them.

It can hardly be said that "Nature," in the modern

¹ 516 sqq.² 467-8.³ 526, 993 ; *cp.* Chap. xiii. *supra*.⁴ θεός . . . ἀγαθός ἦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ δημιουργός, 150.⁶ 559.⁶ 587.⁷ 591.⁸ 568.⁹ 833.¹⁰ 554, 640, 819-20, 993.

sense of the term, is a prominent subject in Clement's pages. His world is one of books and cities, rather than the forest and the field. Moreover, his interest, whenever he displays it, is more akin to the scientific than to the poetic or religious view. Still, his occasional references are interesting, and when he speaks of the mount of salvation, of the sea of blessings, of the many streams which flow into the river of truth; or, again, when he refers to hunting or fishing or to a country estate or to a close-grown thicket or to a trim garden,¹ his language shows him not to be wholly devoid of that "feeling for Nature," which belongs so much more to modern than to ancient times. Sometimes, it is clear, the conscious admiration of Creation, or of some element within it, would lay hold of his spirit. He would be lifted up by the contemplation of the stars.² The beauty of flowers would prompt his praise of the Creator.³ The song of the birds in spring-time had not fallen upon his ears unheeded.⁴ The joyous life of all young creatures gave him special delight;⁵ and, in happy ignorance of the privations which result from the struggle for existence, he speaks of the unfailing supply of food for the wants of all God's creatures.⁶ He knew that grey hairs had their beauty.⁷ Also he had pondered, with Ecclesiastes, on the way "in which the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child."⁸ The sea and the welcome safety of a great harbour are specially well known to him. Perhaps he did not wholly discredit the theory that the rage of demons or bad angels brought the hailstorm and the tempest.⁹ But this, in any case, was an exception, for, in general, it was all good; the Orphic poems which saw God in all nature were right;¹⁰ the Lord rejoiced in His handiwork, and man could accept this "fair world" with wonder,

¹ 3, 86, 331, 736, etc.² 780.³ 211.⁴ 221.⁵ 105 *sqq.*⁶ 173.⁷ 263.⁸ 225.⁹ 754.¹⁰ 724.

reverence, and thanksgiving.¹ So there is no critical eye for discords, conflicts, difficulties. They do not trouble Clement, as they troubled Origen. If he notices them at all, they are accepted without anxiety, as the diverse notes which make up the ultimate concord.² The whole creation does not "groan and travail" as it did for Saint Paul; nor did Nature "lend him evil dreams," as she has done to so many modern souls. It is God's world and very good. His optimism, if somewhat superficial, is characteristic and sincere.

Moreover, it is far reaching, and extends beyond the present order. His references to the world beyond and to the last things are not very numerous, and possibly they are not always very consistent; certainly they came from various origins. They are usually hopeful, rarely sombre. Like the Apologists, Clement held the theory of conditional immortality.³ The soul is not naturally immortal.⁴ This is a gift, promised on certain conditions, dependent on the right use of our opportunities and on our advance in Gnosis, identical, in other words, with our participation in the eternal life of God.⁵ Death from the Christian standpoint is thus only a change and a new beginning: the "robe of immortality" is assumed, and the soul, which has here no proper country, is formally enrolled in its abiding polity.⁶ But this is only for those who have attained. Immortality is an acquired privilege, an object towards which man may direct his aim and will.

Now Clement has nowhere worked out in detail the future

¹ 431. δ καλὸς κόσμος, 839; *cp.* 631.

² 581. ³ Harnack, *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 213-4.

⁴ "Hinc apparet quoniam non est naturaliter anima incorruptibilis," Frag., Stählin, iii. 203. For an early anticipation of the doctrine, also from an Alexandrian source, *cp.* the epigram of Callimachus ending *θνήσκειν μὴ λέγει τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς*. Mackail, *Select Epigrams*, iii., 67.

⁵ 423, 575, 953.

⁶ 117, 278, 450, 583, 599, 774.

of the soul that does not attain. Judgment and future punishment are part of his eschatology, but he knows nothing of an eternity of pain. Explicitly he never teaches annihilation, but he could not consistently reject it; for something of the kind would be involved, if his scheme were set out as a complete theory. Thus, negatively, his conditional view of eternal life helped his optimism. The sombre shadows of the *Dies irae* do not fall upon his pages, and no thought of the suffering of the lost spoils the unruffled bliss of those who see God face to face. He has no Judas or Ardiæus upon his hands, for whom to find a fit and permanent habitation. And though he knows that eternal life is the one thing worth winning and the one thing which it is disastrous to lose, at least he is saved by his theory from the task of reconciling an eternal penalty with absolute Goodness. This is his eschatological optimism on his negative side. Positively also his teaching is wide and hopeful, though it is never lax or sentimental. The process of salvation goes on, as he believes, both in time and beyond it.¹ It cannot, therefore, be limited by any historic event, not even by the Incarnation, for the Gospel must be universal.² This brings him to the common topic of the Lord and His Apostles preaching to the Departed in Hades.

This curious article of early belief is used by Clement for a very noble purpose. He will admit no favouritism in the divine order. Hence, if some souls did not have their chance of salvation on earth, they must have it elsewhere. The dispensation in the other world is the same as here. Man is "in God's universe," even when he is "in another place." "For," he says, with a touch of indignation, as he vindicates the utter impartiality of God, "it would have been an act of no ordinary unfairness for those who departed hence before the coming of the Lord, but

¹ πάντως σφίξει τινὰς ἐν τε τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν τε τῷ αἰῶνι, 332.

² 763.

who had never heard the Gospel, nor of themselves incurred responsibility by their faith or their unbelief, to share either salvation or punishment. It could not surely be right for these to be condemned without trial and only those who lived after the Advent to share the divine justice.”¹ So God is fair in another world, as in this one, and our destiny accords with our deserts. He speaks sometimes of the ministries of departed souls, sometimes of their varied resting-places.² The thought of “many mansions” is congenial to him, for there are stages and degrees in glory, one advance after another, till we grow at last “unto the perfect man.” Thus the varied ranks and services of the Church on earth are really a reflection of corresponding grades and offices in heaven, where there are different “mansions,” proportionate to the deserts of the believer. So clearly does he teach the great hope of spiritual progress in another world. He would have no narrowing down of the soul’s capacity to the level and limits of experience here. “We are no judges of our future destiny and attainments.”³ In this confidence a good man might “bless God for his departure,”⁴ and as for human errors and frailties, it must have been from Clement that his great pupil learned the bold conviction, that God had not done with Pharaoh when He drowned him.⁵

Closely connected with this doctrine of the future is Clement’s theory of Punishment, which is generally recognised as Platonic rather than Scriptural.⁶ The main principle is that all punishment is a form of education. If we suffer, it is for our gain. As the general has a good end in maintaining discipline, and the doctor a similar purpose in employing severe remedies, so it is with the divine “School-

¹ 765.² 755, 794-8.³ τίνων τευξάμεθα καὶ τί ἐσόμεθα, οὐχ ἡμεῖς κριταί, Dindorf, iii. 506.⁴ 640.⁵ *De Principiis*, III., i. 14.⁶ *Cp.* esp. 138.

master." Reproof, fear, correction, the most impartial justice, all secure the good of those on whom they are imposed. Thus, in reality, there was no harshness in the Law. Even the Flood was a salutary training, and the yoke of the Lord a kindly yoke, borne with good results, as He "drives each of us to our salvation."¹ There is no different character in the punishments of the future state. God's penalties are "salutary and educative" even there, and the souls that have been blind to his goodness on earth learn, even against their will, to acknowledge Him hereafter.² Once, indeed, he speaks of fruitless repentance and requital in another state, but even in this passage he adds a reference to the knowledge that comes by pain: *παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω*.³ Thus the primary and essential character of punishment is remedial, instructive, purificatory. It has secondary aims, such as the warning that comes by example, and the protection of society from evil-doers, but its true nature is only understood when we regard it as an element in the divine education of the world. Even Judgment has no more important end.⁴

Let us observe how much this theory rejects, or at least ignores. Clement deliberately excludes everything of the nature of revenge from the Divine Nature. God takes no vengeance, for vengeance is a repayment of evil.⁵ Nor has Clement any scheme of abstract justice, with its demand of legal equivalents as between the offender and the offended Judge. The Church would have been saved much forensic and unprofitable discussion in her doctrine of the Atonement, had she kept the Alexandrine strain of teaching more constantly in her mind. There is a very wide gap between Clement's theory of divine government and the conception which underlies Michel Angelo's great picture in the Sistine Chapel. And yet with all his optimism the earlier

¹ 495, 766. ² 763-4, 879. ³ 74. ⁴ 634, 999. ⁵ 140, 895.

master is never careless or easy in his standards, never leads us to think that the Ten Commandments do not matter, never allows his favourite principle of "accommodation" to blur spiritual distinctions, or to qualify the exacting rule that only by purity of heart is the vision of God attained.

We may dismiss his theory of punishment with one further illustration. From time to time he refers to Fire as a reforming agency, and the different references are well worth notice. Once, in connection with a passage of prophecy, he mentions incidentally the fiery destruction in store for those who refuse salvation.¹ Elsewhere he connects the discipline of fire with the general theory of future punishment, and says poets and philosophers derived their teaching on this point "from the barbarian philosophy."² The Stoic theory of fire as the productive force in nature is familiar to him ;³ so, of course, is the Scriptural use of the term as an emblem of the name of God. But there are more important references, notably two. In one he writes, "We say that fire purifies not the flesh of the victim but sinful souls, meaning by fire not the vulgar and devouring fire but the discerning flame, which penetrates the soul that passes through the fire."⁴ In the *Eclogæ*⁵ he writes similarly : "Fire is conceived as a good and mighty force, destroying the worse and preserving the better elements. Consequently this fire is called 'discerning' by the Prophets." In the same passage, referring to the Lord's saying that He had come to cast fire on the earth, he observes that fire is "evidently a force which purifies the saints, and, as our

¹ 73-4.

² 701. The fiery rivers of the nether world are among the *κολαστήρια εἰς παιδείαν*.

³ 708.

⁴ 851. See the valuable note of Hort and Mayor *in loc.* The remedial or preventive discipline of this *φρὴνιμον πῦρ* is also mentioned, 280.

⁵ 995-6.

opponents say, destroys, as we say, educates, the 'hylic' or material natures." In other words, fire purifies and preserves all that can so be dealt with. If the chaff is consumed, this is but a normal part of the process.¹ It is a sane and reasonable view of God's remedial methods of discipline, blending wholesome severity with the wider hope.

Matthew Arnold says of Wordsworth that his—

"eyes avert their ken
From half of human fate,"

the implication being that the sweet calm of his serenity would have been otherwise impossible. Perhaps Clement's optimism must also lie open to the charge that he "averts his eyes" from a good many of the darker realities of the world. He never, for example, discusses the Fall; and the divine scheme, as he sometimes describes it, seems so continuous that it is difficult to find place for any interruption in the sequence.² We have had occasion to remark previously that Clement never really faced Marcion's problem, and that he seems unconscious of the cruel side of Nature. Sin, too, as he thought of it, is a negative rather than a positive evil, a hindrance and a failure rather than a spiritual tragedy. And he can hardly be said to have realised all the gravity of the world's contradictions. They are mentioned as a topic familiar to the philosophers and to Marcion's followers,³ but his own discussion of them, like that of many other awkward problems, is "deferred till we undertake the treatment of first principles." He knew there were various theories as to how the tares came to be sown among the wheat, and that matter, ignorance, and irrational forces, had all been assigned as the real origin of Evil.⁴ But a glance and a reference to these problems is enough. They never trouble or arrest him. Without doubts,

¹ 148.

² *E.g.* 156.

³ 520.

⁴ 526, 837.

without antagonisms, without too keen a penetration, without any of the weariness that comes upon intellectualism when divorced from the affections and the soul, he retains throughout his dominant note of faith and hope and gladness, and, if his philosophy has not explained all things that are in heaven and earth, it has at least left us a memorable example of Christian serenity and high trust in goodness, knowledge, and the power of love.

How great in his own spirit's life was Clement's debt to Christianity, how seriously he is misunderstood by all who ignore the religious element in his pages, is apparent when we compare him in point of tone and outlook with some of his well-known contemporaries. Two comparisons of this nature may be suggested.

Marcus Aurelius died about the time of Clement's arrival in Alexandria. He must have been the older man by about thirty years, though it is probable that a much shorter interval separated the composition of the Emperor's *Meditations* from the period of Clement's literary activity. In any case they both belong to the latter half of the second century, and, when all allowance is made for the difference of their positions and their surroundings, the two men retain much in common. Both have revealed their own natures and convictions with singular frankness in documents which survive. Both were greatly indebted to the philosophic teachers of their younger days and have freely acknowledged their obligations. Both derived some of their most fundamental ideas from the later Stoicism. Both, under this guidance, had come to hold *ex animo* the belief in Providence and Nature, the supreme value of the inner life, the ascetic doctrine of detachment from the world. Both spent their most important years in great cities, the one in the imperial capital, the other in its only possible alternative, and both disliked their crowds, their excitement,

and their noise. Both, philosopher-like, distrusted the judgment of the multitude. Both men loved little children, could admire old age, and had felt the spell of the starry heavens' majesty. Both were by nature religious, disinterested, sincere. Both, in theory at least, maintained throughout a faith in the unity and the goodness of the world.

With so much in common the pages of the two writers may well afford us, when comparatively estimated, some clue as to the "differentia" of the Christian standpoint. It is true that to some extent divergence may arise from other sources. We must not forget that Marcus was a Roman, Clement to the core a Greek; nor that the Emperor wrote under the burden of heavy responsibilities and failing health, while the Christian philosopher put together his voluminous memoirs in the quiet of a library. Still, in the main, what the *Stromateis* possess and the *Meditations* lack, will largely coincide with the elements which Christianity had the power to add to Stoicism, Religion to Philosophy.

Most commonly the distinctive feature of the Gospel is seen in the Cross of Christ. "The old Gnostics called the Cross 'Horos,' the Boundary or Dividing Line. The Gnostics were a curious people, but they were right here."¹ But this would hardly have held good for our present comparison. The "Cross" is not prominent in Clement's teaching, and perhaps his teaching suffers because of this. On the other hand, few men have taken up their cross daily and borne it with greater devotion than the Imperial philosopher, even though he did not consciously bear it after Jesus or call it by any name. Thus the distinctive feature of Christianity, as between Marcus and Clement, did not lie here. But we do find in Clement's pages a sense of the love of God, and a hope for the future, which in degree at any rate go far beyond the thoughts or faith of Marcus.

¹ Bigg, *The Church's Task*, xv.

It is true that for the Emperor, Providence rules, Nature knows no evil, the Gods have charity even for the bad and stupid, and, if they have counsel for the individual life, they take counsel well, for "a god of ill counsel one can scarce imagine."¹ The order is good. The welfare of the world-city is secure, and what is good for the city must be good for the citizen.² But this universal mind and order is strangely remote from the needs of the individual soul. There is little of what the Christian understands by fellowship and communion, in spite of the all-pervading immanence of the divine reason and in spite of the bidding to "live with the gods." Will his soul ever attain to the peace of divine fellowship, asks the Emperor in one of the later books.³ There lacks the personal element in his divinity :

"It shall be

A Face like my face that receives thee ; a Man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever"—

we miss that note. There is hardly more love and care for the individual in the splendid order of the Stoic Cosmos than there is in modern Science. Contrast all this with Clement's chapters on the office of the *Pædagogus*, or with the divine appeals made to humanity in the *Protrepticus* and the *Quis Dives Salvetur*, or with the Gnostic's relations to God, as the seventh book of the *Stromateis* portrays them. Something has been added by religion, and it is the belief in God as personal—personal, not in the sense that He is limited by the infirmities inherent in human personality, but that He is capable of entering into personal relations with the individual human soul.⁴ Therein does the Christian love of God differ from the fair, beneficent, but

¹ *Meditations*, ii. 3 ; ii. 17 ; vi. 44 ; ix. 11.

² *Ib.*, v. 22 ; x. 33.

³ x. 1.

⁴ On this point see C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, chap. viii.

irresponsive cosmic order, faith in which, as Renan said,¹ "may fortify, but cannot console."

So with the Future Life. With Marcus, at best, it is an open question. The wider hope is far stronger in the *Phædo* than in the *Meditations*, and the Mysteries of Eleusis do not seem to have left any permanent conviction on the mind of their imperial visitor. Throughout the Emperor's pages comes the constant reference to the two possibilities. At the end of life's voyage we step out, for another life perhaps, if not, all consciousness is at end.² Serenely we are to await our end, be it extinction or transmutation.³ Perhaps the soul is reabsorbed into the seminal reason.⁴ Quite towards the close of the *Meditations*, probably towards the close of the Emperor's own life, he raises the question, "Why do not the good renew their being?" He can only answer, that if they do not, it must so be best.⁵ The sentiment is that of Huxley's epitaph :

"And if an endless sleep He wills, so best."

So there is no clear outlook of hope, only the undiscovered country. "Serenely greet the journey's end, as an olive falls when it is ripe."⁶ It was thus that old Job expected to be gathered to his fathers, "Like as a shock of corn cometh in in his season," but that was in the days before deeper and sadder experience had shown him the inadequacy of this creed. And with Marcus, too, the creed is inadequate. We feel the strain and the effort, the painful resolve to believe that all is well in either case, the deeper trouble that underlies the serenity, which, without insincerity, is still professed and taught rather than attained. Contrast Clement's standpoint, with Death but a transition, and the Hereafter a great assurance, and many stages of progress

¹ *Marc-Aurèle*, 271.

³ *Ib.*, v. 33.

⁶ *Ib.*, iv. 48 ; *cp.* Job v. 26 ; xxix. 18.

² *Meditations*, iii. 3.

⁵ *Ib.*, xii. 5.

⁴ *Ib.*, iv. 14.

awaiting the departed soul. Contrast his confident expectation, with all the crude materialism of the Chiliasts refined away, of spiritual development and fuller Gnosis and at last the conscious and abiding rest in God. Truly the doctrine of the interior life, divorced from the doctrine of the future life, is scant support for the human spirit. There have been ages and natures for which it alone was possible. Such ages may come again ; such natures still exist. Let them read and re-read the *Meditations* ; it has been called the *De Imitatione* of Paganism, and it deserves the name. But no one who has understood the outlook of the imperial Stoic and compared it with that of the philosophic Christian doctor, will ever rate the belief in the world to come as a negligible addition to Philosophy ; or contemplate with equanimity a time in which the Christian religion should narrow down the range of its message to this present world, so marvellous, so varied, so beautiful, yet so incomplete, so disappointing, so inadequate to the spirit's claims.

From the constrained seriousness of the Emperor to the kindly cynicism of Lucian, the laughing sceptic of Samosata, his contemporary, is a considerable transition. Lucian's literary activity must have partially coincided with that of Clement ; the two men may have met either in Athens or, later, in Alexandria, for Lucian held a lucrative office in that city, and though he preferred to reside in Athens and discharge his duties mainly by deputy, there no doubt were occasions when his actual presence in the Egyptian capital was necessary. So the two, both men of letters, both lovers of books, both blessed with geniality and ease of temperament, may conceivably have known one another ; the contrast between their estimates of human life is instructive.

The Dialogue *Charon*, or *The Spectators*, may be taken as typical of Lucian's sceptical gaiety. It has all the charm

which, from Koheleth to Heine, so often graces the literature of pessimism, and a further element of humour which is the writer's own. Charon has obtained permission to leave his ferry and spend a day in this upper world, to learn what are its attractions and why his passengers are so greatly troubled at leaving it. He falls in with Hermes, whom with some difficulty he persuades to defer business, which he has in hand for Zeus, and to act as his guide. If they are to view the world in a day, it must be done from some exalted eminence, and Hermes hits upon the Homeric plan of piling the mountains, Pelion and Ossa, upon Olympus, and then, with Mount Cæta thrown in as an addition, crowning the whole erection with Parnassus. Charon, with some risk, for "safety and curiosity never go together," is assisted to the summit, and there, seated on the two peaks of the mountain and endowed with the power of distant vision, the grim Ferryman and his guide survey the ways of men. All the futility and vicissitudes of life are pointed out to Charon, as, in a kind of historic parable, Herodotus had long ago expressed them. We see Cyrus preparing to attack Sardis, Cræsus discoursing with Solon, the royal gifts to the oracle for its delusive utterances, Tomyris beheading Cyrus, and the madness of Cambyses. "ὦ πολλοῦ γέλωτος, cries Charon as the story ends; laughter and mockery are all the tale deserves. Then Polycrates of Samos, the typical tyrant with his typical reverse, comes in review; and after him all the varied occupations and unrest of life, with cities like hives of bees "in which each one has his own sting and stings his neighbours"; and over all, dim and hovering, the crowd of human hopes and fears and follies and pleasures and greed and rage and hate and all their like. Higher still, just discernible as Charon strains his eyes, are the Fates spinning off for each his slender thread of existence. Hermes dwells on the folly of life, its

efforts, its hopes cut short, its carelessness in prosperity, its whimpers in reverse, its wilful ignorance of its own insecurity, its ironies, as one eagerly builds his house and leaves it to his heir without taking a single meal under its roof, another rejoices in the birth of a son who dies ere he is seven years old, others dispute for property, others gather wealth, only to be summoned hence without time to enjoy their own. And Charon wonders what, indeed, is the attraction of such a life. Even kings have no security, and commoners fare worse. It seems that human life is just like the succession of bubbles on the surface of the water, some larger and longer lived than others, but broken every one at last. He would like to address to them a spectator's counsel: "O fools, why take these things so seriously? Cease your toils, you will not live for ever; nothing that we admire here is lasting; a man can take nothing away with him when he dies." So he would admonish them, but Hermes says that it would be useless; their ears are so stopped that we could not open them with a drill, and the few, who do know and see, live apart and laugh at the crowd, never popular and always glad to take leave of life. And the Dialogue closes with a panorama of elaborate tombs, and ruined cities, and fierce contests for territory, on the part of men who will scarce be allowed a foot's space by Æacus below.

