CRISTO RAUL.ORG

READING HALL

THE DOORS OF WISDOM

OCTAVIUS CAESAR AUGUSTUS :

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE FOUNDER OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

CHAPTER V

PHILIPPI

The first task of the Triumvirs, after securing their power at Rome, was the restoration of unity and peace to the Empire, which was threatened at two points: Brutus and Cassius were in arms in the East, Sext. Pompeius in the West. The opposition of Brutus and Cassius seemed the more formidable of the two. Brutus, indeed, after holding Macedonia throughout BC43, after capturing and eventually putting to death Gaius Antonius, and after winning some laurels in contests with surrounding barbarians, had towards the end of the year practically abandoned the province and removed to Asia, in which a decree of the Senate had given him propraetorial authority along with Cassius. But at Cyzicus and on the coast of Bithynia he had collected a considerable fleet, and having thus strengthened himself and levied large sums of money, he sent urgent messages to Cassius to join him in the defence of the republic.

Meanwhile Cassius had done much towards securing the rest of the East to their cause. At the end of BC44 he had entered Palestine, and been joined successively by the forces of, L. Statius Murcus, proconsul of Bithynia; of Caecilius Bassus, the old Pompeian officer who had seduced the troops of Sextius Iulius from their allegiance; and by four legions from Egypt under Aulus Allienus, whom Dolabella had sent to bring them to himself. With twelve legions he had shut up Dolabella at Laodicea-ad-Mare, aided by a fleet raised in part by Lentulus, the proquaestor of Asia, and had eventually terrified him into suicide. He had himself also, or by his legates, collected a fleet strong enough to prevent Cleopatra sending aid to Antony and Octavian, while part of it, under Statius Murcus and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was to watch the harbour of Brindisi and prevent the despatch of troops from Italy.

In the spring of BC 42, therefore, when Brutus and Cassius met at Smyrna they were both in possession of formidable forces, naval and military, and Cassius at any rate was also well supplied with money. They did not, however, at once push on to Macedonia, for they believed that the danger threatened by Sext. Pompeius would delay the advance of the Triumvirs. They therefore spent some months in farther securing the East. Brutus proceeded to reduce the cities in Lycia, Cassius sailed against Rhodes, while one of his legates invaded Cappadocia, and defeated and killed King Ariobarzanes. Both encountered some resistance, but when they met again in the summer at Sardis they had successfully carried out their objects; and Cassius had refilled his exchequer by the taxes of Asia, the towns in which had been compelled to pay nearly ten years' revenue in advance.

Having told off a portion of his fleet to keep up the watch over Cleopatra and at Brindisi, the two proconsuls set out together for Abydos, and thence crossed to Europe. They marched along the coast road, formerly traversed by Persian invaders, their fleet also, like that of the Persian king of old, coasting along parallel with their march, till they came to the part of the Pangaean range which covers the ten miles between Philippi and its harbour Neapolis (Datum). There they found the road blocked by Gaius Norbanus and Decidius Saxa, with eight legions, sent in advance by Antony. When they left the main road and attempted to pass nearer Philippi they found the heights immediately south of the town also guarded. They drove off the enemy and encamped on two hills which they connected by a trench and stockade; and eventually farther secured their position by occupying a line of hills commanding the road to the sea. They thus kept up communication with the fleet at Thasos as a base of supplies. Norbanus and Saxa did not venture to attack them, but retired upon Amphipolis, and thence sent intelligence to Rome, meanwhile keeping the enemy in check by skirmishing parties of cavalry. Brutus and Cassius were in no hurry to advance, for they had an excellent position, and were sure of supplies while in touch with their fleet; whereas their opponents depended on the country, which was neither rich nor well stocked. The fleet of Murcus and Domitius might also delay, and perhaps prevent Antony and Caesar from bringing reinforcements, while the fleet at Thasos could stop supplies being conveyed by sea.

Nor were these the only difficulties in the way of the Triumvirs. Ever since the battle of Munda (BC45) Sextus Pompeius had been leading a piratical life in the Western Mediterranean. His forces had been Sextus continually increased by fugitive Pompeians and by natives from Africa, until he had become possessed of a formidable power against which the successive governors of Southern Spain had been able to effect little. After the death of Iulius Caesar an attempt was made through Lepidus to come to terms with him, and he had agreed to submit to the government on condition of a restitutio in integrum, including the restoration of his lather’s property, but though Antony obtained a confirmation from the Senate the arrangement was never carried out. Probably the immense sum named as the value of the property made it impossible, especially when the money in the temple of Ops had been squandered. Moreover Pompeius seems to have demanded the actual house and estates of his father, and these were in Antony’s hands, who would not easily surrender them. Sextus therefore stayed in Spain or with his fleet. When the Senate broke with Antony it renewed negotiations with Sextus, promised him the satisfaction of his claims, passed a vote of thanks to him for services, and confirmed him in his command of all Roman ships on active service. The Triumvirs deposed him from this command, and put his name on the proscription list. His answer was to sail to Sicily, force Pompeius Bithynicus to surrender Messana, and take possession of the island. Here he was joined by numerous refugees of the proscribed and many skilful seamen from Africa and elsewhere. By thus holding Sicily and Sardinia he could do much towards starving our Italy, upon the southern shores of which he also made frequent descents. He acted as an independent ruler, and presently put Bithynicus to death on a charge of plotting against him.