The Greeks were a clever and often a happy people, and they were delightful even in their pessimism. But they could not meet all the needs of the human spirit, at any rate not in the second century. Lucian, the one man of his age who had the right to smile at the world's follies,¹ brings into relief by what he lacks some of the gains that were due to Christianity. Clement's conviction that even this life was worth while; his patience and tenderness with

¹ See Renan's estimate, *Marc-Aurèle*, 372-3.

much human weakness ; his sense of value in ordinary things such as farming, marriage, money, books ; his certainty that this world is not a jest and a game but a way leading somewhere, and a school where knowledge may be gained ; his own personal freedom from the disease of *tedium vite* ; his insistence that you could not estimate the value of the part without a knowledge of the whole ; and, above all, his assurance that at the heart of all things Love and Reality, not Laughter and Vanity, prevail, are missing elements in Lucian's brilliant and delightful pages. For Lucian was a pessimist with all his charm ; the Alexandrian master was an optimist, who in large measure owed his optimism to his creed.

Such are some of the aspects of Clement's many-sided piety. The modern reader who will take the trouble to penetrate behind his discursive prolixity, his literary indebtedness, his doctrinal peculiarities, until he comes into contact with the real spirit of the master, may gain much from such companionship. Clement had his mistakes and his limitations, but his religion had the great qualities of faith and hope and love. He believed in truth and knowledge. He had no theological bitterness. He welcomed all good things as he found them. He found joy in believing: He valued ideals. He sought light, truth, purity, service. He discerned and taught the breadth and variety of the ways of God. With such natures it is good to dwell.

CHAPTER XX

THEN AND NOW

WHOEVER desires to trace the development of Christian thought from the sub-apostolic age to the Council of Nicæa ; or to mark the various phases and tendencies of the Church's gradually formed organisation ; or, more particularly, to see how Christian men and women of various orders thought and felt in Alexandria towards the close of the second century, is not likely to undervalue what Clement has to offer. Previous chapters in this book have attempted to make more accessible his varied stores of information and to portray in some degree his life, his character, his relations to his own time. It remains to bring into clearer prominence a further question, of which hints and suggestions have already presented themselves to the reader. Apart from Clement's interest to the student of the past, has he any value for those who are confronted by the claims and problems of to-day ? Thucydides wrote his history and believed that it might prove "an eternal possession," because he expected events, like or parallel to those he was about to narrate, would surely occur again.¹ If he did not regard the course of this world exactly as a cycle, at least he held that men could so far carry the past with them down the ages, as to draw upon its resources for the ever varying yet ever similar demands of life. May the modern Christian teacher apply this principle to patristic

¹ Thuc. i. 22.

studies, and hope in particular that the somewhat laborious enterprise of an intimate acquaintance with Clement's writings will yield him guidance and suggestions for the discharge of his difficult office amid the actual conditions of our own time? To what extent may he derive from the second century lessons which will not be wholly out of date in the twentieth, and feel, after conversing in spirit with the old Alexandrine father in his library, that he comes away better qualified to speak, whether *πρὸς παρόντας* or *δὲ ὑπομνημάτων*, to men who are living to-day's life in Oxford, or Liverpool, or London?

Whoever resolves to risk his time and pains in approaching Clement with this purpose, may find several encouragements for his quest. Not least among these will be the very general consensus of opinion among modern interpreters of Clement, as to his peculiar value for the Church of later days. So far back as 1859 the Abbé Cognat wrote in the preface of his book on the Alexandrine father, "Notre travail n'est donc pas une œuvre de pure érudition historique. C'est pour répondre à des besoins présents, pour résoudre des questions contemporaines."¹ Similar is the view expressed by E. de Faye in his singularly valuable study, "Ce qui rend le siècle de Clément d'Alexandrie si intéressant, c'est qu'il est, comme le nôtre, une époque de transition où fermentent les germes féconds de l'avenir."² And Professor Swete writes in a like strain, "Clement's conception of Christianity, in its relation to the whole field of human thought, is one that has an especial value for our own times, and promises to be increasingly useful in the present century."³

¹ *Clément d'Alexandrie, sa doctrine et sa polémique*, Preface, p. 3.

² Preface, 1-2.

³ *Patristic Study*, p. 48. So Westcott, *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, art. "Clement of Alexandria," says his writings have "their peculiar interest in all times of change." See, too, Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, ii. 89 *sqq.*

With such sanctions the Christian teacher of our own day may make his journey across the ages, and sojourn for a while in Clement's world, much as the typical teacher of that day would travel and stay for a season in one city or another, where the voice of wisdom might be heard. The similarities between the two ages, Then and Now, will not fail to present themselves. Again and again the parallelism will suggest the old question, whether present history is not, after all, a repetition of the past. In some such terms as the following our supposed traveller from the modern world to the ancient might tell the tale of what he saw, and then be puzzled to find that his account of the second century might, in its essential features, be said to hold good for the twentieth as well.

"I see around me," we could imagine him to say, "a civilisation which has stood for many centuries and has survived many vicissitudes, yet shows evidence that it has passed its prime. Old traditions, old sanctities are called in question. There is an increasing tendency to break away from the past, without as yet any certainty or guarantee for the future. Outside its area are other nationalities rising slowly into prominence, held for many previous generations of slight account, but now threatening a possible challenge for the future. Principles of humanity, and of the love of man as man, are taught by all the finer spirits of the time, yet the lot of the unfortunate remains little altered. The children who are born come sometimes into a world where there is little welcome for them, and population, as the few observers who understand know well, tends to decline among the races whose achievements have been most marked. Many methods of reconciling old forms and faiths with new tendencies are suggested ; many influences altogether novel in aim and character are at work ; yet no man may so read the signs of the times as to say

with any certainty in what quarter the supreme and dominant influence of the future must be sought.

“Out of such a shifting and uncertain environment come different moods to take possession of the human spirit. One of these, hardly amounting to actual pessimism, is the acquiescent recognition that great days have been, shall be, but are not now ; the resolute surrender of many dreams and ideals, accompanied often by the loyal discharge of such minor duties as are clear. In this spirit many follow life’s roadway with a certain sense of “tedium,” under dim skies, and with no knowledge of its destination, but with the sure abiding fact that the road at least is there. With no certain vision many sincere spirits pass through life’s stages in this temper, without great hopes or noisy murmurs. But sometimes the result of this environment is rather the interior mood of quest. Doubting the value, under the prevailing conditions, of a public career, and conscious that much of external religion had lost its significance and validity for those who know, many a man has turned within, and sought there for the realities upon which he may stay his soul. On this inward pathway of mystic quest advance is slow and it is the few who find. But, when the value of external achievements is called in question, the treasure must be sought elsewhere. For those who can tread it the inward way is an alternative, and few who start upon it ever finally turn back. Religion so reclaims her proper sanctuary, and there awaits the advent of the New Age, in which she may issue forth into the world again for fuller activities of service.

“For the rest, many barriers are breaking down, many landmarks no longer separate. Systems are losing their clearness of outline, and eclectics learn in many schools. There are many books, there are many ideas, many teachers ; but their very abundance is both token and cause of the change and uncertainty that prevail. Men travel with ease

and security : they develop the material resources of earth with singular success : they have a heritage from the past rich beyond their power of appropriation : they have abundantly elaborated the conveniences and apparatus of existence : they are so far freed from convention that any question may be raised, any theory criticised. Yet their wealth, their freedom, their entry into other men's labours, leaves them in need of some new thing, of which they can tell neither the source, nor the nature, nor the manner of its coming. Only they are aware that the old powers no longer rule, and that of the many new claimants for dominion none has yet succeeded in finally making his title clear. The world has arrived, not so much at the Parting of the Ways, for that implies the possibility of immediate decision, but rather at the Cross Roads, where several courses are open, and there are no signposts to guide, and hesitation falls upon the traveller."

On such lines as these might some modern spirit read the present in the past. Sometimes resemblances of detail, sometimes similarities of atmosphere and tone, would remind him of the parallel, and encourage him in his effort to appropriate ancient wisdom for to-day's problems. Yet he would reflect, too, that, if there is approximation, there is also divergence. For history does not really repeat itself, and the world is not, as the old Stoics thought, a cycle, but a process and an evolution. It remains so for us, even though the goal be altogether beyond man's range of vision. Hence arises the danger of being misled by partial similarities and the need of vigilance in any utilisation of the ancient stores. For there is, in reality, no going back, neither to Alexandria, nor even, in the common phrase, "back to Christ," which must ever be interpreted as meaning Forward, to the Christ who is to be. And this general truth, following, as it necessarily does, from the

dynamic, as opposed to the static principle in religion, would come home to the observer of the twentieth century, who, in spirit, should reside for a season in the second, through various particular divergences. It is only needful to name a few.

He would note especially that for the age of Clement there was no Social Question, in the sense in which our own age is conscious of it. Property, slavery, marriage were not, of course, wholly forgotten; the Alexandrian father himself had something to say on each. But the regeneration of the individual was then the primary concern of Christianity, and outward conditions were only indirectly changed. The Church was more conscious of God's inward presence, than of the possibility of higher ideals for Cæsar's kingdom. So, perhaps because it could not have been otherwise, her standard was open to the charge of "incivism"; she was content to make saints instead of attacking slavery.

In our own time it is very different. We start with the conditions and treat character as the consequence; we think that we must first build the City of God, and then consider how to produce the angels. Christianity is exploited by those whose real convictions are economic or social rather than religious, and in a somewhat facile contempt for the old-fashioned "other-worldliness" we seek the Kingdom of God in a minimum wage and an amended Social Order. The trend of the time draws our leaders more and more from the quest of truth in theology to the quest of righteousness in economic conditions. Whether the pendulum have not swung too far from the error of incivism towards a purely mundane Christianity, whether the Gospel of social progress can really be proved identical with the message of Jesus, are questions beyond our present purpose. It is enough to note that the Christianity of the

second century was predominantly individual, while that of the twentieth is predominantly social. Certain deductions are, of course, to be made on either side of the antithesis, but in the main it holds good and it is a contrast of great moment.

There is another difference, hardly less important. In both centuries, then and now, religious thought is found in solution. Ideas are singularly fluid and can be run together into various moulds. Then a man could be a Stoic and a Christian. Now he may be a Christian and a Hegelian, or, perhaps, a Christian Agnostic. But this solution or fluidity of thought, in so far as Christianity is involved as one of its constituent elements, differs in one important respect to-day from what it was in Clement's time. Then the ideas in liquidation were derived from ancient Philosophies, from Eastern Religions, from Nature Cults, or the Mysteries, or the hoar antiquity of Egypt. Into the ferment, as the latest added element, its potency, its assimilative powers wholly unsuspected, was thrown Christianity. The result is well known. To-day, with ourselves, the condition of solution is found again; the component elements are no less varied, no less complex, in their subtle action and reaction. But Christianity is this time, not the latest, but the oldest of them all. It has acquired properties and characteristics. It has crystallised into shapes, which *may* be soluble, but which *may* only be capable of assimilation if first they are crushed and broken. Something of the vitality and elasticity of youth it has lost inevitably with the years. The tremendous heritage of its history is also, in certain aspects, an obstacle and a limitation. Only partially can we enter into other men's labours. Our observer may note in the second century a score of points in which the Christianity of the twentieth has the advantage. But in one respect, a respect of primary importance in a transitional time, the preference lies with

the early Church. It was more free, just because it was so much less deeply committed to the past. Therein lay a second contrast, this also of great moment.

Beyond these two divergences, our imaginary visitor to Clement's age and city would notice others of hardly less significance. The years have brought an obvious change in the mode of interpreting the Scriptures. Allegory is gone, and Prophecy is more truly understood. The Demons are no more. The belief that all non-Christian teachers must have "stolen" their truth has vanished also. The doctrine of the Logos, in spite of Saint John's Prologue, was not preserved and developed as it might have been. The Quartodeciman has been succeeded by other controversies. And, in place of the ancient pride in higher spiritual Gnosis, the modern spirit is painfully conscious of the limitations which beset man in his search for reality. These and many other differences would come into the mind of one who should try to blend old and new; as afterthoughts, when the first impression of notable similarity had given place to further reflection. It has been said by one well qualified to judge, that "At every turn we are constrained to feel that we can learn to good effect from the Apostolic Age only by studying its principles and ideals, not by copying its precedents."¹ What is true of the Apostolic Age is also true of many other ages of the "Christian Ecclesia," even of one presenting so many parallels with our own as that of Clement in Alexandria.

But, after all, principles and ideas are of more value than precedents of detail. And when there has been deducted from Clement's work that very large element which had only transient interest and validity, and when the modern teacher who would learn in Clement's school has made, in full, the whole abatement which his religious

¹ F. J. A. Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, p. 169.

and didactic standpoint, as distinct from one purely historical, must involve, there remain still certain characteristic elements in the Alexandrian Master which are of permanent worth ; for whose effective operation the world renews its especial gratitude whenever the days of spiritual transition recur. Let us take leave of Clement by gathering together such abiding contributions as a fellow spirit, under latter-day conditions, might appropriate from his abundant diversity.

He has to offer us, before all else, a great example of the synthetic attitude of mind. Again and again we have found him noting similarities rather than points of difference, claiming alliance rather than scolding error. The great scheme of his tripartite work was one of far-reaching synthesis, never fulfilled, because his comprehensive spirit outran his intellectual powers. It is the same tendency we have observed in his delight to reconcile Plato with the Gospels ; in his readiness, unlike Tertullian, to see value in culture ; in his wish, unknown to Irenæus, to understand the best in Gnosticism. He is no lover of contrasts or of catastrophes or of rifts or of barriers. Rather he finds the one Divine Word everywhere at work, and builds on this faith a great habitation, in which the simple and the learned, the Greek and the Jew, Past and Present, Church and Cosmos, Saint and Philosopher, may meet to be at one. So he stands among his kind, with Homer, Shakespeare, Erasmus, Goethe, rather than with Æschylus, Paul, Luther, Milton.¹ Like the ideal philosopher of his loved Plato he was *συνοπτικός*,² with the faults of his qualities and all the inconsistencies of spiritual liberality, but with an eye for affinities, which reminds us, though the surroundings differ, of the insight of the Lord Himself.

¹ For the contrast between these two types of mind, see E. Caird's art. *Hibbert Journal*, October 1903.

² *Republic*, vii. 537, c.

This attitude, this *orientation*, though it ever needs its complement in the critical, analytical, antithetic temper of other minds, is perhaps singularly appropriate to the conditions which confront the modern Christian teacher. He has to recognise Science, Criticism, and Democracy, as factors in to-day's world too powerful to be ignored. He may not refuse, if he is honest, to allow elements of value in other great religions than his own. He is unwise, if he fails to watch carefully the emergence of new ideals, or to listen to the voices which call traditional and accepted values in question. Moreover, in spite of all visions of unity, he sees the fact of a divided Christendom. Under such conditions must he deliver his message or write his books. Where so many diverse elements are still in a condition of competitive ferment, he may well warn himself of the risk of premature synthesis, and refuse to accept any particular adjustment of detail as certain to survive in the final harmony. But he can hardly be wrong in conceiving of the teacher's office to-day as fundamentally one of Reconciliation. Many streams, he may well claim, in Clement's words, flow into the river of truth. The spiritual tragedy of Christendom lies in the Church's inability to value its points of agreement beyond its points of difference; in the ease with which great common truths, which should have been the potent bonds of unity, have been permitted to lapse into ineffective commonplace. The Modernists may fail to maintain their position in theology, and the Christian Socialists may be proved guilty of many economic errors, but at least these attempts to reconcile criticism with faith, democracy with the Church, are evidence of the character of our present task.

The truly wonderful thing in the history of the second and third centuries is the assimilative power of Christianity. The world in East and West had few possessions worth

claiming, upon which the Church did not lay its hands. The outcome is rightly described as a "Syncretism," in which it is by no means easy to distinguish the original and distinctive elements. Neither in Clement's age, nor in our own, have men ever won general assent when they have set out to answer the question, "What is Christianity?" Yet, however this may be defined, and even though the true answer be that it is a thing so spiritual that it is best left nameless, without definition, at least it had the power in the early centuries to unite with a large number of concrete and recognisable factors, and so to gather unto itself that body of *media* and materials without which, in the main, the spiritual forces are impotent to affect our human life. How an ancient Christian teacher ministered with special ability to this end, and fused, in one notable instance of synthesis, the Christian spirit with elements that had origin elsewhere, may be seen by every reader of the *Stromateis*. For our own time it has been truly said, that the permanence of the triumph of Christianity depends not only on its power to free itself from the obsolete adjuncts, which were appropriate enough in their time, but also on its power to *unite itself to fresh coefficients*.¹ In that phrase of Harnack's, which is surely true answer to the same brilliant writer's complaint of the "secularisation" of Christianity, lies the suggestion of a critical and pressing duty. And whenever this task presents itself, whether now or in any after age, the future of the Christian religion becomes largely dependent upon the labours of those wide-minded teachers, who have the power to discern affinities and to greet the ally in disguise.

There is a saying, twice quoted by Clement,² in the *Preaching of Peter* to the effect that the Saviour is both the

¹ Harnack, *Mission*, i. 318.

² νόμον καὶ λόγον τὸν κύριον προσείπεν, 465; *cf.* 427.

“Law” and the “Word.” In these two terms are expressed the diverse constituents of Christianity, the one derived from Hebraic, the other from Hellenic sources. To what extent the Hellenic element is discoverable in the teaching and mind of Jesus may be regarded, for the present, as a question in debate ; but there is no doubt as to the combination of Law and Logos in the case of either Saint Paul or Saint John. The characteristics of Hebraism and Hellenism are widely different, and it is sometimes questioned whether the two have ever really been so intimately fused as to form a unity. Be this as it may, the phases of theology and the minds of individuals tend usually in the one direction or the other, for the Prophet and the Philosopher are not naturally akin. Clement, with all his genius for synthesis, and with all his sincere appreciation of the ancient Scriptures, is still predominantly and representatively Hellenic. His philosophy never drove out his piety, but his piety throughout is such as the Greek spirit could entertain. Through Christianity the world became for him one universal Hellas, one comprehensive Athens. The rationality of the Divine means more for him than its Sovereignty. His personal need is for Illumination, rather than for Pardon. The highest grace possessed by his ideal Christian is that of Knowledge. He holds ideas of more moment than events. In all this he expresses to us his fundamental Hellenism. Trait by trait, feature by feature, the Greek stands revealed. He never forgets Moses, but neither does he forget Philo’s interpretation of him. Can this aspect of Clement suggest anything to our imaginary visitor from the twentieth century to his lecture-room ?

Huxley used to say that the real chosen people were the Greeks¹ and the preference of light to heat, which the saying implies, was natural enough in a man of Science.

¹ *Life and Letters*, ii. 426 ; (ed. 1900).

But it is not for Science alone that the Hellenic standpoint has value. There are few religious needs of which our age is so conscious, as it is of its desire for Light. The old mediæval dread of God is happily gone, nor is there anything which men need really fear in the discipline of a Future State. The legal conception of Christianity convinces us no longer; this debt, at least, Faith owes to Evolution. Nor can it be said that our day is really lacking in the power of responsive enthusiasm for high causes. But our vision is not certain, our light falls in meagre radiance, and beyond the brilliantly illuminated circle of the scientific knowledge of nature lies the dim, surrounding region, with its great ultimate problems of God, Freedom, and the Destiny of the Soul. It is an age of quest rather than conviction, when the Prophet frequently fails because he cannot in reality convince himself. He would do well sometimes if, like Isaiah's Watchman, he confessed uncertainty. "The morning cometh and also the night," but whether the present dimness be the twilight of evening or the dawn of a new day that is very near, it were wiser to leave time to show. In either case men wait and watch for the light, not greatly concerning themselves whether it shall break inwardly upon the soul, or outwardly like a new eastern sunrise, but surely the stronger and more resolute in their patience for every record, such as Clement notably affords, of an earlier day, when veritable illumination made the way plain for the traveller, and the land of far distances was clearly discerned. The Greek spirit had been no stranger to our modern need, since the ancient Homeric hero had lifted up his prayer, *ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὄλεσσον*, and "to behold the daylight" became the accepted equivalent of all that was worth possessing in the common human lot.

Perhaps more distinctively Hellenic is the readiness to consider new suggestions, a certain elasticity of mental

temperament, a certain capacity to view the question from a different standpoint. No power degenerates more easily, none is more open to criticism, than this dangerous facility of the Greeks. Saint Paul failed in Athens ; it is no difficult matter to contrast his depth of conviction with the superficiality of men who were ever ready "either to tell, or to hear some new thing." The realities of the spirit are too precious to be made the playthings of intellectual agility. Moreover, with all his gifts, the Greek was brilliant rather than reliable, and could raise problems more easily than he could bring peace of mind. On similar grounds will our modern teacher hear many warnings as to the perils of an Alexandrian type of Christianity. He will be bidden avoid the society of Clement and his kind,¹ on the ground that the Church wins more by intransigence than by accommodation, on the ground that essentials are not open to discussion, on the ground that, while great verities are in debate, the souls of the common folk may starve. We are all familiar with the arguments of religious conservatism, and the liberal minded fail in sympathy, if they have never felt the force and the pathos of its sincere appeal.

And yet, by the side of those whom the movement of the age has not robbed of their Hebraic certitude, or of their Latin rigidity of view, a place is open for the ministry of the Hellenic type of mind. Such a mind knows well the variety and multiformity of truth. It has the peculiar gift of adjusting differences. It can suspend judgment—what prophet ever could ? It can discern a true tendency under suspicious or unwelcome associations. It can recognise the wisdom of timely surrender. It is conscious, often painfully conscious, of the flux and movement of cosmic process. It is fundamentally unable to hold religion isolated and apart.

¹ Perhaps the significant omission of Clement and Origen from the *Library of the Fathers* is worth mentioning once again.

It is conscious that different difficulties confront different minds, and that God's mode of education is not the same for all. If the Christian religion be a Deposit, once committed to the keeping of a Divine Society, rigid, final, static, unique, absolute in character, then it is sufficiently evident that the Greek mind has little right to deal with it. Having supplied the form and vehicle of its expression, the Greek should have departed and left the Latin and the Hebrew in control.

But if Christianity is the life of the human spirit in its highest yet attained expression, manifested in the Saviour, and through Him communicated for its realisation and perfection to the Race ; and if, further, like all other forms of life, it is only secure by its perpetual adjustment to the conditions, social, intellectual, physical, economic, of its environment, then there can be little question of the world's indebtedness to those teachers of Hellenic temper, who prize clearness and fairness of mind, who suspect theological violence, who hold sweet reasonableness in honour, and who have the special ability to help their fellows in the hours of change. They are rarely proclaimed as heroes, and it is often beyond their range to deal with a soul's tragedy. On the other hand, in addition to their other distinctive powers of service, they have frequently the special gift of recognising, while they discharge their own appointed task, that there are other orders of labourers, under the same Master, occupied in the same great field. So, like Clement, they minister to the cause of charity, as well as to that of truth.

There is yet another service which Clement may render to the modern teacher. In every age of Christianity it is important to ascertain not only what beliefs men hold, but also in what proportion they distribute their serious attention among the various items of their professed creed. For stress and emphasis fall very variously in different

times upon the several aspects or elements of Christian faith. One age has given prominence to the Atonement, another to the Day of Judgment, another to the sufficiency of the Scriptures. God's Sovereignty has come home to one generation, God's Love to another. There have been seasons marked by the vigour of Christian enterprise, others by the value set on Contemplation and the Interior Life. Making the same profession, and appealing to the same authorities, the Church of different ages, and the individuals of differently constituted natures, have thus manifested remarkable variety in virtue of their different distributions of value and insistence. Clement has his own marked features in this regard. He leaves his readers in little doubt as to where his emphasis and interest mainly fall.¹ It is perhaps in his estimate of the "proportion of faith" that the modern spirit can follow him most closely.

This will be specially evident in relation to the Articles of the Creed. In whatever manner the Church may eventually agree to interpret or restate the doctrines of the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, the Ascension, the Future Judgment, it will hardly be questioned that, for the present, considerable difficulties beset their literal and concrete presentation. True as principles, they raise many questions if we treat them as events. Hence it is not surprising that present-day Theology shows little inclination, even when it most seriously maintains their historic character, to build upon them, or to venture its conclusions upon their stability. The emphasis, in our present stage of thought, does not lie there. But with the Incarnation it is different. Here we have a doctrine far more capable of relation to the dominant ideas and convictions of the present. Science has little quarrel with it, and, philosophically interpreted, it sheds light on many problems.

¹ See *supra*, pp. 240-1.

It is a principle singularly fruitful for existing conditions of religious thought, and involving far less effort of adjustment than, for example, the traditional theory of the Atonement. Herein there is the closest correspondence between present tendencies and Clement's interpretation of Christian thought. For he says little of Sin, Reconciliation, or Judgment. He lays no stress on the Virgin Birth, and he tends, like the Gnostics, to spiritualise the Resurrection. But the doctrine of God's highest or nearest act of self-manifestation in a Human Life on earth, the extension and implications of this principle in the Church and in Humanity, the unity of the one spiritual Power in all the many forms of its self-expression, are dominant conceptions in his theology and may be applied, with a minimum of modification, to many questions of to-day.

So it is, if we consider the transcendent and immanent aspects of the Godhead. Clement has both, for he is Platonist and Stoic at once, and his critics have found fault with him both for banishing the divine to excessive distance, and also for bringing it into too intimate relations with mankind. In any case he holds the two, and theology to-day is in some sense reverting to his position. God's Sovereignty, God's Government, God's Law have in many ages seemed to monopolise religious thought, but our more recent guides speak to us of the Indwelling Deity. The thought of divine immanence, incomplete as it is, and however liable it may be to pantheistic exaggeration, is well worth recovering, and we may gather suggestive expressions of it from the Alexandrians. Whoever to-day would school himself to recognise the Divinity, which pervades and inspires both Cosmic Order and Nature's Beauty and Human History and Individual Lives, may have his vision quickened and his heart made glad by the study of Clement's numerous references to the immanent operation of the Word.

The source of his happy optimism lay really there, and, if we could recover his sense of the divine nearness, we should be more likely to share his optimism. Yet the transcendent Sovereignty is never abandoned.

The same result is reached if we consider Christianity as involving three elements, spiritual, intellectual, institutional. We are tending more and more to rate these in the foregoing order, to lay stress on inward experience, to minimise the institutional apparatus, to acknowledge the barrenness of the intellect if it be isolated and alone. There is no question that, for Clement, the Institution comes last, though we have already observed how real was his appreciation of the Church and its order. But it is, no doubt, possible to take different views as to his relative valuation of the Spirit and the Intelligence. Authorities debate whether religion or reason, the mystic or the philosopher, is really the dominant element in his nature. We must not here reopen the subject, beyond saying that if our interpretation of Clement has been a true one, it is religion, piety, the things of the spirit, the inward fellowship, the mystic principle that prevail. Whoever, then, in our own day, conscious of the increased significance of the mystical element in Christianity, takes note of the reaction from the mere intellectualism of much of our traditional theology, and, recalling the reminder of Saint Ambrose, "Non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum,"¹ or Harnack's similar admission that "The intellect can produce nothing of religious value,"² recognises that the fundamental demand is always for religion rather than theology, for life more than for understanding; whoever, with this fully recognised, goes on to realise that reason, thought, intelligence, are still essential co-operants, though they are not the spirit's life, so that philosophy, metaphysic, and theology can never,

¹ *De Fide*, i., 5.

² *Hist. Dogm.*, ii. 327, n.

save at the peril of disastrous loss, be eliminated from the scheme of religion, since the inward and spiritual significance of Christianity must be perpetually expressed according to the changing modes and conceptions of age and environment; whoever, with these two elements so secured at their true valuation, passes on to the remaining factor of Church, Society, Brotherhood, Civitas Dei, Ecclesiastical Polity, with all its necessary mechanism of rite, creed, custom, form, buildings, membership, so infinitely valuable as the means and organs of spiritual life, so infinitely dangerous when they are over-esteemed as treasure, goal, and end; whoever desires that in his personal contribution as a Christian teacher he may conserve these three elements in their several values, without violence to the proportion of faith, and scans the ages of religious history in the quest for a kindred spirit who has served God with a like ideal—such a man may well find fellowship in the company of our Alexandrian father, who had so much to say on the inward converse of the soul with God, and pleaded so earnestly the cause of philosophy within the Church, and also had so high an estimate of ecclesiastical tradition and the pastor's cure of souls.

There is one further lesson to be derived from Clement's example, by which the teacher under modern conditions may gain something for his task. In every centre of religious thought, and more especially in ages when any "New Learning" is in the air, the claims of the simple majority are apt to come into collision with the needs of the more thoughtful few. The "Orthodoxists" and the "Gnostics" come into prominence again with every movement of religious discussion; the interests of "Parochial Christianity" are set in contrast with the Professor's claim for freedom and with the restless "intellectual's" desire to reconcile the old and the new. Mother Church, in the main,

has cared especially for her simpler children. She has valued their docility, their devotion, their indifference to the awkward questions. She has been angry, rightly angry, with those who would put stumbling blocks in their lowly pathway, or trouble with needless problems the serenity of their service and their faith. Hence often her strange harshness to the inquirer, her lack of sympathy with those who felt the old home had grown narrow, her unwise habit of scolding doubt. Remembering what the Lord said about placing occasions of offence in the way of children, but forgetting that He had also welcomed Nicodemus and appreciated the sincerity of Thomas, she has only too often sought to conserve the welfare of the many by ignoring the claims and difficulties of the few.

The conditions which are liable to occasion this error were once prevalent in Alexandria, and they are not unknown to-day. Clement's work is an abiding protest against all ecclesiastical neglect of the hesitating minority. Faith is harder for them than for others, but it is less conventional and more productive of results. So he faced, for their sakes, the charge of being an intellectual aristocrat and even of economising truth. Whoever, in our age of numbers and religious competition, seeks to minister to the questioning few who can be won to listen from the borderlands of faith; whoever is prepared, if it must be so, to be criticised and misunderstood by every sincere obscurantist of his time; whoever, knowing the risks of the way, and not forgetting how easily the claim for liberty of teaching may become the hard, contentious, illiberal, assertion of individual whims, still takes his stand by conviction on the side of wider interpretation, of greater generosity towards those without, of larger spiritual freedom, and of sympathy for uncertain souls, may be encouraged by recollecting with what tact, with what kindly care for narrower susceptibilities, yet also with

what clear intention and with what quiet courage, the cause of the thoughtful minority was once maintained in an Alexandrian lecture-room, about which in certain Christian circles there were doubtless great searchings of heart.

There, then, "foncièrement pédagogue," in his lecture-room, among his pupils, in the place that was peculiarly his own, we leave this learned, happy, and wide-minded interpreter of the Gospel. Those of us to whose lot it has fallen to serve God within the ancient Church of the English People, may remember that Clement has his affinities with one of our own divines ;¹ that in his distrust of extremes, in his love of peace, in his reverent and sober piety, he anticipates some of the best religious characteristics of our race. His Church, like ours, had its middle way, distinct from the Roman type of Catholicism, diverse from the emotional subjectivity of the Phrygian Montanists. It had, too, its peculiar similarities, a like estimate of the Orders in the Ministry, a like regard for "sound learning." Its mission, like our own, was to win men for Christian ideals in the midst of a busy commercial environment, and to prove the possibility of the Christian standpoint for educated people in times of change. To these purposes Clement's life was devoted, and our knowledge of him justifies us in remembering him as among the Saints, even though his namesake, Pope Clement VIII., removed his name from the official list. Christian Liberalism has had few worthier exponents ; nor need we deal unfairly either with Victor or Tertullian or their latter-day successors, because we set an especial value upon that different type of Christianity which was Clement's own. Alone, by itself, this type would be ineffective and unstable ; as a leaven and an element within the whole it renders noble service, for charity and fairness and intelligence and peace of mind and the reasonable

¹ He was "not unlike our own Jeremy Taylor." Bigg, *Origins*, 404.

temper are among its qualities. Therefore in every age it is well that some men should learn, either in Clement's school or in any other, to reappropriate the Alexandrian standpoint, as one by one we make our several fragmentary contributions to that great unknown consummation, so assured yet so remote, which lies hidden in the mysterious purposes of God.

CHAPTER XXI

SAYINGS AND EXTRACTS

HITHERTO the reader has been invited to consider the substance of Clement's statements and opinions, rather than his actual words. Quotations, even in the notes, have not been numerous. In this concluding chapter the *ipsissima verba* of our author are given, in the belief that some, who have not time for a fuller study, may be glad in this minor degree to come into direct contact with Clement's writings. Some of these extracts are worth remembering for their intrinsic interest; most of them illustrate or confirm what has been said in the foregoing pages.

The figures in brackets refer to the volume, page, and lines of Dr Stählin's edition.

I. DIVINE TRANSCENDENCE

Ὁ γὰρ τῶν ὄλων θεὸς ὁ ὑπὲρ πάσαν φωνὴν καὶ πᾶν νόημα καὶ πᾶσαν ἔννοιαν οὐκ ἂν ποτε γραφῇ παραδοθείη, ἄρρητος ὢν δυνάμει τῇ αὐτοῦ.—685 (ii. 369. 26–28).

The God of the universe, Who is above all speech and all thought and all reasoning, cannot be committed to writing, being ineffable in His power.

2. MAN'S INABILITY TO DESCRIBE GOD

Ὅσον γὰρ δυνάμει θεοῦ λείπεται ἄνθρωπος, τοσοῦτον καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐξασθενεῖ, κἂν μὴ θεόν, ἀλλὰ περὶ θεοῦ λέγῃ καὶ τοῦ θείου λόγου. ἀσθενὴς γὰρ φύσει ὁ ἀνθρώπιος λόγος καὶ ἀδύνατος

φράσαι θεόν, οὐ τοῦνομα λέγω (κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο οὐ φιλοσόφων μόνον ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιητῶν) οὐδὲ τὴν οὐσίαν (ἀδύνατον γάρ), ἀλλὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ.—826 (ii. 517. 17-23).

For as man in his potentialities falls short of God, so too his language is weak and faltering, even in speaking not of God Himself, but of the attributes of God and of the divine Word. For the language of man is in its nature weak and incapable of expressing God—I do not mean the mere name, for the use of the name is common not only to philosophers, but also to poets; nor do I mean the essence, for that is impossible—but I mean the power and the works of God.

3. HOW GOD MAY BE KNOWN

Τὰ γὰρ λεγόμενα ἢ ἐκ τῶν προσόντων αὐτοῖς ῥητὰ ἔστιν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως, οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων λαβεῖν οἶόν τε περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμη λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται, τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προὔπαρχει. λείπεται δὴ θεία χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἄγνωστον νοεῖν.—695-6 (ii. 381. 3-8).

Things admit of being expressed in words either from their attributes or from their relation to one another. But we can lay hold of nothing of this nature in the case of God. Neither is He apprehended by demonstrative knowledge, for this is made up of prior and better known elements, but nothing has prior existence to the Uncreated. So, then, it is only by divine grace and solely through the Word which proceeds from Him, that we can apprehend the Unknowable.

4. THE METHOD OF ABSTRACTION

Λάβοιμεν δ' ἂν τὸν μὲν καθαρτικὸν τρόπον ὁμολογία, τὸν δὲ ἐποπτικὸν ἀναλύσει, ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην νόησιν προχωροῦντες δι' ἀναλύσεως, ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιούμενοι, ἀφελόντες μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὰς φυσικὰς ποιότητας, περιελόντες δὲ τὴν εἰς τὸ βάθος διάστασιν, εἶτα τὴν εἰς τὸ πλάτος, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὴν εἰς τὸ μῆκος· τὸ γὰρ ὑπολειφθὲν σημείον ἔστι, μονὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν θέσειν ἔχουσα, ἧς εἰάν περιέλωμεν τὴν θέσειν, νοεῖται μονάς. εἰ τοίνυν,

ἀφελόντες πάντα ὅσα πρόσεστι τοῖς σώμασιν καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀσωμάτοις, ἐπιρρίψαιμεν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ Χριστοῦ κακεῖθεν εἰς τὸ ἀχανές ἀγιότητι προῖοιμεν, τῇ νοήσει τοῦ παντοκράτορος ἀμῆ γέ πη προσάγοιμεν ἂν, οὐχ ὃ ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἐστὶ γνωρίσαντες· σχῆμα δὲ καὶ κίνησιν ἢ στάσιν ἢ θρόνον ἢ τόπον ἢ δεξιὰ ἢ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ τῶν ὄλων πατρὸς οὐδ' ὄλως ἐννοητέον, καίτοι καὶ ταῦτα γέγραπται· ἀλλ' ὃ βούλεται δηλοῦν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, κατὰ τὸν οἰκίον ἐπίδειχθήσεται τόπον. οὐκ οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ἀλλ' ὑπεράνω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ ὀνόματος καὶ νοήσεως. —689 (ii. 374. 4-20).

The stage of purification we may attain by confession, that of vision by an analytic process, as we advance towards the primary conception by this means. We make our start in this process from the inherent properties, and strip away from body its physical qualities, removing from it the dimension of depth, then that of breadth, then as well that of length. The residuum is a point, a monad, so to say, having position. If we remove its position, the conception of the monad remains. If then we strip away all properties of bodies and of things called incorporeal and cast ourselves upon the magnitude of Christ and thence advance by holiness to infinity, we should in some sort draw near to the conception of the Almighty, understanding not what He is but what He is not. Form and motion and position or a throne or localisation or right or left we must in no wise conceive as belonging to the Father of the Universe, though indeed these terms are used in Scripture. However, the sense intended by each of them will be made clear in the proper place. Thus the First Cause is not in space, but is beyond both space and time and name and thought.

5. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE IDEA OF GOD

Γένος δ' οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ τῶν γεωργούντων οὐδὲ νομάδων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν δύναται ζῆν, μὴ προκατελημμένον τῇ τοῦ κρείττονος πίστει. διὸ πᾶν μὲν ἔθνος ἐφῶν, πᾶν δὲ ἐσπερίων ἀπτόμενον ἡόνων, βόρειόν τε καὶ τὰ πρὸς τῷ νότῳ, πάντα μίαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πρόληψιν περὶ τοῦ καταστησαμένου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, εἴ γε καὶ τὰ καθολικώτατα τῶν ἐνεργημάτων αὐτοῦ διαπεφοίτηκεν ἐπ' ἴσης πάντα.—729-30 (ii. 417. 2-8).

No race anywhere of tillers of the soil, or of nomad tribes, no, nor of civic communities, can live without being prepossessed by the conviction of the Supreme Power. Therefore every nation which reaches to the shores of East or West, the North, and all who dwell towards the South, have one and the same preconception concerning Him who holds established sovereignty, since the most universal of His operations pervade all the world alike.

6. THE DIVINE SCHEME

Οὕτως ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν θελήματι τοῦ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς αἰτίος ὁ υἱὸς καθίσταται, πρωτουργὸς κινήσεως δύναμις, ἄληπτος αἰσθησεῖ. οὐ γὰρ ὃ ἦν, τοῦτο ὥφθη τοῖς χωρῆσαι μὴ δυναμένοις διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός, αἰσθητὴν δὲ ἀναλαβὼν σάρκα τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ὑπακοὴν τῶν ἐντολῶν δείξων ἀφίκετο. δύναμις οὖν πατρικὴ ὑπάρχων ῥαδίως περιγίνεται ὡς ἂν ἐθέλη, οὐδὲ τὸ μικρότατον ἀπολείπων τῆς ἑαυτοῦ διοικήσεως ἀφρόντιστον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ ὄλον εὖ εἰργασμένον. δυνάμει δ', οἶμαι, τῆς μεγίστης ἢ πάντων τῶν μερῶν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ μικροτάτου προήκουσα δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξέτασις, πάντων εἰς τὸν πρῶτον διοικητὴν τῶν ὄλων ἐκ θελήματος πατρὸς κυβερνῶντα τὴν πάντων σωτηρίαν ἀφορώντων, ἐτέρων ὑφ' ἑτέρους ἡγουμένους τεταγμένων, ἔστ' ἂν τις ἐπὶ τὸν μέγαν ἀφίκεται ἀρχιερέα.—833 (iii. 8. 4-17).