Caesar and Antony suspected Lepidus of keeping up communication with Pompeius, and consequently he was practically shelved. He was to remain at Rome to keep order and carry out formal duties, while Antony was to transport his legions from Brindisi to attack Brutus and Cassius, and Caesar was to conduct the war against Sextus Pompeius. But the strength of Pompeius seems not to have been fully realised. Caesar despatched a fleet under Q. Salvidienus to Sicily, while he himself went by land to Rhegium. But Salvidienus was badly defeated by Pompeius and had to retire to the Italian shore to refit, and before Caesar had time to do anything more he was called to the aid of Antony, who was in difficulties at Brindisi, the exit of the harbour being blocked by the ships of Statius Murcus, presently reinforced by those of Ahenobarbus. The arrival of Caesar and his fleet enabled the transports to cross, and Antony marched along the Egnatian Way to join his advanced army at Amphipolis. Caesar was once more attacked by illness and obliged to stay at Dyrrachium; but hearing that Antony, on his arrival, had suffered some reverses in cavalry skirmishes, he resolved to join him at all hazards. It was indeed a crisis of the utmost importance to him. He was leaving Italy exposed to a double danger, on the east from Murcus and Ahenobarbus, on the south from Sextus Pompeius. If Antony were defeated Caesar would be in a most alarming position; if Antony won without him, his own prestige would be damaged and he might have to take a second place in the joint government. As before in the Spanish journey his resolution conquered physical weakness, and he reached the seat of war before any general engagement had taken place. He found the army somewhat discouraged. Antony had left his heavy baggage at Amphipolis, which had been secured by Decidius and Norbanus, and had advanced over the wide plain (about sixty miles) to within a mile of the high ground on which Brutus and Cassius were entrenched. But they were too strongly posted to be attacked, and he had suffered some losses in his attempts to draw them down. His men were getting demoralised by the evidently superior position of the enemy, who were protected on the right by mountains, and on their left by a marsh stretching between them and the sea, so that it was impossible to turn their position on. either side. Delay was all in favour of Brutus and Cassius, whose fleet afforded abundant provisions, while Antony would have great difficulty in feeding his army during the winter, and the season was already advanced. In mere numbers there was not much difference. Both had nineteen legions; and, though those of Brutus were not at their full strength, he and Cassius had 20,000 cavalry, as against 13,000 of Antony and Caesar.

The first battle (late in October) was brought on by an attempt of Antony’s to get across the marsh by a causeway which he had himself constructed, and storm an earthwork which Cassius had thrown up to prevent him. Repulsing a flank attack made by the division of Brutus, he carried the earthwork and even took the camp of Cassius, who with his main body retired to the heights nearer Philippi with heavy loss. But Antony had also suffered severely, and the fate of the day could not be considered decided until it was known how Brutus had fared, who after the unsuccessful attack on Antony's flank, had attacked Caesar’s division which was opposite him. In this last movement he had been entirely successful. Caesar’s camp had been stormed and his men driven into flight, he himself being absent through illness. The result of this cross victory was that both armies returned to their original positions. Antony, finding that the left wing was defeated, did not venture to remain in the camp of Cassius. Cassius might have returned to it, but for a mistake which cost him his life. He was wrongly informed that Brutus had been defeated, and being short-sighted he mistook a squadron of cavalry that was riding up to announce Brutus’s success for enemies, and anticipated what he supplied to be inevitable capture by suicide. Brutus, informed of this, withdrew his men from the attack on Caesar’s camp, and retired behind their lines, occupying again Cassius’s abandoned quarters.