Thus by the will of the Almighty Father the Son is the permanent cause of all good things. He is the initial activity of all movement, inapprehensible to sense. For it was not in His real nature that He was seen by those who were incapable of such comprehension by reason of the weakness of their flesh, but He took upon Him a sensible body and came to reveal what man had power to receive through obedience to the commandments. Being then Himself the Power of the Father, He easily prevails in whatever He wills. He leaves not even the least item of His administration without His care, for otherwise His conduct of the universe would no longer be entirely good. And I regard His minute and accurate scrutiny of all the parts, extending to the tiniest atom, as evidence of the greatest power, while all turn their eyes to the high Administrator of the universe, as He pilots the world's salvation by the Father's will, rank stationed under rank in precedence, until we reach the great High Priest.

7. ALL THINGS PUT UNDER HIM

Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ μερίζομενος, οὐκ ἀποτεμνόμενος, οὐ μεταβαίνων ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, πάντα δὲ ὧν πάντοτε καὶ μηδᾶμη περιεχόμενος, ὄλος νοῦς, ὄλος φῶς πατρῶον, ὄλος ὀφθαλμός, πάντα ὄρων, πάντα ἀκούων, εἰδὼς πάντα, δυνάμει τὰς δυνάμεις ἐρευνῶν. τούτῳ πᾶσα ὑποτέτακται στρατία ἀγγέλων τε καὶ θεῶν, τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πατρικῷ τὴν ἀγίαν οἰκονομίαν ἀναδε-
δεγμένῳ “διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα,” δι’ ὃν καὶ πάντες αὐτοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν “κατ’ ἐπίγνωσιν,” οἱ δὲ οὐδέπω, καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς φίλοι, οἱ δὲ ὡς οἰκέται πιστοί, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἀπλῶς οἰκέται.—831 (iii. 5. 25–6. 7).

The Son of God never leaves His watch-tower, never divided, never dissevered, never migrating from place to place. He exists everywhere and at all times and is nowhere circumscribed. He is all mind, all light of the Father, all eye ; He sees all, hears all, knows all, and tests the Powers by His power. To Him every regiment of Angels and of Gods is subject, even to the Word of the Father, Who has been entrusted with the holy dispensation “by reason of Him who hath subjected” them ; through Whom also all men belong to Him, but some “according to knowledge,” others not as yet ; some as friends, some as faithful servants, some as servants simply.

8. THE ALL-SEEING EYE

“Ὅνπερ γὰρ τρόπον ὁ ἥλιος οὐ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸν ὄλον κόσμον φωτίζει γῆν τε καὶ θάλασσαν ἐπιλάμπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ θυρίδων καὶ μικρᾶς ὀπῆς πρὸς τοὺς μυχαιτάτους οἴκους ἀποστέλλει τὴν αὐγὴν, οὕτως ὁ λόγος πάντη κεχυμένος καὶ τὰ σμικρότατα τῶν τοῦ βίου πράξεων ἐπιβλέπει.—840 (iii. 15. 28–16. 2).

Even as the Sun not only illumines the heaven and the whole world with the light that shines on land and sea, but also sends his rays through windows and through crannies into the inmost recesses of our homes, so the Word, shed everywhere abroad, beholds even the minutest details of our life.

9. MAN THE WORK OF THE WORD

Ἄττιος γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ὁ Χριστός, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι πάλαι ἡμᾶς (ἦν γὰρ ἐν θεῷ), καὶ τοῦ εἶναι· νῦν δὴ ἐπεφάνη ἀνθρώποις αὐτὸς

οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὁ μόνος ἄμφω, θεός τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος, ἀπάντων ἡμῖν αἴτιος ἀγαθῶν· παρ' οὗ τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐκδιδασκόμενοι εἰς αἰδίου ζωῆν παραπεμπόμεθα.—6-7 (i. 7. 17-21).

The Word, even Christ, was the cause both of our first being (for He was in God), and of our well-being. And now this self-same Word, Who alone is both God and man in one, the cause of all things good to us, has revealed Himself personally unto men. Learning from Him how to live aright, we are helped upon the way to life eternal.

IO. THE TRUE SHRINE OF THE WORD

Μάλιστα γὰρ

ἄγαλμα θεῖον καὶ θεῶ προσεμφερές

ἀνθρώπου δικαίου ψυχῆ, ἐν ἣ δια τῆς τῶν παραγγελμάτων ὑπακοῆς τεμενίζεται καὶ ἐνιδρύεται ὁ πάντων ἡγεμῶν θνητῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων, βασιλεύς τε καὶ γεννήτωρ τῶν καλῶν, νόμος ὢν ὄντως καὶ θεσμὸς καὶ λόγος αἰώνιος, ἰδίᾳ τε ἐκάστοις καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσιν εἰς ὢν σωτήρ. οὗτος ὁ τῷ ὄντι μονογενής, ὁ τῆς τοῦ παμβασιλέως καὶ παντοκράτορος πατρὸς δόξης χαρακτήρ, ἐναποσφραγιζόμενος τῷ γνωστικῷ τὴν τελείαν θεωρίαν κατ' εἰκόνα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς εἶναι τρίτην ἤδη τὴν θεῖαν εἰκόνα τὴν ὅση δύναμις ἐξομοιουμένην πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, πρὸς τὴν ὄντως ζωὴν, δι' ἣν ζῶμεν τὴν ἀληθῆ ζωὴν, οἷον ἀπογράφοντες τὸν γνῶσιν γινόμενον ἡμῖν, περὶ τὰ βέβαια καὶ παντελῶς ἀναλλοιώτα ἀναστρεφόμενον.—837-8 (iii. 12. 14-26).

For, above all else, the soul of the righteous man is

“God's own resemblance, effigy divine.”

In this soul is formed, by obedience to the commandments, the holy place and shrine of Him who is ruler of all mortal and immortal beings, King and Originator of every excellence, veritable Law and Ordinance, and Everlasting Word, the one Saviour of every individual and of all the race. He is the true “Only-begotten,” the express image of the glory of the Sovereign and Almighty Father. On the mind of the Gnostic he sets the stamp of perfect vision, after His own image, so that the Gnostic is the divine image in the third degree, through the closest attainable likeness to the second Cause, who is the Life indeed. Through this Life we live

the true life, making a sort of copy of Him who was made knowledge unto us, and who hath converse with things sure and altogether unalterable.

II. THE PURPOSE OF THE INCARNATION

Καί μοι δοκεῖ αὐτὸς οὗτος πλάσαι μὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ χόσος, ἀναγεννῆσαι δὲ ὕδατι, αὐξῆσαι δὲ πνεύματι, παιδαγωγῆσαι δὲ ῥήματι, εἰς υἰοθεσίαν καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀγίαις ἐντολαῖς κατευθύνων, ἵνα δὴ τὸν γηγενῆ εἰς ἅγιον καὶ ἐπουράνιον μεταπλάσας ἐκ προσβάσεως ἄνθρωπον, ἐκείνην τὴν θεϊκὴν μάλιστα πληρώσῃ φωνήν· “ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμῶν.” καὶ δὴ γέγονεν ὁ Χριστὸς τοῦτο πλήρες, ὅπερ εἶρηκεν ὁ θεός, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μόνην νοεῖται τὴν εἰκόνα.—156 (i. 148. 18-149. 1).

It was He, I think, who fashioned man from the dust, and regenerated him by water, and fostered his growth by the Spirit, and instructed him by His Word, and directed his course by holy commandments to sonship and salvation. It was His purpose, by drawing near to him, to transform the child of earth into a holy and heavenly man, and to fulfil that most divine of sayings “Let us make man in our image after our likeness.” Now Christ was the perfect fulfilment of that which God hath said. But the rest of humanity is to be regarded as possessing the “image” alone.

12. THE EDUCATIVE OFFICE OF THE WORD

Σοφία δὲ οὗτος εἶρηται πρὸς ἀπάντων τῶν προφητῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν γενητῶν ἀπάντων διδάσκαλος, ὁ σύμβουλος τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα προεγνωκότος. ὁ δὲ ἄνωθεν ἐκ πρώτης καταβολῆς κόσμου “πολυτρόπως καὶ πολυμερῶς” πεπαίδευκέν τε καὶ τελειοί.—769 (ii. 461. 11-14).

He is named Wisdom by all the Prophets. He is the teacher of all the children of men, the Counsellor of God, Who foreknew all. And He that is from above, from the first foundation of the world, hath been training us and making us perfect “at sundry times and in divers manners.”

13. SYMBOLISM ENDS WITH THE ADVENT

(On loosing the latchet of the Lord)

Τάχα δὲ καὶ τὴν τελευταίαν τοῦ σωτῆρος εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐνέργειαν, τὴν προσεχῆ, λέγει, τὴν διὰ τῆς παρουσίας, ἐπικρυπτομένην τῷ τῆς προφητείας αἰνίγματι· ὁ γὰρ διὰ τῆς αὐτοψίας τὸν θεσπιζόμενον δείξας, τὴν εἰς φανερόν πόρρωθεν ὀδεύουσαν μὴνύσας ἤκουσαν παρουσίαν, ὄντως ἔλυσεν τὸ πέρας τῶν λογίων τῆς οἰκονομίας, ἐκκαλύψας τὴν ἔννοιαν τῶν συμβόλων.—679 (ii. 363. 20-25).

But perhaps he (the Baptist) means the last activity of the Saviour for our sakes, the nearer activity of His Advent, which is concealed in the riddle of Prophecy. For by pointing out for eyes to see Him who had been foretold, he declared that the Presence, which had been long upon its way towards manifestation, had now indeed arrived. So he veritably unloosed the thread of the oracles of the Dispensation by revealing the meaning of their symbols.

14. THE EXTENSION OF THE INCARNATION

Ὡσπερ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὁ σωτῆρ ἐλάλει καὶ ἰᾶτο, οὕτως καὶ πρότερον μὲν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν, νῦν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν διδασκάλων· ἡ ἐκκλησία γὰρ ὑπηρετεῖ τῇ τοῦ κυρίου ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔνθεν καὶ τότε ἄνθρωπον ἀνέλαβεν, ἵνα δι' αὐτοῦ ὑπηρετήσῃ τῷ θελήματι τοῦ πατρός. καὶ πάντοτε ἄνθρωπον ὁ φιλόθρωπος ἐνδύεται θεὸς εἰς τὴν ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίαν, πρότερον μὲν τοὺς προφήτας, νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἐξυπηρετεῖν κατάλληλον πρὸς τὴν ὁμοίαν σωτηρίαν.—994-5 (iii. 143. 4-11).

For even as through the body the Saviour spake and healed, so also did He aforetime by the Prophets, and now by the Apostles and Teachers. For the Church is the minister of the activity of the Lord; for which cause He took upon Him at that time the nature of man, that He might be thereby the minister of His Father's will. Thus at all times, in His love for man, doth God put on man's nature for his salvation; aforetime the Prophets, now the Church. That like should minister unto like accords with the like nature of salvation.

15. HUMAN NATURE NOT "OF ONE SUBSTANCE" WITH
THE DIVINE

Ὁ θεὸς δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν, ὡς οἱ τῶν αἱρέσεων κτίσται θέλουσιν, (οὐτ' εἰ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ποιοίη οὐτ' εἰ ἐξ ὕλης δημιουργοίη, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν οὐδ' ὄλως ὄν, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πάντα ἕτερα τυγχάνει τοῦ θεοῦ) εἰ μὴ τις μέρος αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοουσίους ἡμᾶς τῷ θεῷ πολμήσει λέγειν· καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἀνέξεται τις ἐπαῖων τούτου θεὸν ἐγνωκῶς, ἀπιδὼν εἰς τὸν βίον τὸν ἡμέτερον, ἐν ὅσοις φυρόμεθα κακοῖς· εἴη γὰρ ἂν οὕτως, ὃ μὴ εἰπεῖν θέμις, μερικῶς ἀμαρτάνων ὁ θεός, εἴ γε τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὄλου μέρη καὶ συμπληρωτικά τοῦ ὄλου, εἰ δὲ μὴ συμπληρωτικά, οὐδὲ μέρη εἴη ἂν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ φύσει "πλούσιος ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἐλέῳ" διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητα κήδεται ἡμῶν μήτε μορίων ὄντων αὐτοῦ μήτε φύσει τέκνων.—467-8 (ii. 152. 6-17).

God has no natural relationship with us, as the founders of the Heresies try to prove. This is true, whether He created us from non-existence or fashioned us out of matter, since the one has no being whatever and the other is different in every way from God. Otherwise one must dare to say that we are a part of Him and of one substance with God. I know not how a man who hath knowledge of God could endure to give ear to this, when he has regard unto our life with all its evil and confusion. For in that case (though to say it is blasphemy) God would partially be involved in sin, since the parts are parts of the whole and complementary of the whole, and, if not complementary, are not parts at all. But God, who by nature is "rich in mercy," has care for us because of His goodness, though we are neither parts of Him, nor by nature His children.

16. ALL MEN BELONG TO GOD

Δίκαιος τοίνυν δικαίου καθὼ δίκαιός ἐστιν οὐ διαφέρει, εἴαν τε νομικὸς ἢ εἴαν τε Ἕλληνας οὐ γὰρ Ἰουδαίων μόνων, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων ὁ θεὸς κύριος, προσεχέστερον δὲ τῶν ἐγνωκῶτων πατήρ.—764 (ii. 455. 19-21).

Now one righteous man in point of righteousness does not differ from another, whether he be under the Law or a Greek.

For God is Lord of all men and not of the Jews alone, though He is more intimately the Father of those who know Him.

17. THE MANY WAYS OF GOD

Πάντων γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ὁ παντοκράτωρ κηδόμενος θεὸς τοὺς μὲν ἐντολαῖς, τοὺς δὲ ἀπειλαῖς, ἔστιν δ' οὖς σημεῖοις τεραστίοις, ἐνίοις δὲ ἡπίοις ἐπαγγελίαις ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς σωτηρίαν.—753 (ii. 444-10-13).

God, the Almighty, in His care for mankind, turns some to salvation by commandments, some by threats, others by signs and portents, and yet others by tender promises.

18. THE MINISTRY OF HEALING

Ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς παιδαγωγός, ἡ σοφία, ὁ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς, ὁ δημιουργήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅλου κηδεταί τοῦ πλάσματος, καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἀκείτῃ αὐτοῦ ὁ πανακῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ἱατρός. 100-1 (i. 93. 16-19).

Our good Instructor, Wisdom, the Word of the Father, the Creator of man, cares for His entire handiwork and, as the all-healing physician of humanity, heals both body and soul.

19. PROVIDENCE

Πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου σωτηρίαν τῷ τῶν ὅλων κυρίῳ πάντα ἐστὶ διατεταγμένα καὶ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους.—835 (iii. 9. 26-28).

All things, both universally and in particular, are ordered by the Lord of the universe with a view to its welfare.

20. FAITH IN THE DIVINE ORDER

Πάντα μὲν ὄν οἰκονομεῖται ἄνωθεν εἰς καλόν.—369 (ii. 55. 15-16).

All things are administered from above for good.

21. THE PERVADING ENERGY

Τῇ καθολικῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προνοίᾳ διὰ τῶν προσεχέστερον κινουμένων καθ' ὑπόβασιν εἰς τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους διαδίδοται ἡ δραστικὴ ἐνέργεια. 817 (ii. 508. 18—20).

In the universal Providence of God the action of force is successively transmitted through the more immediate motions on to things in particular.

22. GOD'S GOODNESS

Τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν, ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιεῖ ἢ ὅτι ὠφελεῖ. πάντα ἄρα ὠφελεῖ ὁ θεός.—136 (i. 127. 13—15).

That which is good, by virtue of its goodness, cannot be other than beneficent. God, consequently, is the Benefactor of all.

23. PHILOSOPHY A GIFT

Πάντων μὲν γὰρ αἴτιος τῶν καλῶν ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατὰ προηγούμενον ὡς τῆς τε διαθήκης τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ τῆς νέας, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐπακολούθημα ὡς τῆς φιλοσοφίας. τάχα δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐδόθη τότε πρὶν ἢ τὸν κύριον καλέσαι καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας· ἐπαιδαγώγει γὰρ καὶ αὕτη τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἑβραίους εἰς Χριστόν. προπαρασκευάζει τοίνυν ἡ φιλοσοφία προοδοποιούσα τὸν ὑπὸ Χριστοῦ τελειούμενον.—331 (ii. 17. 35—18. 5).

Now God is the author of all good things, but in the case of some, such as the Old Covenant and the New, it is by primary intention; in the case of others, such as Philosophy, it is for secondary ends. Yet perhaps it was even by primary intention that Philosophy was given to the Greeks, before the call of the Lord had been extended to them. For it was the Schoolmaster of the Greek race, as the Law was the Schoolmaster of the Hebrews, unto Christ. So then Philosophy is preliminary and preparative, giving him whom Christ trains unto perfection a start upon the road.

24. CORRECTION, BUT NEVER VENGEANCE, COMES FROM GOD

Ἐπεται δὲ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἢ φύσει ἀγαθός ἐστιν, ἡ μισοπονηρία. διὸ καὶ κολάζειν μὲν αὐτὸν ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμι τοὺς ἀπίστους (ἡ γὰρ κόλασις ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τοῦ κολαζομένου, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπανόρθωσις ἀντιτείνοντος), τιμωρεῖσθαι δὲ μὴ βούλεσθαι. τιμωρία δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνταπόδοσις κακοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ τοῦ τιμωρουμένου συμφέρον ἀναπεμπομένη. οὐκ ἂν δὲ ἐπιθυμήσειε τιμωρεῖσθαι ὁ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπηρεαζόντων ἡμᾶς προσεύχεσθαι διδάσκων.—140 (i. 131. 4-10).

Hatred of evil, from the very nature of goodness, is inseparable from one who is good. For this reason I should admit that God punishes the unbelieving, but not from a wish to retaliate. For punishment is for good and for the benefit of the person punished, since it is the correction of one who is refractory. But retaliation is the requital of evil, inflicted for the advantage of him who retaliates. He who teaches us to pray for those who use us despitefully could never desire to retaliate.

25. REPENTANCE IN ANOTHER PLACE

Τουτὶ γὰρ ἔπρεπεν τῇ θεῖᾳ οἰκονομίᾳ τοὺς ἀξίαν μᾶλλον ἐσχηκότας ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ προηγουμένως βεβιωκότας ἐπὶ τε τοῖς πλημμεληθεῖσι μετανοηκότας, κἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ τόπῳ τύχῳσιν ἐξομολογούμενοι, ἐν τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντας τοῦ παντοκράτορος κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἐκάστου γινώσιν σωθῆναι.—763 (ii. 454. 23-27).

It was in accordance with the divine scheme that those who had attained merit in righteousness, and had lived lives of excellence, and had repented of their sins, should find salvation, each according to his own grade of knowledge, even though it did happen that they made their confession in another place. They were all within the range of God's Almighty power.

26. GOD'S IMAGE IN MAN

Ἡμεῖς γάρ, ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν οἱ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ περιφέροντες ἐν τῷ ζῶντι καὶ κινουμένῳ τούτῳ ἀγάλματι, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, σύνοικον εἰκόνα, σύμβουλον, συνόμιλον, συνέστιον, συμπαθῆ, ὑπερπαθῆ. ἀνάθημα γεγόναμεν τῷ θεῷ ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ.—52 (i. 46. 15-19).

We it is, we, who in this living and moving figure, Man, bear about the image of God, an image that seems to share our homes, our counsels, our intimate thoughts, our hearths, our affections, itself affected for our sakes. We are made a votive image unto God for Christ's sake.

27. THE WRITING WITHIN THE SOUL

Καλὸς ὕμνος τοῦ θεοῦ ἀθάνατος ἄνθρωπος, δικαιοσύνη οἰκοδομούμενος, ἐν ᾧ τὰ λόγια τῆς ἀληθείας ἐγκεχάρακται. ποῦ γὰρ ἀλλαχόθι ἢ ἐν σώφρονι ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνην ἐγγραπτέον; ποῦ ἀγάπην; αἰδῶ δὲ ποῦ; πραότητα δὲ ποῦ; ταυτάς, οἶμαι, τὰς θείας γραφὰς ἐναποσφραγισαμένους χρῆτῃ ψυχῇ καλὸν ἀφετήριον σοφίαν ἡγεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐφ' ὅτιοῦν τοῦ βίου τραπέισι μέρος, ὄρμον τε τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκύμονα σωτηρίας σοφίαν νομίζειν· δι' ἣν ἀγαθοὶ μὲν πατέρες τέκνων οἱ τῷ πατρὶ προσδεδραμηκότες, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ γονεῦσιν υἱοὶ οἱ τὸν υἱὸν νενοηκότες, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἄνδρες γυναικῶν οἱ μεμνημένοι τοῦ νυμφίου, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ οἰκετῶν δεσπότες οἱ τῆς ἐσχάτης δουλείας λελυτρωμένοι.—84 (i. 76. 23—77. 2).