Nearly at the same time as this indecisive battle the cause of the triumvirs had suffered a disaster nearer home. A fleet of transports conveying the Martia, another legion, and some cavalry was destroyed by Murcus and Ahenobarbus, and the greater part of the men had been lost at sea or forced to surrender. Though Brutus did not yet know this he held his position for about a fortnight longer. But the tidings when they came made it more than ever necessary for Antony and Caesar to strike a blow; for they were still more isolated than before and more entirely cut off from supplies. On the other hand, the officers and men in the army of Brutus were inspired by it with an eager desire to follow up the good news by fighting a decisive battle. Brutus yielded against his better judgment and drew out his men. Antony and Caesar did the same. But it was not until the afternoon was well advanced that the real fighting began. After spending more time than usual in hurling volleys of pila and stones, they drew their swords and grappled in a furious struggle at close quarters. Both Antony and Caesar were active in bringing up fresh companies to fill up gaps made by the fallen. At last the part of the line against which Caesar was engaged began to give way, retiring step by step, and fighting desperately all the while. But the order grew looser and looser, until at length it broke into downright flight. The camp of Brutus was stormed and his whole army scattered. Caesar was left to guard the captured camp, while Antony (as at Pharsalia) led the cavalry in pursuit. He ordered his men to single out officers for slaughter or capture, lest they should rally their men and make a farther stand. He was particularly anxious to capture Brutus, perhaps as hoping to avenge his brother. But in this his men were foiled by a certain Lucilius, who threw himself in their way professing to be Brutus, and the mistake was not discovered till he was brought to Antony. Brutus had, in fact, escaped to high ground with four legions. He hoped with this force to recapture his camp and continue the policy of wearing out the enemy by delay. But a good look-out was maintained by Antony during the flight, and the next morning his officers told Brutus that they would fight no more, but were resolved to try to save their lives by making terms with the victors. Exclaiming that he was then of no farther use to his country, Brutus called on his freedman Strato to kill him, which he immediately did.

There is some conflict of testimony as to the severity inflicted after the victory. The bulk of the survivors with their officers submitted and were divided between the amies of the two triumvirs. A certain number who had been connected with the assassination and included in the proscription lists felt that they had no mercy to expect, and saved farther trouble by putting an end to their own lives. But some also, as Favonius the Stoic, imitator of Cato, were executed. Suetonius attributes to Caesar not only special severity, but cruel and heartless insults to those whom he condemned. To one man begging for burial he answered that “that would be business of the birds”. A father and son begging their lives he bade play at morra for the privilege of surviving. And he ordered the head of Brutus to be sent home that it might be placed at the foot of Iulius Caesar’s statue. As usual there remain some doubts as to these stories. That of the father and son, for instance, is related by Dio, but placed after Actium. And the story as to the head of Brutus is somewhat inconsistent with the honourable treatment of the body attributed to Antony. The refusal of funeral rites is contrary to his own assertion in his autobiography; and, in the Monumentum Ancyranum, he declares that he “spared all citizens”. But it must be conceded that until the assassins and their supporters were finally disposed of, he showed himself relentless. The milder sentiments are those of a later time. The plea of a duty to avenge his “father’s” murder may mitigate, but cannot annul, his condemnation.

The victory of Philippi reunited the eastern and western parts of the Empire, and therefore necessitated a fresh distribution of spheres of influence among the triumvirs. The new agreement was reduced to writing and properly attested, partly that Caesar might silence opposition at Rome, but partly also because the two men had already begun to feel some of their old distrust of each other. During the late campaign, when there seemed some chance of defeat, Antony had expressed regret at having embarrassed himself with Caesar instead of making terms with Brutus and Cassius, and such words, however hasty or petulant, would be sure to reach Caesar’s ears. The respect also shown by Antony to the remains of Brutus, and the evident tendency of the defeated party to prefer union with him rather than with Caesar, as well as the more generous terms which he was willing to grant, must all have suggested to Caesar the precarious nature of the tie between them. It was necessary therefore to put the arrangement now made beyond dispute.

The division did not, as two years later, distinguish between East and West. It was still only the western half of the Empire which was to be divided. Italy was to be treated as the centre of government, open to all the triumvirs alike for recruiting and other purposes. The provinces were to be administered in the usual way by governors approved of by them, except that Antony was to have Gaul and Africa, Caesar Spain and Numidia, thus securing to each a government in the west and south roughly equal in extent and in importance, now that Sicily and Sardinia were in the hands of Sextus Pompeius and thus actually hostile to Italy. But the last article in the agreement, though intended to provide only for a passing state of affairs, did in fact foreshadow the division of the Empire into East and West. By it Antony undertook to go at once to Asia to crush the fragments of the republican party still in arms in the East, and to collect money sufficient for the payment of the promised rewards to the veterans. Caesar, on the other hand, was to return to Italy to carry on the war against Sextus Pompeius and arrange the assignation of lands. Lepidus was still consul as well as triumvir, but if the suspicion of his being in correspondence with Pompeius was confirmed he was to have no province and was to be suppressed by Caesar. If it did not turn out to be true Antony undertook to hand over Africa to him. He was throughout treated as subordinate—

                     “a slight, unmeritable man,

     Meet to be sent on errands”.

The real governors of the Empire were to be Antony and Octavius Caesar. The force of circumstances ordained that for the next ten years Antony was to govern the East and Caesar the West. And as yet the heart and life of the Empire was in the west. It was this, as much as the difference of his character, which eventually secured to Octavius the advantage over his colleague and made him master of the whole.

CHAPTER VI. PERUGIA AND SICILY