A noble hymn of God is man, immortal, built up in righteousness, with the oracles of truth engraven upon his nature. For where else, save in the wise soul, can righteousness be engraven? or love? or reverence? or gentleness? These surely are the divine Scriptures which we must grave and seal upon the soul, deeming such wisdom a fair port of departure for whatever quarter of life the course is set, and no less a haven of peace and safe arrival. So shall they who have run unto the Father be good fathers of children, and they who have learned to know the Son be good sons to parents, and they who remember the Bridegroom be good husbands to wives, and they who have been ransomed from uttermost slavery good masters of servants.

28. MAN BORN TO BECOME VIRTUOUS

Ἐπὶ πᾶσιν εἶδέναι αὐτοὺς κἀκεῖνο ἐχρῆν, ὅτι φύσει μὲν γεγόναμεν πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐ μὴν ὥστε ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ γενετῆς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κτήσασθαι ἐπιτήδειοι. ᾧ λόγῳ λύεται τὸ πρὸς τῶν αἰρετικῶν ἀπορούμενον ἡμῖν, πότερον τέλειος ἐπλάσθη ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἢ ἀτελής·

ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀτελής, πῶς τελείου θεοῦ ἀτελὲς τὸ ἔργον καὶ μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος; εἰ δὲ τέλειος, πῶς παραβαίνει τὰς ἐντολάς; ἀκούσονται γὰρ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὅτι τέλειος κατὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν οὐκ ἐγένετο, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀναδέξασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτήδειος· διαφέρει γὰρ δὴ που ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν γεγονέναι ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς. ἡμᾶς δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σφίξεσθαι.—788 (ii. 480. 3-13).

Above all, they should bear in mind the fact that by nature we are born for virtue, not so as to possess it from our birth, but with an aptitude for its acquisition. By this consideration we can solve the dilemma of the Heretics, whether Adam was formed perfect or imperfect. If imperfect, say they, how could the work of God, who is perfect, be imperfect, especially such a work as man? But if perfect, how comes his transgression of the commandments? We, too, will make reply that man was not created constitutionally perfect, but only with an aptitude for the reception of virtue. Certainly, for the pursuit of virtue, it makes all the difference to be born with an aptitude for its acquisition. And it is God's will that we should originate our own salvation.

29. TRUE BEAUTY

Τὸ γὰρ ἐκάστου καὶ φυτοῦ καὶ ζῴου κάλλος ἐν τῇ ἐκάστου ἀρετῇ εἶναι συμβέβηκεν. ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἀρετὴ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐσέβεια. καλὸς ἄρα ἄνθρωπος ὁ δίκαιος καὶ σώφρων καὶ συλλήβδην ὁ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ὁ πλούσιος.—243 (i. 230. 11-15).

The beauty of every plant and animal must be found in its particular excellence. Man's excellence is righteousness and temperance and courage and piety. Beauty, therefore, belongs to the man who is righteous and temperate, and, in one word, good; not to him who has wealth.

30. IN PRAISE OF MARRIAGE

Γαμητέον οὖν πάντως καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων διαδοχῆς καὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ὅσον ἐφ' ἡμῖν συντελειώσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ γάμον τιὰ οἰκτείρουσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ “ἡμιτελῆ” καὶ ἄπαιδα, μακαρίζουσι δὲ τὸν “ἀμφιθαλῆ.” αἱ δὲ σωματικαὶ νόσοι μάλιστα

τὸν γάμον ἀναγκαῖον δεικνύουσιν· ἡ γὰρ τῆς γυναικὸς κηδεμονία καὶ τῆς παραμονῆς ἢ ἐκτένεια τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ φίλων ἔοικεν ὑπερτίθεσθαι προσκαρτερήσεις, ὅσφ τῇ συμπαθείᾳ διαφέρειν καὶ προσεδρεύειν μάλιστα πάντων προαιρεῖται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἀναγκαῖα “βοηθός.”—504 (ii. 190. 15–23).

By all means we should marry, for the sake of our country, for the succession of children, and for the completion of the world's order so far as that depends on us. The poets speak in pity of the sort of marriage that is incomplete and childless, but give their blessing to one that is “fruitful.” And bodily ailments are the best proof of the necessity of marriage. For the affection of a wife and the zeal of her solicitude seem to surpass the assiduities of all other kinsfolk and friends. Her sympathy gives her the will to do more than the rest in the way of attentive care. So indispensable is she, “an help meet for him,” as the Scripture says.

31. THE EVILS OF POVERTY

Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ πενίας, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἀναγκαίων, τῆς θεωρίας λέγω καὶ τῆς καθαρῆς ἀμαρτησίας, ἀπασχολεῖν βιάζεται τὴν ψυχὴν, περὶ τοὺς πορισμὸν διατρίβειν ἀναγκάζουσα τὸν μὴ ὄλον ἑαυτὸν δι' ἀγάπης ἀνατεθεικότα τῷ θεῷ.—573 (ii. 257. 22–26).

The same consideration applies to poverty. This, too, compels the soul to withdraw its interest from things that are needful, from contemplation, I mean, and sinless purity. It drives the man, who has not entirely dedicated himself to God through love, to spend his time over ways and means.

32. ASTRONOMY

Ἐκ τε αὐ τῆς ἀστρονομίας γῆθεν αἰωρούμενος τῷ νῷ συνυψωθῆσεται οὐρανῷ καὶ τῇ περιφορᾷ συμπεριπολήσει, ἱστορῶν αἰεὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνίαν.—780 (ii. 471. 27–29).

Through astronomy a man's mind shall be lifted up from earth, and he shall dwell in heavenly altitudes, and move around with the revolution of the spheres, for ever contemplating the works of God and the harmony of their relations.

33. THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

Κείσθω δέ σοι πάντα εἰς θεὸν καὶ ἔργα καὶ λόγοι, καὶ πάντα ἀνάφερε Χριστῷ τὰ σαυτοῦ, καὶ πικρῶς ἐπὶ θεὸν τρέπε τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τὸ νόημα ἐπέρειδε τῇ Χριστοῦ δυνάμει ὡσπερ ἐν λιμένι τινὶ τῷ θείῳ φωτὶ τοῦ σωτήρος ἀναπαυόμενον ἀπὸ πάσης λαλιᾶς τε καὶ πράξεως. καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν πολλάκις μὲν ἀνθρώποις κοῖνου τὴν σεαυτοῦ φρόνησιν, θεῷ δὲ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐν νυκτὶ ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ· μὴ γὰρ ὕπνος σε ἐπικρατεῖτω πολὺς τῶν πρὸς θεὸν εὐχῶν τε καὶ ὕμνων· θανάτῳ γὰρ ὁ μακρὸς ὕπνος ἐφάμιλλος. μέτοχος Χριστοῦ αἰεὶ καθίστασο τοῦ τὴν θείαν αὐγὴν καταλάμποντος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ· εὐφροσύνη γὰρ ἔστω σοι διηκεῆς καὶ ἄπαστος ὁ Χριστός. μηδὲ λῦε τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τόνον ἐν εὐωχίᾳ καὶ ποτῶν ἀνέσει, ἱκανὸν δὲ ἡγοῦ τῷ σώματι τὸ χρειώδες.—(iii. 222. 13–25).

Let thy whole life, deeds and words alike, be dedicated unto God, and commit all thy affairs to Christ. Turn thy soul frequently to God. Stay thy mind upon the power of Christ, finding a haven of rest from all talk or action in the divine light of the Saviour. By day share thy thoughts oftentimes with men, but most of all with God, by night and by day alike. Too much slumber must not master thee, to stay thy prayers and hymns to God, for long sleep is the match and mate of death. Have thy sure share in Christ, Who sends from heaven the divine radiance. For Christ must be thy constant and unceasing joy. Do not slacken the strings of thy soul by feasting and drinking without restraint, but be satisfied with sufficient for thy body's wants.

34. THE SPREAD OF THE GOSPEL

Τάχει μὲν δὴ ἀνυπερβλήτῳ εὐνοίᾳ τε εὐπροσίτῳ ἡ δύναμις ἡ θεϊκὴ ἐπιλάμψασα τὴν γῆν σωτηρίου σπέρματος ἐνέπλησε τὸ πᾶν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ τοσοῦτον ἔργον ἄνευ θείας κομιδῆς ἐξήνυσεν ὁ κύριος, ὄψει καταφρονούμενος, ἔργῳ προσκυνούμενος, ὁ καθάρσιος καὶ σωτήριος καὶ μειλίχιος, ὁ θεῖος λόγος, ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως θεός, ὁ τῷ δεσπότη τῶν ὄλων ἐξισωθείς, ὅτι ἦν υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ “ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐν τῷ θεῷ,” οὐθ' ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον προεκηρίχθη, ἀπιστη-

θείς, οὐθ' ὅτε τὸ ἀνθρώπου προσωπεῖον ἀναλαβὼν καὶ σαρκὶ ἀναπλασάμενος τὸ σωτήριον δρᾶμα τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος ὑπεκρίνετο, ἀγνοηθείς· γνήσιος γὰρ ἦν ἀγωνιστῆς καὶ τοῦ πλάσματος συναγωνιστῆς, τάχιστα δὲ εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους διαδοθεὶς θάττον ἡλίου ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀνατείλας τῆς πατρικῆς βουλήσεως, ρᾶστα ἡμῖν ἐπέλαμψε τὸν θεόν, ὅθεν τε ἦν αὐτὸς καὶ ὃς ἦν, δι' ὧν ἐδίδαξεν καὶ ἐνεδείξατο, παραστησάμενος, ὁ σπονδοφόρος καὶ διαλλακτῆς καὶ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν λόγος, πηγὴ ζωοποιός, εἰρηνικὴ ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς χεόμενος, δι' ὃν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τὰ πάντα ἤδη πέλαγος γέγονεν ἀγαθῶν.—85-6 (i. 78. 8-24).

With swiftness unsurpassed, and sped with favouring good-will, the Divine Power poured light upon the earth and filled the world with the seed of Salvation. For never without divine co-operation would the Lord have in so short time achieved so mighty a result. He was despised in appearance, but He was worshipped in deed and act. He was Purifier, Saviour, the Most Gracious, the Divine Word, most evident and veritable God, made equal to the Sovereign of the universe, for He was His Son, and "the Word was in God." Neither were the first prophecies of Him disbelieved, nor, when He took upon Him the person of man and fashioned His being in flesh to play out the drama of humanity's salvation, did He pass unrecognised. He was the true champion and confederate of His handiwork, the boon so rapidly distributed to all mankind, rising more swiftly than the sun from the very will of the Father. And with ease did He bring to us the light of God, convincing us of His origin and His nature by His teaching and His signs. He is the sacred Herald and Reconciler and our Saviour Word, a life-giving Fount, a source of Peace, shed abroad upon all the face of the earth. Through Him the universe has now become, so to say, a very sea of good.

35. LIGHT AND UNITY

Ἀκούσατε οὖν "οἱ μακρὰν," ἀκούσατε "οἱ ἐγγύς." οὐκ ἀπεκρύβη τινὰς ὁ λόγος· φῶς ἐστὶ κοινόν, ἐπιλάμπει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις· οὐδεὶς Κιμμέριος ἐν λόγῳ· σπεύσωμεν εἰς σωτηρίαν, ἐπὶ τὴν παλιγγενεσίαν· εἰς μίαν ἀγάπην συναχθῆναι οἱ πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μοναδικῆς οὐσίας ἔνωσιν σπεύσωμεν· ἀγαθοεργούμενοι ἀναλόγως ἐνότητα διώκωμεν, τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐκζητοῦντες μονάδα. ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἔνωσις ἐκ πολυφωνίας καὶ διασπορᾶς ἀρμονίαν λαβούσα θεϊκὴν μία γίνεται

συμφωνία, ἐνὶ χορευτῇ καὶ διδασκάλῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐπομένη, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀναπανομένη, "Ἀββᾶ" λέγουσα "ὁ πατήρ". ταύτην ὁ θεὸς τὴν φωνὴν τὴν ἀληθινὴν ἀσπάξεται παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ παίδων πρῶτην καρπούμενος.—72 (i. 65. 25-66. 3).

Hearken ye that are far off; hearken ye that are near. From none is the Word hidden. He is the universal light. Upon all men His radiance falls. In the Word none knows Cimmerian darkness. Let us haste unto salvation, unto regeneration. Let us haste in our numbers to the one assembly of the Feast of Love, in accordance with the unity of the single Substance. Conformably to our blessings let us follow after unity, making quest of the good Monad. So the combination of many elements gathers a divine harmony from various scattered voices, and becomes one concordant strain, directed by one conductor and teacher, even the Word, and coming to rest upon the very note of truth, saying "Abba, Father." This is the true cry, which God welcomes as the first-fruits of the lips of His children.

36. THE SYMBOLISM OF SCRIPTURE

Διὰ πολλὰς τοίνυν αἰτίας ἐπικρύπτονται τὸν νοῦν αἱ γραφαί, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα ζητητικοὶ ὑπάρχωμεν καὶ προσαγρυνώωμεν αἰετῇ τῶν σωτηρίων λόγων εὐρέσει, ἔπειτα ὅτι μηδὲ τοῖς ἅπασιν προσήκον ἦν νοεῖν, ὡς μὴ βλαβεῖεν ἐτέρως ἐκδεξάμενοι τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος σωτηρίως εἰρημένα. διὸ δὴ τοῖς ἐκλεκτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς τε ἐκ πίστεως εἰς γνῶσιν ἐγκρίτοις τηρούμενα τὰ ἅγια τῶν προφητειῶν μυστήρια ταῖς παραβολαῖς ἐγκαλύπτεται· παραβολικὸς γὰρ ὁ χαρακτήρ ὑπάρχει τῶν γραφῶν, διότι καὶ ὁ κύριος, οὐκ ὢν κοσμικός, ὡς κοσμικός εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἦλθεν.—803 (ii. 495. 18-26).

For many reasons the Scriptures conceal their meaning; primarily, with the aim of making us diligent and unresting in our study of the words of salvation, and, secondly, because it is not in the province of all men to examine their meaning, lest they should receive hurt through a mistaken interpretation of words uttered by the Holy Spirit for salvation. For this reason the sacred Mysteries of Prophecy are veiled in parables, and so reserved for chosen men and for those who are selected for higher knowledge from the grade of faith. For the fashion of the Scriptures is essentially parabolic,

since even the Lord, though He was not of the world, came among men as though He were of the world.

37. THE DIFFICULTIES OF SIMPLE TEACHING

Καὶ γὰρ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κυρίου δοκοῦντα ἠπλώσθαι πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς τῶν ἡνιγμένως ὑπειρημένων οὐδὲν ἥττονος, ἀλλὰ πλείονος ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῆς ἐπιστάσεως εὐρίσκεται δεόμενα διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλουσαν τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπερβολήν. ὅπου δὲ καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διοίχθαι τοῖς ἔσω καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς τῆς βασιλείας τέκνοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένοις ἔτι χρήξει φροντίδος πλείονος, ἢ πού γε τὰ δόξαντα μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐξενηνέχθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ διηρωτημένα πρὸς τῶν ἀκουσάντων, εἰς ὄλον δὲ τὸ τέλος αὐτὸ τῆς σωτηρίας διαφέροντα, ἐσκεπασμένα δὲ θαυμαστῶ καὶ ὑπερουρανίῳ διανοίας βάθει, οὐκ ἐπιπολαίως δέχεσθαι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσήκεν, ἀλλὰ καθιέντας τὸν νοῦν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ σωτῆρος καὶ τὸ τῆς γνώμης ἀπόρρητον.—938-9 (iii. 163. 20-31).

Indeed, the apparently simple teaching given by the Lord Himself to His disciples, by reason of the surpassing measure of its wisdom, is found to need not less but greater study than the truths symbolically suggested. And if teaching which we regard as fully explained by Him to the inner circle and to the true "children of the kingdom," as He called them, still makes demands on thought; far more must we refuse a superficial hearing to those utterances which were apparently simple and therefore did not lead the hearers to inquire further, for they make all the difference to the supreme end of our salvation, albeit their truth is hidden in the marvellous and heavenly depths of wisdom. Rather must our mind fathom the very spirit of the Saviour and the secret of His meaning.

38. TRADITION

Μία γὰρ πάντων γέγονε τῶν ἀποστόλων ὡσπερ διδασκαλία, οὕτως δὲ καὶ παράδοσις.—900 (iii. 76. 22-24).

The tradition of all the Apostles, like their teaching, has been always one.

39. MARTYRDOM

Ἔοικεν οὖν τὸ μαρτύριον ἀποκάθαρσις εἶναι ἀμαρτιῶν μετὰ δόξης.
—596 (ii. 281. 25-6).

Martyrdom then may be regarded as a cleansing away of sins with glory.

40. MANY MANSIONS

Εἰσὶ γὰρ παρὰ κυρίῳ καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ μοναὶ πλείονες κατ' ἀναλογίαν βίων.—579 (ii. 264. 12-13).

With the Lord are many rewards and many mansions, corresponding to the character of our lives.

41. I, YET NOT I

Ἄλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐναρέτων ἀνθρώπων ἐπίνοια κατὰ ἐπίνοιαν θείαν γίγονται, διατιθεμένης πως τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διαδιδόμενου τοῦ θεοῦ θελήματος εἰς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς, τῶν ἐν μέρει θεῶν λειτουργῶν συλλαμβανομένων εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας διακονίας.—822 (ii. 513. 2-5).

The thoughts of good men correspond with the thoughts of God, as the soul in some way receives an influence and the Divine Will permeates the souls of men, God's particular ministers meantime co-operating in such service.

42. ON DRAWING NEAR TO GOD

Καθάπερ οὖν οἱ ἐν θαλάττῃ ἀπὸ ἀγκύρας τονούμενοι ἔλκουσι μὲν τὴν ἄγκυραν, οὐκ ἐκείνην δὲ ἐπισπῶνται, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἄγκυραν, οὕτως οἱ κατὰ τὸν γνωστικὸν βίον ἐπισπῶμενοι τὸν θεὸν ἑαυτοὺς ἔλαθον προσαγόμενοι πρὸς τὸν θεόν· θεὸν γὰρ ὁ θεραπεύων ἑαυτὸν θεραπεύει. ἐν οὖν τῷ θεωρητικῷ βίῳ ἑαυτοῦ τις ἐπιμελεῖται θρησκευῶν τὸν θεὸν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἰδίας εἰλικρινοῦς καθάρσεως ἐποπτεύει τὸν θεὸν ἅγιον ἀγίως.—633 (ii. 315. 27-316. 2).

As men riding at anchor on the sea pull at the anchor, but do not draw it, but draw themselves towards the anchor, so they who

in the Gnostic life draw upon God, do unconsciously bring themselves more near to God. For he who does God service serves himself. So in the contemplative life a man careth for himself in his devotion to God, and by the purity and sincerity of his own nature has the holy vision of God's holiness.

43. WITHOUT AND WITHIN

*Σχήμα τοῦτ' (sc. τὸ σῶμα) ἔστιν ἔξωθεν ἡμῖν περιβεβλημένον τῆς εἰς κόσμον παρόδου προφάσει, ἢ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῦτο παιδευτήριον εἰσελθεῖν δινηθῶμεν· ἀλλ' ἔνδον κρυπτὸς ἐνοικεῖ ὁ πατήρ καὶ ὁ τοῦτου παῖς ὁ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀποθανὼν καὶ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἀναστὰς.—*954 (iii. 182. 12–16).

The body is an outward form thrown around us to facilitate our entrance into the world, so that we may be able to find admission to this common school-house. But within us the Father has His secret abode, and His Son, Who died for us and rose again with us.

44. THE KINGDOM TAKEN BY FORCE

*Τοῦ εἶναι καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἔνεκα Χριστιανοὶ εἶναι βιαζόμεθα, ὅτι μάλιστα “βιασῶν ἔστιν ἡ βασιλεία,” ἐκ ζητήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ συνασκήσεως τελείας τὸ γενέσθαι βασιλέα καρπουμένων.—*818 (ii. 509. 5–8).

For the sake of virtue and goodness we are drawn with violence to be Christians. For the kingdom belongs specially to “the men of violence,” who reap the fruit of kingly character from quest and learning and perfectness of training.

45. THE WELCOME

*Παντὶ γὰρ τῷ μετ' ἀληθείας ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας ἐπιστρέψαντι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀνεώγασιν αἱ θύραι καὶ δέχεται τρισάσμενος πατήρ υἱὸν ἀληθῶς μετανοοῦντα.—*957 (iii. 185. 14–16).

To every one who turns in sincerity with all his heart to God, the doors are thrown open and the Father with threefold joy welcomes His truly repentant son.

46. AMARANTH

‘Ο γὰρ καλὸς τοῦ ἀμαράντου στέφανος ἀπόκειται τῷ καλῶς πεπολιτευμένῳ· τὸ ἄνθος τοῦτο γῆ βαστάζειν οὐ κεχώρηκεν· μόνον δὲ αὐτὸ καρποφορεῖν ἐπίσταται οὐρανός.—214 (i. 202. 6–9).

The fair crown of amaranth is laid up for the man of fair and noble life. Earth has not the power to bear this flower. Heaven alone knows the secret of its growth.

47. PERFECT PEACE

Εἴη δ’ ἂν ἡ τελεία εἰρηνοποίησις ἢ ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι ἄτρεπτον φυλάσσουσα τὸ εἰρηνικόν, ἀγίαν τε καὶ καλὴν τὴν διοίκησιν λέγουσα, ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καθεστῶσα, δι’ ἧς τὰς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐναντιότητας ἁρμονίαν κτίσεως καλλίστην λογιζέται.—581 (ii. 266. 15–19).

That would be the perfection of “peacemaking” which should preserve our peace undisturbed at any accident, and esteem the world as a holy and beautiful scheme, and rest in understanding of things divine and human, whereby it can regard the contrarities in the world’s order as the admirable harmony of creation.

48. A SAYING OF THE LORD

Οὐ παύσεται ὁ ζητῶν, ἕως ἂν εὔρη· εὐρὼν δὲ θαμβηθήσεται, θαμβηθεὶς δὲ βασιλεύσει, βασιλεύσας δὲ ἐπαναπαύσεται.—704 (ii. 389. 14–16).

He who seeks shall not stay until he find. When he finds he shall wonder ; when he wonders he shall reign ; when he reigns he shall have rest.

49. THE GATES OF REASON

“Ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι ἡ θύρα,” φησί που· ἦν ἐκμαθεῖν δεῖ νοῆσαι θελήσασι τὸν θεόν, ὅπως ἡμῖν ἀθρόας τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀναπετάσῃ τὰς πύλας· λογικαὶ γὰρ αἱ τοῦ λόγου πύλαι, πίστεως ἀνοιγνύμεναι κλειδί.—9–10 (i. 10. 12–15).

"I am the door," He says somewhere. This door, if we would understand God, we must learn to know, that He may throw open to us abundantly the gates of Heaven. For the gates of the Word are gates of Reason, and they open by the key of Faith.

50. FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE INSEPARABLE

Πιστὴ τοίνυν ἡ γνῶσις, γνωστὴ δὲ ἡ πίστις θεία τινὶ ἀκολουθία τε καὶ ἀντακολουθία γίνεται.—436 (ii. 121. 7-8).

So by a divine sequence and counter-sequence knowledge becomes matter of faith and faith matter of knowledge.

51. THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL

Ἡ γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν πίστις καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου γνῶσις ἐξήγησίς ἐστι τοῦ νόμου καὶ πλήρωσις.—625 (ii. 307. 33-34).

For faith in Christ and the higher knowledge of the Gospel are the interpretation and fulfilment of the Law.

52. PROPORTION

*Ἄν οὖν τις τοῖς μερικοῖς ὡς τοῖς καθολικοῖς χρώμενος τύχη καὶ τὸ δούλον ὡς κύριον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τιμᾶ, σφάλλεται τῆς ἀληθείας.—769 (ii. 460. 16-18).

Whoever deals with the particular as though it were universal, and esteems that which is slave as Lord and Master, misses truth.

53. KNOWLEDGE

Καὶ μὴ τι ἡ γνῶσις ἰδίωμα ψυχῆς τυγχάνει λογικῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἀσκουμένης, ἵνα διὰ τῆς γνώσεως εἰς ἀθανασίαν ἐπιγραφῆ. ἄμφω γὰρ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς, γνῶσις τε καὶ ὄρμη.—774 (ii. 466. 11-14).

I take it that knowledge is a characteristic of the reasonable soul when prepared for it by discipline, so that through knowledge it may be entered on the lists of immortality. For knowledge and impulse are both faculties of the soul.

54. PHILOSOPHY, FAITH, KNOWLEDGE

Φιλοσοφία δὲ ἢ Ἑλληνικὴ οἶον προκαθαίρει καὶ προεθίζει τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς παραδοχὴν πίστεως, ἐφ' ἣ τὴν γνῶσιν ἐποικοδομεῖ ἢ ἀλήθεια. —839 (iii. 14. 20–22).

Greek philosophy is a kind of preparatory cleansing and habituation of the soul for the reception of faith, and upon that "the Truth" erects the fabric of knowledge.

55. THE QUEST OF TRUTH

Δεῖ δ', οἶμαι, τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐραστῇ ψυχικῆς εὐτονίας· σφάλ-
λεσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη μέγιστα τοὺς μέγιστοις ἐγχειροῦντας πράγμασιν.
—890 (iii. 67. 3–5).

Of a surety the lover of truth needs a well-knit soul. For of necessity they who undertake the greatest enterprises are liable to the greatest disasters.

56. THE UNITY OF TRUTH

Ἄτὰρ καὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ παντὶ τὰ μέρη σύμπαντα, κὰν διαφέρηται
πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὅλον οἰκειότητα διαφυλάττει. οὕτως
οὖν ἢ τε βάρβαρος ἢ τε Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τὴν αἰδίων ἀλήθειαν
σπαραγμόν τινα, οὐ τῆς Διονύσου μυθολογίας, τῆς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ
ὄντος αἰὲ θεολογίας πεποιήται. ὁ δὲ τὰ διηρημένα συνθεῖς αἰθεῖς
καὶ ἐνοποιήσας τέλειον τὸν λόγον ἀκινδύνως εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι κατόψεται
τὴν ἀλήθειαν.—349 (ii. 36. 27–37. 2).

In the universe all the parts, even though differing from one another, maintain their congruity to the whole. Thus it is that the Barbarian¹ and the Greek philosophies have made a sort of dismemberment of the eternal truth, not of the Dionysus of mythology, but of the divine knowledge of the ever-existing Word. He who reunites the several fragments and perfectly unifies the Word shall surely without fail behold the truth.

¹ Sc. Old Testament.

57. KNOWLEDGE OR SALVATION ?

Αὐτίκα ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ θεοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ λέλεκται· “αἴτησαι παρ’ ἐμοῦ καὶ δώσω σοι ἔθνη τὴν κληρονομίαν σου,” αἴτημα τὸ βασιλικώτατον διδάσκων αἰτεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωτηρίαν ἀμισθί, ἵνα δὴ ἡμεῖς κληρονομήσωμεν καὶ κτησώμεθα τὸν κύριον. ἔμπαλιν γὰρ χρείας τινὸς ἔνεκεν, ἵνα μοι τόδε γένηται καὶ τόδε μὴ γένηται, τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐφίεσθαι τῆς περὶ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ἴδιον γνωστικῶν, ἀπόχρη δ’ αὐτῷ αἰτία τῆς θεωρίας ἢ γνῶσις αὐτή. τολμήσας γὰρ εἶποιμ’ ἂν, οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶξασθαι βούλεσθαι τὴν γνῶσιν αἰρέσεται ὁ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν θείαν ἐπιστήμην μεθέπων τὴν γνῶσιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοεῖν ἐκ συνασκήσεως εἰς τὸ αἰεὶ νοεῖν ἐκτείνεται, τὸ δὲ αἰεὶ νοεῖν, οὐσία τοῦ γινώσκοντος κατὰ ἀνάκρασιν ἀδιάστατον γενομένη καὶ αἰδῖος θεωρία, ζῶσα ὑπόστασις μένει. εἰ γοῦν τις καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν προθεῖη τῷ γνωστικῷ, πότερον ἐλέσθαι βούλοιτο, τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τὴν σωτηρίαν τὴν αἰώνιον, εἶη δὲ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα (παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐν ταυτότητι ὄντα), οὐδὲ καθ’ ὅτιοῦν διστάσας ἔλοιτ’ ἂν τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, δι’ αὐτὴν αἰρετὴν κρίνας εἶναι τὴν ἐπαναβεβηκυῖαν τῆς πίστεως δι’ ἀγάπην εἰς γνῶσιν ιδιότητα.—625-6 (ii. 308. 16-33).

God is represented as saying to the Lord, “Ask of me and I will give thee the heathen as thy inheritance,” teaching us that it was the most royal request for Him to ask without price for the salvation of men, so that we may find the Lord our heritage and our possession. On the other hand, it is no mark of the Gnostic to desire the knowledge of God for some advantage, “that I may gain this or avoid that.” For him higher knowledge is of itself a sufficient motive for contemplation. For I would make bold to say, that it will not be through the desire of salvation that he, who follows after knowledge for the sake of the divine science itself, will make knowledge his choice. For the act of contemplation is expanded by practice into the state of contemplation, and this state, becoming through indissoluble intercourse the very being of the Gnostic and a constant activity of vision, forms at last his living and abiding personality. At any rate, if we imagine anyone propounding to the Gnostic which of the two things he would choose, the knowledge of God or eternal salvation, and these two things were distinct—though in reality they are identical—without a moment’s hesita-

tion he would choose the knowledge of God, deeming the distinctive character, that results from faith and rises through love into higher knowledge, on its own account desirable.

58. THE CHARACTER OF THE Gnostic

Ὅθεν ἡμερος καὶ πρᾶος αἰεὶ, εὐπρόσιτος, εὐαπάντητος, ἀνεξίκακος, εὐγνώμων, εὐσυνείδητος, αὐστηρὸς· οὗτος ἡμῖν ὁ αὐστηρὸς οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀδιάφθορον μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀπειράστον (οὐδαμῆ γὰρ ἐνδόσιμον οὐδὲ ἀλώσιμον ἡδονῆ τε καὶ λύπη τὴν ψυχὴν παρίστησιν), δικαστῆς, ἐν ὃ λόγος καλῆ, ἀκλινῆς γενόμενος μὴδ' ὀτιοῦν τοῖς πάθεσι χαριζόμενος, ἀμεταστᾶτως ἢ πέφυκεν τὸ δίκαιον πορεύεσθαι βαδίζων, πεπεισμένος εὖ μάλα παγκάλως διοικεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄμεινον αἰεὶ τὴν προκοπὴν προϊέναι ταῖς ἀρετῆν ἐλομέναις ψυχαῖς, ἔστ' ἂν ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἀφίκωνται τὸ ἀγαθόν, "ἐπὶ προθύροις" ὡς εἰπεῖν τοῦ πατρὸς προσεχεῖς τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀρχιερεὶ γενόμεναι.—858 (iii. 34. 7-17).

He is always kindly, gentle, accessible, courteous, forbearing, a man of good heart and clear conscience and rigorous life, so rigorous that we find him beyond the reach not only of corruption, but even of temptation, keeping his soul at every point unyielding and impregnable to pleasure or to pain. At the bidding of the Word he is an unbending Judge, making no concessions whatever to the passions or the feelings, walking with sure steps along the path of nature's righteousness. He is surely convinced that the universe is admirably administered, and that for the souls who have chosen virtue the course of life is a continuous advance towards better things, till they reach at length the absolute goodness, arriving at the vestibule of the Father, in proximity to the Great High Priest.

59. HIS PRAYERS

Ὅ μὲν οὖν γνωστικὸς δι' ὑπερβολὴν ὁσιότητος αἰτούμενος μᾶλλον ἀποτυχεῖν ἔτοιμος ἢ μὴ αἰτούμενος τυχεῖν. εὐχὴ γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ βίος ἅπας καὶ ὁμιλία πρὸς θεόν, κἂν καθαρὸς ἢ ἀμαρτημάτων, πάντως οὐ βούλεται τεύξεται.—875-6 (iii. 52. 21-24).

By reason of his surpassing holiness the Gnostic would rather

pray without receiving than receive without praying. For his whole life is prayer and converse with God, and if he be free from sin he shall surely receive what he desires.

60. WHAT WE SHOULD ASK IN PRAYER

Αὐτίκα οὐδὲ εὔξεται τυχεῖν τῶν τῆδε ὁ τεύξεσθαι πεπεισμένος τῶν ὄντως ἀγαθῶν, ἔχουσθαι δὲ αἰεὶ τῆς ἐπιβόλου καὶ κατορθωτικῆς πίστεως. καὶ πρὸς τοῖσδε παμπόλλους ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοίους αὐτῷ γενέσθαι εὔξεται, εἰς δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν τελειοῦται· σωτήριος γάρ τις ὁ τῷ σωτῆρι ἐξομοιούμενος, εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει χωρῆσαι τὴν εἰκόνα θέμις, ἀπαραβάτως τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς κατορθῶν.—778 (ii. 470. 5-11).

He who is persuaded that he will find the true good will not pray to find earthly blessings, but rather for the preservation of his correct and effectual faith. He will pray, besides, that as many as possible may become like himself to the glory of God, which is made perfect by our fuller knowledge. For he who is acquiring the Saviour's likeness, in so far as human nature is suffered to receive this image, has himself something of the Saviour in him, never deviating from the right life which is according to the Commandments.

61. LIFE A FESTIVAL

"Ἄπας δὲ ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ πανήγυρις ἁγία.—860 (iii. 37. 2-3).

All his life is a holy Festival.

62. THE STABILITY OF GNOSTIC CHARACTER

Ταύτη οὐδέποτε περιστάσεως γενομένης τῆς ἰδίας ἕξεως ὁ γνωστικὸς ἐξίσταται. ἔμπεδος γὰρ καὶ ἀμετάβλητος ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιστημονικὴ κτήσις, ἐπιστήμη θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων ὑπάρχουσα.—874 (iii. 50. 27-51. 1).

Thus no outward circumstance ever deflects the Gnostic from his own habit and disposition. For the scientific possession of Goodness is fixed and unalterable, consisting in the understanding of things human and divine.

63. THE LORD'S DAY

Οὗτος ἐντολήν τὴν κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον διαπραξάμενος κυριακὴν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ποιεῖ, ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ φαῦλον νόημα καὶ γνωστικὸν προσλάβῃ, τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ κυρίου ἀνάστασιν δοξάζων.—877 (iii. 54. 17-20).

Such a character, in performance of the precept of the Gospel, regards the day on which he repels a thought of evil or receives a deeper truth as a true "day of the Lord," giving glory to the resurrection of the Lord within him.

64. STRANGERS AND PILGRIMS

Ἀτεχνῶς "ξένος γὰρ καὶ παρεπίδημος" ἐν τῷ βίῳ παντὶ πᾶς οὗτος, ὃς πόλιν οἰκῶν τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν κατεφρόνησεν παρ' ἄλλοις θαυμαζομένων, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν ἐρημίᾳ τῇ πόλει βιοῖ, ἵνα μὴ ὁ τόπος αὐτὸν ἀναγκάζῃ, ἀλλ' ἡ προαίρεσις δεικνύῃ δίκαιον.—878 (iii. 55. 4-8).

Truly such an one is but a "stranger and pilgrim" all his life. Living in a city he despises those features of city life which are so admirable to other eyes. In the city he lives as in a wilderness, admitting not the mastery of the place, but letting his will declare him just.

65. RESULTS

Ὁ μὲν πόνος παρῆλθεν, μένει δὲ τὸ καλόν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ καταλείπεται, ἀναμάσσεται δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν.—792 (ii. 484. 9-10).

The labour passes, the prize abides. That which is sweet remains, that which is foul is wiped away.

66. OUR DESTINY

Ἄλλ' ἐκπύνει καὶ μὴ ἀπόκαμνε· ἔσθι γὰρ οἶος οὐκ ἐλπίζεις οὐδ' εἰκάσαι δύναιο ἄν.—157 (i. 149. 22-23).

Work on and grow not weary, for thou shalt be such as thou hast neither hope nor power to fancy.

67. THE JOURNEY OF LIFE

Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἀρθέντας μετατεθῆναι, ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντας ἀφικέσθαι οἱ δεῖ, διὰ πάσης τῆς στενῆς διελθόντας ὁδοῦ.—627 (ii. 309. 18-19).

We may not be taken up and transported to our journey's end, but must travel thither on foot, traversing the whole distance of the narrow way.

APPENDIX I

THE PERSECUTION OF A.D. 202-3

IT is generally allowed that the persecution of the Church under Severus in the years A.D. 202-3 was the cause of Clement's departure from Alexandria. It will be well to examine somewhat in detail the character of the events which so suddenly interrupted Clement's conduct of the Catechetical School; drove him, never to return, from the city in which he had found or made his opportunity; and, possibly, brought the *Stromateis* to their incomplete termination.

I

Persecution, varying in degree and intensity, depending more on local conditions than on imperial policy, seems to have gone on throughout the reign of Severus. The measures taken in A.D. 202-3 were not so much a new departure, or a special outbreak, as rather an aggravation of conditions which existed previously and continued afterwards.

(a) Before A.D. 202 we have the following evidence. Tertullian wrote his *Ad Martyres*, *Ad Nationes*, and *Apologeticus* about A.D. 197. These all imply that conditions of persecution were prevalent. The imprisoned Christians are said to escape, at least temporarily, the greater violence outside: "vacas . . . jam et a persecutione. Hoc praestat carcer Christiano, quod eremus Prophetis." (*Ad Mart.*, 2). They must expect to suffer: "bonum agonem subituri estis" (*ib.*, 3). The existing laws against unauthorised religions were set in motion: "Christianum puniunt leges" (*Ad Nat.*, i. 6). The "Name" alone was a sufficient accusation: "nomen in causa est" (*ib.*, 3). Sometimes the further charge of disloyalty would be added: "prima obstinatio est, . . . quod irreligiosi dicamur in Cæsares" (*ib.*, 17). Provincial governors were pressed by the populace to condemn those accused:

“sed hoc agite, boni præsidēs, meliores multo apud populum, si illis Christianos immolaveritis” (*Apol.*, 50). Some governors, however, were themselves actively hostile: Vigellius Saturninus, who held office in Africa in A.D. 198, “primus hic gladium in nos egit” (*Ad Scap.*, 3). Clement in the *Protrepticus*, possibly written early in the reign of Severus, or even before, speaks of the hostility of the crowd to Christian teachers: τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ θεοῦ διώκουσιν . . . φιλανθρώπως κατηχούντα ἀποσφάττειν ἀπανθρώπως ἐπιχειροῦσιν (82). The activity of Herminianus in Cappadocia, stimulated as it was by the conversion of his wife, may perhaps belong also to this period. Tertullian (*Ad Scap.*, 3) seems to place it before the fall of Byzantium in A.D. 196. There is only late evidence (Gregory of Tours, *Historia Francorum*, i. 27) that Irenæus died as a martyr about this time. It is far more probable that he fell a victim, though not for his faith, in the common vengeance which Severus exacted from the city of Lyons after his victory over Albinus in A.D. 197 (Herodian, III., 7, 7: Aubé, *Les chrétiens dans l'empire romain*, p. 98). It has been suggested, too, that Victor, Bishop of Rome, was a martyr about this date (Fuchs, *Severus*, 75), but there is no direct evidence to justify the supposition. Leaving, however, Irenæus and Victor out of account, it is sufficiently clear that in the earlier years of Severus, particularly about A.D. 197-8, there was persecution, intermittent, local, uncertain, arising mainly from the hostility of the populace or the attitude of the Governor. It is not directly associated with the Emperor's action before the year A.D. 202, but the number of victims must have been considerable to judge by Tertullian's language in his *Apologeticus*. “Plures efficimur, quoties metimur a vobis” (50) implies more than an occasional martyr. So far as general causes were at work, we may reckon the rapid growth of Christianity under Commodus (H.E., v. 21); the removal of Marcia from the imperial court; and the generally troubled condition of the Empire until Severus had made his position secure.

(b) After A.D. 202-3, as before, the amount of persecution seems considerable. Tertullian's *Ad Scapulam* may be dated A.D. 212. It is occasioned by the governor's action; he had already condemned one Christian, Mavilus of Adrumetum, to the amphitheatre. More victims were clearly to be expected. The same writer's *De Fuga in Persecutione* is very variously dated. It may be as early as A.D. 203, or as late as 213. In any case it relates to a period in which persecution was constant, though not specially acute. Christians had to flee from one city to another; on the other hand, they *could* escape by flight. Sometimes, too, they could purchase safety: “Christianus pecunia salvus est”

(*De Fuga*, 12), though the stricter sort thought this an unworthy evasion. In Cappadocia, or some other eastern province, Alexander, Clement's pupil, seems to have been kept in prison for several years (H.E., vi, 11). In Alexandria several pupils of Origen suffered the extreme penalty (*ib.*, 4) and their execution must be dated some time later than A.D. 202-3, since meanwhile Origen had recommenced the catechetical instruction from which Clement had been driven, and had evidently gathered a considerable number of pupils around him.

Thus the conditions after A.D. 202-3 are much the same as before. There is no entire cessation of persecution; on the other hand, it is not specially acute. Christians with an ambition for martyrdom could always attract attention, but there was no need to "leap upon death" or to "challenge the wild beast" (*cf.* Clem., 571, 598; and the words of Arius Antoninus, governor of Asia, ὦ δειλοί, εἰ θέλετε ἀποθνήσκειν, κρημνοὺς ἢ βροχοὺς ἔχετε, *Ad Scap.*, 5). But neither in this nor in the earlier period is there any direct reference to the will or command of Severus as the cause of such measures as were actually taken.

II

From these general conditions, which show great local variety but no clearly marked difference as between one year and another, there does, however, emerge the special attack of the authorities in the year A.D. 202-3, which is usually set down to the initiative of Severus. The evidence with regard to this is as follows:

(a) Spartian, writing of the period at the close of the Emperor's Parthian campaign, states that Severus, naming Caracalla as his colleague, entered upon the consulship (A.D. 202) in Syria: "post hoc dato stipendio cumulatiorē militibus Alexandriam petiit. In itinere Palæstinis plurima jura fundavit. Judæos fieri sub gravi pœna vetuit. Idem etiam de Christianis sanxit. Deinde Alexandrinis jus bouletarum dedit," etc. (*Severus Imperator*, 16, 17).

(b) Eusebius sets down the persecution to the direct action of Severus: "Ὡς δὲ καὶ Σεβήρος διωγμὸν κατὰ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἐκίνει, λαμπρὰ μὲν τῶν ὑπὲρ εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν κατὰ πάντα τόπον ἀπετελεῖτο μαρτύρια, μάλιστα δ' ἐπλήθυνεν ἐπ' Ἀλεξανδρείας· τῶν ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου καὶ Θεβαΐδος ἀπάσης ἀριστίνδην αὐτόθι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μέγιστον ἀθλητῶν Θεοῦ παραπεμπομένων στάδιον. . . . δέκατον μὲν γὰρ ἐπέειχε Σεβήρος τῆς βασιλείας ἔτος, ἡγήτο δὲ Ἀλεξανδρείας καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς Αἰγύπτου Λαῖτος, τῶν δὲ αὐτόθι παροικιῶν τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν νεωστὶ τότε μετὰ Ἰουλιανὸν Δημήτριος ὑπειλήφει (H.E., vi, 1, 2).

(c) Sulpicius Severus, writing half a century later than Eusebius, reckons this as the sixth persecution, though he does not attribute the responsibility for it so directly to Severus: "sexta deinde Severo imperante Christianorum vexatio fuit; quo tempore Leonidas, Origenis pater, sacrum in martyrio sanguinem fudit," etc. (*Historia Sacra*, ii. 32).

(d) Hippolytus probably wrote his *De Antichristo* shortly before A.D. 202-3, and his *Commentary on Daniel* soon after this date (see Harnack, *Geschich. der altchr. Lit.*, II. (ii.), 215, 250). Both these works were written during a time of persecution, though this was apparently more severe at the date of the latter work. The end of all things seems to the writer to be near; the judgment is at hand; the eschatological outlook is marked: ἴδωμεν τοίνυν τὰ συμβησόμενα (*de Antic.*, 29); the writer expects τὴν ἐπερχομένην διὰ πυρὸς κρίσιν (*Com. Dan.*, iv. 60). All such statements, even if less lurid than those of the Apocalypse, are entirely in keeping with a period of special stress and danger.

(e) Similar evidence is afforded us by Eusebius (H.E., vi. 7) with regard to the historian Judas, who brought his narrative to a close at the tenth year of Severus and clearly shared the expectation that the end of all things was at hand. Eusebius says of him, ὃς καὶ τὴν θρυλλουμένην τοῦ Ἀντιχρίστου παρουσίαν ἤδη τότε πλησιάζειν ᾤετο· οὕτω σφοδρῶς ἢ τοῦ καθ' ἡμῶν τότε διωγμοῦ κίνησις τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνετάραττε διανοίας.

(f) Potamiæna (H.E., vi. 5) was one of the martyrs of this period, not, however, till some time after the outbreak of the persecution, for Lætus was governor of Alexandria when the movement against the Christians commenced, whereas Aquila had succeeded him (H.E., vi. 5; *cp. ib.*, 2) when Potamiæna suffered.

(g) Perpetua, Felicitas, and the other members of their company suffered martyrdom in Africa early in A.D. 203. They seem, unlike Potamiæna, to have been all recently converted to Christianity, and therefore were more directly affected by the order of the Emperor, which forbade the Church to add to its membership. (Note *fieri* in Spartian's account and compare Tertullian's "Fiunt, non nascuntur Christiani," *Apol.*, 18).

(h) Serapion, Bishop of Antioch, who died in A.D. 203, wrote to a certain Dominus, who sought to escape persecution by lapsing from Christianity to Judaism. Eusebius describes him as ἐκπεπτωκότα τινα παρὰ τὸν τοῦ διωγμοῦ καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς Χριστὸν πίστεως ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰουδαϊκὴν ἐθελοθησκειαν (H.E., vi. 12).

III

It is evident from the foregoing facts, all of which rest upon good evidence, that the general conditions which prevailed throughout the reign of Severus became specially adverse to the Church in A.D. 202-3. How far was this due to the direct action of the Emperor?

Many considerations lead us to suppose that it was no deliberate policy on the part of Severus to set in motion any such general and widespread persecution, as those which are connected with the names of Marcus Aurelius before him and of Decius at a later period. In estimating the extent of his action in A.D. 202-3, the following facts should be borne in mind.

(a) Tertullian mentions no edict issued by Severus against the Christians. Not the Cæsars but the provincial governors are the persons whose fair treatment he is anxious to secure. His *Ad Scapulam* goes far to show that throughout the reign the governors were impelled by no imperial command to persecute, but left free to be lenient or severe towards Christianity, according as their individual sympathies or judgment might suggest.

(b) Dion Cassius and Herodian are as silent as Tertullian in regard to any edict. If they knew anything of the Emperor's attitude towards Christianity, they did not, at any rate, regard it as sufficiently important to be placed on record. The treatment of the Christians under Severus was in their eyes, as Aubé remarks (p. 81), not a matter of imperial policy but an affair for the police.

(c) Tertullian also states (*Ad Scap.*, 4) three facts of importance, viz. that Severus had once been cured by a Christian physician, Proculus Torpacion; that Christian influences had surrounded Caracalla in his childhood; and that on some occasion Severus had protected well-born men and women, known to be Christians, from the anger of the crowd. This may quite possibly have been in Carthage, when Severus was legatus of the Proconsul of Africa, about A.D. 174 (see Spartian, 2; Fuchs, p. 7). Or it may have been in Rome: we cannot say. In any case it is probable that all these events occurred several years before Severus became Emperor. But they are symptomatic, and hardly consistent with an attitude of hostility to Christianity.

(d) The prohibition which forbade the Jews to admit further converts by circumcision, is not difficult to account for, since it was the re-enactment of a similar order of Antoninus Pius (see evidence in Aubé, p. 74), and no doubt was occasioned by the fact that the Jews had taken sides with Niger. Indeed, Severus punished their aid to his rival

with sufficient severity to justify the Senate decreeing to Caracalla a "Jewish Triumph." But the Christians had taken no sides in the civil war, "Nunquam Albiniani, nec Nigriani . . . inveniri potuerunt Christiani" (*Ad Scap.*, 2). They had even rejoiced when the Emperor's armies took Byzantium. No considerations of imperial policy existed to suggest harsh measures against them; the most that could be said was that they declined to pay certain kinds of honour to Cæsar. Of itself this was hardly sufficient to call for vigorous action from the Emperor: it was a matter rather for the subordinate authorities.

(e) Directly after the issue of the order of A.D. 202-3—"idem etiam de Christianis sanxit"—whatever its exact nature may have been, Severus returned to Rome (Herod., iii. 10, 1), where he mainly spent the years A.D. 203-8. The whole of this period falls within the episcopate of Zephyrinus. During these years the Church in Rome was much occupied over internal questions. Callistus and Hippolytus come into prominence. The Monarchian movement claims attention. Doctrine and discipline are much discussed. Such interests in a time of special persecution would have been in abeyance. The evidence thus leads to the conclusion that external dangers did not specially menace the Roman Church in the first half of Zephyrinus' episcopate. "Die römische Kirche hatte . . . auch unter ihm (*sc.* Severus) nicht sonderlich zu leiden" (Langen, *Geschichte*, 201). But if Severus, while still in the east, had determined on any special policy of active hostility towards the Church, this decision would certainly have been made evident on his return to Rome. He had sufficient leisure then to attend to internal affairs, and, had he intended to persecute, would have persecuted relentlessly and with method. The peace of the Church in Rome during the years A.D. 203-8 must prevent our interpreting Spartian's expression as a statement of general and determined policy on the part of the Emperor. Severus usually carried out his intentions with unremitting pertinacity. But Tertullian says of him "Christianorum memor fuit."

(f) It is, besides, generally recognised that Severus had no special interest in maintaining the traditional religion, so far as the Empire in his day possessed one, against innovations. Motives which impelled Marcus Aurelius to persecute had no influence with him. By birth an African, by conviction a believer in oriental astrology, by culture and experience acquainted with many phases of religion, and by marriage associated with Julia Domna—he was hardly the type of Cæsar to suppress Christianity in the interests of the gods of Rome. Had he really

suspected the Christians of disloyalty to his own *régime*, he might have taken determined action. The prohibition to make new converts would have been a quite inadequate penalty for the graver offences of "majestas," and there is no other ground on which Severus is likely to have resolved on vigorous measures. This general improbability that he would be among the persecutors, inconclusive in itself, gains importance when we notice its congruity with such particular facts as can be ascertained.

IV

So far then the following points seem clear. (1) Persecution went on, in varying degrees, during the reign of Severus, both before and after A.D. 202-3. (2) During the last-named years it became more insistent and intense, the severity being of longer duration in some provinces than in others. (3) Whatever the cause of the special activity of the authorities, it does not seem to have proceeded from any settled resolve on the part of Severus to push the suppression of Christianity throughout the Empire to extremes. Sulpicius' statement that persecutions occurred, "Severo imperante," is probably more near the truth than the *Σεβήρος . . . ἐκίνει* of Eusebius.

Spartian's account, "idem etiam de Christianis sanxit," must then be understood not as a statement of general and considered policy embodied in an edict, but as a local and incidental order or permission, probably given to one particular governor and occasioned by special considerations. Is it possible to suggest the circumstances under which it was issued?

The evidence associates this decree, or rescript, if it is to be so described, somewhat directly with Alexandria. Eusebius states that the persecution was specially severe there, and mentions the name of the prefect Lætus in a manner which suggests that he was specially active. Spartian's account seems at first sight to imply that the prohibition was issued while Severus was travelling through Palestine, from Antioch to Alexandria. But Neumann (*Der röm. Staat und die allgem. Kirche*, 161) is probably right in regarding the statement, "idem . . . sanxit," as parenthetical. There is no need to suppose the time of this order to have been exactly identical with the issue of the Jewish law. There could hardly be special reasons for the issue of such an order against the Christians in Palestine, nor does it appear that the episcopate of Narcissus in Jerusalem was ever directly troubled by imperial action. Spartian's mention of "Alexandria" just before, and of the "Alex-

andriani" immediately after, the statement quoted may thus be taken to support the probability that the proclamation against the Christians was issued in Alexandria.

Nothing is more likely than that this should have been the case. Severus seems to have gone out of his way to please the citizens of this second metropolis. Alexandria had sided with Niger. Six years before the Emperor had dealt severely enough with Antioch for similarly espousing his rival's cause. "Antiochensibus iratior fuit . . . multa his ademit" (Spartian, *Severus*, 9). But in Alexandria he accepted the citizen's explanation of an awkward inscription in Niger's honour,¹ though he must have seen through its trickery; gave them a local Senate, and extended their privileges in many other respects. He could afford to do these things now that his rule was established, and it was true policy to keep the city, upon whose harbours Rome depended so largely for daily bread, in a loyal and contented mood. Moreover, Severus was delighted with Egypt, explored its antiquities, paid special attention to its divinities, and clearly spent his time there as a visitor ready to please and to be pleased. Spartian's and Dion's accounts both leave this impression.

All this renders the suggestion, first made by Milman, extremely probable: "The hour of imperial favour was likely to be seized by the Egyptian priesthood to obtain the mastery, and to wreak their revenge on this new foreign religion, which was making such rapid progress throughout the province" (*Hist. of Christianity*, ii. 208-9). Whether it was the priests of Serapis, or whether, as may be more likely, it was the professors in the Museum, it is in either case a most natural supposition that the recently rapid growth of Christianity should have prompted one section or another of its opponents to induce the Emperor, while in the mood to grant favours, to inform Lætus, the prefect, that the further progress of this religion must be checked. The proclamation would, on this supposition, be principally local in character, however much the activity of the governors in other provinces may have been stimulated by their knowledge of it. It is to be noticed, in any case, that the exact order of Severus was at once exceeded both in Alexandria and elsewhere. Neither Leonides, nor Potamiæna, nor Domninus were converted *after* its issue, yet two of them fell as victims, and the life of Domninus was evidently in danger. The order or edict, limited in its original intention, thus became the cause of considerably wider activity on the part of the subordinate authorities.

¹ See vol. i., p. 103.

The main point of interest in relation to Clement is to notice that, if the before-mentioned probabilities hold good, Severus' action must have been directly called forth by the work of the Catechetical School, and in some sense directed against Clement's own activities as a teacher. This may in part explain why he was compelled to leave the city and to give up his work, though the work was so soon recommenced by Origen, and Demetrius, the Bishop, in all probability never left Alexandria at all. Such direct relation between the career of Clement and the action of Severus cannot, it is true, be clearly proved from the available evidence. But no other theory accords more fully with such facts as are known, and in all that regards Clement's personal history it is with probabilities that we must often rest content.

V

One further point of interest arises, when we ask whether Clement's references to martyrdom have the events of A.D. 202-3 specially in view.

There is one passage which is usually taken to have been directly occasioned by the events which followed Severus' edict. Clement has quoted, quite incidentally, Zenon's remark, that the sight of one Indian being roasted alive outweighed all arguments about endurance. Then he adds, *ἡμῖν δὲ ἄφθονοι μαρτύρων πηγαὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν θεωρούμεναι παροπτωμένων ἀνασκινδυλενομένων τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀποτεμομένων. τούτους πάντας ὁ παρὰ τοῦ νόμου φόβος εἰς Χριστὸν παιδαγωγήσας συνήσκησε τὸ εὐλαβεῖς καὶ δι' αἱμάτων ἐνδείκνυσθαι* (494).

Two points are here to be noticed. First, Clement is speaking of common, not of special, experience. Martyrdom, he says, is an everyday spectacle. This does not point to a sharp, short outbreak of special severity, such as that described by Eusebius. He has in his mind what is a normal element in the Christian life of the period (note *συνήσκησε*: it is not a sudden and unexpected situation he is describing).

The second point is this. Are we to suppose it probable that in a period of special persecution, possibly, as we have seen, arising from the very success of the Catechetical School with which he was connected, Clement would have been allowed, peacefully and leisurely, with uninterrupted access to his books, to go on composing his "Memoirs," while the tide of martyrdom flowed by before his eyes? He would probably have been one of the first victims to fall, had he remained in Alexandria, for it is evident from Eusebius that for a period diligent

search for important personages was made (N.B. ἀριστίδην . . . παραπεμπομένων, H.E., vi. 1; it is the opposite of "Conquirendi non sunt" in Trajan's answer to Pliny).

Prima facie, Clement appears to write, with some touch perhaps of rhetorical emphasis—similar to that found in Tertullian's *Apology*—of the normal experience of Christians in the period, and to write, too, from a position of personal security.

This interpretation of a passage, which more than any other is usually interpreted as a reference to the persecution of A.D. 202-3, receives some support from Clement's language in regard to martyrdom and persecution elsewhere. There is no hint in these passages of any prohibition of further conversions. Throughout the *Stromateis*, in the later as well as the earlier books (*cp.* δελέατα, 902), he writes with the evident desire to gain *further accessions* of the intelligent to Christianity. No trace emerges of any knowledge on Clement's part that Severus had directly prohibited such augmentations of the faith. On the other hand, he has frequently in view the common facts and possibilities of martyrdom, constant rather than acute, an element in the general situation rather than a special and unusual crisis.

Thus, for example, Clement makes it clear that the Christian teacher was always liable to suffer through the ignorant opposition of the crowd (*cp.* 82, quoted above). The Church was full of men and women alike who had always looked forward to the glory of a martyr's death: μεστή μὲν οὖν πᾶσα ἡ ἐκκλησία τῶν μελετησάντων τὸν ζωοποιὸν θάνατον εἰς Χριστὸν παρ' ὄλον τὸν βίον καθάπερ ἀνδρῶν οὕτω δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν σωφρόνων (590). Death, however, was the extreme, not the usual penalty: κἂν ἀτιμία τις περιβάλλῃ τοῦτον (*sc.* the Gnostic) φυγῇ τε καὶ δημεύσει καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θανάτῳ, οὐκ ἀποσπασθήσεται ποτε τῆς ἐλευθερίας κ.τ.λ. (587). The nobility and courage of confessors had come to be a recognised influence in strengthening and enlarging the Church: δοθήσεται δέ τισιν, ἐὰν συμφέρῃ, ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἵνα διὰ τε τῆς μαρτυρίας διὰ τε τῆς ἀπολογίας ὠφελῶνται οἱ πάντες, ἰσχυροποιούμενοι μὲν οἱ κατ' ἐκκλησίαν, θαυμάζοντες δὲ καὶ εἰς πίστιν ὑπαγόμενοι οἱ ἐξ ἔθνῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν πολυπραγμονήσαντες, οἱ λοιποὶ δὲ ὑπ' ἐκπλήξεως κατεχόμενοι (596). But escape was usually possible; there was no inevitable necessity to suffer, and Clement had little tolerance for the fanaticism which courted death (*cp.* ὁ ἑαυτὸν προσάγων τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, 597: ἐπιρριπτοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κινδύνοις, 871). He had failed, it may be noticed, to teach this lesson to Origen (ἔρωσ τοσοῦτος μαρτυρίου τὴν Ὀριγένους . . . κατεῖχε ψυχὴν, H.E., vi. 2). The martyrs, it seems, are not sought out by the authorities: they had themselves to seek death: (ἐπιπηδᾶν τῷ θανάτῳ, 571). Martyrdom is a

subject which, apart from special circumstances, a Christian writer of this time might naturally be expected to discuss: ἀκόλουθον δὴ οἶμαι περὶ μαρτυρίου διαλαβεῖν κ.τ.λ. (563). Persecution did not always originate with officials, but often from educated opponents of Christianity: τῶν Ἑλλήνων μαθόντων . . . ὡς ἀνοσίως τὸν θεοφιλῆ διώκοντες ἀσεβοῦσιν (736): more often from the ignorant hostility of the crowd: ὁ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδρείος, προφανῆ τὸν κίνδυνον διὰ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ζήλον ἔχων, κ.τ.λ. (871).

These are the features of persecution with which Clement was most familiar. They are characteristic of a period in which the liability to loss and suffering and even death constantly and normally beset the profession of Christianity. But they do not accord with a time in which the authorities were aggressively and vigorously hostile. In other words, it is improbable that Clement wrote with the events of A.D. 202-3 specially in mind. His conditions rather approximate to those under which Tertullian wrote his *Apology*.

The conclusions, then, to which the probabilities lead us are—

(1) That persecution, in varying degrees, went on throughout the reign of Severus.

(2) That in A.D. 202-3 persecution was specially severe.

(3) That this severity was not due to any settled policy of hostility on the part of the Emperor.

(4) But that such direct action as Severus took in the matter should be set down to special circumstances, and with some reason may be connected with his visit to Alexandria.

(5) That in his references to martyrdom and kindred subjects, Clement has not the special attacks of A.D. 202-3, but the normal condition of Christian experience during the period in view.

APPENDIX II

ON THE ORDER AND DATE OF CLEMENT'S WORKS

WHAT books Clement wrote, and where and in what order he wrote them, are questions almost as complicated as those which arise when we ask what books he read and how he used them. The attempt will be made in this Appendix to set out in greater detail the evidence for the views suggested in Chapter VI of this work. The opinions of De

Faye, A. Harnack, C. Heussi, and P. Wendland should be carefully considered by any who desire to understand the points at issue.

I

The *Stromateis*, it seems, were the first work Clement wrote for publication. They opened with a passage, quoted from the *Shepherd of Hermas* (Vis., v. 5), to justify such literary enterprise. The recurrence of the words *γράψον . . . γράψεις . . . γράψαι*, no doubt included in the missing portion of the quotation, is to be noted. Clement adduces, besides, the following considerations in the opening section: "If Epicurus and Archilochus may write books, surely a Christian may" (316): "Writing and the living voice are only different ways of preaching the Word" (318): "An author must look to his motives" (319): "Some opportunities which a preacher or lecturer possesses are not open to a writer" (320): "What I hesitated to say in teaching, I shall not venture to write" (324), and much else in a similar strain. Thus his attitude in commencing the *Stromateis* is that of one who is making a new departure and wishes to justify it. The whole section, 316-28, has only point and significance on the supposition that the writer is making, with considerable hesitation, the transition from oral teaching to the different method of the published book. This seems to be the most certain fact in connection with the problem of Clement's literary undertakings, and other probabilities should be estimated in relation to it.

The *Stromateis* were evidently not commenced till some time after the death of Commodus in A.D. 192. Sufficient time had elapsed for this event to be already a recognised *terminus ad quem* in chronological calculations (*ἄλλοι δὲ μέχρι τῆς Κομόδου τελευτῆς ἀριθμήσαντες κ.τ.λ.*, 409). In Alexandria, with its known interest in such matters, this interval need not have been long, but in any case Book I of the *Stromateis* can hardly be dated earlier than A.D. 195. It is clear that Clement had done much in the collection of his material before he began to write, and the actual composition of the *Stromateis* may therefore have been somewhat rapid.

II

But if *Strom.*, i., is Clement's earliest work for publication and was not written before this date, what becomes of the statement in the *Little Labyrinth* (H.E., v. 28), that he wrote books before Victor became Bishop of Rome, *i.e.* before A.D. 189 or 190? The passage runs

as follows : καὶ ἀδελφῶν δέ τινων ἐστὶ γράμματα πρεσβύτερα τῶν Βίκτορος χρόνων, ἃ ἐκείνοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔθνη ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τότε αἰρέσεις ἔγραψαν· λέγω δὲ Ἰουστίνου καὶ Μιλτιάδου καὶ Τατιανοῦ καὶ Κλήμεντος καὶ ἐτέρων πλειόνων· ἐν οἷς ἅπασιν θεολογεῖται ὁ Χριστός.

The difficulty is most naturally met by supposing that Clement's earlier writings were not originally intended for publication. The common practice of the time was for an author to read his book aloud to an audience. Lucian, for example, says, τὸ μὲν οὖν περινοστοῦντα νῦν μὲν Ἀθηναίους, νῦν δὲ Κορινθίους ἀναγινώσκειν ἢ Ἀργεῖοις ἢ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν τῷ μέρει, ἐργῶδες καὶ μακρὸν ἤγειτο (*Herodotus*, i.); also, referring more directly to his own experience, ἃ δ' ἐν ἱστορίᾳ διαμαρτάνουσι, τὰ τοιαῦτα ἂν εὖροις ἐπιτηρῶν, οἷα κάμοι πολλάκις ἀκρωμένῳ ἔδοξε, καὶ μάλιστα ἦν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς ἀναπετάσης τὰ ὄντα (*Historia quomodo conscribenda*, vii.). It was a further stage for the original manuscript to be copied and find its way into the booksellers' shops. The case of Galen presents an interesting parallel to that of Clement. Many of Galen's works were written only for his pupils or his friends. Some even originated as notes of his lectures, taken down verbatim by his pupils, much as Arrian took down the lectures of Epictetus. Galen, in the *De ordine librorum suorum*, c. I. (ed. Kühn, xix. 49 *sqq.*), remarks to Eugenianus, in reference to his books, τὰ μὲν γὰρ φίλων, ὡς οἶσθα, δεηθέντων ἐγράφη τῆς ἐκείνων μόνον ἕξωσ τοχαζόμενα, τινὰ δὲ μειρακίους εἰσαγομένους ὑπηγορεύθη, σκοπὸν ἐπ' οὐδετέρων ἔχοντός μου διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ, φυλαχθῆναί τε τῷ μετ' ἐμὲ χρόνῳ; again, in c. II. (Kühn, xix. 53), μία μὲν οὖν ἦδε τῶν ἡμετέρων ὑπομνημάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως ἐκείνοις τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ὅσοι καὶ φύσει συνετοὶ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐταῖροι.

It would therefore entirely accord with the practice of the times, if Clement's earlier works were primarily written for use in his lecture-room, without any ulterior purpose of making them accessible to the world at large. A literary propaganda was not at this time any part of his plan. Certain terms and phrases in the *Protrepticus* and in the *Pædagogus* support this theory, e.g. the following: He uses the second person, as one addressing an audience, οὐκ ἄτοπον, ὦ φίλοι κ.τ.λ. (8); μὴ πολυπραγμανεῖτε (10); πιστεύσατε . . . σωφρονήσητε (77); ταῦτα ὑμῖν . . . παρατίθεμαι (256-7). He speaks of *hearing*, not of reading: τὰς ἀκοὰς ὑμῶν (24); ἀκοῦσαι (66); ἀκούσατε (77); ἀκούετε (116); ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἀκούοντων . . . ὀνομάζειν (225); and there are other similar expressions. The Prayer to the Word, and the Hymn, στόμιον πῶλων ἀδαῶν, with which the *Pædagogus* closes, are also more appropriate to an address than to a treatise intended for private reading.

The *Protrepticus*, indeed, is in form a sermon or a lecture rather than a book, and similar characteristics belong, in a less marked degree, to the *Pædagogus*. Thus the statement in Eusebius need not conflict with the fact that Clement had written nothing before the *Stromateis* for publication.

III

Clement's intention was originally to make the third portion of his whole enterprise similar in form to the first two. The *Master*, *Διδάσκαλος*, was to have been addressed to his pupils. The three are regarded as successive stages in one continuous course of oral instruction: τῇ καλῇ συγχρηῆται οἰκονομία ὁ πάντα φιλόανθρωπος λόγος, προτρέπων ἄνωθεν, ἔπειτα παιδαγωγῶν, ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκδιδάσκων (99). His pupils having listened to the *Pædagogus* are later on to hear the *Master*: καὶ δὴ ὥρα γε ἐμοὶ μὲν πεπαῦσθαι τῆς παιδαγωγίας, ὑμᾶς δὲ ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ διδασκάλου (309). Thus the *Master*, like the *Protrepticus* and the *Pædagogus*, was to have been addressed πρὸς παρόντας (320). It appears to me that De Faye has conclusively shown that Clement did intend the third part of his work to be entitled the *Master*, and that the *Stromateis* are a deviation from his earlier purpose. A series of published miscellanies took the place of lectures or instructions composed for oral delivery. The reasons which may have led to this modification of Clement's scheme have been suggested in the sixth chapter and need not be further discussed here.

IV

But, as against De Faye's contention that the *Stromateis* are a purely preliminary work, preparing the way for the *Master*, it seems to me that Heussi's view that the *Stromateis* are the *Master*, in so far as this part of Clement's project was ever realised, holds good. Such alteration as he made in his scheme did not consist in its enlargement from one of three divisions to one of four, but concerned only the form and method of its third portion. The passages to which Heussi refers leave little doubt on this point. The higher Gnostic teaching is contained, however sporadically, in the *Stromateis*, as may be seen by such language as the following: οἱ στρωματεῖς τῇ πολυμαθίᾳ σωματοποιούμενοι κρύπτειν ἐντέχνως τὰ τῆς γνώσεως βούλονται σπέρματα (327); διασποράδην καὶ διερριμμένως ἐγκατεσπαρμένην ἔχουσι τὴν ἀλήθειαν (348); ἐμοὶ τε ὑπομνήματα εἶεν ἂν ζώπυρα, τῷ τε εἰς γνώσιν ἐπιτηδείω . . . πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον . . . ἡ ζήτησις γενήσεται (736); σποράδην, ὡς ὑπεσχήμεθα, καὶ διερριμμένως τὰ ζώπυρα τῶν τῆς ἀληθοῦς γνώσεως ἐγκατασπείραντες δογμάτων

(901). How it comes that at the end of the seventh book the great project of a scheme of higher teaching is still in so large a measure unaccomplished (μετιώμεν, he must still say, ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν: τῶν ἐξῆς ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ποιησόμεθα τὸν λόγον, 901-2), is a question which has already received some consideration.

V

Failing evidence to the contrary, it would be natural to suppose that the three portions of Clement's work, *Protrepticus*, *Pædagogus*, *Stromateis*, were composed in the order in which we possess them. "Es steht auch fest, dass Klemens die einzelnen Teile in der Reihenfolge geschrieben hat, in welcher sie sich zu einem Ganzen zusammenfügen" (Bardenhewer, *Gesch. der altkirch. Litt.*, ii. 38). The reasons advanced for believing that Clement wrote the *Pædagogus* after *Strom.*, i.-iv. (this is held by Harnack, Heussi, Wendland) are as follows: (1) There are no references to the *Protrepticus* and the *Pædagogus* in *Strom.*, i.-iv.: (2) There are passages in the *Pædagogus* which refer to the discussion on marriage in *Strom.*, ii.-iii. (502-62) as already written.

But the first of these reasons is an argument from silence. This is specially precarious in dealing with a writer whose literary habits were those of Clement. Many authorities, for example, hold that the *Hypotyposesis* were written before the *Stromateis*, though the *Stromateis* do not refer to them. Those who are so convinced must at least allow that it may be held with equally good reason that the absence of references to the *Protrepticus* and the *Pædagogus* in *Strom.*, i.-iv., does not disprove their prior existence.

As to the discussion on marriage, the evidence is very complicated. Three passages in the *Pædagogus* have to be considered, which run as follows:—

(i.) Καθόλου μὲν οὖν ἡ γαμητέον ἢ γάμον εἰς τὸ παντελὲς καθαρευτέον (ἔχεται γὰρ ζήτησεως καὶ τοῦτο), ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐγκρατείας ἡμῖν δεδῆλωται (226).

(ii.) Διειλήφαμεν δὲ βαθυτέρῳ λόγῳ ὡς ἄρα οὔτε ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τοῖς συνουσιαστικοῖς μορίοις καὶ τῇ κατὰ γάμον συμπλοκῇ, καθ' ὃν κείται τὰ ὀνόματα τὰ περὶ τὴν συνήθειαν οὐ τετριμμένα, ἢ τοῦ ὄντως αἰσχροῦ προσσηγορία τάττεται (199).

(iii.) Ὅπως μὲν οὖν συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ περὶ αὐτουργίας καὶ οἰκουρίας καὶ οἰκετῶν χρήσεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς ὥρας τοῦ γάμον καὶ τῶν ὄσα γυναιξὶν ἀρμόζει, ἐν τῷ γαμικῷ διέξιμεν λόγῳ (278).

The first of these passages tells in favour of the supposition that

Strom., ii.-iii., were already written. The question of the advisability of marriage is certainly discussed in *Strom.*, ii. 502 *sqq.* (ζητοῦμεν δὲ εἰ γαμητέον κ.τ.λ.). And neither Eusebius nor other authorities mention any separate treatise by Clement on marriage.

On the other hand, the second passage refers to a statement which is not found in *Strom.*, ii.-iii. It therefore affords no reason for believing that this section was already in existence.

The third passage refers to a projected work. διέξιμεν is future (*cp.* μέτιμεν in 564; Zahn, *Suppl. Clem.*, 38; Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, ii. 53). This seems to imply that Clement, so far, had not had occasion to discuss the subject of marriage, *i.e.* that *Strom.*, ii.-iii., were not yet written. Moreover, the subjects he proposes to consider, οἰκουρία, οἰκετῶν χρήσις, ὥρα τοῦ γάμου, are not dealt with in the *Stromateis* and therefore were probably treated, if at all, in some separate and independent work. It is difficult to draw any sure conclusions from such conflicting data.

But, apart from these references to the treatise on marriage, there is a further point to be considered. If when Clement wrote the *Pædagogus* he had already written *Strom.*, i.-iv., and so determined the character of this portion of his work, it is extremely improbable that he would have spoken in the *Pædagogus* of the *Master* as he has done. The difference between his intention as expressed in the *Pædagogus* and his actual execution of it as found in *Strom.*, i.-iv., is so marked, that we can only suppose that he first expressed his intention and subsequently adopted a different scheme, *i.e.* wrote the *Pædagogus* before commencing the *Stromateis*.

Finally, there is the further consideration that the fragment given in Stählin's edition, iii., p. 228, ll. 13-15, which clearly comes from some treatise on marriage, does not occur in the *Stromateis*, and therefore also points to the work, Περὶ ἐγκρατείας ἢ λόγος γαμικός, having been a separate and independent treatise. It does, indeed, directly mention one of the subjects—περὶ τῆς ὥρας τοῦ γάμου—which Clement proposed (see 278, quoted above) to discuss.

VI

If there is sufficient reason, then, to suppose that Clement wrote his three main works in the order in which they stand, are we to suppose that they were written in Alexandria or elsewhere? There is a marked tendency on the part of later critics to place the most important period of his authorship after A.D. 202. Harnack says of the *Pædagogus* that

it was in any case not written in Alexandria and that the composition of *Strom.*, v.–vii., may have extended beyond the first decade of the third century. Bardenhewer would place even the *Protrepticus* as late as A.D. 199 (*op. cit.* ii. 39). The earlier dates are maintained by Zahn. This view, as against the general tendency of recent authorities, may be supported by the following considerations.

(a) The *Protrepticus* is the address of a teacher, speaking in settled circumstances, to an audience with whose character he is thoroughly familiar. These conditions are those of Clement during his residence in Alexandria, but we have no evidence that they held good for any other portion of his life.

(b) The many references to luxury in the *Pædagogus*, however largely drawn from literary sources, would be out of place in any but a wealthy city, in which rich people were coming over to Christianity. It is also to be noted that the writer's circumstances are evidently settled: he forms plans for the further instructions of his pupils (97–99, 309); he has no special occasion to encourage them to face persecution. He sometimes makes statements which exactly accord with our knowledge of life in Alexandria, e.g. οὐ σωφρονεῖν φήσοιμ' ἂν τὰς πόλεις, αἷς καὶ τὸ παιδεύω σπουδάξεται (299). These considerations tell in favour of the theory that the *Pædagogus* was written for converts in Alexandria.

(c) The *Stromateis*, it is usually allowed, were commenced in Alexandria. It is, however, often urged that in *Strom.*, ii. 494, we have a reference to the persecution of A.D. 202–3, and that the later portions must consequently have been written after Clement had fled from the city. This passage, together with the other references to martyrdom, has, however, been discussed in the previous Appendix. If the view there taken of their significance be correct, they point not to the special attack upon the Church in A.D. 202–3, but to the conditions normally prevalent during the period. The passage in question would in that case afford no ground for believing that Clement must have left Alexandria at an early date after he had written it.

(d) Again, it is difficult to suppose that Clement wrote the important passage (*Strom.*, vi. 827) on the inability of Emperors, Governors, and mobs to hinder the spread of Christianity, after he had left Alexandria in consequence of the persecution under Severus. If the authorities had succeeded in driving him from his school and his library, and so brought the greatest work of his life to an abrupt termination, it would hardly have been natural for Clement to reply with the exulting boast that Christianity “flourishes all the more.” Tertullian, in his fierce

way, might have said this, but it was hardly Clement's manner. He would have recognised the actuality of the check. In other words, the close of *Strom.*, vi., can hardly have been written after he left Alexandria.

(e) Whatever "public" Clement had in view when he commenced the *Stromateis*, were still in his mind at the end of the seventh book. The φιλοθεάμονες τῆς ἐκκλησίας (900; so MS. : τῆς ἀληθείας is suggested by Stählin), the φιλόπονοι καὶ εὐρετικοί (902), correspond exactly to the few for whom γνῶσις is appropriate (εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντων ἡ γνῶσις, 317) and who have the ability to hear (τὸν οἶόν τε ἀκούειν, 320). The uninitiated (ἀμήνητοι, 901) and those who blamed Clement for going beyond the Scriptures (829) are identical with the πολλοί (323), the ψοφοδεεῖς (326), the φιλεγκλήμονες (327), who were so much in his thoughts when he began to write. Moreover, the literary conditions are the same. In *Strom.*, vii., the writer has access to books, just as he had in earlier portions of his work. Such evident similarity of conditions, combined with the complete absence of any hint in the *Stromateis* of a violent change in the writer's circumstances, leads us to suppose, until the contrary is shown, that Clement's environment, when he wrote *Strom.*, vi. and vii., was the same as when he wrote *Strom.*, i. and ii. In other words, we may assign the composition of the whole of the *Stromateis* to the period of his residence in Alexandria.

VII

If, then, it is at least possible that all three portions of Clement's Trilogy are to be dated before A.D. 202-3, what is to be said of his other works, particularly of the *Hypotyposeis*? The evidence, on the whole, seems to favour the supposition that they were written after the *Stromateis*. It is difficult to suppose that in all the seven books of the *Stromateis* there would have been no reference to this work of exegesis, had it already been in existence. No doubt this is an argument from silence, and such, it has already been admitted, are specially precarious in Clement's case. In this connection, however, the absence of all mention can hardly be other than significant, for Clement's references to Scripture are specially frequent, and in many of them some allusion to an expository treatise of his own, had such already existed, would have been evidently natural. When, for example, Clement expounds the Decalogue (807 sqq.), he is engaged on much the same kind of task as occupied him in the *Hypotyposeis* and would probably have mentioned them, had they been written before. Or consider such a passage as

the following: τῶν δὲ λέξεων τῶν προφητικῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἐπιμνησθησόμεθα, κατὰ τοὺς ἐπικαίρους τόπους ὕστερον ταῖς γραφαῖς συγγρασόμενοι (829). The language seems almost incompatible with the supposition that the *Hypotyposes* preceded the *Stromateis*. Such considerations, no doubt, are not conclusive. More certain evidence may be derived from the fact, that Clement expressly states that he undertook the *Stromateis* as an aid to memory for his later years and as a record of the precious teaching of his masters. The *Hypotyposes* can hardly have been in existence when this statement was made, for they must themselves have largely fulfilled this purpose. It is known (H.E., v. 11) that Clement referred to Pantænus in the *Hypotyposes*, and, quite apart from this, it is improbable that he could have written eight books of exegesis without incorporating in them many of the "apostolic seeds" (323) he had derived from the Elders. The opening passage of the *Stromateis* seems, in other words, to afford clear probability that the *Hypotyposes* had not as yet been written.

VIII

As to Clement's other writings, the evidence is of a more general character. There is a passage in the *Quis dives salvetur*, on the interpretation of the term "camel" in the Gospels, which runs as follows: σημαινέτω μὲν οὖν τι καὶ ὑψηλότερον ἢ κάμηλος διὰ στενῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τεθλιμμένης φθάνουσα τὸν πλούσιον, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ θεολογίας ἐξηγήσει μυστήριον τοῦ σωτήρος ὑπάρχει μαθεῖν (950).

In spite of what von Arnim (p. 13) has said on this point, the passage appears to me to be a reference to some already known and published work, with which Clement's hearers were familiar. Could he otherwise have said of a definite piece of interpretation, ὑπάρχει μαθεῖν?

If, then, the *Stromateis* are rightly regarded as Clement's earliest published work, the treatise mentioned in the *Quis dives*, and also the *Quis dives* itself, must have been written later. The work entitled *Canon ecclesiasticus* was dedicated to Alexander, Clement's pupil, and probably written fairly late in Clement's own lifetime (see *supra*, vol. i. p. 204; also Zahn, p. 175). The various pastoral works attributed to Clement suit the circumstances of his later years, so far as we know them, better than his period of residence in Alexandria. It is to be noted that the statement, "Multa et varia conscribit," of the Eusebian *Chronicle* applies to a date (A.D. 204) subsequent to his departure from that city.

In any attempt to assign dates and localities to Clement's written works, probability, in default of better evidence, is often our only guide. The one assured fact in the whole intricate inquiry is that Clement had written no book for publication before he undertook the composition of the *Stromateis*. Starting from this evidence, I have tried in this short Appendix to show that something may still be said for the theory that Clement wrote his great Trilogy during his years in Alexandria, and that it was to other works that his later literary activity was devoted. But I fully recognise that many recent authorities would invert this order.

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